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S. HRG. 113–149

ASSESSING THE TRANSITION

IN AFGHANISTAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 11, 2013

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

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FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Chayes, Sarah, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace, Washington, DC ....................................................................................... 36

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement ................. 3

Dobbins, Hon. James, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ...................................................... 5

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert 

Menendez ....................................................................................................... 52

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert P. 

Casey, Jr. ....................................................................................................... 54

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Jeff Flake ..... 56

Hadley, Stephen, senior advisor for international affairs, U.S. Institute of 

Peace, Washington, DC ....................................................................................... 31

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33

Lavoy, Dr. Peter R., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and 

Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC ......... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert 

Menendez ....................................................................................................... 58

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert P. 

Casey, Jr. ....................................................................................................... 61

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Jeff Flake ..... 61

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening statement .... 1

Nadery, Ahmad Nader, founder and chairman, Fair and Free Elections Foundation of Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan ....................................................... 41

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 42

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1)

ASSESSING THE TRANSITION

IN AFGHANISTAN 

THURSDAY, JULY 11, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Murphy, Kaine, 

Corker, Risch, and Johnson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ‘‘Assessing the Transition in Afghanistan,’’ will come to order. 

Today’s hearing on Afghanistan comes none too soon. With 

63,000 U.S. troops still based there and the upcoming political and 

security transitions in 2014 just around the corner, now is the time 

to take stock of our efforts and make any necessary changes. Most 

importantly, given recent speculation about our intentions, this 

means the United States needs to make clear once again that we 

are committed to a long-term partnership with Afghanistan. 

Period. 

Let me be clear because I believe this is a fundamental point. As 

long as the Afghan people and their government want the United 

States as a partner, we do not intend to leave Afghanistan. Our 

goal, our clear intent is to stay committed with both security and 

civilian assistance post-2014. 

I am fully aware that there is a deep-seated anxiety in the region 

about what the U.S. troop presence will look like post-2014. I heard 

it firsthand when I was in Afghanistan and Pakistan earlier this 

year, and I know Senator Corker heard it on his travels to the 

region just last week. 

As President Obama has said repeatedly, the United States is 

planning on leaving behind a United States force presence to support the Afghan security forces if the Afghan Government wants it. 

But we need a workable bilateral security agreement acceptable to 

the United States. President Karzai must now decide whether his 

government is willing to accept a longer term U.S. troop presence 

by coming back to the negotiating table with acceptable terms. The 

ball is in his court, but he and the Afghan people should underFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2

stand that if we fail to reach an agreement, it will not be for lack 

of trying on America’s end. 

For our part, I believe that President Obama should signal to the 

Afghans and our allies what the post-2014 U.S. troop presence will 

look like governed by a security agreement. The lack of clarity on 

this point has led to too much hedging in the region. Afghans who 

may otherwise be interested in building a fledgling democracy want 

to know that they will not be abandoned by the United States as 

the Taliban claims they will be. 

These are the very Afghan allies we need, those committed to 

democracy, people like Lt. Islam Bibi, the most senior Afghan 

female police officer in Helmand province who survived three death 

attempts by her own brother for enlisting and who was tragically 

shot dead last week by assailants. Afghans like her are counting 

on us to support a successful and inclusive political transition next 

year so that the country does not return to civil war. 

So I want to reiterate that from my perspective, the ball is in 

President Karzai’s hands, and I hope he does not think that this 

is a question of simply leverage for him. If he does, then he is sadly 

mistaken. 

The other most important piece of this puzzle is getting the 2014 

elections right because ultimately it is the political transition that 

will determine whether we have a successful security and economic 

transition. 

I am very pleased that Senate Resolution 151 that I sponsored 

with Senators Casey and McCain passed this week urging the 

Afghan Government to ensure transparent and credible elections. 

Many of us here in Congress are concerned that the window for 

establishing a successful election framework for next April’s vote is 

closing. There is little time left to get a credible preelection process 

off the ground. Delays in approving new electoral laws and new 

appointments to the Independent Election Commission, Complaints 

Commission, and Supreme Court could undermine the entire process. Afghan political stakeholders must come together and agree to 

fair rules governing the elections to ensure that the process and 

outcome is accepted by all parties. And now is the time for the 

United States, the United Nations, and all our allies to speak with 

one unified voice about what is really at stake here. We must convince the Afghan people that having credible and fair elections on 

April 5, 2014, is our No. 1 priority in Afghanistan. And President 

Karzai should understand in clear terms that his legacy of leaving 

behind a stable Afghanistan that is supported by the international 

community will be in serious jeopardy with a flawed election outcome. 

Already the Obama administration has requested $3.4 billion in 

civilian assistance for Afghanistan in 2014, more than it has 

requested for any other nation, bringing total United States civilian aid to about $20 billion. But before Congress approves additional funding, we need to know that the Afghan Government is 

serious about holding credible elections in April 2014 and upholding the reform commitments it made in Tokyo last year. 

Congress also needs to hear from the Obama administration 

about how it is addressing serious problems raised by the Special 

Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Though many of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3

our aid programs have helped raise the quality of life for many 

Afghans, some of them are ironically working against our collective 

interests. I am baffled, for instance, that the Pentagon purchased 

about 800 million dollars’ worth of aircraft, including 30 Russian 

helicopters, when the Afghan air unit lacks basic capacity to operate them. I am also skeptical about some of our INL programs 

relating to counternarcotics and rule of law efforts in Afghanistan 

and have asked SIGAR to fully investigate if our multibillion dollar 

investments in this area make sense. 

As we draw down in Afghanistan and move to third-party monitoring of our civilian assistance programs, this committee wants 

assurances from the State Department, USAID, and Defense 

Department that they are making real oversight reforms as laid 

out by SIGAR and others and are making oversight a priority during and after the transition. With billions of dollars at stake, we 

cannot afford to keep doing business as usual. 

There are a lot more areas I would like to cover, including Pakistan’s role in the transition and whether we have made lasting security gains, but for now, let me save that for the questions and 

answers and turn to my distinguished ranking colleague, Senator 

Corker, who has just returned from the region, for his own opening 

statements. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing. And I do want to say that I appreciate working with you. I 

think that it has always been the hope that foreign policy and partisanship dissipate at the shoreline. And I think the way we work 

together on this committee has demonstrated that, and I very 

much appreciate your comments. I am going to take a slightly different take, but I think your concerns about Afghanistan and Pakistan are similar. And I look forward to working with you as we try 

to craft policies. And I thank you for doing that on Syria. 

With that, I want to thank the witnesses today, both the first 

and second panels. We have a little bit of an issue that has arisen 

that is going to be brewing next week, and at 11 o’clock I am likely 

to have to depart. But I know that we had a classified briefing earlier this week, and we have had a chance to talk with you all as 

well. I know the second panel is made up of people that I very 

much respect, and if I miss you, I apologize. 

But I want to say that this last week I spent a good part of a 

day in south Waziristan and saw the roadways that we are building with U.S. dollars, the dams that we are building with U.S. dollars, the transmission lines that we are building with U.S. dollars 

in an area that was, let us face it, not very long ago the center of 

al-Qaeda activities. And I saw the benefits of that. There is no 

question that bringing civilization to that part of the world and the 

chance for economic growth certainly changes the dynamic. And so 

I want to applaud—I know the chairman was involved in that and 

others have been too. 

On the other hand, as Admiral Mullen testified here 2 years ago, 

we know, for a fact, that the ISI, the intelligence arm of the Pakistani military, is helping coordinate directly activities with the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4

Haqqani network in Afghanistan in conducting high profile activities that are designed to kill and maim Americans and destabilize 

the country. And we know that. 

And I say to the two of you—you have a difficult job. It is complex. But we have got to rectify that problem. And as we move 

ahead with looking at aid, I have a feeling the chairman is going 

to be looking at those issues in a similar light. But we have got 

to rectify this bipolar activity that is taking place that is not in our 

U.S. interest. 

Now, Pakistan has security problems within the country. Candidly, down the road I have a feeling we are going to be worried 

about Pakistan being a stable country and a country with a lot of 

nuclear weapons on mobile launchers. Certainly that is a problem. 

But let me move to Afghanistan, and I am going to say some 

things that are a little bit out of my character but I am going to 

say them. Look, I think that everybody knows over the next 6 

months, actually between now and April, it is a very important 

time in Afghanistan. The bilateral agreement we know needs to be 

done by October, and I know that you all are working toward that 

end. And I know that you know the election being free and fair, 

generally speaking per Afghanistan standards, is something that is 

very important and I know that there are people there on the 

ground both on the Afghan side and our side trying to make that 

happen. 

This administration, though, has tremendous difficulty making 

decisions. This administration has multiple voices within it that 

keep it from having clarity. And I have to tell you, as the chairman 

mentioned, I think the administration has got to quit looking at its 

navel and make a decision on what the force structure is going to 

be in Afghanistan. Our allies are going to have difficulty planning 

and provisioning if we wait much longer. Capital outflows out of 

Afghanistan are increasing dramatically which is causing the economy to be less than it could because we have yet to state what we 

are going to do, generally speaking, as it relates to force structure. 

And I know that we will not do anything if we do not end up with 

a bilat—agreement. 

But I think the fact is that we have got to go ahead and tell our 

allies, tell the people in Afghanistan what we are going to do, generally speaking, as it relates to force structure. And I am telling 

you this continued looking at our navel, trying to make a decision, 

having competing forces at the White House is hurting us. It is 

hurting our efforts in Afghanistan. It is hurting our military and 

it is hurting our allies. 

Now, Karzai. Karzai is the most frustrating world leader we have 

probably dealt with in a long time. He is irrational. It is hard to 

believe that he believes the things that he believes. But he truly 

believes today that we are in cahoots with Pakistan and trying to 

destabilize the country, as crazy as that is. The fact that we have 

spent hundreds of billions of dollars there, we have lost American 

lives and limbs, and the fact that he today believes that somehow 

or another we are coordinating with Pakistan to destabilize it is 

almost beyond belief. But the reason he does is because he knows 

the first fact that I just mentioned and that we have noticed here 

in this committee for a long time. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5

I think he also believes—I do not think he believes this with all 

his heart. I think he thinks—I do not believe this, by the way, and 

I want to make this clear to anybody listening. I do not believe 

this. I think he believes there are some people within the administration that because of previous political issues, almost want 

Afghanistan to fail. I do not. He is a strange person. 

I will say—and this is a minor detail—I think we have helped 

create the kind of relationship that we have with him. Since no one 

at the administration will talk with me about some of the questions 

I have asked about our support of him personally, I would not be 

surprised if we were supporting him personally prior to him even 

being President of Afghanistan. But I think we have helped create 

a monster here. 

So I would just say to the two of you, that you have a tough job. 

I am not speaking to you specifically as I say this, I am speaking 

to the administration. I know that we have a tough and difficult 

and frustrating person to deal with on this bilateral agreement, but 

I hope that this administration is not going to personalize it. I 

know that Karzai has embarrassed the President publicly by talking about the fact that he believes that he is working with Pakistan to destabilize the country, and I know that we have a lot of 

problems with Karzai. I am asking this administration to look 

beyond Karzai—he is going to be gone in April—to look at our 

national interests, to make some decisions with clarity and show 

some world leadership and do the things that we need to do as a 

nation to support these outstanding men and women in uniform 

that have sacrificed life and limb, the taxpayers that have sacrificed precious dollars and move on with this. I am very, very frustrated with this administration and its lack of ability to lead on 

this issue and to provide clarity. 

I hope your testimony helps us with that. I look forward to working with you. I thank you for being public servants. I know it is 

a frustrating job, but it is time to move on this issue. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

With that, let me turn to our witnesses and thank them for their 

participation today. On our first panel, we have the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Jim Dobbins, and Acting 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security 

Affairs, Dr. Peter Lavoy. 

And let me note that while Ambassador Dobbins has only been 

on this particular job for 2 months, he was the first senior American civilian into Afghanistan back in 2001 and raised the flag over 

the newly reopened U.S. Embassy in Kabul. So he is no stranger 

to the region. 

We look forward to your testimony. We ask you to summarize it 

in about 5 minutes or so so we can have a question and answer 

session. Your entire statements will be included in the record. And 

with that, Ambassador Dobbins. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES DOBBINS, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

Ranking Member Corker. Thanks for giving both Peter Lavoy and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6

me an opportunity to appear before you, and thank you for your 

constructive opening remarks and your advice which we will certainly take to heart and make sure others in the administration 

are aware of. 

As you noted, I have only been in my current position for a couple of months, having come back essentially to the same job I had 

12 years ago with respect to Afghanistan just after 9/11. And this 

may give me a somewhat different perspective than those of you 

who have been following Afghanistan from day to day. 

I know we tend to look at the efficacy of our efforts in Afghanistan day to day, project by project, measuring it largely in terms 

of inputs and outputs. But the true measure of our efforts in 

Afghanistan is not either what we put into it or the direct outputs, 

but rather the outcomes. The best measure of education assistance 

is not schools built or even students instructed, but literacy rates. 

The best measure of health assistance is not the number of hospitals built or even patients treated, but increases in longevity. Of 

course, it takes a long time to measure outcomes like this, but we 

have been in Afghanistan and helping Afghanistan for a long time 

now. 

By measures of this sort, outcome measures, and on the basis of 

some research that I completed with some colleagues at RAND just 

a few months before taking up my current job, I believe Afghanistan may actually be the most successful international effort at 

reconstruction in a conflict or post-conflict country over the last 

quarter century. 

In a study that we did at the RAND Corporation, we looked at 

20 cases over the last 25 years where there were civil and military 

interventions in a conflict or post-conflict environment. This 

included all the big United States efforts in Somalia and Haiti, 

Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and about a dozen smaller 

U.N. and other efforts of this sort. And we tried to measure the 

outcomes in these efforts over a 10-year period using statistics and 

indices that were kept by Freedom House, the IMF, the World 

Bank, and UNDP. 

Afghanistan rated quite high on most of those indexes, but 

rather remarkably in the category of human development, it 

showed the best rate of improvement of all 20 of these countries. 

The human development is an index kept by UNDP and it measures a combination of health, education, and standard of living outcomes. And as I said, Afghanistan rated top of all 20. 

Now, this is not just because it was the poorest to start with 

because some of the others were actually poorer. And it is not just 

because it got a lot of assistance because a couple of the others 

actually got more assistance on a per capita basis. 

What does this mean in practical terms? In Afghanistan, it 

means life expectancy has gone from 44 years to 60 years, and that 

is in a country that is still at civil war. 

What does it mean in terms of literacy? It means that Afghanistan has gone from having the worst rate of literacy in the entire 

world, maybe 15 percent back in 2001, to 33 percent literacy today 

and to 60 percent literacy by 2025, if the kids that are in school 

today stay in school. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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It means going from one TV station that was owned by the government to 75 nearly all independent TV stations. 

It means going from 40,000 telephones to 18 million telephones. 

It means cell phone coverage going from 0 to 90 percent of the 

country. 

These are pretty remarkable outcomes. In fact, taken as a whole, 

they may be unmatched outcomes in a conflict or post-conflict 

society. 

Now, this is a pivotal time. NATO and the United States are 

transitioning from a combat to an advisory and assistance role. As 

I think both of you stressed, the United States is committed to continuing to support a fully sovereign, democratic, and united 

Afghanistan. We do not intend to repeat the mistakes we made in 

the 1980s and 1990s. As the Afghans stand up, they will not stand 

alone. We remain committed to a long-term strategic partnership 

with the Afghan Government and the Afghan people. 

As the President said in January, along with President Karzai, 

the United States has two goals: Number one, to train, assist, and 

advise Afghan forces so they can maintain Afghanistan’s security; 

and number two, making sure that we can continue to go after 

remnants of al-Qaeda or its affiliates. 

At the NATO defense ministerial this year in June, NATO allies 

and partners endorsed a detailed concept of the new mission for 

Afghanistan after 2014. 

Regarding the number of American troops to remain in Afghanistan—that is to say, the number of troops that would remain 18 

months from now—the President is still reviewing his options. We 

are, at the same time, continuing our conversation with the 

Afghans about how we can carry out those missions. We have made 

significant progress on the text of a new bilateral security agreement. Of course, without an agreement on our presence in Afghanistan, we would not remain, but we do not believe that that is the 

likely outcome of these negotiations. 

Unlike Iraq to which comparisons are often made, the Afghans 

actually need us to stay. Most Afghans want us to stay, and we 

have promised to stay. None of these three things were true in 

Iraq, and all of these three things are true with respect to Afghanistan. 

While we continue to help Afghans take responsibility for their 

own security, we are also continuing to support an Afghan-led, 

Afghan-owned reconciliation process designed to find a political 

solution to conflict with the Taliban. At the same time, we must 

be clear that our main priority for the coming year is neither the 

military transition nor the reconciliation process, but rather the political transition that will occur when Afghan people choose a new 

President and a new President takes office next year. The future 

stability of Afghanistan rests on the peaceful transition of political 

authority in the course of 2014, and if this occurs, then I believe 

these other problems and challenges will resolve themselves quite 

satisfactorily. 

The first steps in this process is already underway, and we will 

continue to work with the Afghan Government to support their 

electoral process and achieve a successful and unifying political 

transition. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Like any developing country emerging from conflict, Afghanistan 

will require international support for some time. We should, however, recognize that a country that a little more than a decade ago 

provided a haven from which the 9/11 attacks were planned has 

already become a staunch partner in the fight against international 

terrorism. There is much the Afghan people can be proud of, and 

we can be proud of, in the work we have done over the last decade 

and more. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES F. DOBBINS

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the progress of U.S. efforts 

in Afghanistan. 

Although I have been in my current position for less than 2 months, I did briefly 

occupy a similar position nearly 12 years ago, when, in the aftermath of 9/11, I was 

appointed the Bush administration’s first special envoy for Afghanistan. In that 

capacity I represented the United States in the early diplomacy after 9/11 which led 

to the Bonn Conference and the establishment of an interim government in Afghanistan. The Bonn Conference set in motion the political process that produced a new 

constitution for Afghanistan and its first democratically elected government. 

Afghanistan is a remarkably changed place in 2013 as compared to 2001. In 2001, 

fewer than 900,000 children—almost all boys—were in school. Today, that number 

is 8 million, more than one-third of whom are girls. Life expectancy has soared from 

44 years in 2001 to over 60 today. While maternal mortality rates remain too high 

in Afghanistan, women and children are far more likely to survive childbirth than 

they were 11 years ago. In 2001, Afghanistan had one state-run television station. 

Today, the media landscape is among the region’s freest and most vibrant, with over 

45 percent of Afghans owning televisions and 75 television stations and 175 radio 

stations available. Afghans are more connected than ever with more than 18 million 

active cell phone subscribers and a combined phone network that covers 90 percent 

of the population. Remarkably, 80 percent of Afghan women have access to a cell 

phone today. 

To understand the significance of these types of changes, it is useful to put them 

in a broader perspective. A study I published with colleagues at the RAND Corporation just before taking this position looked at the 20 major post-cold-war civilmilitary interventions conducted by the United States, the United Nations, and 

others in conflict and post-conflict states. The study compared outcomes in those 

countries over the 10 years after each intervention. We found that Afghanistan—

even though it was one of only four of the 20 countries still experiencing violent conflict—had by far the greatest improvement of all 20 in its Human Development 

Index score (measured by the United Nations Development Program), the secondgreatest cumulative growth in per capita gross domestic product (based on International Monetary Fund data), and the third-best improvement in its government 

effectiveness score (measured by the World Bank). 

The Human Development Index is an especially useful indicator of Afghanistan’s 

advancement. It is a composite measure of socioeconomic well-being that takes 

account of health, education, and income. Since 2001, Afghanistan’s Human Development Index score has improved faster than the world average, the South Asia 

regional average, and the average for countries with low human development. These 

objective advancements in Afghanistan cannot be explained simply by the low base 

from which progress has been made since 2001. Several of the other 20 countries 

we studied were poorer to begin with and improved less rapidly over 10 years after 

intervention. Nor are these improvements just a manifestation of international aid, 

as Afghanistan was not the largest foreign aid recipient of the 20 countries on a 

per capita basis. These changes are real and can be expected to be durable. 

Afghanistan is still, of course, a poor country, and one that has suffered decades 

of conflict; it has a long way yet to go in its political and economic development. 

No society, whether it has been affected by conflict or not, can be lifted out of poverty, cleansed of corruption, and endowed with fully effective and resilient institutions in the short span of a decade. This is why it is most useful to assess progress 

against a realistic set of expectations. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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In this light, the outcomes produced by American, Afghan, and coalition efforts 

have been impressive, and color the prospects for Afghanistan’s future in many 

ways. Crucially, the people of Afghanistan now have a strong interest in seeing the 

improvements in their country sustained and even further advanced. Hopes and 

expectations have risen for peace, for economic development, and for what the government delivers to the people. Afghanistan will not return to the conditions of 2001 

as the U.S. role shifts in line with the transition processes and shifts in the security 

realm to supporting and assisting the Afghans. 

I am pleased to once again be working to advance U.S. efforts in a now vastly 

changed Afghanistan. This is a pivotal time: NATO and the United States are 

transitioning from a combat to an advisory and assistance role in Afghanistan; 

Afghan authorities are assuming responsibility for their country’s security; and, 

most importantly for Afghanistan’s future stability, next year’s Presidential election 

presents an opportunity for the first transfer of power from one freely elected government to another in the country’s history. 

Fifteen months ago, speaking at Bagram Air Base, President Obama discussed 

the five lines of effort that underpin U.S. policy in Afghanistan, all of which we continue to pursue: (1) successfully implementing the 2014 security, economic, and 

political transition; (2) strengthening the Afghan National Security Forces; (3) building a strong partnership with Afghanistan; (4) supporting an Afghan peace process; 

and (5) enhancing regional cooperation. The steady commitment of the United 

States, and the sacrifices the American people have made in lives and treasure, 

have resulted in progress in Afghanistan that is both significant and likely to endure. 

Against this backdrop our partnership with Afghanistan has continued to mature. 

The United States is committed to continuing to support a fully sovereign, democratic, and united Afghanistan. We have been clear in public and in private, as have 

many of our allies and partners in ISAF and in the broader international community, that we do not intend to repeat the mistakes of the 1980s and 1990s and that 

as the Afghans stand up, they won’t stand alone. Through our Strategic Partnership 

Agreement, our robust civilian assistance within the mutual accountability framework, and our support to the ANSF, we remain committed to a long-term strategic 

partnership with the Afghan Government and the Afghan people. 

As the President said in January with President Karzai, the United States has 

two goals: Number one, to train, assist, and advise Afghan forces so that they can 

maintain their own security; and number two, making sure that we can continue 

to go after remnants of al-Qaeda or other affiliates that might threaten our homeland. That is a very limited mission, and it is not one that would require the same 

kind of footprint, obviously, that we’ve had over the last 10 years in Afghanistan. 

At the NATO Defense Ministers meeting on 5 June, NATO allies and partners 

endorsed a detailed concept of the new mission for Afghanistan after 2014. 

With respect to troop numbers, the President is still reviewing a range of options 

from his national security team and has not made a decision about the size of a 

U.S. military presence after 2014. 

