[Cite as Baraga v. McCormick, 2020-Ohio-3287.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

BRIAN F. BARAGA, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 108926 

 v. : 

 

KORRI A. MCCORMICK 

(F.K.A. BARAGA), : 

 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 11, 2020 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Division of Domestic Relations 

Case No. DR-11-337522 

 

Appearances: 

Robert Divizmeg, for appellant. 

 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.: 

Plaintiff-appellant, Brian Baraga (“Baraga”), appeals the trial court’s 

modification of his child support order. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm. 

Baraga and defendant-appellee, Korri McCormick (“McCormick”), 

were divorced in 2011. They had one child together, N.B., who was born in 2009. 
As part of the original divorce decree, Baraga was ordered to pay McCormick child 

support in the amount of $400 a month plus a two percent processing charge. 

In 2016, McCormick filed a motion to modify child support. The 

parties entered into stipulations in lieu of holding an evidentiary hearing. The 

matter was handled by a magistrate, who recommended granting McCormick’s 

motion modifying child support upwards to $701.64 per month (plus the two 

percent processing charge). 

Baraga filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, claiming that 

the magistrate erred in calculating both his and McCormick’s gross incomes. The 

trial court overruled his objections to the magistrate’s decision and granted 

McCormick’s motion to modify child support with an effective date of April 19, 

2019. 

It is from this order that Baraga appeals, raising one assignment of 

error for our review. McCormick did not file an appellee brief. 

I. The trial court erred by concluding Appellant’s income was 

$77,550.00 and said determination is an abuse of discretion. 

In his sole assignment of error, Baraga contends that the trial court 

abused its discretion in determining that his income was $77,550 for the 2016 

calendar year. 

A trial court’s decision regarding child support obligations falls 

within its discretion. N.W. v. M.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107503, 2019-Ohio1775, ¶ 16, citing Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 541 N.E.2d 1028 (1989). “A 
trial court abuses its discretion only when it acts unreasonably, arbitrarily, or 

unconscionably.” N.W. at id., citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 

450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). There is no abuse of discretion where there is some 

competent, credible evidence in the record to support the trial court’s decision. 

Trolli v. Trolli, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101980, 2015-Ohio-4487, ¶ 29, citing 

Kapadia v. Kapadia, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94456, 2011-Ohio-2255, ¶ 24. 

Baraga contends the trial court abused its discretion in computing 

his income for 2016. Specifically, Baraga stated that he owns a pool maintenance 

company and is therefore self-employed. He deposited all his business funds into 

a bank account and paid business and personal expenses from that single account. 

In 2016, Baraga deposited $152,983.40 into the account. Of that amount, he 

asserted he paid out $120,317 for supplies and business-related items. Thus, 

according to Baraga, his income was not that which the trial court found it to be ─

$77,550 ─ but rather $32,666. 

R.C. 3119.01(C)(5)(a) defines “income” for purposes of calculating 

child support as “the gross income of the parent.” R.C. 3119.01(C)(13) defines selfgenerated income as: 

Gross receipts received by a parent from self-employment, 

proprietorship of a business, joint ownership of partnership or closely 

held corporation, and rents minus ordinary and necessary expenses 

incurred by the parent in generating the gross receipts. 

“A court has authority to rely on information other than a tax return 

in order to examine business expenses and deductions, especially if the party is 
self-employed, and should consider living expenses or other personal use of 

business funds with ‘sharp scrutiny of all available records to prevent avoidance of 

child support.’” Hilbert v. Hilbert, 2016-Ohio-8099, 74 N.E.3d 977, ¶ 11 (12th 

Dist.), quoting Marder v. Marder, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2007-06-069, 

2008-Ohio-2500, ¶ 64. 

As noted by the trial court in its judgment entry adopting the 

magistrate’s decision, this court has held that when 

computing income for purposes of child support, a court should pay 

particular attention to the possibility that a spouse who is the sole 

shareholder of a business is engaged in “creative accounting” designed 

to cloak net income. Therefore, the court needs to consider all 

financial data which relates to the operation of that spouse’s business. 

Corrigan v. Corrigan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 74088 and 74094, 1999 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 2182, 29 (May 13, 1999). 

In this case, the magistrate determined that Baraga had a 2016 gross 

annual income of $77,550 based upon the cash flow as demonstrated by his 2016 

bank statements. The trial court noted that Baraga owned pool maintenance and 

snow plowing businesses. The trial court found that the magistrate correctly relied 

on: (1) Baraga’s deposits and expenditures in his bank account for 2016 to provide 

the best determination of his income for the purposes of computing child support 

and (2) his bankruptcy filing, which reflected that he earned a net income of 

$5,000 a month with “gross annual income computed to be at least $80,000.” 

Baraga’s 2016 bank records coupled with his bankruptcy filing show 

that his income was far greater than that which he claimed. The trial court did not 
err when it adopted the magistrate’s decision. We find that there was competent, 

credible evidence to support the trial court’s decision and its decision was not an 

abuse of discretion. 

The sole assignment of error is overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

 The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this 

judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

_____________________________ 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR