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THE SHOCKING TRUTH ABOUT

NORTH KOREAN TYRANNY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 26, 2014

Serial No. 113–132

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Grace Jo, survivor of North Korean human rights abuses ........................... 8

Mr. Greg Scarlatoiu, executive director, Committee for Human Rights in 

North Korea .......................................................................................................... 15

Mr. Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow, Northeast Asia, The Heritage 

Foundation ............................................................................................................ 24

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Grace Jo: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 11

Mr. Greg Scarlatoiu: Prepared statement ............................................................. 17

Mr. Bruce Klingner: Prepared statement .............................................................. 26

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

(1)

THE SHOCKING TRUTH ABOUT NORTH 

KOREAN TYRANNY 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. The hearing will come to order. Good afternoon. I 

am chairman of the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, and I’d like to 

yield my time to the chairman of the full committee, Ed Royce of 

California. 

Mr. ROYCE. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I want to 

welcome our witnesses. I think my good friend, Steve Chabot, has 

done a lot of work over the years, and holding this important and 

timely hearing is part of that effort to make certain that we see 

some justice for people who have been through things which are 

unimaginable for us here. 

I want to take the opportunity to welcome Ms. Minhee Jo to the 

Foreign Affairs Committee, and to thank her for bravely sharing 

her story. And I want to also share, as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, that it’s my commitment to all the people who 

continue to suffer in North Korea that this committee will do all 

it can Kim Jong-un and his generals accountable for crimes against 

humanity. 

Today, I am announcing that the committee plans to consider bipartisan sanctions legislation against North Korea which I authored in May of this year. My legislation targets the regime where 

it is most vulnerable, in the pocketbook, and it will prevent Kim 

Jong-un from assessing or accessing, having the ability to use that 

hard currency that he needs in order to pay his generals. 

H.R. 1771 now has over 130 cosponsors, and it will go a long way 

toward bankrupting the regime in North Korea. 

It is important that we wake up to the reality that North Korea 

is not interested in reform. Frankly, that’s not—denuclearization 

does not drive their calculus. And, thus, I urge the administration 

to work with this committee so that the people of North Korea can 

finally have an opportunity to live without fear, to have an existence without abuse. 

And I’ve long been involved in shining the spotlight on the horrific human rights abuses in North Korea. I’ve had many, many 

2

trips to that part of the world and spoken with so many defectors 

about their particular circumstances. I’ve had people show me the 

scars on their bodies from when they tortured in North Korea. 

I co-chair the International Parliamentarians Coalition for North 

Korean Refugees and Human Rights, and I can say that the Committee of Inquiry Report on North Korea offers one of the most 

comprehensive accountings of human rights abuses in that country. 

Despite the international community’s focus on North Korea’s 

weapons program over the past 20 years, too little attention is paid 

to the question of human rights, the lack of human rights in the 

country. And this report has finally changed the way the world 

views North Korea, and I’m hopeful that with this new awareness 

action is not far behind. 

Last month I led a bipartisan delegation to Seoul. I’ve been there 

many times, but this is the second time in some 12 months in order 

to reaffirm our nation’s special alliance with South Korea. In my 

meetings with President Park, she has always stressed the importance of fighting, struggling for human rights for the people of 

North Korea. She said it last year, and she said it again this year 

to us. 

As a longtime friend of the Korean people, I know that this issue 

is very important to South Koreans and Korean Americans alike, 

and that’s why I’m committed to passing this legislation into law, 

and also because I’ve looked into the eyes of those who have survived in North Korea. And I want to make certain that that type 

of horrific thing does not continue to occur. 

Fighting for human rights is one of the most important tasks 

that we have as a nation, and that we have here as members of 

this committee. When we see grave abuses occurring it is our duty 

to stand up and take action. 

Chairman Chabot, thank you for your leadership on this issue, 

and I look forward to hearing the testimonies of this distinguished 

panel. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And the chair announces that we have a series of votes on the floor. The buzzers 

that you heard going off were to call us over to the floor to vote, 

so we’re going to go over and vote right now. Then we’ll come back 

and finish opening statements, we’ll hear from the panel, and have 

time for questions, and that sort of thing. So, we apologize for any 

inconvenience, but we have to head over and vote. We’ll be back 

in a short period of time. The committee is in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. CHABOT. Welcome, everyone, to this afternoon’s Asia and Pacific Subcommittee hearing on the shocking truth about North Korean tyranny. I want to thank my colleague from California, Mr. 

Ami Bera, for serving as today’s ranking member and also thank 

our distinguished witnesses for being here, as well. We’re especially 

extremely grateful to Ms. Grace Jo, as the chairman mentioned before, that you could join us here this afternoon. Your perspective 

will be invaluable for everyone to hear today. I’ll make my formal 

introductions of all the witnesses after I’ve concluded and the ranking member has concluded his opening statements here this afternoon. 

3

We’ve already heard from the full committee chairman, Mr. 

Royce, but we had to go into recess because of votes. We won’t have 

any votes for another hour and half or so, I don’t think, so hopefully we can get through the rest of the hearing before we have 

votes again. 

For 60 years, North Korea has been ruled by one of the most repressive totalitarian regimes on earth. Millions of North Koreans 

have been starved to death and sent to concentration camps to die 

in inhumane ways not seen since the days of Hitler or Stalin. The 

extent of human rights abuses, a list too long to go into great detail, are deliberate and calculated actions utilized by the Kim regime to quell dissent and maintain ultimate control, just as his father and grandfather did before him. 

In February, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry released 

its report on human rights in North Korea, yielding a compendium 

of crimes against humanity committed by the North Korean regime. While the totality of this report is certainly shocking—a 

wake up call for the international community to take action—the 

horrors described are not a surprise to the human rights community, which has worked with dozens of individuals who have been 

lucky enough to escape from the Kim chamber of horrors. Yet, 

North Korea remains one of the least understood regimes in a 

world seemingly focused elsewhere. 

As discussions at the U.N. about the Commission of Inquiry Report continue throughout this week in Geneva, I would urge the 

international community to reach a consensus to do more than just 

condemn by words. The time for willful blindness, for looking the 

other way for North Korea’s abuses must come to an end. There is 

a tremendous amount the international community can and must 

do. Future discussions about North Korea should make human 

rights a priority right alongside nuclear disarmament. 

North Korea has consistently represented one of the greatest security challenges for the United States because of its determined 

pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles. But the threat North 

Korea poses to our South Korean ally, its record of human rights 

abuses and the dangers that it presents to regional stability make 

dealing with North Korea that much more difficult. After decades 

of trying to negotiate, cajole, and pressure North Korea to halt its 

proliferation and stand by its commitments, we have seen little 

success. In fact, North Korea seems much more determined today 

to act irresponsibly than ever before. 

Since 2009, the U.S. has pursued a reactive policy toward North 

Korea called ‘‘Strategic Patience,’’ which maintains leveled pressure 

and resolute warnings with a door to renewed discussions partly 

open. This policy, however, has not slowed North Korea’s nuclear 

program, as illustrated by Pyongyang’s decision to restart its 

Yongbyon reactor, and as has been noted in the recently released 

U.N. Panel of Experts Report, North Korea continues to develop 

creative ways to evade U.N. Security Council prohibitions on trade 

and economic activities to boost its nuclear and missile programs. 

It has also done nothing to decrease the extent of human rights 

violations in North Korea. Clearly, U.S. policy has been ineffective. 

Since Kim Jong-un assumed power in December 2011, he has 

embraced the evil, tyrannical, depraved, corrupt, and vile characVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:58 May 08, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\032614\87337 SHIRL
4

teristics of his father and grandfather. Despite only slight 

stylistical leadership differences, the ultimate goals for North 

Korea remain the same and the pursuit of nuclear weapons continues unfettered. 

Throughout 2012 and 2013, the world witnessed an escalation of 

war-like rhetoric and dangerously irresponsible actions from the 

third-generation Kim, who wanted nothing more than to show the 

world his threats were real. And this bellicose behavior continues. 

During this year’s joint U.S.-South Korea military drills, which 

began in February, North Korea conducted a number of prohibited 

missile tests. Just this past weekend, North Korea test fired 46 

short-range rockets, bringing the total to 70 over the course of the 

last month, one of which came within range of a Chinese passenger 

plane. Pyongyang has claimed these tests as part of its own routine 

self-defense exercises. 

The Obama administration appears to have outsourced its North 

Korean policy to China, but China’s policies, too, are failing. The 

sudden and brutal removal of Jang Sung Taek thought to be close 

to Beijing, was a blow to China, and now the Kim regime seems 

to be trying to push China out of its circle of influence. This raises 

a number of concerns and questions as to how China will act in the 

coming months as the U.S. urges Beijing to not veto the inevitable 

Security Council resolution condemning North Korea’s human 

rights record, and to stop evading our sanctions policy by funneling 

money to support Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile production. 

It’s clear that a non-nuclear and compliant North Korea is an 

unreachable goal if the administration maintains its current policy 

approach. We cannot become comfortably accustomed to North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons or its systematic torture and 

killing of its own people. 

North Korea is a grave threat to the United States and our allies 

in Asia. Policies pursued by Presidents of both parties, with minor 

variations, have failed. It is time for us to reconsider the policies 

that haven’t worked, and reapply those that have. Trading valuable 

concessions failed once, so let’s not ‘‘buy the same horse twice.’’ I 

believe it’s possible to disarm North Korea involuntarily without 

the use of force. Legislation was introduced last year to give the 

President the legal tools to do just that. The U.N.’s report makes 

it vividly clear that if the world community continues to dawdle, 

growing numbers of innocent North Koreans will suffer and die in 

horrific ways. Now is the time to put our resources together and 

act. 

I look forward to our witness’ testimonies this afternoon, and discussing options we have to hold the North Korean regime accountable. At this time, I would like to turn to the acting ranking member of the committee, Ami Bera from California. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Chairman Chabot. And thank you for calling this incredibly important hearing to discuss North Korea’s 

abysmal human rights record, and clearly the other serious issues 

that are taking place as North Korea postures. 

As we all know and we’ve talked about in the past, North Koreans are deprived of just the basic fundamental freedoms and universal human rights for decades. North Koreans don’t have freedom of speech, they don’t have freedom of movement, they don’t 

5

have freedom of religion, and they’re also subjected to chronic starvation and abysmal and dismal public health system. 

Last month, the U.N. released a disturbing report on the gross 

human rights violations and oppression that North Koreans experience under the Kim regime. The U.N. report details atrocious 

crimes against humanity that are occurring every day, such as persecution, murder, sexual abuse, and forced abortion. However, the 

perpetrators of these horrendous crimes remain immune by the 

North Korean justice system, which is utterly despicable. 

Unless rampant immunity is addressed and stopped, these egregious violations against humanity will, unfortunately, continue in 

North Korea. I’m also very concerned with North Korean’s aggressive behavior toward South Korea, its nuclear weapons program, 

and the security threat it poses to the region. 

Just last Saturday, as the chairman mentioned, North Korea 

launched 30 short-range rockets into open waters to demonstrate 

its discontent with ongoing U.S.-South Korea military exercises. 

This morning North Korea fired two mid-range missiles in Japan’s 

direction in protest for trilateral talks that were held between the 

U.S., Japan, and South Korea. 

These types of provocations are completely unacceptable and 

threaten to destabilize the region. As the world’s greatest democracy, we must take a tougher stance with our international partners on North Korea’s threatening antics and deplorable human 

rights record. 

Lastly, I want to highlight the importance of strengthening our 

partnership and our relationship with South Korea. In 2013, South 

Korea was the United States’ sixth largest trading partner. According to the California Chamber of Commerce, California is Korea’s 

fifth largest export destination, and in 2013 exported nearly $8.4 

billion of product to South Korea. It’s an incredibly important relationship. 

Korean Americans also have a very deep-seated history and 

deep-seated roots in my home state of California. The vibrant and 

thriving Korean community has successfully created two of the 

largest cultural heritage centers outside of Korea in both Los Angeles and Oakland. Deepening our longstanding friendship and cooperative relationship with South Korea is imperative and necessary 

as we look to stabilize the inter-Korean relationship. 

I look forward to reviewing our positions, and I remain wholeheartedly committed in supporting a peaceful and prosperous Pacific region. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to thank you again for calling this crucial 

hearing, and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. And now are there any other 

members who would like to make a brief opening statement? I’ll 

recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for 

holding this hearing and let the word go forth that the Congress 

of the United States understands the monstrous nature of the regime that now controls North Korea. 

North Korea’s military power has been financed by taking food 

from its people, medicine from its sick, education from its children. 

They have used that wealth that should have gone to supply just 

6

basic needs for their people, and instead used it to subsidize a 

ghoulish elite that is guilty of monstrous crimes, and to subsidize 

a military power that would then, of course, be used not only for 

their country’s security against threats from abroad, but also be 

used against its own people to keep themselves in power. 

The North Korea horror story is testimony to the failure of a policy that is based on trying to change the behavior of some monstrous gangster regimes by treating them well, or by doing them 

favors, or trying to figure out a way of being nice to them thinking 

that that will change the fundamental nature, or in some way affect the decisions of those people who rule with an iron fist as far 

as North Korea. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m not sure if you were here then or not, but I 

certainly remember a debate in which I sat right over here years 

ago about whether or not we should be providing North Korea with 

energy, with oil, and whether we should help feed their population. 

And, of course, over a decade we provided huge amounts of food 

and energy for the North Korea Government and surprise, surprise, it didn’t change the nature of that horrible regime. It didn’t 

civilize the leaders of that country whatsoever. And today we, in 

fact, can see no results whatsoever to the hundreds of millions of 

dollars of humanitarian assistance that we gave to the people of 

North Korea, yet they are still held in bondage and their government—it has had no impact on their government policies whatsoever. 

We need to take this as a lesson, make sure that it guides what 

our decisions are in the future, which is we should be siding with 

the oppressed rather than trying to curry favor with the oppressor. 

And we have not reached out to the people of North Korea in an 

effort to eliminate that horrible regime that oppresses them, so I 

look forward to hearing more details about what’s happening in 

North Korea from our witnesses. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher, by the way, is the 

chairman of the Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats Subcommittee. I’d now like to recognize another gentleman from California. We’ve got a lot of Californians here this afternoon. Brad 

Sherman, who is the ranking member of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee. The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, it was good to be with you, the 

chairman of the full committee, and others on our trip to Asia last 

month where we had a chance to meet with President Park, to 

view the DMZ, and even a few soldiers of the North Korea military. 

And one thing that’s striking because I think it’s the only place in 

the world where this is true, land is considerably cheaper in Northern Seoul than Southern Seoul simply because in Northern Seoul 

you’re under the gun of more than tens of thousands of artillery 

pieces north of the DMZ. I think Seoul is the only great city in the 

world where you have a national security reason for land to be 

cheaper on one side of town than the other side of town. 

The gentleman from California makes a point about our aid. I 

would say that were there to be a curtailment and rollback of the 

nuclear program of North Korea, that might not help the people of 

North Korea, but it would make this a safer planet. And I would 

7

differ with him under those circumstances which do not exist and, 

therefore, don’t differ with him. 

You know, I’ve served on this committee for about 18 years. 

We’ve heard every possible description of cruelty, but this is a nationwide gulag. This isn’t some people being oppressed, this is virtually everyone. And this will go down in history as one of the cruelest regimes in the world, certainly the cruelest in Korean history. 

We should keep in mind that this regime survives only because 

of the subsidy it receives from China. And on a trade policy that 

gives China—allows China to sell $300 billion more in the United 

States than we sell there empowers Beijing, and Beijing doesn’t always use that power for good. 

Kim Jong-un has simply added an element of immaturity and 

mercurial unpredictability, and instability to what was already a 

cruel regime. 

And, finally, we should never hesitate to call on Japan, and especially South Korea to spend more on its military. We who are 

blessed to behind oceans and are not on the front lines spend over 

5 percent of our GDP on our military if you include veterans benefits, as I do, whereas South Korea spends roughly 2.7 percent, 

Japan slightly less than 1 percent. And those who are on the front 

lines who face the greatest threat should be willing to spend as 

much of their treasure as we do. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman, and I’d at this time like to 

introduce our distinguished panel. 

We begin with Grace Jo who was born in North Korea, a place 

where she almost starved to death as a child. In 2006, Ms. Jo and 

two of her family members escaped North Korea. Soon after, she 

and her family were rescued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees which enabled them to enter the U.S. as legal 

refugees. Grace is one of 170 refugees from North Korea who have 

settled in the U.S. She became a U.S. citizen last year and we congratulate you for that, and welcome you. Grace lives outside of 

Washington, DC. She and her family have actively protested the 

forced repatriation of North Korean escapees hiding out in China. 

In addition to being a human rights activist, she dreams of going 

to law school to study international law for the purpose of helping 

North Korean defectors. Ms. Jo works as a dental certified assistant in the United Dental Group to earn a living. She attends classes in the evening to reach her academic goals. She also volunteers 

for her sister’s nonprofit organization, North Korea in USA, which 

helps North Korean refugees in the United States and China. And 

we welcome you here. 

I would next like to introduce Greg Scarlatoiu. Mr. Scarlatoiu is 

the executive director for the Committee for Human Rights in 

North Korea (HRNK) where he handles outreach programs aiming 

to focus world attention on human rights abuses in North Korea. 

Prior to joining HRNK, he was the director of public affairs and 

business issues of the Korea Economic Institute. He has also served 

as management associate for the International Science and Technology Institute in Arlington, Virginia. He previously lived in Seoul 

for 10 years and is fluent in Korean, French, and Rumanian. He 

has also authored a weekly radio column broadcast by Radio Free 

Asia to North Korea. Mr. Scarlatoiu holds master’s in international 

8

relations from Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and Seoul National University, and a B.A. in international 

relations from Seoul National University. Mr. Scarlatoiu was conferred the title of Citizen of Honor, City of Seoul and is also a 

member of the board of directors for the International Council on 

Korean Studies, and we welcome you here this afternoon. 

