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86–078 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–71] 

U.S. ASIA–PACIFIC STRATEGIC 

CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO 

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY 

NAVAL FORCES MODERNIZATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

DECEMBER 11, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page HEARING: 

Wednesday, December 11, 2013, U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategic Considerations 

Related to People’s Liberation Army Naval Forces Modernization ................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, December 11, 2013 ............................................................................. 23 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2013 

U.S. ASIA–PACIFIC STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO 

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVAL FORCES MODERNIZATION 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Cropsey, Dr. Seth, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute ............................................ 6 

Erickson, Dr. Andrew, Associate Professor, China Maritime Studies Institute, 

U.S. Naval War College ....................................................................................... 2 

O’Rourke, Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service .......................................................................................................................... 4

Thomas, Jim, Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments ............................................................................... 9 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cropsey, Dr. Seth ............................................................................................. 67 

Erickson, Dr. Andrew ....................................................................................... 31 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 27 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike ........................................................................................ 29 

O’Rourke, Ronald .............................................................................................. 47 

Thomas, Jim ...................................................................................................... 74 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 89 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 105 

(1) 

U.S. ASIA–PACIFIC STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVAL 

FORCES MODERNIZATION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, December 11, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:34 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. I would like to welcome everyone to our Seapower 

and Projection Forces Subcommittee hearing today on the People’s 

Liberation Army [PLA] naval modernization efforts. This is a continuation of the Asia-Pacific oversight series that the full committee kicked off last month. 

I want to apologize to our witnesses for the delay, based on those 

votes, but thank you for your patience. 

In just a few weeks, recent developments in the East China Sea 

have demonstrated that improving our understanding of regional 

events and key players is critical to assuring our allies and partners of U.S. commitment to the region and protecting U.S. interests. Tensions in the East and South China Seas have been ongoing now for several years as China attempts to exert its influence 

in claiming land, sea, and airspace that is clearly beyond their 

internationally recognized borders. While naval modernization is a 

natural development for any seafaring nation such as China, it is 

clear the modernization is emboldening the Chinese Government to 

exert their interests by bullying their neighbors and pushing back 

the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, it is also 

critical that we exercise congressional oversight of those requisite 

U.S. Navy capabilities that will be needed to counter any anti-access and area-denial capabilities the PLA Navy is rapidly developing as they modernize and expand their fleet. 

We also must understand how to engage with the PLA Navy in 

a manner that is constructive for all parties involved and demonstrates respect and adherence to established international norms 

of maritime conduct. I hope our witnesses can provide insight to 

these key issues. 

I would like to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. And we have testifying before us Dr. Andrew Erickson, associate professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute of the U.S. Naval War College; Mr. Ronald 
2 

O’Rourke, specialist in naval affairs at the Congressional Research 

Service; Dr. Seth Cropsey, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute; 

and Mr. Jim Thomas, vice president and director of studies at the 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. We look forward 

to your testimony. 

And with that, I would like to turn to my good friend Mike McIntyre, but I understand he is not here. So, Mr. Courtney, I will recognize you for any remarks you would like to make sitting in for 

Mr. McIntyre. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, my friend and chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Forbes, for holding this hearing. In many ways, 

this is one of the most topical subject matters that we could have 

for the Congress. 

Mike had prepared some opening remarks. So, again, what I 

would just ask is unanimous consent to submit those for the record 

and look forward to hearing from the witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McIntyre can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. FORBES. Without objection, we will make those part of the 

record. 

I would also like to recognize my good friend and co-lead for our 

Asia-Pacific series, the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. Colleen 

Hanabusa, for any remarks she may have. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief. 

I just want to say that one of the things that a good friend of 

mine who has passed and a great mentor, Senator Inouye, told me, 

I think it is very appropriate for these hearings. He had said to me, 

he says, you know, after World War II, the United States dominated the seven seas. He said, if we do that now, he says, I would 

be really surprised. He says, but, he says, never forget the one 

thing: We will always dominate the deep blue sea. 

So with that, I look forward to hearing from all of you. Thank 

you very much. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Colleen. 

And now we will start. And I don’t know which order we want. 

Mr. Thomas, were you going to start, or Dr. Erickson? 

Okay. Dr. Erickson, they will let you start, and we thank you 

once again for your patience in being here with us, and we look forward to your remarks. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW ERICKSON, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, CHINA MARITIME STUDIES INSTITUTE, U.S. NAVAL 

WAR COLLEGE 

Dr. ERICKSON. Chairman Forbes, Congressman Courtney, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity. I am testifying as an individual, not as a representative of 

the U.S. Navy. While I have submitted a detailed statement for the 

record, allow me to highlight the issues I believe are most pertinent to the subcommittee’s vital work. 

In contrast to ongoing limitations, shared interests, and even opportunities for cooperation far away, China’s navy and other services are achieving formidable anti-access/area-denial, A2/AD, capa-
3 

bilities closer to shore. Beijing seeks to wield this growing might 

to carve out in the Yellow, East, and South China Seas an airspace 

above them, a zone of exceptionalism within which existing global 

security, legal, and resource management norms are subordinated 

to its parochial national interests. This threatens to weaken the 

global system on which all nations’ security and prosperity depends, and to destabilize a vital but vulnerable region that remains 

haunted by history. 

To ensure that Beijing cannot use force or the threat of force to 

change the status quo in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. must maintain 

military capabilities to deter any threatening or aggressive actions 

by China, even as the two nations cooperate in areas of shared interest. Given the inherent defensiveness of the U.S. approach, it 

should be possible to meet core objectives at an affordable price 

through the most critical timeframe, likely over the coming decade, 

with a bottom-line strategy of deterrence by denial. 

Washington must be careful not to compete with Beijing in excessively expensive and ultimately ineffective arms competitions. It 

should not counter China’s A2/AD weapons by attempting to acquire a more sophisticated counter in each and every instance. It 

must also avoid the temptation to embrace approaches such as 

mainland strikes that would be unduly escalatory or counterproductive and lack the credibility to deter Beijing through their 

threatened use over issues in the East and South China Seas, 

given a disparity of national interests. A distant blockade, also 

escalatory, is likewise unfeasible because of the logistical difficulty 

of implementation in a dynamic commercial world. 

Instead, as China works to deny U.S. forces an ability to operate 

close to the mainland, the U.S. aim at a minimum should be to 

deny China the ability to resolve territorial and maritime disputes 

by the use of force. To resolve disputes conclusively, China would 

have to seize and hold territory as well as resupply its forces. This 

is inherently difficult on small islands, where geography imposes 

vulnerability. 

To demonstrate that China cannot achieve this, and thereby 

deter it from ever trying to do so, the U.S. and its allies should 

maximize disruption capabilities, their own form of A2/AD. The 

U.S. should, therefore, develop, deploy, and demonstrate in a measured, targeted fashion the capability to deny China the ability to 

seize and hold offshore territories. Here some pages can be taken 

from China’s own A2/AD playbook. 

Military capabilities are based on a complex system of hardware 

and software. Amid this, certain platforms and weapons offer disproportionate benefits, including submarines, missiles, and sea 

mines. The tight fiscal environment and threat timeline places a 

premium on deploying and maintaining existing platforms and 

weapons systems with proven technologies in limited numbers as 

rapidly and effectively as possible. 

The most promising approach is to hold and build on formidable 

U.S. undersea advantages to which China lacks effective countermeasures and would have to invest vastly disproportionate resources in a slow, likely futile effort to close the gap. It is, therefore, essential to ensure the present two-a-year construction rate of 

Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, SSNs, ideal for 
4 

denying the ability to China to hold and resupply any forcefully 

seized islands. The Virginia payload module allows for useful increases in missile capacity. Given China’s ongoing limitations in 

antisubmarine warfare and the inherent difficulty of progressing in 

this field, China could spend many times the cost of these SSNs 

and still not be able to counter them effectively. 

Additionally, more can be done to better equip U.S. platforms, 

such as submarines. The U.S. should do far more with missiles, 

particularly with anti-ship cruise missiles. Recent tests of the longrange anti-ship missile, LRASM, represent a step in the right direction, but more ought to be done in this regard. Offensive naval 

mine warfare is another underexploited area that offers maximum 

bang for the buck. 

U.S. submarines can oppose any Chinese naval forces engaged in 

an invasion, resupply, and protection. Long-range air or missile delivery can blow any lodgement off disputed islands or rocks. To be 

sure, both U.S. SSNs and LRASMs and Chinese A2/AD forces could 

achieve denial effects. Long-range surface-to-air and air missiles 

from both sides might hold air operations over the features in question at risk, prevent continuous operations, or even fully create a 

no man’s land. U.S. forces other than SSNs might not be able to 

operate without assuming great risk and hence be denied unfettered access. But Chinese forces would also not have access and 

would thereby be denied their objective of seizing and holding disputed territory. 

Demonstrating this to China would be an effective deterrent. Beijing could not afford to risk the likelihood of not achieving its objective in this regard. By adopting this deterrence-by-denial strategy, 

the U.S. can continue to preserve the peace in the Asia-Pacific, 

which has prospered during nearly seven decades of American protection. No other nation has the capability and lack of territorial 

claims necessary to play this still vital role. 

Thank you very much for your attention and for your continuing 

support for U.S. seapower. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Erickson can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Dr. Erickson. 

And, Mr. O’Rourke, we welcome you back to this committee, and 

we appreciate your taking the time, look forward to your remarks. 

STATEMENT OF RONALD O’ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NAVAL 

AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Chairman Forbes and Representatives Courtney, 

Hanabusa, and Conaway, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before you today to discuss China’s naval modernization effort. 

Chairman Forbes, with your permission, I would like to submit 

my statement for the record and summarize it here in a few brief 

remarks. 

Mr. FORBES. Each of our witnesses’ statements will be submitted, 

without objection, to the record. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Top-level U.S. strategic considerations related to 

China’s naval modernization effort include, among other things, the 

following: preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one 

part of Eurasia or another; preserving the U.S.-led international 
5 

order that has operated since World War II; fulfilling U.S. treaty 

obligations; shaping the Asia-Pacific region; and having a military 

strategy for China. 

China’s naval modernization effort appears aimed at producing a 

regionally powerful navy with a limited but growing ability to conduct operations in more distant waters. A near-term focus of China’s naval modernization effort has been to develop military options for addressing the situation with Taiwan. 

Observers also believe that China’s naval modernization effort is 

increasingly oriented toward additional goals, including the following: asserting or defending China’s maritime territorial claims; 

enforcing China’s view that it has the legal right to regulate foreign military activities in its exclusive economic zone; protecting 

China’s sea lines of communications; protecting and evacuating 

Chinese nationals in foreign countries; displacing U.S. influence in 

the Pacific; and asserting China’s status as a major world power. 

Consistent with these goals, observers believe China wants its military to be capable of acting as an A2/AD force. 

China’s actions in recent years have suggested to some observers 

that China is pursuing an overarching goal of gaining greater control of China’s near-seas region and of breaking out into the Pacific. 

If China were to achieve a position of being able to exert control 

over access to and activities within the near-seas region, it would 

have major implications for top-level U.S. strategic considerations. 

It would constitute a major step toward China becoming a regional 

hegemon, pose a significant challenge to the preservation of the 

post-World War II international order, and substantially complicate 

the ability of the United States to fulfill treaty obligations to countries in the region and to shape the region’s future. It would 

amount to a fundamental reordering of the Asia-Pacific security situation. 

Some observers have posited that China’s growing capabilities 

will at some point compel U.S. Navy surface ships to remain outside China’s A2/AD perimeter. That is far from clear, however, as 

the Navy has numerous options it can pursue for breaking the kill 

chains of China’s maritime A2/AD weapons. Electromagnetic rail 

gun and high-powered lasers can be the U.S. Navy’s own game 

changers for countering Chinese capabilities. 

To field such systems, the Navy would need to not only continue 

their development, but also procure ships with integrated electric 

drive systems or some other means of providing enough electrical 

power to support them. The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan currently does not include any surface combatants that will clearly 

have enough electrical power to support lasers with more than a 

certain amount of strength. 

The geographic expanse of the Asia-Pacific and the potential advantages of being able to outrange Chinese systems when needed 

may focus attention on the option of acquiring long-range to carrier-based aircraft, such as the UCLASS [Unmanned CarrierLaunched Airborne Surveillance and Strike] manned aircraft, and 

long-range weapons such as the long-range anti-ship missile and a 

long-range air-to-air missile. 

Navy attack submarines can operate effectively well inside China’s surface and air A2/AD perimeter. This can focus attention not 
6 

only on the procurement of Virginia-class attack submarines, but 

also on other options for expanding the capabilities of the attack 

submarine force, such as the Virginia payload module. 

Operations by Chinese Coast Guard ships for asserting and defending China’s maritime territorial claims close to the Philippines 

often go uncountered by equivalent Philippine forces because the 

Philippines has relatively few such ships. This may focus attention 

on the option of accelerating actions for expanding and modernizing 

the Philippines maritime defense and law enforcement capabilities. 

None of this precludes cooperating with China in maritime operations in areas where the two countries may have shared interests, 

such as antipiracy operations, search-and-rescue operations, and 

humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations. Such 

operations can provide an opportunity for demonstrating to China 

the benefits that China receives from the current international 

order and China’s interest in preserving that order. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you again for 

the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to the subcommittee’s 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Rourke can be found in the Appendix on page 47.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. O’Rourke. 

Dr. Cropsey. 

STATEMENT OF DR. SETH CROPSEY, SENIOR FELLOW, 

HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Dr. CROPSEY. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Courtney, distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to speak before 

this committee. Thank you for your invitation. 

As dangerous as the threats posed by jihadism are, so far they 

don’t approach the risks of open confrontation between the United 

States and the Soviet Union in the cold war. But the likelihood is 

that we will again face a larger challenge than the one the 

jihadists now present. No one is a better candidate to offer such a 

challenge than China, which is not to say that China is an enemy, 

or to predict that China will become an enemy. But it is clear the 

Chinese leaders are ambitious, and that their diplomatic policy and 

their military armament are moving them toward great power status, or at least regional hegemony, in a series of small steps designed to achieve these ends with minimal resistance from their 

Pacific competitors, America’s allies. 

The U.S. is not taking this possibility as seriously as it should. 

This is different from the America of the 1920s and 1930s. The 

generation that had experienced a World War learned the hard 

way why strategy was needed to be prepared for whatever the future might bring. Then, U.S. anticipated a potential future threat 

from Japan and acted to prepare for such a threat. In what was 

known as, as you know, War Plan Orange, U.S. military leadership 

devised and tested its strategy for a potential conflict with Japan, 

which evolved with new technology and tactics during the interwar 

period. It incorporated the critical roles of aircraft carriers and submarines, amphibious warfare, an island-hopping campaign, all of 

them new, in any potential Pacific conflict. 
7 

The linchpin of this plan was the doctrine of ‘‘advanced base’’ 

strategy, the idea developed and exhaustively tested during the 

interwar period that a Pacific conflict with Japan could be won by 

securing the outlying archipelagos and islands of the theater. This 

would take place by amphibious assault that would secure American bases from which to launch offensive operations further and 

further into enemy territory. At the same time, it would deny the 

enemy territory from which to do the same. The result, the U.S. 

military had a strategy when the conflict broke out, one whose familiarity to officers improved its execution, and which was, in fact, 

highly successful. 

We have no such strategy toward China today. Diplomatically, 

the closest we have come is the long-standing effort that existed 

since the administration of George H.W. Bush to persuade China 

to become a stakeholder in the international system. One of the 

most fundamental principles of that system is respect for 

untrammeled navigation through international waters and airspace. 

The events of the past few weeks, as China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone over a large section of the East China 

Sea, show that they have no such respect. So, while efforts to persuade China to become a stakeholder in the international order 

should not be abandoned, we ought to understand that those efforts 

have proved of limited value in generating any positive effect on 

Chinese international behavior. To the extent that any American 

strategy hangs on our and the international community’s attempt 

to transform China into a state that accepts the general principles 

of the international order, it has been a failure. 

The Obama administration’s much publicized pivot to Asia is not 

a strategy for dealing with China. It is an idea which, if sensibly 

implemented, would preserve and increase our influence in the region. But so far all the hard power of the pivot is a minor element 

of the administration’s preference for using soft power. The hard 

power consists of a Marine contingent in northern Australia that 

remains much smaller than the envisioned 2,500 Marine rotational 

force, eventually 4 littoral combat ships to be based in Singapore, 

and, as you know, a U.S. military budget that is being whittled 

away at a rate that alarms our allies in Asia and the rest of the 

world. 

A successful pivot to Asia would require more cooperation, especially with our Asia treaty allies, the most important of which is 

Japan. In the current and potentially risky matter of the People’s 

Republic’s recently declared Air Defense Identification Zone, Japan 

had said, as you know, that its commercial airliners would not 

identify themselves when passing through the airspace in question. 

At the same time, the State Department of the United States has 

urged American commercial flights to comply with the zone. I 

would not call this cooperation. 

China, by its own admission and actions, wants to deny us access 

to large parts of the Western Pacific. The Defense Department’s response, a large part of it so far, has been a set of ideas, as you 

know, called the Air-Sea Battle [ASB]. The ASB itself is a plan for 

greater cooperation between the military services in gaining access 

where a potential enemy would deny it. Much like the pivot, or re-
8 

balance, it is not based on a strategy, and it is not a strategy toward China. In fact, as you know, it makes no mention of China. 

China’s leaders are more tolerant of risk than the Soviet leaders 

were. The ASB talks about blinding a potential enemy’s surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence capabilities. In China’s case, 

this would mean striking targets on the mainland. The wisdom of 

this should be questioned. But the U.S. is not doing anything to 

turn even that idea into a strategic plan. 

There are other possible strategic approaches to the same problem of access denial; however, the first question that needs to be 

considered is what is the objective of any strategy toward China, 

and my colleagues here have already mentioned that. I agree with 

them. The answer is the same as our objective in World War I, 

World War II, and the cold war. In each of those, our objective was 

to prevent the rise of a hegemonic power on the European Continent. With China, our objective ought to be to prevent the rise of 

an Asian hegemon, a power that would destroy the current U.S. alliance system in Asia, dominate the world’s most populous region 

economically and militarily, and perhaps extend itself into Eurasia 

and beyond. 

As in the U.S.’s experience in Europe, our first diplomatic objective in executing a strategy that seeks to prevent the rise of an 

Asian hegemon should be to establish an alliance of like-minded 

nations. This is very difficult because of ancient enmities in the region. But as the threat from China grows, current realities might 

eclipse fear. An important part of U.S. strategy toward China 

should be to prepare the groundwork now for such an alliance, one 

which establishes contingencies for repatriating allied business interests on the mainland back to allied countries, so as to exert economic pressure on the PRC [People’s Republic of China] in the 

event of a conflict. 

As for the immediate problem of access denial, which does indeed 

require strategy to counter, there are approaches which don’t require an attack on China’s mainland. One would be to destroy the 

Chinese Navy at sea. Another would be to impose a blockade on 

Chinese merchant and naval shipping. Like the ASB, neither of 

these are being looked at as possible military strategies toward 

China, nor, as Dr. Erickson pointed out, the idea of denying them 

use of the islands, the disputed islands. 

What is clear is that any strategy to counter China’s increasing 

access-denial capabilities should prioritize deterrence—which 

means readiness, sustainability, and overmatching firepower and 

defense—and be built upon an integration of the ground forces necessary to control the outlying islands, archipelagos, littorals, and 

straits of the Pacific with the naval and air power necessary to control the air and seas. Such a strategy should also include an increased focus on missile defense to protect civil and military infrastructure, sea and airports, and mobile warfare capabilities. And it 

should, I think, above all, be designed to give the U.S. the power 

to assemble a durable forward defense in the event of a long war. 

But however one regards these strategic ideas, the fact remains 

that we don’t have any strategy toward the most populous nation 

in the world, one whose economic strength is considerable and in 

tandem with the military power its leaders are gradually accumu-
9 

lating to match their ambitions. My colleagues who are testifying 

here this afternoon are offering a thoughtful account of the hardware and tactics that support those ambitions. This needs to figure 

in our strategy as clearly as it does in China’s. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee, Mr. 

Chairman, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cropsey can be found in the Appendix on page 67.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Doctor. 

Mr. Thomas. 

STATEMENT OF JIM THOMAS, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Mr. THOMAS. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, let me add my thanks 

for convening these important hearings and inviting me to testify 

today. I will discuss key priorities for the PLA’s naval modernization program and then turn to their implications for U.S. and allied 

operational and force planning. 

To begin, I think it is worth recalling just how far the PLA has 

come over the past decade. Chinese defense spending has increased 

from an estimated $45–$60 billion in 2003 to $135–$215 billion 

today, roughly 25 to 40 percent of what DOD [Department of Defense] spends annually on our defense. Unlike the United States, 

however, with its competing global security responsibilities, China 

is able to focus its resources almost entirely on supporting its regional counterintervention strategy, which emphasizes the buildup 

of anti-access and area-denial, or A2/AD, capabilities and its ability 

to conduct short, decisive campaigns before an outside party like 

the United States could intervene effectively. 

A decade ago China was also heavily reliant on Russian assistance and its armaments, but has increasingly shifted towards indigenous design and production. It is rapidly building up a modern 

submarine force while retiring its older submarines. Its advanced 

guided-missile destroyers represent a major improvement in fleet 

air defense and, along with advanced submarines, will allow China 

to protect its aircraft carriers while pushing its naval perimeter 

farther out into the Pacific. 

China is also fielding an armada of fast, smaller combatants 

armed with anti-ship missiles. Their numbers could create a significant tracking and targeting problem and make it far more difficult for foreign surface forces to safely approach within 200 nautical miles of China’s coast. 

The PLA Navy also now operates more than 100 modern landbased strike fighters, equipped with sophisticated avionics, sensors, 

and advanced air-to-air as well as anti-ship missiles that could be 

used to overwhelm the defensive countermeasures of U.S. and allied naval forces operating within their reach. 

Finally, although it is not technically part of its naval modernization program, China has placed priority on the development of an 

anti-ship ballistic missile. The DF–21D [Dong-Feng 21D] reached 

initial operating capability in 2010 and has a range exceeding 930 
10 

miles. Its maneuverable warhead is optimized to attack large surface combatants, such as aircraft carriers, underway. 

The cumulative effect of all of these modernization efforts is that 

the military balance in the Western Pacific is shifting perceptibly, 

while U.S. costs to project power into the region are rising. There 

is no single silver-bullet approach to preserve the regional military 

balance. No one action alone can do it. Instead, the United States 

and its allies will have to undertake a combination of efforts to 

demonstrate their defensive strength in the face of China’s challenge, including steps to, number one, counter hostile communications, command and control, computers, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance networks by being able to conduct operations to degrade them, disrupt them, or spoof them. These efforts 

would help to reduce the PLA’s ability to effectively employ their 

missiles against friendly forces. Ideally, this could be done with 

nonkinetic activities that don’t require strikes on the mainland of 

China. But at the same time, I think it is probably imprudent to 

rule out such strikes as they contribute to our deterrent. 

Number two, we should be able to sustain operations inside hostile A2/AD envelopes by hardening our airbases against attack, improving our air and missile defenses, including with next-generation air defenses, as Mr. O’Rourke discussed, such as solid-state lasers and electromagnetic rail guns. It will also require the development of novel operating concepts as the U.S. Air Force and Marine 

Corps are now pursuing to facilitate distributed air operations from 

cluster airbases and ad hoc forward arming and refueling points for 

short-takeoff and vertical-landing aircraft. 

Number three, our forces will also need to be able to operate 

from beyond the range of hostile A2/AD networks. By increasing 

the range and payload and stealth of our carrier as well as our 

land-based aircraft, the strike payloads of our submarine force, and 

also developing newer long-range missile systems for both land attack and anti-ship missions, such as the long-range anti-ship missile. 

Number four, I believe our forces will need to build up allied and 

partner anti-access and area-denial capabilities to defend their own 

sovereignty by conducting air and sea denial operations, especially 

around the first island chain and in Southeast Asia. The U.S. Army 

and the U.S. Marine Corps in particular may have prominent roles 

to play in helping build up partners’ air and sea denial capacities. 

And last, number five, I think the United States does need to be 

able to be prepared to conduct peripheral operations by capitalizing 

on the U.S.—the United States air and naval mastery beyond the 

reach of potential adversaries’ A2/AD systems to conduct indirect, 

peripheral operations, like distant blockades. 

In closing, PLA naval modernization and the contested maritime 

environment it is creating offers a lens for evaluating U.S. strategic 

choices in a time of austerity with the objective of ensuring the 

U.S. military prioritizes the most viable elements of its forces to remain in the power projection business. That is why these hearings 

are so important. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas can be found in the Appendix on page 74.] 
11 

Mr. FORBES. We thank all of our witnesses. 

I am going to defer my questions until the end. So I am going 

to recognize Mr. Conaway for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. 

Mr. Erickson and Mr. O’Rourke both talked about just the mere 

presence of a very strong submarine capability would somehow influence the Chinese to not put soldiers on all these outlying islands 

that they are trying to claim. But yet at the same time, we have 

just recently seen that they very effectively said—declared an air 

superiority zone that has now threatened commercial air traffic. 

And I guess commercial air traffic has actually left the area, and 

we are still running our planes through there. 

Two questions. One, what did you think the Chinese were trying 

to accomplish by the air superiority issue and—not superiority, 

but—the air dominance or assertion of airspace, what were they 

trying to accomplish with that? And how do you distinguish that 

bold move and our lack of response there to what a potential landing on one of these small rocks out there that is currently 

uninhabited and us actually using a submarine to do whatever it 

is you two guys think we would do to stop the Chinese in that regard? 

Dr. ERICKSON. Yes, Congressman, you have raised two very important issues here. And I think we have seen a very regrettable 

approach from China in terms of how they rolled out their Air Defense Identification Zone [ADIZ] in the East China Sea. I think this 

is related to a larger effort that I described to try to establish a 

zone of exceptionalism within the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, 

and the South China Sea, an area in which they can try to subordinate international norms that undergird the effectiveness of the 

global system to their own national interests in a way that is not 

in concert with international law. 

I think there already has been a positive element of U.S. response. The B–52s being dispatched from Guam, I think, sends a 

very clear message that an ADIZ does not give one the right to regulate others’ freedoms in that airspace. 

I think it is a different issue when we are talking about what 

submarines can deter and what submarines can do vis-a-vis these 

disputed territories whose status should not be resolved through 

the use of force or the threat of force. The capability of submarines 

speaks to operational situations that go beyond the peacetime scenario that we are seeing with the Air Defense Identification Zone. 

So demonstrating, if necessary, in a worst-case scenario the ability 

to use these submarines to prevent and to stop and to roll back 

that kind of seizure of territory, I think, can nevertheless be quite 

effective. 

Mr. CONAWAY. How will they prevent stopping? 

Dr. ERICKSON. The use of the submarines and their affiliated 

weapons systems can literally, if necessary—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. The system has got to be fired. You can’t just simply pop up on the top of the ocean there from a submerged position 

and stop something; you have actually got to go kinetic, don’t you? 

Dr. ERICKSON. Yes. If necessary, as a last resort in a worst-case 

scenario, that is exactly what the submarines are good for. And 
12 

even better news is the fact that demonstrating that credible capability should be enough to prevent China from engaging in the behavior that would necessitate such a response. I think that is how 

the U.S. can preserve deterrence and keep the peace in the region, 

even with this tremendous uptick in Chinese A2/AD capability. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I think the commentary about the ADIZ has included speculation as to various goals that China may have had in 

mind in announcing the zone. A lot of the commentary mentioned 

the fact that it was intended, as these people saw it, in part to 

strengthen China’s position in the dispute over the sovereignty of 

the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 

A second goal that appears in a lot of the commentary is to generally strengthen or reinforce China’s influence over activities in 

that part of the near-seas region generally, and as a part of that, 

perhaps, to challenge the international norms relating to freedom 

of operation on the high seas and international airspace. Some of 

the commentaries included other goals as well, such as driving a 

wedge between us and Japan or putting the United States in the 

position of being a mediator. 

Mr. CONAWAY. In your statement, do you actually see that working? In other words, is China accomplishing their goals? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. The opinions right now are mixed from what I 

have seen in people’s reaction and commentary. Some people think 

that China’s ADIZ has backfired for China by angering many of its 

neighbors and perhaps encouraging greater cooperation among the 

other countries in that region with the United States. Other people 

see that China has had some success, because, frankly, they don’t 

care about that as long as they achieve their goal in terms of establishing a new reality on the ground or in the air. 

The question you relate to earlier about the role of submarines 

has to do with the fact that this is very much a three-dimensional 

game: It is taking place in the air; it is taking place on the ground, 

in the case of these territories in the near-seas area; and also on 

the water and under the water. It is taking place in connection 

with wartime scenarios and scenarios that are short of full war, 

such as what we are seeing with the generalized pressure and initiatives that China is placing on its neighbors regarding how it 

would like to see its disputes with these territories resolved. The 

submarines play in part of that, and they don’t play in other parts. 

So it depends on what your scenario is. 

Mr. CONAWAY. My time has expired. But I don’t see China being 

unduly impressed with our air capabilities and, hence, this air 

identification zone that they have declared. So I am not as confident that they are all that worried about our submarines out 

there. 

So, anyway, thank you all for your-all’s opinion. Yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Conaway. 

Ms. Hanabusa is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I think one of the things that I am getting from all of your testimonies, and thank you all for being here, is that there seems to 

be a lack of strategy. And you are all coming up with different 

ideas, but there is no overarching strategy about what to do. 
13 

Having said that, Mr. O’Rourke, in reading your testimony, the 

thing I was struck about is that you made a clear statement about 

the fact that if we go below the 306 number in terms of our fleet, 

that we are going to have a major problem. Then you go on a couple of pages later and you talk about the fleet architecture, which 

then seems to me, okay, we are talking about this number, 306, but 

we are also talking about with A2/AD that what we need to start 

to think about is the fleet architecture, what would be the best architecture that we would have in the region. So can you tell me, 

306, fleet architecture, what exactly—I mean, if we had to choose 

between one or the other, what would prevail between them? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. That is a great question. The 306 is, as you know, 

not just a number per se, it is not just a one-dimensional figure, 

it is a figure that has a lot of dimensions embedded into it, including the currently planned fleet architecture. There is a debate 

under way as to whether that architecture is the most appropriate 

one for ensuring our interests, especially in that part of the world, 

especially in the face of A2/AD systems in the future, especially in 

a situation of constrained defense resources. 

That debate is under way. It has been gaining steam. How it is 

eventually resolved is not yet certain at this point, although for the 

time being, of course, the program of record stands. 

If we were to switch to a different fleet architecture, we wouldn’t 

be talking about the 306 number anymore. It would be some other 

number that reflected the mix of ships that we would then be planning at that point. If the fleet falls short of 306, and we stick with 

the current architecture, and this happens because of constraints 

on defense, then one of the points I made in my testimony is that 

the Navy at that point would have options for trying to enhance 

the forward presence of the fleet that it did have, whether that was 

a fleet of 280-something or 250-something or less. Those options include a greater degree of forward homeporting, greater use of 

lengthened deployments, greater use of multiple crewing and crew 

rotation. All those options have certain costs associated with them, 

and they would have to be considered very carefully. So there are 

trade-offs involved here. 

