1 ... T h i s pr oce edi n g a r i s es ou t of Cau s e N o. D C- 08- 01 , s t y l ed E dw ard H uer t a, eta l

. v. Wel ls F argo B an k, et a l. , p e n d ing in the 2 2 9 th J u d ic ia l D istric t C o u rt, D u v a l C o u n ty, T e x a s , t h e H o n o ra b le A le x W . G a b e rt p re sid ing
. i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No. 04-09-00216- CV IN RE WELL S FA RG O BANK, N .A., AMERICA ’S SERVICING COM P ANY, P RE M IERE A SSET SE RV IC ES, L AN G LEY & B AN AC K , I NC ., Ro be r t C ar l JO NE S, and A lbe r t GAR CI A Orig inal Mandamus Proce eding 1 Opinion by : Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Rebec ca Simmons , J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: September 23, 2009 PETI TI ON F OR WR I T OF MANDAMUS CONDI TI ONAL L Y GRANTED Relators Wells Far g o Ba

nk, N.A. (“ Wells Farg o”), A merica ’s ServicingCompany , Premiere Asset Service s, L ang ley & Ba nack, I nc., Robert Carl J ones (“ J ones”) , and Alber t Garc ia (“ Gar cia” ), defe ndants in th e u n d erlying pr ocee ding, f iled a petition for wr it of mandamus see king to c ompel the tr ia l cou

rt to va c a te the or de r de nying re la tor s’ mot ion s to c omp e l arb itr a tio n. We c on dit ion a lly g rant manda

mus relief.04

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2 ... It is und i sput ed that thi s i s no t the co rr ect p rop ert y d escri p t i o n. W el l s F argo sought to o b t ai n a l i en o n t he H u er t as ’ h ome; h owe v er , a cc or di n g t o t h e par t i es , t h e des cr i pt i on of t h e pr oper t y i n t h e D ee d of T r u s t i s n ot own ed by the H u e rta s.

- 2- BA CKGROUND A. D e e d o

f Tr us t and Arb i t r ati on Agr e e m e nt The unde rly ing dispute involves alleg ations that relator s wrong fully fore closed on Edwa

rd and Mar g arita H uerta ’s (“ the Huer tas”) p ro p er t y . On Dec ember 27, 2000, the Huer

tas obtained a home equity loan in the amount of $33,600 fr om Wells Fa rg o. The loan w as sec ured by a lien on proper ty descr ibed as 4.867 acr es of land with the addre ss of “HC 1 B ox 36 Concepc ion, TX 78349,"
a s e vid e nc e d b y

the De e d o f T ru st. 2 In c o n n ec t i o n wi t h t h i s l o an , t h e H u er t as an d W el l s Fa rgo enter ed into an ar

bitration ag ree ment, ref

ere nced by

and incor porate d into the Dee d of Trust. The
arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s: Any party to this Agre ement o r to any L oan Doc ument may

require thatany Di sp ut e be r eso lv ed b y

bi nd in g arbi tr ati on in accor dan ce w ith the terms of this Arbitration Progra m, administered by

the Amer ican Arbitration Association (the “ AAA” ) . . . and the Fe dera l Arbitration Act . . . . A ‘Dispute’ shall include any dispu t e, claim or controversy of any kin d , wh et h er in contract or in tort, leg al or e quitable, now existi ng or her eaf ter a ri s i n g, relating in any

way to this Note or L oan Documents or a

ny related ag ree ment incorporating this Arbitration Program (t

he “ Do c ume nts ” ), or

any pa st, pr e se nt, or

futur e loa

ns , transac tions, contracts, a g ree ments, relationships, incidents, or injuries of any

kind whatsoeve r re lating to or involving c onsumer lending , business banking , community banking , Priva t e C lient Service s, o r an y s ucce ssor g roup or de partment of L ender
. . . . Arbitration may

be demande d at any time, a nd may be compe lled by su mma ry pr oc e e din g s in

Court
.04

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3 ... T h e re c o rd d o e s n o t i n c lud e a c o p y o f t h e W e lls F a rg o p ro o f o f cla im
.

- 3- In 2 0 0 5 , t h e H u e rt a s d e f

a u l t e d o n t h e h o m e e qu i t y l o an , an d e v e n tu a l l y f

i l e d f o r b an kr u p t c y. The Hue rtas listed 9.95 acr es as their homestead proper ty
. Howeve r, the prope rty identified as the Huer tas’ homestead in the bankruptc y petition wa s not the same proper ty as the prope rty

descr ibed in the Dee d of Trust with Wells Fa rg o. Wells Farg o was listed in the “Sche dule D-Cre ditors Holding Secure d Cl a im s . ” T h e H u e rta s li s te d We ll s F ar g o , w it h th e f o ll o w in g d e s c r ip ti o n : “ Dec . 2000,
s u p p o s e d h o m e e qu i t y l o an o n h o m e s t e a d p r o p e r t y, 9.95 acr es and home in Duval County Texas debtor disputes claim and avers it to be unsec ured.” Acc ording to the parties, ne ither the Hue rtas
nor Wells F arg o ever filed an adver sary proce eding related to the Wells Farg o purported lien. 3 O n J anuar y 11, 2006, the Huertas were discharg ed under section 727 of Title 11, of the United States Code. On

May 5, 20 06, We lls F arg o, thr ou g h it s c ouns e l L a ng le y & B ana c k a

nd Jone s, so ug ht a non-judicial for eclosure of the home- equity loan base d on the Dee d o f Trust. The pr operty was purcha sed by Wells Fa

rg o at t he foreclosure sale. Acc ording to the Huertas, Wells Farg o then hired Gar cia to evict the Hue rtas and r emove their belong ings f

rom their home. Follow in g th e e v iction, on J anuar y 3, 2008, the Huer

tas filed sui t against W ells Fa rg o, L ang ley

& B anac k, and other defe ndants that are no longe r a part of the case . L ang ley & B anac k answe red the suit on Februa ry 15, 2008, and Wells F arg o answe red the suit on Apr il 18, 2008. Then, on J une 9, 2008, the Hue rtas filed their F irst Amended Petition, adding Americ a’s Ser vicing Company , who answe red the suit on October 13, 2008, and Jones, an attorney at L ang ley

& B anac k, who answe red the s u i t o n J uly 1, 2008. On Octobe r 15, 2008, the Hue rtas filed the ir Second Ame nded Petition, adding Pre miere04

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4 ... T h e H u er t as f

i l ed t h ei r T h i r d Amen ded Pet i t i on on O ct ober 29, 2008 a n d t h ei r Fou r t h Amen ded Pet i t i on on J an u ar y 21, 2009.

