Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021) 1 

Per Curiam 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

ALASKA v. SEAN WRIGHT 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 20–940. Decided April 26, 2021

 PER CURIAM. 

In 2009, an Alaska jury convicted Sean Wright of 13

counts of sexual abuse of a minor. See State v. Wright, 404 

P. 3d 166, 170 (Alaska 2017). Wright finished serving his 

sentence in Alaska in 2016, and shortly thereafter he

moved to Tennessee. Once there, he failed to register as a 

sex offender as required by federal law. See Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act, 120 Stat. 591, 593, 34 

U. S. C. §§20911, 20913. Wright pleaded guilty to one count 

of failure to register, see 18 U. S. C. §2250(a), and ultimately received a sentence of time served along with five 

years of supervised release. See Judgment in United States 

v. Wright, No. 1:17–cr–00112, ECF Doc. No. 66 (ED Tenn.).

During the course of those federal proceedings, Wright 

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United 

States District Court for the District of Alaska pursuant to 

28 U. S. C. §§2241 and 2254. He argued that the Alaska 

Supreme Court had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it denied his Sixth Amendment 

claims and affirmed his 2009 state conviction and sentence. 

The District Court denied the motion on the threshold 

ground that Wright was not “in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court.” §2254(a). Noting that a proper

motion under §2254(a) requires more than merely being “in 

custody” somewhere, the court reasoned that “the proper

procedure for Wright to challenge his current federal custody would be a motion filed in the Eastern District of Tennessee pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2255.” App. to Pet. for Cert.

16a. 
 

 

2 ALASKA v. WRIGHT 

Per Curiam 

The Court of Appeals reversed. In its view, Wright’s state

conviction was “‘a necessary predicate’” to his federal conviction, 819 Fed. Appx. 544, 545 (CA9 2020) (quoting Zichko 

v. Idaho, 247 F. 3d 1015, 1019 (CA9 2001)), so Wright was 

in fact in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court.

The panel declined to assess the District Court’s view that 

§2255, rather than §2254, provided the proper route for 

Wright to challenge his current custody. 819 Fed. Appx., at 

546, n. 1. One judge concurred and asserted that §2254 was

the proper mechanism “because Wright is not attacking the 

constitutionality of his federal conviction for failing to register as a sex offender in Tennessee; he is collaterally attacking the constitutionality of his predicate Alaska conviction for sexual abuse of a minor.” Id., at 546. 

The Court of Appeals clearly erred. Section 2254(a) permits a federal court to entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus on behalf of a person “in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court.” In Maleng v. Cook, 490 U. S. 

488 (1989) (per curiam), we held that a habeas petitioner

does not remain “in custody” under a conviction “after the 

sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because of 

the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes of 

which he is convicted.” Id., at 492; see also id., at 490 (noting the “in custody” requirement appears in both 

§§2241(c)(3) and 2254(a)). It made no difference, we said, 

that the possibility of a prior-conviction enhancement had 

materialized for the habeas petitioner in that case: “When

the second sentence is imposed, it is pursuant to the second 

conviction that the petitioner is incarcerated and is therefore ‘in custody.’” Id., at 492–493. 

That Wright’s state conviction served as a predicate for 

his federal conviction thus did not render him “in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court” under §2254(a).

If Wright’s second conviction had been for a state crime, he

independently could have satisfied §2254(a)’s “in custody” 
Cite as: 593 U. S. ____ (2021) 3 

Per Curiam 

requirement, see Lackawanna County District Attorney v. 

Coss, 532 U. S. 394, 401–402 (2001), though his ability to 

attack the first conviction by that means would have been

limited, see id., at 402–404. Wright could not satisfy 

§2254(a) on that independent basis for the simple reason 

that his second judgment was entered by a federal court. 

* * * 

We express no view on the other theories Wright advanced before the District Court for meeting the requirements of §2254(a). We grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and remand the case to that

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.