But I think what your question does is it pinpoints the fact that 

there is a nexus between the number that we might quote and 

what kind of fleet that we are talking about, and that there is a 

discussion under way about what that should be, especially in the 

context of constraints on defense forces and rising A2/AD capabilities. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Mr. O’Rourke, in the beginning part of your testimony, you talk about the fact that you have been following and 

studying China since the 1980s. And I was surprised to know that 

since 2005 your report has been amended, like, 90 times plus. But 

the focus since 1980 for yourself has been China. So given that we 

are here to talk about China and its naval modernization, and that 

is really—if we are being honest about what we are doing and what 

we are studying, that is what we are talking about; we are talking 

about China’s modernization and how it affects us. 

But one of the testimonies here is saying that what we are allowing to happen to us is that China is defining what we are then 

doing. So do you see that as we look at the fleet architecture, and 
14 

as we look at the number 306 or whatever that number would be, 

that we are really looking as responding to what we may foresee 

as a threat to China and how to best combat that or be prepared 

for that? Is that what the underlying, I guess, the threshold that 

we are going to be dealing with? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. The debate over fleet architecture has been occasioned in part, in large part, by what China is doing and the challenge that observers see that posing to the future of the Navy and 

U.S. military generally. Not only China, though; it has to do in part 

with what other countries, particularly Iran, is doing in terms of 

its A2/AD forces in the Persian Gulf region. 

But, yes, that is the dynamic that we are in right now. Other nations are rising in terms of their military capabilities. They are 

doing so in a certain way, and that is causing us to ask whether 

we are currently on the proper path for responding to that. 

Ms. HANABUSA. And you did mention Iran also in your testimony. 

It was ‘‘China parens (Iran)’’ and ‘‘A2/AD.’’ So I guess the question 

is do you see a point where the United States is the power—we are 

not talking about a hegemonic power. We are trying to prevent a 

hegemonic power, a hegemon, from developing in Asia. But notwithstanding, it seems like we are reacting to others versus others 

reacting to us. Would that be a correct statement? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I think that is certainly a good issue to raise. In 

devising our strategy, whatever it may be, we should ask ourselves 

whether we are simply reacting to what the other side is doing or 

instead also posing a challenge that the other side has to react to. 

If the United States is in a situation of only reacting to what the 

other side is doing, then what in the long run is the best we can 

do in that situation? If we do not put into the mix our own initiatives that pose problems for the other side, and we restrict ourselves only to reacting to what the other side is, how well can we 

do in the long run? I think that is a question we need to ask ourselves and keep in the back of our mind. 

Ms. HANABUSA. It comes back to strategy. 

Mr. Chair, I know that it is not blinking, but I am pretty sure 

my time is up. Thank you very much. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa. 

Mr. Courtney is recognized. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Erickson, when you talked about that sort of disruption strategy as a smarter response than sort of a full-blown arms race or, 

you know, tit-for-tat kind of approach to China’s buildup, undersea 

seemed to be sort of the domain that you, I think, stressed was 

where we have an advantage and also a better capability to employ 

that strategy. 

You know, the Office of Naval Intelligence is saying, however, 

that China is building up its own submarine fleet, and that they 

are going to have 60 submarines in the relatively near future. And 

I guess the question is if your strategy, you know, is the approach 

that the U.S. adopts, is our inventory adequate to execute it, even 

with the two-sub-a-year build rate that you mentioned in your remarks? 

Dr. ERICKSON. Sir, those are excellent questions, and I think 

they cut right to the heart of the matter of how we should be pre-
15 

pared to execute what I would advocate, the strategy of deterrence 

by denial, which—I call it a bottom-line strategy because I see as 

the bottom line we ought to be able to do this. There is a lot more 

that I hope we could be able to do on top of that to include peacetime shaping and other capabilities, but at a minimum I think we 

need to be able to do this to keep the peace over time in the region. 

You are absolutely right to refer to analyses that suggest that 

the number of Chinese submarines will continue to increase. Obviously, the vast majority of those will be focused on the immediate 

region as opposed to U.S. submarines and other forces which are 

dispersed around the world. And even more than quantity, it is the 

quality that will continue to increase. So this is very significant. 

What I should stress, though, is that this increased submarine 

numbers and presence by China does not automatically translate 

into across-the-board antisubmarine warfare [ASW] capabilities. In 

fact, my colleague William Murray at the Naval War College calls 

Chinese approaches to their conventionally powered submarines 

making them aquatic tells or aquatic transporter erector launchers; 

in other words, a large focus on missile firing. And if you look at 

photographs available, you will see some load-outs that have a high 

ratio of anti-ship cruise missiles to torpedoes. 

My point there is, yes, China is putting a big focus on submarines, but I don’t think that negates the points that I was making about ASW being a major vulnerability that we can target in 

this regard. 

What I do think this highlights, though, is in order to make sure 

we have that ASW capability, we do need to emphasize certainly 

keeping the current build rate on Virginia-class submarines. And 

I am not an expert on this subject per se, but I would say look at 

the great studies by CBO [Congressional Budget Office] and others. 

The number of U.S. SSNs in the outyears going forward, I think, 

is something we have to keep our eyes on very closely. I don’t know 

what the exact number is, but if that gets too low, it is really going 

to have a negative impact on our ability to hold this bottom-line 

strategy. And I can tell you that Chinese publications, including 

some fairly serious publications, look very seriously at these issues. 

So by even having these reports come out that our numbers may 

get that low for SSNs, we are sending a powerful message to China 

in that regard, whether we intend to or not, and it is not necessarily a message that works in our favor. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Just as a quick addendum to what Andrew said, 

even at two per year, as you know, we will experience a shortfall 

in the attack submarine force in the 2020s relative to the 48-boat 

force level goal that forms part of the 306-ship fleet. 

And the other thing I would say is that there is nothing physically limiting us to two per year. Two per year is the current program of record over the next few years before we get into the Ohio 

replacement years, at any rate. But there is nothing saying that 

physically that you couldn’t do more than two. You could talk about 

three per year if you wanted, if you felt it was a high enough priority, if you felt that was the right thing to do, and you wanted to 

shift the resources into that. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. Yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Joe. 
16 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

witnesses for being here today and sharing your insights with us. 

So obviously today’s budgetary constraints are familiar to all of 

us, and some of the hardest decisions that we are going to make 

will be basically trade-offs between the highly capital-intensive investments in platform modernization. And in the context of the 

focus on the Asia-Pacific region and the PLA’s modernization, what 

military capabilities should we be prioritizing, developing, or maintaining? And, in particular, are we making strong enough investments in sub service and autonomous systems as well as maybe socalled a game-changer, next-generation technology such as directed 

energy and electromagnetic rail guns? 

Now, Mr. Thomas, you kind of touched on some of these things. 

Maybe we could start with you. 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Congressman. I think you already put 

your finger on two of the things I put on the top of my list, which 

is doing everything we can to maximize the stealth and the weapons capacity of our manned submarines, and at the same time accelerating development of complementary unmanned underwater 

vehicle capabilities. And how these will work is essentially an undersea family of systems, just as we are building a long-range 

strike family of systems in the air today. 

I think the second area is looking at game changers in terms of 

how we are going to do air and missile defense in the future not 

only for the fleet, but how we will protect forces ashore. Electromagnetic rail gun as well as solid-state lasers are two potential directions that we could be pursuing. 

One of the things that is so attractive about these systems is, in 

fact, their ability to free up vertical launch system tubes on our 

surface combatants so we can focus more on offensive strike power, 

land-attack missiles, anti-ship missiles, and less on the air and 

missile defense mission. This is a broader concern with our naval 

investments as a whole, which is increasingly we are focusing more 

on our own self-defense and less on the offensive striking power 

that we can bring to bear for deterrence. 

The third area that I would point out really is the transformation 

of the carrier air wing. How do we extend the reach of that carrier 

air wing through unmanned, longer-range, stealthier, and greater 

payload systems so that our carriers can operate beyond the range 

of anti-ship ballistic missiles and other threats to them and still 

maintain their punch? 

And the last I would say is an area that is two interrelated areas 

that don’t get a lot of attention and aren’t terribly sexy. One is our 

fleet logistics that I think we are probably underinvested in terms 

of fleet logistics to support forward operations. And related to that 

is both the types of munitions that we have, that we are going to 

need longer-range munitions, stealthier munitions, hypersonic munitions. But we are also going to need a greater magazine of them. 

And we have got to find a way to reload our combatants, particularly our submarines at sea, so that we can keep them on station 

longer. 

Submarines are great, and they have a lot of advantages, but one 

of them is they have a very small magazine, and they have to re-
17 

turn to ports. If we could overcome that problem technologically, I 

think that would a game changer also. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. On that point do you have suggestions of how we 

would actually undertake that kind of a—— 

Mr. THOMAS. I am not an engineer, but I think the idea of rather 

than switching out missile per tube to actually think of entire missile sets of VLS [vertical launch system] cells that you could switch 

out en masse might be part of that. But I think we have a long 

way to go. It is a well-recognized problem, but we haven’t solved 

it yet. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. O’Rourke, do you have anything that you wanted to add? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Yes. In terms of expanding the capabilities of the 

attack submarine force, we have already talked about the option of 

building Virginia-class boats, we have talked about the Virginia 

payload module. There are a couple of other things you could put 

on that list if you wanted to put more money into that area, and 

some of which we are already doing, and that would be to further 

the development of submarine-launched unmanned air vehicles and 

submarine-launched unmanned underwater vehicles to extend the 

eyes and the ears and the reach of the attack submarines. 

Then I also want to call out one program that already is under 

way to modernize our existing Los Angeles-class attack submarines, 

and that is the Acoustic Rapid COTs [commercial-off-the-shelf] Insertion Program, or the A–R–C–I, ARCI, program. This is a very 

important program for getting increased utility out of our existing 

Los Angeles-class attack submarines in terms of their sonar signal 

processing. It makes them better boats, and that is important because they will continue to constitute a large share of the attack 

submarine force going many years into the future. 

In terms of the air wing, we talked earlier about the UCLASS. 

We have talked about the issue of payloads for their airplanes. And 

one that I did call out in my testimony and I will repeat it here 

is the option of a new generation of long-range air-to-air missile. 

When we were encountering what was then called the Soviet seadenial force, and what in today’s terminology we would refer to as 

the Soviet A2/AD force, we had the F–14 armed with the Phoenix 

long-range air-to-air missile, and that was going to be succeeded by 

a next-generation long-range air-to-air missile called the Advanced 

Air-to-Air Missile, or the AAAM. That missile was under development in the late 1980s going into the early 1990s when it was cancelled as a result of the end of the cold war. 

But if you want to extend the reach of the strike fighters that 

will continue to make up a large share of the carrier air wings 

alongside whatever UCLASSs we eventually deploy, then you 

would want to look at air-to-air refueling for those strike fighters, 

and you would also want to look at the option of giving them a 

next-generation long-range air-to-air missile, which they currently 

do not have. They only have a medium-range missile. So that 

would be a couple of other possibilities. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. And let me move on to just one other question. Then I will yield back. 

We touched on this already, but the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence does project an unclassified assessment that China will 
18 

have between 313 and 342 submarines and surface combatants by 

2020. Approximately 60 of those would be submarines, potentially, 

that are able to employ submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles. My question is do you believe that the projected U.S. Navy attack submarine inventory will 

be able to sufficiently counter the submarine inventory of the PLA 

Navy? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. That goes back to the issue I discussed earlier 

about the shortfall in the attack submarine force that we will experience in the 2020s going into the early 2030s. That creates a period of increased operational risk for the submarine force and the 

Navy as a whole. The Navy can attempt to mitigate against that 

by pushing the maintenance for the submarine into the earlier 

years and the later years so as to maximize the operational availability of the attack submarine force during that period in question, 

although that will also bear costs on the submarine force in those 

years prior to and after. 

But that is a matter for policymaker judgment about whether 

that operational risk is acceptable or not, and if it is not, then you 

have the option of considering adding additional Virginia-class 

boats into the shipbuilding plan. That has a cost associated with 

it, and in a period of constrained resources, doing that would mean 

not doing something else. That is the trade-off that you would have 

to weigh and decide whether in the end the net result was better. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In your professional opinion, is it an unacceptable 

risk? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I think that in the long run, that is a policymaker judgment. What I can tell you is that there is some degree 

of risk, and that during a period of shortfall, whatever that risk is, 

it will be, other things held equal, greater if you have a period 

when the shortfall is in play. But whether it is acceptable or not 

ultimately is something for policymakers to judge based on the 

input that they get from military professionals. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thanks, Jim. 

I just have three questions and I would like each of your opinions 

on this. The first one is this: If I could have a little bit larger room 

here, and I could bring Members of Congress and sit them over 

here, because obviously they have to weigh in on the resourcing 

that we are going to do, and I brought our allies over here and I 

sat representatives from them there, do each of you—you were 

some of the best experts we could bring on this. You write, you 

study, you look at it all the time. Could any of you—I am not asking you to do this—but could you articulate a U.S.-China strategy 

right now that exists for our country, and would you be able to articulate that to Members of Congress or to our allies? 

Mr. Thomas, we will start with you. 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, I think the short answer is no. And I think 

we don’t have that strategy today. And I think it has to be established on multiple levels. Ultimately we need a grand strategy, 

which thinks about the problem from an interagency perspective, 

using all instruments of national power. And this gets to this issue 
19 

of how we think about buying time and a long-term strategic competition. 

And then I think it gets down to the military dimension. And it 

has to start with, you know, an understanding of what our shared 

objectives are with our allies. What are we trying to accomplish in 

terms of maintaining the credibility of our security commitments 

and how we sustain those with the shifting challenges that are 

posed by China? 

And then I think it has to get down to the operational level, and 

here I think it has to provide useful guidance on how we should 

think about presenting China with a multiplicity of problems that 

it would have to contemplate before it tried to undertake any form 

of coercion or aggression. 

And here, again, I would just underscore the importance of presenting China with a multiplicity of challenges. The harder you 

make this—it cannot rely on some single silver bullet sort of solution. It is going to take the entire joint force; it is going to take air, 

surface and undersea, as well as space and cyberspace assets, I believe. 

Mr. FORBES. But to the best of your knowledge, no such strategy 

exists right now. 

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. All right. 

Dr. Cropsey. 

Dr. CROPSEY. No such strategy exists. Forming one is difficult. 

When President Eisenhower had the problem with the cold war before him and the question of how to deal with the Soviet Union, 

I think you know he ran the Solarium Project, and he sat in on the 

meetings himself. At least that is what the record says. Someone 

with that distinguished a record in strategy felt that it was necessary to bring in a group of advisers and talk the issue through 

and sit there himself. Probably something like that is needed right 

now. If you are asking what I think we should do—— 

Mr. FORBES. Well, I will come back to that another time. I just 

want to know if we have got one right now. 

Dr. CROPSEY. We do not. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I will give you a two-part answer to that. One is 

you have the option of examining the classified war plans that we 

have for that part of the world, and you can decide whether those 

war plans reflect a strategy for conducting an upper-level war. 

But to get back to Representative Conaway’s point earlier, it is 

not just a matter of war at the high level, it is a matter of what 

is happening on the days when we are not at war in the situation 

short of war that we currently have in the East China Sea and the 

South China Sea, with this pattern of pressure and tactics short of 

outright conflict that China is using to pressure and consolidate its 

control of that area, and it is not clear to me that we have a strategy for that. That is a strategy that really I think needs to involve 

our allies inherently—it is not something for us to do by ourselves—and which the allies need to play a significant role in. 

And so when you say do we have a strategy that we can articulate, I don’t know about the big war, but at the moment I am just 

as worried about whether we have a strategy for countering what 
20 

China is doing in—currently on a day-to-day basis in the situation 

short of war for putting pressure on its neighbors regarding these 

maritime territorial issues. 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Erickson. 

Dr. ERICKSON. This is an excellent point. I could spend a lot of 

time explaining why I think it is important to have explicit and understandable strategy, but I assure you I won’t do that. 

What I will say is I think the U.S. has an implicit collection of 

approaches that together can constitute a strategy, but it would be 

far more effective and clear to all the right people if this were 

brought together in a more cohesive framework invoked more consistently. I don’t know if now is the time, but I can say very briefly 

what I think that strategy—— 

Mr. FORBES. I will let you do that another time because we are 

kind of out of time. 

Last question I want to pose to each of you, and it is a two-part 

question, and then we will be done. 

We have talked about China, and sometimes we think they are 

10-foot tall, sometimes we think they are 6-foot tall, but we look 

at these projections of how much money they are spending for their 

military buildup. I would like for each of you to tell me, do you 

think they can sustain this, and if not, why not? 

And the second thing is, what do you believe is the likely domestic pressure which may force them to do something militarily in the 

next 10 years as opposed to international pressures that might 

come on? And, Dr. Erickson, why don’t we start with you, and we 

will work back to Mr. Thomas. 

Dr. ERICKSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. That is an excellent question, 

and that gets to the strategic issue of how do we approach things. 

I think many people who are experts on China’s economy and domestic issues would agree with the argument increasingly that 

China is facing a slowdown in the rate of national growth to the 

point that this coming decade will see increasing pressure and 

challenges for China to maintain its trajectory in the international 

system and also domestic support because so much of that has been 

contingent on economic growth. 

And I think the risk is, as it becomes more and more difficult to 

generate a rate of economic growth that is seen as desirable for political purposes, the other main pillar of legitimacy, nationalism, 

will increase the chance of pursuing not diversionary war per se, 

but diversionary tension in the Yellow and especially the East and 

the South China Seas. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I think in recent years there has often been an 

image of China as a juggernaut that is just going to be growing at 

some relentless pace, and that this would eventually pose an overwhelming problem. The concern, in fact, may not be that the juggernaut continues and that you can straight-line their growth, but 

that their growth will bend over and slow down to one degree or 

another as a result of the buildup of debt in the Chinese economy, 

bad debt, their demographic issue, the buildup of environmental 

issues. 

If that is the case, if their growth line is going to bend downward, and if the Chinese Government is aware of that, they may 
21 

see the next few years as their period of maximum opportunity for 

pursuing their goals in the near-seas area. If that is the case, then 

they are going to be in a hurry. They are not going to see themselves as a situation in which time is necessarily on their side, but 

one in which time is not necessarily on their side. And if that is 

the case, it says something about the urgency of the years ahead 

and about their ability to sustain the kinds of growth and activities 

that we have seen over the last 30 years. It tends to put a premium 

on the next decade, which I think in part was what Andrew’s presentation was getting at earlier. 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Cropsey. 

Dr. CROPSEY. I agree with my colleagues’ assessments about the 

Chinese future. It may not be all rosy. They are going to have problems ahead. But are those problems the kind that will turn China 

back into the country that it was before Deng Xiaoping? I don’t 

think so. Is China going to revert to a small power with a failing 

economy and accept Third World status again or something minor? 

I don’t see that in the future at all. 

So I think that while I agree that they have significant problems 

ahead, that that does not mean that we can go home and rest easily. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Thomas, we will let you have the last word. 

Mr. THOMAS. Chairman, I think we share an interest with China 

in the sense that we want a China that is secure and prosperous. 

But I think there are real questions as we look ahead for China, 

whether it is demographically and the pressures it faces with the 

end of cheap labor, the environmental problems that are just enormous that it faces, very heavy municipal debt that I think goes unreported and nonperforming loans, as well as reliance on over-investment and infrastructure for GDP [gross domestic product] 

growth. So there are an awful lot of pressures out there that are 

going to require reforms. 

At the same time, I think the honest answer is we simply don’t 

know what China’s future trajectory is going to be in terms of its 

defense program. I think that a strategy which in part helps us to 

buy time and manage through this period is probably the right 

course, but at the same time we have to hedge against continued 

growth in China’s military capabilities. 

And as far as domestic pressures for external actions, I agree 

with my colleagues that I think that China’s increasing reliance on 

nationalism in its domestic policies as almost a replacement for a 

Communist ideology is of real concern because it introduces emotionalism into these discussions over disputed islands and so forth, 

which can lead to inadvertent escalation. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, thank you all so much for your work in 

this area. Thanks for your willingness to help this subcommittee. 

All of us, I know, appreciate you being here today, your patience 

with us, and this late hour. 

And, Mr. Conaway, if you or Ms. Hanabusa have nothing else, 

we will be adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

DECEMBER 11, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

DECEMBER 11, 2013 

(27) 

Opening Remarks of the Honorable J. Randy Forbes 

for the 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces Hearing on 

u.S. Asia-Pacific Strategic Considerations Related to P.l.A. Naval 

Forces Modernization 

December 111 2013 

I would like to welcome everyone to our Sea power and Projection 

Forces Subcommittee hearing today on the People's Liberation Army 

Naval Modernization efforts. This is a continuation of the Asia-Pacific 

Oversight Series that the full-committee kicked off last month. 

In just a few weeks, recent developments in the East China Sea 

have demonstrated that improving our understanding of regional 

events and key players is critical to assuring our allies and partners of 

u.s. commitment to the region and protecting U.S. interests. Tensions 

in the East and South China Seas have been ongoing now for several 

years, as China attempts to exert its influence in claiming land, sea and 

air space that is clearly beyond their internationally recognized borders. 

While naval modernization is a natural development for any seafaring nation such as China, it is clear the modernization is emboldening 

the Chinese government to exert their interests by bullying their 

neighbors and pushing back the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Therefore, it is also critical that we exercise congressional oversight of 

those requisite U.S. Navy capabilities that will be needed to counter any 

anti-access and area-denial capabilities the PLA Navy is rapidly 
28 

developing as they modernize and expand their fleet. We also must 

understand how to engage with the PLA Navy in a manner that is 

constructive for all parties involved and demonstrates respect and 

adherence to established international norms of maritime conduct. 

hope our witnesses can provide insight to these key issues. 

I'd like to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for 

appearing before the subcommittee today. 

Today we have testifying before us: 

• Doctor Andrew Erickson, Associate Professor at the China Maritime 

Studies Institute of the U.S. Naval War College; 

• Mr. Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs at the Congressional 

Research Service; 

• Dr. Seth Cropsey, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute; and, 

• Mr. Jim Thomas, Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center 

for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. 

We look forward to your testimony and with that, I turn to my 

good friend and colleague, the ranking member of the subcommittee 

and gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Mike Mcintyre for any 

remarks he may have. 

I'd also like to recognize my good friend and co-lead for our AsiaPacific Series, the gentlelady from Hawaii, Ms. Colleen Hanabusa for 

any remarks she may have. 
29 

Opening Statement by Congressman Mike MCintyre 

1Ill""ml"\pr Sea power and Projection Forces Subcommittee 

Hp;:lrirm on Liberation Army Navy Modernization 

December 11, 2013 

issue facing the United States: the 

of China's naval and supporting 

.. I deliberately chose Ihe word "issue", as opposed to "threat" or "danger" because 

I do not believe that China has to become OUi enemy in Ihe future. 

.. Great nations have choices, and I hope that China's government will, over time, 

into one that respects human and participates as a 

cooperative member of international community, including rpr:nnn;?;nn 

international rules freedom of and peaceful resolution of 

territorial disputes. 

" However, until that occurs, I do believe that 

account for any potential situation our military may face, 

conflict in the Western Pacific. 

.. As a result, I look forward to 

naval modernization and what 

from loday's panel of 

the United States 

on China's 

do about it 

.. Before we to their testimony, I would like to make a few broad points that I 

our can address in their statements or as part of answers to 

questions during loday's 

.. My first issue of concern is that nations in the 

naval strategy very to the one 

so I want to what history tells us: 

have tried "area denial" 

pursued by China today, 

o While there are numerous examples, two ~innit1i('''''nt 

(:;Arm,mv in World War 1 and the Soviet 

o In both cases, through a mix of different technologies, these nations made 

it dangerous to approach their coastlines directly. 

However, Great Britain in WW1 and NATO nations in the Cold War wisely 

avoided a or "direct" approach to meeting such a threat 

o To defeat these threats, in both cases, the correct approach appears to 

have been to not to up close" and duke it out with a large coastal 

nation right on front where they have all the advantages. 
30 

Instead, a "distant blockade" Of other power projection at a distance turned 

out to be an economical, and winning, strategy. 

So my question is - what do those two historical tell us about 

what we should do if China continues to build up its naval forces along its 

current path? 

• The second issue I'd like to hear more about is what could be a real win-win for 

the United States and our allies in the 

o I would like to hear thoughts on the potential to 

larl(H)a~.eCl cruise missiles, systems, and sensors to be 

by US allies in the region, rather than more US troops for this 

purpose. 

o I think that could be a 

the burden of deterring from 

nr"""fI.I"" opportunities to support jobs through 

various systems our ailies would need to 

role. 

.. I look forward to our witnesses' testimony and thank the Chairman for holding 
31 

China's Naval Modernization: Implications and Recommendations 

Andrew S. Erickson 1 

China's military development pursues outstanding territorial and maritime claims in the Yellow, 

East, and South China Seas by targeting what I'll call "physics-based"" limitations in potential 

opponents' systems. Beijing is prioritizing an "anti-Navy" to deter U.S. forces from operating 

there over a blue water navy to project power far away. China's interests and capabilities, which 

decrease with distance from the mainland, must thus be viewed geographically. Current Chinese 

strategic and military priorities are unlikely to change radically because China faces unresolved 

domestic and regional challenges, yet is already increasingly experiencing an S-curve-shaped 

growth slowdown. China is thus already beginning to pose its greatest challenge to U.S. 

inf1uence and interests in the Asia-Pacific. 

Fundamental issues hang in the balance: If not addressed properly, China's rise as a major 

regional maritime power could begin an era in which the U.S. military lost unfettered access to 

key regions. Haunted by history, the Asia-Pacific has prospered during nearly seven decades of 

U.S. forces helping to preserve peace. No other nation has the capability and lack of territorial 

claims necessary to play this still-vital role. More broadly, Chinese success in subordinating 

international norn1S to its parochial interests in the region so that they do not apply fully in 

practice would harm U.S., regional, and international interests: these are the same standards that 

ensure the global system operates openly and effectively, for the security and prosperity of all. It 

would encourage the application of force to more of the world's many persistent disputes. The 

Asia-Pacific is simply too important for Washington to accept a diminished role there. As 

Singapore's founding father Lee Kuan Yew observes, "The 21 st century will be a contest for 

supremacy in the Pacific, because that is where the growth will be .... If the U.S. does not hold 

its ground in the Pacific, it cannot be a world leader.,,3 

Chinese leaders are acutely attuned to perceived changes in relative national power, and 

periodically examine other nations' stated policies for potential changes in the will to maintain 

their position regarding issues that are important to Beijing. They will create incidents and probe 

relentlessly when circumstances suggest that something may have changed, whether timing, 

leaders, or resources. When met with convincing capability--provided that they do not perceive 

gratuitous humiliation or threats to the most vital of interests-they typically retreat. When 

insufficiently opposed, they see how far they can push. The Impeccable Incident of March 2009 

represented an important test from Beijing for newly elected President Barack Obama; he passed 

by maintaining U.S. policy vis-a-vis surveillance, reconnaissance, and observation (SRO) 

missions. It was made in the face of naysayers who claimed that the United States would never 

tolerate analogous activity in its "backyard," when in fact it accepted considerable Soviet SRO 

activity throughout the Cold War and today tolerates Russian SRO activity. 
32 

2 

This was an extremely wise decision: with 38% of the world's oceans claimable as exclusive 

economic zones (EEZs), such an exception could not be accommodated without compromising 

vital U.S. interests, or establishing an unacceptable precedent. Now, driven by its own maritime 

interests and trajectory, Beijing is already shifting on this issue, pursuing approaches that will 

complicate future opposition to such U.S. activities. "Chinese maritime intelligence collection 

operations increased in 2012," Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Samuel 

Locklear testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2013, "with historic first 

such missions into the Indian Ocean and within the U.S. exclusive economic zones ofT of Guam 

and Hawaii."" Chinese acknowledgement at the 2013 Shangri La Dialogue of its conducting 

military surveillance in America's undisputed EEZ may presage reduced opposition to similar 

activities in China's own EEZ as China rises as a maritime power with access interests of its own. 

Similarly, dispatch of B-52s from Guam on a routine training mission following China's recent 

announcement of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) sent the right 

message: a coastal state has no authority to alter international freedoms in international airspace, 

or interfere with freedoms of others.s China's neighbors and the U.S. are rightly concerned 

about how China has (and how it has not) gone about the announcement and explanation of its 

ADIZ. Thus far, Beijing has defined its new ADIZ in a categorical manner that ignores the 

complexities and risks involved, and remains ambiguous in its compliance with international 

legal norms. This is particularly problematic because China's ADIZ overlaps so extensively with 

Japan's ADIZ (perhaps the only such overlap over an active sovereignty dispute), and even to 

some extent with South Korea's ADIZ. To diffuse the resulting tensions, China needs to exercise 

restraint and allay concerns by its neighbors and other users of the international airspace in 

question by offering specific clarifications and reassurances. 

How the U.S. responds to such tcsts shapes subsequent Chinese behavior. Though Beijing 

dislikes it, rebalancing has already been effective. For instance, Chinese leaders disliked 

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's 2010 speech in Hanoi but nevertheless at around that time 

began to "walk back" their overly assertive posture of2009-1O. The U.S. must be prepared for 

further tests, and must consistently resist counterproductive Chinese efforts designed to elicit 

weakness. 

While conflict with China should be avoided if at all possible, China must also be prevented 

from significantly coercing its neighbors or altering the region's status quo. Failure to emphasize 

this point as well risks making the U.S. appear weak and acquiescent to Chinese assertiveness, 

both to Beijing and to regional allies, friends, and partners. This risks miscalculation on Beijing's 

part. It also makes it unclear to taxpayers and their representatives why significant U.S. military 

investments are needed in a time of austerity. This should be framed in terms of ensuring the 

continued functioning of the existing international system. Washington should clarify, as 

necessary, that it is not trying to contain Beijing per se, but rather to resist any Chinese actions 

that would hann the existing system. 
33 

3 

The U.S. has upped the ante ambitiously, particularly in the South China Sea, while a rising and 

already potent China is playing a long game. The worst possible approach would be for the U.S., 

having anted up, to fail to follow through adequately, both in capability and in action. Ifboth 

private and public expectations of America's "walk" matching its "talk" are not met across the 

Asia-Pacific, and views of a "hollow rebalancing" take hold, the results could be worse than not 

having tried in the first place. 

To prevent such failure, as well as the destabilization of a vital but vulnerable region, the U.S. 

must maintain the credibility of regional presence and demonstrated capability. This is essential 

to renew and intensify the U.S. role in the region. The credibility of continuous naval presence 

and capability is essential. As the latest U.S. Maritime Strategy emphasizes, "trust and 

confidence cannot be surged." That is one reason why the U.S. would not be able to address 

anywhere near its present objectives if it allowed itselfto diminish to a mere "offshore balancer." 

