Final Report

From Representation 

to Inclusion:

Diversity Leadership for 

the 21st-Century Military
Final Report

From Representation 

to Inclusion:

Diversity Leadership for 

the 21st-Century Military
MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMMISSION

1851 South Bell Street

Arlington, VA 22202

March 15, 2011

The Honorable Barack Obama, President of the United States

The 112th United States Congress

Mr. President and Members of Congress:

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 established the Military 

Leadership Diversity Commission. The Commission was asked to conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies and practices that shape diversity among military leaders. Sixteen interrelated tasks, given by Congress, informed the Commission’s 

enclosed final report, From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21stCentury Military. As chairman of this Commission, I am proud to present this report for 

your consideration. 

The Commission held itself to high standards of openness and transparency in all 

deliberations. Moreover, we modeled inclusiveness by inviting those with diverse backgrounds, expertise, and experience to have a say in our independent analysis. The Commission sought extensive input for our deliberations from the Department of Defense and 

the Services as well as the private sector. We hosted 13 public hearings, meeting in locations across the country where many active-duty servicemembers and veterans reside. We 

heard public testimony from top military leaders, subject matter experts, and diversity 

officers from leading corporations known for their diversity practices. In addition, we conducted interviews with servicemembers. 

The Commission believes that the diversity of our servicemembers is the unique 

strength of our military. Current and future challenges can be better met by broadening 

our understanding of diversity and by effectively leading our uniformed men and women 

in ways that fully leverage their differences. While we find the promotion policies and 

practices of the Department of Defense and the Services to be fair, we find also that there 

are some barriers to improving demographic representation among military leaders. 

Among the 20 recommendations given in this report is a new definition of diversity 

for the 21st century. We offer ways to remove barriers that are affecting the demographic 
makeup of military leadership, and we suggest approaches to leadership, education, and 

assessment that can enable the Department of Defense and the Services to fully benefit 

from the increased diversity of military leadership. We are confident that these recommendations will positively shape our military leadership in ways that meet the unique 

challenges of this century. However, the Commission recognizes that presidential and 

congressional guidance and support are necessary if success is to be realized. 

It has been both an honor and privilege for this Commission to support the U.S. 

military’s continuing journey of becoming a preeminently inclusive institution.

Sincerely,

Lester L. Lyles, Chairman

Military Leadership Diversity Commission
v

Commissioner Signatures

Current Commissioners
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

vi

Former Commissioners
vii

Preface

The U.S. Armed Forces became a deliberately inclusive organization in 1948, when 

President Harry S. Truman issued his historic Executive Order 9981 that called for 

“equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services” (The 

White House, 1948). Since then, the U.S. military force has endeavored to become 

an inclusive organization dedicated to the equality of all its members, regardless of 

their background. Its dedication to equal opportunity has resulted in increased representation of racial/ethnic minorities and women among the top military leaders in 

recent decades. Despite undeniable successes, however, the Armed Forces have not 

yet succeeded in developing a continuing stream of leaders who are as diverse as the 

Nation they serve. Racial/ethnic minorities and women still lag behind non-Hispanic 

white men in terms of representative percentage of military leadership positions held. 

Marked changes in the demographic makeup of the United States will throw existing 

disparities into sharp relief, creating a recruiting pool that looks very different from the 

pool of 30–40 years ago, from which today’s leaders were drawn.

Recognizing existing disparities and seeking to look ahead, Congress, in the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 596, mandated the 

creation of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC). The Commission was tasked to “conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies 

that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members 

of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are senior officers.” Its charter 

required that a final report be delivered directly to the President and Congress one year 

after its first meeting. 

An independent deliberative body, the Commission was itself an inclusive organization. Military Commissioners were active-duty and retired officers and senior 

enlisted personnel from both the Active and Reserve Components of all the Armed 

Forces, including the Coast Guard, as well as civilians. They included those who served 

in major armed conflicts from World War II to Iraq and Afghanistan. Civilian Commissioners included senior executives of major corporations, civil servants, and a law 

school chancellor. 

The Commission’s charter listed 16 specific tasks. To address these tasks, the 

Commission was divided into ten subcommittees, each supported by a research team. 

Each subcommittee produced issue papers on specific topics and a decision paper that 

reports the subcommittee’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations.1

1	 The Legal Implications Subcommittee did not produce a decision paper because the Commission made no 

recommendations specific to the subcommittee’s findings. Rather, those findings served to inform all of the 

Commission’s recommendations.
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

viii

This final report, founded on rigorous research and enhanced by serious and open 

deliberation, presents the Commission’s main findings and recommends policies and 

practices to develop future military leaders who represent the face of America.
ix

Contents

Commissioner Signatures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Figures and Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi

Section I: Introduction

Chapter One: About the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter Two: Defining Diversity for a New Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Section II: Building the Foundation for Change

Chapter Three: Ensuring Leadership Commitment to Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Section III: Developing Future Leaders

Chapter Four: The Demographic Composition of Today’s Military Leadership . . . . . . . . . . 39

Chapter Five: The Eligible Pool of Candidates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Chapter Six: Outreach and Recruiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Chapter Seven: Branching and Assignments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Chapter Eight: Promotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Chapter Nine: Retention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Chapter Ten: Going Beyond Race/Ethnicity and Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Section IV: Ensuring Continued Progress

Chapter Eleven: Managing and Sustaining Diversity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Chapter Twelve: Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Appendixes

A. The Military Leadership Diversity Commission Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

B. Commission Members. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

C. Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

D. Glossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

xi

Figures and Table

Figures

2.1. 21st-Century Inclusion Builds on the Foundation of 20th-Century 

Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

3.1. Best Practices for Managing Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

3.2. The 1998 DoD Human Goals Charter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

4.1. Racial/Ethnic Minority and Female Shares of Officers and Enlisted 

Personnel, by Component, September 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

4.2. Racial/Ethnic Minority Shares of Enlisted Personnel, by Service and 

Rank, September 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

4.3. Female Shares of Enlisted Personnel, by Service and Rank, 

September 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

4.4. Racial/Ethnic Minority Shares of Officers, by Service and Grade, 

September 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

4.5. Female Shares of Officers, by Service and Grade, September 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . 43

4.6. All Stages of the Military Personnel Life Cycle Affect the Demographic 

Composition of Military Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

5.1. The Cumulative Effect of Individual Requirements on the Demographic 

Composition of the Eligible Enlisted Population, Marine Corps, 2009 . . . . . 48

5.2. The Cumulative Effect of Individual Requirements on the Demographic 

Composition of the Eligible Officer Population, Marine Corps, 2009 . . . . . . . 48

6.1. Comparison of Air Force ROTC Host Locations and Student Body 

Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

7.1. Percentage of AC Officers in Tactical/Operational Occupations, 

December 2008, by Pay Grade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

7.2. Percentage in Nontactical/Nonoperational and Tactical/Operational 

Occupations Who Were White Men, December 2008, by Service . . . . . . . . . . . 65

11.1. The Centrality of the CDO Within the Proposed Diversity Management 

System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Table

11.1. Court Martial Cases, by Race/Ethnicity Group, 2008. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

xiii

SuMMARY

Th is report presents the fi ndings and recommendations of the MLDC. Under the provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 596, 

Congress asked the Commission to “conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of 

minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are senior 

offi cers.” Congress charged the Commission to carry out 16 interrelated tasks. Th e 

nonpartisan, deliberative body of military and civilian leaders researched, refl ected on, 

and recommended improvements to existing diversity-related policies and off ered new 

initiatives designed to be supportive of the missions and goals of the Department of 

Defense (DoD). 

Th e Commission’s recommendations support two overriding and related objectives: (1) that the Armed Forces systematically develop a demographically diverse leadership that refl ects the public it serves and the forces it leads and (2) that the Services 

pursue a broader approach to diversity that includes the range of backgrounds, skill 

sets, and personal attributes that are necessary to enhancing military performance.

Th e Commission acknowledges that the Services have been leaders in providing 

opportunities for all servicemembers, regardless of their racial/ethnic background or 

gender. Today’s mission-eff ective force is a living testament to progress in the areas 

of military equal opportunity policies and 

related recruiting and management tactics. 

However, more needs to be done to address 

21st-century challenges. 

Th e Armed Forces have not yet succeeded in developing a continuing stream of 

leaders who are as demographically diverse 

as the Nation they serve. Current projections suggest that the proportion of racial/ethnic 

minority youth will increase in this century, while the proportion of non- Hispanic 

white youth will decline. More importantly, racial/ethnic minorities and women are 

still underrepresented among the Armed Forces’ top leadership, compared with the 

servicemembers they lead. Th is disparity will become starkly obvious without the successful recruitment, promotion, and retention of racial/ethnic minorities among the 

enlisted force. Without sustained attention, this problem will only become more acute 

as the racial/ethnic and cultural makeup of the United States continues to change. 

Th e Armed Forces must also acknowledge that diversity encompasses more than 

demographics, and they must take action to harness the range of knowledge, skills, 

and backgrounds needed to prevail in the rapidly changing operational environment. 

Leaders will need to address complex and uncertain emergent threats. For example, 

[D]espite our progress today, too many people 

still suff er from what I call the illusion of inclusion, which is a condition you get when you 

rest on past laurels.

—The Honorable Claiborne Haughton, Jr., 

remarks to the Commission, 2010
From representation to inclusion: Diversity leaDership For the 21st-century military

xiv

U.S. military and civilian cyber systems 

are becoming more complex to defend and 

utilize, and enemy techniques blur the line 

between combat and noncombat situations 

on the ground. Th e ability to work collaboratively with many stakeholders, including 

international partners, will also be critical 

in meeting such challenges and will require greater foreign-language, regional, and 

cultural skills. In that vein, expert testimony comes from General James Mattis, then–

Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. Closing out the 2010 Joint Warfi ghting 

Conference, he stated,

In this age, I don’t care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you 

cannot create harmony—even vicious harmony—on the battlefi eld based on 

trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/

military lines, you really need to go home, because your leadership in today’s 

age is obsolete. We have got to have offi cers who can create harmony across all 

those lines. (quoted in Boyer, 2010)

To address these challenges, the Commission proposes 20 recommendations to

• establish a defi nition of diversity that addresses the complexity of today’s 

environment

• build a foundation for change by ensuring leadership commitment to diversity

• develop and maintain a qualifi ed and demographically diverse military leadership

• ensure continued progress through policy goals and metrics that allow DoD to 

manage and sustain diversity.

Defi ne Diversity for a New Era

Currently, each Service defi nes diversity diff erently. Developing a uniform defi nition of 

diversity to be used throughout DoD can inspire a common vision and elicit the needed 

changes. Th e Commission’s recommended defi nition, presented below, brings together 

DoD’s core values and the core values of each Service, and it addresses today’s unique 

mission and demographic challenges:

Diversity is all the diff erent characteristics and attributes of individuals that are consistent with Department of Defense core values, integral to overall readiness and mission accomplishment, and refl ective of the Nation we serve.

Th e defi nition acknowledges that individuals come to the military not only with 

diff erent cultural backgrounds but also with diff erent skills, experiences, and talents. It 

also acknowledges that these diff erences are operationally relevant. With proper leadership, diversity can increase military agility and responsiveness. 

And the issue that we’re talking about here 

today—diversity—is a readiness issue. Sustaining our all-volunteer force is a readiness 

issue.

—The Honorable Cliff ord Stanley, 

remarks to the Commission, 2010
summary

xv

Th e defi nition is consistent with equal opportunity policies and practices. If policies resulting from the new defi nition are properly communicated, implemented, and 

assessed, the new concept will help to further eliminate discrimination and guide DoD 

along a path of inclusion. 

Build the Foundation for Change

Leveraging diversity as a vital strategic military resource will require the commitment, 

vision, and know-how of leaders at every level. Without this commitment to instill 

respect for diversity as a core value, the needed cultural change may not take place.

Ensure Leadership Commitment to Diversity

Diversity leadership must become a core competency at all levels of the Armed Forces, 

and respect for diversity should be made an explicit core value of DoD and the Services. 

An eff ective leader promotes fairness and equity in his or her organization or workgroup and knows how to focus a broadly diverse group to use its members’ diff erences 

in ways that benefi t the mission. Getting a diverse group to work together in ways that 

improve mission capabilities is a learned skill. Th e Services should provide diversity 

leadership education and training, distinct 

from traditional forms of general diversity 

training, to servicemembers at every level. 

Th is requires a fundamental shift in 

institutional thinking about diversity. One 

clear message comes from both the literature on diversity management and the experience of organizations with a strong reputation for diversity: Such a shift requires 

the personal and visible commitment of top 

leaders. Th e Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Service 

Secretaries and Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders will be critical to implementing the 

kind of change needed to inspire and manage reform. 

To meet emerging operational challenges, the Services need to identify and reward 

the range of skills required for mission success. To endure, the new understanding of 

diversity as a way to enhance mission eff ectiveness must become inherent in military 

culture and in the military’s way of doing business. 

Commitment to change is expressed fully by national leaders when new goals 

and values are made into law. Consistent with this insight, the Commission recommends that Congress revise Title 10, Section 113, to require the Secretary of Defense 

to report annually on the status and progress of DoD’s diversity eff orts. 

Secretaries and Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders will be critical to implementing the 

I’ve always considered myself, in addition 

to being the commander, a safety offi cer of 

every organization I led. That was something 

I couldn’t hand off to anybody else. And the 

second thing that I always considered myself 

as being was the diversity offi cer . . . . Yes, there 

are other people who had staff responsibilities 

for all of this, but ultimately, those two responsibilities I saw as my own, because they are 

consequential of good and strong leadership.

—The Honorable Eric Shinseki, 

remarks to the Commission, 2010
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

xvi

Develop Future Leaders 

The Commission found that top military leaders are representative neither of the population they serve nor of the forces they lead. The extent to which racial/ethnic minorities and women are underrepresented varies across the Services, but the Commission 

found, on average, low racial/ethnic minority and female representation among senior 

military officers.

During the Vietnam War, the lack of diversity in military leadership led to problems that threatened the integrity and performance of the Nation’s military (Becton et 

al., 2003). This is because servicemembers’ vision of what is possible for their career is 

shaped by whether they see individuals with similar backgrounds excelling and being 

recognized in their Service. The performance of the Nation’s military is tied to the individual’s belief that he or she will be treated fairly regardless of his or her background.

The Commission found four explanations for discrepancies in representation 

among senior military leaders: low racial/ethnic minority and female presence among 

initial officer accessions, lower representation of racial/ethnic minority and female officers in career fields associated with advancement to flag/general officer rank, lower 

retention of midlevel female servicemembers across the enlisted and officer spectrum, 

and lower rates of advancement among racial/ethnic minority and female officers. To 

address these issues, the Commission recommends the actions summarized below.

Increase the Pool of Eligible Candidates

Recent statistics from the Pentagon show that three out of four young people ages 

17–24 are not eligible to enlist in the military (Gilroy, 2009). Many fail to meet entry 

requirements related to education, test scores, citizenship, health status, and past criminal history. Further, racial/ethnic minorities are less likely to meet eligibility requirements than are non-Hispanic whites, and that gap is widening. This is a national security issue requiring the attention and collected effort of top public officials, such as 

the President, members of Congress, and State and local leaders, all of whom can 

turn the tide by developing and executing strong, united, action-oriented programs 

to improve eligibility among the youth population. Together, these officials and other 

stakeholders, such as DoD, the Department of Education, the Department of Health 

and Human Services, and the Department of Homeland Security, can and should 

improve educational and physical readiness among American youth and foster new 

interest in military service.

Improve Outreach and Recruiting Strategies

In the military’s closed personnel system, tomorrow’s leaders are developed and selected 

from today’s recruits. Recognizing this constraint, the Services employ a variety of 

strategies to attract qualified youth to enlist or join officer commissioning programs, 

such as the Service academies, the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, and Officer Candidate School/Officer Training School programs. The Commission’s review of recent 

accessions revealed that, in each Service, at least one racial/ethnic minority group was 

underrepresented. The review also revealed that women were underrepresented across 
Summary

xvii

all the Services. The Commission’s recommendations include that DoD and the Services explore untapped recruiting markets, require accountability for recruiting from 

underrepresented demographic groups, and develop a common application for Service 

academies and the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps.

Eliminate Barriers to Career Advancement

Increasing the racial/ethnic and gender diversity of senior leadership requires eliminating barriers that disproportionately affect the advancement of racial/ethnic minorities and women. This can be done on two levels. First, the Services should ensure 

that all servicemembers are equally well prepared to manage their own career progression. Related preparation steps include educating all servicemembers about the 

promotion process early in their careers and mentoring them at all stages of the career 

process. Multiple occasions for preparation can help servicemembers recognize careerenhancing opportunities and make choices that further their professional and personal 

goals. 

Second, DoD and the Services must remove institutional barriers in order to open 

traditionally closed doors, especially those relating to assignments—both the initial 

career field assignment and subsequent assignments to key positions. An important 

step in this direction is that DoD and the Services eliminate combat exclusion policies 

for women, including removing barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing 

field for all servicemembers who meet the qualifications. 

Ensure Continued Progress

The changes recommended by the Commission cannot be managed or sustained without developing a stronger organizational structure and a system of accountability, 

monitoring, and enforcement.

Realign the Organizational Structure

Currently, responsibility for DoD diversity management falls under the Office of 

Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity. This office is understaffed, isolated 

from top leadership, and unable to set the agenda or drive progress. The central feature 

of the new accountability system proposed by the Commission is the Chief Diversity 

Officer. This new position will report directly to the Secretary of Defense to ensure 

that diversity management is embraced as a “line” rather than “staff” responsibility. The 

second key feature of this system is a set of mutually reinforcing elements that work 

together to provide effective, consistent implementation and persistent accountability 

for achieving the goals of diversity and inclusion. Supported by the existing Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) Research & Analysis office, 

which will be enhanced to deal with diversity-related issues, the Chief Diversity Officer will monitor and advise on all facets of the system for the Secretary of Defense.
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

xviii

Institute a System of Accountability

The Secretary of Defense will oversee the diversity effort of DoD and the Services 

through annual accountability reviews with the Service Secretaries, Chiefs, and senior 

enlisted leaders. In parallel, the Deputy Secretary of Defense will convene biannually 

the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group to discuss the status and progress of diversity 

efforts throughout the Armed Forces. Finally, to ensure consistent implementation of 

the new diversity vision, each of the Service Chiefs will hold internal accountability 

reviews prior to meeting with the Secretary of Defense. Reviews will be conversations 

that focus on progress and areas for improvement. They will enable military leadership not only to see evidence about demographics but also to take stock of the diversity 

awareness and leadership of those in line to succeed current leaders. In particular, the 

reviews will provide a forum for senior leaders to assess whether and how leaders at 

lower levels are leveraging all types of diversity in their units to improve capability.

Ensure the Succession of Leaders Committed to Diversity

To ensure that the diversity effort continues, demonstrated diversity leadership must 

be assessed throughout careers and made, in both DoD and the Senate, a criterion for 

nomination and confirmation to the 3- and 4-star ranks. Individuals considered for 

top leadership positions should be able to demonstrate their experience in providing 

diversity leadership and their understanding of its connection to readiness and mission 

accomplishment.

Develop and Implement Robust Policies and Strategic Metrics

Successful implementation of diversity initiatives requires a deliberate strategy that ties 

the new diversity vision to desired outcomes via policies and metrics. DoD must revise 

and reissue existing equal opportunity policies, formalize the new diversity management goals in clear and robust policies, and clarify what the Services must do to meet 

those goals. At the same time, appropriate metrics and reporting tools must be put 

in place to ensure that progress is made. With such data and tools, military leaders at 

all levels can be held accountable for their performance in diversity management and 

rewarded for their efforts.

Conclusion

Today’s military operations are executed in complex, uncertain, and rapidly changing 

environments. Men and women representative of the U.S. population and with different skills, experiences, and backgrounds are needed to respond to new and emerging 

threats. To harness these differences in ways that increase operational effectiveness, 

the military must revise and develop policies consistent with the new diversity vision. 

Diversity needs to work—for the good of the Nation and of the Armed Forces that 

serve it.

Joint operations, imposed by Congress on an unwilling military 25 years ago, 

have since become a large-scale example of the strength that comes with diversity. 
Summary

xix

These operations do not level or eliminate each Service’s unique traditions and capabilities: Each Service maintains its culture, heritage, and ways of engaging in battle 

and peacekeeping missions. Integrating the Services’ differences into a single coordinated force is difficult, and the U.S. military has spent considerable time and funding to make joint effort possible. Despite challenges, however, joint operations have 

demonstrated that a seamless integration of differences can be accomplished and can 

positively influence the outcome of the fight.

The ultimate impact of the recommendations in this report depends on the 

unwavering commitment of the President of the United States, the resolute conviction 

of the Secretary of Defense, and the concerted effort of military leaders at all levels to 

bring about enduring change. The MLDC is the third deliberative body established 

by an external authority to find ways to transform the U.S. military to become a more 

inclusive institution. Its predecessors were the Fahy Committee (1949–1950), created 

by President Harry S. Truman, and the Gesell Committee (1962), appointed by President John F. Kennedy. Historians have hailed the Fahy Committee as instrumental 

in desegregating the Armed Forces and thus paving the way for the Nation to move 

closer to its ideals. On the other hand, few even remember that the Gesell Committee existed, despite the fact that it recommended policies that might have enabled the 

military to avoid the harmful racial tensions and conflicts that occurred in the Armed 

Forces during the Vietnam War. 

The U.S. military is a learning organization capable of adapting to change and 

the needs of the Nation, provided that the Nation’s highest leaders are willing both 

to change and to provide a clear vision of success that is followed by the sustained 

oversight needed to succeed. The Armed Forces have led the Nation in the struggle 

to achieve equality. To maintain this leadership, they must evolve once again, renewing their commitment to providing equal opportunity for all. The time has come to 

embrace the broader concept of diversity needed to achieve military goals and to move 

the Nation closer to embodying its democratic ideals.

xxi

Abbreviations

AC Active Component

AFQT Armed Forces Qualification Test

ANG Air National Guard

ARNG Army National Guard

CDO Chief Diversity Officer

CEO chief executive officer

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

CONOPS concept of operations

DACOWITS Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services

DAWG Deputy’s Advisory Working Group

DEOC Defense Equal Opportunity Council

DEOCS DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey

DEOMI Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center

DoD Department of Defense

DoDD DoD Directive

DUSD(EO) Deputy Under Secretary (Equal Opportunity)

EEO equal employment opportunity

EO equal opportunity

FY fiscal year

GED General Educational Development

JROTC Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

xxii

K–12 kindergarten through grade 12

MAVNI Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest

MLDC Military Leadership Diversity Commission

NH non-Hispanic

OCS Officer Candidate School

ODMEO Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OTS Officer Training School

PI Pacific Islander

RC Reserve Component

ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

SOFS Status of Forces Survey

USA U.S. Army

USAF U.S. Air Force

USAFR U.S. Air Force Reserve

USAR U.S. Army Reserve

USCG U.S. Coast Guard

USCGR U.S. Coast Guard Reserve

USMC U.S. Marine Corps

USMCR U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

USN U.S. Navy

USNR U.S. Navy Reserve

WEOA Workplace and Equal Opportunity Survey of Active-Duty 

Members
Section I: 

Introduction

3

Chapter One

About the Study

The U.S. Armed Forces have played a pivotal role in the Nation’s pursuit of equality 

of opportunity for all citizens. In 1948, after the end of World War II, Commander 

in Chief of the Armed Forces President Harry S. Truman issued his historic Executive Order 9981. The order called for the desegregation of the Armed Forces by providing “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services” 

(The White House, 1948). Since then, the U.S. military has become a groundbreaking institution that is dedicated to the ideal that individual servicemembers should 

be rewarded for their performance and dedication, no matter their gender, skin color, 

ethnic background, or religion. This dedication to equal opportunity has resulted in 

the increased representation of racial/ethnic minorities and women at all ranks of the 

military, including among top leadership positions. Today, the Armed Forces have 

made impressive progress toward President Truman’s vision of an inclusive military 

that reflects the ideals of the Nation it serves.

Despite this progress, however, the transformation of the Armed Forces remains 

unfinished. Racial/ethnic minorities and women are still underrepresented in leadership 

positions. Demographic changes in the United States are reshaping the pool from which 

the Services will recruit and promote future military leaders. Prolonged conflicts of 

unprecedented complexity require agile leadership that leverages all the capabilities at 

its disposal. Like the private sector, the U.S. military recognizes the need for a diverse 

workforce that includes a greater range of individual competencies, including skills, 

education, and professional backgrounds. Recognizing the needs of the new era, Congress mandated the creation of the Department of Defense (DoD) Military Leadership 

Diversity Commission (MLDC).

The Commission, an advisory body of active and retired military, academic, and 

corporate leaders, was tasked in its charter to “conduct a comprehensive evaluation 

and assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces, including minority members who are 

senior officers.”1 This final report presents the results of that evaluation. It examines 

policies affecting the career life cycles of military personnel from the five Services—

the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—as well as the National 

Guard and Reserve. The report outlines a vision, strategy, and action plan for improving the inclusiveness of military leadership.

1	 The charter is reproduced in Appendix A. The Commissioners are listed in Appendix B.
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

4

Background

The MLDC is the third deliberative body established by an external authority to find 

ways to transform the U.S. military to become a more inclusive institution. As this 

Commission offers its report to the President of the United States and Congress, the 

Nation’s top military leaders, and the American public, it is worth reflecting on the lessons learned from the two previous committees.

The Fahy Committee

When President Truman declared that widespread racial/ethnic discrimination would 

be abolished in the Armed Forces, he stated that the new policy was to be “put into 

effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any 

necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale” (The White House, 1948). 

He assigned responsibility for ensuring rapid implementation to the newly formed 

President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity, which was commonly known as the Fahy Committee (after its chair). The order stated, 

The Committee is authorized on behalf of the President to examine into the 

rules, procedures and practices of the armed services in order to determine in 

what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved 

with a view to carrying out the policy of this order. (The White House, 1948)

From January 1949 to July 1950, the Fahy Committee, which comprised three 

white and two black civilians, “advised, encouraged, and prodded each of the armed 

services into at least nominal compliance with the administration’s expectations regarding Executive Order 9981” (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998). Although the committee 

had no formal administrative power, President Truman made it clear to all stakeholders that he stood behind its effort. In January 1949, at the first meeting of the committee, he said, “I want this job done. And I want to get it done in a way so everybody will 

be happy to cooperate to get it done. Unless it is necessary to knock somebody’s ears 

down, I don’t want to do that, but if it becomes necessary, it can be done. But that’s 

about all I have to tell you” (quoted in Mershon & Schlossman, 1998).

The direct support it received from the President sets the Fahy Committee apart 

from all other such deliberative bodies. With President Truman’s unequivocal support, the Fahy Committee brought about lasting changes to the U.S. military that 

went beyond desegregation. For instance, the Fahy Committee’s systematic analysis 

exposed some long-held beliefs about policies toward racial/ethnic minorities in the 

Armed Forces and their impact on mission effectiveness. The Fahy Committee’s findings also debunked an assertion that any inclusive policy designed to expand opportunities for blacks must come at the expense of other people and at the expense of the 

general welfare. More importantly, the findings showed that a more inclusive military 

that enables all members to use their talents and skills to the fullest is a more effective 

fighting force. 
About the Study 

5

Despite this progress, however, desegregation of the military in the following 

years was neither smooth nor consistent. Official racial segregation in the military was 

not fully revoked until 1954, four years after President Truman dismissed the committee in a compromise with Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson (Mershon & 

Schlossman, 1998). The momentum to desegregate was sustained during the Korean 

War and brought to completion by military leaders in the theater, such as General 

Matthew B. Ridgeway (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998). But this momentum was difficult to sustain after the war, particularly because the U.S. military was ahead of the 

Nation in terms of race relations in the late 1950s (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998).

The Gesell Committee

In recognition of the need to revitalize efforts to expand opportunities for racial/ethnic 

minorities in the military, President John F. Kennedy established a new investigative 

body in 1962, the President’s Committee on Equality of Opportunity in the Armed 

Forces, which was commonly known as the Gesell Committee (after its chair). All 

seven members were civilians, and three were black (Mershon & Schlossman, 1998). 

The committee was asked to assess the status of blacks in the military and to find 

ways to improve their opportunities. More specifically, the committee addressed two 

questions:

• What measures should be taken to improve the effectiveness of current policies 

and procedures in the Armed Forces with regard to equality of treatment and 

opportunity for persons in the Armed Forces?

• What measures should be employed to improve equality of opportunity for members of the Armed Forces and their dependents in the civilian community, particularly with respect to housing, education, transportation, recreational facilities, 

community events, programs, and activities?

The Gesell Committee’s report, released in 1964, called for “far-reaching proposals for greater institutionalization of the military’s commitment to equality of treatment and opportunity.” The Gesell Committee considered military commanders to 

be the central agents in this process. For instance, it proposed that “DoD establish 

a system for monitoring race relations.  .  .  . Under this system, commanders would 

be held responsible for ensuring that race relations received continuous attention, and 

would be evaluated on their handling of racial matters.” More important, according 

to Mershon and Schlossman (1998), the Gesell Committee “insisted that the results 

of such evaluations be incorporated into the regular promotion process,” writing the 

following: “It should be made clear [that] officers showing initiative and achievement 

in this area will enhance their performance ratings and obtain favorable consideration 

for promotion and career advancement” (all Gesell Committee report quotations from 

Mershon & Schlossman, 1998). 

Unlike the Fahy Committee, the Gesell Committee did not directly report to the 

President. Moreover, whereas the Fahy Committee was asked to implement a policy of 

the President, the Gesell Committee was asked to recommend new policies to the Sec-
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

6

retary of Defense. The Gesell Committee released its final report in 1964. The committee’s recommendations to institutionalize the inclusive ideals in the U.S. military 

are still relevant today, especially because they were never fully implemented. 

Unfortunately, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara chose not to implement 

all of the Gesell Committee’s recommendations. Instead, he issued DoD Directive 

(DoDD) 5120.36, Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, which addressed the recommendations related to the second question—but not the first—and dealt with external 

issues to address how DoD should deal with the fact that many institutions in the 

country remained racially segregated while the military had already ended segregation 

(Mershon & Schlossman, 1998).

Unlike the Fahey Committee, which is recognized for its historic achievements, 

the Gesell Committee is little known. Its recommendations, if implemented, would 

have institutionalized the process of monitoring and evaluating progress in race relations and equal opportunity within the military and the accountability system. However, Secretary McNamara failed to implement the recommendations that might 

have enabled the Armed Forces to avoid the harmful racial tensions and conflicts that 

occurred in the decades that followed.

DoD’s failure to implement the Gesell Committee’s recommendations had high 

costs. Inequities persisted at all levels of the military, particularly in the leadership 

ranks. The negative effects of such inequities were detailed in the 2003 amicus brief 

submitted by Becton et al. to the Supreme Court in the cases of Gratz v. Bollinger

and Grutter v. Bollinger, which addressed whether the treatment of race as a favorable factor in admissions decisions at the University of Michigan Law School was 

constitutional. The brief—filed by 29 former military and civilian leaders, including 

several retired 4-star generals, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretaries 

of Defense—recounted that the lack of diversity in military leadership led to problems that threatened the integrity and performance of the Nation’s military: “[T]he 

armed forces suffered increased racial polarization, pervasive disciplinary problems, 

and racially motivated incidents in Vietnam and on posts around the world” because 

the percentage of minority officers was “extremely low” relative to the percentage of 

blacks among the enlisted ranks (Becton et al., 2003).

The Military Diversity Leadership Commission

The MLDC is building on the legacy of the two previous committees in the hope that 

the Nation’s political and military leaders will embrace its recommendations so that a 

new commission on this subject will not be needed in the years ahead. The Commission has tackled the same issues as its predecessors and has focused on military leadership. It has also addressed two important trends of the past decade that may become 

more pronounced in the future: the growing demographic diversity of the American 

population and the sophisticated challenges of current warfare that require a broader 

set of qualifications in its leaders. Congress asked the Commission to reconsider the 

concept of diversity with these trends in mind. 

The Commission recommends an expanded definition of diversity and a modern, 

systematic approach to diversity management in DoD. The new definition goes beyond 
About the Study 

7

the traditional concept of diversity by shifting focus away from eliminating discrimination against members of certain groups and toward valuing and leveraging all kinds of 

human differences, including demographic differences, to improve capability and readiness. The Commission believes that institutionalizing this broader concept of diversity 

will ensure that the U.S. military will develop officers and senior enlisted servicemembers who not only are demographically diverse but also have the background and skills 

most needed to enhance military performance.

Approach and Scope 

Congress listed 16 specific tasks for the Commission in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 596. After careful review, the Commission 

grouped these tasks into ten substantive categories. Four were based on the military 

leadership career life cycle. The remaining categories were designed to cover topics 

critical to defining and managing diversity, tracking the progress of change, and ensuring that recommendations and affiliated policy changes were made in full accordance 

with U.S. law. In 2010, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, 

Section 594, expanded the mission of the MLDC to include the National Guard and 

Reserve Component. Six new Commissioners were added to the MLDC in order to 

fulfill this new mandate.

The following subcommittees were formed to address the ten substantive 

categories: 

• Definition of Diversity 

• Legal Implications 

• Outreach and Recruiting 

• Leadership and Training 

• Branching and Assignments 

• Promotion 

• Retention 

• Implementation and Accountability 

• Metrics

• National Guard and Reserve. 

These subcommittees acquired pertinent information from the Services, including their definitions of diversity, ongoing initiatives, personnel data, outreach and 

recruiting strategies, retention efforts, promotion processes, and career development 

programs. They also received material on diversity management from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

The Commission also gathered information through informational interviews 

with servicemembers and key stakeholders and through monthly public meetings that 

featured presentations from military leaders from DoD and each of the Services. Representatives of the diversity offices of OSD and the five Services presented demographic 

data and briefings on their current policies and practices. The Chairman of the Joint 
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

8

Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), and each of 

the five Service Chiefs spoke to the Commission as well, providing their perspectives 

on diversity. Additional speakers included the Honorable Claiborne Haughton, Jr., the 

Honorable Colin Powell, and the Honorable Eric Shinseki. Diversity experts from private industry and academia addressed the Commission and answered questions about 

their approaches to diversity management. Finally, a panel of male and female combat 

veterans addressed the Commission on issues surrounding women serving in combat.

