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IN THE SHADOW OF THE SPHINX

A HISTORY

 OF

 ARMY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

By

James L. Gilbert

John P. Finnegan

Ann Bray

History Office

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION

US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND

FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA

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THE SPHINX

Traditionally, the sphinx has been a symbol of strength and the keeping of secrets. It was because of

these characteristics that the Institute of Heraldry selected the sphinx in 1923 to represent the new discipline

of military intelligence. In 1949, Army counterintelligence began its close association with the sphinx when its

image was made part of the Counter Intelligence Corps School crest. In 1953, a gold-painted statue made its

appearance in front of CIC headquarters at Fort Holabird. The monument possessed a secret of its own—just

when and how it came to exist. The most popular rumor was that counterintelligence agents had originally

liberated it from in front of a brothel in France during World War II. After the closure of Fort Holabird, the

statue eventually found a home at Fort Huachuca, Arizona—the new location of the US Army Intelligence

Center and School. In keeping with the tradition of the sphinx, the men and women of counterintelligence for

nearly a century have guarded the secrets of the Nation and its Army from hostile intelligence services.

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FOREWORD

The challenges facing our Nation today in its war against terrorism are reminiscent of the security

concerns in the days leading up to World War I. Newspaper headlines told of large explosions in major

metropolitan areas, the presence of spy cells inside the country, and the capture of foreign saboteurs

crossing our borders. These events would ultimately result in the establishment of a permanent corps of

trained counterintelligence specialists within America’s Army.

During peacetime and war, counterintelligence has served to protect the Army’s most important

secrets; its success or failure often spell the difference between victory and defeat on the battlefield.

Highlights include the outstanding work performed by Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) detachments in

support of our combat forces during World War I and World War II. Later in the Korean War, the Army

turned to the CIC to establish and operate a very sophisticated, behind-the-lines network of intelligence

collectors. However, counterintelligence’s greatest contribution may have occurred in the occupation

period following World War II. In Germany and Austria, counterintelligence agents were responsible for

the successful denazification program that gave democracy a chance. In Japan, they served as the ears

and eyes of the occupation authorities to monitor the steps being taken towards a representative form of

government. Agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps were among the first to define and then confront the

emerging threat posed by communism bent on derailing the progress toward free societies, and throughout

the Cold War, counterintelligence would remain as the Army’s principal shield against hostile intelligence

services.

The end of the Cold War did not lessen the need for counterintelligence—in fact, just the opposite

occurred. The increased deployment of US warfighters in support of regional conflicts posed new challenges in the area of force protection. The coming of the Information Age meant that for the first time

foreign intelligence and other hostile elements could assess, steal, and transport a large volume of sensitive

material through cyberspace with little signature or latency. And in the war against global terrorism,

counterintelligence professionals remain engaged 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Today, counterintelligence is an integral part of the Army’s all-source intelligence capabilities, helping to analyze huge amounts

of raw data which can be funneled to commanders and law enforcement agencies in near real time.

All facets of counterintelligence have been touched upon, but as a matter of readability, the book is

weighted towards counterespionage. Regardless, it is still trusted that the reader will gain some appreciation of the total contribution that counterintelligence has made in support of the Nation and its Army for

over 90 years. It is also a story of individual sacrifice and dedication by counterintelligence personnel that

should continue to foster esprit de corps among future generations of military intelligence professionals.

JOHN F. KIMMONS

Major General, USA

Commanding

US Army Intelligence and Security Command

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PREFACE

It seems just the other day that my former colleague, Dr. John P. Finnegan, and I sat discussing the

possibility that he undertake the writing of a history on Army counterintelligence. Our talk ended with

his successfully persuading me against such a venture, principally because of the lack of easy access to

primary sources. When I was later tasked with the current project, I reflected back on my earlier

dialogue with Dr. Finnegan and wondered if I should have been more insistent.

In preparing the document, I was given two choices: write around the earlier works of Ann Bray

and John Finnegan, which while significant were far from complete, or be inclusive. Since both authors

labored under the auspices of military intelligence, I decided to stand on their shoulders and give them

full credit for their sizable contributions. By its very nature, counterintelligence history is dependent

upon personal accounts. Thus, I opted to supplement the narrative with a generous number of photos

and personal stories. Although portions of the counterintelligence history have been told before, this

volume is intended to serve as a useful overview linking these fragments. It is my hope that the counterintelligence order of battle will be found useful to other researchers in the future. Regardless of the

format, some readers will be disappointed that certain themes were not more fully developed, but I can

only trust that an equal number will find the volume a useful primer on the subject.

Major General (later LTG) Keith B. Alexander, then INSCOM Commander, first suggested the

idea for this book. His successor, MG John F. Kimmons encouraged the History Office to proceed

with publication. Oversight and support to the project were provided by Mr. Daniel Scarfo, Chief,

Strategic Management and Information Office. The final product benefited greatly from the reading

and comments of Mr. Thomas N. Hauser, staff historian, and from the editorial expertise of Mrs.

Karen E. Kovach, writer-editor. Ms. Romana Danysh, Organization Branch, Center of Military

History, provided invaluable assistance on the background of Counter Intelligence Corps units. Credit

for the design of this publication belongs to James Hubbard, Visual Information Specialist of the

INSCOM Public Affairs Office.

The project benefited significantly from the talents of Mr. Robert J. Bills of INSCOM Photo Lab

and assistance of the US Army Cryptologic Records Center. Non-INSCOM photos are credited to

National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Library of Congress (LC), and US Army

Heritage and Education Center (AHEC). Special thanks to the Defense Visual Information Center for

their support in obtaining a number of the photos. Finally, several members of the INSCOM staff read

the manuscript and offered important insights. However, all errors and omissions are solely the responsibility of the author.

JAMES L. GILBERT

Command Historian

US Army Intelligence and Security Command

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD iii

PREFACE v

CHAPTER ONE: CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICE

The Beginnings 1

World War I 4

Between the Wars 17

CHAPTER TWO: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS IN WORLD WAR II

Joining the Fight 23

Retreat on the Home Front 31

Foothold in Europe 37

Advance toward Germany 43

Invasion of Germany 51

The Pacific 58

CIC Worldwide 69

CHAPTER THREE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS DURING THE OCCUPATION

Return to Normalcy 81

Occupation of Europe 86

Post-War Pacific 98

CHAPTER FOUR: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE COLD WAR

The Korean War 111

Advent of Human Intelligence 119

A Decade of Turbulence 127

New Directions 138

The End of the Cold War 146

EPILOGUE 155

BIBLIOGRAPHY 157

APPENDICES 161

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“There is one evil I dread, and that is, their spies. I could wish, therefore, the

most attentive watch be kept...I wish a dozen or more of honest, sensible and

diligent men, were employed...in order to question, cross-question etc., all such

persons as are unknown, and cannot give an account of themselves...I think it a

matter of importance to prevent them from obtaining intelligence of our

situation.”

General George Washington, 24 March 1776

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THE BEGINNINGS

It has been said that intelligence is the art of knowing

one’s enemies. If that is so, then counterintelligence is

the craft of shielding one’s own secrets from hostile

intelligence agencies. Counterintelligence as an

organized discipline is a product of the 20th century, but

individuals as far back as the Revolutionary War have

from time to time engaged in the business of catching

enemy spies and protecting secrets. Although fragmented, these beginnings are an essential part of the

counterintelligence story.

Drawing upon first-hand experience gained during

the French and Indian War as well as knowledge

obtained from books of his day, General George Washington, Commander of the Continental Army, became an

early advocate and practitioner of military intelligence.

Besides establishing and running his own spy nets and

deception operations, Washington equally demanded

that his own plans be kept utmost secret and routinely

instructed his staff to be on guard against enemy spies:

“...All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the

whole matter as Secret as possible. For upon Secrecy

success depends....”

Washington’s senior intelligence officer, CPT (later

Colonel) Benjamin Tallmadge, was a key player in the

most heralded case involving counterintelligence during

the Revolutionary War. Learning from his sources that a

certain “John Anderson” was expecting the surrender of

a major fort being held by the patriots, Tallmadge

immediately placed guards on alert. Upon hearing that a

suspect by that name had passed through the lines to

meet with General Benedict Arnold, commander at West

Point on the Hudson River, Tallmadge acted quickly to

intercept Anderson, who turned out to be the British

spy-chief, MAJ John Andre in disguise. A search

revealed incriminating documents concealed inside his

boot. Control of the Hudson River was preserved, and

America’s most infamous traitor—General Benedict

Arnold—unmasked. In a follow-up operation, CPT

David Gray of Massachusetts, posing as a deserter,

became the courier for Andre’s successor, MAJ Oliver

DeLancey. To add credibility to Gray’s cover story,

General Washington took the precaution of having

Captain Gray listed as a deserter. For 2 years, Gray

CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICE

CHAPTER ONE

successfully penetrated the British Secret Service in New

York, obtaining vital information on its spy network.

For nearly a century and a half, the Army would view

intelligence and counterintelligence as skills not needed in

peacetime. The only emphasis on security was in the area

of guarding the army. A manual of the times cited the

requirement for a cadre of guards to ward off any surprise

attack by the enemy and cited the traditional role of

pickets and sentinels. “On the march the security of the

army is provided for by advance guards, rear guards, and

flanking detachments.” Cavalry normally fulfilled these

functions. The next real milestone for counterintelligence

did not occur until 1861, when the outbreak of the Civil

War threatened the Nation’s very existence.

Major John Andre, Adjutant General to the English Army and

spy chief, was hanged on 1 October 1780 at the New York

headquarters of the Continental Army. (LC)

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Washington, DC, not only

served as the capital of the North

and the center of its war-planning

activities but also as home to

many Southern sympathizers,

making it fertile ground for

Confederate spies. Union COL

Charles P. Stone, who served as

Inspector General of the District of

Columbia, estimated that at the

start of the war there were

potentially 20,000 citizens of the

District who would gladly aid the

Southern cause. Consequently,

the Confederacy carefully created

a number of spy routes along

which flowed a steady stream of

information from Washington, DC,

through southern Maryland and

on to the Southern capital of

Richmond, Virginia.

Over the course of the war, two

men would be entrusted with

leading the effort to safeguard the

secrets of the Nation’s capital.

The first was Allan Pinkerton, a

Scottish immigrant who had

discovered that he possessed

investigative skills and had

proceeded to turn them into a wellestablished, money-making

enterprise—the Pinkerton National

Detective Agency. Based out of

Chicago, Pinkerton had come to

the attention of railroad executive

George M. McClellan, and when

McClellan was appointed as a

Union commander, Pinkerton came

along as head of the general’s

intelligence-gathering operation.

Following the defeat of the

Federals at the Battle of Manassas

on 21 July 1861—a defeat that Union authorities believed to have in part been

brought about by timely information furnished by Confederate spies based in

Washington, DC—President Abraham Lincoln appointed General McClellan

Commander of the Army of the Potomac. With McClellan headquartered temporarily in the District, Pinkerton and his so-called “Secret Service” turned their

attention to catching spies for the War Department.

High on Pinkerton’s list of suspects was Rose O’Neal Greenhow, an attractive

and charming widow and prominent Washington hostess who had connections

with leading figures in government and the military. Pinkerton would later

In 1861, famed detective Allan Pinkerton (shown here with President Lincoln) helped to

capture several important Confederate spies. (LC)

2

Allan Pinkerton recalled with some embellishment a night spent performing surveillance outside Rose

Greenhow’s residence: “a storm burst upon us in all of its fury. Umbrellas were a useless commodity and,

unprotected, we were compelled to breast the elements, which were now warring with terrible violence.”

Standing on the shoulders of his assistants, Pinkerton peered inside the house, only to find the room lit but

empty. Upon hearing footsteps, the counter-spies quickly hid and watched. A captain assigned to the

Office of the Provost Marshal knocked on the door and was greeted by Greenhow herself. Taking up his

position again at the window, Pinkerton described what happened next, “he [the officer] took from an inner

pocket of his coat a map which, as he held it before the light, I imagined that I could identify a plan of the

fortifications in and around Washington. My blood boiled with indignation.”

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describe her as a woman with “almost irresistible seductive powers.” To collect evidence and identify her

sources of information, Pinkerton and his operatives kept

watch on Greenhow’s residence, which was located just

two blocks north of the White House and a block west of

General McClellan’s headquarters. After observing her in

the act of receiving plans from an Army officer, Pinkerton

had Rose Greenhow placed under arrest. A follow-up

search of her house uncovered incriminating documents

and codes.

When McClellan departed Washington, DC, to launch

a campaign against Richmond, Pinkerton went along to

provide intelligence estimates on the enemy’s strength.

The counterintelligence vacuum left behind would soon

be filled by a 36-year-old, red-bearded, itinerant mechanic

by the name of Lafayette Baker. A native of New York,

Baker had journeyed to the gold fields of California where

he gained prominence as a leader in the vigilante movement. Once the war broke out, Baker offered his services

as a spy for the Union. Following the conclusion of an

espionage mission to Richmond, Baker was tapped to

head counterintelligence operations within the State

Department, largely involving tracking down contraband

mail and merchandise. Baker and his so-called “National

Detective Police” even performed liaison with the New

York City police and sent agents on assignment to

Canada.

When Edwin M. Stanton became Secretary of War, he

commissioned Baker and gave him the title of “Special

Agent.” Over the next 3 years, Colonel Baker and his

cadre of 30 agents labored to neutralize the threat of

Southern spies by methods that often were viewed as

intimidating by those on the receiving end. Upon taking

an oath of allegiance to the Union, most of the internees

obtained their release from the Old Capital Prison, now site

of the Supreme Court Building. Baker also maintained

contact with other military departments and local army

headquarters. (Although armies for the North and the

South used their cavalry and spies to collect information,

no equivalent counterintelligence organization is known

to have existed in the field.) Baker’s last major assignment

consisted of directing the capture of conspirators involved in the assassination of President Lincoln.

Military Information Division

In the latter part of the 19th century, the Army began

taking steps to modernize. Its recognition of the need for

greater professionalism resulted in the creation of a school

in 1881 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for infantry and

cavalry officers. The Army also acknowledged the need

for more information on military-related developments

abroad. This, coupled with pressure on the Army to keep

up with the Navy’s new Office of Naval Intelligence,

culminated in 1885 in the establishment of a Military

Information Division (MID) within The Adjutant General’s

Office. Initially, Army leaders viewed MID as simply a

reference library located within the ornate State, War, and

Navy Building (now the Eisenhower Executive Office

Building) next to the White House. In 1889, Congress

approved, for the first time, the dispatching of military

attachés to the major European capitals (Paris, Petersburg,

London, Berlin, and Vienna) to actively gather information

and send reports back to MID at the War Department.

In the late 19th century, the principal spokesman for

military intelligence was COL Arthur L. Wagner, an

instructor at the Fort Leavenworth School. Here, Wagner

wrote the book The Service of Security and Information,

an early primer on the use of intelligence and counterintelligence. When apprehending a suspected spy, Wagner

furnished the following guidance: “...he should be

carefully searched, his clothes ripped apart, the soles and

heels of his shoes cut open, and his buttons examined.”

He went on to describe how the spy’s hair, beard, and

mouth should be carefully inspected along with all pieces

of equipment and weapons. Considered a visionary for

his time, Wagner received command of the Military

Information Division and, during the Spanish-American

War in 1898, oversaw the strengthening of its intelligencegathering capabilities. In the process, Wagner exposed a

3

During much of the war, Colonel Lafayette Baker headed the

Union’s counterintelligence effort in Washington, DC. (LC)

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Colonel Arthur L. Wagner was an early visionary in the practice of

intelligence and security. (NARA)

number of young officers to the potential of

military intelligence. Among those who fell under

Wagner’s influence was CPT Ralph H. Van

Deman. Although trained as a medical doctor,

Van Deman would instead devote his life to the

cause of promoting intelligence, and subsequently play an important role in shaping modern

counterintelligence.

The conclusion of the Spanish-American War

left the United States, for the first time, with major

overseas responsibilities in Puerto Rico and the

Philippines. Having been liberated from Spanish

rule, Filipino patriots quickly turned against their

new masters. When conventional warfare failed,

the nationalists led by Emilio Aguinaldo resorted

to guerrilla tactics. In response, the Army

organized a volunteer force consisting of 2-year

enlistees for the purpose of fighting what would

become a drawn-out campaign.

To aid in identifying and locating the enemy,

Army leaders formed an autonomous Military

Information Division of the Philippines in 1901.

One of its primary purposes was maintaining files

on enemy insurgents; at the head of this records

section was Captain Van Deman. MID also

assembled an invaluable collection of maps on

the Philippines and even sent its own undercover

agents to gather first-hand information. In the

process, MID brought to light a serious counterintelligence problem—the presence of undercover

Japanese agents, some of whom were posing as

local businessmen. Whenever Japanese agents

were identified, US officials promptly took steps

to deport them. In one instance, an officer of the

Japanese General Staff was among those killed

while fighting alongside Philippine insurgents in

southern Luzon.

 In 1900, the United States was little more than

100 years old and on the verge of becoming a

world power. Unlike European powers which had

a long tradition of intelligence gathering, only a

handful of Army officers embraced the need for a

full-time military intelligence effort. It would take

a major international conflict before the Nation

and its Army would acknowledge the requirement

for permanent organizations dedicated to spying

and spy-catching.

WORLD WAR I

When war broke out among the major European powers in 1914, President Woodrow Wilson

fell back upon America’s long-standing policy of

neutrality. In the past, the Atlantic Ocean had

shielded the United States from conflicts on the European continent. However, Britain’s paper blockade (enforced in part with the

employment of mines to prevent goods from reaching Germany),

coupled with Germany’s introduction of submarine warfare, placed

America’s goods, passengers, and principles at risk. The most

shocking incident was the sinking—without warning—of the

British passenger ship Lusitania by a German U-boat. The pride

of the British merchant marine went down on 7 May 1915 with

1,198 civilians on board, including 128 Americans.

On the home front, the United States’ confidence in its policy of

neutrality was being shaken by a series of incidents involving

sabotage by German agents. Although few lives were lost, the

total effect was to heighten tensions and war rhetoric. The most

dramatic of these acts occurred on 30 July 1916 in New York

Harbor where a pier on Black Tom Island, containing a thousand

tons of munitions destined for the Allied powers, exploded with

such a force that shrapnel scarred the Statue of Liberty, shattered

windows in Times Square, and woke sleeping citizens as far away

as the state of Maryland. The other major attack took place at the

Navy Yard on Mare Island in San Pablo Bay, California. In the

midst of these growing tensions, voices of the “preparedness

movement” grew louder for general conscription and training of

US soldiers. On the other hand, only one lone voice advocated

the strengthening of military intelligence.

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Following a 5-year hiatus from Washington, DC, MAJ

(soon Colonel) Ralph Van Deman returned in 1915 to find

that the Military Information Division had atrophied to the

point where the War Department was without any viable

intelligence organization. The entire operation consisted

of a handful of clerks, routinely filing attaché reports

without reading or analyzing them. Sensing that US

involvement in the war was imminent, Van Deman argued

passionately for establishing a permanent intelligence

organization similar to those of European armies, but his

“numerous memoranda” to the Army Chief of Staff went

unanswered.

In 1917, Germany announced unrestricted submarine

warfare against all ships carrying goods to its enemies.

The sinking of US ships without warning finally forced

President Wilson to ask Congress for a Resolution of War:

“The world must be made safe for democracy.” On 6 April

1917, the United States entered the war on the side of the

Allies. Nevertheless, General Hugh L. Scott, the Army’s

Chief of Staff and a veteran of the Indian wars in the west,

remained intransigent against the creation of a viable

intelligence organization. If the United States stood in

need of intelligence, General Scott reasoned it could be

obtained from America’s new allies. Van Deman later

wrote, “No amount of talking or argument would change

the Chief of Staff’s opinion, and after two or three such

interviews, he became exasperated and ordered me not to

approach the Secretary of War.”

Undaunted, Van Deman remained resolved to raise the

issue with Secretary of War Newton Baker. Prohibited to

go in person, Van Deman utilized personal acquaintances

as envoys, including the Chief of Police of the District of

Columbia, who regularly breakfasted at a private club with

the Secretary. Fortunately, Secretary Baker proved

receptive to the idea and in May 1917 issued instructions

to establish the Military Intelligence Section within the

Army’s War College. For his effort Van Deman would later

be called the “Father of Military Intelligence,” but in the

interim, he suffered the humiliation of having his promotion to general officer temporarily scuttled by an indignant

Chief of Staff.

In his “Final Memoranda,” Van Deman described the

inauspicious beginnings of the Military Intelligence

Section; “It is unbelievable, but when we entered the war

the branch consisted of two officers and two clerks.”

Using the British intelligence system as a model, Van

Deman’s organization soon ballooned to a staff reaching

over 1500 military and civilian members, transforming the

Intelligence Section into a separate division—Military

Intelligence Division or MID. Van Deman bifurcated his

organization into Positive (Intelligence) and Negative

Prior to the United States entering World War I, German saboteurs successfully destroyed the munitions sheds on Black Tom Island

in New York Harbor. (NARA)

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(Counterintelligence) Branches.

Underneath the two major subsections

were 14 functional areas that performed

such diverse missions as training

intelligence officers for duty overseas,

supervising military attachés, and

testing correspondence for secret inks.

After several moves, the MID finally

settled into its wartime headquarters at

the Hooe Building on 1330 F Street,

Northwest, two blocks directly east of

the White House.

Internal Threat

Separated by an ocean, the American

Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France

remained independent from the leadership of the War Department. It soon

became apparent that positive collecColonel Ralph M. Van Deman, later dubbed the “Father of Military Intelligence,” served as first Chief of the War Department’s

Military Intelligence Division. (NARA)

For most of the war, the Military Intelligence Division worked out of the upper

floors of the Hooe Building in the District of Columbia. (LC)

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One of the first security steps taken was the issuing of passes for

all War Department employees. (INSCOM)

tion of intelligence against Imperial Germany could be

better accomplished by the AEF than by a War Department element 3,000 miles to the rear. Consequently, Van

Deman would direct much of his attention to the new field

of negative intelligence or counterintelligence: “the

supervision and control of such a system of

military...counterespionage as shall be

established...during the continuance of the present war.”

When the United States joined the war against

Germany in 1917, the country believed itself to be confronted by a substantial threat from within. America was

still a nation of immigrants, many of whom had recently

arrived from countries in Europe that were now at war.

The loyalty of German Americans was naturally questioned, but the War Department was equally unsure of

where Irish Americans, Scandinavian Americans, and even

African Americans stood. In fact, the Army recruited two

African-American undercover agents to travel the country

for the sole purpose of ascertaining their racial group’s

views on the war. Besides the problem posed by

unassimilated ethnics, a significant anti-war movement

persisted. Finally, early in the war, the politicians, the

press, and military leadership exaggerated the scope and

power of the German espionage and sabotage organization

within the United States. This meant that the threat, real or

imagined, demanded action.

Against these perceived menaces in 1917, the United

States seemed almost defenseless. The Treasury Department had a Secret Service, but it was confined by law to

narrowly circumscribed duties. The Department of Justice

maintained a Bureau of Investigation, but its mission

before the outbreak of war largely consisted of investigating cases of fraud against the government. Finally, a few

major cities had organized police “bomb squads” to deal

with the anarchist threat. This lack of civilian resources in

the counterintelligence field spurred the Army to launch

its own wide-sweeping program.

In June 1917, Van Deman took the first steps toward

ensuring that War Department offices had security guards

and that all personnel were issued identification cards.

He then proceeded to set up a War Department security

force of civilian investigators. This “Personnel Improvement Bureau” was first intended as a guard force, but

soon began screening military personnel and applicants

for government employment. A month later, the Military

Intelligence Division opened its first field office in New

York City, staffed by 23 former members of the police

department’s Neutrality and Bomb Squad. Six additional

field offices—Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, New

Orleans, Hoboken (New Jersey), and San Juan (Puerto

Rico)—were eventually set up in major cities and at

embarkation points. Of all the field offices, New York City

was the busiest. It was responsible for over 400 arrests

during the war, including picking up an individual for

impersonating an officer, shutting down an anti-war

printing operation run by “Reds,” and apprehending

escaped international criminals and terrorists.

As the necessity for undercover investigations of

individuals and organizations grew in the Washington,

DC, area, Van Deman sent out a call for a group of

individuals with the requisite skills; the majority selected

came from the Metropolitan Police of New York City.

Upon their arrival in Washington, DC, the recruits were

quartered in a private house in the southeast part of the

city. Wearing civilian clothes, this squad of elite investigators worked incognito; knowledge of their existence was

limited to those within the direct chain of command. A

captain, also formerly of the NYPD, assumed the role of

leader. Looking back, Van Deman saw this small group as

foreshadowing the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) of a

later generation.

Countersubversion

The Military Intelligence Division was particularly

concerned about possible subversion from within the

ranks of the vast new citizen Army being raised by the

draft. The draft act passed by Congress in May 1917 was

designed to tap as much of the national manpower pool as

possible. Granting few exemptions, the act impartially

swept up American citizens and resident foreign nationals,

including citizens of enemy countries. Regarding this

heterogeneous force as posing a serious threat to national

security, Van Deman believed the newly formed National

Guard and National Army divisions in particular to be

vulnerable to agents of the Central Powers and their

sympathizers. A fellow intelligence officer echoed many of

these same concerns, “...unless we proceed on an

extensive and thorough scale, the enemy with his existing

system in the United States, will be stronger than we are

right in our own army and we will be helpless.”

In October 1917, Van Deman ordered intelligence

officers just assigned to the newly activated divisions to

come to Washington, DC, under conditions of tight

secrecy. Upon reporting, the officers received instruction

on how to set up a secret surveillance program within their

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respective units. Van Deman would later extend the

program to Regular Army divisions and installations by

using guidelines contained in a confidential pamphlet,

“Provisional Counter-Espionage Instructions.” The

counterespionage program conceived by Van Deman’s

staff was comprehensive. It called for the creation of a

clandestine agent network throughout the Army, extending down to company level. Nets in each division would

be overseen by an assistant to the intelligence officer and

would work through a system of anonymous collection

managers. At the bottom of this secret pyramid, two

“operatives” mutually unknown to one another would be

recruited from each company. As the process worked,

these MID observers would submit reports on their fellow

soldiers. Eventually, the divisional intelligence officer

gathered and relayed them to the military intelligence staff

at the War Department. Once this system was fully

operational, more than 400 divisional and installation

intelligence officers produced a growing stream of incident

reports that drove the relentless expansion of a counterintelligence organization to conduct follow-up investigations. To supplement the efforts of his overextended force

of intelligence officers, Van Deman hired civilian detectives and recruited unpaid volunteers; however, he soon

found a fresh source of investigative manpower from

within the enlisted ranks—the Corps of Intelligence Police.

After his arrival in Europe, Colonel Dennis E. Nolan,

intelligence chief for the American Expeditionary Forces,

became concerned about the possible security problems

faced by American troops operating on foreign soil. In

early July 1917, he requested that The Adjutant General

furnish him “fifty secret service men who have had

training in police work [and] speak French fluently.” He

added that it was essential they be men of “high character” with “courage and unquestioned probity.” This called

Colonel Dennis E. Nolan, G2 for the AEF, initiated a call for establishment of the Corps of Intelligence Police. (NARA)

8

33290_P001_176.pmd 16 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
for a category of intelligence personnel not previously

envisioned by anybody in the War Department. In

August, authorization was approved, creating a 50-man

Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP) made up of enlisted

soldiers who would serve with the “rank, pay, and

allowances” of sergeants of infantry.

Tasked with furnishing the appropriate personnel for

the AEF, Colonel Van Deman immediately ran into difficulties. Private detective agencies at first seemed a likely

source, but when told of the Army’s requirement for

French-speaking investigators, the head of the Pinkerton

Agency quickly dismissed such a preposterous notion,

“There ain’t no such animal.” The War Department was

eventually reduced to sending a recruiting officer to New

Orleans and New York City where he placed advertisements in local papers. All candidates who could pass the

Army physical and answer a few simple questions in

French were promptly signed up, shipped off to Fort Jay in

New York Harbor for a month’s training as infantry,

outfitted with distinctive green-corded campaign hats and

collar brass marked “IP” for Intelligence Police, and put on

a boat bound for France without civilian clothes or any

instruction in intelligence work.

Besides helping to meet the security needs of the AEF,

the Corps of Intelligence Police would also help solve the

personnel problems of the MID on the home front. The

iron broom of the draft had swept highly qualified people

into the ranks of the Army; men with backgrounds in law,

education, and insurance were especially suited for

counterintelligence work. Furthermore, the military

strongly believed in the principle that investigations of

Army personnel should be carried out by other soldiers.

In November 1917, the Military Intelligence Division

requested an additional 250 CIP agents to assist its

counterintelligence program. One unexpected consequence was that many of the civilians previously emAircraft plants were among the first war-time industries to be covered by new security regulations protecting against sabotage.

(NARA)

9

33290_P001_176.pmd 17 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
ployed by Van Deman chose to promptly enlist in the

Corps of Intelligence Police.

In addition to focusing on the Army, the Military

Intelligence Division monitored the activities of those

individuals or groups in the civilian population who were

suspected of opposing the draft and wishing to hamper

war production. The operative premise was that “the

misbehavior, disloyalty, or indifference of native Americans is as important a material of military intelligence as

any other.”

To conduct its duties in the civilian sector, the Military

Intelligence Division found it necessary to maintain an

active liaison with a host of other government agencies,

especially the Department of Justice, which alone had

powers of arrest and prosecution in cases of civilian

offenses against the military.

To carry out its mission, MID relied on two civilian

auxiliaries for help: the Plant Protective Service and the

American Protective League. Major General George O.

Squier, the Chief Signal Officer who oversaw Army

aviation, created the Plant Protective Service to protect the

country’s new aircraft industry from sabotage and laborrelated activities that could slow or stop production.

Subsequently, the umbrella of the Plant Protection Service

began to cover other industrial facilities working under

war-time, government contracts. Inevitably, the Plant

Protective Service came under the supervisory wing of

military intelligence in January 1918.

The American Protective League was larger and less

official in character. Estimates of the league’s strength

ranged between 60,000 and 200,000, with the organization

itself favoring the latter number. The league was an

amalgam of several vigilante groups originally tied

together to help the Department of Justice uncover spies

and saboteurs. Regarding the early independence of the

American Protective League, Van Deman expressed grave

concern, “This sort of thing was extremely dangerous and

it was evident that these must be stopped at once.” Van

Deman sought to curb the organization’s excesses while

still making use of its thousands of members to keep watch

over suspicious activities and help enforce the draft. Van

Deman accomplished his goal by issuing guidelines

making the American Protective League accountable to

MID. As an added measure, Van Deman had the American

Protective League’s top leaders commissioned as military

intelligence officers. In 1918, Congress debated a bill

which would lead to the declaration of “war zones” around

military sensitive areas and further extend the power of

MID. However, the Department of Justice successfully

deflected such a proposal.

Even elements of the Positive Branch within MID

supported the counterintelligence mission. For instance,

MI-8, which was responsible for breaking codes, had its

greatest success against enemy agent communications.

The Signal Corps maintained a series of monitoring sites

along the southwest border with Mexico and in Maine

where they copied messages from German intelligence

operatives attempting to enter the United States and do

harm; the intercept was then forwarded to MI-8 for

decoding and translating.

The Army’s most widely heralded case of spy catching

in the war involved codebreaking. Byron S. Butcher of the

CIP recruited an informant in Mexico City to keep tabs on

Luther Witzke, a German Navy lieutenant turned saboteur

who was responsible for a number of bombings in the

United States. Butcher learned from his source that

Witzke was planning a return trip from Mexico where he

had been in hiding under the Russian name of Pablo

Waberski. Van Deman summarized what followed, giving

MI-8 credit for helping to solve the case: “Witzke was

detained at the border and placed in jail and the coded

message found on his person sent to the ... Code and

Cipher Section and decoded during a single night. This

led to the trial and conviction of Witzke who was sentenced to death.”

10

Military Intelligence Division’s

Organization 1918

Negative Branch Positive Branch

MI-3 (Counter- MI-2 (Intel

Espionage within Analysis &

the Army) Reporting)

MI-4 (Counter- MI-5 (Attaché

Espionage outside Collection)

the Army)

MI-10 (Censor- MI-6 (TransShip) lation)

MI-11 (Passport MI-7 (Graphics

Control) Support)

MI-13 (Graft MI-8 (Crypt-

& Fraud) ology)

MI-9 (Combat

Intel Training)

33290_P001_176.pmd 18 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
An Evaluation of the Threat

The threat against the home front to which MID had

directed much of its efforts fortunately never materialized

and, in fact, never existed. Hyphenated Americans

remained loyal, and enemy agents were few in number and

largely ineffective. Looking back on these beginnings,

MAJ Garland Williams, Chief, Corps of Intelligence Police

on the eve of World War II, offered the following scathing

commentary: “In the United States the Corps of Intelligence Police was composed of many well-meaning but

inexperienced officers, enlisted men, and civilians and

their unorganized efforts accomplished practically

nothing. It is said that the organization may have caught

one spy.” Despite such criticism, the screening of

American “doughboys” prior to shipment to France

ensured that no act of espionage was perpetrated within

the ranks of the AEF. Similarly, MID also ensured the

loyalty of civilian workers, such as Red Cross and other

support personnel, destined for the rear areas of the AEF.

If there were excesses and misdirected energies, they

could be blamed in large part on the fact that World War I

had no precedent. Starting from scratch, Van Deman and

his staff constructed an organization that established a

series of basic security safeguards and practices that

would continue in times of peace: industrial security, a

personal identification system, and background checks.

The Military Intelligence Division also reigned in the

potential excesses of such quasi-official groups as the

American Protective League. Most important, WWI led to

the establishment of a permanent counterintelligence arm

within the army—the Corps of Intelligence Police. For the

next 50 years, the CIP and its successors would remain

one of the two major pillars of military intelligence, the

other being signals intelligence.

Over There

Upon his arrival in France, COL (later Brigadier General)

Dennis E. Nolan as the G2 of the American Expeditionary

Forces (AEF) immediately requested assistance from the

War Department to address the potential counterintelligence problem. His French and British counterparts had

emphasized to him the need to stop enemy agents from

entering France and Belgium along the American sector of

operations. This prompted Nolan to request from Colonel

Van Deman in July that a Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP)

be established. The first group of 50 sergeants under the

command of 1LT Royden Williamson finally arrived in

December. One American officer was quick to label them

as “a delegation of ‘Cajuns’ from Louisiana, a sprinkling of

Army counterintelligence screened civilians who went to France to work in the rear areas, such as members of the Red Cross.

(NARA)

11

33290_P001_176.pmd 19 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
Sergeant Peter de Pasqua, who served with the Corps of Intelligence Police in the rear area of the

American Expeditionary Forces, was a master of several languages giving him the ability to move

unnoticed in the disguise of an interpreter for the American Red Cross. He frequented the various eating

and drinking establishments of the old French city of Beaune with his ears open to the sentiments

expressed by the local clientele. While visiting a local bistro, Pietro, as de Pasqua called himself, quickly

befriended a Spaniard by the name of Diaz, who was openly threatening the Americans. Diaz’s

companions included a second Spaniard who, like Diaz, had been hired as a laborer on building projects

undertaken by the American Services of Supply and a third individual who was an invalid French veteran

with radical political leanings. Under Diaz’s leadership, the three were in the middle of planning various

acts of sabotage and were in contact with a German spymaster located in Spain. They brought Pietro into

their confidence when he offered to obtain an American mail censorship stamp to aid in their

correspondence to Spain. In his role as courier, Pietro was able to learn of the group’s plans for destroying

a major munitions depot. This information was passed on to French authorities who proceeded to arrest

the would-be saboteurs. For his part, de Pasqua was awarded the Citation for Meritorious Service and in

the process earned the distinction of being the first member of the Corps of Intelligence Police to be

formally decorated.

Members of CIP in support of the Rear Zone. Sergeant Peter de Pasqua, first agent to be decorated, stands on the last row, far left.

Officers and stenographers are in the front row. (INSCOM)

12

33290_P001_176.pmd 20 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
Counterintelligence in Action: Belgian and US intelligence officers question a suspected enemy agent. (NARA)

13

Specialists were assigned to the Counter-Espionage Section at GHQ. One function was to search for secret inks that might reveal

invisible codes hidden in correspondence. (NARA)

33290_P001_176x1.pmd 21 11/28/2005, 3:32 PM
enlisted men operated out of Hotel St. Anne until relocated to more suitable quarters at No.11 Avenue

Montaigne. The move was heralded by a large explosion

in the nearby street when an 8.26-inch shell used by the

German’s so-called “Paris guns” landed from an estimated

75 miles away. The Rear Zone CIP had two sub-headquarters, one at Tours, which was the headquarters to the

Services of Supply (SOS), and the other in London;

together they fulfilled four major missions—port, frontier,

depot, and recreational area security. There were 14 major

ports in France, England, and Scotland; 400 miles of

frontier of Spain and Italy; and 31 French cities with

American supply, service, or training depots. Finally, CIP

personnel oversaw the security of seven centers that

hosted soldiers on temporary leave from the front.

In one instance, the Military Intelligence Division back

at the War Department furnished information that led CIP

agents within the AEF to search certain vessels arriving in

French ports where they discovered explosives concealed

among cargo destined for the front lines. The source of

this intelligence may have been Dr. Walter T. Von Scheele,

a spy and saboteur who had traveled to Cuba where he

was apprehended through the efforts of the local military

attaché, CPT Thomas F. Van Natta. Ironically, Von Scheele

would later blow himself up while attempting to demonstrate for American intelligence how his incendiary bombs

worked.

In the spring of 1918, the War Department issued

“Counter Espionage Principles,” which outlined the duties

of a counterintelligence officer. Among other things, the

instructions defined the relationship between counterespionage and criminal investigations: offenses and crimes

“are of interest to Intelligence Officers only when possibly

connected with enemy activity...avoid the dissipation of

energy in following cases of vice, liquor selling, fraud,

draft evasion, and desertion unless these are traceable to

French Canadians, a number of Europeans, a coterie of

Harvard men; and their professional antecedents ran the

gamut of occupations.” Following screening by French

authorities who rejected many as undesirables, to include

a deserter from the French army, those passing final

muster were hustled off to Le Havre to receive instruction

at the hands of veteran Allied counterintelligence officers.

Although the initial group was not promising, the CIP

had set a precedent. It was obvious to the AEF leadership

that more counterintelligence personnel were still needed,

and in January 1918, General John J. Pershing, Commander

of the AEF, requested the CIP quota be increased to 750

and local recruiting be allowed from among units already

overseas.

 Although this request was approved, CIP agents

assigned to the AEF never reached more than 452 by the

end of the war. As new recruits to the CIP arrived at

General Headquarters (GHQ) at Chaumont, they immediately began to study a series of manuals that outlined the

organizational chain of command for the Allies and

described the German spy system. Next they went

through a practical phase of training either at the ports of

Le Havre or Marseille or at one of the US corps headquarters. Eventually, American intelligence officers took over

this phase of the orientation from the British.

Approximately one-third of CIP members wound up in

what was called the Front Zone where the US was

responsible for 100 miles of territory contiguous to the

fighting front. Under the command of Colonel L.A.

Sigaud, the headquarters for the Front Zone was collocated with GHQ. The Front CIP Zone also had branches

with the First Army at Seine-et-Marne, and shortly before

the war ended, with the newly established Second Army at

Toul.

The American sector north of Toul and facing the St.

Mihiel salient was near enough to the region of Lorraine

to have a mixed civilian population (speaking both French

and German) with equally mixed loyalties. Crossing “No

Man’s Land” within the American Zone was rather safe

since the country was wooded, the terrain rough, and the

front relatively quiet. To reduce the flow of civilian traffic,

the CIP set up a system of travel controls that resulted in

scores of refugees and line crossers not properly identified being brought in for questioning. On the eve of the

St. Mihiel offensive in September 1918, the CIP assembled

a large body of its agents for the sole purpose of clearing

potential enemy agents from the area of operations.

Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Lester noted the CIP work “was

done so effectively that the movement of the troops was

unknown to the enemy until it was too late.”

The bulk of the CIP agents was in the Rear Zone and

was under the command of Colonel Cabot Ward. From

their Paris headquarters, Ward along with 8 officers and 15

 “...after the Armistice, one of the

senior intelligence officers of the

German Army...said he would like to

ask a question...why the 41st Division

had never appeared in line?...The fact

that the Germans did not learn of that

[the 41st had been made a base

division] until we told him after the

Armistice showed their agents were

poor or our system [counter-espionage]

was pretty effective.”

BG Dennis E. Nolan, G2, AEF

14

33290_P001_176.pmd 22 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
enemy activity.” This proved easier said than done,

especially in the rear areas of the AEF. Colonel Ward later

testified to conflict of interest, “Particularly during the

early months of the service we were called upon, in fact all

too frequently, to help the Military Police in running down

crimes committed by Americans upon the civil population,

investigating drinking places and low-class hotels.”

However, on a number of occasions, these types of

investigations did lead to uncovering serious security

risks. The CIP established a counterespionage organization at various US aviation camps that served 45 squadrons and maintained 740 airplanes. These efforts revealed

an international ring of cocaine traffickers trading drugs

for supplies and parts; follow-up undercover work by the

CIP brought to light evidence of a conspiracy to use

drugs to undermine the will of American soldiers to wage

war. Given this evidence, the French authorities proceeded to apprehend those involved.

Besides agents who worked in either the Front or Rear

Zones, a handful of CIP specialists were assigned to the

Counter-Espionage Section at GHQ. Here, members of

Special Projects helped compile a central card file (eventually numbering 160,000 names and 3,500 open cases),

search for invisible codes and inks, disseminate information received from Allied counterparts, and control travel

by rail. Special Projects even assigned one agent to

General Pershing’s private train. Other experts included an

agent who worked exclusively on “labor, socialism, and

Bolshevism cases;” another dealt with possible incidents

of sabotage at Army construction sites. Agent Walter J.

Goedeke, a former State Department employee from

Baltimore, Maryland, received a commission as a first

lieutenant and was given charge of examining passports

for forgery.

As a whole, the AEF’s counterintelligence effort

demonstrated itself to be more successful than its homefront counterpart and less controversial. Despite the

overwhelming size of its operations area, the Corps of

Intelligence Police had justified its existence by making

important contributions to the security of US combat

forces.

The Council of Four at the Peace Conference: Lloyd George (Great Britain), Vittorio Orlando (Italy), Georges Clemenceau

(France), and Woodrow Wilson (United States). Nearly 60 CIP agents were detached to support the conference. (NARA)

15

33290_P001_176.pmd 23 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
The Aftermath

Although the fighting stopped at the 11th hour on 11

November 1918, the work of the CIP in Europe continued.

As troops moved into evacuated or recaptured towns,

agents received “black” and “white” lists. Orders called

for apprehended suspects on the black list to “be sent

under escort for examination.” Those on the white list

filled out questionnaires. A number of these procedures

would later be replicated by counterintelligence personnel

in World War II.

Soon, Army counterintelligence found itself expending

much of its energies confronting an altogether new type

of threat—communism. The most visible case involved

the well-known American political cartoonist and correspondent by the name of Robert Minor, a key figure in

America’s anti-war movement. While traveling in post-war

Germany, Minor declared the time “ripe to spread the

doctrines of Lenin and Trotsky among the American

soldiers....” and proceeded to prepare a number of

circulars to that end. These writings resulted in Minor’s

arrest, being charged with distributing treasonous

propaganda, and his eventual return to the States where

he continued to dedicate his life and talents to the

Communist cause.

In support of the 1919 Peace Conference held in Paris,

the Army detailed 20 MID officers to accompany President

Wilson and the American delegation on their trip overseas. The Army also placed 60 CIP agents under the

command of Colonel Van Deman to provide security for

the United States delegates. One of the CIP sergeants

wrote that apart from helping to guard President Wilson,

they were mostly employed as “a species of bell boys,

ladies maids, and hall men.”

Peace At Home

On the domestic front, the small counterintelligence

element that remained at the end of the war also quickly

shifted its efforts from German spies to Bolshevik agents

and agitators. In the fall of 1919, an overwrought MID

officer warned that the “situation in the United States is

one that is verging on revolution....” The summaries

issued by the Military Intelligence Division contained

weekly reports of “radical activities” and “labor unrest,”

and the correspondence of BG Marlborough Churchill, the

current Chief of MID, reflected dire warnings of an

impending economic and social crisis. Consequently,

MID assumed an active role in helping to draft the War

Department’s Plan White, which provided for the use of

the Army in times of domestic disorder.

The establishment of the Workers’ (later Communist)

Party, followed by an intensive propaganda campaign and

isolated incidents of violence, resulted in the widespread

crackdown of political and labor agitators by the Department of Justice. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer

announced his “determination to drive from our midst the

agents of Bolshevism,” and promptly deported 249

individuals, including a number of known anarchists. As

the crisis subsided, the need for a strong peace-time

counterintelligence presence within the Army diminished

too. When the Nation retreated into the isolationism of

the 1920s, the Army proceeded to discontinue its

countersubversive system and recall all regulations on the

subject. The Negative Branch of MID, which had

supervised the War Department’s counterintelligence

work, formally closed its doors in 1921.

A Sideshow

When the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional

Government of Russia in the October Revolution of 1917,

they proceeded to sign a separate peace treaty with the

Germans. In August 1918, the Allies sent forces, including

5,000 US soldiers, to protect northern Russian ports near

Archangel from possible German attack and to secure

military stores located there. The creation of counterrevolutionary White armies soon placed the Allies on the

side of the anti-Bolshevik resistance groups. Unfortunately, the American Expeditionary Forces in northern

Russia faced serious morale problems that made them

susceptible to the intense barrage of Communist propaganda: the cold and isolation, resentment of being under

British command, association with numerous other

nationalities, and the natural desire to return to the States

with their comrades-in-arms following the end of the war

on the Western Front. Intelligence officers quickly

identified the source of the words being voiced by the

men in their complaints—Bolshevik propaganda leaflets.

Over time, the Allies experienced 13 mutinous actions that

included the refusal by a company of US infantry to pack

their sleds in response to a movement order. To no one’s

surprise, the leader of this act of disobedience was a

disaffected agitator working for the Soviets.

The American forces at Vladivostok came to eastern

Russia from the Philippines as a unified force of 9,000.

Four officers and 4 clerks were assigned the task of

providing counterintelligence support for the troops. In

his final report, the G2 wrote that their effort was an

overall success, “Attempts on the part of the Russians to

spread Bolshevik propaganda among our troops were

promptly discovered...There were a few cases of desertion to the Russian partisan or Bolshevik forces, but in

every case the soldiers were found to be Russians who

had apparently enlisted in the United States for that

purpose.” Besides their normal duties, counterintelligence

personnel also collected intelligence on local threats.

Eventually, deteriorating international conditions led the

United States to withdraw all its troops; first from Archangel in June 1919, and then from Vladivostok a year later in

April 1920.

16

33290_P001_176.pmd 24 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
BETWEEN THE WARS

By 1922, wartime emergency legislation had expired,

reducing the peacetime Army to 125,000. On the books,

the Army retained positions for 45 Corps of Intelligence

Police agents scattered among the various corps areas

across the continental United States (a disproportionate

number were committed to the Eighth Corps Area along

the Mexican Border). In all instances, counterintelligence

fell under the control of the local G2. Overseas, the CIP

supported Army troops stationed in the Panama, Hawaii,

and Philippine Departments. In terms of strategic sites,

the security of the Panama Canal was a high priority,

leading the Panama Canal Department to request the

services of two CIP agents in 1922. Priority not withstanding, the positions remained vacant for the next 5 years

until a highly capable Reserve lieutenant, trained in

intelligence work and fluent in four languages, arrived to

fill the position of staff sergeant. “Performing several

men’s work,” the new recruit checked with local Panamanian villagers for the presence of strangers and explosives. Despite efforts to expand this one-man operation,

the G2’s repeated calls for additional resources went

unanswered.

Hawaii had only four agents to monitor the local

population, a large segment of which was composed of

first- and second-generation Japanese. In addition, large

numbers of Chinese, Filipinos, and Koreans lived on the

islands. In the Philippines, it was not only a problem of

insufficient personnel, but capable ones. The Adjutant

General of the Philippine Department wrote to the War

Department, “Of the five sergeants on this duty only one

gives any promise of being a useful man in the capacity

for which he is paid by the United States. This man has

just arrived and is apparently fitted for the work by race,

intelligence and disposition.”

Domestic Intelligence

Because of the Army’s need to distance itself from

civilian political matters, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

(as the former Chief, MID had been redesignated) instructed CIP agents not to report on nonmilitary personnel. Absent the authority to conduct investigations, the

CIP concentrated on instructing troops in combat intelligence techniques. Behind the scenes, the debate over

what role, if any, the Corps of Intelligence Police should

have in peacetime continued. Representing one viewpoint

In response to the global depression, a number of would-be saviors appeared on the scene. (INSCOM)

17

33290_P001_176.pmd 25 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
with which the Army should in no wise concern itself... .”

On the other side of the debate, the man who established

the CIP in the first place, MG Dennis E. Nolan, now

Commanding General, Fifth Corps Area, lamented many of

the new restrictions on the CIP. For example, he believed

that the inability to conduct surveillance might well have

negated the very rationale for the corps. “...The restrictions on subversive coverage placed on the CIP in

December 1922 make it unnecessary to assign members of

the CIP to Corps Area.”