We are continuing our conversations with the Afghans on how we can carry out 

those missions and have made significant progress on the text of a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). Before the suspension of the last round of negotiations by 

President Karzai, we felt we were nearing the completion of the technical aspects 

in the BSA and were very pleased with the productive negotiations to develop an 

agreement that served both countries’ interest. Since the suspension, we continue 

to make clear that we remain prepared to negotiate and conclude the BSA. Of 

course without such an agreement, there could be no such presence, but we do not 

believe that the likely outcome of these negotiations. 

To bolster our partnership, over the past 2 years we have undertaken an active 

diplomatic campaign to rally regional and international support for Afghanistan 

through what we call the Transformation Decade after 2014. From Lisbon to Bonn 

to Chicago to Tokyo, the international community, together with Afghanistan, has 

built a framework that will help support Afghanistan through this formative period. 

A year ago, we agreed at Tokyo to put the relationship between Afghanistan and 

its partners on a foundation of mutual accountability; to pursue continued political, 

economic, and social development; and to support a secure, stable, democratic, and 

prosperous Afghanistan. 

The Afghan Government and donors met in Kabul last week for frank conversations focused on priority actions that were specified in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and that are required to achieve our shared goals. These actions 

include ensuring inclusive, transparent, and credible Presidential and provincial 

council elections next year; respecting and upholding human rights commitments, 

especially maintaining and improving the rights of women; combating corruption; 

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transitioning from a donor-driven to private sector-led economy; improving governance; and ensuring continued development. 

We know that Afghanistan takes seriously the reform commitments made in 

Tokyo last year. These Tokyo commitments reflect Afghanistan’s sincere desire to 

achieve self-sufficiency and economic sovereignty. In Kabul last week, we urged the 

Afghan Government to continue to press for the legislation and regulations required 

to strengthen electoral institutions, combat corruption, and facilitate economic 

growth. We also discussed the need to further improve the way international assistance is delivered. As part of our broader effort to enhance Afghan capacity and 

increase Afghan accountability, we continue to work hard with our Afghan partners 

to increase the amount of direct assistance provided through the Afghan Government. This decision reflects our bilateral commitments to align our programming 

with Afghan priorities as well as our strategic desire to strengthen the Afghan state 

and promote Afghanistan’s sustainable development. 

At the same time, in order to further encourage the Afghan Government to meet 

agreed goals, the United States announced on July 3 the establishment of a new 

$175 million bilateral incentive program to encourage progress on the full range of 

Tokyo reforms. The United States plans to set aside up to $75 million in incentive 

funding available this year, and up to an additional $100 million of planned funding 

available next year. The new program will promote Afghan reform progress with 

flexible funding to be used for development projects or other needs prioritized by the 

Afghan Government. But the funds will only be available if specific and concrete 

progress is made toward the Tokyo goals, including on elections, anticorruption, and 

women’s rights. We look forward to further discussions with the Afghan Government on how we can best implement this new incentive program to promote the 

reforms, which we agree are critical to Afghanistan’s future. 

Over the last year the United States has reoriented its civilian assistance programs to better support Afghan needs during the upcoming transitions and to maximize sustainability. The revised program being put in place now focuses on maintaining the social gains of the last decade (focusing on health, education, and 

women’s rights), building the civilian capacity of the Afghan Government, and mitigating the negative economic impact of troop withdrawal. The new strategy takes 

into account input from the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction 

and other inspectors general, and will consolidate programming along key economic 

corridors, phase out stabilization programs, decrease spending on new infrastructure, and focus on building capacity to maintain prior investments. While new 

spending in the infrastructure sector will focus on commercializing existing services 

and building Afghan capacity to maintain and operate existing infrastructure, we 

will continue to support completion of existing projects proposed under the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF). The AIF will not be used to support new projects 

that would further increase the future financial burden on the Afghan Government.The Department of State, USAID and DOD are working closely together to ensure that Afghan ministries have the necessary capacity and authorities to 

sustainably maintain these investments in the future. 

While our bilateral assistance is an important part of our economic relationship, 

we have also endeavored to promote economic cooperation between Afghanistan and 

its neighbors. We believe that the best way to enable the Afghan people to achieve 

sustained economic progress beyond 2014 is to enable this increased regional 

connectivity—to help the countries of the region dismantle trade barriers, promote 

investment, and support the development of regional energy, transportation, and 

communications links. This is at the very heart of the New Silk Road vision. Our 

support for the Istanbul Process, in particular, promotes a regionally led effort to 

build trust and regional leadership post-2014. 

My colleague Peter Lavoy will speak in more detail about the progress we and 

our Afghan partners have made in developing the Afghan National Security Forces 

over the past 2 years and what we are doing together to ensure continued progress, 

but I want to highlight a few important points on these issues. 

We are in the final stages of transition to Afghan lead for security, realizing commitments that we, our allies, and Afghanistan made at Lisbon in 2010 and 

reaffirmed at Chicago last year. On June 18, we marked the milestone of transition 

to full Afghan lead for security and ISAF’s shift from combat operations to support 

of the Afghan National Security Forces. In concert with reaching the milestone, 

President Karzai announced the fifth and final stage of transition to full Afghan 

lead on security throughout the country, which will begin later this summer and put 

us on track to complete a process begun 2 years ago. While the Taliban remain 

capable of staging dramatic attacks, Afghan forces are demonstrating their growing 

capabilities during this fighting season, taking on the Taliban across Afghanistan 

even as ISAF forces gradually leave the field. But as our forces pull back, we remain 

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committed to ensuring that the ANSF is as strong as it can be. We continue to train 

ANSF units and improve the capacity of the security ministries, a mission that will 

last beyond 2014 as part of NATO’s longer term train, advise, and assist plans. And 

as we work with the Afghans to build a stronger ANSF, we will also partner with 

them on our post-2014 counterterrorism mission that will prevent al-Qaeda from 

again using Afghanistan as a safe haven. 

While helping the Afghans take responsibility for their own security, we are also 

working to support an Afghan-led reconciliation process designed to find a political 

solution to conflict with the Taliban. To that end, in January, President Obama and 

President Karzai called for the establishment of an office in Doha for the purpose 

of enabling negotiations between the Afghan High Peace Council and authorized 

representatives of the Taliban. We appreciate the efforts of the Government of 

Qatar to encourage this process, and the public statements of support from the 

international community, including Pakistan and others. We are appreciative of 

Pakistan’s efforts to further Afghan-led reconciliation, including Pakistan’s call to 

Taliban leaders and insurgents to join talks with the High Peace Council. We continue to encourage consultations between the Afghan and Pakistani Governments 

in support of reconciliation efforts. 

Talking peace means talking to your enemy. The first steps are always hard, and 

a final settlement may be a long time coming. Our goal remains for Afghans to be 

talking to Afghans about how they can move forward, end the violence, and continue 

rebuilding their country. From the start, we have made clear that, as part of any 

outcome, the Taliban and other insurgent groups must end violence, break ties with 

international terrorism, and accept the Afghan Constitution, including its protections for women and minorities. We have also made clear that while the United 

States will try to help facilitate a peace process, negotiations about the future of 

Afghanistan must be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. 

We will continue to work to promote a peace process, but this cannot distract from 

the main priority in the coming year—the political transition that will occur when 

the Afghan people choose a new President next April. I cannot stress enough the 

importance of a successful and democratic political transition next year and, as an 

essential part of that, a credible and timely election process that reflects the will 

of the Afghan people. Next April’s election will be a momentous occasion in Afghanistan’s national history. The future stability of Afghanistan rests on a peaceful transition of political authority from President Karzai to his successor in 2014 through 

an election that Afghans themselves accept as credible. Afghans know that inclusive 

elections are critical to their country’s stability, as well as to sustaining international commitments to Afghanistan. 

The first steps in the process have already been taken. We urge the Afghan Government and Parliament to take the next critical steps and pass electoral legislation 

that provides for appointments of electoral officials and an independent complaints 

process, and for President Karzai to sign them into law, as he has promised to do, 

in order to ensure the credibility of the elections processes. A successful and unifying political transition based on a transparent, inclusive, free, and fair election 

will reaffirm to the Afghan people and the international community that Afghanistan’s commitment to democracy, peace, and prosperity remains strong and unwavering. 

The Afghans have already taken significant steps to prepare for this historic process. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) has created a timeline for the elections, designed a public education campaign for voters, and developed a comprehensive operational plan to combat fraud and expand participation, including of women. 

Political leaders have been meeting to clarify a common understanding of how elections should be conducted, who should run and on what platform, and how to ensure 

that influential political factions respect the result. It is encouraging that Afghans 

understand that nothing will strengthen Afghanistan more than an election that 

serves to unify their country. I want to reaffirm that the United States will not 

endorse any single party or candidate. However, we along with the international 

community will be paying close attention to the election process as it unfolds. We 

will continue to encourage all political figures to play a positive and unifying role, 

irrespective of their differences, to help ensure a transparent, peaceful, and democratic political process that fulfills the aspirations of Afghans. The Afghan people 

deserve nothing less given their sacrifices over the past three decades. 

We are providing significant financial and program assistance to help Afghans 

build credible and independent electoral institutions. In doing so, we emphasize the 

importance of expanding voter participation, particularly for women, and of ensuring the independence of the election commission, as well as the need for an independent complaints commission and consultative procedures for selecting commissioners. We are engaging intensively with Afghan officials, civil society, and political 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12

leaders to support their efforts to establish effective elections processes. We also are 

coordinating closely with the U.N. and with other donors on training, public information campaigns, fraud mitigation, domestic observation efforts, and improved 

ways to identify eligible voters. 

The U.S. Government provided $179 million in assistance for 2009–2013 for programs focusing on effective voter registration, civic and voter education, electoral 

reform and legislation, and expanding political participation. For the 2014 Presidential and provincial council elections, USAID plans to contribute an additional 

$110 million. Of this amount, about $75 million directly supports the UNDP–

ELECT project working with the two main Afghan electoral bodies, the Independent 

Election Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). An additional $15–20 million has been budgeted to assist civil society actors that are 

stakeholders in the democratic process (e.g., women’s groups, media, youth, political 

party capacity-building, and election observers). For the 2015 parliamentary election 

USAID is budgeting additional funding for democratic stakeholders that has yet to 

be determined. 

Afghanistan has made impressive progress since 2001. Afghanistan is freer and 

more prosperous, people are better educated, healthier, and enjoy much greater economic opportunity. Like any developing country emerging from conflict, Afghanistan 

will require international support for some time, but Afghans are determined to 

stand up. A country that a little more than a decade ago provided the haven from 

which the 9/11 attacks were planned has become a staunch partner against international terrorism. There is much the Afghan people can be proud of, and we can 

be proud to stand at their side, working together to ensure that these tremendous 

accomplishments are not reversed. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I look forward to your 

questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Dr. Lavoy. 

STATEMENT OF DR. PETER R. LAVOY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. LAVOY. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and 

members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss 

with you today the present status and future course of our military 

engagement in Afghanistan. It is an honor to be here with Ambassador Dobbins to discuss both the significant progress we are making and the very real challenges we continue to face in the country. 

Our fundamental objectives in Afghanistan have not changed. 

Our goal remains to deny safe havens to al-Qaeda and its affiliates 

and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government. Over the past 4 years, due to the dedication, hard work, 

and sacrifices of our forces, our coalition partners, and the Afghan 

security forces and population, we have made significant progress 

in advancing those objectives. 

Today the Afghan people have greater economic opportunity and 

greater access to health care, better and more education, and more 

freedoms and individual rights, especially for women, than ever 

before. As committed to in Chicago last year and reaffirmed at the 

Presidential summit this January, the Afghan National Security 

Forces, or ANSF, last month took the lead countrywide for providing security to the people of Afghanistan. 

This important milestone also signaled a shift in the International Security Assistance Forces’ primary mission from combat 

to assisting the ANSF. The combat leadership shift from ISAF to 

ANSF demonstrates the capability and resolve of the Afghan Army 

and police to secure their people and their nation. It also enables 

the United States and other ISAF nations to continue reducing the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13

presence of their combat forces. The 2013 security milestone and 

final tranche of the transition process will mark the fulfillment of 

the pledges our leaders made in Lisbon and Chicago. 

The ANSF are being tested this fighting season but are performing admirably. Afghan forces now plan and conduct the overwhelming majority of combat operations and are also taking the 

vast majority of casualties. However, despite heavy fighting, the 

Afghans are holding the gains of recent years and the Taliban must 

come to grips with the fact that they cannot defeat the Afghan 

National Security Forces militarily. 

The United States is transitioning in Afghanistan, not leaving. 

We are on track to bring the ISAF mission to a close by the end 

of 2014 and transition to Operation Resolute Support, a new train, 

advise, and assist mission under a NATO umbrella. Beyond this 

NATO mission, the United States also plans to conduct a narrowly 

focused counterterrorism mission. 

The United States and Afghanistan are already negotiating a 

bilateral security agreement to provide the necessary framework to 

support the presence of U.S. forces to accomplish these missions. 

NATO is also preparing to negotiate such a framework with 

Afghanistan. 

While the United States has not made a decision on the size of 

the post-2014 military presence, our planning and our ultimate 

United States presence will be guided by a number of factors to include: progress toward our core goal of defeating al-Qaeda in the 

region; second, the potential for peace talks between the Afghan 

Government and the Taliban; third, continued progress with the 

ANSF; fourth, Afghanistan’s political transition centered on the 

elections in April 2014; fifth, the regional setting; and finally, concluding the United States-Afghanistan bilateral security agreement 

and the NATO-Afghanistan status of forces agreement. 

We will keep Congress informed of any post-2014 U.S. presence 

decisions and developments in other areas such as the BSA. 

This is a critical time for our shared effort in Afghanistan. After 

more than a decade of war and tremendous sacrifices by the people 

of the United States, our coalition partners, and Afghans, we can 

see the prospect for peace and stability in Afghanistan. 

Thank you for your continuing support to the mission in Afghanistan and to our men and women in uniform, without which none 

of this would be possible. Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lavoy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PETER R. LAVOY

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify before you today to discuss the present status 

and future course of our military engagement in Afghanistan. It’s an honor to be 

here with Ambassador Dobbins to discuss both the progress we are making and the 

challenges we continue to face. 

Our fundamental objectives in Afghanistan have not changed. Our goal remains 

to deny safe havens to al-Qaeda and its affiliates and to deny the Taliban the ability 

to overthrow the Afghan Government. Over the past 4 years, due to the dedication 

and sacrifice of our forces, our coalition partners, and the Afghan security forces and 

people, we have made significant progress in advancing those objectives. 

Today, the Afghan people have greater economic opportunity, greater access to 

health care, better and more education and more freedoms and individual rights, 

especially for women, than ever before. As committed to in Chicago last year and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

14

reaffirmed at the Presidential summit this January, the Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) last month took the lead countrywide for providing security for the 

people of Afghanistan. 

This important milestone also signaled a shift in the International Security 

Assistance Force’s primary mission from combat to assisting the ANSF. The combat 

leadership shift from ISAF to the ANSF demonstrates the capability and resolve of 

the Afghan army and police to secure their people and their nation. It also enables 

the United States and other ISAF nations to continue reducing the presence of their 

combat forces. The 2013 security milestone and final tranche of the transition process will mark the fulfillment of the pledges our leaders made in Lisbon and Chicago. 

The ANSF are being tested this fighting season, but are performing admirably. 

Afghan forces now plan and conduct the overwhelming majority of combat operations and are also taking the vast majority of casualties. However, despite heavy 

fighting, the Afghans are holding the gains of recent years and the Taliban must 

come to grips with the fact that they cannot defeat the ANSF militarily. 

The United States is transitioning in Afghanistan, not leaving. We are on track 

to bring the ISAF mission to a close by the end of 2014, and transition to Operation 

RESOLUTE SUPPORT, a new train, advise, and assist mission under a NATO 

umbrella. Beyond this NATO mission, the United States also plans to conduct a narrowly focused counterterrorism mission. 

The United States and Afghanistan are already negotiating on a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) to provide the necessary framework to support the presence 

of U.S. forces to accomplish these missions. NATO is also preparing to negotiate 

such a framework with Afghanistan. 

While the United States has not made a decision on the size of the post-2014 military presence, our planning and our ultimate U.S. presence will be guided by a 

number of factors, to include:

• Progress toward our core goal of defeating al-Qaeda in the region; 

• The potential for peace talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban; 

• Continued progress with the ANSF; 

• Afghan political transition, centered on the elections in April 2014; 

• The regional setting; and 

• Concluding the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement and the NATOAfghanistan Status of Forces Agreement.

We will keep Congress informed of any post-2014 U.S. presence decisions and 

developments in other areas such as the Bilateral Security Agreement. 

This is a critical time for our shared effort in Afghanistan. After more than a decade of war, and tremendous sacrifices by the people of the United States, our coalition partners, and Afghanistan, we can see the prospect for peace and stability in 

Afghanistan. 

Thank you for your continuing support to the mission in Afghanistan and our men 

and women in uniform, without which none of this would be possible. I look forward 

to answering your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you both for your testimony. 

There is a lot of ground to cover here, so let me start. 

Ambassador Dobbins, we seem to have spent, from my perspective, an enormous amount of time on this reconciliation effort. I am 

not sure that the Taliban, looking at the Karzai government leaving next year, looking at the reduction of international forces, 

really believes that it is the right negotiating moment for them. 

But the one thing that is very important from my perspective is 

the elections. And I am trying to understand. We hear very little 

about our efforts with the elections. We have a witness from our 

second panel who flew in from Afghanistan, for which we are very 

grateful, Mr. Ahmad Nader Nadery of the Fair and Free Elections 

Foundation of Afghanistan. I was reading his testimony. He has a 

series of items that are critical toward elections that are ultimately 

fair, transparent, and for which there can be confidence of the 

Afghan people as we move forward, which in the longer term process is going to be a critical part of any reconciliation effort that, 

as you described, is led by the Afghans at the end of the day. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

15

What are we doing to ensure these elections are taking place in 

a successful way? In 2009, we appointed a senior official to coordinate support for the elections at the Embassy in Kabul to signify 

how important a priority this was for the United States. Why do 

we not do this again? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Well, on the reconciliation issue, I mean, we are determined to 

move forward on this in lockstep with the Government of Afghanistan. The objective here is not for us to negotiate peace in Afghanistan. The objective is for us to promote an Afghan process, a process between the insurgency and the government and the high peace 

council of government is formed to address these issues. We do not 

expect it to progress quickly. We are not sure it will start at all 

over the next year. And we are certainly not going to let it distract 

us from these other priorities, as you correctly suggest. 

On elections, the United States, through both State and AID 

financing, is joining a large-scale international effort to fund both 

the election process in terms of the machinery and also the ‘‘get out 

the vote’’ type education process that can assist in ensuring that 

this is a satisfactory election. 

I will take aboard the suggestion that somebody at a significantly 

senior level be appointed specifically for this in the Embassy. That 

may be helpful. I am sure the Embassy is devoting a great deal of 

attention to it. 

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to get all the time on the—I know 

the facts, and I know that we have moneys ascribed. 

My problem is I do not get the sense that in our focus in Afghanistan that one of our critical focuses is getting the Afghan Government to make the appointments to the Election Commission, to 

make the other appointments to the Supreme Court, to create the 

structure that all the money in the world bringing out to vote will 

not guarantee unless we have a structure at the end of the day 

that can have disputes settled in a fair, honest, transparent way. 

And so are we engaging through our Embassy there, through the 

State Department, through your own representation with President 

Karzai to make it crystal clear that it is very important to make 

these appointments, that we will look at this as part of our overall 

assistance? Because from my perspective, if we do not have elections that are fair and transparent, we are going to have a huge 

challenge in addition to the security question ahead. And I think 

we have lost sight of that as a major part of what we should be 

doing. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I agree with you entirely. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is not good news. If you agree with me 

entirely that we have lost sight of it, that is not good news. The 

question is, How do we change the course here because we are talking about April of next year? That is months away. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I agree with you entirely on the importance, indeed, the priority that is given to this. In fact, I think 

every time I have spoken to any audience on Afghanistan, I have 

made clear that among all of the major transitions that are taking 

place, this is the most critical one. 

There are two pieces of legislation that are the critical inputs to 

creating the Electoral Commission and a Complaints Commission 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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that are currently in their Parliament. They are moving through 

their Parliament. They have passed Houses. They are in the process of negotiation between the two Houses. As you know, legislative 

processes are not subject to, you know, light switch type influence, 

but the President has said that he will keep the Parliament in session through Ramadan, if necessary, in order to get this legislation 

out, and he has promised me and he has promised everybody else 

who has visited, probably Senator Corker, too, when he saw him. 

He has promised to sign this legislation as soon as it is out. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think there are appointments to be made. 

Those appointments are executive powers. We need to see those 

appointments made. It is not about a legislative process at the end 

of the day. So I think there are very clear benchmarks here that 

we are not reaching that ultimately are going to provide a problem 

for us next April. And I hope that I am wrong, but what we need 

is a fair and open, transparent election that all parties in Afghanistan can ultimately believe that their future is dictated by an honest election. And if we do not get that, then everything else we are 

talking about is going to fall apart. 

Let me ask Dr. Lavoy. Today the Washington Post in an article 

says the Afghan army struggles with lack of reach, and it talks 

about a realization by many commanders that, ‘‘part of Afghanistan will probably remain in the enemy’s hands.’’ And it talks 

about the challenges of that Afghan army. 

Now, after spending a small fortune in trying to build this army, 

what are our abilities to help them move in a direction—I have 

heard all the testimony. I honor their leading the fight and losing 

lives. But I am looking at what this article and other information 

suggests, and it seems to me that there are critical gaps here that 

even the most courageous soldiers in the Afghan army and their 

commanders are going to face moving forward. Are we looking at 

how we deal in a support role to helping the Afghans be able to 

achieve their own security? 

Dr. LAVOY. Thank you for that question, Chairman. It is a very 

important issue. 

I think the story of the Afghan National Security Forces is really 

one of success and really a remarkable success. If you look back 5 

or 6 years ago, there were only 70,000 Afghan National Security 

Forces. Today there is an authorized ceiling of 352,000 forces and 

an actual amount of somewhere over 340,000. Not only the quantitative change but the qualitative change of this capability, the 

army and the police, has been amazing. These forces are now, as 

I said in my prepared remarks, out there leading combat operations throughout the country. They are encountering a lot of 

resistance. They are taking a lot of casualties, but they are standing up to that resistance. They are an increasingly professional 

force that is getting the job done and doing a better job each and 

every day. 

You asked, specifically, are there gaps. Yes, there are gaps. 

Today the Afghan National Army and the police are not totally 

self-sustainable entities capable of doing everything. We are providing critical support and assistance to them. ISAF is. That 

enables them to do the jobs. But I think one of the most remarkable features in the last 2 years is the ability for the army and the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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police to do more and more of the job themselves. They are increasingly planning operations themselves. They are pulling in intelligence, identifying where adversaries are, identifying threats to 

populations, and they are going after those threats successfully. 

They are clearing routes. They are providing for their own enabling 

capabilities. 

Where we find the biggest gaps today is really at the ministerial 

level, at the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior where 

they need critical, basically, support to the army and the police 

that are out there operating. They need a human capital strategy. 

They need to manage contracts, payrolls, food, fuel, other logistics, 

planning, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, et cetera. So as 

the Afghan army and police are increasingly capable operationally 

in getting the job done, the focus of our assistance is shifting now 

to higher echelons and to support that supportive structure. 

