Th e Ho no ra ble JohnR. G ibs on , U nit e d St ate s Co ur t of Ap pe a ls f

or the Ei g hth

Cir c uit , 1 sitti ngby desig nation. 1 07- 0699- cr U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Ma t t h e ws 1 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 2 3 F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT 4 5 6 7 August Term, 2008 8 9 (Argued: September 23, 2008 Dec ided: October 7, 2008) 10 11 Docke t No. 07-0699-c r 12 13 14 U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA , 15 16 Appellee , 17 18 –v.– 19 20 M I CH A EL M AT TH EWS , 21 22 Defendant- Appellant

. 23 24 25 26 Be fore : 27 W ES L EY , H A LL , and G I B S ON , Circuit Judges

. 1 28 29 Appea l from an or der of the United States District Court for the Norther n District of Ne w 30 York (H urd, J.) convicting Micha el Matthews on c harg es of c onspiracy to commit bank robbery 31 and bank r obbery , respe ctively , 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2113(a) , and sente ncingMatthews to life 32 in p ri so n p ur su ant t o 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 59 (c )( 1) (A )( i) be c a us e the c onvic tio n at is su e and Matth e ws ’ 33 two prior robbe ry and bank r obbery

convictions wer e ser ious violent felonies that involved the 34 use or thre atene d use of a firea rm. The district cour

t rejec ted Matthews’ attempt to prove by 35 clea

r and c onvincingevidenc e under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(3) (A) that two of his felony2 1 convictions wer e not serious violent fe lonies beca use they did not involve the actual use of 2 firea

rms but instead objects disguised as fire arms. Matthew s appea led the convic tion. He ar g ues 3 that it is unconstit utional to shift the burden to the def endant to prove his curre nt and prior 4 c onvic tio ns we re no t se ri ou s v iol e nt f e lon ie s, that e ve n if

the burd e n s hif

tin gwa s c on sti tut ion a l, 5 requiringproof by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e wa s not, and that § 3559(c) (3)( A) violated the 6 Six th Amendment under Apprendi . Matthews also ra ises another due proc ess claim re lated to the 7 fa ir

ne ss o f h is tri a l th at he fi rs t r a ise d in an unti me ly

mot ion to s e t a sid e the ve rd ic t. We ho ld 8 that sh if

tin gthe burd e n to the de fe nd ant u nd e r § 35 59 (c )( 3) (A ) i s c on sti tut ion a l, a nd be c a us e 9 Matthews did not prove by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that his felonies w ere not serious, we 10 re fr a in f

ro m a dd re ssi ngthe c on sti tut ion a lity of the c le ar- and -c onvin c ingsta nd ard . M atth e ws ’ 11 Apprendiclaim is fore closed by our ca se law. We find no e rror in the district court’s re

jection of 12 Matthews’ f

air-tr ial due proc ess claim as untimely . Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the c onviction and 1 3 s en t en ci n g. 14 15 A F F I RMED . 16 17 18 19 A PP EL L ANT ’ S C OUN S EL , J ulia Pamela He it, New Yor k, New Y ork, for

De fe nd an t20 Appellant

. 21 22 A PPEL L EE ’ S C OUN S EL , Andre w T. B axter, ActingUnited States Attorney for the 23 Norther n District of Ne w York, Sy rac use, Ne w York (Edwa rd R. Br oton, 24 Of Counsel, Assistant United States Attorney for the N orthern D istrict of 25 New Y ork, Sy rac use, Ne w York) , for Appellees