The Asia-Pacific Rebalance must thus be comprehensive, credible, and sustained (properly 

funded). Here shipborne trade and ship numbers (particularly of nuclear-powered attack 

submarines) will speak much louder than sermons or soundbites, both to China, and perhaps 

equally importantly, to longstanding and newly emerging U.S. partners in the region. Lee Kuan 

Yew offers wisdom of particular relevance to the Asia-Pacific rebalance: "Americans seem to 

think that Asia is like a movie and that you can freeze developments out here whenever the U.S. 

becomes intensely involved elsewhere in the world. It does not work like that. If the United 

States wants to substantially affect the strategic evolution of Asia, it cannot come and gO.,,6 

At a minimum, the U.S. must continue to deter the use-or threat-of force to resolve AsiaPacific disputes and cooperate where it can until Beijing embraces the mutual efTorts required for 

the two Pacific powers to achieve durable, if frequently or even continuously competitive, 

coexistence. To ensure this, the U.S. should demonstrate the capahility to deny China the ability 

to seize and hold disputed territories. 

The need to avoid an insular approach, combined with the increasing inability for Washington to 

exercise undifferentiated global preeminence, makes it necessary to craft a coherent Asia-Pacific 

Strategy. Subordination of vital regional realities to global strategy may have been appropriate 

during the Cold War, when the U.s. confronted a global adversary that threatened vulnerable 

Euro-Atlantic allies directly, and in the subsequent "unipolar moment," when U.S. hegemony 

was undisputed and substantial regional challengers and direct global terrorist threats had yet to 

manifest themselves, but it is no longer sufticient. Failure to craft an explicit comprehensive 

Asia-Pacific Strategy will complicate etlorts to "see the big picture" across the entire diplomacy, 

information, military, and economic (DIME) spectrum and beyond. The most relevant example 

to build on is a series of unclassified regional policy documents issued by the Office of 

International Security Affairs in the late 1990s.7 This strategy should facilitate a coordinated, 

whole-of-government approach. At the same time, it should also support a clear bureaucratic 

division of labor based on which agency (or agencies, in special cases) is best placed to lead on 
34 

and address a given issue. This will help to maximize efficiency and effectiveness by offering 

clear strategic guidance, aligning resources, and ensuring that agencies not ideally placed to 

contribute in a given area are not motivated or pressured to waste resources chasing headlines. 

The U.S. must (I) engage with China, (2) hedge against its possible negative behavior, and (3) 

work with its allies, friends, and other partners (including China) to further positive outcomes in 

the Asia-Pacific and beyond. Accordingly, U.S. policymakers should base their response to 

China's naval/military development on the following principles: 

• Understand key dynamics of geography, physics, economics, and politics. 

• Develop an Asia-Pacific Strategy. 

• Support rhetoric with resources. 

• Emphasize and demonstrate U.S. identity as an Asia-Pacific power. 

• Maintain regional presence and credibility. 

• Sustain alliances and partnerships and leverage them in new ways. 

• Engage and cooperate with China where productive to build on substantial shared 

interests and interdependence. 

• Accord China international status in proportion to its international contributions. 

• Focus military and strategic hedging on resisting China's regional exceptional ism. 

• Resist intimidation and coercion, pass Beijing's tests. 

• Prevent China from using force, or threat of force, to address regional disputes or alter 

the region's status quo. 

• Pursue detclTence by denial capabilities as a minimal foundation. 

• Avoid making concessions during China's growth slowdown, while emphasizing that 

genuine constructiveness and reciprocity may be possible ifit ultimately moderates its 

demands. 

The A2IAD Approach 

4 

To further its maritime interests within approximately, say, 500 nautical miles of its coastline, 

China is undernlining the efficacy of, and likelihood of involvement by, U.S., allied, and friendly 

military forces there. By developing abilities to hold U.S. and other foreign forces at risk, Beijing 

hopes to deter them ii'om intervening in the Y cllow, East, and South China Seas, and to persuade 

regional actors that Washington's assistance will be neither reliable nor forthcoming. The 

People's Liberation Army (PLA) thus systematically targets limitations in foreign military 

platforms stemming from laws of physics: for example, the fact that missile attack tends to be 

easier and cheaper than missile defense. Asymmetric weapons development, coupled with 

determination to address regional disputes, promise to radically improve China's anti-access/area 

denial (A2/AD) capabilities and undennine regional stability. 

Strong close to shore, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is weaker farther away. Its capahilities are 

concentrated close to Mainland China, with ever-less-intensive layers radiating outward. The 
35 

5 

PLAN is largely deployed in and around the Yellow, East, and South China Seas and their 

immediate approaches. Beijing is working assiduously to address its weaknesses. Since 2008, it 

has been deploying limited forces out-of-area. Over the next two decades, greater diversity of 

out-of-area missions will be overlaid on strengthening and -broadening A2/AD capabilities. 

Outside observers will be able to monitor many visible indicators, e.g., the PLAN's pursuit of 

overseas access points. In its near-to-mid-tenTI development of a regional blue water navy to 

consolidate control in the region while pursuing influence further afield, China could develop 

and acquire the necessary hardware should it elect to expend sufficient resources, but "software" 

will be more difficult to accrue, and coordination and integration of data and forces may be most 

difficult of aIL The further from shore China's forces operate, the fewer safeguards and 

workarounds will be available. 

The U.S. should not be overly concerned that Asia-Pacific rebalancing could open up a vacuum 

far from China for China to fill. Generally speaking, China's overseas military activities should 

be viewed as far more vulnerable to disruption, and potentially mutually beneficial, than those in 

the Near Seas. Rather than involving nationalistic zero-sum claims, they target non-state actors 

who threaten not only Chinese lives, property, and prosperity but also potentially those of other 

nations as well. At a minimum, this allows for sovereign exercise of Chinese rights; in many 

cases, it permits productive pursuit of common interests. Overseas military operations occur far 

from China's homeland, with its extensive secure communications, logistics, and defenses. They 

are thus relatively unprotected; particularly any fixed overseas access points that China may 

develop. Far from China, China's military forces become vulnerable to the same physics-based 

limitations that it is working so persistently to target in U.S. and allied platfonns, yet the PLA 

has far less ability to defend forces operating out of area than do the U.S. and its allies. 

The Regional Dilemma 

To address historical grievances and rise again as a great power that commands neighbors' 

deference, Beijing seeks to carve out from the global commons the Yellow, East, and South 

China Seas and the airspace above them as a zone of exceptional ism within which existing 

global legal, security, and resource management norms are subordinated to its national interests. 

China champions the idea of greater "democracy" in international relations in words, but in 

deeds coerces smaller neighbors when it regards them as not knowing their place. This bullying 

tendency is likely to worsen as China's power l,'fows. 

Absent Beijing's clarification to the contrary, there is reason for concern that the "new type of 

great power relations" it promotes appears to be nebulous rhetoric with undertones of 

expectation that Washington yield to an ascendant Beijing and its "principled" positions. This 

makes it risky for the U.S. to embrace such a concept. As with "core interests," China is likely to 

exploit perceived endorsement for future diplomatic and negotiating leverage. 
36 

While substantial Sino-American cooperation is already possible-and in many cases highly 

desirable-regarding overseas and global issues, particularly regarding non-traditional security 

threats, there is presently regrettably little hope of reaching effective, durable understanding 

regarding regional traditional security issues. 

The S-Curved Trajectory 

Mounting challenges stand in the way of China fulfilling its regional objectives and shifting 

emphasis to safeguarding growing overseas interests and resource imports through distant seas 

operations. First, China insists on preconditions involving recognition of its sovereignty over 

disputed claims that its neighbors are unlikely to accept. It is di11icult to see how Beijing can 

peacefully realize its objectives anytime soon over its neighbors' growing opposition and 

Washington's continued commitment to preserving regional peace. Second, overseas objectives 

lack strategic coherence, limiting support for military approaches. This is especially tme as the 

U.S. provides substantial global commons security free of charge. 

6 

Still larger dynamics are in play, however. Great powers typically follow an S-curved growth 

trajectory.s Initially, national consolidation and infrastmcture development, combined with 

competitive labor and resource costs, unleashes rapid economic development. Smart policies in 

which the govemment regulates and supports in the right areas and stays out of the way in others 

can further enhance these synergies. Resulting increases in technological, military, and political 

power facilitate domestic consensus and intemational influence. Eventually, however, intemal 

inefticiencies and extemal overextension slows growth. It is lately fashionable to trace such 

pattems in American power, but observers are only beginning to appreciate Chinese applications. 

While Beijing may have limited its foreign commitments for now-and even abandoned forms 

of foreign aid that were burdensome to an impoverished China during the Cold War-it may be 

headed for rapid changes in the other two areas. China faces rent seeking behavior, aging, rising 

labor costs, growing welfare demands, and consequent reorientation of societal priorities away 

from economic and national power growth analogous to those that have affected the United 

States and other Westem nations. In fact, the unleashing of Chinese society in 1978 after a 

century of foreign predation and intemal turmoil and three decades of abnormally constricted 

individual possibilities and economic growth may have disl:,'Uised the subsequent three decade 

economic boom-facilitated though it was by pragmatic policies and globalization-as a "new 

normal" when in fact it was an exceptionally-well-managed catch-up period that cannot last. 

Indeed, this one-time nmneling of national potential, which has produced urbanization of 

unprecedented scale and rapidity, coupled with the world's greatest artiticial demographic 

restriction (the "one child" policy) and dramatic internal disparities, may be sending China along 

the "S-curve" faster than any other major power has gone before. 

In addition to demographic decline, Beijing's own policies have imposed unusually dire 

pollution, resource shortage, and vested interest problems. China may thus be further along the 
37 

S-curve than many realize. And China is already facing such headwinds long before it has 

achieved high per capita income, comprehensive social programs, or an innovative, highefficiency economy that can absorb rapid cost increases generated by temporary or permanent 

resource scarcity. Eventually, Beijing will have to adjust its behavior accordingly, and may 

thereby become more reccptive to mutually beneficial interaction with Washington at last. 

The Bully or The Benefactor? 

With these gathering challenges comes a risk and an opportunity. The risk is that Beijing will 

seek to compensate for waning economic achievements by bolstering its one other major source 

of popular legitimacy: nationalism. While China's leaders are unlikely to seek diversionary war, 

fanning historical grievances and pursuing diversionary tension vis-a-vis regional claims can'ies 

real temptations and risks. Efforts at deterrence themselves, however envisioned, can have 

signiticant strategic consequences; "defensiveness" is in the eye of the beholder. Disturbingly, 

authoritative PLA sources reveal overconfidence in China's ability to control escalation. Close 

encounters among Chinese and foreign military platforms could readily produce an accident, 

yielding at best a crisis harming all parties involved. That is one ofthe reasons why Washington 

cannot to afford delay in, or distraction from, maintaining presence and preserving peace in the 

Asia-Pacific. 

7 

The opportunity is for increasing realism in Chinese expectations. Chinese perceptions are 

outpacing reality, placing dangerous pressures on Sino-American relations. In fact, the 

extraordinary achievements of the past three decades have led many to believe that Chinese 

power will continue to grow at a similar rate in the future. An unusual lack of major recession or 

other setbacks during their lifetimes has severely inHated the expectations of an entire new 

generation of Chinese. Today, too many Chinese at every level appear to be conHating what 

might be called the "second dcrivative"-which measures how the rate of change of a quantity is 

itself changing-of national power with the actual rate of change in national power. They 

demand foreign treatment of China based in part on its perceived future potential: feeling 

empowered by newly-acquired capabilities, they expect to be given credit for capabilities that 

they don't yet have (but expect to obtain soon), and are emboldened by the promise of 

capabilities that appear within reach in the future (though they may never be realized in practice). 

China appears already be tempering some efforts at "soft power" because it views it to be less 

necessary given rapid shifting in the halance of power. Beijing increasingly reserves the right to 

ignore rules whose development it did not participate in, and to attempt to reshape organizations 

that it joined under previous circumstances. Hence the likely assumption undergirding Beijing's 

concept of "a new type of great power relations": to avoid repeating the cont1ict that has 

occurred repeatedly between rising and established powers throughout history, the U.S. should 

yield to China regarding issues on which Beijing takes a principled stand. 

Under such circumstances, Beijing is simply not disposed to enter into binding agreements that it 

believes constrain it or otherwise harm its interests. Why agree to substantive constraints today 
38 

8 

when China's negotiating position is only expected to strengthen tomorrow'? To make matters 

worse, China's asymmetric regional security focus precludes the parallel global posture and 

interests that enabled Washington and Moscow to achieve a variety of agreements during the 

Cold War. Thus, while substantial Sino-American cooperation is already possible regarding 

ovcrseas and global issues, particularly regarding non-traditional security threats, there is 

currently little hope of reaching effective and lasting agreement regarding regional security 

issues. Yet no economy is permanently immune to the business cycle, and rare is the straight-line 

projection that is proven in practice. No matter how capably managed, China is unlikely to long 

defy known laws of economics. 

Pursuit of "selective power status" will not work anymore for China. China has become 

sufficiently powerful that it should not be allowed to have it both ways by posing as a poor 

developing country or a U.S. peer as convenient. When Beijing pushes overzealously for "equal" 

treatment from the U.S., Washington should politely emphasize that such efforts must not be 

selective, but rather part oflarger nonns oftreating other countries appropriately even when they 

are less powerful. This includes avoiding both a "kiss up, kick down" approach (i.e., do unto 

India as you would have the U.S. do unto you) and a "schoolyard bully" approach (relations with 

Vietnam and the Philippines offer an excellent opportunity to show what "democracy" in 

international relations actually means in practice). 

U.S. willingness to accord China international status should lie not in its internal development (a 

task for all nations, including the U.S.) or bilateral negotiations (many of which the U.S. is not a 

party to) but to the puhlic goods it provides. Beijing will likely not offer all the public goods that 

Washington would find ideal, and may even see expectations in this regard as a ploy to burden it 

and slow its rise. Such differences in perspective are likely unavoidable. Nevertheless, Beijing is 

likely to grow into such an approach as its capabilities and interests continue to evolve. China's 

Gulf of Aden antipiracy missions represent a positive step forward, and have rightly received 

approbation from the U.S. and many other nations. Further steps in this direction could have 

similarly salutatory effects. 

Achieving the great power status to which China understandably aspires will hinge largely on 

what it provides the world, not what it demands from it. It requires embracing reciprocity and a 

"responsible stakeholder" mentality. A popular movie says this best: "with great power comes 

great responsibility." Slowing growth may eventually help moderate public expectations and 

thereby allow Chinese leaders to pursue positive approaches even in its immediate region. Until 

that happens, however, only U.S. security capabilities and partnerships can preserve the peace 

that underwrites the success of all Asia-Pacific nations, including China itself. 

The Solution 

Washington's management of U.S.-China relations faces both unprecedented challenges and 

meaningful opportunities. America's present strategic approach, centered on defending the 
39 

9 

global system and the institutions and nonns that underpin it, remains vital. But maintaining the 

capability to do so in practice requires regional focus and prioritization to address key dynamics 

in the most important yet challenging regions for furthering U.S. interests. Washington must 

demonstrate commitment to sustaining a properly resourced, continually effective presence in the 

Asia-Pacific. This will require redirecting resources from elsewhere through prioritization-the 

essence of strategy. 

As a great power, China is already here to stay. China has reached a level of aggregate national 

power at which it would be impossible and ineffectual for the U.S. to simply oppose all Chinese 

exercise of power with which it is not entirely satisfied. In many cases, no amount oflecturing 

will change Chinese behavior. With respect to communications, Washington's focus should 

instead be on ensuring that U.S. and allied taxpayers and voters are fully informed, and hence 

willing to continue to fund robust investment in all dimensions of national power and influence, 

as well as international cooperation, so that the U.S. continues to be able to approach interactions 

with China from a position of strength. With respect to actions vis-a-vis China, the U.S. should 

not waste time on unrealistic proposals. Instead, it should support positive Chinese approaches to 

cooperation and oppose with great care and selectivity specific Chinese negative approaches by 

marshaling concrete resources through a whole-of-government approach that combines 

information, economic, diplomatic, and military policies-all oriented toward achieving a 

common strategic outcome in U.S. policy toward China. 

Yet, to paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of American decline are greatly exaggerated. In the 

analysis of Wang Jisi, Dean of the School ofIntcrnational Studies at Peking University, formerly 

a key advisor to President Hu Jintao, and one of Foreign Policy's Top 100 Global Thinkers in 

2012, legal traditions, social values, technological-institutional innovations, and civil society 

underwrite America's competitive edge and will keep it the world's sole superpower for the next 

20-30 years at least. 9 Apart from the issue of distance, time is likely to be far kinder to America's 

approach and overall position in the Asia-Pacific than to China's. In the longer term, likely 

within a decade, China's growth rate is almost certain to slow considerably and its domestic 

challenges proliferate while the United States-for all its problems and ability to exacerbate 

them with counterproductive approaches-enjoys sustained advantagcs in national power and 

influence. This may finally establish a basis for the two Pacific powers to achieve "competitive 

coexistence"lo by making Beijing willing to make adjustments and clarifications of its own 

instead of merely demanding that Washington do so while declining to specify what China might 

otTer in return. That could allow for a "new type or great power relations." 

In the meantime, with all the bilateral exchanges currently underway, including at the highest 

levels, it is reasonable for Washington to ask tor-and receive promptly-a clear definition of 

this concept so that it can detennine whether it is wise to embrace it. U.S. government 

understanding of the concept should be shared publicly so that the American people and all their 

representatives, as well as their allied and friendly counterparts, can be confident that 

Washine,>1:on is not being manipulated. The U.S. would be ill advised to accept vague rhetoric to 
40 

10 

help with problems of international concern, e.g., vis-it-vis North Korea and Iran, in return for 

U.S. 'acknowledgement' of 'core' Chinese national interests. Washington should not be an 

"ardent suitor" and bend over backwards to cater to Beijing's sensitivity while Beijing refuses to 

do the same for Washington. True reciprocity precludes China's exploiting its restrictive system 

to make demands of the U.S. in the name of American principles, while refusing American 

requests in the name of Chinese principles. 

Until new, more positive possibilities materialize, it is essential for the U.S. to weather the 

present window ofvulnerability without making hasty, unilateral concessions that would be 

difficult, ifnot impossible, to reverse later; losing credibility vis-it-vis allies or China; or-worst 

yet-allowing Beijing to change the status quo through the threat ot~ or use of, torce. Defeating 

China is not necessary; it would be adequate to show that Beijing cannot achieve maritime 

territorial ambitions using force. This will enable the U.S. to keep the region peaceful, an 

important component both of reassuring U.S. allies and friends and ensuring security of, and 

access to, the global commons to maintain a stable global system. 

Policy Recommendations 

The following section elaborates on how these larger objectives can be achieved. Of most direct 

relevance to the work of the Committee, it is imperative to maintain military capabilities to deter 

any threatening or aggressive actions by China. 

Pursue Deterrence bv Denial. Given the inherent conservatism and defensiveness of the U.S. 

approach, it should be possible to meet core objectives at an atlordable, sustainable price through 

the most likely critical timeframe with strategy of deterrence by denial. Washin!:,>ton must be 

carellil not to compete with Beijing in excessively expensive and ultimately ineffective arms 

competitions. It should not counter China's A2/AD weapons by attempting to acquire a more 

sophisticated, expensive counter in each and every instance. It must also avoid the temptation to 

embrace approaches such as mainland strikes that would be unduly escalatory or 

counterproductive-and lack the credibility to deter Beijing through their threatened use over 

issues in the East and South China Seas given a disparity of national interests. A distant blockade, 

also escalatory, is likewise unfeasible because of the logistical difficulty of implementation in a 

dynamic commercial world. 

Instead, as China works to deny U.S. forces an ability to operate close to the mainland, the U.S. 

aim at a minimum should be to deny China the ability to resolve territorial and maritime disputes 

by the use of force. To resolve disputes conclusively, China would have seize and hold territory 

and also resupply its torces. This is inherently dimcult on small islands, where geography 

imposes vulnerability. To demonstrate that China cannot achieve this, and thereby deter it from 

ever trying, the U.S. and its allies should maximize disruption capabilities--their own form of 

A2/AD. The U.S. should therefore develop, deploy, and demonstrate in a measured, targeted 

fashion the ability to deny China the ability to seize and hold offshore territories. Here, some 
41 

pages can be taken from China's own playbook. Modem military capabilities are based on a 

complex systcm of hardware and software. Amid this, certain platforms and weapons offer 

disproportionate benefits, including submarines, missiles, and naval mines. 

11 

A tight fiscal environment and threat timeline will place a premium on deploying and 

maintaining existing platforms and weapons systems with proven technologies in limited 

numbers as rapidly and effectively as possible. In this regard, the most promising approach is to 

hold and build on formidable U.S. undersea advantages, to which China or any other potential 

opponent lacks effective countermeasures and would have to invest vastly-disproportionate 

resources in a slow, likely futile effort to close the gap. Viewed in this light, it is essential to 

ensure the present two-a-year construction rate of Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack 

submarines (SSNs)-ideal for denying China the ability to hold and resupply any forcefully 

seized islands. The Virginia Payload Module allows for useful increases in missile capacity. 

Given China's ongoing limitations in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and the inherent difficulty 

of progressing in this field, China could spend many times the cost of these SSNs and still not be 

able to counter them effectively. 

Additionally, more can be done to better equip U.S. platforms, such as submarines. The U.S. 

should do far more with missiles, particularly anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Recent tests of 

the long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM) represent a step in the right direction, but more ought 

to be done in this regard. Offensive naval mine warfare is another underexploited area that offers 

maximum bang for the buck. 

U.S. submarines can oppose any Chinese naval forces engaged in invasion, resupply, and 

protection. Long-range air or missile delivery can blow any lodgment otT disputed islands or 

rocks. To be sure, both U.S. SSNs and LRASMs and Chinese A2/AD forces could achieve denial 

effects. Long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and air-to-air missiles from both sides might 

hold operations in the air over the features in question at risk, prevent continuous operations, or 

even fully create a "No Man's Land." U.S. forces, other than SSNs, might not be able to operate 

without assuming great risk, and hence be denied unfettered access. But Chinese forces would 

also not have access, and would also be denied their objective of seizing and holding disputed 

territory. It might not be necessary to defeat China militarily; preventing it from achieving its 

objectives would suffice. Demonstrating this to China would be an effective detelTent: Beijing 

could not afford to risk the likelihood of not achieving its objective. 

To maintain a successful presence in the region and maximize its ability to influence Chinese 

behavior in a positive direction, the U.S. will also have to address other important challenges in 

its policy and with allies, friends, and partners: 

Maintain and Maximize Alliances ami Partnerships. As central as these U.S. actions are, they 

will not be sufficient. Deepening and modernizing Asia-Pacific alliances and security 

partnerships is likewise critical. Alliances with five treaty allies--Australia, Japan, the 
42 

12 

Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand-are at the heart of the U.S. security presence in the 

Asia-Pacific. Three key strategic relationships-with Singapore, India, and Indonesia-must he 

nurtured carefully and consistently over time. Due to its colonial history, India is particularly 

resistant to outside pressure. With the exception of China, all maritime nations welcome U.S. 

presence. U.S. has distinct advantages, including "honest broker" credibility for lack of territorial 

claims. China's neighbors simply to not want to be forced to "take sides" openly, given their 

vulnerability vis-ii-vis, and reliance on trade with, China. What they fear most, after the threat of 

Chinese coercion, is lack of U.S. commitment to, or capability in, the region. The U.S. must 

therefore demonstrate that commitment and capacity, particularly the ability to persist amid 

growing Chinese A21 AD capabilities. It is not only the militaries and intelligence communities of 

key regional nations that make policy; in fact, they are sometimes marginalized in decisionmaking amid competing bureaucracies and priorities. Moreover, public opinion plays an 

increasingly important role. Therefore, counter-A21 AD capabilities must not only be proven to 

those in the region with a security clearance (whether in China or one of its neighbors); they 

must also be proven in some form to other actors and even the public more broadly. 

Yet U.S military influence and operations have not fully demonstrated the ability to persist amid 

Chinese A2/AD challenges. Naval influence and operations remain untested in the age oflongrange, large-scale missile threats. If ships become viewed increasingly as targets, overburdened 

U.S. taxpayers may ask increasingly what port calls and naval diplomacy actually accomplish. 

That, in tum, would undermine support critical to sustain rebalancing. Ideally, therefore, 

demonstrations of enduring capability could be tailored, e.g., to assure allies and deter Chinese 

leaders while not overly exciting the Chinese populace. An excellent example of an action so 

ideally targeted in its effect, was the simultaneous Asian port calls by multiple 7'h Fleet 

submarines in July 2010: USS Michigan in Pusan; USS Ohio in Subic Bay, and USS Florida in 

Diego Garcia. It is extremely important to engage in such credible actions in the future, and 

y okosuka is another important port of call. The U.S. must not be outmaneuvered by Chinese 

attempts to declare new "norms." It is much easier for Beijing to argue that activities should not 

be restarted than that they be ceased. 

Adapt Aging Alliances. Demographic decline will challenge Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan's 

investment in military capabilities and willingness to contribute. Japan-South Korea bilateral 

cooperation should be encouraged to the extent that lingering historical grievances will permit, 

particularly regarding intelligence sharing and missile defense. Perhaps the U.S. military can 

playa useful "convening" role. India, a rare source of excellent demographics, will be a 

constrained but useful partner. It will be important to establish and maintain a growing set of 

connections and exchanges as a particularly large and robust coalition of many ad hoc coalitions 

to further a variety of cooperative efforts in the region. The U.S. should help to India expand its 

presence in the Asia-Pacific maritime region, as part of a larger effort to help ensure that no one 

power can dominate it and thereby coerce its neighbors, a principle that is broadly appealing. 
43 

13 

Address "Ambivalent Alignment. " Politics of American security ties in post-authoritarian East 

Asian societies require special attention from Washington. Throughout Cold War alliance history, 

the U.S. cooperated with the authoritarian governments then in power as key military allies, thus 

becoming embroiled in complex struggles over national identity playing out in democratic 

politics today. From a U.S. pcrspective, the goal was defend maritime East Asia from 

communism's dead-end devastation and thereby stem the spread of that destructive ideology, 

which is documented to have killed tens of millions in China alone, in addition to millions of 

others around the world. In a common pattern, populist political opposition, repressed under 

former authoritarian/colonial rule, finally achieves power and seeks policies to overturn elite 

power structures domestically, strengthen national identity symbolically, and put military 

relations with the U.S. on more "equal" terms. However understandable in principle, in practice 

this typically results in political paralysis, deterioration in relations with Washinf,rton, and 

exploitation by the nation whose earlier threats helped to motivate the allianee in the first place. 

Examples have appeared in South Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, and even Japan. In 

South Korea, this was complicated by war, national division, and regional identity; in the 

Philippines, by America's colonial legacy. While the U.S. ended its alliance with the Republic of 

China in 1980, and it does not enjoy status as a sovereign nation, local politics today exhibits 

many similar dynan1ics thanks to similar historical factors. In a certain respect, parallel patterns 

have manifested themselves in Indonesia as well, given its long and convoluted history of 

relations with the U.S. This included clear long-term U.S. support for Suharto, and a perception 

that Washington suddenly withdrew support in 1998-99, just as Indonesia was transitioning to 

democracy. Even in Japan, a robust democracy since the beginning of the post-war era, distantly 

related factors appeared at work during an earlier administration. 

It is thus imperative for Washington to be sensitive to domestic issues in host nations. U.S. 

basing issues will continue to be sensitive in this era of dynamic change in domestic politics; for 

example, the Japanese districts with the highest crime rates are those surrounding U.S. bases. 

While the U.S. military rightly remains studiously apolitical, by viItue of basing in and 

cooperation with allied nations, it cannot avoid operating in host nations' domestic sphere. To 

address these challenges, the U.S. needs to be sensitive to historical grievances and symbolism, 

particularly vis-a-vis basing issues. It must maintain robust connections and dialogue with actors 

across the political spectrum in each of its allies. 

Promote Foreign Militarv Sales (FMS) Systematically to Enhance Interoperabilitv and 

Bilateral Ties. This will be essential to preserving U.S. military shipbuilding in an era of 

austerity. It is also a potent way to build and maintain connections with existing allies and 

potential new partners. China is likely to pursue this route increasingly; the U.S. would be ill 

advised to pass up the opportunity to maintain predominance in this area. For example, U.S.-

Myanmar military connections can be strcl1f,rthened through FMS, in part to limit reliance on 

purchases from China. Given its recent opening and ongoing effort to diversify away from 
44 

14 

exclusive reliance on China, Myanmar may represent a particularly FMS window of opportunity 

for the U.S. 

Facilitate Development of Maritime Law Enforcement Forces for Regional Allies and 

Partners. China's rapid, broad-based development ofMLE forces is giving it tremendous 

regional coverage, signaling, and escalation options. It enjoys an entire "rung" of escalation that 

others largely lack. As the recent incident at Scarborough Shoal demonstrated, the Philippines 

was handicapped its interaction with China there by not having an equivalent to China's MLE 

vessels that it could deploy there. Facilitating development of China's neighbors MLE forces 

could help limit Chinese coercion while reducing the risk of escalation-both important 

objectives. 

Help and Encourage Allies and Friends to Develop Defensive Capabilities. Mine 

countermeasures (MCM) and defensive mine laying capabilities should be emphasized in 

cooperation with Japan and South Korea. They can be bolstered as part of a "porcupine strategy" 

for the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan. MCM proticiency can be enhanced with Singapore. 

Pursue Partnerships with Extra-regional Allies. Coordination with European allies as 

potentially useful partners in the rebalance and leveraging NATO offers underexplored potential. 

Over the past several centuries, Euro-American power, influence, institutions, and norms have 

truly flowed with the sea power that spread and supported them. Now, as the international 

economic, political and military balances converge in the Asia-Pacific, more than hal f a 

millennium of power and influence that has supported Western-originated interests, ideas, nonus, 

and rules can no longer be taken for granted. Shall they now be permitted to ebb away? 

Legal disputes in the South China Sea are prime examples of the enormous potential for U.S.-EU 

cooperation to uphold international security norms in the Asia-Pacific. Both sides disagree with 

Beijing's legal stance on territorial claims in the South China Sea. A longer-term issue for the 

U.S. and EU is the risk that the international norms they have developed could be undermined if 

China exploits 'legal warfare' and rallies support to pressure the UN to alter UNCLOS and other 

international security mechanisms over time. Cyber security represents an additional field in 

which improvements in U.S.-EU policy alignment are increasingly imperative. More direct 

capability development cooperation between the U.S. and EU countries would help both sides 

defend against future attacks. NATO already has strong cyber intelligence capabilities, which 

could potentially be shared with allies in the Asia-Pacific. Space development is another strategic 

plane where the 'Tyranny of Distance' does not apply and where both sides have a stake in 

enhanced coordination. Beijing's advocacy o1'a multilateral treaty focused on constraining inspace, but not ground-based, weapons deployment contributes to China's counter-space 

aspirations and simultaneously undermines current U.S. and EU plans. Other possible areas of 

cooperation include coordination with the UK regarding the Five Power Alliance and sharing of 

regional facilities. The U.S. should continue cooperation with the UK vis-a-vis Diego Garcia, 

encourage UK to station SSN(s) in Asia-Pacific in return for U.S. basing access (e.g., in Guam), 
45 

and welcome reciprocal access and visits between U.S. and French regional forces (e.g., at 

France's bases in South Pacific and Indian Ocean). 