With this information, the Commission and its staff conducted extensive investigation into the demographic profile of the Armed Forces today; the ways in which the 

Services recruit, train, assign, promote, and retain military personnel; the future missions the Armed Forces will likely face; current diversity policies and plans; and diversity best practices in the private sector. During this process, the Commission realized 

that it needed to give careful consideration to the evolving concept of diversity, which is 

moving beyond differences in race/ethnicity, religion, and gender to include a broader 

set of factors needed to create an inclusive workforce. 

Based on the information collected, each subcommittee released a series of issue 

papers providing substantive background unique to the topic. Each subcommittee also 

developed a decision paper that reports both the subcommittee’s main findings and the 

Commission-approved, topic-specific recommendations that resulted from the Commissioners’ understanding and interpretation of the subcommittee’s findings.2 The final 

step of the process was to develop specific, final recommendations for improving the 

diversity of military leadership.

Recommendations

The Commission determined that its final recommendations should serve three interrelated goals:

• Establish the foundation for effective diversity leadership with a definition of 

diversity that is congruent with DoD’s core values and vision of its future.

• Develop future leaders who represent the face of America and are able to effectively lead a diverse workforce to maximize mission effectiveness.

• Implement policies and practices that will make leaders accountable for instilling 

diversity leadership as a core competency of the Armed Forces. 

Each of the final recommendations was also required to meet several criteria 

defined by the Commission. Each needed to fulfill the Commission’s charter, be supported by empirical evidence, be strategic rather than tactical, be feasible for implementation, meet legal requirements, and have a quantifiable intent. Commissioners 

evaluated recommendations based on how closely they adhered to these criteria. Rec2	 The Legal Implications Subcommittee did not produce a decision paper because the Commission made no 

recommendations specific to the subcommittee’s findings. Rather, those findings served to inform all of the 

Commission’s recommendations.
About the Study 

9

ommendations that did not meet the criteria were modified or eliminated. If Commissioners in attendance did not approve the recommendations unanimously, the Commission deliberated until a consensus was reached. All final recommendations were 

approved by the conclusion of the final meeting in December 2010.3

Two important topics related to diversity were outside the scope of the Commission’s work. First, the Commission did not study the civilian workforce and its top 

leadership. This omission should not imply, however, that the diversity of the civilian 

workforce is not important for DoD. On the contrary, a diverse civilian workforce is 

critical to the 21st-century military because this group is an essential element of the 

total force. But, because the civilian workforce is managed differently than the military 

workforce, to fully address the issues and challenges associated with improving the 

diversity of the civilian workforce requires a separate study. 

Second, the Commission did not address issues related to the military service of 

openly gay men and women. Although the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy certainly 

pertains to diversity and diversity leadership, a comprehensive examination of the issue 

was already in progress by the DoD Comprehensive Review Working Group. Two 

other efforts have addressed that issue in detail.4

Organization of This Report

This report is divided into four sections. Section I, Introduction, introduces this study 

and, in Chapter Two, defines diversity for DoD. This definition incorporates but goes 

beyond equal opportunity to include a broader range of diversity factors, with important implications for Armed Forces core values, core competencies, training, and leadership skills. 

Section II, Building the Foundation for Change, articulates the Commission’s 

belief that leveraging diversity as a vital strategic military resource will require the 

commitment, vision, and know-how of all senior leadership. In Chapter Three, the 

Commission presents its most far-reaching recommendations: those related to ensuring leadership commitment to diversity. Without this commitment to instill respect for 

diversity as a core value, the needed cultural change may not take place.

Section III, Developing Future Leaders, describes recommendations that focus 

primarily on increasing racial/ethnic and gender representation within military 

leadership:

• Chapter Four offers an overview of the demographic composition of current military leadership, documenting that military officers today are less demographically 

3	 The recommendations are presented in full in Appendix C.

4	 DoD General Counsel Jeh Johnson and Army General Carter Ham led DoD’s comprehensive review of 

the policy and of how the U.S. military must prepare for and implement any associated changes in the law 

(see Johnson et al., 2010). In response to congressional tasking, the RAND Corporation recently published 

an update of its 1993 report on sexual orientation and U.S. military personnel policy (see National Defense 

Research Institute, 2010).
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

10

diverse than both the enlisted troops they lead and the broader civilian population they serve.

• Chapter Five discusses how eligibility requirements both define the eligible population from which the Services can recruit and affect the demographic profile of 

eligible recruits. 

• Chapter Six describes current outreach and recruiting practices across the Services, reports on the demographic composition of recent accessions, and recommends policies to improve recruiting of racial/ethnic minorities and women. 

• Chapter Seven describes how policy changes can remove structural and perceptual barriers that create potential demographic differences in career field preferences and command assignment opportunities—which, in turn, influence the 

future demographic diversity of senior military leadership. 

• Chapter Eight discusses how potential barriers to promotion and resulting demographic differences in promotion rates can affect the future demographic diversity 

of senior military leadership. 

• Chapter Nine examines whether there are demographic differences in who 

chooses to remain in and who chooses to separate from military service and identifies barriers that may influence demographic differences in retention. 

• Chapter Ten describes how the Commission recommends tracking and improving other aspects of diversity within the military.

Section IV, Ensuring Continued Progress, describes how to manage and sustain 

the changes proposed in the earlier sections. Chapter Eleven proposes recommendations related to developing a stronger organizational structure and a system of accountability, monitoring, and enforcement to ensure continued progress toward greater 

diversity among all ranks of the military. Chapter Twelve advises that the ultimate 

impact of the recommendations in this report will depend on the unwavering commitment of the Commander in Chief (the President of the United States) and the resolute 

conviction of the Secretary of Defense.
11

Chapter Two

Defining Diversity for a New Era

The word diversity provokes mixed reactions from U.S. citizens. For some—especially 

those who grew up before and during the civil rights movement—the word conjures up 

the fight against racial segregation and inequality. For these Americans, diversity policies and programs are another name for equal opportunity (EO) programs, and most 

notably for affirmative action. But for other Americans, especially the young who have 

grown up under the protection of laws and regulations that provide equal opportunity 

for all, diversity means something broader. It goes beyond differences among demographic groups and requires more than affirmative action. 

DoD and the Services have developed their own definitions, which vary widely 

in length and specificity and are not consistent with one another (see Issue Paper #20 

and Lim et al., 2008). One of the first tasks the Commission tackled was to develop a 

uniform definition of diversity that could be used by DoD and the Services. Congress 

asked the Commission to define diversity in a way that is congruent with the core 

values of DoD and its vision of the future workforce. The Commission investigated 

existing definitions with these considerations in mind. DoD’s core values are “leadership, professionalism, and technical know-how,” which are upheld through the core 

values that everyone in uniform must live by: “duty, integrity, ethics, honor, courage, 

and loyalty” (U.S. Department of Defense, n.d.). Each Service has established its own 

core values as well, and these too were taken into consideration. 

The Commission also examined DoD’s vision of its future workforce and the factors that will affect its composition. Research on this subject confirms the importance 

of embracing a definition of diversity that goes beyond the concept of equal opportunity for all. The future workforce will be made up not only of men and women of different racial/ethnic backgrounds and different religious views but also of people with 

different talents, work backgrounds, and skill sets. 

The Commission recognizes that the Nation is facing enemies who attack in nontraditional ways and must be countered with a wider range of capabilities. The Nation’s 

warfighting forces must be willing and able to benefit from the talent of all individuals 

who are prepared to offer their unique skills, perspectives, and backgrounds in the service of their country. With this in mind, the Commission developed a new definition 

of diversity. 
From representation to inclusion: Diversity leaDership For the 21st-century military

12

The Department of Defense Should Adopt a New Defi nition of 

Diversity 

Recommendation 1—

DoD shall adopt the following defi nition: Diversity is all the diff erent characteristics and 

attributes of individuals that are consistent with Department of Defense core values, integral to overall readiness and mission accomplishment, and refl ective of the Nation we serve.

Th e defi nition of diversity recommended by the Commission has evolved from 

the concept of diversity that has motivated the Services for decades. Th at concept is 

associated with equal employment opportunity (EEO) laws, initiatives, and programs 

that make it illegal to discriminate in the hiring or promotion of an individual on the 

basis of race, color, religion, sex, or other physical-appearance or individual characteristics. Th ese laws were put in place to avoid a continuation of the historic discrimination 

and mistreatment experienced by certain groups. 

After the Vietnam War, which highlighted the great disparities between the percentages of racial minority offi cers and racial minority enlisted personnel that resulted 

in racial polarization and harassment, the Services dedicated themselves to the goal 

of improving the fairness of their personnel practices, including recruitment, career 

opportunities, and promotion. Th ey turned to civilian EEO laws and applied them 

to the military sector.1 Th ey embraced the guiding principle of EO programs, which 

declared that all individuals will have a chance to pursue the same opportunities and 

will not be discriminated against or harassed in their pursuit of a career or position 

(U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment 

Commission, n.d.). Th ey implemented 

affi rmative action policies that extended 

beyond EEO laws because these policies 

entailed actively reaching out to individuals 

from underrepresented demographic groups 

or groups that have been historically left out 

of the organization.

Th ese eff orts, sustained over decades, 

have made the U.S. military a groundbreaking institution that strives to advance 

the democratic equality of its workforce. 

Th e Services have pioneered outreach and 

recruiting strategies, management tools, and racial/ethnic minority representation 

goals arising from EO and affi rmative action programs. Military men and women of 

diff erent racial/ethnic backgrounds have learned to work together as a team to protect 

the Nation. Individuals expect to be promoted not on the basis of their background 

1	 Military equal opportunity regulations are separate from EEO. Th e latter is the suite of laws and regulations that apply to the civilian workforce.

Because of the success of affi rmative action in 

the military, it is easy to forget just how segregated the offi cer corps once was. In 1968, 

African-American enrollment at West Point 

and Annapolis was less than 1 percent; as late 

as 1973, just 2.8 percent of all military offi cers 

were African-American. By contrast, during 

that period, African-Americans constituted as 

much as 17 percent of the rank and fi le. In Vietnam, the consequences of this de facto segregation were devastating.

—Jerome Karabel, “Race and 

National Security,” 2003
DeFining Diversity For a new era 

13

or heritage but on the basis of the Services’ standards of excellence and performance. 

Building on this foundation, the Commission’s concept of diversity incorporates these 

goals and adds others.

Moving Forward: From Representation to Inclusion

Th e new defi nition of diversity is based on a model of diversity management that incorporates the best ideals of EO and affi rmative action with the practice of casting a wide 

net to recruit, train, foster, and promote people with a diversity of characteristics and 

attributes that can benefi t the Services. Th e new defi nition aims to give all servicemembers equal treatment at every step in their military careers, but it also goes further: 

Th e words “all the diff erent characteristics and attributes of individuals” in the defi nition refer not only to characteristics and attributes legally protected by EO laws but 

to any and all characteristics and attributes 

that can benefi t the Services, including 

thinking style, occupational background, 

and skill sets. In other words, diversity, as 

understood by the Commission, includes 

characteristics and attributes both included 

and not included in EO law; this is because 

any type of diff erence can aff ect mission 

eff ectiveness. 

Th e Commission has heard concerns that defi ning diversity broadly in this 

manner will turn attention away from historically underrepresented demographic 

groups in military leadership positions. In 

other words, some critics believe that to 

defi ne diversity in a way that goes beyond race/ethnicity and gender is to defi ne away 

the very real challenges that specifi c groups still face.

Th e Commission recognizes this concern but believes that establishing a broad 

understanding of diversity throughout DoD will not harm the representation of these 

populations. In fact, understanding diversity more broadly can help to build the representation of these populations in military leadership because these populations have 

always off ered the skills and talents that military leadership requires. 

Furthermore, the broad defi nition of diversity refl ects the realities faced by today’s 

military. Just as changes in the demographic mix of the Nation’s population are increasing the demographic diversity of new accessions, changes in the budgetary and confl ict 

environments are calling for new skills, more integration across military components, 

better coordination with other government agencies, and smoother cooperation with 

global partners.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the progression from the EO model of diversity used in the 

past to the broader concept of inclusion proposed for the future. EO relies on compliance with regulations to eliminate discrimination; the concept of diversity as inclusion 

[S]ome of these [diversity] consultants 

. . . would encourage you to sweep these directives on EO and EEO under the rug in the hope 

that they will go away and yes, they will simply 

want you to take down the sign off the EEO 

and the EO director’s door and replace it with a 

sign that says “Director for Managing Diversity,” 

but you can’t manage diversity if you haven’t 

fi rst achieved diversity. So I stopped by here to 

tell you that if you think that you can manage 

diversity without fi rst achieving diversity, in the 

words of Malcolm X, you have been had, took, 

bamboozled, and hoodwinked.

—The Honorable Claiborne Haughton, Jr., 

remarks to the Commission, 2010
From representation to inclusion: Diversity leaDership For the 21st-century military

14

values individual diff erences because they are critical to the new approaches and practices 

needed for a successful fi ghting force. Th is concept is consistent with EO policies and practices because it is based on the fair and equitable treatment of all personnel, regardless 

of their membership in a protected class.

America’s growing Diversity: A Resource for Leadership

It is critical for DoD leaders to understand that, by all accounts, the racial/ethnic and cultural makeup of the United States is changing. Current projections from the U.S. Census 

Bureau (n.d.) suggest that the proportion of racial/ethnic minority youth will increase 

in this century and that the proportion of non-Hispanic white youth will decline. If 

the Services wish to stay strong in numbers, they must attract more individuals from 

traditional racial/ethnic minority groups. Current military leadership undoubtedly recognizes the need to ensure the continuous replacement of departing servicemembers, 

especially during times of crisis or threat of crisis. A military stretched thin by a lack of 

new members and aspiring leaders can pose a serious threat to national security.

Th e Commission believes strongly that the Services need to develop and promote 

military leaders who refl ect the forces they lead. It has always been in the best interest 

of the military to recruit and retain leaders who are representative of the many faces 

Figure 2.1. 21st-Century Inclusion Builds on the Foundation of 20th-Century Representation 

Inclusion 

20th century Historical period 21st century 

Diversity driver 

Representation 

Broad

All characteristics 

and attributes

External

Law, societal 

factors

Internal

Diversity leadership, 

mission effectiveness

Definition of 

diversity

Narrow

Protected groups, 

EO programs

SOURCE: Adapted from Defense Business Board Task Group on Increasing Diversity in DoD’s Flag and Senior Executive Ranks, 

2004.
DeFining Diversity For a new era 

15

of America.2 Today’s multiracial, multiethnic, and multicultural force is a living testament to the richly diverse population of 

the Nation it serves. Current Service leadership, however, does not refl ect the demographics of those it leads or serves. 

Th e Commission believes that leadership positions held by men and women 

from the many race/ethnicity groups that 

make up the United States have the potential to instill pride among the populations 

they represent and to secure greater trust 

in military leadership. A demographically 

representative leadership can also encourage servicemembers from underrepresented 

groups to aspire to leadership roles themselves, or they can inspire youth from different backgrounds to become interested in 

military service. One need only remember 

the popular perceptions of racial/ethnic 

minorities serving as “cannon fodder” for white military leaders in Vietnam to understand how important ethnic, racial, and gender representation is to the psychological 

well-being and reputation of the U.S. military (Becton et al., 2003). Perceptions of a 

noninclusive military leadership can estrange the military from the people it represents 

and from which it ultimately draws its strength. 

Diversity as a Force Multiplier

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has faced an increasingly wide range of threats. Th e gap between conventional and unconventional warfare continues to widen. Th e 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report communicates 

DoD’s commitment “to ensure that tomorrow’s leaders are prepared for the diffi cult 

missions they will be asked to execute” by placing “special emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and building partner capacity skill sets in its professional 

military education and career development policies” (U.S. Department of Defense, 

2010). DoD’s newly formed vision of its requirements implicitly suggests that greater 

diversity should be developed within and across the total defense workforce. Instead of 

relying on outdated strategies, the Armed Forces must expand military skill sets and 

2	 Th e issue of representation in the military has existed as long as the Nation and represents “the legitimate concerns of the populace” about the motives and allegiances of its Armed Forces: “In a democracy, it is 

believed that a broadly representative military force is more likely to uphold national values and to be loyal to 

the government—and country—that raised it” (Armor, 1996).

Just as our military looks like America, so too 

must our general offi cers.

—Rep. James E. Clyburn (D-SC), 

press release, 2008

The truest melting pot in our society exists 

aboard aircraft carriers, in barracks, and on 

bases. Mess halls and exchange service stores, 

shooting ranges and training facilities are portraits of diversity. But in the offi cers’ clubs, a 

much diff erent picture emerges.

—Rep. Kendrick B. Meek (D-FL), 

press release, 2008

Leadership is what we need, because I believe 

that when someone who is attracted to the 

Navy . . . looks up that chain of command, they 

have to see themselves. If they can’t see themselves, they won’t believe.

—Admiral Gary Roughead, remarks 

to the Commission, 2010
From representation to inclusion: Diversity leaDership For the 21st-century military

16

train the force so that the right people with the right capabilities and backgrounds are 

brought to the fi ght when they are needed.

New challenges have made an emphasis on total force integration more critical than ever before, and DoD is facilitating a greater number of joint, coalition, and 

interagency collaborations that will allow threats to be analyzed and addressed from 

multiple points of view using multiple areas of expertise. Joint operations are a largescale, military example of the strength that comes with diversity. Th e goal of joint 

operations is to bring together the Services’ unique strengths and capabilities to maximize the odds of military success. Each Service has its own “personality”—traditions, 

culture, and modes of training, operating, 

and fi ghting. Joint operations do not level 

or eliminate each Service’s unique traditions 

and capabilities but instead work toward 

seamlessly integrated tactical coordination 

and strategic direction. Army, Navy, Air 

Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard 

servicemembers are not outfi tted with just 

one uniform or taught to employ one single 

way of fi ghting: Each Service maintains its 

culture, heritage, and ways of engaging in 

battle and peacekeeping missions. Joint operations have demonstrated that the inclusion of diff erences can enhance situational awareness, agility, and responsiveness to 

current and emergent threats. Integrating the Services’ diff erences into a single coordinated force is diffi cult, and the Armed Forces have spent considerable time and treasure 

making it possible.

Th e Commission similarly recognizes that individuals come to the military not 

only with diff erent cultural, racial/ethnic, and religious backgrounds but also with 

myriad skill sets, talents, education levels, and work experience. Th e Commission 

believes that all of these characteristics and attributes, if properly managed, can help 

the Services reap optimum results from their most valuable resource: their people. 

In the new model of diversity and diversity management put forth by the Commission, there are four dimensions of characteristics that can assist in meeting new 

missions: 

1. Demographic diversity refers to immutable diff erences among individuals, such 

as race/ethnicity, gender, and age, as well as to diff erences in personal background, such as religion, education level, and marital status. 

2. Cognitive diversity refers to diff erent personality types, such as extroverted/

introverted, and to diff erent thinking styles, such as quick and decisive versus 

slow and methodical.

3. Structural diversity refers to organizational background diff erences, including 

Service, occupation, component (i.e., Active or Reserve), and work function.

4. Global diversity occurs through contact with those (e.g.,  members of foreign 

military services) who have national affi liations with countries other than the 

United States (Lim et al., 2008; Riche et al., 2007).

We are going to be operating in diverse cultures, and having a diverse squad or a platoon 

gives you a lot of diff erent views to deal with 

diverse culture and the complexities that they 

are going to be confronting. It’s absolutely a 

combat multiplier, especially in the environments that we see coming at us and that we 

are dealing with today.

—General George W. Casey, Jr., 

remarks to the Commission, 2010
Defining Diversity for a New Era 

17

Although demographic diversity alone is not enough to meet the challenges that lie 

ahead, it is a critical component of overall diversity. Including a broad range of men and 

women from different backgrounds can increase the likelihood that the U.S. military 

“knows the enemy” and is better able to work with international partners by adding to 

the cultural and linguistic knowledge base from which U.S. forces may draw. Actively 

seeking demographic diversity also ensures that no talented individual will be “left 

behind” as a result of prejudice or discrimination. Engendering greater demographic 

diversity in both the rank and file and among leadership will result in a military that is 

representative of the citizenry it serves. 

Cognitive diversity ensures that the military will be able to fill both traditional 

and novel positions. Different skill sets, personalities, and thinking styles are needed 

to manage, strategize, equip, fight, operate, repair, and otherwise engage in any of the 

hundreds of functions that the Services perform daily (Issue Paper #4; Kraus et al., 

2007). 

Structural diversity provides the expertise of servicemembers affiliated with particular occupations, Services, or components. It also enables needed capabilities to be 

brought to the table and fully incorporated into the mix. Exchanging information and 

perspectives across different branches or occupations can result in innovative ways of 

confronting the threat. 

Global diversity is an inevitable part of today’s missions. Both warfighting and 

peacekeeping are increasingly being done in cooperation with global coalition partners. 

Diversity Management: An Institutional Priority

Many nonmilitary organizations recognize that diversity can provide a competitive 

edge if it is developed and managed properly. The Commission reviewed relevant management literature and a number of diversity goals from successful businesses. These 

emphasize the importance of developing and utilizing the diversity of workforces 

in ways that improve outcomes, such as generating a larger customer base, boosting 

revenue, and improving cost-effectiveness. This set of organizational goals is usually 

referred to as the business case for diversity. The corporate diversity statements generally 

share two broad themes:

• Diversity, broadly defined, creates performance advantages through the synergy 

of people’s different ideas and competencies.

• Good diversity management entails recognizing, appreciating, respecting, and 

utilizing a variety of human attributes, not just race/ethnicity.

Evidence suggests there is not a strong business case for diversity per se, but, 

given that demographic diversity is already here, pervasive, and growing, demographic 

business-case arguments stress the importance of managing diversity to achieve desired 

organizational and business outcomes (Issue Paper #14). The evidence also suggests 

that organizations may be able to mitigate diversity’s potential costs: Diversity must be 
From representation to inclusion: Diversity leaDership For the 21st-century military

18

managed, diversity management tools must be provided, and there must be agreement 

that the benefi ts are worth the investment (Issue Paper #29).

DoD and the Services are also interested in improving performance through diversity, but their desired outcomes diff er from those of nonmilitary organizations. Th ese 

diff erent objectives include increasing regional and cultural capabilities, better coordinating military and civilian capabilities, more seamlessly integrating the National 

Guard and Reserve with the full-time, active-duty forces, and developing a broader 

inventory of specialized skills (such as foreign languages, medicine, and computer network operations). 

Th e new defi nition of diversity and the focus on diversity management necessarily 

have profound implications for the way the military conducts big-picture and day-today personnel management. Th erefore, the Commission suggests that DoD accompany the release of the recommended defi nition—or indeed any new defi nition—with 

a mission statement that prioritizes equity and inclusion and provides a purpose that is 

actionable, measurable, and accompanied by a concept of operations to advance implementation. As with any mission objective, diversity will require a clear presentation of 

goals, strategies, and tactics, as well as recommended processes for initiating and maintaining implementation to move closer toward success. 

Diversity management calls for creating a culture of inclusion in which the diversity of knowledge and perspectives that members of diff erent groups bring to the organization shapes how the work is done (see Holvino et al., 2004). Creating this culture 

will involve changing the way in which people relate to one another within a single 

unit, within a particular military branch, and throughout DoD. In particular, although 

good diversity management rests on a foundation of fair treatment, it is not about 

treating everyone the same. Th is can be a diffi cult concept to grasp, especially for leaders who grew up with the EO-inspired mandate to be both color and gender blind. 

Blindness to diff erence, however, can lead 

to a culture of assimilation in which diff erences are suppressed rather than leveraged 

(see Th omas & Ely, 1996). 

Cultural assimilation, a key to military 

eff ectiveness in the past, will be challenged 

as inclusion becomes, and needs to become, 

the norm. Traditional basic training, for 

example, is focused on assimilating individuals into a fi ghting force tied together by the 

adoption of similar terminology, customs, 

and attitudes. However, current military operations are executed within more- complex, 

uncertain, and rapidly changing operational environments that defy the warfi ghting 

standards of the past and that need to be met with an adaptive and agile leadership that 

is ready to respond more fl exibly and with a greater propensity for creative strategizing. 

Th e need to leverage diversity while maintaining unit cohesion will require implementing new training and procedures and addressing new tensions—important elements of diversity management described later in this report.

and attitudes. However, current military operations are executed within more- complex, 

And diversity in the Navy, diversity at home, 

makes us better, when we as a Navy are operating in support of our country’s interests, 

because I really do believe the motivator for 

me when it comes to diversity is [that] diversity 

gives us better solutions. Diversity makes us 

stronger. It makes us more eff ective because 

we are able to draw from many diff erent perspectives, and that is the power of diversity.

—Admiral Gary Roughead, remarks 

to the Commission, 2010
Section II: 

Building the Foundation for Change

21

Chapter Three

Ensuring Leadership

Commitment to Diversity

Leveraging diversity as a vital strategic military resource will require the commitment, 

vision, and know-how of leadership, as well as an organizational plan for achieving the 

desired outcomes. Two different but related paths will need to be taken. One involves 

following through on EO principles and practices. The Commission’s recommendations in this area will help the Armed Forces systematically develop a demographically diverse leadership that reflects the forces it leads. The second path involves the 

new, broader understanding of diversity, which includes yet goes beyond demographics. Many of the Commission’s recommendations are related to both of these aspects 

of diversity.

This chapter addresses what the Commission believes are its most far-reaching 

recommendations. They are the needed changes that will most securely set DoD and 

the Services on a path toward reaping the benefits of diversity.

Diversity Leadership Must Become a Core Competency

Recommendation 2—

To enhance readiness and mission accomplishment, effectively leading diverse groups must 

become a core competency across DoD and the Services. To implement this recommendation,

• a. Leadership training at all levels shall include education in diversity dynamics and 

training in practices for leading diverse groups effectively.

• b. DoD and the Services should determine the framework (e.g.,  curriculum, content, 

methods) for how to inculcate such education and training into leader development, 

including how to measure and evaluate its effectiveness. 

Both the Commissioners and guest speakers from corporate and military backgrounds believe that diversity has the potential to increase mission capability. However, to be effective, members of a broadly diverse unit or the entire force must be led 

in ways that value and include their differences while minimizing any negative influence that differences can have. Effective practices for leading a diverse group, referred 

to here as diversity leadership, address how leaders at all ranks and organizational levels 

shape the effect that diversity has on the forces under their command. Diversity lead-
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

22

ership thus refers to how leaders influence the ways in which people and groups under 

their command relate to one another. 

The Commission strongly believes that diversity leadership must become a core 

competency at all levels of the Armed Forces. Diversity leadership is both a fundamental way of thinking and a set of skills at which all military leaders must excel in order 

to get the best performance possible from the servicemembers they lead every day. 

Diversity leadership can be inculcated by focusing on two strategies.

Leadership Training at All Levels Shall Include Education in Diversity Dynamics 

and Training

The Commission identified a number of effective practices for leading diverse workgroups that can help the Services benefit from diversity and avoid some of the potential 

pitfalls (see Issue Paper #29). Studies suggest that effective diversity leadership begins 

with a leader looking through a “diversity lens” to identify and understand the diversity 

dynamics that are relevant in his or her command. Doing this requires the leader to

• recognize the “differences” that exist within the group

• both understand the dynamics that can cause those differences to have negative effects (e.g., loss of cohesion, communications difficulties, conflict) and create 

opportunities for those differences to have a positive effect on organizational 

performance 

• apply leadership practices that can neutralize the potential negative effects and, if 

possible, leverage differences in support of the mission.

Diversity leadership involves applying practices that management professionals 

have long identified as successful personnel management techniques but that take on 

new significance for leaders of diverse workgroups. This is because leaders are responsible for the way group members communicate, cooperate, trust one another, and remain 

cohesive as a group.1 Absent effective leadership, such as the leader focusing the group 

on the overarching mission, this fundamental and powerful human process can create 

in-groups and out-groups within a given work unit or organization. These dynamics 

can strongly affect the on-the-ground functioning of a diverse group in a planning 

room or in a war zone and at the platoon level or for the commander of a joint force. 

Facilitating strong communication, cooperation, trust, and cohesion can be challenging for leaders.

 The Commission emphasizes education as part of the recommendation pertaining to diversity leadership. Developing leaders to lead diverse groups effectively goes 

beyond training them to understand diversity: It requires educating them about the 

1	 These elements are in play because the fundamental mechanism through which diversity affects capability is social identity and social categorization (see, for example, Jackson et al., 2003; Tsui & Gutek, 1999; 

and Tsui et al., 1992). People attach meaning to their memberships in identity groups, such as demographic 

or occupational groups, and these identity groups then shape behaviors and perceptions in different settings 

(see, for example, Mor Barak et al., 1998).
Ensuring Leadership Commitment to Diversity

23

dynamics that diversity creates in workgroups and then training them in practices that 

can neutralize the negative dynamics and maximize their positive potential. 

Diversity Leadership Education and Training Are Not the Same as Diversity Training

A training assessment performed by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management 

Institute, Directorate of Research (2008), found that diversity training within each 

Service addresses respect for demographic differences. Current diversity training does 

not, however, teach leaders to utilize differences to improve mission effectiveness. 

Briefings from DoD and Service representatives to the Commission indicate that the 

Services are generally not instilling these practices in their leadership paradigms and 

that they are not teaching them. However, Service representatives indicated that each 

Service does teach practices that can be effective for leading both diverse and homogeneous teams. 

The Commission stresses that diversity leadership training must be offered at all 

levels because it is leaders who are in direct contact with the workgroups that can make 

a difference in capability. The key term here is workgroup because it is in these groups 

that day-to-day interactions among different people take place. In other words, the 

Commission views diversity leadership practices as the things that all leaders do every 

day, not what others (e.g., EO advisors, diversity officers) may do on their behalf.

DoD and the Services Need a Framework for Implementation and Assessment of 

Leader Development

The Commission, which found no DoD or Service syllabus that addresses diversity 

leadership, believes it is important to ensure that DoD develop an overall framework 

within which the Services can develop their own leadership training. 

The Commission acknowledges the large training burden already placed on the 

Services. As one Commissioner said, “The last thing we want is another training 

requirement, but we need to shift from an EO to a diversity framework.” The framework will both allow the Services to develop their own education and training modules 

and ensure that they address the same goal: creating a core competency at each level of 

leadership for leveraging diversity in the service of mission capability. In other words, 

the Commission is not proposing a new program but rather new modules for the Services to incorporate in their existing leadership programs. 

Finally, the Commission recommends that once the curriculum, content, and 

methods are developed and implemented, they be evaluated. The Commission found 

no indication that the Services have thus far evaluated the effectiveness of either their 

leadership training or their diversity training. It did, however, hear about research 

showing that much of corporate sector diversity training is not effective for achieving 

the corporate goal of greater racial/ethnic minority and female representation in senior 

leadership positions (Dobbin, 2010; Kalev et al., 2006). Thus, evaluation is a serious 

concern and must be addressed in order for diversity leadership to become a true core 

competency.
From representation to inclusion: Diversity leaDership For the 21st-century military

24

Leadership Must Be Personally Committed to Diversity

Recommendation 3—

The leadership of DoD and the Services must personally commit to making diversity an institutional priority.

Successful change in an organization depends on committed leadership. Th is is as 

true for the Services as for nonmilitary organizations. Th e Commission reviewed statements by chief executive offi cers (CEOs) and diversity professionals from a number of 

leading corporations and also examined statements by military leaders already committed to developing diversity. Time and again, it was stressed in documents and presentations that leadership must personally and visibly lead a diversity eff ort in order to bring 

about meaningful and lasting change. 

Organizational change is a top-down process, and creating a powerful coalition 

of leaders to manage and maintain the change process is a critical component of success. Persons in top leadership positions are the ultimate drivers of change because they 

have both the authority to initiate new methods of operation and the fi nal responsibility for ensuring the methods’ success. Th e leaders responsible for driving a diversity 

paradigm shift throughout DoD and the 

Services include the President of the United 

States, the Secretary of Defense, members 

of Congress, and leaders from each of the 

Services. Each of these leaders must authorize change and oversee the success of military diversity management programs and 

initiatives. Together, active top leaders can 

develop, implement, and maintain change 

by constantly reinforcing one another (see 

Issue Paper #21). 

It is important to remember how critical strong leadership is to servicemembers’ 

performance and morale. When change 

comes into view, there can be strong resistance. Changes that address people’s racial/

ethnic, religious, and other diff erences can 

prove to be especially challenging because 

these topics can be emotionally charged for 

many people. 

A model of diversity leadership from 

the top is Admiral Gary Roughead, the 

current Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). 

Alone among the Service Chiefs, Admiral 

Roughead, in his diversity policy statement, 

The fi rst and most eff ective thing in any organization’s desire to manage diversity is clearcut support from the senior leader.

—Luke Visconti, remarks to 

the Commission, 2010

Senior leadership commitment in both word 

and action was the most commonly cited key 

to success mentioned in the Task Group’s bestpractices interviews. Interviewees were adamant that the Chief Executive Offi cer’s (CEO’s) 

leadership must be visible to the whole organization, that it must be plain-spoken, clear, 

convincing, frequent and supported by action. 

The CEO must incorporate this commitment 

into the corporate strategy, culture and values.

—Defense Business Board Task Group 

on Increasing Diversity in DoD’s Flag 

and Senior Executive Ranks, 2004

Part of getting there . . . is if your senior leadership declares [diversity] as key to its success 

and the key leaders—the top leaders—are 

actively, not passively, but actively managing 

the process.

—Michael Montelongo, remarks 

to the Commission, 2010
Ensuring Leadership Commitment to Diversity

25

states clearly and unequivocally that he will lead diversity initiatives: “As the Chief of 

Naval Operations, I will lead diversity initiatives in the Navy. I challenge all who serve 

to do the same through leadership, mentorship, service, and example” (Chief of Naval 

Operations, 2008). He and his predecessor as CNO, the current Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, spoke to the Commission movingly and 

personally of their commitment to diversity (see Mullen, 2009, and Roughead, 2010).