In 1922, the issue of domestic intelligence was briefly

resurrected when, without consulting his superiors, 1LT

W.D. Long, Post Intelligence Officer at Vancouver

Barracks, Washington, sent a letter to all County Sheriffs

in Oregon, informing them that the intention of the

Military Intelligence Division was to conduct surveillance

on all radical groups. Among the organizations listed by

Long were “World War Veterans, Socialists ...and

American Federation of Labor.” The contents of Long’s

letter were soon leaked to the newspapers, and the

subsequent outcry from readers led to the dismissal of

Lieutenant Long and MID’s reiteration for a second time

of its ban on surveillance of nonmilitary personnel.

was a respected

veteran of the AEF

leadership in

France, MG

Johnson Hargood,

Commanding

General, Seventh

Corps Area, who

wrote the following objection to a

peacetime CIP:

“As Chief of Staff

for the Services of

Supply in France,

the whole organization of counterespionage in the

back areas came

under my immediate jurisdiction and I fully realize the importance of this

service in time of war....But in my opinion in time of peace

in America, radicalism, communism, and efforts to overturn

the existing form of government are political questions

A handful of CIP agents circulated among the Bonus Army camps in an attempt to determine the intent of the marchers.

Eventually, Federal troops were called upon to disperse the mob once rioting broke out. (NARA)

18

A CIP agent badge. (INSCOM)

33290_P001_176.pmd 26 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
By 1932, the turmoil of the Great Depression caused the

ban on surveillance to be lifted on at least one occasion.

When World War I veterans gathered in Washington, DC,

as a Bonus Army and camped on the doorstep of Congress to press their pension demands, the Army staff

called upon the CIP to make a counterintelligence assessment of the situation, “furnishing information which was

obtainable in no other way, because of their ability to

associate with the veterans on terms of equality.” At the

same time, COL Alfred T. Smith, Assistant Chief of Staff,

G2, issued secret orders to all G2s to also report on any

other veteran disturbances in their respective corps areas.

But these actions remained the exception, and by 1934,

only 7 years away from America going to war again, the

Army had allowed the Corps of Intelligence Police to

dwindle to just 16 noncommissioned officers, and a

subsequent survey found that most of them were being

used as file clerks rather than as investigators.

On the other hand, security concerns did not fully

disappear from the Army’s consciousness during the

interwar years. A survey of the subject matter crossing

the desk of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, War Department, revealed a number of unofficial and official studies

on potential foreign intelligence threats and domestic

security issues, particularly those involving the Soviet

Union and the international communism movement, and

Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany were soon added to the

list containing topics of high interest.

On The Eve Of War

Acts of aggression by both Germany and Japan

provided the justification needed to reinvigorate the

Army’s interest in counterintelligence. The Military

Intelligence Division at the War Department established a

small Counterintelligence Branch in April 1939 and divided

its mission among the following sub-elements: Domestic

Intelligence, Investigations, Plant Intelligence, Safeguarding Military Information, Special Assignments, and

Corps of Intelligence Police. Domestic Intelligence

included such benign functions as conducting liaison

with the FBI and furnishing the State Department with

information on personnel seeking passports and visas. In

the coming summer, growing concerns about foreign

espionage encouraged the Army to issue its first regulation dealing with the security of military information. At

the same time, representatives of the Army and Navy met

to form an Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee with

the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the purpose of

coordinating the administration of espionage cases. A

year later, the three signed the Delimitations Agreement of

1940, which allotted domestic intelligence to the FBI; the

World War I scenario in which the Army had assumed

responsibility for surveillance of American civil society

would not be repeated in the next conflict.

The agreement, however, did give the Army the mission

of conducting investigations on those civilians employed

by the military in the continental United States and on all

civilians in the Canal Zone and the Philippines. To

accomplish these tasks, the Corps of Intelligence Police

expanded its ranks to around 200 in early 1941. This rapid

growth changed the nature of the CIP force. Until then,

the appointment of CIP personnel had been centralized at

the War Department level, but in January of that year,

appointment authority for agents was decentralized to the

corps area and overseas department level in an attempt to

The Army War College served briefly as home to the CIP School. (NARA)

19

33290_P001_176.pmd 27 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
obtain more manpower. At the same time, Assistant Chief

of Staff, G2, authorized the creation of the Office of Chief,

Corps of Intelligence Police, and the establishment of a

CIP training school.

In January 1941, the first 50 students of the Investigators Training School filed into a room of the Army War

College at what is now Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington,

DC. Because Army counterintelligence identified itself

with the FBI, America’s principal crime busters and

counter spies, it was natural that the CIP should turn to

the FBI for its first instructors and early curriculum.

(Reflecting the influence of the FBI, the initial courses

placed a disproportionate emphasis on subjects related to

criminology.) The buildup of the military presence in the

Nation’s capital soon forced many of the counterintelligence classes to relocate from Fort McNair to nearby

office space in the District and Arlington, Virginia.

The makeup of the corps also began to change. The

Army approved the detail of officers to the Corps of

Intelligence Police for the first time. Initially many did not

possess the background needed to perform adequate

oversight of some types of counterintelligence missions.

To resolve the situation, the Military Intelligence Division

assumed a hands-on role in selecting officers. Counterintelligence achieved another milestone when the Army

permitted a greater use of specialized investigations,

which led to recruitment of African American and Asian

American agents—firsts in the organization’s history. On

the home front, African-Americans would prove irreplaceable in such areas as Harlem; later, they would be deployed overseas in undercover assignments within the

Caribbean Command. The growing international crisis

would also foster recruitment of a large number of

Hispanic Americans for operations in Panama and Puerto

Rico.

The expansion of the CIP renewed the debate over the

degree to which the recruitment, assignment, and promotion of agents should be centralized and over who should

supervise counterintelligence investigations. Traditionally, the G2s of the various corps areas and departments

had overseen these responsibilities. But the reserve

officer who became the first to hold the position of Chief,

Corps of Intelligence Police, MAJ Garland Williams,

wanted a centralized organization structured along the

lines of the FBI, with its chief assigned directly to the

Secretary of War for “detecting and investigating” all

matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage, and subversion. He also believed that the decentralized personnel

arrangements adversely impacted the quality of his

manpower.

These proposals to strengthen the powers of the Chief,

Corps of Intelligence Police, were vigorously rebutted by

the commanders in the field, and the structure remained

unchanged. In vain, Williams protested that he would

now have to deal with “14 different policies, 14 different

practices, 14 different methods of work, and, in general, 14

separate and distinct units.” The Army soon relieved the

unhappy commander of his worries by reassigning him to

the Infantry School.

Unfortunately, the lack of adequate central control over

operations in the field did create serious problems for the

entire investigative effort. The procurement of personnel

by the various corps areas led, in the words of The

Adjutant General, to the recruitment of “a larger percentage of agents whose character, education, adaptability,

and experience in no way qualified them for the duties

they would be called to perform.” The pressure on some

commanders to tackle their escalating investigative

workload also resulted in agents being pressed into

service without ever having attended basic training. On

the eve of World War II, the ranks of the CIP swelled to

513, but one corps area commander communicated that he

alone could use half that number to handle his backlog of

2,600 cases.

The Hawaiian Department

In the Pacific, Army counterintelligence naturally

viewed Imperial Japan as its most significant threat.

Altogether more than 160,000 Japanese residents were

living and working in the Territory of Hawaii. In Hawaii

on the eve of the war, the CIP Detachment sprang from a

4-man staff to 12 officers and 18 special agents. Gero Iwai,

On the eve of World War II, undercover agents Richard

Sakakida (right) and Arthur Komori pose aboard a freighter

bound for the Philippines. (Komori)

20

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a veteran undercover agent assigned to the G2 Section

within the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, busied

himself creating lists of local Japanese who supported

Imperial Japan. Of particular concern were the 5,000

Kibeis, citizens of the United States who when children

had been sent to Japan to receive their cultural education,

many at the hands of nationalistic instructors. Iwai later

spoke of the progress made, “...we have compiled

background info on Japanese of Hawaii who we thought

would be dangerous to the security of our nation in time

of war with Japan. This info was taken from newspapers,

magazines, surveillances, informants, etc.” Both the FBI

and the CIP relied heavily upon informants or “listeners”

from among the Nisei (second generation Japanese

Americans).

In March 1941, MAJ Jack Gilbert recruited two Japanese-Americans in their early twenties, Richard Sakakida

and Arthur Komori, to undertake a dangerous undercover

mission for their country. As their former military instructor at nearby McKinley High School in Honolulu, the

officer was fully aware of Sakakida’s and Komori’s athletic

and academic achievements as well as their character and

believed them fully capable of pulling off the assignment.

Disguised as seamen who jumped ship to avoid the draft,

Sakakida and Komori were to learn of any hostile intentions on the part of Japanese citizens living in Manila,

capital of the Philippines. For the next 6 months, the two

agents met surreptitiously with CPT Nelson Raymond,

commander of the local CIP detachment, to pass on

information.

“By the end of April 1941, Yoshikawa [a Japanese spy] had acquired a

number of espionage locations. From a point on Aiea Heights he had an

excellent view of Pearl Harbor, while the best look at the submarine base

called for a stop on Kamehameha Highway between Aiea and Makalapa.

Occasionally he would take a jitney to Honolulu bound for any point

beyond Pearl Harbor, get off at Aiea, and prowl about. The cane fields of

Aiea gave the best view of all [to view the comings and goings of US

Naval ships]. Yoshikawa would dress in laborer’s garb and hide amid the

cane.”

At Dawn We Slept by Gordon W. Prange

21

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“Soon 71 Counter Intelligence Corps agents, fresh from warm rooms and soft

beds of urban life, were camping with seasoned troopers of the 2d Armored

and the 3d and 9th Infantry Divisions, and calling the Chief of the Counter

Intelligence Corps harder names than the ground they slept on.”

LTC Hugh D. Wise, Jr., Chief, CIC

22

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CHAPTER TWO

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS IN

WORLD WAR II

JOINING THE FIGHT

At 1100 hours on 7 December 1941, Imperial Japan’s

surprise attack against Pearl Harbor was just an hour old

when CIP agents, together with their counterparts from the

FBI and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the

Honolulu Police, made their first arrests. Using the names

gathered by Gero Iwai before the war, 200 suspects were

quickly in custody. Iwai recalled one such arrest with

particular satisfaction, “Yes, I picked up the number one

suspect at his home on Nuuanu Avenue with an FBI agent

named Polkinghorn.”

The next day the United States formally declared war

against Japan and its Axis partners of Germany and Italy.

The entrance into war would bring about an immediate and

total mobilization on the part of the United States and its

armed forces.

Within the Territory of Hawaii, authorities immediately

imposed martial law and put travel restrictions into effect,

particularly between the islands; several months later,

Army counterintelligence would officially be made

responsible for internal security, except for matters

involving Navy installations and personnel. In Honolulu,

the Army activated the “Contact Office” under the

Hawaiian Department G2 (later Central Pacific Area) and

gave it the authority of search and seizure. As one of its

first steps, the Contact Office initiated a series of security

lectures to military personnel and civilian employees,

instructing them in the handling of classified information

and warning of the dangers of enemy spies.

Back in the States, the Corps of Intelligence Police, in

partnership with the FBI and New York Police Department,

conducted almost daily raids on homes and business

places of suspected Nazi sympathizers. These included

members of the German-American Bund, an association

promoting stronger ties between the US with Nazi

Germany. Property seized consisted mostly of propaganda such as books, swastika armbands, and uniforms.

More important was the confiscation of shortwave radios

and weapons. The FBI and the CIP also worked together

to round up a secret Nazi organization sending subversive

literature into Army camps.

In the District of Columbia, Lieutenant Hugh D. Wise,

Executive Officer of the CIP, left the Washington Redskins

football game early and turned on the radio to hear news

The first headquarters of the Chief, CIP, was the War Department Munitions Building located on Constitution Avenue, west of the

Washington Monument. (NARA)

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of the attack. Racing to the CIP offices in the War

Department Munitions Building on Constitution Avenue,

Wise assembled his staff to begin calling in CIP personnel.

Many former agents began showing up on their own

asking how they could be put to work. One of the first

actions taken was to conduct a sweep of the War

Department’s offices. The findings immediately raised the

security consciousness of the Army Staff when large

numbers of classified documents were discovered to be

unsecured and file cabinets left unlocked.

One agent described the charged atmosphere surrounding the early days of the war as something akin to a

silver screen thriller: “urgency, glamour, and informality.

The civilian clothes, the impressive credentials describing

the agent as a representative of the Office of the Secretary

of War, the tacit permission to carry private firearms and

blackjacks, the immediate-action, red-bordered, highly

classified letters requesting investigation which flooded in

with every mail, all created a strong sense of mission in

officers and enlisted agents alike. Everyone was on call

day and night. Surveillances, raids, and other special

assignments frequently kept men in the field into the early

hours of the morning.” Over the years, it was these types

of mental images that would continue to draw recruits to

the corps.

As promising as these early steps were, much was still

to be done before counterintelligence would become a

recognized part of the Army. This is illustrated by a story

that made the rounds following Pearl Harbor: When a

general officer requested the support of plainclothes

personnel from the FBI, Director J. Edgar Hoover purportedly replied, “Why don’t you use your own organization?” To which, the requestor expressed with shock,

“My God, do we have one?”

From The Ground Up

Army counterintelligence underwent a series of

organizational changes in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor.

The Military Intelligence Division created the Military

Intelligence Service (MIS) to serve as its operational arm.

A newly established Counterintelligence Group within

MIS assumed the functions previously performed by the

discontinued Counterintelligence Branch. One of the

group’s most important missions was to provide various

studies on major security threats facing US troops at

home and abroad.

On 1 January 1942, the War Department redesignated

the Corps of Intelligence Police as the Army Counter

Intelligence Corps (CIC) which better reflected its expanded mission and placed 34-year-old MAJ (later

Colonel) Henry G. Sheen in charge. Like its predecessor,

the new organization was based in the Nation’s capital,

but now possessed a more appropriate name and a more

centralized organization. Plans called for the CIC to be an

elite force, picking its enlisted personnel from the cream of

Selective Service inductees. As MG George V. Strong, the

Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, put it, “the personnel of this

corps are of officer caliber.” The War Department also

took over control of all background investigations of

prospective counterintelligence agents and centralized the

issuance of their credentials.

Originally all CIC enlisted men held the rank of sergeant; now corporals and privates were added to the

corps. This permitted functional differentiation. Sergeants served as “Special Agents” with full investigative

powers, while corporals and privates occupied subordinate positions as agents and counterintelligence clerks.

The new arrangements also allowed some relaxation in the

Counter Intelligence Corps’ appointment standards. For a

period in late 1942 and early 1943, service commands once

more were allowed to procure and transfer agents and

clerks, while Washington retained full control over special

agents and officers. Following suit, the Counter Intelligence Corps School confined its activities to providing

advanced courses, thus permitting the service commands

to conduct introductory counterintelligence training.

Washington politics would eventually force the

Counter Intelligence Corps to relocate its headquarters

from the Munitions Building on Constitution Avenue. At

the end of 1942, the War Department expressed concern

that too many fit young officers were serving in staff

assignments and proceeded to stipulate that no more than

a third of the officers assigned to any element in the

District of Columbia could be below 35 years of age. The

“Child Labor Law,” as the order was jokingly referred to,

literally drove the CIC out of town. In January 1943, LTC

In early 1940, the FBI approached the CIC

for assistance. A German network the Bureau

was trailing had an army contact: a soldier who

regularly met his handler at the Manhattan

terminus of the Governor’s Island Ferry. Who

was the soldier and what was his role? The CIC

quickly found out his name and his position—a

stenographer in the hospital at Fort Jay.

Although he had a spotless record, the suspect

had family connections with the American Bund,

which was supporting a closer relationship with

Nazi Germany. Using his role at the hospital, the

soldier had taken advantage of patient records to

acquire order-of-battle information. He also

subscribed to a number of military-related

magazines and was in the process of carefully

analyzing their contents for information on

equipment, units, and names of key personnel.

24

33290_P001_176.pmd 32 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
Hugh D. Wise, Jr., Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, and

his staff shoved off for office space at 2327 North Charles

Street in nearby Baltimore.

Schooling

The need for more room at the CIC Training

School led authorities to relocate the school away

from Washington, DC, to Chicago. The lease of the

Tower Town Club at 820 North Michigan Avenue

proved ideal. Besides adequate classroom space,

the move in January 1942 furnished students

access to the police laboratory of the City of

Chicago, the criminal laboratory of nearby Northwestern University, and a place to study sabotage

at the huge Underwriters’ Laboratory. Conveniently, the first officer candidate school for military

intelligence personnel was located at the nearby

facilities of the former Illinois Women’s Athletic

Club. Among the new subjects added at the CIC

School was a course on how to pick locks and crack

safes. Unfortunately, what many of the early

recruits most needed was basic training, which had

been bypassed so as to quickly fill CIC quotas.

To maintain a low profile, the school’s administrators did not publicize its location or very

existence. They also took the precaution of issuing

a small badge in the shape of a four-leaf clover to all

new recruits. However, as one attendee was quick

to report, this fooled no one. When he and his

fellow students, all in plain clothes, descended on a

local hotel for food and drink following a day of

classes, the waitress serving them quickly spotted

the badges and announced, “Well I see we have a

new group of students at the CIC School here.”

Early in the war, the CIC School moved to Chicago, Illinois, and settled

into the Tower Town Club on Michigan Avenue. (Copyright, Chicago

Historical Society)

25

Following Pearl Harbor and the subsequent invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese, agents

Richard Sakakida and Arthur Komori dropped their cover and donned Army uniforms to join in the

defense of the islands. Eventually, the two found themselves at the island fortress of Corregidor as part

of the last stand being made by Allied forces. Here, they used their knowledge of the Japanese language

to assist the intercept efforts of the local Army signals intelligence unit. Arthur Komori would be on one

of the last planes in April to depart for Australia, where he would help establish the Allied Translator and

Interpreter Service to tackle the translation of captured enemy documents. Sakakida opted to relinquish

his seat on the plane to another Japanese-American even if it meant capture. On 6 May 1942, Allied

forces in the Philippines surrendered, beginning the infamous Bataan Death March. Fortunately, a

number of the Filipino CIP agents were able to blend into the jungles and mountains where they helped the

local guerrillas. One posed for 3 years as a peddler in Manila, selling fruit to Japanese soldiers and

gleaning information to be passed on to resistance fighters. However, because of his ethnic background,

Sakakida was immediately thrown into the infamous Bilibid prison where he underwent torture. Over

time he was able to gain the confidence of his captives by convincing them he had been a reluctant

recruit. Later in the employment of a Japanese officer, Sakakida fed important bits of information to

nearby Filipino guerrillas. Altogether, nine members of the original CIC Detachment would die in

captivity including MAJ Nelson Raymond, the commander who perished on a prison ship which sank on

its way to Japan.

33290_P001_176x2.pmd 33 12/5/2005, 7:37 PM
Investigations

Within the continental United States (CONUS), the

vast majority of the work took place in the traditional

Army Corps Areas, which underwent a series of name

changes to include Corps Area Service Command and

Service Command. Population-wise, the largest of these

military regions was the Second Corps Area that comprised the states of Delaware, New Jersey, and New York,

encompassing 20 million people. The Second Corps also

had the largest city, the largest shipping port, and the

largest entry point for immigrants. At the outbreak of the

war, the area had only 47 agents; 2 years later the number

climbed to a more respectable 460. Transportation was a

major problem. As late as January 1942, the Second

Service Command found itself with only one automobile.

Agents normally used their own vehicles, often without

compensation. By October 1942, the number had risen to

40 plus two enlisted mechanics to maintain the fleet.

The overall efficiency of the CIC investigations was

enhanced by its inter-service relationship with the Navy.

Throughout the war, the CIC maintained a close relationship with the Office of Naval Intelligence. The same could

be said for the FBI with only a couple of exceptions. The

FBI did not share entire report files with the CIC and only

answered specific questions. The FBI agents viewed

themselves “as professionals in the field” and tended to

look upon “Counter Intelligence men as dilettantes.”

The relationship between the CIC and the Air Force

was an evolving one. When World War II broke out, the

Army Air Corps did not possess an investigative arm. On

paper, the G2s of the various Service Commands were

responsible for Army Air Corps facilities in their jurisdiction. A scarcity of qualified personnel eventually led to a

directive making the Air Corps commanders temporarily in

charge of their own security. In March 1942, the Army Air

Corps became the Army Air Force with an enlarged

intelligence staff and capabilities, but a year later, the Air

Force still had only 4 officers and 11 enlisted men devoted

to its counterintelligence mission. In November 1943, a

breakthrough occurred when Chief, CIC, relinquished

control of all CIC elements attached to Air Force units to

the Chief, CIC Army Air Force. Specialized schooling was

initiated for Air Force agents to provide them the technical

knowledge required to handle such cases as aircraft

sabotage. By June 1944, 12 detachments were finally in

place to support the major Air Force Commands.

Countersubversion

The scope of the CIC’s responsibilities vastly increased in March 1942 when the Army expanded its

existing countersubversive program and gave it new

guidelines. Just as in World War I, the countersubversive

operation latticed the Nation’s military establishment with

“an elaborate and fine network of secret agents.” Intelligence officers secretly recruited informants within each

unit on an average ratio of one informant to every 30 men,

resulting in a program of enormous proportions. By the

summer of 1943, just one of the nine service commands in

the continental United States reported having 53,000

operatives; over 150,000 reports were filed monthly once

the system became fully operational. Although the

countersubversive program was administered by unit and

installation commanders, not by the Counter Intelligence

Corps, it was the latter’s agents that became involved in

following up reports of potential subversive activity. At

the War Department level, the Counterintelligence Group

of the Military Intelligence Service monitored the entire

process.

The Counter Intelligence Corps began to label cases in

which subversion was not apparent as “Disaffection.”

For example, members of radical organizations that did not

desire to overthrow the United States Government but

would, for instance, slow down wartime production to

accomplish certain political or anti-war goals fell into this

category. In these cases, the CIC continued to monitor

the subjects’ activities, but often chose to take little or no

action. In the early stages of the war, this new category

made up 40 percent of the case load.

Inevitably, the number of countersubversive cases

resulted in the expansion of the counterintelligence

workload, which in turn generated the need for more

agents, and new personnel meant still more investigations. Half of the CIC’s man-hours were spent investigating its own applicants. Individuals who were assigned to

the Army’s most secret code-breaking effort and other

sensitive missions within military intelligence made up the

other half. By July 1943, the corps showed an authorized

“The ordnance officer had been

asked to provide a civilian-type

sedan, not painted olive drab, in an

effort to make the car as

inconspicuous as possible for

surveillance work. The car turned

up painted coal black from top to

bottom except for the glass. There

was not a speck of chrome or trim.

That car was as ‘inconspicuous as

an Italian funeral carriage.’ It was

promptly dubbed ‘The Black

Maria.’”

History of the Second Service Command

26

33290_P001_176.pmd 34 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
strength of 543 officers (95 of whom held the rank of major

and above) and 4,431 enlisted personnel.

North Africa

It was now 9 months into the war, and little thought

had been given to deployment of CIC personnel with

combat elements. Outside the Office of the Chief, CIC, no

one was even talking about the possibility that “agents

might do their investigating under combat situations with

pistols strapped to their belts.” The Counter Intelligence

Corps’ early focus had been exclusively on establishing a

headquarters staff and recruiting qualified personnel to

carry out counterintelligence duties on the home front. In

August 1942, Major General George V. Strong, Assistant

Chief of Staff, G2, dropped the challenge on the desk of

Major Hugh D. Wise, Jr., Chief, Counter Intelligence

Corps, to come up with 100 agents and prepare them for

combat duty. The former proved to be the easier assignment. Drawing from the various Corps Service Commands, Wise quickly assembled 13 officers and 71 enlisted

men to support the Western Task Force of Operation

TORCH, due for launching within 3 months. The main

objective of the North African campaign was to wrestle

the Mediterranean from the Axis and use Africa as a

spring board to Europe. A secondary goal was to gain

Ordered to search for documents at El Hafey Bordj (Tunisia) Lieutenant Leonard Bessman entered the

area on 3 April 1943 in advance of armored reconnaissance. Instead of having vacated their position, the

enemy was well entrenched with machine guns, armor, and artillery. Lieutenant Bessman immediately sent

his driver back to warn advancing friendly troops. Although wounded, he continued to engage the enemy

with rifle fire for nearly 2 hours before being captured. Ernie Pyle, the famous combat journalist, described

Bessman as a personal friend and termed his duties as being “up front with our advance troops, for that was

his job.” For his act of heroism, Lieutenant Bessman was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

Bessman was eventually relocated to a prisoner-of-war camp in Italy. Upon learning they were soon to be

transferred into German hands, Lieutenant Bessman and a fellow prisoner managed to escape and, while

hiding in caves with the help of locals, make their way back to Allied lines.

North Africa would be the first test for both the US Army and the CIC. (NARA)

27

33290_P001_176.pmd 35 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
control over what remained of the French forces in Algeria

and French Morocco.

Some CIC personnel had never been through a day of

basic training, and as far as physical exercise was concerned, “their longest hike had been from the bus stop

back to the office.” Making them combat-ready soldiers

proved a challenge. Although the conditioning program,

including full field road marches, went well, an orientation

class held in Washington, DC, that included a colonel

urging the recruits to “kill, kill, kill!” was deemed less

effective. And the introduction of the CIC contingent to

the rest of the Western Task Force at Camp A.P. Hill,

Virginia, proved a disaster. For instance, when the subject

of pyramidal tents came up, one of the CIC soldiers

incredulously asked, “What shall we do with these?” In

retrospect, one observer summed up these inauspicious

beginnings: “That they became excellent soldiers never

erased the Gilbert and Sullivan operatic classification

initially given this group.”

The exact mission of this first combat counterintelligence venture was anything but clear. The CIC hastily

put together a field manual but failed to get it approved

until after Operation TORCH was under way. The CIC

staff formulated an interim operations plan only 40 hours

before embarkation. For doctrine on how to organize

troops, the CIC drew upon the experiences of the Field

Security Police of the British and Canadian Armies: “In

the British forces this is cared for by Field Security

Sections consisting of one officer and 13 other ranks. One

section is usually attached to each divisional headquarters or higher formation and a varying number of sections

to GHQ according to circumstances.”

The CIC was not the only American counterintelligence

organization going to war. In support of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, the Office of Strategic Services provided both

intelligence and counterintelligence support down to

corps echelon, except for the Southwest Pacific Area

where General Douglas MacArthur barred the organizaA group of CIC agents pose in Oran, Algeria. Agents primarily dressed in plain clothes for the purpose of collecting human

intelligence. (AHEC)

28

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tion. Especially in the early days of the Mediterranean

Theater of Operations, the relationship between the OSS

and CIC organizations was strained, and personnel often

worked at cross purposes. Much of this was because the

OSS promoted an attitude of independence, but over time

and with a little experience, the two sides resolved most

issues for the sake of winning the war.

On board the ships headed towards North Africa, the

CIC personnel began to ply their trade by assisting in the

enforcement of security restrictions. Steps included

dismantling privately owned radios and confiscating other

illegal electronic devices. They also took advantage of

the free time to learn more about the threats and local

conditions awaiting them, since much of this type of

information had been kept from them for security reasons.

There was even sufficient time to assemble an index

system consisting of approximately 5,000 cards listing

names of subversive suspects, arrest targets, and friendly

informants.

Meanwhile, the other half of Operation TORCH—the

Central Task Force consisting of British and American

troops—was preparing to sail from England for Algeria.

Drawing upon Counter Intelligence Corps personnel

already in London and diverting others en route to

support troops in Iceland, US authorities hastily threw

together a small CIC element. Reminiscent of the first

Army counterintelligence group that deployed to France

in World War I, the Central Task Force CIC detachment

proved itself to have a very diverse membership: a former

Paris journalist, an immigration inspector, an auto salesman, an instructor at the Sorbonne, a Swiss auto racer, and

a Rhodes Scholar. Seven spoke French fluently; others

demonstrated a smattering of Italian, German, Danish,

Dutch, Spanish, and Norwegian.

 On 8 November 1942, the Western Task Force conducted landings at three sites in French Morocco: Safi,

Fedala, and Mehdia; the major objective was the eventual

control of Casablanca. The French met the invasion with

a heavy bombardment from shore batteries, but once US

forces came ashore, resistance quickly collapsed. Illustrative of the close support to combat forces in the early

going, CIC soldiers received four Silver Stars, three

Legions of Merit, and one battlefield commission, all in the

first 3 days of the fighting.

Counter Intelligence Corps personnel enjoyed a

number of early successes: At Fedala, just north of

Casablanca, agents seized documents of Hitler’s Armistice

Commission—the primary counterintelligence target in

Operation TORCH—along with Commission members.

The Armistice Commission from its headquarters at the

Miramar Hotel had organized the Moroccan industry for

delivery of goods to the German war machine. Commission documents depicted transportation links and

factories that might be targets of stay-behind German

saboteurs. More importantly, the papers contained lists of

names and aliases of members of the French Intelligence

Service along with those of collaborators. The capture of

the commission’s documents and personnel “saved the

American Army a great deal of work.” The CIC personnel

also discovered and neutralized a monitoring board

installed by enemy agents to listen in on the American

Headquarters at Fedala.

In response to the security threat posed by French

Morocco’s many ports, long border, and population of

uncertain loyalty, CIC officers dispersed their soldiers

among the towns of Casablanca, Marrakech, Safi, Rabat,

Port Lyautey, Souk el Arba, and Petijean. At Casablanca,

agents obtained names of their French counterparts,

allowing for the substitution of CIC persons unknown to

the enemy. The Counter Intelligence Corps dispatched

these undercover agents directly from Washington, DC,

so that they could “be on their own” and have no outward

ties with local Army authorities.

The Central and Eastern Task Forces enjoyed less

success with their landings in Algeria, but in the end

accomplished their objectives. Near Oran, CIC agents

apprehended a German official who possessed maps

showing all the Vichy French minefields in North Africa;

the find not only saved lives but quickened the Allied

advance. Unfortunately, neither the experiences of

Morocco nor Algeria prepared US forces for what they

were to face next—veteran German and Italian forces in

Tunisia and much more hostile terrain. It would take 6

months of hard fighting and recovery from a number of

costly losses at Kasserine Pass and Fondouk el Aouareb

before victory could be declared.

During the Tunisian operations, Agent Crosby Lewis,

who was fluent in French, dressed himself in Arab garb,

and riding a horse, traveled on his own initiative through

the Faid Pass as part of a caravan. Lewis returned with

information on enemy positions in and behind the pass.

He also arranged to make the Caid of Sidi Bou Zid

responsible for the loyalty and movement of local Arabs in

the no-man’s land between the passes. For these actions,

Lewis received the Silver Star.

In a hospital at Tunis, a routine search by the CIC of

German POW quarters led to the arrest of a US soldier

who while convalescing had become involved in a black

market trade between locals and German prisoners. The

private was caught in the act of passing weapons to

enemy inmates planning an escape. At the Casablanca

Conference, which took place between President Franklin

D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill in midJanuary 1943, the Allies handed the responsibility for

planning and executing the security arrangements to the

CIC. Dressed in plain clothes, counterintelligence agents

worked alongside the Secret Service to secure the

immediate area.

In the end, the Allies expelled Axis forces from North

Africa and took a giant step toward victory in the Mediter29

33290_P001_176.pmd 37 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
ranean Theater of Operations. American forces learned

a number of important lessons that would impact their

assault against Hitler’s Europe. Major General George S.

Patton, Jr. was elevated to command II Corps, and Major

General Omar N. Bradley was selected as his deputy.

But many of the commanders still lacked appreciation

for the contributions of their organic intelligence and

security staffs; this, coupled with the absence of

coordination within and among intelligence organizations, created an environment that one senior officer

termed “utter confusion.” The Counter Intelligence

Corps profited from their own lessons learned in North

Africa that would soon reverse these early negative

perceptions. In the future, plans called for CIC personnel to be well forward and among the first troops to

enter towns and villages.

The need for better combat training for counterintelligence specialists was apparent. Consequently, the

Allies opened the Field Security School at Ain el Turk in

Algeria for the sole purpose of providing arriving

agents with a 20-day course in both basic infantry and

counterintelligence skills. The Counter Intelligence Corps

also redesigned its elements in the field into uniformed,

cellular structures: “A Divisional section was defined as

one officer and five enlisted men; a Corps section, two

officers and 11 enlisted men; and an Army section, five

officers and 45 enlisted men.” At each echelon, detachments remained under the control of their respective G2.

Despite their shortcomings, CIC personnel had

demonstrated the potential for becoming a cadre of highly

competent professionals. Besides counterintelligence,

CIC agents were called upon to play a variety of important

roles, from serving as civil affairs officers—such as the

acting mayor of a captured village—to collectors of

human intelligence, a function that in North Africa often

required agents to don plain clothes. The Allied leadership desired to know what locals in occupied and friendly

territories were thinking politically. In French Morocco,

members of the CIC also found themselves performing

censorship responsibilities.

From the beginning, CIC agents played an important role in the search for documents that could be exploited for order-of-battle

information and the identification of spies. (NARA)

30

33290_P001_176.pmd 38 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
Sicily

The campaign for Sicily (Operation HUSKY) began on

9 July 1943 when Patton’s newly activated Seventh Army

landed on the southwestern corner of the island. Again,

CIC personnel were among the first waves of assault

troops. Sicily would be important because it established

procedures for counterintelligence operations that would

continue for the remainder of the war in Europe. Each

division had its own assigned counterintelligence

detachments plus attached agents from corps to move

forward with the assault troops. When towns were

secure, tactical counterintelligence detachments continued to advance with fighting elements while corps-level

agents remained behind to carry out a variety of duties.

A top priority in Sicily that remained constant was

policing mail and severing lines of communications to

enemy territory. Although a tedious job, reading impounded mail bore fruit with the identification and arrest

of a number of spies. While awaiting the arrival of either

civil affairs types or members of the Allied Military

Government, CIC officers often assumed control of local

governments. Acting in its civil affairs capacity, the local

CIC element frequently called upon city officials, partisans, church officials, and firemen for assistance; issued

proclamations imposing restrictions on political and

community life; and on occasion, employed military force

to put down local disturbances such as food riots.

In these captured towns, the CIC would make its most

significant contribution of the Sicilian campaign. By 25

September, the Counter Intelligence Corps had accounted

for more than 700 political prisoners, including leaders of

various pro-Fascist quasi-military organizations (Opera

Volunatria Repressioni Anti-Fascismo and Squadra

DiAzione), 24 enemy agents, and 7 saboteurs. Captured

documents revealed locations of roads and land mines as

well as information on enemy order of battle and troop

morale. Using informants, agents were even able to glean

the locations of most prisoner of war camps holding

political captives and Allied soldiers. By the time the

fighting drew to a close in Sicily, it had become evident

that the G2s were beginning to rely heavily on the Counter

Intelligence Corps and to validate its combat role.

RETREAT ON THE HOME FRONT

In mid-1943, the Army was at last beginning to deploy a

sizable portion of its strength overseas. This in turn gave

the Counter Intelligence Corps a whole new reason to

exist. The CIC School in Chicago put its students in

uniform for the first time and placed a new emphasis on

counterintelligence operations under battle conditions.

Making counterintelligence personnel combat-ready led to

the creation of a Counter Intelligence Corps Staging Area

in the summer of 1943 to better prepare units about to go

As a stop-gap measure to give agents much needed language training, the CIC turned to the highly respected Berlitz Language

School. (INSCOM)

31

33290_P001_176.pmd 39 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
overseas. The staging area, initially located at Logan

Field in Baltimore, Maryland, soon moved to nearby Camp

Holabird, which signaled the beginning of a long association of the post, affectionately known as “The Bird,” with

military intelligence.

Having agents with foreign language skills was no

longer a luxury, it had now become essential. Although

many Americans possessed a second language, they

often didn’t meet the strict security criteria prerequisites

for the CIC. Consequently, the corps had to equip its own

with the necessary skills. To do so, the CIC turned to the

highly respected Berlitz Language Schools to host a

series of intensive 13-week courses in four major cities

(Chicago, Baltimore, New York and San Francisco).

Approximately 150 agents underwent the one-time

training offered in German, Italian, French, Dutch, and

Spanish.

By the fall of 1943, the Counter Intelligence Corps

appeared to have solved its initial problems and had

become an established part of the Army. Agents increasingly served in uniform with the troops rather than

working as anonymous “spooks” on the fringes of the

military establishment. The War Department had also

begun to transfer reassignment authority for CIC personnel from the Military Intelligence Service at the Pentagon

to the field commands, again bringing the CIC into

conformity with the rest of the military establishment.

Finally, the CIC had at last approved an organizational

manual.

Shortcomings

Despite these advances, the activities of the Counter

Intelligence Corps still managed to generate enough

criticism to place its very existence in jeopardy. From the

viewpoint of the wartime military, the CIC absorbed a

disproportionate percentage of high-quality personnel

and used them to accomplish what many regarded as a

marginal mission. Tradition-minded Army officers disliked

the whole business of counterintelligence, especially

when it involved enlisted personnel, acting as investigating officers. The CIC’s investigations of individuals with

membership in leftist groups were not universally popular

with a number of politicians, particularly since the War

Department’s Counterintelligence Group often used the

findings to exclude some well-connected young men from

officer candidate school.

Moreover, investigations on occasion were conducted

with more zeal than prudence. In early 1943, CIC agents

installed listening devices in a hotel room being occupied

by an Army Air Force sergeant with suspected connections to groups with Communist ties. The individual

under surveillance just happened to be a personal friend

of First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, who herself had recently

occupied a nearby suite in the same hotel. When word

was leaked to the White House that the CIC had

recorded a sexual liaison between the suspect and Mrs.

Roosevelt, there was an immediate call for heads to roll.

In actuality, the whole episode merely involved the

sergeant and a lady acquaintance who would become his

wife.

Accumulated resentments eventually found official

expression, leading to the temporary eclipse of the

Counter Intelligence Corps. In July 1943, LTG Joseph T.

McNarney, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, ordered

Major General Virgil L. Peterson, The Inspector General,

to launch an investigation of the corps.

On 5 November 1943, the Army ordered all CIC agents

out of Washington, DC, and a day later, the Army

Inspector General submitted a devastating critique of the

corps’ operations and organization, charging that many

CIC investigations were “superficial, and unproductive

of positive results except in rare instances.” The

Inspector General found that the only thorough investigations being conducted were those of applicants for

the CIC or of military and civilian personnel suspected of

subversion, and many of these investigations were

viewed as being excessively thorough, since they

dragged on after all immediate allegations had been

resolved. Moreover, when officers were under investigation, CIC procedures failed to protect against indiscriminate dissemination of reports containing unverified

derogatory information “based on hearsay, gossip, and

innuendo.”

The countersubversive program that generated much

of the CIC’s workload also faced heavy criticisms, since

the 1,000,000 reports submitted in the first part of 1943

had identified only 600 suspects; and it was possible

that just one individual was the subject of many of these

reports. The Inspector General’s report was equally

critical of the organizational concepts that underpinned

Counter Intelligence Corps operations in CONUS. In the

security field, the team’s members found that the

activities of the CIC at least partially duplicated the work

of criminal investigators assigned to the Provost

Marshal General’s Office. Finally, the existing counterintelligence system undermined the concept of command

responsibility, since the G2s in the service commands

had to answer both to their commanding generals and to

the Counterintelligence Group of the Military Intelligence Service, the operational arm of MID.

The Inspector General’s damming report became the

justification for an immediate unraveling of the Counter

Intelligence Corps. The countersubversive program was

terminated, and most CIC agents in the continental

United States merged with the criminal investigators of

the Provost Marshal’s Office to form a new Security

Intelligence Corps that operated under the control of the

service commands. (Over 950 CIC agents and almost an

equal number of Criminal Investigation Division (CID)

32

33290_P001_176.pmd 40 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
investigators flowed into the new organization.) Although

CIC detachments continued to serve with the Army Air

Forces, the Manhattan Project, and tactical units, the

presence of the Counter Intelligence Corps on the home

front had for all intents and purposes been eliminated.

The CIC School was transferred to the Provost Marshal

General, its staging area closed, and the position of Chief,

Counter Intelligence Corps, abolished in early February

1944. The departing chief, Colonel Harold R. Kibler,

blamed the fall of his command on the enmity of the White

House, specifically “Harry Hopkins and the Secret

Service.” (Hopkins was President Franklin Roosevelt’s

personal advisor.) A short time later, the Army took the

final step by eliminating the Counterintelligence Group

within the Military Intelligence Service.

In reality, many of the old practices in CONUS died

slowly. For example, at the Security Intelligence Corps

field office located in New York City at 50 Broadway,

former CIC agents remained separate from the CID

specialists; each group continued to work those investigations demanding their respective area of expertise.

The restructuring of counterintelligence in CONUS did

not do away with the requirement to train agents for

overseas duties; an advanced course of instruction was

still crucial. Following a 7-month delay brought about by

the reorganization, the Military Intelligence Training

Center (MITC) at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, finally held its

first counterintelligence classes in September 1944, but the

bulk of Camp Ritchie’s curriculum remained focused on

training combat military intelligence specialists in such

areas as order of battle and photo interpretation. Isolated

in the mountains of central Maryland, the school lacked a

laboratory and was not in close proximity to a major

metropolitan area, which was needed for counterintelligence surveillance and search problems. In response to

the campaign for the Rhineland and the desperate need for

language-qualified agents, the War Department directed

that 250 agents attend a 2-week course in German at the

University of Pennsylvania. By the time MITC finally did

produce a useful curriculum of courses to meet requirements of counterintelligence in Europe, the direction of

the war had shifted towards the Pacific in anticipation of a

final battle for Japan’s home islands.

33

At the Military Intelligence Training Center, Fort Ritchie, Maryland, instructors teach CIC agents to recognize Japanese Army

insignia. (NARA)

33290_P001_176.pmd 41 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
Manhattan Project

Apart from the CIC, the Army ran a small counterintelligence organization in support of the most secret Manhattan Project, which had been assigned the mission of

developing the atomic bomb. In the spring of 1942, MG

George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, established

a cover element within the Pentagon under the name of

the Investigation Review Branch and placed MAJ (later

Colonel) John Lansdale, a lawyer in civilian life, in charge.

By the summer of 1943, the Manhattan Project had

moved from the research and development phase into

plant construction and production. At the same time the

headquarters relocated from New York to Oak Ridge,

Tennessee. A major security problem emerged for the

Manhattan Project that remained throughout the war—the

possible loss of classified documents and material during

transit. Army counterintelligence helped to establish

security procedures and continuously monitored the

system. Over the last 13 months of the war alone, 18

couriers logged 832,000 miles, and convoys of trucks

bearing classified materiel traveled 300,000 miles—all

without loss or incident.

When it appeared in late 1943 that the Counter Intelligence Corps would soon disappear on the home front,

General Strong acted quickly to preserve Lansdale’s unit.

General Strong authorized the resubordination of Lansdale

and his detachment to the control of the Manhattan

Project. Lansdale himself remained in Washington, DC, to

keep the Manhattan Director, MG Leslie R. Groves,

apprised of security issues. Another officer took charge

of the new Intelligence and Security Division within the

Manhattan Engineering District, which performed the

administrative functions needed to support the project.

The Chief of the Intelligence and Security Division also

assumed oversight of the daily activities of a subordinate

detachment.

The goal of this unique counterintelligence effort was

to ensure the security of military and civilian personnel

assigned to the project along with those associated with

related military installations and munitions industries.

Among the countermeasures undertaken was the scanning of 370 newspapers and 70 magazines on a regular

basis to determine if any information on the project had

leaked out. But guaranteeing security of a large work

force drawn mostly from the academic and scientific

communities that had enjoyed unrestricted freedoms

would not prove to be easy.

Investigations remained the major means of protecting

the secrets of the atomic project from possible enemy

34

Robert J. Oppenheimer is being recognized for his leading the successful development of the atomic bomb. (LC)

33290_P001_176x1.pmd 42 11/28/2005, 3:38 PM
agents. At one level, CIC agents conducted investigations that uncovered leaks caused by carelessness,

such as loose talk or mishandling of classified documents. Over a 2-year period, agents worked approximately 1,500 such cases. Agents also conducted

follow-on investigations of the initial background

checks on employees. For instance, information

occasionally surfaced that a certain scientist or technician had traveled to Germany or Italy prior to the United

States’ entry into the war. The most highly publicized

of these cases involved J. Robert Oppenheimer, the

head of the Los Alamos Laboratory. Along with family

members and friends, Oppenheimer had had a long

association with Communist-front organizations. (In

fact, his wife and brother were former Communists.)

Because of the compelling national need for

Oppenheimer and others like him, authorities decided to

simply issue a strong warning. At the same time, the

Army assigned Oppenheimer two bodyguards for his

“protection” against foreign threats. It just so happened the guards were specially trained counterintelligence agents.

The final type of investigations performed by the

CIC concerned serious breeches of security. In 1943,

when the Manhattan Project entered its growth phase,

the number of these types of cases significantly increased. If warranted, the CIC set up special agents in

offices, plants, and laboratories to conduct surreptitious

surveillance; implant listening devices; perform photo

surveillance; and on occasion, go undercover disguised

as hotel clerks, electricians, and even gamblers. Only

approximately 100 of all such cases were deemed serious.

The War Department proceeded to remove violators from

the project and induct them into the Army, giving them

nonsensitive assignments where they could be watched.

Throughout the war, the Army adopted the practice of

dealing with suspected but unproven acts of security

breeches by assigning individuals to special holding units

located in remote parts of the country.

Ironically, the greatest threat to the project did not

come from the enemy, but from a wartime ally, the Soviet

Union. The stage was set for security lapses when the

Roosevelt White House adopted a policy of treating the

Soviet Union as any other ally and chose to ignore the

presence of Soviet sympathizers within its wartime

administration, some of whom held positions of high trust.

In early 1943, evidence emerged that the Soviet embassy

in Washington, DC, had given money to a West Coast

Communist leader for the purposes of spying. Subsequently, Russian-born, LTC Boris T. Pash from Army

Detachment of CIC agents stationed in Santa Fe, New Mexico, helped to secure the secrets of the atomic bomb. (INSCOM)

35

33290_P001_176x2.pmd 43 12/6/2005, 1:44 AM
counterintelligence helped to uncover Soviet espionage

efforts directed at America’s atomic secrets. The CIC

learned that Communists and Communist sympathizers

were working at the Radiation Laboratory in Berkeley,

California, where they were routinely passing information

to the Soviet Vice Consul in San Francisco. But the most

serious phase of Soviet espionage, the transfer of

technology on the atomic bomb itself, would not take

place until late 1944 and early 1945 when over 280 highly

classified documents found their way into the hands of a

Soviet spy ring. Unfortunately, these leaks would not be

brought to light until after the war.

Special Projects

Besides the Manhattan Project, the CIC provided a

number of agents to other special projects. Based in

Miami, Florida, the American Intelligence Command (AIC)

had the mission of countering the threat of Axis penetration and subversion in the Southern Hemisphere. Working out of the former Harvey S. Firestone mansion, which

had been turned over to the Government, CIC personnel

Counterintelligence investigators were called upon to investigate any type of suspicious war-munitions explosions or accidents.

(INSCOM)

“Several inquiries have been received

concerning a heavy explosion which

occurred on the Alamogordo Air Base

Reservation [New Mexico] this

morning. A remotely located

ammunition magazine containing a

considerable amount of high explosives

and pyrotechnics exploded. There was

no loss of life or injury to anyone, and

the property damage outside of the

explosives magazine itself was

negligible.”

Cover story issued by the Commanding Officer

of the Alamogordo Army Air Base on 16 July

1945 following the first atomic test.

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“I am in receipt of a recent letter from

the Allied Armies in Italy that points

out how effective the Allied security

measures have been and consequently

how little the enemy knew of our

actual strength prior to our attack on

11 May. ...a good share of the credit for

effective security of the Corps belongs

to you and the other members of your

detachment [202d CIC Det].”

MG Geoffrey Keyes, Commander, II Corps

debriefed returnees from the Southern Hemisphere and

maintained identification cards on travelers within the

Americas.

The Counter Intelligence Corps also contributed a

detachment to the Transportation Corps. During the war,

more than 7 million military personnel and almost 127

million tons passed through Army controlled ports. Much

of CIC’s port security efforts focused on the 171,000

individuals employed on site and the potential threat of

sabotage to ammunition and materiel in transit. Finally,

during the North African campaign, the Air Transport

Command delivered aircraft via a route that passed

through Puerto Rico, Brazil, Ascension Island, and the

Gold Coast of Africa. To ensure that men, planes, and

materiel were not lost through acts of sabotage, CIC

agents worked undercover as mechanics at the various

stops. Unfortunately, lack of technical experience on the

part of the agents and complications in administrating the

undercover program placed the whole operation at risk.

FOOTHOLD IN EUROPE

The fall of Sicily precipitated the collapse of

Mussolini’s Government in July 1943 and the transfer of

power to Italian leaders who were anxious for peace; but

by establishing a firm grip on the rest of Italy, German

forces dispersed the Italian forces and for all intents and

purposes nullified the surrender. The series of campaigns

for the Italian peninsula that followed would witness some

of the toughest fighting of the war. In September, the

Allies landed at Messina, the toe of Italy’s boot; this was

followed by Salerno, the shin, and finally at Taranto and

Brindisi, the heel. The Germans reacted to each of these

offensive thrusts far more quickly than the Allies anticipated. After capturing Naples in October, the Allied

advance slowed to “inching,” progressing only 70 miles

over the next 4 months. By November 1943, the Germans

remained firmly in control of the so-called Winter Line,

which ran 100 miles across the narrowest part of the

peninsula from Garigliano River at its western end to

south of Pescara on the east coast.