Finally, as the U.S. works to engage with China and shape its behavior in a positive direction, 

several principal approaches are in order. 

15 

• Encourage reduction in Chinese 'free-riding' in international system. The essence oru.s. 

concern with respect to Chinese Far Seas operations should not be an "overactive" China, but 

rather a "selfish superpower" China that husbands its military energies for coercing its 

neighbors. 

• Expand international cooperation as feasible. A key question for U.S.-China relations will 

be to what extent the two Pacific powers can broaden cooperation in the Far Seas amid 

ongoing differences in the Near Seas. Given China's Near Seas focus, this question will be 

answered largely in Beijing. 

• Welcome constructive Chinese contributions, don't [lXate on form. In keeping with its 

imperative to prioritize interests, the U.S. should showflexibility vis-a-vis Chinese actions 

that are largely positive. Washington should anticipate Beijing's hesitancy to simply integrate 

into Western-established security mechanisms (e.g., Combined Task Force/CTF -151) and 

look for ways to deepen cooperation incrementally through other mechanisms, such as 

Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE). 

I The views expressed here are solely those of the author. and in no way represent the policies or estimates ofthe 

U.S. Navy or any other of the U.S. government. They draw on his previous scholarship, which is 

avai lable at ~""":ms~0!.9:Jf.1j2Q1l&.filll: 

1 By "'physics-based," 1 mean that the Chinese have identified. and are exploiting, limitation in U.S. weapons 

systems that stem from restrictions on fundamental physical principals. For example, quiet diesel submarines will 

always be difficult to detect. track and kill. Fixed targets like airbases will always bc difficult to defend against 

ballistic missiles. 

3 Graham Alison and Robert D. Blackwill, with Ali Wyne, Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, 

United States. and the World (Cambridge. MA: MIT Press, 2013), 35. 

5 Peter A. Dutton, "Caelum Liberam: Air Defense ldentification 

Journal (){ International Law l:9 (2009), )mp"""!\~,\:}j',"l!eIm:l~,'ltl!l~<;§",,"m£h::c="~)nlllin:g/1:lliI:l,]=l~1jJJritj!QJg::3tl,,",1~,",: 
46 

Associate Professor IIJ~li 

China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) ,*,OOifij~liIfllpJT 

Fax: (401) 841-4161 

Email: andrew.erickson@usnwc.edu 

Dr. Andrew S_ Erickson is an Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department 

at the U.S. Naval War College and a core founding member of the department's China 

Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). He is an Associate in Research at Harvard 

University's John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies (2008-). Erickson also serves 

as an expert contributor to the Wall Street Jouma{s China Real Time Report (<1'Iii!l~S:H~ 

). In spring 2013, he deployed as a Regional Security Education Program scholar aboard 

the USS Nimitz (CVN68), Carrier Strike Group 11. 

Erickson is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. In 2012, the National Bureau of Asian Research 

awarded Erickson the inaugural Ellis Joffe Prize for PLA Studies. During academic year 2010-11, Erickson was 

a Fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program in residence at Harvard's Fairbank Center. From 

2008-11, he was a Fellow in the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations' Public Intellectuals Program, and 

served as a scholar escort on a five-Member Congressional trip to Beijing, Qingdao, Chengdu, and Shanghai. 

In addition to advising a wide range of student research, Erickson has taught courses at the Naval War College and 

Yonsei University, and has lectured extensively at government, academic. and private sector institutions throughout 

the United States and Asia. He has briefed the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and his Executive Panel, as well as 

the Secretary of the Navy. Erickson previously worked for Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) as a 

Chinese translator and technical analyst. He has also worked at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, the U.S. Consulate in 

Hong Kong, the U.S. Senate, and the White House. Proficient in Mandarin Chinese and Japanese, he has traveled 

extensively in Asia and has lived in China, Japan, and Korea. 

Erickson received his Ph.D. and MA in international relations and comparative politics from Princeton University and 

graduated magna cum laude from Amherst College with a BA in history and political science. He has studied 

Mandarin in the Princeton in Beijing program at Beijing Normal University's College of Chinese Language and Culture 

and Japanese language, politics, and economics in the year-long Associated Kyoto Program at Doshisha University. 

Erickson's research, which focuses on Asia-Pacific defense, international relations, technology, and resource issues, 

has been published widely in edited volumes and in such peer-reviewed journals as China 

Quarterly (forthcoming), Asian Security, Journal of Strategic Studies, OrNs, and China Security; as well as 

in Foreign Affairs, Joint Force Quarterly, The National Interest, The American Interest, Foreign Policy, and China 

International Strategy Review (<1' Iii!llii!lli,j; ,,~mil W l{~). 

Erickson is coeditor of, and a contributor to, the five-volume Naval Institute Press book series, "Studies in Chinese 

Maritime Development," comprising Chinese Aerospace Power (2011), China the U.S. and 21st Centurv Sea 

Power (2010), China Goes to Sea (2009), China's Enerav Strategy(2008), and China's Future Nuclear Submarine 

Force (2007); as well as the Naval War College Newport Paper China's Nuclear Force Modernization (2005). He is 

the author of the Jamestown Foundation monograph Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development (2013) and 

coauthor of the CMSI monographs Chinese Anti-Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden (forthcoming 2013) 

and Chinese Mine Warfare (2009). Erickson has also published annotated translations of several Chinese articles on 

maritime strategy. 

Erickson is co-founder of China SignPosfTM il'l!\'l<1'1ii!l a research newsletter and web 

portal that covers key developments in Greater China, with particular on strategic commodities, trade, and 

security factors. Links to this, and his other publications, can be found at China Analysis from Original Sources ~)lI'l 

-'f.ij'fNDlljE1'rj~ (www.andrewerickson.com). a website that posts and curates analyses, many based on Chineselanguage sources not previously assessed by foreign observers, to offer insights into China and its impact on the 

world .. 

Specialties 

China's military and foreign policy 

Japan/Asia-Pacific security and international relations 

Chinese defense science, technology, and industry 

Maritime and aerospace technology development, history and current status 

Energy, resources, and geostrategy 

Military basing and power prOjection 

Sino-American relations and contemporary policy issues 
47 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

UNTIL RELEASED BY 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

STATEMENT OF 

RONALD O'ROURKE 

SPECIALIST IN NAVAL AFFAIRS 

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

ON 

U.S. ASIA-PACIFIC STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO 

PLA NAVAL FORCES MODERNIZATION 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

UNTIL RELEASED BY 

DECEMBER 11,2013 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
48 

Chairman Forbes. Ranking Member Mcintyre, Representative Hanahusa. and other distinguished 

members of the suhcommittee, thank you for the oppormnity to appear before you today to discuss U.S. 

Asia-Pacific strategic considerations related to China's naval modernization effort. 

As part of my work as a naval issues analyst at CRS, I have been tracking developments relating to 

China's naval forces since 1984. In 2005, I initiated a CRS report on China's naval modernization effort 

and its implicationsfor U.S. Navy capabilities.' The report was first issued in November 2005 and has 

since been updated more than 90 times, most recently on Septemher 30. The report currently runs 119 

pages and includes a wealth of data and discussion on China's naval modernization effort. This statement 

draws from that report and makes additional observations in connection with the specific topic of this 

hearing. 

China's forces for influencing events in the Asia-Pacific region include not only the PLA Navy, but also 

China's newly reorganized Coast Guard and land-based Chinese military forces that are not part of the 

PLA Navy or China's Coast Guard, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based 

surt'acc-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based air force aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles 

(ASCMs), and land-based long-range radars for detecting and tracking ships at sea. For convenience, this 

statement uses the term China's naval modernization effort to refer to its effort for modernizing alJ these 

forces. 

Some Top-Level U.S. Strategic Considerations 

Top-level U.S, strategic considerations related to China's naval modernization effort include, among 

other things, the following: 

preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another; 

preserving the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II; 

fulfilling U.S. treaty ohligations; 

shaping the Asia-Pacific region; and 

having a military strategy for China. 

Each of these is discussed briefly below. 

Preventing Emergence of A Regional Hegemon 

In response to the United States' location in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. policymakers for the last 

several decades have chosen to pursue. as a kcy clement of U.S. national strategy. a goal of preventing the 

emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another, on the grounds that such a hegemon 

could deny the United States access to important resources and economic activity. Although U.S. 

policymakers do not often state this key national strategic goal explicitly in public, U.S. military 

operations in recent decades-both wartime operations and day-to-day operations-have been carried out 

in no small part in support of this key goal. Consequently, a potential key question {()r Congress to 

consider is whether China's naval modernization eff0l1 forms part of a hroader Chinese effort to become a 

regional hegemon, and if so, how the United States should respond. 

I CRS Report RL33 153, China Naml Modernizatitm: Implicationsjbr U.S. Navy Capabilities-Background and Issues for 

Congress, oy Ronald O'Rourke. 
49 

Preserving the U.S.-Led International Order 

A second top-level U.S. strategic consideration concerns the implications that developments involving 

China, including its naval forces. may have for preserving the U.S.-led international order that has 

operated since World War II. Key characteristics of this order include, among other things, a rules- and 

norms-based system grounded in international law, the use of intcrnationallaw and other non-coercive 

mechanisms for resolving disputes, market-based economies and free trade, broadly defined global 

commons at sea and in the air, and freedom of operations in international waters and airspace. This 

international order has henefitted not only the United States and its allies, but many other countries as 

well, induding China. Consequently. a second potential key question for Congress to consider is whether 

China's naval modernization effort forms part of a broader Chinese effort to rewrite one or more elements 

of the post-World War II international order, at least for the Asia-Pacific region, and if so. how the United 

States should respond. 

It is important to note that a Chinese effOli to rewrite one or more elements of the international order in 

the Asia-Pacific might have implications that go well beyond the Asia-Pacific. International Jaw. for 

example, is universal in its application, so a change in its application in the Asia-Pacific region would 

imply a change in its applkation globally. If China, for example, were to succeed in an effort to gain 

international acceptance of its view that it, as a coastal state, has the right to regulate the activities of 

foreign military forces operating in its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), that would have 

important implications not only for U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific. but for U.S. military 

operations around the world.2 

Fulfilling U.S. Treaty Obligations 

A third top-level U.S. strategic consideration concerns the potential implications of China's naval 

modernization effort for the United States in terms of the current and future ability of the United States to 

fulfill its obligations to treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly Japan, South Korea, and the 

Philippines, and its obligations 10 Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Acl (P.L. 96-8 of April 10, 1979). 

This, too, is an issue that could have implications that go heyond the Asia-Pacific region, because a 

failure to fulfill such ohligations in the Asia-Pacific region, or uncertainty among third-party observers 

regarding the U.S. ability or will to fulfill them, could lead to uncertainly among observers regarding the 

U.S. ability or will to fulfill obligations to countries in other parts of the world. 

Shaping the Asia-Pacific Region 

A fourth top-level U.S. strategic consideration for Congress concerns the implications that China's naval 

modernization effort may have for shaping the future of the Asia-Pacific region. Some observers consider 

a military conflict involving the United States and China to be very unlikely, in part because of signiilcant 

U,S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both 

sides. In the absence of such a confHct, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Asia-Pacific 

region could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Asia-Pacific countries, including 

choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, 

decisions by policymakers regarding U.S. Navy and other DOD programs (as well as other measures, 

including possibly non-military ones) for countering improved Chinese naval forces could influence the 

political evolution of the Asia-Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue 

goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere. 

Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving 

China: /s.lUesfor Congress. by 
50 

Having a Military Strategy for China 

A fifth top-level U.S. strategic consideration for Congress is whether the United States has a military 

strategy ror deterring or defeating China. Some ohservers have questioned whether the United States has 

such a strategy.' The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept is not a such strategy, and does not purport to he 

one--it is, rather, a concept for countering anti-access/area-dcnial (A21 AD) forces (such as those being 

fielded by China) that could be used to help implement a strategy. 

Overview of China's Naval Modernization Effort! 

China's naval modernization effort appears aimed at producing a regionally powerful navy with a limited 

but growing abilHy to conduct operations in more distant waters. The paragraphs helow provide an 

overview of China's naval modernization effort. 

Date of Inception 

Ohservers date the beginning of China's naval modernization effort to various points in the 1990s.5 

Design work on the first of China's newer ship classes appears to have begun in the later 1980s.6 Some 

ohservers believe that China's naval modernization effort may have been reinforced or accelerated by a 

1996 incident in which the United States deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups to waters near Taiwan 

in response to Chinese missile tests and naval exercises near Taiwan.' 

J See, 

off its coa"t. The ASB office public document does not 

Department acknowledges the challenge of China's anti-access efforts, we have no strategy to defeat it nor does there 

appear to be a plan to constrllct one. 

See also TX. Hammes. "A Military Strategy to Deter China," Real Clear D<iensc (1'I'.nr,RealClcarD4cll.'ic,com), December L 

2013, which states that 

fl First-in-class ships whose keels were laid down in 1990 or 1991 (see previolls footnote) likely reflect design work done in the 

latter J 980s. 
51 

4 

Elements of Modernization Effort 

China's naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including 

programs for anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise 

missiles (LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft, submarines, 

aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, patrol craft, amphibious ships, mine countermeasures 

(MCM) ships, underway replenishment ships, hospital ships, and supporting C4ISR8 systems. China's 

naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval 

doctrine, personnel quality, education and training. and exercises,9 

For actual and projected numbers of Chinese ships and aircraft, sec the tables presented in the appendix 

to this statement. 

Limitations and Weaknesses 

Although China's naval modernization ctTort has substantially improved China's naval capabilities in 

recent years, observers believe China's navy continues to exhibit limitations or weaknesses in several 

areas, including capabilities for sustained operations by larger formations in distant waters, 10 joint 

operations with other parts of China's military,11 antisubmarine warfare (ASW), MCM. a dependence on 

foreign suppliers for some ship propulsion systems, 12 and a lack of operational experience in comhat 

situations. U 

The sufficiency of a country's naval capabilities is best assessed against that navy's intended missions. 

Although China's navy has limitations and weaknesses, it may nevertheless be sufficient for performing 

certain missions of interest to Chinese leaders. As China's navy reduces its weaknesses and limitations, it 

may become sufficient to perform a wider array of potential missions. 

Goals of Naval Modernization Effort 

Capabilities for Taiwan Scenarios, Including Acting as An AZ/AD Force 

DOD and other observers helieve that a ncar-term focus of China's military modernization effort, 

including its naval modernization effmi. has been to develop military options for addressing the situation 

g C41SR stands for command and control, communications. computers. intelligence. surveillance. and reconnaissance. 

and exercises, see Office of N<1Vullntclligence, The 

Clumu·tenisti<·s. Suitland (MD), Office of Naval Intelligence. 

sized force, several battalions of ground forces or a naval 

from China. will hlY the foundation for a 

However, it is unlikely that China will 

China prior to 2020." {2UI I DOD CMSD, p. 

II DOD stated in 2011 

foreign suppliers for some [ship] propu}"ion units, 

J.l DOD stated in 2010 that "the PLA remains untested in modem combat. 

complicate outside a~scssment of the progress of China'" military transformation, 
52 

with Taiwan. 14 Consistent with this goal, observers helieve that China wants its military to be capable of 

acting as an A2/AD force~a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or 

failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. 

ASBMs, attack submarines, and supporting C4lSR systems are viewed as key clements of China's 

emerging maritime A2/AD force, though other force elements~such as ASCMs, LACMs (for attacking 

U.S. air bases and other facilities in the Western Pacific), and mines-are also of significance. IS 

China's emerging maritime A2/AD force can be viewed as broadly analogous to the sea-denial force that 

the Soviet Union developed during the Cold War to deny U.S. use of the sea or counter U.S. forces 

participating in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. One potential difference between the Soviet sea-denial 

force and China's emerging mati time A2/AD force is that China's force includes ASBMs capable of 

hitting moving ships at sea. 

China's emerging maritime A21 AD force can also support additional Chinese goals not directly related to 

Taiwan, including those discussed in the next section. 

Additional Goals Not Directly Related to Taiwan 

DOD and other observers believe that China's military modernization effort. including its naval 

modernization effort, is increasingly oriented toward pursuing additional goals not directly related to 

Taiwan, including the following: 

asserting or defending China's territorial claims in the South China Sea and East China 

Sea;16 

enforcing China's view-a minority view among world nations-that it has the legal 

right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-nautical-mile maritime exclusive 

economic zone (EEZ); 17 

protecting China's sea lines of communications, including those running through the 

Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf, on which China relies for much of its energy irnports; 

protecting and evacuating Chinese nationals living and working in foreign countries; 

displacing U.S. influence in the Pacific; and 

asserting China's status as a major world power. 

A Possible Overarching Goal of Gaining Greater Control of the Near Seas Region 

and Breaking Out Into the Pacific 

A range of Chinese actions in recent years-including the modernization of its navy and coast guard. its 

actions for asserting and defending China's tenitorial and EEZ claims in the South China Sea and East 

China Sea, and its recent announcement of an air defense identifIcation zone (ADIZ) for the East China 

is ror further discussion, see. for example, 2013 DOD CMSD. pp. 32, 34-35. 

16 Par marc on China's territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. see CRS Report R42784. Maritime Territorial a/Td 

by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report R42930. 

Shirley A. Kan. und Mark E. Manyin. 

Territorial and Exclllsin' 
53 

6 

Sea~has suggested to some observers that China is pursuing an ovcrarching goal of gaining greater 

control of China's ncar-seas region (meaning the waters, land features, and airspace of the Yellow Sea, 

East China Sea, and South China Sea-that is, the area inside the so-called first island chain), and of 

breaking out into the Pacific.!S There is debate among observers regarding China's goals and strategy for 

the near-seas region, but if China were to achieve a position of being able to exert control over access. to, 

and activities within, this region, it would have major implications for the top-level U.S. strategic 

considerations outlineu at the beginning of this statement: it would constitute a major step toward China 

becoming a regional hegemon, pose a significant challenge to the preservation of the post-World War II 

international order, and substantially complicate the ability of the United States to fulfill treaty obligations 

to countries in the region and shape the region's future. II would amount to a fundamental reordering of 

the security situation of the Asia-Pacinc. 

Some Observations on the U.S. Response To China's Naval 

Modernization Effort 

Below are some observations on the U.S. response to China's naval modernization effort, particularly as it 

relates to U.S. Navy programs. 

Funding for Programs 

Many observers, viewing constraints on U.S. defense spending levels that could result from the Budget 

Control Act or other legislation. have expressed doubts about the prospective ability to fully fund Navy 

and other DOD programs for implementing the military pillar of the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the 

Asia-Pacific. In a situation of reduced levels of defense spending, such as what would occur if defense 

spending were to remain constrained to the revised cap levels in the Budget Control Act, the challenge of 

fully funding these programs would be intensified. Even so, the challenge would not necessarily be 

insurmountable, particularly jf these programs were given priority in the DOD resource-allocation 

process. and if actions beyond those now heing implemented by DOD were taken to control military 

personnel pay and benefits and reduce what some observers refer to as DOD's overhead or back-office 

costs. 

Fully funding the Navy's current 3D-year shipbuilding plan in coming years, for example, would require 

shifting to the Navy's shipbuilding account 1.5% or less of what DOD's total budget would be under the 

revised caps of the Budget Control Act. rully funding the Department of the Navy's (DaN's) total budget 

as shown in the FY2014 budget submission would require shifting to the DoN budget 4% or 5% of what 

DOD's total budget would be under the revised caps of the Budget Control In a context of giving 

priority to the strategic rebalancing, such budget shifts would appear feasible. 

10 for further di<';CllssioJl. see Statement of Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, COlngn,,,jlJllai 

the House Armed Services Committee, Suhcommittee on 

Shipbuilding Plall. October 23. 2013. pp. 1-4. 
54 

7 

Forward-Deployed Ships 

Responding to China's naval modernization effort can focus attention on options for enhancing the 

number of forward-deployed ships that the U.S. Navy can maintain in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly 

if constraints on defense spending limit the size of the Navy to something less than the Navy's 306-ship 

force-level goa1. Such options include lengthening deployments, making greater use of multiple crewing 

and crew rotation, and making more use of overseas homeporting and/or overseas stationing of ships. 

Although these options can enhance the Navy's number of forward-deployed ships. they also have 

potential costs in terms of impact on Navy ship crews, impact on ship maintenance and material 

condition, and (for ships homcported or stationed in foreign ports) potential host-nation limits on how the 

ships can be used. 

Countering Maritime A2/AD Weapons 

Some observers, viewing China's growing maritime AllAD capahilities, have posited that these weapons 

will at some point compel U.S. Navy surface ships to remain olltside China's A2/AD perimeter. Doing 

that would, among other things, reduce the Navy's ahility to conduct forward-deployed deterrence, 

reassurance, and engagement operations in the Asia-Pacific. which could lead to doubts among thirdparty observers about the U.S. ability or willingness to fulfill its treaty ohligations to countries in the 

region and reduce U.S. options [or shaping the region's future. It is far from dear, however, that U.S. 

Navy surface ships will be compelled at some point to remain outside China's rnaritime A2/AD 

perimeter, as the Navy has numerous options at its disposal for breaking the kill chains of China's 

maritime A2/AD weapons (I.e., for disrupting the sequence of actions that China would need to complete 

to successfully employ these weapons). 

Much of the discussion about U.S. Navy surface ships possibly heing compelled at some point to remain 

outside China's A2/AD perimeter, for example, relates to China's ASBMs, which some observers have 

described as "game changers:' Although a new type of weapon like the ASBM might be described as a 

game changer, that docs not mean it Clmnot be countered. The ASBM is not the first ·'game changer" that 

the Navy has confronted; the Navy in the past has developed counters for other new types of weapons, 

such as ASCMs, and is likely exploring various approaches for countering ASBMs. 

Countering China's projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of active (i.e., "hard-kill") 

measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e., "soft-kill") 

measures, such as those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing ASBM reentry 

vehicles. Navy surface ships. for example, could operate in ways (such as controlling electromagnetic 

emissions or using deception emitters) that make it more dilficult for China to detect, identify, and track 

those ships.::o The Navy could acquire weapons and systems for disabling or jamming China's long-range 

maritime surveillance and targeting systems. for attacking ASBM launchers. {(" destroying ASBMs in 

various stages of !light, and for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets. 

Options for destroying ASBMs in night include developing and procuring improved versions of the SM-3 

BMD interceptor missile (including the planned Block IlA version of the SM-3), accelerating the 

acquisition of the Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) interceptor (the planned successor to the SM-2 Block IV 
55 

8 

terminal-phase BMD intcrccptor),21 accelerating development and deployment of the electromagnetic rail 

gun (EMRG), and accelerating the development and deployment of shipboard high-power free electron 

lasers (FELs) and solid state lasers (SSLs), Options for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach 

their intended targets include equipping ships with systems, such as electronic warfare systems or systems 

for generating radar-opaque smoke douds, that could confuse an ASBM's terminal-guidance radar.22 

Directed-Energy Weapons 

Directed-energy weapons such as the electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG) and high-power lasers could be 

the U.S. Navy's own "game changers" for countering Chinese air and missile systems, particularly in 

terms of dramatically reducing the Navy's cost per shot and substantially increasing the magazine depth 

of Navy surface ships. To field such systems, the Navy would need not on1y to continue their 

development, hut also procure ships with integrated electric drive systems or some other means of 

providing enough electrical power to support them, The Navy's shipbuilding plan currently does not 

include any surface combatants that wiH clearly have enough electrical power to support lasers with more 

than a certain amount of power.:?} 

Long-Range Aircraft and Weapons 

The geographic expanse of the Asia-Pacific region and the potential advantages of being able to outrange 

Chinese A2/AD systems when needed may focus attention on the option of acquiring long-range carrierbased aircraft such as the Unmanned Carrier Launched Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) aircraft and 

long-range weapons such as the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). Potential oversight issues for 

the subcommittee include whether the UCLASS will be designed to be capable of penetrating capable airdefense systems2

.J- and whether the Navy should also pursue the acquisition of a long-range air-to-air 

missile for carrier-based strike fighters. 25 

Submarines and Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) 

U.S. Navy attack submarines are considered capable of operating effectively in waters that arc well inside 

China's surface and air A2/AD perimeters. This can focus attention not only on the procurement of 

Virginia-class attack submarines, hut also on other options for expanding the capabilities of the attack 

2J For more on the SM-3. including the Block IlA version. and the SilT. see CRS 

Defense (EM])) Program: Badgrol1l1d and is.I'uesfi)r Congres,l, by 

Thomas 1. Clllora. ''The Strategic Implications of 

"Make Smoke!"' U.S. Naval [nstitute Proceedings, 

June 2011: 58-63. 

Specialist in 

Congressional Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection 

Forces, on the Navy's FY20{4 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. October 23, 2013, pp. 13-14. 

., USNl News 

(http://new.ulSnLorg),August29, 2013. 
56 

9 

suhmarine force, such as the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), submarine-launched unmanned air and 

underwater vehicles, and the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI) program [or upgrading the 

capabilities of existing Los Angeles c1ass attack suhmarines (which will continue to constitute a 

significant portion of the attack submarine neet into the 2020s). Conversely, China's suhmarine force can 

focus attention on U.S. Navy ASW capabilities and surface-ship torpedo-defense systems, induding the 

anti-torpedo torpedo (ATT), whieh could improve the Navy's ability to counter wake-homing torpedoes 

that might otherwise he difficult to countcr. 

Computers and the Electromagnetic Spectrum 

Responding to China's naval modernization effort can focus attention on Navy cyber capabilities, Navy 

electronic warfare programs, Navy networking capabilities (and, conversely, the ahility of Navy ships and 

aircraft to continue to operating effectively if networks arc degraded), and the ability of Navy systems to 

withstand electromagnetic pulse (EMP), 

Fleet Architecture 

The growth of Chinese (and Iranian) maritime A21AD capabilities has helped propel a debate about 

whether the U.S. Navy should shift from its current fleet architecture to a more-distributed architecture 

that would include fewer large surface ships (such as aircraft caITiers and large surface combatants) and 

greater numbers of smaller surface ships (such as smaller aircraft caITters and small surface combatants). 

Advocates of a more-distributed fleet architectllre~who appear to include, among others, analysts 

working at the Naval Postgraduate School~argue that a more-distributed architecture would offer 

benefits in terms of fleet affordability and effectiveness in countering adversaries who field capable 

maritime A2/AD systems. 27 The Navy and other supporters of the Navy's current fleet architecture 

disagree on both of these points. 

Participants on the two sides of this debate appear to proceed from differing or even contradictory views 

on underlying factors such as the likely effectiveness of adversary A2/AD weapons. the likely 

effectiveness of U,S, Navy systems [or countering them, the resulting likely survivability o[ Navy surface 

ships to attack from such weapons, and how the survivability of a ship changes as a function of ship sizc. 

Duc to differences on matters such as these, it can sometimes appear as if the two groups are almost 

talking past one another. 

One option for the subcommittee would be to attempt to understand why the two groups have come to 

such differing views on these underlying issues, Given the signitieantly different points of view of these 

two groups. and the potential stakes of this issue in terms of its implications for the Navy's program of 

record, this might qualify as a high-priority item for the subcommittee, 

2h For more on Report RL324J8, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack 

by Ronald O'Rourke. 
57 

10 

Activities Conducted by China's Coast Guard 

Many of China's actions for asserting and defending its maritime territorial claims in the East China Sea 

and South China Sea are being conducted by ships from China's Coast Guard (with PLA Navy ships over 

the horizon as potential hack-up forces). In the East China Sea, operations by Chinese Coast Guard ships 

for asserting and defending China's maritime territorial claims are being countered hy Japanese Coast 

Guard ships. In the eastern and southern portions of the South China Sea, in contrast, operations hy 

Chinese Coast Guard for asserting and defending China's maritime territorial claims often go uncountered 

by equivalent Philippine forces, because the Philippines has relatively few such ships. To the extent that 

gradual consolidation of Chinese control over parts of the Spratly islands and other South China Sea 

features such as Scarborough Shoal would affect U.S. interests connecting back to the top-level U.S. 

strategic considerations discussed at the beginning of this statement, policymakers may wish to consider 

the option of accelerating actions for expanding and modernizing the Philippines' maritime defense and 

law enforcement capabilities. 

Cooperation With China in Maritime Operations 

None of the foregoing precludes the United States from pursuing opportunities to cooperate with China in 

maritime operations when and where the two countries have shared interests. Chinese forces continue to 

contribute to the international effort to counter piracy in waters orf Somalia, and in the future could 

contribute to anti-piracy operations in other locations as well. U.S. and Chinese naval forces might also 

cooperate in search-and-rescue operations and humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) 

operations. Such operations, plus Chinese participation in multilateral naval exercises (such as the next 

RIMPAC exercise) and interactions through multilateral fora such as the Western Pacific Naval 

Symposium (WPNS)" and the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF),29 could build trust and help 

reinforce compliance with rules for operating ships and aircraft safely in proximity to one another. 

Cooperative maritime operations might also provide an opportunity for demonstrating to China the 

benefits that China receives from the current international order, and China's consequent interest in 

preserving that order. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will pleased to respond to any questions the subcommittee 

may have. 
58 

11 

Appendix: Numbers of Chinese Ships and Aircraft; Comparisons to U.S. 

Navy 

This appendix, which is adapted from the CRS report on China's naval modernization effort and its 

implications for U.S. Navy capahilities, presents figures on actual and projected numbers of Chinese ships 

and naval aircraft and a discussion on comparing U.S. and Chinese and naval capabilities. 

Numbers Provided by ONI in 2013 

Table 1 shows figures provided by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 2013 on numbers of Chinese 

navy ships in 2000. 2005, and 2010, and projected figures for 2015 and 2020, along with the approximate 

percentage of ships within these figures considered hy ONI to be of modern design. 

Table I. Numbers ofPLA Navy Ships Provided by ONI in 2013 

Ship type 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 

Numbers 

Diesel attack submarines (SSs) 60 51 54 57 to 62 59 to 64 

Nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) 6 to a 6 to 9 

Ballistic missile submarines 3 to 5 4to5 

Aircraft carriers I to 2 

Destroyers 21 21 25 28 to 32 30 to 34 

Frigates 37 43 49 52 to 56 54 to 58 

Corvettes 20 to 25 24 to 30 

Amphibious ships 60 43 55 53 to 55 50 to 55 

Missile-armed coastal patrol craft 100 51 85 85 85 

Approximate percent of modern design 

Diesel attack submarines 40 50 70 75 

Nuclear-powered attack submarines 33 33 70 100 

Destroyers 20 40 50 70 85 

Frigates 25 35 45 70 85 

Source: Prepared by CRS using data from Craig Murray, Andrew Berglund, and Kimberly Hsu, China's Naval Modernization 

and Implications for the United States, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), August 26, 2013. 

Figures I through 4 on pp. 6-7. The source notes to Figures! through 4 state that the numbers and percentages "were 

provided by the US. Office of Naval Intelligence. U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, PLA Navy Orders of Battle 2000-2020, 

written response to request for information provided to the US.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 

Suitland, MD, June 24, 2013." Citing this same ONI document, the USCC publication states in footnotes on pages 6 and 7 

that "Modern submarines are those able to employ submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles or antiship cruise 

missiles," and that "Modern sulface ships are those able to conduct multiple missions or that have been extensively 

upgraded since 1992." 

Numbers Provided by ONI in 2009 

Table 2 shows figures provided by ONI in 2009 on numhers of Chinese navy ships and aircraft from 1990 

to 2009, and projected figures for 2015 and 2020. The figures in the tahle lump older and less capable 

ships together with newer and more capablc ships. The modern attack submarines, destroyers, and frigates 
59 

12 

shown below in Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 account for ahout half of the attack submarines, about half 

of the destroyers, and about 42% of the frigates shown in Table 2 for 2009, An August 2009 ONI report 

states that "as newer and more capahlc platforms replace aging platforms, the PLA(N),s total order of 

battle may remain relatively steady, particularly in regard to the surface force,"'" 

Table 2. Numbers of PLA Navy Ships and Aircraft Provided by ONI in 2009 

(Figures include both older and less capable units and newer and more capable units) 

Projection for Projection for 

t990 t995 2000 2005 2009 2015 2020 

Ships 

Ballistic missile submarines 4 or 5? 4 or S? 

Attack submarines (SSNs and SSs) 80 82 65 58 59 -70 -72 

SSNs 5 5 5 6 nfa nfa 

55, 75 77 60 52 53 nfa nfa 

Aircraft carriers 11 21 

Destroyers 14 18 21 25 26 -26 -26 

Frigates 35 35 37 42 48 -45 -42 

Subtotal above ships 130 136 124 127 136 -146 or -1471 -146 or -141? 

Missile-armed attack craft 200 165 100 75 80+ nfa nfa 

Amphibious ships 65 70 60 56 58 nfa nfa 

Large ships (LPDsILHDs) 0 0 0 I -6? -6? 

Smaller ships 65 70 60 56 57 nfa nfa 

Mine warfare ships nfa nfa nfa nfa 40 nfa nfa 

Major auxiliary ships nfa nfa nfa nfa 50 nfa nfa 

Minor auxiliary ships and support craft nfa nfa nfa nfa 250+ nfa nfa 

Aircraft 

Land-based maritime strike aircraft nfa nfa nfa nfa -145 -255 -258 

Carrier-based fighters -60 -90 

Helicopters nfa nfa nfa nfa -34 -153 -157 

Subtotal above aircraft nfa nfa nfa nfa -179 -468 -505 

Soul"ce: Prepared by CRS. Source for 2009, 2015. and 2020: 2009 ONI report. page 18 (text and table), page 2! (text), and 

(for figures not available on pages 18 or 21). page 45 (CRS estimates based on visual inspection of ONI graph entitled 

"Estimated PLA[N) Force Levels''). Source for 1990. 1995.2000. and 2005: Navy data provided to CRS by Navy Office of 

Legislative Affairs, July 9, 2010. 

Notes: n/a is not available. The use of question marks for the projected figures for ballistic missile submarines. aircraft. 

carriers, and major amphibious ships (LPDs and LHDs) for 2015 and 2020 reflects the difficulty of resolving these numbers 

visually from the graph on page 45 of the ONI report. The graph shows more major amphibious ships than balHstic missile 

submarines. and more ballistic missile submarines than aircraft carriers. Figures in this table for aircraft carriers include the 

Liaoning. The ONI report states on page J9 that China "willlikeJy have an operational. domestically produced carrier 

sometime after 2015." Such a ship. plus the Liaoning, would give China a force of 2 operational carriers sometime after 

2015. 

The graph on page 45 shows a combined total of amphibious ships and landing craft of about 244 in 2009. about 261 

projected for 2015. and about 253 projected for 2015. 

311 2009 ON! Report, p. 46. 
60 

13 

Since the graph on page 45 of the ONI report is entitled "Estimated PLA[N] Force Levels," aircraft numbers shown in the 

table presumably do not include Chinese air force (PLAAF) aircraft that may be capable of attacking ships or conducting 

other maritime operations. 

Numbers Presented in Annual DOD Reports to Congress 

Table 3 shows numbers of Chinese navy ships as presented in annual DOD reports to Congress on 

mjHtary and security developments involving China (previously known as the annual report on China 

military power). As with Table 2. the figures in Table 3 lump older and less capable ships together with 

newer and more capable ships. The modern attack submarines, destroyers, and frigates shown below in 

Table 4. Table 5, and Table 6 account for about half of the attack submarines, about half of the 

destroyers, and about 42% of the frigates shown in Table 3 for 2009. DOD stated in 20 II that the 

percentage of modern units within China's submarine force has increased from less than 10% in 2000 and 

2004 to about 47% in 2008 and 50% in 2009. and that the percentage of modern units within China's 

force of surface comhatants has increased from less than 10% in 2000 and 2004 to ahout 25% in 2008 and 

2009." 

DOD states that "The PLA Navy has the largest force of major combatants, submarines, and amphibious 

warfare ships in Asia. China's naval forces include some 79 principal surface combatants, more than 55 

submarines, 55 medium and large amphibious ships, and roughly 85 missile-equipped small 

combatants, ,,32 

Table 3. Numbers of PLA Navy Ships Presented in Annual DOD Reports to Congress 

(Figures include both older and less capable units and newer and more capable units) 

2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 

Nuclear-powered attack submarines nfa 

-60 Diesel attack submarines -60 - 50 nfa 51 50 53 54 54 54 49 48 

Destroyers -20 nfa 21 25 25 29 27 25 26 26 - 60 > 60 Frigates -40 nfa 43 45 47 45 48 49 53 53 

Missile-armed coastal patrol craft nfa - 50 - 50 nfa 51 45 41 45 70 85 86 86 

Amphibious ships: LST sand LPDs almost nfa 20 25 25 26 27 27 27 28 

50 -40 >40 Amphibious ships: LSMs nfa 23 25 25 28 28 28 28 23 

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on data in 2000-2013 editions of annual DOD report to Congress on military and 

security developments involving China (known for 2009 and prior editions as the report on China military power). 

Notes: n/a means data not available in report. LST means tank landing ship; LPD means transport dock ship; LSM 

means medium landing ship. 

,1\ 2011 DOD CMSD. p. 43 (figure). 

,22013 DOD CMSD, p. 6. 

2013 

49 

23 

52 

85 

29 

26 
61 

14 

Annual Numbers of New Submarines, Destroyers, and Frigates 

Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 present actual and projected figures on new Chinese navy suhmarines, 

destroyers, and frigates, respectively, entering service each year. For discussions of the ship classes listed 

in these tables, see the CRS report on China's naval modernization effort and its implications for US 

Navy capabilities. 

1995 

1996 

1997 

1998 

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 

2003 

2004 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

2014 

2015 

2016 

Table 4, PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings 

Actual (1995-20 I I) and Projected (20/2-20/6) 

Annual Cumulative 

Jin Shang Ming Song Yuan total total for 

(Type (Type Kilo S5 (Type (Type (Type for all Cumulative modern 

094) 093) (Russian- 035) 039) 039A) Qing types total for all attack 

55BN 55N made) 55- 55 55' 55 shown types shown boatsc 

2' 3 

II 

12 

15 

16 

18 

22 13 

29 20 

2' 36 27 

If 38 28 

38 28 

40 30 

42 31 

I, 46 35 

51 40 

nlo nla nlo nla nla 

nla nla nla nla nla 

nla nla nla nla nla 

/" nla nla nla nla nla 

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 20 12~20 13, and previous editions. 

Note: nfa = data not available. 

a Figures for Ming~c!ass boats are when the boats were launched (Le., put into the water for final construction). Actual 

commissioning dates for these boats may have been later. 

b Some observers believe the Yuan class to be a variant of the Song class and refer to the Yuan class as the Type 039A 

c This total excludes the Jin-class SSBNs and the Ming-class SSs. 

d jane's Fighting Ships 2012-2013 lists the commissioning date of one of the two Kilos as December 15, 1994. 

e No further units expected after the! 2th and 13th shown for 2006. 

f jane's Fighting Ships 2012-2013 states that production of the two Shang-class boats shown in the table is expected to be 

fonowed by production of a new SSN design known as the Type 095 class, of which a total of five are expected. A 

graph on page 22 of 2009 ONI Report suggests that ONI expects the first Type 095 to enter service in 2015, 

g It is unclear whether this is the lead ship of a new class, or a one-of-a-kind submarine built for test purposes. jane's 

Fighting Ships 2012-2013 refers to the boat as an auxiliary submarine (SSA). 
62 

15 

h A total of six Jin-class boats is expected by jane's. with the sixth unit projected to be commissioned in 2016. 

1994 

1995 

1996 

1997 

1998 

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 

2003 

2004 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

20/1 

2012 

2013 

2014 

Sovre~ 

menny 

(Russianmade) 

Luhu 

(Type 

052) 

Table 5. PLA Navy Destroyer Commissionings 

Actual (1994·20 I I) and Projected (2012·2014) 

Luhai 

(Type 

051B) 

Luyang I 

(Type 

052B) 

Lyugang II 

(Type 

052C) 

Louzhou 

(Type 

051C) 

Luyang 

III 

(Type 

0520) 

nla 

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 2012-2013, and previous editions. 

Annual 

total 

0 

0 

nla 

Cumulative 

total 

10 

12 

13 

13 

13 

13 

13 

14 

16 

nla 
63 

1991 

1992 

1993 

1994 

1995 

1996 

1997 

1998 

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 

2003 

2004 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

2009 

2010 

2011 

2012 

2013 

Table 6. PlA Navy Frigate Commissionings 

Actual (1991-2011) and Projected (20/2-20/3) 

Jiangwei I (Type 

053 H2G) 

Jiangwei II Jiangkai I 

(Type 053H3) (Type 054) 

Jiangkai II Annual Cumulative 

(Type 054A) total total 

4 

4 

10 

10 

12 

12 

12 

15 

16 

16 

20 

20 

23 

25 

27 

32 

Source: jane's Fighting Ships 20 12~20 13, and previous editions. 

Comparing U.S. and Chinese Naval Capabilities 

u.s. and Chinese naval capabilities are sometimes compared by showing comparative numbers of U.S. 

and Chinese ships. Although numbers of ships (or aggregate fleet tonnages) can be relatively easy to 

compile from published reference sources, they are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative 

U.S. and Chinese naval capabilities, for the following reasons: 

A fleet's total number of ships (or its aggregate tonnage) is only a partial metric 

of its capability. fn light of the many other significant contributors to naval 

capability:\J navies with similar numhers of ships or similar aggregate tonnages can 

have significantly different capabilities, and navy-lo-navy comparisons of numbers of 

ships or aggregate tonnages can provide a highly inaccurate sense of their relative 

capahilities. In recent years, the warfighting: capahilities of navies have derived 

increasingly from the sophistication of their internal electronics and software. This 

factor can vary greatly from one navy to the next, and often cannot be easily assessed 

16 
64 

by outside observation. As the importance of internal electronics and software has 

grown, the idea of comparing the warfighting capabilities of navles principal1y on the 

basis of easily ohserved factors such as ship numhers and tonnages has become 

increasingly less valid, and today is highly problcmatic. 

Total nnmbers of ships of a given type (such as submarines, destroyers, or 

frigates) can obscure potentially significant differences in the capabilities of 

those ships, both between navies and within one conntry's navy,'" The potential 

for obscuring differences in the capabilities of ships of a given type is particularly 

significant in assessing relative U.S. and Chinese capabilities, in part because China's 

navy includes significant numbers of older, obsolescent ships. Figures on total 

numbers of Chinese submarines, destroyers, frigates, and coastal patrol craft lump 

older, obsolescent ships together with more modern and more capable designs:'IS As 

mentioned earlier, DOD stated in 2011 that the percentage of modern units within 

China's submarine force has increased from less than 10% in 2000 and 2004 to 50% 

in 2008 and about 56% in 20 10, and that the percentage of modern units within 

China's force of surface combatants has increased from less than 10% in 2000 and 

2004 to about 25% in 2008 and 26% in 2010.'" This CRS report shows numbers of 

more modern and more capable submarines, destroyers, and frigates in Table 4, 

Table 5, and Table 6, respectively. 

A focus on total ship numbers reinforces the notion that increases in total 

numbers necessarily translate into increases in aggregate capability, and that 

decreases in total numbers necessarily translate into decreases in aggregate 

capability, For a Navy like China's, which is modernizing in some ship categories by 

replacing larger numbers of older, obsolescent ships with smaller numbers of more 

modern and more capablc ships, this is not necessarily the casco As shown in Table 2, 

1(" example. China's submarine force today has fewer boats than it did in 1990, but 

has greater aggregate capability than it did in 1990, because larger numbers of older, 

obsolescent boats have been replaced by smaller numbers of more modcrn and more 

capable boats. A similar point might be made about China's force of missile-armed 

attack craft. DOD states that "Since the 1990s, the PLA Navy has rapidly transformed 

[i'om a large fleet of low-capability, single-mission platforms, to a leaner ()rce 

equipped with more modern, multi-mission platforms."" The August 2009 ON! 

report states that "cven if [China's] naval force sizes remain steady or even decrease, 

overall naval capabilities can be expected to increase as forces gain multi mission 

capabilities.,,}R For assessing navies like China's, it can be more uscfuj to track the 

growth in numbers of more modern and more capable units. This CRS report shows 

numhers of more modern and more capahle submarines, destroyers. and frigates in 

Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6, respectively. 

issue, see Joseph Carrigan. "Aging Tigers, Mighty Dragons: China's bifurcated Surface Fleet" 

2-6. 

1

6 201 / DOD CMSD. p. 43 (figure). 

37 2011 DOD CMSD. p. 3. 

38 2009 ONI Report. p. 46. 

17 
65 

Comparisons of numbers of sbips (or aggregate tonnages) do not take into 

account maritime-relevant military capabilities tbat conntries migbt bave 

outside their navies, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs).landbased anti-ship cmise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based air force aircraft anned with 

ASCMs or other weapons. Given the significant maritime-relevant non-navy forces 

present in both the U.S. and Chinese militaries, this is a particularly important 

consideration in comparing U.S. and Chinese military capabilities for influencing 

events in the Western Pacific. Although a U.S.-China incident at sea might involve 

only navy units on hoth sides, a broader U.S.-China military conflict would more 

likely he a force-on-force engagement involving multiple branches of each country's 

military. 

Tbe missions to be performed by one country's navy can differ greatly from the 

missions to be performed by another country's navy. Consequently, navies are 

better measured against their respective missions than against one another. Although 

Navy A might have less capability than Navy B. Navy A might nevertheless be better 

able to perform Navy A's intended missions than Navy B is to perform Navy B's 

intended mission~. This is another significant consideration in assessing U.S. and 

Chinese navaJ capabilities, because the missions of the two navies are quite different. 

18 
66 

Ronald O'Rourke 

Mr. O'Rourke is a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the Johns Hopkins University, from which he 

received his B.A. in international studies, and a valedictorian graduate oCthe University's Paul 

Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, where he received his M.A. in the same field. 

Since 1984, Mr. O'Rourke has worked as a naval analyst for the Congressional Research Service 

of the Library of Congress. He has written numerous reports for Congress on various issues 

relating to the Navy. He regularly briefs Members of Congress and Conl:,'fessional staffers, and 

has testified before Congressional committees on several occasions. 

In 1996, Mr. O'Rourke received a Distinguished Service Award from the Library of Congress for 

his service to Congress on naval issues. 

Mr. O'Rourke is the author of several journal articles on naval issues, and is a past winner of the 

U.S. Naval Institute's Arleigh Burke essay contest. He has given presentations on Navy-related 

issues to a variety of audiences in government, industry, and academia. 
67 

Statement of Seth Cropsey 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces 

U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategic Considerations Related to P.L.A. Naval Forces 

Modernization 

II December 2013 

Chairman Forbes; Ranking Member Mcintyre, Representative Hanabusa: 

It is an honor to speak before this subcommittee. Thank you for your invitation. 

As dangerous as the threats posed by jihadism are, so far they don't approach the risks of open 

confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. But the likelihood is that 

we'll again face a larger challenge than the one the jihadists now present. No one is a better 

candidate to otTer such a challenge than China, which is not to say that China is an enemy, or to 

predict that China will become an enemy. But it's clear that Chinese leaders are ambitious, and 

that their diplomatic policy and their military armament are moving them toward great power 

status, or at least regional hegemony, in a series of small steps designed to achieve those ends 

with minimal resistance from their Pacific competitors, America's allies. And the U.S. is not 

taking this possibility as seriously as it should. 

This is different from the America of the 1920's and 1930's, when the generation that had 

experienced a World War learned the hard way why strategy was needed to be prepared for 

whatever the future might bring. Then, the U.S. anticipated a potential future threat from Japan 

and acted to prepare for such a threat. In what was known as War Plan Orange, the U.S. military 

leadership devised and tested a concrete strategy for a potential conflict with Japan, which 

evolved with new technology and tactics during the interwar period to incorporate the critical 

roles of aircraft carriers and submarines, amphibious warfare, and an island-hopping campaign in 

any potential Pacific conflict. 

The linchpin of this plan was the doctrine of "advanced base" strategy, the idea developed and 

exhaustively tested in the interwar period that a Pacific conflict with Japan would be won by 

securing the outlying archipelagos and islands of the theater by amphibious assault that would 

secure American bases from which to launch ofTensive operations further and further into enemy 

territory. At the same time this would deny the enemy territory from which to do the same. As a 

result, the U.S. military had a strategy when such a conflict broke out, one whose familiarity to 

officers improved its execution and which was in fact highly successful. We have no such 

strategy towards China today. 

Diplomatically, the closest we've come is the long-standing effort that's existed since the 

administration of George H.W. Bush to persuade China to become a stakeholder in the 

international system. One of the most fundamental principles of thai system is respect for 

untrammeled navigation through international waters and airspace. The events of the past few 

weeks, as China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone over a large section of the East 

China Sea, show that they have no such respect. So, while efforts to persuade China to become a 

stakeholder in the international order should not be abandoned, we ought to understand that those 

efforts have proved of limited value in generating any positive effect on Chinese international 
68 

behavior. To the extent that any American strategy hangs on our and the international 

community's attempt to transform China into a state that accepts the general principles of the 

international order, it has been a failure. 

The Oban1a administration's much publicized "Pivot to Asia" is not a strategy for dealing with 

China. It's an idea which, if sensibly implemented, would preserve and increase our influence in 

the region. But so far, all the hard power of the pivot is a minor element of the administration's 

preference for using soft power. The hard power consists of a Marine contingent in Northern 

Australia that remains much smaller than the envisioned 2,500 Marine rotational force, 4 littoral 

combat ships to be based in Singapore, and a U.S. military budget that is being whittled away at 

a rate that alarms our allies in Asia and the rest of the world. A successful "Pivot to Asia" would 

require more cooperation, especially with our Asian treaty allies, the most important of which is 

Japan. In the current and potentially risky matter of the People's Republic's recently-declared air 

defense identification zone (ADIZ), Japan has said that its commercial airliners would not 

identify themselves when passing through the airspace in question. At the same time, the US 

State Department has urged American commercial flights to comply with the zone. This is not 

cooperation. 

China, by its own admission and actions, wants to deny us access to large parts ofthe Western 

Pacific. The Defense Department's response so far has been a set of ideas known as the Air-Sea 

Battle (ASB). The ASB itself is a plan for greater cooperation between the military services in 

gaining access where a potential enemy would deny it. Much like the administration's "Pivot," or 

"rebalance," it is not based on a strategy, and it is not a strategy towards China; in fact, it makes 

no mention of China at all. 

China's leaders are more tolerant of risk than the Soviet leaders were. The ASB talks about 

blinding a potential enemy's surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities. In 

China's case, this would mean striking targets on the mainland. But the U.S. is not doing 

anything to turn the access denial ideas of the ASB into a strategic plan for such an eventuality. 

There are other possible strategic approaches to the same problem of access denial. However, the 

first question that needs to be considered is, what is the objective of any strategy towards China? 

The answer is the same as our objective in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. In 

each ofthose, our objective was to prevent the rise of a hegemonic power on the European 

continent. With China, our objective ought to be to prevent the rise of an Asian hegemon, a 

power iliat would destroy the current U.S. alliance system in Asia, dominate the world's most 

populous region-economically and militarily, and perhaps extend itself into Eurasia and 

beyond. 

As in the U.S.' experience in Europe, our first diplomatic objective in executing a strategy that 

seeks to prevent the rise of an Asian hegemon should be to establish an alliance of likeminded 

nations. This is very difficult, because of ffi1cient enmities in the region. But as the threat from 

China grows, current realities may eclipse historic fear. An important part of U.S. strategy 

towards China should be to prepare the groundwork now for such an alliance, one which 

establishes contingencies for repatriating allied business interests on the mainland back to allied 

countries, so as to exert economic pressure on the PRC in the event of a conflict. As for the 

immediate problem of access denial, which does indeed require strategy to counter, there are 

2 
69 

approaches which don't require an attack on China's mainland. One would be to destroy the 

Chinese navy at Sea. Another would be to impose a blockade on Chinese merchant and naval 

shipping. Like the ASB, neither of these are being looked at as possible military strategies 

toward China. 

What is clear is that any strategy to counter China's increasing access denial capabilities should 

prioritize deterrence--which means readiness, sustainability, and overmatching firepower and 

defense--and be built upon an integration of the ground forces necessary to control the outlying 

islands, archipelagos, littorals and straits of the Pacific with the naval and air power necessary to 

control the air and seas. Such a strategy should also include an increased focus on missile 

defense, to protect civil and military infrastructure, sea and airports and mobile warfare 

capabilities, and it should, above all, be designed to give the U.S. the power to assemble a 

durable forward defense in the event of a long war. 

But, however one regards these strategic ideas the fact remains that we don't have any strategy 

toward the most populous nation in the world, one whose economic strength is gathering in 

tandem with the military power its leaders are gradually accumulating to match their ambitions. 

My colleagues who are testifYing here this afternoon are offering a thoughtful account of the 

hardware that supports those ambitions. This needs to figure in our strategy-as it clearly does in 

China's. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee. 

3 
70 

Seth Cropsey began his career in government as assistant to Secretary of Defense Caspar 

Weinberger. In 1984 he was appointed Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy where he 

advised the Secretary on strategy, special operations, defense organization, and naval 

education. In the George H. W. Bush administration he served as Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. 

After leaving the Defense Department in 1991 Cropsey led the Asia Studies Center where 

his work focused on U.S.-Japan seeurity and diplomacy as well as emerging commercial 

and security relations between the U.S. and China. 

In 1994 he returned to the government as first department chairman and distinguished 

professor at the George W. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in GarmischParten kirchen, Germany. He administered the department of national security planning, 

developed curriculum, lectured, and led seminars. After returning to the U.S. Cropsey 

joined the American Enterprise Institute where he wrote and published a monograph on 

defense export controls. 

In 2002 he was confirmed by the Senate as director of international broadeasting where 

he helped increase resourees, broadcasting, and focus on audiences in key Middle Eastern 

states. 

In 2005 Cropsey returned to writing, analyzing, and lecturing on U.S. strategy. He is 

currently a Senior Fellow Senior at Hudson Institute and serves as Senior Advisor for 

maritime strategy at the Center for Naval Analyses. He completed a book on the decline 

of American seapower in January 2012, scheduled for publication in early 2013. 

Cropsey served as a naval officer from 1985 to 2004 and served with Special Boat 

Squadron TWO in Little Creek. He has lectured at Oxford, the Ecole Militaire, the 

NA TO School at Oberammergau, various national security forums in Albania, Hungary 

and Romania, Taiwan's National Defense University, and U.S. colleges and universities. 

His articles have been published in such journals and newspapers as the Foreign Affairs, 

World Affairs, The American Interest, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, 

Hmper's, Commentmy, and The Weekly Standard. 

He is a graduate of St. Johns College in Santa Fe and received his M.A. from Boston 

College. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Cluj in Romania. 

Cropsey, his wife, and 12-year old son live in Bethesda, MD. 
71 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION 

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules orthe U.S. 

House of Representatives for the l13'h Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses 

appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum 

vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants 

(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous 

fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is 

intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in 

complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with 

appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address 

and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one 

day after the witness's appearance before the committee. 

Witness name: Dr. Seth Cropsey 

Capacity in which appearing: (check one) 

X Individual 

_Representative 

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other 

entity being represented: 

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contracts grant 

none 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 

federal grant(s) / federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract or 

contracts grant 

BoozAllen $30,000 dollars Provide strategic advice to 

Hamilton U.S. Southern Command, 

Special Operations 

Command. 
72 

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2 
73 

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3 
74 

STATEMENT BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE 

By Jim Thomas 

Vice President and Director of Studies 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 

Chainnan Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre. and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for 

convening this important series of hcmoings on Asia-Pacific regional security. I appreciate your 

invitation to testify today on the subject of PLA naval modernization and its implications for 

how the United States and its allies preserve the regional security balance during a period of 

rapid change. I will discuss key trends and priorities in the Chinese People's Liberation Army 

(PtA) naval morlcmization program. as \vell as China's development of an anti-ship ballistic 

missile, although it is technically not a naval modcmization program. I \vll1 also address the 

implications of this modemization effort for U.S. and allied operational and force planning. 

Assessing modernization requires comparing capabilities of one country with the capabilities of 

its competitors. Over the long tenn. this is an interactive process since the modernization effort 

of one country will intluence the modernization decisions of the other. Since 20(H. the U.S. has 

been engaged in extended counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan that have 

~onsumed a great deal of American attention and resources that might otheIviise have been 

focused on countering the PLA innovations detailed below. As a result. the PLA has had a 

relatively free hand to field new systems and forces specifically designed to exploit 

characteristics of ·'the American Way of War" that have been easily observable over the past t\vO 

decades of U.S. military operations in the Middle East. Central Asia, North Africa. and the 

Balkans. These characteristics include reliance on large theater bases. long-haul sateHite 

communications and logistics net'vvorks. and a relatively shallow inventory of long-range 

precision-guided \;v'capons. While the PLA has fielded a wide and grO\ving array of advanced 

capabilities to counter U.S. pO\ver prqjection. the United States has spent insufficient time. 

intellectual effort. and resources responding to new and innovative PLA capabilities. 

Assessing modemization also requires thinking ahout trends in force development over time. In 

this regard. it is \\"orth recalling just hmv far China has come over the past decade. a period in 

which China's rapid naval modemization has been fueled by substantial increases in defense 

spending. In 2003, annual Chinese defense spending was estimated by the U.S. Department of 

Defense (000) to be $45-60 billion. Ten years later, DoD estimated that PLA spending had 
75 

increased to $t35-215 billion. or roughly 25-40 percent what the United States spends on its 

military annually. In addition, China has been able to focus its defense effort almost entirely on 

its immediate maritime perimeter in support of its '''counter-intervention'' stratcgy, unlikc thc 

United States \vith its competing global security responsibilities. This strategy emphasizes 

surprise and the ability to conduct short, decisive campaigns \vhile precluding effcctive U.S. 

intervention long enough that China could realize its campaign objectives and present the United 

States with a fail accumpli. Anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities-designed to 

prevent an adversary from cmering the theater or to dcny those already in the theatcr from being 

able to operate effectively-playa central role in China's strategy. China's naval modernization, 

in tum. has undenvTitten etTOIts to expand its geographic A2/AD envelope over time and extend 

it farther out in the V·lcstcrn Pacific Ocean. 

A Decade of Rapid Naval Modernization 

A decade ago China \vas also heavily reliant on Russian assistance for its arn1aments. The most 

sophisticated surface combatants in its fleet at the time \vcre two SOVREMENNY-dass 

destroyers, and the most advanced submarines in its fleet were four KILO-class submarines. all 

acquired Il'om Russia. Since that time. the situation has changed markedly. The PLA Navy 

(PLAN) has reduced its reliance on Russia in favor ofindigenous ship and submarine design and 

production. The PLAN today includes roughly 190 m~~jor combatants and is on a trajectory to 

surpass the U.S. Navy in size b)' 2020. This force is increasingly capable or denying access 

within 200 miles of the Chinese coastline and \vil! have the ability to support some povvcr 

projection at greater distances (e.g., along China' s sea lines of communication). Interestingly. the 

PLA fleet is grmving even while it is aggressively retiring or transferring older ships to China's 

maritime law enforcement agencies-the so-called "Five Dragons" under the State Oceanic 

Administration-paramilitary fi)fces carrying out fisheries law enforcement. survei [Jance, coast 

guard and other maritime functions. 

As impressive a'i the PLAN's growth has been. its qualitative improvements are even more 

remarkable. Ongoing modemization programs with respect to counter-intervention operations 

include: 

Advanced Submarines. China is rapidly building up a modem submarine force \vhile retiring its 

older submarines. Its latest, indigenously produced submarines---thc Improved SHANG-class 

SSN and Type 095 SSON-have greater acoustic signature reduction than older HAN-class 

SSNs and incorporate advanced nuclear reactors. Type 095s also incorporate vertical launch 

system (VIS) tubes. The YUAN-class (Type 041) SSP now in production replaces obsolete 

ROMEO- and MINO-c1ass SSKs and incorporates air-independent propulsion to extend its 

submerged enJuranc~. Together, these advanced submm'ines \~'i1l heJp to screen for the surface 

fleet. The most significant concern, hmvevcr, is their improving ability to conduct long-range 

anti-ship and land-attack cruise missile strikes. As long a,<; they can remain submerged underway 

and receive targeting infol111ation. they can attack surface ships and land targets from outside the 

effective detection range of U.S. systems. 
76 

Guided-Missile Destrovers. The PLA is also continuing construction of LUYANG H-c1ass (Type 

052(,) DDGs, and starting to procure the follow-on LUYANG III-class (Type 052D) DDGs_ 

\vhich incorporate multi-purpose VLS that can latmch land attack. anti-ship. or air defense 

missiles interchangeably_ In totaL China is likely to have sixteen advanced DOGs (both Type 

052('5 and Ds) within the next several years. These advanced guided-missile destroyers represent 

a major improvement in fleet air defcnse and. along with advanced submarines, will allow China 

to protect its aircraft carriers and amphibious ships while pushing China's naval defense 

perimeter out farther into the Pacific Ocean. 

Guided-Missile Patrol Crall. China is beginning to tield JlA,<"GDAO-class (Type 056) stealthy 

corvettes. which. along vvith its largc inventory of HOUBEI-class (Type 022) guided missile 

patrol boats. \vill carf)' the YJ-83 long-range. supersonic anti-ship cruise missile. These fast. 

small combatants have improved the PLA's ability to conduct llttoral ,varfare. and thcir numbers 

could create a significant tracking and targeting problem, Working in tandem with land-based 

missile forces and aircratt. these smallcr naval combatants could make it far more difficult for 

foreign surface forces to safely approach \vithin 200 nautical miles of China's coast. 