- 4- Asset Service s, who answe red the suit on Dec ember 3, 2008, and Gar cia, who answe red the suit on November

5, 2008. 4 On J anuar

y 5, 2009, Wells Farg o, Premiere As set Service s, and Amer ica’ s Servicing Co., jointly filed a no e vidence motion for summary judgme nt on the Huer

tas’ claims for e x emplary or additional statutory damag es. The motion wa s set to be hea rd on F ebrua

ry 6, 2009. Howeve r, on J anuar y 22, 2009, L ang ley

& B anac k and J ones filed a motion to compel arbitration. Bec ause of the motion to compel arbitration, relators asked that the trial court r emove the motion for summar y judgme nt fro m t h e trial c ourt’s consider ation. Subsequently , Wells Farg o, Americ a’s Ser vicing Company , and Premier e Ass et S er v i ce s filed a similar motion to compel arbitration. Finally , on Fe bruar y 3, 2009, Gar cia f

iled a motion to compel arbitration. I n r e sp on se to t

he mot ion s to c omp e l arb itr a tio n, the Hu e rt a s a sse rt e d the re wa s no t a va lid and binding arbitration ag ree ment beca use: (1) the ag ree ment was only betwee n “Wells Far g o Ba nk Texas, N.A.” a

nd the Huert as, not any

of the a ctual par

ties to the lawsuit; (2) the ag ree ment was discharg ed by

the Huer tas’ bankr uptcy ; ( 3) the ag ree ment was mer g ed, and the ref ore, e liminated, by the fore closure sa le and the substitute trustee’ s deed of trust; ( 4) the Huer

tas’ minor children w ere not bound by

the ar bitration ag ree m en t ; and (5) Marg arita H uerta , who sig ned the a rbitration ag ree ment “pro forma” was not bound by the ar bitration ag ree ment. I n addition, the Huer tas argued their claims did not fall within the scope of the ar bitration ag ree ment, and asse rted the de fense that relators waived the ir rig ht to arbitration by substa n t i al l y i n v o king the judicial proce ss and by not reque sting a

rbitration within a “r easona ble time.”04

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- 5- Following a hea

ring on the motions to compel arbitration on Marc h 2, 2009, the trial cour t de nie d a ll of the mot ion s to c omp e l arb itr a tio n wi tho ut de ta ili ng any e xplanatio n in

the or de r. Th is petition for writ of manda mus ensued. AN AL YSI S A. Stand ard of Review Relators conte nd the trial cour t erre d in denying r elators’ motions t o compe l a rbitration under the Fe dera l Arbitration Act (“ FA A” ). The pa rties do not dispute that the arbitration ag ree ment invokes the F AA. Manda mus will i ssue only

to corre ct a c lear

abuse of di s cr et i o n fo r whi ch the relator has no adequate remedy at law. In re Prude ntial Ins. Co. of Am. , 1 4 8 S. W. 3 d

1 2 4 , 1 3 5 ( T e x. 20 04 ) ( or ig . p ro c e e din g ); W alker v . Pack

er , 827 S.W .2d 833, 839-40 (Te x . 1992) (or ig. pr ocee ding)
. When a motion to compel arbitration under t h e FA A h as bee n err oneously denied, ther e is no adequate re medy

at law, a nd mandamus will issue. In re D. W ilson Cons tr. Co. , 196 S.W .3d 774, 78 0 ( Te x. 20 06 ). A p art

y se e kin g a wr it of mand a mus to c omp e l arb itr a tio n und e r t he F AAmus t: (1) establish the exis tence of a valid arbitration a g ree ment; a nd (2) show that the cla ims asserted a re within the s cope of the ag ree ment. See I n re Advanc ePCS Health, L.P. , 1 7 2 S. W. 3 d 6 0 3 , 6 0 7 ( T e x. 2005) (or ig. pr ocee ding) (per curiam). B. Va lidi tyof t he Ar bit r at ion Ag r e e m e nt Whe the r t he re is a va lid and e nf

or c e a ble a g re e me nt to ar

bit rate is a leg a l qu e sti on

su bje c t to de novo revie w. J.M. Davidson, Inc . v. W ebster , 128 S.W .3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003). Althoug h there is a str on g pr e su mpt ion

fa vo ri ngarb itr a tio n, that pr e su mpt ion ari se s o nly

a ft e r t he pa rt y se e kin g to compel ar bitration proves a

valid arbi t ra t i o n ag ree ment exis ts. Id. Under both the FAAand the TAA, we apply

ordinary state contra ct l aw principles in order to decide whether a valid ar bitration04

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- 6- ag ree ment exis ts. See In r e D

. W i l son , 1 9 6 S
. W
. 3 d

at 7 8 1 (c i t i n g First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan , 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)). O nce a valid ag ree ment to arb i t ra t e h as b een established, a pr e su mpt ion

a tta c he s f

a vo ri ng arb itr a tio n and the burd e n sh if ts to t he pa rt y re sis tin g arb itr a tio n to establish a def

ense to e nforc i n g ar b i t ration. Se e In re Ad v an c e PCS, 172 S.W .3d at 607; In re Hartigan , 107 S.W .3d 684, 6 8 7-88 (Te x . App.—San Antonio 2003, orig . proce eding [m and. denied]). Be cause the trial cour

t did not specify t h e re as on why it denied the motions to compel
arb itr a tio n, we mus t c on sid e r a ll o f t he Hu e rt a s’ argume nts ma de in the tr ia l c ourt a sse rt ing the re is not a valid ag ree ment to arbitrate
. 1. Do re lat

or s ha v ethe

rig ht to e nf or c ethe ag re e ment?
a. Wells F argo Th e fi rs t is su e be fo re the tr ia l c ourt wa s w he the r We lls F arg o B ank , N .A . e sta bli sh e d it is Wells Farg o Ba

nk Texas, N.A., the lender listed on the arbitration ag ree ment. The Hue rtas ar g ued in the trial court that Wells Fa rg o Ba nk, N.A. did not e stablish it i s Wells Farg o Ba nk Texas, N.A. and that Wells Far g o Ba

