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S. HRG. 113–148

SECURITY COOPERATION IN MEXICO: EXAMINING

THE NEXT STEPS IN THE U.S.–MEXICO SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 18, 2013

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE

AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS

TOM UDALL, New Mexico, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Brownfield, Hon. William R., Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau 

of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department 

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9

Feierstein, Hon. Mark, Assistant Administrator for Bureau of Latin America 

and the Caribbean, United States Agency for International Development, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13

Jacobson, Hon. Roberta S., Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ............................ 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4

O’Neil, Dr. Shannon K., Ph.D., senior fellow for Latin America Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY ............................................................ 24

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26

Steinberg, Nik, senior researcher, Americas Division, Human Rights Watch, 

New York, NY ...................................................................................................... 29

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 31

Udall, Hon. Tom, U.S. Senator from New Mexico, opening statement ............... 1

Wood, Dr. Duncan, Ph.D., director, Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC ................................................. 35

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1)

SECURITY COOPERATION IN MEXICO: EXAMINING THE NEXT STEPS IN THE U.S.–MEXICO SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 

TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 2013 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND

GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom Udall (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Udall, Murphy, and Kaine. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO 

Senator UDALL. I call this hearing of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Global Narcotics Affairs to order. Thank you 

very much. 

Today we are meeting to examine the next steps in the United 

States-Mexico security relationship; an important relationship that 

has grown stronger over the last decade. We have made real 

progress in working together and in addressing the destructive 

drug trade in the region. Our nations do not just share a border, 

we also share a history and culture that goes back centuries. In 

New Mexico and other border States, we value this shared history 

and the cultural exchanges that continue to grow and develop. 

So it is with a shared sense of purpose that we should work with 

Mexico to address the violence caused by drug cartels and also the 

underlying judicial and economic reforms that will prevent drug 

cartels from eroding society further in the future. 

We should be clear. The Mexican people and the Mexican nation 

are strong. While the violence is most reported in the news media, 

there are positive developments under way. Mexico has a growing 

economy and middle class. Many of its regions and cities have 

crime rates comparable to most U.S. cities and States. Furthermore, the people of Mexico have embraced democracy, with several 

peaceful transfers of power between competing political parties in 

recent years. 

But serious problems remain for the new administration in Mexico. Between December 2006 and November 2012 there were more 

than 60,000 deaths related to drug trafficking. According to some 

estimates, nearly 6,000 more deaths have occurred in the last 6 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2

months. The numbers are staggering and especially for neighboring 

U.S. States like New Mexico and Arizona. 

In order to address drug trafficking and violence in Mexico, the 

United States announced the Merida Initiative in 2007. Since then 

Congress has appropriated over $1.9 billion to support it. In addition, Mexico has invested nearly $47 billion to improve security and 

public safety. The Merida Initiative seeks to address violent crime 

in Mexico by focusing on four pillars: one, disrupting the operational capacity of organized criminal groups; two, institutionalizing reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect for human 

rights; three, creating a 21st century border; and four, building 

strong and resilient communities. 

Reform of the criminal justice system in Mexico is of paramount 

importance. According to some estimates, only 13 percent of all 

crimes are reported in Mexico due to fear of reprisal and lack of 

confidence in the authorities. As a result, Mexico has made it a 

goal to develop a more adversarial system, with prosecutors and 

defense attorneys, with new rules of evidence and criminal procedure to ensure that the rights of victims and defendants are 

respected. The United States, including the Department of State 

and the USAID, have been working to help Mexico at the state and 

federal level to help make this transition. 

Despite these efforts, reform has been slow. Judicial reform has 

only been fully implemented in three states and is partially implemented in nine. So there is a lot of work to do. 

In addition to judicial reform, there are new initiatives from 

President Pen ̃ a Nieto’s administration, for example the proposed 

gendarmerie, which may replace the military security role in some 

cases, and efforts to address criminality through preventive programs such as improving education and economic opportunities for 

regions torn apart by years of violence. I am looking forward to discussing how these efforts will impact United States cooperation 

with the Mexican Government and hearing more about your 

assessment of these changes. 

Today we have two very knowledgeable panels to speak about 

the next steps in the United States-Mexico security relationship. In 

the first panel we are joined by Assistant Secretary of State for 

Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roberta Jacobson; Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement, William Brownfield; and Assistant Administrator for 

USAID’s Bureau of Latin America and Caribbean, Mark Feierstein. 

In the second panel, we will be joined by Dr. Shannon O’Neil, the 

senior fellow for Latin American Studies at the Council on Foreign 

Relations. We are also joined by Dr. Duncan Wood, who is the director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars, and Nik Steinberg, the senior researcher in 

the Americas Division of Human Rights Watch. 

Thank you to all the panelists for joining us today. Now I will 

turn to any of my—Senator McCain I don’t think is here yet, so he 

may make a statement when he comes in. I don’t know if you have 

a brief statement, Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. No. 

Senator UDALL. OK. Well, why don’t we start with our witnesses—start, Roberta, with you. Because when we scheduled this 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3

we did not know we were going to have a vote at 3 o’clock, so if 

you try to keep to your 5 minutes I think that will give us—if you 

each keep to 5 minutes, and then we will, of course, have your 

statements in the record, and then we can get into questioning. So 

thank you very much for that, and please go ahead. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERTA S. JACOBSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and, Mr. 

Chairman, thank you for being here. We are delighted to be here 

today. I will keep this very short. The full statement is submitted 

for the record and I will try and cut it further as I go. 

I really appreciate the opportunity to testify today about a relationship that President Obama has described as one of the largest 

and most dynamic relationships of any two countries on Earth. I 

have had the pleasure of working on Mexico during a fascinating 

and productive time in our relationship, initially as Director of 

Mexican Affairs, later as the Deputy Assistant Secretary covering 

North America, and now as the Assistant Secretary. I know firsthand the breadth and the complexity of this relationship, but I am 

also very lucky to have the best possible partners in Assistant Secretary Brownfield and Assistant Administrator Feierstein, both of 

whom I have known for many years. 

The United States and Mexico share one of the world’s most 

vibrant and mutually beneficial economic relationships. Mexico is 

our second-largest export market and third-largest overall trading 

partner. We sell more to Mexico than we do to Brazil, Russia, 

India, and China combined. 

To increase competitiveness, foster economic growth and innovation, and explore ways to partner for global leadership, Presidents 

Obama and Pen ̃ a Nieto announced on May 2 the establishment of 

a high-level economic dialogue. We hope to hold the first meeting 

of that group later this year. To increase trade flows, modernize 

border infrastructure and border management is essential. At the 

May meeting the two Presidents also reaffirmed their commitment 

to the 21st century border management initiative established to 

improve infrastructure, facilitate secure flow of legitimate commerce and travel, and strengthen law enforcement. 

In 2012 Mexico was our second-largest supplier of imported 

crude oil, the largest export market for United States refined petroleum products, a growing market for United States natural gas 

exports. We have negotiated and signed the U.S.-Mexico TransBoundary Hydrocarbons Agreement to provide a cooperative framework and greater legal clarity for the development of reserves that 

cross our border. And President Obama is committing to working 

with Congress to pass legislation to implement that agreement, 

and we look forward to working with the Senate to move that 

ahead. 

Since the Merida Initiative was announced in 2007, our cooperation with Mexico has centered on the recognition that we share responsibility for transnational criminal networks and for protecting 

our citizens. Under Merida, the U.S. Government has delivered 

about 1.2 billion dollars’ worth of training and equipment. But it 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4

has also proved crucial to supporting the Mexican Government’s 

efforts to build its rule of law institutions and reform the justice 

sector. Moreover, it has been an important element in the transformation of the bilateral relationship and the cooperation that we 

have. 

One in ten Americans, more than 30 million people, is of Mexican 

heritage. A robust Mexican-American community in the United 

States contributes to our culture, our values, our politics, and our 

social structures. Some 20 million Americans travel to Mexico 

every year for tourism, business, or study, and Mexico is home to 

the largest expatriate community for American citizens in the 

world, more than 1 million. These ties bring us together as families, as neighbors, as friends, and they contribute to our mutual 

understanding. 

During President Obama’s visit to Mexico, he announced the creation of a bilateral forum on higher education, innovation, and 

research, which will begin meeting this year to develop a shared 

vision on education cooperation. Through this and President 

Obama’s 100,000 Strong in the Americans Initiative, we encourage 

Mexican students to study in the United States, just as President 

Pen ̃ a Nieto did. 

We have growing cooperation with Mexico on global and regional 

issues at the United Nations, at the OAS, and at other multilateral 

venues. Our common interest in the environment and clean energy 

is promoted through the Energy and Climate Partnership of the 

Americans and Mexico will host a ministerial on that subject in the 

fall. 

I want to thank you for being here and for your time today, and 

I look forward to your support as we strengthen our engagement 

with Mexico in the future. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERTA S. JACOBSON

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify to the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee on ‘‘Security 

Cooperation in Mexico: Examining the Next Steps in the U.S./Mexico Security Relationship.’’ President Obama described the relationship between the United States 

and Mexico as ‘‘one of the largest and most dynamic relationships of any two countries on earth.’’ The United States relationship with Mexico is indeed unique in that 

it touches the daily lives of so many Americans and Mexicans. 

I have had the great pleasure to work on Mexico at crucial stages in our relationship—initially as Director of the Office of Mexican Affairs, as Deputy Assistant Secretary covering North American affairs, and now as Assistant Secretary for Western 

Hemisphere affairs. I know firsthand that our relationship with Mexico is broad, 

complex, and relevant, filled with a dynamic mix of challenges and opportunities. 

Today I would like to review our progress with Mexico to strengthen our shared economic potential, our collective security, and our people-to-people ties. 

When President Obama met with President Pen ̃ a Nieto in Mexico on May 2, the 

two Presidents spoke again of their commitment to bilateral partnership and built 

on the positive personal relationship they established at their first meeting in 

November 2012 in Washington. They agreed to take new steps to strengthen our 

economic relationship, enhance shared competitiveness, and create new trade, 

investment, and employment opportunities. The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to collaborate on citizen security based on shared responsibility and mutual 

respect. They highlighted efforts to increase the connections between our peoples 

that enrich the culture and prosperity of both societies. The Presidents also 

reviewed our cooperation on global and hemispheric issues. Their discussion highlighted the extraordinary benefits we realize from our relationship that often do not 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5

make the daily headlines, but are profoundly relevant to our daily lives and to our 

future. 

ECONOMIC AND ENERGY ENGAGEMENT

The United States and Mexico share one of the world’s most vibrant and mutually 

beneficial economic relationships. Our economic links are the linchpin of our overall 

relationship. We are partners in an integrated enterprise whose success depends on 

us working together. Given the high degree of intra-industry trade, much of what 

we import consists of U.S. exports to Mexico processed further in Mexico. U.S. companies have more than $91 billion invested in Mexico, while Mexican companies are 

increasing their investment in the American economy, currently nearly $27.9 billion. 

It is difficult to overstate the importance of our trade relationship with Mexico. 

In 2012, two-way merchandise trade reached nearly $500 billion and services trade 

was $39 billion in 2011. Mexico is our second-largest export market and thirdlargest overall trading partner. We sell more to Mexico than we do to Brazil, Russia, 

India, and China combined. The United States is Mexico’s largest trading partner. 

Together with Canada, Mexico and the United States comprise one of the most successful and competitive economic platforms in the world today. We have taken steps 

to strengthen that trading relationship. Last October, the United States and eight 

other countries welcomed Mexico (and Canada) to join the negotiations for the 

Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). TPP is a high-standard, 21st century trade agreement that includes countries from one of the fastest-growing regions in the world. 

To increase competitiveness, foster economic growth and innovation, and explore 

ways to partner for global leadership, Presidents Obama and Pen ̃ a Nieto announced 

on May 2 the establishment of a High-Level Economic Dialogue (HLED). We plan 

to hold the first meeting later this year. We will organize the dialogue around three 

broad themes: promoting competitiveness and connectivity; fostering economic 

growth, productivity, and innovation; and partnering for regional and global leadership. 

The HLED will increase cooperation in sectors that connect our economies, including transportation, telecommunications, and energy, and promote greater two-way 

investment. The dialogue will stimulate entrepreneurship and innovation, encourage 

the development of human capital, and examine regional and international initiatives, including our engagement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Asia 

Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and the G20. 

Given the massive flow of goods and people across our shared border, modernizing 

border infrastructure and border management is essential. At their May meeting, 

President Obama and President Pen ̃ a Nieto reaffirmed their commitment to our 

21st Century Border Management Initiative. At the April meeting of the initiative’s 

Executive Steering Committee, senior representatives of both governments encouraged projects and initiatives that will improve infrastructure, facilitate the secure 

flow of legitimate commerce and travel, and strengthen law enforcement along the 

border. 

Our energy relationship with Mexico is a critical component of North American 

energy security. In 2012, Mexico was our second-largest supplier of imported crude 

oil, the largest export market for U.S. refined petroleum products, and a growing 

market for U.S. natural gas exports. President Pen ̃ a Nieto has made energy reform 

a priority, and if it is successful, Mexico could attract international investment and 

expertise to reverse the decline in its oil production. 

We have negotiated and signed the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons 

Agreement. By establishing a cooperative framework and greater legal clarity for 

the development of reserves that traverse the U.S.-Mexico maritime border, it would 

benefit both the United States and Mexico. In his meeting with President Pen ̃ a 

Nieto, President Obama committed to working with Congress to pass legislation to 

implement the Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. Senators Wyden and Murkowski recently introduced S. 812, legislation which authorizes the Secretary of the 

Interior to implement the Agreement. We look forward to working with the Senators 

to move this important legislation forward. 

In Mexico, the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration is pursuing a broad reform agenda with 

a focus on economic development. In just 6 months, Mexico passed major reforms 

in labor, education, and telecommunications. The Mexican Government announced 

plans for further reforms of energy, fiscal, and financial policy. Provided the implementing legislation accompanying these reforms leads to meaningful policy change, 

as is likely, these changes have the potential to reshape our neighbor’s economic 

landscape and expand our economic engagement with Mexico. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6

SECURITY COOPERATION

Since the Merida Initiative was announced in 2007, we have based our cooperation with Mexico on the recognition that our countries share responsibility for 

combating transnational criminal networks and for protecting our citizens from the 

crime, corruption, and violence they generate. Our unprecedented cooperation reflects our mutual respect and our understanding of the tremendous benefits our two 

countries can produce through collaboration. Our strong partnership improves citizen safety by fighting drug trafficking, organized crime, corruption, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, and demand for drugs on both sides of the border. 

Our Merida partnership is organized around four pillars:

• Disrupting the capacity of organized criminal groups; 

• Institutionalizing reforms to sustain rule of law and respect for human rights; 

• Creating a 21st century border; and 

• Building strong and resilient communities.

We are strengthening institutions, especially police, justice, and civil society organizations; expanding our border focus beyond interdiction of contraband to include 

facilitation of legitimate trade and travel; and building strong communities resistant 

to the influence of organized crime. 

Since the inception of the Merida Initiative, the U.S. Government has delivered 

about $1.2 billion out of $1.9 billion worth of training and equipment. The Merida 

Initiative has provided crucial support to the Mexican Government’s efforts to build 

the capacity of its rule of law institutions and reform the justice sector, while 

enhancing the bilateral relationship and extent of cooperation between the U.S. and 

Mexican Governments. Our Mexican partners have invested at least $10 for every 

dollar we have contributed to our Merida goals in Mexico. The U.S. contribution is 

vitally important. 

U.S.-Mexico bilateral engagement has been transformed over the last 10 years, 

and the Merida partnership is an important component of this broader evolution in 

the relationship. President Pen ̃ a Nieto and his team have consistently made clear 

to us their interest in continuing our close collaboration on security issues, most 

recently during President Obama’s visit. The Merida Initiative continues to provide 

a comprehensive, flexible framework under which our partnership can move forward 

to the benefit of both Americans and Mexicans. 

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE TIES

The people-to-people ties that bind Mexico to the United States are strong and 

deep, and they enrich both countries. One in 10 Americans—more than 30 million 

people—is of Mexican heritage. A robust Mexican-American community in the 

United States contributes to our culture, our values, our politics, and our social 

structures. Some 20 million Americans travel to Mexico every year for tourism, business, or study. The cities and towns along our common border are interconnected. 

Mexico is home to the largest expatriate community of American citizens in the 

world—more than 1 million people. These ties bring us together as families, neighbors, and friends, and contribute to our mutual understanding. 

During President Obama’s visit to Mexico, we announced new initiatives to use 

people-to-people links to build a stronger bilateral relationship. The Presidents announced the creation of a Bilateral Forum on Higher Education, Innovation, and 

Research to promote mutual prosperity, expanded opportunity, job creation, and the 

development of a 21st century workforce in both countries. The Forum, which will 

begin meeting this year, will bring together government, academia, and civil society 

to develop a shared vision on educational cooperation. Through President Obama’s 

‘‘100,000 Strong in the Americas’’ initiative, we encourage Mexican students to 

study in the United States, just as President Pen ̃ a Nieto did. We also want to facilitate American students to study abroad in the hemisphere, including in Mexico, and 

greater academic mobility between our two countries. These initiatives will 

strengthen educational institutions in both countries, just as Mexico begins to 

implement its education reforms. 