Diversity Needs to Become an Integral Part of DoD Culture

Recommendation 4—

DoD and the Services should inculcate into their organizational cultures a broader understanding of the various types of diversity by

• a. Making respect for diversity a core value.

• b. Identifying and rewarding the skills needed to meet the operational challenges of 

the 21st century.

• c. Using strategic communications plans to communicate their diversity vision and 

values.

Deep changes, like those called for in the Commission’s recommendations, cannot 

be instituted with the push of a button. If DoD is to institutionalize the new definition 

of diversity so that all servicemembers understand its meaning and importance and act 

accordingly, leading diversity to enhance mission effectiveness must become inherent 

in military culture. 

All personnel must be aligned with diversity objectives in order to truly reap the 

benefits of diversity. Making diversity and diversity leadership top priorities may call 

for individuals to step beyond their comfort zones from time to time. For example, if a 

leader is faced with a choice between two very different individuals of equal qualifications, he or she must be ready to choose the person who best enhances the effectiveness 

of the work unit, knowing that diversity has the potential to improve the work of that 

unit. This “difference” could relate to race/ethnicity, gender, or religion, but it could 

also relate to educational background, specialty, or international experience. Although 

this is one example of a decision, it is important to remember that increasing the diversity of DoD and each Service requires thousands of decision-makers in similar situations to go beyond the comfort and familiarity of old ways of thinking.

To inform its recommendation for effectively introducing and implementing the 

new understanding of diversity throughout DoD, the Commission reviewed management literature and found that the leaders who were most effective in undertaking 

fundamental change followed some variation of the model presented in Figure  3.1 

(see Issue Paper #21). Leaders understand that, to last, change must be introduced by 

“unfreezing” old attitudes and behaviors, implemented through forward movement, 

and then sustained by “refreezing” new behaviors and attitudes. 
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

26

Figure 3.1. Best Practices for Managing Change

Step 1: Create a Sense of UrgencyIt is important to demonstrate how an issue affects everyone in an organization and why the situation should be changed so that everyone sees the need for change. Step 2: Construct a Guiding Coalition A collaborative coalition of leaders should be established to serve as decision-makers who will plan and monitor the change process.Step 3: Create a Vision A vision energizes action toward the future state of the organization. Leaders should create an inspirational and clear vision that applies to all individuals in the organization. Step 4: Communicate the VisionA well-organized communication plan is vital to success. To disseminate the vision to all members of the organization, various forms of communication should be used. Messages should be memorable to all members.

Step 5: Remove Psychological Obstacles Symbols of the new vision and subsequent polices and programs should immediately replace the old ones to remind the workforce of the promising future and to empower each member to move forward.Step 6: Create Short-Term WinsShort-term wins must be carefully constructed to be achievable and to represent steps in the right direction. Leadership needs to consider multiple avenues for guaranteed short-term wins. Short-term wins should be thought out carefully because, if they fail, they can provide fodder for those resistant to change.

Step 7: Refrain from Declaring Victory Too SoonImplementing change takes time, and it is vital that the support for change continue so that the desired change and behaviors become inculcated into the culture of the organization. It is helpful to periodically evaluate the change initiative to determine areas for improvement and to assess the effects of change. By evaluating the actual change process and member reactions to the initiative, leaders can improve the process, manage resistance, and identify areas that need attention.Step 8: Anchor ChangeOnce the change is embraced, leaders are responsible for maintaining the results. Leaders should adopt the notion that instituting change is a constant process: Old habits can easily reemerge if desired behaviors are not reinforced through an accountability system. Leaders can anchor change by constant and consistent mentorship and by communicating the vision.

Phase One 

Unfreezing

Phase Two 

Movement

Phase Three 

Refreezing
Ensuring Leadership Commitment to Diversity

27

The eight steps presented in Figure 3.1 may help leadership institute the changes 

necessary to inculcate diversity into Service cultures while, at the same time, reducing resistance to those changes. Notably, this is not a quick-fix method; rather, it is 

a continuous process to improve the staying power of new programs and policies by 

developing servicemember commitment through planning and communication from 

the top down. It is critical that each leader subscribe to the same clear vision of diversity because these leaders will be communicating the vision to all of the organization’s 

members. It is also important that the vision of diversity include the entire workforce. 

Leadership should express why the future state is better than the current state, explain 

how DoD and the Services will arrive at the future state, and inspire all members to 

reach new goals. 

To carry out this recommendation, the Commission recommends three key 

strategies. 

All Members of DoD and the Services Must Understand Respect for Diversity as 

a Core Military Value 

Core values are unchanging foundational principles that guide how people in an organization conduct their everyday business. An organization’s core values do not require 

external justification. They are the internal structure that informs the way members 

interact with one another, and they guide the strategies that the organization employs 

to fulfill its mission. Ultimately, core values motivate how the organization works and 

give a shared identity to the people belonging to it. 

In 1969, DoD issued the first DoD Human Goals Charter,2 which explicitly and 

publicly recognized respect for diversity as a value integral to the DoD identity (U.S. 

General Accounting Office, 1995). From 1969 through 1998, evolving versions of the 

charter were signed by every incoming Secretary of Defense and by the leadership of 

the military departments and Services.3 Excerpts of the 1998 Human Goals Charter, 

which is reprinted in full in Figure 3.2, follow: 

In all that we do, we must show respect for the serviceman, the servicewoman, 

the civilian employee, and family members, recognizing their individual needs, 

aspirations, and capabilities. . . . We [must] strive: . . . 

TO provide opportunity for everyone, military and civilian, to rise to as high 

a level of responsibility as possible, dependent only on individual talent and 

diligence;

2	 The charter was ahead of its time in making the following statement of goals for the civilian workforce: 

“TO provide equity in civilian employment regardless of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, disability, 

age, or sexual orientation, and to provide an environment that is accessible to and usable by all.”

3	 DoDD 1440.1, The DoD Civilian Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program, mandates that DoD 

“prepare a new DoD Human Goals Charter each time a new Secretary of Defense is appointed” (U.S. 

Department of Defense, 1987). However, the last charter was signed in 1998 by then–Secretary of Defense 

William Cohen. The charter was not renewed by the George W. Bush administration and, as of January 

2011, had not been renewed by the Obama administration.
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

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Figure 3.2. The 1998 DoD Human Goals Charter
Ensuring Leadership Commitment to Diversity

29

TO assure that equal opportunity programs are an integral part of readiness;

TO make military service in the Department of Defense a model of equal 

opportunity for all regardless of race, color, sex, religion or national origin; . . .

TO create an environment that values diversity and fosters mutual respect and 

cooperation among all persons[.]

A process was followed that helped the charter became part of DoD’s culture. 

The Honorable Claiborne Haughton, Jr., recalled the procedure when he addressed the 

Commission at its March 2010 meeting: 

[The charter] must go out to all of the major elements of the Department of 

Defense and be coordinated and get their concurrence. . . . [T]he signatories 

are the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the secretaries 

of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

the Service Chiefs, and the DoD general counsel. Those are all the top leaders 

. . . and they must sign on to that charter before we can present it to the Secretary of Defense for signature, and so it is done that way each time that the new 

charter has been prepared and issued. And the wonderful thing about it is then 

we are authorized to make . . . a huge Styrofoam copy or a printed copy, a small 

copy, and you send them all over, and so when you walk into federal agencies 

you will see where they have maybe a picture of the President or the agency 

chief on the wall when you first walk in, well then, most of the DoD [offices] 

back in that period, they would get the charter. It’s [in the] EEO office and the 

commander’s office, different places like that, so they are clear that this is the 

policy and practice of the Department of Defense, and what I really love about 

it is it allows new political executives and new military leaders . . . to get a briefing on why should they sign that charter. They are briefed on what it is. They 

know what they are signing up to and they get a clear statement of the vision 

upfront. (Haughton, 2010)

However, the charter has not been renewed since 1998. The Commission believes 

that renewing the charter is an important statement for leadership to make. Of course, 

much more action will be required than simply reissuing the charter. For change to 

take root, appreciation and respect for diversity need to become an integral part of what 

it means to be a U.S. servicemember, and a strategic approach is required. Exposure to 

core values begins with recruitment, is forged during boot camp and officer induction 

training, and reinforced throughout a career, both in professional military education 

and in the unit. The Services must take this new core value on board and inculcate it 

into each of their cultures throughout the servicemember life cycle.
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Skills Critical to 21st-Century Mission Success Need to Be Identified and 

Rewarded

Military operations are changing, and the mix of skills required of the Armed Forces 

is also in flux. The Commission believes that future leadership in the officer corps will 

require a wider range of competencies to be effective in the future operational environment. This assumption is supported by changes that have already occurred since the 

attacks of September 11, 2001, and by forecasts of needed competencies made in such 

reports as the Quadrennial Defense Review Report. The Commission’s research found 

that 21st-century military leaders will need

• the ability to work collaboratively in interagency environments, with different 

governments, and in nation-building activities

• keen decision-making skills, since leaders will need to address complex and 

uncertain emergent threats in 21st-century operational environments

• additional knowledge of foreign languages, regional expertise, and cultural skills

• technological skills, since U.S. military and civilian cyber systems are becoming 

more complex to defend and utilize.4

The Commission recognizes that DoD must also contend with its longstanding 

concerns that the Armed Forces may not possess enough people with the skills necessary for stability operations. Foreign-area officers, enlisted regional specialists, civil 

affairs personnel, military police, engineers, and psychological operations personnel 

are all professionals whose skills are needed for military success and who yet may be 

insufficiently represented in the personnel pipeline and sparsely represented among 

senior leadership.

Many needed skills may best be acquired through incorporating reservists, civilians, and contractors more closely into the total force. As demonstrated by the crucial 

role played by the National Guard and Reserve in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

DoD is already addressing structural diversity through its work in total force integration. The total force can provide skills that are in high demand but in short supply in 

the Active Component. Computer skills, language proficiency, civil affairs knowledge, 

and other relevant expertise are likely available in the civilian skill sets possessed by 

reservists. Efforts are also ongoing to incorporate government employees from a range 

of agencies into overseas operations.

To attract and retain the range of talent they need, the Services may need to 

broaden their conception of who belongs in the military and what it takes to be a 

member of the Armed Forces. Instead of total reliance on “growing their own,” the 

Services may want to explore lateral entry, bringing into active duty older people who 

already possess the experience and expertise that would be difficult, costly, and timeconsuming to create from scratch. A wider range of requirements will call for more 

types of people. For example, can the operator of a remotely piloted vehicle do his or 

4	 See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, 2010.
Ensuring Leadership Commitment to Diversity

31

her job from a wheelchair? To compete with the private sector, does the military need 

to adapt to the ethos of the “computer nerd”?

A broader range of expertise is needed not just at the deckplate but also in the 

wardroom and at the highest levels of the military hierarchy. The current composition of senior leadership is heavily weighted toward tactical/operational occupations 

(i.e.,  warfare specialties). Officers in these specialties, such as infantry (Army and 

Marine Corps), fighter pilot (Air Force and Navy), and surface warfare (Navy), have 

been recognized and rewarded because they possess the historical core competencies of 

their Services. An impartial observer may wonder, however, whether the skills that are 

valued match up with the competencies currently in highest demand. This is not merely 

a matter of providing opportunities to traditionally undervalued specialties. It becomes 

mission critical if needed expertise is not present at councils of war or at meetings of 

4-star leaders—the venues in which the Services make decisions about their strategic 

direction. 

The bottom line is that changing operational requirements requires new expertise 

to be sought out, developed, and integrated into both the workforce and the leadership. How do the Services implement this recommendation? How do they indicate 

that they value important new skills? At the June 2010 Commission meeting, Admiral 

Roughead recommended looking at promotion board precepts (the guidance provided 

to promotion boards). He indicated that he has revised the Navy’s precepts to reflect 

changing needs, with visible results in the mix of skill sets among its 1-star officers. He 

suggested that the way to shape the force for tomorrow is to change the precepts today 

(Roughead, 2010). 

Use Strategic Communications Plans to Communicate Diversity Vision and 

Values 

Leaders need to recognize that some servicemembers may react negatively if they feel 

that diversity management initiatives and programs are basically a repackaging of EO 

initiatives that will benefit some and not others. Other servicemembers may simply 

think things are fine the way they are and wonder why there is a need for the changes 

that a paradigm shift will undoubtedly elicit. Most troubling, research shows that, if 

it is not managed effectively, diversity—whether defined in traditional demographic 

terms or more broadly—can actually reduce workforce capability (Thompson & Gooler, 

1996; Tsui & Gutek, 1999). This failure occurs most frequently because of decreased 

communication, the increased conflict that can result when some people are (or feel) 

excluded, or both. Thus, it is the leaders’ responsibility to communicate the new vision 

and values and why they matter.

One of the first steps toward establishing the new diversity paradigm as part 

and parcel of DoD culture is to plan and execute a high-profile communication effort 

explaining the values and vision behind these policies. The change management literature suggests that successful introduction and maintenance of a new institutional 

culture requires multiple, interconnected exposures to core values (see Issue Paper #21). 

Any one such communicative effort—a poster, a briefing, a leader’s orders—alone is 
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

32

unlikely to have much effect. A thoughtful communications plan that ensures delivery 

of consistent messages from leaders at all levels is vital for successful cultural change. 

The communications plan should have consistent internal and external components that explain the importance to the Armed Forces of diversity, inclusion, and 

diversity leadership. All communications engendered under the plan should explicitly 

address how diversity is critical to military success. Finally, the individual servicemember should be able to understand the expectations and implications of the new vision 

for his or her behavior. 

Congress Needs to Take Action to Ensure Sustained Progress in 

Diversity 

Recommendation 5—

Congress should revise Title 10, Section 113, to

• a. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop a standard set of strategic 

metrics and benchmarks to track progress toward the goal of having a dynamic and 

sustainable 20–30-year pipeline that yields (1) an officer and enlisted corps that reflects 

the eligible U.S. population across all Service communities and ranks and (2) a military force that is able to prevail in its wars, prevent and deter conflict, defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the allvolunteer force. 

• b. Add diversity annual reports to the list of topics on which the Secretary of Defense 

reports to Congress and the President. Similar provisions should be added to Title 14 for 

Coast Guard reporting and to Title 32 for National Guard reporting. 

• c. Require the Secretary of Defense to meet at least annually with Service Secretaries, 

Service Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders to drive progress toward diversity management goals.

Commitment to change is expressed fully by national leaders when new goals and 

values are made into law. Title 10, Section 113, requires that the Secretary of Defense 

report to Congress annually on a number of important topics concerning the operations 

and activities of DoD. These reports include information on the work, accomplishments, expenditures, and savings of the Armed Forces; the justification for projected 

military missions and force structure; and an account of the military and civilian personnel assigned to support positions in the past five fiscal years (FYs). The Commission 

found that the law does not require any reports that could help drive diversity management initiatives further across DoD. Many of the Services are performing assessments 

and reporting internally on diversity, but these efforts are focused on demographic 

diversity only and are not sufficiently consistent in terms of what they measure or how 

they measure it to allow for DoD-wide assessments. 

The Commission wishes to stress that producing a 400-page report that presents undigested diversity-related data is not the intention of this recommendation. Any 
Ensuring Leadership Commitment to Diversity

33

report elicited by new diversity initiatives must ultimately drive improvement. Thus, 

reporting should focus on a key set of strategic metrics linked to the end state and 

include analysis and action items. 

The Commission proposes the three key changes to reporting requirements.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense Should Develop a Standard Set of 

Strategic Metrics and Benchmarks 

The Commission recommends that Congress direct OSD to develop meaningful metrics that are clearly tied to its diversity goals. These metrics, focused at the strategic 

level, will not only give Congress and the President the ability to track DoD’s progress: 

They will also improve the Secretary of Defense’s understanding of where DoD and 

the Services stand in achieving their goals. 

Diversity managers of major companies stressed to the Commission that strategic metrics must be driven from the top—the CEO level—and that there must be an 

accountability structure supporting the metrics. Simply put, collecting data without 

an idea of how to use them will not result in improvement. To drive improvement, the 

data must be linked to organizational goals, be demanded by leadership, and form the 

basis of an accountability structure. 

The Commission found that the Services are at various stages in their work on 

diversity and have taken a variety of approaches. Although many of the Services are 

doing substantial work in this area, the work is primarily personality driven and is not 

institutionalized.5 By developing DoD-wide metrics, OSD will facilitate the Services’ 

work with their respective diversity initiatives and align each Service with DoD-wide 

goals. (Chapter Eleven’s discussion of Recommendation 16 covers metrics in more 

detail as part of policy development and enforcement.) 

The metrics and benchmarks that the Commission is calling for are those that 

support the understanding that the new diversity paradigm is a response both to U.S. 

demographic shifts and to the challenging mission environment. These metrics and 

benchmarks should be designed in a way that enables the Secretary of Defense to track 

progress toward the goal of having a dynamic and sustainable 20–30-year pipeline of 

individuals who represent the U.S. population and who have the diverse backgrounds 

and skills needed to face the challenges of the coming years.

Assessment Should Result in Service and National Guard Annual Reports to 

Congress and the President, Authorized by Corresponding Laws

Reporting is one of the most powerful methods of communication available to the 

President, Congress, and military leadership needing to oversee and review the imple5	 See, for example, the difference between the perspectives of CNO Admiral Roughead on the one hand 

and former Commandant of the Marine Corps General James T. Conway on the other (see Conway, 2010, 

and Roughead, 2010). These different personal perspectives translated into major policy and practice differences between the Navy and the Marine Corps. When questioned about why the Navy had a string of three 

CNOs who were out front on demographic diversity, Admiral Roughead (2010) said it was because one CNO 

had influence over who was picked to be the next CNO.
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

34

mentation of DoD policy. DoD- and Service-wide performance reports can ensure 

that the right information is put into the hands of the right decision-makers at the 

right time.

As previously stated, the Commission recommends that Congress revise Title 10, 

Section 113, to require that the Secretary of Defense report annually on progress toward 

diversity goals. It follows that similar provisions be made in Title 14, for the Coast 

Guard (which is part of DHS, not DoD), and in Title 32, for the National Guard.

As codified in Title 10, the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed 

Forces of the United States, including the National Guard and Reserve when called to 

active duty. However, most of the time, the National Guard is not on active duty and, 

therefore, not under federal control.

Title 32 assigns command of State National Guard units to the Governor of the 

State; each Governor is the commander in chief of his or her State National Guard 

when it is not under federal control.6 As commanders in chief, the Governors select the 

Adjutant Generals for their States. 

The Commission recommends that Congress include the National Guard in its 

reporting requirements. This would mean revising Title 32 in a way that would require 

the National Guard Bureau to report annually to Congress and DoD on the status of 

progress toward its diversity management goals. This should include, but not be limited 

to, reporting on the extent to which each State’s National Guard, including its leadership, is representative of that State’s general population, relevant labor pool, and eligible population. The report should cover all ranks of the Army and Air National Guard 

in each State, territory, and the District of Columbia. Requiring these reports will 

ensure a persistent focus on diversity issues and place accountability at the State level.

Regular Meetings Between the Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, 

Service Chiefs, and Senior Enlisted Leaders Should Be Held to Drive Progress

Like reports, meetings can drive collective progress toward goals. The Commission 

recommends that Congress require that the Secretary of Defense hold an annual meeting with the leadership of each of the Services. These meetings are an opportunity for 

the Secretary of Defense to monitor the state of diversity in each of the Services. The 

meetings could focus on and revisit diversity management goals by going over key 

strategic metrics, analyses of the root causes of potential concerns, and potential action 

items for improvement. (Additional information and ideas related to these meetings are 

provided in the discussion of Recommendation 17.)

Conclusion

The Commission believes that developing diversity leadership skills, establishing diversity as a military core value, and reporting on new key milestones throughout DoD and 

the Services will firmly communicate that the leadership’s commitment to diversity is 

6	 The President is the Commander in Chief of the District of Columbia National Guard.
Ensuring Leadership Commitment to Diversity

35

absolute. The recommendations presented in this report are founded on military and 

private sector best practices and are the foundation for the way forward in an era of 

mission uncertainty.

Section III: 

Developing Future Leaders

39

Chapter Four

The Demographic Composition of

Today’s Military Leadership

Current and former military leaders have long argued that developing and maintaining qualified and demographically diverse leadership is critical for mission effectiveness 

(Becton et al., 2003; Lim et al., 2008). Specifically, they argue that the military should 

mirror the demographic composition of the population it serves and that senior leaders 

should mirror the demographic composition of the troops they lead. The chapters in 

this section (Chapters Four through Ten) present an analysis of how specific barriers at 

each stage of the military personnel life cycle influence the diversity of military leaders, and they provide recommendations designed to address these barriers and increase 

diversity at each of these stages. 

Although the Commission’s definition of diversity states that “diversity is all the 

different characteristics and attributes of individuals,” the chapters in this section focus 

primarily on increasing racial/ethnic and gender representation within military leadership. The focus on racial/ethnic and gender representation is due to the fact that 

the MLDC charter specifically focuses on having the Commission evaluate “policies 

that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members 

of the Armed Forces.” In addition, these categories represent historically and socially 

relevant groups and are more easily measured than other, unobservable individual attributes (Cox, 1994). The importance of increasing racial/ethnic and gender representation within the military has also been a specific priority of senior military leaders and 

is argued to be critical to mission effectiveness (see Lim et al., 2008). Where appropriate, the Commission also makes recommendations for improving the representation 

of broader dimensions of diversity, such as structural, language, and cultural diversity.

This chapter offers an overview of the demographic composition of current military leadership. It documents that military officers today are less demographically diverse 

than both the enlisted troops they lead and the broader civilian population they serve. It concludes with the anatomy of the life cycle of a military career. 

Chapters Five through Nine are organized around the stages of the military 

personnel life cycle, each of which promotes or impedes career advancement. Unlike 

other private and public organizations, the military operates as a closed personnel 

system. Senior leaders cannot be brought in from the outside but are instead brought 

up through the lower ranks. Therefore, each stage of the military personnel life cycle—

from who is recruited to who is promoted—is intricately linked to the composition of 

future military leaders. By examining the policies and practices at each stage of the life 

cycle, the Commission was able to identify both barriers to advancement and potential 
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

40

policy levers for reducing those barriers for members of underrepresented demographic 

groups. Chapter Ten makes recommendations for promoting aspects of diversity that 

go beyond race/ethnicity and gender.

Current Military Leadership Still Lags in Terms of Demographic 

Representation

Overall, the data show that the demographic composition of the officer corps is far 

from representative of the American population and that officers are much less demographically diverse than the enlisted troops they lead. With some exceptions, racial/

ethnic minorities and women are also underrepresented among senior noncommissioned officers and flag/general officers compared with their representation in the ranks 

below.

The following sections draw on a common dataset provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to make descriptive comparisons among all five Services. 

They offer demographic snapshots of military leadership for both the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) in September 2008.

The Officer Corps

Figure 4.1 shows that, relative to the enlisted forces, non-Hispanic blacks, Hispanics, 

and non-Hispanic others (i.e., American Indians, Alaska natives, and those of more 

than one race) were underrepresented among officers in both the AC and RC.1 Only 

AC non-Hispanic Asian/Pacific Islander officers had representational parity compared 

with the enlisted force. Compared with the enlisted force, women were roughly equally 

represented or slightly overrepresented among the officer corps. Finally, compared with 

the U.S. population as a whole, both racial/ethnic minorities and women were underrepresented to various degrees in the officer corps.

Senior Noncommissioned Officers and Flag/General Officers

Racial/ethnic minorities were also largely underrepresented among senior noncommissioned officers and flag/general officers in most of the Services compared with their 

representation in the ranks below. Figure 4.2 shows that, compared with their representation in ranks E-1 through E-6, among senior noncommissioned officers, racial/

ethnic minorities were underrepresented in the AC of the Air Force, the Coast Guard, 

and the Navy and overrepresented in the Army and the Marine Corps. In the RC, 

1	 These figures are intended to be descriptive in nature. In making comparisons across groups, we calculated 

representation indexes in which each representation index is equal to the ratio of the reference group’s share 

of the population to its share of the population in the comparison group (e.g., the ratio of the share of officers 

to the share of enlisted personnel). Values greater than one indicate overrepresentation, values less than one 

indicate underrepresentation, and values equal to one indicate representational parity. As a rule of thumb, we 

identified a group as being over or underrepresented based on whether there was at least a ± 0.10 difference 

from 1.0. Only the conclusions based on these representation indexes, and not the indexes themselves, are 

presented in this chapter.
The Demographic Composition ofToday’s Military Leadership

41

Figure 4.1. Racial/Ethnic Minority and Female Shares of Officers and Enlisted Personnel, 

by Component, September 2008

Enlisted

Officer

U.S. population

Share of total (%)

NH white

NH black

Hispanic

NH Asian/PI

NH other

Female

NH white

NH black

Hispanic

NH Asian/PI

NH other

Female

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Reserve Component Active Component

60

75

66

1112

19

6

15

4 3 5

2 1 2

2122

51

62

66

12 12

5

15

4 4 5 3 1 2

1416

51

13

77

18

8

SOURCES: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009; U.S. Census Bureau, 2008.

Figure 4.2. Racial/Ethnic Minority Shares of Enlisted Personnel, by Service and Rank, 

September 2008 Share of total (%)

ANG

ARNG

USAFR

USAR

USCGR

USMCR

USNR

USAF

USA

USCG

USMC

USN

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Reserve Component Active Component

E-1–E-6

E-7–E-9

18.1

27.3

39.9

36.0

49.5

29.4

36.1

45.2

28.526.5

22.2

44.6

34.7

24.8

27.1

41.1

45.8

26.1 25.4

20.8

17.2

21.2

33.7

11.1

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

42

compared with ranks E-1 through E-6, racial/ethnic minorities were underrepresented 

in all Services except the Army and the Marine Corps Reserves. 

Figure 4.3 shows that, compared with their representation in ranks E-1 through 

E-6, women were also underrepresented among senior noncommissioned officers across 

almost all the Services and in both the AC and RC. The only exception to this pattern was in the Marine Corps Reserves, where women in ranks E-1 through E-6 had 

approximate representational parity with noncommissioned officers. However, women 

in the Marine Corps Reserves constituted less than 5 percent of all enlisted Marine 

Corps Reserve personnel—the lowest share across all the Services.

Figure 4.4 shows that, compared with their representation among officers of ranks 

O-1 through O-6, racial/ethnic minorities were underrepresented among flag/general 

officers across all Services in both the AC and RC. However, it should be noted that, 

because the number of these officers was small, any change in the demographic composition could have significantly affected the percentages. 

Figure  4.5 shows that, compared with their representation among officers of 

ranks O-1 through O-6, women were also underrepresented among flag/general officers across almost all Services in both the AC and RC. The only exceptions to the general pattern were the Marine Corps and Navy RCs, where women actually constituted 

a greater percentage of the flag/general officer population compared with their presence 

in ranks O-1 through O-6.2

2	 It must be noted, however, that the number of female flag officers in the Marine Corps Reserve was one.

Figure 4.3. Female Shares of Enlisted Personnel, by Service and Rank, September 2008 Share of total (%)

ANG

ARNG

USAFR

USAR

USCGR

USMCR

USNR

USAF

USA

USCG

USMC

USN

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Reserve Component Active Component

E-1–E-6

E-7–E-9

7.3

5.2

6.3 6.3

12.5

11.0

13.5 13.5

20.9

16.6

21.0

4.8

10.3

20.7

21.8

25.4

15.0

17.2

16.0

4.6

14.6

19.2

9.5

24.4

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.
The Demographic Composition ofToday’s Military Leadership

43

Figure 4.4. Racial/Ethnic Minority Shares of Officers, by Service and Grade, September 2008 Share of total (%)

ANG

ARNG

USAFR

USAR

USCGR

USMCR

USNR

USAF

USA

USCG

USMC

USN

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Reserve Component Active Component

O-1–O-6

Flag/general officer

6.5

16.0

22.6

5.5

10.4

15.7

11.1

14.7

0.0

31.0

27.8

14.7 15.9

12.3

7.2

12.9

7.5

14.3

4.1

14.2

4.4

19.4 19.7

9.2

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.

Figure 4.5. Female Shares of Officers, by Service and Grade, September 2008 Share of total (%)

ANG

ARNG

USAFR

USAR

USCGR

USMCR

USNR

USAF

USA

USCG

USMC

USN

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Reserve Component Active Component

O-1–O-6

Flag/general officer

6.9

15.4

5.9

12.5

17.2 16.9

18.4

3.4

20.0

16.1

11.1

6.4

21.5

8.6

25.2

17.0

12.6

8.6

0.0

9.2

4.4

9.5

4.5

24.6

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

44

Summary

These data show that, as of September 2008, officers were generally less demographically diverse than both the enlisted troops they led and the civilian population they 

served. In addition, compared with their representation in the ranks below, racial/

ethnic minorities and women were underrepresented among senior noncommissioned 

officers across several Services in both the AC and RC. Finally, women (with the 

exceptions noted above) and racial/ethnic minorities were underrepresented among 

flag/general officers in both the AC and RC. 

Given the desire to develop and maintain a military leadership that is demographically representative of the American public, it follows that military leadership 

should also represent the servicemembers it is entrusted to lead. Leaders from racial/ 

ethnic and cultural backgrounds similar to those of the U.S. citizenry have the potential to inspire future servicemembers and engender trust among the population. Demographic similarities between the enlisted corps and its leaders can equally inspire and 

facilitate greater confidence. Also, given the fact that American demography is rapidly 

changing, it is important to design future polices that will shape personnel trends 

in desired ways. Advancing understanding of how the military personnel life cycle 

both promotes and impedes members of underrepresented demographic groups from 

achieving leadership positions is a critical first step.

Stages of the Military Personnel Life Cycle 

As previously explained, unlike other private and public organizations, the military 

operates as a closed personnel system. Senior leaders cannot be brought in from the 

outside but are instead brought up through the ranks. Therefore, each stage of the 

military personnel life cycle—from who is recruited to who is promoted—is intricately 

linked to the composition of future military leaders. Figure 4.6 provides an overview of 

the key stages of the military personnel life cycle and illustrates how the demographic 

composition of military leadership is shaped by the cumulative effects of barriers at 

each stage. 

As Figure 4.6 shows, the demographic diversity of future military leaders is first 

shaped by who is eligible to serve and by the ability of outreach and recruiting strategies to attract members from all demographic groups. Following this, career field 

and assignment decisions, which are shaped by both policy and individual preferences, 

influence the overall demographic composition within each career field and within 

key assignments. The career fields and assignments held by servicemembers then play 

a role in overall career progression and in the resulting demographic composition of 

those who advance to higher ranks. In the military, however, career progression is a 

function of both retention and promotion. That is, potential differences in who chooses 

to remain in and who chooses to separate from the military influence the composition 

of the available promotion pool. Together, these stages of the military personnel life 

cycle—and the resulting demographic composition at each stage—determine the final 

demographic diversity of senior leaders. 
the Demographic composition oF toDay’s military leaDership

45

Figure 4.6. A ll Stages of the Military Personnel Life Cycle Aff ect the Demographic Composition of Military Leadership

Demographic

composition

of youth

qualified

for military

service

Demographic

composition

of

senior

 leaders

Outreach

and

recruiting

strategies

Military

eligibility

requirements

U.S.

population

Demographic

composition

of

accessions

Branching

and

assignment

policies and

preferences

Demographic

composition

of career

fields and

assignments

Promotion

criteria

and

policies

Career

decisions

(retention)
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

46

At any stage of the personnel life cycle, a number of barriers may arise to impede 

career progression to higher ranks. These barriers are both structural and perceptual. 

Structural barriers are “prerequisites or requirements that exclude minorities [and 

women] to a relatively greater extent than non-Hispanic whites [and men]” and are 

“inherent in the policies and procedures of the institution” (Kirby et al., 2000). Perceptual barriers are “perceptions, attitudes, or beliefs that lead minorities [and women] to 

think they cannot or should not pursue . . . a job or career option” (Kirby et al., 2000). 

Chapters Five through Nine are organized around each stage of the military personnel life cycle and its associated barriers, as illustrated in Figure 4.6:

• military eligibility requirements

• outreach and recruiting 

• branching and assignments 

• promotion 

• retention.

Each chapter describes the barriers that characterize that stage of the life cycle 

and explores their effects on the demographic composition of senior military leaders. 

Each chapter includes the Commission’s recommendations for addressing those barriers and increasing the proportion of demographic minorities that make it to the next 

stage of the life cycle. Chapter Ten describes barriers and related policy recommendations for promoting other important diversity dimensions, such as language, cultural 

expertise, and structural diversity brought by the RC. A more in-depth discussion of 

methods and findings related to a specific stage in the military personnel life cycle can 

be found in the relevant Commission issue papers and decision papers.
47

Chapter Five

The Eligible Pool of Candidates

The pool of individuals from which the military can recruit is defined by specific eligibility requirements that can present a structural barrier to service. Although the 

specific eligibility requirements differ across the Services, in general, those who wish 

to serve must first meet standards related to age, citizenship, number of dependents, 

financial status, education level, aptitude, substance abuse, language skills, moral conduct, height and weight, physical fitness, and medical qualifications (see Asch et al., 

2009).1 Together, these requirements define the eligible population from which the 

Services can recruit. Currently, however, a large portion of young people are not eligible to join the military. In fact, statistics released by the Pentagon show that 75 percent 

of young people ages 17–24 are currently not eligible to enlist (Gilroy, 2009). Furthermore, racial/ethnic minorities and, in some cases, women tend to meet these eligibility 

requirements at lower rates than whites and men. 

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the impact of such requirements on the demographic 

profile of recruits. Figure 5.1 shows how some basic Marine Corps enlisted requirements shaped the profile of the population that was eligible to enlist in 2009. For 

example, the education requirement (i.e., high school graduation or General Educational Development diploma) and the minimum Armed Forces Qualification Test 

(AFQT) score requirement reduced the share of non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics 

who could enlist, and the weight and body fat requirements decreased the share of 

women who could enlist.