Land-Based Naval Fighter and Strike Aircraft. The PLAN has traditionally relied on land-based 

combat aircraft to provide support to the fleet and has long operated significant numhers of landbased fighter and strike aircratl dedicated to supporting naval operations. A decade ago these 

aircraft \vere overwhelmingly Chinese derivatives of 1 950s-era Soviet designs, This has changed 

significantly in rccent years. The PLAN now operates more than 100 modern strike-Hghters 

including Russian-supplied Su-30MK2 and indigenous ,I-lIB, JH-7A. and 1-10 aircraft equipped 

vvith modern avionics, sensors, and advanced air-to-air and anti-ship missiles. The first three of 

these aircraft are capable of operating 500 nautical miles or more from the Chinese coast w"hile 

carrying multiple advanced air-to-air and/or anti-ship missiles, The .1-10 is a shorter-range multirole aircraft also capable of employing advanced air-to-air and anti-ship missiles. The PLAN 

advanced strike aircrafi are capable of catTying \vell over 100 advanced anti-ship missiles in a 

single mass attack. They could also be supplemented by hundreds of similar aircraft operated by 

the PLA Air l'orce to incrcase the odds of ovcnvhc1ming the defensive capabilities of U,S, and 

allied naval forces operating 'v!thin their reach, 

Beyond the PLA Navy: Land-Based Sea Denial Missile Forces 

While distinctly separate from the PLA naval force. a critical component of China's counterintervention strategy is its land-based ballistic missile forces under the control of the Second 

Artillery Corps (a separate military "servke" assigned responsibility for China's nuclear and 

conventional missile strike forces). China has placed high priority on its missile strike forces. 

particularly the development of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), KnO\vn as the Dong Feng21 D (Dr-2ID), the tvw-stage. solid-fueled missile with a range exceeding 930 miles is a variant 

of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and calTies a maneuverable 

warhead optimized to attack large surface combatants. such as aircraft can-iers, undenvay. The 

motivation for developing the ASBM appears to be the 1996 Tahvan Strait crisis in which two 
77 

u.s. aircraft carriers \vere sent to the vicinity of the Strait. The ASBM is intended to inhibit 

similar U.S. interventions in the future. 

Although the DF-2ID reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2010. there are questions 

about the maturity the missile system's associated battle netw-ork. comprised of the .suite of 

surveillance, reconnaissance. and battle management capabilities needed to enable accurate DF2ID strikes. To date China has yct to conduct a succcssful test of the capability under rcalistic 

conditions at long-range against a mobile target at sea-although it reportedly conducted a test 

against a stationary mock-up of an aircratl carrier in the Gobi deseli earlier this year. 

Nevertheless, China has made great strides in its long-range surveillance capabilities including 

improvements in its ability to integrate data from its land-based over-the-horizon radars. airborne 

sensors. and its naval ocean surveillance satellites to cue China's ASBMs. Despite the lack of 

evidence that China could effectively target its DF-21D missiles, it is useful to keep in mind that 

large salvo attacks could compensate for the lack of a fully mature battle net\vork. China might 

be willing to expend hundreds of ASBMs (with an estimated unit cost of $25 million) in a 

saturation attack to destroy or "mission kill" a single aircraft carrier (valued $10-15 billion)-

essentially a "brute force" approach to compensate for its battle netvi/ork limitations. 

Implications for the U.S. and Allied Defense Planning 

The cumulative effect of China's modernization efforts is that the military balance in the western 

Pacific is heing altered, and the costs to the United States ofprqjecting power into the region are 

rising dramatically. With the DF~21 D, advanced submarines. large numbers of modern sw-face 

combatants, and maritime strike aircraft. increasingly the United States faces a multidimensional "jast thousand-mile" pO\ver projection prohlem. These capabilities. coupled v.;jth 

growing evidence that China intends to unilaterally challenge and alter the geo-political status 

quo ufthe western Pacit1c. present the United States with a choice: it can accommodate China's 

ambitions at the expense of its allies' and partners' secmity interests, or it can attempt to balance 

China's increasing assertiveness and grov .. ih in military capabilities with measures designed to 

ensure the continued viability of its power projection forces. There is no single "silver bullet" 

approach to preserve the regional military balance. Instead the United States and its allies \vill 

likely have to undertake a combination of eITorts to demonstrate their defensive strength in the 

tace of China's challenge. These efforts should include preparations to: 

1. Counter Hostile C4ISR. U.S. and allied militm'y forces should plan to conduct operations to 

disrupt, degrade, or spoof hostile commw1ications, command and control. computer, intelligence. 

surveillance and reconnaissance nctv,'Orks. All of these efforts can help to break an adversary's 

"kill chain"-their ability to effectively employ their weapons against friendly forces. '1l1ese 

eilOlt.s could help to reduce the size of missile salvos Chinese forces could mount. For example, 

if target infonnation is degraded or many more targets appem' than are actually there, salvos will 

be diluted or smaller as the attacker "hedges his bets" by attacking each likely target or holding 

fire until the "real"' target becomes clear. The concept of countering C41SR has generated 

controversy given that China's battle networks for its conventional and nuclear forces arc 
78 

intert\vined. Nevertheless. a credible capability to counter discrete elements of an adversary's 

C4ISR systems-ideally using non-kinetic capabilities to inflict reversible effects--·--could 

undermine their confidence in achieving "infonnation dominance," which Chinese analysts have 

\vritten is a prerequisite for taking offensive actions. Finally. there is a need to develop a joint 

approach to Counter~C4ISR. \vhich could emerge as the most important joint mission area of this 

century. 

2. Sustain Operations Inside a Hostile A2/AD Envelope. Beyond the ability to counter hostile 

C4ISR systems, (I,S, and allied military forces must take additional steps to improve their ability 

to operate inside China's growing A2/AD envelope. This will entail initiatives to harden 

facilities at airbases against attacks and to access to a wider range of shared military facilities in 

the Indo-Pacific. It \vill also require the development of alternative operating concepts as the lJ .S. 

Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps are now pursuing to facilitate distributed air operations from 

cluster airbases and ad hoc forward anning refueling points for short takeoff and vertical landing 

aircraft. as \vel! as unconventional fonvard refueling at dispersal bases n'om transport aircraft 

like the C-l7 and V-22. Finally. it \-vill likely require a ne\v generation of integrated air and 

missile defense systems incorporating solid-state laser and electro-magnetic rail-gun 

technologies. While some have argued that the United States could minimize risks to its own 

forces by withdrawing them from forward positions inside a hostile A21 AD zone area. doing so 

would call into question America's security commitments to frontline maritime allies like Japan. 

U,S, military forces must stay forn'ard to reassure its allies and partners while detening potential 

adversaries. but they must be more survivable and able to sustain operations under attack. At a 

minimum. alongside the military forces of mmitime fi'ontline states like Japan. they should be 

capable of denying an aggressor its immediate military objectives vvithin the contested zone. 

], Operate [rom Beyond the Range of Hostile A2!AD. Complementing improvements in the U.S. 

military's ability to operate inside hostile A2/AD lones, U.S. air and naval forces must improve 

their ability to operate from far greater ranges and penetrate contested airspace and seas to nnd 

and engage the full range of land and maritime targets. While some have argued that the United 

States should fors\vear attacks on an aggressor's territory given the risks of escalation. such a 

policy could make war more likely as the perceived risks to the aggressor would he lower. A 

more prudent policy \vould maximize detelTence through the demonstrated ability to attack 

targets within an adversary's tenitory and littoral \vaters in response to aggression against e.s. 

or allied interests. Undenvriting an enduring lJS conventional deterrent capability will require 

the fielding of several nc\I.,' aircraft. The Navy \",,·ill need a carrier-based ulUnanned combat air 

system incorporating advanced features such as broad~bandiall-aspcct radar cross-section 

reduction for survivability, aerial refueling for extreme range and endurmlce. an unrcfueled 

combat radius exceeding 1.000 miles so that tankers can stand off from hostile fighter range, a 

robust sensor suite to find heavily defended targets. and the largest possible weapons payload 

fea<;ible in combination \vith the aforementioned attrihutes. The Air Force \vill also need to field 

a combination of two new aircraft to bolster detenence: a new stealth bomber and a penetrating. 
79 

persistent surveiHance/clcctronic attack system to enhance bomber lethality and 

survivability. These aircraft would operate as team in the medium- to deep-battlespace, \vhile 

the caiTier-based system would generally focus on the littorals and the shallow- to mediurnbattlespace. The land-based component of this new conventional airborne "triad" \\'il! also need 

access to a \vider range of secure bases throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Submarine forces, 

including unmanned underwater vehicles. \vill also be critical for penetrating A2/AD zones from 

undersea to conduct surveillance and strike missions. Increa'ling their strike capacity-to 

include developing an at-sea ",-capons reloading capability-should be a top priority. Finally. the 

United States will need longer range stealthy or hypersonic standoff anti-ship a11d land-attack 

weapons that can be launched from the air, sea. and undersea. as \vell as by ground forces. 

4. Build Up Allied and Partner A2/AD Capacities. U.S. allies and partners on the nc\\! maritime 

frontlinc in Asia should accelerate efforts to develop their O\vn mini-A2/AD architectures to 

defend their own sovereignty and provide U.S. forces sanctuaries from which they could operate 

in a contlict. Such an archipelagic delense concept would entaH allies and partners improving 

their ability to conduct air and sea denial operations through the usc of mobile coa'ltai a1tillery 

anti-ship missile batteries and truck-mounted air defense systems as well as thl! ability to conduct 

offensive and defensive mining operations and undersea vvarfare to impede hostile naval forces. 

Building up the A2/AD capabilities of allies and partners ·will make help them less susceptible to 

regional pmver projection and threats of intimidation. thereby improving regional stability. The 

Anny and Marine Corps in particular might play prominent roles in helping build up partners' air 

and sea denial capacities. 

5. Conduct Peripheral Operations. Finally. as a global maritime power. the United States will 

continue for the foreseeable future to exercise a high degree of air and sea control beyond the 

reach of potential adversaries' A2/AD systems. Thus, in a contlict it may have an advantage in 

conducting more indirect. peripheral operations such as a distant blockade. Such operations are 

unlikely to be a silver bullet in a major conflict. Historically. blockading alone has rarely 

achieved its objectives and is unlikely to compel an aggressor to withdrawal and give back its illgotten gains. The more effective a blockade is. moreover. the higher the likelihood that it would 

be percdved by the adversary as an escalatory move. akin to a direct attack on its ten-hot)'. 

Despite these potential drawbacks, the prospect of imposing a blockade may help to deter 

conflict in the first place by holding out the prospect of a protracted conflict a11d horizontal 

escalation while raising the risks that an aggressor would not be able to achieve alait accompli. 

No single one of these elements on its own is likely to be successful in preserving the regional 

security balance and upholding our security commitments. It is how they are pursued in 

combination that will detem1ine the overall success of our approach. Future operating concepts 

will likely incorporate vmying degrees of all of these elements. Force development efforts. in 

turn. \-vill need to be aligned with them. 
80 

Conclusion 

Some might argue that in light of our fiscal situation this is the \-\Tong time to introduce what 

amounts to a major overhaul of our power projection forces. I would argue the opposite: that a 

clear vision of America's future force design should info1111 the near-term choices the 

Administration and Congress Volill have to make ahout ·which forces and capabilities to preserve 

or expand as \vell as lower priority areas \vhere \ve will have to divest and accept greater risk, 

Changes that begin today will take yeats. if not decades. [0 lhlly play themselves out. PLA 

modernization and the contested air. sea, land, space, and cyber environments it is creating 

through its multi-domain denial capabilities oilers one lens for evaluating Lhcsc choices with the 

objecti"ve of ensuring the U.S. military preserves and develops the most viable elements of its 

forces to remain in the pmver projection business. 

The past decade has illustrated that even relatively small wars against opponents with 

unsophisticated capabilities are extremely costly. Investments made today to maintain a stable 

military balance in the Western Pacitic, \vhile costly in absolute tenus. are a relatively 

inexpensive "insurance policy" against a mf~ior conflict. We have lime to make the needed 

adjustments in our force posture, but no time to waste. 
81 

Jim Thomas is Vice President and Director of Studies at the 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He oversees 

CSBA's research programs and directs the Strategic and Budget 

Studies staff. 

Prior to joining CSBA, he was Vice President of Applied Minds, 

Inc., a private research and development company specializing 

in rapid, interdisciplinary technology prototyping. Before that, 

Jim served for thirteen years in a variety of policy, planning and 

resource analysis posts in the Department of Defense, 

culminating in his dual appointment as Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans and Acting 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy. In these 

capacities, he was responsible for the development ofthe Defense Strategy, conventional 

force planning, resource assessment, and the oversight of war plans. He spearheaded the 

2005-2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and was the principal author of the 

QDR report to Congress. 

Jim began his career in national security at Los Alamos National Laboratory, analyzing 

foreign technological lessons learned from the first Gulf War. After serving as research 

assistant to Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Jim joined the Department of Defense as a 

Presidential Management Intern in 1993 and undertook developmental management 

assignments across the Department of Defense over the next two years. From 1995 to 

1998, he managed a NATO counterproliferation initiative and wrote three reports 

endorsed by allied foreign and defense ministers to integrate countering-WMD as a 

mission area into NATO post-Cold War force planning. From 1998 to 1999, he was 

seconded to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (!ISS) in London, where he 

wrote Adelphi Paper 333, The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions (Oxford: 

Oxford University Press, 2000). From 1999 to 2001, Jim worked in the Secretary of 

Defense's Strategy Office, playing a lead role developing the defense strategy and force 

planning construct for the 200 I QDR. From 200 I to 2003, he served as Special Assistant 

to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He was promoted to the Senior Executive Service in 

2003. 

Jim received the Department of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service in 1997 

for his work at NATO, and the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public 

Service, the department's highest civilian award, in 2006 for his strategy work. 

Jim is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for 

Strategic Studies. He holds a B.A. with high honors from the College of William and 

Mary, an M.A. from the University of Virginia and an M.A. from 10hns Hopkins 

University's School of Advanced International Studies. 

A former Naval reserve officer, Jim attained the rank of lieutenant commander. 
82 

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4 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

DECEMBER 11, 2013 

(89) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. Do you assess that the United States currently possesses a relevant 

and tangible National Security Strategy, Defense Strategy, and Military Strategy 

for successfully addressing China’s growing regional and global influence? If not, 

why not? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. Trends in China’s defense spending, research and development, and 

shipbuilding industry suggest China will continue its naval modernization for the 

foreseeable future and may field the largest fleet of modern submarines and surface 

combatants in the Western Pacific by 2020. What factors do you recommend decisionmakers consider when determining the necessary and appropriate U.S. military 

force structure posture to maintain in the Asia-Pacific region? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. The PLA Navy’s expanding role in military missions other than war 

and new willingness to operate beyond China’s immediate periphery creates opportunities to enhance maritime cooperation between the United States and China. 

How do you believe the United States military should leverage these opportunities 

for increased engagement with the PLA Navy? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. Regarding United States current and planned naval modernization 

and recapitalization programs, do you believe the Department of the Navy is on the 

right track to project global power in the foreseeable future for anticipated missions 

the Department may have to perform in the Asia-Pacific region? What is the Department doing well? What are the gaps? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. The challenges associated with fiscal resource constraints stemming 

from the Budget Control Act of August 2011 and subsequent sequestration will 

make it nearly impossible for the Department of the Navy to maintain a sufficient 

force structure required to meet all global power requirements in the maritime domain. In the context of the ‘‘rebalance to Asia’’ strategy, what maritime naval capabilities should decisionmakers consider high-priority to develop and/or maintain 

given limited fiscal resources to maximize flexibility and elasticity in meeting global 

force projection requirements in the maritime domain? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. Although China’s primary maritime focus remains regional, Beijing 

aspires to play a larger role in select global issues that will require a naval power 

projection capability. These ambitions are driving the development of PLA Navy capabilities to operate on a limited basis outside of the Western Pacific region. At 

what point in time, if ever, do you believe China will be able to project maritime 

global power similar to how the Department of the Navy projects naval power in 

the maritime domain? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence projects in an unclassified assessment that China will have between 313 and 342 submarines and surface combatants by 2020, including approximately 60 submarines that are able to employ 

submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles. 

Do you believe the projected U.S. Navy attack submarine inventory will be able to 

sufficiently counter the submarine inventory of the PLA Navy? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. Do you assess that China’s naval modernization effort forms part of 

a broader Chinese effort to assert regional influence, and if so, how should the 

United States respond? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. Key characteristics of international order in the Asia-Pacific region 

include, among other things, a rules- and norms-based system grounded in international law, the use of international law and other non-coercive mechanisms for 

resolving disputes, market-based economies and free trade, broadly defined global 

commons at sea and in the air, and freedom of operations in international waters 

and airspace. Do you assess that China’s naval modernization effort forms part of 
90 

1Department of State, ‘‘Expanded U.S. Assistance for Maritime Capacity Building,’’ fact sheet, 

December 16, 2013, accessed December 19, 2013, at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/ 

218735.htm. 

a broader Chinese effort to alter one or more elements of this international order, 

at least for the Asia-Pacific region, and if so, how should the United States respond? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. The United States has obligations to treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific 

region, particularly Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and certain obligations 

to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. As China continues to exert sovereignty 

claims in the Asia-Pacific region, such as its declared Economic Engagement Zones 

in the East and South China Seas and its recently declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, how should the United States balance 

international obligations with China’s desire to exert territorial influence in the 

Asia-Pacific? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FORBES. Do you assess that the United States currently possesses a relevant 

and tangible National Security Strategy, Defense Strategy, and Military Strategy 

for successfully addressing China’s growing regional and global influence? If not, 

why not? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Regarding potential combat operations, the subcommittee has the 

option of examining classified U.S. war plans and deciding whether those plans reflect a relevant and tangible U.S. wartime strategy. A related issue is whether the 

strategy reflected in classified U.S. war plans should be articulated publicly in unclassified form (i.e., be issued as a declarative strategy) for purposes of deterring 

China, reassuring U.S. allies and partners in the region, and otherwise shaping the 

security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. 

Some observers perceive China to be implementing a concerted strategy for gradually asserting and consolidating control of its near-seas regions using measures, 

many implemented by Chinese Coast Guard ships, that fall short of war. The 

United States, in addition to periodically reiterating U.S. positions regarding the 

resolution of maritime territorial disputes and operational rights in EEZs, announced on December 16 an expansion of U.S. regional and bilateral assistance ‘‘to 

advance maritime capacity building in Southeast Asia,’’ particularly Vietnam and 

the Philippines.1 A potential oversight issue for the subcommittee would be to see 

whether the December 16 announcement is followed in time by other U.S. actions 

that might reflect a more active U.S. strategy for countering the strategy that some 

observers perceive China to be following for gradually asserting and consolidating 

control of its near-seas regions. 

Mr. FORBES. Trends in China’s defense spending, research and development, and 

shipbuilding industry suggest China will continue its naval modernization for the 

foreseeable future and may field the largest fleet of modern submarines and surface 

combatants in the Western Pacific by 2020. What factors do you recommend decisionmakers consider when determining the necessary and appropriate U.S. military 

force structure posture to maintain in the Asia-Pacific region? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Top-level U.S. strategic considerations that policymakers may consider in determining U.S. military force structure and posture for the Asia-Pacific 

region include: • preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another, • preserving the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War 

II, • fulfilling U.S. treaty obligations, and • shaping the Asia-Pacific region. 

Additional factors that policymakers may consider include: 

• the capabilities of U.S. allies and partners in the region, and the likelihood that 

those capabilities will be committed in crisis and conflict scenarios involving 

China, • demands for U.S. forces in other parts of the world, • constraints on U.S. defense resources, 

• the benefits and costs of measures such as forward homeporting, forward stationing, multiple crewing, and crew rotation, and 

• industrial-base considerations. 

Mr. FORBES. The PLA Navy’s expanding role in military missions other than war 

and new willingness to operate beyond China’s immediate periphery creates opportunities to enhance maritime cooperation between the United States and China. 

How do you believe the United States military should leverage these opportunities 

for increased engagement with the PLA Navy? 
91 

2 28 UST 3459; TIAS 8587. The treaty was done at London October 20, 1972, and entered into 

force July 15, 1977. A summary of the agreement is available online at http://www.imo.org/ 

about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/colreg.aspx. 3For a discussion, see Dave Majumdar, ‘‘Navy Shifts Plans to Acquire a Tougher UCLASS,’’ 

USNI News (http://news.usni.org), November 12, 2013; USNI News Editor, ‘‘Pentagon Altered 

UCLASS Requirements for Counterterrorism Mission,’’ USNI News (http://news.usni.org), August 29, 2013. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Cooperative maritime operations with China’s navy can be used 

as an opportunity to: 

• marginally reduce demands on U.S. Navy forces for performing certain missions 

(such as the anti-piracy mission), 

• demonstrate the professionalism of U.S. naval personnel to Chinese personnel, 

• build trust among Chinese personnel regarding U.S. intentions, 

• help reinforce Chinese compliance with existing rules for operating ships and 

aircraft safely in proximity to one another (including the October 1972 multilateral convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 

commonly known as the COLREGs or the ‘‘rules of the road,’’ to which both 

China and the United States are parties),2 and 

• demonstrate to China the benefits that China receives from the current international order, and China’s consequent interest in preserving that order. 

Mr. FORBES. Regarding United States current and planned naval modernization 

and recapitalization programs, do you believe the Department of the Navy is on the 

right track to project global power in the foreseeable future for anticipated missions 

the Department may have to perform in the Asia-Pacific region? What is the Department doing well? What are the gaps? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Regarding the Navy’s plans for modernizing and recapitalizing the 

cruise-destroyer force, the replacement of the CG(X) and DDG–1000 programs with 

resumed DDG–51 procurement leaves the Navy without a clear roadmap in the 30- 

year shipbuilding plan for accomplishing certain things for the cruiser-destroyer 

force that were to have been accomplished by the CG(X) and DDG–1000 programs, 

including but not limited to the following: 

• restoring ship growth margin for accommodating future capabilities; 

• introducing integrated electric drive technology into a large number of ships, 

particularly for supporting future high-power electrical weapons such as highpower lasers; and 

• substantially reducing ship life-cycle O&S costs by, among other things, reducing crew size. 

Accomplishing the above three items will depend to a large degree on when procurement of large surface combatants shifts from Flight III DDG–51s to some follow-on design, and on the features of that follow on design. Options for the next 

large surface combatant after the Flight III DDG–51 include a further modification 

of the DDG–51 design (i.e., a Flight IV design, which might include a lengthening 

of the hull to accommodate new systems and restore growth margin), the current 

DDG–1000 design or a modified version of the DDG–1000 design, and a clean-sheet 

design that might be intermediate in size between the DDG–51 and DDG–1000 designs. 

Regarding the Navy’s plans for developing and procuring new aircraft, a potential 

oversight item for the subcommittee concerns the mission definition for the UCLASS 

carrier-based unmanned aircraft. Recent press reporting suggests that there is some 

debate and uncertainty within the Navy regarding whether the UCLASS should be 

designed to be capable of penetrating capable air-defense systems.3 Given potential 

constraints on Navy funding and potential future mission demands, the subcommittee may also wish to examine the future mix of strike fighters on carrier air 

wings. The current plan is for each air wing to include two squadrons of F/A–18E/ 

F Super Hornets and two squadrons of F–35C Joint Strike Fighters (i.e., ‘‘2+2’’). Potential alternative mixes that might be examined include 0+4, 1+3, 3+1, and 4+0. 

Regarding the Navy’s plans for developing and acquiring unmanned vehicles 

(other than the above discussed UCLASS), a potential oversight item for the Navy 

concerns the Navy’s plans for transitioning current experiments and demonstration 

efforts in submarine-launched unmanned vehicles into procurement programs of 

record. 

Regarding the Navy’s plans for developing and procuring new weapons, potential 

oversight items include the Navy’s plans for developing and procuring: 

• the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) as a next-generation successor to 

the Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile; 
92 

4Such a missile might be broadly similar to the Advanced Air-to-Air Missile (AAAM), a longrange air-to-air missile that was being developed in the late-1980s as a successor to the Navy’s 

long-range Phoenix air-to-air missile. The AAAM program was cancelled as a result of the end 

of the Cold War. 

• a long-range air-to-air missile for use by carrier-based strike fighters (no such 

weapon is currently planned); 4

• the previously mentioned anti-torpedo torpedo (ATT); • the electromagnetic rail gun, including its use as an air and missile defense 

weapon; • solid-state lasers (SSLs) with beam powers of a few hundred to several hundred 

kilowatts that could be capable of countering anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) 

and perhaps also anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs); and • a megawatt-class free electron laser (FEL). 

Mr. FORBES. The challenges associated with fiscal resource constraints stemming 

from the Budget Control Act of August 2011 and subsequent sequestration will 

make it nearly impossible for the Department of the Navy to maintain a sufficient 

force structure required to meet all global power requirements in the maritime domain. In the context of the ‘‘rebalance to Asia’’ strategy, what maritime naval capabilities should decisionmakers consider high-priority to develop and/or maintain 

given limited fiscal resources to maximize flexibility and elasticity in meeting global 

force projection requirements in the maritime domain? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Naval capabilities that policymakers might consider as candidates 

for receiving priority in a context of the U.S. strategic rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region and limits on fiscal resources include but are not limited to the following: • platforms that can evade China’s A2/AD capabilities—attack submarines and 

stealthy aircraft are the examples usually mentioned, but they may not be the 

only examples; • capabilities of all kinds (both soft-kill and hard-kill) for breaking the kill chains 

of China’s A2/AD weapons; • platforms and weapons that can improve the Navy’s ability to outrange China’s 

A2/AD capabilities when needed; • capabilities that can substantially increase surface ship magazine depth and, by 

dramatically reducing cost per shot, substantially improve cost-exchange ratios 

against China’s A2/AD weapons, such as electronic warfare capabilities, other 

soft-kill mechanisms, electromagnetic rail guns, and lasers; • technologies for reducing ship operation and support (O&S) costs, so that a 

Navy budget of a given size can more easily support a force structure of a given 

number of ships; • measures (such as forward homeporting, forward stationing, multiple crewing, 

and crew rotation) that can increase the fraction of the fleet that can be forward-deployed sustainably (i.e., without overburdening crews or wearing out 

ships)—although, as mentioned earlier, the costs as well as the benefits of such 

measures would need to be weighed; • capabilities that would be expensive for China to counter (i.e., so-called cost-imposing or competitive strategies)—attack submarines are often mentioned in 

this connection; mines and large numbers of inexpensive unmanned vehicles 

might additional examples; • capabilities for performing missions that, within DOD, are performed solely or 

largely by naval forces, such as ASW or mine countermeasures; and 

• improved capabilities for other nations in the region (particularly the Philippines and Vietnam) for maintaining maritime domain awareness (MDA) and 

defending territorial claims and operational rights in the South China Sea. 

Regarding the first part of the question, overall Navy force structure and the 30- 

year shipbuilding plan will be affected in coming years not only by the future DOD 

budget top line as influenced by the Budget Control Act or other legislation, but also 

by additional factors, such as the allocation of the DOD budget top line among the 

military departments and by the portion of the DOD budget top line that is used 

for other expenses, including military pay and benefits and DOD’s so-called overhead and back-office costs. Presentations from the Navy, CBO, GAO, or other 

sources on future Navy force structure and the 30-year shipbuilding plan sometimes 

appear to assume little or no change in these additional factors, perhaps because 

there is no specific basis that can be cited for assuming a particular change. The 

fact that other organizations choose to assume little or no change in these additional 

factors does not prevent Congress from considering such possibilities. The alternative of assuming at the outset that there is no potential for making anything 

more than very marginal changes in these additional factors could unnecessarily 
93 

5See Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels 

for FY2014, May 2013, p. 18. 6 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2014 Shipbuilding Plan, 

October 2013, Table 3 (page 13). 7The ‘‘one-third, one-third, one-third’’ terminology, though convenient, is not entirely accurate—the military departments’ shares of the DOD budget, while more or less stable during this 

period, were not exactly one-third each: the average share for the Department of the Army was 

about 26%, the average share for the Department of the Navy (which includes both the Navy 

and Marine Corps) was about 32%, the average share for the Department of the Air Force was 

about 30%, and the average share for Defense-Wide (the fourth major category of DOD spending) was about 12%. Excluding the Defense-Wide category, which has grown over time, the 

shares for the three military departments of the remainder of DOD’s budget during this period 

become about 29% for the Department of the Army, about 37% for the Department of the Navy, 

and about 34% for the Department of the Air Force. 8Since the Defense-Wide portion of the budget has grown from just a few percent in the 1950s 

and 1960s to about 15% in more recent years, including the Defense-Wide category of spending 

in the calculation can lead to military department shares of the budget in the 1950s and 1960s 

that are somewhat more elevated compared to those in more recent years, making it more complex to compare the military departments’ shares across the entire period of time since the end 

of the World War II. For this reason, military department shares of the DOD budget cited in 

this statement are calculated after excluding the Defense-Wide category. The points made in 

this statement, however, can still made on the basis of a calculation that includes the DefenseWide category. 

constrain options available to policymakers and prevent the allocation of DOD resources from being aligned optimally with U.S. strategy. 

In a situation of reduced levels of defense spending, such as what would occur if 

defense spending were to remain constrained to the revised cap levels in the Budget 

Control Act, the affordability challenge posed by the 30-year shipbuilding plan 

would be intensified. Even then, however, the current 30-year shipbuilding plan 

would not necessarily become unaffordable. 

The Navy estimates that, in constant FY2013 dollars, fully implementing the cur- rent 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of $16.8 billion in annual 

funding for new-construction ships, compared to an historic average of $12 billion 

to $14 billion provided for this purpose.5 The required increase in average annual funding of $2.8 billion to $4.8 billion per year equates to less than 1% of DOD’s annual budget under the revised caps of the Budget Control Act. The Congressional 

Budget Office estimates that, in constant FY2013 dollars, fully implementing the 

current 30-year shipbuilding plan would require an average of $19.3 billion in annual funding for new-construction ships, or $2.5 billion per year more than the Navy 

estimates.6 This would make the required increase in average annual funding $5.3 

billion to $7.3 billion per year, which equates to roughly 1.1% to 1.5% of DOD’s annual budget under the revised caps of the Budget Control Act. 

Some observers, noting the U.S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region, have advocated shifting a greater share of the DOD budget to the Navy and 

Air Force, on the grounds that the Asia-Pacific region is primarily a maritime and 

aerospace theater for DOD. In discussing the idea of shifting a greater share of the 

DOD budget to the Navy and Air Force, some of these observers refer to breaking 

the so-called ‘‘one-third, one-third, one-third’’ division of resources among the three 

military departments—a shorthand term sometimes used to refer to the more-or-less 

stable division of resources between the three military departments that existed for 

the three decades between the end of U.S. participation in the Vietnam War in 1973 

and the start of the Iraq War in 2003.7 In a context of breaking the ‘‘one-third, onethird, one-third’’ allocation with an aim of better aligning defense spending with the 

strategic rebalancing, shifting 1.5% or less of DOD’s budget into the Navy’s shipbuilding account would appear to be quite feasible. 