nk, N.A. is not entitled to e nforc e the ar bitration ag ree ment. Although the Huer tas failed to a ddress this issue in this court, we must consider it beca use it was an issue upon which the tria l court could have base d its ruling. T h e H u er t as ’ O ri gi n al P et i t i o nan d al l s u b s eq u en t p et i t i o n s i nt h e r ec o rdn am e W el l s Fa rgo Ba nk, N.A. as a defe ndant and asser t that the l oan they

obtained wa s from Wells Far g o Ba nk, N.A. I n addition, in a reply

to the Huertas’ sur- reply

befor e the tria l court re g ardingthe motion to compel arbitration, W el l s Farg o Ba nk, N.A. spec ifically

asser ted that Wells Farg o Ba nk, N.A. is the
succe ssor by

merg er to Wells Far g o Ba nk Texas, N.A. Fur

thermor e, Wells Farg o Ba nk N.A.04

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- 7- included as a

n exhibi t to the reply

a docume nt from the F eder al Reserv e S y stem National I nformation Center and a letter from the Comptroller of the Currenc y , Administrato r o f N at i o nal B ank s, ind ic a tin g that Wel ls F arg o B ank Te xas, N. A. wa s c on so lid a te d and the re su lti ngc ha

rt e r i s Wells Farg o Ba

nk, N.A. As a

result of the f

oreg oing, w e conc lude that Wells Farg o Ba nk, N.A. established that W ells Fa

rg o Ba nk Texas, N.A. was consolidated and resulted in Wells Far g o Ba nk, N.A., and, the ref

ore, ha s the rig ht to enforc e the a g ree ment. b. Nonsign atorie s I n addition to ar g u in g We ll s F ar g o B an k , N
. A
. w a s n o t e n ti tl e d to e n f o r c e th e ar

b it r a tion
a g re e me nt, the Hu e rt a s c la ime d th a t th e re ma ini ngrel ato rs lac ke d s tand ingto a sse rt any ri g ht t o enfor ce the arbitration ag ree ment. There fore , we must addre ss whether relators Americ a’s Ser

vicing Com pa ny , P rem ier e As se t Se rv ic e s, L ang le y & B ana c k, I nc ., Jone s, and Ga rc ia have the ri g ht t o
e n f o r c e t h e ar

b i t r a t i o na g r e e m e n ts i n c e t h e y w e r e n o n s i g n at o r i e s t o t h e ar b i t r a t i o na g r e e m e n t
. In
su pp or t of the ir argume nt t

hat th e y are e nti tle d to c omp e l arb itr a tio n und e r t he arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt, the nonsig natories a ssert they are ag ents of a sig natory , Wells Farg o Ba nk. The burde n of establishing the exist ence of a valid and enfor cea ble ar bitration ag ree ment includes provingthat the party seeking to c ompel arbitration wa s a party to the ag ree ment or had the rig ht to enforc e the arbitration ag ree ment. In re M errill Lynch Trust Co. , 123 S.W .3d 549, 545-555 ( T e x. A p p . — Sa

nA n to n io 2 0 0 3 , o r ig
. p r o c e e d ing ), ma n d

. granted , 235 S.W .3d 217 (Tex. 2007) (orig . proce eding ) (pe r cur iam). “F eder al cour ts have re cog nized six theories, a rising out of

common pr inc ipl e s o f c on tr a c t and a g e nc y law, that ma

y bin d n on sig nator ie s to arb itr a tio n a g re e me nts : (1) incor poration by

ref ere nce; ( 2) assumption; (3) ag ency ; (4) alter eg o; (5) equitable estoppel; and (6) third-par

ty benef iciary .” In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. , 166 S.W .3d 732, 739 (Tex. 2005).04

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- 8- Th e no ns ig nator ie s to an a rb itr a tio n a g re e me nt wh o are a g e nts of a sig nator y may be a ble to invoke an a

rbitration ag ree ment in some case s. See In re Kaplan Higher Educ . Corp. , 235 S.W .3d 206, 209 (Tex. 2007) (holding that “the a g ents of a sig natory may sometimes invoke an ar bitration
c la us e e ve n if

the y the mse lve s are no ns ig nator ie s and a c la ima nt i s n ot s uin g on

the c on tr a c t.” ); In re Vesta Ins. G roup, Inc. , 192 S.W .3d 759, 763 (Tex. 2006) (holding that “[w]hen contrac ting pa rties
a g re e to a rb itrate all di sp ute s ‘ un de r o r w ithre sp e c t to ’ a c on tr a c t . . ., the y

g e ne ra lly int e nd to include disputes about their a g ents’. . . .”) . “The scope of an arbitration ag ree ment may be extended to cl a ims a g a ins t ag e nts of the pr inc ipa l whe n all the a g e nts ’ a lle g e dly wr on g fu l a c ts r e la te to t

he ir behavior as ag ents of the principal signatory company , and those a cts wer e within the scope of the claims cove red by

the ar bitration provisions for which the pr incipal would be liable.” In re Me rri ll Lynch , 1 2 3 S
. W
. 3 d

at 5 5 6 (c i t i n g Pritzker v. M errill Lynch, Inc. , 7 F.3d 1110, 1121 ( 3d Cir. 1993)). The Huert as d o not appea r, in the trial cour

t or in this court, to dispute that all of the nonsignatory

relators wer e ag ents of Wells F arg o. To the contra ry , the Huer

tas’ F ourth Amende d Petition i ndicates that eac h of the nonsig natory relators wer e ac ting a s ag ents of Wells Far g o: Am e ri c a ’s Se rv ic ingis t

he assume d n a me fo r We lls F arg o H ome Mo rt g a g e , Inc ., a Ca lif

or nia Cor po ratio n r e g ist e re d to do bu sin e ss i n Te xas. Am e ri c a ’s Se rv ic ingwa s spec if ic a lly a uth or ize d b y

Wel ls Fa rg o to a c t a s it s a g e n t i na ll p r o c e e d in g s an d a c ts a g a in s t t

he Plaintiffs complained of in this lawsuit. . . . [L ang le y & B ana c k] wa s hir e d by Am e ri c a ’s Se rv ic ingand /or Wel ls F arg o a s it s a g e nt o r s ub a g e nt a nd a c te d in fu rt he ra nce of its principals’ inter ests. . . . [ R o b e rtC ar l J o n e s ] i s ane mp l o y e e o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f