Now, you specifically asked, Are they capable of getting out to 

the parts of the country where that is threatened by the insurgency? Afghanistan, as you know, sir—and all of you have been to 

Afghanistan—is a difficult country to get around. The communication network is not very well established. It is a mountainous country. It is hard to access different places. So that is a challenge for 

any military force inside Afghanistan to access the remote parts of 

that country. And that is the challenge that the army and the 

police will continue to face. We are working with them to improve 

their mobility so they can get out there, but that will be an enduring challenge that they will face. 

The CHAIRMAN. I have followup questions, but I will wait for a 

second round. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate your line of questioning. 

Let me say to the witnesses again I do appreciate your public 

service. I know that the leader of Afghanistan is a very frustrating 

individual, and I will say this and you do not have to agree. I know 

it is also frustrating trying to solve a problem when we have an 

administration that has such difficulty making a decision and providing clarity. So I know that you guys are whipsawed. I hope that 

you can help the administration soon have some clarity and make 

a decision. But I thank you for your work. 

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the election. And I did sit down 

with the chief election officer there, Mr. Amarkhil, I believe, and 

I know you have worked with him. And I just want to ask the witnesses, Is there any question that as people begin to hedge their 

bets because they do not yet know what our force structure is going 

to be and what kind of commitments we and NATO are going to 

make—is there any question that the hedging that is taking place, 

the capital outflows that are occurring works against U.S. interest 

at present? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think it is important to reassure Afghans 

that we are going to be committed to that long-term security, stability, and prosperity. And I think to be fair, we have gone a long 

way in doing that. 

I take your point that more certainty on force levels would be 

helpful. That is a decision that is still 18 months away, and we will 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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probably know a lot more about what is actually necessary once we 

get through this fighting season with the Afghans in the lead and 

we will know what they need and what they do not need. But I 

take your point. I think it is certainly a valid argument. 

On the election process, just to go back to the chairman’s question, I mean, this is something that the President has raised 

repeatedly with Karzai, including during his visit in January and 

since. It is something that the Secretary raised when he was last 

in Kabul. It is the only meeting he had outside of meetings with 

the government was on this topic. And it was the main issue at the 

recent donors conference that took place in Kabul where they went 

through the various Afghan performance and commitments, and 

the major emphasis in those discussions was on the importance of 

meeting the election targets to long-term assistance to the country. 

Senator CORKER. So the chairman has asked you a question and 

you have pointed out that we really have not formalized a structure 

to help make that happen. I sat down with several of the people 

that may well run for President, and they are very concerned about 

the fact that we are not doing the things yet that we need to do 

to ensure that there is a free and fair election. I agree with the 

chairman. If that does not exist or at least by some standard, 

which may be a little different than we have here, I think it is 

going to be the greatest destabilizing thing that can possibly occur. 

Let me just ask you another question relative to the elections. Is 

people’s perception about security within the country an important 

factor as to whether we are going to have a good election process? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. It will certainly be a factor in areas with 

heightened insecurity, and indeed, there are some areas where it 

may become difficult to vote. At the moment, the responsible 

Afghan officials are pretty confident that they can maintain adequate security throughout the vast majority of the country to permit the election to go forward. So the answer, of course, is yes, it 

is a factor. 

I have not seen the latest statistics but by and large the Afghans, 

while they continue to be concerned about security, also continue 

to regard it as having improved in almost all of the country almost 

all of the time, which is encouraging. And they also have remarkably high confidence in the quality and capabilities of their own 

armed forces. But I think you are again, I think, making the point 

that we need to assure them that our commitment to Afghanistan’s 

development and security is an enduring one. 

Senator CORKER. So if they take the risk of getting out and getting involved in elections and they are not sure what our commitments are—of course, I hope they will know by that time. So I 

guess in many ways that issue hopefully will be decided by the 

administration. 

Let me move on to another issue. The chairman mentioned a 

story that he read this morning about the capability of the Afghan 

forces. I think all of you and everybody here that has looked at the 

charts realizes that the Afghans are the ones taking most of the 

casualties today. They are the ones that are out in front. But there 

is a debate within the administration right now about force levels. 

And I would like for Mr. Lavoy, if he would, to speak to this. I 

guess there is a corps in Kabul and then six corps scattered around 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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the country that are part of the Afghan military. And one of the 

great factors that NATO—one of the great assets that NATO represents to the Afghans right now is the role of enabling them. In 

other words, we are able to cause them to be far more effective if 

we have the ability to be involved in all seven of those corps. And 

yet, for some reason right now, it appears the administration is 

actually considering not providing the very few thousand, maybe 

not even that many, folks that would enable that to occur and for 

the country to actually have much greater security. This is an option for the administration, a decision for some reason, despite all 

that Americans have done over the last 11 years. 

Mr. Lavoy, I would like for you to speak to the importance of our 

NATO force structure being such that we have the ability to actually have people out scattered around the country enabling the 

Afghans to secure their own country. 

Dr. LAVOY. That is a very important issue, Ranking Member 

Corker. 

Today, as I indicated earlier, the Afghan National Army and 

police are capable of performing operations on their own, but we do 

continue to provide, assist, and support to them to improve their 

effectiveness. Our desire, our objective is by 2015 for the Afghans 

to have all of the capabilities to be largely self-sufficient in all 

aspects of security. So planning operations, conducting the operations, withdrawing from operations successfully, doing medevac, 

doing all the other critical tasks. 

So we are working very hard now to help them adopt and integrate those enabling capabilities inside the army and police structure today. That is a big challenge, as I indicated. Just 6 years ago, 

there were only 70,000 ANSF. Today it is a much bigger army, as 

you indicated, corps spread throughout the country, and the police 

also have seen commensurate growth and in adopting new qualitative aspects to perform all aspects of their missions. 

So this is an ongoing process, and I would agree with you that 

the coalition is providing absolutely essential support for the ANSF 

to become more sustainable and ultimately a more self-sufficient 

force. 

Senator CORKER. And if we were to try to, for some reason that 

would be unknown to me after all that has happened—if we were 

to try to just shave a little bit for some reason, the risk factors geometrically grow. Do they not? 

Dr. LAVOY. Well, sir, I think as I indicated, the administration 

has a process in place where we will be doing periodic reviews of 

the performance of the ANSF and of other indicators that I indicated, the political transition and other factors that are critically 

important. So we will be assessing how well the ANSF perform 

over the course of this fighting season. And this is the first year 

that the ANSF are actually in the lead in combat, this fighting 

season. And we will make assessments and the necessary adjustments so that they have the capacity and the enabling capability 

to continue to perform admirably and provide that security for the 

population. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate this 

timely hearing. I actually think it is very timely. I think decisions 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20

hopefully—hopefully—will be made soon. I do think the lack of 

clarity is almost embarrassing and I think hurting our effort. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here. I know that you 

all are public servants that are very respected. I thank you for giving us an opportunity to share our frustrations publicly. I want to 

assure you I have done it privately also. So thank you, and I look 

forward to hopefully a good outcome. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

let me thank both of our witnesses not only for being here but for 

your service to our country. 

I want to follow up on some of the questions that have been 

asked. I certainly share the concern about clarity and transparency 

with the Congress as we move forward on the removal of our combat troops from Afghanistan. 

The election issues are very important. Good governance is important. Over these years, many of us have expressed concern, 

frustration about the corruption of the Afghan Government. We 

have seen over and over again countries’ stability challenged and 

overthrown as a result of corrupt regimes. 

What steps are we taking, in addition to the election process, to 

improve the governance in Afghanistan so that there is confidence 

among the people of Afghanistan that they are being treated fairly, 

which in turn gives us a much better chance for a stable regime? 

In a way, the United States has contributed to some of that corruption by the manner in which aid has been made available. What 

are we doing? Can you assure us that the way that we are proceeding will reduce the corruption within the Afghan Government 

so that we can have better governance as the United States transitions to the next stage in Afghanistan? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, we share your concern, Senator, 

about corruption, and it is a major focus of not only our efforts but 

the international community’s efforts as a whole both to police ourselves, in terms of the degree to which our assistance efforts can 

be misused and to strengthen the government. 

I think we have to recognize, first of all, that Afghanistan is in 

Central Asia, and so when we talk about levels of corruption, we 

need to look at Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. We need to note 

that Afghanistan has a more efficient tax collection system than 

Pakistan, only marginally so, and it puts it in a little bit of 

perspective. 

Senator CARDIN. So some of your comparisons are not exactly the 

best countries that we like to——

Ambassador DOBBINS. No, they are the worst. 

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. Look at as model examples of good 

governance. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. No. Exactly. They are the worst. But that 

is the neighborhood that Afghanistan is in. And Afghanistan was, 

first of all, the poorest of all those countries to start with, and it 

had no government at all. 

Senator CARDIN. But the United States has been actively

engaged in the country now for 11 years. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I agree with that. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21

Senator CARDIN. So, you know, we should be able to have some 

impact on what legacy we leave to the people of Afghanistan. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I agree entirely with you. And this is a 

problem on which we need to continue to work in terms of our own 

efforts. About 10 percent of our total civilian strength in Afghanistan is dedicated to oversight and accountability of our own programs. In terms of the effectiveness of our aid programs, in my 

opening statement I think I mentioned that if you look at outcomes, if you look at levels of literacy, levels of longevity, the projection of health care, education, the Afghan Government is actually providing services which have historically never been provided 

before in Afghanistan to the population, certainly not at current 

levels. 

So despite the corruption, despite having had no government at 

all 10 years ago when I last held this position or 12 years ago, 

rather, when I last held this position, you have a government that 

is performing by regional standards not very badly and by standards compared to other conflict and post-conflict societies, among 

the best in terms of actually delivering services and producing outcomes that improve the lives of the population. 

Now, that does not mean that you are not absolutely right to 

keep harping on corruption and keep insisting that we do more 

about it. 

Senator CARDIN. For the Afghan people to have a reasonable 

chance for a stable government—Senator Corker is right—they 

have to have a secure country. The military issues are very, very 

important. Governance is extremely important and the corruption 

issue I would point out I think we have not taken aggressive 

enough steps during these years to give a better opportunity for 

good governance. And finally, economic opportunity—the removal 

of the international military presence is going to have a major 

impact on the economy of Afghanistan. 

What steps are being taken in order to provide economic opportunity for the people of Afghanistan as we transition to the elimination of American combat troops? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think there is no doubt that the

reductions in the NATO military presence there is going to have 

some impact on the economy. I think the latest World Bank assessment was that it would lead to not a negative growth but a significant drop in positive growth. It is important that the nonmilitary 

assistance flows continue beyond the departure date for most U.S. 

troops, and I think that is one answer to your question. 

There is no doubt that the Afghan economy has undergone considerable growth over the last decade. Indeed, I think the increase 

in GDP on a per capita basis is about 130 percent over that period, 

which is pretty substantial. Afghanistan has been growing at a rate 

comparable to China for most of the period we have been there, 

and that is probably not going to continue. You are going to see 

some diminution in that growth, and it will be important for our 

assistance and other forms of international assistance to continue 

to flow in the post-2014 period. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I agree with Senator Corker in 

regards to the need for the military security of Afghanistan. I think 

I may come at it from a different perspective as to the need for 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22

American troops to be there. But I think every member of this committee wants to see more clarity on how the decisions are being 

made on troop levels as we go into this critical year. So I would 

just urge the continued openness to this committee as those decisions are being made. Americans expect Afghanistan to take 

responsibility for its own country, and I think we need to know 

what continued commitments are being made on behalf of America. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I want to associate myself with the remarks of both 

Senator Corker and Senator Cardin regarding the clarity issue on 

those decisions. I think it is critical not only for Congress but for 

the American people to have a much, much better understanding, 

higher level of understanding than we do. 

Having said that, those of us on this side have an important 

meeting at 11 o’clock this morning, and I was just called yesterday, 

which is unfortunate because this is a critically important issue. 

We will obviously be watching the transcript of this as we go forward. I was hoping to hear at least part of panel two, but that is 

not going to be possible. But in any event, I am going to yield back 

my time, again with the thanks for holding this hearing, and we 

will review the transcript after we are done. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome you, 

Mr. Ambassador, and Doctor, thank you for your public service. 

I wanted to start by way of reiteration, harkening back to what 

the chairman said about the elections and what happened in our 

committee as it relates to the resolution which has now been 

passed by unanimous consent in the Senate that you reconsider the 

position the administration took with regard to dedicating an 

ambassadorial level person to monitor the elections and to make a 

much greater commitment because I believe that if we do not have 

that kind of oversight or involvement as it relates to the Afghan 

elections, our strategy will be adversely impacted. So I will just 

make that point and we can develop it further later. 

I wanted to start, though, with a question as it relates to women 

and girls in Afghanistan. We have had, over the last decade or so, 

tremendous progress in the number of girls going to school, literally millions now that were not going to school before, a lot more 

participation by women in the political process, even more involvement of women in the Afghan security forces. 

Unfortunately, though, we have at the same time a great concern. We know that just recently in Helmand, Lt. Islam Bibi was 

assassinated. She joined the police force 9 years ago when it was 

particularly risky to do so. That is a grave understatement. So we 

have had progress in some areas but setbacks. An overarching concern is that when we draw down completely, when our forces are 

out, when our focus is elsewhere, that Afghanistan will go back to 

the old ways where women are not just marginalized but really targeted for discrimination and abuse and no effort or little effort will 

be undertaken to either maintain the gains or to advance in the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23

direction of more political participation and more involvement of 

women in the Afghan National Security Forces. 

So because of that concern, I had introduced and got passed an 

amendment to the Defense Authorization Act which requires both 

of your Departments, State and Defense, to report on efforts to 

improve both the recruitment of women, as well as the retention 

of women, in the Afghan security forces. In addition to that, the 

report has to speak to efforts made to train male security personnel 

on gender sensitivity. 

So I would ask you a two-part question. It is really for both of 

you. Number one is, How do you assess progress on both of those 

measures? And number two, When will the report be submitted? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, let me just say a general word and 

then turn to Peter on the more specific. 

We share your priority on the role of women. We agree that there 

has been remarkable progress particularly when you are changing 

the social mores of an entire society. The role of women and women’s equality is a problem in societies that are far more developed 

than Afghanistan. And so I think that we can take some satisfaction to the degree that it has been made. There is danger of rollback, and it is one of the reasons why a continued American commitment, once we withdraw from combat operations, is going to 

continue to be important. 

Let me turn to Peter on the more specific question. 

Dr. LAVOY. Thanks, Jim. 

Yes, let me also speak to your general issue. The role of women 

in the armed forces is a priority for us. What is a very positive 

development to observe for the leadership of the military, for the 

leadership of the army and the police, incorporating more women, 

giving them more responsibility, and treating them with the same 

dignity and respect as other soldiers and police is a priority for that 

leadership now. They are incorporating these norms and values in 

the leadership. So I do believe this will be sustainable going 

forward. 

And the statistics I think are impressive. I have here that the 

Afghan Army—there are now over 400 women in the army, and 

that is very significant from zero. The Afghan police—there are 

over 1,500 women now serving in the police. And in Afghanistan’s 

very small air force, there are 44 women now serving in this. 

So I think that the strides have been made to have these women 

in there. And I have met a number of these women in Afghanistan. 

They are some of the most patriotic professional people in the 

entire country, and I think that experience is showing people that 

come from a different mindset, a different cultural background that 

the role of women should be here to stay in Afghanistan and it is 

important for Afghans to recognize that. And I believe this is taking place. And I think it is your support and others’ that have 

pushed us in this direction, the right direction, and it is working. 

Sir, you asked about this particular report. I can tell you right 

now that we are incorporating all the information that you have 

asked for in the broader 1230 report on Afghan National Security 

Forces, and I believe we have information coming up to you very 

quickly on when this will be handed over to you. But my underFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24

standing is that it will be coming up very, very soon. But we are 

attentive to it, sir. 

Senator CASEY. Are we talking days or weeks? 

Dr. LAVOY. It will be by the end of this month. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. I appreciate that because 

like any society, we will measure the progress in Afghanistan, 

especially after we are disengaged, by one of several measures. 

This will be one of them, women’s participation. It is extraordinary, 

as you know and as people in the audience know that have had 

some interaction with women in Afghanistan directly. 

I had an opportunity back in 2011 to sit with women, parliamentarians, people involved in the political process. One in particular, 

both her father and her husband were killed because of their political participation. Despite that horror, she still went forward and 

ran for office and stayed involved. So both on the political front and 

on the security front, it is vitally important. 

I am running low on time, but I will submit a question for the record as well on the NRC Southwest, the $34 million building, 

which I know has been raised as a taxpayer issue and a taxpayer 

concern about waste. And I will submit one for the record about the 

Pentagon’s commitment on making sure that no more money is 

wasted on that kind of a structure. But I know we are out of time. 

But thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

focus on this issue and for this hearing. Thank you to both of you 

for being here today. 

I recently returned from my fourth trip to Afghanistan, and I 

guess I came back with sort of three top-level takeaways. 

One, to agree in part with your assessment of our ability to stand 

up the Afghan military. They have clearly made significant gains. 

They certainly are able to fight on their own in many parts of the 

country. I am not necessarily sure I would share the same optimism or put them in the same boat as the status of the police 

forces, but the military certainly shows a lot of progress. 

On the negative side two sort of connected takeaways, one was 

a pretty surprising amount of diversity of opinion on behalf of U.S. 

personnel there as to what is going to happen once we significantly 

draw down and, second, the opinion that comes from the Taliban 

that they are winning the fight there today, that they are very optimistic about their ability to take some significant control of portions of the country once we leave. And as I was there right at the 

beginning of the spring fighting season, there was a lot of talk 

about this being a very decisive moment in terms of that impression on the ground amongst the Taliban and many Afghan civilians 

that the Taliban is doing very well. 

So I guess, Ambassador Dobbins, I will just ask you this. What 

do we know so far about the spring fighting season? What do we 

know about the optimism of the Taliban? How has the military performed? I mean, it seems like we say every single year this is going 

to be a critical fighting season, but this one certainly seems to be 

true. What do we know so far? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think Peter, I am sure, will want 

to comment on this as well. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

25

The Afghan forces are definitely in the lead. They are taking, by 

far, the majority of casualties, and in our judgment they are holding up well. But they are under significant pressure. Clearly the 

insurgents are making every effort to knock them off balance and 

to undermine their self-confidence as they step out on their own. 

In terms of the Taliban, our impression is that there is something of a debate within the movement between those who see the 

military route as the only route forward and are confident of their 

ability to ultimately prevail and those who have a broader recognition of the changes that have taken place in Afghan society, the unwillingness of the population to return to the conditions they were 

in a decade ago, and the recognition that if the Taliban were to win 

a military victory, the health clinics would close, the schools would 

close, the cell phone towers would close, the roads would get 

potholed, the TV stations would go off the air, they would be getting no assistance, they would be recognized by no country in the 

world. And even if they were successful militarily, they could not 

govern that country for any length of time. And that is the element 

that is arguing that they need to negotiate as well as fight. I do 

not know that there are any of them who just think they should 

negotiate, but there are those who think they should justify it and 

those who think they should do both. So that is the kind of division 

that we have seen so far. 

But, Peter? 

Dr. LAVOY. Yes, thank you, Senator Murphy. 

As you witnessed yourself, the Afghan security forces are doing 

a good job, and I think they are confident that they can achieve 

their mission. They are taking a lot of casualties. I think it is somewhere close to 400 killed in action every month total between army 

and police. So the insurgents are going after them. But this poses 

a threat, a threat to their individual security, but operationally 

they have performed very well and they continue to hold and 

secure the major population centers in Afghanistan and the key 

routes of communication throughout the entire country. So strategically the mission seems to continue to be successful with the security forces in the lead. 

But you are right. There are a lot of questions about the future 

and whether you talk to Americans or especially you talk to 

Afghanistans there will be questions and uncertainties about what 

happens in the future. Afghanistan will be going through an unprecedented election where Hamid Karzai is not running. The outcome of this election is not clear to anyone, and we are doing, as 

Ambassador Dobbins indicated, everything we can to ensure a successful, fair, and free and representative election. But there is 

uncertainty. 

In the security sector in particular where you have good governance in the country, the security problem tends to be easily manageable by the Afghan Army and police. Where you have poor governance, where you have a district or provincial governors that are 

not addressing the grievances and needs of the population, the 

security problem is more pronounced and it is more difficult for the 

army and the police. 

So it gets to the point that I think the entire committee is making and we hear very loudly that improvements in the political 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

26

transition need to go hand in hand with the ongoing improvements 

in the security transition. 

Senator MURPHY. Dr. Lavoy, let me ask you a specific question 

about the capabilities that we will need to continue to lend to the 

Afghan military, and that is with respect to the air capabilities of 

the Afghan military. It is very frustrating 10 years in to still see 

the status of the Afghan Air Force. We are contemplating sending 

to them a bunch of Russian helicopters that there are legitimate 

questions as to whether they can even operate. As we take a look 

at what kind of support we are going to need to provide them in 

the long run, it seems hard to believe that we are going to be able 

to walk away from providing them with medevac support or with 

close air support as the ground forces, which clearly have made 

progress, are out there doing the majority of the fighting. I walked 

away not completely understanding how we were not going to have 

a long-term military commitment above the ground. 

Can you just talk to us a little bit about that? 

Dr. LAVOY. Well, I think you are right, Senator. With the terrain 

in Afghanistan and the difficulty to access remote regions, air 

mobility is a critical asset. The Afghans recognize this. The Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior—they are looking to have 

their own air mobility, their own air force capability. And we are 

working with them to provide that capability. 

We have gone from the security transition that is taking place—

in the past, we would perform all the air operations for the 

Afghans and they would perform increasingly sophisticated ground 

operations. We are now moving in this transition phase where they 

are beginning to do more of the air operations themselves, and we 

are trying to work with them so that they will have this sustainable, self-sufficient air capability in the future. 

It is not clear to us like it is not clear to you, sir, how long it 

will take for them to develop that capability. Training pilots is a 

laborious process, but it is something that we are prioritizing right 

now and also getting them the equipment and helping them 

develop the means to maintain this equipment in a sustainable 

manner. 

As I indicated at the outset of my remarks, sir, the administration is conducting regular assessments of the performance of the 

Afghan security forces, including the air force. So we will make the 

necessary adjustments to ensure that they can have this capability 

going forward. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And to our witnesses, I was in Afghanistan last week with five 

others—actually seven other Senators and had robust discussions 

about the sort of midpoint in the fighting season and there was 

some positive news I think in terms of our own military leadership’s reckoning of the performance, even including the scale-up of 

some air capacity. More to tell. 

Much of the discussion that we had was about this troop number. 

We all recognize the troop number is not an end. It is a means to 

an end. And so what is the end we are trying to reach for the abilFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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ity to train, assist, advise in an appropriate way, the ability to provide some CT efficacy, and we talked about that. 

There has been public testimony before the SASC hearing, where 

I sit, from General Mattis in February recommending a troop level 

of about 13,600. General Dempsey in April publicly talked about a 

total force of between 8,000 and 12,000. I am not going to ask you 

about numbers, but I will say what we heard from military leadership in Afghanistan was not at odds at all with that general range. 

I wanted to ask you a question, and I realize that one of the next 

witnesses, Stephen Hadley, actually phrased it better than I did. 

