# GuidetoExercisesin Chemical EmergencyPreparednessPrograms

MAY1988

U.S. ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONAGENCY

### GUIDE TO EXERCISES IN CHEMICAL EMERGENCY 

### PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS

Foreword

This Guide has beenpreparedby the U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency as a service to local and state chemical emergency response and planning authorities, including local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) and state emergency response commissions (SERCs) created pursuant to Title III of the SuperfundAmendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986. It consists of three Technical Assistance Bulletins previously distributedby EPA: #l Introduction to Exercises in Chemical Emergency Preparedness Programs #2 A Guide to Planning and Conducting Table-Top Exercises #3 AGuide to Planning and Conducting Field Simulation Exercises For purposes of this Guide, each of these original bulletins has been revised to ensure comprehensive coverage and consistent format. In addition, a fourth section, providing example simulation exercise scenarios, has been added to complement the three bulletins. The purpose of this Guide is to provide local and state officials with a self-containedmanual for use in conducting a wide range of chemical emergency exercises. Many agencies have discovered that such exercises are an effective way both to test existing hazardous materials emergency plans and to identify priority concerns in developing new or revised plans. The resource materials providedhere, as well as additional materials referencedherein, should enable emergency response and planning agencies to undertake exercises on their own. ·

### PREPAREDNESS·

## &PREVENTION TECHNICALASSISTANCEBULLETIN#1


# Introduction·toExercisesin Chemical EmergencyPreparednessPrograms

U.S. ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONAGENCY

### 1. INTRODUCTION EPA PREPAREDNESS AND PREVENTION TECHNICALASSISTANCE BULLETIN#l INTRODUCTION TO EXERCISES IN CHEMICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS

In recent years emergency planners and managers have employed various types of exercises in the development and testing of contingency plans and response capabilities for a wide range of emergencies. Anumber of these exercises have been conducted with the support of federal agencies such as the Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA), the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA), and the United States Coast Guard (USCG), as well as with the support of private industry, especially through the efforts of the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA). · Many communities have reported that they are confusedby the existence of the various types of exercises and are oftenunsure as to which type(s) of exercises will meet their needs. This Technical Assistance Bulletinprovides an overview of the major exercise types and describes some resources currently available for conducting exercises. 

### 2. AN OVERVIEW' OF EXERCISES The first section of this overview includes a discussion of the essential elements of exercises, differences among major exercise categories, descriptions of hypothetical exercises, and the use of exercises in the planning process. 2.1 The Essentials Of Emergency Exercises A chemical emergency exercise is a distinctive type of directed activity with the following essential elements:
• The triggering event of the exercise is a simulated hypothetical accident that generates problem(s) for participants;
• The participants are representatives or principals of some, most, or all of the major organizations that would respond to an actual emergency, including first responders, HAZMAT teams, medical personnel, public works personnel, emergency services officials, city managers, and elected officials;
• The participants solve the problems presented to them by using existing plans and operating procedures, activating emergency response systems, and/or deploying equipment;
• Problems are presented sequentially and each problem requires some type of response by the participants, whether itbe in the form of discussion, written messages, and/or actions; and-2-
•

**Thes~** responses are related to one or more emergency activities (e.g., coordination of various response units, fire suppression, emergency medical services). Following the exercise the participants are debriefed, and a summary and critique of the exercise are prepared. 2.2 DifferencesAmong Exercises In addition to the shared exercise

**e~lements** listed above, there are important differences among the various t:ypes of exercises that canbe employed in emergency preparedness.

**Exe1~cises** can hav.e differences in purpose, scope, level of stress, and types of responses or actions required ofparticipants: Purposes. The purposes of emergency exercises range from training and familiarization of participants with their roles and responsibilities to a rigorous test of contingency plans and response capabilities. Scope. By scope of the exercise is meant the number of functions to be exercised and/or the depth to which the functions are examined. Among the functions that canbe exercised are prevention and control, warning, incident assessment, and containment. (See Exhibit 1 for a list of major emergency response functions.) Exercises can deal with one, several, or all functions and/or some or all of the activities assc,ciated with each function. Stress. Exercises impose varying dc:lgrees of stress on participants. In low-stress exercises, participants are g:lven fairly simple problems and ample time to solve them. In high-stress exercises the problems are numerous, complex, andpresented in real time. Actions. Participants in an exercise may be asked to respond orally to problems (e.g., to discuss_responses or actions that they might take, and/or verbally "walk through" a process); simulate actions that they would take ' without actually deploying personnel and equipment to the scene of an accident (e.g., activate the communication system, provide technical assistance); or simulate all actions that they would take in an emergency, including those at the scene of an accident. Exercise planners create different types of exercises by combining the variables ofpurpose, scope, stress, and actions in different ways. 2.3 Major Exercise Categories There are three major categories of exercises

-- table-top, functional, and field, each of which is described below. A list of the exercises and their sponsors is presented in Exhibit 2. Because the various agencies that sponsor exercises do not use consistent terminology to describe the various types of exercises, the subcategories in Exhibit 2 indicate some of the names usedby different sponsoring agencies. While this list is representative of the types of chemical incident exercises available to states and local communities, it is by no means exhaustive.-3- EXHIBIT 1 List ofMajor Emergency Response**Functio~**

Initial Notification of Response Agencies Direction and Control Communications (among responders) Warning Systems and Emergency Public Notification Public Information/Community Relations Health/Medical Services Response Personnel Safety Human Services Personal Protection of Citizens (Indoor Protection, Evacuation) Fire and Rescue Law Enforcement On-going Incident Assessment Resource Management Public Works Containment and Cleanup Documentation and Debriefing

1 This list of functions, compiled from the National Response Team's Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide, is not intended to suggest priorities among activities.-4- EXHIBIT 2 

### Exercise Types Employedby EPA, 

### FEMA, USCG and CMA

------------SponsoringOrganizations------------ EXERCISE TYPES EPA FEKA 

### USCG CKA 

### Table-Tops X X X


### Functiona1 Functional X 

### Emergency X 

### Operations Simulation OSC/RRT (Yorktown) X


### Field Drill X 

### Field X 

### Full-Field X 

### OSC/Local X 

### Full-Scale X-5- Table-top.Exercises. The first category of exercises is the "table-top." The distinctive characteristic of the participant action in all table-top exercises·is "talk," which may range from informal responses to questions about emergency situations to a verbal "walk-through" of procedures and processes. · "Table-tops" are generally low-stress activities. They are usually held for the purpose of training or familiarizing participants with plans and procedures. They may differ significantly in scope, however. Any given table-top may focus on one, several, or all of the major response functions. They may also differ in the depth to which each function is exercised. The principal output of a table-top is to highlight problems inbroad response categories, such as communications or traffic control. Procedural training and equipment problems show up inore so in the field exercises. As shown in Exhibit 2, the specific types of exercises in this category include:
• EPA's Table-top Exercise;
• FEMA's assistance for Table-top Exercise; and
• CMA's Table-top Exercise. (See Technical Assistance·Bulletin#2 for a more detailed discussion of table-top exercises.) Functional Exercises. The secondmajor category of exercises is the "functional exercise", i.e., a simulated exercise with no actions in the field. The dominant feature of this category is the actual performance of some or all of the actions that would be required of participants in an actual emergency, except those activities that are performed at the scene of an accident. These functions could include the activation of emergency systems, such as warning or communications systems. Functional exercises tend to

**t~ve** moderate to high stress. Often they focus on a single function (e.g., direction and control, providing technical assistance to responders). Their purpose is generally to test planning and response capabilities of personnel and systems without actually deploying response equipment. As shown in Exhibit 2, the exercises in this category include:
• FEMA's Functional Exercise;
• U.S. Coast Guard's OSC/Regional Response Team Simulation; and
• CMA's Emergency Operation Simulation (EOS). Field Exercises. The third major category of exercises is the "field exercise". The dominant participant activity in field exercises consists of response operations conducted at the site of a simulated emergency.-6- Field

**exe~cises** involve all or most of the emergency response functions. The common purpose of field exercises is to provide a rigorous test of emergency capabilities of the total emergency response system. Response equipment is deployed, realistic scenarios are used, medical personnel and equipment including·operating rooms are included, and plant managers and other industry employees are participants. Because these events involve key community groups and agencies, these exe1:cises often elicitmedia attention. As shown in Exhibit 2, the exercises in this category include:

• EPA's Full-Field Exercise;
• FEMA's Full-Scale Exercise;
• CMA's Drill and Field Exercises; and
• USCG's OSC/Local Response Terun Exercise.2 2.4 Descriptions ofHypothetica1 Exercises The following capsule descriptions of a hypothetical chemical emergency exercise for each of the three categories may help illustrate the differences among these categories. These descriptions are in the form ofbrief "informationbulletins" that mightbe issuedby officials of a hypothetical "Lake City" following the conclusion of each exercise. These descriptions provide information on the purpose, participants, location, scope, and activities of exercise participants. Table-Top. During a recent table-t,op exercise, officials of Lake City reviewed the city's plans for responding to a major chemical emergency. Senior managers of the police and fire departments, the city's new Hazardous Materials Team, a representative from the Red Cross, a local hospital liaison, and the field commanders of all major response units conducted informal discussions of actions that their units wouldhave taken if this had been an actual emergency. Their discussions covered the full range of required responses to such an emergency. Abrief evaluation or "lessons learned" period followed the exercise. Functional Exercise. Officials in Lake City report the completion of a major test of the city's capabilities to provide emergency medical services to affectedpopulations following a major leak of a highly toxic chemical. The test focused on the local Bayfront Chemicals plant on Bay View Avenue and nearby neighborhoods. Participants in the exercise included the City's Emergency Services Director, officials of the public health department and Bayside Hospital, andmedical emergency units from the fire department. Emergency activities of interest in this test included the coordination of responses, the management of resources, and the identification of medical requirements arising from such an emergency. Participants simulated the activation of the emergency warning system and the city's new emergency medical response system. The major activities were conducted from the