We also have Bruce Klingner who is the senior research fellow 

for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Study Center. Previously, he served as the CIA’s Deputy Division Chief for 

Korea where he provided analysis on political, military, economic, 

and leadership issues for the President of the United States and 

other senior U.S. policymakers. He was the Chief of CIA’s Korea 

Branch, which analyzed military developments during a nuclear 

crisis with North Korea. Mr. Klingner is a distinguished graduate 

of the National War College where he received a master’s degree 

in national security strategy. He also holds a master’s degree in 

strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College and a 

bachelor’s degree in political science from Middlebury College in 

Vermont. 

And, as I said, we welcome all three witnesses here this afternoon. We have, of course, what you probably heard referred to as 

the 5-minute rule. There are lights down there that will let you 

know when you have 1 minute to go, it will turn yellow at that 

point, and when it turns red, we ask that you wrap it up. Your 

time is up at that point. We’ll also limit ourselves to 5 minutes in 

asking questions. So, we’ll begin with you this afternoon, Ms. Jo, 

and you probably need to turn the mic on there. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MS. GRACE JO, SURVIVOR OF NORTH KOREAN 

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 

Ms. JO. Thank you very much. Hello, my name is Grace Jo. It’s 

very nice to see everyone here. 

I was born in 1991 in North Hamkyoung Province in North 

Korea. In 1993, our family started to have shortage of food. In 1997 

to 1998 my family was my father, maternal grandmother, younger 

siblings and big sister. 

Since I was born, my parents have tried many different ways to 

raise us. They tried to find sustenance in wild vegetables, grasshoppers, rats, tree barks and even cattle in government-operated 

farms. In North Korea killing a cow is considered a crime comparable to homicide, so a person caught killing a cow could be sentenced to death by shooting. 

Fully aware of these facts, my parents risked their lives in order 

to feed my family. Our family did everything we could try but due 

to the government’s prohibition you cannot do any business, and 

eventually even my parents ran out of ways to feed our family. 

They made the hard decision to illegally cross the border to China. 

In Spring 1997, my parents illegally visited a relative in China and 

purchased some food with their help. 

However, when they arrived home, my father was arrested by 

the police, and officials of our home town came with clubs and took 

my mother away after ruthlessly beating her. They also took away 

all of the food. My grandmother, my younger brother, my older sister, and I all cried as we tried to hold on to the things that they 

9

were taking away. In 1 day we lost our parents and our food, and 

our house was in ruins with nothing left for us. Later, we learned 

afterwards that my father had told the officials about my mother’s 

pregnancy and begged for her release. However, my father admitted all the charges that they were accusing him of and he was punished. 

Because he was a man, he had to suffer from all kinds of torture 

by the police. In the end, while he was being transported to a prison on a train he passed away unable to stand any further. 

Continuously, many things happened that led us to leave our 

hometown and escape to China. However, we were deported back 

to North Korea four times. When we were sent back to North 

Korea, I myself did not receive too many punishments since I was 

a minor. However, the miseries I saw ripped at my heart. When 

minors are sent back to North Korea, Bo-Wee-Bu take them to orphanages called Koo-Ho-So. The first orphanage I was sent to was 

located in Sinuiju. In Sinuiju, among the people who are staying 

at the orphanage included a 5-week-old infant to an 18-year-old. 

The directors at the orphanage gave only 40 gram of baby formula 

per day. Sixteen-year-olds were less than four feet tall. There were 

two groups of children at the orphanage. The first group was those 

few children who had enough strength to go out to the market field 

and steal food. And there were those who could only stay inside of 

the orphanage. Those who could move built storage rooms and did 

other labor. 

Inside the orphanage there were about 10 rooms and 15 to 20 

children stayed in each room. The space was so small that everyone 

had to sleep in the same direction at night. There wasn’t enough 

water. And for food, instead of rice, we were given barley and radish soup. 

After waking up at 6 each morning, we had to work until 7 p.m. 

For the smallest instance, the directors would punish us. And because guards stood post every day, we couldn’t escape outside the 

orphanage over the wall. For an example, a 15-year-old who was 

caught escaping tore his left leg tendon as a result of a beating. 

And there was no one to take care of his condition. Some of these 

children who were beaten had their food taken away and worked 

endlessly, died because of their weakness. 

I am 5 foot 3 inches, but when I was sent back to North Korea 

in 2006, they used to call me a giant. And one time I was slapped 

on the face on account of my height. Likewise, many others born 

in and after the ‘90s couldn’t grow due to malnutrition. 

Education was available only for those children from families 

with good backgrounds, with ties to the government, and with ties 

to Communist heroes. Only those from families who did well 

enough to give money or other goods to the teachers or schools 

could attend schools. The study materials available were in poor 

quality, such as paper made from tree barks for writing. 

Lastly, in October 2006, there were three boiled potatoes that the 

orphanage was giving out to the children. Our family, before being 

released, was staying together for 3 days at an orphanage after 

transported to my hometown. And when we asked the girl who 

brought the potatoes to us, she said they had been living on those 

10

potatoes for the past 2 weeks. I was well over 10 years old, but 

North Korea had not changed at all during my lifetime. 

A country that beats people to death like they are animals for 

having a religion, a country that sends a family of three generations for one family member’s trivial comment, a country that requires a travel permit for someone to attend his or her parent’s funeral, in novels, books, biographies, and poems, nothing else can be 

written but praises of the Great Leader. It is a country with absolutely no freedom, a country that abuses its senior citizens and 

mistreats its children while it labels them as ‘‘treasures.’’ A country 

that has beaten its citizens for the past over 20 years, a country 

in which the soldiers rob the civilians of their food. I believe in the 

U.S. and the U.N., a country and an international body that actually do treat the children as they should be as ‘‘treasures.’’ I would 

like to please ask the U.S. and U.N. to rescue the suffering North 

Korean people. 

I would like to please ask you, please remember the Holocaust. 

At least the survivors have finally found their freedom, and may 

live freely as all of you do. However, the people in North Korea 

have been living under tyranny over the past several decades, and 

even right now, as the people suffered under the Nazi regime. 

Please be their voice, and be advocates of their human rights. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jo follows:]

11


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Human Rights Abuses in North Korea: 

A Survivor's Perspective 

Testimony before 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on Asia & the Pacific 

liThe Shocking Truth about 

North Korean Tyranny" 

March 26, 2014 

Grace Minhee Jo 

Survivor of North Korean Human Rights Abuses 
12


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Mr. Chairman, ranking member, and members of the Subcommittee, please accept my sincere 

appreciation for the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee today. My name is Minhee 

Jo. I was born in 1991 in North Hamkyoung Province, in North Korea. (We were protected under 

UNHCR for about a year in Beijing, China, and upon receiving refugee status, my family came 

directly to the United States on March 20th, 2008.) The story of my family is as follows. 

Starting in 1993, our family started to have shortage offood. Tn 1997, my family lost my father, 

maternal grandmother, younger siblings, and big sister. Since Twas born, my parents have tried 

many different ways to raise me and my siblings. We tried to find sustenance in wild vegetables, 

grasshoppers, rats, tree barks, and even cattle in government-operated farms. In North Korea, 

killing a cow is considered a crime comparable to homicide, so a person caught killing a cow 

could be sentenced to death by shooting. Full aware of these facts, my parents risked their lives 

in order to feed my family. Our family did everything we could try, but due to the government's 

prohibition, we could not do any business, and eventually when my parents ran out of ways to 

feed our family, they made the hard decision to illegally cross the border to China. In Spring, 

1997, my parents illegally visited a relative in China and purchased some food with their help. 

However, when they arrived home, my father was arrested by the police, and officials of our 

town came with clubs and took my mother away after ruthlessly beating her. They also took 

away all of the food. My grandmother, my younger brother who couldn't walk at the time, my 

older sister, and I all cried as we tried to hold on to the things that they were taking away. ln one 

day, we lost our parents and our food, and our house was in ruins with nothing left for us. 

My grandmother cursed this world, and there wasn't anything that any of us children could do 

other than crying and staring at the road where we last saw our mother being taken away. We 

survived each day on wild plants and water as we earnestly waited for our parents' return. Three 

months passed, and we could finally see the contour of my mother coming back through the 

woods. We all ran towards her and greeted her with tears and hugs, filled with joy. She could 

barely walk due to the tortures she had suffered Her body was all bruised, and she just lay on 

the floor, unable to get up, for about a month. In her conversation with my grandmother, I could 

hear all the tortures she had to undergo. 

When she was jailed, she was forced to sit still, not allowed to move. They stepped on her legs 

as she sat still. They made her put forward her hands so that they could step on them with their 

heels. As a result, she couldn't use her legs. Although she said that the tortures were not as bad 

as they could have been, at the time she had been pregnant for 3 months, so from our standpoint, 

they could have put her life in danger. We learned afterwards that my father had told the 

officials about my mother's pregnancy and begged for her release. It was thanks to him that we 

could see our mother again. 

However, my father admitted all the charges that they were accusing him ot: and he was 

punished. Because he was a man, he had to sutTer from all kinds of torture by the police. Being 
13


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kicked by the heels is only nonna!. They beat him with a club till it broke. And in order to hear 

the response that they wanted from my father, they forced him to starve for longer than 10 days 

with no water, tortured him, and beat him everyday. 1n the end, while he was being transported 

to a prison on a train, he passed away unable to withstand any further. 

5 months after my mother was released, we heard the news of my father, and due to the shock, 

my mother bore a child at only 8 months. My youngest brother was born in the break of dawn 

with no light My grandmother helped with the child-bearing, and all of us children were scared 

to death hearing my mother scream with pain. 

Afterwards, many things happened that led us to leave our hometown and escape to China. 

However, we were deported back to North Korea 4 times, and it is still very difficult for me to 

explain the sort of torture and pain we suffered each time we were sent back. When we were sent 

back to North Korea, I myself did not receive too many punishments since I was a minor. 

However, the miseries 1 saw ripped my heart. When minors are sent back to North Korea, BoWee-Bu (North Korean State Political Security Department) take them to orphanages called 

Koo-Ho-So ("Rescue Station") The first orphanage I was sent to was located in Sinuiju. The 

second was on Onsung-kun. In Sinuiju, among the people who were staying at the orphanage 

included a five-week-old infant to an 18 year-old. There was also a family of three, a mother and 

two daughters, who had lost their home due to fire. The directors at the orphanage gave only 40g 

(1.4 oz) of baby formula per day. 16 year-olds were less than 4 feet tall. There were two groups 

of children at the orphanage. The first group was those few children who had enough strength to 

go out to the market field and steal food. And there were those who could only stay inside the 

orphanage. Those who could move built storage rooms and did other labor. Inside the 

orphanage, there were about 10 rooms, and 15-20 children stayed in each room. The space was 

so small that everyone had to sleep in the same direction at night There wasn't enough water. 

And for food, instead of rice, we were given barley and radish soup. We became hunger soon 

after eating. After waking up at 6 each morning, we had to work until 7pm, and we didn't 

receive any education. For the smallest incidents, the directors would punish us, and because 

guards stood post every day, we couldn't escape outside the orphanage over the wall. If someone 

was caught trying to escape, he or she was beaten until the instrument of beating broke. When a 

15 year-old who was caught escaping tore his left leg tendon as a result of beating, and there was 

no one to take care of his condition. Some of these children who were beaten, had their food 

taken away, and worked endlessly died because of their weakness. I am 5'3, but when I was sent 

back to North Korea in 2006, they used to call me a giant, and one time, 1 was slapped on the 

face on account of my height Likewise, many others born in and after the nineties couldn't 

grow due to malnutrition. Education was available only for those children from families with 

good backgrounds, with ties to the government, and with ties to communist heroes. Only those 

from families who did well enough to give money or other goods to the teachers or schools could 

attend schools. Children from families like ours that was caught after escaping from the country 

could only attend classes focused on ideological indoctrination, and the only study materials 
14


87337a-4.eps

available were in poor quality such as "paper" made from tree barks for writing. At train stations 

and public places, there were young children sleeping under a bench as well as those children 

who had their clothes and shoes taken away by stronger kids. There were also those children 

who were sutTering inj uries trom beating when they had been caught stealing food. Lastly, on 

October, 2006, there were three boiled potatoes that the orphanage was giving out to the 

children. Our family, before being released, was staying together for three days at an orphanage, 

and when we asked the girl who brought the potatoes to us, she said they had been living on 

those potatoes for the past two weeks. 1 was well over 10 years old, but North Korea had not 

changed at all during my lifetime. 

A country that beats people to death like they are animals for having a religion, a country that 

sends a family of three generations for one family member's trivial comment, a country that 

requires a travel permit for someone to attend his or her parents' timeral. . In novels, books, 

biographies, and poems, nothing else can be written but praises of the Great Leader. It is a 

country with absolutely no treedom A country that abuses its senior citizens and mistreats its 

children though it labels them as "treasures." A country that has beaten its citizens for the past 

over 20 years. A country in which the soldiers rob the civilians of their food. I believe in the 

US. and the UN, a country and an international body that actually do treat the children as they 

should be as "treasures." I would like to please ask the US. and UN. to rescue the sutTering 

North Korean people. 

I would like to please ask you. Please remember the Holocaust. At least the survivors have 

finally found their freedom and may live freely as all of you do. However, the people in North 

Korea have been Ii ving under tyranny over the past several decades and even right now, as the 

people sutTered under the Nazi regime. Please be their voice, and be advocates of their human 

rights. 

There are many more stories I would like to share, but since the time is limited, I will conclude 

here. Thank you for your precious time, and thank you for listening. 
15

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much for your testimony. Mr. 

Scarlatoiu, you’re recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. GREG SCARLATOIU, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 

Mr. SCARLATOIU. On behalf of the Committee for Human Rights 

in North Korea, I would like to express great appreciation to Chairman Steve Chabot and the distinguished members of the subcommittee for holding this hearing today to highlight the human 

rights situation in North Korea and for inviting me to testify. Mr. 

Chairman, in today’s oral testimony I will be summarizing my 

written statement. 

One hundred and twenty thousand men, women, and children, 

those suspected of being disloyal to the Kim regime and up to three 

generations of their families continue to be brutally persecuted behind the barbed wire fences of North Korea’s political prison 

camps. The people of North Korea continue to be divided into three 

social categories and 51 subcategories based on their loyalty to the 

regime. 

In the mid to late 1990s, as up to 3 million North Koreans 

starved to death, the Kim regime continued to invest in the development of its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons program. The 

human rights situation has deteriorated under the Kim Jong-un regime. Three trends stands out in particular, an aggressive crackdown on attempted defections, a forceful purge of former officials, 

and the restructuring of North Korea’s political prison camp system, facilities near the border with China have been closed while 

other camps have been expanded. 

The U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North 

Korea established by consensus by all 47 member states of the 

U.N. Human Rights Council found that in many instances the violations identified entailed crimes against humanity based on state 

policies. Systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations 

that have been and are being committed by North Korea involve 

extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, 

forced abortions, and sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial, and gender grounds, the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced disappearance of persons, and the inhumane 

act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation. 

The Commission of Inquiry determined that crimes against humanity target anyone viewed as a threat to the political system 

and leadership of North Korea, in particular, political prisoners, 

those attempting to defect, religious believers, Christians in particular, people introducing information from the outside world into 

North Korea, and citizens of other countries abducted by North 

Korea. 

The Commission of Inquiry pointed out that since the Government of North Korea is not willing to prosecute its own officials, 

the United Nations will have to protect the population of North 

Korea and insure that those most responsible for crimes against 

humanity are held accountable. 

The Commission of Inquiry further recommended that the U.N. 

Security Council refer the North Korean situation to the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, the inclusion of North KoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:58 May 08, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\032614\87337 SHIRL
16

rean human rights in the U.N. Security Council’s permanent agenda would be a long overdue and feasible measure. 

It is our Committee for Human Rights in North Korea’s view 

that the United States Government ought to support greater involvement by U.N. agencies in North Korea beyond the human 

rights bodies. U.N. agencies to which the United States Government is a significant contributor, agencies tasked with development 

of humanitarian assistance should be fully aware of the findings of 

the U.N. Commission of Inquiry and find ways to promote them. 

U.S.-North Korea policy has been dominated by grave political 

security concerns. The policy of Strategic Patience has been one of 

very few, if any, options within a context defined by the North Korean regime’s lack of international credibility and established patterns of deceitful behavior. 

Nevertheless, crimes against humanity have been and are being 

committed in North Korea. 

As the horror of what author Mark Helprin termed as a ‘‘slow 

motion holocaust continues,’’ the people and the Government of the 

United States can unambiguously afford no Strategic Patience that 

would allow the Kim regime more time to abuse, starve, wrongfully 

imprison, maim, torture, and kill the innocent. 

Human rights concerns must be included in the agenda of future 

bilateral and multilateral talks with North Korea should such talks 

be resumed. The international sanctions regime against North 

Korea aims to prevent the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology by North 

Korea, and is not linked to North Korea’s human rights situation. 

In order to achieve international momentum on a scale comparable to the anti-apartheid campaign of the 1980s, the international sanctions regime must address North Korea’s human 

rights violations. 

A sanctions regime effectively addressing the North Korean 

human rights situation must sever access to funds linked to the 

crimes against humanity and other human rights violations perpetrated by the North Korean regime until the situation has been 

verifiably remedied. Effective sanctions should also sever the access 

to luxury goods and foreign travel for those officials most responsible for North Korea’s crimes against humanity. 

