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JOSEPHINE SMALLS MILLER v. APPELLATE COURT

(SC 19436)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald,

Espinosa and Robinson, Js.

Argued November 13, 2015—officially released April 5, 2016

Josephine Smalls Miller, self-represented, the plaintiff in error.

Alayna M. Stone, assistant attorney general, with

whom were Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general,

for the defendant in error.
Opinion

PALMER, J. This case is before us on a writ of error

brought by the plaintiff in error, Josephine Smalls

Miller, who claims that the Appellate Court abused its

discretion in suspending her from the practice of law

before that court for a period of six months, in addition

to imposing other sanctions, due to her failure to comply with Appellate Court rules and deadlines, and for

filing a frivolous appeal. We disagree and, accordingly,

dismiss the writ of error.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural

history. Miller is an attorney licensed to practice law

in the state of Connecticut. On November 3, 2014, the

Appellate Court issued an order directing her to appear

before an en banc panel of that court and to show cause

‘‘why she should not be sanctioned . . . for her failure

[as appellate counsel] to meet deadlines and to comply

with the rules of appellate procedure in [Addo v. Rattray, Docket No.] AC 36837, [in which] she . . . failed

to timely file the appellant’s brief and appendix in compliance with the appellate rules; for herfailure [as appellate counsel] to meet deadlines and to comply with the

rules of appellate procedure and [court] orders . . . in

Willis v. Community Health Services, [Docket No.] AC

36955, and Cimmino v. Marcoccia, [Docket No.] AC

35944, and for her presentation of a frivolous appeal

. . . [on behalf of the plaintiff] in Coble v. [Board of

Education, Docket No.] AC 36677.’’ The order further

stated that ‘‘[t]he sanctions being considered by the

Appellate Court include a prohibition against appearing

in the Appellate Court or filing any papers in the Appellate Court for a period of time, the imposition of a fine

pursuant to General Statutes § 51-84,1 and costs and

payment of expenses, including attorney’s fees, to the

opposing part[ies].’’ (Footnote added.) The Appellate

Court also ordered opposing counsel in three of the

aforementioned cases to appear at the hearing and to

present argument on the following then pending

motions: (1) the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees

in Coble; (2) the plaintiff’s motion to open the dismissal

of the appeal in Willis; and (3) the plaintiff’s motion to

set aside rule nisi No. 142267 in Cimmino.

On December 3, 2014, the Appellate Court conducted

a hearing at which Miller presented oral argument as

to why she believed sanctions in the aforementioned

matters were unwarranted. Miller also submitted a written memorandum of law in support of her position.

With respect to the claim that she had failed to properly file the appellant’s brief and appendix in Addo,

Miller argued that she did, in fact, file those materials

on two separate dates, September 15, 2014, and October

4, 2014. Miller asserted that someone in the Appellate

Clerk’s Office must have tampered with the Judicial

Branch website (website) to make it appear that she
had not filed them. In her memorandum of law, Miller

accused the Appellate Clerk’s Office of ‘‘serious misconduct,’’ stating that, ‘‘[o]bviously, someone has deliberately manipulated [the] electronic website information

in order to justify the claim that no filing has been made

by [her].’’

In response to Miller’s assertions, one of the judges

of the Appellate Court explained that the issue was not

that Miller had not filed the brief and appendix but,

rather, that she had failed to file the certifications that

must accompany them pursuant to Practice Book § 67-

2 (g),2

(i),3 and (j),4 and, as a consequence, the materials

were rejected by the Appellate Clerk’s Office. Miller

responded that she was not aware that she had not

filed the required certifications until early November,

2014, around the time of the order to show cause, and

that she subsequently filed the materials on November

10, 2014. The record reveals, however, that, by letter

dated September 22, 2014, the Appellate Clerk’s Office

informed Miller that the brief and appendix she had

filed on September 15, 2014, ‘‘fail[ed] to comply with

the requirements of . . . [§] 67-2 . . . . The electronic

submission and the paper filings must be certified [in

accordance with that rule of practice] . . . . Please

resubmit the electronic version of the brief and appendix containing the required certification. Please submit

proper certifications for the printed brief and appendix

and please also submit the electronic confirmation

receipt for the refiled electronic version.’’ Miller subsequently received a second letter, entitled ‘‘SECOND

NOTICE,’’ dated October 10, 2014, stating that the brief

and appendix still did not comply with the requirements

of § 67-2 and, therefore, that they would have to be

refiled. As in the first letter, the second letter set forth

in detail what Miller needed to do to comply with § 67-

2. The letter concluded: ‘‘Please immediately resubmit

the electronic version of the brief and appendix containing the required certifications for the uploaded brief

and appendix. Please immediately submit all of the

proper certifications listed [in the second letter] for

the printed brief and appendix. Please also submit the

electronic confirmation receipt forthe refiled electronic

version.’’ As of the date of the show cause hearing,

Miller had not filed the required certifications and confirmation in Addo.