President Obama also spoke in Mexico of his administration’s vision for comprehensive immigration reform that respects our tradition as a nation of immigrants, 

but also a nation of laws; reform that recognizes the need to strengthen border security, but also to strengthen legal immigration. Although comprehensive immigration 

reform would affect Mexico more than any other country, President Pen ̃ a Nieto publicly recognized that it is a U.S. domestic issue. Our border is more secure than it 

has ever been and illegal immigration attempts into the United States are near 

their lowest level in decades. Mexico announced its intention to improve border 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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security along its own southern border, at least in part to reduce the flow of 

migrants who seek to transit Mexico on their way to the United States. 

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR DRUG DEMAND REDUCTION IN MEXICO

We are working together on new opportunities for drug demand reduction in Mexico. The Pen ̃ a Nieto administration has made demand reduction one of the principal 

pillars of its crime and violence prevention program, with the objective of modernizing and expanding its addiction diagnosis and treatment capabilities. 

The United States and Mexico will be able to apply this approach to three areas 

of demand reduction policy—professionalizing addiction treatment counseling, improving Mexican capacity to research and develop addiction prevention and treatment methods, and expanding the prevalence and use of drug treatment courts. 

GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT AND COOPERATION

We are increasing cooperation with Mexico on global and regional issues. Mexico 

is an important player on the world stage—demonstrated by its hosting of the U.N. 

Climate Change Conference in 2010 and the G20 summit in 2012. Mexico joined the 

Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral export control regime, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group nonproliferation regimes. Mexico has made great advances on its own 

strategic trade controls—something we welcome from a major trading partner—and 

hosted the plenary meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 

in May. We engage closely with Mexico on these issues. 

Our common interest in the environment and clean energy is another area of 

growing cooperation. Since the 2010 U.N. climate negotiations in Cancun, the 

United States and Mexico have maintained a high level of engagement. Mexican 

leadership has been critical to successful outcomes on a range of important environmental issues. We engage closely on the responsible and environmentally sound 

development of unconventional gas resources, as well as wind energy development, 

energy efficiency, cross-border electricity trade, a bilateral renewable energy market, 

and low-emissions development. We cooperate closely under the Energy and Climate 

Partnership of the Americas, for which Mexico will host the next Ministerial in the 

fall. President Obama also discussed with President Pen ̃ a Nieto in May our interest 

in working with Mexico to engage with Central American partners in facilitating a 

robust regional electricity market. 

CONCLUSION

When President Obama spoke to Mexican youth on May 3, he recognized the new, 

emerging Mexico that is strengthening its democracy through greater participation 

by civil society, creating new prosperity and enabling millions to rise from poverty, 

and courageously confronting challenges to its own security. He also outlined the 

potential of greater engagement by the United States with Mexico across the spectrum of our shared interests. President Obama challenged each of us to ‘‘do more 

to unlock the potential of our relationship.’’ I believe we are on the right path to 

do that—renewing our commitment or expanding initiatives that have served us 

well, and forging a new path where we see new opportunities. 

I thank the members of the subcommittee for your time today. By calling this 

hearing, you acknowledge the importance of the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship 

and the prominent role Mexico plays in our economic well-being and our security. 

I look forward to your support as we strengthen our engagement with Mexico and 

I am happy to answer any of your questions.

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much. 

Let us proceed with Mr. Brownfield. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Kaine. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today 

to discuss United States-Mexico security cooperation under the 

Merida Initiative. 

Senators, we do not start our discussion of Merida at point zero. 

Since our two governments agreed in 2007 that we share responsiFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8

bility for the security threats affecting Mexico and agreed to cooperate in solving them, as Roberta just said, the United States 

has delivered $1.2 billion in support and assistance to professionalize Mexico’s law enforcement and to build capacity under the 

rule of law, with this committee’s strong support. 

The Mexican Government for its part has invested more than 10 

dollars for every dollar contributed by the United States to these 

shared challenges. And we have had an impact. More than 8,500 

justice sector officials and more than 19,000 federal, state, and 

local police have received training under Merida, the vast majority 

of it in Mexico, at Mexican training centers, but some of it here at 

home, where special skills or instruction are found at institutions 

like our International Law Enforcement Academy in Roswell or the 

New Mexico Corrections Department outside of Santa Fe, where 

more than 390 Mexican corrections officials have developed 

advanced skills. 

The training we provide has shown results. Secure federal prisons in Mexico have increased from 5 to 14 and their quality has 

increased even more. The U.S. Government has provided 100 million dollars’ worth of inspection equipment, resulting in more than 

$3 billion in illicit goods seized in Mexico—a return on our investment of 3,000 percent. 

More than 50 senior members of drug trafficking organizations 

have been removed from the streets of Mexico and more than 

700,000 Mexican students have received civic, education, and ethics 

training under the Merida Initiative. This subcommittee should 

take great pride in its support for the Merida Initiative and what 

it has accomplished for both the American and Mexican peoples. 

Senators, a new President of Mexico was inaugurated last 

December. As with all new governments, the Pen ̃ a Nieto government came to office determined to formulate its own national security strategy and place its own stamp on the United States-Mexico 

bilateral relationship. The new government has sent some clear 

signals on the direction it wishes to go. It wants a single point of 

contact in the Mexican Government to coordinate Merida Initiative 

programs and operations, and greater focus on crime prevention 

and economic and social development. It wants greater engagement 

by Mexican state and local government and a sharper focus on 

human rights. It wants to strengthen the Mexican Attorney General’s Office, professionalize the police, and build a new gendarmerie to lift the policing burden from the armed forces. 

Mr. Chairman, I have no problem with these signals. They are 

logical, they are coherent, they are good ideas. There are a number 

of details yet to be defined, but what we have now is fully consistent with our strategic approach to the Merida Initiative, where 

we support the four pillars, shift focus from equipment to training, 

and transition from federal to state and local institutions. 

As the President said in Mexico City 6 weeks ago, it is the Government of Mexico that decides how we will cooperate in Mexico. 

We have made an unprecedented and historic start to cooperation 

under the Merida Initiative during two different administrations in 

both Mexico and the United States. I expect to report even more 

progress to this subcommittee in the months ahead. 

Thank you, Senators, and I look forward to your questions. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brownfield follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD

Chairman Udall, Senator McCain, and members of the subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today. In every society, citizen security 

underpins economic stability and allows trade, investment, energy development, and 

education exchanges to flourish. The partnership forged between the United States 

and the Government of Mexico over the past 6 years under the Merida Initiative 

exemplifies how strengthening citizen security supports these broader objectives. We 

have worked together to strengthen the capacity of Mexico’s justice sector to counter 

organized crime and its violent and corrupting effects. Now is an excellent opportunity to recognize our shared accomplishments, acknowledge the common challenges we face, and look forward to the progression of our partnership. 

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MERIDA INITIATIVE

The Merida Initiative was conceived in 2007 in an effort to enhance collaboration 

against the drug trade and build more effective justice sector institutions in Mexico. 

At the time of the program’s inception, cartel-related violence had been increasing 

dramatically and corruption was a threat to rule of law. Mexican institutions were 

ill-equipped to deal with the challenges they faced. In 2008, Mexico took the important first step of passing constitutional reforms to overhaul its entire justice sector 

including the police, judicial system, and corrections at the federal, state and local 

levels. Mexico’s institutional reforms and its objective of building strong institutions 

that its citizens can depend on to deliver justice provided a foundation for U.S. cooperation. 

Our Merida resources have helped advance Mexico’s implementation of these reforms. Since the inception of Merida, the United States Government has delivered 

about 1.2 billion dollars’ worth of training, capacity-building, and equipment. By no 

means did we go it alone: For every $1 of foreign assistance that America invested 

in our shared security goals, the Government of Mexico dedicated at least $10 of 

its own. Because our assistance was designed jointly with the Government of Mexico, many programs formed integral parts of Mexico’s justice sector reforms and 

today enjoy a high level of sustainability. 

Our partnership with Mexico has demonstrated results. With our assistance, the 

Government of Mexico has: Augmented the professionalization of police units by providing training to more than 19,000 federal and state police officers, 4,000 of which 

are federal investigators; built a stronger legal framework through the training of 

over 8,500 federal justice sector personnel; improved the detection of narcotics, 

arms, and money, reaching almost $3 billion in illicit goods seized; expanded secure 

incarceration at the federal level from five facilities with a capacity of 3,500 to 14 

facilities with a capacity of 20,000; and provided civic education and ethics training 

to more than 700,000 Mexican students. Since 2009, Mexico has apprehended more 

than 50 senior and mid-level drug trafficking organization (DTO) leaders, significantly disrupting all major Mexican DTOs. 

In line with Mexico’s evolving capabilities, the Merida Initiative has undergone 

several planned transitions. These include: (1) a transition away from major equipment assistance intended to increase the government’s reach toward additional 

training and capacity-building for personnel; and (2) a shift from focusing assistance 

on federal institutions to an increasing emphasis on state and local government 

capabilities. The Merida Initiative continues to be structured around the four pillar 

framework: (1) Disrupting the operational capacity of organized crime; (2) institutionalizing Mexico’s capacity to sustain the rule of law and protect human rights; 

(3) creating a 21st century border; and (4) building strong and resilient communities. This framework, combined with the shift toward training and an emphasis 

on building capacity at the state and local level, will be the basis for our security 

cooperation with the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration going forward. 

THE MERIDA INITIATIVE IN 2013 AND BEYOND

Deliberations between our governments on how to proceed under the Merida 

Initiative have been productive and comprehensive. President Pen ̃ a Nieto and his 

administration are committed to continuing our close collaboration on security 

issues under the four-pillar Merida framework, with a sharper focus on crime prevention and rule of law. The Pen ̃ a Nieto administration has proposed a security 

strategy which includes strengthening the Attorney General’s office, revising the 

practice of pretrial detention to better protect human rights, establishing a Commission for the Prevention of Crime, and creating a National Human Rights Program. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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The strategy also focuses on police professionalization by seeking to create a career 

professional service, consolidating police certification and vetting, elaborating protocols for police action, and creating a national training plan for police. These elements track well with the planning and direction of INL programming under the 

Merida Initiative for professionalized and credible civilian security. 

We continue to build on the success of several ongoing programs. For example, 

Mexico’s federal corrections system is now a recognized international leader in corrections reform, with eight federal facilities already certified by the independent 

American Correctional Association. Mexico has begun to offer corrections officer 

training to its Central American neighbors, and the first class of Central American 

(Guatemalan) corrections officers graduated from Mexico’s academy in July 2012. 

The reforms already underway, including the creation of an objective prisoner classification system and the construction of new facilities, are making great strides. 

Mexico’s success in reforming the corrections systems at the federal level can serve 

as the launching point for supporting similar reforms at the state level, where significant challenges remain. We will support Mexico in assessing state facilities and 

in its efforts to undertake similar reforms at the state level. 

To help Mexico build policing capacity for its communities, we are putting in place 

the building blocks to expand police training to the state and municipal level. We 

have strengthened police academies in the states of Chihuahua, Sonora, Nuevo 

Leon, and Puebla by providing equipment and training materials, enabling them to 

serve as the backbone for training programs and to conduct regional training. We 

are building our joint state training program around this regional structure. This 

will not only enable us to provide training more effectively, but will enhance cooperation between law enforcement officials in neighboring states as they implement 

reforms. 

Building on the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration’s agenda for police professionalization, 

we are prepared to work with the Government of Mexico to enhance and professionalize existing law enforcement institutions to develop federal standards for 

Mexican officials in the areas of training, discipline training, and promotion. We 

would partner with the Mexican Government to provide international experts in 

policing standards and best practices, and facilitate regional working groups that 

integrate state, local, and federal entities to derive Mexico-specific standards. These 

standards would be designed to further police professionalization, facilitate greater 

observance of civil and human rights, and foster trust among the Mexican public 

in its police. 

On rule of law, we will focus on supporting Mexico in its transition to an 

accusatorial justice system, build on our efforts with the federal judiciary, and help 

to improve effectiveness in case management and court administration. Mexico’s 

ambitious effort to reform its justice system by 2016 is in mid-stream and requires 

sustained focus and resources. 

Complementary to our assistance at the institutional level, we will also continue 

to support local communities by promoting behavioral changes for improving rule 

of law from the ground up, such as through our Culture of Lawfulness program. 

This program offers a civic education curriculum to schools in 29 of the 31 states 

in Mexico. 

To enhance our bilateral efforts to build a 21st-century border, we will continue 

to offer capacity-building support to Mexican law enforcement agencies involved in 

border security, further enhancing their ability to interdict illicit narcotics, arms, 

and money. We have offered specialized training for police and Mexican Customs 

officials that address advanced border security and import/export processing techniques and methodologies. This training is designed to produce a cadre of instructors who can then provide training within their home agencies, multiplying the 

effect of our initial investment. We are prepared to support Mexico in their efforts 

to strengthen the southern border, an area the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration has 

prioritized. 

We will continue supporting Mexico’s efforts to improve information-sharing 

among its agencies involved in the fight against money laundering and illicit 

finance, a priority area for the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration. Enhanced Mexican interagency coordination will lead to more prosecutions and cash seized. We have already 

provided funding for the training of the Financial Intelligence Unit’s (UIF) personnel, sophisticated financial analysis software, and the accompanying computer 

hardware. Given the expanded responsibilities of the UIF under the new antimoney 

laundering legislation passed in late 2012, additional support may be needed to provide upgrades and expand their data center. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

11

CONCLUSION

We are currently forging a new way ahead for the Merida Initiative with President Pen ̃ a Nieto and his team. The discussions and collaboration have been frank 

and positive and the conversation is ongoing. Building strong and able justice sector 

institutions capable of dealing with organized crime and the accompanying violence 

and corruption, is a difficult and long-term endeavor. It takes years of dedicated and 

sustained work across numerous institutions and sectors, the political will to affect 

change, and the resources and stamina to see it through. Over the course of the 

Merida Initiative, the U.S.-Mexico bilateral security relationship has proven steadfast and collaborative while including some notable transitions and changes along 

the way. Our support to Mexico over the past 6 years has achieved positive results, 

and I am confident that our collaborative efforts can continue. 

Thank you, Chairman Udall, Senator McCain, and members of the subcommittee, 

for your time. I will do my best to address your questions.

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much. 

Let us proceed now with Mr. Feierstein. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK FEIERSTEIN, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR BUREAU OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. FEIERSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Kaine, thank you for the 

opportunity to discuss USAID’s contributions to the Merida Initiative. It is a real honor to testify with my colleagues from the State 

Department. I think it is accurate to say the collaboration between 

our three Bureaus has never been stronger. 

Mr. Chairman, in Latin America and the Caribbean USAID is 

increasingly focused on helping the region’s governments to reduce 

crime and violence. This is a matter of national security to the 

United States, as my colleagues have just noted, as well as economic and political imperative to the affected countries. Crime and 

violence are a severe drain on private and public investment in the 

Americas and the leading constraint to economic growth in some 

countries. Criminal activity is also arguably the greatest threat to 

democracy in some nations. 

Given the importance of reducing crime, we have made tough 

choices and managed in a period of tight budgets to maintain and 

even increase our funding for Merida programs. USAID’s collaboration with the Mexican Government in this area has three principal 

goals: to improve the effectiveness of the judiciary; to bolster the 

capacity of communities to reduce crime; and to protect and defend 

human rights. To achieve these goals, we operate in a genuine 

partnership with Mexico, jointly designing and implementing 

programs. 

Five years ago, Mexico began a transition from the written, 

inquisitorial criminal justice system to the more open and transparent oral accusatorial system. USAID support of that transition 

at the state level ranges from helping to develop new laws, policies, 

and regulations to training judges, prosecutors, and public defenders. Later this year we plan to double the number of states where 

we support this training. 

The transition to the accusatorial system is already proving effective. Preliminary data suggest that in states undergoing the reform 

acquittal rates have decreased, judges are imposing longer sentences for serious crimes, and pretrial detention has been reduced. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12

Strengthening the justice sector is vital to ensure that crimes are 

properly investigated, the accused treated fairly, and the guilty 

appropriately sentenced. Ideally, however, we can help avert that 

youth ever having to enter the legal system in the first place. Like 

its neighbors, Mexico has embraced preventative actions to reduce 

crime and violence. President Pen ̃ a Nieto has launched a national 

crime prevention strategy with funding commitments of $9 billion. 

To support the Mexican Government’s crime prevention efforts, 

USAID is testing approaches in three cities affected by drugrelated violence and other criminal activity, Ciudad Juarez, Monterrey, and Tijuana. In each city we are partnering with local organizations and drawing on international expertise to develop models 

for safe urban spaces, provide job skills for at-risk youth, and improve the capacity of the government to keep citizens safe. 

One of the keys to success of our Merida activities has been the 

extent to which the private sector has supported our programs. For 

example, we partner with companies like Cisco, Intel, and Prudential to train youth from tough neighborhoods for jobs in technology 

and construction. 

Many of the approaches we draw upon are from the United 

States. Through an agreement with Los Angeles, USAID has been 

sharing that city’s proven gang reduction and youth development 

tools with officials in Latin America. Last week a deputy mayor of 

L.A. met with government officials and civil society leaders in Mexico City and Monterrey to share the keys to L.A.’s success in reducing criminal gang activity. 

Among the segments of society most affected by crime and drug 

trafficking are human rights defenders and journalists. USAID is 

helping the Mexican Government to protect journalists, citizen 

bloggers, and others who expose crime and corruption. Last year 

we trained more than 150 Mexican journalists and human rights 

professionals on practices, tools, and technologies to protect themselves and their work. 

To increase law enforcement’s awareness of international human 

rights standards and practices, we are also helping to train federal 

and state police. This year 250 officers earned master’s certificates 

in human rights with USAID’s support. 

Citizen activism is key to raising awareness and mobilizing action on the defense of human rights. So we are collaborating with 

Mexican organizations on campaigns to support the implementation of the government’s human rights reforms and educate citizens 

about their rights. 

Mr. Chairman, we are encouraged by steps that Mexico has 

taken to reduce crime and violence, but we also recognize that 

defeating the powerful cartels and reducing other factors that contribute to crime will take time. USAID is prepared to continue to 

stand shoulder to shoulder with the Mexican Government and civil 

society in this endeavor. Their success will make the United States 

safer as well. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feierstein follows:]

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK FEIERSTEIN

Chairman Udall, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) contributions to the Merida Initiative and to receive your advice and counsel. 

It is an honor to testify with my colleagues from the State Department, Assistant 

Secretaries Roberta Jacobson and William Brownfield. Collaboration among our 

Bureaus has never been stronger. 

In Latin America and the Caribbean, USAID is increasingly focused on helping 

the region’s governments to reduce crime and violence. This is a matter of national 

security for the United States, as my colleagues have just noted, as well as an economic and political imperative for the affected countries. Crime and violence are a 

severe drain on private and public investment in the Americas and, according to 

studies by USAID and the Inter-American Development Bank, the leading constraint to economic growth in some countries. Criminal activity is also arguably the 

greatest threat to democracy in some countries in the region, corrupting governments, restricting citizen engagement, and undermining freedom of the press. 

In Mexico, USAID’s collaboration with the Government on citizen security has 

three principal goals: to improve the effectiveness of the judiciary; bolster the capacity of communities to reduce crime; and protect and defend human rights. To 

achieve these goals, we operate in a genuine partnership. Every one of our programs 

is designed, developed, and implemented jointly with our Mexican counterparts. And 

our activities are coordinated with the State Department and other U.S. agencies 

to make for a comprehensive approach to crime reduction. And even in a time of 

tight budgets, we have nevertheless been able to increase and maintain our funding 

for Merida security programs. 

Five years ago, Mexico began a legal transition from the written inquisitorial 

criminal justice system to the more open and transparent oral accusatorial system. 

USAID’s support of that transition in 12 states ranges from helping to develop new 

laws, policies and regulations and train judges, prosecutors, lawyers and public 

defenders in the new criminal justice system. We are also helping the Mexican 

Government to create and strengthen institutions essential to the reform, such as 

internal training units, victims’ assistance centers, alternative dispute resolution 

offices and pretrial services units. To prepare the next generation of Mexican lawyers and judges to effectively perform their functions under the new criminal justice 

system, we are assisting Mexican bar associations and law schools to develop their 

curriculum. 

Later this year, we plan to double the number of states where we are providing 

training and technical assistance. Our programs complement Mexico’s significant 

contribution to the reform process, including building new courtrooms, providing 

infrastructure and staffing and expanding training and capacity development. 

The transition to the new system is already proving effective. A review of the 

process in five states has found a marked decrease in pretrial detentions, longer 

sentences assigned for serious crimes, reduced case backlogs and stronger alternative dispute mechanisms and victims assistance units. 

Strengthening Mexico’s justice sector institutions is vital to ensure that crimes are 

properly investigated, the accused are treated fairly, and the guilty appropriately 

sentenced. Ideally, however, we can help avert that youth ever have to enter the 

legal process in the first place. Like its neighbors, Mexico has embraced preventative actions to reduce crime and violence, such as economic investments in communities and social programs designed for youth most susceptible to joining gangs. In 

February, President Enrique Pen ̃ a Nieto launched a national crime prevention strategy, with funding commitments totaling $9 billion. 

To support the Mexican Government’s crime prevention efforts, we are testing 

innovative approaches in three of the cities most affected by narcorelated violence 

and other criminal activity: Ciudad Juarez, Monterrey and Tijuana. In three communities in each city, we are partnering with local organizations and drawing on 

international expertise to develop new models for safe urban spaces, providing life 

and job skills for at-risk youth, increasing educational opportunities, improving the 

capacity of all levels of government to keep citizens safe and empowering communities to address the root causes of crime and violence. We will jointly evaluate the 

effectiveness of these activities with the Mexican Government as it considers their 

broader application across the country. 

One of the keys to success of our Merida activities has been the extent to which 

the private sector has assisted in implementing our programs. For example, we have 

partnered with companies like Cisco, Intel, and Prudential to train youth from 

tough neighborhoods for jobs in the growing fields of technology and construction. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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To truly ensure the sustainability of our efforts, we are increasingly supporting 

local organizations at the forefront of the effort to reduce crime and violence in 

Mexican communities. Such organizations as the Chihuahuan Business Foundation 

and Citizens Committed to Peace are bolstering their communities by, providing 

educational and professional counseling services, setting up after school programs 

and offering support services to youth and families affected by narcorelated violence 

and other criminal activity. 

Many of the approaches that we and our Mexican counterparts draw upon are 

from the United States, which have achieved dramatic reductions in crime in the 

past two decades. Through an agreement signed last year with Los Angeles, USAID 

has been sharing that city’s proven gang reduction and youth development tools 

with officials in Mexico, as well as in Central America. Last week, a deputy mayor 

of Los Angeles met with Federal Government officials in Mexico City and with local 

authorities and civil society leaders in Monterrey to share some of the keys to Los 

Angeles’s success in reducing criminal gang activity, including community policing 

models and tools to assess the extent to which individual youth are at-risk of joining 

a gang. 

Among the segments of society most affected by crime and drug trafficking are 

human rights defenders and journalists. Through the Merida Initiative, USAID is 

helping the Mexican Government to protect journalists, citizen bloggers, and others 

who expose crime and corruption. We are benefiting from lessons learned from 

nearly a decade of investments to enhance similar protection mechanisms in Colombia. Last year, we trained more than 150 Mexican journalists and human rights professionals on practices, tools, and technologies to protect themselves and their work, 

and we plan to reach hundreds more in the coming years. 

To increase law enforcement’s awareness of international human rights standards 

and practices, we are helping to train federal and state police and the staff of the 

Mexican Government’s new victims assistance unit. This year, over 250 officers 

earned master’s certificates in human rights with USAID’s support. 

Citizen activism is key to raising awareness and mobilizing action on the defense 

of human rights. So we are collaborating with Mexican organizations on campaigns 

to support the implementation of the Government’s human rights reforms, including 

a groundbreaking Constitutional Reform that strengthens Mexico’s human rights 

commission and elevates the country’s international human rights commitments to 

the same level as their national laws. 

Mr. Chairman, we are encouraged by many of the steps that Mexico has taken 

to reduce crime and violence. But we also recognize that defeating the powerful cartels and reducing other factors that contribute to crime will take time. We are prepared to continue to stand shoulder to shoulder in support of the Mexican Government and civil society in this endeavor. Their success will make the United States 

safer. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Senator UDALL. Thank you. I really appreciate you staying on 

time so we can focus on questions. 

Senator Kaine, I appreciate you being here and if you would like 

to start the questioning, go ahead here. 

Senator KAINE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. It is great to be with 

each of the witnesses. I have looked forward to this hearing. 

Maybe a nontraditional starting question. If this was a hearing 

in the Mexican Congress and it was on the United States-Mexico 

security relationship, where it stands today, what do you think the 

testimony would be of Mexican governmental officials in the new 

government about what they would expect from the United States? 

We have heard very good testimony. I am a fan of each of your 

agencies and the work that you are doing about things that the 

United States is doing with Mexican institutions, funding and others, to strengthen them. What do you think we would be hearing 

as the testimony from Mexican gubernatorial counterpoints or 

counterparts or agency heads about things that they would hope 

that we would do, in addition to fund programs on Mexican soil? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. May I defer to you? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I would be delighted. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

15

Thank you, Senator. You know, I think one of the first things I 

should say is one of the things you won’t hear any more, because 

the dialogue with Mexico I think has changed significantly and all 

of my counterparts remember how often we heard from our Mexican counterparts that we were not doing enough and we were not 

doing it fast enough. It was a really serious problem at the beginning of the Merida Initiative, in a country where, frankly, we did 

not have much experience, if any, in foreign assistance. Setting 

things up to get things working in the right way and doing that 

jointly at every step with the Mexicans took us longer than we 

would have liked. 

I think that has changed dramatically. I think the delivery of so 

much of our assistance has made a big difference, so I don’t think 

we would be hearing as much complaint about slowness to deliver. 

I do think that we would hear that they want us to remain 

engaged in many of the areas that we are, in particular pillar two 

and pillar four, if you will, of the Merida Initiative, which focuses 

on building institutions, police, justice, penitentiaries—and my colleagues have talked about that and the importance of that—and 

that pillar four, which frankly was a little slow to come on line, 

which is building those resilient communities. 

If I could, as a fan of the AID programs that work in communities in Tijuana and Monterrey and in Ciudad Juarez, I think 

those programs have shown really dramatic changes, and I do 

think our Mexican counterparts want more of that, of the work in 

communities, and are going to work to try and replicate some of 

the successes. 

So I think some of the areas that they have particular eagerness 

to work in are well within the Merida Initiative, but may get a little bit more attention and they might like to accelerate some of 

those. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Other perspectives on that question? Secretary Brownfield? 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. I will just offer one additional point, Senator, 

to an excellent answer by Roberta. It’s based upon my own personal experience during 3 years in Colombia from 2007 to 2010, 

when in essence what was happening, in an earlier sensitive bilateral relationship, United States support for Colombia under Plan 

Colombia, was that after a certain period of time the issue that we 

were talking about was how to Colombianize the effort, which is to 

say how to do less direct involvement and participation by the 

United States Government and have the Colombian Government do 

more of these things themselves. 

History proved this was a positive development. What this meant 

was the institutions, the organizations, the agencies in Colombia, 

were able to take on these responsibilities themselves, thanks to, 

in no small measure, the support, the equipment, the training, the 

capacity-building that they had received from us. It would not surprise me at all that this will become much of the dialogue between 

the United States and Mexico in the coming years. Mexico is not 

Colombia. They are two very different countries, different histories, 

different cultures, different approaches, different relationships with 

the United States. But the logic is as we begin to see success in 

this cooperation, in this shared endeavor, we will see quite logically 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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the Government of Mexico saying: These are things that we will do, 

these are decisions for us to make, these are areas where we would 

expect to be doing on our own these functions. I would say that is 

a healthy thing, not an unhealthy thing. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Feierstein. 

Mr. FEIERSTEIN. Sure, thank you. Just very briefly, I would suspect that the Mexicans would underscore that they are emphasizing, as Roberta did, both pillars two and four, and that USAID 

is being responsive to those requests. As I note in my statement, 

we are about to double the number of states that we are working 

in. We are currently working in 11; we are looking to work in 20 

states, training prosecutors, judges, public defenders, and other 

operators in the judicial system. 

I think they would also probably suggest that they are pleased 

with our efforts to work more closely with Mexican organizations. 

This is something we are trying to do globally as an agency, is 

channel more funds through local organizations, rely less on United 

States contractors, and we are starting to do that with Mexican 

NGOs, Mexican human rights groups. 

I anticipate also that they would be pleased with our responsiveness to their desire to learn more from various U.S. cities, particularly Los Angeles. There is real interest in Mexico, in Central 

America, and elsewhere about the success that L.A. has had in 

reducing gang activity, and we have been able to send the deputy 

mayor from L.A. to Mexico last week and he has been able to share 

some of the lessons they have learned. 

So I would hope that the Mexicans would recognize our responsiveness to their needs and their priorities. 

Thank you. 

Senator KAINE. Another question if I could, Mr. Chair. This is a 

general question that I would like to hear the perspective of panel 

two on as well. The Mexican economic track record has had some 

pretty spectacular success in recent years. Secretary Jacobson 

talked a bit about it. Whether you measure it by trade, the openness of trade, the growth of the middle class, the purchase of consumer goods, the whole series of things that are happening are 

pretty positive. 

I would assume that kind of as you think about that pillar four, 

the resilience of communities, increasing economic standard of life 

both creates resources to deal with problems, but also shows young 

people that they have a path to success that is not involving criminal activity, and that also may even create sort of a more demanding populace. My sense is sort of the more economically positive 

people have it, the more they want to demand a government and 

a set of civil institutions that sort of protect the success that we 

are achieving. 

If you could talk a little bit about that, that economic arc that 

Mexico is on and how it bears upon this resilient communities pillar four in the Merida Initiative, that would be great. 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think you have got it exactly right, Senator. I 

think that the virtuous circle that we are sort of all trying to reinforce with the community programs and with the economic development has a huge impact on what happens on fighting transnational 

crime. We have seen that everyplace. Those two things are 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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inextricably linked. If there is no optimistic future for young people, if they don’t have access to education, if there is not economic 

growth, then the lure of the criminal organizations is just that 

much greater. They may not go away completely during good economic times, but they certainly are easier to encourage kids to stay 

away from. 

But I also think that we have learned that constraints to growth 

become much, much more difficult when you have a severe security 

situation. We know that investors look at the security situation. 

We know that companies have to build into their bottom line what 

they have to pay for private security if the state is not providing 

it. 

So I think one of the things that was not as well understood perhaps at the beginning of our engagement with Mexico, although we 

certainly learned it, as Bill underscored, in Colombia, is the 

engagement of the private sector in this battle. It cannot be just 

the government’s responsibility and it cannot even be just civil society or NGOs. It has to be with the private sector, and I think AID 

has done a lot in that regard. 

But the other thing that I think has happened in Mexico is a real 

understanding of the next set of economic reforms that really does 

bring Mexico into the kinds of growth rates that are going to make 

a big dent in their social structure and the ability to fight transnational crime. We have all been saying to some extent in the 20 

years since NAFTA was passed and implemented that the other 

part of the economic reforms did not all get made. Free trade 

agreements only take you so far. Now this government in only 6 

months in office has already passed labor reform. They have passed 

education reform. They are focusing now on fiscal reform, on financial reform, on energy reform. Those are the kinds of things that 

are going to sort of lay down those roots in economic growth and 

provide, I think, the next great leap forward for the Mexican system, and also are really an important part of fighting crime and 

improving the security situation. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. Thank you for those answers. One 

of the most important next steps in the United States-Mexico security cooperation is the transition to an adversarial system in Mexico. I remember when I was State attorney general and we used 

to share back and forth with Mexico trips to visit with law enforcement officials across the border. They were very interested in our 

adversarial system, and, in fact, I think I loaned one of my prosecutors to them for a couple of months because they wanted to 

learn more about the system. 

We know it is going to be very complicated, requiring judges, 

lawyers, police officers, detention officials, and it is going to take 

some real political will to do this. I was wondering, during President Obama’s visit with President Pen ̃a Nieto was this issue discussed? Do you believe that Mexico’s plans to accelerate judicial 

reforms are on track? And if not, what needs to be done to get 

them back on track? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I am just going to start that off real quickly, to 

say that I thank you for your recollection, Mr. Chairman, of loaning 

a prosecutor to Mexico. The Western States in particular and the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Western attorneys general have been just stalwart supporters of 

that transition in Mexico. Without the resources of State prosecutors going to Mexico, helping to train folks, working with the bar 

association in Mexico, working with law schools, none of this could 

be done. 

But the Mexicans have given themselves a pretty short window. 

This constitutional reform passed in 2008. It is supposed to be completed by 2016. They do have a long way to go. So I think President 

Pen ̃ a Nieto’s acceleration of that process is most welcome. 

He did talk about it with the President when President Obama 

was in Mexico. He talked about, in particular, what he had seen 

happen in the state of Mexico when he was governor and the way 

in which, as Mark said, the way in which it really did open the system up; open it up for scrutiny by the public in a much more transparent way and reduce pretrial detention, and also keep many 

cases from ever getting to court because they could be resolved 

through alternate means. 

So I do think there is a lot of work still to be done. But we are 

pretty optimistic that this is a high priority. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. We will do a tag team here, Mr. Chairman. I 

reinforce and concur with everything Roberta has said, including, 

by the way—and this has happened since you left your prosecutorial responsibilities—within the last 3 months I have signed an 

MOU with the current attorney general of the State of New Mexico 

formalizing this relationship and your State’s willingness to provide prosecutors for specific training and specific programs in 

Mexico. 

We have in essence, ‘‘we’’ the United States Government, have 

divided responsibility for support on this particular issue, with my 

side, State INL, managing the Federal Government side of this 

reform and Mark’s people handling the State and local side, because, to remind us all, Mexico, like the United States of America, 

is a federal system. Ninety percent of all courts, cases, and law enforcement is performed at the state and local level. 

We have provided some degree of training through the Department of Justice to 8,500 prosecutors in the Federal Attorney General’s Office. We have worked with the Government of Mexico to 

establish basic law enforcement and police standards that would be 

applicable throughout the entire country. And as the new government, now not so new government, has organized its own efforts 

into its five regions where it attempts to do reforms and support 

for its national security policy, we have tracked onto those regions, 

placing an adviser and working a specific regional strategy for each 

one. 

I am actually optimistic on this, Mr. Chairman. I am not saying 

we won’t hit some bumps in this road to 2016, but I am saying 

right now you are hearing from a fairly optimistic person. 

Dr. Feierstein, over to you. 

Mr. FEIERSTEIN. Thank you. I think I would share the optimism 

as well, but just underscore what a daunting task it is. Mexico is 

really undergoing a judicial revolution to make this transition to 

the accusatorial system in just a matter of a few years. It requires 

a whole range of training. I noted the training for judges, prosecutors, public defenders that we are doing. We have also been sponFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19

soring judicial exchanges. A number of judges have come to the 

United States to see how the U.S. system operates. We have been 

working with law schools to help them to reform their curricula 

because it means that students who are now about to enter the 

legal field have to learn a whole new curriculum. 

It requires as well support for NGOs to help them to educate the 

public. The public needs to understand what the system is about, 

what their rights are. I think initially there was some skepticism 

both among the public and among judges and lawyers. We think 

that is changing as people start to see how the system operates. 

They are seeing some of the early results. I noted that we are seeing that cases are being resolved more quickly, acquittal rates are 

coming down. As long as those results continue, I think we will 

continue to see strong support from the Mexico public and from 

those operating in the judicial system. 

Having said that, this is, as Bill Brownfield noted, a Federal system. There are some states that are moving very quickly. Others 

are moving more slowly. And we are prepared to provide the support to those states that have the political will and putting in the 

resources necessary to make this transition. 

Thank you. 

Senator UDALL. So it sounds to me like they are making significant progress, but some states are going slower. Are they on track 

to do it all in 2016 or are you going to have a few laggard states? 

What is your judgment there, Mark or Roberta? 

Mr. FEIERSTEIN. I hate to make predictions, especially in the context of a hearing like this. But certainly there is a constitutionally 

imposed deadline that all the states are required to meet. This new 

administration, the Pen ̃ a administration, is clearly committed to 

help the states reach that goal by 2016. And we are prepared to 

provide whatever support we can to help them achieve that. 

Senator UDALL. Great. Thank you. 

Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you for this hearing. 

I am sorry that I missed some of your testimony, but I read most 

of it. One of the things I was struck by in reading the testimony 

is that a lot of our assessment of success here, a lot of the measurements that we use, are couched in terms of the number of dollars 

spent, the number of individuals that we have trained, journalists, 

prosecutors, human rights advocates, officers. 

So I wanted to ask a deeper question about how we assess performance of the Merida Initiative as it exists today, but the larger 

security relationship going forward. We have other metrics available to us. You have the simple one of levels of violent crime. But 

I guess my question is, As members of this committee what should 

be the measurements—and I will put the question first to you, Secretary Jacobson—should be the measurements that we look to? 

Is measurement of violent crime enough? And if not, what do we 

look to in between just the mere measurements of dollars and personnel trained and then that final number, which is the number of 

Mexicans that are victims of the violent crime that we are trying 

to stop? Is there something in between that we can look to to try 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20

to judge the month to month, year to year, success of this relationship? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Senator, and thanks for being here. 

I think you ask a really important question and frankly one which 

I with my partners here have been wrestling since the beginning 

of the initiative, because we know that you cannot start down this 

road without knowing what success looks like and what you are 

going to look at as measurements. 

I think, in fact, there are things that we need to look at in between. Some of them are good measures, some of them are partial 

at best, some of them have to be taken sort of over time to see 

trend lines. I will let Bill and Mark talk a little bit about what 

each of their particular programs are using. 

But there are measures that we have used in this region for a 

long time in looking at drug cartels and drug trafficking, things 

like seizures of drugs. But seizures of drugs are at best a very imperfect measure. They either mean that the cops are doing a much 

better job and they are seizing a lot more drugs or they mean that 

a lot more drugs are going through a territory in the first place. 

So what you want to do is you want to put together a lot of different measures. You also want to know—and I think Mark and I 

have talked about this particularly as we look at communities and 

their resilience—how do people feel about their institutions? Do 

they have more confidence in them? Is the system stronger and 

more responsive to them? 

Some of this should be done in public opinion surveys over time, 

but probably takes a longer amount of time for both people to feel 

more confident in the system, as Mark was referring to it, and also 

to have those results kind of translate back into the community. 

But we know that some of it is also a question of how many cases 

are actually prosecuted and taken all the way to trial, what is the 

conviction rate, how many cases don’t ever come to trial because 

they are settled? So depending on the program, we have different 

kinds of metrics. When we are doing equipment, whether it is nonintrusive inspection equipment or helicopters, that may be a lot 

easier to measure. Are they using them for what they were 

designed for? Bill talked about how much has been seized in programs that are designed to look at cargo or travelers and see 

whether contraband is being brought in of any sort—weapons, 

guns, money. 

So there are lots of different measures. We have developed 

metrics with the Mexican Government for individual programs. But 

I think we do owe both you all and the taxpayers, as well as our 

colleagues and the Mexicans, interim looks at how we are doing. 

And we have done that with GAO and others as we have gone 

along, but still a work I progress. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. If I could just add a little bit to that, Senator 

Murphy. Your question is right on the mark and I would submit 

that what has happened, which is logical and coherent and inevitably happens in this sort of program, is the first 2 or 3 years are 

metrics or what I would call inputs, which is to say what have we 

delivered? How many aircraft, how many vehicles, how much 

equipment? Or for that matter, how many individuals have been 

trained? And you hold us pretty intensely to a standard of wanting 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21

to see material after you have appropriated the funds getting down 

there where it can do some good. 

We are now in year 6 of this joint shared effort between the 

United States and Mexico, and the metrics obviously have to shift 

to another level. That is what I guess I would call outputs. You put 

your finger on one: What is the homicide rate? What is the violence 

rate? That would obviously be a pretty clear indication that we are 

having an impact. 

There are others, some of which Roberta has mentioned: conviction rates or numbers of arrests, which would tell you the police 

are actually doing their job or the prosecutors are actually doing 

their job. There is seizures and interdictions, which would suggest 

those who are manning the borders or monitoring the highways are 

doing their job. There is a numerical issue in terms of how many 

police are on the street today, federal as well as state or local? Or 

if corruption is an issue, how many corrupt officials have been 

removed? Just give us the number. Is it 10? is it 1,000? is it 

10,000? That is a useful number to know. 

In the case of financial crime and money-laundering, we can 

measure how much has been taken out of the system. In other 

words, we do have a series of metrics which should make logical, 

coherent sense to everyone, which answers the question, What is 

the impact that we are getting from the $1.6 billion that has so far 

been appropriated by Congress to support the Merida Initiative in 

terms of the funds that I manage? 

Dr. Feierstein. 

Senator MURPHY. Dr. Feierstein, the question of inputs and outputs is not one that USAID is unfamiliar with. I know you deal 

with this question all the time. 

Mr. FEIERSTEIN. We are very much familiar with it. Thank you 

very much. I appreciate the question. 

First in the area of judicial reform, we are looking at five particular metrics. They are: are cases being resolved? Are more cases 

being resolved? How fast are they being resolved? Are acquittal 

rates moving lower? Are sentences tougher for serious crimes? And 

is pretrial detention coming down? 

To the extent that we can move, help move those five metrics, 

in the states undergoing the reform, we would consider that a 

success. 

In the cities where we are helping to reduce crime and violence 

and supporting activities, for example, with at-risk youth, we have 

a program with Vanderbilt—and we also have one with Vanderbilt 

University in Central America—where we are able to look at the 

impact of our programs in the cities, in the communities where we 

are operating, and also look at comparable communities, so we get 

a sense of the impact of our programs, are they working to reduce 

crime, are they not, and if they are working which of the activities 

are most successful and leading to those reductions. 

The goal of our programs—the value of USAID’s program actually is not about the size of the budget. What we can put into Mexico is quite modest and, as I noted in my statement, the Mexicans 

are prepared, the Mexican Government is prepared, to invest $9 

billion in prevention. What we are trying to do is help them to 

develop certain models that they can then take to scale. We are 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22

confident with Vanderbilt University we will be able to figure out 

what is working, what is not working, and what can the Mexicans 

then take the scale. 

Thank you. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator UDALL. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. The one last question that I was going to ask this 

panel is just—and it has already been alluded to really—is the 

USAID experience and all of your experience in Colombia—you 

know, Colombia was synonymous with violent crime, horrible security challenge. ‘‘Medellin’’ called up all these images. I am not sure 

we have told the story to the American public as much as we possibly should, not that there aren’t still challenges in Colombia, but 

the significant investment that we made through Plan Colombia 

has been accompanied with some really dramatic reductions in 

crime and increases in economic activity and political stability. 

So I am sort of curious, since USAID was so much on the front 

lines of Plan Colombia, what are lessons to extract from that success, acknowledging the different culture that had been mentioned 

by Secretary Brownfield earlier. But what are some of the lessons 

to extract from that success as we go forward into continuing the 

Merida Initiative? 

Mr. FEIERSTEIN. Thank you, Senator. It is a great question and 

I will start off and then defer to my colleagues, who know Colombia 

very well as well. 

I think first in Colombia you had real political will. The entire 

society came together, all political parties, civil society, the private 

sector, and understood that they had to make a concerted effort to 

defeat drug trafficking, to defeat the guerrillas, and it required a 

whole range of activities to do that. 

Second, they were prepared to invest their own resources. It is 

true the U.S. Government invested a lot, but the Colombians themselves invested millions and millions. President Uribe passed a 

security tax. Beyond the efforts at the national level in Colombia, 

I think we have also seen some very innovative local leadership. 

You mentioned Medellin. They have had a terrific series of mayors, 

Bogota as well, and they have been able to introduce some pretty 

innovative ways to reduce crime and violence, focusing on creating 

appropriate urban spaces, investing in at-risk youth, and a whole 

range of other activities. 

The Mexicans and others have taken real interest in the Colombian experience. In fact, we have been able to sponsor some 

exchanges. We had some officials from Medellin in Mexico. So I 

think there is an awful lot to learn from Colombia. 

Now we are trying to institutionalize that relationship through 

what we call trilevel cooperation, basically working with Colombia 

and third countries, and Mexico is among those countries who we 

help to work with the Colombians. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BROWNFIELD. We will go down in reverse order for this

answer. 

Senator—and I will offer you my six lessons learned as I 

attempted near the end of my tenure in Colombia to answer just 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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that question: What have we learned here that could be applicable 

elsewhere? Mark has already alluded to several of them. 

One, there must be a degree of consensus, both in the country 

and between that country’s government and us, as to what are we 

attempting to accomplish here? What is the objective? If you don’t 

have that consensus, if you don’t have that agreement, you will 

eventually fail. It is just inevitable. 

Second, you need to identify your partners. Maybe there are no 

partners, but there are usually others in the international community, whether governments or international organizations or international financial institutions or NGOs. Who else is interested in 

the issue and willing to work to address those threats and 

problems? 

Third, you must think in I would call it almost sequential or a 

transitional mode. In other words, what you might be doing on day 

one is very certainly going to be different from what you will be 

doing at the end of 5 years or 6 years. You have got to have a concept. In Colombia the concept was heavy on security at the start 

and then ratchet down on security and begin to build up on the 

developmental side, operating on the assumption that you cannot 

do a lot of developmental work if your people are just going to get 

whacked when they are out in the field because there is no security. Every country is different. Figure what the transition is. 

Fourth, some degree of flexibility. There is no plan ever in the 

history of the human race that was so perfect that it required no 

adjustment, no change, no modification in the course of its development. We learned that lesson many times the hard way in Colombia and we will undoubtedly have to apply that lesson in any other 

country in the world. 

Fifth, assume at some point, because you, the United States Congress, will force us to do it, that we must eventually nationalize. 

If you continue to see that it is the United States Government 

doing all the program, spending all the money and doing all of the 

operations, eventually you will say: Are we ever going to see an end 

to this? 

That gets me to the sixth and final lesson, and that is have some 

sense of what the end game is. If end game is perfection, we will 

never get there, at least not—well not in this world. We have to 

have some sense, ideally some consensus, as to what we are prepared to say is the point where we have successfully reached a sustainable relationship that does not require a continued substantial 

investment of the taxpayers’ money. 

Dr. J. 

Ms. JACOBSON. The only short sentence I would add to that is I 

do think that the American taxpayers should be pleased with the 

fact—and Mark and Bill have both alluded to it—that the assistance that we provided to Colombia over these many years in some 

ways is having really a multiplier effect or is being repaid in some 

respects by the extent to which Colombians are now able the help 

their neighbors on some of the things that they learned and did 

right and only they can really convey much more effectively than 

we can, whether it is in Mexico, Central America, or the Caribbean. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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As predicted, our 3 o’clock vote has gone off and we are almost 

halfway through it at this point. So I just wanted to thank all three 

of you for your service. We very much appreciate your attendance 

here today. I think you gave excellent, excellent testimony and I 

think really taught us a lot about what is happening down there. 

This panel will be excused and the second panel—we are expecting to be back here about 4 o’clock is what we are predicting at this 

point. So thank you very much and we will be in recess until 4 p.m.

[Recess from 3:07 p.m. to 4:11 p.m.]

Senator UDALL. Welcome. Thank you very much for being here 

today. We really appreciate it. We are very glad you accommodated 

us on the vote. As you know, we interrupted panel one and panel 

two with a vote. So thank you for being here. 

What we are going to do is do your—I have already done an 

opening statement. If Senator Kaine wants to do a brief one at the 

beginning here, we can do that. But do your statements and keep 

them to 5 minutes, and then have questions and discussion. Hopefully, we are going to get you out of here about 5 o’clock. So that 

is the plan. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Just real quick, Mr. Chair. I am thrilled to have 

the panel here. I came out and apologized to them all, because I 

have the best excused absence ever at 4:30, which is I have a meeting with the Mexican Ambassador to the United States. So I think, 

given the topic, I wanted to tell you, too, as well. I want to hear 

the opening statements, then I will have to duck. But these are 

great witnesses and I am sure they are going to have good things 

for us to hear. 

Senator UDALL. Well, thank you very much. Being on the Western Hemisphere Committee, that is right along the line of duty 

there. So it is great to hear that. 

Why don’t we start, Dr. O’Neil, with you and then we will move 

down with Mr. Steinberg and then Dr. Wood. 

Thank you. Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF DR. SHANNON K. O’NEIL, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW FOR LATIN AMERICA STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 

RELATIONS, NEW YORK, NY 

Dr. O’NEIL. Thank you very much, Chairman Udall, Senator 

Kaine. Thank you so much for this opportunity to testify today on 

this important issue of our bilateral security relationship with 

Mexico. 

The United States-Mexico security cooperation, led by the Merida 

Initiative, is vital and must continue. Building on the lessons of the 

past 5 years, the United States should work with Mexico to implement the programs envisioned in the current framework, and in 

particular prioritizing Mexico’s judicial reform, its state and local 

level training and initiatives, and modernizing the United StatesMexico border. 

During his campaign, Enrique Pen ̃ a Nieto promised to shift the 

country’s current security strategy away from combating drug trafficking toward reducing violence. But during his first 6 months, we 

have seen more continuity than change in this strategy. His plan 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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maintains a role for the armed forces and calls for creating a firmer 

legal basis for the military’s public security role. He has said that 

he will continue to push through the judicial reform that was 

begun in 2008. He has also promised to build on community-based 

programs such as Todos Somos Juarez in Ciudad Juarez, expanding and prioritizing broad-based crime prevention efforts. 

Some strategic changes are planned. The government has 

announced that it will create a new national gendarmerie, a 

40,000-person force. It has also begun the process of centralizing 

control and command of the security apparatus under the Ministry 

of the Interior, beginning with folding in the autonomous federal 

police force back under this wing. These centralizing tendencies 

will also affect the United States-Mexico cooperation, requiring all 

joint programs to be channeled through this ministry. 

The government has also announced that it will consolidate the 

over 2,000 local police forces into 31 state-level commands. 

It is still somewhat unclear what these announcements will 

mean in reality. For instance, many question whether the gendarmerie will ever come to pass, or whether Pen ̃ a Nieto will fare better than President Calderon in his efforts to replace the local police 

forces with state-level forces. 

For the United States, these announcements will change how law 

enforcement and other agencies work with Mexico on security 

issues. But this most recent articulation by the Mexican Government should not be seen as the last or permanent word on United 

States-Mexico security cooperation. Instead, it should be considered 

as part of an ongoing discussion and evolution in the relationship. 

So, recognizing that, the United States should prioritize three 

areas. The first is judicial reform, as long-term sustainable security 

will only exist in Mexico when it has a strong civilian-based rule 

of law and is able to take on and punish all types of criminal activity. In 2008 Mexico passed a wide-ranging package of constitutional 

and legislative reforms to transform the justice system, introducing 

oral trials, the presumption of innocence, an adequate defense, 

strengthening due process, and establishing alternative arbitration 

mechanisms and plea bargaining. 

All told, these reforms should increase transparency and accountability and improve justice more generally. 

With President Pen ̃ a Nieto’s backing, United States resources 

can help achieve this transformation, creating or remodeling courtrooms, training or retraining Mexico’s over 40,000 active lawyers 

and judges, and revamping law school courses and materials to 

prepare the next generation of justice officials. 

Second, U.S. security should continue to move beyond the federal 

level, focusing on state and local challenges. This support should 

involve not only expanding training and professionalization of local 

police, but should move beyond the classroom to help develop systems of standards, police procedures, evaluation mechanisms. As 

most of Mexico’s federal or local police forces, they lack elements 

as basic as manuals that lay out standard practices. 

Finally, the United States should prioritize the modernization of 

the United States-Mexico border. This means expanding roads, 

bridges, express lanes for trusted travelers, as well as increase the 

number of U.S. Customs and other officials and staff at the main 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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ports of entry. These investments are vital for security, helping 

keep out illicit goods and people. But upgrading the border has the 

added benefit of facilitating legal trade, which supports U.S. companies and an estimated 6 million U.S. jobs. 

These outlined initiatives, many already part of the Merida 

framework, have a greater chance of reducing violence in Mexico 

as they will help strengthen police forces, court systems, and local 

communities. In the end, Mexico’s security will depend on the 

actions and decisions of Mexico. But there is much the United 

States can do to help or hinder the process, and a justice and 

locally based approach to United States security assistance will 

help Mexico establish more effective and longlasting tools for combating crime and violence. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. O’Neil follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. SHANNON K. O’NEIL

Chairman Udall, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of the 

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Global Narcotics Affairs, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify today on the important issue of our bilateral security 

relationship with Mexico. Given our deep economic, personal, and community ties, 

Mexico’s safety and security is vital to our own. A strong and safe Mexico will have 

positive benefits for the United States, while a dangerous Mexico will have repercussions far beyond the southern U.S. border. 

REFOCUSING U.S.-MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION

U.S.-Mexico security cooperation, led by the Merida Initiative, is vital and must 

continue. But Mexico’s political landscape has changed under the Enrique Pen ̃ a 

Nieto government, and the United States must adjust its strategy and support 

accordingly. Building on the lessons of the past 5 years, the United States should 

work with Mexico to implement the nonmilitary programs envisioned in the current 

Merida framework, in particular supporting and prioritizing Mexico’s ongoing judicial reform, training police officers at the state and local levels, investing in local 

community and youth-oriented programs, and modernizing the U.S.-Mexico border. 

THE MERIDA INITIATIVE AFTER FIVE YEARS

The Merida Initiative was launched in 2007 under the George W. Bush administration, which promised $1.4 billion over 3 years to ‘‘support Mexico’s law enforcement in the fight against organized crime.’’ The Obama administration revised and 

expanded Merida’s mission, moving from a heavy emphasis on military equipment 

to a more comprehensive bilateral strategy that seeks to reduce the role and influence of organized crime. The initiative now encompasses four priorities (called pillars): disrupting the operational capacity of organized crime, institutionalizing the 

rule of law, creating a 21st-century border to speed the flow of legal commerce and 

stop that of illegal goods, and building strong and resilient communities that can 

stand up to criminal intrusions. The main problem today is not Merida’s design but 

its uneven implementation, with the gains in some areas offset by minimal progress 

in others. 

Together Mexico and the United States have been most successful in removing 

drug kingpins. In the last few years Mexican authorities have captured or killed the 

majority of the most-wanted drug traffickers and substantially disrupted the operations of Mexico’s best-known criminal networks. Many of these high-profile arrests 

resulted from bilateral intelligence and operational cooperation. 

Advances have been made as well in strengthening the rule of law, most notably 

the expansion and professionalization of the federal police. But progress has been 

slight beyond this particular law enforcement body, which represents just 10 percent 

of Mexico’s police forces. The United States has also provided support for justice 

reform. Though a set of 2008 constitutional and legislative reforms set in motion 

a fundamental transformation of Mexico’s court systems, the implementation of 

these changes has been slow, so much so that many worry the shift will not occur 

by the 2016 deadline, leaving Mexico’s judicial future uncertain. On a practical 

level, rising crime and violence have exposed the weak capacity of the current jusFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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tice system. With fewer than 20 percent of homicides ending in convictions, impunity reigns, providing a weak legal deterrent to a life of crime. 

Initiatives to modernize the border and build resilient communities (pillars three 

and four of the Merida Initiative) are further behind. Though some innovative 

border management programs, such as the Customs Trade Partnership Against 

Terrorism—which helps trusted businesses avoid extensive border checks—have improved efficiency, the overall tenor of U.S. policy has been to increase barriers, slowing flows of legal commerce. Financially, investment in border crossings and infrastructure has not matched the exponential increase in trade crossing the border 

each year. Investment has lagged not only for new construction, but also for basic 

maintenance on existing infrastructure, leading to overwhelmed and at times downright dangerous facilities (the San Ysidro border crossing roof collapsed in 2011, 

injuring 17 people). Stressed infrastructure has also led to traffic jams lasting up 

to 8 hours, and has cost billions of dollars in trade losses, without drastically discouraging or disrupting illegal flows. 

The building of ‘‘resilient communities,’’ too, has been limited. The pillar’s ambitious objectives of addressing the underlying socioeconomic and community factors 

behind rising crime rates have not yet moved beyond pilot programs in Ciudad 

Ju ́ rez and a few other places. 

Finally, though talking often of coresponsibility in the drug war, the United 

States has done little to address the domestic factors that affect Mexico’s security. 

The illegal flow of weapons and money southward continues unabated, and U.S. 

drug consumption remains high. (The 2011 National Survey on Drug Use and 

Health found that just under 9 percent of Americans over the age of 12 used illegal 

drugs in the past month.) 

CHANGING REALITIES ON THE GROUND

As the U.S.-Mexico security cooperation strategy has evolved, so, too, have the 

realities on the ground. The most drastic shift is the rise in violence. When the 

Merida Initiative was signed in 2007, there were just over 2,000 drug-related homicides annually; by 2012, the number escalated to more than 12,000. Violence also 

spread from roughly 50 municipalities in 2007 (mostly along the border and in 

Sinaloa) to some 240 municipalities throughout Mexico in 2011, including the oncesafe industrial center of Monterrey and cities such as Acapulco, Nuevo Laredo, and 

Torreon. 

This increase in violence is not just the direct result of drug trafficking. Criminal 

organizations have diversified into numerous illicit businesses, including kidnapping, robbery, human trafficking, extortion, and retail drug sales, and as a result 

prey more directly on the local population. One recent survey found that over 40 

percent of Mexicans reported that they or a family member had been a victim of 

a crime in the past year. 

Mexico’s politics have also changed. On December 1, 2012, Enrique Pen ̃ a Nieto became President, bringing the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) back into Los 

Pinos, Mexico’s White House. During his campaign, he promised to shift the country’s current security strategy away from combating drug trafficking toward reducing violence. Throughout his first 6 months however he has been somewhat slow to 

define the details of his new security approach, though the general announcements 

reflect more continuity than change. Pen ̃ a Nieto’s National Development Plan maintains a role for the armed forces, and in fact calls for creating a firmer legal basis 

for the military’s public security role. He has said he will continue to push through 

the judicial reform begun in 2008. He has also promised to build on programs such 

as Todos Somos Juarez, expanding and prioritizing broad-based crime prevention 

efforts. 

Some strategic changes are planned. The government has announced it will create 

a new national gendarmerie, a 40,000 member force. It has also begun the process 

of centralizing control and command of the security apparatus under the Ministry 

of the Interior, beginning with folding the autonomous Federal Police back under 

its wing. These centripetal tendencies also will affect U.S.-Mexico cooperation, 

requiring joint programs to be channeled through this same Ministry, ending the 

decentralized engagement between U.S. and Mexican agencies and agents that 

occurred during the Caldero ́n administration. The Pen ̃ a Nieto government has also 

announced it will consolidate the roughly 2,000 local police forces into 31 state-level 

commands—something the Caldero ́n administration tried but failed to do. 

It is still somewhat unclear what these announcements will mean in reality and 

on the ground. For instance Mexican officials have said that members of the new 

gendarmerie will march in this year’s September Independence Day parade; yet at 

the same time, the force was not mentioned in the government’s recently released 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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National Development Plan, nor adequately provided for in last year’s federal 

budget, leading many to question whether it will ever come to pass. There are questions, too, about the centralization of the local police into state-level forces, as many 

cities and states may push back on relinquishing control of their security forces. 

U.S.-MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION GOING FORWARD

These announced changes will lead to some shifts in how U.S. law enforcement 

and other agencies work with Mexico on security issues. Within the United States 

there are worries that these changes will stifle cooperation, and in particular the 

flow of information—especially sensitive intelligence—that has been important in 

many of the successful operations and takedowns of recent years. But the most recent articulation by the Mexican Government should not be seen as the last or permanent word on the future of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. Instead, it should 

be considered as part of the ongoing discussion and evolution in the relationship 

that has happened, that is happening, and that will continue to happen in the coming months and years. The challenge for the United States is to work with the new 

Mexican administration and legislative branch in ways that are both congruent with 

their objectives, and that also enable both countries to push past the current limits 

on security cooperation and implementation. As the consequences of the changes in 

the operational relationship become clear, there will likely be both the desire and 

the opportunity to adapt bilateral and operational strategies, and the United States 

should be prepared to take advantage of these openings to focus and refocus bilateral efforts. 

U.S. assistance will undoubtedly remain a small portion of the overall security 

spending in Mexico, as it should be. But with the funds that the United States does 

dedicate, it should prioritize civilian (versus military) law enforcement institutions, 

and focus on four areas. The first is judicial reform, as long-term sustainable security will only exist when Mexico has a strong civilian-based rule of law, and is able 

to take on and punish all types of criminal activity. 

In 2008, Mexico passed a wide-ranging package of constitutional and legislative 

reforms that, if and when enacted, will fundamentally transform Mexico’s judicial 

system. The new legal framework introduces oral trials, the presumption of innocence, access to an adequate defense, and strengthens due process. It also establishes alternative arbitration and plea bargaining options to help streamline the 

legal process, helping prosecutors to prioritize their time and resources more strategically. It bolsters investigation and prosecution tools against organized crime, making it easier to tap phones and to hold suspects, effectively suspending habeas 

corpus for especially serious crimes. 

All told, the reforms promise to change the basic nature of the system and the 

role of its main actors—judges, prosecutors, police, defense attorneys, defendants, 

and victims—in ways that should increase transparency and accountability and improve justice more generally. But, with the deadline for the reform’s implementation 

set for 2016, not enough has been done yet to make this design a reality. At the 

federal level the government still needs to pass unified penal and criminal procedure codes, and a majority of states still have huge hurdles to climb. In the roughly 

one-third of Mexico’s states that have implemented at least in part the new judicial 

framework, initial studies show the new systems are faster in resolving cases, better 

at prioritizing serious crimes, able to limit pretrial detentions, and lead to tougher 

sentences for the convicted. With President Pen ̃ a Nieto’s backing, U.S. resources can 

help Mexico achieve this transformation, creating or remodeling courtrooms, training or retraining Mexico’s roughly 40,000 active lawyers and thousands of judges, 

and revamping law school courses and materials to prepare the next generation of 

judicial system officials. 

Second, U.S. security support should continue to move beyond the federal level, 

focusing U.S. resources and programs in Mexico on state and local efforts, as this 

is where violence and insecurity are most concentrated and devastating. A shift to 

the local level would also enable policymakers and U.S.-supported programs to recognize and address the varying nature of the violence. In cities such as Ciudad 

Jua ́ rez, local gangs today are perhaps as threatening as transnational drug cartels. 

This more local focus will involve expanding the training and professionalization 

courses available to state and local law enforcement. It should move beyond classes 

to greater support for the development of systems of standards, police procedures, 

and evaluation mechanisms for Mexico’s local law enforcement, as most of Mexico’s 

police forces lack elements as basic as manuals that lay out standard practices. 

Drawing on known national and international accrediting agencies and programs 

such as the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), 

the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and TrainFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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ing, and the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, the United 

States can be useful in helping Mexico define and set these guidelines, to which officers can then be held accountable. 

In addition, these joint U.S. and Mexican local efforts should concentrate on realizing the so-far-neglected fourth pillar of the Merida Initiative, which calls for building resilient communities. Mexico has seen many instances of innovation in places 

hit hard by violence, including the business community’s involvement in creating a 

new state police force in Monterrey, and the security roundtable in Ciudad Jua ́ rez 

that brings together civil society leaders, businessowners, political officials, and 

local, state, and federal law enforcement to address the security threat. Meeting 

often on a weekly basis, these interchanges have helped to slowly build the trust 

so lacking in many of these communities, and to cultivate a close working relationship between law enforcement officers and those they protect—something largely 

missing in Mexico, yet vital to a longer term peace and safety. 

In practice, this reorientation will mean more funding for the U.S. Agency for 

International Development’s (USAID) community projects and youth programs, as 

well as INL’s training of state and municipal police (as opposed to just federal-level 

officers). 

Finally, the United States should prioritize the modernization of the U.S.-Mexico 

border. This means expanding its roads, bridges, and FAST lanes (express lanes for 

trusted drivers), as well as increasing the number of U.S. customs officers, agricultural specialists, and support staff that man the ports of entry. The estimated cost 

of these necessary investments would also be relatively small, with the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol estimating the need for some $6 billion over the next decade. These investments are vital for security, helping to keep out illicit goods and 

people. Upgrading the border has an added benefit, as it will facilitate legal trade, 

where consultants estimate losses in the tens of billions of dollars and hundreds of 

thousands of jobs, due to long border wait times and distances between ports of 

entry. 

The outlined initiatives—many already part of the Merida framework—have a 

greater chance of reducing violence in Mexico, as they will help strengthen police 

forces, court systems, and local communities. The border improvements, moreover, 

will benefit both the U.S. and Mexican economies, which can have indirect positive 

effects by providing greater legal opportunities to young people. In the end, Mexico’s 

security will depend on the actions and decisions of Mexico. But there is much the 

United States can do to help or hinder the process. A transition to a justice and 

a more local level and community-based approach to U.S. security assistance will 

help Mexico establish more effective and long-lasting tools for combating crime and 

violence.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Dr. O’Neil. 

Let us move to Mr. Steinberg now. 

STATEMENT OF NIK STEINBERG, SENIOR RESEARCHER, 

AMERICAS DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NEW YORK, NY 

Mr. STEINBERG. Chairman Udall, Senator Kaine, thank you for 

the opportunity to address this committee. My name is Nik Steinberg and I am the senior researcher in the Americans Division at 

Human Rights Watch. 

In recent years the public security strategy pursued by the Mexican Government has led to one of the worst human rights crises 

in Latin America in decades. In December 2006, then-President 

Felipe Caldero ́n deployed the military to confront Mexico’s powerful 

and violent cartels. The strategy, which he called a war on drugs, 

led to a dramatic increase in serious abuses by security forces. 

For example, we documented the systematic use of torture by soldiers and police in five states, including the routine use of waterboarding, electric shocks, and beatings to obtain intelligence. 

Despite unimpeachable evidence of these and other abuses, 

Caldero ́n spent virtually his entire Presidency vigorously denying 

that they had occurred. Instead, he falsely claimed that 90 percent 

of the victims of drug-related violence were criminals. While in his 

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final year in office he reluctantly conceded that abuses had 

occurred, he continued to insist that they were isolated. 

For their part, prosecutors consistently neglected to carry out 

even the most basic steps to investigate these abuses. As a result, 

virtually none of the soldiers and police responsible were punished 

for their crimes. 

The strategy also failed to stop an alarming increase in violence 

and dismantle cartels. By the government’s tally, more than 70,000 

people were killed in drug violence during the Caldero ́n years, and 

out of roughly 620,000 people who were detained in counternarcotics operations, nearly 500,000, 80 percent, were released for 

lack of evidence or on bail. 

Since President Pen ̃ a Nieto took office, we have seen a shift in 

the government’s willingness to acknowledge the abuses that occur. 

In February 2013, for example, Human Rights Watch released a report documenting widespread abuses by Mexican security forces. 

The day we released the report, the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration 

acknowledged that more than 26,000 people had been reported to 

government officials as disappeared or missing, a number never 

before made public. 

Two weeks ago I was in the Mexican state of Coahuila, which is 

across the border from Texas and is among those hardest hit by 

drug violence. The Governor there told me that more than 1,800 

people had disappeared in his state alone. Yet in only one case 

have prosecutors’ efforts led to the conviction of those responsible. 

While I was there, Mexico’s Deputy Attorney General came to 

meet with relatives of the disappeared. In a public address, he told 

them that Mexico is in the midst of a humanitarian crisis, to which 

the government’s response has been grossly inadequate. 

While acknowledging these problems is a positive step, Pen ̃a 

Nieto has yet to put forward a concrete plan to address them. A 

critical question is, How will this administration’s security strategy 

be different from its predecessors? Until now, Pen ̃a Nieto has not 

answered that question, nor has his government shown meaningful 

progress in prosecuting any of the hundreds of abuses documented 

by Human Rights Watch. 

As the main supplier of illicit weapons and destination for drugs 

trafficked through Mexico, the United States has a shared responsibility for tackling Mexico’s organized crime problem. The United 

States has taken an active role in these efforts through the Merida 

Initiative, which has channeled almost $2 billion to Mexico since 

2007. Fifteen percent of that assistance is supposed to be conditioned annually to Mexico’s ability to meet a set of basic human 

rights requirements. Yet, despite unequivocal evidence that Mexico 

has not met these requirements, the Obama administration has 

repeatedly released the conditioned funds. 

So what can the U.S. Government do to address this crisis? 

While it is true that Mexico faces huge challenges, the willingness 

of the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration to acknowledge those problems 

and change course presents a unique opportunity. The United 

States should seize it by taking an approach that recognizes 

respecting human rights as a fundamental part of, rather than an 

obstacle to, improving public security. 

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That means sending a clear message that the only way to dismantle Mexico’s powerful cartels is not through torture or killings, 

but rather through comprehensive investigations that can prosecute vast, sophisticated criminal networks. That will require 

training security forces who understand that cutting corners on 

rights will only exacerbate the climate of lawlessness in which cartels thrive, and training prosecutors who have the ability and the 

will to investigate criminals and abusive security forces alike. And 

it requires enforcing the human rights conditions set by the U.S. 

Congress for Merida assistance, whose fulfillment is in the interest 

of both countries. 

I thank you for your time and look forward to answering any 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Steinberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NIK STEINBERG

Chairman Udall, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for this opportunity to address the Subcommittee on Western 

Hemisphere and Global Narcotics Affairs on the critically important issue of the 

United States-Mexico security relationship. My name is Nik Steinberg and I am a 

senior researcher in the Americas division at Human Rights Watch. 

My testimony today will be divided into three parts. The first will set out the 

widespread human rights violations committed by Mexican security forces with near 

complete impunity over the past 6 years of the ‘‘war on drugs.’’ The second will analyze the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration’s response to the human rights crisis it inherited. While the new administration has acknowledged the unprecedented scale of 

abuses and the shortcomings of its predecessor’s overall public security strategy, it 

has demonstrated little progress in the investigations into those abuses or reforms 

to the policy that produced them. The third and final part will ask how the U.S. 

can play an active role in helping Mexico create a less abusive, and more effective, 

public security strategy, which is in both countries’ interest. 

WIDESPREAD ABUSES AND IMPUNITY IN MEXICO’S ‘‘WAR ON DRUGS’’

In December 2006, then-President Felipe Caldero ́n deployed Mexico’s military to 

confront the country’s powerful and violent cartels. The strategy produced a dramatic increase in serious abuses committed by security forces, virtually none of 

which have been adequately investigated and prosecuted. 

Enforced Disappearances 

Human Rights Watch has documented approximately 150 cases of enforced disappearances during the administration of President Caldero ́n (Dec. 2006–Dec. 

2012)—cases in which we found compelling evidence that state agents had participated in the crime. These crimes have been perpetrated by members of all branches 

of the security forces: the Army, the Navy, and the federal and local police. In some 

cases, such as a series of more than 20 enforced disappearances by Navy personnel 

in June and July 2011, the common modus operandi of the crimes, the scale of the 

operations, and the inconsistent official accounts suggest the crimes may have been 

planned and coordinated. In more than 60 of the 149 cases, we found evidence that 

state agents collaborated directly with organized crime groups to disappear people 

and extort payments from their families. 

The enforced disappearances documented by Human Rights Watch do not represent all of the cases in Mexico since 2007. On the contrary, official statistics leave 

little doubt that there are hundreds, if not thousands, more. For example, Mexico’s 

official National Human Rights Commission (Comisı ́n Nacional de los Derechos 

Humanos) has registered nearly 2,500 disappearances in which evidence points to 

the involvement of government officials. 

Prosecutors and law enforcement officials consistently fail to search thoroughly 

and promptly for people reported missing or to investigate those responsible for the 

disappearances. All too often, officials blame the victims and tell families it is their 

responsibility to investigate. What limited steps prosecutors take are undermined by 

recurring delays, errors, and omissions. The inept or altogether absent investigations exacerbate the suffering of the families, for whom not knowing what happened 

to their loved ones is a source of perpetual anguish. Making matters worse, families 

of the disappeared may lose access to basic social services that are tied to the vicFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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tim’s employment, forcing them to fight slow, costly, and emotionally draining battles to restore essential benefits such as child care. 

Torture 

Human Rights Watch has obtained credible evidence of torture committed by 

state agents in more than 170 cases across five states. The tactics we documented—

which most commonly included beatings, asphyxiation with plastic bags, waterboarding, electric shocks, sexual torture, and death threats—are used by members 

of all security forces. The apparent aim of such tactics is to extract information 

about organized crime, as well as to elicit forced confessions that not only accept 

guilt but also a posteriori conceal the abuses by security forces leading up to and 

during coercive interrogations. 

Authorities responsible for preventing torture have been at best passive observers, 

and at worst active participants, in grave abuses. Prosecutors travel to military 

bases to take detainees’ confessions in coercive conditions; medical examiners fail 

to document obvious signs of physical abuse; and judges admit testimony that 

defendants allege was obtained through torture without first investigating the 

allegations. 

Neither civilian nor military prosecutors adequately investigate and prosecute 

cases in which there is compelling evidence of torture. Officials rarely apply the 

Istanbul Protocol, a critical tool for detecting the physical and psychological effects 

of torture, and routinely fail to conduct basic steps critical to thorough and impartial 

investigations. Instead, prosecutors too often reflexively dismiss victims’ allegations 

of torture as a cynical ploy by criminals to evade punishment. As a result of this 

chronic lack of investigation, cases of torture are not punished, abusive security 

forces continue to use tactics that violate civilians’ rights, and a climate of impunity 

flourishes, which undermines broader public security efforts. 

Extrajudicial Killings 

Human Rights Watch obtained credible evidence in 24 cases that security forces 

committed extrajudicial killings, and in most of these cases took steps to conceal 

their crimes. These killings fall into two categories: civilians executed by authorities 

or killed by torture; and civilians killed at military checkpoints or during shootouts 

where the use of lethal force against them was not justified. In the majority of these 

cases soldiers and police tampered with crime scenes, either to falsely present victims as armed aggressors or to cover up their excessive use of force. And in some 

cases, our research strongly suggests that security forces manipulated crime scenes 

to present the false appearance that extrajudicial executions by soldiers were in fact 

killings carried out by rival drug cartels. Furthermore, in more than a dozen cases, 

families of the victims of killings told Human Rights Watch they had been pressured by the Army to sign settlements agreeing to abandon all efforts to seek criminal punishment for soldiers, in exchange for compensation. 

Shootouts between criminal groups and security forces, as well as between rival 

gangs, lead to many casualties in Mexico. However, evidence of coverups by security 

forces and the complete lack of investigations into the overwhelming majority of 

killings cast serious doubt on the government’s claims that most violent deaths are 

the result of confrontations. In the rare instances in which investigations into such 

killings are opened, justice officials fail to take basic steps to identify those responsible, such as conducting ballistics tests or questioning soldiers and police involved. 

In addition, rather than question official reports—many of which are marred by 

inconsistencies and contradicted by witness accounts—prosecutors accept security 

forces’ reports as fact and overlook evidence of excessive use of force or torture leading to death. 

The Use of Military Jurisdiction to Investigate and Prosecute Alleged Abuses 

One of the main reasons military abuses persist in Mexico is because the military 

personnel who commit them are virtually never held accountable. And they go 

unpunished in large part because most cases are investigated and prosecuted in the 

military justice system, which lacks basic safeguards to ensure independence and 

impartiality. Mexico’s Secretary of Defense wields both executive and judicial power 

over the Armed Forces. Military judges have little security of tenure and may fear 

that the Secretary will remove them or sideline their careers for punishing military 

personnel. And there is virtually no public scrutiny of, or access to, information 

about what actually happens during military investigations, prosecutions, and trials. 

The result is near total impunity for members of the military: while the Military 

Attorney General’s Office opened nearly 5,000 investigations into alleged human 

rights violations committed by soldiers against civilians from January 2007 to April 

2012, in only four of those cases were members of the military convicted (two of 

which are under appeal). 

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A series of rulings by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Mexico’s 

Supreme Court have called on Mexico to end this practice. The Inter-American 

Court of Human Rights issued four rulings to Mexico from 2009 to 2010 in which 

it stated that under no circumstances should military jurisdiction apply to any 

human rights violations committed by the military against civilians. In July 2011, 

Mexico’s Supreme Court ruled that Mexico’s courts are obligated to comply with one 

of those decisions: the November 2009 Inter-American Court judgment in the enforced disappearance case of Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico. That ruling stated that, 

‘‘Regarding situations that violate the human rights of civilians, military jurisdiction 

cannot operate under any circumstance.’’ In another landmark decision in August 

2012, Mexico’s Supreme Court ruled that the killing of an unarmed man by soldiers 

at a military checkpoint should be prosecuted in civilian jurisdiction, declaring that 

the article of the Military Code of Justice used to claim jurisdiction over human 

rights cases was unconstitutional. 

In spite of these rulings, efforts to reform the Military Code of Justice in Mexico’s 

Congress have been met with stiff resistance. Meanwhile, unlike his predecessor, 

President Enrique Pen ̃ a Nieto has not sent a proposal to Mexico’s Congress to reform the military justice system. Nor were plans to pursue such a reform included 

among the myriad commitments Pen ̃ a Nieto and other elected officials made in the 

Pact for Mexico (Pacto por Me ́xico), which set out key legislative priorities for the 

new government. The military has stated that it will continue to claim jurisdiction 

over cases of alleged abuses until its justice code is reformed. In the meantime, the 

practice of investigating such abuses remains unchanged, as do the results: the 

majority of complaints of human rights violations by soldiers continue to be sent to 

the military justice system, where they still go unpunished. 

Caldero ́n’s Response 

In spite of unimpeachable evidence of enforced disappearances, torture, 

extrajudicial killings, and other abuses, President Caldero ́n spent virtually his entire Presidency vigorously denying that any human rights violations had occurred. 

Instead, he falsely claimed that 90 percent of the victims of drug-related violence 

were criminals, and said that reports of abuses had been fabricated by narcos in 

order to undermine the reputation of Mexico’s security forces. It was not until his 

final year in office that Caldero ́n reluctantly conceded that abuses had occurred. 

Nevertheless, he continued to insist—contrary to all evidence—that they were isolated incidents, and did not put in place policies to ensure that those responsible 

for the abuses were brought to justice. 

Beyond producing horrific abuses by security forces, Caldero ́n’s ‘‘war on drugs’’ 

also failed to halt an alarming rise in violence, or dismantle the drug-trafficking 

organizations that pose a serious threat to Mexico’s national security. By the government’s tally, more than 70,000 people were killed in drug violence during the 

Caldero ́n years, rising from over 2,500 in 2007 (his first full year in office) to a peak 

of nearly 17,000 in 2011. Meanwhile, of approximately 620,000 people who were 

detained in counternarcotics operations, nearly 500,000 (roughly 80 percent) were 

released for lack of evidence or let out on bail. (In Mexico, people charged with 

organized crime or other serious offenses cannot be released on bail, meaning that 

those granted bail could only have been charged with minor crimes, not connected 

to organized crime.) 

THE PEN ̃ A NIETO GOVERNMENT: A NEW APPROACH?

Since President Pen ̃ a Nieto took office in December 2012, we have seen a shift 

in the government’s willingness to recognize some of the serious human rights 

abuses committed by security forces in the ‘‘war on drugs’’ and, more broadly, the 

need to change Mexico’s counternarcotics strategy. In February 2013, for example, 

Human Rights Watch released a report documenting widespread disappearances 

carried out by Mexican soldiers and police. The day we released the report, the Pen ̃ a 

Nieto administration acknowledged that more than 26,000 people had been reported 

disappeared or missing to government officials during the previous administration—

a number that had never previously been made public—and pledged to implement 

many of our recommendations, such as the creation of a national database of the 

disappeared. 

Two weeks ago, I was in the northern Mexican state of Coahuila, which is across 

the border from Texas, and is among those hardest hit by drug violence. The Governor, Ruben Moreira, told me that more than 1,800 people had disappeared in his 

state alone. In only one of those cases have those responsible for the crime been convicted. While I was in Coahuila, Mexico’s deputy attorney general for human rights, 

Ricardo Garcı ́a Cervantes, visited the state to meet with relatives of people who 

have been disappeared. In a public address, he told the families that Mexico is in 

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the midst of ‘‘a humanitarian crisis,’’ to which he said the government’s response 

until now has been grossly inadequate. 

While acknowledging these problems is a critical step, the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration has yet to put forward a concrete, comprehensive plan for how to remedy them. 

One of the critical questions that must be addressed is: How will the Pen ̃ a Nieto 

administration’s security strategy be different from its predecessor’s? For example, 

how will it build a professional, accountable federal police force, rather than yet 

another corrupt and ineffective one? How will it strengthen anemic efforts to implement a nationwide overhaul of Mexico’s broken justice system, and prevent 

counterreforms that would allow some of the most pernicious practices of the old 

system—such allowing confessions obtained through torture to be admissible in 

court—in through the back door? Until now, the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration has provided no clear answers to these questions. 

Nor, in the time since this administration took office, have federal, state, or military prosecutors demonstrated meaningful progress in the investigation and prosecution of any of the hundreds of cases of disappearances, torture, and executions 

documented by Human Rights Watch. These include cases in which we have provided evidence that not only identifies the specific security force involved, but also 

the individual units responsible for the abuse. 

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

As the main supplier of illicit weapons and the main destination for the drugs 

trafficked through Mexico, the U.S. has a shared responsibility for addressing Mexico’s organized crime problem. The U.S. has played an active role in collaborating 

with Mexico’s counternarcotics efforts, primarily through the Merida Initiative, 

which has channeled approximately $2 billion to Mexico since 2007. Fifteen percent 

of that assistance is supposed to be conditioned annually to Mexico’s ability to meet 

a set of basic human rights requirements, which include ensuring that military personnel who commit alleged abuses are investigated and prosecuted in civilian 

courts. 

Yet despite unequivocal evidence that Mexico has failed to meet the requirements, 

the Obama administration has repeatedly allowed the funds to be released. As justification, the State Department has argued that Mexico has demonstrated progress 

toward meeting the requirements as well as greater engagement which, while positive, are not the standards set by the law, nor do they reflect the reality in Mexico. 

The only frank questioning of whether these requirements have been met has come 

from Members of the U.S. Congress, who have rightly asked what the purpose is 

of the U.S. establishing human rights requirements if the government is not going 

to enforce them. 

Making matters worse, confronted with one of the worst human rights crises in 

the hemisphere in decades, the Obama administration has consistently offered 

uncritical support for Mexico’s ‘‘war on drugs.’’ On multiple occasions, President 

Obama expressed admiration for Caldero ́n’s ‘‘bravery’’ in confronting cartels, without once expressing concern publicly about the widespread abuses being committed 

by Mexican security forces, or for Caldero ́n’s rhetoric blaming the victims for the 

abuses they suffered. In a state visit to Mexico in April 2013 to meet with Pen ̃ a 

Nieto, Obama again neglected to express public concern about human rights violations by security forces. 

So what can the U.S. Government do to address these serious abuses, and the 

broader public security problems that persist to this day? 

While it is true that Mexico is facing extremely powerful cartels, endemic corruption, and near total impunity for those who commit crimes, the willingness of the 

Pen ̃ a Nieto administration to reform its public security approach presents a genuine 

opportunity to address significant flaws in Caldero ́n’s ‘‘war on drugs.’’ The U.S. 

should seize this opportunity by taking a proactive role in working with Mexico to 

craft a new strategy that recognizes that respect for human rights is a fundamental 

part of—rather than an obstacle to—improving public security. Both the U.S. and 

Mexico should send a clear message that the way to dismantle powerful cartels is 

not through arbitrary arrests and torture, but rather through comprehensive investigations, which lay the groundwork for prosecuting vast, sophisticated criminal networks. 

To achieve that goal, Mexico will need to train security forces who understand 

that cutting corners on rights will only exacerbate the climate of lawlessness in 

which cartels thrive. And it will need to train prosecutors who have the capacity 

and will to investigate violent criminals and abusive security forces alike. Meanwhile, the U.S. will need to candidly evaluate Mexico’s progress toward meeting the 

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human rights requirements contained in the Merida Initiative, and withhold funds 

when those benchmarks are not met. 

Not only will such a shift in strategy reflect the shared values of the U.S. and 

Mexico, but it will also advance the immediate goal of improving security while 

curbing abuses, which is in both countries’ interest. 

Thank you for your time. I look forward to answering any questions you may 

have.

Senator UDALL. Thank you for your testimony. 

Please proceed, Dr. Wood. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DUNCAN WOOD, PH.D., DIRECTOR, MEXICO INSTITUTE, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. WOOD. Thank you very much, Chairman Udall, Senator 

Kaine. 

I would like to begin by stating that we are still in the early 

stages of the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration’s implementation of its 

security strategy, so our evaluation can only be somewhat partial 

at best. However, even though there are still insufficient details 

available to the general public, there are clear lines developing 

within the strategy and they provide us with a point of entry into 

the analysis. 

Thus far we can identify two central themes to the Mexican Government’s strategy that stand out above all the rest. The first of 

these is coordination. The government has identified that one of 

the major failings of the Caldero ́n administration was its failure to 

properly and adequately coordinate the actions of the diverse security agencies in Mexico. That is why upon taking office President 

Pen ̃ a Nieto took the immediate step of centralizing security decisionmaking power into the Secretaria de Gobernacion, the Interior 

Ministry, under the leadership of Miguel Angel Osorio Chong, 

bringing the office of public security under his purview. 

But the coordinating tendency is not limited just to structural 

changes in the administration. Much higher levels of coordination 

between all government ministries and between the federal and 

state governments has emerged as a central feature of this government. This coordinating theme is to be seen most clearly in the operation of the Pacto por Mexico, a coordinating mechanism between 

Mexico’s major political parties that has achieved considerable success thus far in getting reforms passed through the Congress that 

includes 34 different proposals relating to security policy. 

The second major theme of the administration’s security strategy 

is violence and crime reduction. The government is touting the role 

that will be played by the ministry of prevention and citizen participation under the leadership of Under Secretary Roberto Campa 

within the Interior Ministry. Coordination is again a central element here. 

The national program for the social prevention of violence and 

crime is based on close coordination between nine different government ministries. Although details are still not clear, the goal of this 

government agency is to invest heavily in social programs and citizen engagement strategies at the local level in high-risk communities. Building on the successful experience of cities such as 

Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and now Monterrey, the government is 

developing a range of social programs that seek to both reduce 

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immediate violence levels and prevent youth from entering into 

organized crime. 

When we examine Pen ̃a Nieto’s administration’s security 

strategy at a closer level, we should take note of several other 

approaches that stand out, and a number of them have been mentioned already. First of all, there is the creation of the much touted 

gendarmerie, which will be a paramilitary style police organization. 

Its final size is really not clear. We seem to be getting different 

messages from the Mexican Government about that. It will be used 

largely as a rapid reaction force in those areas of the country where 

local and state police are either failing or absent. 