Mr. Chairman, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 

considers it essential to bring attention to the systematic widespread crimes against humanity, and egregious human rights violations perpetrated by the North Korea regime to protect the victims, 

to bring justice to their tormentors, and without further delay to 

seek ways to improve the human rights situation in that country. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Scarlatoiu follows:]

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87337b-1.eps

Statement of Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director, Committee for Human Rights in 

North Korea (HRNK): "The Shocking Truth about North Korean Tyranny," 

Hearing of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

On behalf of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), I would like to 

express great appreciation to Chairman Steve Chabot for holding this hearing today to 

highlight the human rights situation in North Korea, and for inviting me to testify. The 

Committee for Human Rights in North Korea considers it essential to bring attention to 

the systematic, widespread crimes against humanity and egregious human rights 

violations perpetrated by the North Korean regime, to protect the victims, to bring justice 

to their tormentors, and, without further delay, to seek ways to improve the human rights 

situation in that country. 

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNIZ) 

HRNK is a US-based, bipartisan organization, established in 2001, to conduct research, 

publish reports and carry out outreach activities to focus international attention on the 

human rights situation in North Korea. For more than a decade, the organization's well 

documented and well written studies have established its reputation and leading role in 

the international network of organizations committed to promoting human rights in North 

Korea and to designing solutions for improving the situation. Its report The Hidden 

Gulag: Exposing North Korea's Prison Camps (2003, 2012 and 2013) was the first to 

fully put on the map the North Korean political prison camp system through interviews 

with former prisoners, guards, and government officials formerly in charge of running the 

camps as well as satellite images. 

The North Korean Human Rights Situation 

For more than 65 years, North Korea's human rights record has been abysmal. A quarter 

century after the collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 

North Korea's Kim regime has maintained its tyrannical grip on power, while 

accomplishing two hereditary transmissions of power: from Kim ll-sung to Kim Jong-il 

in July 1994, and from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un in December 2011. The primary 

strategic objective of the Kim regime continues to be its own self-preservation, regardless 

of the toll imposed on the North Korean people's fundamental human rights. 

Although North Korea is bound, as a UN member state, by the Universal Declaration (if 

Human Rights, and although it is a party to the International C()1Jenant on Civil and 

Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 

the Convention ol/the Rights of the Child, the Genocide Convention, and the COl/ven/ion 

on the Elimination of Al1 Forms of Discrimil/alion against Women, each and every 

conceivable human right continues to be violated in that country. In the year 2014, 

120,000 men, women, and children, continue to be brutally persecuted behind the barbed 

wire fences of North Korea's political prison camps, subjected to unrelenting induced 

malnutrition, forced labor, torture, sexual violence as well as public and secret 
18


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executions. Those suspected of being disloyal to the regime, of being, from the regime's 

viewpoint, wrong-thinkers, wrong-doers, of possessing wrong knowledge, of having 

engaged in wrong associations, or of coming from the wrongfamily hackground, are 

subjected to extrajudicial arrest and detention, often together with members of three 

generations of their families. They are held in North Korea's hidden gulag indefinitely, in 

most cases without charge or hope for recourse. 

In the year 2014, pursuant to Sungbun- a system of social discrimination established in 

the 1950s-the people of North Korea continue to be divided into three social categories 

and 51 subcategories, based on their degree of loyalty to the regime, and on the perceived 

allegiance of their parents and grandparents. Their access to food, jobs, and any type of 

opportunity continues to depend on their social classification. In the mid to late 1990s, as 

up to 3 million North Koreans starved to death, the Kim regime continued to invest in the 

development of its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs, and purchased 30 

MiG-29 fighters from Belarus and Russia, and 40 MiG-21 fighters from Kazakhstan. 

Human Rights Trends under the Kim Jong-un Regime 

The human rights situation has deteriorated under the Kim Jong-un regime. Three trends 

stand out in particular: an aggressive crackdown on attempted defections-the number of 

North Korean escapees arriving in South Korea declined by almost 50% from 2011 to 

2012/2013); an aggressive purge-culminating in the execution of Jang Sung-taek, the 

leader's uncle, and his associates in December 2013; and the "restructuring" of North 

Korea's political prison camp system-facilities near the border with China have been 

closed, while other camps have been expanded. 

The UN Commission ofInquiry (COl) 

On March 21, 2013, the United Nations Human Rights Council-composed of 47 UN 

member states-adopted by consensus a resolution to establish a "Commission of Inquiry 

on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (COl)." While NGOs 

such as HRNK, tasked to monitor, research and report on the North Korean human rights 

situation, had been aware of the extent of the North Korean human rights violations for 

many years, this was the first time that an investigative body was established by the 

United Nations to detennine the extent and gravity of North Korea's human rights 

abuses. 

After investigating "the systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights" in 

North Korea, the COl released its draft report on February 17, one month ahead of the 

fonnal submission to the UN Human Rights Council on March 17. The report finds that 

"in many instances, the violations found entailed crimes against humanity based on State 

policies."] 

1 Human Rights Council, A.HRC.25.63, Report oJthe commission oj inquiry on human rights in the 

/)emocratic Repuhfic oJf.:orea. February 17. 2014, 

llt!J1J/www.ohcilr.org!ENIIJRBodies;IIRC/CollJPR1SL!:ilges/Repgrtofth~;gmmlssionoflnilllliYlJPRK.~. 

2 
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The COT's Findings 

The COl has determined that systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations 

have been, and are being, committed by North Korea. These include: 

• arbitrary detention, torture, executions and enforced disappearance to political 

prison camps; 

• violations of the freedoms of thought, expression and religion; 

• discrimination on the basis of State-assigned social class, gender, and disability 

• violations of the freedom of movement and residence, including the right to leave 

one's own country; 

• violations of the right to food and related aspects of the right to life; and 

• enforced disappearance of persons from other countries, including through 

international abductions. 

Tn light of the gravity, scale and level of organization of these violations, the COT has 

concluded that crimes against humanity have been committed by officials of the 

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, pursuant to policies established at the highest 

level of the State. These crimes against humanity involve extermination, murder, 

enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, 

persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds, the forcible transfer of 

populations, the enforced disappearance of persons and the inhumane act of knowingly 

causing prolonged starvation. The COl has also established that crimes against humanity 

continue to be committed in North Korea because the policies, institutions and patterns of 

impunity that lie at their heart remain in place. 

One of the most important determinations made by the COT is that North Korea can be 

characterized as a totalitarian state that does not content itself with ensuring the 

authoritarian rule of a small group of people, but seeks to dominate every aspect of its 

citizens' lives and terrorizes them from within. In other words, the COl has found that 

crimes against humanity and other abysmal human rights violations are at the very core 

of the North Korean regime's modus operandi. The COl has characterized North Korea as 

"a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world," due to the "gravity, 

scale, and nature of the violations committed" by the North Korean regime 

The Victims of North Korea's Crimes against Humanity 

The COl determined that crimes against humanity target anyone viewed as a threat to the 

political system and leadership of North Korea, in particular: 

• the estimated 80,000-120,000 inmates of the DPRK's political prison camps; 

• inmates of other detention facilities, including political prisoners; 

• persons who try to escape North Korea, in particular those forcibly repatriated by 

China to conditions of danger; 

• religious believers, Christians in particular; 

3 
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• people considered to introduce "subversive" influences into North Korea, such as 

those who smuggle South Korean video material into North Korea, or those who 

are suspected of having had contacts with South Koreans; 

• the COT determined that crimes against humanity have been committed by 

deliberately starving selected segments of the North Korean population, in 

particular during the great famine of the 1990s. The purpose of de facto 

condemning targeted groups to death by starvation was the preservation of North 

Korea's leadership and political system; 

• the COT found that crimes against humanity have been, and are being committed 

against the citizens of the Republic of Korea, Japan, and other countries abducted 

by agents of the North Korean regime. 

What Actions Should Be Taken by the United States and International Community 

to Hold North Korea Accountable? 

The COl has emphasized that the international community has the responsibility to 

protect the population of North Korea from further crimes against humanity, as their own 

State distinctly fails to do so. The COl has recommended a multi-faceted approach to 

implement this responsibility to protect, by combining urgent accountability measures 

with a reinforced human rights dialogue. The COl pointed out that, since the government 

of North Korea is not willing to prosecute its own officials, the United Nations will have 

to ensure that those most responsible for crimes against humanity are held accountable. 

The COl further recommended that the UN Security Council refer the North Korean 

situation to the International criminal Court, The European Union, together with 

Japan, Australia, and South Korea clearly stated their support for Security Council 

referral to the International Criminal Court on March 17, following the formal 

submission of the COl report to the UN Human Rights Council. 

The COl further recommended that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 

establish a field-based presence in the region to document human rights violations in the 

DPRK, in particular where they amount to crimes against humanity, in order to continue 

to focus attention on the human rights situation in that country. 

Due in particular to potential opposition by the People's Republic of China, a pennanent 

member of the UN Security Council, the referral of the North Korean case by the UN 

Security Council to the International Criminal Court is unlikely, at least over the short 

term. However, it can be argued that, by bringing the case to the UN Security Council 

and thus forcing a Chinese veto, the spotlight will be on China, which continues to 

unconditionally extend its support and protection to the Kim regime, and to refuse North 

Korean escapees access to the process leading to their acquiring political refugee status. 

In a letter dated December 16,2013, the COl has already urged the Government of the 

People's Republic of China to warn relevant officials that the forcible repatriation of 

North Korean refugees to conditions of extreme danger-involving persecution, torture, 

prolonged arbitrary detention, sexual violence, forced abortions, and infanticide-could 

amount to the aiding and abetting of crimes against humanity. 

4 
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87337b-5.eps

For more than two decades, the United States and the international community have been 

concerned with the grave political security challenges posed by the North Korean regime. 

Concern for North Korea's egregious human Tights violations hasn't been similarly 

re±1ected in either the sanctions regime imposed on North Korea or attempts to engage in 

bilateral or multilateral dialogue. The inclusion of North Korean human rights in the 

UN Security Council's permanent agenda would be a long overdue and feasible 

measure, since 9 out of 15 votes of permanent and non-permanent members of the 

Council would be needed, and such course of action could not be blocked by the veto of a 

permanent member. 

In order to create an atmosphere conducive-at the very least-to the inclusion of North 

Korean human rights in the UN Security Council's permanent agenda, over the short 

term, considering the application of the Arria Formula could be an efJective approach to 

be pursued by the United States and like-minded Council members. The Arria Formula is 

an informal arrangement ensuring that the Council has greater ±1exibility in its ability to 

be briefed on international peace and security issues. The formula also allows members 

of the Council to invite speakers other than UN officials, delegations or high-ranking 

officials of Council members. 

While recognizing that the report by the COl is a critical and historic step by the United 

Nations, HRNK also urges the United States Government to support greater 

involvement by UN agencies in North Korea, beyond the human rights bodies. 

HRNK insists that UN agencies to which the United States Government is a significant 

contributor, agencies tasked with development or humanitarian assistance-including 

UNICEF, WHO, WFP and UNFPA-should be fully aware of the findings of the UN 

Commission of Inquiry and find ways to promote them. 

HRNK urges the United States Government to e.:'Ctend its support to NGOs lind other 

organizations tasked to monitor and report on North Korea's human rights violations. 

In particular. efforts to document crimes against humanity in North Korea and to identify 

those responsible will be critical to efforts to ensure accountability as well as preparations 

for a future effective transitional justice program in North Korea. 

Should the COl Report Provoke Changes to the U.S. "Strategic Patience" Policy? 

U.S. North Korea policy has been dominated by grave political security concerns, 

including North Korea's development of its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons 

program, and also serious military provocations, such as the sinking of the ROKS 

Cheonan in March 2010, or the shelling of South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island in 

November of the same year. The policy of "strategic patience"-implying that the United 

States can afford to wait for North Korea's decision to denuclearize, or for a set of 

circumstances conducive to North Korean denuclearization-appears to make sense 

within a context defined by the North Korean regime's established patterns of behavior, 

invol ving the alternation of provocations and "charm offensives." 

5 
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From the heaty Oil the NOIl-Pmliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPl) and the 199-1 

Geneva Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks to the February 2012 Leap Day 

Agreement, the North Korean regime has rescinded each and every commitment it has 

made, in multilateral or bilateral talks. The North Korean regime's utter lack of 

international credibility suggests that "strategic patience" is one of very few options left 

to the U.S. Government. Moreover, the historic record of the past two decades denotes 

that the assumption that North Korea continues to develop its nuclear and missile 

capabilities unless the United States initiates bilateral or multilateral dialogue is Hawed. 

The North Korean regime continues such developments regardless of the status of 

bilateral or multilateral talks, with the ultimate goal of miniaturizing a nuclear warhead to 

the point where it can be mounted on a long-range ballistic missile capable of reaching 

the continental United States. From the viewpoint of the North Korean regime, such 

development is essential to its survival, and to North Korea's maintaining international 

relevance. 

Nonetheless, the COl report has confirmed what human rights NGOs and research 

organizations had known for years: crimes against humanity have been, and are being 

committed in North Korea. Under the regime of Kim Jong-un, as many as 23,000 

political prisoners disappeared prior to the transfer of the prison population from Camp 

No. 22 in Hoeryong, North Hamgyeong Province, to other detention facilities 2 As the 

horror of what author Mark Helprin termed a "slow-motion holocaust" continues, the 

people and government of the United States can unambiguously afford no "strategic 

patience" that would allow the Kim regime more time to abuse, starve, wrongfully 

imprison, maim, torture, and kill the innocent men, women, and children of North Korea. 

Human rights are at the very core of the fundamental values that define us, values that 

Americans share with our friends, allies, and partners in the Asia-Pacific region and 

beyond, first and foremost with the Republic of Korea. Recent developments in the 

Middle East confirm that tyrants who violate the rights of their own citizens with 

impunity become threats to regional and international peace and security, especially if 

they are anned with weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, rather than applying 

"strategic patience" to the U.S. approach to the human rights crisis in North Korea, or 

postponing significant policy measures until the circumstances have changed, the United 

States must include human rights in the North Korell policy IIgenda. The next requisite 

steps should comprise the inclusion of human rights concerns in the agenda offuture 

hi/literal lind multilateral talks and linking the internationlll slInctions regime to the 

humlln rights situation in North Korell. 

How Could Effective and Targeted Sanctions against the North Korean Regime 

Improve Its Human Rights Situation? 

The international sanctions regime against North Korea, established through UN Security 

Council Resolutions 825, 1540, 1695, 1718, 1874,2087, and 2094, aims to prevent the 

development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile 

2 Hawk, David. ,Vorth f.. .. orea ',\' Hidden Gulag: Interpreting Reports afChange,,,,' in the IJrison Camp,,",', page 

22. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. 20n. 

6 
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technology by North Korea. The current international sanctions regime is not linked to 

North Korea's human rights situation. In order to achieve international momentum and a 

degree of etfectiveness comparable to that applied to efforts to do away with South 

Africa's apartheid, the international sanctions regime must be expanded beyond 

counter-proi!feration e.tforts, and be linked to North Korea's human rights situation. 

The COl has determined that the main perpetrators of human rights violations and crimes 

against humanity are officials of North Korea's State Security Department (SSD, the 

Ministry of People's Security (MSC), the Korean People's Army (KPA), the Office of 

the Public Prosecutor, the judiciary and the Korean Workers' Party (K WP). These 

otlicials have been acting under the effective control of the leadership organs of the 

K WP, the National Defense Commission (NDC) and the leader of North Korea. A 

sanctions regime effectively addressing the North Korean human rights situation must 

sever access to funds aimed to support, aid and abet the crimes against humanity and 

other human rights violations perpetrated by the North Korean regime, until the 

situation has been verifiably remedied (i.e. the political prison camps have been closed, 

full disclosure has been brought to the issue of abductions of foreign nationals etc.). 

Effective sanctions would also sever the llccess to luxury goods and foreign travel for 

those officials most responsihlefor North Korea's crimes against humanity. 

On more than one occasion, HRNK has called upon the international community to 

concern itself not only with security and nuclear issues, but with the persecution, 

starvation and political repression of the North Korean population. The COl 

recommended that the UN Security Council impose targeted individual sanctions against 

those most responsible for North Korea's systematic, widespread and gross human rights 

violations, and crimes against humanity. The COl further recommended that states should 

not use the provision of food and other essential humanitarian assistance to impose 

pressure on North Korea, and that humanitarian assistance should be provided in 

accordance with humanitarian and human rights principles, including the principle of 

non-discrimination, while the North Korean authorities should provide adequate 

conditions of humanitarian access and related monitoring. 

Following the letter and spirit of the COl report, effective targeted sanctions aiming to 

improve the human rights situation in North Korea would ensure that adequately 

monitored humanitarian assistance reaches those who need it most, in particular the most 

vulnerable people of North Korea. While targeting the perpetrators of crimes against 

humanity, effective sanctions regimes must ensure that funds that would otherwise have 

been spent on ski lifts, luxury goods, and weapons be used to purchase food, medicine, 

and other humanitarian supplies for the people of North Korea. 

7 
24

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. We appreciate your testimony. Mr. 

Klingner, you’re recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BRUCE KLINGNER, SENIOR RESEARCH 

FELLOW, NORTHEAST ASIA, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. KLINGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished 

members of the panel. It is truly an honor to be asked to appear 

before you on such an important issue to our national security. 

As we’ve heard from my colleagues, North Korea’s crimes against 

humanity clearly show the regime is a threat to its citizens. North 

Korea under Kim Jong-un has also demonstrated it is a military 

threat to U.S. allies in Asia, a worldwide proliferation threat, and 

increasingly a direct military threat to the United States. 

It is fitting that today’s hearing occurs on the 4-year anniversary 

of North Korea’s sinking of the South Korean naval ship, Cheonan, 

a North Korean act of war which resulted in the deaths of 46 South 

Korean sailors. 

North Korea has made greater progress than widely perceived—

if not already achieved—warhead miniaturization, the ability to 

place nuclear weapons on its short-range missiles, and a preliminary ability to reach the United States. As such, the United States 

and its allies face a greater threat today than is widely construed. 