More broadly, if defense spending were to remain constrained to the revised cap 

levels in the Budget Control Act, then fully funding the Department of the Navy’s 

total budget at the levels shown in the current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) 

would require increasing the Department of the Navy’s share of the non-DefenseWide part of the DOD budget to about 41%, compared to about 36% in the FY2014 

budget and an average of about 37% for the three-decade period between the Vietnam and Iraq wars.8 While shifting 4% or 5% of DOD’s budget to the Department 

of the Navy would be a more ambitious reallocation than shifting 1.5% or less of 

the DOD budget to the Navy’s shipbuilding account, similarly large reallocations 

have occurred in the past: 

• From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, reflecting a U.S. defense strategy at the 

time that placed a strong reliance on the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, 

the Department of the Air Force’s share of the non-Defense-Wide DOD budget 

increased by several percentage points. The Department of the Air Force’s share 
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9Defense Business Board briefing, ‘‘Reducing Overhead and Improving Business Operations, 

Initial Observations,’’ July 22, 2010, slides 15, 5, and 6, posted online at: http://www.govexec. 

com/pdfs/072210rb1.pdf. See also Defense Business Board, Modernizing the Military Retirement 

System, Report to the Secretary of Defense, Report FY11–05, posted online at: http://dbb. 

defense.gov/Portals/35/Documents/Reports/2011/FY11-5_Modernizing_The_Military_Retirement_ System_2011-7.pdf; and Defense Business Board, Corporate Downsizing Applications for DoD, 

Report to the Secretary of Defense, Report FY11-08, posted online at: http://dbb.defense.gov/ 

Portals/35/Documents/Reports/2011/FY11-8_Corporate_Downsizing_Applications_for_DoD_2011- 

7.pdf. 10Statement of Admiral Jonathan Greenert, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the 

House Armed Services Committee on Planning for Sequestration in FY 2014 and Perspectives 

of the Military Services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review, September 18, 2013, 

pp. 6–10. 

averaged about 45% for the 10-year period FY1956–FY1965, and peaked at 

more than 47% in FY1957–FY1959. 

• For the 11-year period FY2003–FY2013, as a consequence of combat operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of the Army’s share of the non-Defense-Wide DOD budget increased by roughly ten percentage points. The Department of the Army’s share during this period averaged about 39%, and 

peaked at more than 43% in FY2008. U.S. combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during this period reflected the implementation of U.S. national 

strategy as interpreted by policymakers during those years. 

The point here is not to argue whether it would be right or wrong to shift more 

of the DOD budget to the Navy’s shipbuilding account or to the Department of the 

Navy’s budget generally. Doing that would require reducing funding for other DOD 

programs, and policymakers would need to weigh the resulting net impact on overall 

DOD capabilities. The point, rather, is to note that the allocation of DOD resources 

is not written in stone, that aligning DOD spending with U.S. strategy in coming 

years could involve changing the allocation by more than a very marginal amount, 

and that such a changed allocation could provide the funding needed to implement 

the current 30-year shipbuilding plan. 

As an alternative or supplement to the option of altering the allocation of DOD 

resources among the military departments, the 30-year shipbuilding plan could also 

become more affordable by taking actions beyond those now being implemented by 

DOD to control military personnel pay and benefits and reduce what some observers 

refer to as DOD’s overhead or back-office costs. Multiple organizations have made 

recommendations for such actions in recent years. The Defense Business Board, for 

example, estimated that at least $200 billion of DOD’s enacted budget for FY2010 

constituted overhead costs. The board stated that ‘‘There has been an explosion of 

overhead work because the Department has failed to establish adequate controls to 

keep it in line relative to the size of the warfight,’’ and that ‘‘In order to accomplish 

that work, the Department has applied ever more personnel to those tasks which 

has added immensely to costs.’’ The board stated further that ‘‘Whether it’s improving the tooth-to-tail ratio; increasing the ‘bang for the buck’, or converting overhead 

to combat, Congress and DoD must significantly change their approach,’’ and that 

DOD ‘‘Must use the numerous world-class business practices and proven business 

operations that are applicable to DoD’s overhead.’’ 9

One potential way to interpret the affordability challenge posed by the Navy’s 30- 

year shipbuilding plan is to view it as an invitation by the Navy for policymakers 

to consider matters such as the alignment between U.S. strategy and the division 

of DOD resources among the military departments, and the potential for taking actions beyond those now being implemented by DOD to control military personnel 

pay and benefits and reduce DOD overhead and back-office costs. The Navy’s prepared statement for the September 18 hearing before the full committee on planning 

for sequestration in FY2014 and the perspectives of the military services on the 

Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) provides a number of details 

about reductions in Navy force structure and acquisition programs that could result 

from constraining DOD’s budget to the revised cap levels in the Budget Control 

Act.10 These potential reductions do not appear to reflect any substantial shift in 

the allocation of DOD resources among the military departments, or the taking of 

actions beyond those already being implemented by DOD to control DOD personnel 

pay and benefits and reduce DOD overhead and back-office costs. 

Mr. FORBES. Although China’s primary maritime focus remains regional, Beijing 

aspires to play a larger role in select global issues that will require a naval power 

projection capability. These ambitions are driving the development of PLA Navy capabilities to operate on a limited basis outside of the Western Pacific region. At 

what point in time, if ever, do you believe China will be able to project maritime 
95 

global power similar to how the Department of the Navy projects naval power in 

the maritime domain? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. China’s ability to operate naval forces in more-distant waters will 

likely continue to grow, but if ‘‘project[ing] maritime global power similar to how the 

Department of the Navy projects naval power in the maritime domain’’ is taken to 

mean a capability to operate substantial forward-deployed forces on a sustained 

basis in multiple ocean areas around the world, and to project substantial power 

ashore in one or more of those areas on a sustained basis, then I am not sure that 

China’s navy will ever become capable of doing that, or that China’s leadership 

would aspire to having a navy with that capability. 

The missions assigned to navies reflect the national strategies of their parent 

countries. The ability of the U.S. Navy to operate substantial forward-deployed 

forces on a sustained basis in multiple ocean areas around the world, and to project 

substantial power ashore in one or more of those areas on a sustained basis, reflects 

the United States’ location in the Western hemisphere and the consequent top-level 

U.S. strategic goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part 

of Eurasia or another. China’s geographic setting and consequent national strategy 

differ from those of the United States, and may never require a navy that can operate substantial forward-deployed forces on a sustained basis in multiple ocean areas 

around the world, and project substantial power ashore in one or more of those 

areas on a sustained basis. China’s navy will, however, likely develop a growing capability to operate in more distant waters on a focused and selective basis, and may 

develop a capability for projecting some amount of power ashore from those waters 

on a focused and selective basis. 

Mr. FORBES. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence projects in an unclassified assessment that China will have between 313 and 342 submarines and surface combatants by 2020, including approximately 60 submarines that are able to employ 

submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles. 

Do you believe the projected U.S. Navy attack submarine inventory will be able to 

sufficiently counter the submarine inventory of the PLA Navy? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. U.S. Navy operations to counter Chinese submarines would be 

conducted not only by Navy attack submarines, but by aircraft and surface ships 

as well. Conversely, U.S. Navy attack submarines have missions other than countering submarines, such as conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

operations, attacking land targets with Tomahawk cruise missiles, tracking and attacking surface ships, inserting and recovering special operations forces, and detecting and countering mines. So there would likely be U.S. platforms other than attack 

submarines countering Chinese submarines, and missions other than countering 

Chinese submarines being performed by U.S. attack submarines. That said, the projected attack submarine shortfall will, other things held equal, add some degree of 

risk during the period of the shortfall to the ability of the attack submarine force 

to contribute to U.S. operations for countering Chinese submarines and to perform 

other missions. The Navy can attempt to mitigate that risk by taking measures to 

maximize attack submarine availability during the period of the shortfall, such as 

shifting submarine maintenance work outside the shortfall period. Such measures, 

however, might simply spread some of the added risk to neighboring years. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you assess that China’s naval modernization effort forms part of 

a broader Chinese effort to assert regional influence, and if so, how should the 

United States respond? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Yes, China’s naval modernization effort forms part of a broader 

Chinese effort to assert regional influence. Factors that policymakers may consider 

in determining the U.S. response include those listed above in response to an earlier 

question, namely: 

• the following top-level strategic considerations: 

• preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another, 

• preserving the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World 

War II, 

• fulfilling U.S. treaty obligations, and 

• shaping the Asia-Pacific region, and 

• the following additional factors: 

• the capabilities of U.S. allies and partners in the region, and the likelihood 

that those capabilities will be committed in crisis and conflict scenarios involving China, 

• demands for U.S. forces in other parts of the world, 

• constraints on U.S. defense resources, 

• the benefits and costs of measures such as forward homeporting, forward stationing, multiple crewing, and crew rotation, and 
96 

• industrial-base considerations. 

Regarding the goal of shaping the Asia-Pacific region, some observers consider a 

military conflict involving the United States and China to be very unlikely, in part 

because of significant U.S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage 

that such a conflict could cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Asia-Pacific region could nevertheless 

influence day-to-day choices made by other Asia-Pacific countries, including choices 

on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In 

this sense, decisions by policymakers regarding U.S. Navy and other DOD programs 

(as well as other measures, including possibly non-military ones) for countering improved Chinese naval forces could influence the political evolution of the Asia-Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere. 

As noted earlier, the Philippines military in particular currently has relatively little capability for maintaining maritime domain awareness (MDA) and defending its 

territorial claims and operational rights in the South China Sea. In the eastern and 

southern portions of the South China Sea, operations by Chinese Coast Guard ships 

for asserting and defending China’s maritime territorial claims and operational 

rights often go uncountered by equivalent Philippine forces. To the extent that gradual consolidation of Chinese control over parts of the Spratly Islands and other 

South China Sea features such as Scarborough Shoal would affect U.S. interests, 

policymakers may wish to consider the option of accelerating actions for expanding 

and modernizing the Philippines’ maritime defense and law enforcement capabilities. 

Mr. FORBES. Key characteristics of international order in the Asia-Pacific region 

include, among other things, a rules- and norms-based system grounded in international law, the use of international law and other non-coercive mechanisms for 

resolving disputes, market-based economies and free trade, broadly defined global 

commons at sea and in the air, and freedom of operations in international waters 

and airspace. Do you assess that China’s naval modernization effort forms part of 

a broader Chinese effort to alter one or more elements of this international order, 

at least for the Asia-Pacific region, and if so, how should the United States respond? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Views among observers on this question vary. My own assessment 

as an analyst is that China’s naval modernization effort appears to form part of a 

broader Chinese effort to alter one or more elements of the current international 

order. Specifically, my assessment is that China appears, at a minimum, to be seeking to change the international order as it relates to freedom of operations in international waters and airspace. Although China may be seeking to do this only for 

the Asia-Pacific region, Chinese success in that regard would potentially have implications for other regions as well: Since international law is universal in its application, changing its application in one region would create a precedent for changing 

it in other regions. In addition, my assessment is that China appears to be seeking 

to change the international order as it relates to non-use of coercive mechanisms 

for resolving disputes, at least in the Asia-Pacific region. Again, views among observers on this question vary; some might assess that China’s effort goes further 

than what I have described, while others might assess that there is no such broader 

Chinese effort, at least not as a matter of conscious, coordinated Chinese policy. 

If policymakers judge that China’s naval modernization effort forms part of a 

broader Chinese effort to alter one or more elements of this international order, at 

least for the Asia-Pacific region, there would be various options for responding. One 

possibility would be to recognize the issue formally and explicitly in the policymaking process and devise an integrated, cross-agency strategy for addressing it. 

Such a strategy might have multiple elements and involve U.S. allies and partners 

in the region. 

Mr. FORBES. The United States has obligations to treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific 

region, particularly Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and certain obligations 

to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. As China continues to exert sovereignty 

claims in the Asia-Pacific region, such as its declared Economic Engagement Zones 

in the East and South China Seas and its recently declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, how should the United States balance 

international obligations with China’s desire to exert territorial influence in the 

Asia-Pacific? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. In seeking to balance U.S. international obligations with China’s 

desire to exert territorial influence in the Asia-Pacific, one key factor to keep in 

mind is whether China’s actions are consistent with customary international law as 

reflected in instruments such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 

Sea (UNCLOS) and the October 1972 multilateral convention on the international 

regulations for preventing collisions at sea, commonly known as the COLREGs or 
97 

11 28 UST 3459; TIAS 8587. The treaty was done at London October 20, 1972, and entered 

into force July 15, 1977. A summary of the agreement is available online at http://www.imo.org/ 

about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/colreg.aspx. 

the ‘‘rules of the road,’’ to which both China and the United States are parties.11

The current international legal regime provides mechanisms for resolving maritime 

territorial disputes that can result in decisions in China’s favor, and it provides for 

freedom of operations in international waters and airspace that can benefit Chinese 

maritime and air operations not only in China’s near-seas regions, but around the 

world. If China’s actions to exert territorial influence in the Asia-Pacific challenge 

the current international legal regime, it could affect the ability of the United States 

to fulfill its international obligations not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but in other 

regions as well, because, as noted earlier, international law is universal in its application, so changing its application in one region consequently would create a precedent for changing it in other regions. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you assess that the United States currently possesses a relevant 

and tangible National Security Strategy, Defense Strategy, and Military Strategy 

for successfully addressing China’s growing regional and global influence? If not, 

why not? 

Dr. CROPSEY. The U.S.’s current National Security, Defense, and Military Strategy documents contain many admirable principles and desired outcomes. The documents neither explain how these outcomes will be achieved, what forces are needed 

to produce the outcomes, nor how much these forces will cost. Closest to a strategy 

for addressing China’s growing regional and global influence is the current administration’s idea of a ‘‘rebalance’’ to Asia. This is longer on soft power than the hard 

power needed to support it. However, current and recent U.S. efforts to improve relations with Vietnam, Myanmar, and other Southeast Asian states on China’s periphery that fear it are worthwhile and should be continued and accelerated. However, this is necessary but not sufficient. China is seeking influence around the 

world in the form of investments, presence, cultural exchange, and foreign assistance. No sign exists that we have thought through how to address this. What’s 

needed is an Eisenhower-like approach similar to the Solarium Project but broader 

in scope since China’s wealth makes it a more formidable global actor than the Soviets whose ideology had a very restricted international appeal for which they had 

limited funds to advance in any event. Congress could play an important role in creating such a project whose ideas the current administration might not adopt. But 

thinking through the questions and starting to answer them would shape national 

attitudes and possibly the ideas of a future administration. After the ‘‘rebalance’’ 

concept comes the Air-Sea Battle concept. It is not a strategy, and does not claim 

to be one. The project I propose ought to have a national security team that would 

examine and make recommendations about U.S. security policy toward China. 

Again, the current administration is not likely to look kindly on a hard-headed recommendation about strategy. But, thinking ahead, this is what is needed to shape 

thinking and action for a future administration. 

Mr. FORBES. Trends in China’s defense spending, research and development, and 

shipbuilding industry suggest China will continue its naval modernization for the 

foreseeable future and may field the largest fleet of modern submarines and surface 

combatants in the Western Pacific by 2020. What factors do you recommend decisionmakers consider when determining the necessary and appropriate U.S. military 

force structure posture to maintain in the Asia-Pacific region? 

Dr. CROPSEY. The under-funded U.S. submarine force that Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plans anticipates will be smaller than China’s current subsurface force. 

During the same three decades Chinese naval modernization will continue. Even if 

the U.S. withdraws its commitments from the rest of the world this will put us at 

a numerical disadvantage compared to China which—even without its planners’ admiration for the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan—is likely to concentrate its submarine force in the West Pacific. Decision-makers should consider this probable imbalance with particular attention because of the littoral combat ship’s (which is expected to include an ASW module) vulnerability to China’s growing arsenal of missiles, naval air, and the reasonable possibility that the DF–21 missile will become 

a useful instrument of China’s anti-access/area denial strategy. Destroying Chinese 

subs should be the U.S. and its allies’ strategic objective. This precedes using U.S. 

submarine-launched attacks on Chinese land targets which are likely to produce a 

response against U.S. territory. The more of their submarine force that is sunk the 

safer it will be for the U.S. to hold at risk their amphibious capability, control the 

island chains, and maintain their access to such strategic and sea-borne supplies as 

energy. U.S. decision-makers should fund not only unmanned subsurface drones 

that augment the capability of our current SSN force and the networking capacity 
98 

that multiplies their combat effectiveness, but also a large number of (relatively) inexpensive and quieter diesel-electric boats. Besides offering the U.S. submarine fleet 

a low-cost numerical advantage these vessels should be based or supplied from our 

treaty allies in the region thus offering the additional benefit of assuring them that 

we continue to deserve their trust. Navy will also need to make important investments in the logistics ships that are particularly important for sustaining a naval 

force at the western end of the Pacific. Navy’s 30-year plan aims to build more logistics ships but the entire plan lies under a cloud—as Congress has noted—because 

of the gulf between the Navy’s plans and reasonable expectations for funding the 

SCN account. No appropriate posture for the U.S. Pacific Fleet can reasonably ignore the necessity of resupplying ships at sea including the ability to re-arm underway. Moreover, the Flight III DDG–51-class only puts off the question of the character of Navy’s surface fleet backbone. By the time they join the fleet—in the early 

‘20s—the demand for electrical power from rail guns and laser weapons, for example, will likely have exceeded the power-generating capacity that the Flight IIIs volume can accommodate. Despite submarines’ increasing importance in the West Pacific, the U.S. cannot maintain a force posture worthy of the name without a resilient and dominant surface fleet. The Zumwalt has the needed capacity including 

space for electrical generation. Alternatives include less expensive surface ships that 

perform fewer missions that can be changes in the same modular fashion as the 

LCS. Navy should be making and funding decisions about the surface fleet now— 

one hopes—guided by strategy. Finally, although the USAF is taking the increased 

importance of Asia seriously, the Army is well behind and shows few signs of catching up. The Army is responsible for the defending our bases in the Western Pacific 

from air and missile attack. Rather than concentrating on this mission the Army 

is looking at Asia as justification for maintaining force structure. There may be 

something to this in holding or retaking territory in the island chains that bracket 

the Asian mainland—as the Army did in WWII. But—unlike WWII—we already 

have good positions in WestPac. Our first priority should be to assure their safety. 

Decision-makers would benefit our military posture by looking more closely at the 

air defense of our bases in the region. 

Mr. FORBES. The PLA Navy’s expanding role in military missions other than war 

and new willingness to operate beyond China’s immediate periphery creates opportunities to enhance maritime cooperation between the United States and China. 

How do you believe the United States military should leverage these opportunities 

for increased engagement with the PLA Navy? 

Dr. CROPSEY. As noted above in the answer to Question 12, China’s aggressive 

actions of the past year make this the wrong time to increase cooperation with the 

PLA Navy. If our goal is to encourage China to become a stakeholder in the international order we do not advance it by rewarding them for behavior that violates 

international norms. However, if and when China ceases territorial and armed 

provocations in the East and South China Seas maritime cooperation with the 

PLAN could include search-and-rescue, disaster relief, and humanitarian operations 

outside the states that border China. There can be no point in suggesting to Southeast Asian states on China’s periphery that Beijing’s intentions are benign. Nothing 

in these smaller states’ history would lead them to believe it. Africa offers the best 

opportunity for cooperation between the U.S. and China in non-combatant maritime 

operations. Ice-breaking if it is needed to open or keep open sea lanes through the 

Arctic offers an opportunity for maritime cooperation that has relatively few political implications while it assists the most tangible benefit of U.S.-China relations, 

trade. This would be better than the implicit message of U.S.-China maritime cooperation in any state whose leaders could conclude that cooperation between the 

two navies implies American collaboration with, or approval of, Chinese foreign policy. 

Mr. FORBES. Regarding United States current and planned naval modernization 

and recapitalization programs, do you believe the Department of the Navy is on the 

right track to project global power in the foreseeable future for anticipated missions 

the Department may have to perform in the Asia-Pacific region? What is the Department doing well? What are the gaps? 

Dr. CROPSEY. In many places, as with UAVs, UUVs, rail guns, lasers, cyber security, the Navy is on the right technological track. On funding platforms the widening gulf between plans and likely funding Navy is on the wrong track. On strategy Navy is on no track at all. N3/5 has been working on revisions to the ’07 maritime strategy for years and had a publishable document over a year ago. Release 

has been postponed due to the revolving door of admirals responsible for the document, unaccountable delays, and what appears to be a lack of interest at the senior 

level of the department. The revised strategy was supposed to be published last 

summer. This was delayed until the autumn. Last I heard release has been resched-
99 

uled to ‘sometime soon.’ ‘‘Doing well’’ would start with a strategy from which most 

of everything else would flow—at a minimum the justification for modernization, 

weapons, networks, and platforms. 

Mr. FORBES. The challenges associated with fiscal resource constraints stemming 

from the Budget Control Act of August 2011 and subsequent sequestration will 

make it nearly impossible for the Department of the Navy to maintain a sufficient 

force structure required to meet all global power requirements in the maritime domain. In the context of the ‘‘rebalance to Asia’’ strategy, what maritime naval capabilities should decisionmakers consider high-priority to develop and/or maintain 

given limited fiscal resources to maximize flexibility and elasticity in meeting global 

force projection requirements in the maritime domain? 

Dr. CROPSEY. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) rests on the notion of neutralizing China’s 

growing anti-access/area denial capability by degrading the C4ISR network on 

which it depends. This would require—among other actions—striking targets on 

China’s mainland. China has the ability to retaliate against U.S. targets. Such retaliation would escalate a conflict where U.S. strategy should seek to contain and end 

it as quickly as possible. A strategy that sought to contain conflict could be accomplished by seizing the key nodes of both 1st and 2nd island chains as well as securing the land areas that surround the straits through which traffic between the Middle East and Asia moves. Holding these areas assisted by naval and air support 

would allow us and allies to enforce a blockade with unacceptable economic consequences to China. Alternatively, American seapower could destroy the PLAN’s 

fleet as quickly as possible. This would have both economic and far-reaching military consequences that would encourage an end to hostilities. The second strategy 

would require more naval forces to command the seas that surround China. There 

are other possible strategic approaches. They were not the subject of this question. 

The point is that decision-makers’ ability to prioritize naval capabilities should depend on strategy. The ‘rebalance to Asia’ lacks one. When this problem is addressed 

the question of priorities and fiscal resources can be better addressed. 

Mr. FORBES. Although China’s primary maritime focus remains regional, Beijing 

aspires to play a larger role in select global issues that will require a naval power 

projection capability. These ambitions are driving the development of PLA Navy capabilities to operate on a limited basis outside of the Western Pacific region. At 

what point in time, if ever, do you believe China will be able to project maritime 

global power similar to how the Department of the Navy projects naval power in 

the maritime domain? 

Dr. CROPSEY. It is not clear that China will ever be able to project maritime power 

globally as does the U.S. The Chinese have many obstacles to overcome: the numerical disparity between the coming generation’s genders, a population that as Nick 

Eberstadt has put it ‘will grow old before it grows wealthy,’ a brittle political system, and the likelihood that they cannot sustain the economic growth of the previous 30 years for the next three decades to name a few. Any one of these will put 

China’s continued rise in jeopardy. Together, they would stop it. However, there can 

be no doubt that Chinese leadership aspires to return the nation to the position of 

global influence it once occupied. If it can maintain its double-digit increases in GDP 

and surmount the serious obstacles to continued single-party rule and if U.S. 

seapower maintains its current descending trajectory China will be a peer-competitor—or better—before the midpoint of this century. If both nations maintain their 

current seapower trajectories, the best chance that China will not equal or surpass 

us is if they adopt Harold Mackinder’s idea of controlling the Eurasian landmass 

and succeed in doing so. Then their markets, productive power, strategic commodities, and wealth will depend very little on the seas, and we will have other much 

more serious problems than vanishing seapower. 

Mr. FORBES. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence projects in an unclassified assessment that China will have between 313 and 342 submarines and surface combatants by 2020, including approximately 60 submarines that are able to employ 

submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles. 

Do you believe the projected U.S. Navy attack submarine inventory will be able to 

sufficiently counter the submarine inventory of the PLA Navy? 

Dr. CROPSEY. I agree with Navy’s general assessment that by 2020 PLAN modernization will not have matured sufficiently to overcome our technology and experience with larger numbers of vessels. But China knows its technological weakness. 

It has a strategy of anti-access/area denial to compensate for their current technological inferiority. And the strategy is based importantly on countering our strength 

asymmetrically—for example, WU–14 hypersonic glide vehicle whose testing was reported in the 13 January edition of The Washington Free Beacon. (See http:// 

freebeacon.com/china-conducts-first-test-of-new-ultra-high-speed-missile-vehicle/) 

The trend line is what we should be watching to understand if the projected U.S. 
100 

submarine inventory will be able to counter the PLAN in the future. And the trend 

line does not favor us for many of the reasons already noted in these answers. It 

is based on an unsupportable U.S. Navy shipbuilding plan, China’s increasing numbers of submarines, and its ever-expanding fleet. It would be worth the effort to analyze at what point China’s submarine fleet will be a match for that which the U.S. 

is able to dedicate to the Western Pacific. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you assess that China’s naval modernization effort forms part of 

a broader Chinese effort to assert regional influence, and if so, how should the 

United States respond? 

Dr. CROPSEY. I am not convinced that Chinese leadership has decided yet what 

role the PLAN should play globally: I am convinced they believe that China was 

once a major world power and want to restore it to its proper place as one. China’s 

interest in anti-access/area denial; its investment in systems that would disrupt and 

degrade U.S. forces’ dependence on network-centricity; its development of such 

weapons as the DF–21 anti-ship ballistic missile; and its military and diplomatic 

focus on the South and East China Seas are convincing evidence that China aims 

first at asserting regional influence. Regional influence will advance the larger and 

longer-term aim of regional hegemony. U.S. policy aimed to prevent the hegemony 

of a continental power in Europe from WWI through the Cold War. We have at least 

as great an interest in preventing it in Asia. The U.S. should respond to China’s 

efforts through more effective alliance management aimed at convincing regional allies and friends that we will remain the dominant Pacific power; by increasing our 

naval presence in the region; by securing our bases against potential Chinese 

threats; by encouraging China—where possible—to cooperate with the U.S. in such 

non-combatant operations as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance; by diverting China’s attention to the seas through closer diplomatic, commercial, and security 

ties to India and Southeast Asia; and by substantial increases in public diplomacy 

efforts aimed at the Chinese audience as well as public diplomacy and other efforts 

aimed to support the Uighurs, Tibetans, and Mongolians. U.S. policy should aim to 

increase the range of problems that China faces on land as a means of diverting 

their attention from the seas. This should also include exploiting China’s reflexive 

imitation of American military technology by investing in defense programs whose 

imitation will cost China heavily as it forces the PLA to increase its investments 

in land warfare. 

Mr. FORBES. Key characteristics of international order in the Asia-Pacific region 

include, among other things, a rules- and norms-based system grounded in international law, the use of international law and other non-coercive mechanisms for 

resolving disputes, market-based economies and free trade, broadly defined global 

commons at sea and in the air, and freedom of operations in international waters 

and airspace. Do you assess that China’s naval modernization effort forms part of 

a broader Chinese effort to alter one or more elements of this international order, 

at least for the Asia-Pacific region, and if so, how should the United States respond? 

Dr. CROPSEY. China’s military buildup of which naval modernization is a part of, 

but does not fully express, Chinese leadership’s unconventional view of international 

order. China’s leaders do not share our view that international order depends significantly on balanced power. Peer competition in China’s leaders’ view eliminates 

the possibility of true sovereignty. The global instruments that Woodrow Wilson envisioned and which were created after WWII are as inimical to true sovereignty as 

the ideas of sovereignty and non-interference in other state’s affairs that were codified in Europe at the midpoint of the 17th century. Naval and military forces are 

means to intimidate neighbors and gain psychological and defacto legal advantage. 

Decisive defeat of an enemy remains a possibility but is as likely to be achieved by— 

in the example of the Western Pacific—denying the U.S. access as by traditional 

naval engagements. As the utility of traditional military engagements recedes such 

non-kinetic means as declaring limited control over international waters and airspace; and such psychological/legal instruments as active pressure to assert claims 

in international waters which Chinese leadership has said represent core national 

interests are the evolving battlefield. China’s respect for international norms, as 

their actions in the Senkakus show, is subordinate to its leaders’ pre-modern view 

that sovereignty rests ultimately on an imbalance, rather than a balance, of great 

powers. The U.S. should not abandon its hope and efforts to convince China that 

it can benefit from a liberal international order but should add to these a serious 

and sustained attempt to loosen Beijing’s central authority, assert the superiority 

of international order based on rules, and the fundamental principles of respect for 

sovereignty as the West has understood and practiced it for nearly 400 years. Such 

efforts should be complemented by the understanding that China’s leaders are not 

likely soon to change either their views or behavior. Our answer should be to respond in terms that Chinese leadership respects. Naval power is necessary but in 
101 

China’s view not sufficient to achieve the global power they seek. Besides countering 

their non-kinetic approach to accomplishing their grand strategic objectives, the 

U.S. should also emphasize forming and preserving effective allied coalitions, increasing our diplomatic and naval presence in the region, and building a fleet that 

maintains the superiority we currently enjoy over the PLAN. 

Mr. FORBES. The United States has obligations to treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific 

region, particularly Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and certain obligations 

to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. As China continues to exert sovereignty 

claims in the Asia-Pacific region, such as its declared Economic Engagement Zones 

in the East and South China Seas and its recently declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, how should the United States balance 

international obligations with China’s desire to exert territorial influence in the 

Asia-Pacific? 