Unlike the North African landings when the Counter

Intelligence Corps had been kept totally in the dark, the

Fifth Army gave its 305th CIC Detachment responsibility

up-front for pre-invasion counterintelligence planning; 5

officers and 22 enlisted men accompanied the Fifth Army

to Italy, leaving behind fellow agents to continue border

control work in North Africa. During the campaign for

southern Italy, the Counter Intelligence Corps would

achieve new milestones. In Naples, the largest city to

date, the CIC secured documents taken from German

agents and arrested several Italian generals who had gone

into hiding. These successes would cause the 305th to

adopt the policy of assuming the initial responsibility for

counterintelligence within large population centers

throughout the Peninsula Campaign rather than delegating the task to divisional detachments. In Europe, the CIC

quickly abandoned the use of the armband marked “CIC”

as it drew unwanted attention. The CIC personnel also

began to wear their United States insignia in place of their

rank for the purposes of enhancing dialogue with more

senior officers during their interrogations.

In December 1943, the 305th CIC Detachment assumed

control of an Italian counterespionage organization,

Sicurezza Informazione Militare, Contro-Spionaggio

(SIM CS). Personnel of the SIM CS proved invaluable in

the conduct of undercover counterintelligence missions

that would have been practically impossible for nonnative personnel to accomplish. Others deployed to

assist regular CIC elements at both corps and division.

Because large portions of the population were pro-Allies,

agents often recruited local Italians to infiltrate enemy

lines for the purpose of obtaining information on the

military situation. To improve the operations of such nets,

the CIC established the General Investigative Squad for

the purpose of checking the information provided by one

informant against that of another.

To handle the unique challenges of Rome, the Allies

assembled a thousand-man intelligence and counterintelligence force, called the “S” Force (“S” for Security). The

Fifth Army furnished 50 CIC agents to the “S” Force

operation, which entered Rome on 4 June 1944 with the

first combat troops and assumed custody of high-interest

targets. Members of the force seized numerous documents and apprehended known enemy agents. Aided by

information gained from telephone taps, Allied counterintelligence followed up with a series of coordinated raids.

A report by LTC J.W. Pumpelly, Commander “D” Group,

testified to CIC’s accomplishments, “The CIC was

excellent. The men were everywhere, into everything, and

provided most of the reliable data coming into my headquarters.” For their outstanding work, members of the

combined intelligence team were officially commended.

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33290_P001_176.pmd 45 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
Counterintelligence agents examine cans of explosives hidden in Rome. (NARA)

Italian partisans such as these surrounding an OSS officer provided invaluable support to the CIC. (NARA)

38

33290_P001_176x1.pmd 46 11/28/2005, 4:32 PM
Highway of Spies

In preparation for making a stand 160 miles to the north

along the Gothic Line, the German command launched a

massive assault of espionage and sabotage agents.

Infiltrators parachuted behind the lines; others arrived by

boat along a 300-mile coastline; but the majority simply

walked through the war zone. Major Stephen Spingarn,

Commander, 305th CIC Detachment, reported that a major

lesson was quickly learned during this period: “It is the

stranger rather than the local resident who is most likely to

be an enemy agent, that systems of control for screening

strangers must therefore be devised and perfected.”

To counter these various threats, the CIC implemented

a control system with road blocks and roving patrols

along what became known as the “Highway of Spies.”

Simultaneously, the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments launched an aggressive security education campaign: “Be wary of everyone in your area. Remember this

is not Brooklyn, or Topeka, or Oakland, but a foreign

country where espionage, intrigue and deception are

ingrained in the people....” The 305th CIC Detachment

also published a “Patterns Report” that communicated to

agents in the field the current modus operandi being

utilized by the German Intelligence Service. In one issue,

the report described a suit material given German agents

as a Christmas gift. Fifteen days after the holiday, a spy

by the name of Ferdinando Camaiori walked into a local

CIC office wearing a suit of the cloth described in the

report. When confronted, he quickly confessed.

Over the course of 6 months, the 305th CIC Detachment

was credited with having “captured over 200 German

espionage and sabotage agents and German Intelligence

Service officials...seized large numbers of clandestine

radio transmitters...dug up numerous caches of enemy

sabotage explosives, and arrested and interned hundreds

of subversive Italians.” Illustrative of the overall success

enjoyed by the CIC, a German spy master and head of

Abwehr Kommando 190 revealed after the war that none

Boat used by three captured German agents dressed in British uniforms. Their foiled plot was to have been the assassination of

General Mark Clark. (INSCOM)

“Urgent security situation here: ten

sabotage agents captured within past

four days. Three hundred more

reported en route or soon to come.

Several caches of enemy sabotage

explosives discovered...security

situation most serious since beginning

of Italian operation...additional

agents urgently needed.”

Message from MAJ Stephen Spingarn,

Commander, 305th CIC Detachment

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33290_P001_176.pmd 47 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
of his agents deployed within the Fifth Army area ever

returned.

The need to screen persons seeking employment at the

various Allied locations as well as those desiring food

rations and identification cards soon became a distraction

to the performance of regular counterintelligence duties.

To solve the problem, counterintelligence established an

Allied Identification Center to cover the area surrounding

Leghorn on the west coast; here, a handful of agents

screened an average of 200 people daily, thus freeing up

their fellow agents to focus on higher priority missions.

Invasion of France

Secrets of Allied plans for the invasion of France were

entrusted to the practitioners of deception and to counterintelligence. Deception took the form of rubber tanks and

landing crafts, phantom Army Divisions, controlled leaks

of misinformation, and masked communications. Because

the United Kingdom served as the jumping off point,

British military and civilian agencies naturally handled the

bulk of the counterintelligence work. The Counter

Intelligence Corps confined its dealings to United States

military personnel and rarely interfaced with British

counterparts. Although the numbers would eventually

grow to 800 agents and 100 officers by May 1944, the

leadership of the CIC continued to argue that still more

personnel were needed to support the fighting force of 1.5

million.

In the weeks leading up to the invasion of Hitler’s

Europe, the Counter Intelligence Corps busied themselves

conducting security lectures and providing 24-hour-a-day

coverage of service clubs and restaurants both in and out

of uniform. The rumor quickly spread that the person

setting at the bar next to you might actually be a CIC

agent, and this possibility in itself served as a powerful

deterrent. Agents also mingled with personnel in the port

areas and gave security briefings to incoming crews. In

the end, the CIC concluded there was more danger of

information being leaked by merchant marines and civilian

technicians assigned to work on aircraft than by the

troops themselves. Finally, the Counter Intelligence Corps

assumed the responsibility for securing the marshalling

areas as troops prepared to jump off for the invasion.

In his book, A Soldier’s Story, General Omar Bradley

wrote, “Although our commands were carefully seeded

with CIC agents who rifled desks nightly and rattled safes

in search of security violations, only one serious breach

was uncovered during the life of the ‘Big Secret.’”

General Bradley referred to the well-publicized story of the

major general who, at a cocktail and dinner party late in

April 1944, talked too freely about the date of the invasion. Reduced in rank, the newly demoted colonel

disappeared from the theater within 24 hours, and all those

who had heard his indiscreet remarks, in General Bradley’s

words, “were visited by CIC agents and cautioned to

forget the conversation. The prompting was probably

unnecessary; by that time all of them had been badly

frightened.” Elsewhere, security personnel intercepted a

packet of classified papers erroneously mailed to the

States and then proceeded to track down the soldier

involved. Then there was the case of the carpenter who

German intelligence used radio transmitters to receive information from stay-behind agents. (INSCOM)

40

33290_P001_176.pmd 48 11/9/2005, 10:37 AM
by accident wandered into a room full of maps on the wall

and immediately found himself sequestered.

Retooling

The experiences of CIC elements in North Africa, Sicily,

and Italy would greatly influence what lay ahead in

western Europe. Many in leadership positions had

already seen action; at the top of the CIC pyramid, Colonel

Sheen, himself the one-time head of the CIC, had recently

returned from North Africa to London to become the

Chief, CI Branch (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces [SHAEF]). Other examples included Major

Horace Miner, Commander, 301st CIC Detachment. General

Bradley in A Soldier’s Story described Minor as a “quiet

pipe-smoking professor of anthropology from Ann Arbor,

Michigan, who had trekked across the Sahara from a

native hut in Timbuktu to get into the war.” Miner had

served with the new G2 of First US Army in Tunisia and

Sicily.

Previous exposure to combat conditions proved useful

in defining Counter Intelligence Corps doctrine (SHAEF

Directive No. 7, dated 5 February 1944) for the upcoming

campaign: “Whether at Army, Corps, or Division level, all

CIC detachments are responsive to the appropriate G2.

Their mission is to combat espionage, sabotage, and

subversion; to prevent leakage of information to the

enemy; and to deliver security lectures to troops. Close

liaison and cooperation is to be maintained with all

counterintelligence agencies, Civil Affairs, and the

Provost Marshal. In addition to normal counterintelligence duties, they are to perform such tactical functions

as search of enemy command posts and questioning of

Agents maintained a careful watch over deployment areas for D-Day, such as this one at Brixham, England. (NARA)

Not only did Colonel H. Gordon Sheen serve as an early head

of CIC, but he later helped to direct the effort in Europe.

(NARA)

41

33290_P001_176x2.pmd 49 12/6/2005, 4:16 AM
civilians, informers, and agents in occupied territory.” As

practiced in the Italian campaign, agents at corps and

army would accompany division detachments. In this

manner, detachments could continue to push forward with

their supported divisions while handing off the remaining

counterintelligence duties smoothly to agents at corps.

At the time of the invasion, the Army implemented a

global numbering system for CIC detachments. Those

units serving with infantry and airborne divisions were

given the numbers corresponding with their divisional

organization: the 200’s were reserved for detachments

serving with corps; the 300’s for those attached to field

armies; the 400’s to those assigned at theater; 500’s for

armored divisions; and 600’s and 700’s for CIC elements in

support of the Army Air Force.

Normandy

Before dawn on D-Day, 6 June 1944, six CIC detachments had already landed by parachute or glider in

Normandy; among them were officers and agents assigned to the 101st and 82d

 Airborne Divisions. Among

eight members of the 101st CIC Detachment, three were

killed, another severely injured, and a fifth wounded and

captured, all on the first day. In each new town or village,

Counter Intelligence Corps agents rushed to secure their

number one target—control of communications centers to

When a captured safe proved too

difficult to open, the CIC was often called in.

In one instance, the CIC agent, a new arrival

to the combat zone, used five pounds of

dynamite which not only demolished the

container and scattered its contents of monies

and documents over the Normandy

countryside, but destroyed the house it was in.

The blast even caused a local battalion to go

on alert, fearing that the Germans had

launched a counteroffensive.

42

Information could come from any source, such as this elderly French gentleman. (NARA)

The 35th CIC Detachment no more than hung up a sign announcing it was open for business in St Lo

when an elderly, disheveled Frenchman stumbled in and offered to exchange information for a pair of

shoes. Skeptical at first but eventually agreeing to the bargain, the CIC agent watched with amazement as

the source proceeded to produce a fountain pen that he then took apart revealing a piece of tissue paper a

foot long and 4 inches wide. On it were listed the positions of German units 200 miles inland along with

the locations of various mine fields, road blocks, observation posts, and radio stations. The source had

even taken time to jot down the size and location of resistance groups and the presence of air strips.

33290_P001_176x1.pmd 50 11/28/2005, 3:41 PM
ensure all telephone, telegraph, and radio communications

were stopped, the mail impounded, and printing presses

shut down. In Normandy, arrests of those on the CIC’s

“Black List” were made easier by the presence of resistance groups who had proceeded to detain all collaborators who had not retreated with the Germans.

By far, the biggest contribution the CIC made during

the first few days was collecting information that tactical

commanders could put to immediate use. For example,

agents from the 82d

 CIC Detachment were credited with

finding a document on the body of a German officer that

revealed the enemy’s order of battle. In the city of

Cherbourg, CIC soldiers seized a huge number of captured

documents that were turned over to the VII Corps Order of

Battle team. Agents from still another detachment

obtained from French Resistance the location of an

ammunition dump, names of other resistance members

within the area, and disposition of enemy troops in the

vicinity of Berginy. During a search of the former German

headquarters at Ste. Mere-Eglise, two agents discovered

construction plans for various defensive measures and

supply dumps on the Cotentin Peninsula.

Initiative and improvisation became the hallmark of

Army counterintelligence in combat conditions during

World War II. Upon learning that the widow of a French

underground leader possessed valuable information but

risked capture by the enemy, members of the 101st CIC

Detachment commandeered a truck belonging to a local

French citizen. Within full view of German soldiers, CIC

agents and a French guide traveled behind the lines to

reach the villa where the lady was hiding. Not only did

the mission end in the rescue of the woman, but she

brought with her numerous notebooks containing many of

the names and addresses of personalities on the CIC’s

detention list.

Routine duties also played an important role in the life

of a typical CIC unit. The handling of civilians proved an

ongoing issue that required close and constant coordination with civil affairs, military police, and military intelligence. Many cases involved individuals who had

fraternized with the enemy or were caught up in the black

market. These were turned over to the French authorities.

The growing number of cases involving looting by

American soldiers had an adverse impact upon the

counterintelligence mission, both by undermining the

overall good cooperation with French citizens and by

distracting the CIC from more important investigations.

Security lectures continued to be given to tactical

units, emphasizing among other things the need for troops

to be on the alert for flashing lights and parachuting

agents. For example, instructors informed soldiers that an

enemy agent who had recently dropped from the plane

might still show telltale signs of welts under his arms

caused by the parachute’s straps. The side benefit of this

type of orientation was to reduce the numbers of false

reports, thus freeing counterintelligence specialists to

pursue more important assignments.

By the end of July, CIC teams associated with the

Advance Section Communications Zone (ASCZ) began

operating in the First Army’s rear area, taking over from

CIC detachments that continued to advance with the

combat commands. Two hundred and fifty personnel

were drawn from 400-numbered units and refigured as 18

“lettered” detachments; their field offices covering some

31 towns. Their primary mission was to protect headquarters staff against possible spies and saboteurs. To

accomplish this, the detachments performed a wide range

of traditional functions; travel control—involving check

points and screening of personnel—consumed most of

their energies. The use of such detachments in the rear

areas would be repeated as Allied Armies advanced across

Europe.

ADVANCE TOWARD GERMANY

The campaign for Northern France began with Operation COBRA in July 1944. On 31 July, Allied forces broke

out at Avranches and drove 90 miles to the east unopposed. When the Third Army’s direction of attack

abruptly turned southward, it left many of its CIC agents

operating in towns of the First Army’s area of responsibility. Conversely, agents assigned to the First Army found

themselves within the Third Army’s area of operations.

The fast-pace movement necessitated an exchange of

operational plans as well as overnight reassignment of

CIC personnel between the two armies. The campaign

Sometimes, CIC agents resorted to subterfuge to accomplish their objective. In September, the dock

workers in Marseilles, who were a vital link in the supply chain, announced a Communist-inspired strike.

On their own initiative, two agents met with members of the French Foreign Legion, bivouacked not far

from the city, and convinced the commander that a “Celebration of Victory in Southern France Day”

might be in order. The festivities proved a great success with cheering crowds lining the streets, various

dignitaries giving speeches, and of course, soldiers marching with their fixed bayonets. Afterwards the

French Foreign Legion conveniently remained in the city for several days, thus undercutting any

motivation for a strike.

43

33290_P001_176.pmd 51 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
ended on 14 September—three days after the Seventh

Army, coming up from the south, established liaison with

elements of Patton’s Third Army near Dijon in central

France.

For those involved in counterintelligence, the sweep

across France was very frustrating in terms of fulfilling

their duties; CIC soldiers were often called upon to act as

traffic coordinators, temporary town officials, and virtual

“father confessors.” On several occasions the would-be

spy catchers even turned into peace makers. Second

Lieutenant Charles W. Colgan recalled having to cross a

river near Orleans under a white flag to try and negotiate a

surrender of 14,000 German troops. The rapid pace of the

war also forced agents to frequently leave investigations

only partially completed and to entrust them to others in

the rear areas. During this phase, the wisdom of having

two agents from the corps CIC detachments assigned to

each of the tactical detachments to facilitate the hand-off

was validated over and over again. The quick advance of

the Allies did have one side benefit; it convinced many

enemy sleeper cells to abandon their plans of spying and

sabotage.

Lack of communication facilities often made liaison

with other Allied intelligence agencies and even with other

CIC detachments impossible. The quality of support

Army counterintelligence could expect from local French

resistance also deteriorated the further the Allied Forces

advanced into the center of the country. Then there was

the lack of French linguists. At first, counterintelligence

employed soldiers from Military Intelligence Interpreter

Teams, but soon began using French citizens. A son of a

French diplomat and a former officer in the Free French

Forces were typical of those employed.

Entries in the 79th CIC Journal for August 2 reflected

just how busy one day could be: “While in the coastal

city of Granville, screened and released 260 civilians;

turned over to Third Army the locations where Germans

were reported to be hiding and signaling to aircraft; also

provided a list of collaborationists; informed authorities of

location of ammunition dumps; reported burial sites of

four US soldiers; identified hiding places of 20 personnel

sent on an infiltration mission; and captured one alleged

spy.”

During the campaign, CIC agents successfully rounded

up a number of high level enemy spies. In one instance

the individual was in the process of making a reconnaissance of US Army military positions. Dressed in civilian

clothes, the operative carried a document that authorized

him to pass through German lines. Taken to the First

Army Interrogation Center for questioning, the enemy

In the European Theater, prisoners, not documents, proved the more frequent source of timely information. (NARA)

44

33290_P001_176.pmd 52 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
agent eventually faced trial by the US Military Commission and death by hanging.

Based on the favorable experience of the “S” Force

mission in Rome, Allied planners launched a similar effort

to carry out “seizing, safeguarding, and exploiting

important intelligence and counterintelligence targets in

the larger cities” of western Europe. Paris would become

the first objective for “T” (Target) Force, whose 1,800

personnel were divided between an administrative element

of 200; a tactical contingent of 1,050 to remove mines,

guard targets, etc.; and a 550-man intelligence and

security element. The CIC, to include members of its antisabotage teams, contributed 115 men—the largest single

portion of the intelligence contingent. After Paris, the

418th CIC Detachment in support of the 12th Army Group

became the primary source of agent support for future “T”

Forces.

Southern France

For 6 months prior to the Allied invasion of Southern

France, the CIC worked in Italy helping to keep planning

for the campaign a secret. A detachment was specifically

established to guard the activities of Task Force 163, and

after the task force dissolved itself in March 1944, CIC

agents remained busy circulating among the troops and

local populace to learn of any leaks of the pending

operation. They also turned all apprehended enemy

agents over to the OSS to be “doubled” so the would-be

spies could be used to transmit disinformation back to

their handlers. Finally, the CIC set up a school in Naples

to acquaint its agents with the security environment that

would await them in France.

The Seventh Army entered France (Operation ANVIL)

in mid-August through the German Mediterranean

defenses. Many of the detachments that served with the

Seventh Army had already been tested in the campaigns

of North Africa, Sicily, and southern Italy; however,

Seventh Army counterintelligence found itself confronted

with counterintelligence problems not previously experienced by the First and Third US Armies in western France.

Local French did not greet the liberators with the same

open arms. Instead, the CIC agents discovered a population with a higher number of enemy sympathizers or

employees of the Abwehr—German intelligence. The

Abwehr didn’t have spies as members, but rather enlisted

civilians for the purposes of espionage and sabotage.

One successful recruitment method frequently employed

45

At a US interrogation center, a captured German radio agent displays his equipment. (NARA)

33290_P001_176.pmd 53 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
by the Abwehr was to gain control over a person by

drawing him or her into the black market.

Following the Southern D-Day, the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, dispatched CIC soldiers

at Marseilles to the Franco-Spanish frontier for border

control work of apprehending would-be saboteurs and

enemy agents. Having performed similar duties in North

Africa along the border separating French and Spanish

Morocco, the element assumed the title of the Pyrenees

Border Control Group. Here, CIC agents dealt with a

population that had literally been cut off from news of the

war; many Spanish Republican troops had been in hiding

and were just waiting the chance to resume civil war

against Dictator Francisco Franco. A similar operation

was created to monitor the ill-defined boundary running

from the Mediterranean coast to the Swiss frontier and

dividing Southern France from Northern Italy.

September was a difficult month for Seventh US Army

counterintelligence. The rapid advance opened a vast

area of operations to the north, covering roughly 30,000

square miles. Because CIC’s French counterpart, the

Securite Militaire, could not begin to handle its share of

the task, the Seventh Army committed 70 of its counterintelligence officers and enlisted men. Although relations

between the CIC and the French Securite Militaire were

often strained, an integrated approach was eventually

adopted for the course of the campaign. At each corps

and division, attached French counterintelligence specialists helped to facilitate liaison with local government

agencies.

General Charles DeGaulle commanded the French

Forces of the Interior, whose primary mission was to carry

out operations to hamper German troops in Southern

France: blowing bridges, cutting communications,

In counterintelligence, verifying

the absence of a security problem can

consume as much time as dealing with

a real one. On the evening of 5

February 1945, a team from the 28th

Signal Company Message Center

moved from Kayserburg to Colmar,

France, as part of the relocation of its

division headquarters. Arriving at

their new billets, they proceeded to

park their 21⁄2-ton truck for the night,

only to awaken the next morning to

find that not only was the truck

missing, but much more importantly, its

cargo was gone—a cipher machine,

nicknamed SIGABA. The SIGABA

was an electro-mechanical converter

used to encipher messages containing

the Allies’ operational plans at division

echelon and above. Panicked by the thought that an enemy agent was behind the theft, US authorities

immediately reassigned 15 CIC agents to the case and placed COL David G. Erskine, the CIC Chief of

the Sixth Army Group, in charge of the massive search. Erskine’s discreet inquiries with French officials

eventually bore fruit and resulted in finding the perpetrator, a local Frenchman who, himself having had a

truck stolen, decided to do the same. But when the thief discovered the two safes each weighing 550

pounds, plus a field safe, he sensed immediately that the cargo was too hot and proceeded to dump it into

the nearby Geissen River. By 9 March, the level of the river had dropped enough for divers to locate the

larger safes 100 yards down stream, but still no evidence of the third safe. Colonel Erskine’s only

alternative was to begin planning for the diversion of the river so that a more thorough inspection could

take place. One last search by CIC agents along the banks bore fruit when the sun reflected off the

container’s exposed metal some 600 yards from the bridge.

46

33290_P001_176.pmd 54 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
destroying railroads, etc. In the course of the campaign,

the CIC detachments maintained close contact with these

partisans who not only served as invaluable sources of

information but helped with rounding up collaborators

and would-be spies. Unfortunately, the French Forces of

the Interior soon evolved into a revenging army. One CIC

report read, “A truck with Germans in civilian clothes was

captured. The French Forces of the Interior shot 19 of

them as Gestapo Agents.” Ironically, this allowed the CIC

agents to assume the role of “good cop” and made their

job easier since the French population soon preferred the

Americans to handle security-related matters.

The Stall

By early September, counterintelligence found its job

much easier on the front lines. The various detachments

began to witness the presence of a lower class of enemy

agents: those recruited as a result of their black-market

activities, those open to blackmail, and those simply freed

from jail. The trained eyes of an experienced agent easily

recognized the newly made suitcases carried by these

inexperienced operatives and the sequentially-numbered

bills being sported about.

The G2, First US Army reflected the optimism of the

moment: “...The German Intelligence Service left a

network of stay-behind agents along the so-called

Atlantic Wall. This network has been a complete and

miserable failure in the First Army area as three of these

agents are now working as double agents for the US Army

and are feeding the Germans false information. Some

agents have surrendered; some have tried to remain

unknown, ...never working or sending reports to the

German Intelligence Service.”

By the end of the month, the Allied drive had lost

steam in Northern France, allowing for the Germans to

regroup. Relations with the French also began to change.

Previously, the Counter Intelligence Corps had worked

with the local French authorities following liberation of

occupied territory. The French viewed the initial intervention and backing of the CIC as beneficial but desired less

American involvement once the rear areas had been freed

of German influence. Following the reorganization of the

47

A prisoner is brought in for interrogation by counterintelligence agents. (NARA)

33290_P001_176.pmd 55 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
French Government, the Counter Intelligence Corps found

its duties and powers becoming more and more restricted

to cases involving Army personnel. However, small

pockets still remained in German hands, separated from

the rest of the country by narrow areas of operations

under the Army’s jurisdiction.

In late September, the US VII Corps quickly breached

the main defenses of the Siegfried Line and entered

Germany south of Aachen. The US First Army eventually

encircled Aachen, and following tough house-to-house

fighting by the 1st Infantry Division, the city fell. The 205th

CIC Detachment earned the distinction of being the first of

its kind to enter Germany, helping to take the nearby town

of Rotgen on 14 September. When military intelligence

discovered that no technical intelligence (TECHINT)

specialists were available, the 205th assumed responsibility

for running down information and personnel associated

with the Prym Enterprises, which served as the source of a

new type of turbine blades being used in German jet

aircraft.

By October the CIC detachments assigned to the First

and Third United States Armies began to face, for the first

time in the war, large numbers of refugees, evacuees, and

forced laborers released by the enemy so that they would

float back through the front lines, causing congestion.

Among them were German soldiers who had donned

civilian clothing when they found themselves cut off from

their retreating army. More importantly, stay-behind

agents had joined the migration for the purpose of

obtaining information. As the First and Third United

States Armies advanced closer to Germany, the problem

grew increasingly serious. As a result, 14 holding camps

were set up, and from there, agents screened detainees to

determine their category.

The Low Countries

When Counter Intelligence Corps personnel began

operations in Holland, they were quick to make use of

resistance groups. The first was the Orde Dienst that

A CIC agent attached to the 94th Infantry Division interrogates the Dutch engineer who installed Hitler’s electronic security system

at Berchtesgaden. (NARA)

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33290_P001_176.pmd 56 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
came into existence after the arrival of the Allied Armies

and tended to represent the more mainstream part of

society. The second was the Koninkluke Patrouille,

which had engaged in acts of sabotage during the German

occupation. Once liberated, Dutch civilians, like the

French before them, falsely believed all travel restrictions

were automatically lifted. In response to the need to

check proper identification of travelers, the CIC deployed

approximately 360 members of the resistance organizations

to man stationary checkpoints and roving patrols.

Resistance groups in Luxembourg were quite active

during the war, and with the departure of the Germans,

these groups united to temporarily form a police force

which operated road control posts and performed routine

police duties. After its liberation the Hadir Steel Works of

Differdange, Luxembourg—the largest European producer

of 100-foot “I” beams—

began to supply the Allies

with the essential material

needed for bridge building.

The CIC assumed oversight

responsibility for security

at the plant and in the

process implemented a

number of changes.

Raising carrier pigeons was

a popular pastime in

Luxembourg and Belgium,

but when captured German

agents revealed that

pigeons, not radio-transmitters, were the chosen

means of communicating

with higher headquarters,

pigeon flights were

prohibited. Later when

troops entered Germany, the

CIC gave orders to destroy

all such birds.

Belgium posed the

greatest challenge to

security because its

location made the people

equally wary of both the

French and Germans.

Belgian society reflected

these divisions politically

and culturally. People did

not trust CIC agents, which

in turn made their investigations more time-consuming.

Even the resistance

movement itself was

divided. Upon liberation by

the Allies, resistance

groups in certain areas proceeded to make wholesale

arrests including many innocent civilians; still others

displayed reluctance to give up their weapons, posing

even more problems for the CIC. Communists exploited the

situation for the purpose of creating an armed force that,

for a brief time, threatened the overthrow of the Belgian

National Government.

Skorzeny

In late 1944, the Germans made a surprise counteroffensive through the Ardennes and the Alsace region of

France, the so-called Battle of the Bulge. This proved a

last desperate attempt to reverse the tide of war on the

western front, and counterintelligence would face one of

its greatest tests on a battlefield. On 16 December, German

forces aided by surprise and wintry weather attacked the

49

Lieutenant Colonel Otto Skorzeny orchestrated the training of 150 German soldiers to use the

latest American slang and then outfitted them with US uniforms. (INSCOM)

33290_P001_176.pmd 57 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
lightly held sector of the First Army. Success depended in

part on the so-called 150th Panzer Brigade, organized by

the German Intelligence Service. Dressed in US uniforms

and equipped with captured weapons and jeeps, enemy

soldiers of the Einheit Stielau were to perform intelligence

collection, commit acts of sabotage, and sow confusion.

To give the plan a chance at success, German leaders

selected English-speaking soldiers for participation and

provided them an intense orientation to American culture

to include watching newsreels and movies, learning

current slang words, and practicing American mannerisms,

such as the handling of cigarettes.

The architect of this campaign of deceit was LTC Otto

Skorzeny, a man with many talents who before the war had

been an engineer, racing car driver, and business executive. He had attained a reputation among the German High

Command for his daring rescue of Mussolini in November

1943.

A series of events would conspire to undermine the full

impact of Skorzeny’s plan. For several months leading up

to the Battle of the Bulge, US troops were fully aware of

isolated cases of German soldiers posing in US uniforms

and on occasion using stolen jeeps. For instance, the CIC

within the Ninth Army area of operations apprehended 31

Germans in civilian clothing in the first 15 days of December. These captured Germans revealed they had been

instructed to remain behind Allied lines to tap into US

communications. But the clinching bit of information

came from one prisoner who told of having seen the secret

order laying out Skorzeny’s plans. (Everything proved

correct except for the location.) Later, an order taken from

the body of a dead German officer confirmed the

prisoner’s story. Based on this information, Allied

counterintelligence flashed the word on the day of the

attack to alert American troops about the enemy’s plan of

deception.

US troops immediately took steps to re-mark vehicles

and to implement new identification procedures. Counterintelligence forces deployed to meet the situation, even in

areas not affected by the German advance. Military police

and guards checked identifications at bridges, reinforced

security at vital sites, and posted control points to screen

refugees. They questioned suspicious persons beyond

merely asking for the traditional password: “What staging

area did you pass through in the States? What is the

price of an air mail stamp? A V-mail stamp? What is

Sinatra’s first name?” Say “wreath.” Germans apparently

found it difficult to pronounce “th.” In one instance,

Germans gave themselves away when they claimed they

were trained at Fort Hood, but then stated they had never

been in Texas. On the other hand, having to name both

baseball teams in St. Louis—the Cardinals and the

Browns—proved difficult even for some American

soldiers.

On 18 December—the second day of the counteroffensive—CIC efforts yielded results. Failing to give the

correct password, three members of a Skorzeny team were

apprehended wearing US uniforms and possessing a jeep

and sabotage devices. Rushed by agents to the First

Army’s Interrogation Center, the Germans revealed the

size of their brigade and that it possessed 150 English

linguists. The next day an alert MP with the assistance of

a CIC agent unmasked another group when they appeared

just “too damn polite;” this time the captives served up

the unsettling news that a possible plot was underway to

assassinate the Supreme Allied Commander, General

Dwight D. Eisenhower, and other high ranking officers.

Eventually, it became evident that no such operation was

underway. Of all the teams he sent out, Skorzeny would

later claim that two returned but only one brought

“information.”

Progress in Italy

In a pamphlet entitled “Po Valley,” Thomas A. Popa

summarized the campaign for Italy as follows: “...Allied

armies in Italy had battled north over 1,000 miles of

mountainous terrain, through inclement weather, against a

capable and determined enemy.” The Fifth Army would

earn the distinction of being the only US field army of the

war in continuous combat for over 600 days. In the end,

superior manpower and supplies coupled with tacit

determination on the part of the Allies resulted in victory,

but the cost was high. Nearly 32,000 Allied soldiers were

killed in action; of these over 19,000 were Americans.

Borrowing the expertise and equipment of

a local radio intelligence unit, the 426th CIC

Detachment detected a strong, unidentified

signal coming from the area surrounding the

Piazza San Pantaleo in Rome—6 months after

the retreat of the Germans from the city. A

week later, an enemy agent who dropped by

parachute surrendered to CIC agents and

proceeded to reveal to them that he had monies

and radio crystals for a pair of fellow spies who

had been providing timely intelligence from

Italy’s capital. Under the surveillance of CIC

personnel, the would-be espionage agent was

allowed to make contact with his comrades.

This, in turn, led to their arrest. Their

apartment on the top floor was perfectly

situated to maximize transmissions and observe

troop movements. An antenna wire was strung

from their terrace and cleverly disguised in

between clothes lines.

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33290_P001_176.pmd 58 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
 Sometimes, fact imitated fiction. In

March, VII Corps agents operating from

Cologne took into custody a “better-looking

than average Belgian girl, in her twenties,

medium height, blonde hair, and an interesting

figure.” She had been pulled from the Rhine

when her boat had collapsed. CIC agents

quickly dismissed Heloise Bouconville’s cover

story and confronted her with her true

identity—Sybille Delcourt, the mistress of

Werner Kramer, chief of a storm-trooper spy

network within the region. Unmasked,

Delcourt revealed that she had worked for the

Gestapo for more than 4 years and was

presently on a mission to assassinate an

informer and to free Gestapo personnel who

had been picked up by the Allies. Fluent in

French, German, Flemish, and Dutch, Sybille

quickly decided it would be in her best interest

to become a double-agent for the CIC. In the

coming weeks, she worked alongside disguised

CIC agents to compromise locations of

Gestapo “Drop Houses” and to identify

individuals the Gestapo had marked for

assassination. She was also present while

other internees were being interrogated. Once

CIC captors left the room, uncooperative

prisoners were often quick to reveal their real

identity to a fellow captive such as Sybille. All

told, Delcourt would compromise some 150

people associated with the Gestapo. Yet, she

still lied to conceal the name of one arrestee—

her former lover, Werner Kramer. Sentenced

to death by Belgian authorities, Delcourt

ultimately had her sentence commuted; thanks

in part to CIC personnel who recommended

mercy for the girl with a “rather appealing

face.”

Army counterintelligence counted seven of its soldiers

among those who made the supreme sacrifice.

From 10 October to 31 December 1944, elements of Fifth

Army arrested 110 espionage and sabotage agents; 75 of

these by CIC soldiers. Then a cold winter stalemate set in,

allowing local Fascists to spread rumors. Inscriptions in

crayon and coal began appearing on walls of the various

towns: “Roosevelt, I tre etti di pane” or “Roosevelt,

where are the three hundred grams of bread.” But apart

from promoting unrest and distracting the CIC from more

important duties, the whisper campaign accomplished

little.

The months leading up to V-E Day (May 8) continued

to remain extremely productive ones for the Allied security

force. For example, the 305th CIC Detachment participated

in the “S” Force in the city of Bologna, captured more

than 20 enemy espionage and sabotage agents of the

German Intelligence Service, four clandestine radio

transmitters, and various valuable documents. In Genoa,

newly assigned Special Agent Henry Feldmen personally

rounded up 30 stay-behind agents in one month and

obtained their confessions.

The Counter Intelligence Corps picked up a number of

well-known personalities such as Ezra Pound, the prominent American poet-turned expatriate and profascist.

Although partisans executed Mussolini before the CIC

could arrest him, agents were able to collect important

correspondence and place his daughter and her children

in custody. Finally, as the German threat faded, the Allied

Military Government discovered itself facing an unexpected new one—communism. The presence and

influence of Communists were so widespread the CIC took

immediate steps to establish a reliable informant net that

targeted groups planning to undermine the authority of

the Military Government.

INVASION OF GERMANY

Following the German counteroffensive into ArdennesAlsace, General Eisenhower laid plans involving concentric attacks for the enemy’s final defeat on the battlefield.

At his disposal were 90 full-strength divisions, including

25 armored and 5 airborne, stretching 450 miles along the

Rhine. During the campaign, Eisenhower had to make a

number of adjustments, but he continued to resist British

pressure to take the capital city of Berlin. By doing so, he

honored the agreement previously negotiated among the

Allies to halt along the east bank of the Elbe and Mulde

Rivers where they would make contact with the Soviet

forces moving west.

As US forces prepared to enter Germany, the call went

out for more German linguists. The 208th CIC Detachment

was typical; of its 5 officers and 14 enlisted men, only 2

spoke German. Borrowing members of the Army’s

interrogation teams proved unsatisfactory as these types

eventually had to return to their own units and mission.

The prospect of using local German civilians was equally

unsatisfactory as they could not travel with a detachment

as it moved forward. To obtain language qualified agents,

Army leaders approved a change in security standards to

allow for wider recruitment of foreign-born personnel.

51

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 The Enemy’s Homeland

In early 1945, the Allies launched Operation GISBOMB,

a series of bombing raids on spy schools in order to

reduce the number of agents being released by the

German Intelligence Service. Interrogations of captured

spies and saboteurs provided locations of the training

facilities that were then passed on to the Ninth US Air

Force. Sites included the radio school and station at

Hundsbach; the headquarters for sabotage units at

Leitstelle II West; guerrilla training facility at Kloster

Tiefenthal; and the training center for long-term agents at

the Waldburg Radio School. Aerial damage assessments

following the raids revealed significant destruction to the

enemy’s facilities. In addition, there was the unseen and

unknown impact of the bombings, such as the psychological effect upon the morale and resolve of would-be

spies.

Learning that enemy saboteur swimmers might attempt

to destroy pontoon bridges at Remagen, the CIC recruited

Army engineers to devise underwater nets made of barbed

wire entanglements; guards were also instructed to fire at

all floating objects. These countermeasures were successful in turning back an attempt by German frogmen, socalled Flusskaempfer or “River Fighters.” Later at the

bridge crossing in the vicinity of Oppenheim, a number of

these would-be saboteurs were captured and turned over

to counterintelligence for interrogation.

Once in Germany, the CIC treated the German populace

with a conqueror’s hand. Already prepared psychologically to obey those in control, the Germans responded

well to orders, but saw requests as being a sign of

These young members of the Wehrwolf organization were responsible for cutting communications lines. (NARA)

Counterintelligence took action to prevent the efforts of

German so-called “river fighters” to sabotage bridges.

(NARA)

52

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The end of Richard Jarczyk, a stay-behind spy. Such executions were highly publicized to deter others. (NARA)

weakness. Cooperation of German informants varied

significantly. The further from the fighting, the more

cooperative they became. Also, individuals tended to be

responsive once they saw that their cooperation netted

results, i.e., witnessing a highly visible Nazi official being

arrested. Not unsurprising, people were inclined to refer

to themselves in terms of their political and cultural

identity before the rise of Nazism. Former Communists, in

particular, proved helpful; but over time, they would

become the chief critics of the new Military Government,

especially when any former leader within the community

was put back into power. In Germany counterintelligence

did not enjoy the benefit of resistance groups. The CIC

did discover the presence of the Edelweiss Piraten, a

small youth organization that harassed members of the

Hitler Jugend or Youth, but nothing of substance came

from trying to run down its leadership.

New Threats

Army counterintelligence faced a series of new threats

in Germany. In early 1945, Nazi Party leaders responsible

for security or the Reichssicherheits-Hauptamt issued

instructions to various Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei)

headquarters to launch the Wehrwolf movement, which

would usher in the “coming freedom movement”

(Kommende Freiheitsbewegung). By enlisting members

of the party and other volunteers, the Wehrwolf set about

to “destroy the enemy wherever we find him after he has

entered Germany,” to terrorize Germans inclined to assist

the Allies, and to sabotage Allied installations and

communications. Fortunately, the Wehrwolf proved

largely ineffective because of the lack of planning. One

captured member of the organization told interrogators

that his band had been given no equipment and no

instructions and had been told simply “to do what we

could.”

The CIC also faced a small but real threat from the

Hitler Youth. During an interrogation, one 12-year-old

expressed the ultra nationalism that was at the heart of the

movement: “I hate you Americans. I wish I had a pistol to

kill all of you. I shall never betray my Führer as long as I

breathe.” Then there were the organizations that proved

53

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more rumor than fact, such as the Sonderkommando

Bienenstock, an airborne saboteur group sponsored by the

Luftwaffe for behind-the-line action. Their mission called

for them to land German planes behind Allied lines and

proceed to carry out acts of sabotage. New types of

sabotage and terrorist devices would surface in Germany,

such as a cigarette lighter with a poison pellet that when lit

would give off a deadly gas; poison aspirin tablets,

chocolate bars, and sugar; and a so-called “butter mould”

antipersonnel bomb.

Routine Missions

As the Allies advanced across Germany’s homeland, the

mission of counterintelligence on paper remained much as

it had been before: “protection of Allied interests from

espionage, sabotage, and subversion activity; the collection and study of information relative to underground

movements; the liquidation of the German Intelligence

Service (and related organizations); and the arrest and

investigation of those whose activities pose a threat to

Allied security.” In addition, the CIC assisted the Military

Government in investigating applicants for public office

and for service with the German police. Because divisions

would daily move as much as 20 to 30 miles, Counter

Intelligence Corps detachments focused on neutralizing

communications coming from enemy territory, arresting

persons considered an immediate threat to Allied operations, and sealing buildings that might contain records of

value to the Military Government.

The screening of various peoples (displaced persons,

German soldiers in civilian clothes, and German POW’s)

constituted a major effort. In March-April 1945, the 29th

Infantry Division alone oversaw camps in the rear area

that housed approximately 80,000 displaced persons,

40,000 freed Allied prisoners, and 1,000 German soldiers.

Under such conditions, the best the CIC could hope to

Seventh Army counterintelligence arrested staff members of the Dachau Concentration Camp. The man with the clasped hands was

the camp executioner. (INSCOM)

54

33290_P001_176x1.pmd 62 11/28/2005, 3:41 PM
A would-be saboteur leads CIC agents to the location of his buried explosives. (NARA)

accomplish was a quick search for personnel fitting a

profile. Those falling into the displaced category presented the greatest challenge. For example, a survey of

one town revealed all men of military age consisted of 215

Germans, 100 Russians, 80 Serbians, 30 Poles, 25 Italians,

and 5 Frenchmen.

The impact of screening persons was such as to create

personnel shortfalls. One solution was for the Counter

Intelligence Corps to stop being responsible for every

town and adopt a broader approach involving areas of

operations. Another time-saving measure was the placing

of individuals under house arrest and recording their

detention on Military Government registration slips. This

allowed agents to reopen their investigations when given

sufficient time.

The CIC continued to make policing documents a

priority. Special Agent George J. Novak was involved in

what turned out to be one of the more important finds.

The S2 directed Novak to lead a column of jeeps to search

a castle belonging to the former German Foreign Minister

Von Ribbentrop. Arriving at the castle concealed in the

evergreen forests of the Harz Mountains, the searchers

were greeted by Baron Witilo Von Griesheim, who had

prudently chosen to disobey orders from Berlin to destroy

the German Foreign Ministry Files from 1871 to 1944 and

had instead burned newspapers for appearance sake.

Among other things, the documents contained the official

exchanges between Berlin and British Prime Minister

Neville Chamberlain, the German-Russian negotiations in

1939, and a letter from French General Marshal Petain to

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Hitler begging the Führer to declare Paris an open city and

save it from destruction.

As the Allied armies grew nearer, the Germans attempted to destroy the paper trail of the Third Reich,

especially the personnel files of the Nazi Party. Acting

upon a tip, Agent Francesco S. Quaranta investigated a

local paper mill in the village of Freimann where he

discovered all the Nazi Party membership cards with

identification photos on the back along with documents of

various high-level Gestapo figures and court officials. But

not all documents came in such neat packages. An agent

overheard the Hitler Jugend anthem coming from a

German police lieutenant’s home in Konigshofen. Suspicious, he ordered a search of the house. Here, agents

found personal papers from the Luftwaffe High Command.

In addition, the man’s wife, an engineer, produced

technical drawings that she had made of an antiaircraft

device and its timing mechanism that allowed it to explode

at any altitude.

On occasion, the CIC discovered more than documents. Counterintelligence also came across caches of

hidden treasure, such as art, jewelry, watches, precious

coins, and banknotes, including US currency. In western

Austria, a German pastor approached local counterintelligence with information that he knew the hiding place of

gold bullion, but with one reservation, he desired the US

and not the French to take possession of it. There was a

small problem—the location of the treasure was in the

French area of operations and the building was presently

being occupied by the French military. Going by himself,

Special Agent Victor de Guinzboug, who was fluent in the

language, convinced the French to vacate the premises,

and then immediately radioed for the convoy of military

police to rapidly proceed to the location and retrieve the

gold bars hidden under a pile of coal in the cellar. The

caravan along with the gold was out of sight before

anyone was the wiser. The pastor then led the Americans

to a nearby farm house where the process was repeated.

Agents recovered all totaled, 8 tons of gold from these

two snatch operations alone.

Army counterintelligence frequently served as investigating officers in atrocity cases. When only four members

of a nine-man bomber crew could be confirmed dead or

captured, counterintelligence detailed 1LT Lynn E.

Neunechwander and Special Agent Sam D. Beall to track

down the fate of the missing flyers. By pursuing various

leads, they quickly determined that following the airmen’s

capture and turnover to local police, the five American

flyers had been taken to a nearby farm in the vicinity of

Hohenhauser-Eichholz and executed. Not only did the

agents identify the grave sites, but they obtained photos

and descriptions of the perpetrators that eventually led to

their apprehension. On a much larger scale, members of

the 307th CIC Detachment were among the first to arrive at

the Dachau concentration camp. Counterintelligence

agents assumed responsibility for locating the camp’s

administrators and apprehending 57 prisoners who had

perpetrated crimes against fellow inmates, among them

was the executioner in charge of mass murder—the socalled “Butcher of Dachau.”

Before the war Agent Ib Melchior, a Dane by birth, had traveled extensively throughout Europe

as a member of an acting troupe. In his book, Case by Case, Melchior recalls how on one occasion,

he had to put all his skills to the test. Sent behind the enemy lines to bring back a scientist associated

with Germany’s atomic program, Melchior attempted to allay the scientist’s fear of being caught

defecting. To solve the dilemma, Melchior proposed a ruse. He tied his “captive’s” hands and struck

him on the back of the head, not to inflict injury, but to induce bleeding. This way, if they should fall

into German hands, the scientist could claim he was a reluctant prisoner. Melchior and his companion

did not travel far before they ran into a road block. Melchior described what happened next; “I ripped

off my woolen cap, tore the officer’s SS cap from the scientist’s head, slapped it on my own, and

hissed to my petrified passenger, ‘Don’t move!’...‘May I—,’ the German guard began. I cut him off

at once. ‘What the devil is going on here, Sergeant?’ I barked. ‘I am Sturmbannfuhrer von Stuelp,

Gestapo. Get that damned roadblock out of the way!’ [After a lengthy exchange, the German soldier

remained adamant to check the vehicle; Melchior was down to his last card—the Wehrmacht map,

which he now produced as a writing pad.] Imperiously I stuck out my hand toward the man. ‘Your

pencil,’ I demanded curtly, ‘I shall want your name, your service number for the record.’ I smiled

maliciously, ‘The Reichsfuhrer SS will wish to know exactly who delayed a mission in which he is

vitally interested.’ The MP stared at me, chalk-faced.” With this last bit of acting, Melchior won

passage to the front behind a German convoy.

56

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Not all activities of the CIC could be said to be either

profitable or even mission related. The weekly summary

of the 218th CIC Detachment reflected the frustrations of

its commander: “A day spent carrying women through the

street who have fainted from starvation (three days locked

up in a school building without food or water); helping

midwife a cow (the farm labor was interned and the droves

of fine stock left untended); doctoring a young girl who

had lacerations on her face from our shelling; settling the

problems of sorting and shipping 78 Poles, Dutch, Italians,

and French, while at the same time finding white bread for

a dying diabetic; putting out fires; chasing drunken GI’s

out of the Headquarters; and finding details to bury dead

Germans...is far from the intelligence, systematic search

for the dissident elements whom we have come here to

find....”

Although the fighting eventually ground to a halt,

major distractions continued to confront counterintelligence. When the VII Corps CIC entered Leipzig, they

faced the assignment of determining the nature and intent

of an anti-Nazi group called the National Komitee Freies

Deutschland. In existence since 1935, the organization

had remained dormant throughout the war. Apparently

sincerely motivated, they were volunteering their services

to keep the Nazis from power, but soon their “get-even”

attitude caused difficulties when they falsely accused

individuals of being members of the Gestapo or Schutz

Staffeln (SS); such accusations were a distraction to a

counterintelligence effort already spread thin. The

presence of so many displaced Russians further compounded the problem as did the issue of protecting

informers. Cooperative citizens often awoke the next

57

Throughout the Pacific, CIC agents checked travel papers of arriving passengers. (AHEC)

33290_P001_176.pmd 65 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
morning to find on their doors the following message:

“Auch fuer Dich, Du USA Soeldling, wird die Stunde der

Vergeltung Kommen!” “For you too, USA hireling, will

come the day of vengeance soon.”

Despite the surrender, CIC agents remained vigilant for

spies. For example, Army agents became suspicious

when an individual soon to be appointed mayor of a small

town persisted in his requests for travel permits. Followup interrogation revealed he had been trained to sabotage

Allied materiel, kill US soldiers, and report on troop

movements. Posters were widely distributed throughout

the Seventh Army area depicting his execution coupled

with a warning in German that others would suffer a

similar fate. Counterintelligence also regularly checked

for members of the Gestapo and SS who may have found

their way into POW holding cages. By VE-Day, the

number of key Nazi personnel taken into custody grew as

they simply ran out of places to hide. Also for the first

time, agents added war criminals to their arrest lists.