With respect to the claim that she had failed to timely

file the brief and appendix in Cimmino, Miller argued

that she had not filed those materials because she did

not discover until the week that they were due that the

trial transcript, which had been delivered to her more

than one year before the show cause hearing, was

incomplete, and, according to Miller, she could not complete the brief without the missing transcript pages.

The record reveals that, prior to the issuance of the

orderto show cause, Miller had been granted two extensions of time to file the appendix and brief. Miller was
granted a four month extension on September 24, 2013,

followed by a six month extension on December 16,

2013, with a due date for the brief and appendix of July

1, 2014. Six weeks after that date, on August 19, 2014,

Miller requested a third extension, which the Appellate

Court denied. On August 26, 2014, the Appellate Court

issued an order nisi to Miller advising herthat the appeal

in Cimmino would be dismissed if the brief and appendix were not filed by September 9, 2014. The record

indicates that, at the time of the December 3, 2014 show

cause hearing, those materials still had not been filed.

Miller also presented argument in support of her

motion in Willis to open the dismissal of that appeal.

The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal after Miller

failed to respond to a July 31, 2014 order nisi informing

her that the appeal would be dismissed if, by August

11, 2014, she did not file a certificate indicating the

estimated date of delivery of the transcript pursuant to

Practice Book § 63-8 (b). Miller, a solo practitioner,

explained that she was out of the country when the

order was issued and that the appeal was dismissed

before she returned. Miller further explained that the

transcript in question had been filed with the Appellate

Court on February 24, 2014, in connection with an earlier appeal in the case, which the Appellate Court had

dismissed for lack of a final judgment. Miller explained

that, after obtaining a final judgment, she refiled the

appeal without realizing that she had to refile the transcript and certification. Miller argued that the mere

failure to file those documents should not serve as a

ground for imposing sanctions or for the dismissal of

the appeal. In response, opposing counsel argued that,

if Miller’s only misstep in Willis had been a failure to

file the transcript and corresponding certification, then

she would agree that a dismissal would be too severe

a sanction. Opposing counsel argued, however, that

there were many other examples of Miller’s failure to

diligently prosecute the appeal, including Miller’s failure to appear at a previously scheduled hearing and

her act of falsely certifying that certain documents had

been sent to opposing counsel. When a judge of the

Appellate Court asked Miller, at the show cause hearing,

whether, prior to leaving the country, she had made

arrangements for another attorney to cover her practice, Miller responded that she had not done so because

she did not believe that there was any reason to make

such arrangements. When asked what assurance she

could provide the court that such lapses would not

occur in the future, Miller stated that, because of her

limited resources as a solo practitioner, she could

assure the court only that she would try to find someone

to cover her practice on a pro bono basis if she were

to travel again for an extended period of time. Miller

also admonished the court that, ‘‘[r]ather than being

sanctioned, [she] should be commended’’ for her work

because, according to Miller, all of her appellate work
is performed on a pro bono basis. Miller further indicated that the Appellate Court’s treatment of her

appeared to be racially motivated and reminded her of

how she was treated in the late 1970s as a court

employee in Georgia.

Finally, the Appellate Court considered the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees in Coble as well as

Miller’s argument that sanctions were unwarranted in

that case because the appeal was not frivolous. The

record reveals that the action in Coble was originally

brought in May, 2009. In July, 2010, the trial court rendered a judgment of nonsuit on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to, inter alia, comply with the defendant’s

request to revise. See Practice Book § 10-37. Miller, on

behalf of the plaintiff, thereafter filed a motion to open

the judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212 (a),

which was denied. That ruling was appealed to the

Appellate Court, which determined that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to

open the judgment and, accordingly, affirmed the trial

court’s judgment.5

In 2013, Miller refiled the action in Coble on behalf

of the plaintiff in that case pursuant to the accidental

failure of suit statute, General Statutes § 52-592. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. In a deposition of Miller taken in connection with

that motion, she stated that the original action had failed

because, as a solo practitioner, she had no one to teach

her the ‘‘ins and outs’’ of Connecticut practice, and, as

a result, she was ‘‘ignorant’’ of the rules of practice.