. 26 27 28 29 P ER C UR I UM : 30 Michae l Matthews appe als both his conviction of cha rg es of ba nk robber y and conspira cy 31 to commit bank robbery as we ll as his life sentence imposed under thre e-strike s sentencinglaw, 32 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1) (A)( i), by the United States District Court for the Norther n District of 33 Ne w Y or

k ( Hurd , J.) . M atth e ws c la ims that th e burd e n p la c e d o n d e fe nd ants , und e r 1 8 U .S. C. 34 § 3559(c) (3)( A), to prove that prior convic tions were not se rious violent felonies within the 35 me anin gof

the statut e fo r t

he purp os e of

avo idi nga

lif e se nte nc e , is un c on sti tut ion a l. H e a lso3 1 claims that eve n if this burden shifting is constituti onal, § 3559(c )(3) (A)’ s require ment that the 2 de fe nd ant m e e t hi s b ur de n o f p ro of by c le ar a nd c onvin c ing

e vid e nc e is t oo str ing e nt a nd is 3 there fore unconstitutional. Finally , he cla ims § 3559(c)(3) (A) is unc onstitut ional under 4 Apprendi . We disag ree with Matthews’ fir st claim, ref rain fr om decidingthe sec ond, and find 5 the third settled by our ca se law. 6 Matthews also c laims that his right to a fa ir trial was violate d when he was see n by a juror 7 while he wa s beingescor ted in handcuf

fs and pr ison clothes throug h the cour thouse by marshals. 8 Matthews ra ised this issue in an untimely motion to s et aside his guilty verdic t. We find that the 9 single instance of

arguably inappropriate exposure of the de fenda nt to a single juror outside the 10 courtroom wa s harmless er ror, a nd thus we af

firm the district cour

t’s decision to deny

as 11 un tim e ly

the de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to se t a sid e the ve rd ic t on that ba sis

. 12 Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the c onviction and sentenc e. 13 Bac kgr ound 14 Michae l Matthews was c onvicted of c onspiring to r ob and robbingthree banks in 2003. 15 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2113(a). In two of the thre e robbe ries Matthew s threate ned bank 16 e mpl oye e s and

patr on s w itha

ha nd dr ill dis g uis e d to loo k li ke a g un . M atth e ws ha d p re vio us ly 17 been c onvicted of at least two felonies. In 1983, Matthews wa s convicted of first deg ree robber

y 18 under N ew Yor

k Penal L aw § 160.15, a fter he , arme d with a handgun, robbed patrons of a ba r. 19 Se e Pe op lev . M

att he ws , 68 N.Y.2d 118, 123 (1986) (af firmingMatthews’ f

irst adult conviction). 20 In 1993, Matthews wa s convicted in fe dera l court of c onspiracy to commit bank robbery

and 21 bank robbe ry

for r obbing a

bank with a water pistol disguised a s a handgun. 18 U.S.C. §§ 371,18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2)( F ) the term “ serious violent felony” mea ns— 2 (i) a F eder al or State off

ense, by whateve r desig nation and whe reve r committed, c on sis tin gof

. . . r ob be ry

(a s d e sc ri be d in

se c tio n 2 11 1, 21 13 , o r 2 11 8) ; . . . o r atte mpt , c on sp ir a c y , o r s oli c itatio n to c omm it a ny of the a bo ve of fe ns e s. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (1) No tw ith sta nd ingany oth e r p ro vis ion

of law, a pe rs on wh o is 3 convicted in a

court of the United States of a se rious violent felony shall be sentenc ed to life imprisonment if– (A ) t he pe rs on ha s b e e n c onvic te d ( and

tho se c onvic tio ns have be c ome fi na l) on se pa rate prior occ asions in a cour

t of the United States or of a State of– (i ) 2 or mor e se ri ou s v iol e nt f

e lon ie s. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (3)( A) Rob be ry , a n atte mpt , c on sp ir a c y , o r s oli c itatio n to c omm it 4 robber y ; or an off

ense de scribed in pa

ragraph ( 2)(F )(ii) shall not serve as a ba sis for sentenc ing under this subsection if the de fenda nt establishes by

clea r and c onvincingevidenc e that— (i) no fire arm or othe r dang erous we apon wa s used in the offe nse and no threat of use of a firea rm or other