THE PACIFIC

Within a year of going to war, the Counter Intelligence

Corps in Hawaii (initially referred to as the Contact Office)

reached 81 agents, or 80 percent of its peak strength.

Besides its headquarters on Oahu, the Contact Office

maintained a handful of agents on each of the other main

islands: Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai. Throughout the war,

training remained a problem for the counterintelligence

program in Hawaii. As circumstances permitted, the CIC

sent personnel to attend its school in Chicago, but this

arrangement could not accommodate the numbers of

untrained agents arriving. As a quick fix, the Contact

Office established a one-time school in Honolulu to train

the remainder of the detachment; this make-shift arrangement was repeated on two more occasions.

With the assistance of the CIC, the Army Air Force

established a detachment for the purpose of monitoring

inter-Hawaiian travel; the Navy’s Trans-Pacific Travel

Control Bureau performed a similar role for trips to and

from the islands. As the war increased in scope in the

Pacific, the need to screen incoming personnel grew

proportionately. Army counterintelligence eventually

established offices in San Francisco and Seattle to

process the 3,500 persons a month moving between these

ports and Honolulu.

The Hawaiian Islands faced their share of unique

threats. A survey of alien-owned corporations revealed

58

While conducting security surveys of various islands, CIC agents made contact with Allied coast watchers. (NARA)

33290_P001_176.pmd 66 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
that more than half were owned wholly or in part by

residents of Axis countries. The same investigation found

a number of former members of the German Storm Troopers to be in the employment of those with defense

contracts. As a precaution, the CIC arrested these

individuals and arranged for their transfer to the States.

The Contact Office also placed high priority on monitoring

a variety of local fraternal and cultural organizations

whose purposes remained unclear. Counterintelligence

successfully recruited informants as a means of keeping

tabs on membership, meetings, and agenda of suspect

groups.

 At the end of the war, CIC in Hawaii proudly pointed

out that “no known espionage, nor single case of enemyinspired sabotage, occurred there during the war.”

Leading up to the end of martial law in October 1944, 1,579

persons were apprehended. Of these, 1,466 were Japanese; the remainder Germans and Italians. Almost half

(617) were released or paroled by the hearing board; 313

relocated to internment camps on the mainland; and 79

repatriated, leaving nearly 500 still in custody on Sand

Island in Honolulu Harbor at the war’s end.

The first CIC combat detachment to arrive in Hawaii

belonged to the 6th Infantry Division. Only four-persons

strong, the detachment was quickly taken under the wing

of the Contact Office to gain hands-on experience in

dealing with local Japanese. Altogether, five combat

detachments would eventually benefit from similar

training. Hawaii would serve as the jumping off point for

Counter Intelligence Corps operations on Saipan, Iwo

Jima, and Okinawa.

South Pacific

From its beginnings in June 1942, the United States

Armed Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA), later

South Pacific Base Command, functioned primarily—as its

name suggests—in the capacity of a huge marshalling

area for millions of tons of equipment along with troops

destined for the Southwest Theater of Operation; the

South Pacific covered New Zealand, New Caledonia, Fiji

Islands, New Hebrides, and Guadalcanal. In September

1942, the Army dispatched the first of six counterintelligence agents to the USAFISPA Headquarters at Noumea,

the capital city and chief port of New Caledonia.

Undaunted by the mission assigned to the newly

formed South Pacific Provisional CIC Detachment,

Lieutenant Marvin C. Goff, Jr. immediately made plans to

cover an area that encompassed 7,000 square miles. In

addition to their personal observations and reportings,

Goff and his team depended upon close coordination with

the theater G2 to learn of any suspicious events or

persons located on the various islands. Surrounded by

water, Counter Intelligence Corps personnel constantly

responded to reports and rumors of submarine sightings

and possible enemy landing parties. Counterintelligence

also expended much time searching for the presence of

illegal radio transmitters, and during one period, even

utilized a direction-finding team from a nearby Signal

Corps unit to help in the effort.

Each set of islands had its unique challenge: On New

Caledonia, significant attention was paid to the Japanese

minority who made up an important segment of the local

business community. For similar reasons, agents viewed

the presence of Europeans with added suspicion and

monitored the propaganda efforts of the local Communist

Party. On Fiji, tensions existed between the natives and

Indian immigrants. The Indians upset the local economy

when they abandoned work on sugar plantations for more

profitable laundry and souvenir businesses and later

provided alcohol and women in exchange for the GI’s

money.

To cover the New Hebrides Group, Agents James W.

Franklin and Edgar M. Lucas set off with a small crew on a

50-foot fishing vessel to the remoter islands of the 250-

island chain. Born in Tahiti, Lucas had prior experience in

helping recruit native laborers in the area before the war.

Over a 10-day period, the two exchanged gifts of twists of

tobacco, canned milk, soap, etc. while meeting with native

chieftains, missionaries, Allied coast watchers, plantation

owners, and cannibals in hopes of neutralizing any enemy

coast watchers. French planters sympathetic to the Vichy

Government were thought to pose the greatest threat.

Priorities in other theaters delayed the deployment of

additional agents to the South Pacific, but by 1943,

significant changes began to take place. In April, MAJ

Arthur Turner arrived in theater to take command of the

South Pacific Provisional Detachment. Twenty enlisted

men accompanied him, allowing for personnel to be

permanently assigned to New Zealand, which had become

a rest and recuperation area for troops fresh from the

front. Besides the usual tavern brawls, military authorities

were confronted with soldiers who found they had had

enough of war or discovered local love interests and had

gone into hiding. (Interesting enough, their flights from

59

A former anthropologist turned CIC agent

was sent to deal with local bushmen in New

Guinea. His mission was to convince them that

Japanese spies and American airmen who landed

in their area were better alive than dead. The

agent knew the natives’ fascination with objects

so he presented a brightly enameled sunflower,

emblazoned “Vote for Landon,” (a presidential

campaign button for the Republican candidate in

1936 who hailed from the sunflower state of

Kansas) as a reward for each captive turned

over to authorities.

33290_P001_176.pmd 67 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
service were often supported by a sympathetic population.) “Loose talk” posed a security risk, and especially

doctors, nurses, and bartenders found themselves the

unwanted recipients of restricted information.

Counterintelligence’s principal means of dealing with such

leaks consisted of lectures to local hospital staffs and

assignment of undercover agents to monitor barroom

banter.

During 1943, the CIC teamed up with the Navy and the

Censorship Office to establish the Allied Security Office

for the purpose of providing port security and ensuring a

constant flow of goods and personnel to the front lines.

Eventually, branches were set up in all the major ports

from New Zealand to the New Hebrides. The Security

Office also created a “Critical Cargo Branch” to monitor

items frequently being pilfered, such as whiskey and

radios. New guidelines on the handling and guarding of

such types of cargo quickly reduced the losses.

Southwest Pacific

Army counterintelligence in the Southwest Pacific Area

(SWPA) experienced its own unique growing pangs. Lack

of trained personnel, absence of doctrine, and nonexistent

tactical CIC detachments delayed the development of an

effective organization by at least a year and a half. In

early 1942, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2,

Headquarters, United States Army Forces in Australia

(USAFIA) acted as the initial counterintelligence agency

with a nucleus of only 14 soldiers who had undergone a 3-

week, make-shift course.

Besides the lack of a formal school, counterintelligence

had to compete with the local officer candidate school for

qualified recruits. To join the Counter Intelligence Corps,

a recruit not only had to be Officer Candidate School

material but possess an investigative background, such as

that of a lawyer or newspaper man. The high standards

demanded of the early “G2 investigators” resulted in the

selection of only a handful of soldiers (14 out of 1,500

applicants). Those who did finally pass muster were

immediately assigned to the commander of one of the five

base areas into which large numbers of troops would

eventually flow.

The initial mission of the CIC was limited in scope since

the Australian Security Service assumed leadership in

anti-espionage work in country. The Counter Intelligence

Corps focused its attention on assuring the security of all

personnel and materials in the various base areas,

conducting investigations of civilians working for US

Army agencies, and indoctrinating troops in security

matters. An intense campaign was launched to educate

the troops on the danger of loose talk and the need to

adopt strong security practices. Menu folders and

playing cards were distributed with appropriate reminders,

and local Australian businessmen enthusiastically joined

in a campaign to display security posters within their

establishments.

Allied Headquarters launched an early counteroffensive against the Japanese thrust towards Australia.

Operations to the north of the Australian mainland kicked

off in October 1942 at Port Moresby, New Guinea, which

was designated as the Advance Base. The Allies proceeded to expel the Japanese from Milne Bay and establish a Sub-Advance Base there. For the first time in the

war in the Southwest Pacific, the possibility of enemy

spies and saboteurs within friendly lines could not be

ruled out; as a consequence, a handful of counterintelligence officers were dispatched to man the Port Moresby

office.

1943

The year 1943 would be the defining one for counterintelligence in SWPA. It opened with the arrival of MAJ

Albert L. Vreeland and 20 agents from Washington, DC,

thus allowing the separation of the CIC from the G2 staff.

To symbolize their operational and administrative independence, the CIC moved to a new location at 144 Bowen

Terrace in Brisbane. The driving force behind many of the

changes was BG Elliott R. Thorpe. One of the few officers

with intelligence experience, Thorpe was serving as a

military observer in the Dutch East Indies when war broke

“Attention all troops! This is Military

Intelligence speaking. Enemy agents

are operating in this area. They

operate in every role from newsboys to

kindly old ladies. They may be

wearing GIs’, officers’ uniforms, or

Australian Army issue. Not all spies

are blonde and beautiful nor will they

ask you the details of secret

plans....Don’t Talk! No matter who

starts discussing military information,

from officers down to shoeshine boys,

from motherly welfare workers to cute

little country girls. Be smart! Dummy

up! Change the subject. Don’t be

ashamed to say, ‘I don’t know.’”

Security broadcast at various train platforms in

Australia

60

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out. Given responsibility for the Counter Intelligence

Corps, US Army in the Far East (USAFFE), Thorpe

worked to ensure close cooperation and coordination

between staffs of the G2 and the CIC.

In March, the War Department, upon request of the

theater G2, relieved all CIC agents from their unit assignments and reassigned them directly to Headquarters,

United States Army in the Far East. The next month,

authorities proceeded to create the 5227th CIC Detachment

(Provisional) as the theater command detachment. (Four

months later, the 441st CIC Detachment under the command of now Colonel Vreeland was established in its

place.) During its first year of existence, the energized

441st CIC Detachment completed more than 11,000

investigations.

In April the first counterintelligence combat personnel—5 officers and 39 agents—reached the SWPA

Theater, followed 3 months later by a counterintelligence detachment assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division.

Next, a permanent CIC training school was organized in

July, supplemented by instructors from various Australian

intelligence agencies. Located in a 100-year-old mansion

in Brisbane, the school shaped its curriculum to reflect

anticipated combat-required skills ranging from map

reading to jungle warfare. The curriculum also stressed

native languages such as those found in Dutch East

Indies and Malaya along with traditional counterintelligence subjects—handling POWs and captured documents. The school’s staff viewed the Army’s issuance of

Technical Manual 30-215, “Counter Intelligence Corps”

as a godsend. A number of agents were also exposed to

3 months of additional hands-on training with military

elements conducting patrols in areas of New Guinea that

had recently been under Japanese control. The practical

experience gained from dealing with local natives proved

invaluable for the campaigns that lay ahead. Finally,

General Elliot R. Thorpe, who oversaw the CIC in the

Southwest Pacific Theater, is shown pinning the bronze star

on an agent. (INSCOM)

61

A scene repeated over and over: a CIC agent conducts a security lecture. (AHEC)

33290_P001_176x2.pmd 69 12/6/2005, 4:49 AM
besides a school, the CIC established its own chemical and

photographic laboratories to work special problems.

In 1943, there was a growing consensus that the

Japanese were receiving militarily valuable information

being leaked from Australia. Counterintelligence personnel

launched an aggressive security campaign; loudspeakers

at railroad stations intermittently broadcasted reminders to

troops within earshot. In Melbourne’s Little Italy, Sergeant

Frank Colucci successfully assumed the disguise of a

deserter and became a member of an Axis spy-ring. Agents

also began to systematically board ships arriving in

Australia and New Guinea to examine the papers of seamen

and search for possible enemy agents. To supplement the

initial checks being done by the military police on airplane

crews and passengers, the CIC established control points

at airports in Australia and, as the war progressed, at air

traffic centers in New Guinea such as Milne Bay, Hollandia,

and Biak Island. In one year’s time, the CIC checked out

over 12,000 planes.

The Long March to Tokyo

By the middle of 1943, the Allies had checked the

Japanese advance with the naval battles of the Coral Sea

and Midway and by hard-fought victories for the Territory

of Papua, southeastern portion of New Guinea, and for

Guadalcanal, a part of the Solomon Island chain. The

growing strength of General Douglas MacArthur’s forces

in the Southwest Pacific coupled with those of Admiral

Chester W. Nimitz in the Central Pacific allowed for the

Allies to go on the offensive. In early 1944, the Joint Chief

of Staffs blessed a two-fold strategy that would converge

at the Japanese homeland—a compromise between

Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur’s proposals.

Using Army ground forces, land-based air power, and a

fleet of old battleships, MacArthur would move along the

northern coast of New Guinea toward the Philippines.

Nimitz would use carrier-based aircraft and Marine and

Army ground forces to island-hop across the Central

Pacific.

Initially many tactical commanders in SWPA confused

the CIC with the CID (Criminal Investigation Division) or

FBI; others inappropriately utilized them in nonofficial

roles ranging from “spies on our side” to orderlies. As a

result of the Kiriwina-Woodlark Operation, a transformation began to take place within the chain of command that

would allow counterintelligence personnel to begin

performing the combat support role they were trained to

do. Two makeshift CIC detachments were among elements

of the Sixth Army’s Alamo Task Force (specifically created

for long-range reconnaissance) that seized Kiriwina and

Woodlark Islands, located between New Guinea and the

Solomons. No resistance was met, and for the remainder

of July, agents accompanied patrols in search of docuNisei or second-generation Japanese Americans assisted CIC teams as translators and interpreters. (NARA)

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33290_P001_176.pmd 70 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
ments and made contact with local natives. As requested,

CIC personnel gathered enough information to complete a

survey of the island and its inhabitants.

On 29 February 1944, an agent by the name of Barney

Strachan from the 1st Cavalry Division took part in a

reconnaissance of Los Negros, the largest of the Admiralty Islands. Working alongside a member of the Allied

Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS) responsible for

document exploitation and assisting in interrogations, he

helped gather several hundred pounds of documents that

revealed important order of battle information. For

instance, the knowledge that only a small number of

enemy soldiers occupied nearby Manus Island was critical

in the decision to capture the island. By late March the

Japanese resistance that at times had been heavy, ended.

This resulted in the CIC’s collection of still more valuable

documents.

During the campaign for the Admiralty Islands,

counterintelligence personnel created several useful

intelligence gathering tools. For instance, they assembled a display of desired captured enemy equipment

as a training aid, and circulated the popular exhibit among

the various units. Local agents also developed what they

liked to call a “grab bag” to encourage soldiers to turn in

their war trophies, any one of which might prove to be a

valuable piece of information. Soldiers who submitted

materiel and documents could exchange them for any

comparable item that intelligence personnel had already

deemed to be of no use.

Following the capture of the Admiralty Islands, the

Allies targeted Hollandia and Aitape, which lay on the

north side of New Guinea. Supported by aircraft carriers,

the troops of LTG Robert L. Eichelberger’s I Corps

launched a two-prong attack. The 32d

 Infantry Division

deployed east of Aitape; over 100 miles to the west in

Netherlands New Guinea, the 24th and 41st Infantry

Divisions landed near Hollandia. A great deal of planning

went into the Hollandia-Aitape operations to ensure

success, including emphasis placed on security. All

agents underwent physical training, orientation to enemy

sabotage techniques, and a familiarization with the

Malayan language. Twenty-six members of the Netherlands East Indies Army also accompanied CIC teams as

interpreters.

By the end of the first week of fighting, it was evident

to all that the intense preparation had paid off. Agents

had managed to seize 26 boxes of enemy documents

hidden in caves. These contained the detailed diaries and

records of the Japanese 36th Division showing strength,

disposition, and fortifications of enemy units at Biak and

other Japanese-held islands in the Pacific. Agents also

uncovered maps, code-books, and casualty reports. At

When the war started, the CIC was not well known by the American public. Its image began to rise after 1943 when stories on the

corps began to appear in popular magazines. Here is the last installment of a serial run in Terry and the Pirates.

(Terry and the Pirates®+©2005 Tribune Media Services, Inc.)

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33290_P001_176.pmd 71 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
Aitape, agents, without adequate transportation, still

managed to gather up 5 tons of paper to include four

priceless Japanese code books, pinpointed supply dumps

for follow up by technical intelligence specialists, and

even secured intact aircraft.

Counterintelligence agents worked alongside Dutch

authorities to debrief the recently liberated native population. The CIC paid local natives a half guilder (26 cents)

for each enlisted Japanese soldier turned in, and more for

officers. (Over 100 were rounded up this way in the month

of May alone.) The CIC detachment assigned to the 24th

Infantry Division effectively used local youths to assist

with interrogations, to perform liaison with local villages,

and to participate in an informant network. Counterintelligence personnel were also responsible for arresting a

Dutch schoolmaster who directed the activities of six

native tribes on behalf of the Japanese. On the island of

Morotai, the last stepping stone to the Philippines, agents

helped to capture a radar site with its engineers and

technicians; the equipment alone was valued at more than

a half-million dollars.

Throughout the Pacific campaign, counterintelligence

personnel frequently came under small arms, artillery, and

mortar fire, especially while accompanying front line

troops. On 17 May, CIC soldiers participated in seizing

Wakde, a group of small islands off of Netherlands New

The highly skilled individuals who made up the corps performed a variety of unique assignments.

When a damaged runway necessitated repair in the Philippines, the Commander, 801st CIC Detachment

volunteered Agent Charles C. Deubel, who was reared in China as a son of missionaries, to recruit a

local group of Chinese immigrants as laborers. To Deubel’s pleasant surprise, the Chinese not only

readily agreed to the task but insisted on doing the job for free to show their patriotism. To express his

appreciation, Deubel arranged for a modest ceremony with both American and Chinese flags and a

couple of speeches; both parties seemed more than satisfied with the end results. (As Japanese forces

retreated, local CIC elements would be called upon again and again to oversee similar recruitments of

local laborers to reconstruct bridges, roads, and other civil works.)

64

Filipinos undergo counterintelligence training in Australia pending the invasion of their homeland. (AHEC)

33290_P001_176.pmd 72 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
Guinea. The landing cost the corps its first fatality in

theater when Sergeant Woodrow G. Hunter was killed in

action on the Insoemoar Island beach at D-plus-1.

The Philippines

The Counter Intelligence Corps would undergo more

pre-invasion training for the Philippines than for any other

campaign. In July, 1944, a school was established at the

Palmarosa House in Brisbane specifically for that purpose,

and individuals knowledgeable of the Philippines were

invited to serve as guest lecturers. Agents received

instruction in language as well as an orientation on local

customs, geographical place names, local laws, and

various secret societies. They also studied an enemy

order of battle and a “who’s who” of the islands. At the

same time, 50 members of the 2d Filipino Battalion received

training in basic counterintelligence techniques.

 The CIC required Army personnel, upon receiving

departure orders, to sign a statement acknowledging their

security responsibilities. Agents monitored all unit

publications and bulletin boards, ensured that soldiers

turned in all personal papers and diaries, and conducted a

search of all bivouac areas. They even checked to see if

the markings on clothing and equipment had been

removed as directed.

By September, the counterintelligence organization in

theater had grown to 39 combat, regional, and area units

(450 officers and enlisted men), but was still approximately

20 percent under authorized strength. The same month,

General MacArthur moved his headquarters to Hollandia,

New Guinea, followed soon thereafter by the 441st CIC

Detachment and the CIC Training School; all of this in

anticipation of the upcoming campaign directed at

retaking the Philippines.

Leyte

On 20 October 1944, Allied forces under General

MacArthur returned to the Philippines by invading Leyte.

More than 70 Counter Intelligence Corps officers, agents,

and attached Filipinos made the initial landings in support

of elements of the Sixth Army and X Corps (1st Cav

Division and 24th Infantry Division). The 7th and 96th

Infantry Divisions entered the island under the XXIV

Corps from the Central Pacific Theater. In total, eight CIC

detachments of the Sixth Army Task Force landed on the

Leyte beachhead within the first 4 days. The Sixth

Army’s 306th CIC Detachment would direct counterintelligence operations within the combat zone, but the 441st CIC

Detachment, situated back in Hollandia, continued to

coordinate all Army counterintelligence activities within

theater.

The Army assigned combat detachments to each army,

corps, division, and separate task force. At the division

level, the normal strength consisted of 2 officers and 10

enlisted plus 5 soldiers from the 2d Filipino Battalion

whose contributions as linguists, fighters, and undercover

agents proved invaluable. Counter Intelligence Corps

detachments further broke themselves into teams, some of

them going forward with regiments, some remaining with

command posts, and still others setting up headquarters

in towns and villages. The 400-numbered detachments

assigned to theater were given responsibility to cover

specific areas. Here, they supplemented the work of the

tactical counterintelligence effort, and once the combat

phase was over, remained in place to complete any

residual mission.

The 224th CIC Detachment was among the first detachments ashore, landing 20 miles south of Tacloban on the

Leyte Gulf. During the first days, agents interrogated

persons of interest who had been rounded up and placed

in a compound. Other teams contacted prominent

individuals living in the area, especially pre-war municipal

officials, to obtain a list of names of pro-Japanese civilians

to be questioned as well as names of loyal Filipinos who

could help with the establishment of informant nets.

Agents searched out the headquarters of the Dulag

branch of Kempei Tai (Japanese equivalent of the German

Gestapo) where they found a considerable amount of

information on its organization. Other targets included

records of the Japanese-dominated Bureau of Constabulary, local police, and Japanese “trading” organizations

that fronted for espionage. Elsewhere agents made a

systematic search of buildings in Tacloban where they

discovered several hundred pounds of documents for

turnover to members of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service.

As the campaign for Leyte progressed, the Counter

Intelligence Corps found itself more and more involved in

dealing with the various guerrilla movements. This

consisted mainly in locating the guerrillas and debriefing

65

Japanese soldiers sometimes attempted to blend into the local

population by donning civilian clothes. (INSCOM)

33290_P001_176.pmd 73 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
them on a wide range of subjects to include enemy

psychological warfare and propaganda techniques,

economic and political conditions, and the location of

possible military targets. From these exchanges, agents

assembled for the first time an accurate picture of the

workings of the Japanese Kempei Tai and similar groups.

One such element, the Ju Tai, consisted of youths who

served as the ears and eyes of the Japanese Military

Police to alert them to the presence of guerrillas.

The Counter Intelligence Corps detachments often

became overwhelmed by reports from guerrillas and local

citizens anxious to denounce “spies” and “collaborators.”

This would hold true throughout the Philippine Campaign.

To ensure justice, the Counter Intelligence Corps initiated

a Legal Board of Review, which depended on a network of

such persons as priests, school teachers, etc., for invaluable insights on how to evaluate certain types of suspects; however, the Army left the punishment of all

collaborators to the Philippine Government.

Upon entering a town, CIC agents called upon the

mayor, police, and other civil officers. After conducting an

on-the-spot check of their loyalty, counterintelligence

elements instructed the officials to call a meeting where

information could be distributed to allay the public’s fears.

Agents also found themselves arranging for the distribution of food, medical aid, and shelter to the civilian

population until civil affairs personnel arrived. In Palo,

nearly a hundred stay-behind Japanese soldiers attacked

the local CIC office, but quick reaction by the agents

repulsed the assault.

In retrospect, it was fortunate for the counterintelligence effort that Leyte came first. Because of its large

population, Leyte represented a type of challenge not

previously faced by the CIC in the Pacific. Experience

gained in keeping up-to-date files of reports on suspects

and informants and learning to hand off these responsibilities to the next echelon proved invaluable because

even larger population bases, to include greater numbers

of Japanese civilians, awaited counterintelligence agents

on Luzon.

Luzon

The largest deployment of the CIC in the Pacific came

during the Luzon Campaign: 29 detachments, including 16

combat units. As had been the case during the early

stages of the Leyte campaign, counterintelligence

operations fell under the control of the 306th CIC Detachment, attached to the Sixth Army. The first Counter

Intelligence Corps personnel in Luzon landed on Lingayen

Gulf on 9 January 1945, within an hour after the initial

assault troops forged a beachhead along the coast of

Pangasinan Province. Three days later nine CIC detachments with a total of 22 officers and more than 100 agents

were on the ground and fully operational. Agent MSG

Lorenzo Alvarado, who had spent the last 3 years posing

as a flower peddler, was there to greet them. After

removing his shoe to reveal his credentials, he simultaneously produced a map of enemy troop positions.

As they were on Leyte, the guerrillas became a major

distraction, and to further complicate matters, there were

opportunists who pretended to be guerrillas. Partisans

were divided between the 7,000 strong Hukbalahap—a

Communist-inspired group—and an Allied-sponsored

group. The Huks—as they were called—were being led

In Manila, CIC agents examine the contents of the desk of the

Japanese puppet President, Jose Laurel. (INSCOM)

Lieutenant Colonel Lowell L. Bradford, Commander, 493d

 CIC

Detachment, conducts a prisoner to the Bilibid Prison in

Manila. (INSCOM)

66

33290_P001_176.pmd 74 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
by Luis Taruc, who had been schooled in Moscow. Both

groups were anti-Japanese but had opposing political

objectives. As the fighting waned, the Hukbalahap

guerrillas continued to wage a campaign for power

through the use of atrocities, raids, and kidnappings. A

counterattack upon the Huks’ headquarters netted lists of

targets for assassination that included among them the

names of CIC agents. Documents also revealed that a

local informant for counterintelligence had been turned

and was actually now spying on his handlers.

All of what counterintelligence had done in the

Philippines was a prelude to its role in the capture and

occupation of the capital city of Manila. The 801st CIC

Detachment established operations at Santo Thomas

University, which had been the wartime home to Allied

internees. Within days, BG Elliott Thorpe and his staff

arrived on the scene to take personal charge. The 214th

CIC Detachment established its headquarters at the

infamous Bilibid Prison, where members of the corps set

about determining the fate of those accused of collaborating with the enemy, clearing individuals to hold public

office, and searching for any remaining espionage agents.

The security problem in Manila was further compounded

by the presence of large numbers of German, Italian, and

Spanish spies. The Spanish Falangist movement had

gained many Filipino followers; Manila even had its own

active Nazi Party. By the end of March, agents had taken

into custody some 1,216 collaborators, puppet officials,

enemy nationals, and Kempei Tai agents. The city also

yielded tons of documents describing the activities of the

Japanese front organizations.

Manila Bay was the scene of one of CIC’s most

unusual operations. When General MacArthur departed

the Philippines in 1942, he had directed that pay-master

bags containing silver coinage be sunk in the bay. Among

the liberating army in 1945, there were a number of

individuals who were aware of the dumping and were

determined to retrieve the monies for themselves. While

in a bar, an agent from the 801st CIC Detachment overheard

the plot. Offering his assistance, he was on hand when

divers retrieved the US property. By removing his shirt,

he signaled other counterintelligence agents to move in

and make the arrests.

Unique Missions

In the Philippines, counterintelligence faced its share of

one-of-a-kind distractions. To handle thousands of

persons who passed through the American lines daily,

agents established screening points. Japanese soldiers

easily blended into the local population and even dressed

in women’s clothing to gain passage. The Japanese also

deployed gangs of arsonists of all ages and both sexes.

Small children received 350 pesos to toss grenades into

buildings. Guerrilla groups often mistook Chinese aliens

for Japanese, leading to numerous wrong arrests that were

time-consuming; this was corrected by the issuance of

identification cards for the Chinese. At the request of the

American consul, Army counterintelligence became

involved in a very unpopular assignment that won them

no friends: the screening of 8,500 American civilian

internees anxiously awaiting repatriation. Member of Spanish consulate being debriefed in Manila.

(INSCOM)

“The prison [Bilibid] covers an area of

several square blocks, and the prison

barracks radiate out like spokes in a

wheel from a chapel at the center. A

high, thick wall surrounds the prison

area and divides it in half through the

chapel. Various wooden towers and

buildings are on or adjoining the

outside walls. Bilibid will be the base

of operations for the CIC detachment.

We are to live in the prison buildings.

Prisoners interned by the CIC will also

be here. There is little to eat. No water

or electricity is available. Bedding and

clothing found there is piled high and

burned in the yard.”

William B. Simpson, Special Agent in the

Pacific, WWII

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33290_P001_176.pmd 75 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
The many islands that made up the Philippines created

still other challenges. A Western Visayan Task Force

consisting of two regiments and a CIC detachment landed

in late December 1944 on the southern island of Mindora

and proceeded to capture its major city of San Jose.

Within months, other islands of the Central Philippines

also fell to US forces. Here, counterintelligence established sub-offices. Mindanao and the Visayas Islands,

however, remained in the hands of guerrillas. Eventually a

“CIC Navy” was created, using three boats to move from

island to island to search for collaborators. Agents also

facilitated contact with guerrillas and picked up Japanese

soldiers cut off and left behind. On the island of

Mindanao, Army counterintelligence dealt with the

unpredictable Moro tribesmen.

Early July marked the transition into the mopping up

phase of the war. The Eighth Army replaced the Sixth

Army, and in a like manner, the 308th CIC Detachment

assumed the mission from the 306th. The establishment of

the Philippine Government required agents to redirect their

priorities to conducting 5,000 background checks for

potential office holders—all within a 45-day period.

The Final Advance

The Ryukyu Islands are a chain of Japanese islands

running southwest from the home island of Kyushu

toward Taiwan. By March 1945, the Japanese had

assembled a force of over 77,000 Imperial troops and

20,000 Home Guardsmen to defend Okinawa, the largest

within the island group. From 2 to 16 miles wide and 60

miles in length, the island with its rugged terrain of hills,

ravines, and caves offered ideal topography for the

defenders. On 1 April, two US infantry divisions and two

marine divisions landed virtually unopposed. Drawing

upon lessons learned on Saipan, the Japanese forces,

under the command of General Mitsuru Ushijima, were

determined to meet the enemy upon more advantageous

terms.

As the Tenth Army moved inland, military police and

military government personnel rounded up hundreds of

civilians for temporary internment in hastily erected

stockades. Counterintelligence personnel helped to

establish security measures at the various compounds

and followed up with spot checks on operating procedures. They also formed interrogation teams to screen for

bits of information. Because Okinawans had historically

been isolated and treated as inferior by the Japanese, CIC

personnel quickly won their support by working through

the local Hancho or village chief. Agents recruited “CIC

Aides” among the natives who demonstrated themselves

to be of great value in assisting with interrogations. In the

latter stages of the campaign, Army counterintelligence

sought help from local informants to identify where

Japanese soldiers and officials were hiding.

On Okinawa, the CIC quickly gained the cooperation of locals. (INSCOM)

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33290_P001_176.pmd 76 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
In the battle for Okinawa, US forces experienced some

of the fiercest fighting of the war in the Pacific, suffering

nearly 50,000 casualties including over 12,000 killed in

action. Seven CIC soldiers lost their lives during the

campaign. Fortunately, Okinawa would not serve as a

prelude for an even greater struggle to conquer the

Japanese homeland.

CIC WORLDWIDE

The China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater of Operations

under the command of LTG “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell was

considered a side-show to the Pacific Theater and

because of their pre-war presence in India and Burma, the

British took the initial lead. The United States Army

Forces, CBI was organized in March 1942 with headquarters in Chungking, China. The headquarters later transferred to New Delhi, India, where the British headquarters

was also located, leaving Chungking as the forward base.

The primary mission of US forces was to assist the

Chinese in the prosecution of the war against the Japanese, thus draining resources from the enemy. That

mission grew in 1943 to include the “exploitation of the

development of overland communications to China” for

the purpose of breaking the Japanese blockade and

assisting the Chinese Army and Air Force. The Allies

Native Okinawans served as interpreters for Army counterintelligence agents, some of whom were attached to the Marines.

(INSCOM)

69

 “[Fill in name] is engaged in

counter-intelligence activities with

the United States Army. He is

authorized to be in any place, any

dress, at all time, in the execution of

his duty. He is authorized to travel in

any manner. He is authorized to

bear arms at all times.”

China-Burma-India CIC

Identification Card

33290_P001_176x2.pmd 77 12/6/2005, 4:56 AM
made plans to build a road through North Burma, paralleled

by an oil pipeline to supply Chinese forces and B-29 bases.

Completion would make it possible to ship 85,000 tons of

general supplies and 54,000 tons of petroleum products

each month.

Major D. MacKenzie of the Counter Intelligence Corps

arrived in India in September 1943 and proceeded to

conduct a security survey of the Service of Supply base

areas which revealed significant shortcomings. The most

fundamental safeguards were lacking, and there was a

widely held belief that Japanese agents were everywhere

and knew everything. Fortunately, Major MacKenzie

found the threat highly exaggerated, “No evidence was

ever obtained that the Japanese actually exploited the

information passing over the phone lines even though

every opportunity was given them to get it.”

In December, the first CIC element consisting of five

enlisted and one officer arrived in Calcutta, India. A

second group—one hundred strong—left Hill Field,

Ogden, Utah, and proceeded east to Hampton Roads,

Virginia, where they embarked upon a journey through

North Africa, finally setting foot in Bombay in April 1944.

Unfortunately, many of these initial arrivals had undergone training suitable for combat duty in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and had received little

exposure to the unique cultural, geographic, and combat

environment awaiting them in CBI. A 2-week course at the

British Field Security School at Karachi served as a

general introduction; a conditioning course and an

additional set of instructions were held at the British

Jungle Warfare School at Budni. Just as in other theaters,

agents quickly found themselves educating those in

70

A US convoy negotiates the 21 curves linking Chen-Yi and Kweiyang, China. The CIC helped to secure the Burma Road that

carried supplies to our Chinese allies. (NARA)

33290_P001_176.pmd 78 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
In Burma, CIC’s Team #1, consisting

of four corporals, handled several interesting

cases; most notable was the capture of the

leaders of a bandit gang which had captured

and tortured a number of Allied soldiers.

Besides atrocities, the gang was guilty of

spying on Chinese forces and reporting their

movements. In all, 26 arrests were made,

resulting in three death sentences, four life

imprisonment sentences, and two sentences

of shorter duration.

In Northern Burma, CIC teams utilized many modes of transportation to reach distant villages and apprehend individuals on their

“wanted” list. (NARA)

command on the reason that the Counter Intelligence

Corps existed.

In August 1944, the War Department issued an order

creating 12 CIC detachments within the CBI Theater: the

405th CIC Detachment was designated as Theater Headquarters, with the additional duty of covering the New

Delhi area; other detachments were located at Karachi,

Bombay, Calcutta, Chabua (2), and Ledo (Assam); three

more were destined for China; and the final two assigned

to the Tenth Air Force and the XX Bomber Force, then at

Kharagpur, India. The counterintelligence mission in CBI

required continuous shifting of resources to meet higher

priorities. For example, three of the India detachments

transferred to upper Burma in the vicinity of the Stilwell

Road for the purposes of assisting the work in Assam.

Elements of the 405th then assumed the vacated missions

in Karachi, Bombay, and Calcutta.

The mission in the China, Burma, India Theater was far

more complex than simply apprehending spies and

saboteurs. US forces found themselves in the middle of a

political cauldron of anti-colonial, pro-nationalistic

groups. For instance, the Hindu and Burmese nationalists

held a long-time hatred against the British authorities.

Naturally, some of these ill-feelings aimed at the British

were also soon directed at the Americans. In addition,

local Communists actively worked at exploiting political

unrest. In short, the political situation complicated the

duties of counterintelligence. The question always had to

be asked: Was an act of sabotage at a factory producing

war materiel the work of an enemy agent, the act of an

anti-British worker, or that of a local Communist?

At Delhi, the mission was primarily one of education in

security. Because actual combat seemed distant, loose

talk was extremely prevalent. A five-man team designed

security posters, used “spots” on the Army Radio Service,

gave lectures, and showed films to the troops. As part of

a security awareness campaign, a ten-dollar War Bond

was given to anyone recognizing the face of a CIC plant

appearing on a dummy wanted poster. In Bombay, the

increased volume of military traffic and materiel led the

local detachment to incrementally redirect much of its

attention to safeguarding the port authority. Agents

boarded all ships entering the harbor to inspect the crew’s

papers and to seek out information of value to the war

effort. In the process, agents helped to screen a large

number of Americans passing through the port of Bombay

on way to the United States; many of whom were labeled

71

33290_P001_176.pmd 79 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
as undesirables and “considered to be corrupt—dealing in

narcotics, stolen Army property and espionage.”

In CBI, pilferage often took the form of sabotage, such

as when locals uncoupled the pipeline for the purpose of

stealing gasoline—an extremely valuable commodity for

barter on the local economy. To counter this on-going

problem that existed from Bengel to the Chinese Border,

agents helped to organize a 24-hour guard force and

investigated all incidents. Furthermore, agents posted

warnings in various languages and informed villages that

they would be held accountable for damages to communications lines within their respective areas. In February

1945, Agent Edwin W. Simpson traveled the entire 1,120

miles of the newly completed Stilwell Road, from Doom

Dooma in India to Kumming, China. Simpson, who was

fluent in Hindustani, prepared a most useful after-action

report on security conditions by interviewing Indian

soldiers and locals.

Burma

In North Burma, the counterintelligence effort was

composed of detachments specifically tailored to work in

the region and those awaiting their departure for China.

All operated as one unit in support of the Northern

Combat Area Command and under the supervision of its

G2 who outlined the CIC mission as follows: “to install an

effective and rapid system for classifying the native

population into ‘black’ and ‘white’ categories; to apprehend known enemy agents, collaborators and saboteurs;

to maintain security between the front lines and rear areas;

and to effect close liaison with the British Civil Affairs

Service.” Most CIC agents were divided into interrogation teams—a structure unique to the theater. Teams

consisted of 2 to 3 agents, plus native interpreters from

the OSS Detachment 101. Traveling by jeep, elephant,

boat, and foot, the five teams journeyed throughout the

jungle area of North Burma, making contact with local

villages. They discovered a world filled with gangs,

feuding tribes, and secret societies who reflected a wide

range of political positions: pro-Japanese, anti-Japanese;

pro-British, anti-British. Their major mission was to bring

in individuals on the “black list.”

To this end, subterfuge was sometimes required. Staff

Sergeant Edmund Fong traveled for 2 weeks using all

modes of transportation before he reached Kansi Village in

search of an individual wanted for the murder of Allied

soldiers. When locals appeared reticent to turn over the

suspect, Fong gained their cooperation by telling them the

person was wanted so he could provide the Allies with a

better understanding of Japanese tactics. The teams also

came in contact with Chinese troops and faced the

challenge of making them understand CIC’s mission and

convincing them not to destroy captured Japanese

documents. In the process of carrying out their functions,

counterintelligence personnel were not immune from the

adverse effects of the jungle environment where fatigue

and malaria were constant companions.

72

A member of the OSS arrests Gestapo leader and secretary of the German consulate in Canton, China. The CIC and OSS

cooperated most closely in the CBI Theater. (INSCOM)

33290_P001_176.pmd 80 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
With the retreat of the Japanese from the Malay

Peninsula, many American prisoners of war were released

from camps in Java, Singapore, Burma, Thailand, and

French Indo-China. Authorities in theater arranged for the

former prisoners to be transported to Calcutta for medical

treatment before their repatriation to the United States.

The Calcutta CIC element assumed responsibility for

debriefing the former POWs to obtain information for

possible use in any future war crimes trials. As hostilities

in Southeast Asia drew to a close, a number of the CIC

units finally found themselves on their way to China.

China

In October 1944, the strained relationship between the

Allies and Chiang Kai-Shek, leader of China’s Nationalist

forces, precipitated splitting the China-Burma-India

Theater of Operations in two. General Albert C.

Wedemeyer was placed at the head of United States

forces in the China Theater where he commanded a

diverse group of tactical assets; the most important being

the Fourteenth Air Force under MG Claire L. Chennault.

As a result of Wedemeyer’s orders, CIC elements began to

redeploy from the India-Burma Theater into China. All

totaled, there were only 6 officers and 32 enlisted men.

Their ranks had been depleted while in India and Burma

awaiting reassignment to China.

A Theater CIC Detachment was created for the purpose

of coordinating the counterintelligence detachment that

supported the Services of Supply (SOS) and two other

detachments that were assigned to Headquarters, China.

This arrangement followed a geographic pattern: the

northern portion, roughly that part north of the Yangtze

River, would be handled by CIC agents attached to

Theater Headquarters at Chunking; the area south of the

Yangtze would be handled by counterintelligence personnel assigned to the SOS. However, it soon became

evident that counterintelligence personnel could not

operate effectively under such an arrangement. On 28

March, the theater G2 assumed direct control and abolished the arbitrary dividing line.

Dealing with the Chinese was from the start difficult for

Army counterintelligence. Apart from the Air Force, the

US role in China was as an adviser, or as someone aptly

put it, a “gigantic military liaison mission.” Rivalries

between internal Chinese groups and agencies made

matters worse, and agents found themselves too often

caught in the middle. Because their role was principally

diplomatic in nature, counterintelligence personnel

enjoyed a freedom of movement not duplicated in any

other theater. This was reflected in the wording of their

credentials: “...to travel in any manner, and their freedom

of movement when on assigned missions will not be

hindered at any time of day or night by the military police

or other military agency. CIC credentials and badges will

be honored at all times.” Agents were furthermore

authorized to wear the uniform prescribed for civilians and

to operate without rank. And if that wasn’t enough, all

personnel coming in contact with these CIC agents were

warned of the necessity of maintaining the secrecy of their

identity and methods of operation.

Nowhere was the tension and lack of cooperation

between counterintelligence personnel and the Chinese

greater than in issuing background clearances for Chinese

civilians employed by the US Army, especially in Services

of Supply installations where they often had access to

classified information. Each civilian was required to fill

out a personal history statement that had to be checked

with Chinese agencies. The need to provide clearances

for Chinese workers required resident offices be established in the following locations: Chengtu, Hsian,

Paoshan, Yunnanyi, Chanyi, Kweiyang, and Peishii. Filled

by sergeants or corporals, these positions “will lend

assistance to all US Army organizations and installations

located within their areas of jurisdiction. They are

authorized to receive and act upon requests for their

services without prior reference to this headquarters,” and

“will have sole authority in assigning priority to these

requests.” Local military commanders were ordered to

provide quarters, rations, office space, and vehicular

maintenance. Over time, the relationship between the

agents and the Chinese improved, and in the end, the

work of these resident offices became the most important

mission performed by the CIC in the China Theater.

Besides security clearances, they conducted espionage

and sabotage investigations, provided security education,

and collected information. Unfortunately, whatever

modicum of cooperation and good will the CIC and

In Brazil, an undercover CIC agent, who

in real life was a language professor, kept tabs

on local Japanese and German businessmen.

When he received word of a pending riot

directed against local Axis businesses because

of the sinking of Brazilian ships, he and a

fellow agent readied themselves. In the

aftermath of the vandalism, they entered the

wrecked office of a Japanese agent posing as

a businessman to search for lists of Axis

agents and their contacts. The whole

operation almost went awry when a large

Japanese man suddenly appeared on the scene

and lunged toward one of the agents.

Fortunately, his partner was able to bring the

butt of his revolver against the back of the

assailant’s head, which allowed for a hasty

getaway along with the sought-after

documents.

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Chinese authorities achieved would quickly disappear

when the war against a common enemy ceased; at that

moment infighting between Chinese factions began

afresh.

Eventually, all agents in China were consolidated into

one organization, the 415th CIC Detachment. Just before

the end of hostilities, CIC teams deployed in support of

combat operations to gather intelligence and perform

counterintelligence duties. For example, in Southeast

China, the Counter Intelligence Corps worked jointly with

the Office of Strategic Services to collect and analyze

information that would be of value to US forces as they

advanced on Canton and other ports in Kwantung

Province. Once the US Army finally arrived, agents

helped to screen for individuals on the black list.

The Global War

World War II witnessed the stationing of US forces

around the globe; Army counterintelligence, in a similar

manner, had an international reach. Many of these areas

were far from the scene of major fighting but still had

security issues. Agents carried out tedious, routine

duties, often in isolation, over a large area of operations

with limited linguistic support and inadequate administration. In Newfoundland, an undercover agent found

employment with base contractors as a truck driver while

his partner worked as a shipping expert. The truck driver

soon discovered that his job kept him too busy to do his

counterintelligence assignment whereas the so-called

shipping expert didn’t have enough responsibilities to

maintain cover. Writing to his superior, Agent Joseph P.

Gilbert expressed his frustrations: “...there don’t seem to

be any leads on anything and I’ll be darned if I can dig

any up. Jack and I both feel we are wasting our time.”

In Iceland, just the opposite proved true. Two agents

followed up a tip about three suspicious strangers located

in a remote region of the country. After a boat trip up a

raging river and an exhausting mountain climb through

heavy snows, the agents were able to apprehend the

suspects. The three turned out to be trained espionage

agents who had recently come ashore from a German

submarine; their mission was to report by radio on military

and naval installations as well as the comings and goings

of ship convoys. Follow-up interrogations yielded

valuable information on German spy schools to include

their methods and intended targets.

In the Caribbean Basin, three CIC detachments (469th,

470th, and 472d) helped to secure the Panama Canal. In one

74

The Big Three (Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill) gathered at the Tehran Conference where a CIC agent posed as President

Roosevelt during the ride back to the airport. (NARA)

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instance, agents apprehended a Hungarian spy who

divulged a German plan to make a small runway concealed

by the jungle canopy. This would allow a plane to take

off, and after bombing the locks, the pilot would ditch the

aircraft in the Atlantic and escape by U-Boat. Counterintelligence also collected a significant amount of human

intelligence by debriefing crews and passengers passing

through the isthmus.

Continuing around the globe, in Accra, Ghana, British

counterintelligence homed in on a transmitter being used

by an anti-British dentist to transmit messages to German

U-boats sitting off the Gold Coast of West Africa. Their

prey was shipping vessels carrying cargos of manganese

to US steel factories, critical in the manufacturing of

aircraft and armaments. An undercover agent disguised

as a patient with a toothache was sent to the dentist-spy

to feed him false shipping news—news so good that he

would rush out to transmit it. Counterintelligence then

moved in for the arrest and to police up the codes that

were turned over to the Allied navy for use in entrapping

U-boats. In Eritrea, northeast Africa, Counter Intelligence

Corps agents found evidence of saboteurs in local US-run

workshops engaged in building aircraft for the war effort.

A counterintelligence agent posed as an Italian-American

proprietor of a local hotel near the airbase and openly

boasted of his Fascist leanings; microphones hidden in all

the rooms quickly identified which guests were would-be

saboteurs.

The Middle East was the scene of a number of significant cases. The first involved the rounding up of five

members of the German Gestapo who flew from Athens,

Greece, and parachuted into Palestine, landing near

Jericho. The team’s mission was to sabotage Allied

installations and lead local Arabs in a revolt. In Iran, with

the British taking the lead, Allied counterintelligence

cornered and captured the most dangerous enemy spy in

the theater of operations—Franz Mayer. Confiscated

documents tipped off authorities to his plans to sabotage

railroad tunnels in Iran; Mayer’s whereabouts were

uncovered when counterintelligence personnel followed

the trail of a parachuted agent to his headquarters. Along

with the spy chief, Allied counterintelligence rounded up

130 Iranian collaborators and ended a major threat to the

lend-lease program that conveyed goods to the Soviet

Union.

The Army also used the CIC to carry out a number of

one-time missions to include protection for Allied conferences held in the Middle East. In November and December 1943, CIC personnel joined forces with their Allied

counterparts to cover the meetings of Prime Minister

Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt

and their discussions with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

regarding the war in the Far East. Later, at the Tehran

conference, which involved Prime Minister Churchill,

President Roosevelt, and Premier Joseph Stalin, Agent

Robert Ebaugh, who resembled the president, posed as

FDR during the drive back from the Soviet embassy while

the real chief executive rode in a nondescript olive-green

Army sedan, several cars behind.

A Look Back

As in World War I, Army counterintelligence had a

mixed report card. On the down side, a part of the

Inspector General’s critique of the Counter Intelligence

Corps that led to its dissolution on the home front was

valid. Chief among the criticisms was the drain of highly

qualified personnel for the purpose of investigating

marginal threats. These emanated from the counterespionage system established to ensure a loyal army when no

evidence existed that the recruits flowing into the Armed

75

In 1943, Rudolph Hamburger, who carried a Nicaraguan

passport, offered an American officer a large amount of monies

to gain information on the Persian Gulf Command. The contact

was reported to the CIC who placed Hamburger under

surveillance as a suspected German agent. Using a fake

shipping list of war materiel as bait, CIC agents lured Hamburger

in; only to discover that the would-be spy was actually working

for their ally—the Soviet Union. After informing all commands

in the area that Hamburger was persona non grata, the CIC

handed him over to the British, who in turn released him to the

Soviets, who proceeded to have him shot for failing his mission.