Second, there is once again the discussion of the idea of the unified command structure, the mando unico, for police forces. The 

idea is to bring together the multiple police forces in each of Mexico’s states under one unified command structure. It is an idea that 

was attempted under the Caldero ́n administration and it has returned as part of the pacto pro Mexico, that political mechanism, 

and we are waiting to see how it will be implemented. 

At the same time, the government has recognized that different 

regions of the country have divergent security needs and has thus 

divided up Mexico into five security zones, each of which will be 

treated accordingly. This is where the government faces its biggest 

threat in the short term, understanding the diversity of Mexico’s 

public security challenges cross different zones and implementing 

actions that will bring down violence levels. Already the government has been able to report drops in homicides, but there is considerable skepticism in Mexico over the official numbers and it is 

unclear if this is a long-term trend or just a short-term drop. 

The impact of the change in security strategy by the Pen ̃ a Nieto 

administration on United States-Mexico relations has been marked. 

Since the elections of last July, there has been a process under way 

of gaining mutual understanding, with United States authorities 

trying to find areas of overlap and common interest with their 

Mexican counterparts. Of course, the process really only began in 

earnest with the beginning of the new administration in December, 

and since then there have been many comments by U.S. personnel 

that it is much more difficult to communicate and talk substantive 

issues with the new Mexican security team. 

Much-publicized decisions by the Mexican Government to halt 

ongoing cooperation has also proved an irritant. It is my understanding the process of feeling each other out is still very much 

under way. 

But we can point to a number of areas where we can expect fruitful collaboration. First in the area of prevention and violence reduction, there is ample room for continued cooperation similar to that 

which took place under pillar four of the Merida Initiative. The 

work of rebuilding communities, of investing in social programs, of 

engaging in civil society and crime prevention and the justice system, has attained significant success in places such as Baja California, and the experience of working with U.S. agencies there provides a model for future efforts. 

Second, there is likely to be receptive attitude from the Mexican 

authorities with regards to the issue of policing standards. As the 

process of unifying police commands across communities in Mexico 

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continues and as police professionalization remains a key topic, 

there is much that the United States has to offer. 

Third, the creation of the gendarmerie will likely involve the 

secondment or permanent transfer of military personnel into the 

new force. In order to avoid the pitfalls of having troops adopt a 

policing function, there will be a need to retrain these elements. 

Beyond this, money-laundering will be a key issue. Mexico’s new 

anti-money-laundering laws will require immediate implementation, and the United States and Mexico could cooperate very fruitfully on that issue. 

On intelligence-sharing, I perceive a more difficult road ahead. 

Trust issues in the absence of mutual understanding, combined 

with a centralization of power over security policy and the Interior 

Ministry, mean that the progress of the past 5 years is by no 

means guaranteed. At this point in time it is vital that we adopt 

a long-term perspective, that patience and good judgment prevails, 

and that we do not burden the new relationship with the expectations of the old. 

Thank you for your attention. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Wood follows:]

PREPARED STATESMENT OF DR. DUNCAN WOOD

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a privilege to join you 

today. 

I have been asked to cover a number of issues related to Mexico’s evolving security situation today and would like to begin by stating that we are still in the early 

stages of the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration’s implementation of its security strategy so 

that our evaluation can only be somewhat partial at best. However, even though 

there are still insufficient details available to the general public, there are clear 

lines developing within the strategy, and they provide us with a point of entry into 

the analysis. 

Thus far we can identify two central themes to the Mexican Government’s strategy that stand out above all the rest. The first of these is coordination. The government has identified that one of the major failings of the Calderon administration 

was its failure to properly and adequately coordinate the actions of the diverse 

security agencies in Mexico. That is why, upon taking office, President Pen ̃ a Nieto 

took the immediate step of centralizing security decisionmaking power into the 

Secretaria de Gobernacion (Interior Ministry), under the leadership of Miguel Angel 

Osorio Chong, bringing the office of Public Security under his purview. But the coordinating tendency is not limited to structural changes in the administration. Much 

higher levels of coordination between all government ministries, and between the 

federal and state governments has emerged as a central feature of this government. 

The coordinating theme is to be seen most clearly in the operation of the Pacto por 

Mexico, a coordinating mechanism between Mexico’s major political parties that has 

achieved considerable success in getting reforms passed though the Congress and 

includes 34 different proposals relating to security policy. 

The second major theme of the administration’s security strategy is violence reduction. The government is touting the role that will be played by the Ministry of 

Prevention and Citizen Participation (subsecretaria de Prevencio ́n y Participacio ́n 

Ciudadana), under the leadership of Under Secretary Roberto Campa, within the 

Interior Ministry. Coordination is a central element here: the National Program for 

the Social Prevention of Violence and Crime is based on close coordination between 

the Ministries of the Interior, Social Development, Health, Education, Economy, 

Employment, Communications and Transport, Agrarian Development and Finance. 

Although details are still not clear, the goal of this government agency is to invest 

heavily in social programs and citizen engagement strategies at the local level in 

high-risk communities. Building on the successful experience of cities such as 

Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and now Monterrey, the government is developing panoply 

of social programs that seeks to both reduce immediate violence levels and prevent 

youth from entering into organized crime. 

I mention Monterrey for three reasons. First, it was discussed recently in a piece 

by The Economist magazine that focused on the central theme of rebuilding and 

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maintaining the social fabric. Second, it is the marquee program that is being touted 

by the government and highlights the administration’s goal of coordination. Monterrey involves close collaboration between the Federal Government, the government 

of the state of Nuevo Leon, the municipal government, business and civil society 

groups. Third, it highlights the tie in between these social programs and the 

remaking of state-level police forces. The Fuerza Civil is a new police force for 

Nuevo Leon that has been in the making since 2011, and the government sees this 

as an example to be followed by the rest of the country. 

When we examine the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration’s security strategy at a closer 

level, we should take note of several other approaches that stand out. First, there 

is the creation of the much-touted gendarmerie, a paramilitary style police organization whose final size is unclear (somewhere between 10–50 thousand), which will 

be used as a rapid reaction force in those areas of the country where local and state 

police are failing or absent. Second, there is once again the discussion of the idea 

of the unified command structure for police forces, the mando unico. The idea here 

is to bring together the multiple police forces in each of Mexico’s states under one 

unified command structure, to ensure better coordination, professionalization and 

the implementation of common standards. An idea that was attempted under the 

Calderon administration, it has returned as part of the Pacto por Mexico, and we 

are waiting to see how it will be implemented. 

At the same time, the government has recognized that different regions of the 

country have divergent security needs, and has thus divided up Mexico into five 

security zones, each of which will be treated accordingly. This is where the government faces its biggest threat in the short term—understanding the diversity of 

Mexico’s public security challenges across different zones and implementing actions 

that will bring down violence levels. Already the government has been able to report 

drops in homicides but there is considerable skepticism in Mexico over official numbers and it is unclear if this is a long-term trend or just a short-term drop. 

Judicial reform and penal reform are also key elements in the government’s overall approach. Continuing, and accelerating the implementation of the judicial 

reforms of 2008 is a priority according to leading government representatives. The 

deadline for implementation is 2018, but the urgency of a properly functioning court 

system is more urgent than ever. Although tens of thousands have been sent to trial 

over the past 6 years, only a small percentage has been incarcerated, and the public 

has almost no faith in the operation of Mexican justice. Just as urgent is a reform 

of the prison system—of those who have been convicted and have gone to prison 

many have escaped, and those who have stayed in jail have continued to play a role 

in organized crime activities. However, there is little sign as yet that the government is ready to take on a wholesale reform of the prison system. 

The impact of the change in security strategy by the Pen ̃ a Nieto administration 

on U.S.-Mexico relations has been marked. Since the elections of last July, there has 

been a process underway of gaining mutual understanding, with U.S. authorities 

trying to find areas of overlap and common interest with their Mexican counterparts. Of course the process really only began in earnest with the beginning of the 

new administration in December, and since then there have been many comments 

by U.S. personnel that it is much more difficult to communicate and talk substantive issues with the new Mexican security team. Much publicized decisions by 

the Mexican Government to halt ongoing cooperation have provided an extra irritant. It is my understanding that the process of ‘‘feeling each other out’’ is still very 

much underway. 

However, we can point to a number of areas where we can expect fruitful collaboration. First, in the area of prevention and violence reduction, there is ample room 

for continued cooperation, similar to that which took place under Pillar IV of the 

Merida Initiative. The work of rebuilding communities, of investing in social programs, of engaging with civil society in crime prevention and in the justice system 

has attained significant success in places such as Baja California and the experience 

of working with U.S. agencies there provides a model for future efforts. Second, 

there is likely to be a receptive attitude from the Mexican authorities with regards 

to the issue of policing standards. As the process of unifying police commands across 

communities in the states of Mexico continues, and as police professionalization 

remains as key topic, there is much that the U.S. has to offer. Third, the creation 

of the gendarmerie will likely involve the secondment or permanent transfer of military personnel into the new force. In order to avoid the pitfalls of having troops 

adopt a policing function, there will be a need to train these individuals in policing, 

criminal justice, and investigation techniques. Again, the U.S. has significant and 

important experience in this area. 

Beyond these areas, counter-money-laundering actions and intelligence gathering 

and sharing continue to provide potential areas for collaboration. Mexico’s new antiFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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money-laundering laws require immediate implementation—over the past 5 years, 

a mere 83 individuals were convicted of money laundering in Mexico, while we know 

that more than $10 billion is laundered a year within the country. The movement 

of money back from the United States is an issue that needs to be addressed and 

high-level talks are needed on that issue. On intelligence-sharing I perceive a more 

difficult road ahead. Trust issues and the absence of mutual understanding, combined with the centralization of power over security policy in the Interior Ministry, 

mean that the progress of the past 5 years is by no means guaranteed. At this point 

in time it is vital that we adopt a long-term perspective, that patience and good 

judgment prevails, and that we do not burden the new relationship with the expectations of the old. 

Last, I have been asked to comment on the recent visit by President Obama to 

Mexico, to meet with President Pen ̃ a Nieto. There can be little doubt that the visit 

was a huge success, both in terms of building a relationship with the Mexican President on a personal level, and in convincing the Mexican public that the relationship 

with the United States is a positive one. In particular, the speech given by the 

President at the National Anthropological Museum received very favorable press 

and attention. On a more substantive level, the agreements between the two Presidents on education and the economy have injected new vigor into bilateral affairs, 

helped greatly by the optimism over the prospects for immigration reform here in 

Washington. Already we are seeing benefits in terms of spill over into other areas—

the upcoming Inter-Parliamentary Group meetings in Washington in the fall, as 

well as the bilateral talks on energy scheduled for October, promise to further revitalize the relationship. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today. I am, of course, at your 

disposal to answer any questions you might have on my testimony.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, and thank all three of you for that 

excellent testimony there. 

All three of you are in the unique position of not representing a 

United States or Mexican interest and you are able to take a more 

nuanced look at the challenges facing United States-Mexico security cooperation. In your honest opinion—and I know you have 

talked about this a little, but I thought we would get into it in a 

little more depth—do you believe that we have made progress in 

our shared efforts to strengthen the institutions and combat drug 

cartels in Mexico? Whoever wants to jump in first, that is fine. 

Dr. O’Neil. 

Dr. O’NEIL. Thank you. I do think we have made progress. When 

we look back at the last 5, 6 years of the Merida Initiative, some 

almost $2 billion spent, in part it is the monetary commitment to 

work with our neighbor, which was not there before the Merida 

Initiative, when less than $40 million a year was spent on security 

aid. 

But perhaps more important than the money is the contacts, the 

back and forth. So we have agencies talking to agencies, agents 

talking to agents, working with each other and helping Mexico 

work through a problem, which, as my colleagues here have said, 

is a coresponsibility. It is a problem that crosses the border and 

involves both countries. 

I think the challenge is today is now with the new administration there and a new administration here in the United States, is 

how do we continue and how do we build on the good that has happened there, but also perhaps some of the areas where we have not 

made as much progress as we would like. 

When you look at the four pillars of the Merida Initiative, there 

has been significant progress on the taking down of the kingpins. 

There has been some progress on the institution-building, particularly at the federal level and the police. There is much more, I 

believe, that can be done on that level, particularly moving from 

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the federal level to the state and local level and, as I mentioned 

in my testimony, moving into the justice reform and really helping 

this country push that over the finish line, which is supposed to be 

2016, just 3 years from now. 

Then I would also like to say, on the last two pillars, the modernizing of the United States-Mexico border as well as the building of 

community resilience, I think there is a lot the United States can 

do, continue to do and deepen on that side. The benefit of those two 

is it helps strengthen communities that cross the border, particularly since so many Mexicans in Mexican-Americans have family 

ties, community ties, as well as economic ties. So strengthening the 

border helps those families, those communities, as well as helps 

our larger economy. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Mr. STEINBERG. I think possibly the institution and the job in 

Mexico that still requires the greatest amount of work is the job 

of building prosecutors, both at the federal and the state level, who 

can investigate crimes. Mexico has a 98-percent impunity rate and 

I think that is being generous. 

Now, to your question of whether the United States cooperation 

on building prosecutors at the federal and state level has actually 

succeeded, I think perhaps best to quote here from the current 

Attorney General of Mexico, Murillo Karam, whose word that he 

uses to describe the state of the federal prosecutor’s office, the 

Attorney General’s office that he inherited, is ‘‘desmantelada,’’ 

which is more or less ‘‘in shambles.’’ That is the way he describes 

the office. 

That is very much borne out by the experience that we have had 

in working with cases that we follow to see if the investigation is 

advanced or not. So I think that the biggest lacuna in the investment of building a justice system and the rule of law in Mexico is 

training prosecutors that know how to do the very basic job of investigating cases. What we have seen is families who are affected 

by these crimes do more to investigate the cases than prosecutors. 

In other words, it is not rocket science, it is not that they do not 

know how to do it; it is that there is a lack of will. 

I think if we scale up from this, that is very much reflected in 

the advance of the justice reform in general. I know that it is something that Mexico needs, that on paper is a beautiful reform. It is 

beautifully written. And where we see it faltering is in the implementation. Three of thirty-two states have fully implemented the 

justice reform at the state level. 

The ones that have advanced the most are the ones that have 

also seen the greatest counterreforms that bring the worst practices of Mexico’s old justice system in through the back door. So I 

think there needs to be a very frank accounting of the lack of 

progress, not for lack of effort on the United States side, but in 

terms of producing investigators, investigative police and prosecutors in Mexico that can put a dent in the huge wall of impunity 

that exists right now. 

Thank you. 

Senator UDALL. Do you think with this new—I guess they put a 

deadline in of 2016 to achieve a lot of these reforms. Are they going 

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to make it? My sense is you think very few of the states will make 

it. 

Mr. STEINBERG. Well, you know, I guess the message would be 

we want them to make it, but we want them to do it well. So the 

states that have made it—let us use Chihuahua, which is the first 

state to have crossed the finish line. Chihuahua had the unfortunate luck of being the state that was the most advanced, that then 

was hit with the most dramatic wave of violence. So the system 

was immediately inundated and overwhelmed. What our experience has shown us in Chihuahua is that to implement the justice 

system in a state that was experiencing unprecedented levels of 

violence produced the effect that many citizens living in that state 

said: The problems that we have are generated from the new justice system and it is the fault of the Attorney General who is 

implementing it and the prosecutors who are not doing their jobs, 

and this is for criminals. 

So there is a huge risk in that Mexico is trying to implement 

what even in normal circumstances would be an incredibly complicated reform to its justice system, at a time when the country 

is experiencing its greatest wave of violence in decades. So they 

need all the help they can get, and I think the essence—we have 

made this point with USAID, we have said this to the Embassy in 

Mexico. We think that it is important to generate a couple models 

of states that perhaps are not in as dire a situation as Chihuahua 

was when they implemented it, and show that actually the justice 

reform, if implemented properly is good for public security, it is 

good for convicting criminals, and it is good for protecting the innocent. And we do not have a model like that yet. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Dr. Wood. 

Dr. WOOD. Thank you. I think that undeniably the experience of 

the last 6 years or so has been incredibly useful and incredibly 

fruitful. I was living in Mexico for all of that time until December 

of last year and the attitude in Mexico was that we were entering 

a new phase of security collaboration between the United States 

and Mexico. On the issue of security, this was an issue that had 

been taboo up to this point. It was extraordinary, the leap forward 

that was made over the past few years. 

But there was a certain degree of hubris at work as well. I think 

that people believed that this was a change that was permanent, 

that could not really be turned back. I think it was a belief that 

things had changed forever in Mexico, just based upon the experience of the Caldero ́n administration. 

What we have seen over the past 6 months is that, in fact, the 

Caldero ́n administration was the anomaly, I would say, that this 

willingness to enter into a very, very active, very open security 

relationship with the United States, is something that we should 

not expect to continue in the future. It does not mean that we 

should not be optimistic about security collaboration between the 

two countries. On the contrary, I would say that the experience of 

the past 6 years showed the new administration that there is a lot 

to be gained from cooperation with the United States, not just in 

terms of equipment and training, et cetera, but in terms of having 

a new vision on security. 

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The idea is that, as Shannon mentioned in terms of the resilient 

communities, which is something that really came out of the discussions between the two countries, had a huge impact in places 

such as Ciudad Juarez, is having a very positive impact right now 

in the city of Monterrey. Nobody is saying that that will solve the 

problem of security in those places, but it has to be an integral 

part. The government has embraced that under the new administration. 

Information-sharing and intelligence-sharing were crucial over 

the past 6 years in securing the arrest or targeted killings of leaders of organized crime. And the trust that was built up between 

individuals was seen as being a very, very crucial element. 