Despite repeated U.S. attempts at diplomacy, North Korea refuses to abide by the commitments it made during numerous international agreements to give up the nuclear weapons that it had 

previously agreed never to pursue in the first place. North Korea 

now demands recognition as a nuclear armed state. It declared, 

‘‘There will be no more discussions over denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,’’ and proclaimed, ‘‘Only fools will entertain the delusion that we will trade our nuclear deterrent for petty economic 

aid.’’

Despite initial hopes that the new Chinese leadership would 

more fully implement U.N.-required actions against North Korea, 

Beijing instead continues to be part of the problem rather than 

part of the solution. Clearly, the United States cannot rely on 

China to constrain North Korea. 

President Obama declared that North Korea’s nuclear weapons 

program was a ‘‘threat to U.S. national security’’ and vowed ‘‘significant, serious enforcement of sanctions,’’ but despite this, the 

United States has pursued a policy in which we only incrementally 

increase punishments on Pyongyang toward repeated defiance of 

the international community. 

The United States has pulled its punches when targeting financial measures against North Korea. By contrast, the U.S., EU, and 

U.N. have imposed far more pervasive and compelling measures 

against Iran, even though Pyongyang and not Tehran has withdrawn from the non-proliferation treaty, tested nuclear weapons, 

and repeatedly threatened nuclear attacks on the United States 

and its allies. 

By adopting a sanctions policy of timid incrementalism, with 

promises to be tougher the next time that North Korea misbehaves, 

the U.S. is squandering the opportunity to more effectively impede 

progress on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and coerce compliance with U.N. resolutions. Just as strong measures inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:58 May 08, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\032614\87337 SHIRL
25

duced Iran back to the negotiating table, more robust sanctions are 

needed to leverage North Korea. 

There is a widespread misperception that North Korea is the 

most heavily sanctioned country in the world, and there’s nothing 

more that can be done. That is simply not true. In my submitted 

testimony I’ve provided an extensive list of additional specific financial measures that the U.S. can and should impose on North 

Korea, as well as against non-North Korean entities that are violating U.S. law and U.N. resolutions. 

Most of these recommended actions have already been applied 

against other nations, including Iran and Burma. These are targeted financial measures against the regime and other violators, 

not the North Korean people themselves. In essence, they are financial precision guided munitions and not economic carpet bombing against the populace. 

Since it is a unilateral U.S. financial strategy against violators, 

China cannot veto it and Beijing will find it harder to block than 

a diplomatic strategy or traditional trade sanctions. 

A few of these recommended actions are to: Designate North 

Korea as a primary money laundering concern, as the U.S. previously did with Iran and Burma; ban North Korean financial institutions correspondent accounts in the United States—even financial institutions not doing business in the U.S. would be affected 

since nearly all dollar denominated transactions internationally 

must pass through U.S. Treasury-regulated banks; publicly identify 

and sanction all foreign companies, financial institutions, and governments assisting North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs; 

impose third-party sanctions on entities that trade with those on 

a sanctions list; compel the removal of North Korea from the 

SWIFT financial transfer network as Iranian banks were in 2012; 

formally charge North Korea as a currency counterfeiter; tighten 

maritime counter proliferation by targeting shipping companies 

and airlines caught proliferating; and finally, enhance U.S. inspections of shipping companies transiting ports that consistently fail 

to inspect North Korean cargo. 

In conclusion, the current U.S. policy of Strategic Patience is predominantly passive because it fails to impose sufficient pressure to 

effectively degrade North Korea’s capabilities or alter its behavior. 

Minimalist measures have only encouraged North Korea to continue to expand and refine its nuclear arsenal of missiles and embolden it to proliferate. The U.S. has sufficient tools, it has only 

lacked the resolve to use them. 

Finally, I would submit that the operative question should be 

why would the United States hesitate to impose the same measures on North Korea that Washington has already implemented on 

other countries for far less egregious violations? 

I thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you, and 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klingner follows:]

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'Tlie • 

Hefltage Foundation LEADERSHIP FOR AMERICA 

2]4 Ma"sachusetts Avenue, NE· Washington DC 20002· (202) 546-4400· heritage.org 

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Going Beyond 'Strategic Patience:' Time to 

Get North Korean Sanctions Right 

Testimony before 

Asia Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs 

Committee 

United States House of Representatives 

"The Shocking Truth about 

North Korean Tyranny" 

March 26, 2014 

Bruce Klingner 

Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia 

The Heritage Foundation 
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My name is Bruce Klingner. I am the Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The 

Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony are my own, and should not 

be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

Assessing North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Threat 

Experts predominantly assert that North Korea has developed several nuclear devices but 

not yet mastered the ability to miniaturize the warhead nor deliver it via missile. Media 

reports habitually declare that North Korean missiles cannot yet reach the United States. 

Based on this benign conclusion, policymakers presume the United States and its allies 

still have several years to diplomatically constrain North Korea's nuclear program, pursue 

timidl y incremental sanctions, and prepare military defenses. 

However, this analytic construct is flawed since it, for example, gives insufficient weight 

to Pyongyang's lengthy collaborative nuclear and missile relationship with Pakistan, a 

country that all experts assess already has nuclear weapons deliverable by missile. North 

Korean scientists provided critical assistance to Islamabad's missile programs in return 

for reciprocal uranium-based nuclear weapon expertise, technology, and components. 

Moreover, analysts have frequently underestimated North Korea's nuclear and missile 

programs due to ideologically-driven analysis, political expediency, and the belief that a 

technically backward nation could not have achieved the necessary breakthroughs. The 

potential for continued regime refinement of its nuclear and missile arsenal was often 

discounted until confronted with irrefutable evidence. 

Skeptics initially dismissed evidence of North Korea's plutonium-based nuclear weapons, 

its highly enriched uranium program, involvement in constructing a Syrian nuclear 

reactor, and ability to develop long-range missiles. US. intelligence estimates of these 

programs were dismissed as politically motivated, until they were proven 

unquestioningly correct. 

North Korea has likely made greater progress than perceived -- if not already achieved --

warhead miniaturization, the ability to place nuclear weapons on its short range missiles, 

and a preliminary ability to reach the United States. As such, the United States and its 

allies face a greater threat today than is widely construed. 

Nuclear programs. Pyongyang began its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program in 

the 1960s and now likely has 6-10 nuclear weapons. Even as Pyongyang signed several 

agreements to never pursue a nuclear weapons program, it began in the late 1980s to 

develop a second, parallel path to acquiring nuclear weapons using uranium. 

AQ. Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, provided a nuclear 

package deal to Pyongyang including warhead designs, centrifuges, and nuclear fuel. 1 

The warhead design may have been the same he provided to Libya which contained 

I David Sanger. ··U.S. Sees More Anns Ties Behveen Pakistan and Korea." The Ne,,,, York Times, March 

1-1.200-1. 
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detailed, step by step instructions to produce a Chinese-designed nuclear warhead that 

would be deliverable by North Korea's No Dong missile 2 

Pakistan assistance increased dramatically in 1997 when Islamabad began paying for 

North Korean missiles by sharing nuclear weapons secrets. According to a CIA National 

Intelligence Estimate, Pakistan provided information to North Korea on building and 

testing uranium-based nuclear weapons and helped Pyongyang conduct a series of "cold 

tests," simulated nuclear explosions, using uranium. Pakistan also provided advice on 

how to hide nuclear research from American satellites 3 

In 2010, Pyongyang disclosed the uranium program by displaying 2,000 centrifuges to a 

visiting u.s scientist who was stunned by the scope and sophistication of the program 

which exceeded all expert predictions. North Korea likely has additional covert uranium 

enrichment facilities and has sought enough components for at least 10,000 centrifuges 4 

It is suspected but not proven that the February 2013 nuclear test was of a uranium-based 

weapon. If so, then Pyongyang has a break-out capability to augment its nuclear arsenal. 

In November 2013, South Korean Minister of Defense Kim Kwan-jin testified that North 

Korea has the ability to build uranium-based nuclear weapons.' 

Mi,~siles. North Korea began developing missiles in the late 1970s by reverse-engineering 

Soviet-designed Scud-B missiles acquired from Egypt. Pyongyang extrapolated this 

technology to build extended-range Scuds, No Dong missiles, and the Taepo Dong 

ICBM. 

North Korea exported No Dong missiles to Iran and Pakistan, providing the basis for 

those countries' Shehab and Ghauri missiles. The initial Iranian and Pakistan missiles 

displayed in military parades were manufactured solely in North Korea. 1n 1992, North 

Korea signed an agreement for Tehran to provide $500 million for joint development of 

nuclear weapons and No Dong ballistic missiles.,,6 

A.Q. Khan described how, in return for Pakistani assistance to Pyongyang's centrifuge 

program, "North Korea would help Pakistan in fitting the Iluclear warhead into the 

Ghauri missile.,,7 Khan's assertion is important since analysts continue to assert that 

North Korea has not yet developed the ability to mount nuclear warheads on its No Dong 

missile while unequivocally accepting Pakistan has done so. 

, Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, "Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China," Washington Post, 

Febmary 15, 200~. 

1 SeY1ll~urHersh. "The Cold Test." The New Yorker, January 27, 2003. 

4 D~vid Albright. "North Korea's Estimaled Slacks ofPlulOirimu and Weapon-Grade Uranium ISIS. 

5 Kim Elm-jung. "N. Korea can produce uranium-based nuclear bomb: Seoul's defense chief," Yonhap, 

November 20, 2013. 

6 Daniel PinkstolL "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. Febmary 

200S, p. IS. 

" R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby \Vanick. "Pakistani scientist depicts more advanced nuclear program in North 

Korea," The Washington Post, December 28,2009. 

2 
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North Korea currently has an extensive ballistic missile force. Pyongyang has deployed 

approximately 800 Scud short-range tactical ballistic missiles, 300 No Dong mediumrange missiles, and 50 Musudan intennediate-range ballistic missiles. The Scud missiles 

threaten South Korea, the No Dong can target all of Japan, while the Musudan can hit 

U.S. bases on Okinawa and Guam. Pyongyang continues development of the Taepo Dong 

series of intercontinental ballistic missiles.~ 

North Korea claims nuclear capable missiles. North Korea now asserts it is fully nuclear 

strike capability. In October 2012, the National Defense Commission warned its strategic 

rocket forces can hit U.S. bases in South Korea, Japan, and Guam as well as the U.S. 

mainland9 North Korea announced in February 2013 that its nuclear test was a 

"miniaturized and lighter" nuclear weapon that could be fit atop a missilelO 

In March 2013, the Korea People's Anuy Supreme Command warned that "The U.S. 

should not forget that Anderson AFB in Guam [and] naval bases in Japan and Okinawa 

are within striking range of the DPRK's precision strike means."ll Pyongyang threatened 

to tum Seoul and Washington into "seas of fire" through a "diversified precise nuclear 

strike,,,12 using "lighter and smaller nukes unlike what they had in the past."u 

'Diversified' was interpreted as Pyongyang having developing both plutonium and 

uranium weapons. 

US. and allies increasingly assess North Korea is nuclear capable. After recovering 

components of the North Korean long-range missile launched in December 2012, South 

Korea assessed it had "a range of more than 10,000 kilometers.,,14 In March 2013, 

Minister of Defense Kim Kwan-jin told the National Assembly that the missile could 

have reached the U.S. west coastl' 

U.S. Vice Chainuan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Winnefeld stated in March 2013, 

"We believe the KN-08 probably does have the range to reach the United States. The 

North Korean threat went just a little bit faster than we might have expected.,,16 In April 

8 "NorlhKorca's Nuclear and Missilc Programs." Inlernalional Crisis Group. ltme 18,2009. 

hllp:/ /www.crisisgroup.orgi-/lIlediaiF iles/asiafnorlh-easl-asiafnorUlkoreafl68 _north_ koreas _nuclear_and _missile .J)rograllls.ashx. 

'J "North Korea Says Its Rockets Could Hit Continental US," Chosun Tlbo, October 12,2012. 

I <1 Note verbale from the Pennanent Mission of the Democratic People' s Republic of Korea to the United 

Nations addressed to the Presidcnt of the Sceurity Council. February 13. 2013. 

hllp://www.undoes.org/Sf2013/91 

11 "Norlh Korea says U.S. bases in Japm~ Guam could be largeled by nukes," Mainiehi Shilllbun. March 

21. 2013. 

12 Choe Sang-hyun, "North Korea Threatens to Attack U.S. With 'Lighter mid Snmller Nukes'," The New 

York Times. March 5, 2013. 

13 Choe Smlg-hLU~ North Korea Threalens lo Allack U.S. Willi 'Lighler mid SmallcrNukes', New York 

Times. March 5, 2013. hllp:f/www.nyllmes.com/2013/03/06/worldfasiafnorlll-korea-lhrealens-lo-allack-uswith-lighter-and-smaller-nukes.html. 

14 "S. Korea Says Debris Reveals North's ICBM TecllllOlogy," Voice of America, December 23, 20l2. 

15 ·'N. Korea Rocket Could Fly IO,OOOklll," Chosun Tlbo, April 16, 2012 

1(, Park Ryun. "US to boost missile defense in response to North Korean threats," Hankyoreh, M::lfCh 18, 

2013. 

3 
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2013, the Obama Administration reversed its previous decision to cut construction of 14 

additional missile defense interceptors in Alaska claiming an unexpected, sudden 

acceleration of the North Korean missile threat. 

u.s. experts privately commented that the recovered North Korean missile provided 

"tangible proof that North Korea was building the missile's cone at dimensions for a 

nuclear warhead, durable enough to be placed on a long-range missile that could re-enter 

the earth's atmosphere from space." A U.S. official added that South Korea also provided 

other intelligence that su~?ested North Korea had "mastered the miniaturization and 

warhead design as well." 

In April 2013, U.S. officials told reporters that North Korea "can put a nuclear weapon on 

a missile, that they have missile-deliverable nuclear nukes, but not ones that can go more 

than 1,000 miles."ls 

In March 2014, General Charles Jacoby, chief of the North American Aerospace Defense 

Command, testified that "tangible evidence of North Korean and Iranian ambitions 

reinforces our understanding of how the ballistic missile threat to the homeland has 

matured from a theoretical to a practical consideration.,,19 

Battle for power, not policy in Pyongyang 

Despite some initial naive predictions that Kim Jong-UN would be a reformer, there were 

unmistakable signals from the beginning that he would not deviate from existing policies. 

Real economic refonn requires a willingness to incorporate foreign capitalist precepts 

into North Korea's socialist system. But doing so would entail opening North Korea to 

the outside world. 

Kim Jong-un instead unequivocally affirmed the continuation of North Korea's centrallyplanned socialist economy. Frustrated by frequent foreign speculation of North Korea 

refonn, Pyongyang even denounced such suggestions as "the height of ignorance. To 

expect policy change and refonn and opening from [North Korea] is nothing but a foolish 

and silly dream ... There cannot be any slightest change in all policies.,,20 

Pyongyang's diktat on the unitary leadership of Kim long-un does not broach any 

resistance. Ifthere was doubt that Kim Jong-un would be just as merciless as his father 

and grandfather, it died along with Jang Song-taele 

Kim has emulated the power politics of his father and grandfather but taken it to new 

levels of brutality. During his two years in power, Kim Jong-un has unleashed the 

" Eli Lake, "US Reeovel}' of North Korean satellite exposed nuclear progress." The Daily Beast April 15. 

2013. 

18 Richard Engel. "Will North Korea follow lhrough onnuciear Urreals"," NBC NighUy News. April 3. 

2013. http://www.nbcnews.eom/video/nightly-news/SI421978#SI421978. 

l' Statement of General Chades H. Jacoby. Jr .. Commander United States Northern Command and North 

American Aerospace Defense Command before the Senate Armed SeIVices Committee. March 13, 2014. 

http://www.amled-selViees.senate.gov/imo/media/doe/Jacoby _ 03 -13 -14.pdf. 

20 "North Korea dismisses South's talk ofrcform" BBe. July 29, 2012. 

4 
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security services to eliminate enemies within the government and escalated the 

subjugation of the populace. He increased public executions, expanded the gulags for 

political prisoners, and increased government punishment for people caught with 

information from the outside world to intimidate the populace. Kim had 80 people 

executed simply for watching foreign videos. 21 

Do purges reflect stability or instability? 

Korea watchers are debating whether Jang's purge reflects a weak or strong North 

Korean leader. Some experts perceive an embattled Kim Jong-un desperately fending off 

real or imagined challengers. But it is more likely that the purge of hundreds of North 

Korean otlicials since 2011 shows Kim is firmly in control and coniident enough to 

remove even the senior most otlicials. 

Regime change in the foreseeable future is unlikely due to the pervasiveness of North 

Korean security services, the lack of a viable opposition party or movement, and the 

state's absolute control over information sources. Moreover, China and South Koreafearful of the consequences of a collapsing regime - have often increased aid and 

developmental assistance when economic collapse appeared imminent. 

To be sure, a stable North Korea does not equate to a non-threatening North Korea. Kim 

J ong-un has shown himself to be just as belligerent and dangerous as his predecessors. 

Indeed, he raised tensions to perilously high levels in early 2013, with strategic and 

tactical threats against the United States, South Korea, and Japan. 

Kim Jong-un has maintained Kim Jong-il's foreign policy but appears to be 

implementing it a more volatile, reckless, and unpredictable manner. Indeed, it appears 

Jong-un may not have a game plan. 

Kim's refusal to implement economic reform dooms his country's economy to continued 

abysmal conditions. His threatening antics have poisoned the well for North Korea to 

receive the level of foreign resources and benefits necessary to improve the national 

economy. Unable to achieve its economic and diplomatic objectives, North Korea will 

return to provocations and threats. 

The North Korean threat -- always high -- has gotten worse under the young leader. There 

can be debate as to how best to address the situation. But there should be no debate as to 

just how dangerous the situation could become. 