So I am just going to read a section and try to get you to tell me 

whether or not you agree with it. And if I could just hand the witnesses Stephen’s testimony. It is on page 2, and I just want to read 

this into the record. 

‘‘The unfortunate recent press accounts of a ‘zero option’—even if 

ultimately disavowed—are extremely damaging in this regard. The 

United States and its allies need to be actively countering the narrative of abandonment that is frequently heard in Afghanistan. The 

best way to do this would be for the U.S. Government to make 

clear as soon as possible its intention to have a robust troop presence in Afghanistan well beyond 2014 and to announce the size of 

that troop deployment now even before negotiations have concluded 

on the Bilateral Security Agreement that will provide the legal 

framework for this troop presence. The U.S. Government should be 

clear that it is ready to negotiate an acceptable BSA with the current Afghan Government or, if necessary, to leave that negotiation 

to the post-2014 government. But the U.S. troop commitment needs 

to be made clearly and it needs to be made now. This will do three 

things: 

‘‘One, it will reassure Afghans that their votes in the 2014 election will count for something because the government they elect 

will have the international support it will need to succeed. 

‘‘Two, it will encourage candidates to come forward to stand for 

election. 

‘‘And three, it will lessen the ability of some Afghan elements to 

use the BSA negotiations as a political football in service of other 

agendas.’’

In your best independent professional judgment, do you think the 

prompt announcement of the size of that security force, leaving the 

size of it for military and the administration to determine, would 

have the positive effects that I referenced from Stephen Hadley’s 

testimony? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, let me say a couple of things. 

First, the best that I can determine—and I have spent some time 

trying to determine it—the leak to the New York Times about the 

zero option and what prompted the story was not intended. It was 

not a negotiating ploy. 

Secondly, I agree that the article was, on balance, unhelpful, and 

the focus on this issue unhelpful. 

I have already addressed, I think, the issue of the timing of a 

decision on troop levels. But I will say that if you agree with Steve 

Hadley that both your views and those of former National Security 

Advisor Hadley are important and will certainly be taken into 

consideration. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Senator KAINE. Dr. Lavoy. 

Dr. LAVOY. Yes, Senator. Well, first of all, I take everything that 

Steve Hadley says very seriously. I mean, he is very, very thoughtful, and I think even in this regard as well, that this does deserve 

really our fullest attention and we need to consider what he is saying. And I look forward to his testimony afterward. 

I think right now, as I said, the Afghans are uncertain about 

their future. Any statement of commitment of U.S. or international 

support I think can mitigate some of that uncertainty. But we need 

to recognize the uncertainty will be there. Afghanistan is going 

through a democratic transition that is really unprecedented in 

that country. Similarly in Pakistan, the first-ever civilian government to be elected after another government serving a full term. 

So the democratic impulse is very, very strong, and we need to do 

everything we can to support that and to provide the confidence 

that tomorrow will be better than today, better than yesterday in 

Afghanistan and in Pakistan as well. 

We are, as you indicated, in negotiations with the Afghan Government on the bilateral security agreement, which will be the 

framework that will enable us to have a military presence going 

forward. The negotiations have been rather successful. We have 

come to agreement on many, many things and parameters for that 

framework, but there still are some fundamental issues remaining. 

The Afghans are very good and shrewd negotiators and I think 

they will use all leverage possible in this negotiation. I would just 

say the one thing about not having made that announcement, even 

though it might have contributed to some of the uncertainty going 

forward in Afghanistan, is that it is something that President 

Karzai and the Afghan Government needs to take seriously. They 

cannot take it for granted, and they need to have a very fair and 

balanced bilateral security agreement. 

Senator KAINE. Right. And I would think that there would be bipartisan agreement not only on this committee but more generally. 

If we cannot reach a bilateral security agreement that protects our 

personnel, then that is a default zero option, I mean, if they are 

not willing to do that. 

In addition to the three benefits that Dr. Hadley mentioned, 

would U.S. announcement of a force posture have an additional 

benefit of encouraging NATO allies to do the same, or is it likely 

that NATO allies will make hard commitments before we do? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, several allies have made generalized 

commitments, including the Germans, to take the lead in providing 

the core of a force in the northern part of the country, the Italians 

in the western part of the country. Several other allies have indicated their intention to stay. But, yes, they will measure their 

actual levels of commitment by ours in every case. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Lavoy, do you agree with that? 

Dr. LAVOY. I do. We have had a principle governing our engagement in Afghanistan with the coalition: ‘‘in together, out together.’’ 

We are making decisions. Coalition cohesion is critically important, 

and I believe that will be a factor as we go forward. 

Senator KAINE. Great. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kaine. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Just very briefly, because I do want to get to our next panel, but 

while I have you here, Ambassador Dobbins, I mean, your title 

includes Pakistan. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. And while this hearing is about Afghanistan, you 

cannot talk about Afghanistan in part without looking at the realities in Pakistan. So let me just put out one or two observations, 

then ask you a question. 

The last time I was in Pakistan, they obviously have their own 

interests. They also have their own views about our Afghan strategy, and they fear direct repercussions from instability in Afghanistan. And despite our generous assistance to Pakistan, which has 

been fraught with its own set of problems, I think we have not convinced them that we have shared goals and mutual interests in 

this regard. 

So what realistically can we expect from Pakistan vis-a-vis 

Afghanistan, and how is our own strategy informed by their calculations? And finally, as we inevitably see a reduction in these 

international troop presence, the insurgents will likely make an 

even more forceful push to gain more ground before December 2014 

to further strengthen their bargaining position and some would say 

with the support of the Pakistan backers. 

Are there steps the United States is taking so that the Pakistan 

military is not allowed to hijack a reconciliation process to benefit 

its chosen Afghan proxies? What redlines are we drawing with 

Pakistan to make clear that we all need to be working from the 

same page here? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, like you, we are very concerned that 

the insurgency enjoys effective sanctuary and draws strength from 

that sanctuary in their operations in Afghanistan. We also recognize that the terrorists and insurgent groups within Pakistan operating against Pakistan are closely linked to those operating in 

Afghanistan, and we keep stressing to the Government of Pakistan 

that they cannot distinguish between benign insurgents and benign 

militants and malign militants, that to the extent militancy grows 

in their country, to whomever it may be directed, it is in the end 

going to destabilize their country, as well as that of their neighbors. And I think that recognition is beginning to sink in. 

I think you have opened a large issue that probably requires 

more discussion than we can do here. I think we do see an opportunity with the new civilian government that has a clear mandate——

The CHAIRMAN. Are you suggesting that to give me a full answer, 

you need a classified session? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. That was not my intention, but the answer is probably, ‘‘Yes.’’

The CHAIRMAN. I am looking for as much of a public answer as 

I can. The question is—I have time. So I am ready to listen to your 

full answer on Pakistan. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think we see an opportunity with the 

new civilian government with a clear mandate, a majority in Parliament. They are grappling with their own internal security problem which is in some ways more acute than that of Afghanistan. 

I do not know what the actual statistics are in terms of civilian 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

30

casualties, but I think they are probably higher in Pakistan these 

days than in Afghanistan. And they are also conducting very significant military operations against militants, unfortunately not 

against the militants that are operating in Afghanistan, but 

against the militants that are operating in Pakistan. But they do 

have a substantial proportion of their military that is now committed to counterinsurgency operations in these border areas. 

This is a continued area of dialogue. Pakistan has become more 

cooperative and more helpful on the issue of reconciliation. Now, 

you suggested that that may be with an intention of hijacking the 

process. I think they, obviously, would like to influence the process. 

That is to be assumed in any case. But I do not think there is 

much likelihood that they will hijack it. Neither we nor the Afghan 

Government have any intention of allowing that to occur. And in 

any case, our objective in these negotiations is not ourselves to 

negotiate peace in Afghanistan but to initiate an intra-Afghan 

process. 

So I think your concerns about Pakistan are understandable. 

They are concerns that we have and discuss internally all the time. 

They are concerns that we address with the Government of Pakistan. I am hopeful that the Secretary of State will be able to visit 

Pakistan sometime soon. I have been there twice in the first 3 

weeks in office and addressed many of these issues. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think we will bring you back just maybe 

to start a discussion on Pakistan and move from there. 

I want two yes-or-no responses to these two questions so we can 

move on to the next panel. 

Ambassador Dobbins, can you assure the committee that you will 

work with INL to ensure that programs like the governor-led eradication, the Justice Sector Support Program, and the Correction 

Systems Support Program, for which INL has already obligated 

over $400 million, will have adequate oversight and evaluation 

mechanisms so we know they are actually working and worthy of 

continued funding? 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Lavoy, can you assure the committee that 

DOD will look into whether it is worth pouring more money into 

the counternarcotics police of Afghanistan, which has a series of 

issues with it? 

Dr. LAVOY. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That is the most succinct answers I 

have gotten in a long time. 

Thank you both for your testimony. You have the thanks of the 

committee, and we look forward to continuing to engage with you. 

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. With that, let me call up our next panel. On our 

second panel, we have a distinguished roster of private witnesses. 

Stephen Hadley was President George W. Bush’s National Security 

Advisor. He is now a senior advisor for International Affairs at the 

U.S. Institute of Peace where he has worked closely with John 

Podesta and the Center for American Progress, pushing for credible 

Afghan elections in 2014. 

Ms. Sarah Chayes is with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She previously lived in Kandahar since 2001 workFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

31

ing as a journalist running an NGO, an agricultural cooperative, 

and advising U.S. military officials on Afghan corruption in 

Pakistan. 

And Mr. Nader Nadery wears many hats, including founding the 

Fair and Free Elections Foundation of Afghanistan. Again, I appreciate that he just arrived in from Kabul, and I want to thank him 

on behalf of the committee for flying in for this hearing to provide 

views from Afghan civil society. 

With that, again, we will include all of your testimony into the 

record. 

We ask our witnesses that are leaving if they can engage the 

press outside so that we can continue with the hearing. 

Your full statements will be entered into the record and, Mr. 

Hadley, we will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN HADLEY, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR 

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. HADLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I want to express my appreciation for the opportunity to 

offer my views on the status of the Afghan transition. The views 

I express today are solely my own and do not represent those of 

the United States Institute of Peace which does not take policy 

positions. 

As you mentioned, my recent involvement with Afghanistan has 

mainly been as cochair with John Podesta of a bipartisan expert 

senior working group convened in 2011 and 2012 by USIP and the 

Center for American Progress. 

Our CAP–USIP senior working group concluded that the United 

States Government’s objective in Afghanistan should be a relatively 

stable Afghanistan that does not slide back into civil war, destabilize its neighbors, or once again become a haven for transnational 

terrorists. 

But more than the peace and prosperity of Afghanistan is at 

stake. A safe, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan is an essential 

element to achieving stability, peace, and prosperity in all of northwest Asia—Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the Central Asian states, 

and even Iran and Russia—for this cannot be a stable, prosperous 

region free from terror unless these conditions can be achieved in 

Afghanistan. 

The problems associated with achieving stability in Afghanistan 

have been exacerbated by the general hedging strategies among 

Afghans and their neighbors that are partly the result of uncertainties regarding the extent to which the United States is committed 

to Afghanistan post-2014. And that is why I am very much in sympathy with Senator Kaine and the portion he read from this testimony that we can solve this clarity problem if we would be clear 

soon that we are going to be in Afghanistan with a specific and significant number of troops adequate to do the missions we need to 

perform. And I think that word needs to get out very promptly, as 

we have talked about earlier in this discussion. 

Last month, full responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan’s 

districts was formally handed over to Afghan forces. The army that 

the United States and its NATO allies have spent a decade helping 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

32

to build and train has become one of the most trusted institutions 

in the country and now will have an opportunity to prove its worth 

to the Afghan people. 

The crucial question for the security transition is not about tactics or firepower, but whether these forces are united around the 

idea that they are a national force defending a legitimate government supported by all elements of Afghan society. At this point, the 

political transition is the most critical of the three transitions that 

will occur in 2014, the security, political, and economic. While the 

security transition is well underway and good progress has been 

made, it cannot succeed unless the 2014 elections are relatively 

free and fair and produce a government viewed as legitimate and 

supported by the Afghan people and accepted by Afghans’ neighbors and the international community. 

If instead 2014 produces a corrupt and tainted election discredited in the eyes of the Afghan people and causing either the chaos 

of no coherent government or one viewed as illegitimate by the 

Afghan people, then we will be transitioning security responsibility 

to a government in a political meltdown, one that is unlikely to be 

able to command the support of the Afghan National Army and the 

other security forces. And at that point, the force could splinter 

along ethnic lines, contributing to instability and national fragmentation, violence, and perhaps a return to civil war. 

So the question is how can this legitimate government with popular support and improved governance come about. An open, free, 

and fair election with broad Afghan participation offers the best 

opportunity to reconcile the whole of Afghan society which currently feels largely excluded from the political process. As part of 

an inclusive peace process, the United States and Afghan Governments have tried to test the Taliban to distinguish those who wish 

to reenter the political process from those who wish to continue 

their war on Afghan society. The efforts to date have failed, with 

the Taliban refusing to participate in talks with the Afghan Government and now talking of closing their Doha office. 

While outreach to the Taliban should continue in a very careful 

way during the preelection period, the best time to test Taliban 

intentions will be after the conclusion of a successful election by a 

government of renewed legitimacy and popular support, backed by 

an army loyal to the government and supported by a significant 

post-2014 U.S. and coalition presence. 

In the interim, efforts should be focused on ensuring a successful 

election, which should include efforts to convince the Taliban to 

reduce violence during the election period and perhaps to agree to 

local cease-fires. The Pakistani Government should be enlisted in 

this effort. There should also be a robust communication plan by 

primarily Afghan voices to make clear that those who seek to derail 

the elections through fraud or violence are the true enemies of a 

peaceful and prosperous future for the Afghan people. 

Ultimately, the best prospect for achieving a stable Afghanistan 

will be a peaceful transition to a new government based on a free 

and fair Presidential election in 2014 that is credible and produces 

an outcome that is acceptable by the Afghan people. This outcome 

must be the U.S. Government’s top priority in Afghanistan for the 

coming year. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

33

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hadley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN HADLEY

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, 

thank you for this opportunity to offer my views on the status of the Afghan transition. The views I express today are solely my own and do not represent those of 

the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), which does not take policy positions. 

My recent involvement with Afghanistan has mainly been as a cochair with John 

Podesta of a bipartisan expert senior working group convened in 2011–2012 by 

USIP and the Center for American Progress (CAP). The working group focused on 

U.S. strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in particular on the need for 

a clear political strategy to guide our security and economic strategies. We produced 

five policy white papers, making recommendations on political and economic components of U.S. strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, and met multiple times 

privately with senior administration officials to share our views. The administration 

encouraged us also to share our views with congressional leaders, which we did 

through a series of briefings in 2012. This year, John and I have cochaired two ad 

hoc off-the-record meetings with experts and senior administration officials to focus 

on Afghanistan’s political transition and specifically the 2014 Afghan elections. 

Our CAP–USIP Senior Working Group (SWG) concluded that the U.S. Government’s objective in Afghanistan should be a relatively stable Afghanistan that does 

not slide back into civil war, destabilize its neighbors, or once again become a haven 

for transnational terrorist groups. While this outcome is desired by nearly all 

Afghans, it has been thwarted by the Taliban and other armed insurgent groups, 

neighboring countries, as well as the short-term concerns of powerful Afghan actors 

who have undermined the consolidation of democratic government institutions. 

But more than the peace and prosperity of Afghanistan is at stake. A safe, secure, 

and prosperous Afghanistan is an essential element to achieving stability, peace, 

and prosperity in all of northwest Asia—Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the Central 

Asian states, and even Iran and Russia. For this cannot be a stable, prosperous 

region free from terror unless these conditions can be achieved in Afghanistan. 

The problems associated with achieving stability in Afghanistan have been exacerbated by general hedging strategies among Afghans and their neighbors that are 

partly the result of uncertainties regarding the extent to which the United States 

is committed to Afghanistan post-2014. 

The unfortunate recent press accounts of a ‘‘zero option’’—even if ultimately disavowed—are extremely damaging in this regard. The United States and its allies 

need to be actively countering the narrative of abandonment that is frequently 

heard in Afghanistan. The best way to do this would be for the U.S. Government 

to make clear as soon as possible its intention to have a robust troop presence in 

Afghanistan well beyond 2014 and to announce the size of that troop deployment 

now even before negotiations have concluded on the Bilateral Security Agreement 

(BSA) that will provide the legal framework for this troop presence. The U.S. Government should be clear that it is ready to negotiate an acceptable BSA with the 

current Afghan Government or, if necessary, to leave that negotiation to the post2014 government. But the U.S. troop commitment needs to be made clearly and it 

needs to be made now. This will do three things: 

1. It will reassure Afghans that their votes in the 2014 election will count for 

something because the government they elect will have the international support it will need to succeed; 

2. It will encourage candidates to come forward to stand for election; 

3. And it will lessen the ability of some Afghan elements to use the BSA negotiations as a political football in service of other agendas. 

SECURITY TRANSITION

Last month, full responsibility for security in all of Afghanistan’s districts was formally handed over to Afghan forces. The army that the United States and its NATO 

allies have spent a decade helping to build and train has become one of the most 

trusted institutions in the country. Now it will have the opportunity to prove its 

worth to the Afghan people. According to the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), at its current capability, the Afghan National Army should be 

able to hold its own against the Taliban. Its best units, especially its special forces, 

are excellent. Its main deficiency is that it continues to suffer from high rates of 

attrition. Under the right conditions, these problems can be solved if the international community continues to provide the levels of support promised at the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

34

Chicago NATO summit last year. At an operational level, therefore, the security 

transition is on track. 

The crucial question for the security transition is not about tactics or firepower, 

but whether these forces are united around the idea that they are a national force 

defending a legitimate government supported by all elements of Afghan society. At 

this point, the political transition is the most critical of the three transitions that 

will occur in 2014—security, political, and economic. While the security transition 

is well underway, and good progress has been made, it cannot succeed unless the 

2014 elections are relatively free and fair and produce a government viewed as 

legitimate and supported by the Afghan people and accepted by Afghanistan’s neighbors and the international community. If instead 2014 produces a corrupt and 

tainted election discredited in the eyes of the Afghan people and causing either the 

chaos of no coherent government or one viewed as illegitimate by the Afghan people, 

then we will be transitioning security responsibility to a government in political 

meltdown—one that is unlikely to be able to command the support of the Afghan 

National Army and the other security forces. At that point, the force could splinter 

along ethnic lines, contributing to instability and national fragmentation, violence, 

and perhaps a return to civil war. 

ECONOMIC TRANSITION

A successful political transition is also critical to the 2014 economic transition. 

Afghanistan’s economy has demonstrated significant growth over the past 12 years. 

The national currency has remained remarkably stable, only beginning to slide 

recently as a result of fears of instability beyond 2014. Much of this economic success has been the result of billions of aid dollars that have flowed into Afghanistan. 

As the transition continues, this funding will be reduced, and Afghanistan will need 

to supplement it with its own resources. The country has those resources, for example in vast potential mineral wealth, but needs to develop them. This will require 

a level of stability that allows construction and extraction, a regulatory framework 

that encourages investment, and a government that is effective enough to tackle corruption and ensure that the taxable revenues from the private sector and foreign 

donors end up in the national treasury, not in the pockets of politicians. The underlying condition for all of the above is, again, a legitimate government after 2014 supported by the Afghan people and that can begin to put in place the economic policies 

that will allow Afghanistan to achieve real sovereignty by reducing its reliance on 

foreign donors. 

POLITICAL TRANSITION

The question is how can this legitimate government with popular support and improved governance come about? An open, free, and fair election with broad Afghan 

participation offers the best opportunity to reconcile the whole of Afghan society 

which currently feels largely excluded from the political process. As part of an inclusive peace process, the U.S. and Afghan Governments have tried to test the Taliban 

to distinguish those who wish to reenter the political process from those who wish 

to continue their war on Afghan society. Efforts to date have failed, with the 

Taliban refusing to participate in talks with the Afghan Government and now talking of closing their Doha office. 

While outreach to the Taliban should continue in a very careful way during the 

preelection period, the best time to test Taliban intentions will be after the conclusion of a successful election by a government of renewed legitimacy and popular 

support, backed by an army loyal to that government, and supported by a significant post-2014 U.S. and coalition presence. In the interim, efforts should be focused 

on ensuring a successful election, which should include efforts to convince the 

Taliban to reduce violence levels during the election period and perhaps even agree 

to local cease-fires. The Pakistani Government should be enlisted in this effort. 

There should also be a robust communication plan by which primarily Afghan voices 

make clear that those who seek to derail the elections through fraud or violence are 

the true enemies of a peaceful and prosperous future for the Afghan people. 

Ultimately, the best prospect for achieving a stable Afghanistan will be a peaceful 

transition to a new government based on a free and fair Presidential election in 

2014 that is credible and produces an outcome that is accepted by the Afghan people. This outcome must be the U.S. Government’s top priority in Afghanistan for the 

coming year. Afghanistan’s Constitution gives immense powers to the President, 

especially the power to appoint the most important figures in government, including 

Cabinet members, Supreme Court Judges, police chiefs, as well as provincial and 

district governors. A new President will offer the opportunity for a new governing 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

35

team that is capable of commanding support from throughout the country and making the necessary political and economic reforms. 

A government of renewed legitimacy and popular support, backed by an army 

loyal to that government and supported by a significant post-2014 U.S. and coalition 

presence, would be a powerful counterforce to the Taliban. A more effective government that is able to administer prompt justice even-handedly and increasingly deliver basic services to Afghans would provide a stark and compelling contrast to the 

Taliban, whose main strategy has been to deny Afghans access to government services and whose main tactics have resulted increasingly in the killing of innocent 

Afghans. Such a revitalized Afghan Government, backed by long-term international 

support, and with a smaller but still significant international military footprint, 

would undermine Taliban efforts to represent themselves as legitimate national 

political actors. And such a government would then be in a position to attract into 

the political process those Taliban prepared to surrender arms and turn to peace 

while leaving those that reject this offer to be dealt with by the Afghan army. 

While credible elections are clearly crucial to achieving stability in Afghanistan, 

there are serious questions as to whether the 2014 elections will take place under 

conditions conducive to ensuring a legitimate broadly supported outcome. As the 

Wall Street Journal pointed out in an article on July 10, the failure of the Afghan 

legislative and executive branches to produce two electoral laws crucial to the effective conduct of the election would create real operational and political problems. If 

Parliament fails to do so before it adjourns, these electoral institutions would very 

likely be established by Presidential decree without the political consensus that parliamentary adoption would bring. The opposition has legitimate concerns that an 

electoral playing field created by Presidential decree, and with little consultation, 

will be tilted against them. Operationally, there is not much time to set up these 

institutions, adding to the serious logistical and security problems that will have to 

be addressed prior to elections now scheduled for April 5, 2014. Afghan political 

elites, representatives of the government, civil society, and all friends of Afghanistan need to encourage Parliament and the President to come together and adopt 

these necessary laws before Parliament adjourns. 