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Forces were anything but. Then there were isolated

incidents involving individual agents who had not wisely

used their investigative powers and had brought unwanted attention on the corps and its mission. Writing in

1946, two experienced intelligence officers made the

following sweeping judgment: “the Counter Intelligence

Corps in World War II was in many ways a peculiar

organization, whose personnel (chosen hurriedly and for

their educational rather than military qualifications)

frequently got in everybody’s hair.”

76

American and Allied servicemen view the surrender ceremony held on the deck of the USS MISSOURI in Tokyo Bay.

Initially, personnel assigned to the Counter Intelligence

Corps had been controlled from Washington as part of the

Military Intelligence Service. Although the rationale for

this arrangement was Washington’s fear that highly

specialized counterintelligence assets might otherwise be

misused, efforts at trans-oceanic administration created

enormous problems. For instance, the arrangement

slowed promotion in the field, and the CIC came to be

nicknamed the “Corps of Indignant Corporals.” The

attempt to run the corps from offices in Washington also

33290_P001_176.pmd 84 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
The CIC detachments in the field provided a security

shield against a very real and present danger of enemy

spies and saboteurs. Take, for example, the record of the

92d CIC Detachment, which was typical. During the Italian

campaign, this single element recorded 23,000 interrogations, 17,000 of which dealt with line crossers. From this

effort, it uncovered and convicted 102 enemy agents. But

agents did so much more than serve as spy catchers. In

the field, their duties as civil affairs administrators and

collectors of human intelligence were equally valued by

the tactical commander; and to top it off, counterintelligence operations grew increasingly efficient over time.

The improvement could be partly attributed to having

resolved various organizational problems. In January

1944, a new organizational table restructured Counter

Intelligence Corps detachments along cellular lines,

allowed units to be tailored to meet the requirements at

each echelon of command. By the end of the war, overseas commanders’ biggest complaint regarding Army

counterintelligence agents was “There simply weren’t

enough of them.”

77

hampered local efforts to make timely adjustments in

organization and doctrine based on field experience.

Ultimately, these problems were resolved as CIC personnel

overseas were transferred to local control. The corps also

failed to create a training system that produced agents

with all the requisite skills: from linguist to interrogator to

combat soldier.

But in total, the contributions of the 241 CIC detachments consisting of 3,000 officers and enlisted men who

served in overseas theaters far outweighed any shortcomings on the home front. Army counterintelligence gave

the tactical commander an invaluable resource of talented,

highly motivated personnel able to carry out a variety of

difficult assignments that someone had to do and do well.

A primary reason for the success that the Counter

Intelligence Corps enjoyed was the caliber of personnel

who filled its ranks. The corps had among its ranks the

likes of future Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (84th CIC

Det) and the author of the American classic Catcher in the

Rye, J.D. Salinger (4th CIC Det).

During World War II, more than 60 Counter Intelligence Corps soldiers would make the supreme sacrifice. (NARA)

33290_P001_176.pmd 85 11/9/2005, 10:38 AM
World War II: German Coal Bomb;

CIC Armband in Europe;

Premier Tojo’s Suicide Pistol.

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Cold War: CIC Matchbox Camera used in Austria;

Soviet Espionage Roll-Over Camera Disguised as Book;

Key and Wax Impression of East European Consulate;

Knife Disguised as a Pen and Used by Filipino Communists.

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“The CIC has more adventure stories buried

in its secret files than a month’s output of

blood and thunder comic books.”

The New York Herald Tribune, 1947

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33290_P001_176.pmd 88 11/9/2005, 10:39 AM
 RETURN TO NORMALCY

The end of World War II left the United States with

overseas responsibilities. In Europe, these involved the

zones of occupation in Germany and Austria. In the Far

East, the United States took the lead in Japan and also

administered the southern half of the Korean Peninsula. It

soon became apparent, however, that the United States’

war-time ally—the Soviet Union—had embarked upon a

policy of subverting free nations. This would bring

communism in conflict with the West and mark the

beginning of the Cold War. In response, Western Europe

and the United States formed a regional military alliance

against Soviet aggression—the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO). New national security realities led

the United States to establish a Department of Defense, a

separate Air Force, and a Central Intelligence. For the first

time, the United States would make intelligence a priority

during peacetime.

By the summer of 1945, it became apparent that the

evisceration of the Counter Intelligence Corps on the

home front was depriving the Army of essential support

just when it was needed the most. The Army’s role in the

occupation of a defeated Germany was placing new

demands on the depleted CIC detachments in the European theater, while in the Pacific the pending expansion of

CHAPTER THREE

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

DURING THE OCCUPATION

Training new agents. (INSCOM)

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military operations to the Japanese mainland threatened to

overwhelm the available CIC resources. But the Army had

left itself in the untenable position of lacking any effective

mechanism either to procure new counterintelligence

specialists or to redeploy the ones it already had.

Although the Military Intelligence Training Center was

responsible for training counterintelligence personnel, the

school’s limited curriculum continued to emphasize

combat intelligence. Moreover, no rotation base existed

for the Army’s counterintelligence personnel being

shipped back to the United States; instead, they were

placed in the Army’s general replacement pool, resulting in

the loss of their specialty. To address these concerns,

COL H.R. Kibler, the former Chief, CIC, and now the

Executive Officer to the Director of Intelligence, signed a

memorandum that set into motion a study recommending

the reestablishment of the position of Chief, Counter

Intelligence Corps. The War Department was quick to

approve these initiatives, and on 13 July, COL Kibler

picked up where he had left off as the head of a revitalized

CIC.

A New Center

The first order of business was the establishment of a

new CIC Center and School at Fort Meade, Maryland

under the control of the Intelligence Division of the Army

Service Forces. The center and school no more than

unpacked when lack of adequate housing and classroom

space forced them to pick up and relocate 25 miles further

north to Fort Holabird, Maryland. Fort Warren, Wyoming

was also favorably considered but its distance from

Washington, DC, precluded selection. Fort Holabird, a

traditional signal and transportation post, was located in

Dundalk, an industrial suburb of Baltimore and near the

city’s harbor—an ideal location for practicing certain

counterintelligence problems such as shadowing wouldbe suspects. That same month, the Army transferred all

agents from the discontinued Security and Intelligence

Command to the CIC, removing the last traces of the 1944

effort to decentralize counterintelligence.

In May 1946, the War Department underwent a massive

reorganization; the Army Service Forces was abolished,

and the Counter Intelligence Corps was once again

resubordinated to the Intelligence Division of the General

Staff. (From 1946 to 1948, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2,

went by the title of Director of Intelligence.) Administering a Fort Holabird-based organization from the Pentagon

quickly proved an impractical arrangement so within a

year a dual-hatted general officer’s position was created:

Chief, CIC and Commanding General, CIC Center. The

consolidated mission consisted of countering espionage,

82

Learning the craft: making casts of footprints. (INSCOM)

33290_P001_176.pmd 90 11/9/2005, 10:39 AM
sabotage, and subversion within

the ranks of the Army and

assuming responsibility for the

procurement, training, and

administration of all counterintelligence personnel. Investigations continued to be supervised by the local G2s, although

the most sensitive cases were

controlled by the Director of

Intelligence within the War

Department.

Between 1946 and 1950, the

CIC Center wrestled with the

central problem of sustaining a

well-trained force of sufficient

numbers. To obtain the nearly

6,000 personnel required for its

worldwide operations, the CIC

was forced to make a number of

adjustments in its policies.

During World War II, the Army,

from time-to-time, reassigned experienced agents to nonCIC duties despite regulations to the contrary. Such

losses were relatively small in number, but given the

extraordinary needs at the time, the Chief, CIC, felt

compelled to request MG Edward Witsell, The Adjutant

General, to send a letter to all commands informing them of

the War Department’s problem in procuring qualified

personnel and reminding them of the existing policy that

prohibited nonapproved transfers. The policy of rotating

personnel from overseas to state-side assignment was also

relooked on an individual-by-individual basis. For

example, retention of agents with the requisite language

skills overseas where they were badly in demand was

preferable to reassigning them stateside to routine duties.

Just as serious as acquiring numbers was CIC’s

struggle to obtain quality personnel. The termination of

the draft eliminated the reservoir of skilled and highlyeducated personnel with whom the wartime Counter

Intelligence Corps had become identified. In World War II,

two-thirds of all enlisted agents had been college graduates, and half of these had a law or related degree. Now,

overseas commanders began reporting that only 10

percent of Counter Intelligence Corps School-trained

personnel possessed a college education. A survey of a

1949 class of officers revealed that the majority were rated

as having met only minimal standards. Noncommissioned

officers arriving at the Center were of such low quality that

pre-tests were reinstituted and deficient personnel ordered

to appear before waiver boards. Eventually, all CIC School

candidates were required to come before an evaluation

board upon their arrival at the center, and those meeting

minimum qualifications were considered on probation.

The CIC leadership continued to suggest to the Army that

creating a branch for military intelligence personnel was

the ultimate solution, but to no avail.

Other decisions and policies affected the makeup of the

corps. In 1947, the Air Force became a separate service

from the Army, which meant the reassignment of detachments and loss of Air Force officers at the center and

school. In March 1950, CIC decided it was necessary to

adopt, for security’s sake, a policy that prohibited agents

from marrying foreign nationals. After 1 June, only the

Chief, CIC, could waive the marriage prohibition and

permit retention in the corps. This prohibition caused the

loss of still more highly qualified individuals, many of

whom possessed much needed language skills. An

exception was made for those who were already married.

They could remain, but could not be stationed in their

spouse’s native country.

The need for qualified personnel led the CIC to

increase the proportion of officers in the force, authorize

the recruitment of warrant officers, and admit four members of the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) to the CIC

School in 1946. One of them was Ann Bray, whom her

fellow agents would come to call “The First Lady of CIC”

for her lifetime devotion to the corps. A former high

school teacher and newspaper reporter from Indiana, Bray

was herself a veteran of World War II. One agent who

was on assignment with Major Bray in Washington, DC

argued that diversity in the corps was actually essential

for effective operations. For instance, during a stakeout,

The CIC School settled into Fort Holabird. Note the school symbol on the sign. (INSCOM)

83

33290_P001_176.pmd 91 11/9/2005, 10:39 AM
the presence of both male and female agents in a car was

apt to raise less suspicion on the part of anyone observing the scene. In 1947, 11 more WAC students were

added. Two years later a WAC detachment was assigned

to the center to assist with administrative duties, and an

all-WAC unit, the 600th CIC Detachment, was activated at

Fort Lee, Virginia and made responsible for security of the

WAC School as well as the local installation.

By 1949 the CIC consisted of 1,125 Reserve officers

and 100 Regular Army officers, 452 warrant officers, and

1,690 enlisted men and had a procurement goal of 1,100

men a year. More importantly, the corps was experiencing

a re-enlistment rate of 65 percent. These kinds of positive

numbers allowed the CIC to reinstate its high standards

and eliminate qualification waivers for enlisted men and to

curtail them for officers. The crisis years when CIC would

take whoever was available had for now come to an end.

Professionalization

The school began to take on the trappings of a

professional institution. It even acquired its own distinctive unit insignia for wear by staff and students and a

motto, “Custos Fidelitatis—Guardians of Loyalty.” The

insignia depicted a crouching sphinx representing wisdom

and discreet silence and which, since the 1920s, had

served as the symbol of military intelligence. Between its

forepaws, the sphinx held a lamp demonstrating the

school’s mission to instill knowledge.

The school also made changes of substance. During

the late 1940s, the school diversified, offering the basic 12-

week investigative course (at a cost of $963 per person);

an 8-week language and area specialization class ($280); a

2-week administrative training class ($170); and a 4-week

technical training class ($240) in such subjects as photography, “defense against methods of entry” (DAME), and

polygraph. School administrators initiated refresher and

extension courses as well as a research library. The

coming of the Cold War furnished impetus for studying

the new adversary and his methods. In 1948, a 10-hour

block of instruction on communism was added to the

basic investigative course to emphasize Russian language

and Soviet area studies. Finally, the arrival of civilian

instructors and creation of a curriculum in technical

First home of the 116th CIC Detachment at 415 22nd Street, NW, Washington, DC, the one-time Briggs Schoolhouse. (AHEC)

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instruction for military attachés and State Department

employees were added indicators of the school’s growing

prestige.

In 1947, the Army established a CIC Board at Fort

Holabird for the purpose of developing special investigative equipment and techniques. Listening devices, a 75-

exposure wrist camera, a telephone dial click counter, and

visual surveillance glasses were among some of the early

items procured.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence established

a clearing house or central file of counterintelligence

investigations—a long-time goal. The central index

system would allow cross referencing by personality,

organization, etc. In 1949, the CIC in Europe sent a

microfilmed copy of its files

to Fort Holabird for safe

keeping. Building upon this,

the CIC then asked all

overseas commands to do

the same. After October

1950, a carbon copy of all

CIC operational reports was

also forwarded, and finally,

the Assistant Chief of Staff

for Intelligence would

formally direct the transfer of

all counterintelligence

personality files from

throughout CONUS to a

central index at Fort

Holabird.

Army Area Commands

The bulk of the work in

CONUS was performed by

Counter Intelligence Corps

detachments in support of

each of the six Army Area

Commands that replaced the

former Service Commands.

Activated in 1946, the

detachments carried out

necessary background

investigations required for

the Cold War military-civilian

force and provided the

traditional range of counterintelligence support to the

various armies and subordinate units. Routine background checks and loyalty

investigations to screen for

communists and other

groups considered to be

threats to national security constituted the bulk of the

workload. Security surveys, safeguarding of military

information, and the investigation of possible subversive

activities were equally important duties.

Although sharing a similar mission and organization

consisting of field offices and smaller resident offices

scattered throughout the six Army areas, each detachment, as in World War II, had its own set of unique

challenges. The 115th CIC Detachment, for example,

conducted a mission over a large geographical area of

eight states stretching from Washington to Arizona.

Headquartered at the Presidio of San Francisco, the 115th

possessed an initial strength of 20 officers, 12 warrant

officers, and 28 enlisted men. The 108th CIC Detachment,

which was based out of New York City and was respon85

A soldier stands guard at the Pentagon. In the 1940s, the 118th CIC Detachment had

responsibility for protecting the building’s secrets. (NARA)

33290_P001_176.pmd 93 11/9/2005, 10:39 AM
I.G. Farben Building (in background) served as headquarters to Army intelligence in Europe and early home to the 970th CIC

Detachment. Here, agents are shown returning from an operation. (NARA)

sible for the First Army and New England area, had just

the opposite problem: 170 personnel to cover a population of 27 million. Naturally, the workload of the detachments varied greatly. The 111th CIC Detachment in the

southeastern States was average, completing just over

8,000 cases, or 190 per man in 1949. However, it still had

nearly 3,800 cases to be closed. By 1950, all detachments

were beginning to make real inroads toward doing away

with their backlogs; increased manning coupled with

assistance from nearby combat CIC elements made the

difference.

The 116th CIC Detachment performed similar responsibilities for the Military District of Washington surrounding the Nation’s capital. The 116th was located in

temporary buildings constructed during the war and

situated adjacent to Fort McNair. Being in Washington,

DC, the 116th CIC Detachment surpassed other CONUS

detachments in the number of investigations conducted.

Of the 16,000 cases processed in 1949, 11,800 were checks

performed for other detachments. To meet their quotas,

members of the detachment often worked nights and

Saturdays and depended upon the temporary loan of

civilian employees from the Office, Assistant Chief of Staff

for Intelligence.

Elsewhere CIC planners established a number of

detachments to carry out one-of-a-kind missions. These

included the 70-person 118th CIC Detachment, activated at

Fort Holabird in 1946, but with duty station at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. For the next 6 years, it conducted the Pentagon’s counterintelligence mission in

direct support of the Army staff. Members of the 118th

often handled sensitive cases and interfaced with the

highest levels of command within the War Department.

In 1947, the enactment of the Atomic Energy Commission Act resulted in the formation of the Armed Forces

Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) to carry on the military

functions of the Manhattan Project. Subsequently, 15 CIC

agents were assigned to furnish security support to the

new organization. As AFSWP activities increased, the

existing arrangements proved unsatisfactory, causing the

Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct the Army to furnish a

dedicated security capability. On 26 February 1951, the

901st CIC Detachment was activated at Albuquerque, New

Mexico, where it was assigned to the Commanding

General, Sandia Base. With the exception of creating a

field office in the Washington, DC, area, the use of a lone

detachment to provide security support for the atomic

program remained virtually unchanged for the next 25

years.

OCCUPATION OF EUROPE

What would follow in the aftermath of Victory in

Europe had been the subject of Army intelligence planners

since the fall of 1944. High on their agenda was the

handling of emerging security issues. The 418th CIC

Detachment, serving the headquarters of the 12th Army

Group, was given responsibility for planning a CIC

organization that would manage counterintelligence

operations post VE Day. Finding the necessary resources

was a first priority. Interrogation, order of battle, and

interpreter personnel were shifted from combat intelli86

33290_P001_176.pmd 94 11/9/2005, 10:39 AM
gence duties to support the counterintelligence mission.

Simultaneously, personnel from CIC detachments in

support of combat divisions were transferred temporarily

into the 418th Detachment.

On 10 May 1945, the 970th CIC Detachment was established in place of the 418th at Wiesbaden, Germany. In turn,

the personnel from 55 CIC divisional detachments were

stood up as subordinate teams of the 970th CIC Detachment, giving it an actual strength of 323 officers and 1,100

agents. Although on paper all personnel of combat

components were reassigned to the 970th, small teams

continued in support of divisions and corps until parent

commands redeployed at which time the remaining

counterintelligence resources became a permanent part of

the 970th. Lieutenant Colonel Norman J. Hearn served as

the first commander of the 970th Detachment. In July, he

oversaw the relocation of his command to Frankfurt,

eventually finding a home in the city’s largest office

building—the I.G. Farben Building, former home to a

chemical company.

Major Anthony Lobb, Commander, 303d

 CIC

Detachment, described counterintelligence’s greatest

challenge at the beginning of the post-war period:

“...many ‘investigating’ agencies running around

Germany, one delving into the other’s case, each doing a

part of a case, and leaving it half done. The most

important thing facing CIC is coordination at the top.”

Apart from the 970th CIC Detachment, CIC personnel were

assigned to the Seventh Army (Western Military District),

Third Army (Eastern Military District), combat divisions,

and the Bremen Enclave. To bring some sort of order, the

970th organized regional headquarters to correspond with

former corps areas. For example, the Third Army area of

operations (Eastern Military District) had regional offices

in Munich, Bamberg, and Regensburg. These offices were

given responsibility for coordinating the sub-regions

within their respective areas. Each of the sub-regions had

one to four teams, often referred to as “slash” teams since

their numerical designators were 970 followed by a “/” and

a team number, i.e., 970/88. However, movement of tactical

units within the regions created an on-going coordination

problem even though the duties of their organic

Not possessing the correct documentation, two youths were picked up in a raid. (NARA)

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counterintelligence elements were supposedly separate

and limited to the security of troops and the local

installation. Despite the confusion, by November 1945,

the CIC had teams functioning in every mid-size city, at

border control points, and at various headquarters and

military installations.

Occupational Duties

During the first 6 months of occupation duty, CIC

personnel spent most of their time conducting wholesale

roundups and interrogating individuals on various

“wanted” lists. For example, TALLY HO was the first US

zone-wide security search and seizure operation. The

Seventh Army alone contributed some 160,000 troops in

the massive checking of credentials and seizing of

contraband during the last week of July. The operation

apprehended more than 85,000 individuals, some for travel

violations and others for posing a possible security risk,

and seized over 300,000 contraband items, including antitank weapons.

In Operation CHOO CHOO, the Sub-Regional Office in

Bamberg ran a smaller but very effective operation in

which entire trains were stopped. The passengers

disembarked to be screened by agents who also searched

the train for contraband. Undercover agents circulated

among the passengers to listen and watch their reaction to

the search. Disgruntled individuals tended to reveal

information withheld from the screeners. Elsewhere the

CIC monitored fishing boats and their crews who worked

out of the Bremerhaven harbor. One anticipated benefit of

all these types of operations was to set into motion a

grapevine effect—spreading the word that all persons

were within the reach of the CIC.

Counterintelligence agents found a very diverse group

of individuals on their wanted lists. For example, the 29th

CIC Detachment apprehended the following: “a physician

and nerve specialist who was believed to have been

responsible for the extermination of patients in an asylum;

a former member of the embassy in Rome who was

considered a ‘fanatical Nazi’; a school teacher and

organist who had been a party group leader; the chief

cook for IG Farben Works who had been denounced as a

The CIC rounded up thousands of Nazis. Here, Germany’s leaders faced justice at the Nuremberg trials. (NARA)

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brutal guard for the SS; ... and a butcher who had beaten

a captured airman.” By June, the members of the 29th had

arrested 175 of these types of individuals.

One of those high on CIC’s list of most wanted was

Ernst Kaltenbrunner, appointed Chief of the Gestapo and

dubbed the “The Hangman.” Following the interrogation

of Kaltenbrunner’s wife, Robert E. Matteson of the 80th

CIC Detachment discovered that a cabin in the Teton

Gebirge Range of the Austrian Alps was the likely hiding

place. Donning traditional Austrian clothes so as not to

arouse suspicion, Agent Matteson’s team approached the

site during semi-darkness and captured Kaltenbrunner

and his three companions without resistance. But not all

individuals being sought were guilty of war crimes. Dr.

Werner von Braun and six other research scientists in

Germany’s rocket program crossed the Alps into Austria

where they surrendered to Agent Charles Stewart.

The functions of the 970th CIC Detachment varied

during the early months of the occupation. For example,

the Army used its agents to determine the loyalty of US

citizens working for the Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and to screen German war brides desiring American

visas. Under Operation GRAB BAG, the CIC participated

in the search of the so-called “Hungarian Navy,” 375

vessels of various sizes anchored in the Danube River

between Passau and Deggendorf. Several hundred

members of the Hungarian Navy and their families who

had fled the Black Sea inhabited the mothballed fleet. The

CIC was specifically interested in shutting down possible

escape routes being used by former SS members. In the

process, the operation yielded battlefield weapons and

resulted in the apprehension of a counterfeit ring.

In the midst of all of these activities, the denazification

program, or Operation LIFE BUOY, remained the CIC’s

primary focus. During a typical week in July 1945, more

than 120,000 people were questioned and 6,500 arrests

took place. Screening citizens for civil service actually met

with greater success than anticipated; only a third were

disapproved. In determining candidates for dismissal,

individuals who had a party membership date after 1 May

1937 were scrutinized but faced removal only if CIC

The presence of thousands of displaced persons posed a major problem for Army counterintelligence. (NARA)

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Captain Edward W. Lattner, a Bavarian by

birth, donned civilian clothes and posed as an

admirer of Hitler. Subsequently, he won the

confidence of a local group plotting sabotage. He

offered to transport the leaders, including two

former German generals, in an American jeep he

had stolen so that the conspirators could find a

suitable location to hide weapons. Instead he used

the commandeered vehicle to drive the plotters

through the gates of the Munich headquarters of

the CIC. All of the passengers were eventually

convicted, largely due to Lattner’s testimony in

open court.

investigators felt circumstances warranted it. When LIFE

BUOY neared the goal of purging public officials, the CIC

then turned its attention to businesses, the professions,

and university faculties.

As a whole, the German population proved surprisingly

docile and cooperative; this, along with the CIC’s use of a

firm hand, was a major factor in the overall success of the

program. To their amusement, CIC offices frequently

received mail addressed to the “American Gestapo.”

However, with the coming winter months, the acute

economic shortages and the strain of the denazification

program caused cracks in new post-war relationships.

Many Germans were particularly against the denazification

of all commercial enterprises, fearful that the new law

would wreak havoc on the already frail economy. The

general population also failed to see the reasoning behind

the need to replace competent, former Nazi officials at the

local level.

Tensions manifested themselves during incidents

involving troop fraternization, confrontations between

German youth and American soldiers, pilfering, and

increased black market activities. On occasion, they

escalated to serious acts of sabotage; communications

lines being a favorite target. A more serious case involved

40 former Nazis under the control of a notorious Gestapo

officer who had gone undercover as a baker in Cologne.

Fortunately, surveillance by CIC agents exposed their plot

to dynamite US installations. On a larger scale, undercover efforts by counterintelligence agents led to a

coordinated surprise raid on 300 towns and villages on the

night of 1 April 1946. The net result was the arrest of 1,000

members of an underground organization bent on perpetuating National Socialist ideals through certain German

political leaders.

Up until 1948, the Counter Intelligence Corps in

Germany tried to limit its involvement in displaced

persons. One area that did concern the CIC was the largescale black marketing within the displaced persons camps.

Unfortunately, sweeps of the camps seldom netted the

ringleaders. Another exception to policy was the Jews.

Plans called for the creation of a homeland for the Jews in

Palestine, but before a formal state of Israel existed, an

underground government issued orders to peoples still in

displaced persons camps in Germany. Under Operation

RUMMAGE, the CIC used informants to learn about the

route being used to smuggle Jews to Italy aboard unseaworthy freighters eventually bound for Palestine, and

about attempts to purchase weapons in Germany and

smuggle these arms to the mid-East. Army counterintelligence, for the most part, limited its activities to monitoring

the evolving situation.

In 1948, CIC’s role regarding displaced persons

significantly changed when the US Congress voted to

open the country’s doors to a given number of them.

Being the only agency with the necessary expertise and

resources meant that the CIC would become heavily

involved in determining whether or not individuals and

families qualified for immigration. The sheer size of the

case load (12,500 a month) placed a heavy burden on

CIC’s limited manpower.

German Technology

The early effort by the War and Navy Departments to

exploit German technology went by the name of Operation

OVERCAST. Several hundred Germans with unique skills

were brought to the US on a temporary basis to supposedly assist in the final phase of the war against Japan. Its

ad hoc approach left much to be desired. Consequently,

in October 1946, US authorities implemented a program

under the title of MESA—later changed to PAPERCLIP—

for the “denial and exploitation of scientists and technicians of the US Zone of Germany and Austria.” The 970th

played a key role. Its mission was to locate literally

hundreds of individuals falling into those categories and

to report the names of those contemplating immigration to

the United States. Even those who were not desirable

candidates for immigration were monitored because they

often were targets of other nations, and in some cases

their movements were restricted so they would not wind

up in the Soviet Union. PAPERCLIP provided the United

States with many leading professionals in such key

research fields as rocket science and physics.

In a separate program, the State Department established in 1947 what became known as the Office of Policy

Coordination (OPC). Its ambitious goal was to roll back

the Iron Curtain and liberate captive states through

guerrilla warfare. This led to the entrance of former Nazis

and other undesirables into the United States to undergo

training to those ends. The book America’s Secret Army

reported that upon learning about the secret immigration

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Werner von Braun, who was Germany’s leading rocket expert (arm in cast), and fellow scientists surrender to the CIC. (NARA)

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policy, a number of CIC agents in Germany registered their

complaints with the Pentagon and Department of Justice.

Restructuring

As the initial phase drew to a close, routine redeployments of soldiers back to the States quickly depleted the

970th of its trained personnel. Simultaneously, a survey in

Europe revealed that 20 percent of the replacement

personnel were unfit for their assignment. Thinking that

discipline and firmer control was what was needed, Army

leaders responded by ordering CIC agents and clerks alike

to don uniforms and to rejoin the Army, unless civilian

attire was absolutely essential. Despite these distractions,

the 970th CIC Detachment managed to achieve an operating

force of 1,400 officers and men. In a 3-month period in

1948, the 970th conducted a total 24,000 investigations of

all types by “the intelligent exercise of routine controls,

the exhaustive searching of available documents, and the

vigorous exploitation of informants as well as a complete

disregard for the conventional 40-hour week enjoyed by

the bulk of the Army.”

The 970th CIC Detachment was divided into eight

subordinate regions (Stuttgart (I), Frankfurt (II), Bad

Nauheim (III), Munich (IV), Regensburg (V), Bamberg

(VI), Berlin (VIII), and Bremen (IX).) This pattern remained in place until 1948 when the Counter Intelligence

Corps in Europe went through a series of rapid changes.

The first was the inactivation of the 970th in June 1948 and

the organization of the 7970th CIC Detachment, which

allowed for greater structural flexibility. The next year, the

7970th moved its headquarters from Frankfurt to Stuttgart.

Because the 7970th did not have a cellular structure, it

soon became evident that the unit was not automatically

receiving its share of personnel. What good was flexibility when there were no people? The 7970th was conseThe emergence of an active Communist Party in Occupied Germany confronted Army intelligence with a new challenge. (INSCOM)

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quently replaced with the 66th CIC Detachment, subdivided

into twelve regions: Stuttgart (I), Heidelberg (II), Frankfurt

(III), Munich (IV), Regensburg (V), Nuremberg (VI),

Bayreuth (VII), Berlin (VIII), Bremen (IX), Bad Wildungen

(X), Wurzburg (XI, and Augsburg (XII). Within each of

these regions, investigative personnel were further broken

down into Political, Counter Espionage, General Investigation, and Visa Screening teams.

Communism

The greatest threat to a democratic, free Germany did

not come from within. It came from the Soviet Union.

Operation BINGO in July 1946 was a coordinated effort by

the CIC to apprehend low-echelon agents. Tight security

preceded the coordinated round-up of suspects. In total,

407 individuals were arrested. More importantly, followup interrogations confirmed US intelligence’s suspicion

that Soviet liaison officers were actively engaging in

espionage within the US occupational zone, and if nothing

else, Operation BINGO served notice that the Soviets

couldn’t flood the US zone with spies with impunity.

During Operation LITHIA, a similar zone-wide round up

was conducted; this time it rounded up a spy network

being run by one of the Soviet-satellite countries—

Czechoslovakia.

The Soviets exploited their links to the small Communist Party in Germany (Kommunistische Partei

Deutschland or KPD), which had disappeared during the

Third Reich, only to reemerge in post-war Germany as one

of the four political groups authorized to resume activity.

Evidence gathered by the CIC revealed that the Soviets

saw the KPD as a handy vehicle to disrupt the political

process in West Germany. Subsequently, the Deputy

Director of Intelligence, EUCOM (European Command),

gave the Counter Intelligence Corps the green light to

penetrate the KPD. In Operation SUNRISE, the CIC

monitored the KPD’s activities and used informants to

infiltrate the party and its plans.

The KPD’s primary role was as a tireless source of

propaganda. Consequently, the KPD was also behind a

concerted effort to foment demonstrations and encourage

labor strikes, particularly during those winters in which

the populace suffered from coal shortages. Individual

pieces often bore propaganda messages such as “The

Socialist Unity Party of Germany Wishes Coal for Everyone.” German Communists also exploited various youth

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A special military commission arraigned eight persons on charges of gathering information relative to military activities in the US

Zone of Germany. (INSCOM)

33290_P001_176.pmd 101 11/9/2005, 10:39 AM
The arrest of General Reinhard Gehlen,

the former head of Germany’s Foreign

Armies East, the intelligence organization on

the Eastern Front, proved to be invaluable to

the CIC. Gehlen had access to a huge

number of files on the Soviet Union that

would eventually prove invaluable in the

forthcoming Cold War. Gehlen guided a CIC

team to the Bavarian Alps where microfilm of

documents had been buried in metal boxes.

Eventually someone in the Army’s intelligence

chain of command realized the full

significance of Gehlen’s experience and

contacts. One of Gehlen’s first actions as a

collaborator was to use his informants to help

the CIC weed out Soviet agents from among

the displaced persons. Gehlen himself would

go on to become the architect of the Federal

Republic of Germany’s foreign intelligence

organization.

transpiring in the nearby French zone in Germany and

gave the CIC access to an enormous network of former

German SS officers. Because of what he brought to the

table, CIC handlers came to view Barbie as one of their

most valuable assets. Ignoring Barbie’s past seemed

justified in light of the declining denazification program

and the many former Nazis who were finding their way

back into the professions.

In the meantime, the French were exerting pressure to

have Barbie turned over so that he could be tried as a war

criminal. However, CIC personnel were afraid that French

intelligence had been penetrated by Communists and that

their real intentions were to use Barbie to gain information

on the corps and its informants. Consequently, CIC

handlers aided Barbie and his family in gaining access to

an underground railroad, called the “Ratline,” run as an

escape service for Croatian nationalists fleeing Yugoslavia. In the end, Barbie relocated to South America where

for the next 33 years he would elude justice. His freedom

ended when he was finally captured and forced to face

justice in a French court. The whole episode would again

shine the light on decisions made by the CIC personnel in

the early years of the Cold War and would serve as a bitter

reminder of the fine line walked by intelligence officers

and how misplaced priorities could have far-reaching

consequences.

Austria

Because it was deemed to have been a reluctant

member of the Axis Powers, Austria was looked upon as

being more liberated than occupied. By agreement of the

four powers, Austria was divided into separate zones of

occupation. The United States, with headquarters first at

Vienna and later at Salzburg, controlled the northwest

segment of the country; France occupied the western

portion with headquarters at Innsbruck; Great Britain

maintained headquarters at Graz and controlled the

southern zone; and the Soviets occupied the areas to the

northeast, with headquarters at Vienna, the Austrian

capital. Each of the Allies was responsible for a zone in

Vienna and controlled a separate international zone on a

rotational basis. As in Germany, there were rules and

understandings on when and how counterintelligence

personnel could cross between the French, British, and

American Zones; restrictions remained in place that

forbade journeying into the Soviet area of occupation

without prior approval.

As authorities debated and negotiated on how and

even if the United States would help occupy Austria, the

CIC leadership in Rome busily set about planning for such

an eventuality. To prepare CIC personnel for their new

mission in Austria, officers and agents were sent to a

school established by the British in Castellamare, Italy,

overlooking the Bay of Naples. Here, for two weeks, they

groups and sponsored gatherings as a means to indoctrinate a future generation of German citizens on the benefits

of life in a Communist state. Finally, the party routinely

conducted classes to instruct followers on how to spread

its gospel.

In turn, the CIC began an espionage effort of its own in

1948, monitoring the largest Soviet Army maneuver in East

Germany by recruiting teams to gather intelligence

independent of one another; thus their observations

could be compared for accuracy. As the Cold War grew

more confrontational, the Soviets blockaded Berlin,

leading to tightened border control on all sides; consequently, Army counterintelligence began recruiting

informants whose business dealings routinely took them

across the various zones. One story picked up by the

International Press told of Czechoslovakian officials

denouncing the network of spies operating in their

country under the direction of the American Counter

Intelligence Corps; another carried the laughable claim

that the CIC had dispatched a band of five assassins to

kill Defense Minister General Ludvik Svoboda.

When the Iron Curtain descended over Eastern Europe,

the Counter Intelligence Corps agents suddenly found

themselves turning to former enemies to help combat new

threats. One of these new recruits was Klaus Barbie, the

former Gestapo Chief at Lyon in German-occupied France.

Although a war criminal in hiding, Barbie offered a wealth

of contacts that some in the CIC, against the advice of

others, found hard to turn down. Barbie provided

information on the German Communist party and what was

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learned the structure of the Nazi Party and related

organizations in Austria along with the country’s culture

and geography. On 1 May 1945, a convoy of 15 jeeps

carrying 25 CIC agents moved slowly through the

Brenner Pass in the Italian Alps before crossing the

border into Austria. By July, the contingent had progressed to Vienna where posted Soviet soldiers with

machine guns greeted the American caravan as it moved

through their sector on the way to the CIC’s new offices

on Roosevelt-platz. Here, they formally activated the

430th CIC Detachment. Later, a third sub-detachment at

Linz was added to those already in Salzburg and Vienna.

Despite the rapid turnover of personnel over the next

few years, the 430th maintained an average of approximately 125 agents. The CIC helped to make up shortfalls

by recruiting qualified soldiers from among the larger

army contingent in Austria and contracting CIC veterans

whose military obligation was up but who would consider staying on as civilian investigators.

Denazification met with even greater resistance in

Austria than the CIC had found in Germany. Although

the Counter Intelligence Corps agents were successful in

apprehending a number of highly visible war criminals,

they found throughout the US zone a reluctance to

strictly enforce the denazification law. Almost all

detainees insisted they had reluctantly signed questionnaires back in 1938 and 1939. In addition, the Austrian

reviewing commissions didn’t take advantage of information they were provided, and in fact, themselves were

frequent sources of security leaks. Austrian officials

continued to argue that further arrests and trials of low

ranking Nazis would only hamper the country’s economy

and overburden the court system. For example, in one

geographical area 111 of 164 dentists faced removal.

One of the more notable cases involved the arrest of a

notorious figure by the name of Johann Schanda. A minor

figure in the Nazi Party, Schanda had acquired the

reputation for dynamiting public buildings, beating Jews,

and tossing persons out of upper-floor windows. Fortunately, one of Schanda’s victims recognized him on the

streets despite the fact that his appearance had been

altered through plastic surgery and that he had assumed a

false identity. Upon hearing the news, counterintelligence

agents began around-the-clock surveillance of the house

of Schanda’s former mistress; the residence, however, lay

in the Soviet Zone. To lure him back to the American side

where he could be arrested, an undercover agent approached Schanda, and requested that he appear to testify

in a black market case. Schanda fell for the line and

proceeded to walk into the CIC headquarters where he

was immediately placed under arrest.

Counterintelligence in post-war Austria quickly moved

away from policing war criminals. Seventy-five percent of

the 430th CIC Detachment’s workload dealt with displaced

persons. Austria had become the temporary home for

Members of the 430th CIC Detachment stationed at Linz, Austria. (AHEC)

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The case began when the CIC was notified that someone was stealing trash from the

wastebaskets of a military office. The suspect was easily identified—a Hungarian refugee, Kalman

Gabris, who worked as a janitor. The next step was to determine the identity of Gabris’ control officer.

This was also quickly done. One fact that immediately became apparent was that neither Gabris nor

his handler, a Major Gyorgy Csergo, could read English, and everything from menus to millinery bills

were finding their way into the Soviet intelligence chain. Circumstances were such that the case had

to be brought to a quick close. The Chief of CIC Operations decided to type the following message on

a piece of paper stamped TOP SECRET: “Dear Major Gy.Cs., This is a greeting from your American

friends in the Counterintelligence Corps. We have been watching your efforts with growing

sympathy....We want to help you....Since most of the information you seem to want is available in the

regular daily edition of The Stars and Stripes, we will enter a subscription for you if you agree to send

over no more drunks, half-wits, or juvenile delinquents.” The letter was then deposited into a trash

can. Months later, word was received that Kalman Gabris had been thrown into a forced labor camp

in Hungary. The last anyone saw of the major was his entering the intelligence headquarters in

Budapest.

numerous ethnic groups. Many had been liberated from

concentration camps where they suffered imprisonment

because of racial, religious, or political reasons. Others

had served as forced laborers in German camps and

factories. The presence of the various ethnic diversities

created added political tensions and on occasion led to

riots. The sheer numbers of foreigners also complicated

the security problem. The Soviets continually sent spies

to ascertain disposition and strength of US military forces.

Espionage agents easily blended with the various ethnic

groups, and given the presence of mountainous and

wooded areas, they could travel virtually undetected in

and out of the country.

It became the CIC’s job to screen displaced persons

and return them to their homeland; however, because of

persecution, lack of desire to return to now Communist

states, and expectations of a better life elsewhere, many

people simply did not want to go back to their place of

birth. In 1948, with the changes in America’s immigration

policy, the CIC was given the additional task of screening

displaced persons for entrance into the United States.

As in Germany, the Jews gave the CIC its greatest

challenge. Because of their sufferings during World War

II, the Jewish people emerged from the conflict intensely

nationalistic. Many desired to migrate to Palestine, and a

number of the leaders were already preparing for future

paramilitary activities. The presence of this militant

element created a number of security problems in the Bad

Gastein and the Bindermichi displaced persons camps in

Upper Austria. To make matters worse, Communist

agitators encouraged anti-Semitic and anti-foreigner

demonstrations on the part of local Austrians. By 1949,

much of the displaced persons problem was solved by the

return of persons to their homelands, the immigration of

many peoples to the United States, and the departure of

the Jews for Palestine.

Besides routine occupational duties, the Counter

Intelligence Corps in Austria faced a major security

challenge from the Soviet Union and local Communists.

Kidnapping became routine, beginning as early as 1946.

In fact, the Soviets even hired black marketers (the Benno

Blum gang) to assist in the work. Typical of those

abducted were former residents of Soviet satellite countries. One incident involved a woman who was literally

carried from her apartment rolled in a rug. Another

concerned a Hungarian repatriation commissioner who

disappeared when offered a ride in another official’s

automobile. Then there were instances involving local

scientists and other professionals. Even university

students were not safe. When CIC agents uncovered a

Soviet plot to kidnap an Austrian citizen who was a key

counter-espionage source for the Americans, they set a

trap that led to the apprehension of members of the Soviet

Repatriation Mission disguised in the uniforms of US

Military Police. In another case, undercover Soviet Army

officers in disguise were caught doctoring cherry brandy

for the purpose of drugging and removing a US informant

from the St. Valentine Hotel.

Overtime, the general populous became outraged at the

Soviet employment of such tactics, causing the number of

episodes to diminish, but the threat of abductions never

completely disappeared. In 1948, for instance, a CIC agent

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himself became a victim, and 2 weeks later, a civilian

employee assigned to military intelligence. Both

underwent interrogations and physical manhandling

before being released. However, it was not just a one-way

street. The Counter Intelligence Corps found many Soviet

soldiers and airmen who regularly defected on their own

to the American Zone to be excellent sources of

information.

Italy

Counterintelligence activities continued after the

unconditional surrender of the German armies in Italy.

Task forces remained active as late as June 1945 in

arresting senior enemy intelligence personnel and policing

up documents of interest. The IV Corps CIC agents

uncovered a large stay-behind sabotage network that

operated under the guise of a cosmetics distribution firm,

Gibim Prodotti—a case broken through a series of followup investigations. Elsewhere, extensive legwork on the

part of CIC agents led to the arrest of 10 more would-be

saboteurs along with numerous war criminals—more

examples of the professionalism and efficiency that

characterized the corps at the war’s end.

The Territory of Trieste, the area on the west side of

the Istrian Peninsula, surrounded the city of Trieste and

was divided into two zones: one controlled by the

Americans and British and the second by the Yugoslavs.

Trieste became an early contest in the Cold War because

the territory served as a vital lifeline to the Mediterranean

both for Allied forces in Austria and for Yugoslavia and

the Soviets. The 428th CIC Detachment handled the

Army’s counterintelligence duties until replaced in 1947

by the 17th CIC Detachment. As the Cold War heated up,

so did the numerous instances of spying, principally

involving the Yugoslavs. In Trieste, the CIC investigated

commercial firms and monitored consulates, both known

for providing cover for espionage activities in the region.

As was the case in Austria, espionage soon became a

two-way street. To exploit persons coming from the other

side, the CIC and the British Field Security Service

established a joint interrogation center to screen displaced

persons, line crossers, and smugglers—many originating

in Austria. Using these sources, CIC agents identified

possible intelligence sources and obtained order-of-battle

data, but the intense rivalry between the Allied intelligence agencies undermined the effectiveness of the

overall effort. Intelligence officers from both sides often

Line crossers along the border proved a primary source of information on conditions behind the Iron Curtain. (INSCOM)

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In his book, Special Agent in the Pacific,

WWII, William B. Simpson described what it was

like to be among the first to arrive in post-war

Japan: “Being in Tokyo during the first days of

occupation was a strange experience. The

Japanese stared as we went about the city.

Often we would be the first American or Allied

troops to be seen, or the first to speak to

somebody, or the first Caucasians seen by the

war-time generation. Japanese civil police,

augmented by Japanese Military Police,

swarmed the city to prevent incidents arising

from actions of the Japanese. Japanese traffic

police held back traffic in all directions to allow

us to pass, even if we were far from the

intersection when first seen.”

The CIC was located in the former Kempei Tai headquarters building in Tokyo; the facilities were renamed Norton Hall in honor

of CPT John H. Norton, killed on Okinawa. (INSCOM)

debriefed apprehended persons before reaching the

interrogation center. British and American intelligence

agencies each launched long- and short-range line

crossers into Yugoslavia for the purpose of collecting

human intelligence and Soviet order-of-battle information. But by 1948, the need for greater cooperation

forced the G2, Trieste US Troops (TRUST) to be

integrated with British Intelligence.

Because the central concern of TRUST was maintaining the status quo, the CIC monitored political activities,

demonstrations and riots, and any incident involving US

servicemen that might disturb the peace. As an exception

to established practices, the Counter Intelligence Corps

uncharacteristically involved itself in criminal matters

and helped to solve a number of highly visible cases, one

involving a triple murder. Black marketing and instances

of kidnapping became a growing concern to the corps.

While conducting port security, CIC agents discovered a

ring smuggling people to the United States in return for

money.

POST-WAR PACIFIC

When Imperial Japan surrendered on 14 August 1945,

the Counter Intelligence Corps had 4 regional and 66 area

detachments operating in the Philippines and Okinawa,

plus another 36 assigned to combat units. In the brief

window of time between the surrender and actual occupation of Japan’s home islands, the 441st CIC Detachment,

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A CIC agent shows his badge to a sentry. Nisei continued to play an important role in the Occupation of Japan. (NARA)

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which controlled all CIC

elements in theater, busied

itself preparing for future

duties. While counterintelligence units worked to finish

their investigations in Okinawa

and the Philippines, personnel

who could be spared were sent

to Manila to attend a brief

orientation class on what

awaited them in Japan. At the

same time, an additional 32

Nisei soldiers arrived from the

States to receive instructions in

counterintelligence work. They

would provide much needed

language skills for the work

that lay ahead.

In October 1945, General

Douglas MacArthur, who had

been named the Supreme

Commander, Allied Powers

(SCAP), established a special

staff section, the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), and placed

BG Elliot R. Thorpe at its head.

The CIS advised MacArthur on

policies relating to “public

safety agencies in Japan and

Korea and to conduct such

investigations relating to

compliance with orders and

instructions to the Japanese

government as may be directed.” To fulfill his mission,

the Chief, CIS, exercised

oversight of the 441st CIC

Detachment, a Civil Censor

Detachment, and the Public

Safety Division.

Six months later, counterintelligence and intelligence

would be brought directly

under the G2—Major General

Charles A. Willoughby. This

change occurred because of

growing tensions between the

General Staff and the Civil

Intelligence Section; the latter

advocated a greater purge at

the lower levels of government

and society, but the former

believed this would only

further harm an already fragile

economy.

The 308th CIC Detachment assigned to the Eighth Army and the 306th CIC Detachment in support of the Sixth was the first of their kind to arrive in Japan and proceeded to supervise the movement of tactical CIC units throughout the islands.

Altogether, 22 detachments would be under the overall administrative control of the

441st CIC Detachment, commanded by LTC Jennis R. Galloway, but as the 441st

Detachment became more established, it systematically assumed operational control

of all resources. Those once organic to tactical commands eventually transitioned

into one of the 13 Area units (1 in Kyushu. 1 in Hokkaido, and 11 in Honshu) or as

one of the 9 Metropolitan units: Tokyo, Yokohama, Hakodate, Kobe, Shimonoseki,

Fukuoka, Yawata, Nagoya, and Sapporo. By 1947, this organization had further

dissolved into a handful of regions, leaving CIC personnel posted at 61 sites across

the country.

The CIC in Japan initially consisted of 181 officers, 22 warrant officers, and 726

enlisted men. To maintain its fill, the 441st resorted to recruiting Army personnel into

the corps from among those already in theater. Many on-hand service men were

“better qualified” than those being received from CONUS, but this proved only a

temporary solution. By late 1947, the War Department ordered the practice to cease.

Japanese Premier Hideki Tojo (center) stands trial for war crimes. CIC agents were

responsible for his arrest. (NARA)

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The CIC School, which had begun in Melbourne, Australia, and had island-hopped its way to Japan, was reestablished at Norton Hall in Tokyo where it offered orientation

classes to new arrivals.

Most agents lacked adequate language skills.

At first, the CIC used members of the Allied

Translator and Interpreter Service on a loan

basis to help fill the gap. Although security

regulations prohibited the assignment of Nisei

on a permanent basis, the 319th MI Battalion was

activated as a means of circumventing the

exclusion of Japanese-Americans. The 319th

Battalion was a “paper organization” filled with

80 officers and 239 enlisted Nisei who were

given special counterintelligence credentials by

the Far East Command.

Serving in the Land of the Rising Sun

On 11 September, the 441st CIC Detachment

received a radiogram from General MacArthur’s

headquarters listing individuals to be arrested

and imprisoned for war crimes. The list was

considerably shorter than in Europe. The

number one name was General Hideki Tojo,

former Prime Minister and Chief of the Imperial

General Staff, who was considered most responsible for Japan’s acts of aggression. A team of

four led by MAJ Paul Krause of the 81st Metropolitan CIC Detachment proceeded to Tojo’s

private residence in Tokyo. At the door, the CIC

party talked to Tojo’s secretary before the

general himself appeared at the window. After

having been informed of his pending arrest, Tojo

eventually agreed to accompany Major Krause;

however, he no more than disappeared from

sight when a shot was heard from inside the

house. Breaking down the door, the CIC

contingent found Tojo slumped in a chair

bleeding from a self-inflicted wound. Major

Krause quickly arranged for medical treatment

to be administered. General Tojo survived only

to face trial and execution for his war crimes.

Another highly publicized case involved the

apprehension of COL Josef Albert Meisinger,

German Attaché and so-called “Butcher of

Warsaw.”