2 This exercise may also be a "functional exercise." For purposes of this analysis, we have listed it as a "field exercise."-7- operations center in City Hall. An evaluation was conductedby key participants following the exercise. Field Exercise. City officials announced today the completion of a major test of the city's new emergency operations plan for chemical accidents. The test involved all the major offices and departments of the city with responsibilities under the plan, including the mayor's office, and the police, fire, medical, public health and emergency services departments as well as a representative from the SalvationArmy and the Red Cross. All aspects of emergency response were tested, including direction and control by officials in the emergency operations center (EOC), coordination of all operations at the site of the simulated accident (the local plant on Lakeview avenue), and all operations required to suppress the simulated'leak and treat all affected persons in the plant and the nearby residential area. An extensive debriefing was held and an evaluation of the exercise will be prepared. Following the evaluation, officials wiil revise the city's emergency plan and operating procedures.
3. USE OF EXERCISES IN THE PlANNING.PROCESS The Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide, recently issuedby the U.S. National Response Team (NRT), suggests that local planning teams3 complete four major tasks:
• Review exis'ting plans;
• Assess current response capabilities to respond to chemical emergencies;
• Develop an emergency response plan for chemical accidents; and
• Revise, exercise, and update the plan. The "exercises" referred to in the fourth task can be useful in the completion of the other planning process tasks as described below. Reviewing Existing Plans. Exercises provide insight into how response functions would actually be carried out under an existing plan. An existing contingency plan canbe tested by presenting exercise participants with a simulated chemical accident requiring a simulated response based on the provisions of the local plan. Use of an exercise is often more effective in many cases than a review of the planby a single planner. Exercises also are useful in obtaining input and expertise from a variety of people from different agencies, rather than from a single planner or set ofplanners. Field exercises provide the most complete review, and they are most useful when plans are relatively complete and formal. Table-top exercises can be used effectively in communities where resources are limited or existing plans are less complete. The results of these exercises canbe used to revise and improve plans which lack sufficient provisions for chemical emergencies.

3 These planning teams may be either a local emergency planning committee (requiredby Title III of SARA) or other local authorities.-8- Assessing Capabilities. Assessment of current capabilities is a major task for any planning team. An assessment:
• Identifies gaps in resources and readiness that need to be addressed·in the planning proctass;
• Produces an inventory of response resources within a community (e.g., chemical containment equipment, fire apparatus, hospital beds); and
• Identifies the level of preparedness of emergency response units and systems in the event of serious chemical accidents. This assessment canbe done through exercises designed specifically to test current capabilities. Exercises canuncover potential capabilities and weaknesses that are often overlookedby other methods. Developing. Revising or Updating the Plan. One of the basic principles of emergency planning is that each planning team needs to design its contingency plans to fit local circumstances. All of the elements of the plan (e.g., required procedures, policies, coordinationmechanisms) need to be specifically related to the existing resources, capabilities; and organizational structure for the given community or emergency planning district. An exercise is a very useful way to identify gaps in existing emergency response procedures or to determine planning factors necessary for developing specific plans for chemical emergencies. In addition, an exercise canbe a powerful stimulus for building interest in developing a comprehensive local emergency plan.
4. AVAILABLE RESOURCES FOR CONDUCTING EXERCISES This section of this Technical Assistance Bulletin includes a description of resources available for conducting exercises from the Environmental ProtectionAgency, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Coast Guard, National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration, Chemical Manufacturers Association, and the National Response Team. 4.1 Environmental ProtectionAgency (EP.A) EPA provides training as well as technical assistance to develop and deliver table-top and field exercises. This assistance is offered through EPA Headquarters, Regional Offices, or through EPA's Environmental Response Team (ERT). In the case ofjoint EPA/FEMA training, the training is coordinatedby FEMA's Emergency Management Institute located in Emmitsburg, Haryland. · EPA Headquarters. EPA Headquarters provides contractor support to EPA Regional Offices to conduct table-tops and field exercises in priority areas designatedby the Regions in consultation with the States. Support for these exercises is coordinatedby EPA's Regional Preparedness Coordinators.-9- EPA**Headq~arters** provides periodic Technical Assistance Bulletins such as this one, designed to provide technical information relevant to chemical emergency preparedness and prevention. Current Bulletins can be obtained from the EPA Regional Preparedness Coordinator. EPA Regional Offices. EPA's Regional Offices will provide States and communities in designated priority areas with the following assistance:
• Programmatic and technical assistance to help communities determine the steps to follow in conducting an exercise;
• Facilitation assistance for both table-tops and full-field exercises; and
• Coordination of EPA Headquarters and Regional Office resources to assist States. This assistance is provided to States and communities upon request to the EPA Regional Preparedness Coordinator. (See Technical Assistance Bulletin#3 for the addresses of all EPA Regional Offices.) EPA's Environmental Response Team. The Environmental Response Team (ERT) provides technical assistance in developing and conducting full-field hazardous materials exercises. This support includes developing scenarios, working with EPA Regional Training Coordinators to provide assistance to the States and local communities**i~** determining appropriate limitations of the exercise, serving as facilitators/evaluators during the exercise, and providing support in critiquing the exercise at the debriefing session following the exercise. ERT provides this assistance upon request from the EPA Regional Preparedness Coordinators or Regional Training Coordinators. (The ERT canbe contacted at (513) 569-7537.) 4.2 Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEKA) FEMA provides exercise training courses, as well as direct assistance for personnel, training, and support materials to aidjurisdictions in developing and coordinating their own exercises. (See Technical Assistance Bulletin#3 for the addresses of FEMA Regional Offices.) FEMA's Exercise Training Courses. FEMA conducts classroom and field exercise training at the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and at the State level. Using the EMI facility located in Emmitsburg, Maryland, FEMA delivers 12 to 14 exercises each year in**t~e** classroom as part of their Exercise Design Course (train-the-trainer) and the Integrated Emergency Management Course. Other FEMA emergency management courses, such as the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Planning Exercise Evaluation Course, also contain material useful in developing an exercise program, conducting exercises, and evaluating exercises. Additionally, FEMA provides instructor guides, student manuals, and resource manuals for resident and field courses. FEMA's Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement (CCA) mechanism provides funding for State and local attendees in the field. For access to these courses, contact the appropriate State Emergency Response Commission or the FEMA Regional Office.-10- FEMA's Exercise Assistance. All State and localjurisdictions receiving FEMA funds**thr~ugh** the CCA must exercise their emergency operations plans and procedures annually. Eachjurisdictionmust submit as part of its annual CCA statement ofwork anupdated 5-year exereise plan. At least one full-scale exercise must be conducted during the 5 years, and a functional exercise is to be held in each of the other 4 years. Exercise scenarios must be rotated among national security, natural, and teehnological hazards. The exercise focus is on multi-agency and intergoverrunental involvement as well as public andprivate interaction. Technical assistance is provided through a State Exercise Assistance Officer (100 percent FEMA-funded) and FEMA Regional Office Hazardous Materials Program staff for scenario development, pre-exercise training, and post-exercise evaluation. For information on upcoming exercises involving hazardous materials, contact the FEMA Regional Hazardous Materiais Program staff or the Regional Training and Educa1:ion officers. FEMA Exercise Support Materials.**Fl~** furnishes a variety of exercise support materials, including a computer-aided exercise generator and an exercise library containing a variety of exercises developed by State and localjurisdictions. The computer-aided exercise generator covers·a number of different scenarios: hazardous materials accident, nuclear power plant accident, flood, winter storm,**earthquake~,** tornado, mass casualty, and nuclear attack. The generator has been incorporated into software packages, enabling the user to design different exercise patterns by varying the objective and timeframe. For more information, contact your State Emergency Management Agency or FEMA Regional Office. 

### 4.3 united States CoastGuard (USCG) The USCG annually conducts six On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) and Regional Response Team (RRT) simulation command post exercises. These simulations focus on specific issues of concern to the OSC and RRT and are designed to exercise the relationship among the pre-designated OSC, the RRT, and response coordinators of Federal, State and local agencies with responsibility for oil andhazardous chemical pollution. .epresentatives of potential pollution sources (i.e., truck, rail, vessel and facilities) and cleanup contractors are also included. (For information con·tact the USCG at (202) 267-2010.) 

### 4.4 National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration (NOAA) The National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administrationprovides reports and critiques on its past field simulation exercises. (These materials are available by contacting the Hazardous Ma·terials Responses Branch, Ocean Assessment Division ofNOAA at 206-526-6273 or FTS 392-6273.) 