dang erous we apon wa s involved in the offe nse; and (ii) the off

ense did not re sult in death or serious bodily injury (as de fined in sec tion 1365) to any person. 4 1 21 13 ; Se e Un ite d S tates v . M att he ws , 2 0 F .3 d 5 38 , 5 53 -5 4 ( 2d Cir . 1 99 4) (a ff

ir min gMatth e ws ’ 2 second c onviction). At Matthews’ se ntencinghear ing f or his most rece nt conviction, the district 3 court (H urd, J.) found that Matthews’ two prior convictions and c urre nt conviction wer e “se rious 4 violent felonies” w ithin the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2) (F )(i) and as suc h qualified 2 5 Matthews for

a mandatory

life sentenc e under

18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1) (A)( i). Matthews 3 6 contende d that the 1993 and 2003 ba nk robber ies wer e not serious violent fe lonies beca use no 7 firea

rms wer e used a

nd there fore there could have been “ no threat of use of a firea rm.” 18 8 U. S.C. § 3 55 9( c )( 3) (A ); Th e c ourt re je c te d M atth e ws ’ a

rgume nt, be lie vin gthat Co ng re ss 4 9 intended the statute to include felons who use device s rese mbling fire arms “to c reate the 10 impression that the object be ing use d by the def endant . . . in th[e] robbery was a wea pon.” Supp. 11 A. for Gov’t

at 85. Matthews’ 1993 and 2003 bank r obberie s qualified as se rious violent felonies5 1 for § 3559( c)( 1)(A) (i) bec ause Matthews had disguised a wa ter pistol as a fir ear

m in the 1993 2 ba nk ro bb e ry and a ha nd dr ill in t he 20 03 ba

nk ro bb e ri e s. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt a c c or din g ly 3 sentenc ed Matthew s to life. 4 In a motion to set aside the ver dict filed two months after conviction, Matthews c laimed 5 his due proce ss rig ht to a fair tr ial had bee n violated bec ause a juror had se en him beingescor ted 6 by marshals while he was ha ndcuff ed and in pr ison clothes. The c ourt dismissed the claim as 7 un t i m e l y. 8 Matthews appe als to this C ourt, arguing that: (1) the re quirement of § 3559( c)( 3)(A) 9 violates his due proc ess rig hts in that itshifts the burden of proof to him to establish that his prior 10 convictions (which c ollectively mandate a

life sentenc e) w ere not serious violent felonies a s 11 define d by

the statute; (2) e ven if the bur den-of -proof shift is constitut ional, the clea r-and12 convincingstandard violate s due proc ess and e qual protec tion; and (3) § 3559(c )(3) (A) violate s 13 Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Matthew s also asser ts a due proc ess violation 14 with reg ard to the juror -prison-g arb inc ident. 15 We join eight other circ uits in uphol ding the constitutionalit y of the statute’ s allocation of 16 the burde n to a def endant to prove that his convictions do not qualify as ser ious violent felonies 17 in order to avoid a life sente nce unde r the thre e-strike s statute. We need not addr ess whethe r the 18 clea

r-a nd-convinc ing sta

ndard is constitutional beca use eve n under a

lesser standa

rd of pr oof 19 Matthews ca

nnot prove that his convictions we re not ser ious violent felonies. We find 20 Matthews’ Apprendiclaim fore closed by our ca se law. F inally , we a g ree with the district court 21 that Matthews’ f air-tr ial due proc ess claim wa s untimely , and ana ly zing the under

pinnings of that6 1 claim for ha

rmful er ror a nd finding none, we need not disturb that ruling

. 2 Discussion 3 B e c a

us e Matth e ws did

no t r a ise his du e pr oc e ss o bje c tio n b e low , th is C ourt re vie ws his 4 appea l for plain er ror. Se e Un ite d S

tates v . B ro wn , 3 52 F .3 d 6 54 , 6 64 (2 d Ci r. 20 03 ); F e d. R. 5 Crim. P. 52(b). Cf. United States v. Johnson , 181 F.3d 83 ( 2d Cir. 1999) (Summary Orde r) 6 (findinga district cour t did not commit plain err or by its failure, sua sponte , to find 7 unconstitutional the three- strikes burden- of-pr oof sche me bec ause “ [t ]here have been no 8 decisions in this circuit on this iss ue, and othe r circ uits have only begun to consider it”)