Unlike European countries, the Japanese

Government took the lead in purging itself and

the rest of Japanese society of undesirable

militarists and ultranationalists, subject to the

approval of the Supreme Commander Allied

Power. Taskings came in the form of SCAPINS,

or Supreme Commander Allied Power Instructions; SCAPINS 548 and 550, were often

referred to as the “Purge Directives.” Their purpose was

to remove the ultra-nationalists and militarists from

positions of power. Surprisingly the Kempei Tai or

Imperial Japan’s security police quickly dissolved on its

Agents arrest the head of the Osaka Japanese Thought Police. (INSCOM)

General Charles A. Willoughby, G2 of the Far East Command, oversaw

the Civil Intelligence Section, which included members of the CIC.

(NARA)

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“A good 75 percent of the trouble we

have gotten into in the past has been

because we were trespassing on some

other agency’s territory....Where the

other agency was not aware of this, bad

feeling resulted. When they were

aware of it and were willing for us to

go ahead, it was usually for one or two

reasons: (a) the case was too hot for

them to handle and they were willing

for us to stick our neck out, or (b) the

job was impossible to accomplish and

they were willing for us to take the

blame for failure, rather than assume

it themselves.”

LTC Wayne E. Homan, Commander, 441st CIC

Detachment (Japan)

own. Many of its leadership committed suicide, others

went into hiding, and still others turned informants. The

CIC were able to successfully plant sources in positions

that furnished access to matters of interest to military

authorities. Captain Benjamin T. Obata recalled routinely

meeting his clandestine contact in an out of the way

teahouse. In the Japanese culture, “gifts” were often

exchanged for information in lieu of monies, especially

cases involving liaison with police officers who passed on

information concerning their investigations of suspected

communists.

Elsewhere, the CIC labored to piece together the

history and post-war activities of the Kokuryu Kai or

Black Dragon Society, the most powerful of the Japanese

patriot organizations. More serious was CIC’s exposure of

a 300-man Current Events Club composed of former

soldiers and bent on harassing occupational troops and

terrorizing local community leaders. The CIC also became

quite successful in locating treasures of war hidden by

Japanese leaders. In one instance, 11 crates of platinum

were found hidden in a chicken coop, some 160 miles from

Tokyo. When further questioned by CIC agents, the

custodian of the cache brought forth a bucket filled with

diamonds.

Besides the traditional security function of preventing

espionage and sabotage, the 441st was assigned responsibility for “suppression of organizations, individuals, and

movements whose existence and continued activities are

considered an impediment to the lasting peaceful reconstruction of Japan.” In the course of carrying out this

assignment, the CIC became known as “Eyes and Ears of

the Occupation” by issuing so-called “spot reports”—

news flashes on subjects of current interest to occupation

authorities or on activities that might present problems in

the future. It was natural that such a role be given the CIC.

Although small in size, it was the most widely dispersed of

all the US agencies and possessed access to informant

nets.

In 1949, the number of spot reports reached nearly

5,000. Labor issues, foreign activity, and political matters

were the most common categories. On one occasion,

General Willoughby desired coverage on a strike taking

place only 10 miles from Tokyo, but the communication

workers in sympathy with the protest shut down the

telephone lines. The CIC assembled a relay system of five

jeeps with radios to provide up-to-the minute coverage.

Besides spot reports there was the time-consuming

activity of preparing weekly summary reports, covering

such trivial subjects as the number of school books or feet

of hoses at the fire station in each community.

Over time, the Counter Intelligence Corps found itself

being assigned cases that other agencies couldn’t handle

or didn’t want because the subject matter was too

politically sensitive. Subsequently, the G2 created a

guide to differentiate between which assignments fell

under the 441st and which belonged to the Military Police,

Military Government, Civil Intelligence, Education, etc.

Later, the G2 organized the Counter Intelligence Division

as an added buffer between the 441st CIC Detachment and

the CIS.

Communist Threat

In 1947, the Counter Intelligence Corps began to

refocus its energies and resources to monitoring the

Japanese Communist Party (JCP)—the greatest single

threat against security and stability. The Civil Intelligence Section described the JCP as an ongoing “menace

to all duly constituted democratic authority [as a result] of

its varied and continued attempts to nullify, discredit and

embarrass the program of democratization.” Although

relatively small in size, the JCP was able to tap into

feelings of discontent on the part of various economic,

ethnic, and political groups. In the early post-war period,

the majority of the people existed in marginal poverty. To

them, the JCP presented itself as the champion of the

downtrodden. Communists also successfully infiltrated

labor unions and used them as a means of public protest.

The Counter Intelligence Corps’ main rationale for

directing a disproportionate amount of attention at the

JCP was its strong anti-American stance. This concern

was validated in 1948 when the CIC acquired the text of a

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Moscow directive to JCP ordering the fostering of

conflicts and strikes and distribution of counterfeit money.

Just as important was the use of JCP as a conduit for

espionage. Here, the Counter Intelligence Corps specifically focused on the Urban People’s Department, created

by the JCP to collect information concerning the Allied

Occupation Forces in Japan.

An important part of CIC’s monitoring the Communist

threat was screening Japanese prisoners of war who were

repatriated from areas under Soviet occupation. During

interviews, the CIC determined the majority of returnees

had been subjected to the most intense program of

indoctrination then known. In one survey, 11 were found

to have joined the local Communist Party, 16 others were

sympathetic to the cause, but the remaining 74 identified

themselves as being very anti-Communist. Also hidden

among the group were Soviet spies and collaborators.

During what was known as Project SWITCH, CIC personnel interviewed as many returnees as possible in an effort

to identify who were Soviet agents and to obtain other

bits of general intelligence. Given their sheer numbers,

reaching over 20,000 a month, these returning soldiers

made a serious impact.

By 1949, the Communists carried 10 percent of the vote

in national elections. But the same year witnessed the

beginning of a turn around for Japan’s economy, just in

time for most repatriated soldiers to find their homeland

not in the dismal condition described by their former

captors. For example, the White Clan Society was a

national organization of veterans who became dedicated

anti-Communists. The arrival of these anti-Communists

helped to counter the JCP propaganda, provided useful

information on individuals belonging to the JCP, and

furnished American intelligence with insights as to Soviet

indoctrination techniques.

The Korean nationals residing in Japan also posed a

major problem. A large portion was disgruntled with the

current state of affairs, making them susceptible to

communism, civil disturbances, and crime. A report from

First CIC Region contained the following sweeping

judgment: “Much of the crime in Japan has been attributed to Koreans.” The Koreans in Japan also mirrored the

political turmoil taking place on the Korean Peninsula. The

leaders of the Japanese Communist Party were quick to

exploit the discontent of Korean nationals and enlisted

them for liaison trips to North Korea. In one instance, the

Communists took advantage of a protest involving 5,000

Koreans in Osaka. What began as a march soon turned

into a riot. Numerous red banners and signs were in

prominent display and the Osaka Prefecture building was

occupied by the rioters.

To counter the Soviet threat, a small element of the 441st

CIC Detachment was designated as “Hongo House

Group” (later to be named the “Zed Section”) and placed

A CIC mobile raiding party offloads its jeep from a C-47 transport plane at Atsugi Airport. (NARA)

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under the direct control of MG Willoughby, G2. At the

head of this team was a colorful and, at times, controversial counterintelligence veteran—MAJ Jack Canon. Zed

focused on the Soviet diplomatic mission and the colony

of Soviet nationals in Japan. Because most of the Soviets

resided in the Tokyo-Kanagawa District, there arose, from

time-to-time, tension between the Zed members and local

CIC investigators. In time, Zed became responsible for all

sensitive investigations that were of special interest to

General Willoughby.

The Philippines and Okinawa

Following the formal surrender of Japan, the 441st CIC

Detachment and the majority of the units transferred to

the Japanese home islands. This left the First CIC Region

of the 441st CIC Detachment behind to finish the work in

the Philippines. On 27 August 1945, the war-time activities

of the CIC in the Philippines were brought to an end; all

records on wartime collaborators were turned over to the

Department of Justice of the Philippine Government.

Later, Sergeant Richard Sakakida, the former stay-behind

agent in the Philippines, would return to the islands to

serve as an important witness at upcoming war trials.

In early 1946, the US Army Western Pacific (WESPAC)

was established. In turn, the 1135th CIC Detachment was

activated in the Philippines to assume the mission of the

First CIC Region. A major focus of the 1135th remained the

various local political entities and their attempt to undermine the morale of American troops. On one occasion,

instigators encouraged US soldiers to stage a mass

demonstration in Manila demanding demobilization. The

1135th Detachment’s excellent coverage of evolving

political events quickly earned the nickname of the

“listening post of WESPAC.” The CIC in Philippines were

also drawn into monitoring the Philippine Army’s campaign against Hukbalahap guerrillas as well as various

Communist-front organizations. The effectiveness of the

1135th CIC Detachment was eventually undermined by its

dwindling size. By 1947, it had shrunk to only 10 officers,

2 warrant officers, and 15 enlisted—close to the CIC’s prewar strength on the islands.

Counter Intelligence Corps agents escort Filipino collaborators back to their home islands to stand trial. (NARA)

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Counterintelligence changes in the Philippines also

impacted CIC’s mission on the Ryukyus Islands, where a

field office of the 1135th CIC Detachment replaced the Fifth

CIC Region of the 441st CIC Detachment. Based on

Okinawa, the largest of the islands, the field office’s

mission differed from its parent unit. Rather than serve as

a news organization, it focused on traditional espionage,

sabotage, and security investigations related to the

military. Because of the language barrier, the field office

was especially dependent upon informants. The agents

also checked lists of passengers and crews of incoming

ships against names on prepared black lists. Troublesome

issues included the growing presence of Communist

agitators and the low morale of US servicemen, factors

that caused an increase in criminal acts against the local

population. By December 1947, the field office was

replaced by the 526th CIC Detachment consisting of only

four officers, four warrants, and nine enlisted men.

Korea

At the cessation of World War II, Korea was divided

into two occupational zones along the 38th parallel with the

United States in the south and the Soviets in the north.

With the end of Japanese rule, Korea was a political

vacuum, and the population lacked the experience

necessary to perform even basic governmental functions.

During their occupation, the Japanese had so controlled

the economy that someone observed, tongue-in-cheek,

that the Koreans didn’t possess the experience required to

run a locomotive. The XXIV Corps, part of the Tenth

Army, was given the occupational mission of disarming

Japanese troops left behind, repatriating Japanese

nationals, and maintaining law and order. The American

authorities, somewhat naively, believed they could fulfill

the goal of seeing the creation of an independent and

united Korea and then quickly depart.

Members of the 224th CIC Detachment first arrived at

Inchon on board the USS Chilton. Most were veterans of

the campaigns in the Philippines or Okinawa. The 224th

was given overall charge of coordinating CIC resources

in-country. The metropolitan and area units were situated

at Pusan, Seoul, Taejon, and Kunsa. Combat detachments were assigned separately to the three US infantry

divisions. But within the year, the Counter Intelligence

Corps in Korea would undergo a cosmetic change. The

100-person 971st CIC Detachment replaced the 224th CIC

Detachment and its subordinate elements.

Organizationally, the 971st divided itself into district

offices. The largest (20 CIC plus 11 Korean typists and

linguists) was located adjacent to the detachment’s

headquarters in Seoul. Other district elements were

situated in Pusan and Chonju. The 971st Detachment also

developed what it liked to call “travel agents,” highly

mobile trouble shooters who drew special assignments in

out-of-the-way areas. Although the 971st was not subordinated to the 441st CIC Detachment in Japan, an unofficial

link was forged. In fact, the 971st was required to transmit

all reports destined for the States through the 441st CIC

Detachment. Many of the personnel assigned to Korea

over the months came by way of the 441st, and individual

counterintelligence personnel were often transferred from

Korea to Japan.

The early CIC personnel were handicapped by the lack

of language skills and no orientation to Korean culture.

Second Lieutenant Gordon W. Avison, Jr.—a son of

missionary parents—and Technical Sergeant Donald P.

Whitaker were the exceptions. Fortunately, Whitaker

decided to stay on in a civilian capacity following his

initial tour of duty. In addition, there were 12 secondgeneration Korean agents, most of them from Hawaii. Lee

Yong Son known as “Wylie” was particularly notable

since he was related to the Korean royal family, giving him

access to the inner circles of the society. But for the most

part, the CIC continued to rely heavily upon native

interpreters and translators. Consequently a special team

was given the responsibility for the recruitment and

supervision of all Korean interpreters/translators. Unfortunately, many of the early recruits were discovered to be

motivated by money and deemed untrustworthy.

On paper, LTG John R. Hodge, Commanding General of

XXIV Corps, controlled both the United States Army

Military Government in Korea and the various tactical

elements. However, conflicting missions and poor

communications quickly created a serious divide between

the two. In some provinces, the rivalry among the

Americans became so intense that separate social and

even religious gatherings were held. Similarly, the CIC

“Timely information is just as

important in making sound decisions

during the occupational phase as it

was during combat. The

contributions of your organization

[971st CIC Detachment] to a proper

understanding of the political

situation, the suppression of

espionage, subversive activity, and

illegal organizations, have been

major factors in the establishment of

an orderly and peaceful

administration for South Korea.”

LTG John R. Hodge, Commander, US Army

Forces in Korea

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and the Military Government experienced their share of

tensions. Issues of contention included the Military

Government’s dislike of CIC’s investigating Koreans being

considered for leadership positions; on the other hand,

Army counterintelligence believed the government to be

ignoring serious security issues. Eventually, some of the

friction would dissipate when the CIC succeeded in

exposing the true intentions of various leftist political

organizations being engaged by the Military Government.

The political situation led to the creation of literally

hundreds of special interest parties. Lyuh Woon-hyung,

who had led a small underground resistance force against

the Japanese, became the head of the Labor Party. The

other major political entity was the Korean Provisional

Government, headed in exile by Syngman Rhee and Kim

Koo. The US Military Government adopted a position of

neutrality and took steps to give the Koreans more and

more say; in February 1946, an all-Korean advisory

counsel was established; and in October, a provincial

legislative body was formed. (The US still retained veto

power.)

Communist Spies

The US forces continually faced threats of espionage

and sabotage. Communist agents were trained in various

spy schools such as the one run in Tunghua, Manchuria,

which produced hundreds of graduates. Information was

easy to come by even for the most inexperienced spy. The

Korean Constabulary and Coast Guard were both heavily

infiltrated, and even the Korean National Police during its

early days had its share of Communist agents. The US

installations regularly hired locals to perform such duties

as laundry help, kitchen workers, translators, and

houseboys. A typical case involved Shizui Kato, an

attractive Japanese housemaid in the home of a South

Korean government official, who regularly met her contact

in Seoul’s Pagoda Park, where she passed on the latest

news about American intelligence agencies.

Most foreign agents didn’t even try to penetrate the

Military Government but simply wandered the country

keeping their eyes and ears open, primarily for order-ofbattle information. From their consulate in Seoul, the

Soviets maintained communications with their agents

using the Russian Orthodox Church in Seoul and South

Korean companies that did business with the North. For

the most part, the spies proved to be inexperienced with

no advance training, which fortunately marginalized their

ability to transmit back completely accurate reports.

To help address the espionage problem, the CIC sent

screeners to each of the refugee centers along the border,

but agents’ lack of language skills once again undermined

the effectiveness of the effort. To rectify the situation, the

CIC employed members of the North West Young Men’s

Association, a group of Koreans who had suffered loss of

land and livelihood at the hands of the Communists in the

North. They served to spot and report on strangers. The

problem was that many of these individuals were motivated by a get-even mentality. Over time the Counter

Intelligence Corps forged an important relationship with

the Korean National Police, who had been given increased

autonomy by the Military Government. Although the

effectiveness of these efforts varied greatly from district

to district, the corps still managed to apprehend 150

suspected enemy agents in 1947.

Counter Intelligence Corps agents were also concerned

with acts of sabotage. From the Soviet zone, it was easy to

smuggle explosives south. The US Military Government’s

failure to take strong measures to control the borders

became still another issue of contention between it and

the CIC. The major targets included communications

(power, telephone, and telegraph lines) and transportation

links (bridges and railroads), but frequently locals in need

of wood or wire were the actual culprits. The CIC estimated that only 20 percent of industrial disasters were

due to sabotage.

The State of Politics

As in Japan, the CIC directed a disproportionate

amount of its time to monitoring and reporting on political

activities. In 1946, the Counter Intelligence Corps made an

important discovery—the existence of a Communist

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North Korean spies often posed as businessmen. (INSCOM)

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Master Plan, calling for the ultimate domination of the

entire Korean Peninsula. In a separate incident, an agent

from the CIC District Office in Pusan rushed to the

hospital to interview a suspect fatally wounded during the

shooting of a police detective; the dying man revealed

that he was a Communist and had murdered the officer to

obtain his weapon. He also disclosed that his orders had

come from Chan Sei Moo, a leader of one of the largest of

the South Korean underground groups—The People’s

Liberation Army (PLA). The arrest and follow-up interrogation of Chan revealed documents in his possession that

for the first time disclosed the size and true intentions of

the People’s Liberation Army, which at the time served

primarily as an intelligence gathering network. From these

papers, CIC agents discovered that they and their Korean

staff were listed among the PLA’s top targets.

In 1946, a series of major labor strikes turned violent.

At first the CIC believed them to be economic in nature,

but obtained documents revealed the attacks to have been

planned by leftists in the hope the protests would lead to

general disorder, which could be exploited for political

gain. Anticipating more trouble on the first anniversary of

the October riots, the Counter Intelligence Corps raided

the headquarters of the South Korean Labor Party and

arrested a number of its leadership.

One of the turning points in the contest for the hearts

and minds of the people came when the police and the CIC

broke the Chung Pan Sa counterfeit case. To fill party

coffers, the Communists resorted to counterfeiting Bank

of Chosen notes. When this activity was brought to

public light, the party immediately suffered a loss of

confidence from many sympathetic supporters as well as

the trust of the Military Government. For the CIC, cutting

off the money supply meant denying the party funds for

espionage, subversion, and propaganda. In a related

case, CIC agents exposed the purposes of some South

Korean companies doing business with the North.

Through the use of undercover informants, counterintelligence learned that companies were trafficking in information, goods, and capital for the South Korea Labor Party.

The $1.18, which Army counterintelligence had paid for

each report, proved well worth the money.

A Coming War

The CIC in Korea also dabbled in the area of human

intelligence when in January 1947, 1LT Wallace K. Wittwer,

a recent graduate of West Point, was placed in charge of

the newly created Information Section at the 971st CIC

Detachment. Under-resourced, the intelligence effort

focused on supervising a number of operatives running

order-of-battle type missions into the north; it also

conducted liaison with several right-wing political

organizations (for example, the North West Young Men’s

Association) that had created their own network of spies.

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Armband of the Great Korea Labor Alliance, just one of the many political parties in occupied Korea monitored by the CIC.

(INSCOM)

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In an operation expected to fool no one, eight undercover

CIC agents posed as drivers for the American delegation

traveling to a US-USSR Commission held in Pyongyang,

where they gained a first-hand look at conditions within

the northern capital.

The best form of human intelligence came from

refugees, many of whom could be talked into returning.

They were planted in the North Korean Army where they

would furnish US intelligence with indicators and an order

of battle. Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall of the CIC

reported that these sources were telling that war was

certain and imminent; a belief widely shared by other

intelligence officers.

By 1947, United States authorities were looking to the

United Nations to act upon the Korean question. Failing

to obtain the cooperation of the Soviets, the UN Temporary Commission on Korea proceeded to hold an election

in the South. The results led to the convening of a

National Assembly; adopting a constitution; and in

August 1948, electing Syngman Rhee to the presidency.

Several months later, the CIC turned over its functions and

files to the Korean Research Bureau that it had organized

and trained, drawing upon recruits from the National

Police and Korean civilians already in the corps’ employment. Pressure from South Korean Nationalists, costsaving actions by bureaucrats in Washington, DC, and

declining morale of US forces in country, led to the

departure of the last American combat units in June 1949.

Within a year, almost to the day, American troops would

return as part of an international force to preserve the

independence of South Korea.

Counterintelligence—A Force

The post-war period marked the beginning of what

might be called the “golden era” of Army counterintelligence. For the next 25 years, the mission remained a

highly visible fixture in the US Army. It all began when the

Army acknowledged that the discontinuance of the

Counter Intelligence Corps in 1944 had been a mistake and

took the corrective steps to reconstitute the organization

and its center and school at Fort Holabird, Maryland. At

the same time, a board was developed to test new technology to be used by agents in the field; a centralized case

file was also established which would eventually benefit

counterintelligence worldwide. More than reversing a bad

decision, the resurrection of CIC was recognition that for

the first time in the Army’s long history a viable counterintelligence apparatus belonged in peacetime.

This is not to say that everything went smoothly for

the CIC in its new overseas role; critics were not hard to

find, especially during the early occupation period. One

inspection team’s report cited the CIC Region IV (Munich)

as being “bewildered, inept and chaotic.” The CIC also

failed to meet all of its goals in obtaining qualified

individuals who possessed the necessary language skills.

It was equally difficult to replace tested veterans with new

agents on their first overseas assignment and not suffer

loss of operational efficiency.

The unlimited power of search and arrest also was

cause for occasional abuse. In their book America’s

Secret Army, the authors described the life styles of some

of the agents who adopted an independent attitude of

being “masters” and “conquerors.” Most allegations

leveled against the CIC proved the exception not the rule

and were often exaggerated or out-and-out falsified. For

instance, one newspaper charged the CIC in Japan of

holding hundreds of citizens in secret captivity.

Although suffering from many of the same personnel

shortages of the larger Army, the CIC still managed to field

a highly motivated and professional force which accomplished a number of significant achievements. The CIC

ensured that militarists and ultranationalists did not retain

positions of power and authority in post-war Germany and

Japan. Army counterintelligence helped to apprehend and

bring to justice various war criminals, especially in

Germany and Austria. The denazification program in

Germany was viewed as a great success and significantly

contributed to the cultivation of democratic institutions.

In Japan, the CIC served as the “eyes and ears” of the

occupation power to ensure the success of reforms.

When the United States opened its doors to displaced

persons in 1948, the CIC assumed the responsibility for

their screening. Finally, the CIC monitored the activities of

the emerging Cold War threat—communism—and

exposed its long-range plans of aggression in Korea and

Western Europe. In a nutshell, Army counterintelligence

made a significant and lasting contribution to the security

of the United States and its Army at a critical time in their

history.

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109

Lowering the colors at the Retreat ceremony at Furlow Field, Fort Holabird, MD.

33290_P001_176.pmd 117 11/9/2005, 10:39 AM
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33290_P001_176.pmd 118 11/9/2005, 10:39 AM
THE KOREAN WAR

The sudden outbreak of the Korean War on 26 June

1950 came as a shock to US leaders. Since the onset of

the Cold War, the Nation’s intelligence assets had been

targeted almost exclusively against the Soviet Union. In

addition, intelligence responsibilities in the Far East were

badly fragmented. General of the Army Douglas

MacArthur’s Far East Command (FECOM), the major

theater headquarters in the area, no longer had any

jurisdiction over the Korean peninsula. Major General

Charles Willoughby, MacArthur’s G2, did maintain a

residual intelligence organization in Korea, the Korean

CHAPTER FOUR

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE

COLD WAR

Liaison Office (KLO), but the reports generated by this

small office received little attention back in Tokyo.

 With the start of war, the first intelligence assets

brought to bear were those controlled by FECOM. On

paper, these were substantial. General Willoughby had

over 2,500 intelligence personnel at his disposal. However, these elements were organized to support an army of

occupation, not a fighting command. The largest single

intelligence component within FECOM was the 441st

Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, targeted against

Japanese subversive elements and reporting to

MacArthur in his capacity as Supreme Commander Allied

Powers, not as head of FECOM. The four Army divisions

A team of the 441st CIC Detachment—the first to enter the Korean Conflict—was attached to the 24th Infantry Division. Linguists

are in the front row. (INSCOM)

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in Japan were without organic CIC detachments of their

own. A large Military Intelligence Service Company of

Japanese interpreters supported the 441st CIC Detachment,

but only two Korean linguists were at its disposal.

The deficiencies in the Nation’s military intelligence

capabilities were thrown into stark relief when the US

committed combat forces to Korea. Although the Occupation of South Korea had terminated only a year before, the

US troops that deployed found themselves fighting in

what for all practical purposes was a terra incognita. Not

only did they lack the linguistic capabilities to exploit their

enemies or even communicate with their allies, but they

were dependent on out-dated, Japanese maps. A major

security threat to US forces manifested itself in the

counterintelligence arena. The endless columns of

refugees that poured through the lines were laced with

infiltrating enemy soldiers and intelligence agents.

Nevertheless, despite the multiple handicaps under which

it was forced to labor, the Eighth Army in Korea was able

to cobble together enough of an intelligence structure to

cope with the immediate threat. The Korean Liaison Office

already in place on the peninsula was quickly augmented.

The 441st CIC Detachment provided the personnel and

equipment to constitute the 308th CIC Detachment in

support of the Eighth Army. The 308th was followed by

other CIC detachments attached to each of the American

divisions. By September, the 441st had transferred almost

240 CIC personnel and five detachments from Japan to

Korea. At the same time, General Willoughby ordered that

copies of all intelligence and progress reports continue to

be submitted to the 441st as the parent organization.

Although many of the initial CIC personnel were

combat veterans, few had seen action in a counterintelligence capacity. The shortage of experienced personnel

led the 441st to create a course back in Japan for deploying

officers and agents. Another problem for the CIC

throughout the war was the lack of qualified linguists.

General MacArthur watches as his daring plan to reverse the course of the war unfolds at Inchon. In Japan the CIC helped to keep

the plan from falling into enemy hands. (NARA)

“How can I fight worth a damn

without counterintelligence people

around me?”

COL John H. “Mike” Michaelis, Commander,

27th Infantry (Wolfhounds)

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The Army Language School in CONUS would take nearly

a year before it was able to train the first 100 Korean

linguists. This meant that almost all counterintelligence

and human intelligence operations had to be conducted

through interpreters of varying abilities. But few records

were available to verify information provided by Korean

Nationals being employed by US forces.

 The Army’s largest and most visible intelligence effort

in the early stages of the Korean War came in the field of

human intelligence (HUMINT). An organization was

quickly built around the nucleus of the KLO, using

personnel from the 441st CIC Detachment. To carry out its

mission, the KLO hastily recruited Korean peasants, gave

them a sketchy training, and airdropped them behind

enemy lines with instructions to return with intelligence

reports. In addition, it set up Tactical Liaison Offices

(TLO) at division level to recruit Koreans as line-crossers

to gather low-level HUMINT. One officer called the TLOs

nothing more than simply “glorified reconnaissance

units.” Korean casualties were high, and the quality of

intelligence they produced unsatisfactory. Historian

S.L.A. Marshal observed grimly, “Only the loss rate [of

agents] fulfilled expectations.” Regardless of the shortcomings, the jerry-rigged intelligence system and its mixed

bag of assets were sufficient to save the Eighth Army from

defeat during its darkest days as it manned the defenses

of the Pusan Perimeter.

During this period, the 308th conducted prisoner-of-war

interrogations, created project and target files, and

integrated various reports—a pattern of operations that

would be repeated throughout the campaign. From the

headquarters office at Pusan, the CIC’s biggest job was to

monitor dock activities and provide indoctrination lectures

to incoming troops on security measures and the need to

safeguard military information. For the first year of the

war, troops would continue to arrive at Pusan and be

trucked up the peninsula.

 Army counterintelligence served as a shield for the

masterful landing of US forces under General MacArthur

at Inchon on 15 September that would dramatically change

the early course of the war. Preparations for such a

 Intelligence agent interrogates a wounded prisoner. (NARA)

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massive assault were too big to be hidden, and the

staging areas in Japan were under observation by hostile

eyes. In Japan, much of the sizeable Korean community

favored the Kim Il Sung regime. As a result, the base

areas for American forces swarmed with enemy agents

whose activities the 441st CIC Detachment was hard-put to

completely extinguish. Enemy espionage operations were

financed through the sale of narcotics on the black market.

The 441st CIC Detachment scooped up interlocking rings

of agents, arresting 200 individuals, among them the head

of the main spy ring less than a week before the landings.

The capture of Seoul following Inchon was also a counterintelligence success because the files created by the 308th

greatly aided the various combat counterintelligence

detachments in reducing potential targets.

After the breakout from Pusan in late September, the

various Counter Intelligence Corps elements faced a

growing problem of refugee control. To accomplish its

mission, the 308th CIC Detachment acknowledged the need

for closer liaison with the Korean National Police and the

Republic of Korea’s own counterintelligence organization.

Previous lack of cooperation lay at the feet of the CIC

agents who had frequently treated their counterparts with

lack of deference, naturally leading to resentments.

The 24th CIC Detachment alone processed 18,000

civilian refugees over a 2-month period. The 181st CIC

Detachment in support of the Marines uncovered a small

spy ring when a search of refugees revealed a handful of

individuals carrying copper spoons, all broken in the same

place as a sign of identification. Other means of identification included a pattern of buttons sewn on a specific

area of clothing. Sometimes women spies purposely used

markings on their inner thighs knowing any search would

create an embarrassing situation.

North Korean troops—cut off and behind the lines—

joined existing guerrilla groups or formed their own in the

Chiri-San hills. The guerrilla bands in south-central Korea

dated back to the Japanese occupation during World War

II. The responsibility for keeping tabs on these 30,000

armed men fell upon the 704th CIC Detachment. Evidence

emerged that some bands had created an escape route

from the prison on Koje-do Island and were conducting

espionage on behalf of North Korea. To monitor the

activities of the guerrillas, the 704th set up an informant net

consisting of 20 to 30 locals.

Human Intelligence

From the beginning, the CIC had involved itself in the

business of collecting order-of-battle information and

conducting reconnaissance missions. But the Inchon

landing had put the enemy on the defensive and placed an

even greater priority on gathering intelligence for immediate tactical use. Maintaining pace with the advancing UN

force severely tested the intelligence organization and its

effectiveness. As Allied elements moved forward,

committees were formed in most villages to take over

local governmental functions. At the same time, North

Korean forces continued to roam within the rear areas.

The I Corps deployed two-man counterintelligence teams

in jeeps to make contact with the new committees, report

by radio on the local situation, accept the surrender of

North Koreans, and pick up enemy agents.

By November, all signs indicated that the North

Korean Army was in a state of collapse. Documents

collected by the 308th in Seoul served as the foundation

for plans to capture and liberate the northern capital of

Pyongyang. Intelligence work was becoming the task of

performing an autopsy on an expired enemy. A multi-unit

party of CIC agents accompanied by a strong military

escort—Task Force INDIANHEAD—scoured the

wreckage of Pyongyang for documents of intelligence

interest as soon as the North Korean capital had been

liberated. The counterintelligence contingent consisted

of 22 soldiers, mostly contributed by the 308th and the 2d

Master Sergeant John R. Wilson was

among the CIC cadre deployed in the early

days of the war. A veteran of World War II in

the Pacific, Wilson had risen to the rank of

major, but following the Army’s downsizing, had

enlisted with the CIC. When alerted early in the

morning of 13 October that the enemy was

moving to capture the small town of Pangso-ri,

MSG John R. Wilson quickly assembled his

contingent of 30 Korean police and interpreters

and organized them into teams surrounding the

town. Taking with him four Koreans, Wilson,

who was an imposing figure at six feet, six

inches, proceeded to dislodge the enemy who

had made a stand in one of the houses.

Although Wilson himself was killed by sniper

fire, his actions facilitated the capture of 21 of

the enemy. For his gallantry under fire, Wilson

was posthumously awarded the Silver Star and

was further honored by having a building at the

CIC School named after him.

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CIC Detachments. The capture of several thousand

Korean and Russian documents caused Army leaders to

label the operation a great success.

With eyes wide shut, the United Nations Command

drove on towards the Yalu River until it was strategically

surprised by a major Chinese Communist intervention and

then thrown backward in defeat. Soon, the second stage

of the war set in, witnessing both armies locked in battle

on a fighting line that swayed back and forth in the

vicinity of the 38th Parallel. Attacks and counterattacks

mounted by both sides in this constricted zone of ground

combat achieved local success, but failed to fundamentally alter the strategic balance. The last days of December 1950 proved to be a milestone both for the Eighth

Army and for military intelligence. They would no longer

have to play a guessing game about the long-range

intentions of the enemy.

Ground patrols could only reveal what was going on near

the front lines, and technical collection systems had

limitations. To meet its intelligence requirements, the UN

Command relied on an expanded program of clandestine

HUMINT. The Army, the CIA, and ROK forces were all

players in this arena. On 20 December, the Army activated

the 442d

 CIC Detachment to take over operational control

of the KLO central office and the division level TLOs.

Between January 1951 and the first armistice negotiations

in June, the unit achieved significant accomplishments in

the areas of agent insertion, communications, and training.

Besides catching spies such as these, the CIC became heavily involved in boating espionage agents of their own behind enemy lines.

(INSCOM)

Just prior to the Hungnan evacuation, the division commander called his intelligence staff together

and expressed dissatisfaction on its intelligence gathering efforts and ordered that the human intelligence

mission be turned over to his CIC detachment, expressing his belief that they would be best qualified to

run it. The CIC proceeded to assemble a team of 31 Koreans (12 military and 19 civilians) to support

the mission. A number of them had previous counterintelligence experience and all were extremely

capable individuals. Although starting from scratch, the team was able to gather intelligence on enemy

troop concentrations, supply points, defensive positions, and unit designations all of which proved “almost

100 percent correct” during an upcoming offensive.

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Until early 1951, agents had been inserted by line

crossing and by parachute drop. At the TLO level,

hundreds of Korean peasants were sent to gather limited

information about enemy dispositions in front of the UN

lines. The KLO had its own line crossers; it also

paradropped smaller numbers of Korean agents on longrange collection missions, using Air Force AVIARY C-47s

controlled by Eighth Army’s Special Activities Mission.

Unfortunately, both techniques resulted in a heavy

attrition of agents. During night drops, parachuted agents

were routinely deposited miles from their intended

objectives by untrained aircrews.

To remedy this situation, the 442d

 began to supplement

its ground and parachute insertion methods by using

boats to land agents behind enemy lines, a course first

suggested in the summer of 1950. The TLO teams of the

3d and 25th Infantry Divisions began transporting agents

by small boat around the enemy’s flank on the west coast

of Korea. At the same time, the 442d CIC Detachment’s

headquarters element implemented a much larger program

of amphibious espionage that was assigned the codename

SALAMANDER. This involved the use of Koreanmanned fishing boats to insert long-range agents deep

within enemy territory. The native fishing boats proved

small and unseaworthy for the task, but the 442d

 quickly

took steps to substitute fast American craft.

The 442d CIC Detachment initially conducted SALAMANDER operations from the numerous islands off the

Korean west coast that were located to the rear of the

enemy’s lines. (The CIA made its own agent insertions

from the east coast.) These islands were rendered more or

less secure from hostile attack by the UN naval blockade,

and many of them were already in the hands of antiCommunist North Korean partisans. There was also a

counterintelligence side to the use of the islands. For

example, the 201st CIC Detachment dispatched two

individuals to Kangwah-do, an island north of Inchon.

Here, they established liaison with local guerrilla forces to

cut down on the black market that allowed goods to flow

north to the enemy and to arrest North Korean agents

making their way south.

Over the course of the war, human intelligence improved its agent communications. During the first year,

radios had been unavailable, and “agent-handlers” were

forced to wait for their sources to return to base before

information could be obtained. The situation gradually

improved in 1951. Radio teams equipped with SCR-300

“walkie-talkies” were provided for both AVIARY and

Counterintelligence created files on captured enemy agents. (NARA)

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SALAMANDER operations. The use of voice radio

allowed agents to furnish Army intelligence with information on a real-time basis. This, however, was not a

panacea. Voice radio had its limitations; its short range

meant relays had to be used or aircraft had to hover in the

immediate area of the agent radio teams, risking compromise of the mission. An additional complication was that

some of the Air Force crews who provided communications support to AVIARY operations lacked sufficient

experience. This resulted in the loss of many agent radio

teams.

In March 1951, the 442d set up a school at Pusan that

was capable of providing 20 HUMINT agents at a time

with a basic 2-week course of instruction. (The facility

moved to Taegu in June.) After completing training, the

new agents went to the TLO teams and the 442d

 CIC

Detachment’s central office. Not surprisingly, the new

breed of agents was rated as “far superior” to their

predecessors. For one thing, it was noted that the new

agents “appear to be enthusiastic” and “have a basic idea

of the mission.” Better training, however, seems to have

been partially offset by increased enemy security measures. Line crossing continued to be a hazardous

operation, although a surprisingly large number of

collectors still managed to make it back to UN lines. At

any rate, the new recruitment and training program made it

easier to obtain replacements.

Refugees complicated the search for infiltrating spies. (NARA)

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The Final Phase

The coming of peace negotiations by the summer of

1951 soon left the fighting in a stalemated situation not

unlike World War I; units began to settle into their respective area of operations for the long haul, and counterintelligence returned to more traditional duties. The various CIC

detachments undertook the evacuation of refugees from

their areas by establishing a mobile checkpoint unit.

During a 1-month period, the 14 agents of the 3d CIC

Detachment screened more than 2,000 indigenous personnel and conducted some 900 interrogations. As units

began to regularly rotate from rear to line duty, the CIC

assumed responsibility for force protection, such as

conducting background investigations on indigenous

hires.

Although peace negotiations proved inconclusive,

major fighting sputtered to a halt in November when both

parties agreed on a tentative military demarcation line

separating North and South Korea. That same month the

Army reorganized its clandestine HUMINT organization.

All CIC personnel gradually returned to their normal duty

assignments, and the 442d

 CIC Detachment ceased to exist.

The former KLO/TLO organization, now known as the Far

East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea, had become a

miniature Army version of the World War II Office of

Strategic Services, with responsibilities both for intelligence gathering and special operations.

The North Koreans infiltrated agents into the UN

prisoner-of-war camps to organize and mobilize the

inmates against their captors. The camps were vulnerable

to this type of approach, especially since no one had

anticipated it. Prisoners of war might try to escape, but

they were not supposed to behave like industrial workers

on strike or participants at a political rally. Korea, however, was a new kind of war in which the enemy was

prepared to disregard all conventions and subordinate all

aspects to the political. Moreover, the camps had been

allowed to slip from under Eighth Army’s effective control.

High-ranking North Korean political operatives donned

the uniform of common soldiers and then deliberately

allowed themselves to be captured for the purpose of

taking control of the camps. They proceeded to propagandize, organize, and arm the inmates with crude weapons. Anyone in disagreement with these plans quickly

found his life in peril. The goal of the operation was to

undermine any attempts by the UN to identify prisoners

who did not want to be repatriated and to create as much

of a disturbance as possible. The situation came to a head

in May 1952 when POWs on the island of Koje-do off the

South Korean coast managed to kidnap the brigadier

general who served as their camp commandant. In

response, UN forces used tanks and paratroops to take

back the compound. Once more a prison camp, and not a

During Operation BIG SWITCH, the CIC played an important role in debriefing repatriated prisoners. (NARA)

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peoples’ revolutionary collective, CIC personnel could

proceed with screening prisoners for repatriation.

As truce talks limped along, the CIC assumed the lead

in debriefing US and Republic of Korea prisoners being

returned. The first effort, known as LITTLE SWITCH,

involved the exchange of many of those who were

wounded or ill; the larger and more significant effort, BIG

SWITCH, occurred in July 1953. The United States

prisoners of war were processed at Inchon; Republic of

Korea personnel at Yoncho-do; and all sick and wounded

at Seoul. The 704th CIC Detachment was responsible for

making the security arrangements at the processing

centers and points of embarkation. The extensive security

measures surrounding the repatriation effort reflected a

real apprehension on the part of the American leadership.

What would be the state of mind of many of the internees

who had been subjected to Soviet indoctrination?

ADVENT OF HUMAN

INTELLIGENCE

The Korean War was the proverbial pebble tossed into

the pond of military intelligence; it created a series of

ripples that resulted in significant changes for years to

come. Following his tenure as Commander of the United

Nations Forces in Korea, General Matthew Ridgway

recommended that the Army organize its own institutionalized human intelligence collection element. Such a force

would help meet the Army’s intelligence needs in both

peacetime and conflict while preventing any future

diversion of Counter Intelligence Corps assets from their

assigned mission. General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of

Staff, US Army, quickly signed off on Ridgeway’s recommendations. In November 1953, the Army issued a

regulation that set the standards for procurement of

personnel to carry out the new discipline of HUMINT

(human intelligence) under the euphemisms of “Field

Operations Intelligence (FOI)” or “Area Intelligence.”

In April 1954, Field Operations Intelligence was added

to the curriculum at Fort Holabird, and for the first time,

collection personnel began training side by side with

counterintelligence agents. At the start, counterintelligence and human intelligence regarded each other as

rivals, and an unhealthy rivalry to boot. According to one

report, “there is too much bickering and snideness at the

Center regarding these two fields.” Some intelligence

officers on the Army Staff and in Europe considered the

new field operations intelligence personnel better qualified

than CIC agents to handle especially sensitive counteresThe symbol of CIC—the sphinx—took the form of a statue which rested in front of HQ CIC at Fort Holabird. (INSCOM)

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pionage operations. On the other hand, many in Army

counterintelligence believed just the opposite. When

given a choice to become FOI agents, veteran CIC

personnel tended to look upon such a proposal as a step

down professionally and, most often, chose to remain

with the corps. To a man, CIC members were adamantly

opposed to the transfer of any counterintelligence

functions to the new HUMINT discipline.

In August 1954, the Chief, CIC gained still more

responsibilities when he assumed command of the

records facility at Holabird, which contained the Army’s

counterintelligence files worldwide. At this point, the

Counter Intelligence Corps Center was redesignated the

Army Intelligence Center, and the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, assumed an added title as the center’s

commanding general. In practice, the concept of an allencompassing army intelligence center was never quite

realized. The US Army Intelligence Center assumed only

the training responsibilities but not the central administration of intelligence specialists. Thus the benefits enjoyed

by CIC personnel were not extended to all members of

military intelligence.

Seven months later, in March 1955, the Army transferred responsibility for training in combat intelligence

from the Army General School at Fort Riley to the CIC

School at Fort Holabird. The merger of the schools would

also result in a new name—the US Army Intelligence

School. The arrangement centralized almost all intelligence training at one post. Only the Army’s Strategic

Intelligence School in Washington, DC, for military

attachés, and the Army Security Agency facility at Fort

Devens, Massachusetts, for signals intelligence specialists, remained separate.

The year 1955 also witnessed the inception of an

intelligence civilian career program within the Army. This

step, first advocated by the second Hoover Commission

on government reform, would augment nontactical military

intelligence units with trained civilian specialists to

provide continuity to operations. Three hundred such

positions were authorized originally. Actual implementation began in 1957, overseen by an Administrative Survey

Detachment organized within the Army Intelligence

Center. The Army soon began to have second thoughts

about the program. Civilians were limited to working 40-

Drama made training more realistic at the CIC School. (INSCOM)

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hour weeks and were not subject to courts-martial. These

and other factors caused the Army leaders to restrict the

number of employees.

Until the late 1950s, Army tactical elements received

their intelligence support from small military intelligence

units put together on the cellular principle. Combat

intelligence elements were organically separate from their

counterintelligence counterparts, and the local G2s had

the responsibility of coordinating all of these disparate

assets. In 1957, the Army introduced a new category of

intelligence unit organized under a concept plan entitled

the “Military Intelligence Organization.” Interrogators,

photo interpreters, order of battle specialists, and combat

counterintelligence personnel would, for the first time, be

integrated into a single unit. Under this concept, a

Military Intelligence Battalion supported a field army and

its organic MI detachments were attached to corps and

division. The creation of the Military Intelligence Organization represented the first step in bringing about

multidiscipline support to the field, but actual implementation would be limited.

The 902d CIC Group

Since World War II, the Counter Intelligence Corps had

run a small cover program for administration of special

projects and confidential funds out of the Office of the

Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, but the duties were

“Place of meeting: the entry of the

restaurant “Tally-Ho” at the corner

of Kensington Parkway and

Frederick Av. (Trade Center). Time:

19.30, first Sunday after the putting

down a signal, reserve meetings two

following Sundays. You have the

magazine ‘Times’ in your hand. You

shall be approached by a man who

will ask you: ‘Don’t you know where

is a French restaurant

‘Mediterranee?’ You shall reply

him: ‘I have known such a

restaurant, but in Paris.’ After that

you show each other your pendants

with keys.”

Instructions given to an Army spy by Nikolai

Popov, a First Secretary at the Soviet

Embassy in Washington, DC

The CIC goes airborne; however, jeeps, safes, typewriters, chairs, etc. were anything but mobile. (NARA)

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often carried out by untrained individuals. For example,

two CIC sergeants were given cover status as heavy

equipment operators and sent on a mission to Turkey.

Before they departed they took a test to become warrant

officers. Unbeknownst to them, while in transit, they were

selected and their names published in the Army Times.

When the undercover agents did finally arrive at their

destination, a tongue-in-cheek committee was waiting to

congratulate the would-be truck drivers who had suddenly become warrant officers.

As a solution, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) activated the 902d

 CIC Detachment at Fort

Holabird, Maryland on 8 January 1952. (To insiders, the

unit became affectionately known as “The Deuce.”) The

902d

 assumed the mission of handling administrative

support for the growing number of special operations

being conducted throughout the world. In 1957, the 902d

passed the management of cover programs on to the

newly organized US Army Administrative Survey Detachment, so as to focus on running the Army’s most sensitive

operations.

Personnel of the 902d

 deployed on a one-time basis to

provide auxiliary technical and linguistic assistance to

counterintelligence units at home and overseas. For

example, in response to a Congressional probe run by

then Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, the Army dispatched a

small undercover detachment from the 902d

 to determine

the cause of botched construction of Air Force bases in

French Morocco. Poor engineering was found not to be

the ultimate cause. Rather, the chief of the engineering

firm who had been hired to plan the bases turned out to be

a Communist and had actually designed the underground

storage tanks and fuel lines so they would rupture under

stress.

The 902d

’s movement from Fort Holabird to Tempo A,

just outside the gates of Fort McNair in Washington, DC,

reflected the unit’s close ties to Headquarters, Department

of Army. The 902d

 CIC Detachment also assumed the

mission of the inactivated 118th CIC Detachment, which

provided counterintelligence support for the Secretary of

Defense, the Secretary of Army, and their staffs at the

Pentagon. In its place, the 902d

 established Sub-Detachment A, better known by its informal title of the “Pentagon

Counter Intelligence Force.” The emergence of the 902d

 as

a key player in Army counterintelligence caused a change

in its status from detachment to group in 1957. Another

outgrowth of the Korean War had been the emergence for

the first time of group- and battalion-size military intelligence units. Authorized strength for the 902d remained the

same at just over 200.

The Internal Soviet Threat

No sooner had much of the World War II economy

been dismantled than the Iron Curtain went up in Eastern

Europe, leaving millions trapped behind it. Countries,

such as Greece, were under the threat of going Communist, and an airlift was required to break the Soviet

blockade of Berlin in 1948. The fall of China to Mao Tsetung’s Communists in 1949 brought home to the American

public the realization that the struggle against communism

would be global in nature. And in 1950, the Cold War

turned hot when North Korea unexpectedly invaded the

South, leading to the deployment of US tactical forces. It

was natural that these headlines would impact the

American psyche.

But the so-called Red Scare that swept America was

more than just a mere reaction to fabricated conspiracies.

A number of events transpired to lend credibility to those

who believed that the United States faced an internal

threat. There were the initial revelations that Soviet spies

had stolen US atomic secrets. Detailed testimonies of

former Communists, such as Elizabeth Bentley and

Whittaker Chambers, told of Soviet espionage at the

highest levels of government, and several foreign policy

missteps by the Truman Administration in its dealings

with the Soviet Union seemed only to confirm that proCommunist forces were at work. Unfortunately, instead of

cooperating to identify and counter real national security

threats, the Truman Administration and its critics politicized the debate.

A final judgment on the internal Soviet

threat had to wait until after the end of the Cold

War and the public release of the so-called

VENONA Project. In 1943, Army cryptologists

began to attack Soviet diplomatic messages that

contained information on espionage matters.

Once decoded, the messages revealed that the

British scientist Klaus Fuchs had conveyed

atomic secrets to the Soviets. Under arrest,

Fuchs confessed to British authorities that he had

an American accomplice named “Raymond.”

Only then was the FBI in a position to undertake

the complicated investigations that led first to

Harry Gold, then to David Greenglass, and finally

to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. For 37 years, a

small element of the Army (later the National

Security Agency) and the FBI labored over the

Soviet traffic that eventually yielded 200 names

of spies and sources. Unfortunately, because all

used cover names, it was virtually impossible to

discover their true identity until after the fact.

VENONA was the perfect illustration of

counterintelligence’s dependence on a synergistic

relationship with other intelligence disciplines.

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Regardless, by 1950 the government had taken several

actions to reduce the threat from dedicated Communists

and other extremists. The first was the enforcement of the

1940 Smith Act, which prohibited “teaching and advocating the violent overthrow of the government.” The

second was the efforts of the House Un-American

Activities Committee to expose Communist-sponsored

organizations and to bring to justice Alger Hiss, a highly

placed Soviet agent within the State Department.

As one of the Nation’s agencies responsible for

security, the Counter Intelligence Corps was a minor

player in these events although it did help to enforce the

Smith Act, which required all government employees to

submit to a loyalty oath. However, in December 1953, the

CIC moved to center stage when Senator Joseph R.