Miller also stated that she was overwhelmed by work

in her practice and had adopted a ‘‘hit or miss’’ approach

to civil procedure.

The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment in Coble. In a subsequent articulation of its ruling, the court explained that the nonsuit

in the original action was not the result of mistake,

inadvertence or excusable neglect, and, therefore,

Miller could not rely on the accidental failure of suit

statute to refile the action. Specifically, the court stated:

‘‘In reading the extensive history outlined by the defendant in the initial motion and a review of the Appellate

Court’s [decision] denying the plaintiff’s motion to set

aside a dismissal of the previous matter, it is obvious

that [Miller] appears [to have] exhibited an inherent

failure to comply throughout the previous matter, as

[w]as [n]oted by the Appellate Court, as well as failure

to comply with various orders of [the trial] court. It

was on that basis [that the trial] court found [and] does

find again that, as a matter of law, the termination

of the previous matter was not the result of mistake,

inadvertence, or excusable neglect.’’ The trial court also

granted the defendant’s motion for a special finding

pursuant to General Statutes § 52-226a6

that the second

action was meritless and not brought in good faith.
Miller, on behalf of the plaintiff in Coble, appealed

to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court

incorrectly determined that the earlier nonsuit was not

the result of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect

and, as a result, also improperly concluded that the

accidental failure of suit statute did not apply. Thereafter, the defendant in Coble filed a motion to dismiss

the appeal as frivolous, which the Appellate Court

granted. In its order dismissing the appeal, the Appellate

Court stated that ‘‘[t]he entire panel recommends that

the full court [also] considerthe imposition of sanctions

against [Miller].’’ At the December 3, 2014 hearing to

show cause, Miller argued that such sanctions were

unwarranted because reasonable minds could differ as

to whether the appeal was frivolous, as evidenced by

the fact that one of the judges of the Appellate Court

had voted to deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss

the appeal.

On December 9, 2014, the Appellate Court issued an

order stating that, ‘‘[a]fter reviewing . . . Miller’s conduct in [Coble, Willis, Cimmino and Addo], the Appellate Court has determined that [Miller] has exhibited a

persistent pattern of irresponsibility in handling her

professional obligations before [the Appellate] [C]ourt.

. . . Miller’s conduct has included the filing of [a] frivolous [appeal] and the failure to file, or to file in timely

and appropriate fashion, all documents and materials

necessary for the perfection and prosecution of appeals

before [the Appellate] [C]ourt.

‘‘[Miller’s] conduct . . . has threatened the vital

interests of her own clients while consuming an inordinate amount of [the Appellate] [C]ourt’s time and her

opponents’ resources. . . . Miller has neither accepted

personal responsibility for the aforesaid conduct nor

offered [the] court any assurance that such conduct

will not be repeated, based [on] either her commitment

to improving her knowledge of appellate practice and

procedure or her institution of changes in her law practice to monitor her cases more effectively and ensure

timely compliance with [the] rules of procedure.’’ In

light of the foregoing, the Appellate Court suspended

Miller from practice before that court for a period of

six months with the exception of the appeal in Addo.

The court further ordered that Miller, before being reinstated to practice before the court, be required to file

a motion for reinstatement that includes an affidavit

in which she (1) ‘‘commits herself to discharging her

professional responsibilities before [the Appellate]

[C]ourt in a timely and professional manner,’’ (2) ‘‘provides documentary proof of successful completion of

a seminar on legal ethics and a seminar on Connecticut

appellate procedure,’’ (3) ‘‘documents any other efforts

since the date of [the court’s] order to improve her

knowledge of appellate practice and procedure,’’ and

(4) ‘‘offers [the court] detailed, persuasive assurances
that she has implemented changes in her law practice

designed to ensure full compliance with the rules of

appellate procedure, including a written plan indicating

what procedures she has implemented in her office to

ensure her compliance with the appellate rules and

procedures and to protect her clients’ interests.’’

Finally, the Appellate Court ordered ‘‘that these matters

[be] referred to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel for

review and further action as it is deemed appropriate.’’

In separate simultaneous orders, the Appellate Court

dismissed the appeal in Cimmino, denied the plaintiff’s

motion to open the dismissal of the appeal in Willis,

and denied the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees in

Coble.

7 TheAppellate Court permitted Millerto continue

prosecuting the appeal in Addo, however, as long as

Millerfiled, within ten days of the issuance of the court’s

order, the missing ‘‘certifications . . . [and] a copy of

the November 10, 2014 electronic confirmation receipt

indicating that the brief and appendix were submitted

electronically in compliance with Practice Book [§] 67-

2 (g) . . . .’’ When Miller failed to file those documents

in a timely manner, however, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal in Addo as well.

In her writ of error, Miller claims that the Appellate

Court abused its discretion in suspending herfrom practice before that court because the conduct for which

she was sanctioned does not violate rule 8.4 of the

Rules of Professional Conduct,8 which, in Miller’s view,

provides the exclusive list of misconduct for which an

attorney may be sanctioned. Indeed, Miller contends

that ‘‘[t]here have been no reported cases found [in

which] Connecticut courts have sanctioned an attorney

for alleged failures to comply with rules of appellate

procedure such as filing deadlines, electronic filing

requirements, or the filing of a transcript.’’ Miller also

argues that the sanctions that the Appellate Court

imposed, namely, a six month suspension, referral to

the Chief Disciplinary Counsel for consideration of

whatever further action might be appropriate, and dismissal of Miller’s four Appellate Court cases, were disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. Miller maintains, in fact, that a close examination of each of those

cases ‘‘shows no irresponsibility’’ on her part. We are

not persuaded by Miller’s claims.

It is beyond dispute that courts ‘‘[have] the authority

to regulate the conduct of attorneys and [have] a duty to

enforce the standards of conduct regarding attorneys.’’

Bergeron v. Mackler, 225 Conn. 391, 397, 623 A.2d 489

(1993); see also Gionfrido v. Wharf Realty, Inc., 193

Conn. 28, 33, 474 A.2d 787 (1984) (‘‘[i]t is an inherent

power of the court to discipline members of the bar, and

to provide for the imposition of reasonable sanctions to

compel the observance of its rules’’ [internal quotation

marks omitted]). ‘‘There are three possible sources for

the authority of courts to sanction counsel and pro se
parties. These are inherent power, statutory power, and

the power conferred by published rules of the court.

The power of a court to manage its dockets and cases

by the imposition of sanctions to prevent undue delays

in the disposition of pending cases is of ancient origin,

having its roots in judgments . . . entered at common

law . . . and dismissals . . . . That power may be

expressly recognized by rule or statute but it exists

independently of either and arises because of the control that must necessarily be vested in courts in order

for them to be able to manage their own affairs so as

to achieve an orderly and expeditious disposition of

cases.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Srager v.

Koenig, 42 Conn. App. 617, 620, 681 A.2d 323, cert.

denied, 239 Conn. 935, 936, 684 A.2d 709 (1996); see

also Briggs v. McWeeny, 260 Conn. 296, 335, 796 A.2d

516 (2002) (‘‘[a] court is free to determine in each case,

as may seem best in light of the entire record before

it, whether a sanction is appropriate and, if so, what

the sanction should be’’ [emphasis omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted]).

Disciplinary proceedings are ‘‘for the purpose of preserving the courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to [practice] in them.’’ Ex parte

Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288, 2 S. Ct. 569, 27 L. Ed. 552 (1883).

‘‘The proceeding to . . . [suspend] an attorney is neither a civil action nor a criminal proceeding, but is a

proceeding sui generis, the object of which is not the

punishment of the offender . . . but the protection of

the court. . . . Once the complaint is made, the court

controls the situation and procedure, in its discretion,

as the interests of justice may seem to it to require.

. . . [T]he power of the courts is left unfettered to act

as situations, as they may arise, may seem to require,

for efficient discipline of misconduct and the purging

of the bar from the taint of unfit membership. [Statutes

governing attorney discipline] are not restrictive of the

inherent powers [that] reside in courts to inquire into

the conduct of their own officers, and to discipline them

for misconduct. . . . In [disciplinary] proceedings

. . . therefore, the attorney’s relations to the tribunal

and the character and purpose of the inquiry are such

that unless it clearly appears that [the attorney’s] rights

have in some substantial way been denied him, the

action of the court will not be set aside upon review.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn.