L an g l e y & Ba n ac k , I n c. , an d wa s d i re ct l y re s p o n s i b l e fo r t h e a ct s o f W el l s Fa rgo and Amer ica’ s Servicing and the injury of the Plaintiffs. . . .04

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- 9- Al be rt Ga rc ia and his a g e nts and

his e mpl oy e e s in va de d th e Hu e rt a s’ privac y . . . . Wells Farg o Ba nk and/o r P remier e Asset Ser vices a uth or ize d, c on tr oll e d, dir e c te d, pa rt ic ipate d in , a

nd /or c on sp ir e d in the se wr on g fu l a c ts. Pr e mie re As se t Se rv ic e s a n a ssume d n a me of

Wells F arg o H ome Mortg ag e, A Division of Wells Far g o Ba nk, N.A. . . .
B e c a us e the pa rt ie s in thi s cou

rt do no t di sp ute that th e no ns ig nator ie s w e re a c tin g a s a g e nts of Wel ls Fa rg o and ea ch of the ir alleg edly wrong ful ac ts relate to their behavior as ag ents of Wells Far g o, we conclude relators wer e entitled to enf orce the ar

bitration ag ree ment. There fore , we hold this was not a prope r g round for

the trial cour

t to deny the motions to compel arbitration. 2. Was the arbit

ration agreement di

scharged in bankr uptcy? Also befor e the trial court, was the issue of whe ther the a rbitration agree ment was discha rg ed in bankruptcy . The Hue rtas conte nd that afte r t he discha rg e, the Hue rtas owne d the 9.855 ac res a s if they wer e bona fide purcha sers for value. See I

n re Pee bles , 197 B.R. 799, 801 (B ankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that a bankr uptcy trustee ha s the status of a bona fide purc haser

as of the date of b an kru p tcy

). T h ey fu rt h er as s er tt h at “[ b ] y

o p er at i o no f f

ed er al l aw , t h e b an kru p t cy co u rt ’s d i s ch ar ge order absolved the H uerta s fro m t h ei r pre -filing obligations and debts, nece ssarily including a

ny ob lig a tio ns un de r t

he Ar bit ratio n A g re e me nt. ” Th e Hu e rt a s a sse rt that Gr e e n Tr e e Se rv ic ing , L. L.C.

v . F ish e r is on point

. See 162 P
. 3 d 9 4 4 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007). Howeve r, we do not find Gree n Tree Serv icing persua sive. Gree n Tree involved a lawsuit filed by Gre en Tre e Servic ing a g ainst Fisher to forec lose on proper ty prior to the conc lusion of the bankruptc y proce eding
. Id. at 945-46. Fisher counter claimed, alleg ing G ree n Tree vio l at ed the bankr uptcy injunction. Id. a t 94 6. Gr e e n T re e fi le d a mot ion to04

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- 10- compel ar bitration. Id. a t 94 7. Th e Ok laho ma Court of Ap pe a ls d e te rm ine d th a t F ish e r’ s c la ims

– that Gre en Tre e attempted to collect m oney or property that was no longe r due or in his possession, and to make te lephone c alls prohibited by the Oklahoma act– were not based upon duties imposed b y c o n tr a c t o r s tatute th a t w e r e b r o u g h t in to p la y b y v ir tu e o f th e contra ct. Id

. at 948. The c ourt further held that “Gree n Tree ’s alleg ed attempt to improperly collect money

or prope rty

that was no longe r due f

rom Fisher

or in his possession occurr ed after the contr actua l relationship had bee n terminated by

discharg e in bankr

uptcy .” Id. The court conclude d the ar bitration ag ree ment was not applicable to Fisher’ s counterc laim. Id. Contrary to the Huer

tas’ ar g uments in this court, the court in Gree n Tree did not conclude the ar bitration ag ree ment itself was discha rg ed in bankr

uptcy , but instead, the cour t held that the counter claim was not a

“dispute[] , claim[] , or controve rsy [] arising from or r elating to [ the] Ag ree ment.” Id. The Hue rtas provide no ad d i t i o nal ca se law in support of the ir asser tion that the arbitration ag ree ment was discha rg ed in bankr

uptcy
. To the contra

ry , relators argue that an a rbitration ag ree ment survives the ter m ination or repudiation of the contra ct itself; there fore , even if the Dee d of Trust and the purported lien on the proper ty wer e terminated, the arbitration ag ree ment survived. See A mbulance B illing Sys., Inc. v. Gemini Ambulanc e Serv

s., Inc. , 103 S.W .3d 507, 512-14 (Te x . App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (c on so lid a te d in te rl oc uto ry a pp e a l and orig. pr oc e e din g ); In re Koch I ndus., Inc ., 49 S.W .3d 439, 44 4- 45 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n An ton io 20 01 , or ig
. pr oc e e din g [mand . d e nie d]) ; see also Riley Mfg. Co.

v . A nc ho r G las s Co nta ine r Co rp ., 157 F.3d 775, 782 ( 10th Cir. 1998). F ur the rm or e , r e la tor s c on te nd oth e r c ourt s h a ve he ld t

hat po st- dis c ha

rg e , p la int if

fs are sti ll require d to submit claims to arbitration. Se e MB NA A m. Ba nk

, N. A. v . H

ill , 436 F.3d 104, 110 (2d04

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5 ... Bi ge l ow p ro vid es a si m i l ar e xa m p l e o f wh en a co urt ha s co m p ell ed arb i t rati o n af t er a claim aro se a ga i nst th e s e c u r e d c re d ito r fo r a c ts a fter b a n k ru p tc y w a s fil e d , b u t b e fo re the d e b t wa s d isc h a rg e d
. Bi gel ow , 2 0 0 0 W L 33596476 a t * 6.