McCarthy began to hold hearings intended to spotlight

security problems at the Signal Corps’ Engineering

Laboratories at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; more

specifically, the senator accused the Army of granting

clearances to known Communists. In a number of

instances CIC investigations had noted potential security

risks, but for a variety of reasons, local authorities had

chosen to ignore them. The whole matter quickly turned

into a circus when the Army brought counter-charges that

McCarthy had sought preferential treatment from the draft

for one of his aides. McCarthy responded with allegations of his own that the Army was pressuring him to call

off his investigation of Fort Monmouth. A former CIC

agent later told of being tasked by Army authorities to

shadow McCarthy’s staff to provide advance warning of

what direction the Senator’s investigation would take.

The whole episode culminated in televised hearings which

revealed to the public McCarthy’s heavy-handed methods, undercut his popularity and ultimately led to his

being censored by his fellow senators; thus bringing to an

end America’s preoccupation with the Red Scare.

Overseas

The 1950s witnessed the completion of the European

buildup, the drawdown of forces in Korea, the withdrawal

of all occupational forces from Austria, and a peace treaty

with Japan. The end result was a force structure that left

the Army with five divisions in Europe and two in Korea;

these were under the respective commands of the Seventh

and Eighth Armies. Even if the positioning of troops on

the ground remained relatively static, theater command

Agents of the CIC record evidence—messages stuffed in a pack of cigarettes. (NARA)

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relationships did not. This meant the tailoring of intelligence organizations to the specific theater and the threat

at hand.

In December 1950, President Harry S. Truman appointed General Dwight D. Eisenhower to serve as

commander of the newly established supreme headquarters for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Based on his experience in World War II, Eisenhower

immediately requested added counterintelligence support

for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe

(SHAPE) and the Allied Command Europe (ACE). In

Counterintelligence kept up with the times and became increasingly mobile in monitoring the movements of suspects. (AHEC)

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response, the Army activated the 450th CIC Detachment on

18 January 1951 under the title “ACE Counterintelligence

Activity.” Within the month, a cadre of 13 soldiers was on

its way to Paris. Its first task involved conducting

security surveys of General Eisenhower’s private quarters

at the Trianon Palace Hotel in Versailles and of the SHAPE

Planning Group Headquarters in the Hotel Astoria. The

450th CIC Detachment itself would eventually settle into a

small villa near Versailles, not far from the SHAPE’s new

location in Rocquencourt, a western suburb of Paris.

Besides protecting ACE forces, language-fluent members

of the 450th performed liaison with national-level civil and

military agencies in NATO-member countries. In Naples,

Italy, the 450th CIC Detachment created the first of nine

regional offices that eventually stretched 3,600 miles from

Norway to Turkey.

Elsewhere in Europe, the 66th CIC Detachment with an

authorized strength of over 1,300 became an early candidate for conversion to group status. This was just the

first of many restructurings that the 66th would undergo in

the 1950s. The 66th CIC Group reduced the number of its

internal regions to four and gave them letters (A, B, C and

D) in place of Roman numerals. Next, it activated the 766th

CIC Detachment in Orleans, France to support the US

Army Europe (USAREUR) Communications Zone. But the

requirement to coordinate with French officials on a daily

basis greatly handicapped the detachment’s effectiveness.

The emergence of a separate human intelligence

discipline resulted in a series of organizational changes in

Europe that would last into the 1960s. The 66th transferred

all of its functions that touched upon HUMINT to the

newly activated 522d

 Military Intelligence Battalion, which

was then subordinated to the 513th MI Group. On 1

November 1959, a second major mission shift occurred

when USAREUR divided the counterintelligence and field

operations intelligence responsibilities on a geographical

basis between the 66th and the 513th Groups. The latter

took responsibility for the northern half of the Federal

Republic of Germany to include Berlin, while the 66th

performed a similar mission for the southern half.

Next door in Austria, the 430th CIC Detachment continued to support occupational forces up until their withdrawal. Working out of three sub-detachments based in

Salzburg, Linz, and Vienna, the 315-strong detachment

made a significant contribution to force protection. For

instance, of the 2700 investigations open, 150 dealt with

espionage and 120 with subversive activities; the remainder of cases consisted of background investigations on

individuals being employed by the US Army. In 1953,

agents of the 430th arrested two leaders of a Soviet spy

ring attempting to employ soldiers, airmen, and civilians to

gather classified information. The men, Kurt Ponger and

his brother-in-law Otto Verber, were Austrian-born,

Otto Verber and Kurt Ponger were first identified as spies in July 1949 when a loyal naturalized US

citizen employed by an intelligence organization in Vienna, Austria, came forward and indicated that he

had been approached by Verber. “Hans” agreed to serve as an informant. In the coming months, he

learned that Verber and Ponger had scores of other contacts among US employees. This relationship

was allowed to continue, and eventually Hans was “reassigned” to Washington, DC. Here, in the

Nation’s capital, the FBI took over the case. For two and a half years, Hans provided valuable insights

on his new handlers who worked for the Soviet Embassy, among them Yuri Novikov, Second Secretary.

In the meantime, the 430th CIC Detachment back in Austria designed an elaborate system to keep

Verber and Ponger under surveillance. During this period, they observed Verber and Ponger’s continued

attempts to develop sources from within the American embassy and armed forces. The operation ended

with the sentencing of Verber and Ponger to a prison term of 5 to 15 years, the arresting of three

accomplices, and the declaring of Yuri Novikov as persona-non-grata.

Double-agent (face blotted out in photograph) and his courier

under surveillance in Austria. (AHEC)

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naturalized US citizens, both of whom had once served

with the US Army during World War II.

Detachment D, 430th CIC Detachment, became operational in Leghorn, Italy, in July 1951 for the purpose of

supporting the 4th Logistical Command, which required

employment applicants to be investigated. Because

Leghorn was the birthplace of communism in Italy,

Detachment D adopted a low profile by assuming the

cover name of “Labor Control Branch.” The withdrawal of

occupational forces from Austria in 1955 led to the

inactivation of the 430th CIC Detachment. But 3 months

later, the 430th CIC Detachment was resurrected with a new

Shaping picks needed for surreptitious entry. (AHEC)

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mission and a new authorized strength: 7 officers, 8

warrant officers, and 19 enlisted men. The 430th had now

become the replacement for its former Detachment D and

was assigned to the Southern European Task Force.

Halfway around the world in Tokyo, Japan, the US

Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE), served as the Army’s

principal headquarters element in the Pacific; its G2,

directed an elaborate intelligence architecture. The major

elements consisted of the US Army Command Reconnaissance Activity, Far East; the 500th Military Intelligence

Group; and the 441st CIC Detachment. They each reported

to the US Army Intelligence Support Center, Japan, under

the command of a brigadier general. In 1957 the

Eisenhower-Kishii agreement directed the drawdown of

American troop strength in Japan. Subsequently, this led

to the relocation of the Army’s main Pacific headquarters

to Hawaii, and the inactivation of the 441st CIC Detachment. In Korea, the Eighth Army divided its intelligence

assets among a Collection Detachment, which had

inherited the theater-level army HUMINT mission; the

308th CIC Detachment; and the 528th MI Company. In 1961,

these diverse missions were consolidated into the newly

activated 502d

 MI Battalion.

 The 1950s represented a series of organizational

bumps for Army counterintelligence, much of it brought

about by the creation of a separate human intelligence

discipline. However, the turmoil experienced would be

minor compared to the roller coaster ride that awaited

Army counterintelligence over the next two decades.

A DECADE OF TURBULENCE

The arrival of the Kennedy Administration in 1961

brought with it a new defense policy of “gradual deterrence;” conventional rather than strategic forces were

emphasized. President John F. Kennedy selected a former

Ford Motors executive with a background in systems

analysis, Robert S. McNamara, to serve as his Secretary of

Defense. McNamara’s new direction towards greater

centralization would have a lasting impact upon the

intelligence community. For Army counterintelligence

these changes would be disruptive to say the least. An

early casualty to McNamara’s planning was ACSI’s

Industrial and Personal Security Group whose mission and

spaces were shifted to the newly created Defense Supply

Agency.

Because of the rivalry between counterintelligence and

human intelligence and the lack of a CONUS rotational

base for the latter, the ACSI eventually decided it would

be more economical and efficient to merge all field

operations intelligence assets with the Counter Intelligence Corps and cross-train personnel to serve both as

The Military Intelligence leadership surrounds the desk of Army Chief of Staff GEN George H. Decker as he signs the order

creating the MI Branch on 1 July 1962. (INSCOM)

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counterintelligence agents and as human intelligence

collectors. Accordingly, a consolidated Intelligence

Corps, commanded by the former Chief, CIC was created

on 1 January 1961. The new organization incorporated

slightly over 5,000 personnel, about 85 percent of whom

came from the CIC. Entrance requirements for the Intelligence Corps (INTC) were less restrictive than they had

been for the old Counter Intelligence Corps. In the past

the CIC had attracted the “best and brightest,” but at a

cost. The retention rate was abysmal—7 percent for

lieutenants and just 3 percent for enlisted. Consequently,

a new type of recruit was sought: those who had the best

career potential. The changes that followed left the

Counter Intelligence Corps more like the rest of the Army.

The Army General Test score was lowered for the new

Intelligence Corps from 110 to 100. Although they were

restricted to clerical duties, 18-year-olds were for the first

time able to volunteer for 3-year enlistments.

In the past, the Chief, Intelligence Corps, had

commanded the Army Intelligence Center that consisted

of the Army Intelligence School and the Army Intelligence

Board. In 1962, the Army transferred the school to the

Continental Army Command (CONARC) and divided the

board functions between the Army Materiel Command and

the Combat Developments Command. A new entity, the

Army Intelligence Corps Activity was created to pick up

all residual functions not transferred, such as the

counterintelligence records facility, the Administrative

Survey Detachment, and the Army Photo Interpretation

Center. Besides controlling the new Army Intelligence

Corps Activity, the Chief, Intelligence Corps, continued to

serve as the Commandant of the Army Intelligence School

and Commander of Fort Holabird. Consequently, the

Chief, Intelligence Corps, reported to ACSI, CONARC, and

Second Army in whose area Fort Holabird was located. It

would be only a matter of time before further restructuring

would be required to undo some of these organizational

knots.

On 1 July 1962, the new ACSI, MG Alva R. Fitch, finally

succeeded where others had failed by creating a new

Military Intelligence (MI) Branch (originally named the

Army Intelligence and Security Branch). It was a fitting

recognition of a half-century of achievement by military

intelligence professionals. In reality, the branch came

about as a result of more practical considerations. The

pool of reserve officers capable of filling intelligence slots

was becoming exhausted, and by 1965 it was estimated

that half of the positions would not be filled by qualified

personnel. Over a third of the 283 Regular Army and 3,652

Reserve officers in the new branch came from the Intelligence Corps. The branch gave the Army the potential for

the first time to promote and retain the necessary qualified

The front gates of Fort Holabird. (INSCOM)

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officers. Still, MI’s inability to attract Regular Army

officers would eventually precipitate the branch’s further

upgrade in 1967 to a combat support role status.

Major Security Lapses

From the beginning of the Cold War, the KGB (Soviet

Security and Intelligence Service) and the GRU (Soviet

Military Intelligence) carried out a systematic program to

recruit Americans, particularly those serving or employed

at installations abroad. Younger and low-level workers,

such as file clerks, guards, and secretaries were frequent

targets, especially anyone having access to ciphers that

would give the enemy an entrée to still more secrets.

During the early sixties, Army security experienced a

series of serious penetrations. In May 1960, SFC Jack E.

Dunlap walked into the Soviet embassy in downtown

Washington, DC, with an offer that could not be refused

by its intelligence officers—the sale of important secrets.

Given his position as driver (later messenger) for the

National Security Agency’s (NSA) chief of staff at Fort

Meade, Dunlap had easy access to papers within the

office. Although Dunlap did not possess a background in

intelligence, he knew enough to scoop up the right kind of

documents to support a very lavish lifestyle that included

a 30-foot yacht, a world-class hydroplane, two Cadillacs, a

baby-blue Jaguar sports car, and a blonde mistress. He

even took his girl friend with him on his visits to an

apartment in the District of Columbia where he met his socalled “bookkeeper,” always emerging with a wad of bills.

Feigning a bad back, Dunlap was able to keep from

going on an overseas assignment, but eventually, the

requirement to be reassigned caught up with him, at which

point he took steps to resign from the Army and sign on

as a civilian employee. At this juncture he failed the

mandatory polygraph test and faced the loss of his

security clearance along with the prospect of FBI questioning. Convinced he was about to be exposed, Dunlap

purchased a bottle of the finest whiskey and drove to an

isolated spot where he committed suicide by carbon

monoxide poisoning in his parked car. Never formally

charged with any crimes, Dunlap, a decorated Korean War

veteran, was buried with full military honors at Arlington

National Cemetery.

In the case of Dunlap there had been obvious life-style

warnings. Living beyond his means should have been a

neon sign for those who worked with him, but Dunlap was

able to deflect suspicion by inventing a variety of stories:

he was the heir to a chain of gas stations, his family was

land rich in Louisiana, or his family farm had on it a special

type of clay used in cosmetics. In response to the Dunlap

case, the Army undertook a 2-year study called Project

SECURITY SHIELD, which revealed serious weaknesses

both in the traditional decentralized approach to counterintelligence operations and in the lack of coordination

between Army counterintelligence and criminal investigators; the solution would lead to still more restructuring.

Occurring almost simultaneously, a second case of

espionage by another Army sergeant, Robert Lee

Johnson, would equal, if not surpass, the damage perpetrated by Dunlap. Since 1953 Sergeant Robert Lee

Johnson and a fellow NCO had performed a number of

low-level exchanges of information in the hire of the

Soviets. On one occasion, they faced the possibility of

exposure by Counter Intelligence Corps agents who

searched their living quarters in response to a complaint.

Fortunately, for the pair, they had misloaded their camera

and the film revealed nothing.

In 1961, much to the delight of the Soviets, Johnson

was positioned to become a guard at the Armed Forces

Courier Center at Orly Airport outside of Paris. No other

facility in all of Europe was more critical to the United

States, and armed guards protected it day and night.

Here, top-secret and higher documents passed through on

way to their ultimate destinations in France, Germany, and

Great Britain. Again, Johnson’s luck held. His submission

for an upgraded clearance was helped along by guidelines

prohibiting counterintelligence agents from interviewing

Johnson’s French neighbors who might have revealed a

less than normal family life style. Security lapses by

fellow guards enabled Johnson to copy keys to the inner

vaults containing the most secret of documents. The KGB

eventually arranged for a number of their technicians to be

on stand by for the sole purpose of copying documents

absconded by Johnson. By the time he departed for a

change of duty 2 years later, Johnson had delivered

documents and cipher systems of NATO, American

commands in Europe, and the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and had enabled his handlers to receive the prestigious Order of Lenin. In 1964, Johnson’s life as a spy

came unraveled when his wife who suffered from severe

mental problems disclosed his double life. Johnson

would later die in prison, stabbed to death by his visiting

son who had recently returned from a tour of duty in

Vietnam and who was apparently despondent over his

father’s treason.

US Army Intelligence Command

On 1 January 1965, the Army created the Intelligence

Corps Command, a major Army command, and assigned it

operational control of counterintelligence in CONUS,

principally the MI groups supporting the six CONUS

armies and the Military District of Washington (Washington, DC). Its purpose was to correct the deficiencies

pointed out in the SECURITY SHIELD study. The Chief of

Staff, US Army, articulated the following goal: “that the

Army, in these perilous times, should have a fully inte129

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grated, centrally controlled investigative organization

which can function smoothly and effectively on a local,

national, or worldwide basis, and which will permit

pinpoint concentration of responsibility for any and all of

its operations.”

At the same time, the Army Intelligence Corps Activity

went away and its noncounterintelligence functions, such

as the newly designated Imagery Interpretation Center,

were transferred to ACSI. For the first time in history, the

Chief, Intelligence Corps, performed operational responsibilities while wearing his new hat as Commander, Intelligence Corps Command. However, this arrangement only

further tightened the organizational knot. Instead of

reporting to three bosses (ACSI, CONARC, and Second

Army), the Chief, Intelligence Corps now had a fourth—

the Chief of Staff, US Army. This arrangement would last

for only 6 months.

On 1 July 1965, the Army redesignated the Intelligence

Corps Command as the US Army Intelligence Command

(USAINTC). Functions previously performed by the

Intelligence Corps Command that were not directly related

to counterintelligence operations—administering the

intelligence civilian career program and procuring intelligence materiel—reverted to ACSI, resulting in the

establishment of the Administrative Survey Detachment

and the Intelligence Materiel Development Support Office

as separate field operating agencies. Over the coming 9

months, the combined headquarters structure associated

with the Intelligence Corps was also broken up, and its

major pieces, such as the US Army Intelligence School,

placed under separate commanders. The Intelligence

Corps itself was discontinued in March 1966, and its

personnel functions transferred to the Department of

Army level. This ended the Army’s attempts to integrate

human intelligence and counterintelligence under a single

organizational structure. Finally, discontinuation of the

Intelligence Corps resulted in the redesignation of all its

former units to that of “Military Intelligence.”

The creation of the US Army Intelligence Command

meant that the Army counterintelligence organization had

been turned inside out. The old Counter Intelligence

Corps had selected, trained, and administered Army

counterintelligence personnel, but counterintelligence

operations themselves had been decentralized under the

control of local Army commanders. The new major Army

field command was a centralized operational organization

without any administrative or training functions. The

demise of the Intelligence Corps ended a special tradition

Major General William H. Blakefield (on right) hosts a USAINTC Commanders Conference in 1967. (INSCOM)

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Until 1968, the 66th CIC Group was stationed at Wallace Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany. (INSCOM)

USAINTC soldiers man its operations center. During the late 1960s, the situation was anything but normal.

(INSCOM)

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that went back to the Corps of Intelligence Police in World

War I, but the new arrangements meant that Army

counterintelligence was now aligned with the rest of the

Army.

The US Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC)

quickly developed into an extremely efficient organization.

Its seven military intelligence groups maintained a

network of 300 field and resident offices scattered across

the continental United States, located in mostly large to

mid-size metropolitan areas. Project SECURITY SHIELD

led to the consolidation of the Army’s criminal files with

those of counterintelligence on 1 July 1965 and transfer of

their control to USAINTC. For the first time, an investigative check of an individual’s records would automatically

result in a check of both past counterintelligence and

criminal files. The master index of the facility at Fort

Holabird included in excess of 11 million references, and

its 20 miles of files were housed in a building as large as

three football fields. The new facility was redesignated as

the US Army Investigative Records Repository. Further

consolidation of records from the US Army Europe Central

Registry and the Counterintelligence Repository, Japan,

added seven million more files to the collection.

Finally, in 1966, USAINTC became the DOD agent

administering the newly created Defense Central Index of

Investigations (DCII) and the National Agency Check

Center (NACC). The DCII was a master file of all counterintelligence and criminal investigations performed by the

armed services, and the NACC performed records

searches on files maintained by non-DOD agencies such

as the FBI and local police departments. Over 1.6 million

National Agency Checks were completed in the first year

alone. Under the old decentralized system, it took an

average of 97 days to perform a background investigation;

now the process was down to a month.

Changes in Europe

Opportunities by US intelligence to exploit Soviet and

Warsaw Pact sources began to diminish in Europe. The

construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the simultaneous imposition of tighter border controls by East

In 1961, East Berlin authorities built a wall to stop the exodus of its citizens. It also greatly reduced the flow of intelligence.

(INSCOM)

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Germany effectively shut off the refugee flow. This

development reduced the need to have three major

intelligence units with partially overlapping responsibilities in Europe. Concurrently, the newly redesignated 66th

and 513th Intelligence Corps (INTC) Groups were reorganized once again. This time to solve the coordination

problems brought about by being structured along

geographical lines. The 513th INTC Group assumed

complete responsibility for human intelligence and certain

sensitive counterespionage missions within US Army

Europe, while the 66th INTC Group was reassigned to

Seventh Army and assumed the mission of the inactivated

532d MI Battalion, which had previously been responsible

for screening between 20,000 and 30,000 refugees annually. The 66th INTC Group lost its regional form of

organization and emerged as the command headquarters

for various intelligence units attached to the Seventh

Army’s corps and divisions.

South Vietnam

Barely registering on the radar in the Pacific was the

activation of the 704th INTC Detachment on 25 January

1962 in Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam. The unit

consisting of 46 officers and enlisted men was attached to

the US Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam

(MAAG-V), but remained assigned to the 500th INTC

Group back in Japan. Personnel of the 704th were quartered at a large compound situated at #10 Hoang Hoa

Tham, Gia Dinh Province—a residential community on the

outskirts of Saigon. The facility provided space for billets,

offices, a mess, and a recreational area.

In Vietnam, facility security became a high priority for counterintelligence. Here, local workers are shown being searched before

they depart. (INSCOM)

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Although not the first Army intelligence unit to be

deployed, the 704th was the first one belonging to the

Intelligence Corps. Unlike other military elements in South

Vietnam, the 704th did not initially lack for proficient

Vietnamese and French linguists. The detachment’s

mission entailed all phases of traditional counterintelligence work: counterespionage, countersabotage, and

countersubversion.

Initially, the 704th Intelligence Corps Detachment

focused its limited resources on advising its South

Vietnamese counterpart, the Military Security Service.

The Military Security Service had no direct connection

with other Army, Republic of Vietnam intelligence elements

and was solely responsible for counterintelligence.

Unfortunately, Military Security Services’ major interest

was political reporting on internal threats to the regime.

The 704th also conducted each month some 100

security investigations on US personnel. Lack of means

to travel safely throughout the country greatly cut down

on the numbers of background checks performed.

Counterintelligence personnel often waited for aircraft or

convoys to become available, and upon arriving at a

contact’s home base, the investigating agent frequently

faced still more delays waiting for the individual to return

from an operation.

To keep South Vietnam from collapsing under the

weight of military setbacks and political crises, US Army

and Marine ground forces deployed in 1965 together with

supporting air and naval elements. The new J2, Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)—MG Joseph A.

McChristian—restructured his staff so that it could

respond to the increased mission. Among the steps taken

by McChristian was to create a Counterintelligence

Division, which was divided into three branches: Personnel Security, Counterintelligence, and Security of Military

Information. The Counterintelligence Division established

an orientation course for all incoming personnel regardless of service to remind them that enemy intelligence was

listening and watching. Other functions included conducting special operations and monitoring the status of

those missing in action and POWs. In December, Company B, 519th MI Battalion, arrived to replace the 704th

INTC Detachment. For the first time, sufficient counterintelligence teams existed for deployment throughout the

country. However, lack of language skills and the inability

of US counterintelligence agents to blend with the local

population hampered operations. This meant a heavy

dependence upon South Vietnamese linguists as part of

joint teams. Nine months later, the counterintelligence

effort was significantly upgraded when the 135th MI Group

arrived under the command of COL Paul Goodman to

replace Company B, 519th MI Battalion. Within a year, all

MACV elements had access to counterintelligence

support.

Winning the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese

was a major objective of the war planners. Consequently,

the US Embassy, which was charged with developing

counter themes, had a vital interest in the impact the

enemy’s words were having on the local population. The

enemy’s use of propaganda against Allied servicemen was

of equal concern. In particular, the enemy bombarded the

III Corps Tactical Zone, which surrounded Saigon, with

leaflets. Besides monitoring and reporting on such

propaganda efforts, counterintelligence also conducted

security inspections, evaluations, and liaison visits to

bring home to both US and South Vietnamese combat

units the need to take appropriate countermeasures.

Because Vietnam was a guerrilla war and the threat of

sabotage was always present, Army counterintelligence

placed a great deal of emphasis upon physical security.

Regular inspections of facilities noted any deficiency in

terms of guard forces, alarm systems, perimeter lightings,

and physical barriers. Counterintelligence also screened

locally hired Vietnamese who had access to facilities. To

safeguard the power grid that surrounded Allied installations in Saigon, Allied leaders established a Combined

Security Committee under the leadership of the city’s

Chief of Police. Six short months later, the enemy put the

system to the test when it launched a major offensive in

January 1968 during the celebration of Tet. Communications lines were among the primary targets.

Vietnam has often been called an intelligence war—

finding an elusive enemy in a sea of green. On the other

hand, it was not noted for major successes in the area of

counterintelligence. This is not to say a threat did not

exist. General McChristian summed up the challenge:

“The rather simple, unsophisticated character of the

enemy disguised his complex, highly efficient intelligence

system....Further, it is doubtful that the average US officer

or enlisted man ever appreciated the extent of the Communist collection effort even though the Counterintelligence

Division placed maximum emphasis on educating them to

the security hazards confronting the command daily.”

Army counterintelligence was not alone in its challenge

to improve security. Leaders of the Central Intelligence

Agency and the Army Security Agency (ASA) both

“Vietnam was not viewed as a high

priority counterintelligence threat at

the time.... Were our operations

penetrated during that period?

Obviously they were. Why? Failure to

give proper emphasis to the CI aspects

of clandestine operations.”

Russell Holmes, CIA counterintelligence

officer

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America’s cities, both people and property, were put at risk during several large riots in the 1960s. (LC)

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acknowledged similar failures in their respective pieces of

the security pie. For example, communications security

specialists of ASA failed to convince Army personnel that

enemy signal intelligence specialists could and did

routinely monitor radio/telephone traffic and broke and

exploited home-made codes in a timely manner.

By mid-1969, America’s new president, Richard M.

Nixon, announced the withdrawal of the first US troops

and the transfer of the fighting back to the Army, Republic

of Vietnam. Subsequently, military intelligence began a

series of downsizing reorganizations. Marginally effective

missions were first on the chopping block, which led to a

reduction in counterintelligence resources and the

inactivation of the 135th MI Group in September 1969.

Civil Strife

The 1960s were marked by disturbances and riots in the

wake of the Civil Rights Movement and anti-war movements, coupled by the increased presence of radical fringe

groups. Commanders of Federal troops deployed to

maintain the peace were demanding better knowledge of

the local situation. Just showing up with force was not

adequate. Since the early 1940s, the job for collecting

domestic intelligence had fallen on the shoulders of the

FBI. But the FBI possessed neither the personnel nor

makeup of personnel to adequately do the job. Middleage agents conducting surveillance didn’t blend well with

student rioters. This would cause Army counterintelligence to abandon its long-standing policy against

involvement in domestic intelligence.

The leaders of USAINTC did not dive head-long into

domestic intelligence; they would take a series of steps—

each encouraged and blessed by higher-ups. During the

Watts Riots (Los Angeles) in August 1965, USAINTC

established a crisis support center after the fact. To

facilitate coordination during future incidents that might

require a timely military response in the Nation’s capital,

USAINTC assigned plain-clothes agents to the Washington, DC, Police Department. The next major step was the

formulation of a contingency plan in 1966 under the name

of STEEP HILL that allowed for collection following the

deployment of federal troops. But STEEP HILL (redesignated in 1967 as GARDEN PLOT) was soon judged to be

inadequate; for commanders in the field to receive the help

needed, USAINTC would have to begin collection once it

became likely that troops would deploy. Thus a new plan

by the name of ROSE HILL (later designated PUNCH

BLOCK and still later LANTERN SPIKE) was prepared.

During the Meredith Civil Rights March in Mississippi,

members of the 111th MI Group filed regular spot reports

(130 altogether) using mobile-mounted telephones along

the route.

In 1967 alone, 83 riots and civil disorders left over 80

dead and 2,000 injured. The National Guard deployed in

response to 25 of these disturbances, and the LANTERN

SPIKE collection plan was implemented four times. In the

wake of the riots in Detroit, which resulted in more than

$100 million of damages, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Cyrus Vance tasked the Army with “reconnoitering the

major cities” to gain such information as topography and

vulnerability before any troops would be sent into urban

areas. One of the warrant officers involved was quick to

point out the major flaw in such thinking, “There we were

plotting power plants, radio stations, and armories on the

situation maps when we should have been locating the

Troops were called out in response to the growing anti-war movement, which faded away when US forces in Vietnam drew down

and the draft ended. (LC)

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liquor and color-television stores instead.” Deputy

Secretary Vance went on to urge greater analysis of

data—another step towards involvement. The emerging

anti-war movement brought with it still more disturbances

and actual attacks against Federal facilities and potential

harm to government personnel. The anti-war movement

also presented a new threat by fostering sedition in the

ranks.

During the march on the Pentagon in October 1967,

USAINTC agents issued 687 spot reports, and the

command provided 49 special summaries to the Pentagon

Operations Center. USAINTC began to dramatically

widen its collection on sources of potential subversion

and sabotage; subsequently USAINTC’s files at Fort

Holabird began to bulge. Despite being blessed by the

leadership of the Johnson Administration, the assembling

of this data bank of civilian intelligence still lacked formal

authorization by statute. Domestic intelligence data

collection also involved an independent effort on the part

of intelligence and counterintelligence units assigned to

the Continental Army Command and the field armies in the

United States. Although on a much smaller scale than

USAINTC, these elements maintained their own files.

Riots in the Nation’s capital following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968 initiated still

stronger measures by Army counterintelligence. Nationwide, USAINTC expended nearly a half million dollars in

response to various disturbances and events surrounding

the King assassination. In a 2-week period, USAINTC

furnished a total of 2,388 reports of information to Army

commands and governmental agencies. The command

also prepared 29 special summaries in response to

Department of the Army one-time requests. The various

military intelligence groups submitted some 3,000 spot

reports to USAINTC’s operations center.

At this point, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

set up civil disturbance elements within its Counterintelligence and Counterintelligence Analysis Branches. They

soon became the recipients of a huge amount of data on a

daily basis from the FBI. During 1968, the CI Analysis

Branch sent observers to the Democratic National

Convention in Chicago and the Republican convention in

Miami. In Chicago, the 113th MI Group created an emergency command and control facility. Eighteen two-man

teams gathered information on demonstrations and the

subsequent confrontations with the police, and a separate

element performed visual surveillance out of a van painted

to look like it belonged to a bogus television broadcasting

company. Army authorities judged the overall support

furnished by USAINTC elements as excellent.

In 1968, the Department of the Army created a classified Civil Disturbance Information Collection Plan that

levied requirements upon USAINTC that could not be

filled by traditional methods of overt collection or liaison

with the FBI and local law enforcement. The plan indicated

that the current state of affairs was such that the Army

must obtain information on future hot spots and potential

trouble makers. Although the plan acknowledged that

anti-war and racial movements were made up of mostly

sincere Americans, it contended that a handful still meant

to exploit the situation for violence. In keeping with a

long historical tradition, the Army only “seeks to collect

that needed to exercise honest and sound judgment of the

measures to be taken in suppressing rampant violence and

restoring order—to assure that only the mildest effective

measures are exercised...”.

The most significant flaw of the Civil Disturbance

Information Collection Plan was its openness to receiving

input on individuals and organizations on the fringe. For

instance, it encouraged a vacuum cleaner approach that

swept up a wide variety of information on university,

church, and political groups opposed to the Vietnam War.

For this reason, when the executive secretary of the

Central Committee of Conscientious Objectors spoke on a

college campus, a new file was created. Consequently, the

central data base soon ballooned to some 100,000 entities.

Then there were the rare occasions when even the lines

drawn by the Army were crossed. For example, in 1969,

FBI agents, without a search warrant, did a surreptitious

search of the Washington Free Press headquarters. Their

findings were subsequently turned over to USAINTC for

analysis.

Members of the new Nixon Administration in 1969 were

the first to question the long-range consequences of

these blanket requirements. Robert F. Froehlke, Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Administration, expressed his

doubt about whether or not the demands made upon

USAINTC had gone “substantially beyond the capability

for military intelligence units to collect. These questions

reflected the all encompassing and uninhibited demand for

information directed at the Department of the Army.” But

it would take a suit in 1970 by the American Civil Liberties

Union against US Army Intelligence Command for “spying

137

“I honestly believe we drifted into this

area without quite realizing what we

were getting into and because no one

else was around to do the job. I’m

convinced that no one intended to spy

on individuals or control civilian life

in any way. But I also believe that

some of the things begun, if expanded,

sure as hell posed a real risk.”

Robert E. Jordan III, General Counsel of the

Army

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Since the 1950s, the Investigative Records Repository served as an important asset to Army Counterintelligence. (INSCOM)

on civilians” to bring the collection effort to a screeching

halt.

In summing up this period, it is important to remember

that civil disobedience and disturbance tested the system

on a scale never before faced. Each cause had its radical

fringe groups bent on violence, and the civil-rights

movement experienced a counter reaction of violence

against many of its activities and organizations. A

legitimate rationale existed for collecting against such

groups that threatened the life and property of ordinary

citizens, destruction of Government property, and sedition

within the ranks of the Armed Forces. The Justice

Department and FBI could not provide the Department of

Defense and law enforcement with the extent of information that was believed necessary to maintain order. So

with the full weight of the chain of command behind them,

Army counterintelligence stepped in to help fill the void.

If there was one great overarching mistake made by

USAINTC, it was that the command collected information

for the sake of collecting. So much of it was peripheral to

any threat, real or imagined. One officer who served in

one of the field offices recalled jokingly that sometimes

more agents than activists showed up at anti-war rallies.

Ironically, what allowed USAINTC to accomplish as much

as it did was its tremendous efficiency; USAINTC did all

of this collection, reporting, and filing while fulfilling its

major duties of conducting background investigations,

performing force protection, and dealing with day-to-day

security issues.

For any excesses, the White House, the Justice

Department, FBI, and the Army leadership all legally

shouldered a part of the responsibility or as Secretary of

Defense Melvin Laird put it, “The military is sometimes

blamed but this operation was known by the highest

authorities within government.” However, as is often the

case, the lowest echelon—in this instance, Army counterintelligence—would bare more than its share of the

consequences.

NEW DIRECTIONS

Public disclosure of the Army’s domestic intelligence

efforts through newspapers and a national television

documentary brought a swift response by the Army to

minimize potential damage. The US Army Intelligence

Command would undergo a complete 180-degree reversal

overnight. On 19 February 1970, USAINTC issued orders

that all civil disturbance and civilian biographic data

stored in the Investigative Records Repository at Fort

Holabird be destroyed. As the command’s historian put it,

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33290_P001_176x1.pmd 146 11/28/2005, 3:43 PM
“instead of collect, process, and store, the order of the

day was research, screen, and destroy.” The Continental

Army Command and the field armies in the United States

would carry out a similar purge of their collections of

domestic intelligence. Finally, the ambitious Civil Disturbance Information Collection Plan was formally rescinded

in June. In spite of these steps, the damage had been

done.

In early 1971, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights from the Committee on the Judiciary, chaired

by the venerable Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina,

opened a series of hearings on violations of civil liberties

by government authorities. In February, the Army ordered

USAINTC to suspend all countersubversive and counterespionage activities. Created to curb abuses in counterintelligence, the Defense Investigative Review Council

decided that all service-connected background investigations should be centralized under a new civilian body, the

Defense Investigative Service (DIS). Control of the

Central Index of Investigations and the National Agency

Check Center was given over to DIS in October 1972 along

with 1,400 personnel spaces—altogether, 90 percent of

USAINTC’s mission. Three military intelligence groups in

CONUS and 250 field offices were closed in the process.

Control of criminal investigative files was simultaneously

passed to the new US Army Criminal Investigative

Command. An exception to these losses was overseas

where Army counterintelligence would continue to

perform Personnel Security Investigations in support of

the new DIS. A colonel now commanded what was left of

USAINTC.

These actions had the total effect of undoing major

parts of Project SECURITY SHIELD put in place less than

a decade before. But Army counterintelligence lost more

than resources and economy. Some of the legislation and

executive orders unfortunately went far beyond providing

reasoned restraints; they also had a chilling effect that

would impact operations into the next millennium. For the

first time, lawyers began to play an active role in policy

decisions that in the past had been based solely on

security considerations.

In 1971, the newly restructured US Army Intelligence

Center and School was relocated from Fort Holabird to

Fort Huachuca, Arizona, as part of a master intelligence

concept by the then ACSI, MG Joseph A. McChristian.

However, all did not go as planned. The school at Fort

Huachuca immediately ran into water restrictions that

forced a scale back of McChristian’s vision. A part of the

curtailed plans included a large chunk of USAINTC, which

was to have been reconfigured as a Counterintelligence

139

Defense Against Methods of Entry Class being taught at the newly established US Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort

Huachuca, Arizona. (INSCOM)

33290_P001_176.pmd 147 11/9/2005, 10:39 AM
Directorate within the new MI center. Meanwhile, the

remnants of USAINTC at Fort Holabird could not justify

keeping the post open, forcing the command in July 1973

to relocate 20 miles south to Fort Meade, Maryland, a

large multipurpose post. The command’s treasured

“Golden Sphinx,” which once sat outside USAINTC

headquarters, barely made the trip through the Baltimore

Harbor Tunnel without breaking apart—symbolic of the

fragile condition of the command itself.

The end of USAINTC and its remaining military

intelligence groups came on 1 July 1974. In its place, the

Army established the US Army Intelligence Agency

(USAINTA) at Fort Meade. Initially, USAINTA, a field

operating agency under ACSI, controlled two major units:

the 902d

 MI Group, relocated to Fort Meade and the 525th

MI Group, recently returned from Vietnam and stationed at

the Presidio of San Francisco. Dividing their support to

the Army along the Mississippi River, the two groups

“Major General Joseph McChristian

had a dream. He dreamed of creating

a central training school that would

transform Army Intelligence units

into an elite corps. That dream, the

general charged yesterday, was largely

dried up by the Army when it was

decided to put the school in arid Fort

Huachuca, Arizona. ‘My concepts,

my recommendations were

overruled.’”

Long Island Newsday, 11 May 1972

As it had for more than 2 decades, Army counterintelligence provided security to testing of special weapons. (INSCOM)

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etc; and to clarify if a formal investigation was required.

The second major functional area involved operations

directed against foreign intelligence activities. Since

1968, the ACSI leadership had taken a series of actions to

revitalize the Army’s most sensitive counterintelligence

missions, beginning with formulation of new doctrine. By

the early 1970s, these special operations were consuming

20 to 25 percent of counterintelligence’s overall resources.

The third major area covered a wide range of functions

involving education, assistance, and inspections. Typically, security education consisted of an orientation class

on the threat of subversion. Assistance took many forms.

For example, specialists evaluated security containers

against various methods of entry. Inspections were used

to estimate the nature and degree of the security threat

confronting a command or agency. An abbreviated form

of a survey was the counterintelligence inspection that

addressed a unit’s compliance to established security

policy and guidelines. Going a step beyond a survey,

counterintelligence professionals could simulate a hostile

intelligence attack against an installation or organization.

 The Final Shoe

In 1974, the Chief of Staff, US Army, Fred C. Weyand,

directed MG James J. Ursano, Director of Management, to

lead a review of Army intelligence subsequently known as

the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS).

The reasons behind IOSS were many, but they generally

fell into one of several categories. Program budget

decisions in 1973 had significantly curtailed military

intelligence resources, making consolidation and cuts

within headquarters and support elements inevitable. A

second rationale stemmed from recent inspections by the

Army Audit Agency and the Inspector General that

pointed out deficiencies in the way the Army Security

Agency did business in the arenas of materiel and force

development and contingency planning. The ASCI also

faced criticism for focusing too much of his energies on

human intelligence/counterintelligence management at the

expense of the larger military intelligence community.

Underneath the surface of the review was the desire on

the part of the Army’s leadership to bring military intelligence in step with the rest of the service. For all too long

ASA had been viewed as standing apart from the larger

Army, operating from behind green doors marked “Restricted.” Counterintelligence and human intelligence

personnel suffered from a similar image problem—the

stigma of being labeled “spooks.”

In addressing the need for change in the arena of

counterintelligence, the authors of IOSS drew heavily

upon the doctrine of operations security (OPSEC) that had

emerged from within the Department of Defense in the late

sixties. Operations security was the premise that a

broader approach than counterintelligence or communicashared the CONUS counterintelligence mission.

USAINTA also inherited from USAINTC a technical

support activity providing polygraph, technical service

countermeasures, and computer security assistance; the

US Army Counterintelligence Support Detachment (later

designated Central Security Facility), comprising the

Investigative Records Repository and the Personnel

Security Group; and the Administrative Survey Detachment. Finally, the Army gave USAINTA an overseas

responsibility—the 500th MI Group in the process of

moving from Hawaii back to Japan.

The ink had not yet dried upon USAINTA’s organizational charts before another study was underway, not just

to reshape Army counterintelligence but all of military

intelligence. From a historical perspective, counterintelligence had undergone seven major restructurings,

averaging one every 4 years since World War II; its

organization had been literally in a constant state of flux.

Contrast that with the other pillar of military intelligence,

the US Army Security Agency, which experienced only

one such major change over the same period. The

difference was, that unlike ASA, which labored under the

umbrella of the National Security Agency, counterintelligence enjoyed no protection from Army planners who

during peacetime often tended to restructure for the sake

of restructuring. Over time, such constant turmoil was

bound to have a negative effect of unknown proportions

on operational efficiency.

The State of Counterintelligence

By the seventies, Army counterintelligence had shrunk

to a very small piece of the military intelligence pie.

Resource-wise it consisted of 5.6 percent of the funds and

5.8 of the personnel; in real terms, $35 million and approximately 2,500 personnel—military and members of the

Civilian Excepted Service Program. In contrast, the Army

Security Agency, which performed signals intelligence,

had some 80 percent of the manpower and even more in

terms of dollars. Almost half of the counterintelligence

resources were located at HQDA (ACSI) and USAINTA.

Another third was in Europe: assigned to the 66th MI

Group or the 650th MI Group (as the 450th CIC Detachment

had been redesignated) in support of the Supreme

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. The final pieces of

any size were in support of US Army Forces Command

(FORSCOM) in CONUS and the Caribbean or as part of

the Eighth US Army in Korea. Of all manpower spaces

worldwide, 20 percent were in direct support of tactical

forces.

At the mid-point in the Cold War, the mission of Army

counterintelligence could be broken down into three major

areas. The first was personnel security investigations

(PSI) required to grant or deny a security clearance; to

respond to a complaint of alleged espionage, sabotage,

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33290_P001_176.pmd 149 11/9/2005, 10:39 AM
tions security was needed to identify and counter threats

from foreign intelligence agencies. A joint effort was

required that simultaneously addressed military deception,

physical security, communications security, and information security. What was the profit of only looking at the

threat of foreign agents when the enemy’s signals

intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and

electronic-warfare attacks went unchecked? The IOSS

reflected the latest terms: counter-HUMINT, counterSIGINT, and counter-IMINT.

The IOSS went on to point out that USAINTA had

developed, tested, and delivered a comprehensive OPSEC

approach to commanders with sensitive missions, but

such an approach had not been implemented Army-wide.

Nowhere was the failure more evident than at the tactical

level. The lack of OPSEC was also reflected in the

allocation of resources where no correlation existed

between the magnitude of the threats and the counter

effort against them. Of the approximately 3,200 man-years

devoted to security, 20 percent was devoted to counterSIGINT and the remaining 80 percent to counter-HUMINT.

Almost nothing was given over to counter-IMINT.

Bringing The Pieces Together

As a result of IOSS, two new organizational entities

were created that for the first time in the history of military

intelligence brought together intelligence collection,

counterintelligence, and electronic warfare. Stationed at

historic Arlington Hall, Arlington Virginia, former site of

ASA’s headquarters, the US Army Intelligence and

Security Command (INSCOM) consolidated most of the

functions at echelon above corps. The Combat Electronic

Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) Battalions were designed

to support the Army at corps and below.

The US Army Intelligence and Security Command now

controlled counterintelligence (CI) elements within each of

the overseas military intelligence groups (66th, 470th, 500th,

and the newly created 501st in Korea). The only element

left out was the 650th MI Group that remained in support of

SHAPE. The second counterintelligence building block

was USAINTA and its various components: 525th MI

Group, 902d MI Group, the 901st MI Detachment (in

support of the Defense Nuclear Agency), Special Operations Detachment (involving sensitive counterintelligence

operations), and the Central Security Facility (the Investi142

Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia, became headquarters to the newly established USA Intelligence and Security

Command. (INSCOM)

33290_P001_176.pmd 150 11/9/2005, 10:39 AM
As part of Operations Security, technical countermeasures specialists test communications. (INSCOM)

143

33290_P001_176.pmd 151 11/9/2005, 10:39 AM
gative Records Repository). The third and final piece to

be merged consisted of a number of small elements from

ASA located worldwide and responsible for the Army’s

counter-SIGINT mission.

Major General William I. Rolya was selected to serve as

INSCOM’s first commander. It was a logical choice. As

ASA’s last commander, he had been involved in the IOSS

planning from the beginning and knew as well as anyone

the vision of the Army leadership. Also having a background of a signal officer, General Rolya owed less loyalty

to a specific discipline and more to the larger military

intelligence community, and having come up through the

ranks, Rolya was also seen as possessing the people skills

so essential in bringing diverse groups together. These

qualities were immediately put to the test as MG Rolya

had to work with the Army staff, theater commanders, and

the Intelligence Community on new, yet to be defined,

terms. He also had to bring together staff heads and major

subordinate commanders who up to this point in their

careers had gone to different Army schools and followed

separate career paths that had given rise to an attitude of

indifference to each other’s contributions.

Compounding the problem, the new headquarters did

not possess a collocated staff. The majority of the staff

was at Arlington Hall Station, but a sizeable chunk,

consisting mainly of CI/HUMINT elements, remained

nearly 40 miles to the north at Fort Meade. Added to this

was the lack of secure communications between the two

sites. The situation continued until 1986 when Congressional authority was finally received for a consolidation at

Arlington Hall. Until then, staff members found themselves daily on the road to attend meetings at the other

co-headquarters.

One of INSCOM’s highest priorities was providing

threat data and technical advice and assistance in support

of operations security. Following the drafting of an

OPSEC plan by an Army command, INSCOM personnel

would proceed to test the plan by simulating the

HUMINT, IMINT, and SIGINT threats posed by a foreign

Fort Meade continued to remain as headquarters for most of the Army’s counterintelligence resources. (INSCOM)

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intelligence service. This procedure eventually evolved

into the Multidiscipline Operations Security Support

(MOSS) Concept. Using a tailored approach, specialists

from the US Army Intelligence and Security Command

were able to determine an activity’s security profile and

the necessary countermeasures needed to protect

sensitive information. For instance, counterintelligence

personnel analyzed the Army’s nuclear community’s

vulnerabilities to hostile intelligence and provided OPSEC

for a number of major weapon systems such as the

research and development phase of the Ballistic Missile

Defense System. With INSCOM’s assistance, the Vice

Chief of Staff, US Army, set out a series of priority steps in

1980 for major Army commands to undertake to enhance

their operations security.

The second building block of military intelligence was

the Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI)

Battalions at corps and below. Each battalion consisted of

four companies. Within the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, there was an OPSEC Support Section that

was further broken down into a CI team, a COMSEC team,

and an ELSEC (electronics security) team. By the 1980s,

plans called for 15 battalions to be created, each in the

support of a combat division. Unfortunately, CEWI

counterintelligence resources were never utilized to their

fullest potential. In 1978, the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army

directed that the Readiness Training for US Army Intelligence Resources (REDTRAIN) be expanded to include

counterintelligence. The 902d

 MI Group was given the

lead and deployed mobile training teams to enhance the

proficiency of tactical counterintelligence.

The 1970s marked the end of an era for military intelligence which stretched back to the end of World War II.

No longer would intelligence and security stand apart

from the rest of the Army. To many, the so-called “greening-of-MI” was long overdue. However, the new organizational structures themselves would present a whole new

series of challenges.

145

The creation of firewalls around sensitive programs led to an increased use of the polygraph. (INSCOM)

33290_P001_176.pmd 153 11/9/2005, 10:39 AM
THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The 1980s began with a retreat from operations security

to more specific goals, such as upgrading of counterespionage and renewed focus on computer security. OPSEC

had stretched a limited number of resources too thin.

The principal type of counter-SIGINT support requested by

commanders was communications monitoring. However,

the lack of qualified personnel (less than 1 percent of

INSCOM resources), aging monitoring equipment, and

the increased use of secure equipment were mounting

reasons against further pursuing the mission.

During the early eighties, the US Army Intelligence and

Security Command redefined counterintelligence doctrine,

reissued manuals, upgraded new equipment and systems

(especially in the area of electronic security), and enacted

new measures to safeguard extremely sensitive information from foreign intelligence agencies. Among the new

initiatives was the building of fire walls, which limited the

number of personnel cleared for so-called “special access

programs.” As a second safeguard, the use of the

polygraph was expanded. To upgrade the Army’s

polygraph program, new equipment, greater centralization,

tighter quality control, and greater numbers of examiners

were rushed into place. Another initiative involved the

recruitment of qualified technical personnel with the

expertise to provide technical assistance in the selection

of Army software systems being used in the emerging

world of information security. Finally, INSCOM implemented the policy of dispatching a Technical Surveillance

Countermeasures (TSCM) team to evaluate facilities where

sensitive Army activities were being carried out.

The counterintelligence assets of the 902d MI Group,

the major player in CONUS, were restructured. Between

1984 and 1986, the 902d MI Group and its three subordinate battalions moved from a solely geographical division

(Presidio of San Francisco (CA), Fort Sam Houston (TX),

and Fort Meade (MD)) to one in which each battalion was

responsible for a specific function (counterespionage,

technical, or security). Eventually, all three battalions

would be collocated with the 902d headquarters at Fort

Meade.