Similar patterns are seen in the eligible officer population. Besides height, weight, 

and medical standards, commissioned officers must have U.S. citizenship and a bachelor’s degree, and they must complete a commissioning program (i.e.,  the Reserve 

Officers’ Training Corps [ROTC], Officer Candidate School/Officer Training School 

[OCS/OTS], or a Service academy), each of which has its own unique standards for 

admission. Again using Marine Corps requirements as an example, Figure 5.2 shows 

how the percentage shares of the eligible population for each demographic group in 

2009 changed with the successive addition of each requirement. The share of nonHispanic blacks and Hispanics decreased considerably with the addition of the college 

degree requirement, and the share of female and “other” representation increased.2 The 

1	 In certain circumstances, some of these eligibility requirements can be waived. Which requirements can 

be waived (and when) varies by Service.

2	 The order of the requirements is arbitrary. We could have applied the citizenship requirement before the 

college-attainment requirement, and it would have shown a “bigger” effect among Hispanics.
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

48

Figure 5.1. The Cumulative Effect of Individual Requirements on the Demographic 

Composition of the Eligible Enlisted Population, Marine Corps, 2009 Percentage

Population 

ages 17–29

High school 

or GED

No children

AFQT score 

>31

Not a felon

Weighteligible

Medicaleligible

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

40

11

9

6

18

15

7

SOURCES: Center for Human Research, 2005; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2006; U.S. Census Bureau, 2007.

NOTES: The “other” category includes Asians, American Indians/Alaska natives, Pacific Islanders, and those of unknown/missing 

race/ethnicity. 

Hispanic 

Other

Non-Hispanic black

Female

49

Figure 5.2. The Cumulative Effect of Individual Requirements on the Demographic 

Composition of the Eligible Officer Population, Marine Corps, 2009 Percentage

Population 

ages 18–28

College 

degree

U.S. citizen

Weighteligible

Medicaleligible

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

50

8

7

6

18

14

7

SOURCES: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2006; U.S. Census Bureau, 2007.

NOTE: The “other” category includes Asians, American Indians/Alaska natives, Pacific Islanders, and those of unknown/missing 

race/ethnicity.

Other

Hispanic

Non-Hispanic black

49 Female
The Eligible Pool ofCandidates

49

female share of the eligible population again decreased with the addition of weight and 

body fat requirements. 

Thus, as illustrated above, the requirements to enlist and to become a commissioned officer shape the demographic profile of eligible recruits, with racial/ethnic 

minorities and, in some cases, women being disqualified at higher rates. Although 

there are some differences in how the other Services’ requirements shape the profiles of 

their eligible populations, the overall patterns and effects are the same. 

These same requirements also dramatically reduce the overall size of the eligible 

pool of candidates from which the Services can recruit. In addition to decreasing the 

number of racial/ethnic minorities and women that are eligible, they also decrease the 

number of white men that are eligible for Service—just at lower rates. This lack of eligibility among today’s youth has been identified as a key concern in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which states that, 

in coming years, we will face additional challenges to our ability to attract qualified young men and women into the armed forces. Among them are a large and 

growing proportion of youth who are ineligible to serve in the military for medical, criminal, ethical, or physical reasons. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010) 

Stakeholders Should Develop and Engage in Activities to Expand the 

Pool of Qualified Candidates

Recommendation 6—

The shrinking pool of qualified candidates for service in the Armed Forces is a threat to 

national security. The stakeholders listed below should develop and engage in activities 

that will expand the pool of qualified candidates.

• a. The President, Congress, and State and local officials should develop, resource, and 

implement strategies to address current eligibility issues.

• b. DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) should

– Create and leverage formal partnerships with other stakeholders.

– Institutionalize and promote citizenship programs for the Services.

– Require the Services to review and validate their eligibility criteria for military 

service.

• c. DoD and the Services should focus on early engagement. They should conduct strategic evaluations of the effectiveness of their current K–12 outreach programs and practices and increase resources and support for those that are found to be effective.

This recommendation proposes that all stakeholders, and primarily key public 

officials, develop and engage in activities that will expand the pool of qualified candidates for military service. It is important to note that the intention of this recommendation is not to lower eligibility requirements but instead to involve stakeholders 

in activities designed to bring the qualifications of today’s youth up to par with current 
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

50

eligibility requirements. The Commission proposes three key strategies for achieving 

this goal.

Develop, Resource, and Implement Strategies to Address Current Eligibility 

Issues

U.S. military readiness, and thus national security, will depend on the ability of the 

upcoming generation to serve. Therefore, a shrinking pool of eligible individuals poses 

a critical threat to military readiness. Although addressing this particular national 

security issue is well outside the control, missions, responsibilities, and resources of 

DoD and DHS, it is the collective national security responsibility of the President, 

Congress, and State and local officials. These top officials have the deep understanding and powerful capability to turn the tide on this issue by developing and executing 

strong, united, action-oriented programs to improve eligibility by crafting, resourcing, and implementing an integrated and sustainable set of strategies. Addressing such 

goals as high-quality early education and appropriate in-school fitness plans can ensure 

that more young Americans meet the standards of the U.S. military and that the military will be capable of keeping America strong and safe.

DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) Should Engage in Several Initiatives

Create and Leverage Formal Partnerships with Other Stakeholders

It is not part of the DoD or DHS mission to address the educational attainment issues 

or other problems affecting American youth. However, given the large number of 

young people who do not qualify for military service, and particularly the large number 

of racial/ethnic minority youth in this group, DoD and DHS could partner with other 

federal departments, federal agencies, and State and local agencies whose job it is to 

address these issues. Therefore, the Commission recommends that DoD and DHS 

develop or expand current formal partnerships with such entities as the Department 

of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services, and similar agencies at 

the State and local levels. 

Institutionalize and Promote Citizenship Programs for the Services

In an effort to further expand the pool of qualified candidates, the Commission recommends institutionalizing and promoting successful citizenship programs. One such 

program is the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, 

which was authorized as a pilot program on November 25, 2008, by the Secretary of 

Defense. 

Although noncitizens have served in the military throughout history, changes in 

law have limited their service. According to Title 10, Section 504(b)(1), enlisted personnel must be U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents of the United States (i.e., green 

card holders), or citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands, or Palau. This requirement disqualifies thousands of otherwise eligible legal noncitizens from service in the U.S. military. However, a provision within this 

same law allows a Service Secretary to authorize the enlistment of a person, regardless 

of citizenship status, if the Secretary determines that such enlistment is “vital to the 
The Eligible Pool ofCandidates

51

national interest.” This provision is the basis of the MAVNI program and, before the 

inception of the program, was used only extremely rarely. 

Currently, the MAVNI program expands the eligible recruiting market to noncitizens who do not have green cards but are legally present in the United States if 

they are licensed health care professionals or if they speak at least one of 35 critical 

foreign languages. This group includes noncitizens with certain student or work visas, 

refugees, asylees, and individuals with temporary protected status. MAVNI recruits 

are not only individuals with specialized skills that could greatly benefit the military: 

They also tend to be among the more highly qualified recruits. Thus, MAVNI represents a viable option for expanding the eligible recruiting pool to highly qualified, legal 

noncitizens who could greatly increase not only racial/ethnic but also linguistic and 

cultural diversity throughout the military. The Commission recommends both institutionalizing this pilot program to make it a permanent Service option and increasing the 

number of slots available for eligible MAVNI candidates. In addition, the Commission 

recommends both allowing those with other critically needed specialties to access via 

MAVNI and exploring the possibility of expanding the program to the RC. (Currently, MAVNI permits only those who are health care professionals to serve in the 

RC.) Finally, although there are many barriers to clearance and citizenship for officers, 

the Commission also recommends exploring ways to expand MAVNI to precommissioning officer programs, such as ROTC. 

Review and Validate Eligibility Criteria for Military Service

The Commission recommends that DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) require the Services 

to review and validate their eligibility requirements to ensure that all requirements are 

mission essential. This recommendation is in no way advocating lowering the entrance 

standards. Instead, this recommendation is intended to ensure that all of the Service 

eligibility requirements are necessary and have been validated. In other words, the goal 

of this recommendation is to ensure that no individual is unnecessarily excluded from 

service. Furthermore, ensuring that all requirements have been validated or are important predictors of key performance outcomes within each Service will help ensure that 

the best candidates are selected to join the military. It is important to note that there 

has already been extensive research done to validate many military requirements, such 

as the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (see, for example, Armor & Roll, 

1994; McHenry et al., 1990; and Ree & Earles, 1992). Therefore, those requirements 

that have been validated as strong predictors of key performance-related outcomes 

should continue to be used by the Services, and those that have not been validated 

should be examined to determine whether they are good predictors of key performance-related outcomes.

DoD and the Services Should Focus on Early Engagement

To ensure that there is a large enough pool of qualified and demographically diverse 

candidates from which to recruit, the Commission believes in focusing on early engagement to help youth become and remain academically successful, physically fit, and successful citizens. It should be added that early engagement programs and initiatives 
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

52

should not be created with the sole goal of recruiting youth for the military at young 

ages. Instead, the Commission recommends that there be a renewed focus on goodcitizenship programs that provide youth with opportunities for and guidance about 

achieving more successful futures, regardless of whether they join the military. 

The Services already have a variety of outreach programs for youth in kindergarten through grade 12 (K–12). These range from programs designed to help students 

stay in school to programs focused specifically on introducing youth to science, technology, engineering, and math. However, it does not appear that these programs are 

consistently evaluated to determine the extent to which they achieve their stated goals. 

To ensure that the more successful programs are continued or expanded and to identify 

potential gaps in the curricula of outreach programs, the Commission recommends 

that DoD and the Services conduct a strategic evaluation of the effectiveness of current 

outreach programs. At a minimum, the programs should be evaluated to determine 

the extent to which they improve performance on key eligibility requirements, such 

as physical fitness, high school graduation rates, and performance on aptitude tests. 

Following this strategic evaluation, DoD and the Services should focus on increasing 

resources for programs that have been found to be effective at addressing some of the 

primary military disqualification factors. 

The Commission also recommends increasing funding for the Junior Reserve 

Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC) program, a Service-sponsored program operating within high schools.3 JROTC is designed to promote good citizenship, leadership, physical fitness, motivation, and teamwork among young people. Participating 

students are urged to remain drug free and to successfully graduate from high school. 

The Commission is unaware of any studies examining the effectiveness of JROTC at 

achieving these outcomes while controlling for self-selection bias. However, the Services report that they track JROTC participants’ attendance, high school graduation 

rates, indiscipline rates, drop-out rates, and grade point averages and compare these 

outcomes with those of non-JROTC participants. According to the Services, JROTC 

participants tend to outperform their nonparticipating peers on these outcomes. Based 

on this evidence, the Commission believes that JROTC appears to provide an important opportunity for outreach to racial/ethnic minorities and is associated with positive 

outcomes, indicating the potential to expand the pool of qualified youth not only for 

military service but also for the general workforce. 

Finally, it is also important to note that there are nonprofit organizations outside 

of the Services that provide education and training to familiarize students with military culture, such as the Army Cadet Corps, the Civil Air Patrol Cadet Program, the 

Young Marines, the Devil Pups (Marine Corps), the Naval Sea Cadet Corps, and the 

Navy League Cadet Corps. Because these programs are not under the authority and 

control of the Services, they are not included as part of the Commission’s strategic 

evaluation recommendation. However, the Services may want to both explore whether 

these programs are effective at producing outcomes desired by the Services and determine whether the Services could provide additional resources to such programs.

3	 Detailed information on the JROTC Assessment can be found at ExpectMore.gov, 2006.
53

Chapter Six

Outreach and Recruiting

Given a limited pool of eligible candidates, outreach and recruiting strategies play a 

critical role in attracting qualified youth to military service. Furthermore, because the 

military operates as a closed personnel system, the demographic diversity of accessions 

directly influences the potential demographic diversity of future senior leaders. These 

factors underscore the importance of effective outreach and recruiting strategies within 

the Services. This chapter describes current outreach and recruiting practices across 

the Services, reports on the demographic composition of recent accessions, and recommends policies to improve the recruiting of racial/ethnic minorities and women.

Outreach and Recruiting Programs Used Across the Services

During the Commission’s October 2009 meeting, each Service presented a briefing on 

the outreach and recruiting programs it uses to attract members of currently underrepresented demographic groups. Although each Service has its own unique programs 

and practices, they often employ similar strategies. For example, the Services described 

establishing organizational divisions or offices specifically devoted to recruiting members of underrepresented demographic groups. They also conduct targeted advertising, 

such as creating marketing materials in multiple languages and advertising in college newspapers at Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Minority-Serving 

Institutions. They use media and entertainment marketing sources directed at demographically diverse audiences, such as Telemundo, Black Entertainment Television, and 

such racial/ethnic minority–oriented publications as Jet, The Root, and The Black Collegian. They work to establish connections with key community influencers (e.g., leaders, 

educators, administrators) and affinity groups, including by sending representatives 

to affinity-group events where high-quality candidates might be found. Such events 

include annual conferences conducted by the National Society of Black Engineers and 

the Society for Advancement of Chicanos and Native Americans in Science. Finally, 

the Services also work to increase their own general visibility through social networking sites and participation in community mentoring programs.

Outreach and Recruiting Programs Across Officer Commissioning Sources

There are four main commissioning sources for officers (see Thirtle, 2001). These are 

direct appointments (usually of civilians who serve in occupations—such as law, medicine, and the chaplain corps—requiring advanced education), Service academies (which 

are four-year-degree–granting institutions), ROTC programs (which students attend 
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

54

while pursuing their bachelor’s degree), and OCS/OTS (which are designed for candidates that already have a bachelor’s degree). These programs pursue similar recruiting 

strategies as those just described, but they also use a few methods and programs that 

are specific to their institutional needs.

For example, the Service academies report using a number of key strategies to 

attract high-quality applicants from all demographic groups. These include providing 

summer seminar programs and candidate-parent weekend visits to promote exposure 

of their academies and targeting recruiting at high schools that serve a high number of 

racial/ethnic minority students. They also report making use of academy preparatory 

schools and other academic-improvement programs designed to increase the eligibility of potential applicants. Finally, the academies reported holding a Service Academy 

Diversity Conference at which directors and chief diversity officers from the Service 

academies share knowledge and synchronize efforts.

Like the Service academies, ROTC and OCS/OTS programs use many of the 

outreach and recruiting methods of the general Services. However, they too have several programs designed specifically to attract, from all demographic backgrounds, 

high-quality applicants who either have a college degree or have expressed an intent to 

attend college. These include strategically establishing ROTC programs and academic 

scholarships at Historically Black Colleges and Universities and Minority-Serving 

Institutions and maintaining a targeted OCS/OTS recruiting presence at these same 

universities for students who are ready to graduate. 

Outreach and Recruiting Programs for the National Guard and Reserve

The National Guard and Reserve use many of the same recruiting strategies discussed 

above and, in fact, participate in some of the same programs used by their activeduty counterparts. However, because of their local nature, many National Guard and 

Reserve recruiting efforts are focused on their surrounding communities. This is particularly true of the National Guard because it is, in effect, composed of 54 separate 

State entities that recruit almost exclusively within their States.1 Moreover, although 

Reserve units can recruit both nationally and locally, a good portion of Reserve recruiting efforts are also locally focused. This is because Reserve members are not generally 

reimbursed for the cost of traveling from home to drill site, so Reserve units are much 

more likely to attract and retain local members. 

This means that the National Guard and Reserve have developed unique strategies focused on local communities. These include engaging key community leaders and 

educators and attending local fairs, sports games, and other community events. This 

close interaction with communities makes the National Guard and Reserve a particularly effective bridge between the Armed Forces and civilian communities.

1	 Throughout the discussion of the National Guard, States includes U.S. territories and the District of 

Columbia. Note that, although it is not uncommon for individuals from out of state to join a local National 

Guard unit, State National Guards do not actively recruit outside their States.
Outreach and Recruiting

55

The Demographic Diversity of Recent Accessions

As previously described, the Services use a number of different outreach and recruiting 

programs targeted toward increasing the demographic diversity of accessions. Unfortunately, there is currently little research on the effectiveness of these individual programs at achieving their specified outcomes or attracting youth to enlist or enroll in 

precommissioning officer programs. Data on recent enlisted and officer accessions, 

however, can provide a baseline measure of how well current outreach and recruiting 

strategies are working to attract qualified candidates from all demographic groups. 

This section presents an overview of how recent AC enlisted and officer accessions 

compare with the eligible recruiting pool in terms of demographic representation. Data 

on recent RC accessions are not included because comparisons with the eligible population would need to be done on a State-by-State basis. In addition, a large percentage 

of RC enlisted accessions (i.e., 36 percent of Selected Reserve) and a majority of RC 

officer accessions (i.e., 87 percent of Selected Reserve) are “prior service” accessions 

who have transferred from the AC.2 Issues related to helping servicemembers transition from the AC to the RC are addressed elsewhere in this report.

For accession data, the Commission used a common dataset from the Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (FY 2002–FY 2008), 

which provides the data in a report series called Population Representation in the Military Services. The accession data presented below are from FY  2007 and FY  2008, 

which are the most recently published datasets. The eligible recruiting pool benchmark 

was created using data from the March 2008 Current Population Survey (U.S. Census 

Bureau, 1973–2008). For enlisted accessions, the eligible recruiting pool was defined as 

labor force participants (i.e., people who are either employed or actively seeking work) 

who hold high school degrees (or equivalents) through four years of college (but hold 

no bachelor’s degree) and are between the ages of 18 and 24. For officer accessions, the 

eligible recruiting pool was defined as labor force participants who hold at least a bachelor’s degree and are between the ages of 22 and 34.

Enlisted Accessions

With the exception of the Navy, which had roughly equal or overrepresentation of 

every nonwhite race/ethnicity group, each Service had one or more racial/ethnic minority group that was underrepresented compared with its representation in the eligible 

recruiting pool:

• Hispanics and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Army 

accessions.

• Non-Hispanic blacks and Asians were underrepresented in recent Marine Corps 

accessions.

2	 Based on data from Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

56

• Hispanics and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Air Force 

accessions.

• Non-Hispanic blacks and Asians were underrepresented in recent Coast Guard 

accessions.

Additionally, although women constituted close to 50 percent of the eligible recruiting 

pool, they were underrepresented in recent enlisted accessions across all Services, constituting between only 7 percent (Marine Corps) and 22 percent (Air Force) of those 

accessions.3 Thus, the data show that there were several underrepresented demographic 

groups in recent enlisted accessions across the Services. 

Officer Accessions

As in the recent enlisted accessions, there was considerable variation across the Services and, in particular, across the commissioning sources in terms of racial/ethnic and 

gender representation in recent officer accessions. Overall, the data showed that, compared with the eligible recruiting pool, there were in each Service several underrepresented race/ethnicity groups in the various officer commissioning sources:

• Hispanics and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Navy officer 

accessions.

• Hispanics, non-Hispanic Asians, and non-Hispanic others (American Indians, 

Pacific Islanders, Alaska natives, and those reporting more than one race) were 

underrepresented in recent Army officer accessions.

• Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Marine Corps officer accessions.

• Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Air Force officer accessions. However, the degree of “unknown” 

racial/ethnic accessions in the data was so large that it calls into question the 

accuracy of the data and the conclusions for the other groups.

• Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks, and non-Hispanic Asians were underrepresented in recent Coast Guard officer accessions.

In addition, although women constituted more than 50 percent of the recruiting pool, 

they were underrepresented across all Services and commissioning sources. 

Although the Services are currently engaged in a number of outreach and recruiting efforts, there is little information on the individual effectiveness of these various 

programs and practices. However, data on recent accessions suggest that, across the 

Services, racial/ethnic minorities and women are still underrepresented even when 

compared with only the eligible population. Therefore, if the Services wish to reflect 

the demographics of the larger population, there needs to be further improvement 

in the outreach and recruiting efforts targeting members of underrepresented demographic groups. 

3	 As is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven, not all occupations are open to women. This may influence accession shares for women.
Outreach and Recruiting

57

Improve Recruiting from the Currently Available Pool of Qualified 

Candidates

Recommendation 7—

DoD and the Services should engage in activities to improve recruiting from the currently 

available pool of qualified candidates by

• a. Creating, implementing, and evaluating a strategic plan for outreach to, and recruiting from, untapped locations and underrepresented demographic groups.

• b. Creating more accountability for recruiting from underrepresented demographic 

groups.

• c. Developing a common application for Service ROTC and academy programs.

• d. Closely examining the preparatory school admissions processes and making required 

changes to ensure that accessions align with the needs of the military.

Create, Implement, and Evaluate a Strategic Plan for Outreach and Recruiting 

from Untapped Locations and Underrepresented Demographic Groups

All of the Services have recruiting strategies—including many promising outreach programs—directed at demographically diverse populations. The Commission would like 

to see these initiatives continue and be expanded through having the Services evaluate 

the effectiveness of current spending on minority marketing and recruiting initiatives 

and then develop a clear strategic plan that will be submitted to DoD and DHS (Coast 

Guard) for evaluation. The strategic plan should include an examination of untapped 

recruiting markets of qualified racial/ethnic minorities, such as recruiting at two-year 

colleges and strategically locating ROTC host units. 

Explore Recruiting at Two-Year Colleges

Recent data suggest that close to 50 percent of all students in college attended two-year 

colleges, with slightly higher percentages of blacks and Hispanics attending two-year 

colleges than average (National Center for Education Statistics, 2008). Specifically, 

close to 60 percent of Hispanics attending college went to two-year colleges, and a 

little over half of blacks attending college went to two-year colleges. Furthermore, 

research done for the Navy found that those with two-year college degrees had higher 

test scores and higher continuation and reenlistment rates than those with only high 

school degrees (Kraus et al., 2004). Therefore, two-year colleges may represent a rich 

market for recruiting not only high-quality enlisted recruits but also high-quality Hispanic and black recruits.

Two-year colleges may represent a rich market for ROTC recruits. A candidate 

must have completed a bachelor’s degree before commissioning through an ROTC program. However, roughly 17 percent of all students attending two-year colleges transfer 

to four-year colleges. This includes roughly 19 percent of Hispanics and 8 percent of 

blacks who later transfer to four-year colleges. These members of underrepresented 

demographic groups could be targeted for ROTC. 
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

58

Examine Expanding ROTC Hosts to More–Demographically Diverse Locations

A second way to improve recruiting of racial/ethnic minorities is to ensure that ROTC 

host locations match the geographic distribution of student populations. The map 

shown in Figure 6.1 uses Air Force ROTC units to illustrate this point. In the figure, 

all Air Force ROTC host locations are identified by red triangles. The locations of black 

students are represented by circles, with larger circles indicating larger populations. 

The locations of Hispanic students are represented by stars, with larger stars indicating 

larger populations. Locations that have large populations of black students or Hispanic 

students (or both) but no ROTC host are potential areas for expanding ROTC demographic diversity and increasing the production of officers. The map shows that there 

are potentially rich markets in Texas, the southeastern United States, California, and 

the mid-Atlantic region. Of course, the locations of other Service ROTC units should 

also be taken into account when examining potential areas for expansion. 

In addition, given that the Services have limited resources and that the location 

of ROTC sites involves many stakeholders, the Commission recommends instituting 

an independent council similar to the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Commission to evaluate and decide where new ROTC units should be placed and where 

unproductive ROTC units would best be moved. A key factor to be considered as part 

Figure 6.1. Comparison of Air Force ROTC Host Locations and Student Body Demographics

SOURCES: National Center for Education Statistics, 2008; U.S. Census Bureau, 2007.

Air Force ROTC hosts Hispanic students Black students

200–800

801–2,500

2,501–7,000

7,001–22,192

200–800

801–2,500

2,501–7,000

7,001–56,442
Outreach and Recruiting

59

of this process is the extent to which ROTC host units are located at colleges and universities with large student populations of racial/ethnic minorities. 

Create More Accountability for Recruiting from Underrepresented Demographic 

Groups

The Commission recommends that DoD and the Services create more accountability 

for recruiting racial/ethnic minorities and women by developing goals for qualified 

minority applicants to precommissioning officer programs, developing formal processes for coordinating enlisted and officer recruiting, and working to improve congressional nominations to the Service academies.

Develop Goals for Qualified Minority Applicants 

The Services have long employed incentive programs for recruiters to ensure that designated accession goals are met. This includes setting goals for the total number of 

accessions and goals for recruiting individuals with specific attributes, such as a high 

aptitude level (e.g., a high AFQT score) or specific skills or degrees (see Oken & Asch, 

1997). One way to ensure that there is a demographically diverse candidate pool from 

which to select applicants into precommissioning officer programs is to develop goals 

for qualified minority applicants. This strategy is currently employed by the Navy and 

the Marine Corps but not by the other Services. The goals would not be used during 

the actual admissions decision but would help ensure that there is a demographically 

diverse pool from which to select new students each year. These goals should be developed with careful consideration of the demographics of the eligible population. 

Coordinate Enlisted and Officer Recruiting 

The Commission recommends that the Services explore developing formal processes 

for coordinating enlisted and officer recruiting. Except in the Coast Guard, enlisted 

recruiters are primarily focused on finding enlisted recruits. If they find a prospect with 

a bachelor’s degree, they are required to refer that person to the highest program for 

which he or she is eligible, and they must have the prospect sign a waiver if he or she 

prefers to enlist instead of joining an officer commissioning program. However, this 

coordination does not necessarily apply for high-quality applicants without a bachelor’s 

degree, even if they have the potential to be successful in a precommissioning officer 

program. Therefore, a formal coordination process between enlisted recruiters on one 

hand and academy and ROTC programs on the other could help ensure that qualified 

applicants from all demographic backgrounds have the opportunity to become officers. 

Improve Congressional Academy Nominations

In addition to meeting the minimum eligibility requirements, potential applicants to 

the DoD Service academies must secure a nomination from the President, the Vice 

President, or a member of Congress to apply.4 However, there was general agreement 

4	 For the United States Air Force Academy, the nomination must come from the Vice President or a 

member of Congress (U.S. Air Force, 2009). For the United States Military Academy, the nomination can 

be a Service-connected nomination or congressional nomination (U.S. Army, 2007). For the United States 
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

60

among the Service academy representatives who briefed the Commission in October 

2009 that available nomination slots are often not fully utilized. Furthermore, recent 

media reports have highlighted that lawmakers from areas with large racial/ethnic 

minority populations tend to rank near the bottom when it comes to making nominations for appointment to the academies (Witte, 2009). The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), is working with members of Congress 

to improve their use of nominations, so efforts to engage members of Congress in the 

academy nomination process are already ongoing. The goal of this recommendation is 

both to encourage members of Congress to improve their use of nominations and to 

ensure that any current OSD efforts to improve congressional nominations are sustained over the long term.

Develop a Common Application for Service ROTC and Academy Programs

Currently, each Service academy and ROTC program requires a separate application. 

Therefore, young people who are interested in multiple schools or programs must apply 

separately, with sharing of applicant files occurring inconsistently. Also, students may 

not be aware of all of their options in terms of military commissioning programs. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends a joint or common application for Service 

ROTC and academy programs. Through this coordination, students could apply simultaneously to multiple programs, ensuring that they are exposed to all of the options for 

becoming officers. 

Closely Examine the Preparatory School Admissions Process and Make Required 

Changes to Ensure That Accessions Align with the Needs of the Military

The Service academy preparatory schools originated when President Woodrow Wilson 

expanded the United States Military Academy’s corps of cadets in 1916, authorizing 

180 slots for prior enlisted personnel (Malstrom, 2009). The reality at the time, however, was that few enlisted personnel would be capable of transitioning directly to a 

Service academy without additional academic preparation. The idea of Service academy preparatory schools (for both the Army and the Navy) came about as a way to 

meet this need. Although there are also private military preparatory schools with programs designed to prepare prospective Service academy appointees, most of the cadets 

who reach Service academies via the preparatory school route attend the U.S. Military 

Academy Preparatory School, the Naval Academy Preparatory School, or the U.S. 

Air Force Academy Preparatory School. The Coast Guard Academy does not have its 

own preparatory school. Prior to 2009, the Coast Guard Academy sent some prospective cadets to the Naval Academy Preparatory School. Since 2009, however, the Coast 

Guard Academy has used only private programs to serve the preparatory school function because the private programs were found to be more cost-effective than the Naval 

Academy Preparatory School. The modern purpose of the preparatory schools still 

Naval Academy, the nomination must come from from the President, the Vice President, or a member of 

Congress (U.S. Marine Corps, 2010). The Coast Guard Academy does not require a nomination.
Outreach and Recruiting

61

includes their original mission of providing additional preparation for prior enlisted 

personnel, but it has been generalized to offer opportunities for civilian applicants.

According to data provided by the Services to the Commission, the preparatory 

schools are currently an important source of racial/ethnic minority enrollment at the 

Service academies. However, an examination of preparatory school records suggests 

that there is a large focus on developing athletes to enter into the academies. Approximately 35–40 percent of each of the preparatory school’s recent classes consisted of 

recruited athletes. Although physical fitness is an important characteristic for military 

officers, the Commission feels some concern that the focus on preparing athletes for 

the Service academies may be coming at the expense of individuals with other skills 

that may be more beneficial to the current and future needs of the military. Therefore, 

the Commission recommends that DoD have the preparatory schools closely examine 

their admissions processes and make any required changes to ensure that accessions 

align with the needs of the future military workforce.

63

Chapter Seven

Branching and Assignments

The next stage of the personnel life cycle is the selection of the particular career field 

and related assignments each servicemember fulfills during his or her time in the military. Together, these career field and assignment selections can affect potential promotion opportunities to higher ranks. However, due to both structural and perceptual 

barriers, there are potential demographic differences in career field preferences and 

command assignment opportunities that influence the future demographic diversity of 

senior military leadership. This chapter describes those barriers and how they can be 

addressed through policy changes.

Career Fields, Key Assignments, and Demographic Diversity 

As a first step in examining the role played by career fields and assignments in senior 

military leadership diversity, the Commission explored both the extent to which specific career fields and assignments are related to advancing to senior leadership ranks 

and the extent to which racial/ethnic minorities and women may be underrepresented 

in those key career fields and assignments. The Commission used common DMDCprovided AC and RC datasets for these analyses. The data presented in this section are 

from December 2008 for the AC and June 2010 for the RC. Data on the Coast Guard 

were not included in the analyses because DMDC personnel data for the Coast Guard 

were not available.

Enlisted Career Fields

Based on recent data, it appears that functional support and administration occupations are most closely aligned with membership in the senior enlisted ranks in the AC. 

However, racial/ethnic minorities and women were not underrepresented in functional 

support and administrative occupations and were not overrepresented in occupations 

that are currently aligned with junior enlisted pay grades, such as services and supplies. 

Thus, for the enlisted corps, there is no evidence that career fields have played any significant role in the underrepresentation of racial/ethnic minorities and women in senior 

leadership ranks within the AC. Given these results, the Commission did not pursue 

this line of research for the RC. 

Officer Career Fields

For both the AC and RC officer corps, data indicate that flag/general officers were, in 

the periods under consideration, disproportionately drawn from tactical/operational 
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

64

(i.e., combat) career fields. As Figure 7.1 shows, AC officers with tactical/operational 

backgrounds tended to increasingly populate the higher levels of military leadership.

Furthermore, compared with other occupations, tactical/operational occupations 

tended to have higher concentrations of white men. For example, Figure 7.2 shows 

the percentage of tactical/operational and nontactical/nonoperational AC officers in 

pay grade O-3 who were white men. (For reference, it also shows the percentage of 

white men among all flag/general officers.) Even at the O-3 level, 75 percent of all officers in tactical/operational occupations were white men, compared with 50 percent of 

the officers in nontactical/nonoperational occupations. A similar pattern was seen in 

the RC. 

Of course, the demographics of recent flag/general officers depend on the demographics of their own cohorts and not on the demographics of officers recently at the 

O-3 level. Nonetheless, Figure 7.2 demonstrates that the tendency of tactical/operational occupations to contain higher fractions of white men persisted as recently as 

2008.1 Thus, as long as tactical/operational occupations continue to be associated with 

advancement to higher officer grades, and as long as these tactical/operational occupations continue to consist predominantly of white men, there is likely to be limited 

improvement in the demographic diversity of flag/general officers. 

Key Assignments

The demographic diversity of the officer corps is greatly affected by which career fields 

and specialties officers enter. However, the types of assignments that officers choose or 

are given once they enter their career fields can also affect the demographic diversity of 

the officer corps. In general, this is not a factor for the enlisted corps, so the Commission chose to focus specifically on key assignments for officers. 

The Commission defined key assignments as those assignments that are recognized to be especially demanding, to have high visibility, and to provide competitive 

advantage for advancement. Although none of the Services has “a checklist of assignments required for promotion from one grade to the next,” each Service branch, community, and career field has “a notional career path comprising work and educational 

assignments that will make a due-course officer effective and credible” (Schirmer et al., 

2006). Based on the experiences of the Commissioners and presentations from the Services, these assignments include holding leadership and staff assignments during one’s 

early career, holding command assignments, meeting certain educational milestones 

(e.g., getting advanced academic degrees, attending in-residence professional military 

education, particularly at war colleges), and holding executive officer or assistant positions to current flag/general officers. In addition, current law stipulates that AC officers 

are required to complete a full joint duty assignment and be designated a joint qualified 

officer prior to appointment to the rank of flag/general officer. 

1	 According to information provided to the Commission by the Coast Guard, a majority (about 71 percent) 

of Coast Guard tactical/operational (i.e., mission-execution) positions are currently filled by white male officers. However, the same can be said of nontactical/nonoperational (i.e., mission-support) positions, which are 

largely (about 70 percent) held by white male officers.
Branching and Assignments

65

Figure 7.1. Percentage of AC Officers in Tactical/Operational Occupations, December 2008, by 

Pay Grade Percentage from tactical/operational occupations

100

80

60

40

20

90

70

50

30

10

0

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.

Pay grade

O-3 O-7 O-8 O-9 O-10

Figure 7.2. Percentage in Nontactical/Nonoperational and Tactical/Operational Occupations 

Who Were White Men, December 2008, by Service Percentage who were white men

100

80

60

40

20

90

70

50

30

10

0

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.

Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps All DoD

O-3 nontactical/nonoperational

O-3 tactical/operational

Flag/general officer
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

66

In general, the Services do not collect systematic data on demographic differences 

in the key assignments just described. However, for both the AC and RC, several of 

the Services do capture some data on command assignments. An examination of the 

AC O-5 and O-6 command selection/screening processes for the command selection 

boards in the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy2 revealed that racial/ethnic and gender 

differences in O-5 and O-6 command selection rates were not the result of a clear bias 

for or against any particular group but that a vast majority of personnel (i.e., at least 

80 percent) selected for O-5 or O-6 command during the period under review were 

white men. Similarly, RC data showed that, across all the Services, the majority of 

command billets in the RC were filled by white men. 

These findings suggest that racial/ethnic minority and female representation in 

recent cohorts of command selectees was low because racial/ethnic minorities and 

women were not highly represented in the candidate pools for command assignments. 

The lower representation of racial/ethnic minorities and women in candidate pools for 

command assignments may be due to race/ethnicity and gender differences in accessions, branching, continuation, previous key assignments, and previous promotion 

rates prior to command.

Barriers to Entering Tactical/Operational Career Fields and Serving 

in Key Assignments 

For racial/ethnic minorities and women, barriers to entering tactical/operational career 

fields and serving in key assignments can affect their ability to reach the senior leadership ranks, particularly in the officer corps. This section describes two types of barriers 

that currently exist—structural barriers and perceptual barriers. 

Structural Barriers

The Commission identified two structural barriers related to tactical/operational career 

fields and key assignments—one for women and one for racial/ethnic minorities. The 

barrier for female officers is created by the collection of DoD and Service assignment 

policies known as the combat exclusion policies. These policies work at two levels. First, 

they explicitly prohibit women from serving in certain tactical/operational career fields, 

such as infantry in the Army. Second, within the career fields that are open to women, 

the policies may prevent women from getting key assignments because they prohibit 

women from being assigned to units that are likely to be involved in direct offensive 

ground combat (Harrell & Miller, 1997; Segal & Segal, 2004). Specifically, the assignment policy determines to which unit a female servicemember trained in a particular occupation can be assigned to perform her job. Thus, the assignment policy does 

2	 Three of the Services provided AC command selection outcomes by race/ethnicity and gender. Specifically, the Commission was able to compare outcomes of the O-5 and O-6 command selection/screening processes for the command selection boards, by FY, in FY 2006–FY 2010 for the Army, FY 2007–FY 2009 for 

the Marine Corps, and FY 2007–FY 2009 for the Navy aviation community and the Navy surface warfare 

officer community.
branching anD assignments

67

not curtail what women can do, but it does aff ect the units to which women can be 

assigned. 

Th ese combat policies are most restrictive in the Army and the Marine Corps. 

Calculations from 2003 data show that women can serve in only 91 percent of Army 

and 92 percent of Marine Corps occupations, compared with 99 percent of Air Force 

and 94 percent of Navy occupations (Segal & Segal, 2004). Th e percentage of Navy 

occupations has likely increased since these data were reported because, in early 2010, 

the Secretary of Defense lifted the ban barring female offi cers from serving on submarines (Peck, 2010). All occupations in 

the Coast Guard have been open to women 

since 1978 (U.S. Coast Guard, n.d.).

Although the  percentages presented 

above regarding the occupations open to 

women do not appear inordinately low, 

exclusion from these occupations has a 

considerable infl uence on advancement to 

higher positions. For example, in 2006, 92.3 percent of all Army occupations were 

open to women. However, the remaining 7.7 percent of Army occupations were the 

combat arms occupations of infantry, armor, artillery, cavalry, and special forces, which 

are closed to women because of the current DoD policies that exclude women from 

direct ground combat. Th is relatively small percentage of combat arms occupations was 

held by 29.4 percent of all Army personnel and, in this case, was held exclusively by 

men (Harrell et al., 2007). Additionally, 2006 data show that, in the Army, 80 percent 

of general offi cers (ranks O-7 and above) came from combat arms occupations (Lim et al., 

2009).

Th e structural barrier related to tactical/operational career fi elds and key assignments for racial/ethnic minority offi cers is created by the interaction of two patterns 

related to accession source. First, nonwhite offi cers are less likely than white offi cers to 

commission via the Service academies. Second, the Army and the Air Force allocate 

a larger portion of tactical/operational slots to their Service academies compared with 

other offi cer commissioning sources. Th erefore, in these Services, commissioning via a 

Service academy provides an advantage in terms of securing assignment to a tactical/

operational career fi eld.

Finally, the structural barriers that keep racial/ethnic minorities and women 

from entering tactical/operational career fi elds also function as barriers to obtaining 

command assignments. Th at is, the lower representation of racial/ethnic minorities 

and women in tactical/operational career fi elds means that those servicemembers have 

fewer opportunities for command. 

Perceptual Barriers

Although there are likely perceptual barriers for female servicemembers, the majority of prior research has focused on perceptual barriers for racial/ethnic minority male 

servicemembers. In particular, evidence suggests that more white men than racial/

ethnic minority men prefer tactical/operational career fi elds in the Army (Lim et al., 

We have one 4-star female, there is no doubt in 

my mind that she . . . [could have commanded 

a] division, she is that professional. She’s done 

everything that any of us have done. So, the 

culture said no, simple as that.

—Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, Jr., 

remarks to the Commission, 2010
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

68

2009) and the Air Force (Haygood & Morris, 2009) and that more white men than 

minority men enter special operations forces in the Army, Navy, and Air Force (Kirby 

et al., 2000). These findings persist even after controlling for such factors as rankings 

on merit-based lists for initial branching.3

There are several potential reasons for the difference in preferences. For example, 

research has found that racial/ethnic minorities tend to prefer military career fields that 

they believe will provide skills (e.g., engineering skills) that will readily transfer to the 

civilian sector (Kirby et al., 2000). Generally, these skills are more likely to be found 

in nontactical/nonoperational occupations. Additionally, research suggests that, compared with white communities, racial/ethnic minority communities typically know less 

about certain career fields and are less supportive of decisions to pursue those career 

fields. For example, Kirby et al. (2000) found that, compared with racial/ethnic minorities, more of the white participants they interviewed knew about special operations 

forces, such as Navy SEALs, when they were children. The study also found that some 

racial/ethnic minorities perceive that people in certain military occupational specialties 

hold racist attitudes. For example, some of the racial/ethnic minority servicemembers 

interviewed commented that Army Green Berets and Rangers were believed by many 

to be white organizations with racist attitudes. Finally, anecdotal accounts suggest that 

identification with certain career fields may be lacking due to the absence of successful 

racial/ethnic minority role models in those career fields. 

There are also potential perceptual barriers that prevent racial/ethnic minorities 

and women from obtaining key assignments, such as command. In particular, racial/

ethnic minorities and women may lack sufficient knowledge about key assignment 

opportunities, perhaps because racial/ethnic minorities and women do not receive the 

same career counseling or mentoring about key assignments as their white male counterparts. If this is the case, they would be more likely to miss career-enhancing assignment opportunities. 

The Services Should Optimize the Ability of Servicemembers to 

Make Informed Career Choices from Accession to Retirement—with 

Special Emphasis on Mentoring

Recommendation 8—

The Services should ensure that their career development programs and resources enhance 

servicemembers’ knowledge of career choices, including Reserve Component opportunities, 

3	 Most of the Services’ officer commissioning sources have rankings of cadets/midshipmen in terms of 

“merit-based” factors. These rankings are used to make initial branching and assignment decisions. For 

example, Army ROTC cadets are put on an Order of Merit List based on a weighted composite of academic 

grade point average, leadership performance and skills, and physical fitness qualifications (Lim et al., 2009). 

Although the Services use different strategies when employing merit-based rankings, cadets/midshipmen 

who are higher on the list generally receive earlier consideration terms of career field preferences than do 

cadets/midshipmen who are lower on the list.
branching anD assignments

69

to optimize the ability of servicemembers to make informed career choices from accession 

to retirement.

• a. Mentoring and career counseling eff orts shall start prior to the initial career fi eld 

decision point and continue throughout the servicemember’s career.

• b. Mentoring programs shall follow eff ective practices and employ an active line of 

communication between protégé and mentor.

Th e Services provide a variety of career development resources, including formal 

mentoring programs, career counseling events held at individual installations, and 

websites that provide links to career development information (such as career guides, 

contact information for career counselors or 

mentors, and information about enlistedto-offi cer programs). However, there are 

few available data on the eff ectiveness of 

these programs and resources. 

Additionally, research shows that, 

compared with nonmentored individuals, mentored individuals tend to be more 

highly compensated, to receive more promotions, to be more satisfi ed with their 

career, to have greater expectations for advancement, to be more committed to their 

career, and to be more satisfi ed with their job (Allen et al., 2004). For example, the 

autobiography of Lieutenant General Frank E. Petersen describes the importance of 

mentoring to his success. Lieutenant General Petersen describes how, in 1950, as a 

young cadet, he was having a particularly diffi cult time with an instructor and was 

seriously contemplating dropping out of the Naval Aviation Cadet Program. However, 

he then encountered a phenomenon he considered “an absolute miracle”: He saw “a tall 

black Army Air Corps captain.” 

[Th e captain] was Dan “Chappie” James, . . . holding forth at the Sugar Bowl 

on one of his trips home. I was feeling pretty down, and we talked for about 

two hours. I told him about the hard times, the racism, the possibility of never 

making it because of that. I laid it all out there, including the fact that the black 

guy just in front of me had been wiped out. I felt that “they” were simply waiting to wipe me out, too. . . . Chappie stayed so long that he had to cancel his 

civilian fl ight home. He could’ve run. He didn’t. He stayed there and listened. 

He didn’t say an awful lot at fi rst, except that I could make it if I wanted it badly 

enough. . . . I looked at him and somehow felt new resolve. I mean, here was 

a living example that it could be done. I had a role model now. He patted me 

on the shoulder, then he said it again: “Just don’t give up.” Th at audience with 

Chappie helped get me through. (Petersen & Phelps, 1998)

Young Petersen became the fi rst black Marine Corps aviator and retired from the 

Marine Corps as a lieutenant general. 

When I was at the War College in 1975 to 1976, 

thanks to General Becton, I was supposed to 

go to the Army War College, but because he 

was sitting on the board for the National War 

College . . . he plucked me off and threw me 

into National War College, and I thank you for 

that again, Julius. I thank you many times.

—The Honorable Colin Powell, 

remarks to the Commission, 2010
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70

Based on this evidence about the potential benefits of mentoring, the Commission 

assumes that servicemembers who receive high-quality mentoring relationships from 

their Services will be able to make more-informed career decisions. This ability is particularly important for minority male servicemembers, who may not choose tactical/

operational career fields partly because of a lack of knowledge about the potential benefits of entering such career fields. 

Mentoring and Career Counseling Efforts Shall Start Prior to the Initial Career 

Field Decision Point and Continue Throughout the Servicemember’s Career

The Commission found that the Services value mentoring relationships that benefit 

both ends of the relationship: Protégés gain from the experience and knowledge of their 

mentors, and mentors gain a sense of satisfaction and pride from helping to develop the 

careers of junior individuals. Like many organizations, the Services provide mentoring 

to inform servicemembers of their career options and to help them develop professionally and personally. However, the Services did not indicate to the Commission that 

there is a particular focus on mentoring prior to initial career path decisions. Furthermore, a Commission survey involving a small sample of AC servicemembers revealed 

that, although there were not strong opinions about these career development resources 

and the assignment process, servicemembers reported that they gained only moderate 

knowledge of the career process early in their careers. Given that officers in tactical/

operational career paths are significantly more likely to be promoted into flag/general 

officer positions, it is important that newly commissioning officers make their initial 

career field decisions with full knowledge of these issues. 

Mentoring can also have particular benefits for the RC. First, when it comes to 

retaining qualified and successful servicemembers, mentoring can help inform exiting 

active-duty members about opportunities available in the RC. Additionally, the RC 

has its own constraints and issues, particularly for servicemembers who have transitioned from active duty. These include knowledge of the force structure, knowledge of 

the promotion system, and the geographic distribution of billets that could affect career 

decisions. Therefore, the Commission recommends that the Services ensure that, for 

both the AC and RC, mentoring efforts start prior to the initial career decision point 

and continue throughout the career life cycle.

Mentoring Programs Shall Follow Effective Practices and Employ an Active Line 

of Communication Between Protégé and Mentor

Mentoring can play an essential part in career development, but mentoring can also 

backfire if there is no solid understanding of what makes mentoring relationships successful. Descriptions of the Services’ current mentoring programs and practices indicate that the Services are making extensive efforts to assist servicemembers in their 

career development. However, there is very little information about the effectiveness of 

these efforts, either collectively or for specific demographic groups. 

Research on mentoring has shown that effective mentoring relationships and programs are characterized by practices that include establishing clear objectives, allow-
Branching and Assignments

71

ing mentees and mentors to establish multiple mentoring relationships, providing 

high-quality training for both mentors and mentees, and (if relevant to the mentoring 

program) matching mentors and mentees based on multiple criteria that align with 

the goals of the mentoring program (Allen et al., 2006; Finkelstein & Poteet, 2007). 

These characteristics represent effective practices that can be adopted by the Services. 

In addition, mentoring programs should foster the development of continuous, active 

lines of communication between mentors and mentees. Finally, the Services should 

evaluate the outcomes of their mentoring programs against predetermined goals and 

criteria. The Services can do this through surveys, interviews, and focus groups used to 

gather information about mentoring experiences. The Services should also track over 

time the careers of individuals who use their mentoring programs and tools to assess 

the extent to which mentoring has helped individuals at key career points.

DoD and the Services Should Eliminate Combat Exclusion Policies for 

Women

Recommendation 9—

DoD and the Services should eliminate the “combat exclusion policies” for women, including the removal of barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing field for all qualified 

servicemembers. The Commission recommends a time-phased approach:

• a. Women in career fields/specialties currently open to them should be immediately 

able to be assigned to any unit that requires that career field/specialty, consistent with 

the current operational environment.

• b. DoD and the Services should take deliberate steps in a phased approach to open additional career fields and units involved in “direct ground combat” to qualified women.

• c. DoD and the Services should report to Congress the process and timeline for removing barriers that inhibit women from achieving senior leadership positions.

The Commission recommends that DoD and the Services eliminate the combat 

exclusion policies that have barred women from direct ground combat fields and 

assignments since the early 1990s. As previously described, these policies constitute 

a structural barrier that prevents women from entering the tactical/operational career 

fields associated with promotion to flag/general officer grades and from serving in 

career-enhancing assignments. The Commission is not advocating a lowering of standards with the elimination of the combat exclusion policy. Qualification standards for 

combat arms positions should remain in place. 

The Commission considered four strands of argument related to rescinding the 

policies. First, the Commission addressed arguments related to readiness and mission 

capability. One frequently cited argument in favor of the current policies is that having 

women serving in direct combat will hamper mission effectiveness by hurting unit 

morale and cohesion. Comparable arguments were made with respect to racial integration but were ultimately never borne out. Similarly, to date, there has been little evidence 
From representation to inclusion: Diversity leaDership For the 21st-century military

72

that the integration of women into previously closed units or occupations has had a 

negative eff ect on important mission-related 

performance factors, such as unit cohesion 

(Defense Department Advisory Committee 

on Women in the Services, 2009; Harrell 

& Miller, 1997; McSally, 2007). A study by 

the Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (2009) 

actually found that a majority of focus group 

participants felt that women serving in 

combat in Iraq and Afghanistan have had a 

positive eff ect on mission accomplishment. 

Additionally, panel members discussing this topic at a September 2010 Commission 

meeting cited the need to bring to bear all talent: Th e blanket restriction for women 

limits the ability of commanders in theater to pick the most capable person for the job. 

For example, Colonel Martha McSally noted, 

If you want to have the best fi ghting force, why would you exclude 51 percent 

of your population from even being considered for any particular job? I’ve seen 

recent statistics that say 75 percent of our Nation’s youth between the ages of 17 

and 25 are not even eligible to be in the military based on whether it’s mental, 

medical, or other—criminal issues or whatever. So we just have a very small 

pool to pick from. So if we’re trying to have the most ready force, why would we 

just exclude 51 percent of the population from even competing? (McSally, 2010)

Second, and relatedly, the Commission considered whether the policies are still 

appropriate given the changes in warfare and doctrine that have occurred over the last 

decade. DoD and Service policies that bar women from certain combat-related career 

fi elds, specialties, units, and assignments are based on standards associated with conventional warfare and well-defi ned, linear battlefi elds. However, the current confl icts 

in Iraq and Afghanistan have been anything but conventional. As a result, some of the 

female servicemembers deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan have already been engaged 

in activities that would be considered combat related, including being collocated with 

combat units and engaging in direct combat for self-defense (see Defense Department 

Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, 2009, and Harrell et al., 2007). 

Th us, the combat exclusion policies do not refl ect the current operational environment.

Th ird, the Commission addressed arguments related to discrimination and fairness. Many Commissioners consider the policies fundamentally discriminatory because 

they stipulate that assignment decisions should be based solely on gender, without 

regard to capability or qualifi cations.

First of all, with regard to women in Combat 

Arms, I don’t think you will see a change 

because I don’t think our women want it to 

change, okay? There are certain demands of 

offi cers in a Combat Arms environment that 

our women see, recognize, appreciate, and 

say, I couldn’t do that—in fact, I don’t want to 

do that because I don’t think it best prepares 

me for success if I am trying to do those things 

against the male population at Lieutenant, 

Captain, Major, and Lieutenant Colonel.

—General James T. Conway, remarks 

to the Commission, 2010
branching anD assignments

73

Finally, the Commission considered whether there might be unanticipated 

eff ects from rescinding the combat exclusion 

policies, especially with regard to opening 

career fi elds. In particular, the type of eff ect 

such a policy change would have on enlisted 

recruiting is unknown. If young women 

perceive the opening of combat career fi elds 

to mean that they will be required to enter 

these occupations rather than being allowed

to volunteer for them, female propensity to 

enlist may drop, and the Services may fi nd it 

diffi cult to achieve their recruiting missions. 

Based on these considerations, the 

Commission recommends that DoD and the Services eliminate their combat exclusion 

policies for women, including the removal of barriers and inconsistencies, to create a 

level playing fi eld for all qualifi ed servicemembers. Th is should be done using a phased 

approach so that all potential issues, including how to best implement new policies, 

can be thought through. Th is recommendation was approved by a majority, but not 

all, of the Commissioners. Due to concerns regarding the potential eff ect of the policies’ removal on unit eff ectiveness and to potential challenges associated with implementation, a small number of Commissioners did not approve recommending removal 

of the policies immediately but instead favored further study. On the other hand, a 

small number of other Commissioners believed that the recommendation is not strong 

enough. Th ey would have preferred a more forceful recommendation to immediately 

eliminate the policies.

Th e Commission proposes three strategies for implementing this recommendation.

women in Career Fields/Specialties Currently Open to Them Should Be 

Immediately Able to Be Assigned to Any unit That Requires That Career Field/

Specialty, Consistent with the Current Operational Environment

As previously discussed, current DoD and Service assignment policies prohibit women 

from being assigned to units that may be involved in direct ground combat. Again, this 

means that, for a given occupation, the policies determine to which units a female servicemember may be assigned to do the job for which she has been trained. However, 

given the nature of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, women are currently engaged in 

direct combat, even when it is not part of their formally assigned role. Two key features 

of the policies have created the disconnect between the roles women may be formally 

assigned (policy) and the roles they may fi ll while deployed (practice).

First, many of the terms used in the policies have either lost or changed meaning: Such concepts as “enemy,” “exposed to hostile fi re,” “forward,” and “well forward” 

are no longer useful when determining which units should be closed to women. Th e 

enemy is no longer clearly and consistently identifi able, and all units are essentially 

exposed to hostile fi re. Additionally, the spatial concepts of “forward” and “well forThis is about discrimination of the fi rst order. 

This is 2010, and as we look at outyears for war, 

it will probably be much more electronic than 

it is now. We have things from Creech Air Force 

Base fi ghting unmanned vehicles in Afghanistan right now. So we cannot look at the war 

that was fought in Vietnam and compare that 

to today or future wars. It’s going to be totally 

diff erent. This has to do with every American 

citizen being able to be considered for anything that they are qualifi ed to do. It’s about 

discrimination at its very basics.

—Rear Admiral Mary O’Donnell, 

remarks to the Commission, 2010
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

74

ward” are inadequate to convey the complexity of such operations as those in Iraq and 

Afghanistan.

Second, once a female servicemember has been assigned to a unit, the assignment 

policy prescribes neither what duties she can do nor with which other units she may 

interact. As a result, women are performing in combat roles. Indeed, local commanders have the authority to use their personnel as they see fit to fulfill the unit mission. 

Harrell et al. (2007) found examples of female servicemembers who had been trained 

as cooks having received the Combat Action Badge in Iraq, likely because contractor cooks obviated the need for U.S. servicemembers to cook. Instead, these women, 

along with their male colleagues trained as cooks, were performing other duties, such 

as guard duty, that placed them in greater danger. 

The Commissioners were in near-unanimous agreement that this aspect of the 

combat exclusion policies should be eliminated immediately because, given current 

practices for employing women in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it seems obsolete. 

The assignment policies constitute an unnecessary barrier to women’s advancement.

DoD and the Services Should Take Deliberate Steps in a Phased Approach to 

Open Additional Career Fields and Units Involved in “Direct Ground Combat” to 

Qualified Women

As previously discussed, tactical/operational career fields are associated with advancing to flag/general officer grades. Therefore, as long as the combat exclusion policies 

bar women from entering tactical/operational career fields and units, women will be 

at a disadvantage compared with men in terms of career advancement potential. The 

Commission is not arguing that women cannot reach senior leadership levels without 

being in tactical/operational career fields, and it is not asserting that a large number 

of women will necessarily choose to enter tactical/operational career fields, given the 

opportunity. However, the Commission believes that the existing policies are a structural barrier whose removal could help improve both the career advancement potential 

of qualified women and, ultimately, the demographic diversity of senior leaders. Therefore, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services take steps to open all 

career fields and units to all qualified women.

DoD and the Services Should Report to Congress the Process and Timeline 

for Removing Barriers That Inhibit Women from Achieving Senior Leadership 

Positions

Although there are no laws that specifically restrict women from being assigned to any 

career field, specialty, assignment, or unit, Title 10, Section 652, does require the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress about changes to the current combat exclusion 

policies. Therefore, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services report 

to Congress the process and timelines for developing and implementing new policies 

based on recent combat experience. To be clear, this recommendation means that DoD 

and the Services will have to first determine how to develop and implement new policies, not whether to do so. 
75

Chapter Eight

Promotion

The next stage of the personnel life cycle is selecting servicemembers for promotion. 

In the military’s closed personnel system,1 the demographic diversity of senior leadership depends largely on the relative career progression rates of members of each demographic group: If racial/ethnic minorities and women advance at lower rates than white 

men, they will be underrepresented in the top leadership positions. Thus, potential barriers to promotion and resulting demographic differences in promotion rates can affect 

the future demographic diversity of senior military leadership.

Typically, there are more servicemembers eligible for promotion than can be 

selected, so selection depends critically on identifying the best and most-qualified candidates. To understand how racial/ethnic minorities and women are currently faring 

in the military promotion process, the Commission asked the Services to provide data 

regarding average promotion rates.2 The findings presented in this chapter do not 

reflect RC data, however. The information requested from the RC either had not been 

compiled or collected or was not available in a comparable format.

Demographic Differences in Average Promotion Rates

Line Officer Promotion Rates

The Services were asked to provide data on line officers in pay grades O-4 through 

O-6. Line officers are officers who serve in combat-related specialties, and they constitute the majority of officers. Noncombat specialties include chaplains, lawyers, logisticians, and medical officers. Also, comparing line officers controls for potential occupational differences that may influence promotion rates, such as being in a tactical/

operational career field. 

In several cases, the data showed that promotion rates from O-4 through O-6 for 

several racial/ethnic minority groups were lower than the average. In particular,

1	 As described in Chapter Four, the military operates as a closed personnel system in that senior leaders 

cannot be brought in from the outside but are instead brought up through the lower ranks. Therefore, as previously noted, each stage of the military personnel life cycle—from who is recruited to who is promoted—is 

intricately linked to the composition of the future military leadership.

2	 Army and Air Force averages are based on data from FY  2007 to FY  2009, Navy and Coast Guard 

averages are based on data from FY 2007 to FY 2010, and Marine Corps averages are based on data from 

FY 2008 to FY 2010. 
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• In all the Services, black (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) officers’ promotion rates 

were substantially lower than the pay grade–specific average promotion rates for 

their respective Services.

• Except in the Army, Hispanic officers’ promotion rates were below the Serviceand pay grade–specific averages. Across the Services, Hispanic officers tended 

to have higher promotion rates than black (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) officers.

• Officers from other race/ethnicity groups (i.e., Asians, Pacific Islanders, American Indians, Alaska natives, and individuals reporting more than one race) in each 

Service had substantially lower-than-average promotion rates to O-5. In the Air 

Force and Coast Guard, their promotion rates to O-4 were also below average.

• Female officers in the Navy and Coast Guard had substantially lower-thanaverage promotion rates to O-4 and O-5.

The Commission also examined demographic differences in flag/general officer 

promotion rates. However, discussion of flag/general officer promotion rates requires 

an important caveat: The racial/ethnic minority and female representation in the eligible populations for promotion to O-7, O-8, and O-9 can be very small. In those circumstances, a single promotion can cause a racial/ethnic minority or female promotion 

rate to change substantially. Therefore, flag/general officer promotion rates are provided 

for descriptive reference only. Overall, the data show that, in the period under review, 

the promotion rates of women to O-7 and O-8 roughly equaled the Service averages. 

This was also true of Asian/Pacific Islanders (except for promotions to O-8 in the 

Coast Guard). Although Hispanics had well-above-average promotion rates to O-7 

in the Marine Corps and Coast Guard, the promotion rates of blacks (Hispanic and 

non-Hispanic) to this pay grade were below average for these Services. Finally, blacks 

(Hispanic and non-Hispanic) and Hispanics experienced very low promotion rates to 

O-8 in the Army and Marine Corps. 

E-7 to E-9 Promotion Rates

The Commission examined potential demographic differences in average promotion 

rates for AC senior noncommissioned officers (i.e., enlisted ranks E-7 through E-9). 

Overall, the data indicate that there were a few cases, especially in the Marine Corps, 

in which advancement differed by race/ethnicity or gender. However, below-average 

rates for racial/ethnic minority noncommissioned officers were not the widespread 

problem they were for officers. The key findings were that

• Black (Hispanic and non-Hispanic) marines had substantially lower-than-average 

promotion rates to E-7, E-8, and E-9.

• Hispanic Marines had promotion rates to E-7 and E-8 that were somewhat lower 

than average.

• Airmen from other race/ethnicity groups (i.e., Asians, Pacific Islanders, American Indians, Alaska natives, and individuals reporting more than one race) had 

a substantially lower-than-average promotion rate to E-9. Marines from these 
Promotion

77

other race/ethnicity groups had a promotion rate to E-7 that was somewhat below 

average.

• Female marines had a substantially lower-than-average promotion rate to E-9 but 

a higher-than-average promotion rate to E-7. Female soldiers had slightly belowaverage promotion rates to E-8 and E-9.

Thus, data on recent AC line officer promotion rates indicate that, overall, racial/

ethnic minority officers had lower promotion rates than white officers for pay grades 

O-4 through O-6. With only a few exceptions—for example, Hispanic Army officers—

this pattern appears to have held for all the Services and each race/ethnicity group. 

However, the gender differences for officers and the racial/ethnic or gender differences 

for enlisted servicemembers were more varied across both the Services and pay grades 

and thus do not signal the same widespread, persistent majority-minority gap. 

The Officer Promotion Process

It is hard to identify any single reason for or barrier that explains the lower promotion 

rates of racial/ethnic minorities and women in the military. The Commission did not 

have access to the required data to control for the effects of other variables when analyzing the rates presented above; however, the current rates tend to be similar to those 

found by past analyses that did control for factors other than race/ethnicity or gender 

(see Hosek et al., 2001). Because below-average officer promotion rates appear to be a 

widespread issue across several Services (rather than just one Service, as in the case of 

enlisted promotion rates), the Commission further explored the existence of institutional or individual bias in promotion selection boards, assignment histories, performance evaluations, and knowledge of the promotion process. 

Promotion Selection Boards

Overall, the Commission found that the promotion board process appears to be 

designed to be institutionally fair and to mitigate the effects of bias on the part of any 

individual board member. Selections are made not by a single individual but rather by 

multimember boards that are, to the extent possible, demographically representative 

of the pool of candidates. Furthermore, the guidance to these boards—delivered in 

the form of precepts, instructions, and laws—requires that selections be based on the 

needs of the Services and that they meet the best-and-fully-qualified criterion, without 

regard to race/ethnicity or gender.

Assignment Histories and Performance Evaluations

The Commission explored the potential for unfairness in the inputs to the promotion 

process in terms of assignment histories and performance evaluations. For example, 

each functional community within each Service has a defined due-course career path 

describing the successive milestones that servicemembers need to achieve to be competitive for promotion to each rank. Because of the strict timing requirements of the 
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78

military promotion system, deviations from the due-course path can negatively affect 

an officer’s competitiveness in the selection process. Similarly, bias in the performance 

evaluations an officer receives can influence the officer’s competitiveness in the selection process.

To examine the potential for unfairness in these inputs to the promotion process, the Commission looked at survey data from several different sources. Overall, the 

survey data regarding servicemembers’ perceptions of the fairness of both assignment 

opportunities and performance evaluations generated ambiguous results. According to the 2009 Workplace and Equal Opportunity Survey of Active-Duty Members (WEOA),3 racial/ethnic minority servicemembers were more likely than whites 

to believe that race/ethnicity was a factor in both their assignments and their performance evaluations. In contrast, both the 2008 Status of Forces Survey (SOFS)4 and 

a Commission supplement to the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute 

(DEOMI) Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS)5 indicated that white and nonwhite servicemembers had similar perceptions about the fairness of these two “inputs.” 

These two surveys did, however, find significant differences by gender: According to 

responses on both the SOFS and the DEOCS, women were less likely than men to 

agree that they received the assignments they needed to be competitive for promotion. 

In addition, prior research by Hosek et al. (2001) examining differences in career 

progression for officers in the 1970s and 1980s found that a potential explanation for 

the lag in black officer career progression was that black officers were more likely to 

be given assignments that took them off the due-course career path. Although this 

research is dated, the findings are consistent with the Commissioners’ more recent 

3	 The survey targets active-duty members of the Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Navy 

who had completed at least six months of service at the time the survey was first fielded and were below 

flag/general officer rank. For the 2009 WEOA, data were collected predominantly via the web in February, March, and April 2009, and completed surveys (defined as those with at least half the survey questions 

answered) were received from 26,167 eligible respondents. The resulting sample of respondents was 72 percent enlisted and 28 percent officers and 84 percent DoD and 16 percent Coast Guard.

4	 The Status of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members is administered to DoD servicemembers three times a 

year; the Coast Guard does not participate in the SOFS. As with the WEOA, the target population is activeduty members who had completed at least six months of service and were below flag/general officer rank six 

months prior to data collection. Members of the National Guard and Reserve in active-duty programs were 

not eligible. The SOFS data used here were collected via the web between November 5 and December 19, 

2008. A total of 10,435 eligible servicemembers returned usable surveys, again defined as those with at least 

half the questions answered. The final sample included 3,474 officers (33 percent), 6,303 enlisted servicemembers (61 percent), and 658 warrant officers (6 percent).

5	 The Commission added several sets of questions to learn about servicemembers’ perceptions of various 

aspects of the promotion system, and its questions were fielded during March 2010. During this period, 

a total of 2,196 servicemembers completed the survey, with 2,004 respondents providing usable information. The sample includes AC and RC servicemembers, but the RC sample was too small to allow for separate analysis by demographic group. Relevant shares of the final sample were 87 percent enlisted personnel, 

12 percent officers, 1 percent warrant officers, and 60 percent white non-Hispanic. It is important to note 

that the DEOCS sample is much smaller than the WEOA and SOFS samples, and the DEOCS sample was 

collected without the use of any particular sampling methodology. Therefore, it is less likely to have been 

representative of the population of servicemembers as a whole.
Promotion

79

experience in their Services. Furthermore, although the 2001 study by Hosek et al. and 

an OSD report based on the study’s early findings (Gilroy et al., 1999) recommended 

that DoD conduct further research to determine whether black officers’ promotion 

rates were indeed hampered by recruiting- and EO-related deviations from the duecourse career path, the Commission was unable to find any indication that this recommendation was ever implemented. 

Knowledge of the Promotion Process

Finally, the Commission explored the extent to which servicemembers felt they had 

adequate knowledge of the promotion process. Overall, the Services reported using 

multiple approaches to educate servicemembers about how to be successful in general and about the promotion system in particular. These approaches include formal 

seminars, formal and informal mentoring, and the establishment of websites that provide general and community-specific information about key career milestones and 

due-course career paths. However, the Commission also found that no Service is systematically evaluating the effectiveness of these tools, either overall or for different 

demographic groups. 

Improve Transparency So That Servicemembers Understand 

Performance Expectations, Promotion Criteria, and Processes

Recommendation 10—

DoD, the Services, and Chief, National Guard Bureau, must ensure that there is transparency 

throughout their promotion systems so that servicemembers may better understand performance expectations and promotion criteria and processes. To do this, they

• a. Must specify the knowledge, skills, abilities, and potential necessary to be an effective flag/general officer or senior noncommissioned officer.

• b. Shall formalize the process and requirements for 3- and 4-star officer selection in 

DoD Instruction 1320.4.

• c. Shall educate and counsel all servicemembers on the importance of, and their responsibility for, a complete promotion board packet.

This recommendation calls for making the promotion system as transparent as 

possible to ensure that all servicemembers have adequate and equal knowledge in their 

efforts to proactively manage their own careers. Although the Commission did not 

have data for the RC with which to assess demographic differences in promotion rates 

or perceptions of the fairness of the RC promotion process, these recommendations 

should also help improve promotion opportunities for RC servicemembers. To implement this recommendation, the Commission proposes three strategies.
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80

 Specify the Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Potential Necessary to Be an 

Eff ective Flag/general Offi cer or Senior Noncommissioned Offi cer 

Many have noted that future leaders in the offi cer corps will require a greater mix of 

knowledge, skills, and abilities in order to be eff ective in changing operational environments. Th is claim is supported by changes that have already occurred as a result of the 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and against Al-Qaeda and its Violent Extremist Affi liates and by forecasts of needed competencies that have been laid out in such reports as 

the Quadrennial Defense Review Report. For example, many of the forecasts suggest a 

greater need for foreign-language, regional, and cultural expertise as well as improved 

expertise in cyber warfare. Although the demand for these skills is growing, in terms 

of career advancement, it is often risky for servicemembers to deviate from traditional 

career paths if they seek to reach the highest ranks of the military. 

As previously discussed, research shows that the majority of fl ag/general offi -

cers are drawn from tactical/operational occupations. Although there are positions that 

must be fi lled by an offi cer from a tactical/operational occupation, there are other fl ag/

general offi cer positions that do not require the knowledge, experience, skills, and abilities of an offi cer in a tactical/operational occupation. Th e experiences of some Commissioners suggest, for example, that key leadership positions in combat support and 

combat service support organizations are 

slated for combat arms offi cers instead of 

offi cers who have spent their entire careers 

in combat support and combat service support positions. Th is tendency to slate key 

fl ag/general offi cer positions for those in 

tactical/operational occupations limits the 

ability of offi cers in other occupations to fi ll 

key assignments that would increase their 

likelihood of further promotion.

Th erefore, the Commission encourages a change to a more fl exible offi cer 

career development system that starts with 

core competencies and progresses to a 

broader range of skills as the offi cer becomes 

more senior. In the short term, based on the 

knowledge, skills, abilities, and potential 

required for senior leadership positions, the 

Services should give consideration, where appropriate, to a wider range of offi cers. 

Th is approach may increase promotion opportunities for racial/ethnic minorities and 

women who would otherwise not be considered for more-senior levels of advancement. 

Formalize the Process and Requirements for 3- and 4-Star Selection

DoD Instruction 1320.4 contains some information on O-7 to O-8 and O-9 to O-10 

promotions, but it lacks an overview of the entire process. Th erefore, the Commission 

Services should give consideration, where appropriate, to a wider range of offi cers. 

[W]hen I became an armor offi cer, supposed 

to be qualifi ed with tanks and all of those 

kinds of things, I have never fi red a tank on a 

tank range. I have never gone down range in 

any part of a tank, and yet I commanded an 

armor brigade with two tank battalions and an 

infantry battalion. When I went into combat 

in Vietnam, I had never been in a cavalry unit, 

yet I commanded an airborne cavalry unit. 

When I took command of a division that was 

converted to an armored division, I had never 

been on a tank range in a tank, so someone 

saw something in what I could do.  .  .  . [W]e 

ought to keep that in mind . . . . I don’t think we 

want to deny a person an opportunity when 

they may not be “qualifi ed.” It depends on how 

you defi ne being qualifi ed.

—Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, Jr., 

remarks to the Commission, 2011
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81

recommends that the selection process for flag/general officers from ranks O-7 through 

O-10 be made transparent through description and documentation in DoD Instruction 1320.4, Military Officer Actions Requiring Approval of the Secretary of Defense or the 

President, or Confirmation by the Senate, which outlines the current promotion policy.

Educate and Counsel All Servicemembers on the Importance of, and Their 

Responsibility for, a Complete Promotion Board Packet

As part of their educational efforts, the Services already provide officers with some 

instruction on how to construct a complete promotion packet in preparation for being 

evaluated by a promotion board. With this recommendation, the Commission calls out 

this fundamental step as necessary to ensuring that the promotion system works minimally well for all officers. This is a simple procedural step that, if not done properly, 

could decrease a servicemember’s chances of promotion. The Services should ensure 

that education on constructing complete promotion packets is effective and that it 

reaches all servicemembers equally.

In addition to recommending improvements to the transparency of the promotion 

process, the Commission also makes a recommendation, described immediately below, 

to address potential unfairness in the inputs (i.e., assignment histories and performance 

evaluations) to the promotion process. 

Ensure That Promotion Board Precepts Provide Guidance on How to 

Value Service-Directed Special Assignments Outside Normal Career 

Paths or Fields

Recommendation 11—

The Services shall ensure that promotion board precepts provide guidance regarding 

Service-directed special assignments outside normal career paths and/or fields. As appropriate, senior raters’ evaluations shall acknowledge when a servicemember has deviated 

from the due-course path at the specific request of his or her leadership.

Although the Commission was not able to conduct a systematic analysis of officer 

assignment patterns across the Services, there is some indication that officers who are 

members of demographically underrepresented groups are disproportionately diverted 

from their due-course career paths to fill recruiting and EO assignments, thus making 

them less competitive for promotion. This result is mainly supported by the Commissioners’ collective wisdom and a study by Hosek et al. (2001). Acknowledging that this 

pattern has not been confirmed, the Commission feels strongly that officers should 

not be penalized for helping their Services execute their diversity efforts: It is not only 

unfair to the officers but also detrimental to the Services’ demographic diversity goals. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends that the Services ensure that promotion board 

precepts provide guidance to board members on how to value Service-directed assignments that take officers off the due-course path and recommends that, when possible, 
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performance evaluations note whether a candidate has taken an unusual assignment at 

the request of his or her leadership. 

Although the main motivation for this recommendation is to eliminate institutional bias that might contribute to the promotion gap between racial/ethnic minority and white officers, the wording is intentionally general, referring to any Servicedirected assignment that falls outside the community norm. This wording reflects the 

Commission’s position that diversity encompasses many kinds of human difference 

and contributes to mission capability. In particular, diversity of experience, potentially 

reflected in deviations from the due-course path, is expected to be of extra value in 

the context of changing warfighting environments and in the development of new 

doctrine. Indeed, the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan may already be changing the Services’ ideas about what is considered a “key” assignment. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report, for example, highlights the need to build expertise in 

foreign-language, regional, and cultural skills (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). 

These changes mean that promotion boards must be open to nontraditional assignment 

histories until due-course career paths can be reevaluated.
83

Chapter Nine

Retention

Because career progression depends on the ability to retain as well as promote servicemembers, it is important to examine whether there are demographic differences 

in who chooses to remain in and who chooses to separate from military service. It is 

also important to identify potential barriers that influence demographic differences in 

retention. 

To calculate the retention behavior of different demographic groups for the AC, 

the Commission accessed records from FY 2000–FY 2008 from the Proxy Personnel Tempo files provided by DMDC and from information provided separately by the 

Coast Guard. For the RC, the Commission accessed records from FY 2004–FY 2009 

from the Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System files provided by 

DMDC.1 For the AC, the Commission calculated reenlistment rates based on those 

servicemembers who were eligible (i.e., who had completed at least 17 months of service) both to voluntarily leave active-duty service and to reenlist. Officer retention was 

based on continuation rates of officers, which are calculated as the percentage of officers 

in the same Service observed at year t and again at year t + 1.2 For the RC, retention for 

both enlisted servicemembers and officers was calculated based on continuation rates.

Retention of Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Active Component Retention

Among AC enlisted servicemembers, the reenlistment rates of non-Hispanic blacks, 

Hispanics, and non-Hispanic Asian/Pacific Islanders were higher than those of whites 

and members of other races or ethnicities (i.e.,  American Indians, Alaska Natives, 

1	 The data focus specifically on the Selected Reserve.

2	 These continuation rates do not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary separation. Differences 

in personnel management in the enlisted and officer communities led the Commission to focus on reenlistment rates among active-duty enlisted servicemembers and on continuation rates among active-duty officers. 

Enlisted servicemembers enlist for a set period of time and, after the completion of that term of service, must 

decide either to leave or to reenlist for another term. If the servicemember chooses to stay, another stay/leave 

decision must be made at the end of the second service obligation, and so on. Therefore, retention behavior 

among enlisted servicemembers can be studied at the time of a decision point using reenlistment rates. In 

contrast, officers are free to leave active-duty service at any point after an initial obligation period and do not 

have to make specific recommitment decisions at any particular point. Therefore, retention behavior among 

officers is usually measured through continuation rates.
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and individuals of more than one race). This pattern was consistent across all Services. 

However, the gap in reenlistment rates shrank as time in service increased.

For AC officers, on average, non-Hispanic black and Hispanic officers had cumulative continuation rates that were greater than or equal to whites’ rates at every yearof-service point. Specifically, after the fourth year of service, non-Hispanic blacks and 

Hispanics had consistently higher rates of continuation than both whites and members 

of other racial/ethnicity minority groups. Until 20 years of service, when differences in 

retention begin to taper, the differences between non-Hispanic blacks, Hispanics, and 

whites became more pronounced as years of service increased. The one exception to 

this trend is found in the Air Force, where non-Hispanic blacks consistently had lower 

continuation rates than whites until year 20, at which point the gap began to close. 

The retention rates for other racial/ethnic minority officer groups are more complicated 

because the rates varied according to Service. On average, the rates of non-Hispanic 

Asian/Pacific Islanders and members of other minority races/ethnicities (i.e., American Indians, Alaska Natives, and individuals of more than one race) were less than or 

equal to the rates of whites. Thus, for both the AC enlisted and AC officer corps, racial/

ethnic minorities were, overall, more than or equally as likely as whites to remain in 

service. 

Reserve Component Retention

Among RC enlisted servicemembers, average continuation rates varied somewhat 

across Service components and years of service. However, overall, non-Hispanic Asian/

Pacific Islanders and Hispanics had higher average continuation rates than whites. On 

the other hand, non-Hispanic blacks and, in some Services, members of other minority races/ethnicities (i.e., American Indians, Alaska Natives, individuals of more than 

one race, and those of unknown race) had significantly lower average continuation rates 

than whites. However, the lower continuation rates of non-Hispanic blacks and members of other minority races/ethnicities (i.e., American Indians, Alaska Natives, individuals of more than one race, and those of unknown race) were small, ranging from 

only a 1- to 4-percentage–point difference.

Among officers in the RC, average continuation rates also varied somewhat across 

Service components and years of service. Overall, though, the continuation rates of 

racial/ethnic minorities were higher than or the same as the rates of whites. The only 

exceptions to this pattern were non-Hispanic blacks in the Air Force Reserve, the 

Marine Corps Reserve, and the Navy Reserve and non-Hispanic Asian/Pacific Islanders in the Coast Guard Reserve. Again, these differences in promotion rates were relatively small, ranging from only a 1- to 4-percentage–point difference.

Retention of Women

Active Component Retention

Examining retention among AC enlisted servicemembers, the Commission found 

that, across the Services, women were less likely than men to remain in service. There 
Retention

85

are two notable exceptions: In the Air Force, women’s reenlistment rates early on in 

their careers (between 17 months and six years of active service) were higher than men’s 

during the mid-2000s. Similarly, men and women had very comparable reenlistment 

rates earlier on in their careers in the Marine Corps. 

Similarly, female officers across the Services were less likely to be retained than 

male officers. During the first three years of service as an officer, men and women displayed similar continuation rates. However, by the time officers had completed their 

fourth year of service, differences between male and female continuation rates began 

to emerge and to increase with years of service through roughly years 8 to 12. By the 

tenth year of service, the percentage-point difference between male and female officer 

cumulative continuation rates was 10 in the Army, 15 in the Navy, and 20 in both the 

Marine Corps and Air Force. In other words, although both male and female officers 

separated from the military as years of service increased, female officers separated at 

higher rates during the period under consideration. This difference in later years is 

likely the result of retention rather than promotion because it occurs before the first 

competitive promotion point. However, after 20 years of service, the gender gap begins 

to narrow again, with a difference of less than 5 percentage points by 30 years of service. Thus, overall for both the AC enlisted and officer corps, women were less likely 

than men to remain in service. 

Reserve Component Retention

Women enlisted in the RC, no matter what the Service, were less likely than men 

to remain in service. Furthermore, continuation rates for women generally remained 

below those of their male counterparts across years of service, with only some increase 

in retention past 20 years of service.3

As in the case of enlisted trends, data on RC officer continuation rates show 

that, across all the Services, women were less likely than men to remain in service. In 

general, female continuation rates were lower than male rates until roughly ten years 

of service. Female continuation rates then rose above those of their male counterparts 

between ten and 20 years of service and then dropped back down below the rates of 

men after 20 years of service. Thus, overall, for both the RC enlisted and RC officer 

corps, women were less likely than men to remain in service. 

Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward Military Life

Although there were small differences in the retention rates of racial/ethnic minorities compared with those of whites, particularly in the RC, the largest gap in retention 

rates was between men and women. To explore why this gender gap in retention exists, 

the Commission examined potential differences in servicemembers’ attitudes toward 

military life. Using data from the DMDC’s November 2008 SOFS (found at Defense 

3	 RC servicemembers may have had prior service time in the AC before joining the RC. Therefore, the 

Commission uses the Years of Service Pay Entry Base Date as a measure of years of service rather than years 

of service in the RC. This Years of Service Pay Entry Base Date metric measures years of service from the 

time a servicemember first joins the Armed Forces.
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Manpower Data Center, 2010c), the Commission assessed whether there were gender 

differences in satisfaction with military life, organizational commitment, and retention 

intentions.4

In the AC, female enlisted servicemembers were as likely as their male counterparts in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps both to be satisfied with the 

military way of life and to report that they intended to remain in the Armed Forces. 

Similarly, in the AC Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, female officers were as likely 

as their male counterparts both to be satisfied with the military way of life and to 

report that they intended to remain in the Armed Forces. There was an exception in the 

case of female Army officers, who, compared with their male counterparts, reported 

being less satisfied with the military and less likely to stay. Consistent with the AC, 

female servicemembers in the RC were as likely as their male counterparts to report 

that they were satisfied with the military way of life and that they intended to remain 

in the Armed Forces.

However, the results also showed that AC enlisted female soldiers and sailors 

were less likely than their male counterparts to report that they saw the military as a 

career. Similarly, across all four DoD Services, female AC officers were less likely than 

their male counterparts to report that they saw the military as a career. The Commission did not have data on RC servicemember attitudes toward a military career.

Finally, through the DEOCS, the Commission gathered additional AC data on 

potential reasons for leaving military service.5 Overall, the results from the DEOCS 

suggest that men and women cited similar reasons for leaving active duty. Both genders reported dissatisfaction with their job, low pay, and lack of promotion or advancement opportunities as reasons for leaving. For male officers, the most frequently cited 

4	 The AC sample consisted of 37,494 servicemembers of the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy who 

had completed at least six months of service and were below flag/general officer rank six months prior to data 

collection. A total of 10,435 eligible servicemembers returned usable surveys (3,474 officers, 6,303 enlisted 

servicemembers, and 658 warrant officers). The RC sample included responses from the Army National 

Guard, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard, and the 

Air Force Reserve. The Coast Guard does not participate in the SOFS.

5	 Survey data were collected in two periods during February–March and May 2010. Although a total of 

3,419 servicemembers completed the survey during this period, the Commission focused its attention on the 

1,111 AC officers and enlisted servicemembers who reported that they either were leaving at the end of their 

current obligation (n = 592) or were not sure whether they were leaving at the end of their current obligation 

(n = 519) and whose responses were not missing data on race/ethnicity, gender, branch of Service, or rank. 

Just over half of the servicemembers in the analytic sample were in the Army (616), and roughly one-third 

were in the Navy (315). The rest were spread throughout the Marine Corps (87), Coast Guard (70), and Air 

Force (23). The distribution of respondents across Services reflects differences in how each of the Services 

uses the DEOCS. The DEOCS is typically not used by the Air Force, which relies on its own internal climate survey. Therefore, it is likely that the Air Force respondents in the sample were in a cross-Service command. In the Navy and Marine Corps, unit participation in the DEOCS is required within 90 days of a new 

commander taking command and every year thereafter. The Army has its own climate survey that must be 

administered to units within 90 days of a new commander taking command, but the DEOCS is also available to commanders who choose to use it. The Coast Guard requires administration of the DEOCS to each 

unit annually, as long as the unit contains at least 16 servicemembers. In general, DEOMI does not generate 

a DEOCS report unless at least 16 assigned personnel complete the survey.
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87

reason for leaving was failure to be promoted. Although there were fewer female officer 

responses to analyze, the high frequency of deployments and the desire to settle in one 

location were both listed as primary motivations for separating. Among male enlisted 

servicemembers, low pay and low allowances was the most frequently cited reason for 

leaving; among female enlisted servicemembers, involuntary separation or ineligibility to reenlist was the most frequently cited reason. Overall, however, none of the data 

points to a single reason or single set of reasons that can explain why women haven 

chosen to leave military service at higher rates than men. 

DACOWITS Should Expand Its Focus to Include an Explanation of the 

Gender Gap in Retention 

Recommendation 12—

Where appropriate, DACOWITS should expand its current focus on retention to include an 

explanation of the gender gap in retention. As part of this renewed focus, DACOWITS should 

examine the effects of retention programs, such as the sabbatical programs currently 

offered by the Navy and the Coast Guard as well as any other innovative Service-specific 

approaches to retention. Findings and recommendations from this research should be presented to the Secretary of Defense.

Because the data do not clearly indicate why more women leave service earlier and 

at greater rates than men, the Commission recommends that the Defense Advisory 

Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) expand its current focus on 

retention to examine the gender gap in retention. This examination should also explore 

why women are less likely to view the military as a career and should help to identify 

existing policies and practices that may effectively decrease the retention gap between 

men and women.

The Commission also suggests that DACOWITS examine the effectiveness of a 

number of sabbatical programs. All the Services currently offer a number of these programs to enhance retention among their servicemembers. However, because the law 

prohibits the award of benefits to individuals solely based on gender, designing retention programs specifically aimed at women is challenging. Thus, retention outcomes 

related to three potentially effective, and legal, sabbatical programs should be more 

fully explored. 

In FY 2009, the Navy began to conduct a pilot program, the Career Intermission Pilot Program, to encourage retention through enhanced career flexibility. The 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 allows 20 officers and 20 

enlisted members in each Service to participate in the program each year. The program, which is open to both men and women, allows officers and enlisted personnel 

to temporarily (for up to three years) take time off from active duty. Participants in the 

program transition from the AC to the Individual Ready Reserve during this period. 

Although those who participate in a career intermission do not receive active-duty pay 

or allowances, they do retain medical and dental care benefits and continued access to 
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

88

commissaries, exchanges, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs. Servicemembers incur an additional active-duty service obligation of two months for every 

month of participation in this career intermission. Upon their return to active duty, 

participants return at the same rank they held upon entering the program.

The Coast Guard has two sabbatical programs worthy of exploring. The first, 

Care for Newborn Children, and the second, Temporary Separation Program, are 

restricted to individuals who are at the rank of E-4/O-3 or above. To qualify for Care 

for Newborn Children, at least four years of active-duty service in the Coast Guard are 

required; six years are required to qualify for the Temporary Separation Program. Both 

programs allow for up to a 24-month absence, and the servicemember receives no pay 

or benefits while away. Upon return, individuals are reinstated at the same rank they 

held upon leaving, assuming that they meet physical fitness requirements and return 

within two years. Servicemembers may take advantage of one sabbatical, but not both. 

The Commission suggests that DACOWITS examine the available data on these 

leave programs as well as other innovative Service programs and assess the effect of their 

expansion on female retention. The Commission also recommends that DACOWITS 

disseminate the findings and recommendations from its review to a wide audience, 

including the Secretary of Defense. This can help facilitate the use of successful retention practices that close the gender gap across Services.
89

Chapter Ten

Going Beyond Race/Ethnicity

and Gender

Although the majority of Chapters Four through Nine has focused on increasing racial/

ethnic and female representation within senior military leadership, the Commission 

also recommends tracking and improving other aspects of diversity within the military. 

DoD and the Services Must Better Manage Personnel with MissionCritical Skill Sets

Recommendation 13—

DoD and the Services must track regional and cultural expertise and relevant Reserve Component civilian expertise and continue to track language expertise upon military accession 

and throughout servicemembers’ careers in order to better manage personnel with missioncritical skill sets.

As noted in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report, DoD needs to build 

regional, cultural, and foreign-language expertise in order to prepare for future security 

needs (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). Given that no one can predict where the 

next conflict might be and what future regional expertise would be needed, it is prudent to track all language and cultural expertise, not just that specified by the current 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report, throughout servicemembers’ careers. 

In addition, certain RC civilian expertise can be a critical aid to missions. RC 

personnel may, via their civilian careers and other experiences, possess skills that are in 

high demand in the military. Some of these skills, such as regional, cultural, and language expertise, are linked with demographic diversity. Others, such as those related 

to science and technology, go beyond demographics. Therefore, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services codify and track civilian expertise that is deemed 

mission critical.

A mechanism that could be used to track relevant RC civilian expertise is the 

Civilian Employment Information program, which requires each member of the Ready 

Reserve to report employment status, employer’s name and address, civilian job title, 

and years of experience in current civilian occupation. This information is stored in 

the Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System. This program could be 

expanded to collect information on servicemember skills, including regional, cultural, 
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90

language, technical, and scientific expertise. This information would then be available 

to commanders looking for servicemembers with specific skill sets. 

DoD Must Promote Structural Diversity, Total Force Integration, and 

Overall Retention

Recommendation 14—

To promote structural diversity, total force integration, and overall retention,

• a. DoD must improve the personnel and finance systems affecting transition between 

Active and Reserve Components and internal Reserve Component transition protocols.

• b. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Service Chiefs must 

assess how Reserve Component members can more effectively both gain operational 

experience and fulfill joint requirements within the constraints of their dual military/

civilian lives and take action as appropriate.

Improve the Personnel and Finance Systems Affecting Transition Between 

Active and Reserve Components and Internal Reserve Component Transition 

Protocols

Personnel leaving the AC are valuable resources for the RC, but the current process for 

transitioning from the Active Duty List to the Reserve Active Status List is lengthy 

and inefficient. On average, it takes one to six months to transition from the AC to the 

RC. To encourage servicemembers to join the RC rather than leave the military, DoD 

needs to improve personnel and pay systems to facilitate the transition. For example, 

many steps in this process could be made more efficient through automation and better 

interfaces between personnel and financial (i.e., pay) systems across the Services. These 

improvements could include automatic checks and balances wherever possible, realtime updated billet availability for assignment approvals, and close-to-real-time transitions between personnel and pay systems across the Services. Overall, streamlining 

this process would give the RC access to a broader talent pool by making it easier for a 

servicemember leaving the AC to join the RC. 

Additionally, flexible service opportunities, such as seamless transition within 

the RC, have the potential to improve structural integration within the RC. The force 

structure constraints of one RC Service may limit promotion opportunities for some 

qualified servicemembers; however, another RC Service may not have the same constraints. By moving from one RC Service to another, servicemembers can take advantage of a wider variety of promotion opportunities. 

Assess How RC Members Can More Effectively Gain Operational Experience and 

Fulfill Joint Requirements 

Joint requirements are currently not aligned with the career path of traditional drilling 

reservists in the National Guard and Reserve. Unlike their AC counterparts, RC ser-
Going Beyond Race/Ethnicity and Gender

91

vicemembers must meet their military educational and operational requirements without detriment to or neglect of their civilian occupations. In addition, their window of 

opportunity to gain operational experience and credibility in their primary area of concentration and to complete a joint assignment is particularly narrow; thus, these two 

career milestones are often mutually exclusive. As a result, because they may lack joint 

qualifications or because they missed out on key operational assignments, many traditional RC servicemembers become uncompetitive for flag/general officer consideration.

To address this issue, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services 

implement policy that provides flexible opportunities for officers to become jointqualified to accommodate the constraints and requirements of the RC career path. In 

particular, the Services should provide mechanisms for officers to acquire both joint 

and operational experience, at the appropriate rank, and they should provide enough 

education slots so that all qualified National Guard and Reserve servicemembers can 

complete their joint professional military education and other education requirements 

in a timely fashion.

The purpose of this recommendation is to promote a highly qualified RC officer 

corps that can effectively compete for the highest ranks in the military. The Commission believes that this can add to the structural diversity of the upper ranks by ensuring 

that traditional reservists are qualified to be promoted to the highest ranks.

Conclusion

The chapters in this section outlined how specific stages of the military personnel life 

cycle and related structural and perceptual barriers influence the diversity of future 

military leaders. In an effort to improve the career progression of racial/ethnic minorities and women at each stage, the Commission made detailed recommendations to 

address key barriers. 

Through partnerships and outreach programs, DoD and the Services can attempt 

to address current eligibility issues. Improved recruiting efforts focused on members 

of underrepresented demographic groups can then help improve the demographic 

diversity of initial accessions. The removal of combat exclusion policies for women 

and further development of effective mentoring efforts can create opportunities for, 

and educate servicemembers regarding the importance of, career field selection and 

key assignments to career advancement. Ensuring that the promotion process is transparent and fair can then help ensure that members of all demographic groups receive 

opportunities for advancement. Further research into the current gender gap in retention can lead to changes that ensure that there is a demographically diverse pool of 

candidates for promotion. Finally, going beyond demographics, other important diversity dimensions, such as language skills, cultural expertise, and the structural diversity 

brought by the RC, should be promoted within the Services. Taken together, these 

recommendations can help develop and sustain a talented military leadership that truly 

represents the face of America. 

Section IV: 

Ensuring Continued Progress

95

ChapteR eleven

MANAgINg AND SuSTAININg DIVERSITY

So far, this report has suggested a new defi nition of diversity, proposed that diversity 

leadership be a core competency in the Services, and recommended ways that barriers 

to career advancement can be reduced at all stages of a military career both for underrepresented demographic groups and for people with desirable backgrounds and skill 

sets. Th ese changes, however, cannot be managed and sustained without developing 

a stronger organizational structure and a system of accountability, monitoring, and 

enforcement to ensure continued progress toward greater diversity at all ranks of the 

military. 

Th is chapter highlights the priorities in these areas and makes recommendations 

to address them. It begins with the need for a management system with oversight from 

a Chief Diversity Offi cer who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. It then identifi es the need for strategic diversity planning, new policies, and metrics for measuring 

progress across the Services and within DoD. Finally, it describes the importance of 

holding leaders accountable for progress toward achieving a military workforce that is 

not only diverse demographically but also inclusive of all the characteristics required 

for high performance in the future.

Priority: Aligning the Organizational Structure to Support an 

Eff ective Diversity Management System

Currently, responsibility for diversity management in OSD is assigned to the Offi ce 

of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity (ODMEO). Th is offi ce is charged 

with promoting EO throughout DoD and overseeing diversity policy for DoD, including coordinating the diversity eff orts of 

the Services. Th e diversity mission was an 

added function initiated by ODMEO leadership to help DoD incorporate diversity 

management practices and processes into 

its workforce management culture.

ODMEO grew out of the Offi ce 

of the Deputy Under Secretary (EO) 

(DUSD(EO)), which was established 

under the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). 

DUSD(EO) was established in 2003, when the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for EO was elevated to the position of DUSD(EO) and the position was fi lled by a 

In addition to the CEO’s leadership, responsibility for diversity in “best-practice” companies 

is seen as a line-management responsibility, 

not as a Human Resources .  .  .  staff program 

or initiative.

—Defense Business Board Task Group 

on Increasing Diversity in DoD’s Flag 

and Senior Executive Ranks, 2004
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96

political appointee. When that political appointee departed in 2006, the Offi ce of the 

DUSD(EO) was renamed ODMEO and placed under the Deputy Under Secretary 

(Plans). On one hand, this realignment mainstreamed diversity and EO by integrating responsibility for these functions into the established organization responsible for 

“developing and implementing change in high priority areas within Personnel and 

Readiness” (Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), 2006). On the 

other hand, this change dealt two blows: demotion in status and loss of a political 

appointee position to set and carry out the 

agenda (Haughton, 2010). In 2010, the position of Deputy Under Secretary (Plans) was 

eliminated, and ODMEO was placed under 

the Deputy Under Secretary (Readiness). 

For some time, then, ODMEO has 

been isolated from top leadership and 

unable to set the agenda or drive progress. 

Although several key diversity initiatives 

have been undertaken, the diversity management function of ODMEO’s portfolio 

has been slow to develop (Johnson, 2011).1 Today, ODMEO remains an understaff ed 

offi ce several levels below the Secretary of Defense. In the military departments and 

the Services, the placement of—and funding and staffi ng for—the diversity offi ces 

varies considerably.

Th e Commission looked to industry to see how companies with exemplary diversity programs approach and organize for eff ective diversity management. Th e Commission found that the personal engagement of top leadership is the single most important factor in achieving diversity leadership and inclusion across any organization. In 

corporations, personal engagement from the CEO has been shown to be vital. In the 

U.S. military, the Secretary of Defense is analogous to the corporate CEO and, as 

such, should be responsible for pushing DoD forward on the path to inclusion. He 

and his successors will, however, need help and continuity to enforce new policies 

and ensure that progress continues to be made. Th e Commission believes that a systems 

approach is needed to ensure the sustained emphasis on diversity that has been lacking in the 

past. Within that system, the establishment of a Chief Diversity Offi cer (CDO)—a practice 

common to all the diversity exemplars studied—is the key driver toward embedding diversity 

within the “DNA” of DoD.

1	 ODMEO’s accomplishments include sponsoring a diversity summit, establishing the Defense Diversity 

Working Group, and promulgating DoDD 1020.02, Diversity Management, Equal Employment Opportunity, 

and Military Equal Opportunity in the Department of Defense (Issue Paper #7; Issue Paper #20; Lim et al., 

2009). 

I think . . . this offi ce has been diluted, has been 

moved down in a food chain to a point where 

there is no punch. Taking away the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary position, burying them fi ve 

dead letters down in an organization is not the 

answer.

—The Honorable D. Michael Collins, 

remarks to the Commission, 2010
Managing and Sustaining Diversity

97

Establish the Position of Chief Diversity Officer

Recommendation 15—

The Office of the Secretary of Defense organizational structure must be aligned to ensure a 

sustained focus on diversity and diversity initiatives and should include establishment of the 

position of a Chief Diversity Officer who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. 

• The existing Research & Analysis office should be directed and resourced to support the 

Chief Diversity Officer.

• Chief, National Guard Bureau, must establish and resource organizational structures 

that support DoD diversity initiatives and reinforce ongoing National Guard diversity 

leadership efforts.

In the corporate world, the CDO does not have operational authority per se but 

depends on others for execution of diversity initiatives. Thus, he or she is a strategic 

business partner of others in the executive team, “helping them develop strategy for 

their business units and making sure that they understand what the organization is 

doing and why, how results are measured, who is accountable” (Dexter, 2010).

The Commission recommends that the DoD CDO report directly to the Secretary of Defense and receive support from the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel 

and Readiness), who is analogous to a vice president of human resources. This practice is one way of ensuring that diversity management is embraced as a “line” rather 

than “staff” responsibility. In addition, this reporting relationship supports the goal of 

establishing diversity leadership as the CEO’s responsibility. It is also consistent with 

military staff organizations, which typically have a small number of individuals with 

responsibilities of such importance (e.g., safety) that the commander keeps them close.

The CDO cannot work in isolation, however. An integrated, holistic system for implementation and accountability is needed if progress is to be sustained. Figure 11.1 illustrates 

such an approach and reveals the centrality of the CDO to all facets of the system. 

This proposed diversity management system is a set of mutually reinforcing elements that work together to provide effective, consistent implementation and persistent 

accountability for achieving the goals of diversity and inclusion. Note that all of these 

components have counterparts in best practices in the Services, the corporate world, or 

both. The components are 

• Accountability reviews. The Secretary of Defense meets annually with the leadership of each Service to go over progress toward diversity goals (see Recommendation 17). This prepares him or her for the diversity annual report to Congress.

• The diversity annual report to Congress. Called for in Recommendation 5, this report 

from the Secretary of Defense draws on the Services’ accountability reviews to 

review DoD’s progress toward its overarching diversity goals.

• The early warning/inspector general function. The set of activities undertaken by the 

CDO together provides the information needed to alert the Secretary of Defense 

to potential problems with diversity management progress, programs, or practices.
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98

• The Diversity Policy Integration Group. The CDO, acting as a strategic business 

partner, chairs a diversity policy integration group, through which OSD’s policy 

offices take responsibility for implementation of diversity initiatives within their 

domains.2

• Deputy’s Advisory Working Group (DAWG) “Diversity Days.” The DAWG, the 

existing senior DoD leadership forum, follows up in a regular meeting on overarching diversity issues (see Recommendation 19).

• Expanded DACOWITS special studies. DACOWITS expands the scope of its work 

to provide external oversight and special studies focused on the diversity issues of 

the day (see Recommendation 19).

• CDO supervision of the Research & Analysis office. The Research & Analysis office 

provides support for accountability reviews, the diversity annual report to Congress, barrier analyses, and early warning of systemic diversity issues. 

Provide the CDO with Research and Analysis Support

For the CDO to be effective, he or she needs timely, accurate, insightful research and 

analysis based on objective, standardized data. In its effort to provide recommendations 

that are executable, the Commission recommends that the CDO turn to the existing 

Research & Analysis office within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Per2	 This group would provide the CDO with access to policy offices that have not traditionally been involved 

with diversity, and it would ensure the implementation of diversity initiatives, using a “mainstreaming” 

approach to infuse a diversity perspective across the organization. Implementation of diversity initiatives 

would be carried out by the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)’s “line” organizations 

(Reserve Affairs, Civilian Personnel Policy, Military Personnel Policy, and Readiness) and, ultimately, by the 

Services. 

Figure 11.1. The Centrality of the CDO Within the Proposed 

Diversity Management System

Accountability 

reviews

Chief Diversity 

Officer, supported 

by the Research & 

Analysis office

Diversity 

annual report 

to Congress

Early 

warning/inspector 

general function

Diversity Policy 

Integration Working 

Group

Deputy’s Advisory 

Working Group 

“Diversity Days”

Expanded 

DACOWITS 

special studies
Managing and Sustaining Diversity

99

sonnel and Readiness).3 This office must be properly resourced to support the many 

data and analysis requirements needed throughout the system, including accountability reviews, barrier analyses (see Recommendation 18), the diversity annual report to 

Congress, early warning of systemic diversity issues, the DAWG “Diversity Days,” and 

the expanded DACOWITS special studies.