. 9 Matthews cla ims first that § 3559(c)( 3)(A) violates due proc ess by shifting the bur den 10 onto the defe ndant to prove that he did not commit a serious violent felony , and sec ond, that even 11 if the burde n-of- proof shift is constitutional, making a defe ndant prove by

clea r and c onvincing 1 2 e v i d e n c e th ato n e o f th e § 3 5 5 9 ( c ) ( 1 ) ( A ) ( i ) qu a l i f yi n gc r i m e s w a s n o ta

“ s e r i o u s v i o l e n tf

e l o n y” 13 violates due proc ess. 14 Whe re no fu nd ame nta l r ig ht i s at is su e , th e re is n o d ou bt t hat th e le g isl atur e may

a ssi g n to 15 defe ndants burdens of proof with re g ard to a ffirmative defe nses. See Pa tte rso n v . Ne w York, 432 16 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1977). Cf. Cooper v. Oklahoma , 517 U.S. 348, 367 (1996). I f the g overnme nt 17 has prove n all elements of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt, rea llocatingthe burde n of proof 18 in an af

firmative de fense does not violate due pr ocess. Patterson , 432 U.S. at 205-06. L ikewise, 19 statut e s p la c ingthe burd e n o n th e de fe nd ant t o p ro ve inv a lid ity of pr ior c onvic tio ns in o rd e r t o 20 avoid sentenc e enha nceme nt based on re cidivism are a lso constituti onal . Parke v . Raley , 506 21 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1992). I n Parke the Court noted that “e ven whe n a collate ral attack on a f inal7 1 conviction re sts on constitut ional g rounds, the pre sumption of regularity that attache s to final 2 judgme nts makes it appropriate to assig n a proof burden to the de fenda

nt.” Id. at 31. Howe ver, 3 wher e a f

undamental r ight is involved, a statute ma y not require that the def

endant shoulder

a 4 burden of

proof hig her tha

n a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Cooper , 517 U.S. at 362. 5 This Court has never considere d whether

the clea r-a nd-convinc ing bur den of pr oof plac ed 6 on defe ndants under § 3559( c)( 3)(A) involves a fundamental rig ht. On one occ asion we 7 expressly

rese rved the issue to a future panel. In United States v. Sny pe , the district court 8 convicted Sny

pe of c onspiracy

to commit bank robbery

and sente nced him to life imprisonment 9 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)( 1)(A) (i). 441 F .3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2006). The sentenc e wa s 10 based on his then- curr ent conviction of a serious violent felony

and thre e other

serious violent 11 felonies. Id. at 144. Sny pe ar g ued that re quiring him to prove by clea r and c onvincingevidenc e 12 that his convictions, curre nt or prior, we re nonqua lifying unde r §3559(c )(3) to avoid a life 13 sentenc e under

§ 3559(c) (1)( A)(i) violated his due proc ess rig hts. Id. at 145. The Court he ld that 14 the evidenc e of the use of f irea rms was so compe lling that, re g ardle ss of the burde n of proof and 15 up on

wh om i t w a s p la c e d, it w a s in c on c e iva ble that any

c ourt c ou ld f ind that th e c onvic tio n d id 16 not qualify

as a se rious violent felony

. Id. at 146. Ther efor e the Court explicitly rese rved on the 17 due proc ess claim. Id. at 14 6 n .2 1. I t di d n ote , h ow e ve r, that Coo pe r did not support Sny