North Korean Commits Crimes Against Humanity 

The United Nations Commission ofInquiry report provides a chilling litany of horrors 

that the North Korean regime has inflicted upon its citizens. Based upon overwhelming 

evidence, the commission issued a damning condemnation of the North Korea 

government for "systemic, widespread, and gross violations of human rights." 

21 Julian RyalL North Korea executes SO people for watch foreign films," The Sydney Morning Herald. 

November 13,2013. 

5 
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The commission concluded that these human rights abuses were of such a monumental 

scale as to constitute crimes against humanity. The panel recommended the U.N. Security 

Council refer the situation to the International Criminal Court or the establishment of an 

ad hoc U.N. tribunal for prosecution. The commission also advocated adopting targeted 

sanctions against those most responsible for these crimes against humanity 

Beijing characteristically dismissed the report as "divorced from reality" and vowed it 

would block any further action against North Korea. China's foreign ministry 

spokesperson declared "Submitting this report to the ICC will not help resolve the human 

rights situation in the relevant country." 

The Shame of Inaction. The commission underscored how North Korea's decades-long 

perpetration of "crimes that shock the conscience of humanity raises questions about the 

inadequacy of the response of the international community. The international community 

must accept its responsibility to protect the people of the Democratic People's Republic 

of Korea from crimes against humanity." 

Commission Chairman Michael Kirby eloquently implored. "Now is a time for action. 

We can't say we didn't know. The suffering and tears of the people of North Korea 

demand action." 

There should be widespread international outrage against the horrors systemically 

perpetuated on the North Korean people by their leaders. North Korea's killing fields 

must disappear. Time is running out for the North Korean people, but too many have 

already perished as the world turned its back" 

What Should Be Done 

The U.S. should: 

• Examine existing human rights legislation to ensure that penalties imposed on 

North Korea are consistent with those enacted against other human rights 

violators. 

• Impose targeted financial measures against all North Korean entities-and their 

leadership-identified by the commission and then call upon other nations to take 

commensurate action. 

• Publicly highlight not only Chinese obstructionism to addressing North Korea's 

heinous human rights abuses but also, as delineated in the commission report, 

Chinese complicity. For example, Beijing's forced repatriation of refugees are in 

violation of several international accords. 

• Urge South Korea to pass its tirst North Korean Human Rights Act, which would 

provide funding for human rights groups and impose conditions on engagement 

with Pyongyang. Since its first introduction in 2005, the progressive South 

Korean Democratic Party has resisted approving legislation or even criticizing 

North Korean human rights violations. 

Timid U.S. Responses to North Korean Threat 

6 
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Responding to North Korea's third nuclear test in 2013, President Barack Obama 

declared that North Korea's nuclear weapons program was a "threat to the u.s. national 

security and to international peace and security.,,22 The U.N. Security Council similarly 

warned that North Korea's nuclear and missile threats posed "a clear threat to 

international peace and security.,,21 In 2009, Obama had vowed that North Korean 

"belligerent, provocative behavior that threatens neighbors will be met with significant, 

serious enforcement of sanctions.,,24 

Yet despite these unambiguous warnings and unequivocal vows of resolute response, the 

United States continues to implement timid policies that only incrementally increase 

punishments on Pyongyang for its repeated deiiance of the international community. The 

United States still pulls its punches when targeting financial measures against North 

Korea and its supporting entities, and the U.S. has shied away from effective unilateral 

action since 2006. By contrast, the U.S. has led the charge for far more pervasive and 

compelling measures against Iran, despite Tehran's greater diplomatic and economic 

interaction with the rest of the world. 

The United States should use its action against Tran as a model and impose the same 

severity of targeted financial measures against North Korea. While there are mitigating 

factors, North Korea's limited nodes of economic contact with the outside world and lack 

of a valuable global commodity-such as Iran's oil-make it vulnerable to enhanced 

economic pressure. 

Sanctions: An Important and Variable Component of Foreign Policy 

Sanctions25 are puniti ve measures intended to deter, coerce, and compel changes in 

another country's policy and behavior. During the past decade, the U.S. government 

adopted a more effective financial strategy against rogue regimes. Washington now uses 

targeted tinancial measures against regimes and violators and not the citizens of a 

country. Tn essence, these are economic precision-guided missiles rather than 

indiscriminate economic carpet bombing. 

This new strategy is based on several key precepts: 

1. Even the most isolated regime has to move its money across borders; 

2. Because the U.S. dollar is the principal reserve and trading currency around the 

world, almost all international transactions are denominated in dollars which must 

go through the U.S. financial system; 

" Calum MacLeod and SLUmy Yang, '·U.N. Condellms North Korea Nuclear Test. Promises ActiOll" [7,1,:4 

lodar, February 12. 2013, l.!111r!!w"wusalodav.comistorv/J1ews/wolld/20LlI02/1lleaJ:lhqUakC-!lorthkorea-nuclear-testll ~115g7!. 

TIU.N. s~curiiY Council. Resolution 209~, SIRES/209~ (2013). March 7.2013. 

hUp' //\\ \\'\V" ull.orglcI1'gaiscarch/\ ic\1' doc"asp'h~\, mbol'-'S/RESl209..j.(20 131. 

"I Barack Obama and Lee Myung-Bak. "'Remarks by President Obama ami President Lee Myung-Bak of 

the Republic of Korea in Joint Press Availabilily," June 16,2009. http://www.whitehollse.gm·/lhe-pressQftlcc/remarks-pK>sidel1t-obama-and-~Q,nt-lee-repllbli£:.J,QJ~int-press-availability. 

25 For the purposes of this paper. the terms sanctions. tarRetedfinancial or regulatory measures. and 

coercive financial pressure 'will be used interchangeably. although there are some technical differences 

amongthclll. 

7 
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3. Financial institutions are driven to police themselves by aversion to reputational 

risk and exclusion from the US. financial system, which provides Washington 

with very strong leverage against rogue regimes 

The debate over the utility of financial pressure in foreign policy is usually depicted in 

binary fashion, such as whether the U.S. should use sanctions or engagement. 

The reality, of course, is that sanctions and engagement-along with economic 

assistance, military deterrence, alliances, and public diplomacy-are diplomatic tools to 

intluence the behavior of other nations. These tools can be employed in a range of 

options and combinations. 

Rather than being used in isolation, sanctions and engagement are most effective when 

integrated into a comprehensive strategy that engages all of the instruments of national 

power. Not fully utilizing any element of national power reduces the effectiveness of US. 

foreign policy. 

Critics of coercive tlnancial pressure question its etfectiveness because they have not yet 

forced Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and missile programs, but neither did repeated 

bilateral and multilateral negotiations or unconditional engagement. Adopting such a 

narrow viewpoint overlooks the multifaceted utility of sanctions, which: 

1. Show resolve to enforce international agreements and send a strong signal to other 

nuclear aspirants. Iflaws are not enforced and defended, they cease to have value. 

2. Impose a heavy penalty on violators to demonstrate that there are consequences 

for defying international agreements and transgressing the law. 

3. Constrain North Korea's ability to acquire the components, technology, and 

finances to augment and expand its arsenal. 

4. Impede North Korean nuclear, missile, and conventional arms proliferation. 

Targeted financial and regulatory measures increase both the risk and the 

operating costs of North Korea's continued violations of Security Council 

resolutions and international law. 

5. In conjunction with other policy tools, seek to modify North Korean behavior. 

The UN. Security Council established a Panel of Experts to review member countries' 

implementation of Security Council resolutions imposed on North Korea. In June 2013, 

the panel concluded: 

[W]hile the imposition of sanctions has not halted the development of nuclear and 

ballistic missile programs, it has in all likelihood considerably delayed the [North 

Korean] timetable and ... choked off significant funding which would have been 

channeled into its prohibited activities. [It] has hampered its arms sales and illicit weapon 

8 
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programs. The resolutions are also crucial in preventing the country from exporting 

sensitive nuclear and missile technology26 

Tougher Sanctions on Iran Than on North Korea 

North Korea has withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, developed and tested 

nuclear weapons, declared that its nuclear program is for military purposes, and 

threatened the United States and its allies with nuclear annihilation. As great a threat as 

Iran's nuclear program is, Tehran has done none of these things. Yet the U.S., the 

European Union, and the United Nations have imposed far less restrictive sanctions 

against Pyongyang than against Tehran. 

Iran. For decades, the United States has imposed sanctions on Iran for a variety of 

transgressions. President Jimmy Carter barred U.S. purchase of Iranian oil in response to 

Iran's taking U.S. diplomatic hostages in 1979. The sanctions were subsequently 

removed but then reimposed by President Ronald Reagan in 1987 because ofIran's 

"active support of terrorism" and "aggressive and unlawful action against U.S. t1ag 

vessels ... in the international waters of the Persian Gulf.,,27 

In 1995, President Bill Clinton signed Executive Order 12957 banning U.S. development 

of petroleum resources in Iran. Under congressional pressure, Clinton expanded U.S. 

financial measures against Iran by signing the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA, 

later renamed the Iran Sanctions Act), which authorized sanctions on foreign companies 

and individuals investing $20 million or more in one year in Iran's energy sector or 

selling threshold amounts ofrefined petroleum to Iran. In response to strong European 

objections, Clinton never invoked the sanctions 28 

President George W. Bush expanded pressure against Iran by sanctioning Iranian banks. 

Financial measures were also imposed on the Revolutionary Guards and three ofIran's 

largest banks. The U.S. actions pressured other countries to sever financial transactions 

with these groups. Under President Obama, the U.S. has targeted Iran's energy sectorits principal source of exports-to degrade the government's finances and its nuclear 

weapons program. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 noted a "potential connection 

between Iran's revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding ofIran's 

proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. ,,29 

Since 2010, the U.S, the EU, and U.N. have adopted steadily stricter and more 

comprehensive measures against Iran. In July 2010, Obama signed the Comprehensive 

" Panel of Experts, "Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution ISN (2009)." in 

U.N. Security CounciL S/2013/337, June 11,2013, p. 5, 

http://\y\"\j,Y. un.org/gaiscarch/yic,v doc.asp?svmbol=Si20 13/337. 

2' RonaJd Reag31L "Prohibiting Imports [rom Iran," Executive Order 12613, October 29. 1987, 

hup:l!\\'\\ \V "ar('hives.gov/rederal-regi~ter/codi.fkmioll/executi\ e-orderi12613.htm (accessed September 25. 

2013). 

c, BijanKhajehpour, Rem Marashi. and Trita Parsi, "Never Give In and Never Give Up." March 2013, 

ll11n:i/www.ni~council.or ... I.ile/DocSe!:.&[Di~L!lever giC!LllfUlQ!1!loc!D~ 19H. 

29 U.N. Council, Resolution 1929 SIRES/I 929 (2010), June 9, 2010, 

9 
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Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), which prohibited 

providing fuel to Iran and banned the sale of equipment or services that would help Iran 

to increase its gasoline production capabilityJO 

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2011 (NOAA) restricts foreign financial 

institutions' access to the U.S. financial system if they process petroleum transactions 

with Iran's central bank The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of2012 

(ITRA) prohibits access to the U.S. market by companies doing business with Iran's 

energy sector and froze the U.S assets of any entity doing business with the National 

Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian Tanker Company]l 

In June 20 II, the Obama Administration sanctioned the Iranian security services for 

human rights abuses and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines for proliferation 

activities. In November 20 II, the Obama Administration issued Executive Order 13590 

to expand U. S. financial measures on foreign companies that provided goods or services 

to Iran's oil and gas sector and petrochemical industry. Robert Einhorn, Obama's Special 

Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, cited Iran's progress toward enriching 

uranium, sponsorship of a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, and 

human rights violations as reasons for imposing the tougher measures 32 

In January 2013, the U.S implemented new sanctions against Iran targeting key Iranian 

industries, such as shipping and ports management. The law also imposes sanctions on 

foreign companies that engage with Iranian companies in the targeted sectors. 

The U. S. actions, combined with diplomatic pressure, led other nations to impose their 

own financial and regulatory measures against Iran, including an EU ban in 2012 against 

purchasing Iranian oil. Collectively, the international sanctions have isolated Iran from 

the international banking system, targeted critical Iranian economic sectors, and forced 

countries to restrict purchases of Iranian oil and gas, Tehran's largest export. 

North Korea. The United Nations has imposed a series of incrementally tougher 

Security Council resolutions" on North Korea in response to Pyongyang's repeated 

defiance of previous resolutions. However, the U.N. did not pass any resolutions after 

Pyongyang's two attacks on South Korea in 2010. 

The latest iteration, Resolution 2094 

30 The Comprehensive [ran Sanctions, Accountability. and Divestment Act of 2010, Public Law 1[1-[95, 

)lttp:l/www. treaSll!L£&Y Ire!i.@ rce-@uelisanctiollS/Documents/hrll 9-1. pdf. 31 Khaj ehpour et al., "Never Give In and Never Give Up" 

30 Robert J. EinhoITL "U.S.-Soulh Korea Relations," remarks allhe American Cenlcr Korea, Seoul. 

December 5,2011. 

http://iipdigita1.usembassy.gov/st/english/te''itransI20 [1112/20 1112071-10416suO.157539.hltnl. 

33 The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1695 in response to a North Korean missile test in 2006. 

Resolution 1718 in response to a North Korean rmciear test in 2006. Resolution 1874 in response to a North 

Korean nuclear test in 2009, Resolution 2087 in response to a North Korean missile test in 2012. and 

Resolution 2094 in response to a North Korean nuclear test in 2013. 

10 
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Demands that North Korea return at an early date to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; 

Reaffinns the UN. demand that North Korea abandon all nuclear weapons, 

existing nuclear programs, and ballistic missile programs in a complete, 

verifiable, and irreversible manner; 

Decides that nations shall prevent any financial services, including electronic 

transfers through banks or their overseas correspondent accounts, that could 

contribute to North Korean nuclear or ballistic missile programs; 

Calls upon nations to prohibit North Korean financial institutions from 

establishing correspondent banks in their jurisdiction if reasonable grounds exist 

for believing that it could contribute to North Korean nuclear or missile programs; 

and 

Decides that nations shall inspect all cargo transiting their territory and deny 

pennission to any aircraft flights if there are reasonable grounds for believing that 

it is related to prohibited North Korean programs 34 

The United States has also issued a series of executive orders imposing punitive measures 

on North Korea." In August 2010, the Obama Administration issued Executive Order 

13551 to target North Korean arms trafficking and those engaged in illicit activities, 

including counterfeiting, narcotics smuggling, and money laundering. Executive Order 

13570, issued in 2011, prohibits imports of North Korean goods into the United States 

unless licensed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. 

In 2010, Einhorn declared that North Korea was involved in "counterfeiting of U.S. 

currency and other goods, narcotics smuggling, and other illicit and deceptive activities in 

the international financial and banking systems [bringing] hundreds of millions of dollars 

in hard currency annually into North Korea, which can be used to support DPRK nuclear 

or missile programs.,,36 

Pyongyang has repeatedly challenged Security Council resolutions with nuclear tests and 

ballistic missile launches. The continued existence of these programs is itself a violation 

of the resolutions. Pyongyang has made clear that it has no intention of complying with 

34 U.N. Security Council, Resolution 2094 (2013). 

35 George W. Bush, "Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit Threaten 

to Commit or Support Terrorism:' Executive Order 13224. September 23. 200 I, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/newslrc1eases/200 11091200 10924-l.htmL George W. Bush, "Blocking Property of 

Weapons or Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters:' Executive Order 13382, J'Ule 29. 2005, 

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/06120050629.hl1nl; George W. Busll 

"Continuing Certain Restrictions with Respect to North Korea and North Korean Nationals." Executive 

Order 13466, June 26, 200S, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/newslrc1eases/2008106120080626-4.htmL Barack Obama, ''Blocking Property of 

Certain Persons with Respcetto North Korea," Executive Order 13551. August 30, 2010, 

http://www. w hilehouse. gov Ithe-press-offiee/20 I 0/08/3 O/executive-order -president-bloeking-propertycertain-persons-with-respect: and Barack Obmna, "Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to North 

Korea:' Executive Order 13570, April IS, 20lL http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffiee/20 11/04/1 S/executive-o rder-13570-prohibiting-<:ertain-transaetions-respect-north-kor. 

J(, Robert I. Einhorn, "Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes:' remarks. U.S. Embassy, Seoul. August 2. 

2010. hltp:l/www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/nnl2010/08/145598.htm (accessed September 26, 2013). 

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the U.N. resolutions or fulfilling its six-party-talks pledges to abandon its nuclear 

weapons. North Korea has declared that: 

"Pyongyang will not unilaterally abandon its war deterrence. North Korea's 

nuclear weapons are the ultimate defender of national interest and a trusted shield 

to defend peace.,,17 

Its nuclear weapons "are not goods for getting U.S. dollars and they are neither a 

political bargaining chip nor a thing for economic dealings. The DPRK's 

possession of nuclear weapons shall be fixed by law and the nuclear armed forces 

should be expanded and beefed up qualitatively and quantitatively ,,38 

"The six-party talks and the joint September 19 [2005] statement were rendered 

null and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was put to an end. There 

will be no more discussion over denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.,,39 

It is a "nuclear-armed state and an indomitable military power" in a revision of its 

constitution40 

"Those who talk about an economic reward in return for the dismantlement of 

[North Korea's] nuclear weapons would be well advised to awake from their 

daydream. ,,41 

"We have tightened our belts, braved various difficulties and spent countless 

amounts of money to obtain a nuclear deterrent as a self-defense measure against 

U.S. nuclear threats. Only fools will entertain the delusion that we will trade our 

nuclear deterrent for petty economic aid.,,42 

China Critical to Sanction Success 

The Iranian economy depends on global imports and exports, necessitating extensive 

international cooperation for sanctions to have an impact. Cooperation is complicated by 

Iran's status as a significant producer of oil, a critical world commodity that nations are 

loath to restri ct. 