Chief, National Guard Bureau, Must Reinforce Ongoing Efforts to Promote 

Diversity

The unique features of the National Guard require specific attention in terms of implementation and accountability.4 As codified in Title 10, the President is the Commander 

in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, including the National Guard and 

Reserve when called to active duty. Most of the time, however, the National Guard is 

not on active duty and, therefore, not under federal control.

As explained in Chapter Three, Title 32 assigns command of State National 

Guard units to the Governors of the States when the units are not under federal control. As commander in chief, the Governors select the Adjutant General for their 

States. Title 10 and Title 32 effectively indicate that Chief, National Guard Bureau, 

has no command authority over each State’s National Guard. 

Given these governing laws, the National Guard has a very different command 

and control structure from that of the AC. The fact that National Guard members 

report to their State’s Governor as commander in chief means that policies are often 

State-specific and lack national oversight. In September 2009, the National Guard 

Bureau established the position of Special Assistant to the Chief for Diversity. This 

“diversity office” has a single position, has no annual budget, and reports to the Comptroller and Director of Administration and Management for the National Guard 

Bureau. Thus, the current diversity office is not staffed, resourced, or placed appropriately in the organizational chart to influence policy or promote accountability, and top 

leaders are not involved.5

3	 To ensure broad knowledge of workforce issues, the Research & Analysis office should become a truly 

joint organization by including expert researchers from the major personnel centers of the Services. These 

Services’ analysts could serve at Research & Analysis on a rotational basis. Such a program would institutionalize knowledge sharing among the Services and OSD. Additional expertise could be provided by diversity 

experts at the federally funded research and development centers. This talent base should serve as an advisory 

team to support the CDO and the Research & Analysis office.

4	 Because the major recommendations include the RC through each parent Service, the focus here is on the 

National Guard.

5	 The role of the Special Assistant for Diversity is to provide diversity policy for the entire National Guard. 

The Army and Air National Guard offices are responsible for supporting these policies in each of the states. 

The Army National Guard has a national diversity office and a diversity coordinator in each State. As of this 

writing, the Air National Guard planned to stand up a diversity office in January 2011, and it has a Human 

Resource Advisor in each State. However, these offices do not report directly to the National Guard Bureau’s 

diversity office and are not obligated to advocate national diversity policy. Thus, much of the intended impact 

of this office is curtailed because it lacks direct implementation power. Given these limitations, good com-
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100

Chief, National Guard Bureau, could take several steps to make the diversity 

office more effective. As with the Commission’s recommendation to establish a CDO 

who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense, the Special Assistant to the Chief for 

Diversity should report directly to the Chief, National Guard Bureau, to maximize 

leadership visibility and involvement. In addition, this office should be properly staffed 

and resourced to support the policy objectives of the leadership.

A properly resourced diversity office within the Chief, National Guard Bureau, 

Personal Staff organization can act as the center of communication between the 

National Guard Bureau and OSD. It can also distribute policy and information to the 

Air and Army National Guard from the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Personal Staff 

position. These changes to reporting and resources will increase the ability of the Special Assistant for Diversity to influence National Guard Bureau diversity policy and its 

implementation.

Priority: Developing Strategic Plans, Policies, and Metrics for a 

Diversity Management System

The CDO will need a solid foundation on which to build. First, to be effective and 

practical, the diversity management system must function within the framework of an 

overall DoD strategic plan that publicly states a diversity definition, vision, and goals 

for DoD. But individual Services need their own strategic plans for achieving diversity. Currently, only two Services have such plans: the Air Force and the Coast Guard. 

The release of the Air Force plan was announced during the writing of this report and 

was therefore not evaluated. The Coast Guard’s plan has objectives, milestones, and 

metrics. Its focus, however, is primarily racial/ethnic and gender diversity, which is 

not consistent with the Coast Guard’s broad definition of diversity. The other Services 

have pieces of plans, but they have not been synthesized and promulgated and do not 

provide detailed, coordinated strategies for achieving the diversity visions. Similarly, 

roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability have not been addressed in any 

coordinated fashion. Finally, DoD has a diversity policy (DoDD 1020.02), but no strategic plan.

Second, to support the strategic plan, DoD, the military departments, and the 

Services need a strong set of policies that spells out roles, assigns and aligns responsibilities and authorities, and specifies who is accountable. In addition, to compel progress toward the goals identified in the strategic plan, the Secretary of Defense needs to 

define a set of strategic metrics that are (1) directly linked to key organizational priorities and goals, (2) actionable, and (3) actively used to drive improvement. 

In the area of EO, DoD had in place a number of directives and other policy 

statements, last revised in the 1990s. Together, these provided a rigorous accountability system designed to ensure the continuation of DoD’s pioneering past. These documents included the following mandates:

munication about the importance of the message and support for implementing the policy are key elements 

for successful implementation of national policy in the States, territories, and District of Columbia. 
Managing and Sustaining Diversity

101

• the DoD Human Goals Charter, part of DoD’s EEO policy for civilian employees, to be reissued by each new Secretary of Defense 

• the Military Equal Opportunity Assessment, to be compiled annually from 

reports and data submitted by the Services 

• the Defense Equal Opportunity Council, consisting of DoD’s top leadership, to 

promulgate policy and track progress.

However, these mandates were allowed to lapse during the George W. Bush 

administration and have not been revived under President Barack Obama. The Commission believes that DoD needs newly crafted policies and plans that not only restore 

its leadership in the area of EO but also address the realm of diversity, broadly defined. 

Ultimately, the goal of this effort is to embed the values of diversity and inclusion into 

the culture and practices of the military, as called for in Chapter Three.

Finally, the new system requires a set of metrics that enable leaders to monitor 

progress toward achieving the goals expressed in the strategic plan. Regular, rigorous 

evaluations and assessments can help military leaders understand how well the new 

diversity paradigm defined in the strategic plans is “sticking” and how effective each 

program is at furthering its goals.

Implement Clear, Consistent, Robust Diversity Management Policies

Recommendation 16—

DoD and the Services must resource and institute clear, consistent, and robust diversity management policies with emphasis on roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability. 

• a. DoD and the Services shall implement diversity strategic plans that address all stages 

of a servicemember’s life cycle. Each strategic plan shall include

– a diversity mission statement that prioritizes equity and inclusion and provides a 

purpose that is actionable and measurable

– a concept of operations to advance implementation.

• b. DoD must revise (if appropriate), reissue, and enforce compliance with its existing 

diversity management and equal opportunity policies to

– Define a standard set of strategic metrics and benchmarks that enables the Secretary of Defense to measure progress toward the goals identified in the strategic 

plan, including the creation of an inclusive environment.

– Establish standards that allow for the collection of data needed to generate these 

metrics and the analysis needed to inform policy action.

– Provide oversight of, and support for, the Services’ respective diversity initiatives 

and metrics to ensure that, at a minimum, they align with the end state established by DoD.
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102

Create Diversity Strategic Plans

Under the umbrella of a DoD strategic diversity management plan, each of the Services 

needs its own strategic plan, crafted to articulate goals related to the amount and type 

of diversity in its forces and to explain how all types of diversity should be leveraged 

to improve mission capability. In particular, the strategic plans should highlight the 

creation of cultures that value equity and inclusion as a fundamental aspect of successful diversity management and should lay the groundwork for embedding diversity 

leadership as a core competency of the Armed Forces. The diversity plans must also 

address the whole personnel life cycle of military members to ensure that the Services 

both recruit effectively from an ever more demographically diverse eligible population 

and facilitate career progression for a force that will be increasingly diverse along many 

dimensions, including not just race/ethnicity and gender but also religion, functional 

expertise, and military component, among others. Within this diversity management 

construct, facilitating career progression means equipping servicemembers to proactively map out and follow their own career paths. 

Finally, to ensure that strategic plans are translated into practical action, each 

plan should include a concept of operations (CONOPS) to clearly and concisely 

express what leadership intends to accomplish and how it will be done with available 

resources.6 Specifically, the CONOPS should tell leaders how to plan for and monitor 

the way diversity is managed from recruiting through training, branching, assignment, 

education, retention, promotion, and command and should identify who will be held 

responsible for making progress at each stage. 

Revise, Reissue, and Enforce Compliance with Existing Diversity Management 

and EO Policies

Good policies outlast individual leaders and are required for institutionalization. Currently, the Services’ diversity policy statements say nice things about diversity but 

contain no specifics about what diversity programs should cover, how they should be 

executed, or who is responsible for achieving the desired results. The DoD policy on 

diversity management and EO, DoDD 1020.02, provides a general framework by distinguishing between diversity management and EO, but it is vague about implementation and contains no real accountability mechanism.

Following the development of their diversity strategic plans, both DoD and the 

Services need to strengthen and finalize their diversity management policies, some 

of which have been in draft form for many years. Service policies will vary according 

to Service culture and practices, but, as with the DoD and Service-specific strategic 

plans, DoD needs to provide a fleshed-out policy umbrella under which those policies 

can operate. In addition, OSD should remedy some of the omissions of the past decade. 

The military already has several well-established and well-understood EEO and mili6	 The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (2010) define a CONOPS as “[a] verbal or graphic statement that clearly 

and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using 

available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation.”
Managing and Sustaining Diversity

103

tary equal opportunity policies, but some important pieces of DoD EO policies have 

been allowed to lapse.7

These policies will need to be revised in accordance with the vision defined in 

the DoD strategic diversity management plan and put into effect in ways that not only 

improve the representation of minorities and women in military leadership but also 

increase military readiness and support mission accomplishment.

Define a Standard Set of Strategic Metrics and Benchmarks that Enables the Secretary of 

Defense to Measure Progress

The Commission’s review of management literature and testimony by diversity managers of major companies suggested that metrics empower an organization by enabling 

managers and workers to evaluate and control the performance of the resources for 

which they are responsible and by helping them identify gaps between performance 

and expectation that, ideally, point to intervention and improvement. To do this effectively, however, metrics need to be designed carefully and to result in clearly communicated messages. The final results should provide the user of the metrics with a sense 

of knowing what needs to be done without requiring him or her to understand the 

intricacies of every related process. Poorly developed or poorly implemented metrics 

can lead to frustration and confusion and can send mixed messages.

DoD already has well-established metrics for measuring progress in demographic 

diversity. According to DoDD 1350.2, Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program, the Services are required to submit an annual Military Equal 

Opportunity Assessment that reports the demographic composition of promotions, 

retention, and assignments for that year and contains data on additional aspects of 

demographic diversity (U.S. Department of Defense, 1995). This assessment was the 

sole reporting mechanism required from the Services on their affirmative action and 

EO policies, and although the report is still a requirement according to policy, it was 

last produced in September 2004, using FY 2002 data. The Commission recommends 

that DoD enforce this reporting requirement and compliance with the goals of the 

Services’ strategic plans.8

Although the Services do internally track the demographic profile of their personnel, they generally do not systematically track other aspects of diversity, such as 

cultural expertise and ability, and they do not explicitly evaluate the inclusiveness of 

the environment. To properly assess the broad diversity climate, DoD and each of the 

Services must begin tracking, reporting on, and reviewing programs and personnel 

accordingly.

This requires developing a new set of metrics to capture the inclusion and capability aspects of DoD’s broader diversity goals. Assessment results will allow leaders to enforce accountability, identify which strategies are most effective, and acquire 

7	 DoDD 1020.02 refers to four major EO directives: DoDD 5500.11 and DoDD 1020.1 on nondiscrimination, DoDD 1440.1 on DoD civilian EEO policies, and DoDD 1350.2 on military equal opportunity 

policies. 

8	 The Commission recommends that the data continue to be reported but that the accountability review 

process be used (see Recommendation 17).
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a big-picture view of how the new vision of diversity is being received and implemented across the Armed Forces. These metrics must go beyond the traditional “headcounting” metrics (e.g., how many women are in the Navy?) used to assess the success 

of diversity policies in the past. Relying entirely on the traditional metrics can send the 

wrong signal about diversity, suggesting that Armed Forces, to meet diversity “standards,” need to reach a “quota” of certain people, regardless of their qualifications. 

Establishing an environment of inclusion is not about adhering to a set of regulations 

but about working with different people toward a common goal, and it is important to 

create metrics that are consistent with this new vision.

The Characteristics of Good Metrics. The Commission believes that the following 

are the characteristics of good metrics:

• Developed with an end state in mind and systematically linked to strategic goals. Metrics should link intended goals, strategies, and actual execution. Metrics not 

linked to a strategic end state do not create value for organizations.

• Clearly stated. Metrics should be easily understood and communicated. 

• Value-added. Metrics should deliver value to the organization by providing information on key aspects of performance.

• Actionable to drive improvements. Good metrics must provide information that has 

implications for a clear plan of action.

• Tracked over time. Metrics must be tracked over time to provide information on 

the trend in the metric, not simply its status at one particular moment.

• Verifiable. Metrics should be based on an agreed upon set of data and a documented process for converting data into the measure. 

The primary property of good diversity metrics is that they go beyond simply 

calculating representation of particular groups in the workforce and actually measure 

how those groups are integrated in the workforce. Some of the best measures of this 

kind can come from administrative data sources. The advantages of these sources are 

both that they release servicemembers from the burden of filling out surveys and that 

they are the result of standardized, rigorous administrative processes. The example of 

disciplinary data is used below to illustrate this point.

Going Beyond Head-Counting. Survey data are one means of assessing command 

climate and the extent to which it is inclusive. Data on EO and sexual harassment 

complaints provide another source of information. 

A third metric for an inclusive environment is provided by discipline data: court 

martial cases and nonjudicial punishment. Discipline data are more reliable than survey 

data as an indicator of command climate. Each data point represents the results of an 

investigation that provided sufficient evidence to bring charges, whereas survey data 

are based on anonymous responses from self-selected samples of servicemembers. 

The Services provided the Commission with recent data on courts martial. The 

Commission analyzed the available data for 2007 and 2008. Table 11.1 shows the 2008 

data across court martial type for the four DoD Services combined. Because the data 
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105

the Commission received did not use consistent race/ethnicity categories, we show the 

information for three categories: white, non-Hispanic black, and other. 

The discipline data are normalized into rates of cases brought per thousand servicemembers, and they include all active-duty personnel (enlisted servicemembers, 

officers, and warrant officers). The patterns were consistent across Services and for both 

2007 (not shown) and 2008 (shown): Blacks had a much higher rate of being court 

martialed. The differences were statistically significant: The probability that the differences are due to random chance is very low (less than 0.01). That level of statistical 

significance was also present in the analysis of each individual Service.

These discipline data can be interpreted in multiple ways. Note that the data presented here do not indicate the outcome of the court martial; information on outcome would add another level of meaning to the data. Differences in discipline rates 

might reflect difficulties in some servicemembers’ feeling fully included in their unit, 

their Service, and, most importantly, the U.S. military. Differential rates by race/ethnicity might indicate that current acculturation processes have been less successful in 

getting racial/ethnic minorities to fully incorporate and internalize Service norms, or 

they might reflect a failure in diversity leadership. Without further investigation, one 

cannot pinpoint the locations of this potential failure in the existing acculturation process. But the data clearly indicate that the process has failed differentially for black 

servicemembers. 

These data do not take into account an array of relevant factors that influence the 

numbers, and, due to lack of standardization, the Commission could not look in more 

depth at patterns for different race/ethnicity categories. It is worth noting, however, 

that in-depth analyses of such data could be undertaken by the CDO. Such information is a good candidate for a diversity metric at the strategic level.

Establish Standards That Allow for the Collection of Data Needed to Generate These 

Metrics and the Analysis Needed to Inform Policy Action

Currently, consistency is lacking across the Services in terms of the data they collect 

and the metrics they employ. For meaningful metrics, a standard set of data definitions and collection procedures that are uniform across the Services must be employed 

and enforced. Currently, even basic demographic data are not uniform across DoD, 

Table 11.1. Court Martial Cases, by Race/Ethnicity Group, 2008

Race/Ethnicity Group

No. of Court 

Martial Cases

Total No. of 

Military Personnel

Rate of Cases 

per Thousand

White 2,937 895,965 3.28

Black, non-Hispanic 1,240 231,645 5.35

Other 715 259,641 2.75

Total 4,892 1,387,251 3.53

NOTE: “Other” encompasses American Indians/Alaska Natives, Asians/Pacific Islanders, Hispanics, and those whose 

race/ethnicity was unknown.
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and such metrics as promotion and retention rates are not calculated in a consistent 

manner. The CDO should promulgate standards for these basic data elements and for 

the new types of information required to produce more-meaningful measures of diversity and inclusion. The CDO should also produce standards for analytical methodology 

to ensure that analysis of the data is rigorous, meaningful, and consistent over time and 

from one Service to the next.

Provide Oversight of, and Support for, the Services’ Respective Diversity Initiatives and 

Metrics to Ensure That, at a Minimum, They Align with the End State Established by DoD

The Secretary of Defense, through the accountability review process described in Recommendation 17, will meet annually with Service leadership to discuss the state of 

diversity within the Services and the Services’ progress toward the two goals of demographic representation and mission capability. Annual meetings at this strategic level 

are necessary to ensure that top leadership across DoD is fully engaged in meeting the 

diversity goals established by the Secretary of Defense. The CDO will play a key role in 

this effort by ensuring the production of consistent, meaningful diversity metrics. He 

or she should also work with the Services’ diversity offices to guide and monitor their 

Service-specific diversity work.

Priority: Holding Leaders Accountable 

Meaningful change is most likely to be sustained if leaders are held accountable for 

performance at all stages of implementation. Ongoing communication, ongoing 

assessment, and the establishment of a rewards system are effective approaches to take 

when trying to change the norms of an organization, but, ultimately, leaders should 

be responsible for developing an organizational culture that values and benefits from 

diversity. 

The best accountability measures reviewed by the Commission did much more 

than have managers check a box on a form. Rather, organizations use both internal and 

external measures to assure top leadership that managers at all levels are committed 

and engaged. Internally, midlevel leaders are held accountable for their performance in 

carrying out plans and, if successful, are rewarded accordingly. Externally, all leaders, 

including those at the top, are reviewed by outside consultants that have the ability to 

ask the most-difficult questions and give tough feedback—activities that can be challenging for insiders due to lack of critical distance or fear of repercussion. 

Once DoD develops a plan, policies, and metrics, it cannot just put them on the 

shelf. The most-senior leaders must make use of these tools to drive progress by holding 

themselves and leaders below them accountable for following the plan, implementing 

the policies, and measuring the results. The diversity annual report to Congress discussed earlier is the bedrock of accountability. It requires the Secretary of Defense to 

document, from a strategic level, the extent to which the Services are reaching their 

goals of achieving better racial/ethnic and gender representation across the ranks and 

creating a more inclusive environment. Later in this chapter, the Commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense add another subject to that annual report.
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Institute a System of Accountability Reviews

Recommendation 17—

DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should institute a system of “accountability reviews” that 

is driven by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security (Coast Guard).

• a. The Secretary of Defense shall meet at least annually with Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, senior enlisted leaders, and Chief, National Guard Bureau, to drive progress toward the diversity management goals identifi ed in the strategic plans. The Coast 

Guard should be subject to a similar review.

• b. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland Security should send an annual 

report to Congress and the President on the progress made toward diversity management goals in the Services, including the Reserve Component; the report should include 

the barrier analyses described in Recommendation 18.

• c. The National Guard Bureau should report annually to Congress and DoD on the 

status of diversity in each State, territory, and the District of Columbia for all ranks of 

the Army and Air National Guard. This report shall show how refl ective the Army and 

Air National Guard are of the eligible pool in their particular State or territory or in the 

District of Columbia.

– Based on the report to Congress, the National Guard Bureau shall produce a 

“dashboard” of diversity metrics to be used by the Army and Air National Guard. 

This dashboard shall show comparisons across States, territories, and the District 

of Columbia and highlight best practices.

Th e practice of annual accountability reviews was initiated for the Navy by thenCNO Admiral Mike Mullen and was expanded by his successor, Admiral Roughead. 

Admiral Roughead sits down annually, one on one, with each of his 16 enterprise 

heads (all fl ag offi cers) on the topic of racial/ethnic and gender diversity within that 

enterprise or community. In these reviews, each enterprise head discusses with the 

CNO the demographic diversity health of his or her community. 

Th ese meetings do not consist of a 100-slide briefi ng deck; rather, they are conversations that focus on both progress and problem areas. Enterprise heads are expected to 

speak knowledgably and comfortably about the current composition of their force, the 

factors that led to that composition, and any 

initiatives undertaken to aff ect that profi le 

in the future. 

Th e Commission considers Admiral 

Roughead’s accountability review process a 

best practice that each Service can follow 

either on its own or in support of OSDlevel reviews. Th is recommendation uses 

the Navy’s accountability review construct 

as the model for a series of similar sessions across DoD that culminate in a meeting 

between the Secretary of Defense and each Service, represented by its Service Chief, 

[The accountability reviews] are extraordinarily 

valuable. . . . [They have] focused leadership in 

a way that is more than shouting louder. It’s 

about substance, mentoring, development, 

understanding who you have, moving them 

along. 

—Admiral Gary Roughead, remarks 

to the Commission, 2010
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Service Secretary, and senior enlisted leader. At that meeting, Service leadership discusses with the Secretary of Defense progress in meeting the goals in the Service’s 

diversity strategic plan. 

One way for the Service Chief to prepare for the meeting is to sit down, one on 

one, with his or her enterprise heads or their equivalents. Another option is using the 

senior leadership forum in each Service to share community diversity status and lessons learned.9

Regardless of the specific process, a system of accountability reviews would force 

diversity accountability down as leaders prepared to brief up the chain. It would also 

serve as a powerful indicator of leader commitment to achieving and leading a diverse 

force. Finally, it would enable military leaders not only to see evidence on demographics but also to take stock of the diversity awareness and leadership of those in line 

to succeed them. In particular, it would provide a forum for senior leaders to assess 

whether and how leaders at lower levels are leveraging all types of diversity in their 

units to improve capability.

The roles of the CDO in the accountability review process are preparation and 

facilitation. The CDO’s responsibilities might include analyzing data, assembling evidence, preparing the Secretary of Defense, coordinating with the Services, attending 

each Service’s review, and monitoring compliance with directives.

The command and control structure of the National Guard makes holding leaders 

accountable at the State level a complex issue. To increase accountability at the State 

level, the National Guard Bureau should both prepare the diversity annual report to 

Congress (called for in Recommendation 5b) and set up and maintain a detailed diversity “dashboard” to help National Guard units, and their State leadership, assess their 

diversity efforts related to demographic representation.10 The dashboard will include 

statistics on career progression and on racial/ethnic and gender representation compared with State-specific civilian population benchmarks. Easy access to such data 

should increase stakeholder and public awareness about diversity issues in the National 

Guard and, consequently, increase accountability.

The Air National Guard developed a web-based dashboard that enables continuous updating and interactivity. An expanded dashboard covering both the Air and 

Army National Guard could help each State identify diversity problem areas and solutions. This expanded dashboard should incorporate some of the same statistics included 

in the diversity annual report to Congress, augmented with diversity indicators at the 

unit level. Moreover, the dashboard website should include a compendium of diversity best practices and programs. Such a compilation will be a resource for States just 

beginning (or currently struggling) to implement diversity initiatives.

All of the information contained in the dashboard should be available to the 

States. Taken together, the statistics and best practices will help leaders assess the 

9	 This recommendation envisions focused annual meetings between the Secretary of Defense and the different Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders. In contrast, the DAWG would focus 

on policy and take on specific issues as they arose.

10 A dashboard is a detailed display of key metrics.
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diversity situation of their units or commands and facilitate improvement in State 

National Guard diversity programs. 

The Services Should Conduct Annual Barrier Analyses

Recommendation 18—

As part of the accountability reviews, the Services, in conjunction with the Chief Diversity 

Officer (established in Recommendation 15), should conduct annual “barrier analyses” to 

review demographic diversity patterns across the military life cycle, starting with accessions. 

• a. To ensure comparability across Services, DoD shall establish a universal data collection system, and the analyses of the data should be based on common definitions of 

demographic groups, a common methodology, and a common reporting structure.

• b. The annual analyses should include

– accession demographics

– retention, command selection, and promotion rates by race/ethnicity and gender

– analysis of assignment patterns by race/ethnicity and gender

– analysis of attitudinal survey data by race/ethnicity and gender

– identification of persistent, group-specific deviations from overall averages and 

plans to investigate underlying causes

– summaries of progress made on previous actions.

The diversity annual reports and the accountability review process will provide 

military leaders of all components with the information they need to move toward the 

goals of representation and inclusion. However, the Commission believes that further 

steps are required to ensure that both the annual reports and the accountability reviews 

are based on accurate data and that appropriate analysis has converted the data into 

actionable information. 

To prepare for the accountability reviews, each Navy enterprise conducts barrier 

analyses based on what the data show about how racial/ethnic minorities and women 

are progressing along the community’s notional career path. This practice should be 

adopted by all the Services and should take place at the Service level. All steps along 

the career life cycle—recruiting, career field selection, assignment to command and 

other key billets, education milestones, retention, and promotion—should be assessed. 

The process should include not only assessments of statistical variances by race/ethnicity and gender and analyses of root causes for any differences (i.e., barriers) but also 

identification of corrective actions and creation of representation goals and metrics.

Each Service has its own career structures, career progression patterns, and other 

idiosyncrasies, which it understands best. For this reason, and to ensure that the Services take ownership of diversity initiatives, the Services should take the lead in preparing the barrier analyses. The CDO should serve as a consultant to each Service, 

ensuring analytical consistency across DoD and seeking to understand any inherent 

and valid differences. The CDO must ensure that all the Services are adhering to the 
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data and reporting standards described above. Once the standards are promulgated, 

accountability reviews within each Service can take advantage of the standards to produce consistent analysis both across communities and over time. 

If the barrier analyses, accountability reviews, and annual reports are to be meaningful over time and across reporting groups (i.e., Services and components), consistent, comparable data must be collected from all the Services. OSD should define and 

DMDC should promulgate these standards and data structures to the Services, and 

the Services must be directed to follow them. In addition, analysis of the data must also 

adhere to common standards and methodology. 

The Commission’s research was hampered by the lack of such standards. All of 

the Commission subcommittees that analyzed personnel data faced the same problem: 

lack of consistency across the Services. For example, the Services do not use the same 

procedures for estimating retention rates or even consistent race/ethnicity categories 

for their calculations; they also do not regularly report retention results. This made it 

very hard to make comparisons across Services, but, more importantly, it also makes 

it difficult to formulate any DoD-wide assessments of retention patterns. This Commission recommendation asks all the Services to collect and analyze equivalent data 

in order to compare retention rates and other important aspects of career progression, 

but it still allows them to individually calculate whatever statistics may be meaningful 

within each Service.11

Regardless of the type of data collected, it must be consistent not only across Services but also over time. This can be achieved through the use of common methodologies, data definitions, and reporting conventions. By keeping track of consistent data 

year after year, DoD and each individual Service can assess when and where interventions may be necessary to address differential rates of career progression. They can also 

use the data to help assess whether policy or program changes have made a difference.

11 The Commission recommends that three different types of data be collected for the purpose of tracking 

career progression across diverse groups: 

• Personnel data can be used to show actual behavior and outcomes. Personnel data should go beyond 

race/ethnicity and gender to include other aspects of diversity (e.g., religion; language ability; other lowdensity, high-demand skills) as need dictates.

• Survey data that show attitudes and opinions can be used to assess why group-level differences in career 

progression may be occurring. For example, exit surveys could be used to collect information about 

reasons for leaving active-duty service. Currently, some Services do not conduct exit surveys, and there 

is no centralized system for collection or analysis of this type of data. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Congress required that every member separating from active-duty 

service during a six-month period be surveyed regarding his or her reasons for leaving. The survey was 

conducted once by DMDC and never repeated (see Deak et al., 2002).

• Focused qualitative data can more specifically address the issues identified by personnel or survey data. 

Although exit surveys can be helpful in terms of quantitative analysis, they sometimes do not supply the 

nuanced reasons for separation from active-duty service. Thus, the Commission also recommends the 

use of focused qualitative data, such as that obtained in focus groups, to study personnel and manpower 

issues.
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Institute Mechanisms for Accountability and Internal and External 

Monitoring for Both the Active and Reserve Components

Recommendation 19—

DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should institute mechanisms for accountability and internal and external monitoring for both the Active and Reserve Components.

• a. The Services must embed diversity leadership in performance assessments throughout careers.

• b. DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should establish diversity leadership as a criterion 

for nomination and appointment to senior enlisted leadership positions and flag/general officers, including 3- and 4-star positions and Service Chief. 

– The Senate Armed Services Committee should include this criterion in its confirmation questionnaire.

• c. The Secretary of Defense must transfer the functions of the former Defense Equal 

Opportunity Council to a minimum of biannual meetings of DoD’s leadership, the existing Deputy’s Advisory Working Group.

• d. The Secretary of Defense must expand the DACOWITS charter, where appropriate, to 

encompass diversity as a whole.

Over the years, there have been many reports, studies, and bodies established to 

look at EO and racial/ethnic and gender diversity in the military. The Commission has 

heard that, in the past, when progress was made in increasing demographic diversity 

among senior officers, there was no deliberate, coordinated effort to monitor that progress and ensure that it continued. As a result, the same themes and recommendations 

can be found in studies conducted during the past 20 years. 

Early in this chapter, the Commission laid out a system for diversity management, centered on the CDO. The CDO does not have the authority, however, to establish policies or ensure adherence to them. In particular, the CDO cannot, on his or her 

own, drive the cultural change needed to create an inclusive environment or embed the 

use of effective diversity leadership practices. Thus, the final piece of the Commission’s 

recommended implementation and accountability system is aimed at institutionalizing 

diversity leadership throughout the Armed Forces, forcing continuing engagement on 

the part of senior leadership, and providing the means for sustained effort.

Embed Diversity Leadership in Performance Assessments Throughout Careers

Accountability for internalizing and modeling diversity leadership is needed throughout the Armed Forces, not only at senior levels. Discussions about evaluating an individual’s diversity leadership often center on the difficulty of measuring such a thing. 

But, a simple checkbox on an assessment form will accomplish nothing. In its research, 

the Commission discovered several practices that could be used by the Services to 

evaluate diversity leadership throughout a servicemember’s career. Based on its understanding of private sector practices and military culture, the Commission believes that 
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the Services must incorporate such assessment mechanisms into their performance 

evaluation systems. Possible mechanisms for embedding diversity leadership into the 

core competencies expected of a servicemember include the following: 

• documentation of one’s diversity leadership in a self-statement 

• incorporation of diversity perspective into leadership assessment 

• 360-degree evaluations

• utilization of the following relevant indicators:

– climate survey trends

– discipline and EO data

– retention rates.

One place to start could be following the Coast Guard practice of producing a 

self-statement that documents what one has done to foster an environment of inclusion. 

Another approach could be drawing from the Navy’s incorporation of EO practices 

into its assessments of enlisted personnel. This approach could be expanded through 

incorporating diversity leadership and inclusion into the existing assessment of leadership in general.

And, even though it runs counter to the hierarchical military culture, the Services 

could experiment with 360-degree evaluations. These incorporate assessments from 

peers and subordinates, as well as supervisors. Sodexo uses these 360-degree evaluations to gauge its executive team’s performance in diversity management, diversity 

leadership, and inclusion.

At higher levels of the hierarchy, other options are available, including a careful 

utilization of numerical indicators. For officers who have held command, possible metrics involve indicators of the climate within their units. These include trends in climate 

surveys, unit disciplinary and EO data, and retention rates. Although it is expected 

that such data will form part of the accountability reviews described in Recommendation 17, it may be worth examining their usage in individual assessment at a lower level.

Both quantitative and qualitative metrics are important and should be utilized. 

Whereas quantitative metrics are generally easier to collect, making the extra effort 

to integrate both types of metrics provides a more complete picture of an individual’s 

diversity leadership. At Sodexo, for example,

the quantitative metrics look at recruiting, retention, promotion of women and 

minorities. The qualitative metrics . . . are about behavior change. We look at 

things like mentoring, like engagement in the community. . . . So, the qualitative aspect of the scorecard [has] been very, very critical in changing the behaviors because otherwise it becomes just a numbers game, “the quota has to be 

filled” is how it’s perceived. But here what we are saying is, their behavior systemically need[s] to be changed. If you get the right behaviors, you’ll get to the 

numbers. So, we look at really both of those. (Anand, 2010)
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Diversity Leadership as a Criterion for Top Leadership

Th e assessment of diversity leadership performance must be extended to the highest 

levels of the Services. Demonstrated diversity leadership should be a topic of conversation in both the nomination and confi rmation of fl ag/general offi cers to 3- and 

4-star positions, both within DoD and during the congressional confi rmation process. 

Although this is important for all senior leadership positions, it is especially relevant 

for Service Chiefs and senior enlisted leaders. As discussed elsewhere in this report, 

personal commitment at the top is a crucial ingredient in establishing and sustaining 

successful diversity leadership throughout an organization. 

Th e Commission heard about eff ective diversity practices from CDOs at companies that have been acclaimed for their excellence in creating demographically diverse 

workforces and inclusive environments. One of the topics these CDOs spoke about was 

the need for an executive team committed to diversity.

In response to a question about how Sodexo ensures that executives hired from 

outside are as committed to diversity and inclusion as the rest of the senior team, 

Dr. Rohini Anand indicated the importance of including diversity leadership in the 

interview process:

[T]he candidates who’ve come from the outside to Sodexo have actually said 

that they are very surprised [by] the emphasis that the organization places on 

diversity in the interview process, so 

they really are asked about their commitment, what they have done, their 

understanding. And if they are not 

articulate on this particular topic, we 

don’t seriously consider them. (Anand, 

2010) 

Along these lines, the Commission 

believes that those individuals considered 

for top leadership positions, both senior 

enlisted appointments and 3- and 4-star 

nominations, should be expected to be 

“articulate on this particular topic.” Th ey 

should be able to address their experience 

in providing diversity leadership not only 

for race/ethnicity and gender but across all 

dimensions. 

Congress can assist in establishing 

diversity leadership as a criterion for 3- and 

4-star positions through the questionnaire 

each nominee must submit to the Senate 

Armed Services Committee. Requiring a 

self-statement that explains how the nomiRegardless of how staff support is provided 

or where it is placed, all “best practice” companies regard diversity as a line management 

leadership issue. This leadership imperative in 

several “best-practice” companies is active and 

visible through:

– Diversity Councils—heads of major business units that meet periodically with the CEO 

and . . . [Human Resources]/diversity head to 

review diversity progress and plan initiatives.

– Advisory Boards—distinguished outside 

advisors and experts who meet periodically 

with the business leaders and Affi nity Group 

leaders . . . to bring external perspectives and 

developments to the company.

– Performance Appraisals and Leadership 

Assessments—that reinforce the importance 

of diversity by including assessments of creating a diverse culture and recruiting, developing and promoting a diverse talent pool in 

measuring executives’ performance. 

—Defense Business Board Task Group 

on Increasing Diversity in DoD’s Flag 

and Senior Executive Ranks, 2004
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nee has demonstrated diversity leadership will further emphasize diversity leadership’s 

importance and will lead to sustained progress.

Reestablish a Leadership Forum for Diversity

As part of an integrated, strategic approach to accountability, the Commission recommends that DoD revisit the goals and duties ascribed to the now-defunct Defense 

Equal Opportunity Council (DEOC) with an eye toward transferring applicable goals 

and duties to the DAWG. The membership of the DAWG is close to that of the former 

DEOC, and specifying diversity, broadly defined, as part of the DAWG’s mission and 

purview will both reinstate the high-level attention to EO that had been allowed to 

lapse and expand it to encompass other aspects of diversity.12

DEOC, first established in 1987, was given the responsibility to advise the Secretary of Defense on EO policies, coordinate policy and review programs, and monitor 

progress of program elements. DEOC members presented regular progress reports on 

how well DoD was doing in meeting EO goals, and they appointed members to attend 

to specific issues by forming working committees, such as the DEOC Task Force on 

Discrimination and Sexual Harassment. This body was one of the mechanisms set 

forth in DoD’s EO policies that, like the Human Goals Charter and the Military 

Equal Opportunity Assessment, fell into disuse in the past ten years. 

The DAWG, established in conjunction with the Quadrennial Defense Review 

process, consists of the most-senior military and civilian leaders, including its cochairs, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense. Meetings are held twice weekly and consist of presentations on and candid 

discussion of matters concerning military leadership. The Commission recommends 

that this body also hold regular meetings, at least annually, on diversity issues. Such 

meetings will form part of the strategic accountability system proposed by the Commission. They will also help anchor the concepts of diversity and inclusion among the 

most-senior leadership of the Armed Forces.

Expand the DACOWITS Charter

In 1951, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall established DACOWITS to provide advice and recommendations on issues related to women serving in the military. 

DACOWITS is now a Federal Advisory Committee, authorized by Congress. Currently, it comprises up to 35 civilian members distributed across demographic groups, 

12 The chair and membership of the DEOC differ in the two directives that establish it, DoDD 1440.1 

and DoDD 1350.2. According to DoDD 1440.1, first published in 1987, the chair was to be the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Force Management & Personnel); members were to include the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense (Reserve Affairs) and the military departments’ assistant secretaries for personnel policy and 

Reserve affairs. DoDD 1440.1, first published in 1995, raised the bar, with the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

as chair, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) as vice chair, and a membership including the under secretaries of defense, the secretaries of the military departments, and the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. The more-senior membership of the latter directive is close to that of the DAWG, and, 

at the time, it ensured that the panel was sufficiently senior to assume leadership and take decisive action. 
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career fi elds, and geography. DACOWITS 

members come from the following groups: 

former servicemembers, military family 

members, and experts in women’s workforce issues. DACOWITS’s list of accomplishments over the past 60 years is long.13

Th e Commission suggests that 

DACOWITS expand its charter beyond 

gender to include diversity of all types. 

Th e group would continue to hold regular 

meetings, sponsor research, and undertake 

installation visits and other means of eliciting servicemembers’ views. In addition, 

the expanded committee would receive briefi ngs from DoD leadership on metrics and 

progress made toward implementing diversity management plans and policies. Th e 

Commission notes that DACOWITS dates to 1951 and has provided a clear, unapologetic forum on issues for women in the military. Th is focus must not disappear when 

other elements of diversity are addressed. Besides the example provided by DACOWITS, this concept—creating an external body to monitor progress toward achieving 

diversity goals—was recently adopted by Sodexo. Its CEO views this establishment 

as a “next phase in [Sodexo’s] commitment to diversity and inclusion” (Sodexo, 2010).

Providing an external body to focus on diversity in the Services would help “keep 

things honest” and add an additional dimension to DoD’s monitoring mechanisms. 

Expanding DACOWITS’s charter would provide continuity and place gender issues 

within the broader context of diversity.

Include an Assessment of Qualifi ed Minority and Female Candidates 

for Top Leadership Positions in the Diversity Annual Report to 

Congress 

Recommendation 20—

In congruence with Recommendation 5, Congress should revise Title 10, Section 113, to 

require the Secretary of Defense to report annually an assessment of the available pool of 

qualifi ed racial/ethnic minority and female candidates for the 3- and 4-star fl ag/general 

offi cer positions. 

• The Secretary of Defense must ensure that all qualifi ed candidates (including racial/

ethnic minorities and women) have been considered for the nomination of every 3- and 

4-star position. If there were no qualifi ed racial/ethnic minority and/or female candidates, then a statement of explanation should be made in the package submitted to 

the Senate for the confi rmation hearings.

13 See the Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, n.d.-a, for more information on DACOWITS’s processes, research, and reports.

The Committee is composed of civilian women 

and men who are appointed by the Secretary 

of Defense to provide advice and recommendations on matters and policies relating to the 

recruitment and retention, treatment, employment, integration, and well-being of highly 

qualifi ed professional women in the Armed 

Forces. Historically, DACOWITS’ recommendations have been very instrumental in eff ecting 

changes to laws and policies pertaining to military women. 

—Defense Department Advisory Committee 

on Women in the Services, n.d.-b
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As part of the effort to improve accountability, the Commission suggests that 

Congress include an additional requirement to the revisions in Title 10 called for in 

Recommendation 5: The Secretary of Defense, in his or her diversity annual report to 

Congress, should provide an assessment of the pool of qualified minority and female 

candidates for 3- and 4-star positions. Developing a pool of strong nominees from traditionally underrepresented demographic groups must also become a DoD-wide goal. 

How well leaders are doing at promoting members of underrepresented groups should 

be made transparent through documentation. 

This recommendation complements Recommendation 10b, which involves formalizing and documenting the process and requirements for promotion to 3- and 

4-star rank. One of the reforms the Commission would like to see made permanent is 

the requirement for the Services to provide to the Secretary of Defense biannual “laydowns” of their flag/general officer corps.14 These would focus on the up-and-coming 

2-star officers and on the paths laid out for their advancement. With Recommendation 20, the Commission suggests that the racial/ethnic and gender aspects of the laydown be provided annually to Congress.

The second part of this recommendation carries this concern over to a case-bycase certification that, as each nomination is sent to the Senate, qualified racial/ethnic 

minority and female candidates were considered. If no qualified racial/ethnic minority 

or female candidates were identified, the Secretary of Defense should accompany each 

nomination with an explanation.

Summary

This chapter has presented a combined approach to the challenges of designing and 

implementing diversity policies throughout DoD: It has taken the best from military 

diversity practices and from corporate diversity practices that are especially congruent 

with DoD concerns and culture. 

Successful implementation of diversity initiatives requires a deliberate strategy. 

Piecemeal efforts will not effect the change in culture that is needed, and they will 

not address all of the stages of a servicemember’s career. Among the issues that the 

Commission addressed are the need for a systems approach and for the designation of 

an individual to facilitate and sustain change. Clear, robust policies that specify roles, 

responsibilities, authorities, and accountability are required to institutionalize change. 

Appropriate Service-wide metrics and reporting tools must be put in place, and leaders must be held accountable for progress toward explicit diversity goals. Finally, the 

Commission believes that a continuing external monitoring mechanism will serve as 

an insurance policy, so that another military leadership diversity commission will never 

be needed.

14 Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld instituted the practice of requiring the Services to provide a comprehensive picture of their flag/general officers and the positions they held. Information in these 

“laydowns” included when positions were projected to become vacant and which candidates were likely to 

fill them.
117

Chapter Twelve

Conclusion

The Armed Forces have long been national leaders in securing advancement opportunities for men and women of different racial/ethnic backgrounds. This report describes 

how they can sustain that role in the future by institutionalizing a broad definition of 

diversity that includes both demographic representation and dimensions of diversity to 

develop military leaders who reflect the troops they lead and embody the qualifications 

the Services need to maintain readiness and perform their missions. 

The Commission first recommends that all members of the Armed Forces embrace 

an understanding of diversity that goes beyond the traditional focus on eliminating 

discrimination against members of certain demographic groups and moves toward 

valuing all kinds of human differences for their contributions to military capability 

and readiness. Such a concept needs to become a core value that informs the way servicemembers interact with one another and helps motivate the way the organization 

works. Effectively leading diverse groups—i.e., diversity leadership—requires recognizing the differences among members of a group as assets that have the potential to 

improve performance, neutralizing the tensions that can arise within a diverse working 

group, and leveraging diversity in support of the mission. Top leaders need to make a 

personal and visible commitment to diversity for these needed changes to take hold; to 

sustain change, the Commission recommends that Congress revise Title 10 to require 

the Secretary of Defense to report annually on the progress of DoD’s diversity efforts.

In its second set of recommendations, the Commission urges the Services to recognize the barriers that may have prevented racial/ethnic minorities and women from 

advancing through the stages of their careers to positions of leadership. Beginning with 

the pool of eligible recruits, racial/ethnic minorities are at an increasing disadvantage 

in terms of meeting military eligibility requirements. The Commission recommends 

that all stakeholders work together to improve the educational and physical readiness 

of American youth. It provides recommendations for improving current recruiting 

practices toward underrepresented demographic groups. The Commission also recommends the removal of existing institutional barriers relating to assignments—both 

the initial career field assignment and subsequent assignments to key positions. An 

important step in this direction is to remove the restrictions that prevent women from 

engaging in direct ground combat. Other recommendations address the need to educate and mentor all servicemembers about the promotion process, especially early in 

their careers.

Finally, the Commission offers recommendations to ensure continual progress 

toward inclusion by the Chief Diversity Officer, who works with the Services and OSD 

to achieve effective diversity management by developing policy goals for the Services to 
From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military

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achieve, metrics for measuring their achievements, and annual reporting requirements 

that hold military leaders accountable for progress toward stated goals. 

This report began by comparing two previous committees dedicated to expanding 

diversity in the Armed Forces. Both committees identified gross inequities of opportunity in the Services and made detailed recommendations for reform, some of which 

are echoed in this report. In one case—that of the Fahy Committee—the committee not only received clear commitment from the President for its tasks but was also 

directly involved in the implementation of desegregation policies that helped shift the 

entire culture of the military. In the other case—that of the Gesell Committee—the 

committee played only an advisory role, and the Secretary of Defense ignored the most 

important recommendations in a setback that stalled progress toward equal opportunity and led to protracted conflicts among servicemembers in posts around the world.

The lesson in this contrast between the two earlier committees is that the ultimate 

impact of the recommendations in this Commission’s final report will depend on the 

unwavering commitment of the President of the United States, the resolute conviction 

of the Secretary of Defense, and the concerted effort of military leaders at all levels to 

bring about enduring change. The U.S. military is a learning institution that can continue to evolve, but only if the highest leaders of the Nation provide a clear vision and 

sustained oversight. The Armed Forces have led the Nation in the struggle to achieve 

equality. To maintain that leadership, they must push forward once more, renewing 

their commitment to equal opportunity for all. The time has come to embrace the 

broader concept of diversity needed to achieve the Armed Forces’ goals and to move 

the Nation closer to embodying its ideals.
119

Appendix A

The Military Leadership Diversity

Commission Charter

 Military Leadership Diversity Commission Charter 

 

 

Scope:

The commission shall conduct a comprehensive evaluation and assessment of policies that provide 

opportunities for the promotion and advancement of minority members of the Armed Forces, including 

minority members who are senior officers.

Deliverables:

Not later than 12 months after the date on which the commission first meets, the commission shall 

submit to the President and Congress a report on the study. The report shall include the following: 

– The findings and conclusions of the commission.

– The recommendations of the commission for improving diversity within the Armed Forces.

– Such other information and recommendations as the commission considers appropriate

Tasks:

• Develop a uniform definition of diversity to be used throughout DoD congruent with the core values and

 vision of DoD for the future workforce.

• Incorporate private sector practices successful in cultivating diverse leadership to DoD policy.

• Assess the ability of the current organizational structure to ensure effective and accountable diversity

 management across DoD, including ODMEO and other similar offices within the Military Departments.

• Explore options available to improve the substance and implementation of current plans and policies of

 DoD and the Military Departments.

• Examine existing metrics and milestones for evaluating DoD diversity plans (including the plans of the

 individual Services) and how to facilitate future evaluation and oversight.

• Evaluate efforts to develop and maintain diverse leadership at all levels of the Armed Forces.

• Analyze successes and failures of efforts to develop and maintain diverse leadership, particularly of

 flag officers.

• Determine the status of prior recommendations made to DoD and Congress concerning diversity

 initiatives within the Armed Forces.

• Consider the benefits of conducting an annual conference focused on diversity attended by DoD

 civilians, active duty and retired military personnel, and corporate leaders, to include a review of

 current policy and the annual demographic data from the DEOMI and DMDC. 

• Examine the possible effect of expanding DoD secondary educational programs to diverse civilians

 populations, including military academy preparatory schools.

• Evaluate the ability of current recruitment and retention practices to attract and maintain a diverse

 pool of qualified individuals in sufficient numbers in pre-commissioning officer development programs.

• Assess the pre-command billet assignments of ethnic-specific officers.

• Examine command selection for officers of particular ethnicities.

• Evaluate the establishment and maintenance of fair promotion and command opportunities and their

 effect by gender and ethnicity for officers at O-5 and above.

• Evaluate the existence and maintenance of fair promotion, assignment, and command opportunities for

 ethnic- and gender-specific members of the Armed Forces at the levels of warrant officer, chief

 warrant officer, company and junior grade, field and mid-grade, and general and flag officer.

• Measure the ability of current activities to increase continuation rates for ethnic- and gender-specific

 members of the Armed Forces.

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Appendix B

Commission Members

Current Commissioners

General Lester L. Lyles (U.S. Air Force, Retired), Chairman

Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, Jr. (U.S. Army, Retired), Vice Chairman

Major General LaRita A. Aragon (Air National Guard, Retired)

Major General Arthur M. Bartell (U.S. Army)

The Honorable Gilbert F. Casellas

Chief Master Sergeant Gary G. Coleman (U.S. Air Force, Retired)

The Honorable D. Michael Collins (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Retired)

Marieli E. Colon-Padilla

Rear Admiral Jay DeLoach (U.S. Navy, Retired)

Mary M. Dixon

Brigadier General Rebecca Halstead (U.S. Army, Retired)

Vice Admiral Cecil D. Haney (U.S. Navy)

Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Harris (U.S. Army, Retired)

Colonel Mary Higley Hittmeier (U.S. Air Force)

Lieutenant General John Hopper, Jr. (U.S. Air Force, Retired)

Colonel Ronald M. Joe, Sr. (U.S. Army, Retired)

Sergeant Major Hallie Johnson (U.S. Army Reserve, Retired)

Colonel Jorge J. Martinez (U.S. Army National Guard, Retired)

Rear Admiral Edward Masso (U.S. Navy, Retired)

Senior Chief Petty Officer Thomas McGhee (U.S. Navy, Retired)

Lieutenant General Robert B. Neller (U.S. Marine Corps)

The Honorable Richard J. Noriega (Colonel, Army National Guard)

Rear Admiral Mary P. O’Donnell (U.S. Coast Guard, Retired) 

Lieutenant General Frank Petersen (U.S. Marine Corps, Retired) 

Master Chief Petty Officer Angela R. Rodriguez (U.S. Coast Guard) 

Shamina Singh

Sergeant Major Jack L. Tilley (U.S. Army, Retired) 

Sergeant Major William I. Whaley (U.S. Marine Corps, Retired) 

Major General Leo V. Williams III (U.S. Marine Corps, Retired) 

Frank H. Wu
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Former Commissioners

Captain Kathleen Contres (U.S. Navy, Retired)

Colonel Mohammed A. Khan, Jr. (U.S. Air Force, Retired)

Brigadier General Belinda Pinckney (U.S. Army, Retired)

Lieutenant General Willie J. Williams (U.S. Marine Corps)

Commission Staff

Executive Directors and Designated Federal Officers

Colonel James J. Campbell (U.S. Air Force, Retired)

Master Chief Petty Officer Steven Hady (U.S. Navy)

Research Staff

Nelson Lim, RAND Corporation, Research Director

Amanda Kraus, CNA, Associate Research Director

Carolyn Chu, RAND Corporation

Kate Giglio, RAND Corporation 

Jeremiah Goulka, RAND Corporation

Kimberly Curry Hall, RAND Corporation 

Erin-Elizabeth Johnson, RAND Corporation

Kirsten Keller, RAND Corporation 

Maria Lytell, RAND Corporation 

Jennifer S. McCombs, RAND Corporation 

Sarah Meadows, RAND Corporation 

Ann Parcell, CNA 

Martha Farnsworth Riche, CNA 

Seema Sayala, CNA 

First Lieutenant David Schulker (U.S. Air Force), RAND Corporation 

Lynn Scott, RAND Corporation 

Karen Domabyl Smith, CNA 

Leopoldo E. Soto Arriagada, CNA

Madeleine Wells, RAND Corporation

Staff from CNA and the RAND Corporation provided research and analysis to inform the 

Commissioners’ deliberations; however, the findings and recommendations presented in this 

report are those of the Commissioners alone.

Office Staff

D’Oshemeka Amadi, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC

Vergie Anderson, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC

Ryan Callanan, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC
Commission Members

123

Jennifer Conger, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC

Ernest Duncan, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC

Cassandra Gray, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC

Patricia Grier, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC

Beaulah Hall, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC

Myrtle Johnson, Washington Headquarters Services (in memoriam)

Erica Dorosin, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC

Patricia McClaine, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC

Jessica Schroeder, Visionary Integration Professionals, LLC

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Appendix C

Recommendations

Recommendation 1—

DoD shall adopt the following definition: Diversity is all the different characteristics and attributes of individuals that are consistent with Department of Defense core 

values, integral to overall readiness and mission accomplishment, and reflective of the 

Nation we serve.

Recommendation 2—

To enhance readiness and mission accomplishment, effectively leading diverse groups 

must become a core competency across DoD and the Services. To implement this 

recommendation,

• a. Leadership training at all levels shall include education in diversity dynamics 

and training in practices for leading diverse groups effectively.

• b. DoD and the Services should determine the framework (e.g., curriculum, content, methods) for how to inculcate such education and training into leader development, including how to measure and evaluate its effectiveness.

Recommendation 3—

The leadership of DoD and the Services must personally commit to making diversity 

an institutional priority.

Recommendation 4—

DoD and the Services should inculcate into their organizational cultures a broader 

understanding of the various types of diversity by

• a. Making respect for diversity a core value.

• b. Identifying and rewarding the skills needed to meet the operational challenges 

of the 21st century.

• c. Using strategic communications plans to communicate their diversity vision 

and values.

Recommendation 5—

Congress should revise Title 10, Section 113, to

• a. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to develop a standard set of 

strategic metrics and benchmarks to track progress toward the goal of having a 
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dynamic and sustainable 20–30-year pipeline that yields (1) an officer and enlisted 

corps that reflects the eligible U.S. population across all Service communities and 

ranks and (2) a military force that is able to prevail in its wars, prevent and deter 

conflict, defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force. 

• b. Add diversity annual reports to the list of topics on which the Secretary of 

Defense reports to Congress and the President. Similar provisions should be 

added to Title 14 for Coast Guard reporting and to Title 32 for National Guard 

reporting. 

• c. Require the Secretary of Defense to meet at least annually with Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and senior enlisted leaders to drive progress toward diversity management goals.

Recommendation 6—

The shrinking pool of qualified candidates for service in the Armed Forces is a threat to 

national security. The stakeholders listed below should develop and engage in activities 

that will expand the pool of qualified candidates.

• a. The President, Congress, and State and local officials should develop, resource, 

and implement strategies to address current eligibility issues.

• b. DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) should

– Create and leverage formal partnerships with other stakeholders.

– Institutionalize and promote citizenship programs for the Services.

– Require the Services to review and validate their eligibility criteria for military 

service.

• c. DoD and the Services should focus on early engagement. They should conduct 

strategic evaluations of the effectiveness of their current K–12 outreach programs 

and practices and increase resources and support for those that are found to be 

effective.

Recommendation 7—

DoD and the Services should engage in activities to improve recruiting from the currently available pool of qualified candidates by

• a. Creating, implementing, and evaluating a strategic plan for outreach to, and 

recruiting from, untapped locations and underrepresented demographic groups.

• b. Creating more accountability for recruiting from underrepresented demographic groups.

• c. Developing a common application for Service ROTC and academy programs.

• d. Closely examining the preparatory school admissions processes and making 

required changes to ensure that accessions align with the needs of the military.

Recommendation 8—

The Services should ensure that their career development programs and resources 

enhance servicemembers’ knowledge of career choices, including Reserve Compo-
Recommendations

127

nent opportunities, to optimize the ability of servicemembers to make informed career 

choices from accession to retirement.

• a. Mentoring and career counseling efforts shall start prior to the initial career 

field decision point and continue throughout the servicemember’s career.

• b. Mentoring programs shall follow effective practices and employ an active line 

of communication between protégé and mentor.

Recommendation 9—

DoD and the Services should eliminate the “combat exclusion policies” for women, 

including the removal of barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing field for 

all qualified servicemembers. The Commission recommends a time-phased approach:

• a. Women in career fields/specialties currently open to them should be immediately able to be assigned to any unit that requires that career field/specialty, consistent with the current operational environment.

• b. DoD and the Services should take deliberate steps in a phased approach to 

open additional career fields and units involved in “direct ground combat” to 

qualified women.

• c. DoD and the Services should report to Congress the process and timeline for 

removing barriers that inhibit women from achieving senior leadership positions.

Recommendation 10—

DoD, the Services, and Chief, National Guard Bureau, must ensure that there is transparency throughout their promotion systems so that servicemembers may better understand performance expectations and promotion criteria and processes. To do this, they

• a. Must specify the knowledge, skills, abilities, and potential necessary to be an 

effective flag/general officer or senior noncommissioned officer.

• b. Shall formalize the process and requirements for 3- and 4-star officer selection 

in DoD Instruction 1320.4.

• c. Shall educate and counsel all servicemembers on the importance of, and their 

responsibility for, a complete promotion board packet.

Recommendation 11—

The Services shall ensure that promotion board precepts provide guidance regarding 

Service-directed special assignments outside normal career paths and/or fields. As 

appropriate, senior raters’ evaluations shall acknowledge when a servicemember has 

deviated from the due-course path at the specific request of his or her leadership.

Recommendation 12—

Where appropriate, DACOWITS should expand its current focus on retention to 

include an explanation of the gender gap in retention. As part of this renewed focus, 

DACOWITS should examine the effects of retention programs, such as the sabbatical programs currently offered by the Navy and the Coast Guard as well as any other 
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innovative Service-specific approaches to retention. Findings and recommendations 

from this research should be presented to the Secretary of Defense.

Recommendation 13—

DoD and the Services must track regional and cultural expertise and relevant Reserve 

Component civilian expertise and continue to track language expertise upon military 

accession and throughout servicemembers’ careers in order to better manage personnel 

with mission-critical skill sets.

Recommendation 14—

To promote structural diversity, total force integration, and overall retention,

• a. DoD must improve the personnel and finance systems affecting transition 

between Active and Reserve Components and internal Reserve Component transition protocols.

• b. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Service Chiefs 

must assess how Reserve Component members can more effectively both gain 

operational experience and fulfill joint requirements within the constraints of 

their dual military/civilian lives and take action as appropriate.

Recommendation 15—

The Office of the Secretary of Defense organizational structure must be aligned to 

ensure a sustained focus on diversity and diversity initiatives and should include establishment of the position of a Chief Diversity Officer who reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. 

• The existing Research & Analysis office should be directed and resourced to support the Chief Diversity Officer.

• Chief, National Guard Bureau, must establish and resource organizational structures that support DoD diversity initiatives and reinforce ongoing National Guard 

diversity leadership efforts.

Recommendation 16—

DoD and the Services must resource and institute clear, consistent, and robust diversity management policies with emphasis on roles, responsibilities, authorities, and 

accountability. 

• a. DoD and the Services shall implement diversity strategic plans that address all 

stages of a servicemember’s life cycle. Each strategic plan shall include

– a diversity mission statement that prioritizes equity and inclusion and provides 

a purpose that is actionable and measurable

– a concept of operations to advance implementation.

• b. DoD must revise (if appropriate), reissue, and enforce compliance with its existing diversity management and equal opportunity policies to
Recommendations

129

– Define a standard set of strategic metrics and benchmarks that enables the 

Secretary of Defense to measure progress toward the goals identified in the 

strategic plan, including the creation of an inclusive environment.

– Establish standards that allow for the collection of data needed to generate 

these metrics and the analysis needed to inform policy action.

– Provide oversight of, and support for, the Services’ respective diversity initiatives and metrics to ensure that, at a minimum, they align with the end state 

established by DoD.

Recommendation 17—

DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should institute a system of “accountability 

reviews” that is driven by the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security (Coast 

Guard).

• a. The Secretary of Defense shall meet at least annually with Service Secretaries, 

Service Chiefs, senior enlisted leaders, and Chief, National Guard Bureau, to 

drive progress toward the diversity management goals identified in the strategic 

plans. The Coast Guard should be subject to a similar review.

• b. The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland Security should send an 

annual report to Congress and the President on the progress made toward diversity management goals in the Services, including the Reserve Component; the 

report should include the barrier analyses described in Recommendation 18.

• c. The National Guard Bureau should report annually to Congress and DoD on 

the status of diversity in each State, territory, and the District of Columbia for all 

ranks of the Army and Air National Guard. This report shall show how reflective 

the Army and Air National Guard are of the eligible pool in their particular State 

or territory or in the District of Columbia.

– Based on the report to Congress, the National Guard Bureau shall produce 

a “dashboard” of diversity metrics to be used by the Army and Air National 

Guard. This dashboard shall show comparisons across States, territories, and 

the District of Columbia and highlight best practices.

Recommendation 18—

As part of the accountability reviews, the Services, in conjunction with the Chief 

Diversity Officer (established in Recommendation 15), should conduct annual “barrier 

analyses” to review demographic diversity patterns across the military life cycle, starting with accessions. 

• a. To ensure comparability across Services, DoD shall establish a universal data 

collection system, and the analyses of the data should be based on common definitions of demographic groups, a common methodology, and a common reporting structure.
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• b. The annual analyses should include

– accession demographics

– retention, command selection, and promotion rates by race/ethnicity and 

gender

– analysis of assignment patterns by race/ethnicity and gender

– analysis of attitudinal survey data by race/ethnicity and gender

– identification of persistent, group-specific deviations from overall averages and 

plans to investigate underlying causes

– summaries of progress made on previous actions.

Recommendation 19—

DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should institute mechanisms for accountability 

and internal and external monitoring for both the Active and Reserve Components.

• a. The Services must embed diversity leadership in performance assessments 

throughout careers.

• b. DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should establish diversity leadership as a 

criterion for nomination and appointment to senior enlisted leadership positions 

and flag/general officers, including 3- and 4-star positions and Service Chief. 

– The Senate Armed Services Committee should include this criterion in its confirmation questionnaire.

• c. The Secretary of Defense must transfer the functions of the former Defense 

Equal Opportunity Council to a minimum of biannual meetings of DoD’s leadership, the existing Deputy’s Advisory Working Group.

• d. The Secretary of Defense must expand the DACOWITS charter, where appropriate, to encompass diversity as a whole.

Recommendation 20—

In congruence with Recommendation 5, Congress should revise Title 10, Section 113, 

to require the Secretary of Defense to report annually an assessment of the available 

pool of qualified racial/ethnic minority and female candidates for the 3- and 4-star 

flag/general officer positions. 

• The Secretary of Defense must ensure that all qualified candidates (including 

racial/ethnic minorities and women) have been considered for the nomination of 

every 3- and 4-star position. If there were no qualified racial/ethnic minority and/

or female candidates, then a statement of explanation should be made in the package submitted to the Senate for the confirmation hearings.
131

Appendix D

Glossary

Accession: in general, refers to the act of entering upon or attaining an office. For military purposes, accession refers to entering military service, and the term is applied to new recruits.

Active Guard and Reserve: National Guard and Reserve members who are on voluntary active 

duty providing full-time support to National Guard, Reserve, and Active Component organizations for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the 

Reserve Components (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010). 

Amicus curiae: a phrase that literally means “friend of the court”; a person or group who is not 

a party to specific litigation but who believes that the court’s decision may affect his, her, or 

its interest.

Armed Forces of the United States: a term used to denote collectively all components of the Army, 

Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (when mobilized under Title 10 to augment 

the Navy) (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

Barrier analysis: the process by which an organization uncovers, examines, and removes barriers to equal participation at all levels of its workforce. A barrier is an organizational policy, 

principle, or practice that limits or tends to limit employment opportunities for members of 

particular groups (e.g., on the basis of race/ethnicity or gender).

Benchmark: any standard or reference by which something can be judged or evaluated. The 

benchmarks referenced in this report are used to evaluate racial/ethnic minority and female 

representation in the Armed Forces. For example, there are three commonly suggested external 

benchmarks for the military: racial/ethnic minority and female shares of the current national 

population, the future national population, and the military-eligible population.

Billet: a personnel position or assignment that may be filled by one person (U.S. Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, 2010).

Capability: the ability to execute a specified course of action (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

Competency/core competency: DoD- or Service-set requirements that holders of particular positions or ranks must meet and be accountable for meeting.

Concept of operations: a verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what 

the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources (U.S. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).
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Core values: the foundational principles that guide how people in an organization will conduct 

their everyday business. The DoD core values are leadership, professionalism, and technical 

know-how. DoD also places particular emphasis on the special core values that everyone in 

uniform must live by: duty, integrity, ethics, honor, courage, and loyalty.

Dashboard: a visual interface that illustrates key measures that an organization has determined 

are tightly linked to its success or failure in executing strategy.

Diversity: differences among individuals involving any attributes (e.g., personal, work related, 

or other) that determine how they perceive one another. For strategic purposes, organizations 

define diversity based on the attributes that are relevant to their operations and cultures. Types 

of diversity and diversity related concepts are summarized below:

• Types of diversity:

– Demographic diversity: diversity in terms of immutable differences among individuals, 

such as race/ethnicity, gender, or age, as well as personal background differences, such 

as religion, education level, and marital status

– Functional diversity: diversity in terms of occupation, task, or training background

– Structural diversity: diversity in terms of organizational units, including military rank, 

Service, and component

– Cognitive diversity: differences pertaining to thinking styles, including the mental 

processes of perception, memory, judgment, and reasoning, as well as differences in 

personality types

– Global diversity: diversity related to national affiliations resulting from working with 

coalition partners, host-country employees, etc. 

• Diversity related concepts

– Diversity management: how organizations drive or affect the impact of diversity on key 

organizational outcomes through plans, policies, and practices

– Diversity leadership: how leaders at all ranks and organizational levels manage people 

in order to shape the impact of diversity dynamics in the forces under their command 

through the practices they employ day to day

– Diversity dynamics: how human differences affect interactions between people

– Diversity climate: the prevailing culture, leadership style, and personnel policies and 

practices of an organization.

Flag/general officer: a term applied to an officer holding the rank of general, lieutenant general, 

major general, or brigadier general in the Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps or admiral, vice 

admiral, or rear admiral in the Navy or Coast Guard (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

Inclusion/inclusive environment: An inclusive culture is one where individuals of all backgrounds 

experience a sense of belonging and experience their uniqueness as being valued. With effective diversity leadership, in a culture of inclusion, the diversity of knowledge and perspectives 

that members of different groups bring to the organization shapes how the work is done.

Military personnel life cycle: the phases of a servicemember’s career, from recruitment and accession to assignment, training, advancement, and separation or retirement. 
Glossary

133

Mission: the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and 

the reason therefore (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

National Guard: a joint reserve component of the Army and the Air Force that maintains two 

subcomponents: the Army National Guard of the United States for the Army and the Air 

Force’s Air National Guard of the United States.

Promotion board: Promotion boards, also known as selection boards, recommend for promotion 

to the next higher permanent grade promotion-eligible officers in grades O-3 through O-6. 

Promotion boards are statutory selection boards because the rules governing them are found 

in Title 10. 

Racial/ethnic minorities: members of historically excluded or underrepresented race/ethnicity 

groups (i.e., groups other than non-Hispanic whites).

Readiness: the ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national 

military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels: (1) Unit 

readiness, which is the ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to 

execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. (2) Joint readiness, which is the combatant commander’s ability 

to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned 

missions (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

Ready Reserve: the Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, and Inactive National Guard 

liable for active duty as prescribed by law (Title 10, Sections 10142, 12301, and 12302) (U.S. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).

Reserve Component: The Armed Forces of the United States Reserve Component consists 

of (1) the Army National Guard of the United States, (2) the Army Reserve, (3) the Navy 

Reserve, (4)  the Marine Corps Reserve, (5)  the Air National Guard of the United States, 

(6) the Air Force Reserve, and (7) the Coast Guard Reserve (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010). 

Retention: the proportion of individuals who remain in service, regardless of whether they have 

reached a decision point.

Services: the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard (U.S. Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, 2010).

Title 10: the part of U.S. law that provides the legal basis for the roles, missions, and organization of DoD and each of the Services.

Title 14: the part of U.S. law that establishes the Coast Guard as a military service and a 

branch of the Armed Forces and outlines its role.

Title 32: the part of U.S. law that outlines the role and organizational structure of the National 

Guard.
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Total force integration: DoD’s strategy to create a more capable, but also smaller and more 

affordable, force by purposefully balancing the expertise and experience of personnel from all 

its components (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010).
135

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