President Karzai’s role in this transition is central. Many critical things have been 

said about him. I worked with him closely when I was in government. I respect him 

as a leader facing incredible challenges, who has not always received the respect or 

support he deserved in seeking to meet those challenges. He has begun the process 

of creating law-based, democratic institutions in his country. His legacy can now be 

to ensure the continuation of this process and setting his country on a course toward 

peace and prosperity. That process begins by ensuring a free and fair election in 

2014 that produces a legitimate government supported by the vast majority of the 

Afghan people. If President Karzai steps up to this historic role, it behooves all 

Afghans to ensure that he can live in peace and honor in his country after his Presidential term is complete. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are recommendations on what needs to be done to support the upcoming political transition in Afghanistan. The primary responsibility for this transition—rightly—belongs to Afghans. Our main responsibility is to help to advance 

and not to undermine their efforts to hold a successful election and to achieve an 

effective handover of power to the next elected governing team.

1. Credible elections are the top priority.—The U.S. Government must send a clear 

and consistent message, in words and deeds, that the elections are the top priority. 

We must be aware that there is a credibility gap between our stated commitment 

to the 2014 elections and the degree to which our commitment is believed by key 

Afghan actors. Our regional allies and partners can help to reinforce this message. 

2. Acts count as much as words.—We must be seen to invest political capital in 

helping to ensure the election takes place. It has been clear to Afghans that we have 

invested political capital in the Doha process. They must see a similar investment 

of political capital in the electoral process. The United States should also encourage 

consensus-building efforts among Afghan political actors to facilitate the emergence 

of electoral coalitions able to garner nationwide, multiethnic support. 

3. Logistics and security.—NATO ISAF forces should work with Afghan security 

forces to begin planning for the security and logistical challenges of the election. 

This can be part of the post-security handover training and assistance mission. Support for an impartial election is a way for the Afghan security forces to demonstrate 

their capacity to act in the interest of the nation. Early and consistent public education messages are also essential. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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4. Support a dignified post-presidency role for President Karzai.—The United 

States must allay any uncertainties that President Karzai might have about the 

U.S. commitment to support him in a dignified and secure post-Presidency. 

5. Counter the abandonment narrative.—The uncertainty regarding the future of 

the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is a major cause of hedging strategies that 

undermine the current transition. The Bilateral Security Agreement should be concluded as soon as possible, or failing that, the United States should state publicly 

now its commitment to maintaining a specified and significant number of U.S. 

troops post-2014. 

6. Protect the gains made by women.—One of the most important achievements 

of the past decade has been the tremendous gains made in protecting and promoting 

the rights of Afghan women. Afghanistan needs the resources and inputs of all of 

its population to resolve its problems and take advantage of its opportunities. The 

United States must continue to press that these rights, currently guaranteed in the 

Afghan Constitution, be both preserved and made real for more Afghan women post2014. 

7. Look for opportunities presented by Pakistan’s new government.—The United 

States has an opportunity with the new Pakistani Government to find ways in 

which Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns can be addressed through a framework in which Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s sovereignty are mutually reinforced, 

while the United States maintains good relations with both.

The United States and the international community have 18 months in which to 

align efforts behind an overriding objective of a successful political transition. If this 

is done with clarity and purpose, there is a strong chance of consolidating much of 

what has been achieved over the past 12 years. It is clearly time to transition the 

U.S. engagement in Afghanistan to a more sustainable level. But we must manage 

this transition period extremely carefully to protect the gains that have been 

achieved at such great cost. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I am happy to take questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Chayes. 

STATEMENT OF SARAH CHAYES, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. CHAYES. I thought we are going to go in the order we were 

sitting. 

Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez. Mr. Kaine, thank 

you very much for this opportunity to discuss conditions in Afghanistan and the implications for United States policy. 

Just to remind you of my dual perspective, about 8 years in 

downtown Kandahar and then serving for two COM ISAFs and the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Of course, judgments are my own. 

They got used to that, most of them. 

Three topics dominate the Afghanistan debate: the security situation and related to that, the size of a residual U.S. force; the 2014 

election; and though it has not really been apparent here today, 

negotiations with the Taliban. 

In each case, I think eyes are fixed on the formal process while 

the real meaning lies beneath that surface. What is missing is a 

political strategy within which the formalities might add up to 

something. At this point, I think that strategy must include a more 

broad-based reconciliation process that could set the stage for credible elections and a new approach to Pakistan. 

On elections, I would really just like to second everything that 

you, Mr. Chairman, said and Ranking Member Corker. Sadly, what 

really matters in Afghan elections today is not votes, the ability to 

mobilize them, but who controls the process. So last weekend, the 

head of the Election Commission declared that parliamentary 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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debate on the legislation mentioned by Ambassador Dobbins has 

dragged on for too long, and Karzai will just be enacting regulations by decree. That is a really big issue. 

Also, as I have mentioned here previously, U.S. payments to the 

key political actor also matter. 

Here is my recommendation. If the U.S. Government—and it is 

going to echo a lot of what has been said here today—is going to 

lend the moral authority of this country to the 2014 election, then 

words like ‘‘credible’’ have to mean something. U.S. support for the 

vote must be contingent on some standards, for example, an empowered Elections Commission whose members are not appointed 

by the President. If Mr. Karzai wants to run an election he can 

control, OK, but not on the U.S. dime and not on the democratic 

reputation of the United States. And I am not sure that another 

ambassador in Kabul really would change these dynamics necessarily. It did not in 2009. 

On security, again a lot of talk has been devoted to the Afghan 

National Security Forces’ tactical capabilities. There have been real 

improvements though, as mentioned, the ANSF casualty rate has 

spiked over any previous record, according to ISAF officials, at 

more than 40 casualties per 10,000 servicemembers per month, 

which would be approximately a total of 1,200 killed and wounded 

per month, higher than today’s Washington Post puts it. 

But the technical skills of Afghan soldiers are really beside the 

point. To echo Mr. Hadley in different words, an army, the best 

army—it is only a tool in the hands of a government. You can exercise it, take the arm to gym and do exercises, lift some weights, but 

if the body to which that arm is attached is nonviable, then it is 

not going to be able to defend much. That is the substance that 

keeps getting missed. 

On that and security in general, measures lack. ISAF stopped 

reporting violence statistics in March. They were disputable anyway—those statistics. So we are left with anecdotes. 

Madrasa students in Pakistan are being sent into the fight in 

large numbers this year. Taliban are attacking in larger groups 

than they have in years, but there have been improvements in 

Kandahar, for example, which is my own experience. Afghan colleagues there can visit areas the Taliban controlled in 2009. The 

current police chief is keeping the Taliban at bay, but at such a 

cost in extrajudicial killing that he is turning much of the town 

against him. His name is Raziq. I have known him for more than 

a decade, and this was to be expected. I warned General Petraeus 

when he was COM ISAF about this man’s style and the potential 

Leahy amendment issues that it raises. Meanwhile, northern 

Helmand, for example, is reinfested with Taliban. 

A point often missed is the Taliban strategy is to obtain the maximum policy impact for the minimum investment of resources. That 

is what asymmetric warfare is all about. So note the recent 

attacks. The usefulness in that context of any assessment of current security trends for predicting outcomes is questionable. 

As for residual U.S. troops, I am actually not sure that 10,000 

would make much more of an impact on security and stability in 

Afghanistan than zero. My reading of the signals in this town is 

that zero is a pretty likely bet. And to be honest, in the absence 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

38

of a policy framework within which the commitment and sacrifice 

would make sense, I am finding it difficult to argue with that. 

So how to get to zero without leaving a black hole behind, how 

to get to zero responsibly honoring the efforts and losses and 

preserving some potential for the Afghan people and for regional 

stability. 

Here is my recommendation. Do not look to security structures 

to provide security amidst political meltdown. The way to wind 

down United States involvement in Afghanistan without the place 

unraveling behind us is not to focus on military technicalities. It 

is to take a different approach to the political context. A single 

negotiating track with the Taliban leadership was never the right 

approach for a couple of reasons. The ISI involvement with Taliban 

leadership may be complex and fraught, but it is effective, as Ranking Member Corker raised earlier. It is likely that the ISI started 

reconstituting the Taliban in late 2002, and I watched them doing 

that precisely with negotiations in mind. They, like us, presumed 

an insurgency would end in negotiations, and they wanted to drive 

us there and then control the outcome. The ISI retains enough hold 

over Taliban leadership to choose who goes to Doha and what they 

settle for. Ironically, we have been practically begging Pakistani 

officials to play that role. 

In other words, we would not be negotiating with autonomous 

representatives of an Afghan movement in Doha. We would be 

talking to the ISI by proxy. That carries a couple of implications. 

It means we are effectively rewarding Pakistan for the deliberate 

use of violent proxies as an instrument of national policy, and it 

means the terms of any deal would likely be unacceptable to most 

Afghans because they would entail surrendering too much sovereignty, which brings me to my next point. 

It is not just the Taliban who are opposed to the way the Karzai 

government has been operating. It is most Afghans. But the others 

did not take up arms, and yet those Afghans have no seat. We are, 

in effect, punishing the nonviolent opposition in our rush to placate 

the violent opposition. This approach does not line up with our values as a nation, and it is almost guaranteed not to work but rather 

to lead to the next war. 

Here is my recommendation. Two prongs. With respect to Afghan 

reconciliation, make it much more inclusive like what the French 

tested late last year in Chantilly. Involve all the major constituencies including the Taliban and members of the Karzai government. 

With respect to Pakistan, first, raise the cost of using violent 

proxies as an instrument of policy by an array of leverage and 

smart sanctions do not ask Pakistani officials to act as agents to 

help organize intra-Afghan talks. 

Second, open a proper state-to-state channel through which Pakistan can identify and address its legitimate strategic aspirations 

and concerns with respect to its neighbor. 

Mr. Chairman, I really think only such a change in our political 

approach can offer a way to conclude military involvement in 

Afghanistan without leaving the region more dangerous than we 

found it in 2001. 

Thanks. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

39

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chayes follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SARAH CHAYES

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, committee members, I am grateful for this opportunity to speak with you about conditions in Afghanistan, and the 

implications for U.S. policy. 

My analysis derives from a rare dual perspective: I lived in downtown Kandahar 

for most of the past decade, among ordinary men and women from the city and the 

surrounding villages, no guards or barbed wire, no translator. And, from 2009 

through 2011, I served as special adviser to two ISAF commanders and then the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Of course, my judgments are my own. They got used to that—most of them. 

Three main topics dominate the current Afghanistan debate: the security situation—and related to that, the size of a residual U.S. military force—the 2014 Presidential election, and negotiations with the Taliban. In each case, attention is fixed 

on the formal process, while the real meaning lies beneath that surface. What is 

missing is an overall political strategy within which technicalities might add up to 

something. At this stage, that strategy must include a more broad-based reconciliation process that would help set the stage for credible elections, and a different 

approach to Pakistan.

On Elections 

Some in Washington argue for making the 2014 exercise central to U.S. policy. 

They focus on voter registration and other such technicalities. I don’t disagree with 

the sentiment. 

But while we are all discussing the vital importance of a credible election, moves 

are being made on the ground to ensure it will be no such thing. Sadly, what matters in Afghan elections as they are currently run is not who can mobilize the most 

votes, but who can control the process. So President Karzai and his lieutenants in 

the executive branch are grappling with some of your counterparts over the makeup 

and duties of the election commission and the complaints body. No surprise, Karzai 

is winning. As of this weekend, the head of the election commission declared that 

the tussle over the electoral law had gone on too long for the provisions to be implemented, and that Karzai would be enacting regulations by legislative decree. 

In this context, I’ve already spoken about the issues raised by U.S. payments to 

the key political actor. 

Recommendation: If the U.S. Government is going to lend the moral authority of 

this country to the 2014 election, then words like ‘‘credible’’ have to mean something. U.S. financing and support for the vote must be contingent on Kabul’s adherence to some minimum standards. A truly independent, empowered elections commission whose members are not appointed by the President, for example, and a real 

complaints mechanism, with teeth. If President Karzai wants to run an election he 

can control, that’s his right. But not on the U.S. dime, and not on the democratic 

reputation of the United States.

On Security 

Much attention has been devoted to the Afghan National Security Forces’ tactical 

capabilities. There have been improvements—though vetting and discipline problems were devastating just a year ago. And the ANSF casualty rate has spiked over 

last year’s, according to U.K. officials. Attrition is also up. 

But the technical skills of Afghan soldiers are really beside the point. The real 

meaning is this. An army—the best army—is only a tool in the hands of a government. You can exercise that army, sort of like taking an arm to a gym and lifting 

weights with it, but if the body to which it’s attached is nonviable, it won’t be able 

to defend much. That is the fundamental point that keeps getting missed in discussions about ANSF capabilities. 

Trying to get a meaningful read on the security situation is elusive. ISAF stopped 

keeping violence statistics in March. And they were disputable anyway. So only localized anecdotes are left. There are clear improvements around Kandahar. Colleagues of mine are now able to visit areas that were under deadly Taliban control 

in 2009. The current police chief of Kandahar is keeping the Taliban at bay, but 

I’m hearing at such a cost in extra-judicial killing that he’s turning much of the 

town against him. I have known him for more than a decade and this was to be 

expected. I warned General David Petraeus, then commander of ISAF, about the 

police chief’s style and the potential Leahy amendment issues it raises. Meanwhile, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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northern Helmand is already reinfested with Taliban, according to both residents 

and U.S. military personnel. 

A point often missed in assessments of security is that the Taliban’s strategy is 

to obtain the maximum policy impact for the minimum investment of resources. 

That is what asymmetric warfare is all about. Recent spectacular attacks in Kabul 

and elsewhere indicate they’re still doing a good job at that. 

What local deals are being made between a given kandak and the local Haqqani 

commander? Whose fighters are waiting for ISAF’s final departure? What depredations are the local police committing? No one can claim to know, beyond a very localized understanding. 

So any assessment of current security trends can only be a surface impression. 

Its significance for predicting outcomes is minimal. 

As for residual U.S. troops, 10,000 would not make much more of an impact on 

security and stability in Afghanistan than zero. My reading of the signals in this 

town is that zero is a likely bet. And to be honest, in the absence of an overall policy 

framework within which the commitment and sacrifice would make sense, I find it 

difficult to argue otherwise. 

But how to get to zero U.S. troops after 2014 without leaving a black hole behind? 

How to get to zero responsibly, honoring the efforts and losses of so many, and preserving some potential for the Afghan people and for regional security? The obligation the United States engaged by intervening in the first place—and the historical 

memory in that region of the U.S. just leaving—imposes one last effort to think that 

through. 

Recommendation: Don’t look to security structures to provide security amidst 

political melt-down. The way to wind down U.S. involvement in Afghanistan without 

the place unraveling behind us is not to focus on military technicalities. It is to take 

a different approach to the political context.

On Negotiations 

The idea of a single negotiating track with Taliban leadership was never the right 

approach to the political context—for several reasons. The ISI involvement with 

Taliban leadership may be complex and fraught, but it is deep and effective. It is 

likely that the ISI started reconstituting the Taliban in late 2002—and I watched 

them doing it—with precisely the aim of negotiations in mind. They, like us, presumed an insurgency would end in negotiations, and they wanted to drive us there, 

and then control the outcome. The aim was to regain a degree of the proxy control 

over Afghanistan that they enjoyed under the Taliban regime. Now, however the 

relationship may have evolved, the ISI certainly retains enough hold over Taliban 

leadership to choose who goes to Doha, and what they settle for. And ironically, we 

have been practically begging Pakistani officials to play that role. 

In other words, we would never be negotiating with autonomous representatives 

of an Afghan movement in Doha, even if talks started. We’d be talking to the ISI 

by proxy. That carries a couple of implications. It means we are effectively rewarding Pakistan for the deliberate use of violent proxies as an instrument of national 

policy. Other countries, like Iran and North Korea, may take notice. And it means 

that the terms of any deal that might result would likely be unacceptable to most 

Afghans, because they would entail surrendering too much sovereignty. 

Which brings me to my next point: it’s not just the Taliban who are bitterly 

opposed to the way the Karzai Government has been operating. Most Afghans are. 

But the others did not take up arms. Even though the ballot box—due to fraud—

has not been a recourse. And yet, those Afghans have no seat at these negotiations. 

We are in effect punishing the nonviolent opposition in our rush to placate the violent opposition. This approach does not line up with our values as a nation. And 

it is almost guaranteed not to work—but rather to lead directly to the next war. 

Recommendation: Two prongs. With respect to Afghan reconciliation, make it 

much more inclusive, along the lines of what the French tested in Chantilly late last 

year. Include all the major constituencies, including the Taliban and members of the 

Karzai government, as coequal participants. Choice of participants would necessarily be arbitrary and imperfect at this late date, but it can easily be made more 

representative than the Doha process. Talks should be facilitated by talented international mediators, perhaps sponsored by one or more of our NATO partners. 

With respect to Pakistan, first and—in concert with our allies including the 

U.K.—raise the cost of using violent proxies as an instrument of policy, by means 

of an array of leverage and smart sanctions. Certainly do not ask Pakistani officials 

to act as agents to help organize intra-Afghan talks. Second, open a proper, formal, 

state-to-state channel through which Pakistan can identify and address its legitimate strategic aspirations and concerns with respect to its neighbor. Again, this is 

the type of initiative international bodies are well-placed to help facilitate.

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Mr Chairman, only such a change in our political approach can offer a way to conclude U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan without leaving the region even 

more dangerous than we found it in 2001. Such an adjustment would not require 

more material resources, just more focus and attention, and the willingness to take 

some political risk. 

Thank you for inviting me to share these thoughts.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Nadery. 

STATEMENT OF AHMAD NADER NADERY, FOUNDER AND 

CHAIRMAN, FAIR AND FREE ELECTIONS FOUNDATION OF 

AFGHANISTAN, KABUL, AFGHANISTAN 

Mr. NADERY. Chair Menendez, Senator Kaine, thank you very 

much for the opportunity to speak before this committee at a very 

critical time of our history in Afghanistan. 

I will speak today about three issues, mainly political transition, 

the talks in Doha, and generally the talks with the Taliban, and 

the ongoing security transition. 

I will also outline what is rarely reported in the media, that 

Afghanistan is at a turning point with transformation made in 

many spheres and newly found confidence in our state and security 

forces. Personally, whenever I see the young women and men in 

uniform, I feel proud in Afghanistan. 

However, there are risks and fears. Many Afghans had their confidence shaken by the recent events in Doha, which helped legitimize terrorist groups and played into Pakistan’s hand. 

The news this week that President Obama was again considering 

zero troops also shook confidence in Afghanistan. We understand 

your frustration but, Respected Senator, your real partners in 

Afghanistan are the Afghan people, not our current officials alone. 

In less than a year, we will have a new President and a year later, 

a new Parliament. At this moment when the blood, sweat, and 

tears of these past 10 years is finally starting to pay off, it would 

be a great mistake to sacrifice our achievements to a hasty withdrawal or a bad deal. 

Today life for most Afghans, particularly women and children, 

has changed for the better. Democratic freedoms, women’s rights, 

and the media represent some of the greatest achievements of the 

past 10 years of international engagement. We have got 8 million 

children in school, more than 100 universities, a young population 

with real opportunities for upward mobility. And with our security 

forces growing in strength, transition has exceeded our expectation. 

That is why it is vital to get the political transition right. 

We welcome Secretary Kerry and General Dunford in today’s 

Washington Post calling for a free, fair, and transparent election. 

There are huge challenges but continued U.S. attention we believe 

can make a real difference. 

The priorities are, therefore, first, President Karzai needs to 

approve the electoral law, appoint a chair of the Election Commission, and put a complaint process in place. 

Second, the United States should promote a level playing field 

and continue to insist elections are held on time and according to 

the Afghan Constitution. 

Moving to Doha, Doha really distracted, we believe, the highest 

level of the U.S. Government for our political transition and sideFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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lined negotiations over the very critical issue of the bilateral security agreement. It emboldened the Taliban and played very easily 

into the hands of Pakistan. The Taliban show little sign of being 

ready or able to negotiate or respect our constitutional order or 

women’s rights or democracy. They have actually become more 

extreme in their deliberate attacks against the civilian population. 

I lived through their rule, so I know how brutal they are. 

If we focus on political transition with a new government, a fresh 

mandate, backed by a bilateral security agreement, we can create 

incentives for the Taliban and for Pakistan for them to rethink 

their strategy to one that is more conducive and inclusive of peace. 

On security, Mr. Chairman, the newfound strength and courage 

of our security forces has been demonstrated by their speed with 

which they have closed down recent attacks on our capital with 

minimal loss of life. But we still face big challenges. Our forces are 

already missing the coalition enabler support. Senator Corker has 

spoken about that also. The Afghani Air Force is not in place and 

while our people want to serve in the air force, it will take more 

time to build. Technical knowledge like counter-IED and military 

intelligence is growing but slowly. On top of this, our brave forces 

are not yet supported by a commander in chief that they deserve. 

We know our forces are fighting bravely, being killed and 

wounded for the defense of their own country, but they need continued help. That means, first, a bilateral security agreement to 

boost confidence. Second, fulfilling Chicago commitments to the 

Afghan Air Force and maintain some international air support 

until our Afghan air force can take full responsibility. Finally, fulfill commitments for financial and material support for the continued development of the institutional strength of the Afghan army, 

police, and intelligence. 

We are in debt to the United States for all you have done for our 

country. We know it is a burden. We do not seek an open-ended 

support, but we are now so close to a turning point. Soon we can 

become your trusted ally in an uncertain region. 

I look forward to your questions and thank you all, committee 

members, for your continued engagement and interest in my country and for giving me this opportunity to speak. Thank you very 

much.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NADER NADERY

INTRODUCTION

Senator Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee at this critical time 

in Afghanistan’s political transition. 

I am the chairperson of the Free and Fair Elections Federation of Afghanistan 

(FEFA) and the Director of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). 

From 2004 until last month I was a commissioner of the Afghanistan Independent 

Human Rights Commission. 

I will be speaking about three issues that can determine the course of Afghanistan’s future: The ongoing security transition; the upcoming political transition and 

elections; and, finally the public perception of the current efforts to start negotiations with the Taliban, and U.S. role within it. 

I will also outline for you what so rarely gets reported in the media—that Afghanistan is at a turning point toward stability, with our people beginning to have faith 

in a democratic system. The investments of the last decade by Afghans and their 

partners, in particular the United States, have transformed the country. We have 

seen unprecedented progress made in many spheres, but perhaps what makes me 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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most proud is that on the eve of transition, Afghans are ready and eager to stand 

on their own feet, with a newfound trust in the abilities of their security forces. 

However, alongside this new sense of determination, there are risks and fears. 

Many Afghans had their confidence shaken by the recent opening of a Taliban office 

in Doha. Even if the Taliban have temporarily closed the office, the process helped 

to legitimize a group that is terrorizing the Afghan people, and played directly into 

Pakistan’s hands. The United States involvement in that process gave rise to conspiracies in Afghanistan about the real priorities of the U.S. Government. It would 

be a tragedy if—at this moment—when so much of the blood, sweat, and tears of 

these past 10 years is paying off—the achievements that the United States has 

helped to win were sacrificed for a deal that could destroy them. Particularly when 

we stand less than a year away from elections which will bring a new leader with 

a fresh mandate to govern, and to negotiate on behalf of the Afghan people. 

Similarly, the recent reports that the United States might be seriously considering 

a rapid drawdown to ‘‘Zero Troops’’ sends a terrible message to Afghans at this critical juncture. It would be a waste if the very understandable frustrations with our 

leadership should prompt a precipitous withdrawal during this delicate phase. 