### 4.5 National Response Team (NRT) The NRT has recently published the**~azardous** Materials Emergency Planning Guide to assist local planners in preparing emergency plans. This guide includes a description of the materials that shouldbe included in a local emergency plan and provides a sample outline of a plan. The guide identifies exercises as a principal method for testing, revising, and updating plans. (Copies of the Guide canbe obtained by contacting the EPA-11- Regional Office·or the Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program Hotline at (800) 535-0202 or (202) 479-2449.) 4.6 ChemicalManufacturers Association (CMA) ExerciseAssistance CMA members have conducted.several simulation exercises through CMA's local Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) programs. These exercises involve local industry and response officials (e.g., fire, police, Red Cross) and are oftenvideotaped. CMA provides these and other tapes through their lending library. Funding for exercises is at the discretion of the local CAER coordinator and/or the sponsoring facility. (Contact the CMA hotline (202-463-1599) for additional information on exercises and the CAER program.)

### PREPAREDNESS

### & PREVENTION TECHNICALASSISTANCEBULLETIN#2


# AGuidetoPlanningandConducting 

# Table-TopExercises

U.S. ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONAGENCY

### 1. INTRODUCTION EPA PREPAREDNESS AND PREVENTION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN #2 AGUIDE TO PLANNING AND CONDUCTING TABLE-TOP EXERCISES

This guide provides a process for planning, conducting, and evaluating a table-top exercises. More specifically this guide:
• Describes a set of specific preparatory steps that canbe followed by any community desiring to use a table-top exercise to advance its own emergency preparedness;
• Offers guidelines for use in conducting a table-top exercise;
• Recommends metpods for debriefing participants and evaluating the exercise; and
• Provides a description of a hypothetical table-top exercise held in "Lake City" and the Lake City exercise control materials. The distinctive characteristic of the participant action in all table-top exercises is "talk," which may range from informal responses to questions about emergency situations to a verbal "walk-through" of procedures and processes. Table-tops are generally low-stress activities. They are usually held for the purpose of training or familiarizing participants with plans andprocedures. They may differ significantly in scope, however. Any given table-top may focus on one, several, or all of the major response functions (e.g:, coordination, evacuation, emergency notification). They may also differ in the depth to which ·each function is exercised. To give readers an example of materials prepared for and used in a table-top exercise, this general discussion is precededby a brief summary of the table-top exercise held in "Lake City" (a pseudonym). The Lake City table-top exercise was a half-day event held in a conference room at the offices of a regional planning commission. The primary objective of the exercise (described more fully in Appendix A was to gain experience and insights that couldbe used to advance the chemical emergency planning process in the city. The participants were managers of the first line emergency response units of Lake City and neighboringjurisdictions, including representatives of police and fire departments and emergency medical services, a plant manager, a Red Cross representative, and other key community personnel. During the play of the exercise ("play" refers to the step-by-step execution of a table-top), the participants verbally responded to a sequence of events associated with a major chemical accident by describing the typical response actions that would occur in the event of a real emergency. Subsequently, they evaluated the exercise to identify preparedness and planning needs that Lake City was beginning to address in the development of its first hazardous materials accident contingency plan. (The materials used to conduct the Lake City table-top are provided in Appendix B.)-2- 2. MAJOR STEPS INDEVELOPING A

**TABLE-T01~** EXERCISE The following discussion outlines the essential steps to be completedby those responsible for planning the exercises. (The order inwhich these steps are presented is suggestive only. Completing all of these steps is more important than following the prescribed order.) These steps include:
• Describe the emergency response system to be exercised;
• Develop a clear statement of the general objectives of the exercise;
• Use the statement of objectives to define the scope of the exercise;
• Present the results of the first three steps to the leadership of the necessaryparticipating organizations (if they are not members of the exercise planning team) in order to

**secur~** their approval and commitments of participation;
• Define the critical features of the accident to be simulated;
• Decide on the identity of all.the table-top participants; 

## • Deter
... will the identity and responsibilities of key persons who ;:;t in conducting the

**~~xercise;** • Decide on the ground rules to be followed in the conduct of the exercise;
• Arrange for all

**~the** logistical requirements, including space, exercise materials, and seating arrangements; and
• Develop the

**exe~cise** materials. In this discussionwe assume that an exercise leader or a coordinator of the team efforthas been designatedby the local planning committee and that all of the major steps are completed in concertwith the key offici.;tls concernedwith preparedness and response. Although table-tops vary in their complexity, they all require planning and coordination. It is critical that problems that arise reflect genuine response capabilityproblems, rather than problems that may be due to a haphazardly planned and coordinated exercise process. Step 1: Describe the emergency response system to be exercised The description of the emergency response system should contain, at a minimum, the following:
• A listing of all the major response agencies, e.g., fire, medical and police departments, and HAZMAT team;
• The emergency response roles and responsibilities of these agencies; and-3-
• How the systemwould respond to a major chemical accident. ··It is important to understand how the emergency system operates. To accomplish this, the exercise leader or coordinator should: 

### (1) consult all available plans, procedures, agreements, etc., of the responsible agencies; (2) review prior exercises and reports on responses to past accidents; and (3) hold informal discussions with representatives of the major response units. It is not necessary for the system to be outlined in formal plans and procedures

**.fo~** this step to be completed. If formal plans do not exist, the exercise leader should identify the informal system of operating procedures that typically have governed response to previous incidents. Step 2: Develop a clear statement of the general objectives of the exercise Virtually all table-top exercises for chemical emergencies have the common objective of testing the capabilities of a jurisdiction's emergency system to respond to a chemical

**accide~t** threatening public health and. safety. To this·generic objective might be added something about the type and size of the accident or the emergency response functions to be tested. For example: "The objective of the exercise is to test the capabilities of the City's police and fire departments and emergency medical service units to respond to a major chemical accident at a fixed facility in the City and to minimize the effects of that accident on public health and safety." Step 3: Use the statement of objectives to define the scope of the

**~xercise** The scope of the exercise refers to the number and identity of response functions to be exercised and the depth to which any of the functions will be examined. For example: "The exercise will test the procedures for dispatching response personnel, containing an accident, and treating on-site injuries." Table-tops can deal with a single function, multiple functions, or all of the functions required for a major response. Step 4: Present the results of the first three steps to the leadership of the necessaryparticipating organizations (if they are notaeDbers of the exercise planning team) inorder to secure their approval and commitments ofparticipation This may be an interactive process requiring the revision of some of the results of the first three steps.-4- Step 5: Define the critica1 features oJE the accident to be simll.ated Once the general objectives and scope of the exercise have been agreed upon, three specific features of the exeJrcise shouldbe determined:
• The nature of the accident whic::.h poses the threat;
• The facility or transportation route where the accident is to occur; and
• The characteristics of the neighborhood(s) threatenedby exposure to accident effects. One or more of these features may b4:l dictatedby the general objective of the exercise and/or by its·scope. Th4:l exercise scenario shouldbe realistic and specific to the kinds of r4:lleases a particular community is likely to experience. For example, the objective provided in Step Two (i.e., "•.•to test the capabilities of the city's.police and fire departments and emergency medical service units to respond to a major chemical accident
...") requires an exercise accident that causes injury to workers in the facility or nearby citizens. Otherwise there wouldbe no problems"for which emergency medical services are called. Likewise a decision to test multiple functions, as illustrated in Step Three, leads to the requirement that the accident be complex enough to require the response of different units of the community's emergency system, each of which may be responsible for a different function. Step 

### 6: Decide on the identity of a11 the tab1e-top participants The participants should include the directors of the various units (e.g., police, fire, Red Cross) that wouldbe dispatched to an actual emergency of the type being simulated in the exercise, as well as local officials (e.g., mayor, citymanager), and local plant representatives. Step 7: Determine the identity and responsibi1ities of key persons who wi11 assist inconducting the exercise Persons assisting in conducting the exercise may include:
• A facilitator, who will introduce the exercise events into the "play" of the exercise and facilitate the completion of responses;
• Arecorder, who will take notes during the exercise and collectmaterials; and
• Observer(s)/evaluator(s), who will observe and evaluate the play of the exercise. Collectively these persons constitute the exercise control group.Step 8: -5- Decide on the groundJLUles tobe followed in the conduct of the exercise Table-tops are conductedmost effectivelyunder a clear set of ground rules. These rules typically control such matters as actions expected of the participants, how their .decisions are to be reported to other participants and to the exercise control group, and the length of time to be allocated in responding to each event. ·It is crucial that these be developed in advance of the exercise and understoodby the control group and the participants. (See AppendixGfor an example set of table-top ground rules.) Step 9: Arrange for all the logistical requirements, including space, exerciseuaterials, and seating arrangements All arrangements shouldbe checkedby a member of the exercise planning 'team, who is designated as the exercise coordinator, to make sure that they will support the exercise design. An improperly configured conference room canmake the conduct of a table-top very difficult, as can the lack of key exercise materials such as maps and copies of plans. It canbe very helpful to have a large map showing the accident site, the surroundingneighborhoods, andkey public facilities such as schools, hospitals, and potential evacuation facilities. Step 10: Develop the exercisematerials The exercise materials consist of three parts:
• The scenario which sets the stage for the exercise;
• A sequence of events, which stimulates the play; and
• Anticipatedresponses. The exercise material used in the Lake City Table-top Exercise is provided inAppendix B. The scenario is a briefwritten statement that provides an overview of the emergency situation. The scenario should contain the following:
• Abrief description of the community, the facility, and the area surrounding the facility;
• A description of the chemical accident that is the triggering event for the exercise; and
• Any other information that is important to the setting for the first event in the sequence of events (e.g., the wind conditions at the time of the accident, casualties, and the exact location of the accident). The sequence of events is presented to the participants, either orally or inwriting one event at a time. The events are arranged in a logical and chronological sequence designed to portray the essentials of a developing-6- emergency situation. The events represent changes in the circumstances of the accident or in conditions over which the participants have no control, e.g., a change in the weather or a major change in the rate of spill or leakage of the chemical. The events in this sequence shouldbe:
• Directly relevant to the response functions being exercised, the roles and responsibilities of the participants, the exercise objectives, and the locale of the accident;
• Tailored to the specific characteristics of an actual facility and the community inwhich the accident occurs; and
• Realistic, factual, and arranged in the proper sequence. In selecting the events for the exercise, the exercise coordinator will find ituseful to construct a set of anticipatedresponses tied to the various events. These anticipated responses canbe usedby the exercise facilitators and evaluators as a standard against which to compare actual responses during the table-top. These st:andards are not shared with exercise participants in order to ensure realistic: responses. Anticipated response actions may be derived from relevant cont:ingency plans or standard operating procedures usedby one or more of the