232, 238–39, 558 A.2d 986 (1989), cert. denied, 502 U.S.

1094, 112 S. Ct. 1170, 117 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1992). ‘‘As with

any discretionary action of the . . . court, appellate

review requires every reasonable presumption in favor

of the action, and the ultimate issue . . . is whether

the . . . court could have reasonably concluded as it

did. . . . Therefore, whether this court would have

imposed a different sanction . . . is irrelevant.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thal-
heim v. Greenwich, 256 Conn. 628, 656, 775 A.2d 947

(2001). A uniform standard of clear and convincing evidence applies to attorney disciplinary proceedings,

‘‘regardless of the nature of the sanction ultimately

imposed.’’ Statewide Grievance Committee v. Presnick,

215 Conn. 162, 171–72, 575 A.2d 210 (1990).

Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of the

present case, we conclude that the Appellate Court did

not abuse its discretion in suspending Miller from the

practice of law before that court for a period of six

months on the basis of her repeated failure to meet

deadlines, to comply with the rules of practice, and for

filing a frivolous appeal. See, e.g., Srager v. Koenig,

supra, 42 Conn. App. 621–24 (attorney suspended from

practice before Appellate Court for six months on basis

of repeated noncompliance with rules of practice and

failure to timely file court documents). This court previously has observed that, ‘‘[i]n order to fulfill our

responsibility of dispensing justice we in the judiciary

must adopt an effective system of caseflow management. Caseflow management is based [on] the premise

that it is the responsibility of the court to establish

standards for the processing of cases and also, when

necessary, to enforce compliance with such standards.

Ourjudicial system cannot be controlled by the litigants

and cases cannot be allowed to drift aimlessly through

the system.’’ In re Mongillo, 190 Conn. 686, 690–91, 461

A.2d 1387 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds

by State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147, 735 A.2d 333 (1999).

Thus, General Statutes § 51-84 (a) provides that ‘‘[a]ttorneys admitted by the Superior Court shall be attorneys

of all courts and shall be subject to the rules and orders

of the courts before which they act.’’ Section 51-84 (b)

provides that ‘‘[a]ny such court may fine an attorney

for transgressing its rules and orders an amount not

exceeding one hundred dollars for any offense, and may

suspend or displace an attorney forjust cause.’’ Practice

Book § 85-2, in turn, provides in relevant part that, in

the appellate courts, ‘‘[a]ctions which may result in the

imposition of sanctions include, but are not limited to,’’

the ‘‘[f]ailure to comply with rules and orders of the

court,’’ ‘‘[r]epeated failures to meet deadlines,’’ and the

‘‘[p]resentation of a frivolous appeal or frivolous issues

on appeal.’’ Practice Book § 85-2 further provides that

‘‘[o]ffenders will be subject, at the discretion of the

court, to appropriate discipline, including the prohibition against appearing in the court or filing any papers

in the court for a reasonable and definite period of

time . . . .’’

Thus, Miller’s contention that rule 8.4 of the Rules

of Professional Conduct provides the exclusive list of

misconduct for which an attorney may be sanctioned

is patently frivolous. Nor is the present case, as Miller

argues, the first in which an attorney has been sanctioned by a Connecticut court for failing to comply with

the rules or orders of the court. Indeed, our case law is
replete with examples of instances in which our courts

have exercised their authority, whether inherent or pursuant to statute or the rules of practice, to sanction

an attorney for such conduct. See, e.g., Thalheim v.

Greenwich, supra, 256 Conn. 635, 657 (court did not

abuse its discretion in concluding that appropriate sanction for attorney who filed amicus curiae brief without

first obtaining permission from court was ‘‘to read the

Connecticut Practice Book, to listen to audiocassettes

available from the Connecticut Bar Association pertaining to civil practice and procedure in Connecticut

courts, and to certify to the court within four months

that he had listened to the tapes and read the entire

Connecticut PracticeBook, including the rules concerning professional conduct’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]); CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 239

Conn. 375, 386, 685 A.2d 1108 (1996) (appeal was dismissed on basis of attorney’s failure to comply with

rules of practice and court’s order nisi), overruled in

part on other grounds by State v. Salmon, 250 Conn.

147, 735 A.2d 333 (1999); see also Gionfrido v. Wharf

Realty, Inc., supra, 193 Conn. 31, 34 (trial court did

not abuse its discretion in dismissing case on basis of

attorney’s failure to appearfor voir dire);In re Mongillo,

supra, 190 Conn. 690 (‘‘It is undisputed that a rule of

the Superior Court required the appellant’s attendance

at the call of the calendar at 10 a.m. It is also undisputed

that he was late. It is therefore not open to question

that the Superior Court had the authority to impose a

fine against the appellant for his tardiness.’’); Venezia

v. Kennedy, 165 Conn. 183, 184–85, 332 A.2d 102 (1973)

(trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing

case due to plaintiff’s failure to prosecute case diligently).

In her brief to this court, Miller attempts to minimize

the professional lapses that ultimately convinced the

Appellate Court that it had no choice but to suspend

her temporarily from practice before that court. She

also argues that the record belies that court’s determination that she exhibited a persistent pattern of irresponsibility in the handling of her cases. Miller’s arguments

reveal a disturbing disregard for or ignorance of the

facts underlying this case. With respect to Cimmino,

Miller argues that there is ‘‘no clear and convincing

evidence that [she] knowingly or intentionally violated

any appellate rule of practice.’’ Miller further maintains

that ‘‘[t]he essence of the [A]ppellate [Court’s] finding

against [her] is that the trial [transcript was] . . . not

timely ordered.’’ Contrary to Miller’s assertion, the

Appellate Court did not dismiss the appeal in Cimmino

because the transcript was not timely ordered. The

Appellate Court dismissed the appeal because, after

granting Miller two extensions to file the brief and

appendix, she failed to file them when they were due

on July 1, 2014. Instead, Miller waited six weeks and

then filed a motion for an additional extension of time,
which the Appellate Court had little choice but to deny

pursuant to Practice Book § 66-1 (e), which provides:

‘‘A motion for extension of time shall be filed at least

ten days before the expiration of the time limit sought

to be extended or, if the cause for such extension arises

during the ten day period, as soon as reasonably possible after such cause has arisen. No motion under this

rule shall be granted unless it is filed before the time

limit sought to be extended by such motion has

expired.’’ (Emphasis added.) Thus, on August 26, 2014,

the court informed Miller that the appeal would be

dismissed if the brief and appendix were not filed within

two weeks. As we previously noted, Miller missed that

deadline as well.

With respect to Addo, Miller contends that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that she failed to file

her brief and appendix in a timely manner. Miller maintains that ‘‘[o]ne or more persons with access to the

[court’s] official website appear to have tampered with

the documents in order to give an appearance of a

failure to file by [Miller].’’ Miller further argues that it

is ‘‘shocking that the court should have so little regard

for the integrity of its official website and documents

and yet [admonish Miller] for alleged procedural violations.’’ On the contrary, what is shocking is Miller’s

persistence in making such reckless allegations when

even a cursory review of the file in Addo reveals that

they are wholly unfounded. As we previously indicated,

prior to the issuance of the order to show cause in

Addo, Miller was notified by the Appellate Court on

two separate occasions that the brief and appendix she

previously had filed in that case were not compliant

with Practice Book § 67-2 and would have to be refiled.

In light of these notices, which we can only assume

Miller ignored or did not read, her repeated assertion

that the brief and appendix were removed from the

website in an effort to damage her credibility with the

Appellate Court underscores the propriety of that

court’s determination not only that Miller’s handling of

her cases threatened the vital interests of her clients,

but also that she had demonstrated a regrettable inability to accept personal responsibility for her professional mistakes.

With respect to Willis, Miller claims that the sole

allegation in that case concerns the transcript that was

not timely filed, which, according to Miller, provides

insufficient cause fortheAppellateCourtto have denied

her motion to set aside the dismissal of the appeal in

that case and to suspend her from practice before that

court. As we previously indicated, the record reveals

that the Appellate Court dismissed that appeal after

Miller, who was out of the country at the time, failed

to respond to an order nisi informing herthat the appeal

would be dismissed if she did not file the transcript

certifications required by Practice Book § 63-8 (b)

within ten days. In response to questioning by the court,
Miller stated that, prior to leaving the country, she had

not arranged for anyone to cover her practice. She also

did not dispute opposing counsel’s assertion that her

failure to file the transcript was not her only miscue in

Willis but one of many, which included her failure to

appear at a scheduled hearing and the filing of a false

certification stating that certain documents had been

sent to opposing counsel when, in fact, they had not.