Now, every time that we talk about Mexico I think there is a 

tendency to oversimplify things. So people say that everything was 

great in terms of cooperation under the Caldero ́n administration 

and now things are not so good. I think we have to adopt a much 

more nuanced approach, and that is to say that what we are finding right now is that the United States Government and the Mexican Government are trying to find areas in which they can both 

work together, in which they are both comfortable. 

That really depends upon approaching the new Mexican administration in the way that they want to be approached. That is a difficult conundrum to solve because it is a much more closed communication strategy, if you will. They are not nearly so forthcoming 

with what they want to work together on. So the people that I have 

spoken to in U.S. Government on the ground tell me that it is 

really a question of, would you like to talk about this? would you 

like to talk about that? and then once you get a more positive response you then pursue it. 

So this is going to take time, I think. As a good friend of mine 

always says with Mexico, lower your expectations and adopt a longterm perspective, and I think things are going to work out pretty 

well. But it really is a process right now of getting to know each 

other again. 

Senator UDALL. Do you think that President Obama’s trip and 

then his subsequent meeting down there with President Pen ̃ a 

Nieto, did that move things along or were we running into the 

same kind of problems that you are talking about here? 

Dr. WOOD. I think that the visit itself was an undisputed success. It was a huge success. You saw the very positive press that 

came out of it. But more importantly than that and more important 

than any of the agreements that came out of that, that visit, I 

think was the personal relationship that is developing between the 

two Presidents, which allows for a level of trust. 

But just as important as that I would say is the series of meetings that took place in the weeks prior to the visit, where you saw 

senior Mexican politicians and Mexican Government representatives coming up here to Washington. Folks over at the State 

Department would say: It seems like every week is Mexico week 

right now, because there were always a steady stream of Mexicans 

who were here. 

In particular, I would point to the visit by Minister of the Interior Osorio Chong, which was crucial in exposing him to the way 

in which things are done here in Washington, to understanding the 

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willingness to cooperate. That is something which I think will bear 

fruit in the long term. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Mr. Steinberg, you have focused on some of the key human rights 

issues that still need to be addressed in Mexico. Do you believe 

that the current plan put forward you the Mexican Government 

will adequately meet the needs of the Mexican people, and what in 

your opinion are the aspects missing from the Mexican plan to help 

improve the human rights conditions in Mexico? 

Mr. STEINBERG. In terms of the difference between the new government and the old government, as I outlined in the testimony, 

certainly this government, unlike its predecessor, is acknowledging 

the scale of the problem that they have inherited. We do not have 

to, when we meet with this government, convince them that human 

rights are an issue, abuses of human rights are an issue that they 

need to deal with. They are aware of that. 

Where I think the approach of the new government has been 

lacking is that so much of the government’s plan—and this comes 

from our meetings with the Home Minister, Osorio Chong, with the 

Attorney General, Murillo Karam, with Governors in some of the 

states that have experienced the most serious increase in human 

rights abuses—is geared toward preventing human rights abuses 

in the future. In other words, the line is: What can we do to 

develop and train security forces so they do not disappear more 

people, torture more people, kill more people? 

What they do not seem to have grasped yet, because it is not in 

any of the plans, is that the most effective way to prevent human 

rights abuses is to show security forces that there are consequences 

when they step out of line. Until now there is no element in any 

of the human rights plans that the government has put out—and 

it has put out a lot of them; they have a whole chapter in their 

national development plan that deals with it—is a plan for investigating and prosecuting the enormous backlog of abuses that this 

government has, including new abuses from this administration. 

Let me just give you one statistic that I think captures it. Mexico’s military attorney general’s office, which is responsible for 

investigating all of the abuses that are committed by soldiers 

against civilians—that is a problem in itself; it should be in the 

civilian justice system; I will leave that alone for now. They have 

a backlog, we obtained through Freedom of Information requests, 

of more than 5,000 cases open—now, these are the cases where 

people are brave enough to come forward and denounce the abuses; 

it is a small slice of the pie—into serious abuses by soldiers against 

civilians. 

Of those cases, only four have resulted in convictions of soldiers. 

So 4 out of 5,000, and those are the 5,000 that are reported. That 

is a huge deficit, and until this administration starts to send the 

message to security forces, new gendarmerie or old, army, navy, 

federal police, local police, it will not be able to prevent human 

rights abuses going forward, and we do not see that element in 

their plan. 

Senator UDALL. The 5,000 cases, how old are those? 

Mr. STEINBERG. Those are all from 2007 to midway through 

2012. So they are all from the previous administration. 

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Senator UDALL. OK. 

Mr. STEINBERG. So we have been asking—we have many public 

information requests in. They take many months to get back. So 

we hope to have updated numbers, but that is just that period 

through mid-2012. 

Senator UDALL. Dr. O’Neil, your recent book ‘‘Two Nations, Indivisible: Mexico and the United States and the Road Ahead,’’ 

focused on the many challenges and opportunities facing Mexico. 

One such challenge and opportunity was leveraging the middle 

class of Mexico. You noted the growth of this economic demographic, but also pointed out that this new middle class is, ‘‘decidedly an urban phenomenon.’’

In your opinion, how should the Mexican Government focus its 

efforts to stimulate economic development in rural areas, the border regions, and what role should North American Development 

Bank play to help stimulate improvements? 

Dr. O’NEIL. Thank you. This has been one of the big transformations, this growth of the middle class in Mexico, and it is 

something that this government is thinking a lot about. You look 

at their economic policies and there they are much clearer than 

perhaps the security policies we have been talking about, and they 

are quite ambitious. So we see reforms have passed, labor reform, 

education reform, telecommunications reform, the financial reform 

that is going through the system, and the President talking about 

an energy reform as well as a tax reform, all in this year. 

What Mexico needs to do to really stimulate this middle, that 

will then stimulate their GDP growth more broadly, they need to 

do long-term things like take on their education system, which is 

quite weak. They have started to do this, but this is a long, long 

road. They need to invest in infrastructure. They are far behind in 

terms of roads, railroads, ports, airports, particularly as they see, 

I would say justifiably so, particularly as they see their future 

linked to the United States, to the manufacturing and the production that happens on both sides of the border, supporting companies and workers on both sides of the border. Infrastructure is vital 

to make them more and more competitive vis-a-vis other nations 

like China, Brazil, Europe, or even Canada. When we think about 

the way that this works, it is important that they increase their 

infrastructure to boost their economy. 

The other thing that they struggle with are the concentrated economic sectors, the monopolies, the oligopolies, that make prices for 

average Mexicans much higher than they should be, but then also 

hurt competitiveness of companies that operate on their side of the 

border as well as on our side of the order. 

So these are big issues that affect not just urban citizens, but 

will also affect the rural areas. Connecting the rural areas better 

to urban centers or to the United States will make a huge difference. That also carries over to the border that you mentioned, 

and how to make the border more efficient, more competitive, will 

help the companies that are located there and that are located on 

both sides of the border, not just on the Mexican side of the border, 

but on the United States side of the border. 

This is now an often-repeated statistic, but I think it bears 

repeating one more time, because what we have seen is a transFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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formation in the way the United States and Mexican economies

are linked. So today, for the products that come in from Mexico, so

that are, ‘‘made in Mexico,’’ on average almost 40 percent of that 

product was actually made in the United States by United States 

workers. So that interconnection is something that is good for companies on both sides, but workers on both sides. 

So working with the infrastructure on the border to speed the 

transit, to facilitate the transit, will help people, but also the economies on both sides, benefiting us both. 

Senator UDALL. Do you have any thoughts on the North American Development Bank? 

Dr. O’NEIL. Today the Development Bank has been quite limited 

in its mandate, to environmental focus, to some other infrastructure focuses. I do think there is a role that this can play, a much 

broader role. When you look at reports from our government, official reports on what is needed at the border, the investment is 

there, but it is not a huge amount of investment. It is somewhere 

probably in the order of $6 billion, $8 billion, over the next decade, 

that would really make a difference. 

I do think the North America Development Bank can play a role 

in this, in helping build the infrastructure on both sides of the 

border and speed this. This is a place where we could invest not 

a huge amount of money, but have a huge outsized return. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Shifting a little bit to immigration and the debate around immigration, we have heard a lot in that debate about how we need to 

secure our border. I agree that a secure and efficient border is an 

important objective. With regards to our shared border and our 

efforts as part of the Merida Initiative to create a 21st century border, do you believe that it is possible to completely shut down the 

border and completely prevent the transit of drugs through such a 

border? 

Dr. O’NEIL. In thinking about the border and security at the border, you need to think about both the costs and the benefits. When 

you look at a bit of historical perspective and you think about the 

border that we had known as the Iron Curtain, the amount of 

money that was spent there, the troops that were put there, the 

no man’s land put between there, the concertina wire and everything else to keep people, the shoot to kill orders on one side of the 

border, and you still saw a few thousand intrepid souls get over 

that border each year. 

So the idea of securing the border 100 percent seems unfeasible. 

It is particularly unfeasible when you are thinking about someone 

that is not a country that is isolated from you ideologically, commercially, and the like, but is one of the United States most important trading partners—the idea of closing this down. 

So what we should be thinking about is how to better secure the 

border in the sense of diminishing the flows of bad things while 

facilitating the flows of good things, and what that tradeoff might 

be. That to me is a better framework for securing America’s future. 

Senator UDALL. Dr. Wood, do you have thoughts on that? 

Dr. WOOD. Yes, just a couple of followup points. I think that in 

terms of your question about rural areas in Mexico, particularly in 

the north, there is a looming question, a looming crisis there in 

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terms of water issues. I mean, it is a controversial issue in the 

bilateral relationship already. 

I was in the state of Chihuahua a couple of weeks ago, actually 

last week, and the drought there is a major crisis. You see the 

same thing in the state of Coahuila, across the north of the country. This is really driving a lot of the hardship that is taking place 

in agricultural communities in the north of the country. 

That is something that I think we really need to work with on 

the bilateral basis with the Mexicans. It is an issue that obviously 

hits border communities on the United States side of the border, 

and this ties directly into questions of migration, not just across 

the border, but of Mexicans moving from rural areas into the cities, 

of young Mexican men in particular being the fodder for organized 

crime units. 

Agriculture has suffered in Mexico over the past 20 years. A lot 

of Mexicans blame the NAFTA for that. It is not the NAFTA that 

is to blame. It is actually a lack of investment in the sector. Some 

areas of agriculture have actually benefited. You look at the pork 

industry, for example, in Mexico, which has boomed in recent years 

because standards have been raised, largely thanks to the work of 

economic integration with the United States and with Canada. 

But there really does still need to be significant investment in 

the agricultural sector. 

With regards to the border, I would say that I am 100 percent 

in agreement with what Shannon has said here. There is dramatic 

and urgent need for investment in border infrastructure. Mostly we 

tend to think about border crossings. That is something which I 

think is absolutely right. The payoff that we will get for each dollar 

invested in improving the flow of goods across the border will be 

enormous, much more than any other area I would say right now 

in the bilateral relationship. And that really is the umbilical cord 

of our economic relationship with Mexico. We need to invest heavily in that, in line with what the Mexican Government is going to 

do as well. They have already expressed an interest in doing that. 

In terms of security of the border, hitting at your original question, it is intriguing. How many terrorists have we actually captured trying to cross the border from Mexico? How effective has the 

border been in stopping undesirable goods and people crossing 

over? Building a wall is clearly not the answer when you see how 

many people are actually tunneling underneath the wall. It has become a matter, almost a matter for joking in our circles, the sophistication of the tunnels that extend underneath the border and the 

ways in which organized crime, human traffickers, are able to get 

their goods and people across the border, underneath the border. 

There is another issue as well about the border I would like to 

point to, which is that I think it is urgent that people here in 

Washington visit the border and understand what it means to be 

a border community, and to understand the questions of quality of 

life. When you look at how long the lineups are at the border and 

what the impact that has upon the environment just in terms of 

emissions levels from trucks and cars waiting there for hours to 

cross the border, the economic cost of it, not just upon those people 

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munities there, that is something which I think needs to be experienced firsthand to really understand why this is an urgent issue. 

Thank you. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much. I think your suggestion 

of visiting the border is a good one. I am sure all three of you have 

done that no doubt. 

Just a final question, going back to drug cartels. Among the drug 

cartels currently fighting in Mexico, which cartel in your opinion 

poses the biggest threat to United States and Mexico interests, and 

which ones are seeing their power wane in light of pressure from 

Mexican authorities? 

Dr. O’NEIL. The back and forth of the drug cartels and who is 

on top and who is down is quite fluid. One thing we have seen with 

the approach of Caldero ́n and the United States in directly confronting them is a fragmentation of these groups from perhaps a 

handful, half a dozen, to now dozens. So this is a pretty fast-moving target. 

There are some groups that are much more focused less on moving drugs and now on other businesses, things like extortion and 

human trafficking and contraband and the like. Particularly you 

hear a lot about the Zetas, a quite violent group located in many 

parts of Mexico, but along the border across from Texas, that, 

though hit quite hard, are still incredibly important, incredibly 

dangerous, and really prey on the Mexican population. And they 

are important for Mexico, particularly important for Mexico, but 

also for the United States, as there is some evidence that they have 

strong ties into the United States, money-laundering, businesses, 

and the like. 

What I would say before we start thinking is it this group or is 

it that group, because some of this is moving around so much, is 

that this threat of organized crime more generally in Mexico is 

what is the national security threat to Mexico and to the United 

States. This country, which is so linked to our own, if it does well 

it has huge payoff for the United States, and if it does poorly the 

repercussions for the United States reach far beyond the Southwest 

border of the United States. 

So moving forward, as we think about what to do, helping them 

with these long-term institution-building, creating a justice system 

that can punish the guilty and free the innocent, creating police 

forces that local communities can actually trust rather than fear, 

creating programs that help local communities stitch back together 

the social fabric that is often been rendered by whether it is crime 

or immigration or the like, those are things I think we should be 

thinking about in the United States and trying to work with Mexico on. And then we can take on whatever the name of the particular group that’s preying on citizens in both places. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Mr. Steinberg. 

Mr. STEINBERG. First I would like to build on a point that Dr. 

O’Neil made, which is that we really cannot talk about these as 

drug trafficking organizations any more, because we do not have 

the luxury of dealing with groups for whom that is even their 

majority interest. In fact, organized crime in Mexico now is in 

basically every single illicit industry, with the exception until

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now, from what we have seen, of the trafficking of nuclear materials, which means that they are involved in extortion, moneylaundering, trafficking of migrants, trafficking of children, prostitution, you name it. 

The challenge of confronting organizations like that is that the 

arm of their influence often reaches into state agencies and government. This is I think a critical point to make in this hearing, which 

is that oftentimes we think of organized crime on one side of the 

line and the state on the other. What makes work in Mexico so 

challenging today—and we see this even in cases that we document—is that you have organized crime working hand in glove 

with state agents, and this is not only at the local level. 

We have 70 cases in this report of people who were disappeared 

by state agents and handed over to cartels, who later were probably executed. So this is hand-in-hand work. 

The last point I would like to make, point I would like to make, 

is that I would be very wary of pointing to certain cities as success 

stories where the violence has gone down, because there are many 

narratives that we can construct in order to tell why the violence 

has decreased, for example in a place like Juarez or Tijuana, and 

one of them is that one of the organized crime groups that was battling for supremacy in those places succeeded in controlling that 

space and the other backed down. 

For every city or state where violence has decreased, there is another where it has increased. Juarez goes down, Torion goes up. 

Monterrey goes down, Veracruz heats up. So the violence and Mexico, I think we have to see it as an epidemic. In one place it may 

cool down, but overall the situation of capture of territory and of 

control of every aspect of daily life is very real. 

Thank you. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Final thoughts, Dr. Wood? 

Dr. WOOD. Yes. I think to answer the question we have to ask 

another question: What is it we are trying to achieve here? Are we 

trying to stop the flow of drugs or are we trying to reduce violence 

levels in Mexico to make it a more governable and a country that 

is governed by the rule of law, I would say? If we ask that question, 

then I think that there is no doubt in my mind that it is the Zetas 

who pose the biggest threat to Mexico, just in terms of the fact that 

you look at what is taking place in the state of Talmalpais right 

now and there is a complete absence of the rule of law. The fact 

is that we do not even know what is going on there because journalists are too terrified to report on it. 

I think that this is one of the issues that we really do need to 

work on, to try to get a clearer idea of what is happening in that 

state just across the border from the United States, and to ask the 

question of how we can actually have a positive impact upon that. 

Some of that work can take place at the border, but a lot of it has 

to take place with the Federal Government. I think we are really 

waiting right now for the Mexican Federal Government to come up 

with a strategy for Tamalpais. 

Overall, I would say that is the biggest challenge in the long 

term to Mexico, is to overcome the culture of impunity and to reestablish the rule of law, not just in terms of criminal law and jusFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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tice, but in terms of the economic rule of law throughout society as 

well. I would say that is really where we should be focusing our 

efforts. 

Thank you. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Well, let me just say in conclusion that I think this has been an 

excellent panel and I think your testimony has helped us really 

look at the challenges and look at what faces us and be able to 

come up with some realistic, good, solid, solid solutions to what is 

going on and know where we need to push. 

I also want to thank your organizations and your service to 

them. I think each of your organizations adds so much to the public 

discussion, and your dedication to them and the work that you do, 

it helps us I think here in the Senate kind of move in the right 

direction. 

So with that, we are going to leave the record open for one week, 

and the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 5:02 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

Æ

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