**pat~ticipating** organizations. Ifplans or procedures do not exist, the anticipat:ed response measures shouldbe developed andwritten down prior to the

**E~xercise,** constructed logically from the circumstances being simulated, or

**idE~ntified** through discussions with response

**p~rsonnel** regarding their informal operations procedures. An example of an exercise event and an anticipated response follows: Exercise event: Flow of chemical continues at rapid rate. Anticipatedresponse: First responders on the scene confer with the plant manager on the identity of

**thE~** chemical.
Even ifno intervention is required during the exercise, the process of developing anticipated responses will be valuable to the designer of the exercise events. The set of anticipated responses will provide a useful framework for discussion during the post··exercise evaluation session.
3. GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCliNG THE EXERCISE The major preparatory steps discussed above set the stage for a smooth conduct of the exercise by the exercise facilitator. On the day of the exercise, the facilitator must assume direct responsibility for the conduct of the exercise to ensure adequate accomplishment of its objectives. The facilitator's job is to:
• Describe the ground rules for ·the exercise, including the roles that the various participants are to play;
• Present the players with the exercise narrative;-7-

• Announce the first event of the scenario;
• ?timulate player responses,

**~ithout** intervening in a way that assumes control of the play, unless it appears likely that the players will not initiate a r:esponse critical to the objective of the exercise;
• Control the flow and pace of the exercise by introducing the remaining events in sequence; and
• Keep the exercise on schedule· and terminate play at the specified end time. In general, it is best to let the exercise play develop naturally, with participants responding to prescribed eyents as they deem appropriate. However, some anticipated responses may be so critical to the purposes of the exercise that the exercise facilitator

**~ill** have to intervene in the play to assure that they take place. (The fact that such intervention is required will, of course, represent a very impor'tant lesson for the exercise participants and shouldbe noted for further discussion in the post-exercise debrlefing and evaluation.) An example'would be the activation of an evacuation process during an exercise whose objectives include testing the community's evacuationplan. (AppendixDprovides a lengthy "checklist" of suggestions for the successful conduct of table-top exercises.)
4. GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCfiNG A POST-mQmCISE DEBRIEFING AND EVALDATION Apost-exercise debriefing and evaluation canbe as valuable an experience as the exercise itself. These post-exercise sessions are critical for capturing the lessons of a table-top so that they canbe used to revise and improve emergency plans and procedures. The facilitator should first conduct a debriefing

**sess~on,** whose

**pr~mary** objective is to review the experiences of the participants during :the exercise. A debriefing works best if the facilitator leads the participants through an event-by-event recapitulation of the exercise, discussing the actual responses andhow they compared to anticipated responses. The debriefing may cover all events and responses before they are evaluated, or itmay proceed one event at a time, allowing an opportunity for evaluation:as well. Once the debriefing is completed, the facilitator should elicit evaluations from the participants concerning both their own performance during the exercise and the characteris:tics of the exercise as a whole. This process will be enhanced if the participants understand that the purpose of the evaluation is to develop a set of r.ecommendations for improving the response system, rather than to find fault with the performance of the participants. These recommendations may include actions to improve emergency response plans, procedures, and equipment as well as additional training needs for members of the response system. It is important that problems in the response system (e.g., lack of plans or procedures) be separated from problems related to the specific exercise design or conduct (e.g., a scenario event that did not match conditions in the community). Thus the facilitator should allow opportunity-8- for the participants to evaluate the exercise itself. The facilitator should be alert to both the possibility that participants may be more critical of the exercise than of their own performanc:e and the fact that problems with exercise design and conduct may have produced some responses that do not reflect existingplans, procedures, or the response capabilities of the participants.
5. IMPROVING RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS FOili)WING THE EXERCISE The results of the debriefing/evaluationperiod, especially the remedial actions, need to be implementedby the response system in order to take maximum advantage of the table-top experience. These results shouldbe included in the on-going planning and pre!paredness activities of the community. Local planners should initiat:e efforts to revise existing plans andprocedures or develop new ones to reflect the lessons from the exercise (e.g., revise notificationprocedures, clarify responsibilities for providing services to an evacuatedpopulation.) Exercise planners shoulduse the evaluation of the exercise itself to impi:ove future exercises. All other parties (e.g., police, fire, emergency, n1edical) should**~ake** actions appropriate to their roles in the preparedness effort. Approximately three to sixmonths following the exercise, the contingency plans and procedures · shouldbe reviewed to ensure that appropi:iate changes and revisions were incorporated.Appendix A
B 

### c D -9- 

### LIST OF APPENDICES
Title 

### Lake CityAdvances Preparedness Through TableTop Exercise Lake City Table-Top Exercise Control Materials Example Table-Top Exercise Ground Rules Suggestions for the Conduct of Table-Top ExercisesIntroduction A-1 APPENDIX A LAKE CITYADVANCES PREPAREDNESS THROUGH TABLE-TOP EXERCISE

On July 30, 1986, emergency response personnel from Lake City, Middletown, and Plainville, gathered at the offices of the Regional Planning Commission (RPC) to participate in a table-top Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program (CEPP) exercise. Also presentwere

**represen~atives** of the State Police, the State Department of Environmental Protection, RPC, the American Red Cross, the SalvationArmy, Lake City Bus Transit, Lake CityAir Quality Control, various chemical industries, EPA Headquarters staff, and EPA Regional staff. The immediate purpose of this exercise was to test and improve the response capabilities of Lake City's municipal agencies; another, longer-range objective was to provide impetus toward the development of a chemical emergency contingency plan for Lake City. Extensive preparatory activities had preceded the table-top exercise. This bulletinbriefly discusses these activities as well as the broader context of chemical emergency preparedness inMiddle County. The purpose of this bulletin is to share with other communities the "lessons learned" in Lake City, with the hope that those lessons will contribute to successful table-top exercises and related contingency planning efforts elsewhere. Background Lake City, located inMiddle County, is a medium-sized industrial city. Lake City is home to numero4s chemical, oil, steel, and other industrial facilities. Although Lake City's police, fire, and emergency medical departments have been calledupon to respond to numerous small-scale transportation-related

..hazardous materials incidents, and although the Lake City Fire Department has developed formalized procedures for so-called "hazmat" incidents, no comprehensive contingency planhas yet been developed. Among areajurisdictions, Lake City is not alone in this circumstance. Recognizing this situation, RPC has spearheaded the formation of a Middle County Hazardous Materials Task Force. PreparatoryActivities EPA released interim guidance for its Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program (CEPP) late in 1985. The CEPP coordinator for EPA Region ZZ, decided that the Middle County area wouldbe a suitable location for a case study of how CEPP guidance couldbe implemented at the local level. An RPC official meanwhile, saw the CEPP initiative as one way to foster cooperation and communication among various jurisdictions··that faced potential chemical incidents from fixed facility releases and/or transportation accidents. The Safety, Health, and Environmental Director at the XYZ chemical plant in Lake City, offered use of plant grounds for a field simulation of a hazardous chemical incident to which nearby cities and towns could respond. Meetings at RPC involving various interestedparties revealed that Middletown had recently developed and tested an emergency response plan. Other jurisdictions and industries in the area have informal cooperativeA-2 agreements to assist each other during e1nergencies, but those agreements are not written into contingency plans. Two counties bordering Lake Cityhave hazmat teams, as does the City of Middletown. In 

### 1986, EPA Regional officials held a series of meetings with interestedparties to take more formal s·teps toward a field simulation exercise. Because adequate written contingency plans were not yet

**availabl~,** officials agreed that a carefully-planned table-top exercise should precede a field simulation. Itwas also agreed that, because the XYZ company's · facility is located inLake City, active cooperative leadership from Lake City officials wouldbe essential to the success of any exercise. Lake City political leaders voiced their support for the proposal and the Deputy Police Chief agreed to lead the planning effort. In 

### 1986, emergency response and saf.ety personnel from cities and chemical plants in the Lake City area were interviewed. The purpose of these interviews was to determine the existing response procedures in order to assure that the exercise scenario would present a realistic test of local response capabilities andpractices. 