Unlike Iran, North Korea is small, weak, and undiversified in its economic or diplomatic 

contacts. It is singularly reliant on China, making Pyongyang more susceptible to 

sanctions if Beijing or Chinese banks comply. 

3' Yonhap News Agency. '"N. Korea Says No Plans to Give Up Nuclear Capabilities:' May 28. 2013, 

http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/20 I3IOS128192/040 I OOOOOOAEN20 130S2800840031SF.HTML 

" Korean Centml News Agency, "Report on Plenary Meeting of WPK Central Committee:' Korea News 

Service (Tokyo). March 31, 2013, hllp:llwww.kcna.cojp/iLeIll120 13/201303/ncws3 1/2013033 1-24ec.hLllll. 

39 Yonhap News Agency, '"Korea Vows Lo End DenucieariLaLion Talks," January 23, 2013, 

http://english.yonilapnews.co.kr/northkoreal2013/01123/9S/0401000OOOAEN2013012300IS003ISF.HTML 

40 Yonhap News Agency, ·'N.K. Calls Itself 'Nuelear-Anned State' in Revised Constitution," May 30, 

2012. 

hLLp:llenglish. yonhapnews. co .kr/northkoreal20 12105/30176/040 I 000000AEN20 1205300052003 15F .HTML 

41 CNN, '"North Korea Refuses to Abandon Nukes," Febmary 19,2010, 

http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapefI02/19/north.korea.nuclear/index.html. 

"' Korea Herald! Asia News Network, "North Korea Pledges Not to Abandon Nukes," AsiaOne. Febnlllry 

21. 2010, http://news.asiaone.collllNewslLatest+News/AsiaiStory/AIStory20100221-199951.hunl. 

12 
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North Korea's increased reliance on foreign-owned and foreign-flagged ships in recent 

years43 provides an opportunity to improve interdiction of North Korean shipments. 

Foreign businesses and governments are more likely to allow inspection of their ships 

when confronted with evidence of North Korean malfeasance. 

A Paper Dragon on Sanctions. Strong sanctions can work against a weak opponent, but 

coercive financial pressure against North Korea has been insuUiciently robust and has 

been undermined by China. Despite North Korea's belligerent actions, Beijing is 

reluctant both to allow more comprehensive sanctions and to fully implement those 

already imposed: 

In 2002, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet said that the proliferation 

activities of Chinese firms were at times "condoned by the Chinese government." 

In November 2007, the State Department assessed that shipments of prohibited 

North Korean missile parts "frequently transit Beijing on regularly scheduled 

flights" and that China failed to act on detailed infonnation and a direct, personal 

appeal by President Bush44 

After the April 2012 missile launch, the US, South Korea, Japan, and the EU 

proposed adding 40 additional North Korean entities to the U.N. sanctions list. 

China vetoed all but three, severely limiting the scope of UN. efforts against 

North Korea's prohibited nuclear and missile programs. Despite the Chinese 

obstructionism, the Obama Administration hailed the addition of only three 

violators as a "strong and united response [that would] increase North Korea's 

i sol ati on. ,,45 

In 2013, US. and South Korean authorities found dozens of overseas bank 

accounts worth hundreds of millions of dollars that were linked to North Korean 

leaders Kim Jong-un and Kim Jong-i!. Allied officials urged China to include 

these accounts in UN. sanctions lists, but Beijing refused46 It is unclear why 

Washington and Seoul did not publicly identify the accounts and include them in 

their own unilateral sanctions. 

China has repeatedly increased its economic engagement with North Korea after 

the imposition of sanctions, thus negating their impact. After UN. sanctions were 

first implemented in 2006, Chinese exports to North Korea actually increased by 

140 percent by 2009 47 In response to North Korea's sinking of the Cheonan, 

South Korea cut off most inter-Korean trade, worth approximately $300 minion 

·13 Mary Beth Nikitin et al.. "Implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874:' memorandum to 

Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-IN). October 8,2010, 

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/15263 O. pdf. 

44 "Pyongyang's Accomplice:' The Wall Street Journal. December 7. 2010. 

http://online.wsj.eom/articlc/SB 1000 14N05 2 7 48704594804575648473 842565004 .hlml. 

·15 Voice of America News. "UN Expands Sanctions on N. Korea for Rocket Launch," Chosun Ilbo. May 3, 

2012. http://english.chosun.com/site/dataihtml_dirI20 12104117120 12041700398.html. 

46 "'Kim Jong-un's SlnshFunds Found:' Chosun llbo. March 11. 2013. 

http://english.chosnn.com/site/data/html_dir/20 13/0311 1120130311011 05.hlm!. 

4'"7 Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Refonn (Ne,,, York: 

Cohnnbia University Press. 2007). p. 230. 

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87337c-15.eps

annually. Yet in the following year, China increased its trade with Pyongyang by 

29 percent, from $2.68 billion to $3.47 billion48 

More robust Chinese implementation of sanctions will not guarantee that North Korea 

abandons its nuclear arsenal, but a continuation of Beijing's lackluster enforcement does 

guarantee that sanctions will fail to achieve their objectives. 

Strong Sanctions, Effective When Applied 

In 2005, U.S. criminal investigations Royal Charm and Smoking Dragon proved that 

North Korea was involved in drug smuggling and money laundering. The investigations 

also provided "incontrovertible proof of the role of Macao banks, Macao gangsters, and 

North Koreans in Macao," according to a senior State Department officiaL 49 

As a result, Washington declared Macao-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) a primary 

money-laundering concernso and banned all U.S. financial institutions from dealing with 

BDA. The U.S. Department of the Treasury also considered implementing similar 

measures against other, larger banks, including the Macao branch of the Bank of China, 

against which it had "voluminous" evidence. However, the Bush Administration 

reportedly refrained to "avoid excessive damage to the financial system of Macao and a 

resultant clash with China."sl 

The U.S. action against BOA signaled that Washington would finally begin to enforce its 

laws. Taken in conjunction with sub rosa meetings by US. officials with Asian banks 

and businesses, it had a devastating impact on North Korea's iinances. Foreign 

businesses and iinancial institutions shunned Pyongyang, fearful of being sanctioned as 

complicit in North Korean illegal activity. Two dozen financial institutions voluntarily 

cut back or terminated their business with North Korea, including institutions in China, 

Japan, Vietnam, Mongolia, and Singapore 52 

The BDA targeted financial measures showed the efficacy of economic pressure tactics 

on North Korea. A North Korean deputy negotiator at the time quietly admitted to a 

senior White House official, "You finally found a way to hurt us."" 

The United States eventually acquiesced to North Korea's demands that its ill-gotten 

money be returned. The Bush Administration even used the Federal Reserve Bank of 

48 Editorial, "Is China NeutraliLing N. Korea Sanctions'?" Chosun IIbo, May 23. 20 II, 

hltp:! !english.choslUl.com!sile!dala!html_ dir!20 11105123120 1105230 1 1 84.hlml 

19 Donald Greenlees and David Lague, "The Money Trail That Linked North Korea to Macao," The New 

York Times, April 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.comI2007/04111/world/asiaf11cnd-macao.html 

50 Under the Patriot Act § 311. 31 U.S. Code § 5318A 

51 Greenlees and Lague. "The Money Trail That Linked NorlhKorea lo Macao." 

52 Daniel L. Glaser, lestimony before the COllllnillee on Banking, Housing. and UrlJan Affairs. U.S. Senale, 

September 12. 2006, 

http://www. banking. senate. gov!public!index.cfm?FuseAction~ Files. View&File Store _id~deda4b45 -<Ill 5-

4a22-8ec4-2154cbc61 ded. 

'5 Jmm Zarate. TreaslIIY's Irar: The Unleashing of a Nell' Fro afFinancial Warfare. Public Affairs. New 

York. 2013. 

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New York to transfer the money since no U.S. commercial bank dared to risk 

involvement in felony money laundering. 

At the time, critics derided the BDA law enforcement initiati ve as a neoconservative 

attempt to undermine the six-party nuclear negotiations. Yet senior Obama 

Administration otlicials privately characterized the initiative as having been "very 

effective" and argued that President George Bush's decision to rescind it was "a mistake 

that eased pressure on Pyongyang before it took irreversible steps to dismantle its nuclear 

program."S4 The Obama Administration now "hopes to recreate the financial pressure that 

North Korea endured back in 2005 when [the United States] took the action against 

Banco Delta Asia."s5 

Costs of Timidity 

Regrettably, the world has now become largely inured to North Korea's development of 

nuclear weapons, repeated violations of Security Council resolutions and international 

law, and belligerent threats. Evidence of North Korean nuclear and missile progress has 

often been dismissed until it became irrefutable. 

After each North Korean provocation or violation, the U.S. and its allies returned to the 

Security Council demanding stronger measures, only to run into Chinese obfuscation and 

obstruction. The result has been only incrementally strengthened measures. 

Instead, the U.N. and U.S. should have imposed comprehensive sanctions against North 

Korea and its facilitators immediately after Pyongyang's provocations, when 

international outrage and support was strongest. The Obama Administration's policy of 

strategic patience is predominantly passive because it fails to impose sutlicient pressure 

to effectively degrade North Korea's capabilities or alter its behavior. The U.S has 

sutlicient tools. It has just lacked the resolve to use them. 

In 2010, President Obama declared that the United States will "continue to press on 

sanctions implementation until there is concrete, verifiable progress on denuclearization," 

but Administration ot1icials privately commented that year that the "intensity with which 

they push for tough implementation of sanctions [is] calibrated depending" on North 

Korean behavior. 56 In March 2013, despite North Korea's repeated violations of U.N. 

resolutions, a State Department otlicial commented that there was still room to increase 

sanctions on North Korea: "[W]e haven't maxed out, there is headroom."s7 

The obvious question is: Why has the Obama Administration not lowered the boom on 

Pyongyang as it has on Iran, instead preferring to keep some financial pressure measures 

Jay Solomon, "U.S. Pursues Financial Leverage over North Korea," The Wan Street Journal, July L 

2009. htlp://online. wsj.com/article/SB IN632106686771095.hllul. 

55 Margaret Brenall "U.S. Urges Nations to Cut North Korea's Financial Link," CBS News, April 5, 2013, 

http://webeache.googleusereontent. co m/ search?q~cache: 11.3 xFhCvg6Q AJ :www.cbsnews.com/83 0 1-

202_162 -57 57821 O/u .s-urges-nations-to-cut -north-koreas-financia1-1ink 

56 Nikitin et al.. "Implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874." 

5C Adrian Croft. "U.S. Wants EU to Put North Korean Bank on Sanctions List." Reuters. March 25,2013. 

http://www. reutcrs.eom/articlcl20 13 /03/25/us-korea-north-{;u -idUSBREnOOTU20 130325. 

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87337c-17.eps

in reserve for another incremental step after the next North Korean provocation? For 

example, sanctioning North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank in 2013 is an effective measure, 

but why was it not done several years earlier? 

Sanctions have delayed North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. Punitive measures 

have caused international financial institutions and businesses to become increasingly 

reluctant to engage with North Korea, even in legitimate businesses. Coercive financial 

pressure has raised the risk and cost to Pyongyang and its facilitators and forced them to 

alter their operations, thus stretching out the development timelines. 

However, by adopting a sanctions policy of timid incrementalism, the U.S. squandered 

the opportunity to impede progress on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs more 

effectively and coerce compliance with U.N. resolutions. The regime has successfully 

weathered weak diplomatic responses to its provocations, weak international sanctions, 

and no military response to its two attacks on South Korea. As a result, Pyongyang feels 

that its own strategic patience policy can outlast that of its opponents. 

The collective international finger-wagging and promises to be tougher the next time 

have allowed North Korea additional years to develop and refine its nuclear weapons and 

the means to deliver them. The inability and unwillingness to impose more 

comprehensive sanctions has emboldened North Korea, Iran, and other nuclear aspirants 

to believe they can defy the world until they present their nuclear status as a fait 

accompli. North Korea also has felt no compunction about proliferating nuclear and 

chemical weapon technologies to Syria. 

What Should Be Done 

The United States should increase punitive measures against North Korea, including 

enhancing sanctions to the same degree as they have been applied against other rogue 

regimes, such as Iran today and Burma at key points. 

The United States should unilaterally: 

Designate North Korea as a primary money-laundering concern. In 2002, 

2004, and 2011, the U.S. Treasury designated Ukraine, Burma, and Iran, 

respectively, as "jurisdiction[sJ of primary money laundering concern" under 

Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act 58 

Ban North Korean financial institutions' correspondent accounts59 in the 

United States. Designating North Korea (like Burma and Iran) as a money-

"u.S. Department of the Treasury, "Imposition of Special Measures Against Bunna,"' April 2. 2004, in 

Federal Regisler, Vol. 69. No. 70 (Aprill2, 2004). pp. 19093-19098. 

hllp:!!www.fineen.gov!slaluleS Jegs!paLrio1/pdfllJlmna.pdf (accessed Seplember 26,2013\ and press 

release, "Fact Sheet: New Sanctions on [ran," U.S. Department of the Treasury. November 2L 201L 

http://www. treasury .gov !press-eenter!press-releases!Pages!tg 136 7. asp". 

5~) "Foreign financial institutions maintain accounts at U.S. banks to gain access to the U.S. financial system 

and to take advant<lge of services and products that may not be available in the foreign financial 

institution's jurisdiction." Fedeml Financial Institutions Examination Council, Bank Secrecy Act! Anti16 
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laundering concern under Section 311 of the Patriot Act would prohibit North 

Korea from "the opening or maintaining in the United States of a correspondent 

account or payable-through account by any domestic financial institution or 

domestic financial agency for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution.,,6o 

Executive Order 13310 prohibited "the exportation or reexportation, directly or 

indirectly, to Burma of any financial services either from the United States or by a 

United States person.,,61 Even financial institutions not doing business in the 

United States would likely be affected since "nearly all dollar-denominated 

transactions pass through US. Treasury-regulated banks. Chinese and European 

banks that need their own access to US. tlnancial institutions may also shun 

transactions with North Korea.,,62 

Publicly identify and sanction all foreign companies, financial institutions, 

aud goverumeuts assisting North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. 

Executive Orders 13382 and 13551 enable targeted financial and regulatory 

measures, including freezing of assets, against any entity suspected of helping 

North Korean nuclear, missile, and conventional arms; criminal activities; money 

laundering; or import ofluxury goods63 The U.S. should call on foreign banks, 

businesses, and governments to reciprocate US. actions against North Korean and 

foreign violators. 

Impose third-party sanctions. The US. should penalize entities, particularly 

Chinese financial institutions and businesses, that trade with those on the 

sanctions list or export prohibited items. The US. should also ban financial 

institutions that conduct business with North Korea from conducting business in 

the United States64 

Compel the removal of North Korea from SWIFT financial transfers. The 

Obama Administration and European Union pressured the Belgian-based Society 

for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) to disconnect 

sanctioned Iranian banks in 2012. The system is the world hub for electronic 

financial transactions. 

Money Lalmdering InroBase. s.v. "Correspondent Accolmts (Foreign)--Overview." 

http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_am1_infobase/pages_manuallOLM_047.htm. 

6U U.S. Depanment of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. "Section 311-Special 

Measures:' http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriotJsection311.html. 

'il George W. Bush, "Blocking Property of the Government of Bunna and Prohibiting Certain 

Transactions," Exccutive Order 13310, July 28, 2003, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkgiFR-2003-07-

30/pdf/03-l9573.pdf. 

62 Joshna StantOll "Kaesong Investors Beware: Treasury Issues New Wanring About N. Korea Money 

Laundering Risk:' September 21. 2013. http://freekorea.us/20 13/09121lkaesong-investors-beware-treasuryissues-new -'warning-about -n-korea-money -laundering-risk!. 

m Sung-Yoon Lee and Joshua Stanton, "Hit Kim Jong Eun Where It Hurts: His Wallet," The Washington 

Post, February 13, 2013, http://articlcs.waslringtonpOSl.comI20 13 -02-l2/0pinions1370592l2 _l_nuclcartest-pyongyang-intemalional-network. 

6·' Executive Order 13551 applies U.S. sanctions to anyone that has assisted "any person whose property 

and interests in property are blocked pursuant to tlus order:' Barack Obama, "Blocking Property of Certain 

Persons with Respect to North Korea," Executive Order 13551, § 1 (a)(ii) (E), 

http://www. whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/20 I 010813 O/executive-order -president -b locki ng-propertycertain-persons-"ith-rcspect. 

17 
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87337c-19.eps

Urge the European Union and other countries to sever ties with North 

Korea's Foreign Trade Bank. The Foreign Trade Bank, North Korea's main 

financial portal for international trade, was blacklisted by the US. and China in 

2013 for facilitating North Korean nuclear and missile proliferation. 

Target the North Korean government writ large, not just individuals or 

departments. The U.S. determined in Executive Order 13551 that the North 

Korean government itself was involved in illicit and deceptive activities6 , 

Formally charge North Korea as a currency counterfeiter. US. officials have 

repeatedly declared that North Korea is counterfeiting US. currency66 Under 

international law, counterfeiting of a country's currency "qualities as a proxy 

attack on its national integrity and sovereignty - and a GaIlSIIS helli to justify selfdefense.,,67 

Resume law enforcement efforts against North Korean illicit activities. 

Despite the US. government's affirmation that North Korea is complicit in the 

counterfeiting of currency and pharmaceuticals, illegal production and 

distribution of narcotics, and money laundering, the U.S. apparently has not taken 

any law enforcement action since the mid-2000s when the Banco Delta Asia 

money was returned. Pyongyang's involvement in illicit activities should trigger 

criminal cases against the North Korean leadership. 