Drawing down to zero troops before transition is complete would shake the confidence of your true partners in Afghanistan—the Afghan people. And it would send 

a message to the Taliban that the United States is giving up on all its good work 

here. 

With a small residual force, increasingly tailored over time, all the impressive 

work of the United States military in helping to build our army and police force can 

be cemented. Combine this with a Bilateral Security Agreement and a new government and Parliament, and you have the outlines of a far more stable trajectory. 

Many Afghans—particularly among our new generation, who constitute the majority of the people—have genuine faith in the continued development of a moderate, 

democratic Afghan Republic. The U.S. Congress has rightly been concerned about 

the corruption in our government, but most Afghans do not simply judge the state 

on the flaws of individuals. It is the state institutions—in particular our armed 

forces—that have earned the respect of the people. This stands in absolute opposite 

to the Taliban-era Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 

This is because beneath the dismal headlines that often dominate the international media, life for most Afghans has changed for the better. Educational and 

employment opportunities, women’s rights and democratic freedoms represent some 

of the greatest achievement of these past 10 years of international engagement. As 

this ‘‘Decade of Transition,’’ comes to an end, the highly anticipated ‘‘Decade of 

Transformation’’ can be built on the gains of what was achieved in the past 12 

years. 

But for all these achievements, the future of Afghanistan might still be unstable 

at best or disastrous at worst without close attention to the following three areas: 

one, the security transition; two, the political transition, including the election of a 

new President in less than a year; and three, public confidence in the peace and 

reconciliation process. 

Transition: Impact and Assessment 

First allow me to briefly discuss how Afghanistan looks today, at the end of the 

Transition decade: 

In terms of social change:

—We’ve had a rapid demographic shift—with over 60 percent of the population 

under the age of 20. This new generation benefits from huge improvements in 

educational opportunities, urbanization, and greater social mobility. 

—We have some extraordinary women leaders in the public sphere, including parliamentarians, doctors, lawyers, judges and civil society leaders, with women’s rights 

being articulated by men as well as women activists. As a concrete example of 

their recent gains—2 months ago Afghanistan adopted its first workplace 

antiharassment regulation championed by two dynamic young technocrats in 

government in partnership with civil society. It is now enforced throughout local 

government. 

—Human rights, including a commitment to the concept of human rights, are 

becoming firmly established in public discourse. 

—Over 8 million children are enrolled in schools of which 2.6 million are girls. We 

have over 100 private and public universities compared to only 5 in 2004. 

—Improvements in primary health care have led to a sharp drop in maternal and 

infant mortality rates.

Moving on to the security, democratic, and economic spheres:

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—The security handover is now complete—and has fared much more successfully 

than most had predicted. This has only further boosted the confidence of Afghans 

on their own security forces. This might not be the impression you get here, reading the endless bad news about Afghanistan in the international media. But in 

Afghanistan we highlight our successes as well as our failures. The June attack 

on the Presidential Palace was a clear example of this: here in the United States 

it was reported as a dramatic breach of security. In Kabul reporters and analysts 

also commented on the ability of the Afghan security forces to bring an end to 

the attack in just 90 minutes. 

—Now, to complete what we see as a successful security transition, it is time to 

finalize the Bilateral Security Agreement, which will support the political and 

ensuing economic transition. 

—In the democratic sphere: we’ve seen new maturity and development in our political parties. New political movements and parties have emerged that are not 

based on individual strongmen or ethnicities, but represent the new generation. 

Consensus-building is now the norm. For instance, last fall FEFA facilitated negotiations between 48 political parties and civil society organizations, which resulted 

in the adoption of a 50-point ‘‘Declaration of Principles on Electoral Reform.’’ So 

while our elections still face huge challenges—these trends show democracy is 

taking root. 

—The media—a prerequisite for any democracy—is one of our great success stories. 

Today 95 percent of the Afghan population is exposed to some form of mass media 

and almost 500,000 Afghans are on Facebook compared to almost zero access to 

Internet 10 years ago. We have 50 television stations, 150 radio stations, and 100s 

of newspapers. 

—While the fight against corruption remains challenging, as it is for so many developing nations, the newfound courage of our media in taking on high-level corruption and impunity gives me confidence that we can begin to cure this cancer. 

Afghan journalists are routinely putting themselves at risk to report on the 

crimes of some of the most powerful, and in doing so starting to change the culture of impunity. 

—And it’s not just the media that is pushing for better governance. The Free and 

Fair Election Foundation, which I head, is pushing for electoral transparency and 

demanding accountability of parliamentarians to their constituencies. Afghan 

watchdog groups like Afghan Anti-Corruption Network, Integrity Watch, and 

Equality for Peace and Democracy have also become bold advocates for cleaner, 

more transparent government. Their advocacy recently triggered a parliamentary 

effort to impeach a minister accused of corruption. 

—In the economic and development sphere, hundreds of Afghan-owned small and 

medium-sized enterprises have sprung up; 16,000 new businesses were registered 

between 2004 and 2011, and thousands of kilometers of roads have been paved. 

Our telecommunications industry is thriving with around 20 million cell phone 

users (out of a population of 35 million). And with significant reserves of rare 

earth, minerals, gas, copper, and iron ore it is not too outlandish a statement to 

say that Afghanistan has the capacity to achieve economic autonomy. 

—And last but not least—there’s been unprecedented progress in sports and athletics—we won two Olympic medals in 2012, our cricket team made it into the 

international top 20, we have a newly created football league which has jumped 

up the international rankings after lying dormant for nearly 20 years. We have 

even nurtured a strong women’s football team.

Alongside these great gains, the reality is that today’s Afghanistan presents a 

dual picture: there are small but highly visible groups of Taliban and other terrorists who are rooted in Afghanistan’s past—a past wracked by repression, lawlessness and a painful isolation from the rest of the world. 

But a growing majority of Afghans have left that past behind. While suicide 

attacks and violence still make the headlines, most Afghans are now focused on 

jobs, the rule of law, accountability and the coming elections in 2014. 

Our civil society has grown in confidence, diversity, and strength—from emerging 

new political parties to women leaders, to our courageous investigative reporters 

and dynamic entrepreneurs; we are all invested in the same future, the same path 

to continued progress. 

As 2014 rapidly approaches, we look back at the last decade of our efforts that 

have born all these fruits with delight. I grew up during the civil war and lived 

through the Taliban’s brutal rule; I can attest personally that the past decade has 

led to radical improvements for our nation. But, cementing these achievements and 

paving the path for future peace and progress is also on our minds, for these gains 

can be quickly unraveled. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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After this ‘‘Decade of Transition,’’ Afghans share a collective sense of ownership 

with the process and faith in the system. With international support, we are now 

leading the ‘‘Decade of Transformation.’’

Political Transition: Free and Fair, Achievable and Effective Elections 

At the heart of political transition are the upcoming elections in 2014 and 2015, 

which have the potential to redefine Afghanistan’s future as well as to cement the 

investments of the United States in our emerging democracy. We welcome Secretary 

Kerry’s commitment to promoting a ‘‘free, fair, and transparent elections in 2014.’’ 

However, for this to happen, the United States cannot afford to be sidetracked by 

the likes of the Doha process. Such distractions have the potential to jeopardize the 

political transition and the achievements made to date. I would therefore urge 

Ambassador Dobbins and his team to keep their focus on Afghanistan, not Doha, 

and make the political transition and the elections, their first priority. 

Of course, challenges remain, but a credible election is the first step to building 

a credible government. There is still time to put in place the proper legal framework 

and to develop the necessary electoral institutions to ensure noninterference. 

Afghans are working hard to hold their government to account, and ensure that 

Afghans have the confidence and motivation to take part. The United States can 

also play an important role in the process. 

This upcoming election is already prompting robust campaigns and debates all 

over Afghanistan. It is clear to anyone and everyone involved with voting, elections, 

and government in Afghanistan that a sound legal framework is required. There are 

lively national debates on the progress of two laws that will create an improved 

legal framework for our elections—both laws have been passed by the upper and 

lower Houses of Parliament but still need Presidential approval. 

If the President doesn’t approve the election laws in the next few days or weeks, 

the elections will go ahead according to the Presidential Decree that was used in 

2010. We know from bitter experience how flawed that legislative decree is. Afghan 

civil society and our international partners have worked hard to try to make sure 

we have an improved legal framework, including an independent electoral commission and an electoral complaints process. But time is running out to ensure that 

happens. 

One positive sign is that operational preparations are taking place months earlier 

than in previous rounds—for example, the Afghan security forces announcing their 

plans in good time, including polling station locations. Voter registration is taking 

place—while initial indicators reveal low women’s participation, this is an area the 

Afghan Government with the support of the international community can prioritize 

and rectify. 

One of the most pressing challenges is that the Presidential elections will take 

place within a matter of months and the appointment of the chairman for the Independent Elections Commission has yet to be announced. The IEC is at the front and 

center of elections. Without a credible leader in place, who has a proven independence and an established record, and is driven, committed, and capable, the election 

commission will struggle to build the necessary confidence with the public. 

To counter these challenges and to ensure Afghanistan is given the fighting 

chance it deserves to hold free and fair elections, there are a few actions to consider:

(1) All efforts should be made to make sure that appointment of the IEC commissioners and in particular the chairperson are made through transparent and consultative means so that the next IEC will be perceived as credible and can perform 

independently of the executive. 

(2) While the United States cannot support an individual candidate, it should not 

shy away from supporting democratic parties, platforms, and institutions so that 

there is a level playing field. It should continue to stress the need for noninterference by the Afghan executive in the electoral processes, and fair access to the 

media. 

(3) The United States should continue to insist on the elections being held on time 

and according to the Afghan Constitution, and continue to support and strengthen 

the IEC’s antifraud measures and capacities so that they can manage a smooth 

post-election period. 

(4) All efforts should be made to facilitate the deployment of international election 

observers as well as supporting domestic electoral observers like my group—the 

Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA), not just through the 

2014 elections, but through the 2015 elections and beyond. 

(5) By 2014 the Afghan security forces will have sole responsibility for security, 

including the polling centers. With a small contingency force NATO and U.S. forces 

can provide confidence, and if required can assist with small but important tasks 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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should an emergency arise—such as providing the IEC logistical support for deployment of electoral material. 

Doha, the Threat of the Taliban Emirate, and a Real Path to Peace 

The people of Afghanistan want peace, not appeasement. The United States 

should not be giving any sense of false legitimacy or credibility to a terrorist group, 

or to Pakistan’s games. When the ‘‘political office’’ of the Taliban was opened in 

Doha it sent a signal to Afghans that the United States was not committed to working with the representative Government of Afghanistan. 

This uncertainty about the position and priorities of the United States is dangerous for a number of reasons. Firstly because it distracts the highest levels of the 

U.S. Government from helping to ensure a smooth and viable political transition, 

and sidelined negotiations over the Bilateral Security Agreement. The message that 

Doha sent can lead to hedging behavior by Afghans, which can be very destabilizing. 

Second, it emboldened the Taliban. The audacity of the Taliban flying a flag of 

the ‘‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’’ was shocking for Afghans, and exposed clearly 

their vision of themselves as the rightful rulers of our people. They may have temporarily closed down their office to protest demands that they stop calling themselves the Emirate, but that again shows how central to their movement is this 

notion of themselves as a ‘‘government in waiting.’’

The Taliban have not become a ‘‘moderate’’ group, they remain draconian, highly 

ideological and are, in fact, becoming more and more extreme in their attacks on 

innocent civilians. The Taliban have never categorically said that they will respect 

human rights and women’s rights, or that they are committed to furthering the 

progress in this field. Nor do they show any sign that they are ready to engage in 

the political process—which would mean respecting a (man-made) constitution, and 

accepting defeat at a ballot box. 

U.S. actions in Doha, therefore, risk undermining the proud sovereignty and fragile authority of the Afghan Government. As this Afghan Government has been supported by the United States, it also undermines the credibility of American foreign 

policy. 

This is not to say that we in Afghanistan are against the Taliban joining mainstream politics. We would welcome that with tears of joy—there are one or two 

former Taliban who participate peacefully in our Parliament—more would be welcome. However, we cannot entertain a political process wherein the Taliban refuses 

to denounce violence, rejects the constitution, and maintains relations with al-Qaeda 

and other dangerous regional networks. 

The United States should also be very wary of playing into Pakistan’s hands, in 

particular the designs of the Pakistani military, which treats the Afghan people as 

expendable pawns in their bigger contest with India. 

Throughout the past decade there have been genuine efforts by the Afghan Government and its international partners—including the United States—to gain the 

support of the Pakistani Government in a peace process, but hard facts suggest that 

elements in the Pakistani state continue to prove that they are not faithful partners. 

The Government of Afghanistan has also until recently failed to provide a clear 

path toward peace. They do not seem to have a clear sense of the end goal, they 

allow multiple tracks and institutions to engage in the process, creating confusion 

among the people, and among those elements within the Taliban that might be serious about peace. The government has also failed to build a consensus among different sectors of society about a path to peace—a precursor to an inclusive and sustainable peace process. 

Such a process is likely to take time and patience. Those who are rushing to this 

track seem to feel that the alternative is civil war. Most Afghans fear the shadow 

of civil war, but it is far from inevitable. We must ask you not to look at Afghanistan with the lens of the 1990s where the only contest is between the warlords and 

the Taliban. 

The new Afghanistan is changed—citizens want jobs for themselves and schools 

to be built for their children. This Decade of Transition has exposed even our warlords to far more attractive horizons—where peace and prosperity have been made 

possible. The overwhelming majority of Afghans does not identify with warlords or 

the Taliban—and will not be carried by either group—but are forging new political 

identities and platforms. 

We need to focus on the great test of the constitution that lies ahead of us in 

2014—because really the political settlement is the constitution. Building upon it, 

building upon the center, and upon the wishes of the majority, is the real and the 

sustainable path to peace. Anything else is short-lived and will not ensure lasting 

peace for the people. 

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If we have a new government, which reaffirms our commitment to our constitutional order, backed by the Strategic Partnership Agreement and a new Bilateral 

Security Agreement, we create the right incentives for the Taliban and Pakistan to 

rethink their strategy. I’m confident that these conditions might lead to a Pakistani 

and Taliban strategy that is more conducive to peace. 

What can be done, at this point, when so many mistakes have been made?

(1) The U.S.G—in particular the office of the Special Representative, Ambassador 

Dobbins—should focus on political transition in this critical moment. The next 

Afghan Government will have a far stronger mandate and the energy to play this 

role. 

(2) The United States should immediately halt any talks or preliminary negotiations with the Taliban until the latter has expressed firm commitment to engage 

with the Afghan Government. 

(3) The United States should not engage in any talks or preliminary negotiations 

until the Taliban cease their deliberate attacks on civilians. ‘‘Talking while fighting’’ 

may be common in many peace processes, it is not standard practice to talk while 

one side is consistently carrying out what might amount to war crimes. 

(4) If talks do begin in earnest, the U.S. priority should be working with the government to secure firm commitments from the Taliban that they would renounce 

violence and seek power through the democratic system, they would respect the 

Afghan Constitution, respect human rights, in particular women’s rights, including 

women’s right to work and participate in the political system. 

Cementing the Security Transition Will Preserve Gains and Provide Lasting Stability 

Let me now take a closer look at the achievements and challenges of our security 

transition. In October 2012, Afghanistan exceeded its goal of having a 350,000-

troops strong Afghan National Security Forces. Many Afghans want to join the 

ANSF to defend their own country. This is a magnificent achievement—just 6 years 

ago the total ANSF was not even 80,000 and recruitment was a problem. 

With this impressive force, Afghan leaders have been able to take responsibility 

for leading security in Afghanistan, with less and less reliance on the NATO-led 

International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). This shift toward Afghan leadership has not been accomplished overnight and has not been easy. But as an Afghan 

whenever I see our young men and some women in uniform I feel secure and proud, 

Mr. Chairman. For most Afghans in their 30s and older are seeing this uniformed 

national security force, carrying their country’s flag, for the first time in their lives. 

Our forces show steady improvements in their capacity and their courage, as demonstrated by recent attacks in our capital that were swiftly closed down with minimal disturbance for our citizens. 

The people of Afghanistan welcomed the successful completion of transition. However, we recognize that these achievements come despite enormous challenges that 

still need to be addressed. There is still great doubt as to whether ANSF is capable 

of continuing this progress after 2014, given the challenges we face. For example, 

without ‘‘coalition enabler’’ support, there is a risk that the ANSF are facing severe 

limitations. The Afghan Air Force is not yet in place, and air capacity is just at the 

beginning of development. Our people want to be in the Air Force, but they need 

time to develop the technical skills required. In addition, a basic essential service 

like medical evacuation is not yet in place. With a high attrition rate and literacy 

levels requiring time to improve, the ANSF is under great pressure. There are also 

shortcomings in transportation, logistics, and equipment. Technical knowledge, like 

counter-IED and military intelligence is growing, but slowly. 

On top of all this, our brave forces are not yet supported by a commander in chief 

they deserve. A number of military officers told me that morale is significantly 

affected because their commander in chief still cannot define who the enemy is, and 

who his brother is. Mr. Chairman, we are aware as Afghans that the task of choosing the right commander in chief is solely ours, and I am confident that the nation 

has learned hard lessons to be able to make the right decision in this coming election. We Afghans know our forces are now fighting bravely, sacrificing themselves, 

being killed and wounded, for the defense of their own country. But they need continuing help. They need help not just to keep fighting, but to make sure that they 

are a responsible, accountable military that works for the good of the people, and 

that dangers such as corruption, abuse of the people and seeking political power do 

not arise. Both Afghans and Americans want an Afghan military that we can be 

proud of. 

Finalizing the Bilateral Security Agreement is of paramount importance. It will 

give confidence in the political and ensuing economic transition. It will mutually 

benefit Afghanistan and the United States as the partnership against terrorism is 

cemented, and it will preserve the gains we worked so hard for and sacrificed so 

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much for in the past decade. At this point, Afghans want to be assured of the U.S. 

commitment to Afghan independence, security, and respect for the constitution. In 

return, the Afghan people will partner with the United States in building a country 

that is a productive part of the world community and an ally in an uncertain region. 

The Afghan Government will afford the United States access to military bases and 

partner with the United States in necessary counterterror operations. Afghans from 

different walks of life have echoed their endorsement of the strategic partnership 

between Afghanistan and the United States, including a Loya Jirga and the Afghan 

Parliament. The rhetoric, Mr. Chairman, which you hear from some of our political 

leaders, is far from what the majority of Afghans desire. Most of those I speak 

with—not just the educated elites but average rural Afghans in remote parts—are 

voicing their strong sense of anxiety, caused by delays in signing of the BSA. We 

want to move forward with the United States as our primary ally. 

Based on this brief outline, there are a few steps to be taken to support the security transition:

(1) Prioritize signing a Bilateral Security Agreement. 

(2) As part of the Chicago Commitment, provide resources and technical support 

to the Afghan Air Force for the time necessary. 

(3) Maintain the minimum level of international air power support until the 

Afghan Air Force and medical evacuation teams are ready to take on the job themselves. 

(4) Continue to provide the necessary advice, support, training and capacity-building for the ANSF through 2014 and beyond from literacy campaigns, to recruiting 

all ethnicities and women, to technical vocations, so that the ANSF becomes and 

remains a professional and responsible military. 

(5) As committed to in the Strategic Partnership and by NATO in Chicago last 

year, maintain the financial and material support necessary for the continued development of the institution of the army, police and intelligence.

In the last several years many Afghans like myself have been enormously reassured to see the great strides our military has taken, and remain indebted to the 

United States and our NATO allies for their assistance in training and financing 

our security forces. We appreciate that there must be a limit to this heavy burden 

for you, and this is not a request for open ended support, but we humbly request 

that you continue your support until the ANSF can not only manage, but truly lead 

security across the country. 

While I stress the importance of our military becoming a capable, well-resourced 

and trusted institution, I recognize that we need an equally capable and wellresourced civilian government, in order to avoid the fate of some countries in our 

region. 

After this decade-long strategic partnership, with all its successes and sacrifices, 

now is not the moment to squander the achievements and possibilities that are 

within reach today, because of short-term frustrations or gains. Nor is it the 

moment to chase after quick deals, when we’re so close to getting a new government 

with a fresh mandate, which will be capable of bringing all Afghans with it to reach 

a lasting and inclusive peace. 

Thank you, Senator Menendez and all the committee members for your continued 

engagement and interest, and for giving me the opportunity to provide frank testimony at this important time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you all for your testimony. 

We have a universal agreement that these elections are very 

important. Now, if you had the power, Mr. Hadley, to say this is 

what the United States should be doing right now with the Afghan 

Government to ensure the most honest, transparent, and fair elections possible, what would your answer be? 

Mr. HADLEY. We need to put pressure on President Karzai but 

really to encourage all aspects of the Afghan system to put pressure on Karzai and the Parliament to get this legislation enacted 

and to get the people appointed. That is point one. 

Secondly, we in our statements have to make it clear that this 

election is the top priority. I think a lot of Afghans thought that 

reconciliation with the Taliban was our top priority. This should be 

our top priority. It is our top priority. We have not made that clear. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Third, I would agree the election needs to be part of a broadbased reconciliation with all aspects of Afghan society which 

largely feel alienated. That is what this election can do. That will 

empower the Afghan Government. At that point after the election, 

an empowered government supported by its people, having international import, backed up by an army that is willing to fight for 

that government, then you can talk about having some conversation with Taliban to see those that are willing to come out of the 

fight and give up violence and then let the Afghan Army deal with 

the rest. 

And I think at that point, Pakistan will accept that deal. Pakistan, I think, has given up the notion that the Taliban are going 

to take over in Afghanistan. I think Pakistan now feels that an 

unstable Afghanistan threatens Pakistan which is seeing a high 

level of violence, and I think that Pakistan will lower its objective 

and accept some kind of outcome as long as there is some kind of 

Taliban role. 

But the critical thing will be to have, you said, an empowered, 

fairly elected, legitimate government supported by the Afghan people that can reconcile all of Afghan society. That is the critical element to achieve the things that Mr. Nadery has talked about. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nadery, I appreciate hearing the words 

‘‘thank you’’ because that is something President Karzai never 

seems to be able to say. 

With reference to your own view, what would you want the 

United States to do to help you achieve the type of elections that 

the Afghan people will have faith in? 

Mr. NADERY. Well, I will endorse what Mr. Hadley said just 

about the election, but to add on that is one of the critical things 

is the type of messages that both the Afghan political leadership 

and the public receives starting with raising the bar higher than 

what was discussed in the past. It means emphasize, as much as 

you can, on those processes and the principle of those processes, 

which means what kind of a free election and fair election you 

want to see being there. That message needs to remain consistent 

throughout. We were grateful to hear recently that Secretary Kerry 

changed the message from ‘‘credible’’ election to making it specific, 

‘‘free and fair.’’ That matters especially before the election. So do 

not raise the bar lower. Keep it high—as high as is possible before 

the election so it can send the message to those who are preparing 

for whatever possible end of the election to not be there. 