pe’s 18 du e pr oc e ss a

rgume nt. “ As Coo

pe r rec og nized, there is a sig nificant distinction betwee n the 19 burden of

proof that may

fairly be assig ned to a de fenda

nt with respec t to a fundame ntal rig ht . . . 20 and the bur den that may be assig ned with re spect to a statutory privileg e that Cong ress is under 21 no obligation to afford, suc h as a pr ivilege to avoid an enha nced se ntence on a showingof8 1 specifie d mitigatingcirc umstances.” Id. (interna l citation omitt ed). 2 Other c ircuits have a ddresse d the constitutionality of § 3559(c )(3) (A)’ s burden shifting 3 and the c lear -and- convincingstandard. A ll eight c ircuits that have a ddresse d the first issue have 4 fo un d th at § 3 55 9( c )( 3) (A ) m ay sh if t th e burd e n o f p ro of

to t he de fe nd ant. Ea c h b a se d th e ir 5 ho ldi ng s o n th e pr inc ipl e s o ri g inatin gfr om Patterson and Parke that Congr ess may place the 6 burden of

proof on de fenda

nts when cr eatingstatutory rig hts. See U

nited States v. Contreras , 7 53 6 F .3 d 1 16 7, 11 73 -7 4 ( 10 th C ir . 2 00 8) ; United States v. Bradshaw , 2 81 F .3 d 2 78 , 2 96 -9 7 ( 1s t 8 Cir . 2 00 2) ; Un ite d S tates v . D av is , 2 60 F .3 d 9 65 , 9 70 (8 th C ir . 2 00 1) ; United States v. Gray , 260 9 F .3 d 1 26 7, 12 79 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 1) ; United States v. Fe rguson , 211 F.3d 878, 886- 87 (5th Cir. 10 20 00 ); United States v. Gate wood , 2 30 F .3 d 1 86 , 1 90 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) ; United States v. Kaluna , 11 19 2 F .3 d 1 18 8, 11 96 (9 th C ir . 1 99 9) ; United States v. W icks , 132 F.3d 383, 388- 89 (7th Cir. 12 19 97 ). F or

the re a so ns e xpre sse d b y the se c ir c uit s, we joi n th e m. 13 L ikewise, a ll four circ uits that have examined the shifting of the burde n of proof to the 14 defe ndant to establish an af firmative de fense to a sentenc ing e nhance ment by clea r and 15 convincingevidenc e have found it to be constitutional. Se e Un ite d S tates v . G ur ule , 461 F.3d 16 12 38 , 1 24 9 ( 10 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; Bradshaw , 2 81 F .3 d at 29 4- 95 ; Gatewood , 230 F.3d a t 191; 17 Ferguson , 211 F.3d at 886-87. We need not re ach this issue, howe ver, be cause Matthews ca nnot 18 sh owe ve n b y

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that th e ro bb e ri e s at is su e , o r M atth e ws ’ p a st 19 felonies, did not involve the “thr eat of use of a firea rm or other

dang erous we apon . . . .” 18 20 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(3) (A)( i). 21 Matthews did not rebut the te stimony from witnesses at the second of the robbe ries atMatth e ws fi le d h is m oti on to s e t a sid e the ve rd ic t on thi s g ro un d tw o mo nth s a ft e r h is 5 conviction, well af

ter the se ven-da

y time limi t for such a

motion. See Fe d. R. Crim. P . 29(c) (1). There fore , the district court ha d the discre tion to deny his moti on for untimeliness, see U nited Sta te s v . I do wu , 74 F.3d 387, 391 n.3 ( 2d Cir. 1996), and unless the c ourt committed plain err or, we will not disturb the denial. Se e Un ite d S tates v . G or e , 1 54 F .3 d 3 4, 42 (2 d Ci r. 19 98 ); F e d. R. Crim. P. 52(b). A def endant’ s due proc ess rig ht to a fair tr ial is violated if the def endant is made “to stand 9 1 iss ue that th e y

saw h im w ith“ a

g un in h and ,” and

he ard him sa y that “ no bo dy

[wo uld ] g e t hu

rt ” 2 if the y ob e y e d h is c omm and s, or the te sti mony

of his a c c omp lic e that a

ha nd dr ill , d isguis e d w ith 3 black tape , was used dur ing the robber y . At sentenc ing, Matthews’ counse l conce ded Matthew s 4 had used a