Return North Korea to the state sponsors of terrorism list. North Korea has 

provided missile and nuclear assistance to Iran and Syria, two nations on the U.S. 

State Department's Sponsors of Terrorism List68 North Korean weapons seized in 

Thailand were headed for Islamist groups Hamas and Hezbollah. Two North 

Korean agents confessed that Kim Young-chol, chief of the Reconnaissance 

Bureau, ordered them to assassinate Hwang Jang-yop, the highest-ranking North 

Korean defector. 69 Inclusion on the list requires the U.S. government to oppose 

loans by international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, International 

Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank. 70 

Tighten maritime counterproliferation. The US. should target shipping 

companies and airlines caught proliferating. If they are state-owned, the U.S. 

65 Executive Order 13551 concludes by "finding that the continued actions and policies of the Government 

of North Korea, I including I its illicit and deceptive activities in international markets through which it 

obtains financial and other support, including money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods and currency, 

bulk cash smuggling. and nmcotics trafficking ... constitute an unuslk11 and extraordinmv threat to the 

national security, foreign policy. and economy of the United States." Ibid. (emphasis added). 

6(, Phillip Crowley, daily prcss briefing, U.S. Department of State, August 2,2010, 

http://www.state.govlr/pafprs/dpb/20 10/0811 ~5~91.htlll. 

6'"7 Zarate, Trea:.;urv's rVar. 

68 Countries that the Secretary of State determines have repeatedly provided support for acts of 

international terrorism are designated pursuant to three laws: Section6(j) of the Export Administration Act, 

Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act. U.S. 

Dcpartmcnt of Statc, "Stale Sponsors of Terrorislll." http://www.statc.gov/jlctflistfcl4151.htm. 

69 Kim So-hyun, ''Kim Visits Anny Unit Spying on S. Korea," The Korea Herald, April 27, 2010, 

http://www.koreaherald.com/nationalfDetai1.j sp ?newsMLld~20 100427000663 . 

-u Section 162 L "Opposition to Assistance by International Financial1nstitutions to Terrorist States." of the 

International Filk1ncial Institutions Act (Public Law 95-118), as cited in Mark E. Manyin. "'North Korea: 

Back on the Terrorism List?" Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. June 29, 2010. 

http://www.nkcconwatch.com/nk-uploadsfDPRK-back-on-tcrrorism-1ist.pdf. 

18 
45


87337c-20.eps

should sanction the relevant government ministry. Sanctions have been applied 

against the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line and Iran Air 

Enhance lJ .S. inspection of shipping companies transiting ports that 

consistently fail to inspect North Korean cargo. Any vessel or aircraft that has 

transported prohibited North Korea items should be seized upon entering US. 

jurisdiction. 

In the U.N., the U.S. should press the Security Council to: 

Close loopholes in Resolution 2094, such as including Article 42 of Chapter VII 

of the UN. Charter, which allows for enforcement by military means. This would 

authorize naval ships to intercept, board, and inspect North Korean ships 

suspected of transporting precluded nuclear, missile, and conventional arms, 

components, or technology. 

Adopt a more comprehensive list of prohibited items and materials. The UN. 

Experts Group identified several items and materials critical to Pyongyang's 

nuclear programs that should be-but have not been-added to the list of 

products banned for transfer to North Korea. These include maraging steel, 

frequency changers (also known as converters or inverters), high-strength 

aluminum alloy, filament winding machines, ring magnets, and semi-hard 

magnetic alloys in thin strip form.71 

Constrain trade of major North Korean imports and exports. The US. should 

apply sanctions similar to those imposed on significant Iran imports and exports. 

The U.S. should also restrict North Korean energy imports and the export of 

North Korean resources. US. law restricts access to the US. financial system by 

foreign companies and banks if they do business with Iran's energy sector or 

process petroleum transactions with Iran's central bank. 

Time for Incrementalism Is Past 

North Korea is every bit the nuclear threat that Iran is. In fact, in terms of real 

capabilities, it is an even greater threat today to its neighbors than Iran is to its neighbors. 

North Korea's successful missile and nuclear tests show that in only a matter of time, 

Pyongyang will be able to threaten the United States directly with nuclear weapons. 

North Korea already threatens US. interests and allies in Asia. The regime shows its 

disdain for international efforts to constrain its behavior by openly and repeatedly defying 

international law and U.N. resolutions. Responding with strong rhetoric and minimalist 

measures has only encouraged North Korea to remain on course. 

North Korea faces a perfect stonn of conditions that makes it more vulnerable to 

economic pressure. The US. and its allies are unwilling to otfer unconditional benefits 

without progress in the six-party talks. International aid has been curtailed due to 

Pyongyang's refusal to accept global monitoring standards, and international coercive 

financial pressure is affecting North Korea's finances. This increasing economic isolation 

could lead the regime to become more malleable. 

'I Panel of Expcrts, "Rcport ofthc Panel ofE:'1'crts Establishcd Pursuant to Rcsolution 18].1 (2009)." 

19 
46


87337c-21.eps

The United States possesses an array of strong punitive measures that it can levy on 

Pyongyang. It has employed many of these against Iran. The Obama Administration 

should overcome its reluctance to impose more extensive punitive measures against 

Pyongyang and the foreign entities that assist its nuclear and missile programs. It should 

also make clear to the new Chinese leadership that continued sheltering of its recalcitrant 

ally will only increase the potential for a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. 

Washington should no longer hold some sanctions in abeyance, to be rolled out after the 

next North Korean violation or provocation. There will be little change until North Korea 

feels pain and China feels concern over the consequences of Pyongyang's actions and its 

own obstructionism. 

20 
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87337c-22.eps

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During 2013, it had more than 600,000 individual, foundation, and corporate supporters 

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21 
48

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. We appreciate the testimony 

from all three of the witnesses here this afternoon. I’d now like to 

recognize the gentleman from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr. 

Connolly, for the purpose of making an opening statement. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 

very much your holding this hearing. I also appreciate the testimony particularly of Ms. Grace Jo, and just listening to what she 

went through and her family went through. Thank you so much for 

the courage of testifying today. 

I’m also, Mr. Chairman, delighted that the chairman of the committee has announced that we’re going to actually markup H.R. 

1771, North Korean Sanctions. And, Mr. Klingner, am I pronouncing that right? Thank you for your list, very helpful, because 

I think they do need to have teeth. 

Two points I would just make, Mr. Chairman, listening to this 

panel. One is, it is imperative that the United States put teeth into 

the sanctions it imposes in the North. They should never be less 

than what they are with some other rogue states. And, secondly, 

we may have an opportunity with respect to China, and I know 

we’re going to explore that on this panel. But the fact of the matter 

is, when Kim Jong-un executed his uncle, he executed the Chief 

Interlocutor with the People’s Republic of China. And in doing that, 

perhaps the Chinese got the message that their longstanding policy 

with respect to North Korea may no longer be tenable. And that 

may give us a diplomatic opportunity. And, again, I very much look 

forward to talking with the panel about that. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for the opportunity. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. I’ll now begin by recognizing 

myself for 5 minutes for the purpose of asking questions. 

China’s policy toward North Korea, and Mr. Connolly already alluded to this, appears to have undergone some evolution in the 

year since Xi took office. In some instances, appearing to be more 

willing to express its displeasure with Pyongyang. What, if anything, can be done to influence China, who is, after all, the key 

here and has the most influence to pressure North Korea, to lean 

on them to civilize itself. That seems to be beyond the capability 

of this regime but to at least be less oppressive to its people than 

it currently is? I would welcome any of the witnesses to talk to us 

about that. Mr. Klingner. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Yes, sir. As I said, there were hopes that Xi 

Jinping would be different, and a year ago during the time when 

North Korea was heightening tensions to a dangerous level it appeared China was more angry with its recalcitrant ally. Since then, 

since North Korea has shifted back to a charm offensive, we’ve 

seen Beijing sort of walk back from those initial positive hopeful 

steps. 

Most recently, we’ve seen China has rejected the U.N. Commission of Inquiry’s Human Rights Report saying its ‘‘divorced from reality,’’ and they have refused U.N. action to refer it either to the 

ICC or a tribunal. We have seen in the past, China has turned a 

blind eye to proliferation that transited its country—North Korean 

missile parts, for example, going to Iran. We’ve seen it refuse to 

take actions when the U.S. Government even provided information. 

49

It did recently take action, it severed financial relations with 

North Korea’s Financial Trade Bank. It had done this a decade ago, 

and then undid that action, so there are a number of things China 

has done, but then undid them. So, again, I think we need a focus 

on a unilateral U.S. strategy rather than on China in the U.N. Security Council. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Mr. Scarlatoiu, did you want to add 

anything to that? 

Mr. SCARLATOIU. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. China is an aspiring 

super power that helped establish and maintain the Kim regime in 

power for more than 60 years. In a letter addressed to the President of China, the Commission of Inquiry made it clear that by its 

policy of forcibly returning North Korean refugees to conditions of 

danger, China puts itself in a position where it is aiding and abetting a regime that has committed crimes against humanity. 

Certainly, as Mr. Klingner has pointed out, the recommendation 

that the Security Council submit, refer the case to the International Criminal Court is unlikely to happen over the short to medium term, in particular because of a potential Chinese veto. 

For what it’s worth, we might as well push the Chinese and 

place them in a position where they actually have to exercise their 

right to veto as a permanent member of the Security Council, further reinforcing the clear impression that China is aiding and abetting a regime that has committed crimes against humanity. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. Ms. Jo, if I could turn to you 

now, and ask you a different question. As a refugee yourself, could 

you share with us your insights about the obstacles that you faced 

obtaining refugee status in the U.S., and about the humanitarian 

conditions that North Korean refugees face, in general? 

Ms. JO. Yes, sir. As a refugee our family has lived in the United 

States almost 6 years now. And in the beginning we had support 

from the government, about 8 months, which is Medicare and Food 

Stamps, and cash about $250 for each person, so that helps our 

family a lot. And I believe most of the refugees they do get same 

benefits as our family. 

The one thing I would like to ask government to support refugee, 

which is North Korean refugees, is we need some sort of organization to support new refugees to educate them in society, and in 

America, the language different, and society is different. It’s very 

difficult to assimilate in the society as a refugee, so I don’t know 

is there any organization we can educate them, but I would like to 

ask government to support some organization to educate them and 

support them about a year or year and a half to help them to know 

the United States. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. My time has 

expired. The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ms. Jo, thank you for your courage and for telling 

us your story. 

Mr. Klingner, how many nuclear weapons, and I realize this is 

unclassified and just does North Korea have, or at least have 

enough fissile material to create? And can you tell us the status of 

uranium and plutonium programs to create additional weapons? 

50

Mr. KLINGNER. Well, sir, the information on North Korea is very 

difficult to get. Even when I was in the intelligence community, we 

referred to it as the hardest of the hard targets. But I think experts 

generally assess that North Korea likely has six to eight plutonium-based nuclear weapons. The uranium program I believe is 

much further along than some believe it has achieved because it 

has been underway since the late 1980s. It also received critical 

support from Pakistan and the A.Q. Khan Network. There’s been 

a rogues gallery of interaction with Iran, Pakistan, A.Q. Khan, 

Libya, and North Korea where they exchanged valuable information and components. So, I think in return for North Korea assistance on putting warheads onto short and medium-range missile to 

Pakistan, Pakistan replied by providing centrifuges and critical——

Mr. SHERMAN. So, their plutonium program generated enough 

fissile material, from six to eight weapons, and the consensus 

seems to be that that program is not producing any more fissile 

material? 

Mr. KLINGNER. It has been dormant for some years, but we’ve 

seen just in the last year from unclassified satellite imagery that 

North Korea is expanding its uranium reprocessing facilities. The 

reactor program at Yongbyon, as well as two very extensive missile 

launch facilities on the east and the west coast. 

The latest missile test, I’m sorry, the latest nuclear test may 

have been uranium, but we were unable to determine whether it 

was plutonium. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would point out that there’s a focus on missiles, 

even missile defense. And, obviously, the highest status for a dictator is to have a nuclear tipped intercontinental ballistic missile, 

but the less prestigious way to deliver a nuclear weapon is to 

smuggle one, and you can easily smuggle one into the United 

States inside a bale of marijuana. 

We’re not safe from this. We declared that it was unacceptable 

for North Korea to have a nuclear weapon, and then went to sleep 

pretty much. So, we are now in a position where it may be in our 

interest to negotiate with a terrible regime and to provide the kind 

of aid that Mr. Rohrabacher would decry if there was a way to 

limit them to their current six to eight plutonium-based weapons. 

The only thing worse than North Korea with six to eight weapons 

is a North Korea with 16 to 18 weapons. 

Has the North Korean Government shown any interest in even 

limiting, let alone disgorging, the fruits of its nuclear weapons program, Mr. Klingner? 

Mr. KLINGNER. No, sir. They made very clear under Kim Jongil, and now under Kim Jong-un that they have no intention of 

abandoning their nuclear arsenal. They have repeatedly——

Mr. SHERMAN. Of abandoning or even failing to augment, or just 

they have no intention to abandon, or no intention to fail to augment? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Right. They have violated the four previous 

agreements that they signed to never pursue a nuclear weapons 

program. They violated the three agreements to denuclearize. 

They’ve indicated no indication that they want to pursue that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So, we have no reason not to follow every one of 

your suggestions as to how to impose additional sanctions. 

51

Mr. KLINGNER. What I recommend is, as part of a comprehensive 

integrated strategy, using conditional engagement, and also more 

effective punitive measures to try to compel them to return to their 

denuclearization commitments. And then since perhaps those 

two——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, the problem we have on denuclearization is 

Gaddafi gave up his nuclear program which was more advanced 

than we realized. Saddam gave up his weapons of mass destruction, the Ukraine gave up the third largest nuclear arsenal. 

Gaddafi and Saddam are dead, and Ukraine doesn’t have Crimea. 

It’s going to be very hard to convince any country that has nuclear 

weapons to give them up given that track record. 

We may be able, though, to halt progress toward future weapons 

whether it be Iran, which is still at zero, or North Korea, but I 

think that goal of a non-nuclear North Korea is a goal we should 

have stuck to, and didn’t. But I thank you for outlining the possible 

actions we could take to try to create a verifiable destruction of 

those tools that they are using, particularly in the uranium area, 

to expand their stockpile of nuclear weapons. And given how this 

regime treats its own people, it’s pretty important to make sure 

they don’t have even more. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. The 

gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Scarlatoiu, what would you characterize as the successes of 

our policy of Strategic Patience? 

Mr. SCARLATOIU. Mr. Perry, certainly in our area of human 

rights, unfortunately the greatest challenge that we face is that we 

have paid a lot of attention to the very important political security 

challenges that we face on the Korean Peninsula, but not the 

human rights considerations. 

I think that we need to take those concerns into account because 

concern for human rights is part of who we are, because these are 

values that we share with our friends, partners, and allies in 

Northeast Asia and beyond, in particular, with——

Mr. PERRY. Let me—pardon my interruption, but let me rephrase 

it. 

So, are there any successes, strategic, tactical, nuclear, human 

rights, are there any successes to this strategy that you can enumerate for me? 

Mr. SCARLATOIU. As far as I can see, there are no successes, Congressman Perry. As far as I can see, the policy of Strategic Patience 

is one of very few, if any, available options that we have under the 

current circumstances, in particular, because North Korea has entirely lost its international credibility, as Mr. Klingner was mentioning, by joining the non-proliferation treaty, pulling out of the 

non-proliferation treaty, joining the Geneva Agreed Framework, 

pulling out, most recently in 2012 agreeing to the leap day agreement, then two and a half——

Mr. PERRY. Right. I mean, we know that they don’t honor any 

of their commitments. I’m just—I’m frustrated, I think as many 

Americans are, that what we’re doing is just kind of sitting back 

and waiting to see what happens; meanwhile, the things that Ms. 

52

Jo enumerated are occurring on a minutely, instantaneous basis 

every hour of the day. And it breaks our heart to know that, and 

know that we’re literally doing nothing about it. Let me move on. 

Mr. Klingner, how do you view the international interim nuclear 

deal with Iran in relation to the North Korean nuclear problem? Do 

you see any juxtaposition, does one have any effect on the other, 

or does one incentivize North Korea in a certain way, or not? Is 

there any interplay whatsoever in your mind? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Well, in reviewing the interim agreement, I certainly had a case of deja vu having followed North Korea for 20 

years. I think there are lessons that we’ve learned from negotiating 

with North Korea that should be applied with Iran. I think we 

need very extensive, very detailed negotiations or agreements like 

we had with the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact. We need very, 

very stringent verification measures to insure that North Korea or 

Iran is not cheating, as North Korea repeatedly has done in the 

past. 

We need to have the willingness to walk away from the table if 

it’s a bad deal. I think in the past with North Korea we often saw, 

as one negotiator put it, the desire to keep the bicycle moving. If 

it stops, it falls over, so the negotiations were kept going for the 

sake of——

Mr. PERRY. So, we learned, but in essence we—I mean, learning 

is this—I would think you would take a different action based on 

what you learned from the mistakes that you learned. But we have 

the information, we know what was successful, we know what 

failed, but we haven’t applied any of that in Iran, if I could be succinct about your answer. 

Mr. KLINGNER. I think the lessons are there. Whether we’ve 

learned them is a different story. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. Do you accept the assessment of the U.S. 

Intelligence Committee that North Korea will be deterred from 

using nuclear weapons except possibly in the scenario of imminent 

regime collapse? 

Mr. KLINGNER. I would largely agree. I think they realize that 

using nuclear weapons would bring about the end of their regime 

and the end of their country. I think their nuclear weapons are intended more for compellence or coercion. The U.S. and South Korea 

have been deterred from responding to military attacks that North 

Korea has committed in the past even before they had nuclear 

weapons. And now that they have nuclear weapons, North Korea 

would think that they could get away with more than they did before. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay, thank you. I will tell you that I—as other 

members of the panel listened intently to your list of potential options for the United States, and I’ll be working with the chairman 

and the other members of the committee to help draft that legislation, partly due to the list that you’ve provided, or with that in 

mind, because I think it would be very helpful. 