- 11- Cir . 2 00 6) ; Bigelow v. Gree n Tree Fin. Serv icing Corp. , No. CV-99-6644, 2000 WL 33596476, *6 (E.D. Ca. No v . 30, 2000). In MB NA , H ill fi le d f

or ba nk ru ptc y and his de bts we re dis c ha

rg e d in 2003. See MBNA Am. Bank , N.A. , 436 F.3d at 106. During the bankr uptcy , Hill filed an adve rsar y proce eding ag ainst MBNA , claiming that MBNA violated the automatic sta y . Id. MB NAmov e d to compel ar bitration based on the cre dit ag ree ment with reg ard to the c onsumer loan, but the motion to c omp e l w a s den ied be c a us e the c ourt

he ld t hat th e ba nk ru ptc y c ourt wa s th e mos t a

pp ro pr ia te forum beca

use permitting arbitration would seriously jeopar dize the bankruptcy proce eding
. Id. at 107. The S econd Circuit reve rsed and compelled arbitration, concluding that since the bankr uptcy had ende d, arbitration of the dispute would not je opardize the bankruptc y proce eding
. Id. at 108-09. As a re sult, relators conte nd this case r epre sents an example of how a n arbitration ag ree ment can survive bankr

uptcy and still be enfor ced. 5 We find no support for the Huer tas’ argument that the ar

bitration ag ree ment was discha rg ed in bankruptcy . There fore , we c onclude that this was not a proper ground f or the trial c ourt to deny the motion to compe l a

rbitration. Be cause we have conc luded that the ar bitration ag ree ment was not discharg ed by

bankruptc y , we do not nee d to rea ch re lators’ a ddit i o n al argume nt that the Huer tas
wer e re quired to file a

n adver sary

proce eding in order to c halleng e Wells Far g o’s purporte d lien. 3. Did the arbitrat

ion agreem ent m erge into the tru stee’s de ed? Another issue be fore the t rial court was whe ther the a rbitration ag ree ment merg ed into the tr us te e ’s de e d, and , the re fo re , is un e nf or c e a ble
. I n the tr ia l c ourt

and in t he ir re sp on se to t

his c ourt , the Huer tas argue that, assuming the arbitration ag ree ment survived the discha rg e in bankr

uptcy , the04

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- 12- arbitration ag ree ment is invalid/unenforce able be cause the Dee d of Trus t , that ref ere nced a nd incorpora ted the ar bitration ag ree ment, merg ed into the trustee’ s dee d following the fore closure sa le. See F ed. Land Bank of H

ous. v. Brooks , 124 S.W .2d 161, 163 (Tex. Civ. App.—Bea umont 1938), rev’d on other grounds , 143 S.W .2d 928 (Tex. 1940) (holding that in a trespass to tr y title case, the de e d o f t ru st m e rg e d in to i ts titl e by the de e d ma de to i t by its tr us te e ); see also Alvarado v . Bolton , 749 S.W .2d 47, 48 (Tex. 1988) (holding that when a deed is de livered and acc epted as per formanc e of a c ontrac t to c onvey , the contra ct is merg ed in the dee d). Howe ver, w e do not find these c ases persua sive bec ause ne ither of them repr esent an example of a deed of trust merg ing into a tr ustee’s deed f ollowing a

fore closure sa le. We are not awar e of any authority , nor do the Hue rtas cite a ny authority for the pr oposition that an ar bitration ag ree ment is invalid or unenforce able because the deed of t rust merg ed int o the tru s t ee ’s d ee d afte r the for eclosure sale. To the c ontrary , this court has pre viously considere d a pe tit ion fo r w ri t of

mand a mus that so ug ht t o e nf or c e an a rb itr a tio n a g re eme nt aft er the pr op e rt y subject to a lien in a deed of trust was for eclose d upon. See In re C entex Home E quity Co. , No. 04- 04 -0 05 85 -C V, 20 04 WL29 45 70 2, *4 -5 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 04 , o ri g . p ro c e e din g ) ( me m. op.). The issue be fore the cour t in In re Cente

xwas whe t h er C en t ex had wa ived ar bitration after waiting fiftee n months to compel arbitration. Id

. at *4. We acknow ledg e that in In re Cente xthe issue befor e this court was not w hether a dee d of trust merg ed into the trustee’ s deed f ollowing the f o rec losure, eliminating the ag ree ment to arbitrate
. Id. Howeve r, In re Cente xre pr e se nts an e xamp le of the e nforc ement of a

n arbitration ag ree ment following fore closure of the prope rty
. Id. Relators conte nd the arbitration ag ree ment cre ated oblig ations independe nt of and c ollatera l to the Dee d of Trust, and theref ore, the ag ree ment to arbitrate rema ined af ter the f orec losure sale and04

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6 ... R e la to rs furth e r c o n te n d the H u e rta s’ m e rg e r a rg u m e n t i s e a sily d isp o se d o f b y St anf or d D ev el opme n t

Co r p. v. Stan f o rd C o n d o m i n i u m O w n ers A ss ’n , 28 5 S.W
. 3 d 45 , 51

- 5 2 (T ex. A p p . — H o ust o n [1st D i st
. ] 20 0 9 , no p et
. ). I n S t a n f o rd , t he co urt of ap p eal s hel d that the arb i t rat i o n a greem ent c o nt ai ned i n an earnes t m o ney co nt ract did no t m erge into the d e e d
. Id

. at 52. H o wever, as t he H uert as p o i nt out, t he i ss ue b ef o re t he co urt of ap p eal s i n S t a n f o rd was wh et her an arb i t rati o n c l au se in an ea rne st m o ne y co ntrac t m erg ed i nto a d ee d , no t w he t he r an arb i t rati o n c l au se in a d ee d o f t rust m e rg e s into a tru ste e ’s d e e d in a fo re c lo su re c o n te x t. Id

.

- 13- the trustee’ s deed. 6 We ag ree . I n addition, the ar bitration ag ree ment specific ally provides that “[t]he provisions of this Arbitration P rog ram shall survive any termination, amendme nt, or expiration of the Docume nts or rela

tionships of the parties.” The ref ore, w e find the H uerta s’ ar g uments that the De e d o f T ru st m e rg e d in to t he tr us te e ’s de e d a

nd e xtinguis he d any agreeme nt t o a rb itr a te unpersua sive. As a r esult of the fo reg oing, w e conc lude this was not a prope r g round for the trial court to deny

the motion to compel arbitration. 4. Are

the minor c hild

re n bo und b

y the ag re e ment? Another issue be fore the trial cour t was whe ther the minor children we re bound by the ag ree ment. The Hue rtas a rgu ed in t he trial c ourt that bec ause the minor children’ s claims have nothing to do with a c ontrac t, the minor children are not bound by the arbitration ag ree ment. The Huer tas argue their c laims all arise be cause there was no c ontrac t on the 9.855 acr es and none of their cla ims are pr edicated upon any contra ctual right or the violation of any contra ctual duty

