**_______________________________** Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909

Chief Justice Justices Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. 

# Opinion

Stephen J. Markman

**FILED APRIL 14, 2004**

**HIGHLAND-HOWELL DEVELOPMENT CO, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee,** 

**v No. 122843**  **TOWNSHIP OF MARION, Defendant-Appellant.** 

**BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH CAVANAGH, J.**  **The Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.701** et seq **., defines the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Michigan Tax**  **Tribunal as review of a final decision “of an agency relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special**  **assessments, allocation, or equalization under property tax laws.” MCL 205.731(a). Plaintiff’s complaint contained a**  **count alleging that defendant breached a promise to construct a sewer line through plaintiff’s property. The**  **issue before us is whether the circuit court has jurisdiction to hear this claim or whether it lies within**  **the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. We affirm the Court of Appeals holding that plaintiff’s claim for**  **breach of promise falls outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal.** 

**I. F**  **ACTS AND P**  **ROCEEDINGS Count I of plaintiff’s first amended complaint sought**  **damages for an alleged breach of promise and for the adoption of “a special assessment roll which allocated a**  **disproportionate share of the cost of the sewer improvements to Plaintiff’s property.” Plaintiff’s**  **complaint alleged that defendant promised to construct a**  **sewer line through certain property and plaintiff relied on that promise in making several decisions, including**  **purchasing the property and declining sewer service from the city of Howell. Count II of the complaint challenged**  **the validity of the special assessment. Defendant’s motion for summary disposition argued that**  **plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) because it was within the exclusive**  **jurisdiction of the Michigan Tax Tribunal, as well as under MCR 2.116(C)(8) because count I failed to state a claim**  **upon which relief could be granted. The trial court granted defendant’s C(4) motion and dismissed both counts.** 

**2 Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of count I. The**  **Court of Appeals considered the scope of the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction and concluded that because count I**  **of plaintiff’s complaint fell outside the Tax Tribunal’s**  **jurisdiction, the trial court’s grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) was premature.**  **1 Defendant sought leave to appeal, claiming that the Court**  **of Appeals erred. 2**  **We granted defendant’s application for leave.**  **3**

**II. S**  **TANDARD OF R**  **EVIEW The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary**  **disposition on the basis of its interpretation of the jurisdictional provisions of the Tax Tribunal Act, MCL**  **205.731. The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction in this**  **case turns on the interpretation of the provisions of a statute. Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed** 

1 **Unpublished opinion per curiam issued November 19, 2002 (Docket No. 231937).** 

**2 The trial court did not rule on defendant’s MCR**  **2.116(C)(8) motion, having instead ruled in favor of defendant on its C(4) motion. However, the Court of**  **Appeals examined defendant’s C(8) motion because it “present[ed] an alternate basis for affirming the trial**  **court’s decision.” Slip op at 3. The Court of Appeals**  **held that summary disposition pursuant to defendant’s C(8) motion likewise would have been**  **premature, but defendant did not appeal that decision to this Court. Defendant only**  **appealed the C(4) jurisdictional issue.**

**3 468 Mich 942 (2003).**  **3 de novo.**  American Federation of State, Co & Municipal Employees v Detroit **, 468 Mich 388, 398; 662 NW2d 695 (2003). Likewise, this Court reviews the grant or denial**  **of summary disposition de novo.** Id **. III.**  **A NALYSIS**  **We must determine whether plaintiff’s claim for damages resulting from defendant’s alleged breached promise**  **to construct a sewer line is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal, as delineated**  **in the Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.731. We follow the analysis employed by the Court of Appeals to determine the**  **scope of the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction. Section 31 of the Tax Tribunal Act provides:**  **The tribunal’s exclusive and original jurisdiction shall be:**  **(a) A proceeding for direct review of a**  **final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order of an agency relating to assessment,**  **valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or equalization, under property tax**  **laws. (b)**  **A proceeding for refund or redetermination of a tax under the property tax**  **laws. The language of the statute limits the Tax Tribunal’s**  **exclusive jurisdiction to matters “relating to assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, or**  **equalization, under property tax laws.” Plaintiff’s claims for breaches of promise or contract are not within the** 

**4 scope of the statutory provision, and therefore are within**  **the circuit court’s jurisdiction. 4**  **In 1982, this Court examined the scope of the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction in two cases:**  Wikman v Novi **, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 (1982), and** Romulus City Treasurer v Wayne Co Drain Comm’r **, 413 Mich 728; 322 NW2d 152 (1982).** 

**In** Wikman **, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in the circuit court, alleging that the special assessments**  **imposed on them had been determined in an arbitrary and capricious manner. This Court ruled, inter alia, that the**  **challenge to the special assessments was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal because the**  **action was one “seeking direct review of the governmental unit’s decision concerning a special assessment for a**  **public improvement.”** Wikman **at 626. Unlike the direct challenge to the special assessment**  **in** Wikman **, the plaintiffs in** Romulus City Treasurer **filed a constructive fraud claim in the circuit court, challenging**  **the drain commissioner’s use of funds collected through special assessments. This Court held that the circuit** 

**4 Paragraph 9 of plaintiff’s first amended complaint**  **alleges that the special assessment roll allocated a “disproportionate” share of the cost of improvements to**  **plaintiff’s property. This allegation is within the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive and original jurisdiction pursuant to**  Wikman v Novi **, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 (1982). 5** **court had jurisdiction to hear the case because the question was whether the drain commissioner could pay**  **administrative costs with special assessment funds and, therefore, this question was outside the exclusive**  **jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. In reaching the decision in**  Romulus City Treasurer **, this Court noted that MCL 205.721 designates the Tax**  **Tribunal as a “’quasi-judicial agency’” comprised of seven members; only two must be attorneys with experience either**  **in property tax matters or in the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial office.**  Romulus City Treasurer **at 737. In addition,**  **[o]ne member must be a certified assessor; one, an experienced professional real estate**  **appraiser; and one, a certified public accountant with experience in state-local tax matters. Not**  **more than three of the seven members are to be members of any one professional discipline and**  **persons who are not members of any of the enumerated disciplines are required to have**  **experience in state or local tax matters. The expertise of the tribunal members can be**  **seen to relate primarily to questions concerning the factual underpinnings of taxes. [**  Id **.]**

**This Court also noted that the Tax Tribunal’s membership is qualified to resolve disputes concerning assessments,**  **valuations, rates, allocation, and equalization, as well as to determine whether special assessments are levied**  **according to the benefits received.** Id.

**6 While the Tax Tribunal’s membership is particularly**  **competent to resolve disputes related to the basis for and amounts of taxes, its membership is not qualified to**  **resolve common-law tort or contract claims. Clearly, this supports our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend**  **the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction to encompass matters outside the realm of those tax matters specified in**  **the statute.**

**IV. C**  **ONCLUSION While we express no opinion on whether plaintiff’s**  **claim can withstand a summary disposition motion on the basis of MCR 2.116(C)(8), we do find that, except for the**  **allegations contained in paragraph 9, count I of plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleged issues of law**  **outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. Common-law tort and contract claims are not within the**  **exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal, as defined by MCL 205.731. We affirm the ruling of the Court**  **of Appeals and remand this case to the circuit court. Michael F. Cavanagh**  **Maura D. Corrigan Elizabeth A. Weaver**  **Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor**  **Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman** 

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