hand drill disguise d as a gun to intim idate victims duringthe robbe ry . Reg ardingthe 5 two prior convic tions, defense counsel c oncede d that Matthews used a handgun in his 1983 6 robber

y and used a

water pistol t hat looked like a w eapon to intimidate his victims in hi s 1993 7 b an k

r o b b e r y. We ag ree with the district court that it is irreleva nt for purpose s of ana ly sis under 8 § 3559(c) (3)( A)(i) whether or not the objec t Matthews bra ndished was a ctually

a handgun wher e 9 Matthews used the object to cr eate the impression that he wa s committi ngthe robbe ry with a 10 wea

pon. Se e Ma tth e ws , 20 F.3d at 553-54 (holdingthat the district court prope rly treated 11 defe ndant bra

ndishing a

toy g un as havingcar

ried a “dang erous we apon” f

or purpose s of 12 sentenc ing e nhance ment) (involvingMatthews’ 1993 r obbery conviction, one of

the 13 § 3559(c) (1)( A)(i) prior convic tions at issue). 14 As to Matthews’ Ap pr e nd i claim, we f

ind it foreclose d by

our ca se law. See Snype , 441 15 F.3d at 147-49. We also reje ct Matthews’ due proc ess ar g ument, raised f or the fir st tim e in a 16 motion filed after the jury ’s ver dict, based on a juror see ing Matthews beingescor ted throug h the 17 c ourt

ho us e by mars ha ls i n h and c uf

fs and pr iso n c lot

he s. 5trial befor e a jur y while dre ssed in identifiable prison c lothes . . . .” Estelle v. W illiams , 4 25 U. S. 50 1, 51 2 ( 19 76 ); see also United States v . Hurtado , 47 F.3d 577, 581 ( 2d Cir. 1995) (apply ing Es te lleto fede ral c ourt). While the rig ht to a fair tr ial may be a substantial r ight, f

or plain er

ror analy sis this Court determines whe ther the a lleg ed er ror of the district court, namely denying Matthews’ motion to set aside the ve rdict, pre judicially aff ecte d that substantial rig ht. See Un ite d S tates v . F e ll , 5 31 F .3 d 1 97 , 2 09 (2 d Ci r. 20 08 ); se e als o G or e , 154 F.3d at 43 (noting an err or is plain if it is “so eg reg ious and obvious as to make the tria l judge and prose cutor de relict in permitting it”). T h i s i n qu i ry

go es t o th e s u

b s t an ce o f t h e a l l ege d

v i o l at i o n : wh et h er

th e e rr o r o f a l l o wi n g a juror to see Matthews beingescor ted by marshals through the cour thouse in handcuf

fs and pr ison clothes once prior to conviction violated the r ight to a f air trial or whether such er ror wa s harmless be y ond a re asonable doubt. See H urtado , 47 F.3d at 581. I n Hurtado , this Court deter mined that allowing the jury to see a defe ndant in prison clothes duringthe first day of trial was ha rmless err or consider ing the leng th of time the defe ndant spent in prison clothes in view of the jury and the we ight of

the evidenc e ag ainst him. Id. at 58 2. Matth e ws ’ a lle g e d v iol atio n is even le ss eg reg ious than the violation in Hurtado . Matthews did not appea r in prison clothes or handcuf fs at trial, he was only

seen by one juror, a

nd the juror only

saw him for a

short time as he was e scorted thr oug h the building. This does not rise to the level of a n eg reg ious violation of the rig hts articulated in Es te lle , any err or in allowingthe juror to see Matthews wa s harmless, and there fore the district court did not err in denying Matthews’ motion to set aside the ver dict.

10 1 2 Conclusion 3 T h e d i s tr i c tc o urt ’ s o r d e r c o n v i c t i n gan d

s e n t e n c i n gM at th e w s i s h e r e b y A F F I RMED .