Second, continue the technical assistance both to the institution 

of the Election Commission, especially on the fraud mitigation 

measures. There are a large number of expertise and lessons 

learned in the past. That needs to be translated there in action to 

those in institution, including make sure that you are pressing for 

more international observers, including support for domestic election observers on the ground, but the election issue needs to 

remain a consistent priority and the messages that go need to 

match those issues of priority coming from your government to our 

government and our President. So no preparation or plots that are 

being in some corner of our government for a delay of the election 

or a cancelation of the election to work. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask this to all of you, more of a 

comment. You know, I read the article in the New York Times and 

I said this is certainly unfortunate and not positive. By the same 

token, I think that President Karzai somehow thinks that he has 

some leverage with us over this issue. Somehow he thinks that a 

zero option is not a possibility, so therefore we will have to somewhat be held over the barrel at the end of the day to what is this 

final negotiating opportunity. And I think the one thing that he 

should understand is that that is not beyond the possibility if we 

cannot get a bilateral security agreement. 

How do we disabuse President Karzai of the belief that this is 

something to negotiate with? I mean, negotiating an agreement is 

understandable, but there is a difference between negotiating an 

agreement and using the agreement as an effort to leverage whatever he is seeking personally for his future, his security living in 

Afghanistan, what comes along with his influence, whatever. I get 

a sense that the flip side of this—we talk about the United States 

not making it clear, and I think we should make it all clear. I think 

we have made it very clear that we intend to stay. By the same 

token, we cannot be held hostage by President Karzai. 

Mr. Hadley. 

Mr. HADLEY. It may have started by someone as an effort to kind 

of negotiate with Karzai and to say, you know, we really could pull 

them all out. The problem is the multiple audience problem and it 

dismayed the rest of the country and caused a loss of confidence. 

And so that I think was a terrible mistake. 

I think he is using the bilateral security agreement, and that is 

why my suggestion is to make a clear commitment of a specific, 

substantial number, say this is what we are going to do to reassure 

the rest of the country, and then say to Karzai, and we would love 

to negotiate it with you, but if we cannot negotiate it with you, we 

will negotiate it with the folks who come in after the election. That 

takes the stick away from him and takes the leverage away from 

him. 

And I think the combination of those two things, in the end of 

the day, will lead him to come to the table and negotiate an agreement because I think he wants that to be part of his legacy. I do 

not think he wants to leave it to the next government. 

So that is what I would try, but it is a very frustrating situation, 

but that is what I would try. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Chayes. 

Ms. CHAYES. Yes, thank you and I am going to have to go in just 

a minute. 

I would just like to second that. In fact, I would not say maybe 

we would do it after. I would just pause those negotiations. I would 

do the same thing, say the intent of the United States is to leave 

a troop presence after 2014 in the order of X, but we will resume 

these negotiations after the election. 

Mr. NADERY. I fully agree with both of the speakers on that 

front. But just to add again and reemphasize the point that you 

hear an entirely different message from the rest of the Afghans, including the Afghan Parliament, compared to what President Karzai 

says. There is an overwhelming majority of support for the bilateral security agreement endorsement and adoption. And therefore, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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it needs to be a multilayer of messaging and engagement both with 

the Afghan Parliament and also with other stakeholders on the 

ground. And therefore, not to pause the bilateral security agreement negotiation. It needs to continue with the knowledge that a 

‘‘no’’ answer should not come, making a clear message and communication to the President that if he is not signing it, the next 

administration with the popular support of the public are going to 

achieve and it will not be his legacy but will be a legacy of the next 

government which will have the popular support of the public. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine, if you have a question for Ms. 

Chayes, if you would give it to her first because she has got a 

speaking engagement and she has been hanging in here. 

Senator KAINE. I will. And, Mr. Chair, you asked all my questions almost. But just a threshold one and maybe Ms. Chayes could 

start first. 

Just a threshold question. You know, what is your perception 

about the degree of support in the Afghan population for a United 

States residual force post-2014? 

Ms. CHAYES. I would agree with Mr. Nadery. Very high. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Nadery. 

Mr. NADERY. Well, a good indication of looking into that would 

be all the discussion that have happened when there was a final 

decision was going to be made at the time on the strategy partnership agreement. The overwhelming support on the floor in the 

Afghan Parliament, the overwhelming discussion and support 

throughout Afghan civil society and broader in the provinces in 

support of the strategy partnership is a very clear indication of a 

continued partnership with the United States. 

Whenever there is a discussion about a zero troop option or a 

withdrawal, you hear a higher degree and a higher sense of anxiety 

and fear in the Afghan population. That creates further uncertainty about their future, and that need itself makes and drives a 

lot of support for a residual number of troops on the ground. And 

that need to be looked in a way that it needs to be—if the numbers 

are not coming right away, but at least it need to be announced in 

a way that it is tailored to the needs on the ground. If insecurity 

increases significantly and Afghan forces are fighting hard but 

needs more support, that number of troops will be tailored that 

way. And definitely we hope that we take more responsibility. We 

are going to fight for our own country and, therefore, the numbers 

will be corresponding to those needs for the support role in those 

areas that we need. At this stage, the numbers will definitely make 

a huge psychological confidence-boosting and building role. 

Senator KAINE. And the last question, Mr. Hadley, because you 

have really already answered the question I just asked in your 

written testimony. But in Afghanistan, sort of what I heard was 

the two bad narratives would be United States abandonment or 

United States occupation. And so what we are doing is attempting 

to establish a residual force that is clearly not an occupying force 

and that is clearly not an abandonment strategy. From your professional judgment based on what you are hearing in terms of the 

military leadership about what the size of that force would be, 

which is sort of a combined U.S.-NATO force, is the kind of range 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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you are hearing discussed a range that you generally feel is acceptable? 

Mr. HADLEY. I think the word is it is an ‘‘enabling’’ force that

enables the Afghans to take full responsibility. That is how we 

should see it. 

I think it should be mission-driven, not just an abstract number. 

Ron Neumann, who is our former Ambassador, tried to do that. He 

did sort of a mission-driven. 

I have a lot of respect for General Mattis, and my guess is that 

if you do that mission-driven, which probably he did it, you know, 

you are at a number that in the 15,000, not in the 9,000. And if 

you add 4,000 or 5,000 NATO troops, which is what people are 

talking about, that gets you a 20,000 number. That ought to be 

probably roughly adequate to do the mission. But again, I am no 

mission planner, but you asked me to read the tea leaves. That is 

kind of how I read them. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you both for your testimony. It was 

invaluable. Thank you for traveling all the way from Afghanistan 

on short notice to be here. It was very helpful, insightful. 

The record will remain open till the close of business tomorrow 

for any members who wish to submit questions. 

And with the thanks of the committee, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE JAMES DOBBINS TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Afghanistan’s elections in 2014 and the ensuing political transition are 

a critical piece in the success of the security transition to Afghan forces. Without 

free, fair, transparent, and credible elections, many of the efforts and sacrifices 

made by so many Americans and Afghans will have been for naught.

• What can the United States do better to convince Afghans that the 2014 elections and political transition is our top priority in Afghanistan? 

• In your opinion, what would constitute a ‘‘credible’’ election to the Afghan 

people?

Answer. The 2014 elections are the top political priority for our mission in Kabul 

and our diplomats understand that the 2014 Presidential election will determine the 

future stability of Afghanistan and the region. The Embassy regularly consults with 

Afghans throughout the country and stresses the importance of a successful political 

transition. Assistant Chief of Mission Ambassador David Robinson is the Embassy’s 

primary point of contact on elections. He meets almost daily with Afghan Government officials, political party leaders, Afghan National Security Force commanders, 

civil society, and international partners to assess progress on elections and deliver 

consistent U.S. policy messages on all aspects of planning for this historic event. 

Secretary Kerry, who has direct experience with Afghanistan’s 2009 Presidential 

election, has made the 2014 political transition one of his top priorities. He has 

raised this issue in all his conversations and meetings with President Karzai and 

other high-level Afghan officials, most recently in Kabul in March and in Brussels 

in May, as Deputy Secretary Burns did during his May visit to Kabul. I also discussed the elections during my meeting with President Karzai on May 29. 

Ultimately, Afghans themselves will have to determine what constitutes a ‘‘credible’’ election. However, the general sense we see is that Afghans want a free, fair, 

inclusive and unifying election that reflects the will of the people and reaffirms 

Afghanistan’s democratic progress and the Afghan people’s strong desire for a future 

shaped by democratic politics, not violence. Increased participation and reduced 

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fraud will help to ensure a credible result. It is up to the Afghan people to elect 

a President they hope will best represent all of Afghanistan.

Question. As we saw in Iraq, a coordinated interagency transition strategy for 

Afghanistan will be critical to avoid the risk of duplication or working at crosspurposes. Additionally, oversight of U.S. reconstruction funding is a priority in transition planning. For example, USAID intends to use third-party monitors to oversee 

its programs and projects, although we don’t have data to know whether this would 

be a reliable mechanism.

• Does the U.S. Government have a coordinated interagency strategy for transition in Afghanistan? If so, who is in charge of this planning effort? Is it coordinated with coalition partners and the Afghan Government? Has it applied lessons learned from Iraq? • Is oversight of civilian assistance being considered in transition planning? If so, 

specifically how are the State Department and USAID making oversight a 

priority?

Answer. The term ‘‘transition’’ in Afghanistan refers to a number of separate but 

interrelated processes occurring over the next 2 years and beyond. We often cite the 

security, political, and economic transitions as the three key issues for U.S. foreign 

policy in Afghanistan. In addition, the internal USG transition from a military-led 

to a civilian-led effort in Afghanistan is a critical priority and creates a large number of required actions and challenges, including planning for ongoing operations, 

management of assistance, and continuation of necessary diplomatic engagement. 

Given the broad and complex nature of these transitions, no single strategic document covers all aspects of the issue. Overarching strategic documents, including the 

U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership and the Civil-Military Strategic Framework, provide guidance to our efforts in support of the various transitions. In addition, the 

National Security Staff hosts regular interagency policy meetings to develop strategic guidance on transition issues. 

Earlier this year, in order to consolidate the policy and management aspects of 

the upcoming transitions into a single entity, Embassy Kabul combined the existing 

Transition Office, which was under the Coordinating Director for Development and 

Economic Affairs, and the Management Transition Office into a single Transition 

Office. The new office, led by two Senior Foreign Service officers, reports directly 

to the Ambassador and covers all aspects of transition including coordination with 

other agencies, other countries, coalition military, and the Afghan Government. 

The implementation and oversight of civilian assistance programs is a central 

part of our ongoing transition planning. The Embassy Transition Office is working 

closely with all U.S. implementing agencies and plans to systematically review 

existing assistance programs to assess how they contribute to our foreign policy 

goals and examine whether and how they will continue to operate after the 2014 

security transition. A key question in this analysis is whether the implementing 

agency will be able to provide adequate oversight and monitoring with potentially 

less access to project sites outside of Kabul. The Transition Office has developed, 

and the Ambassador set as Embassy-wide policy, a forward-looking program monitoring and oversight framework that envisions using third-party monitoring as a 

tool to support, but not replace, inherently governmental oversight functions. The 

Mission Policy on Monitoring and Evaluation directs agencies and sections to establish clear mechanisms for effective monitoring post-2014, and specific tripwires for 

deciding when projects should be postponed, put on hold, or terminated. The Embassy continually reevaluates projects and programs based on these criteria. USAID, 

INL, and other offices are currently building their post-2014 portfolios and, with the 

help of advanced planning, are integrating multilayered and technological solutions 

to address the upcoming implementation and monitoring challenges. For example, 

USAID has developed an innovative remote monitoring policy that incorporates best 

practices from other challenging operating environments, such as Iraq and Pakistan. 

The new policy calls for a multilayered approach that uses third-party monitors, 

technology including satellite imagery and mobile technology, surveys, and other 

methods to augment the monitoring information available to government oversight 

officials. 

In addition, Embassy Kabul has merged the two coordination offices, the Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Assistance (CDDEA) and the Coordinating Director for Rule of Law and Law Enforcement (CDROLLE) into one 

Coordination Directorate. This merger will further enhance synergies between the 

multiple agencies and sections working in Afghanistan and provide overarching policy direction in a whole-of-government approach. It will further facilitate and enhance the Embassy coordination with the military as security transition proceeds 

through its final phase. This new office will also coordinate oversight and moniFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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toring across the various agencies in accordance with the aforementioned Embassywide policy. While each agency and section has unique authorities and responsibilities for oversight of their programs, the Coordination Directorate will ensure that 

maximum efficiencies and effectiveness are achieved across the various programs. 

Though the transition processes in Iraq and Afghanistan are different in a number of significant ways, we agree that there are lessons to be learned from our experiences during the transition in Iraq. As such, we have facilitated regular conversations between the offices covering Iraq and Afghanistan in the Department of State 

and USAID to identify best practices. For instance, we learned from our Iraq experience to begin planning early and to establish clear implementing roles for each 

agency. As a result we started major planning for the Afghanistan transition early 

last year, more than 2 years in advance of the security transition, and we have 

defined a clear mission for the Department of State, USAID and the Department 

of Defense in the Strategic Partnership Agreement and in policy statements from 

President Obama and other administration leadership. We also have purposefully 

sought out veterans of the Iraq transition to fill key positions in the Department 

and at USAID overseeing the transition process in Afghanistan. In addition, we 

have increased collaboration with the Afghan Government and civil society in the 

design of our assistance programs to improve sustainability.

Question. In recent months, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has issued a number of troubling reports about our reconstruction efforts 

in Afghanistan. Through its audit and inspection work, SIGAR has identified 

numerous examples in which the United States created a program or built a facility 

without consideration as to whether the Afghan Government could sustain it.

• Which programs and projects funded by the State Department and USAID are 

least likely to be sustained by the Afghan Government? 

• What steps is your office taking to respond to the many problems SIGAR has 

identified and increase oversight responsibilities of civilian assistance in 

Afghanistan?

Answer. As we approach the 2014 security transition the emphasis of all of our 

civilian assistance programs is shifting toward sustainable development and away 

from the construction of infrastructure and quick impact projects designed to 

achieve immediate stabilization impacts. Our goal is to achieve sustainable, positive 

results in Afghanistan without disproportionately increasing the future burden on 

the Afghan Government. In fact, the majority of Department of State and many 

USAID programs are not provided through the government and will not require any 

sustainment effort from the government. For example, we are investing in the empowerment of Afghan women and providing significant support to the Afghan private sector. Of course, some of our previous and future investments including work 

to improve infrastructure, health, and education services, and other programs will 

require support from the Afghan Government in order for the benefits to be sustained. We work closely with the Afghan Government as programs are designed, 

implemented, and completed to ensure the government has the necessary capacity 

to maintain these programs, understands the costs associated with them, and has 

committed to provide the necessary resources. It is our goal to ensure that each 

major investment in civilian assistance is followed up with the resources necessary 

to maintain the progress that U.S. assistance has facilitated over the last decade. 

We welcome the role played by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR) in identifying weaknesses in our reconstruction programming and the potential for misuse of funds and offering solutions. We appreciate the 

insightful recommendations provided in SIGAR audit reports and in each case seriously review recommendations and how we can best apply them. We respond to 

each SIGAR audit report with specific comments on recommended actions and in 

most cases describe how we will or have already implemented recommendations. 

Additionally, when SIGAR provides actionable information, we take action. We 

share SIGAR’s goal of safeguarding U.S. taxpayer resources from fraud, waste, and 

abuse, and are committed to the most effective uses of those resources in advancing 

our Nation’s national security through assistance programs in Afghanistan. 

RESPONSES OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE JAMES DOBBINS TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. On July 9, the Senate unanimously passed S. Res. 151 which urges the 

Secretary of State to condition financial, logistical, and political support for Afghanistan’s 2014 elections based on the implementation of reforms in Afghanistan including——

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• Increased efforts to encourage women’s participation in the electoral process, including provisions to ensure their full access to and security at polling stations; 

• The implementation of measures to prevent fraudulent registration and manipulation of the voting or counting processes; and, 

• Prompt passage of legislation through the Parliament of Afghanistan that codifies the authorities and independence of the IEC and an independent and 

impartial election complaints mechanism.

How would you assess progress on each of these measures?

Answer. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) has made a concerted effort 

to mainstream its gender strategy in its overall operational plan for the 2014 elections. For example, in preparation for the upcoming elections in 2014, the IEC Gender Unit has been actively involved in ensuring that gender is taken into consideration in all of IEC’s electoral work. Despite challenges concerning the capacity of 

the Gender Unit, the IEC has undertaken strategies to encourage female voters to 

register, as well as to increase the female staff at IEC headquarters and provinces 

to conduct voter registration. The IEC continues to engage influential leaders, 

including religious leaders and women’s networks, to create awareness about the 

importance of women’s participation in the electoral process. The IEC has made 

clear that it will develop targeted messages for female voters and that it will ensure 

that gender is taken into account in all of its messaging, in order to promote a gender-sensitive voter education approach. This is intended to promote inclusiveness 

and transparency in the electoral processes, and to safeguard the fundamental right 

to vote for all eligible women voters. Similarly, with regards to staffing, the IEC is 

putting into place measures to ensure women’s active role in the election administration structures, including: female trainers; female voter educators; and voter registration and polling staff. 

We are working closely with the Afghan authorities to support their efforts to 

implement safeguards to prevent fraud, address fraud where it occurs, and improve 

people’s ability to cast their ballots freely. The IEC’s Operational Plan includes 

strengthened fraud mitigation procedures, developed from lessons learned from past 

electoral cycles. Some of these procedures, which the IEC is actively implementing, 

include: improved monitoring and tracking of ballots and ballot boxes; transparent 

vote counting and distribution of preliminary tally sheets at polling centers, and; 

double-blind counting procedures. 

A credible legal framework will help ensure a good election as well as the full 

legal participation of all Afghans. The establishment of an electoral framework 

through broad consultation and compromise is critical. Separate joint committees of 

the two Houses of Parliament are currently reconciling competing versions of the 

IEC Structure Law and Electoral Law. Parliamentarians are confident that they 

will be able to reconcile the laws and pass them for President Karzai’s signature 

before Parliament’s July 23 recess. We look forward to President Karzai’s approval 

of both laws, and the swift implementation of these laws. We will continue to support Afghanistan’s independent electoral institutions, civil society, and the people as 

they prepare for these elections and take the necessary next steps to advance the 

electoral process and ensure independent and credible appointments to the IEC and 

Electoral Complaints Commission.

Question. Since the creation of the Special Representative’s office (SRAP), I have 

been concerned that we have been paying insufficient attention to India-Pakistan 

dimensions in the region. Our bureaucracy has created artificial silos so that the 

Afghanistan and Pakistan offices at the State Department and USAID are separated from the rest of South Asia, even though there are technically bureaucratic 

linkages between them (i.e., dual-hatted positions).

• What steps will you take to ensure greater coordination and integration of 

efforts regarding our Pakistan and India policies and personnel?

Answer. Our relationships with India and Pakistan are both vital components of 

U.S. foreign policy in Asia. The President has identified our relationship with India 

as one of the defining partnerships for the 21st century, a partnership that is a key 

to our Rebalance in Asia. Our relationship with Pakistan is also of prime importance to our efforts to promote regional stability and economic prosperity. These two 

relationships both stand on their own merits, and we seek to ensure that productive 

engagements with each country do not come at the expense of the other. Nevertheless, we also recognize that Pakistan and India have their own bilateral relationship, and the progress of that relationship is vital to U.S. interests in the region. 

We are encouraged by the positive tone that has emerged in recent months regarding relations between the two countries, and hope that this progress continues, 

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including on normalizing trade policies and economic engagement, security issues, 

and people-to-people exchanges. 

In order to advance our objectives in the region, SRAP works hand-in-hand with 

colleagues in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) to shape policy 

and coordinate messaging. In fact, a number of these officers have firsthand experience working with or in both India and Pakistan. We also work closely with our 

interagency colleagues, including the Department of Defense, the National Security 

Staff, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, to ensure a diversity of 

viewpoints and analytical techniques enhances our ability to address regional issues 

in a holistic manner. 

RESPONSES OF SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE JAMES DOBBINS TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF FLAKE

Question #1. The Washington Post reported on July 9 that, ‘‘In northern Afghanistan, the State Department last year abandoned plans to occupy a large building 

it had intended to use as a consulate. After spending more than $80 million and 

signing a 10-year lease, officials determined the facility was too vulnerable to 

attacks.’’ The report also details a $34 million new military headquarters in Afghanistan that ‘‘commanders in the area, who insisted 3 years ago that they did not need 

the building, now are in the process of withdrawing forces and see no reason to 

move into the new facility.’’ This example, in addition to the other egregious examples of wasted taxpayer dollars outlined in the report are unfortunately reminiscent 

of what we saw with regard to Iraq reconstruction projects, as well.

• a. After commanders in the area said 3 years ago that they had no interest in 

the facility, why was construction continued on it? Who foisted the building on 

those commanders? What was the decisionmaking process on this and who was 

ultimately responsible for approving construction of the facility?

Answer. This question is not within the purview of the Department of State. The 

Department defers to the Department of Defense to respond.

• b. Three years ago when this facility began construction, discussions about 

withdrawal from Afghanistan had already begun inside the administration. 

What considerations were given to any potential withdrawal when plans to construct this facility began?

Answer. This question is not within the purview of the Department of State. The 

Department of State defers to the Department of Defense to respond.

• c. How is the State Department using the lessons learned from Iraq reconstruction to put a better, less expensive foot forward in post-war Afghanistan?

Answer. The White House has not yet determined the scale and shape of the post2014 footprint. However, in developing the possible options, the State Department 

has incorporated lessons learned from Iraq to ensure we leverage existing U.S. Government capabilities where possible. We have established an Executive Steering 

Group with the Department of Defense to coordinate planning efforts, logistics 

requirements, and possible solutions for potential areas of concern.

• d. Are the Departments of Defense and State collaborating on the use of existing infrastructure in Afghanistan to minimize costs going forward?

Answer. Yes, the Department of State and Department of Defense continue to 

work closely, including through the colocation of civilian staff with military forces 

throughout Afghanistan. Post-2014 plans are based on military support to the civilian mission, leveraging existing infrastructure where possible for cost savings, in 

order to provide those critical functions or services that civilian agencies cannot perform themselves.

• e. To what degree is the State Department consulting the Government of 

Afghanistan over what its infrastructure needs are and what it can support?

Answer. The State Department has no plans to transfer any of its existing civilian 

facilities to the Government of Afghanistan; however, the United States remains 

committed to ensuring the Afghans have the required capacity to properly maintain 

facilities constructed by U.S. development programs.

Question #2. The Inspectors General for Reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

respectively, have identified many projects that spent millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars and yet despite these investments, the projects have failed or are near failure. 

In Iraq, for example, a wastewater treatment plant built in Fallujah ‘‘was constructed at great cost but to little effect,’’ according to the Inspector General, servFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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ing, ‘‘only a fraction of those intended.’’ That project cost $99.8 million. In Afghanistan, the Inspector General found that an investment of $18.5 million by USAID in 

two hospitals ‘‘may not be the most economical and practical use of funds,’’ because 

‘‘USAID did not fully assess the Ministry of Public Health’s ability to operate and 

maintain these new facilities once completed.’’

• a. To what degree is consideration given to the host country’s ability to maintain facilities such as these when the United States turns them over?