Just in the time remaining, Ms. Jo, your story is incredibly compelling, and I could tell you, I think it breaks everyone’s heart in 

the room, and if every American could hear it, it would break their 

heart. But from your point of view, and I understand you’ve been 

gone a long time, and you were there as child, but the things 

53

you’ve seen and endured, what from your perspective would make 

a difference to turn that leadership around, to turn—to have the 

people rise up against this oppression, to completely change the situation in North Korea? What will motivate—is there anything that 

could motivate the people? Is there any chance for the people to do 

this on their own, and some way for the United States and the 

United Nations to motivate that, empower that, encourage that? 

Ms. JO. Politically, I don’t have full educated, so I cannot give 

you the exact answer. But in my opinion and thinking, the United 

States, we can help the Ministries or the individual people who already escaped into China, who are seeking freedom. So, we can rescue refugees in China to the freedom country. And once we rescue 

hundreds, thousands refugees from North Korea, I believe one day 

North Korean regime will fall down. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, and thank you for your answer. 

Ms. JO. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. We appreciate that. The gentleman from Virginia, 

Mr. Connolly, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Klingner, first of all, I don’t—it’s not often I find myself in 

near total agreement with the Heritage Foundation, but I must say 

I found your testimony right on, and very helpful in terms of not 

just providing a critique of U.S. policy, but giving us a roadmap for 

how we might become much more efficacious. And I thank you for 

that contribution, as well, and I echo what my colleagues said. 

I think when—I’ve written the chairman requesting a markup of 

H.R. 1771, and we’re going to do that. And when we do, we certainly will take a very close, hard look at your recommendations, 

so this hearing is very timely. 

Let me ask you about China. How important do you think China 

is to the ultimate issue of North Korea and ultimate reunification? 

Conventional wisdom had it that the Chinese would never support 

reunification, that having the hermit kingdom sort of under their 

thumb served their interest, keeping the peninsula divided served 

their interest, but you could make the case that perhaps in light 

of recent events and, frankly, the opening up of the Chinese economy, they have a lot more in common with the South than they do 

with the North. And that the North has now become an albatross 

more than anything else. And in this case even a sort of unpredictable albatross, if such a thing exists. I don’t know if albatrosses can 

be unpredictable, Mr. Chairman, but let’s assume they can. Especially in light of the execution of Kim Jong-un’s uncle. 

So, how important is China? What leverage do they have? And 

are we—do we have reason to believe as the United States that 

they might be more open to our importunings than in the past? 

Mr. KLINGNER. You ask a very good question, sir, because experts on China and North Korea have been struggling with that, 

and we haven’t come to an answer. 

The Chinese-North Korean relationship is complicated, and what 

we’ve seen in China, even at the senior leadership level, is a split 

between, if you will, old school who support their ally and alliance 

forged in blood, and the younger leadership who sees, as you pointed out, North Korea is an albatross. The future of China on the KoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:58 May 08, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\032614\87337 SHIRL
54

rean Peninsula is with the South for economic reasons, so there is 

that struggle. But to date, the old school has outvoted the new 

school. 

As for unification, the Bush administration, the Obama administration, and Track II discussions outside of government have tried 

to get China to articulate what are its red lines, what are its 

thoughts toward unification, would it accept it? What would cause 

it to go into North Korea? And China has been resistant, so that 

lack of transparency is very concerning to U.S. and South Korean 

policy makers. 

Just yesterday when Xi Jinping met with Park Eun Ji, he 

seemed to indicate acceptance of unification or support for President Park’s unification approach. We don’t know how much we can 

take that to the bank. One would hope China would acquiesce to 

a Korean unification, but we don’t know. And that uncertainty is 

of great concern to the United States. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. What is the remaining leverage Beijing has on 

Pyongyang? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Although it has the most leverage of any country 

in the world on North Korea, its amount of leverage is less than 

perhaps people think. Of course, you can point to the overwhelming 

majority of economic engagement from North Korea to China, it’s 

its largest trading partner. You know, people say China could cut 

off the food and the fuel, but China is unlikely to do that. That 

would create a crisis on the border, which is what they want to 

avoid. 

So, I think what the U.S. needs to do is point out to China that 

its refusal or its resistance to putting pressure on North Korea is 

bringing about the very crisis it doesn’t want. It’s encouraging 

North Korea to pursue these nuclear programs and missile programs, to engage in deadly acts of attack on South Korea, which 

will bring about U.S. and South Korean military responses that 

Beijing doesn’t want. We need to make clear to Beijing that it can 

act now, or it can act later. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. One can also say that, I suppose, of the kind of 

situation Grace Jo described. I mean, returning North Korean refugees who get into China back to the North Korean regime is virtually a death sentence, and certainly a terrible blemish on the 

Chinese record. And one wonders whether the Chinese think that 

continuing that policy makes any sense in light of the brutality and 

the lack of international acceptance of the North and its behavior 

by any norms at all. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Right. As my colleagues can address far better, 

is that forced repatriation is itself in violation of international accords. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If the chairman would allow Mr. Scarlatoiu to 

address the questions, then I will relent. 

Mr. CHABOT. Sure. The gentleman’s time is expired, but Mr. 

Scarlatoiu can respond. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Mr. SCARLATOIU. Thank you, Congressman Connolly. 

China joined in 1982 the U.N. Refugee Convention, the 1951 Refugee Convention. Pursuant to that Convention, if a person is repatriated and faces conditions of danger, then that person automatiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:58 May 08, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\032614\87337 SHIRL
55

cally qualifies to be granted access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status. We have had numerous credible reports 

of North Koreans who were forcibly returned by China, especially 

those who came in contact with South Koreans or Christian missionaries along the road of defection were tortured, beaten, imprisoned in political prison camps, North Korean women who became 

pregnant with Chinese men along the road of defection, were subjected to sexual violence, rape. We have credible reports of infanticide, forced abortions. 

China continues this policy of forcible repatriation of North Koreans claiming that they’re illegal economic migrants. Last week in 

Geneva on the 17th of March, right after the submission and the 

presentation of the report of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry by 

Judge Michael Kirby of Australia, China again stated that these 

North Korean refugees are not political refugees, but illegal economic migrants which makes absolutely no sense, and is a flagrant 

violation of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. We’ll 

go into a second round in case any other members have questions. 

We’re going to have votes here shortly, so just a couple of quick 

questions. 

Mr. Scarlatoiu and Mr. Klingner, let me ask you this first question: You both mentioned the need for more effective and targeted 

sanctions against North Korea that link sanctions to North Korea’s 

human rights abuses. And we’ve mentioned the legislation that’s 

being contemplated here, H.R. 1771. Could you touch briefly on 

what in H.R. 1771 you like that may actually have some impact? 

Mr. Scarlatoiu? 

Mr. SCARLATOIU. Chairman Chabot, the Committee for Human 

Rights in North Korea recognizes that the North Korea Sanctions 

Enforcement Act of 2013 addresses not only North Korea’s nuclear 

and missile programs, but also identifies human rights violations 

as conduct that is subject to sanctions. 

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea appreciates 

that H.R. 1771 also insures that humanitarian assistance to North 

Korea is not affected by the sanctions in the spirit of targeted sanctions called for by the recently released report of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry. 

We are aware that the revised draft of the legislation actually insures that funds that would otherwise have been used by the North 

Korean regime to purchase ski lifts, luxury goods, weapons and 

missile components will be used for the purchase of humanitarian 

supplies, food, and medicine for those who need it most for the 

North Korean people. It is certainly also important to insure that 

humanitarian assistance is adequately monitored and reaches 

those who need it most, the most vulnerable people of North Korea. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Mr. Klingner, did you want to comment 

on that? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Yes. H.R. 1771 certainly has an extensive list of 

actions that—I noticed a lot of overlap with my own recommendations. 

I think, notably, on the human rights front, that is something 

that has lagged on the North Korean side, as we’ve seen legislation 

against Iranian human rights violations, Syrian. And I think just 

56

to go along sort of my theory of do unto North Korea as we have 

already done unto other violators of either human rights accords, 

or U.S. law, international law, U.N. resolutions. 

So, I think—and a good starting point is look at the Commission 

of Inquiry’s listing of the many North Korean Government entities 

or organizations that it condemns as being involved in these 

human rights violations. They should go on a U.S. sanctions list, 

not only the organizations themselves, but the individuals who 

head those organizations. I think that would be a very good starting point. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. This one is my last question. Ms. Jo, 

how do you assess the impact of foreign radio broadcasts from the 

U.S. and South Korea into North Korea? I think the administration 

favors increasing them and there’s some question as to how effective they’ve been. How effective do you think they have been? Is 

there any way to make radio broadcasts into North Korea more effective? Did you ever hear anything like that? How old were you 

when you left, when you got out of North Korea? 

Ms. JO. The last time was 16, 16-years-old. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Did you ever hear any radio broadcast coming in from outside of North Korea that said anything that would 

let you know what’s really happening out there in the rest of the 

world? Did that ever happen? 

Ms. JO. When I get international news or information is in 

China, yes. 

Mr. CHABOT. From China. You didn’t get anything from the U.S. 

or from South Korea that you’re aware of then, I guess? 

Ms. JO. Before we come to the United States. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. 

Ms. JO. We only watched the news about America. That’s the 

only information we got from Chinese TV. 

Mr. CHABOT. And that was from Chinese TV channels? Okay. 

Ms. JO. Yes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay, thank you. Okay. I’ll turn the question over 

to you gentlemen then. 

Mr. SCARLATOIU. Mr. Chairman, the company tasked to monitor 

broadcasting to North Korea, InterMedia, published a couple of 

years ago—back then, InterMedia was tasked to perform this mission, published an excellent report entitled, ‘‘A Quiet Opening.’’ It 

conducted interviews with North Korean defectors, North Korean 

escapees. About one-third, 30 percent of them stated that they had 

listened to foreign broadcasting while in North Korea. Foreign 

broadcasting also includes broadcasting by stations based in South 

Korea. 

For the past 10 years, we have seen a constant increase in the 

percentage of North Korean defectors who stated that they had listened to foreign broadcasting. Certainly, this does not necessarily 

mean that one-third of all people of North Korea listen to foreign 

broadcasting. These were those who were most likely to actively 

seek out information from the outside world, but North Korea is a 

country where radios have been sealed and basically set to one set 

government frequency. In the aftermath of the great famine of the 

1990s, small informal markets have developed as a coping mechanism, not as the result of top down reform, and cheap radios have 

57

been available in these open markets, so more North Koreans have 

had access to radios, and to broadcasting stations based here in the 

United States, and also in South Korea. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. My time has actually expired. Mr. 

Klingner, did you want to add anything on the broadcasts into 

North Korea? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Yes, if I could, sir. Information is one of the instruments of national power of the United States, along with diplomacy, military, economic, and other means. And getting information into North Korea I think is good. It’s beneficial. It can have 

a corrosive effect on the regime. And we can do that through overt 

and covert means. Overt is through exchanges which are fine. We 

shouldn’t oversell them as a substitute for conditional diplomatic 

engagement or more effective punitive measures. 

We also should do it covertly. There’s been a great deal of information that’s gotten into North Korea through thumb drives, 

through pamphlets being transported by balloons, people bringing 

in DVDs and others. And that really shows the people of North 

Korea the reality of their own regime, as well as the reality of the 

outside world. So, I think we should do everything we can to encourage getting information in and out of North Korea through any 

means possible. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. As I said, my time is expired. We do have votes on the floor, but the gentleman from Virginia is recognized for up to 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I’ll just ask one question as a follow-up if I may. 

Well, actually, two. 

Mr. Klingner, with respect to the chairman’s last question, you 

had been talking earlier about we ought to do unto North Korea 

what we’ve been willing to do to Iran. Do you think one of the reasons there’s been some reluctance to do that is that one of the differences is Iran is sensitive to the impact of sanctions on its own 

population; whereas, North Korea seems to be utterly insensitive 

to the impact of sanctions or any other economic consequences, and 

is willing to have some percent of its own population starve to 

death, or suffer severe malnutrition rather than to bend the knee 

or relent. Is that—do you think that that may be one of the concerns the West has, that in inflicting punishment on a regime 

we’re, in fact, directly inflicting punishment on innocent civilians? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Actually, I think the reluctance to impose greater 

punitive measures on North Korea really is counterintuitive. As I 

said before, North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT. It’s exploded nuclear devices. It says blatantly its nuclear program is for 

military purposes, and it also doesn’t have a valuable commodity, 

oil, like Iran does. One would think there would be far greater 

sanctions on North Korea than Iran, but it’s the opposite. 

I think it’s also useful to point out, though——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I guess what I’m getting at is why do you think 

that is so? And I’m offering you perhaps one theory for why it may 

be so, which in a strange way is a humanitarian reason. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Right. But, actually, the targeted financial measures are not—would not impact the populace. They are not trade 

sanctions, they are not general sanctions. They are going after very 

specific financial links of the regime and other violators to the outVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:58 May 08, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\032614\87337 SHIRL
58

side world. So, you know, I think the reluctance really is puzzling, 

not only to experts on North Korea, but particularly South Korean 

citizens who can’t understand why the U.S. and the international 

community has been more reluctant to impose these things on 

North Korea. So, you know, it’s targeted financial measures that 

we want, not broad sanctions that would impact the populous. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Scarlatoiu. 

Mr. SCARLATOIU. Scarlatoiu, yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Can you just briefly bring us up to date on one 

of the more bizarre practices of the North, and that is this whole 

phenomenon of abductees? It sounds to the uninitiated almost like 

a science fiction UFO kind of thing, abductees but, in fact, it’s real. 

Mr. SCARLATOIU. Congressman Connolly, thank you for the question. Our organization, the Committee for Human Rights in North 

Korea produced the only extensive English language report on this 

topic published 3 years ago entitled, ‘‘Taken.’’ One hundred and 

eighty thousand citizens of South Korea and other countries, including Japan and others have been taken by the North Koreans 

beginning on the 25th of June, 1950 when the North Korean military attacked South Korea. The practice goes back to a decree by 

Kim Il-sung. They initially intended to bring over the best and the 

brightest from South Korea to set up a new society. Most of them 

ended up in political prison camps. Ethnic Koreans from Japan 

who decided to return to North Korea, or were pushed to return at 

the time were never allowed to leave. Their Japanese spouses were 

not allowed to leave. There have also been foreign nationals of 

countries, including even, for example, Romania, former Communist ally of North Korea, who were taken, who were abducted 

by North Korean agents. They were forced to teach foreign languages and cultures to North Korean intelligence operatives. Their 

identities were used in North Korea’s covert operations. And as I’m 

sure you recall, Congressman Connolly, in 1987, two North Korean 

agents bombed Korean Air Flight 858, before the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The two North Korean agents who bombed the plane posed as 

Japanese nationals, one of them, a woman, survived, sentenced to 

death. She survived, her sentence was commuted, married her 

bodyguard, became a star in South Korea, and told the story of how 

some of the Japanese abductees had provided training while she 

was in spy school. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. It’s an unbelievable story, and it deserves much 

more attention. Thank you for doing the only English report on this 

terrible practice. And, again, thank you to all of the panel for being 

with us today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. The gentleman’s time has 

expired. I also want to reiterate what the gentleman just said. I 

think this has been an excellent panel. We especially thank you, 

Ms. Jo, for having gone through this personally, and the trauma 

that you’ve suffered during the course of your life. Thank you, gentlemen, for devoting your lives to a critically important issue here. 

We appreciate it very much. 

Members will have 5 days to submit questions, or to revise and 

expand any of their remarks. If there’s no further business to come 

before the committee, we’re adjourned. Thank you very much. 

59

[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(61)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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87337n.eps

SlJBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

Steve Chabot (R-OH), Chairman 

March 25, 2014 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be 

held by the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and 

available live on the Committee website at ~Y"Y"l~JQL~ign~Ii}1(?Jli-m_S_~._g!~'-:) 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, March 26, 2014 

2:00 p.m 

The Shocking Truth about North Korean Tyranny 

Ms. Grace Jo 

Survivor of North Korean human rights abuses 

Mr Greg Scarlatoiu 

Executive Director 

Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 

Mr. Bruce Klingner 

Senior Research Fellow 

Northeast Asia 

The Heritage Foundation 

By Direction of the Chairman 
63

Æ


87337m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON _______ A_s_ia_&_t_h_e_P_a~ci'__fi_c ______ HEARING 

Day Wednesday Datc __ --'Soc!.22"'61-='2"-0o..14'--__ Rooill ___ -=2""lcc72"--__ _ 

Starting Time 2-06 nUl Ending Time 4:09 mIl 

Recesses ~I (~to ""I"" ) ( __ to __ ) ( __ to __ )( __ to __ ) ( __ to __ )( __ to __ ) 

Presiding Membet'(s) 

Chairman StCl'e Chabot (R-OH) 

Check all ~fflte followillg tltat apply: 

Open Session 0 Executive (closed) Session 0 Televised 0 

TITLE OF IliARING: 

The Shocldllg Trllth Abollt North Korea/! TyraIlIlY 

SUBCOMMITn:J<: MJ<:MBERS PRESENT: 

Electronically Rccord~taped) 0 

Stenographic Record l!:::J 

Rep, Ami Rem (D-CA), Rep. Brad ShermaIl (D-CA), Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), Rep. Scott PeJ'fY 

(R-PA), Rep. Gerald COIlnoily (D-VA), Rep. GeO/'ge Holding (R-NC) 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRRSJ<:NT: (Mark witll all * iflliey are 1101 ",ell/hen' affillI committee.) 

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or 

TIME ADJOURNED __ 4_:_09~p,--I_I1_