Operations

The decade began with the kidnapping of a US Army

senior official, BG James L. Dozier, who was held captive

for 6 weeks by the Italian Red Brigade. Counterintelligence personnel were involved in both the search and the

debriefing phases. More importantly, the episode raised

During the aftermath of URGENT FURY in Grenada, a stay-behind counterintelligence detachment discovered weapons hidden

under a false floor at the former Cuban embassy. (INSCOM)

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33290_P001_176x2.pmd 154 12/6/2005, 6:38 AM
terrorism as a threat that Army counterintelligence would

have to address in the future. Previously, international

terrorism had been an issue for the State Department, which

issued guidelines for US personnel living abroad, and for

the FBI, which directed the response on the home front.

A study at the time pointed out the dearth of background

information on the subject. The findings concluded that

gaps in coverage existed and that INSCOM should be

147

For decades, members of the 470th MI Group helped to secure the Panama Canal Zone, but in the 1980s, they became engaged

throughout the region in opposing low-intensity threats. (NARA)

33290_P001_176.pmd 155 11/9/2005, 10:40 AM
responsible for submitting a new plan that outlined the

Army’s mission and delineated the various requirements

by echelon. For the first time, the Army assembled a set of

basic principles to counter the potential threat from

terrorism abroad.

 In response to the rapid buildup of Cuban and Soviet

activities in Grenada, the murder of Prime Minister Maurice

Bishop, and potential harm to US citizens—many of whom

were students at the local medical college—the United

States along with nations of the Organization of Eastern

Caribbean States deployed forces to the island nation on

22 October 1983.

A team of nine soldiers from INSCOM performed a staybehind counterintelligence mission in support of the

peacekeeping forces. The CI team’s discovery of a large

cache of weapons hidden in a building that at one time

housed the Cuban Embassy in the capital city of Saint

George’s was a major achievement. Acting upon the tip

that bags of cement had been seen being brought into the

facility prior to its being abandoned by Cuban diplomats,

counterintelligence personnel accompanied local police as

they searched the premises. Here they uncovered a false

floor in one of the closets. Inside were numerous rifles,

grenade launchers, submachine guns, and pistols, plus

over 500,000 rounds of ammunition.

Elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin, Army intelligence

monitored the attempt of a Marxist (and Cuban-allied)

government in Nicaragua to foment revolution in the

small, troubled nation of El Salvador. The Army Intelligence and Security Command’s unit in the theater, the

470th MI Group, was strategically located in the Panama

Canal Zone to safeguard the critically important canal and

US interests in the region. Counterintelligence also

played an important role in providing force protection to

Army combat units deployed to Honduras for various

field exercises during the 1980s. The Army committed

added resources to the counterdrug effort, leading the

470th MI Group to target narcotics traffickers and engage

in operations that extended into the Andes Mountains of

South America.

The Decade of The Spy

Since the early seventies, the US Army had in place a

small but professional element to direct its worldwide spycatching effort. Over time, its members had become

extremely adept at turning the tables in the spy-counterspy game by luring hostile intelligence handlers into traps

through the use of double agents. The real heroes of

such operations were often military and civilian personnel

who dutifully reported being approached by a foreign

Hostile intelligence services worked out of the Soviet mission in New York City and posed a major threat to the security of sensitive

technology. (LC)

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agent, and then agreed to assume the role of spy; an

undertaking often requiring great patience and personal

sacrifice on their part.

Europe was most often the battleground of spy versus

counterspy being played out in the shadows of the Cold

War. Counterintelligence faced an added challenge in

Berlin. Located some 100 miles behind the Iron Curtain,

the city was an ideal outpost for Western intelligence.

Under these circumstances, it was logical that US intelligence personnel would become prime targets for possible

exploitation by Soviet intelligence services which wanted

to know: “What information did the United States

possess?” and “Where were the Soviets themselves

vulnerable?” Since 1975, the Army had operated an elite

counterintelligence element—the 766th MI Detachment—

as a shield against these threats in Berlin.

When referring to what motivated spies, counterintelligence personnel frequently used the acronym “MICE”

(money, ideology, corruption, coercion, and ego). In the

beginning of the Cold War, many of those who betrayed

the United States did so for ideological reasons; at the

end of the conflict, the motivations were almost solely

monetary and psychological in nature. In the mid-1980s,

these proved to be the hooks that the Soviets used to reel

in what they thought was another prize catch. The

Soviets had become aware, possibly by means of signals

intelligence, that a sergeant newly assigned to the

sensitive Army site of Field Station Berlin was having

trouble making car payments. Fortunately, when approached by the hostile intelligence organization, the

American soldier remained loyal, relaying the nature of the

contact to members of the 766th MI Detachment and

volunteering to be doubled.

The operation as it played out illustrated all the little

factors that spelled the difference between success and

failure: patience to be willing to turn down meetings that

were not on turf advantageous to the counterspies; the

risk of using actual classified information so that if foreign

agents did not possess diplomatic papers, they could be

tried in German courts; and the coordination required with

French counterparts in whose sector the sting was set.

The professionalism of 766th MI Detachment personnel

was demonstrated when a believable excuse had to be

invented for why the sergeant missed a drop the day

before. By placing a cast on one of his ankles and placing

him on crutches, they furnished the perfect alibi. When

the meeting did take place, the Soviets might still have

completed the transaction and slipped away unnoticed if

not for the good fortune and the sharp eyes of Army

counterintelligence specialists. The rendezvous ended

Surveillance photos of Army sergeant Clyde Conrad (right) and his handler. (INSCOM)

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dramatically with a petite female agent wrestling a burley

KGB officer into submission. The operation netted three

KGB agents, among them, Valery Kirukhin, an officer

assigned to the elite First Chief Directorate.

All of Department of Defense was stunned by the

arrest of a former Navy Chief Warrant Officer. John A.

Walker, Jr. was arrested on 19 May 1985 at the Ramada Inn

in Rockville, Maryland, following a drop of deciphered

secret Soviet messages in a rural area of the Maryland

suburbs of Washington, DC. For 14 years, Walker and his

associates, to include two family members and a close

friend, had delivered to the enemy literally millions of

classified messages and the key to decipher them. The

case was a wakeup call to DOD leadership that it was time

to readjust priorities, take new initiatives to ensure the

security of the force, and double counterintelligence

efforts—all with the intention to, as the current ACSI put

it, “flush-out any Walkers in our midst.”

During the 1980s, the Army had two cases of its own

that rivaled that of the Walkers. The first was the Szabo/

Conrad spy ring that placed US and NATO war plans in

the hands of the enemy; the damage was potentially such,

that had a major conflict actually broken out, Western

Europe would have had no recourse other than to

surrender. The case is well-documented by COL Stuart A.

Herrington’s book Traitors Among Us. (Herrington, a

career HUMINT/CI officer, served as commander of the

766th MI Detachment.) The operation was unusual in the

annals of Army counterintelligence for a number of

reasons. Like the Walkers, there existed several generations of spies that stretched over 16 years from 1972 to

1988, and the investigation required a significant amount

of resources: the expenditure of several million dollars,

and during one period, the deployment of 50 agents—all

indicators of the seriousness with which the United States

and NATO viewed the leaks.

In 1978, National authorities warned the Department of

Defense that one of their sources had indicated that highlevel war-planning documents were being transmitted to

the Soviets through the Hungarian Military Intelligence

Service. But the Army’s initial investigation went nowhere; more information was needed to identify the

source of these breaches of security.

Zoltan Szabo, whose family fled the Hungarian

Revolution in 1956 and eventually migrated to the United

States, entered the Army and became a decorated veteran

of Vietnam; in the early 1970s, he was reassigned to the G3

staff of the 8th Infantry Division in Germany. It was here

that he was first approached by Hungarian intelligence,

which played on his ties to his homeland. Up until his

Berlin became a hot spot for spies and counterspies during the Cold War. Members of the US Army Field Station Berlin, which sat

atop a small mountain made of the city’s rubble from World War II, were targets of Soviet espionage. (INSCOM)

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retirement from the Army in 1979, Szabo routinely provided planning documents to his handlers, and he made

arrangements to ensure the flow of documents would

continue.

In 1985, counterintelligence agents received the break

they had been looking for: added information to include a

list of the documents and the dates they were taken.

Among them was the US Army Europe Operations Plan,

which detailed the Army’s transition to war. This revelation also brought with it the attention and pressure from

on top to move forward with the resources needed to

complete the investigation. Herrington quotes the then

ACSI, LTG William E. Odom, as wanting “the case tackled

with reckless abandon.” Given these new clues, the Army

counterintelligence agents were quick to draw a profile of

the likely perpetrator, and the person who fit it perfectly

was one Clyde Conrad: a hard-working noncommissioned

officer who had spent an unusually large portion of his

career in Germany, mostly with the G3 War Plans Section

of the 8th Infantry where he was known as “Mr. Plans.”

Investigators noted that in the late 1970s, Conrad’s family

seemed to have enjoyed increased prosperity—approximately the same time he had been recruited by Szabo into

the business of spying.

As leading Army counterintelligence professionals

mulled over their discovery of Conrad, they began for the

first time to consider Szabo, who had also served with the

G3 Plans at the 8th Infantry Division. Another important

piece fell into place when Army counterintelligence

identified a master sergeant who early in his career had

befriended Conrad and was willing to make the sacrifice

necessary to be reassigned to Germany in hopes that

Conrad would attempt to recruit his former comrade-inarms. The final factor that was instrumental to the case

was the establishment of a Joint Task Force out of

Washington, DC, that included representatives of the

Army, the FBI, the CIA, and Department of Justice.

Despite the impressive amount of evidence uncovered,

such as the identification of the brothers Sandor and Imre

Kercsik, Swedish citizens who served as couriers of the

classified information, the investigation faced its share of

challenges that kept its outcome in jeopardy until the very

end. The first surprise was the revelation by the New

York Times that it was aware of the case. Fortunately, the

newspaper agreed to back off the story. A second shock

was word that Conrad also had spoken of an unidentified

but potentially lucrative source in V Corps. This mysterious individual turned out to be a second soldier being

used by the Army to lure Conrad. The case also stretched

the Army’s capabilities at technical surveillance. One

phase involved the use of a private aircraft to monitor

Conrad’s travels. For various reasons, the Department of

Justice also continued to demand an extremely high level

of proof to ensure conviction. Finally, there was the

decision of when and how to bring German authorities

into the picture and, the question of what their response

would be.

The end came suddenly on the morning of 23 August

1988 when German officers knocked on Conrad’s door and

proceeded to place him under arrest. During the ensuing

trial, Conrad received a life sentence, the stiffest ever

meted out by the Federal Republic of Germany for such a

crime, but the courts viewed it as being the most serious

act of espionage ever perpetrated against NATO.

While traveling out of country, Szabo and his wife

learned of Conrad’s arrest and were able to seek immediate refuge in his native Hungary. However, he later freely

submitted to a detailed debriefing and named names of all

he attempted to recruit over his 17-year career. Army

counterintelligence apprehended other members of the

spy ring, including a number of minor figures, enlisted

soldiers who had for brief periods been exploited by

Conrad and Szabo. Besides the loss of most-secret

information, just the sheer number of soldiers involved

was staggering; among them were many individuals who

did not cooperate with Szabo/Conrad but at the same time

failed to report the contacts to security personnel.

In 1988, Army counterintelligence first received word

of still another spy of importance within the ranks when

authorities apprehended a low-level East German agent in

the West. In exchange for helping his family to defect, the

enemy agent furnished the description of a US soldier

who was involved in selling secrets. Counterintelligence

In the mid-1970s, the Hungarian

Intelligence Service approached a chief

warrant officer, a Hungarian-American, during

a trip to visit his mother in Budapest.

Subsequently, the soldier agreed to be

managed by Army counterintelligence handlers

to foster future contacts. For 18 months,

Army counterintelligence managed the

warrant officer’s meeting with his Hungarian

contact. The reassignment of the warrant

officer shifted the case back to the United

States. Ultimately the drama was played out

in Augusta, Georgia, at the local Civil War

memorial where FBI agents arrested Otto

Gilbert, a Hungarian-born New Yorker, who

was attempting to exchange $4,000 in payment

for classified documents provided by the

warrant officer from his new assignment.

Gilbert was described by those who knew him

as witty and charming, but a person void of

principles and politics. Years before, he had

been recruited by Hungarian intelligence when

he was caught in the act of smuggling.

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quickly identified the individual as a warrant officer by the

name of James W. Hall. Like Conrad, Hall had spent an

unusually large portion of his career in Germany and had

been at one time assigned to Field Station Berlin. Since

the early 1960s, the US Army had maintained an operational site in West Berlin atop Teufelsberg or “Devil’s

Mountain,” made of the city’s rubble from World War II.

Its array of geodesic domes gave Field Station Berlin a

Disney Land like appearance. More importantly, the

station provided the West a window into East Germany. It

was logical that personnel assigned to such a unit would

be high on the target list of foreign intelligence services.

Army counterintelligence began an intensive technical

surveillance of Hall in his new assignment at Fort Stewart,

Georgia. In the process, they professionally managed a

number of crises that emerged during the investigation.

Like the Conrad case, they faced a serious unintended

leak; this time involving Hall’s own chain of command.

Since timing was critical, Army counterintelligence

arranged for the defection of an East German who had at

one time been a courier for Hall’s information; upon his

relocation to Georgia, he surprised Hall with a telephone

call and an offer to meet. On 21 December 1988, Hall

walked into the Airport Days Inn in Savannah, Georgia,

with more secrets to sell. Here, he was introduced to a

new KGB handler, who in reality was an FBI undercover

agent. The Hall investigation also brought to light a

second stunning revelation—Huseyin Yildirim, a Turk,

well-known to all, including members of the intelligence

community, as Meister, a mechanic-instructor at the Berlin

 The fall of the Berlin Wall would alter the spy/counterspy shadow war which had been in effect for almost 45 years. (NARA)

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Command’s auto shop. For many years, Yildirim had

helped transport the secrets of Hall and others to East

German intelligence.

The Collapse of The Soviet Union

Fifteen years after the commitment to construct a new

headquarters facility for the Army’s major intelligence

command, the promises of the Intelligence Organization

and Stationing Study were fulfilled. In July 1989, the

Intelligence and Security Command relocated from

Arlington Hall to Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The new building

was appropriately named after MG Dennis E. Nolan, the

Army’s first G2 and the leader of the multidiscipline

intelligence effort in support of the American Expeditionary Forces during World War I. For members of the

counterintelligence community, the name Nolan held

added meaning. It was General Nolan, who had initiated

the call for the Corps of Intelligence Police, which played

an important role in launching Army counterintelligence.

It was ironic the same year of the Nolan Building’s

dedication would also mark the end of the Cold War.

Intelligence historian John P. Finnegan provided the

following overview of the Cold War: “At the outset of the

Cold War between the Free World and the Soviet Union,

former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had grimly

noted that ‘from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the

Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the

continent [of Europe].’ The Iron Curtain separating East

from West eventually found its most graphic expression in

the Berlin Wall, a concrete barrier erected in 1962 to stop

the flow of refugees fleeing Communist East Germany. For

a whole generation, the Berlin Wall symbolized totalitarianism and the apparently permanent division of Europe.

In 1989, it came crashing down. With astonishing speed,

the Soviet Empire—and the Soviet Union itself—followed

suit...The Cold War had finally ended, not in truce or

compromise, but in victory for the West.”

For 45 years, Army counterintelligence specialists, both

military and civilian, stood as “silent warriors” on the front

lines of the Cold War. Twenty-four hours a day, 7 days a

week they remained vigilant against the threat posed by

foreign intelligence services. Many a lonely night was

spent fighting boredom and drowsiness while conducting

surveillance or watching isolated stretches of the Iron

Curtain in search of line-crossers. They often dealt with

individuals who were neither friends nor foes and whose

loyalty was uncertain. Although the full contribution of

Army counterintelligence by its very nature is difficult to

fully ascertain, there is no doubt as to the sustained

professionalism demonstrated by its military and civilian

members.

Finally, it is important to remember that the war of

espionage was just not a game being played out. Real

lives were at stake in the world of spy versus counterspy.

On 23 March 1985, the US Military Liaison Mission

suffered its first casualty when LTC Arthur D. Nicholson,

Jr. was shot by a Soviet guard on patrol near Ludwigslust,

East Germany, 100 miles northwest of Berlin. Lieutenant

Colonel Nicholson, unarmed, was attempting to photograph Soviet armored vehicles. In a callous act that

violated all established norms, Soviet guards restrained

Nicholson’s companion from rendering aid to the dying

officer. It was later speculated that Warrant Officer Hall

may have passed information to the Soviets, which alerted

them to the US Military Liaison Mission’s success in

collecting targets in that specific area, and that it was this

leak that could have in turn led to the unusually aggressive response on the part of the Soviets.

In the aftermath of the shooting of Nicholson, the

White House permitted US counterintelligence agents to

conduct a series of harassing actions against Soviet

liaison representatives to hinder them in performance of

their day-to-day activities, subjecting them to blanket

surveillance and to numerous stops for identification

checks. The world of espionage would remain a dangerous one right up to the last days of the Cold War. According to Colonel Herrington, the Soviet sources who

supplied information that eventually led to identification

of Conrad as a spy were themselves victims of betrayal

and subsequently paid with their lives.

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“We have slain a large dragon, but

we now live in a jungle filled with a

bewildering variety of poisonous

snakes. And in many ways, the

dragon was easier to keep track of.”

CIA Director James Woolsey in the wake of

Soviet collapse

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The end of the Cold War did not mean that Army

counterintelligence immediately stood down from its longstanding obligations. For instance, it remained in support

of international inspections involving Nuclear and

Conventional Armed Forces Treaties. At the same time,

new relationships with former Eastern Bloc nations

allowed access to information that helped to shine the

spotlight on here-to-fore unknown traitors within the

ranks. Using these new sources, an unprecedented

number of counterespionage cases were successfully

brought to closure.

The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States

as the only remaining super-power, but it did not bring

about a diminished role for America’s armed forces.

Instead, the Army quickly found itself engaged in a series

of regional conflicts and operations. During Operation

JUST CAUSE, US forces helped topple Panamanian narcodictator General Manuel Noriega. During the combat

operations, small teams of counterintelligence soldiers

from the 470th MI Brigade provided spot reports from

throughout Panama City. Using their sources, the counterintelligence personnel obtained critical information on

troop dispositions and movements as well as the location

of weapons caches. After the fighting ceased, counterintelligence specialists continued to help screen and

process some 7,000 Panamanian soldiers, paramilitary, and

civilians. Agents also identified and apprehended a

number of Noriega’s top aides who had gone into hiding.

Following on the heels of JUST CAUSE, Iraqi Dictator

Saddam Hussein launched a surprise attack on the

neighboring Emirate of Kuwait, a tiny but oil-rich territory

in the Persian Gulf. The United States would lead a United

Nations-backed coalition to oust Hussein’s forces. Army

counterintelligence’s greatest contributions lay in support

of Task Force FREEDOM. Being among the first to reenter

liberated Kuwait City, counterintelligence soldiers

provided force protection and also helped to collect

significant documents to be turned over for exploitation.

Throughout the nineties, elements of the US Army

continued to deploy in support of various regional

peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Whether in

EPILOGUE

Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Persian Gulf or East

Timor, counterintelligence specialists were in country to

assist in force protection.

In 1995, INSCOM lost much of its human intelligence

operations and resources to the Defense Intelligence

Agency’s Defense HUMINT Service. This would throw

counterintelligence and residual HUMINT functions into a

state that they had not been in for 40 years. For the

immediate, soldiers would once again be called upon to

wear two hats. It would take another 10 years before

authorities once again realized that a need existed for

greater diversity in training and assignments.

With the coming of the Information Age, unprotected

DOD networks became vulnerable to intruders who could

steal secrets without being detected. Consequently, Army

counterintelligence has become an important player in

cyber warfare. Today, counterintelligence finds itself

heavily engaged in the war against global terrorism and

provides support to troops on the ground in Afghanistan

and Iraq and protection for America’s interests and

personnel around the world. To accomplish its numerous

missions, counterintelligence has turned to new technologies and real-time linkage to other members of the intelligence and law enforcement communities.

Much has changed since counterintelligence was first

created to serve the Nation and its Army during World

War I. Important transformations have included the

shifting of background investigations to the Department

of Defense and the integration of counterintelligence with

other intelligence disciplines and information operations.

A more recent challenge has been keeping doctrine up-todate with emerging technologies. However, in the midst of

it all, military and civilians have continued to draw

inspiration from their rich heritage as counterintelligence

specialists. Like the Corps of Intelligence Police sergeants

and the Counter Intelligence Corps agents who came

before them, today’s counterintelligence personnel remain

equally committed to shielding the Army from the threats

posed by foreign intelligence services and international

terrorists.

155

Colonel George Trofimoff, son of immigrants, was the highest-ranking US Army officer to be

convicted of spying during the Cold War. Trofimoff was the one-time chief of the US section within a

joint interrogation center at Nuremberg, Germany. For nearly 20 years, beginning as far back as 1968,

Trofimoff fed thousands of secret military documents to the Soviets, giving them insights on just how

much the Allies knew and their sources. The need to deal with financial debts was at the root of

Trofimoff’s betrayal. The Soviets paid approximately $250,000 for the secrets—a very cheap price

considering the information obtained. However, it would take nearly 8 years and the testimony of a

former KGB official to finally bring Trofimoff to justice.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

The documentation of Army counterintelligence is very spotty. The primary reason is that counterintelligence deals

with human sources, and a tendency exists not to leave a record trail apart from official case files. Secondly, there has

never been a centralized, separate reporting system for Army counterintelligence historical records, such as annual unit

reports. They were most often retired to various Federal Records Centers. Finally, the major player in Army counterintelligence was the Counter Intelligence Corps, but except for a brief period, the CIC did not have a professional historian

assigned. However, during its existence the US Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) had its own historian.

In 1947, two free-lance writers undertook a history of the CIC; many former agents cooperated by granting interviews

and providing supporting documents. (Nothing was known to have come from the effort, and many of the accumulated

documents were lost or misplaced, which led to a second attempt.) In 1951, MG John K. Rice, Chief of CIC, authorized the

preparation of a brief history of the CIC for use by the school. The result was so well received that Rice’s successor, MG

Philip E. Gallagher, commissioned a 30-volume history written at the classified level. Except for privacy considerations, the

history has been subsequently declassified. Lieutenant Colonel Franklin P. Jordan headed up the research-writing unit.

However, over the years, the project became associated with MAJ Ann Bray, who served as editor and was with the

project from start to finish. The team canvassed various Federal Records Centers throughout CONUS. They supplemented their research by interviewing numerous participants. In the end, the team claimed to have reviewed 150,000

pages of documents, covering over 300 units; interviewed 500 persons; and read 100 books and articles. The records are

still in the National Archives and many remain scattered at various regional records centers. (The portion of the records

that remained in the custody of the CIC/USAINTC historians is at National Archives Records Administration Annex II at

College Park, Maryland, and is located under Section 319.21 UD of the NARA Guide.)

The two must reads on Army counterintelligence are America’s Secret Army by Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, which

focuses on the CIC in World War II and post-war occupation, and Traitors Among Us by Stuart A. Herrington, whose

first-hand account of counterintelligence successes in the late Cold War reads like a novel. Other overviews meriting

attention include a two-volume work entitled Spy Catchers of the US Army, which was Ann Bray’s effort to summarize the

World War II portion of the 30-volume history on the Counter Intelligence Corps. Gary A. Trogdon wrote a dissertation,

“A Decade of Catching Spies: The United States Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps, 1943-1953.” John P. Finnegan’s

Military Intelligence (a part of the US Army Center of Military History’s lineage series) helps to put counterintelligence in

the context of the larger Army intelligence. Finnegan also wrote an overview of counterintelligence from 1917 to 1947 in a

paper “Enter the Sphinx.” There is also Bruce W. Bidwell’s multi-volume work History of Military Intelligence Division,

Department of General Staff, 1775-1941; unfortunately, it tends to be uneven in quality. Two alumni magazines that

contain valuable personal accounts are the Golden Sphinx (published by the National CIC Association) and Agent

Report (National CIC Veterans). Finally, the now defunct National Counterintelligence Center (NCI) produced “A Counterintelligence Reader” edited by Frank J. Rafalko. It is largely a cut and paste history of stories on spies and counterspies on the home front but does have a useful bibliography.

INTRODUCTION

The information on counterintelligence in the Revolutionary War was drawn from a series of papers prepared by

Edward F. Sayle. The most important of these are “George Washington: Manager of Intelligence” and “Intelligence in the

War of Independence.” Another related paper is “Evolution of a Military Intelligence Service during the American

Revolution” written by Allan C. Ashcraft. Benjamin Tallmadge’s Memoirs of Colonel Benjamin Tallmadge is also an

important source. For the Civil War, Edwin C. Fishel’s book The Secret War for the Union was used. In his appendixes,

Fishel makes an excellent presentation on the problems of the various autobiographical stories written by former Civil War

spies and spy catchers. In particular he attempts to separate fact from fiction in the writings of Allan Pinkerton, Rose

O’Neal Greenhow, and Lafayette Baker. (Baker’s History of the United States Secret Service, Pinkerton’s The Spy of the

Rebellion, and Greenhow’s My Imprisonment and the First Year of Abolition Rule at Washington.) Materiel on military

intelligence in the late 19th century is taken from The Final Memoranda by Ralph Van Deman; this particular edition was

edited by Ralph E. Weber. In a master’s thesis at Kansas State University, Marc B. Powe contributed information on “The

Emergence of the War Department Intelligence Agency: 1885-1918.”

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WORLD WAR I

Van Deman’s account was found in The Final Memorandum. Lieutenant Royden Williamson prepared a short

overview of the early days of the CIP, which is located at NARA II. Colonel Cabot Ward also wrote a comprehensive

report dated 1919 on counterintelligence in the rear areas. Another insightful document at NARA II was the “History of

the Philadephia Branch Military Intelligence Division General Staff.” An article by John P. Finnegan entitled “Army

Counterintelligence in WWI” (Military Intelligence Bulletin, January 1988) provides an excellent overview. Other

sources include Laurie and Cole’s The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877-1945. The story of

Agent Peter De Pasqua by Thomas M. Johnson, “Death to the Americans” is contained in Military Intelligence: Its

Heroes and Legends edited by Diane Hamm. Although of marginal value, Dennis E. Nolan prepared a draft on intelligence

in World War I (to be found at the Military History Institute in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania). Samuel T. Hubbard’s

Memoirs of a Staff Officer (Library of Congress) is a more readable account of the G2, AEF. FBI Historian, John F. Fox, Jr.,

has an article “Bureaucratic Wrangling over Counterintelligence, 1917-18” in the CIA’s Studies in Intelligence (Vol 49, No

1), which tells about inter-departmental struggles.

BETWEEN THE WARS

Herbert O. Yardley’s The American Black Chamber and David Kahn’s The Reader of Gentlemen’s Mail provide

accounts of Army code-breaking in World War I and the 1920s. A helpful overview of the Army’s response to domestic

disturbances is Andrew J. Birtle’s US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941.

Diane Hamm’s Heroes and Legends contains the Sakakida and Komori story as does Ann Bray’s “Spy Catchers.” (Soon

to be released is a history by James C. McNaughton regarding the role of Asian-American soldiers that should contain

the most accurate story on Sakakida and Komori.) John P. Finnegan’s Military Intelligence: A Picture History provided a

background summary for this and other chapters.

WORLD WAR II

“History of Military Intelligence Training at Camp Ritchie, Maryland 1942-1945” is the official account of the school

and provides general background information. Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb by Vincent C. Jones tells the

official story of the Army’s participation in the atomic program. The book also has a chapter dedicated to the subject of

security. “Los Alamos: Beginning of an Era” by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Public Relations Office contains

added background information. The National Counterintelligence Center’s “A Counterintelligence Reader” also has a

section on the Manhattan Project. For those interested in the events surrounding the White House’s efforts to do away

with the CIC in CONUS, America’s Secret Army by Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting contains additional information.

Lieutenant Colonel Horace Miner prepared a small but excellent personal account of operations in North Africa and

Sicily. This is among the interviews at NARA II.

An internal report that deals with the so-called “Colmar Incident” was used for information on the case involving the

stolen cryptologic equipment. Over the years, various CIC agents have written about their experiences in the war; one of

the best written was Ib Melchior’s first hand account in Case by Case. “The Rhine Maiden” (The American Weekly, dated

8 March 1953) by Kurt Singer tells the story of the spy Sybille Delcourt.

Soon to be released is a history by James C. McNaughton regarding the role of Asian-American soldiers in the

intelligence war for the Pacific. Special Agent in the Pacific, WWII by William Brand Simpson is another well-written

account telling of his experiences in the theater and in post-war Japan. William A. Owens’ Eye-deep in Hell tells of his

dealings with the Hukbalahap in the Philippines. In the aftermath of World War II, the Military Intelligence Section of the

US Far East Command prepared a summary report: “Operations of the Counter Intelligence Corps in the SWPA.”

The Reader’s Digest compiled a book of stories that appeared in various issues; the book is entitled Secrets and Spies.

“The Golden Sphinx” by Thomas Johnson is particularly noteworthy. Thomas Johnson was a World War I correspondent

who was befriended by General Dennis E. Nolan, G2 of the AEF. Nolan introduced Johnson to the world of counterintelligence. A writer of limited abilities, Johnson wrote a number of short stories on the subject of counterintelligence and in

the process accumulated various background materials and drafts. These are preserved among the Army counterintelligence records files at NARA II.

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POST WAR

Allan A Ryan, Jr. wrote Klaus Barbie and the United States Government that details the role of the CIC and Barbie. “A

Matter of Hindsight” by Walter J. Unrath (American Intelligence Journal, Autumn/Winter 1992/93) is a first-hand

perspective on the Barbie Affair. Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting’s America’s Secret Army provided added insights not

available in the CIC history regarding post-war Europe.

Peter Oglobin for the Operations Research Office at John Hopkins University prepared a study entitled “The Purge in

Occupied Japan: Appendix I, The Role of SCAP Intelligence Agencies in the Purge of Japanese Undesirables.” There is

an excellent presentation by LTC Gordon Flaherty at the 1951 CIC Commanders Conference on the CIC’s monitoring of

Japanese repatriates returning from Soviet camps. For the Occupation of Japan, an interview of Captain Benjamin T.

Obata is also an excellent source. The views of Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall on post-war Korea are captured in an

interview. See NARA II for all of these documents.

THE COLD WAR

John P. Finnegan wrote a number of articles and monographs that traced the role of the CIC during the Korean War.

The last one was The US Army in the Korean War 1950-53: Operations and Intelligence Support. A number of operational files are among the CIC records at NARA II. “LITTLE SWITCH, BIG SWITCH, CIC Division Operations” (by CWO

W.W. Brame) at the 1951 CIC Commanders Conference is a good summary. Again, see NARA II.

Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner edited for Central Intelligence Agency the following publication: Venona:

Soviet Espionage and the American Response 1939-1957. The 1951 CIC Commanders Conference presentations

contain one by LTC David H. Huntan on “66th CIC Detachment Operations.” CPT K. MacDougall prepared a draft lecture

to be delivered by COL Erskine on the subject of the “Verger-Ponger Case.” These last two documents are in NARA II.

Within its files, the INSCOM History Office has a number of summaries on units.

Regarding the mission of the 704th INTC Detachment in Vietnam, MAJ Dillion prepared a paper on “Operating in an

Environment of Counterinsurgency.” (NARA II) The Role of Military Intelligence 1965-1967 (part of the US Army

Center of Military History’s series on Vietnam) by MG Joseph A McChristian, who served as the J2 MACV provided good

insights. “Army Operational Intelligence Activities in Civil Disturbances Since 1957” by Paul J. Scheips and Karl E. Cocke

is an early overview on the subject. A more significant version is one by Paul Scheips, Domestic Disorders: 1945-1992,

which will soon be released by the Center of Military History. The annual histories of the US Army Intelligence Command

contain little in the area of operational information. A copy of a letter that LTG William P. Yarborough wrote to a newspaper editor of The Memphis Commercial Appeal giving background information on role of Army counterintelligence on the

home front was most useful. The counterintelligence records at NARA II contain numerous after action reports and

decision papers regarding the Army’s response to civil disturbances of the 1960s. “Intelligence Activities and the Rights

of Americans,” Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence

Activities of the United States Senate, Ninety Fourth Congress, Second Session, US Government Printing Office, No. 94-

755, April 14 1976, Book II (Church Committee) provides information on the role of domestic intelligence in the 1960s.

Finally, Don Oberdorfer prepared an excellent article on Sergeant Dunlap, “The Playboy Sergeant Who Spied for Russia,”

which appeared in Great Spy Stories, edited by Allen Dulles.

There are numerous articles on the subject of The Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study, such as the one

written by then BG Edmund R. Thompson, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, entitled “INSCOM: To Move More

Intelligence Faster Up the Line” (October 1977 edition of the Army Green Book). The US Army Intelligence and Security

Command’s Journal ran a series of articles on OPSEC (June/July 1979, August 1979, and April 1981).

Although not an official history, Herrington’s Traitors Among Us provides great insights into the modern world of

Army counterintelligence. INSCOM: 25th Anniversary, which is now out-of-print, provided general descriptions of

various counterintelligence efforts worldwide.

APPENDICES

The World War II order of battle came from unit historical data cards located at the Center of Military History, who is

the final arbitrator on lineage and honors. Also of assistance was Shelby Stanton’s Order of Battle: US Army World War

II. The Korean-era group came from a station list.

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161

Appendix A

CIC ORDER OF BATTLE

WORLD WAR II

(1 March 1945)

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Sixth Army (Philippines/Luzon) 306th CIC Det

6th Inf Division 6th CIC Det

43d

 Inf Division 43d CIC Det

I Corps 201st CIC Det

25th Inf Division 25th CIC Det

32d Inf Division 32d CIC Det

33d Inf Division 33d CIC Det

XIV Corps 214th CIC Det

1st Cav Division 801st CIC Det

11th Abn Division 11th CIC Det

37th Inf Division 37th CIC Det

XI Corps 211th CIC Det

38th Inf Division 38th CIC Det

40th Inf Division 40th CIC Det

Area Detachments (Philippines/Luzon)

442d

, 453d, 457th, 473d, 481st, 484th, 485th, 493d,

and 999th CIC Det

Eighth Army (Philippines/Leyte) 308th CIC Det

41st Inf Division 41st CIC Det

24th Inf Division 24th CIC Det

XXIV Corps 224th CIC Det

7th Cav Division 7th CIC Det

77th Inf Division 77th CIC Det

96th Inf Division 96th CIC Det

X Corps 210th CIC Det

Americal Div 182d

 CIC Det

Area Detachments (Philippines/Leyte)

458th, 459th, 480th, 482d

, 483d, and 486th CIC Det

Eighth Army Area Command (New Guinea)

93d

 Inf Division 93d CIC Det

31st Inf Division 31st CIC Det

Area Detachments (New Guinea)

440th, 441st (Theater HQ), 444th, 445th, 446th, 447th, 448th, 449th,

450th, 451st, 452d

,454th, 455th, 456th, 474th, 475th, 476th,

477th,478th, 487th, 488th, 489th, 490th, 491st, 901st, 902d, 903d,

904th, 951st, 952d, 953d, 954th, 955th, 956th, 958th, 960th, 961st,

and 962d CIC Det

Area Detachments (Australia)

443d

 and 444th CIC Det

CENTRAL PACIFIC

Tenth Army (Central Pacific) 310th CIC Det

27th Inf Division 27th CIC Det

81st Inf Division 81st CIC Det

Central Pacific Base Command (Hawaii)

IX Corps 209th CIC Det

98th Inf Division 98th CIC Det

Area Detachments (Hawaii)

401st, 402d

, 404th, 496th, 963d, and 964th CIC Det

SOUTH PACIFIC

South Pacific Base Command (New Caledonia)

433d CIC Det

EUROPE

Fifth Army (Northern Italy) 305th CIC Det

II Corps 202d CIC Det

85th Inf Division 85th CIC Det

88th Inf Division 88th CIC Det

91st Inf Division 91st CIC Det

34th Inf Division 34th CIC Det

IV Corps 204th CIC Det

1st Armd Division 501st CIC Det

92d Inf Division 92d CIC Det

10th Mt Division 10th CIC Det

Area Detachments (Italy)

425th, 426th, 428th, 430th, and 431st CIC Det

21st Army Group (Low Countries/Germany)

Ninth Army 309th CIC Det

XIII Corps 213th CIC Det

79th Inf Division 79th CIC Det

84th Inf Division 84th CIC Det

95th Inf Division 95th CIC Det

102d

 Inf Division 102d CIC Det

XVI Corps 216th CIC Det

8th Armd Division 508th CIC Det

35th Inf Division 35th CIC Det

75th Inf Division 75th CIC Det

102d

 Inf Division 102d CIC Det

XIX Corps 219th CIC Det

2d Armd Division 502d CIC Det

29th Inf Division 29th CIC Det

30th Inf Division 30th CIC Det

83d Inf Div 83d

 CIC Det

12th Army Group (France/Low Countries/Germany)

66th Inf Division 66th CIC Det

First Army 301st CIC Det

V Corps 205th CIC Det

7th Armd Division 507th CIC Det

2d

 Inf Division 2d CIC Det

28th Inf Division 28th CIC Det

69th Inf Division 69th CIC Det

106th Inf Division 106th CIC Det

33290_P001_176.pmd 169 11/9/2005, 10:40 AM
VII Corps 207th CIC Det

3d Armd Division 503d CIC Det

8th Inf Division 8th CIC Det

80th Inf Division 80th CIC Det

99th Inf Division 99th CIC Det

104th Inf Division 104th CIC Det

76th Inf Division 76th CIC Det

III Corps 203d CIC Det

6th Armd Division 506th CIC Det

9th Armd Division 509th CIC Det

1st Inf Division 1st CIC Det

9th Inf Division 9th CIC Det

78th Inf Division 78th CIC Det

Third Army 303d

 CIC Det

VIII Corps 208th CIC Det

5th Armd Division 505th CIC Det

11th Armd Div 511th CIC Det

4th Inf Division 4th CIC Det

90th Inf Division 90th CIC Det

87th Inf Division 87th CIC Det

XII Corps 212th CIC Det

4th Armd Division 504th CIC Det

5th Inf Division 5th CIC Det

76th Inf Division 76th CIC Det

XX Corps 220th CIC Det

10th Armd Div 510th CIC Det

26th Inf Division 26th CIC Det

65th Inf Division 65th CIC Det

94th Inf Division 94th CIC Det

6th Army Group (France/Germany)

Seventh Army 307th CIC Det

VI Corps 206th CIC Det

14th Armd Div 514th CIC Det

36th Inf Division 36th CIC Det

42d Inf Division 42d CIC Det

45th Inf Division 45th CIC Det

103d

 Inf Division 103d CIC Det

XV Corps 215th CIC Det

44th Inf Division 44th CIC Det

100th Inf Division 100th CIC Det

XXI Corps 221st CIC Det

12th Armd Div 512th CIC Det

63d

 Inf Division 63d CIC Det

70th Armd Div 70th CIC Det

3d Inf Division 3d CIC Det

Other (Low Countries/France)

First Allied Airborne Army

82d

 Abn Division 82d CIC Det

XVIII Abn Corps 218th CIC Det

13th Abn Division 13th CIC Det

17th Abn Division 17th CIC Det

101st Abn Division 101st CIC Det

Fifteenth Army 315th CIC Det

13th Armd Div 513th CIC Det

16th Armd Div 516th CIC Det

20th Armd Div 520th CIC Det

86th Inf Division 86th CIC Det

71st Inf Division 71st CIC Det

89th Inf Division 89th CIC Det

97th Inf Division 97th CIC Det

Area Detachments (France/Low Countries)417th,

418th (ALSOS), 419th, 420th, 421st, 423d, 427th, 429th, 494th, and

495th CIC Det

XXII Corps (England) 222d

 CIC Det

XXIII Corps (England) 223d CIC Det

Area Detachments (England)

223d

 and 333d CIC Det

CHINA

Area Detachments

411th, 412th, and 415th CIC Det

BURMA-INDIA

Area Detachments

405th,406th, 407th, 408th, 409th, 410th, 413th, 414th,

and 416th CIC Det

OTHER OVERSEAS

Panama Canal Dept

469th, 470th, 471st, and 472d CIC Det

Alaska Dept

467th CIC

South Atlantic Base Command (Brazil)

432d CIC Det

Africa-Middle East Theater (Egypt)

400th CIC Det

Bermuda Base Command

460th CIC Det

Iceland Base Command

462d

, 463d,, 464th, and 465th CIC Det

Newfoundland Base Command

466th CIC Det

CONUS

Second Army (Tennessee) 302d CIC Det

Fourth Army (Texas) 304th CIC Det

XXXVI Corps 468th CIC Det

MI Center Training Center (Fort Ritchie)

492d

, 497th, 498th CIC Det

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Appendix B

LIST OF UNITS

KOREAN WAR ERA

(6 April 1953)

PACIFIC

KOREA

2d Inf Division 2d CIC Det

3d Inf Division 3d CIC Det

7th Inf Division 7th CIC Det

24th Inf Division 24th CIC Det

25th Inf Division 25th CIC Det

40th Inf Division 40th CIC Det

45th Inf Division 45th CIC Det

1st Marine Division 181st CIC Det

1st Cav Division 191st CIC Det

I Corps 201st CIC Det

IX Corps 209th CIC Det

X Corps 210th CIC Det

Eighth Army 308th CIC Det

705th CIC Det

 Korean Communications

 Zone 704th CIC Det

HAWAII

US Army, Pacific 401st CIC Det

JAPAN

Armed Forces

 Far East 441st CIC Det

OKINAWA

Ryukyus Command 526th CIC Det

EUROPE

GERMANY

1st Inf Division 1st CIC Det

4th Inf Division 4th CIC Det

28th Inf Division 28th CIC Det

43d

 Inf Division 43d CIC Det

US Army, Europe 66th CIC Gp

V Corps 205th CIC Det

VII Corps 207th CIC Det

US Army, Europe 427th CIC Det

2d Armd Division 520th CIC Det

AUSTRIA

US Forces Austria 430th CIC Det

FRANCE

Supreme HQ

 Allied Powers, Europe 450th CIC Det

TRIESTE

Trieste US Troops 17th CIC Det

CONUS

11th Abn Division 11th CIC Det

(Ft Campbell, KY)

31st Inf Division 31st CIC Det

(Cp Atterbury, IN)

37th Inf Division 37th CIC Det

(Cp Polk, LA)

44th Inf Division 44th CIC Det

(Ft Lewis, WA)

47th Inf Division 47th CIC Det

(Cp Rucker, AL)

82d Abn Division 82d CIC Det

(Fort Bragg, NC)

First Army 108th CIC Det

(New York, NY)

Second Army 109th CIC Det

(Ft Meade, MD)

Third Army 111th CIC Det

(Ft McPherson, GA)

Fourth Army 112th CIC Det

(Ft Houston, TX)

Fifth Army 113th CIC Det

(Chicago, IL)

Sixth Army 115th CIC Det

(Presidio of SF, CA)

Mil Dist of Washington 116th CIC Det

(Washington, DC)

XVIII Corps 218th CIC Det

 (Ft Bragg, NC)

111th CIC Det 316th CIC Det

(Ft Jackson, SC)

1st Armd Div 501st CIC Det

(Ft Hood, TX)

111th CIC Det 503d CIC Det

(Ft Benning, GA)

111th CIC Det 701st CIC Det

(Ft Bragg, NC)

301st Log Cmd 702d

 CIC Det

(Ft McClellan, AL)

Second Army 890th CIC Det

(Fort Meade, MD)

Special Weapons Project 901st CIC Det

(Sandia Base, NM)

Chief, CIC 902d CIC Det

(Ft Holabird, MD)

OTHER

US Army Alaska 467th CIC Det

Iceland Defense Force 468th CIC Det

US Army Caribbean (CZ) 470th CIC Det

US Army Caribbean (PR) 471st CIC Det

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Appendix C

KEY PERSONNEL

DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

LTG Keith B. Alexander Jul 03 –

LTG Robert W. Noonan, Jr. Jul 00 – Jul 03

LTG Claudia Kennedy May 97 – Jul 00

LTG Paul E. Menoher, Jr. Feb 95 – Feb 97

LTG Ira C. Owens Oct 91 – Feb 95

LTG Charles B. Eichelberger Nov 89 – Sep 91

LTG Sidney T. Weinstein Aug 85 – Nov 88

ASSISTANT CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

LTG William E. Odom Nov 81 – May 85

MG Edmund R. Thompson Aug 77 – Nov 81

MG Harold R. Aaron Nov 73 – Aug 77

MG William E. Potts Sep 72 – Jul 73

MG Philip B. Davidson, Jr. May 71 – Sep 72

MG Joseph A. McChristian Aug 68 –Apr 71

MG William P. Yarborough Dec 66 – Jul 68

MG John J. Davis Sep 65 – Oct 66

MG Alva R. Fitch Oct 61 – Jan 64

MG John M. Willems Nov 58 – Oct 61

MG Robert A. Schow Aug 56 – Oct 58

ASSISTANT CHIEFS OF STAFF, G2

MG Arthur C. Trudeau Nov 53 – Aug 55

MG Richard C. Partridge Aug 52 – Nov 53

MG Alexander R. Bolling Aug 50 – Aug 52

MG Stafford LeRoy Irvin* Nov 48 – Aug 50

LTG Stephen Chamberlin* Jun 46 – Oct 48

LTG Hoyt S. Vandenberg Jan 46 – Jun 46

MG Clayton Bissell Feb 44 – Jan 46

MG George V. Strong May 42 –Feb 44

BG Raymond E. Lee Feb 42 – May 42

BG Sherman Miles Apr 40 – Jan 42

COL E.R. Warner McCabe Jun 37 – Feb 40

COL Frances H. Lincoln Nov 35 – Jun 37

BG Harry E. Knight Feb 35 – Nov 35

BG Alfred T. Smith Jan 31 – Jan 35

COL Stanley H. Ford May 27 – Sep 30

COL James H. Reeves Jul 24 – Apr 27

COL William K. Naylor Nov 22 – Jun 24

BG Stuart Heintzelman Sep 21 –Nov 22

CHIEFS, MI SECTION/ DIVISION

BG Dennis E. Nolan Sep 20 – Sep 21

BG Marlborough Churchill Jun 18 – Aug 20

COL Ralph Van Deman May 17 – Jun 18

COMMANDING GENERALS, USA

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

COMMAND

MG John F. Kimmons Aug 03 –

MG Keith B. Alexander Jul 01 – Jul 03

MG Robert W. Noonan, Jr. Jul 98 – Jul 00

MG John Thomas, Jr. Aug 96 – Jul 98

BG Trent N. Thomas Sep 94 – Aug 96

MG Paul E. Menoher, Jr. Aug 93 – Sep 94

MG Charles F. Scanlon Oct 90 – Aug 93

MG Stanley H. Hyman Nov 88 – Oct 90

MG Harry E. Soyster Jun 84 – Nov 88

MG Albert N. Stubblebine May 81 – Jun 84

MG William I. Rolya Jan 77 – Mar 81

COMMANDING GENERALS, USA INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY

BG James E. Freeze Aug 77 – Oct 77

BG Edmund R. Thompson Jul 75 – Aug 77

COL William S. Wolf Jul 74 – Jun 75

COMMANDING GENERALS, USA INTELLIGENCE

COMMAND

COL N. Dean Schanche Oct 72 – Jun 74

COL James R. Waldie Jun 72 – Sep 74

BG Orlando C. Epp Feb 71 – Jun 72

BG Jack C. Matthews Feb 70 – Jan 71

MG William H. Blakefield Jun 67 – Feb 70

MG Elias C. Townsend** Nov 65 – Jun 67

MG Charles F. Leonard, Jr.** Jan 65 – Nov 65

COMMANDING GENERALS, USA INTELLIGENCE

CORPS COMMAND

MG Charles F. Leonard, Jr.** Dec 64 – Dec 64

MG Richard Collins** Aug 63 – Nov 64

MG Garrison B. Coverdale** Jul 62 – Jul 63

CHIEFS, INTELLIGENCE CORPS

MG Garrision B. Coverdale Aug 61 – Jun 62

MG Richard G. Prather Jan 61 – Aug 61

CHIEFS, COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

MG Richard G. Prather Nov 56 – Dec 60

MG Boniface Campbell Oct 53 – Nov 56

MG George B. Barth Aug 53 – Oct 53

MG Philip E. Gallagher Aug 51 – Aug 51

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MG John K. Rice Jun 49 – Aug 51

BG Edwin A. Zundel Jan 48 – Jun 49

BG George V. Keyser Apr 47 – Jan 48

COL Meredith C. Noble Jan 46 – Apr 47

COL Harold R. Kibler Jul 45 – Jan 46

COL Harold R. Kibler*** May 43 –Feb 44

LTC Hugh D. Wise, Jr. Jul 42 – May 43

LTC H.G. Sheen Jan 42 – 30 Jun 42

CHIEFS, CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE

POLICE

MAJ H.G. Sheen Oct 41 – Dec 41

MAJ Garland Williams Jan 41 – Aug 41

*Official title was Director of Intelligence

**Served concurrently as Chief, Intelligence Corps until

corps discontinued on 1 Mar 1966

***Office of Chief abolished

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