### Aone-page accident scenario narrative was developed and circulated for comment by interestedparties in the Lake Cityvicinity. Potential participants were invitedby EPA andRPC to be present. After the proposed narrative was approved, an exercise "script" was developed, in the form of a sequence-of-events thatmight realisticallybe expected to occur following the accident described in the narrative. The Table-Top Exercise Exercise participants and observers met at 8:30 a.m. Everyone introducedhim/herself. Ground rules for the exercise were announced. Among the significant ground rules were the following: 

## •


# •


# •

• Participants would "enter" the exercise, as specific events in the script unfolded, to represent those parties who wouldbe involved in a response if the event were a real one; For each event, the appropriate participants would describe fully the actions that they wc1uld take in response; Because the exercise was especially meant to test the response capabilities and procedures of Lake City and neighboring jurisdictions (rather than thE! safety procedures of local chemical plants), industry representatives were not participants in the table-top; instead, realistic industry reactions were "built-into" the exercise script; and

Exercise facilitators could call a time-out in the exercise whenever technical advice or informationwas needed to assure the fidelity of the simulation. Each individual event was projected onto a screenby an overhead projector while participants described response procedures. Arecorder summarized theA-3 responses. on large paper pads for use in future review and evaluation of the table-top. The simulationbegan at about 9:00 a.m. and lasted approximately two hours. After a fifteen-minute recess all participants and observers reconvened to discuss the,exercise. This discussionwas not meant to produce a decision about the quality of the simulation exercise, nor to judge the appropriateness of the response decisions that hadbeenmade by the participants. Instead, the purpose of the discussion sessionwas to have everyone identify issues that must be faced by area planners preparing for possible hazardous materials incidents. In this way, the table-top became a direct input into Lake City's ongoing contingency planning process. The major planning issues identified concerned the need to develop evacuation procedures and to improve formal coordination of and communication among area emergency responders. Participants noted a general emergency personnel shortage in

**~he** area. These issues and their constituent sub-issues were written down during the discussion session and will be revised over time. It is intended that this list serve in effect as a contingency planning agenda once the field simulationhas·been completed. Next Steps Participants agreed that the next step is to constitute a planning committee, including representatives from each major Lake City emergency response agency, to develop plans for a field simulation. The ultimate end of Lake City's exercise effort, however, will be the completion of a contingency plan which will guide future exercises as well as, in the event of a real chemical emergency, future response actions. Lessons Learned Although Lake City's response officials are, as of this writing, still in the early stages of

**th~** contingency planning process, a few lessons can clearlybe discerned from the Lake City experience to date:
• Active local leadership is key to the successful planning of chemical emergency response exercises and the development of contingency plans. In Lake City, the leadership of the Deputy Police Chief and RPC staffhas been instrumental in carrying process this far.
• Close cooperationwith local chemical plant officials is also very helpful. In Lake City, the XYZ Company's representative took an early leadboth within the Middle County Hazardous Materials Task Force and involunteeringXYZ's plant site for the field simulation. Mo+eover, his technical knowledge will prove essential as Lake City turns its attention from the field simulation to contingency planning.
• Although there is wisdom in the conventional approach of developing a contingency plan prior to undertaking response exercises, experience in Lake City clearly demonstrates that table-top exercises can usefully precede the planning effort. They can serve both as motiyators of the planning process (byA-4 getting people energized to deal with demonstrated response weaknesses) and as substantive guides to the specific issues andproblems the community needs to address in that process.
• Emergency response exercises in one locality canhelp raise awareness andmotivate hazmat planning over a broader geographic area. In the case of Lake City, the table-top exercise attracted county-wide participation and interest and has provided an impetus to similar efforts inneighboring jurisdictions.

### B-1

APPENDIX B
LAKE CITY TABLE-TOP EXERCISE CONTROL MATERIALSB-2 LAKE CITY TABLE-TOP 

### Scenario

XYZ Chemicals, Inc., produces a small line of acids for sale in the manufacturing and trade markets. XYZ stores andhandles a variety of chemicals on-site for use in its own processes; in addition, XYZ products are often stored on

**~lant** 

### grounds pending shipment to customers. XYZ's Lake City plant is located in a neighborhood characterizedby a mix of industrial and residential landuses. Local industrial facilities .include two large steel plants, an oil refinery and numerous specialty chemical plants. The XYZ facility itself is bounded on the northby a spur of the UnionRailroad; on the southby the Grand River; on the west by Elm Street and a rail line; and on the eastby First Street. Beyond the river on the south is an interstatehighway that is heavily traveled. Within two miles north of the plant are seven schools and a hospital. Just north of the plant, across the Union tracks, is a residential neighborhood; additional residential zones of Lake City andMiddletown lie one and one-half miles to the south and southwest,.and three miles to the southeast. Returning from their 12 p.m. break, two XYZ workers resume the task of transferring anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) from a pressurized rail car to a 15,000 gallon outdoor storage tank. They had allowed the transferring pump to operate unattended and found upon returning that the failure of an automatic shutoff valve resulted in a spill of approximately 1000 gallons. The liquidAHF has begun to pool, giving rise to vapor. Inhaling these vapors, both workers suffer severe respiratory injury. Although one worker collapses immediately, the other succeeds in activating the plant safety alarm, thereby alerting the shift supervisor that an emergency has occurred at the transfer site. The supervisor drives to investigate the accident. Smelling the strong presence of HF vapors in the air, the supervisor stops his vehicle 200 feet from the accident site andradios the plant gate to notify the Lake City emergency response authorities by calling 911. In the process of suiting up with protective equipment, the supervisor himself collapses.B-3 LAKE CITY TABLE-TOP Sequence ofEvents andExpectedActions

EVENT 1: PI.ANT SUPERVISOR GALLS 911. Message
• From: Plant employee To: 911 "This is a drill. There has been a chemical spill at the XYZ plant on Elm Street." Note: No inforua.tionis provided on identity ofchemicals involved. ExpectedActions
• 911 makes necessatY notifications, includingl: Police Department Fire Department Emergency Medical Servicels
• Other notifications made, including: State Department of**Envil~onmental** Management State Police Plainville Fire Department (to activate mutual aid) MiddletownHazmat Squad GHEMTREC/CHEMNEI National Response Center

lunderlining identifies most important response activities.B-4

HOLD
No fUrther events introduceduntil first responders arrive on sceneEVENT 2: B-5 FI.DW OF CHEMICAL CONTINU""".LHG AT A RAPID RATE PlANT PERSONNEL EVACUATE. SIXWORKERS SUFFERING EYE AND RESPIRATORY IRRITATION. CONDITION OF SHIFT SUPERVISOR AND 'NO WORKERS UNKNOWN. ALSO UNKNOW lmETHERALL OTHER PERSONNEL ARE SAFELY OUT OF PlANT. ExpectedActions FirstResponders (whether Fire, Police, or Emergency Medical Services (EMS))
• Situation assessment: Confer with plant personnel to determine identity of chemical(s) Count the number of evacuatedpersonnel Messages
• From: Plant employee To: First responders



# • "The chemical leaking from tank is Anhydrous Hydrofluoric Acid (AHF); judging from the rate ofvapor formation, it is a rapid leak." From: To: Plant employee First responders "Plant personnel have evacuated. Six evacuated workers have suffered injury. Shift supervisor and two employees are known missing. Not**knoW1~** whether all other workers have been safely evacuated." Police Department (when they arrive)
• Close off access to plant EMS (when they arrive)

a Establish treatment zone in a safe area
• Begin examining/treating injuredworkers
• Radio for backup units
• Notify City Hospital to expect injuredB-6 Fire Department (when they arrive)
• Establish command post in a safe area
• Delineate "restricted areas", staging area, decontamination zone
• Determine personnel and equipment needs Call for additional resources, as needed
• Squad 1 personnel (and possibly Middletown Hazmat team) suit up in protective clothing to investigate leak and injured
• Squad 1 approaches accident site from upwind position
• Spokesman issues initial press statement

### B-7

PAUSE
Present thenext event soon after all 3 agencies have arrivedB-8 EVENT 3: VIND OBSERVED BLOWING. OUT OF SOUTH/SOUTHWEST AT 5 MPH. Message
• From: Exercise Director To: Fire Department Incident Commander "Winds blowing out of south/southwest at 5 MPH." ExpectedActions
• Begin consideration of evacuation option
• Evacuationnotifications begin: School bus company (to dispatch 3 buses) Red Cross, SalvationArmy Lake City Civil DefenseB-9

HOLD
No further events introducedtm.ti1 suffi4::ient time has passed to a11ow initia1 response actions to be we11 tm.der wayB-10 EVENT 4: THREE ADDITIONAL INJURED PLANT WORKERS DISCOVERED IN PLANT POWERHOUSE.
Kessage
• From: Exercise Director To: Fire Department Incident Commander "Three more injuredworkers have called in from plant powerhouse." ExpectedActions
• Fire Department/MiddletownHazmat personnel (with protective gear) dispatched to powerhouse to evacuate additional injured
• Shift supervisor, two other initial injured employees evacuatedby Squad 1 personnel to decontamination zone
• Initial injured are decontaminated (as necessary)
• Initial injured are taken to EMS treatment zone
• EMS begins triage/hospital evacuationprocedures on initial injured

### B-11

HOI..D
No further events introducedun.ti1 va1V'e is c1osedby Fire Depart:otent and flow ofAHF is stopped

### B-12 EVENT 5: AS A RESULT OF VALVE CLOSURE. THE FLOW OF AHF HAS STOPPED; VAPOR FORMATION STOPS. ·Messages None ExpectedActions
• Fire Department crew notifies Fire Department Incident Commander that leak has been stopped
• Fire Department begins vapor suppression, pool containment procedures
• Fire Department personnel evacuate additional injured from powerhouse to decontamination zone
• Squad 1 members, additional injured decontaminated (as necessary)
• Additional injured taken to EMS treatment area
• EMS begins triage/hospital evacuation procedures

### B-13



### HOLD
No further events introduceduntil Fire Department contains AHF pool, completely suppresses AHF vapors

### B-14 EVENT 6: RESPONSE COMPLETED; INCIDENT OVER. Messages
• From: Exercise Director To: Fire Department Incident Commander "The incident is over." ExpectedActions
• All response personnel notified
• Triagejhospital evacuation completed
• Access to plant reopened
• Clean-up contractor(s) notified
• Press is briefedby press spokesman, plant spokesman

### C-1 APPENDIX G EXAMPLE TABLE-TOP EXERCISE GROUND RULES

• There will be two tables for participants at the exercise; one for "onscene" participation and the other for EOC or command post participation. Participants will "enter" the exercise, as specific events in the script unfold, to represent those parties who wouldbe involved in responding if the event was real. It is important that participants do not enter the exercise until they normally or reasonably would do so.
• For each event, the appropriate participants will describe fully the actions that they would take in response. Discussions as well as statements are encouraged. It is important to try and speak as loudly and clearly as possible for the benefit of those affectedby the actions being described, as well as for the observers and the recorder.
• The recorder will write down the actions taken as described by each participant on the event sheet to which itpertains. These sheets will later be reviewed in the self-evaluationportion of the exercise to compare the actual responses to the anticipated responses.
• When a player's participation is no longer required at either table, the player should return to the observer section.
• The exercise facilitator may call a time-out in the exercise if technical advice or information is needed to assure the realism of the simulation.
• When anticipated responses which are critical to the purpose of the exercise are not carried out, the exercise facilitator may intervene in the play to assure that they take place.
• All questions shouldbe directed to the exercise facilitator. Comments by observers should be made during the evaluationperiod and not during the exercise.

### D-1 APPENDIX D 

### SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF TABLE-TOP EXERCISES

The following are some suggestions to assist in the conduct of table-top exercises. They are subdivided into four stages
-- pre-exercise, exercise, break, and evaluation.
Pre-Exercise Stage
• You should arrive in town the day before the exercise in order to make sure that all necessary arrangements have been made (meeting logistics, etc.) and to meet with your local contacts.
• The meeting room shouldbe arranged so that there is a large table and chairs at one end and a general seating area at the other. This arrangement facilitates the use of the table as the.simulated scene of the accident; exercise players come up to the table as if they were arriving at the scene of an actual emergency. You may include two tables, one for the accident scene and one for the EOC, for more complex table-tops.
• If the exercise is to be videotaped, you should plan out in advance where the camera(s) shouldbe located and make sure that all necessary equipment is available and in good working condition.
• It is useful to have on the walls a large map of the area, clearly showing the site of the simulated accident and the key local infrastructure

-- highways, schools, hospitals, etc.
• Each event in the pre-scripted sequence shouldbe written on a separate page of a "butcher-block" paper pad. (It is on this paper, under each event, that the exercise recorder will record the response actions taken during play.)
• You should know the sequence-of-events by heart. The need may arise during the exercise to re-script as a result of unanticipated response actions. A thorough knowledge of the pre-scripted sequence will help you re-script quickly.
Exercise Stage
• You shouldbegin the exercise itselfby summarLzLng the objectives and scope of the table-top as formulated by the local officials.
• Next you should clearly and quickly explain the groundrules for the exercise i.e., the role of the facilitator and recorder, that people should come up to the exercise table as they become involved in the simulated response, that people are to make decisions as realistically as possible, etc.

### D-2

• You should also briefly tell people that the evaluationwill follow the play (i.e., that there shouldbe no evaluation during the exercise itself). Put people at ease regarding the evaluationby stressing that theywill be evaluating themselves.
• Start the actual exercise playby reading the narrative (each participant shouldhave a copy in front of them).
• Next you shouldbeginby displaying (on the overheadprojector) the first event.
• In general, let exercise playproceed realistically, without much prompting or intervention eitherby facilitator/recorder team or by members of the audience. ·
• Some prompting may be necessary, however, either to remind people to be as realistic as possible in their actions (e.g., if certain responders in'real life would confer before the incident commander makes a specific decision, they-should confer during the exercise) or to keep things moving.
• As play proceeds, the facilitator shouldmake mental or actual notes regarding the correlationbetween the actual response actions taken during the exercise and the "anticipated responses" identified in advat].ce. These notes will help later during the evaluation session.
• In general, the exercise should take about 1 hour 45 minutes, followed by a 15 minute break and a 1 hour evaluation. If there is extra time available, it should go to the evaluation. It is important that the participants not feel that the exercise is "dragging"; they are busy people, don't waste their time. (The time constraint shouldbe included in the initial "groundrules" announced at the beginning.)
• The recorder shouldkeep an ongoing list of response actions on the butcher-blockpaper mentioned above.
• Stay onyour toes! The need to re-scriptmay arise at any time. If youneed to call "time-out" in order to re-script or to confer before answering a procedural question, do so. But keep itbrief! 

### Break
• During the break, the recorder and facilitator should tape each of the event/response sheets to a wall within easy eyesight. These will help as a reference point during the evaluation.
• Keep the break to 15 minutes maximum. Any longer a break risks the danger of dissipating the energy and momentum generated during the exercise. Evaluation Stage
• For the evaluation, the key responders shouldbe back at the table.D-3
• The facilitator should start things offby re-explaining the purpose and process of the evaluation. The goal is to produce a list of planning issues and response problems identified during the exercise that the local officials canuse in improving their plans and response systems. 

## • Next the recorder or facilitator shouldbriefly (5 minutes) recapitulate the key response actions taken at each event. running short on time, dispense with this and skip straight evaluation. If you are to the

• The faciiitator should then ask people to identify (in free-association style) the key issues or problems (and successes) that they observed during the exercise. Keep things moving. The recorder should register each of these either on a blackboard or on another sheet of butcherblock paper. If comments are long-winded, summarize in a few key words.
• Identify and eliminate any duplication in the concerns raised.
• Have people vote on those they believe are the 5 (more or less, use yourjudgment) most important. These then should each be discussed individually. The goal here is to identifyvery specific comments and concerns.
• If questions arise about what actually happened during play, refer people back to the event/response summary sheets taped to the wall. • The list of concerns which comes out of this (including both the master list of issues and the more detailed.comments on the "top five" issues shouldbe written up after the exercise and provided to the local officials as, in effect, an agenda for future action.

### PREPAREDNESS

### &PREVENTION TECHNICALASSISTANCEBULLETIN#3


# AGuidetoPlanningandConducting FieldSimulationExercises

U.S.ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTIONAGENCY

### 1. INTRODUCTION EPA PREPAREDNESS AND PREVENTION TECHNICALASSISTANCE BULLETIN #3
AGUIDE TO PLANNING AND CONDUCTING FIELD SIMULATION EXERCISES

This bulletin is intended as a guide for local emergency preparedness and response personnel to use inplanning, conducting, and evaluating field exercises. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986
. requires Local Emergency Planning Committees to prepare emergency plans by October 17, 1988 and review the**pl~ns** annually. The exercises described in this guide may be used in formulating, testing, and revising those plans. Planning and exercises may be used as interactive elements to maintain an effective and up-to-date emergency response system. With this purpose in mind, this bulletin is organized as follows:
• Section 3 describes the components of planning for a field exercise from the decision to perform a field exercise through the final pre-exercise check and set-up;
• Section4 provides guidelines for actually conducting the exercise;
• Section 5 presents methods for the post-exercise debriefing and evaluation;
• Section 6 relates the exercise experience to emergency preparedness planning; and
• The appendices provide a sample exercise scenario and sequence of events, example planning checklists, an exercise evaluation guide, information contacts, and reference information. The information presentedhere can be supplementedby contacting the regional representatives ofboth EPA and FEMA (see Appendix E) andby

.referring to other published guides to emergency exercises and planning (see

Appendix F)
. 

### 2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF FIELD EXERCISES Field exercises are the most complex and rigorous of the various types of emergency preparedness exercises (described in the overview of chemical emergency preparedness in Technical Assistance Bulletin#l). The procedures presented in this bulletin are based on the assumption that the community has either sufficient direct experience or expertise available to perform exercises of this complexity. Field exercises proceed according to a chemical accident scenario and pre-determined sequence of events to simulate, as realistically as possible, a chemical emergency. Problems are presented to participants for resolution-2- via existing plans, standard operating procedures, emergency response systems, and/or equipment deployment protocols.**A~** definedhere, field exercises vary in complexity:
• Abasic or limited field exercise involves testing single components of a community's emergency response system. Such an exercise may, for example, test only the warning and emergency public notification components. Inplace of a fullscale response, only certain first response agencies will be involved-- e.g., fire and emergency medical services. The exercise may involve a mix of on-scene response by a limited number of agencies and table-top simulation.
• A full-scale field exercise involves extensive site activity, as if the emergency is actually occurring. In this type of exercise, the responders may not be told in advance that an exercise is going to occur. When the notification of a hazardous chemical incident is received, the emergency response system goes into action, including all components and auxiliary services. In order to appreciate the level of realism and complexity involved in a full-scale field exercise, the reader should refer to the appendices at the end of this bulletin. AppendixAprovides an illustrative emergency scenario thatmightbe used to commence an exercise. AppendixBprovides the subsequent sequence of events that follo·w the beginning of the exercise and control the flow of exercise play.
3. STEPS IN DEVEI.DPING A FIELD EXERCISE This sectionpresents the various steps involved in developing a field exercise. The order inwhich the components are described is not necessarily the order inwhich they must be performed. Although some of these steps obviouslymust be performedbefore others, successful exercise planning will require interactions and overlaps among the components and should progress · according to the needs of the locality. The components are presented as follows:
• Establish exercise objectives;
• Determine the basic characteristics of the exercise;
• Secure appropriate approval and commitments;
• Design and plan the exercise;
• Consider other factors such as involvement of media, or the extent ofparticipationby public officials; and
• Provide for staging, set-up, and pre-exercise tasks. Successful planning and execution of these components requires systematic attention. Toward this end, it is advisable to convene appropriate representatives of the agencies expected to participate in the-3- exercise as

**pa~t** of a relatively formal exercise steering committee. Regular committee meetings shouldbe held to make necessary decisions, assign planning and logistical responsibilities, and to make sure that everything is "on track" for a successful exercise. This steering committee is also a useful mechanism for ensuring that the results of the exercise evaluation are linkedback to the planning process. Step 1: EstablishExercise Objectives The decision to perform a field exercise will be based onvarious local requirements or perceived needs.l Ajurisdictionmay wish, for example, to exercise a new component of its emergency response .system or a part of the emergency response system that has not beenused or exercised for a long time. Testing multi-community response capabilities under a mutual aid agreement could also be an objective. The exercise may be based on existing emergency preparedness plans or be used as a tool in the development of such plans. The reasons for performing the exercise provide the basis for the exercise objectives. These objectives should include the functions that will be exercised and the purposes of the effort (e.g., new systems, new chemical hazards, training, new or updated plan, or to gain experience). A clear statement of the general objectives of the effort shouldbe developed. For example, a statement of objectives for the exercise for which the scenario in Appendix

### Amay be used, might read as follows: "The exercise will test the procedures for spill notification, emergency response dispatch, containment and control measures, and evacuation." Step 2: Determine the Basic Characteristics ofthe Exercise Basedon Objectives Scale of the Exercise. As described above, the field exercise can range from a limited to a full-scale, on-scene response. In determining which type of exercise you want to stage, you should consider the number of people, amount of equipment, and time-frame, as well as the level of complexity (e.g., limited field or full-scale field). Decide if the responders are to be notifiedbeforehand or if the exercise will occur as if it is a real situation. Functions/Systems to be Exercised. A clear statement of objectives will guide the development of the exercise. With the objectives and scale established, this component ofplanning should identify the emergency response system, sub-systems, or functions to be exercised. For example, the scenario inAppendix A, in keeping with the statement of objectives (above), couldbe used to test the emergency notification/ communications system; fire, rescue, and hazmat response units; and the contingency plan for evacuation.

1 For assistance in making the decision to perform a field

**exerci~e** refer to Exercise Design Course Guide to Emergency Management Exercises, Federal Emergency Management Agency, June 1984, SM # 170.2, pp. 17-18.-4-

**Oq~anizations** and Individuals Invobred. The basic characteristics of the exercise should also include thejurisdictions, agencies, and industries (if any) involved. The organizations participating shouldbe those referenced in emergency response systems, contingencyplans, or emergency preparedness plans.· (Ifno plans exist or organizations are identified that are not in the systems or

**p~ans,** provisions shouldbe made to follow-up the exercise by preparing or updating such systems or plans.) Industrial plants or other hazardous substance handlers may be invited to participate using their response capabilities. Each of the exercise participants shouldbe represented in the exercise planningprocess, preferably by someone who in real life is involved in responding to emergencies but who will not be a "player" in the exercise. A clear distinction shouldbe maintainedbetween those who are responsible for planning a:nd those who will be responding. This distinctionwill aid in the assignment of responsibilities and preclude any special pre-exercise preparation, on the part of the players, that would compromise the integrity of the exercise as a test of the responders' capabilities. I2Pe andNumber of Continuous or Simultaneous Activities. The type and number of continuing or simultaneous exercise activities shouldbe described. These activities are those basic response functions which,tend to be ongoing throughout much of an emergency response, including first aid and triage, chemical spill abatement and containment, and notification and evacuation of local residents. Coordination of these activities is critical to the success of the exercise because they typically are critical in a real-life emergency. The type andnumber of continuous or simultaneous activities shouldbe appropriate to fit the scale of the exercise, the functions that are to be tested, and the organizations to be tested, as previously determined in the exercise planning process. Level of Stress. The level of stress of the exercise should also be determined. Level of stress (as described inTechnical Assistance Bulletin #l) varies with the type of exercise, problems presented to the participants, and time constraints. Full-scale field exercises impose the highest degree of stress. The level of stress in the field exercise will increase as the exercise

**i~** made more true-to-life. Simultaneous activities in greater numbers and complexity will increase the level of stress. For example, a full-scale response to the spill site in a mixed residential/commercial/ industrial area, described in the AppendixA scenario, will impose more stress than a limited field exercise testing only, for example, a communications facility under the same scenario. Step 3: SecureAppropriateApprova1 and Commitments A statement of the objectives andbasic characteristics of the exercise shouldbe prepared for presentation to, and approval (ifwarranted) by, the chief executive of thejurisdiction(s) involved. This prepared statement should also be presented to the leadership of the necessary participating organizations (if they are not members of the exercise steering committee) to secure their approval and commitments to participate. Press releases; announcements to interestedparties; and invitations for support, volunteers, and observers may also be developed from the statement of objectives and characteristics, once they have been officially approved. Broad assignments or directives to participating agencies and their commitments to participate and support the exercise shouldbe made final at this time. '-5- Step 4: Design and

### Plan the Exercise Designing and planning a simulation exercise involves determining the appropriate emergency scenario and establishing the framework for preparing, managing, performing, and evaluating the exercise. Designing and planning efforts involve the following components: 

## • The Scenario; 

## • The Sequence of Events; 

## • Control Mechanisms; 

## • Participants; 

## • Physical Facilities; 

## • Simulation Equipment andMaterials; 

# • Special Effects; 

## • Set-Up and Break-Down of Simulation; 

# • Schedule and Tasks; 

## • Communications; and 

## • Community Impacts
. Appendix Cprovides several checklists that may help systematize the planning process. The Scenario. The scenario, which shouldbe directlybased on the already determined exercise objectives andbasic characteristics, describes the incident that is being simulated. In effect, the scenario is the script for the accident, and should provide the following types of information:
• The hazardous materials involved including the threat they present, their form, the type of containment vessels from which they are leaking, and the quantity of leaking material;
• The nature of the accident (e.g., release, spill, fire or a combination of the three);
• The facility or transportation route where the accident occurs, including such specifics as location, setting, and building type or mode of transport;
• The characteristics of the neighborhood(s) threatenedby exposure to accident effects;
• The initial number of victims, and potential victims;
• Weather conditions.-6-
The scenario is used to create the :simulated on-scene emergency which activates the emergency response system. Logistical considerations, such as scheduling, transportation, personnel assignments, and physical facilities, are central to the implementation of the scenario. The scenario shouldbe realistic enough to meet the exercise objectives by presenting appropriate problems to the responders. The simulation, once initiated, shouldhave the look and feel of an actual emergency, eliciting reactions from the response systemwithout apparent interference from the exercise controllers. Problems that arise during the exercise should reflect actual weaknesses in local emergency response plans, procedures, and/or systems and not faults in the design of the exercise itself. Refer to the scenario inAppendixA for its description of the hazardous materials involved, the nature of the aceident, the facility, affected transportation routes, threatened neighborhoods, initial number ofvictims, andweather conditions. The Sequence of Events. A sequence of events shouldbe developed to accompany the scenario. The sequence of events proceeds step-by-step through the simulation indicating the occurrence of events, written, verbal·, and simulationmessages (e.g., seeing liquids spill or hearingwarning devices) sent or received, andproblems presented. The sequence of events is presented to the participants, either orally or inwriting, one event at a time. The events are arranged in a logical and chronological sequence designed to portray the essentials of an evolving emergency situation. The events represent changes in the circumstances of· the accident or in conditions over which the participants have no control (e.g., a change in the weather or a major change in the rate of spill or leakage'of the chemical). The events in this sequence shouldbe:
• Directly relevant to the response functions being exercised, the roles and responsibilities of the participants, the exercise objectives, and the locale of the accident;
• Tailored to the specific characteristics of an actual facility and the community inwhich the accident occurs; and
• Realistic, factual, and arranged in the proper sequence. AppendixB is an example of a sequence of events that might accompany the scenario inAppendixA. Control Mechanisms. Control mechanisms, which are critical in maintaining the direction and intensity of the exercise, include:
• Messages, bothverbal and simulated, that provide response cues 

### to the exercise players (examples ofboth types ofmessages have been included inAppendixB);
• Anticipated responses, actions or dialogue of any actors involved;-7-