Answer. As Afghanistan becomes more stable, assistance activities in Afghanistan 

are shifting from shorter-term stabilization activities to efforts increasingly focused 

on systematic, long-term improvements that are Afghan-led and sustainable. The 

Department of State and USAID are committed to ensuring that assistance programs achieve sustainable results in Afghanistan. Likewise, we share the Afghan 

Government’s goal of increasing Afghanistan’s self reliance and decreasing the country’s dependence on foreign aid. The ability of the recipient government to maintain 

U.S. Government-constructed facilities is among the first questions asked in the 

program design process and a required discussion with recipient government counterparts. A number of laws, regulations and guidance documents require project sustainability be considered prior to project initiation. The international donor community and the Afghan Government are taking more concerted steps to build capacity 

of the Afghan Government to operate and maintain facilities. This includes an initiative through the World Bank’s Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund to incentivize policy and operational reforms and encourage increased domestic spending on 

operations and maintenance (O&M). The Ministry of Public Health is to be one of 

the first ministries to benefit from this program, as it has made substantial progress 

to meet O&M demands. This progress includes the development of a norms-based 

O&M policy, an asset registry, and demonstrating increased O&M spending. 

Although it was not in place at the time these hospitals were conceived, we use the 

USAID Administrator’s 2011 Sustainability Guidance as an initial tool to ensure 

current U.S. Government programs achieve sustainable results. In fact, the annual 

foreign operations appropriation requires that the Secretary of State certify, prior 

to the obligation of funding, that funds will be used to support programs in accordance with the Administrator’s Sustainability Guidance. In addition, section 611 of 

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the recently enacted section 1273 of the FY 

2013 National Defense Authorization Act require a sustainability assessment and 

determination prior to the obligation of foreign assistance funding for infrastructure 

projects. As a result of these provisions and in furtherance of our goal of reducing 

Afghan reliance on foreign aid, we have incorporated sustainability into project design processes, and all major infrastructure projects are now subject to a sustainability audit.

• b. Why didn’t USAID fully assess the ability of the Afghanistan Ministry of 

Public Health to manage this facility before it was constructed? Is this typical 

of the way USAID manages assistance projects?

Answer. In USAID’s response to Audit 13–9 by the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) related to the construction of health facilities 

in Afghanistan, we noted our disagreement with the conclusion that the United 

States did not adequately consult with the Afghan Government prior to the construction of hospitals in Gardez and Khair Kot. The Afghan Ministry of Public 

Health was consulted throughout the construction cycle for both projects and has 

committed in writing to fund the operation and maintenance of both facilities after 

they are completed later this year. Furthermore, the Ministry of Public Health has 

made great strides in recent years in building its management and operational 

capacity. It successfully manages thousands of clinics around the country that provide health services to millions of Afghan citizens. We have no reason to believe the 

Ministry will not follow through on its pledge to manage these facilities and will 

continue to monitor to ensure Afghan officials are following through on their 

commitments.

• c. The transition in Afghanistan will be operating during a time of fiscal austerity in the United States. How do you anticipate that the declining budgets 

of State and USAID will affect these types of projects moving forward?

Answer. Following last year’s comprehensive review of the U.S. assistance portfolio in Afghanistan, it was decided that future assistance funds would focus more 

intensively than in the past on sustainable development, including inclusive economic growth and ensuring the Afghan Government has the necessary capacity to 

maintain the development gains achieved over the last 11 years. Examples of such 

programs include helping the National Highway Administration establish an operations and maintenance division. Health sector programs will focus on maintaining 

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the current level of nationwide health service provision and health professional 

training. No construction of new health facilities is planned.

• d. Will these projects be paid for using overseas contingency operations funds?

Answer. Per the draft FY 2013 653(a) allocations recently presented to Congress, 

all Economic Support Funds (ESF) resources for Afghanistan, except for programs 

in the family planning area, will come from the Overseas Contingency Operations 

account. Therefore, the administration will use these funds to support health and 

all other development programming. Afghanistan will require international assistance in the health sector for many years to come and we intend to continue our support for the health sector.

• e. Has there been any effort inside State and USAID to learn from past mistakes and avoid making them in the future?

Answer. Yes. We are constantly reviewing the results of past and current projects 

to derive lessons for our future operations. Every year we review each of our 

projects in Afghanistan and produce a report of performance and results. In addition, we conduct regular portfolio reviews to ensure our programs are well aligned 

with our ongoing mission and with the goals of the Afghan Government. We use the 

data from these reviews and reports to evaluate the effectiveness of our programs 

and to design better programs in the future. For example, USAID has put in place 

a new policy restricting the type of mechanisms that may be used for construction 

services to ensure maximum agency oversight of construction projects as these 

require a greater level of scrutiny in challenging security environments.

Question #3. Negotiations are underway for a bilateral security agreement 

between the United States and Afghanistan that would provide immunity for U.S. 

troops remaining in Afghanistan in a post-2014 environment. According to CRS, 

‘‘observers report that negotiations have bogged down over Afghan demands for 

guarantees that the United States will adequately fund the ANSF for at least several years after 2014.’’

• a. What kinds of guarantees is President Karzai looking for and what does he 

believe to be ‘‘adequate’’ funding for the ANSF? 

• b. What is the administration’s position on providing funding for the ANSF and 

how much of a sticking point will that be in any ultimate agreement?

Answer. The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) is another step in implementing 

our pledge to support a long-term partnership with Afghanistan as outlined in the 

Strategic Partnership Agreement, signed in May 2012, and evidenced through our 

statements at the Chicago NATO summit in May 2012 and the Tokyo International 

Conference on Afghanistan in July 2012. Since the launch of negotiations in November 2012, we have made significant progress on achieving agreement in order to conclude the BSA. We will not comment publicly with regard to ongoing negotiations 

as the positions evolve through discussions. Our BSA lead negotiator, Ambassador 

Warlick, has provided regular briefings to Members of Congress, and has plans to 

brief the Hill in the coming days prior to the August recess. I or my team would 

be happy to provide a briefing again at any point. 

The United States supports the development of the capability and capacity of the 

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to provide security and stability for 

Afghanistan. The administration has sought and Congress has provided annual 

appropriations through the Department of Defense to support ANSF development. 

The BSA is expected to be concluded as an executive agreement. As such, we are 

not discussing specific funding commitments as part of the BSA negotiations. 

Beyond 2014, as agreed in the Strategic Partnership Agreement, the administration 

will seek funds from Congress on a yearly basis—after discussing needs with the 

Afghan authorities—in order to support the agreed upon efforts. 

These are not easy issues, but we continue to approach the negotiation in the spirit of partnership evidenced by our Strategic Partnership Agreement and our longterm commitment. We are working closely with the Afghans to develop a BSA that 

meets the needs of both our countries and confirms our enduring partnership for 

security and defense cooperation. 

RESPONSES OF ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY PETER LAVOY TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENT

Question. There are two oversight issues that I feel should be included in the final 

text of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). First, U.S. Government personnel 

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need to be allowed to oversee U.S.-funded programs and projects in Afghanistan and 

to monitor the use of direct assistance funds provided to the Afghan Government. 

If such provisions are not included, U.S. assistance to Afghanistan will be subject 

to significant risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. Second, U.S. negotiators should incorporate into the BSA a consistent, unified position on what the U.S. Government 

deems appropriate taxation of contractors supporting U.S. Government efforts in 

Afghanistan. A recent SIGAR audit report found that, since 2008, the Afghan Ministry of Finance has levied over $921 million in business taxes, and associated penalties, on 43 contractors that support U.S. Government efforts in Afghanistan, even 

though the contractors should be exempt from most taxation under U.S. bilateral 

agreements with the Afghan Government.

• Are these oversight provisions being worked into the BSA, and if not, why not?

Answer. The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) currently under negotiation with 

Afghanistan, like the current U.S.-Afghanistan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 

is an agreement that would provide a framework for DOD activities in Afghanistan 

after 2014. It would not cover the activities of any other U.S. department or agency. 

The BSA would preserve DOD’s ability to conduct its activities, including provision 

and oversight of assistance to Afghanistan, in accordance with relevant U.S. laws 

and regulations. DOD remains strongly committed to its oversight responsibilities 

in Afghanistan, which include ensuring that any funds (such as Afghan Security 

Forces Fund funding) provided directly to the Government of Afghanistan by DOD 

are used appropriately and effectively to advance U.S. national security objectives. 

United States global SOFA policy and practice are to seek and enforce exemptions 

from taxation on all DOD activities, including that no taxes or similar charges be 

assessed on articles and services acquired in the host country by or on behalf of 

United States forces. This flows directly from the principle that one sovereign nation 

does not tax another sovereign nation when partnering for mutual benefit. The BSA, 

like the 2003 SOFA, is being negotiated consistent with this global SOFA policy and 

practice. Taxation issues related to other U.S. Government contracts in Afghanistan, 

such as taxation of contractors that support activities of the Department of State, 

are addressed in other international agreements with the Afghan Government. We 

firmly believe that it is important that exemptions available under applicable international agreements are claimed for the benefit of the U.S. Government and U.S. 

taxpayer. 

METRICS

Question. Even though the administration speaks positively about the security 

transition, opinions vary greatly about whether Afghans are actually safer. I hear 

from some contacts that security has deteriorated countrywide, civilian casualty 

rates are rising, and the insurgency is spreading.

• What metrics is ISAF using to measure if the transition is really working? 

Where can the committee find this information? Is ISAF still collecting statistics 

on violence rates and civilian casualties?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) assesses success in Afghanistan by 

utilizing data from many sources, including reports from the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. intelligence agencies. Contrary to what you have 

heard, overall violence is down compared to last year. Civilian casualties have 

decreased significantly and insurgent influence over the populated areas of Afghanistan continues to decline. Our most comprehensive single metric for violence in 

Afghanistan is Enemy Initiated Attacks (EIAs). As of June 30, 2013, EIAs had 

declined 6 percent when compared to 2012. Additionally, as of June 30, 2013, improvised explosive device events were down 10 percent, and suicide attacks were down 

23 percent compared to the previous year. 

DOD’s comprehensive assessment of the conflict in Afghanistan, the semiannual 

report to Congress on ‘‘Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,’’ 

draws from an array of security, governance, and economic metrics that provide an 

accurate and comprehensive picture of the overall situation in Afghanistan. These 

metrics include: improvised explosive device events, direct fire attacks, high-profile 

attacks, complex attacks, indirect-fire attacks, civilian casualties, Afghan National 

Security Force (ANSF) capability ratings, ANSF operational reporting, ANSF facilities construction and maintenance, ANSF funding, ANSF recruitment, GDP growth 

rates, population polling, international community donations to Afghanistan, Afghan 

Government budget execution rates, school attendance, economic infrastructure 

build, cell phone usage, counternarcotics indicators, health indicators, and many 

other metrics and indicators. This report—released July 30, 2013—is unclassified, 

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publicly available on the Department’s Web site, and has been made available in 

printed form to all Members of Congress. 

ISAF collects statistics on civilian casualties (CIVCAS), which are also included 

in the Department’s report on ‘‘Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.’’ Between October 1, 2012, and March 31, 2013, CIVCAS from all sources 

decreased by 11 percent compared to the same period a year ago. The majority of 

these CIVCAS were caused by insurgents. ISAF-caused CIVCAS decreased by 72 

percent, the results of extensive ISAF mitigation actions. There was a 50 percent 

decrease in ISAF-caused CIVCAS by precision-guided munitions from October 2012 

to March 2013. Insurgent-caused CIVCAS also decreased by 10 percent. 

As our presence in Afghanistan is reduced, our ability to observe and collect much 

of these data will also decline. 

COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE OF AFGHANISTAN

Question. I have serious concerns about U.S. planning for the Counternarcotics 

Police of Afghanistan (CNP–A). While the CNP–A vetted units have made significant progress, they have had limited success in breaking the nexus between narcotics and the insurgency. More troubling, however, are the CNP–A provincial units 

which seem to lack any coherent strategy for their development. The Defense 

Department (DOD) has been a major funder of the CNP–A, contributing some $40 

million a year in operating costs, in addition to transportation, logistics, and security support from DOD assets. As DOD and State Department’s INL funding dries 

up, there could be a significant impact on CNP–A operations, causing manpower reductions and rendering many operations unsustainable. The U.S. Government needs 

a coordinated strategy and approach for the funding and development of the CNP–

A, beyond the vetted units; currently, responsibility is diffuse among different agencies with no clear chain of command for making policy decisions. The U.S. Government should assess whether the development of the CNP–A, particularly the provincial units, is realistic, achievable, and sustainable before the 2014 transition.

• Does the U.S. Government have a coordinated strategy for the development of 

the CNP–A provincial units? If so, please share in detail with the Committee. 

If not, please justify why we continue to spend money on CNP–A development.

Answer. DOD acknowledges the critical need to continue developing the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). The U.S. Government has an interagencycoordinated strategy, approved by senior leadership in December 2012, to address 

counternarcotics (CN) issues in Afghanistan, an approach which includes the CNPA. 

This strategy calls for continuing efforts to build the capacity of the CNPA, and proposes the establishment of a roadmap to create a sustainable and accountable 

Afghan-led police force by the end of 2014. The strategy also calls for the Ministry 

of Counter Narcotics to develop incentives for provincial governors to undertake 

more robust CN initiatives. In addition to these efforts, DOD is developing a post2014 CN strategy for Afghanistan and plans to deliver this strategy to congressional 

defense committees by late August 2013. 

SIGAR

Question. In recent months, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has issued a number of troubling reports about our reconstruction 

efforts in Afghanistan. Through its audit and inspection work, SIGAR has identified 

numerous examples in which the United States created a program or built a facility 

without consideration as to whether the Afghan Government could sustain it.

• a. Which programs and projects funded by the Defense Department are least 

likely to be sustained by the Afghan Government? • b. What steps is your office taking to respond to the many problems SIGAR has 

identified and increase oversight responsibilities of assistance in Afghanistan?

Answer. Facility maintenance remains a significant challenge for the ANSF. As 

more than 3,900 projects come to completion, the ANSF will need to fully develop 

its own organic capability to maintain facilities. Due to the scale of the reconstruction effort and the diversity of metrics used to determine facility sustainability, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) does not maintain a list of at-risk facilities. However, 

the United States and its coalition partners remain committed to ensuring the longterm sustainability of these facilities by the Afghans. 

DOD has expanded its assessments of certain capital projects in Afghanistan, as 

required by Section 1273 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2013, to help ensure that all the projects we undertake are both needed and sustainable. In addition to DOD initiatives, the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan 

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tinual progress in achieving this goal. The general approach to building facility 

stewardship capacity is along four lines of effort: (1) hiring facilities engineers; (2) 

training facility engineers; (3) provision of tools and equipment; and (4) delegating 

appropriate authorities and developing routine processes so maintenance is consistently executed to high standards. NTM–A also remains committed to constant 

review of ANSF infrastructure projects, to ensure that they still meet valid requirements. This oversight has resulted in almost 100 projects being cancelled or 

descoped in size, reducing the total cost of the ANSF program from the originally 

planned $11.38 billion to $9.41 billion. 

RESPONSE OF ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY PETER LAVOY TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

REGIONAL COMMAND SOUTHWEST

Question. On July 10, the Washington Post reported that the U.S. military spent 

$34 million building a massive command headquarters for Regional Command 

Southwest (RC–Southwest), which was just completed. Special Inspector General 

Sopko’s report indicates the facility will never be fully inhabited and will either be 

demolished or turned over to the Afghan Government in 2014.

• How would you explain to the American people that their taxpayer dollars were 

spent on such a project, which will never serve its intended purpose and may 

even be demolished within a year of completion? Will you commit that no further money will be spent on the construction and outfitting of this facility until 

all of the Special Inspector General’s questions in his July 8 letter are 

answered? Will you commit to making your response to his letter available to 

the public?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is committed to pursuing reconstruction projects that are valuable, desired, and sustainable. Construction and infrastructure development has focused on developing the civilian and military infrastructure that will be critical to ensuring the stability of Afghanistan once U.S. and 

coalition forces depart. These programs continue to bear fruit, and DOD is encouraged by the impact reconstruction efforts are having in Afghanistan. However, due 

to the difficult and dynamic environment operational environment, there have been 

cases where projects initiated on one set of assumptions encounter problems when 

circumstances change. 

We have received the SIGAR letter and intend to provide a response to the points 

that are raised in it. We cannot comment further on the specifics at this time, as 

the matter is currently under investigation by U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR–

A). 

On June 23, 2013, Commander, USFOR–A, opened an investigation under Army 

Regulation 15–6 to determine the facts and circumstances that led to construction 

of the Command and Control (C2) facility in Regional Command-Southwest, 

appointing a major general to lead the investigation. This investigation is ongoing. 

No findings have been approved, and no final determinations have yet been made 

as to decisions, communications, or other actions by any particular individual or organization. However, we are committed to sharing the results of the investigation 

when it is completed. 

RESPONSES OF ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY PETER LAVOY TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF FLAKE

WASHINGTON POST

Question. The Washington Post reported on July 9 that, ‘‘In northern Afghanistan, 

the State Department last year abandoned plans to occupy a large building it had 

intended to use as a consulate. After spending more than $80 million and signing 

a 10-year lease, officials determined the facility was too vulnerable to attacks.’’ The 

report also details a $34 million new military headquarters in Afghanistan that 

‘‘commanders in the area, who insisted 3 years ago that they did not need the building, now are in the process of withdrawing forces and see no reason to move into 

the new facility.’’ This example, in addition to the other egregious examples of 

wasted taxpayer dollars outlined in the report are unfortunately reminiscent of 

what we saw with regard to Iraq reconstruction projects, as well.

• a. After commanders in the area said 3 years ago that they had no interest in 

the facility, why was construction continued on it? Who foisted the building on 

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those commanders? What was the decisionmaking process on this and who was 

ultimately responsible for approving construction of the facility? • b. Three years ago when this facility began construction, discussions about 

withdrawal from Afghanistan had already begun inside the administration. 

What considerations were given to any potential withdrawal when plans to construct this facility began? • c. How is the State Department using the lessons learned from Iraq reconstruction to put a better, less expensive foot forward in post-war Afghanistan? • d. Are the Departments of Defense and State collaborating on the use of existing infrastructure in Afghanistan to minimize costs going forward? • e. To what degree is the State Department consulting the Government of

Afghanistan over what its infrastructure needs are, and what it can support?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is committed to pursuing reconstruction projects that are valuable, desired, and sustainable. Construction and infrastructure development has focused on developing the civilian and military infrastructure that will be critical to ensuring the stability of Afghanistan once U.S. and 

coalition forces depart. These programs continue to bear fruit, and DOD is encouraged by the impact reconstruction efforts are having in Afghanistan. However, due 

to the difficult and dynamic environment operational environment, there have been 

cases where projects initiated on one set of assumptions encounter problems when 

circumstances change. 

On June 23, 2013, Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR–A) opened an 

investigation under Army Regulation 15–6 to determine the facts and circumstances 

that led to construction of the Command and Control (C2) facility in Regional Command-Southwest (RC–SW), appointing a major general to lead the investigation. 

This investigation is ongoing; no findings have been approved, and no final determinations have yet been made as to decisions, communications, or other actions by 

any particular individual or organization. 

The Departments of Defense and State share a strong interest in ensuring the 

appropriate use of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Our agencies are institutionalizing the 

lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan (such as enhanced program oversight, 

higher contractor performance standards, and improved management processes) to 

ensure the highest levels of interagency communication and collaboration. 

For more specific information on the State Department’s Mazar-e-Sharif facility, 

the Department’s consultations with the Government of Afghanistan on infrastructure needs, or the applicability of lessons learned from Iraq reconstruction on their 

efforts in post-war Afghanistan, we refer you to the Department of State. 

PROJECTS FAILED OR NEAR FAILURE

Question. The Inspectors General for Reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

respectively, have identified many projects that spent millions of U.S. taxpayer dollars and yet despite these investments, the projects have failed or are near failure. 

In Iraq, for example, a wastewater treatment plant built in Fallujah ‘‘was constructed at great cost but to little effect,’’ according to the inspector general, serving, 

‘‘only a fraction of those intended.’’ That project cost $99.8 million. In Afghanistan, 

the inspector general found that an investment of $18.5 million by USAID in two 

hospitals ‘‘may not be the most economical and practical use of funds,’’ because 

‘‘USAID did not fully assess the Ministry of Public Health’s ability to operate and 

maintain these new facilities once completed.’’

• a. To what degree is consideration given to the host country’s ability to maintain facilities such as these when the United States turns them over? • b. Why didn’t USAID fully assess the ability of the Afghanistan Ministry of 

Public Health to manage this facility before it was constructed? Is this typical 

of the way USAID manages assistance projects? 

• c. The transition in Afghanistan will be operating during a time of fiscal austerity in the United States. How do you anticipate that the declining budgets 

of State and USAID will affect these types of projects moving forward? 

• d. Will these projects be paid for using overseas contingency operations funds? 

• e. Has there been any effort inside State and USAID to learn from past mistakes and avoid making them in the future?

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is committed to pursuing reconstruction projects that are valuable, desired, and sustainable. Construction and infrastructure development has focused on developing the civilian and military infrastructure that will be critical to ensuring the stability of Afghanistan once U.S. and 

coalition forces depart. These programs continue to bear fruit, and DOD is encouraged by the impact reconstruction efforts are having in Afghanistan. However, due 

to the difficult and dynamic environment operational environment, there have been 

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cases where projects initiated on one set of assumptions encounter problems when 

circumstances change. 

Sustainability, specifically the ability of the Afghan Government to maintain completed efforts, has been, and continues to be a factor in DOD’s project selection. 

DOD has expanded its assessments of certain capital projects in Afghanistan, as required by Section 1273 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2013, to ensure that these projects are both needed and sustainable. In response to 

your direct questions regarding USAID, I respectfully defer to my colleagues from 

the Department of State and USAID, Ambassador Dobbins. 

IMMUNITY

Question. Negotiations are underway for a bilateral security agreement between 

the United States and Afghanistan that would provide immunity for U.S. troops remaining in Afghanistan in a post-2014 environment. According to CRS, ‘‘observers 

report that negotiations have bogged down over Afghan demands for guarantees 

that the United States will adequately fund the ANSD for at least several years 

after 2014.’’

• a. What kinds of guarantees is President Karzai looking for and what does he 

believe to be ‘‘adequate’’ funding for the ANSF? 

• b. What is the administration’s position on providing funding for the ANSF and 

how much of a sticking point will that be in any ultimate agreement?

Answer. Negotiations between the United States and Afghanistan on the Bilateral 

Security Agreement (BSA) are ongoing, and as a result we will not discuss the negotiating positions of the Afghan Government. However, the United States remains 

prepared to negotiate with Afghanistan to conclude a BSA that supports our shared 

objectives. On the question of guarantees, only the Afghans themselves can guarantee the security of Afghanistan. The United States strongly supports President 

Karzai’s vision, as stated in his 2009 inaugural speech, of an Afghanistan able to 

provide for its own security in 2014 and beyond. This is the sovereign responsibility 

of the Afghan Government, and Afghans will provide for their own defense, with 

support from the international community. 

The BSA will enable U.S. forces to continue to remain in Afghanistan after 2014 

to carry out a train, advise, and assist mission and a narrow counterterrorism mission. 

We strongly support continued U.S. funding of the Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) as a wise investment in achieving our objectives in Afghanistan. A 

capable, sustainable ANSF is central to our strategic objective of ensuring Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for al-Qaeda or its affiliates.

Æ

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