Dr. CROPSEY. The U.S. should balance its current international obligations 

against China’s territorial ambitions in WestPac on several fronts but not at the expense of U.S. core interests in the Persian Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean, and Caribbean. Diminished influence in the Persian Gulf not only increases risk to our allies’ 

energy supplies. It risks allowing Iran to hold the whip hand with the Gulf States 

upon which we remain dependent for oil, regional friends, and a balance to a Shiadominated Middle East. Adding to the large energy reserves which have already 

been discovered off the Israeli and southern Cypriot coasts are substantial natural 

gas discoveries off Greece’s Ionian coast. The likelihood is that scheduled exploration 

will produce evidence of much more natural gas in the same region. Extracting, refining, and transporting these deposits will strengthen our friends in the region, address many of their financial problems, offer alternatives to the EU’s dependence 

on Russian-supplied energy, and provide a bulwark against the radicalization that 

threatens the Eastern Mediterranean littoral from Turkey to Libya. The U.S. has 

a very small flotilla in the Med where once we had a robust Sixth Fleet. This should 

be increased, not diminished to augment WestPac forces. The U.S. has a core interest in limiting the flow of drugs from South and Central America and maintaining 

naval presence in the Western Hemisphere. This might be decreased by a very few 

ships but nowhere close to the number required to counter the territorial influence 

that China seeks in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. policy should increase naval shipbuilding 

and its associated costs by reallocation of funds within the DoD budget, by substantially devolving authority to the military services for important defense functions 

from the currently over-centralized and over-staffed agencies in OSD, by 

grandfathering some benefits to military personnel, and by streamlining the heavily 

bureaucratized, inefficient, and needlessly complex process of designing, contracting, 

building, and testing military equipment. At the same time the U.S. should adopt 

the measures needed to counter China’s psychological pressures, its regional territorial claims, and efforts to establish legal support for its claims in the South and 

East China Seas all of which are aimed over time to achieve the same hegemony 

for which force has traditionally been the primary instrument. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you assess that the United States currently possesses a relevant 

and tangible National Security Strategy, Defense Strategy, and Military Strategy 

for successfully addressing China’s growing regional and global influence? If not, 

why not? 

Mr. THOMAS. The United States lacks a particular, articulated strategy for China. 

The NSS, Defense Strategy, and NMS are all universal in their outlooks and do not 

provide specific strategies with meaningful levels of detail for any particular countries or threats. These documents are not very useful in marshaling all instruments 

of national power to deal with a specific challenge like a long-term strategic competition with China, because they deal with multiple problems ranging from terrorism to environmental change. They also tend to list objectives without necessarily 

explaining how their objectives might be achieved. 

Mr. FORBES. Trends in China’s defense spending, research and development, and 

shipbuilding industry suggest China will continue its naval modernization for the 

foreseeable future and may field the largest fleet of modern submarines and surface 

combatants in the Western Pacific by 2020. What factors do you recommend decisionmakers consider when determining the necessary and appropriate U.S. military 

force structure posture to maintain in the Asia-Pacific region? 

Mr. THOMAS. There are any number of factors that U.S. decision-makers should 

weigh in determining the necessary U.S. military force structure and appropriate 

posture to preserve the security balance in the Asia-Pacific region. Four in particular stand out in my mind. 

Perhaps most importantly, decision-makers should consider the potential of any 

change or investment to impose disproportionate costs on a competitor. Too often 
102 

we only look at the price tag of an option to ourselves rather than consider the costs 

it might impose on a rival. 

Another factor in determining our posture is the degree to which it is distributed 

so that we can sustain combat operations under attack. We have a situation today 

where we are putting too many of our military ‘‘eggs’’ in to few ‘‘baskets’’ in terms 

of forward bases in the western Pacific. Diversifying our basing and access posture 

would enhance deterrence and crisis stability by reducing the opportunity for an adversary to deliver a single, no warning ‘‘knockout blow.’’ 

Third, decision-makers should question our investments in terms of whether or 

not they increase the striking power of our forward naval and air forces. Our current investment profile is skewed too much in favor of defensive systems to protect 

our forces rather than increasing their combat firepower. 

Finally, it is important not to overlook logistics as a factor. Decision makers 

should ensure that our combat logistics fleet is adequate to support high-intensity 

combat operations in the region. This may require increasing the number of logistics 

ships. It should also prompt decision makers to prioritize R&D efforts to facilitate 

reloading weapons at sea rather than transiting long distances back to ports. 

Mr. FORBES. The PLA Navy’s expanding role in military missions other than war 

and new willingness to operate beyond China’s immediate periphery creates opportunities to enhance maritime cooperation between the United States and China. 

How do you believe the United States military should leverage these opportunities 

for increased engagement with the PLA Navy? 

Mr. THOMAS. PLA Navy operations in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere expose Chinese naval personnel to multinational operations. Such operations could be further 

leveraged to impress upon the PLA (N) leadership the importance of standardized 

protocols and procedures such as those of NATO or of Coalition Maritime Forces in 

the Arabian Gulf and Arabian Sea. They could also help demonstrate the importance of non-commissioned officers, the need for further professionalizing the PLA 

(N), and the importance of adhering to shared norms and modes of conduct in international waters. In particular, such operations could provide an opportunity for engaging ‘‘next generation’’ PLA (N) officers, whose worldviews may differ considerably 

from older generations of officers. 

Mr. FORBES. Regarding United States current and planned naval modernization 

and recapitalization programs, do you believe the Department of the Navy is on the 

right track to project global power in the foreseeable future for anticipated missions 

the Department may have to perform in the Asia-Pacific region? What is the Department doing well? What are the gaps? 

Mr. THOMAS. The DoN has made considerable progress conceptually since the advent of AirSea Battle. There remains, however, a lack of alignment between the 

DoN’s conceptual advances and its investments. There are five main shortfall areas 

that should be addressed as priorities: 

The first shortfall is the carrier air wing’s viability in the face of A2/AD threats, 

such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles and submarine and bomber launched 

anti-ship cruise missiles. The current manned strike aircraft the Navy is fielding 

lack sufficient endurance/range and all-aspect stealth to conduct carrier flight operations from beyond ASBM range and penetrate sophisticated air defense networks. 

Their limited payloads, moreover, limit the number of fixed or mobile targets that 

can be engaged per sortie. The Navy’s UCLASS program as currently envisaged still 

falls short of Secretary Mabus’ vision of a system that can perform in highly contested environments. It is not clear it would have all-aspect stealth and its limited 

payload potentially would relegate it to serving only as a spotter for the carrier— 

a role that already can be performed by BAMS—and to serve as a communications 

relay point or inefficient tanker for manned strike aircraft. The UCLASS program 

should be reevaluated to ensure it would enable the Navy to exploit the mobility 

of the aircraft carrier in the Asia-Pacific region and provide a credible penetrating 

strike option. 

The second shortfall is in terms of the Navy’s surface fleet as currently envisaged. 

Our cruisers and destroyers devote an increasing amount of their payload volume, 

sensor resources and training time to defensive missions. As A2/AD threats improve, 

this trend will only worsen if new capabilities are not fielded to improve their defenses and relieve them of some defensive missions. Lasers and electromagnetic rail 

gun will be fielded as demonstration capabilities on ships over the next two years. 

These capabilities should be accelerated and deployed on more ships to free VLS 

cells for offensive strike and surface and anti-submarine attack. Also, non-kinetic 

missile defenses will be improved with the fielding of systems such as the Surface 

Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Blocks 2 and 3. This deployment 

should be accelerated to provide surface ships a non-kinetic option to defeat enemy 

C4ISR and missiles, as well as conduct a range of other cyber and electromagnetic 
103 

attacks. New weapons such as the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) should 

be protected for the long-term, while in the near-term the SM–6 surface-to-air missile should be made surface and land-attack capable to increase the offensive capacity of the ships’ main battery. Cruisers and destroyers should be relieved of defensive escort missions they may be tasked with in a conflict by developing an escort 

frigate. By providing limited area air defense and ASW capability for convoys and 

logistics ships, a frigate will free cruisers and destroyers, with their greater weapon 

and sensor capacity, to focus more on offensive missions. 

Undersea warfare represents a third shortfall. The DoN has greatly increased the 

capability and affordability of the Virginia class submarine, with the Virginia Payload Module being the most important upcoming improvement. But there are limits 

to a submarine-centric approach to undersea warfare. While few navies do ASW 

well, new sensors, the processing power of ‘‘big data,’’ and improving long-range precision weapons will make ASW easier for more fleets. We should look past the submarine being the tactical-level unit in the undersea fight and further develop the 

family of undersea systems including UUVs, unmanned fixed and mobile sensors, 

and aircraft and surface ship sensors. With improvements in automation and energy 

storage, unmanned systems will become more practical as tactical units, while 

manned submarines will increasingly be operational-level platforms as the carrier 

or ‘‘big-deck’’ amphibious ship is today. 

The fourth shortfall is in munitions. As precision defensive weapons systems become more common, successfully striking an enemy target will require an increasing 

number of attack weapons. This will put a premium on large magazines, reliable 

logistics, and at-sea reload systems. These capabilities will only be useful, however 

if the number and type of munitions is able to keep up with the demands of a hightempo operation. Our current weapons need greater range and survivability to reduce the number of weapons needed to successfully attack a defended target. At the 

same time, overall munitions inventories need to be increased, at-sea reload capability developed, and more magazine space afforded to offense to enable the Navy 

to sustain operations in high-intensity combat. 

The fifth change needed is in expeditionary warfare. The Marine Corps would be 

called on in future Asia-Pacific conflicts to conduct a wide range of amphibious operations that do not include a large, multi-brigade amphibious assault. While the Marine Corps has stated they see this emerging need, the DoN’s investments and plans 

do not yet reflect the changing nature of amphibious operations. These new operations include establishing and sustaining austere rearming and refueling bases for 

F–35B aircraft or conducting raids to eliminate coastal anti-ship cruise missiles and 

ISR stations. At the lower end of warfare, Marines will be needed to stand by in 

a growing number of locations to evacuate Americans from unstable countries while 

continuing to be first responders to humanitarian disaster. These trends argue for 

changes in the makeup of the ARG/MEU, better expeditionary logistics and perhaps 

a larger and more diverse set of ships capable of conducting amphibious operations. 

While the DoN has talked about the intent to do this, no concrete action has yet 

been taken. 

Mr. FORBES. The challenges associated with fiscal resource constraints stemming 

from the Budget Control Act of August 2011 and subsequent sequestration will 

make it nearly impossible for the Department of the Navy to maintain a sufficient 

force structure required to meet all global power requirements in the maritime domain. In the context of the ‘‘rebalance to Asia’’ strategy, what maritime naval capabilities should decisionmakers consider high-priority to develop and/or maintain 

given limited fiscal resources to maximize flexibility and elasticity in meeting global 

force projection requirements in the maritime domain? 

Mr. THOMAS. The budget reductions of the BCA and subsequent Bipartisan Budget Agreement do not prevent DoN from making the most important investments for 

the future while accepting some reductions in near-term capacity. Large-scale conflict is unlikely in the next few years but the advance and proliferation of A2/AD 

capabilities will require the future fleet to be able to project power in the face of 

sophisticated defenses and while being attacked by long-range precision weapons. 

Four areas are especially important: 

1. UCLASS: This aircraft will need to be a survivable long-range strike system 

with enough payload to destroy defended targets. If the aircraft is not long-range 

or survivable, the carrier will be unable to exploit its major advantage over land 

bases: mobility. Short-range tactical aircraft and UAVs will not be able to penetrate 

an adversary air defense envelope from far enough away for the carrier to be able 

to effectively conduct operations. 

2. Submarines and UUVs: The DoN should accelerate development of a broader 

family of undersea systems including unmanned vehicles, weapons, sensors, communications and command and control systems. 
104 

3. Weapons: The Navy should accelerate defensive weapons that do not place demands on missile magazines such as lasers, railgun and high-powered microwave. 

On offense, long-range survivable weapons able to defeat defended targets are needed such as LRASM, SM–6 (for surface attack) and intermediate-range conventional 

ballistic missiles. With respect to the munitions inventory, DoD should sustain sufficient production capacity to enable increased procurement in the 2020s. 

4. Logistics: Adversary A2/AD capabilities will threaten traditional ‘‘just-in-time’’ 

supply chains, while defended targets will require an increasing number of munitions to destroy. The Navy’s current logistics approach will need to be more robust, 

with more CLF ships, dedicated (i.e., frigate) escorts, protected communications and 

an at-sea reload capability. 

Mr. FORBES. Although China’s primary maritime focus remains regional, Beijing 

aspires to play a larger role in select global issues that will require a naval power 

projection capability. These ambitions are driving the development of PLA Navy capabilities to operate on a limited basis outside of the Western Pacific region. At 

what point in time, if ever, do you believe China will be able to project maritime 

global power similar to how the Department of the Navy projects naval power in 

the maritime domain? 

Mr. THOMAS. Extra-regional maritime power projection probably remains a 

generational challenge for the PLA. The PLA is unlikely to follow the U.S. military 

playbook and may adopt different approaches to power projection. It will require developing new training pipelines, establishing a professional cadre of non-commissioned officers, constructing a maintenance infrastructure that exceeds the PLA’s 

current maintenance posture, creating a rotational base to support overseas deployments, and establishing a network of overseas bases and facilities to support a more 

global military presence. There are enormous challenges associated with each of 

these steps. Global naval force projection would require success in all of them, which 

may take several decades. 

Mr. FORBES. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence projects in an unclassified assessment that China will have between 313 and 342 submarines and surface combatants by 2020, including approximately 60 submarines that are able to employ 

submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles or anti-ship cruise missiles. 

Do you believe the projected U.S. Navy attack submarine inventory will be able to 

sufficiently counter the submarine inventory of the PLA Navy? 

Mr. THOMAS. While the U.S. submarine inventory should not be allowed to shrink 

below the Navy’s requirement and ideally should be expanded, our submarines are 

only a small part of countering adversary submarines. ASW is primarily conducted 

by aircraft such as the P–8A and MH–60R, surface ships such as the DDG–51 and 

LCS with the Multifunction Towed Array and SQQ–89 sonar processor, and an integrated system of manned and unmanned sensors operated from ships and on the 

ocean floor. The DoN continues to make robust investments in this family of ASW 

systems, but this ‘‘traditional’’ approach to ASW, developed through World War II 

and the Cold War, will need to change in light of the long reach of adversary submarine weapons. The Navy will need to exploit advances in sensors and processing 

to detect enemy submarines farther from U.S. forces and employ new approaches 

to prevent attacks that focus on denying enemy submarines an attack opportunity 

as much as trying to sink them outright. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you assess that China’s naval modernization effort forms part of 

a broader Chinese effort to assert regional influence, and if so, how should the 

United States respond? 

Mr. THOMAS. China’s naval modernization effort buttresses its political aim to expand its regional influence in several ways. First, it confers capabilities that underwrite China’s counter intervention strategy aimed at restricting U.S. access and denying it naval mastery in the western Pacific. Second, it provides options for China 

to gain local sea control and conduct limited regional force projection operations in 

its near seas. 

The U.S. response should include efforts to preserve or expand its most viable 

power projection options, such as extending the reach and striking power of its carriers, expanding the strike capacity of its undersea forces, and pursuing game 

changing technologies such as electro-magnetic railgun and directed energy systems 

that could provide new defensive options for the surface fleet. The United States 

should also encourage its allies and regional partners to develop their own forms 

of A2/AD systems, such as land-based anti-ship missile batteries and mobile air defense systems to defend their sovereign territorial waters and airspace in the face 

of China’s maritime expansion. 

Mr. FORBES. Key characteristics of international order in the Asia-Pacific region 

include, among other things, a rules- and norms-based system grounded in international law, the use of international law and other non-coercive mechanisms for 
105 

resolving disputes, market-based economies and free trade, broadly defined global 

commons at sea and in the air, and freedom of operations in international waters 

and airspace. Do you assess that China’s naval modernization effort forms part of 

a broader Chinese effort to alter one or more elements of this international order, 

at least for the Asia-Pacific region, and if so, how should the United States respond? 

Mr. THOMAS. China’s naval modernization provides a coercive backstop for its 

non-military efforts to gradually alter the rules and norms of the international system in ways that disproportionally favor China. An important part of the U.S. response should be bolstering frontline maritime states in Asia so that they are less 

susceptible to Chinese coercion. Ultimately, international rules and norms may continue to evolve as they have throughout history, but the United States has an interest in opposing unilateral efforts by any state to alter them. 

Mr. FORBES. The United States has obligations to treaty allies in the Asia-Pacific 

region, particularly Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and certain obligations 

to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. As China continues to exert sovereignty 

claims in the Asia-Pacific region, such as its declared Economic Engagement Zones 

in the East and South China Seas and its recently declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, how should the United States balance 

international obligations with China’s desire to exert territorial influence in the 

Asia-Pacific? 

Mr. THOMAS. The United States should make clear that it stands with its allies 

and regional partners in defending their sovereignty and that it opposes any unilateral moves to alter the geo-political status quo of the region. This entails bolstering 

the capabilities of allies and partners to defend themselves more effectively against 

acts of coercion or aggression. Increasingly, this requires helping allies and partners 

to deal with incremental paramilitary maritime encroachments. Allies and partners 

will need to respond in kind, by beefing up their own paramilitary surveillance 

forces and coast guards, as well as improving their military capabilities for air and 

sea denial if crises escalate. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Given the renewed focus on PLA Navy submarine construction, do 

you believe that our current investments in undersea warfare and ASW capabilities 

and training is sufficient? If not, what shortfalls are most concerning? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The United States has enjoyed a significant advantage in C4ISR 

capabilities, but China has made significant efforts to acquire those same capabilities. Can you please provide additional insight as to what this means as far as enabling their other modernization investments, as well as areas where Chinese C4ISR 

is still lacking? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs serve both as a boon to 

the domestic defense industry and our relationships with foreign partners. What additional opportunities exist for the enhancement of foreign military sales to other 

countries in the region who are wary of China’s increasing activity? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In what ways can we encourage additional productive Chinese contributions to international security mechanisms? 

Dr. ERICKSON. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Given the renewed focus on PLA Navy submarine construction, do 

you believe that our current investments in undersea warfare and ASW capabilities 

and training is sufficient? If not, what shortfalls are most concerning? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Proficiency in ASW takes effort to develop and maintain, and can 

erode quickly in the absence of periodic training and exercises. Since the end of the 

Cold War, Navy officials from time to time have expressed concern over erosion of 

the fleet’s ASW proficiency. The Navy in recent years has increased ASW exercises 

and training, particularly in the Pacific fleet, with the goal of improving the fleet’s 

ASW proficiency. Sustaining a high state of ASW proficiency will require continued 

devotion of resources to ASW training and exercises. 

ASW and undersea warfare are conducted by aircraft, surface ships, submarines, 

and unmanned vehicles, using various sensors and weapons. Consequently, ASW 

and undersea warfare encompass a large number of platform and equipment programs. Observers might focus on various programs as items that might deserve increased oversight attention. In my own work, I have called attention to the projected 

attack submarine shortfall (an issue I first identified in 1995 and have testified and 

reported on each year since) and to the value of fielding, sooner rather than later, 
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12For more on the NSC, FRC, and OPC programs, see CRS Report R42567, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. 

an anti-torpedo torpedo (ATT) that would give Navy surface ships a hard-kill option 

for countering wake-homing torpedoes, which are not very susceptible to soft-kill 

countermeasures such as decoys. The projected IOC date for the ATT has shifted 

back and forth from one budget submission to the next in recent years, partly due 

to changes in funding profiles. Another area of potential focus for the subcommittee 

are submarine-launched unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), which have the potential for extending the reach and mission capabilities of attack submarines. The Navy for the last several years has conducted numerous experiments and demonstrations with various submarine-launched 

UAVs and UUVs, but has not often transitioned these efforts into procurement programs of record. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The United States has enjoyed a significant advantage in C4ISR 

capabilities, but China has made significant efforts to acquire those same capabilities. Can you please provide additional insight as to what this means as far as enabling their other modernization investments, as well as areas where Chinese C4ISR 

is still lacking? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. The fielding of improved C4ISR systems will improve China’s ability to detect, identify, and track adversary ships and aircraft, and then target and 

attack them with anti-ship and anti-aircraft weapons, particularly longer range 

weapons such as the ASBM. More generally, the fielding of improved C4ISR systems will permit China to operate its ships and aircraft in a more networked fashion, and thereby improve their collective capability. In these ways, improved C4ISR 

capabilities will permit China to increase the utility of China’s ships, aircraft, and 

weapons, and help complete and make more robust the kill chains that China needs 

to execute to employ its weapons, especially at longer ranges. Although China is 

fielding improved C4ISR capabilities, China’s potential C4ISR weaknesses include 

a lack of operational experience in using these systems (particularly in joint operations and combat situations) and the susceptibility of these systems to countermeasures such as jamming, spoofing, computer network attack, and electromagnetic 

pulse. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs serve both as a boon to 

the domestic defense industry and our relationships with foreign partners. What additional opportunities exist for the enhancement of foreign military sales to other 

countries in the region who are wary of China’s increasing activity? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. The United States could use FMS arrangements to sell frigates, 

corvettes, patrol craft, land- and sea-based manned aircraft, land- and sea-based 

UAVs, land-based radars, and command and control systems to countries in the region, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, with the aim of improving their ability to maintain maritime domain awareness (MDA) and defend their territorial 

claims and operational rights in the South China Sea. The Philippines military, in 

particular, currently has relatively little capability for doing these things. In the 

eastern and southern portions of the South China Sea, operations by Chinese Coast 

Guard ships for asserting and defending China’s maritime territorial claims and 

operational rights often go uncountered by equivalent Philippine forces. To the extent that gradual consolidation of Chinese control over parts of the Spratly Islands 

and other South China Sea features such as Scarborough Shoal would affect U.S. 

interests, policymakers may wish to consider the option of accelerating actions for 

expanding and modernizing the Philippines’ maritime defense and law enforcement 

capabilities. 

Potential FMS options for surface ships include but are not limited to variants 

of U.S. Navy Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), variants of U.S. Coast Guard National 

Security Cutters (NSCs), Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) and (starting a few years 

from now) Offshore Patrol Cutters,12 or variants of other ships that have been built 

in the United States for foreign navies, such as the SAAR 5-class corvettes that 

were built in the 1990s for Israel and the Ambassador IV-class fast attack craft that 

are currently being built for Egypt. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In what ways can we encourage additional productive Chinese contributions to international security mechanisms? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. With regard to maritime operations, additional productive Chinese 

contributions to international security mechanisms can be encouraged through participation in anti-piracy operations, search-and-rescue operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations, multilateral exercises, international 

fora such as Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and the North Pacific Coast 

Guard Forum (NPCGF), and bilateral military-to-military discussions. A Chinese 
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navy frigate will reportedly help provide security for the U.S. government ship that 

will be used to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Given the renewed focus on PLA Navy submarine construction, do 

you believe that our current investments in undersea warfare and ASW capabilities 

and training is sufficient? If not, what shortfalls are most concerning? 

Dr. CROPSEY. Even if the funds are available to build one or two Virginia-class 

SSNs annually from 2014 to 2043—and both the Congressional Research Service 

and Congressional Budget Office identify shortfalls between traditional funds available for SCN and what the Navy must spend to execute the current 30-year plan— 

the U.S. combat fleet will include fewer SSNs in FY43 than China’s navy operates 

today. China is modernizing its submarine fleet and will not only increase its size 

but enjoy the advantage of being able to concentrate the overwhelming majority of 

its subsurface fleet in waters immediately adjacent to the mainland. Unless the U.S. 

ends or greatly diminishes its current distributed global presence it will still need 

submarines to patrol other parts of the world such as the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. This is likely to create a strategically significant difference between U.S. 

and Chinese attack sub capabilities in the South and East China Seas. Under current plans, this is the greatest shortfall. Changing the balance in favor of the U.S. 

might in part be accomplished by the ASW capability of surface ships except that 

many of those we are planning to build (LCS) lack sufficient protection from the 

threat of China’s growing missile and naval air forces. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The United States has enjoyed a significant advantage in C4ISR 

capabilities, but China has made significant efforts to acquire those same capabilities. Can you please provide additional insight as to what this means as far as enabling their other modernization investments, as well as areas where Chinese C4ISR 

is still lacking? 

Dr. CROPSEY. China’s once inconsiderable amphibious capability has developed 

impressively along with its sheer number of missiles and other platforms that 

threaten Taiwan. China’s military is being modernized. The modernization includes 

substantive improvements in Chinese C4ISR. Improvements in military hard- and 

software have diminished the security Taiwan once enjoyed as a result of its superior technology. The example demonstrates that China can narrow the gap between 

itself and those of its potential adversaries who are technically superior. C4ISR is 

also critical to China’s DF–21 missile. The missile narrows the same gap between 

China and U.S. military technology. If someone had suggested 20 years ago that 

China would be able to field a weapons system that might be able to target U.S. 

aircraft carriers underway at sea at a distance of 1000 miles, most experts would 

have been amused. They are less so today. There is no reason to doubt that China’s 

C4ISR capabilities will substantially improve in the future. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs serve both as a boon to 

the domestic defense industry and our relationships with foreign partners. What additional opportunities exist for the enhancement of foreign military sales to other 

countries in the region who are wary of China’s increasing activity? 

Dr. CROPSEY. Had the F–22 production line not been closed, the planes should be 

sold to Japan through foreign military sales. But this is moot. More important than 

FMS is the defense industrial base integration with Japan that would allow, to 

name one example, Japan to manufacture the SM–3 missile and sell it to us and 

other allies thus incorporating Japan into the international defense base that helps 

supply the hardware on which democratic states depend for their defense. A parallel 

point applies to Taiwan whose geographic position in the middle of the first island 

chain offers the U.S. a salient in any conflict as did England’s position relative to 

the continent in WWII. This is particularly important to U.S. and allied security because control of the first island chain in China’s likely long-term plan precedes control of the second island chain (linking the Ogasawara island chain with Guam and 

Indonesia) and finally achieving dominant power status in the Pacific and Indian 

Oceans. The fall or effective Finlandization of Taiwan would be a giant stride in 

China’s far-seeing strategy. Taiwan has respectable military force and wants submarines to protect against amphibious assault and blockade. Our nuclear boats are 

not a realistic option for the Taiwanese, although such air-independent propulsion 

boats as the German company’s ThyssenKrupp Type 218SG are. No less important 

are the C4ISR systems which would allow the U.S. and Taiwan forces to conduct 

combined operations. Taiwan doesn’t have these and should. The U.S. ought to encourage Taiwan to buy them through FMS and should use the FMS program aggressively to assure Taiwan’s—and thus, our—security. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In what ways can we encourage additional productive Chinese contributions to international security mechanisms? 

Dr. CROPSEY. The U.S. has invited China to participate in the naval exercise 

RIMPAC 2014. Chinese students attend the Asia-Pacific Center in Honolulu. Chi-
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nese naval officers regularly join in various functions at the Naval War College in 

Newport. Chinese naval vessels have participated for years in multi-national antipiracy operations off the Horn of Africa. At the same time, China has recently declared limited control over large portions of international waters in the South China 

Sea and airspace over the East China Sea. A Chinese vessel escorting their aircraft 

carrier, Liaoning, crossed the bow of the guided missile cruiser U.S.S. Cowpens 

which narrowly avoided a collision in December 2013. And China has been sending 

patrol ships and aircraft into the territorial space of the contested Senkaku Islands, 

whose sovereignty as Japanese territory the U.S. recognizes. Dismissing this as a 

regional spat of no significance compared to trade between the U.S. and China ignores what Beijing sees in the matter: an example of successful execution of its 

‘‘Three Warfares’’ strategy which, based on the idea that nuclear/kinetic warfare is 

increasingly irrelevant to achieving large strategic objectives, seeks to use psychological pressure, the murky sphere of international law, and resource claims to accomplish such goals as control over the Senkaku Islands. China’s success there 

would validate its Three Warfares strategy, invite more of the same, and demonstrate the shallowness of Washington’s security commitment to Tokyo. Asking 

China to participate in additional international security mechanisms now would 

send a message that the U.S. has all but abandoned its long-standing policy of encouraging China to become a ‘‘stakeholder’’ in the international order that their aggressive behavior contradicts. Continued U.S. efforts to persuade China to become 

a stakeholder in the international order should be carefully examined as should 

competitive strategies that would exploit the PLA’s historic imitation of U.S. technology by encouraging China’s military to make costly investments in technologies 

that produce no strategic advantage over the U.S. or our allies. But China’s aggressive actions of the past year suggest that this is the wrong time to reward China 

by including it in additional international security mechanisms. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Given the renewed focus on PLA Navy submarine construction, do 

you believe that our current investments in undersea warfare and ASW capabilities 

and training is sufficient? If not, what shortfalls are most concerning? 

Mr. THOMAS. I am concerned about the programmed shrinking of our attack submarine fleet, as well as the impending retirement of our SSGNs without replacement. A larger submarine force could be an important element in a competitive 

strategy for competing with the PLA longer term. As one of the most effective 

means of penetrating hostile maritime A2/AD perimeters, it would make sense to 

reduce the reliance on submarines for ASW. Using SSNs for ASW incurs an opportunity cost in terms of foregone strike payloads and training time. Looking ahead, 

we should reduce our reliance on submarines to conduct ASW and rely more heavily 

on relatively more cost-effective surface and air systems, as well as unattended undersea surveillance networks. U.S. investment strategy should be informed by the 

potential challenge of having to detect, track and engage large numbers of submarines that might be flushed from their pens in crisis, as well as the opportunity 

to develop an undersea ‘‘family of systems’’ including manned and unmanned underwater systems, as well as new classes of submarine-launched weapons and undersea 

sensors. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The United States has enjoyed a significant advantage in C4ISR 

capabilities, but China has made significant efforts to acquire those same capabilities. Can you please provide additional insight as to what this means as far as enabling their other modernization investments, as well as areas where Chinese C4ISR 

is still lacking? 

Mr. THOMAS. C4ISR systems represent a foundational capability to enable China’s 

whole approach to A2/AD and a core component of China’s ‘‘battle network’’ that enables the PLA’s arsenal of precision-guided ballistic and cruise missiles, and other 

strike systems. They are critical to detect, locate and track targets, as well as to 

transmit such information to and from headquarters and to support battle management. The PLA has made great strides improving its ability to detect and monitor 

naval targets at long ranges (e.g., beyond 200 miles) with a variety of land-, sea- 

, air-, and space-based sensors. It is unclear, however, how mature the PLA’s efforts 

are to integrate its ISR sensors to enable cross-cueing. Sensor integration is critical, 

in particular, for an effective ‘‘kill chain’’ to support anti-ship ballistic missile attacks. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs serve both as a boon to 

the domestic defense industry and our relationships with foreign partners. What additional opportunities exist for the enhancement of foreign military sales to other 

countries in the region who are wary of China’s increasing activity? 

Mr. THOMAS. Two areas stand out thematically when it comes to future FMS. 

First, it is in the U.S. interest to encourage allies and partners to expand their surveillance and early warning coverage of their sovereign territorial waters and air-
109 

space. Second, as the United States already done with the sale of JASSM to Finland 

and SM–3 to Japan, it should consider FMS to expand the missile defense and 

strike options available to allies and partners in the region so that they can more 

equitably share the risks and responsibilities of collective defense with the United 

States. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In what ways can we encourage additional productive Chinese contributions to international security mechanisms? 

Mr. THOMAS. There are a number of areas where the United States and China 

would benefit from closer cooperation, and where China could make greater contributions. No country is better positioned to influence North Korea and move that 

country toward denuclearization and internal reform. China could also play a constructive role in helping to defuse Indo-Pakistani tensions and refocus Pakistan’s 

military and intelligence service toward addressing jihadist threats internally. 

In East Asia, there are two major steps China could take that would contribute 

significantly to international peace and security. First, China could join the United 

States and Russia in the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty and relinquish its 

stockpile of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which are destabilizing the regional security balance. Second, China should sign codes of conduct with its maritime neighbors to govern maritime activities and reduce the potential for incidents 

at sea. 

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