More important, as the Appellate Court noted, when

Miller was asked to provide assurances to the Appellate

Court that such conduct would not be repeated going

forward, Miller could offer no such assurances. In light

of the foregoing, the Appellate Court did not abuse

its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the

dismissal of the appeal in Willis. Nor did it abuse its

discretion in considering Miller’s transgressions in Willis as furtherreason to suspend herfrom practice before

the Appellate Court until such time as she improved

her knowledge of the appellate rules of practice and

could offer that court persuasive assurances that she

would implement the necessary changes in her law

practice to ensure compliance with those rules.

Miller next maintains that the Appellate Court

improperly sanctioned her for filing a frivolous appeal

in Coble. We note that Miller did not file a petition

for certification to appeal from the judgment of the

Appellate Court dismissing the appeal but, instead,

attempts to collaterally attack that judgment in this writ

of error by arguing that the appeal was not frivolous.

As we previously indicated, after the Appellate Court

affirmed the trial court’s judgment of nonsuit in Coble

on the basis of Miller’s failure to comply with the defendant’s request to revise, Millerrefiled the action in Coble

pursuant to the accidental failure of suit statute. The

defendant then moved for summary judgment on the

ground that that statute did not apply because Miller’s

noncompliance with the rules of practice in the earlier

filed action in Coble was not the result of mistake,

inadvertence, or excusable neglect.9

In its memorandum

of law in support of its motion for summary judgment,

the defendant in Coble outlined in painstaking detail

the torturous procedural history culminating in the

judgment of nonsuit. In granting the motion for summary judgment in Coble, the trial court specifically

relied on that history, as outlined in the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment, as the basis for its determination that the plaintiff in Coble could not avail herself of the accidental failure of suit statute. The trial

court subsequently supplemented its decision with a

special finding pursuant to § 52-226a that the refiled

action in Coble was meritless and not brought in good

faith. Miller did not seek an articulation of that finding.

On appeal to the Appellate Court from the granting

of summary judgment in Coble, Miller did not challenge

the trial court’s determination that the action was meritless and not brought in good faith. Instead, she argued
that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the accidental failure of suit statute did not apply because,

according to Miller, her failure to comply with the rules

of practice when she filed the initial action in Coble

was the result of an honest misunderstanding of the

applicable rules. Because Miller failed to challenge the

trial court’s determination that the refiled action in

Coble was without merit and not brought in good faith,

however, the Appellate Court properly credited that

determination and granted the defendant’s motion to

dismiss the appeal as frivolous. In her writ of error,

Miller again fails to explain why the trial court’s judgment regarding the merits of the refiled action in Coble

was improper. We, therefore, like the Appellate Court,

have no occasion to disturb that determination.

Finally, Miller claims that the Appellate Court abused

its discretion in referring her to the Chief Disciplinary

Counsel without alleging the violation of any Rule of

Professional Conduct or otherwise providing guidance

as to the nature of the inquiry to be conducted. Miller

also expresses concern that the referral could result in

duplicative sanctions for the conduct described herein.

Although the order of referral could have been

clearer, we do not understand it to be a request for an

investigation into the specific conduct giving rise to this

writ of error but,rather, a request for a determination of

whether Miller’s conduct before the Appellate Court

was part of a larger pattern of irresponsibility in Miller’s

handling of her professional obligations. As we have

previously noted, ‘‘[j]udges . . . possess the inherent

authority to regulate attorney conduct and to discipline

members of the bar. . . . In exercising their inherent

supervisory authority, the judges have authorized grievance panels and reviewing committees to investigate

allegations of attorney misconduct and to make determinations of probable cause. . . . In carrying out these

responsibilities, these bodies act as an arm of the court.

. . . Accordingly, a formidable array of [actions],

including referrals to the [S]tatewide [G]rievance

[C]ommittee for investigation into alleged misconduct,

is available to courts and dissatisfied litigants who seek

redress in connection with an attorney’s . . . conduct.’’ (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn.

523, 552–54, 69 A.3d 880 (2013). The Appellate Court

not only has the authority to refer an attorney to the

Chief Disciplinary Counsel, it has an obligation to do

so when, as in the present case, it concludes that that

attorney’s persistent pattern of missing deadlines and

violating court rules threatens the vital interests of his

or her clients. Of course, we do not know whether

the Chief Disciplinary Counsel will find instances of

neglectful or otherwise unacceptable conduct by Miller

in the Superior Court, but, in light of the number and

nature of Miller’s transgressions in the Appellate Court,

the Appellate Court certainly had the discretion to bring
those transgressions to the attention of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel for whatever action, if any, may be

appropriate with respect to Miller’s conduct in the Superior Court.