on the part of Wells Fa

rg o and/or its ag ents. Howeve r, “a

nonparty may be compe lled to arbitrate ‘if it seeks, throug h the claim, to derive a dire ct benefit from the contra ct containing the arbitration provisions.’” In re W eek ley Hom es, L.P. , 18 0 S. W.3 d at 13 1 ( int e rn a l c itatio ns omi tte d) . T he Sup re me Court we nt o n to e xpla in t

hat: Under both T exas a

nd fede ral law, whether a claim seek s a d i rec t benef it from a contr ac t containing an ar bitration clause tur

ns on the04

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- 14- substance of

the claim, not ar

tful pleading
. Claims mus t be broug ht on the c o n t ract (and a

rbitrated) if liability

arises solely

from the c on tr a c t or must be determ ined by re ferenc e to it. Id. at 132 (e mphasis added)
. Relators assert t h e Hu ertas’ claims ag ainst them are based on r elators’ enfor ceme nt of the loa n do c ume nts , c on te nd ing that “ bu t fo r the L oa n Do c ume nts , the re wo uld have be e n no di spute and neither

the Huer tas nor their minor c hildren would have any claims.” Relator s further contend that as the Huer

tas make it c lear in the ir pleading s, both in the tr ial court a nd in this court, the Dee d of Trust betwe en the Hue rtas and Wells Far g o define s the rig hts of the par ties and, as the H uerta s claim, establishes Wells Far g o had no rig hts to the property owned by

the Huer tas. The Hue rtas have asser

ted in the trial cour

t, among other c laims, violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act , tr e s p a s s , th e f t, in vasion of priva cy , wrong ful post-fore closure e viction, and they have soug ht declar atory

relief
. The Hue rtas’ F ourth Amende d Petition s pecif ically reque sts a decla

ratory judgme nt “that Def

endant W ells Fa

rg o has no lien or ot her rights in and to the 9.855 Ac res, a nd has
no ri g hts to p ur su e any de fi c ie nc y

a g a ins t th e Pla int if

fs fo r a ny of the deb t di sch arg e d in bankruptc y .” Be cause the Huer

tas’ F ourth Amende d Petition spec ifically reque sts a decla

ratory judgme nt that Wells Fa

rg o has no lien or ot her rights to the 9.855 acr es, and beca use t he Hue rtas and the minor children ha

ve asse rted other

claims which will likely

require a dete rmination as to the validity of the lie n by re fe re nc e to the c on tr a c t, the min or c hil dr e n’ s c la ims mus t be se nt t o a rb itr a tio n a lon g wi th the Huertas’ c laims. See I n re W eek ley Hom es, L.P. , 180 S.W .3d at 131. As a r esult, we c onclude that this was not a proper basis to deny the m otions to compel arbitration as to the minor c hildren.04

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- 15- 5. Is M

ar ga rit a Hu e rta bo und b

y the ag re e ment? Also befor e the tria l court, wa s whether Marg arita H uerta

was bo u n d b y t he ar

bitration
a g re e me nt b e c a

us e sh e signe d th e a g re e me nt “ pr o f or ma .” Th e Hu ert as con te nd that be c a

us e Marg arita Hu e rt a sig ne d th e de e d a

nd the arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt “ pr o f or ma ” on ly , s he e xpre ssl y
rese rv ed her

rig ht to challeng e the substantive pr ovisions of the ag ree ment. Howeve r, we do not need to r eac h this iss ue bec ause just as the minor c hildren ar e bound by the ag ree ment for the r easons explained above, so is Marg arita H uerta
. C. Are the Huertas’ claim s w ithin the scope of the agre em ent? H a v ing determine d

th a t a v a li d ar b it r a ti o na g r e e me n t e xis ts b e tw e e nth e p arti e s , w e n e xt addre ss whether the claims asse rted a re w ithin the scope of the a g ree ment. Se e In re Ad v an c e PCS, 172 S.W .3d at 607. As previously mentioned, t he arbitration ag ree ment provides that a “ dispute” includes in part, “ any

dispute, claim or contr oversy of any kind, whether

in contrac t or in tor

t, leg al
or e qu ita ble , n owe xistin g or

he re a ft e r a

ri sin g , r e la tin g in any wa

y to thi s No te or L oa

n D oc ume nts or any related ag ree ment incorporating this Arbitration Progra m (the “D ocuments”) .” The Hue rtas asse rted in the trial c ourt and in this court that their c laims do not fall within the scope of the ar bitration ag ree ment beca

use the tortious acts of the relators wer e extraneous to any note, loan docume nt, or lending function. The Huer tas furthe r conte nd that at the time the tortious acts occur

red, Wells F arg o had no lien rig hts to the 9.855 acr es and “[f]or a ll pr actical p u rposes Wells Farg o and the Hue rtas we re stra ng ers whe n Wells Farg o ousted the Huertas fr om their 9.855
acr es.” On t he other hand, relators asse rt the ar bitration ag ree ment specific ally require s the Huer

tas to s u b m i t “ a n y ” d i s p u t e r e l a t i n g t o t h e n o t e an d l o an d o c u m e n t s an d t h e p r o p e rt y l o c a te d a t H C 104

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- 16- Box 36, Concepcion, Te x as 7 8 3 49. There fore , relators contend the sc ope of the arbitration ag ree ment would there fore nece ssarily include: (a ) whe ther the D eed of Trust was invalid; (b) whether relators violated the debt c ollection statutes by attempting to c ollect the debt se cure d by the D e e d o f T r u s t ; an d ( c ) w h e t h e r

W e l l s F ar g o w r o n g f

u l l y e v i c t e d t h e H u e rt a s f r o m t h e p r o p e rt y . In order to further

support their ar g ument that the Huer tas’ cla ims fall within the sco p e of the ag ree ment, relators contend the H uerta s’ lawsuit ce nters on the va lidit y o f t he lien in the De ed of Trust beca

use the basis of the Hue rtas’ c laims of wrong ful collec tion and eviction ar e base d on the
a lle g e d inva lid ity

of the lie n. Re la tor s c on te nd the ir argume nt i s f

ur the r s up po rt e d by the Hu e rt a s’ reque st for a de clar atory

judgme nt that Wells Fa

rg o’s purporte d lien was invalid. We ag ree with relators that the Huer tas’ cla ims fall within the scope o f the a rbitration
a g re e me nt. Th e Hu e rt a s se e k a de c larator y jud g me nt that the purp or te d lie n is inva lid , whi c h is a claim that clea

rly “re lates . . . to the Note or

L oan Documents.” Based on the fore g oing, w e conc lude that beca use the Hue rtas’ claims fall wit hin the s cope of the ar bitration ag ree ment, this was not an appropr iate basis for

the trial cour

t to deny the motions to compel arbitration. D. Di d r e lat or s wai ve th e ir r igh t t o a r bit r at ion ? Next we turn to whether

relators waived the ir rig ht to arbitration. A par ty waives a rbitration by substantially invoking the judicial proce ss to the other par ty ’s detriment. Pe rry Ho me s v . Cu ll , 258 S.W .3d 580, 589-90 (Te x . 2008). “D ue to the strongpresumption ag ainst waiver of ar bitration, this hurdle is a hig h one.” Id. a t 59 0. Up un til Pe rry , the Texas Supreme Court had ne v er found such a waiver. Id. The Court took the fe dera l court appr oach to wa iver by adopting the “totality

of the circ umstances” analy sis. Id. a t 59 0- 91 . T he Court a c kn ow le dg e d th a t li ke fe de ra l c ourt s, thi s Court ha s c on sid e re d f

a c tor s su c h a s:04

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- 17- (1 ) w he n th e mov ant k

ne w o f t he arb itr a tio n c la

us e ; (2 ) h owmuc h d isc ov e ry

ha s b e e n c on du c te d; (3 ) w ho ini tiate d th e dis c ov e ry ; (4) whe ther it related to the merits rather than a rbitrability

or sta

nd ing ; (5) how muc h of it would be usef ul in arbitration; and (6) whe ther the mova

nt sought judg ment on the merits. Id. at 591-92. The Court fur

ther he ld that “a pa

rty who enjoy s substantial direc t b en ef i ts by g aining an advant a g e in

th e p r e tr ia l l it ig a ti o np r o c e s s s h o u ld b e b ar r e d f r o m t u r n in g ar o u n d

an d s e e k ing arbitration with the spoil s.” Id. at 593. The C o u rt conclude d that “in close c ases, the ‘ strong presumption ag ainst waiver ’ should g overn.” Id. (quoting In re D. W ilson , 196 S.W .3d at 783). Wh e th e r a p arty h a s w a iv e d it s r ig h t to a r b it r a ti o n is a qu e s ti o n o f la

w th a t we r eview de

novo , g iving no de fer ence to the trial court’ s ruling. Id. at 598. 1. Subs tan tia l Inv oc ation o f t he Jud ic ial Pr oc ess: The Hue rtas tre at all re lators as one and conte nd relators waived the ir rig ht to arbitration beca use the following has take n place : (1) extensive discover y h as b een conducted; ( 2) re lators presumably

knew a ll along the re was a n arbitration ag ree ment; (3) an or al deposition was noticed; (4) a motion for summary

judgme nt was filed by

Wells Farg o, Premiere Asset S er vices, a nd Americ a’s Ser

vicing Co.; (5) a cross-c laim w as filed by Gar cia ag ainst Wells F arg o and Premier e Asset Service s; (6) re lators par ticipated in s i x d ep o sitions; (7) the H uerta s’ have incurre d
a pp ro xima te ly

$2 00 ,0 00 in atto rn e y s’ fe e s; a nd (8 ) r e la tor s a g re e d to a do c ke t c on tr ol o rd e r a nd did
n o to p p o s e at ri al s et t i n g. I n th e ir re sp on se to t

he pe tit ion fo r wr it of mand a mus , the Hu e rt a s p ro vid e a su mma ry of a ll of the written discovery in the case . Howeve r, a signific ant amount of that discover y was c onducted04

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- 18- by the Huer tas themselves. As the Supre me Court pointed out in Perry whe n c omp ari ngthe c a se to Ve sta , “ wh ile the pa

rt y op po sin g arb itr a tio n in

Ves ta all eg e dly

inc ur re d mo re tha

n $ 20 0, 00 0 in expenses, most of that was incurr ed in g etting disc overy ra t h er t h an providing it; a party who reque sts lots of discover

y is not prejudice d by g etting it and taking it to arbitration in the same way that a par ty who produc es lots of discover y outside the stricter discove ry limit s in arbitration. Pe rry , 2 5 8 S
. W
. 3 d

at 5 9 8 (c i t i n g In re Ve

sta Ins. Group, Inc. , 192 S.W .3d 759, 764 (Tex. 2006)). We a na ly ze each in di vidua l r e la tor ’s a c ts b a se d o n th e tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s to deter mine whether

they waived the ir rig ht to arbitration by substantially

inv oking the judicial proce ss. I t is clear f

rom the re cord that relators Pre miere A sset Service s, America ’s Ser v i ci ng Com pa ny , a nd Ga rc ia did no t wa ive the ir ri g ht to c omp e l arb itr a tio n. Pr e mie re As se t Se rv ic e s d id not file an a

nswer to the suit until Dece mber of 2008; Americ a’s Servicing Company did not file an
answe r to the suit until October of 2008; and Garcia did not file an answer to the suit unti l November of 2008. Shortly

afte r the fir st motion to compel arbitration was filed by L ang ley & B anac k, I nc. and J ones,Wells Fa

rg o Ba nk, N.A., Amer ica’ s Servicing Company , and Premier e Asset Ser vices filed a joi nt motion to compel arbitration on J anuar y 30, 2009. Gar cia f

iled a similar motion to compel arbitration on Febr

uary 3, 2009. I n addition, acc ording to the parties, Pre miere A sset Service s has
on ly pr op ound e d r e qu e sts fo r dis c los ur e on the Hu e rt a s, fi le d a

mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt j oin tly with Wells Fa

rg o and Americ a’s Servicing Company , ag ree d to a docket control orde r, and did not
o p p o s e at ri al s et t i n g. Am er i ca ’s S er v i ci n g C o mp an y ’s o n l y p ar t i ci p at i o n i n t h e l aw s u i ti s fi l i n g a joint mot ion for summary judgme nt along with Wells Farg o and Premier e Asset Ser vices, a g ree ing to a do c ke t c on tr ol o rd e r, and no t op po sin g a

tr ia l se tti ng . Ga

rc ia ha s on ly fi le d a

c ro ss- c la im a g a ins t Wells Farg o and Premier e Asset Ser vices, a g ree d to a docke t control order , and did not oppose a tria l04

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- 19- setting. A s a re sult of the fore g oing limit ed activities of the parties, we conclude the Huer tas did not establish that Premiere Asset Servi ces, A merica ’s ServicingCompany , and Ga rcia waived the ir rig ht to arbitration by

substantially

invoking the judicia l proce ss. We now turn to whether t h e re m ai ning r elators Wells Fa rg o, L ang ley

& B anac k, I nc., and Jone s w a ive d th e ir

ri g ht t o a

rb itrati on . L ang le y

& B ana c k w a s th e fi rs t de fe nd ant s ue d, and it
ans we re d o n F e br

ua ry 15 , 2 00 8 and fi le d it s mo tio n to c omp e l arb itr a tio n o n Jan ua ry 22 , 2 00 9; We lls Fa rg o answe red the suit on April 18, 2008, a nd filed its motion t o compel ar bitration on J anuar

y 30, 20 09 ; and , Jon e s ans we re d th e su it on July 1, 20 08 , and fi le d his mot ion to c omp e l arb itr a tio n jo int ly with L ang ley

& B anac k, I nc. Wells F arg o has propounded the following discovery and motion: (1) re quests for disclosure propounded on E d wa rd Huer ta, Marg arita H uerta , and the thre e minor childre n; (2) first set of
re qu e sts fo r p ro du c tio n p ro po un de d o n Ed wa rd Hu e rt a and Ma

rg ari ta Hu e rt a , in div idu a lly ; ( 3) fi rs t set of interr og atories pr opounded on Edwa rd Hue rta a

nd Marg arita H u er t a, individually ; (4) depositions on written qu es t i o n s propounded to a numbe r of third pa rties; and (5) motion for summary judgme nt jointl y

with Premiere A sset Service s and Amer ica’ s Servicing Company
re gar d i n g exemplary

damag es. Ac cordingto the rec ord, L ang ley & B anac k has only

propounded basic discove ry reque sts on the Huerta s. As to J ones, there is nothing in the re cord indicating that he has c onducted a

ny discovery

individually
. I n Ve sta , the Sup re me Court he ld that inc ur ri ng mor e tha

n $20 0, 00 0 in

e xpe ns e s a

nd fe e s, propounding standard r equests for d is c lo s u r e , n o ticing a

total of four de positions, and each de fenda nt propounding reque sts for production, fell short of overcoming the presumption aga inst waiver of a rig ht compel ar

bitration. Se e In re Ve

sta , 192 S.W .3d at 764. Unlike the situation in Perry when04

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- 20- the Texas Supreme Court dete rmined there was wa iver, th e ca s e at hand is not one in which the parties have wa ited until the eve of tria l after all or the majority of the discovery has bee n completed. Pe rry , 258 S.W .3d at 595-596. The parties have indicate d that the trial is not until October 2009, and the re is r e ma ini ngdis c ov e ry that nee ds to be c on du c te d, inc lud ing de po sin g the Hu e rt a s. As a re su lt,
we c onclude that W el l s Fa rgo , L ang ley & B anac k, and Jones have not substantially invoked the judicial proce ss to the ext ent that it ove rcome s the presumption ag ainst waiver of the rig ht to compel arbitration. Be cause we have f

ound that the Huer

tas did not meet their burde n of provingrelators substantially

invoked the judi cial proc ess, we do not ne ed to consider whether the Huer tas wer e pr e jud ic e d. As a re su lt, we c on c lud e that wa ive r of the ri g ht to arb itr a tio n wa s no t a pr op e r b a sis for the tr ial court to deny

the motions to compel arbitration. E . Fa i l u re to E x er ci s e R i g h t t o Ar b i tr a ti o n W i th i n a “ Re a s o n a b l e T i me ” The fina l issue before the trial cour t was whe ther re lators wer e require d to make a show ing that they exercised their

contra ctual rig ht to arbitration within a “r easona ble time” as r equire d by

the
arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt. Th e Hu e rt a s re ly on the fo llo wi ng pr ov isi on in the arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt t o
su pp or t th eir con te nti on

tha t th e arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt r e qu ir e s r e la tor s to de mand arb itr a tio n at a
rea sonable time:

Abritrator s; Preservation of Remedies. . . .The involveme nt of any party in judicial or other pr ocee di n gs as p l aintiff or in a ny other capa city shall not impair such party ’s ri gh t to demand ar bitration at any rea sonable time.04

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- 21- The Hue rtas fur

ther a ssert that the burden o f establishing c ompliance with the r equire ment that arbitration be demande d within a “re asonable time” i s on the relators and is a c ondition prece dent to seeking to compel ar

bitration. We c on c lud e that r a the r t ha n a c on dit ion

pr e c e de nt t

hat mu st b e me t pr ior

to s e e kin g to compel ar

bitration, the lang uag e re lied upo n b y the Huer tas prese rves a

party ’s re medies by pr ov idi ng inp artt h a t

p art i c i p a t i o ni nj u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s w i l l n o ti mp a i r t h a tp art y ’ s r i g h tto demand a rbitration at any rea sonable ti me. I n addition, the arbitration ag ree ment clea rly indicates in the section entitled “A g ree ment For Binding Arbitration,” that “[a]rbitration may be dema nded at any time, and may be compelled by summary proce eding s in Court.” We c onclude this wa s not a prope r basis for

the trial cour

t to deny the motions to compel arbitration. CO NC LU SION Ba sed on the fore g oing, we conclude the trial cour t clear ly abused its discre tion in deny ing
re la tor s’ mot ion s to c omp e l arb itr a tio n. Ac c or din g ly , w e c on dit ion a lly g ra nt the pe tit ion

fo r w ri t of mand a mus . T he wr it w ill iss ue on ly if the tr ia l c ourt

fa ils to w ith in 1 0 d ay s ( 1) wi thd ra w i ts Marc h 27, 2009 order

denying r elators’ motions t o compel ar bitration, and (2) issue an orde r staying the un derlying c ause pe nding a rbitration of the c ase. In addition, the stay imposed by

this court’s order of April 16, 2009 is lifted.

Rebec ca Simmons, J ustice