The writ of error is dismissed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 General Statutes § 51-84 provides: ‘‘(a) Attorneys admitted by the Superior Court shall be attorneys of all courts and shall be subject to the rules

and orders of the courts before which they act.

‘‘(b) Any such court may fine an attorney for transgressing its rules and

orders an amount not exceeding one hundred dollars for any offense, and

may suspend or displace an attorney for just cause.’’

2 Practice Book § 67-2 (g) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Every attorney filing

a brief shall submit an electronic version of the brief and appendix in

accordance with guidelines established by the court and published on the

judicial branch website. The electronic version shall be submitted prior to

the timely filing of the party’s paper brief and appendix pursuant to subsection (h) of this section. . . . Counsel must certify that electronically submitted briefs and appendices: (1) have been delivered electronically to the last

known e-mail address of each counsel of record for whom an e-mail address

has been provided; and (2) have been redacted or do not contain any names

or other personal identifying information that is prohibited from disclosure

by rule, statute, court order or case law.’’

3 Practice Book § 67-2 (i) provides: ‘‘The original and all copies of the brief

filed with the supreme court or the appellate court must be accompanied by:

(1) certification that a copy of the brief and appendix has been sent to each

counsel of record in compliance with Section 62-7 and to any trial judge

who rendered a decision that is the subject matter of the appeal;(2) certification that the brief and appendix being filed with the appellate clerk are true

copies of the brief and appendix that were submitted electronically pursuant

to subsection (g) of this section; (3) certification that the brief and appendix

have been redacted or do not contain any names or other personal identifying

information that is prohibited from disclosure by rule, statute, court order

or case law; and (4) certification that the brief complies with all provisions

of this rule. The certification that a copy of the brief and appendix has been

sent to each counsel of record in compliance with Section 62-7, and to any

trial judge who rendered a decision that is the subject matter of the appeal

may be signed by counsel of record or the printing service, if any. All other

certifications pursuant to this subsection shall be signed by counsel of

record only.’’

4 Practice Book § 67-2 (j) provides: ‘‘A copy of the electronic confirmation

receipt indicating that the brief and appendix were submitted electronically

in compliance with subsection (g) of this section shall be filed with the

original brief.’’

5

‘‘The [plaintiff] could have challenged the merits of the judgment of

dismissal by taking a timely appeal therefrom. On an appeal from a judgment

following a denial of a motion to open pursuant to § 52-212 (a), however,

the standard of appellate review is whether the trial court’s judgment was

an abuse of its discretion.’’ Ruddock v. Burrowes, 243 Conn. 569, 571 n.4,

706 A.2d 967 (1998).

6 General Statutes § 52-226a provides: ‘‘In any civil action tried to a jury,

after the return of a verdict and before judgment has been rendered thereon,

or in any civil action tried to the court, not more than fourteen days after

judgment has been rendered, the prevailing party may file a written motion

requesting the court to make a special finding to be incorporated in the

judgment or made a part of the record, as the case may be, that the action

or a defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted

in good faith. Any such finding by the court shall be admissible in any

subsequent action brought pursuant to section 52-568.’’

7 The defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees in Coble was denied without

prejudice to the defendant’s right to seek such fees in the trial court.

8 Rule 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which sets forth specific

behavior that constitutes attorney misconduct, provides: ‘‘It is professional

misconduct for a lawyer to:

‘‘(1) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,

knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts

of another;

‘‘(2) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;

‘‘(3) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

‘‘(4) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;

‘‘(5) State or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency

or official orto achieve results by means that violate theRules of Professional

Conduct or other law; or

‘‘(6) Knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a

violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.’’

9

It is well established that, in order to avail herself of the accidental

failure of suit statute, Miller was required ‘‘to make a factual showing that

the prior dismissal was a matter of form in the sense that the . . . noncompliance with a court order occurred in circumstances such as mistake,

inadvertence or excusable neglect . . . [and], even in the disciplinary context, only egregious conduct will bar recourse to [the statute].’’ (Emphasis

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Worth v. Commissioner of

Transportation, 135 Conn. App. 506, 518–19, 43 A.3d 199, cert. denied, 305

Conn. 919, 47 A.3d 389 (2012).