• The duration of the response from incident to completion; and
• Communications links to preserve the reality of the response, while not unduly alarming outside people or agencies (e.g., notification or requests for assistance to information services or local, state and federal agencies). Anticipated responses can be used by the exercise simulators and evaluators as a standard against which to compare actual responses during the exercise. These standards are not shared with participants in order to ensure realistic responses. Anticipated response actions may be derived from relevant contingency plans or standard operating procedures used by one or more of the participating organizations. If plans or procedures do not exist, the anticipated response measures shouldbe develc,ped and documented prior to the exercise, constructed logically from the circumstanc_es being simulated, or identified through discussions with response personnel regarding their informal operations procedures. Appendix B provides illustrative anticipated responses appropriate to the sample sequence of events. Participants. All participants or players should be identified as early as possible in the exercise planning process. The number and roles of participants will vary depending on the characteristics of the exercise and available resources. (See Appendix G.1 for a checklist of potential participants.) Roles and responsibilities should be defined for each participant and an accurate roster compiled. The roles of responders and participating agencies shouldbe defined in contingency plans; specific response units may be pre-selected as the responders on the exercise. Roles and responsibilities may include the following:
• Exercise Coordinator. The exercise coordinator is in charge of the exercise. In that capacity, he or she is responsible for controlling the flow of events, coordinating all activities involving evaluation and taping, and determining the beginning and end of play. The exercise coordinator also explains to observers what actions are taking place and why. (See Section 3 below for a detailed discussion of the coordinator's role in conducting the exercise.)
• Simulation Control Team. The simulation control team controls responder command post communications; monitors activities in the command post, on site, and in the "hot zone" (the area contaminated due to the incident) to keep responders aware of the effects of their actions and maintain the flow and direction of the simulation; documents events on paper, camera, and video if desired; and keeps the observers or audience informed.
• Incident Commander. The incident commander is generally a senior official in the fire or police department or other local emergency response organization, often responsible for inter-agency emergency response coordination. The incident commander provides extensive assistance in planning the exercise and is in charge of all local-8- response personnel and coordination of responding agencies during the simulation. Although the expertise of the incident commander will be valuable throughout

**thE~** planning of the exercise, the incident commander shouldnot be directly involved in the development of the simulation scenario in order to maintain the realism of the emergency and a,roid preparation for specific incident response.
• Evaluators. Evaluators

**observE~** and assess various activities during the simulation in order to report, during the formal exercise evaluation session, the strengths andweaknesses in the emergency response operations.
• Safety Officer. The safety officer checks that safety standards andplans are followed throughout the exercise, including the planning, perfonnance, andbreak-down stages.
• Simulators. Simulators bring the scenario to life byhanding notes to participants, controlling props (e.g., setting off smoke grenades), purposely getting in the way (e.g., "rubberneckers"), andperforming as ac::tors (e.g., playing the role of "victims 11 ). 11Victims 11 in the simulationmay be'playedby representatives of participating response agencies, other emergency response auxiliary groups, or the general public. Playing the role of a victimmay be a valuable learning experience in itself, providing emergency response personnel an opportunity to experience the response from the victim's perspective.
• Observers. Observers may be s1alectedby the planners for various substantive, political, andpublic relations reasons, andmay include the press, local politicians, politicians or officials from neighboringjurisdictions, and officials from state and federal agencies inv•olved in the exercise. Physical Facilities. Arrangements must be made for pre-productionwork space, simulation support space, the simulation site, and post-exercise evaluationmeetings. Meeting rooms andpractice areas may need to be located andreserved in advance. Work plans shouldbe reviewed to ensure that such facilities will be available when needed. Simulation site selection shouldbe completed early in the planning stages to provide adequate time to notify neighbors and evaluate the logistics of using the site. If a simulation site is not identified in the development of the scenario, a site that will satisfy the scenario should be selected. The layout and size of the site shouldbe such that the scenario canbe successfullyperformed. On-site locations for the hot zone, an area for the command post and response equipment, documentationvantage points and seating, shelter, and restrooms for observers shouldbe identified and confirmed. The site shouldbe thoroughly researched and prepared to accommodate the exercise, with steps taken for the displacement of normal traffic flow or parking. Arrangements mustbe made for the transport of simulation equipment to and from the site, as well as for the set-up, staging, and break-down of the-9- accident site
... Transportation for observers andvictims must also be considered. Materials and equipment to support the planning and staging of the simulation should·be identified and acquired. An inventory of equipment and materials shouldbe prepared with notes on sources, availability, and costs. Planning and staging equipment and materials may be available through participating groups or other local agencies. Identify Simulation Equipment and Materials. An array of equipment will be needed to make the simulation realistic. Necessary equipment should be identified and purchase arrangements made as early as possible during the exercise planning process. (See Appendix G.3 for an equipment checklist.) The participating groups may have equipment on hand that they can use or loan to.other participants. Other organizations or local groups may be willing to loan or donate equipment (e.g., portable bleachers ·for the observers, or junked cars for the accident scene). Some equipment may·need to be purchased outright; such equipment, as"well as a source, shouldbe identified early. Private industry facilities are often a good source of "loaner" equipment. Various materials will be needed to conduct the simulation. In addition to or in lieu of special effects materials describedbelow, victims will need such items as refreshments and background informationmaterials (e.g., the scenario and sequence of events); documenters will need paper, cameras, or video recorders and film; and the simulation scene may need signs, props, cleanup materials, or other items to enhance the realism of the accident. Special Effects. The exercise shouldbe as realistic as possible. The realism of a simulation canbe greatly enhanced by special effects such as props, make-up for the victims, imitation spills and vapor plumes, fire, and smoke. Special effects shouldbe linked to the scenario to ensure appropriate timing and cue actors, victims, or responders to perform certain actions. The materials shouldbe acquired and tested in advance; sufficient quantities must be available at the time of the simulation. Also, the special effects must be able to function under all conditions (e.g., rain). Set-Uo and Break-Down of Simulation. Provisions should be made for the orderly and timely set-up andbreak-down of the simulation scene. The. set-up of props, such as overturned vehicles, shouldbe completed the day before the exercise if possible. Safety of exercise participants, observers, and site neighbors, as well as site security, should be provided for as long a time asthe exercise activities require personnel or equipment on the site. Set-up also includes seating, food, and restrooms for observers, narrators, documenters, and other participants, as well as roadblocks or warning tape to delineate parking/no parking areas and detours. The exercise plan should provide for the orderly dismantling and restoration of the simulation site to provide an orderly and timely breakdown. Break-down of the site should proceed as quickly as possible after the simulation to ensure the safety and convenience of site neighbors. Clearing wreckage couldbe included in the exercise as an element of the emergency response. Schedule and Tasks. Field exercises are complex activities that depend on effective organization for success. Scheduling and tasking should begin-10- early in the p+anning process, as soon as possible after approval of the exercise by the necessary officials. Scheduling and tasking essentially involve the development of a work plan to assign responsibilities for specific activities, with deadline dates, to the participating groups and individuals. The sehedule should include such items as meeting dates, procurement and preparationmilestones, scenario development deadlines, and simulation set-up andperformance dates. Communications. Reliable communication is a necessity for responders in actual emergency response, and critical for simulators in an exercise. Telephone service, equipment, and directo•ries shouldbe provided where appropriate during the planning stage and particularly during the exercise itself. Communication linkages inpreparedness plans should identify hardware and frequency compatibilities or incompatibilities to ensure that responders know who they can contact. A network of telephones is extremely important during the exercise to simulate! and control the flow of information in a realistic fashion. The incident

**con~and** post will require phones for the incident commander and other response officials, and separate lines for the simulation control team. In some cases actual lines and phone numbers may be used, in other cases the numbers of various response and support agencies may be assigned to certain simulators or locations. For example, in a limited field exercise, an exercise room with several desks equipped with phones may be set up to simulate some of the response activities. Responders and simulationparticipants may be using "walkie-talkies" to communicate. The radio frequencies and compatibility among the response groups and simulators shouldbe identified. If radio contact is not possible, alternatives shouldbe identified and acquired. Community Impacts. Impacts from the simulation on the community should be anticipated, monitored, and controlled. A simulation may require a number of disruptive actions including re-routitlg of traffic, use of public areas or facilities, and use of

**emerge~cy** vehicles. Parties who may be affectedby the simulation-- e.g., residents andbusinesses at or near the simulation site --shouldbe notifiedwell in advance. Step 

### 5: Consider OtherFactors Performing an emergency response exercise is a complex undertaking; many peripherally-related, but nonetheless important considerations must be kept inmind throughout the various phases of an exercise. The type and number of these factors oftendepends on the community sponsoring the exercise. Although this guide does not go into detail on any of these considerations, they are mentiohedhere to ensure that planners are aware of them: Safety. Safety of all participants, observers, and curious on-lookers shouldbe considered throughout the exercise. The designated safety officer will have the responsibility of ensuring this safety, but will need the cooperation of all participants and the aid of safety plans and protocols. The more complex and realistic the exercise, the greater the likelihood of accidents. Liability. Especially in full-scale field exercises, there is significantpotential for accidents to participants, observers, and "innocent bystanders." Potential liabilities shouldbe considered and minimized. The-11- signing of a.liabilitywaiver might be considered for all participants and official observers. Cost. The cost of field exercises varies greatly with the scale and nature of the exercise itself. Inmany cases, however, the cost of the equipment and supplies needed to stage a field simulationwill be significant. Private facilities participating in the exercise should be urged to donate time and the use of equipment. Even where such donations are made, field exercises require a great deal of coordination and pre-planning and, therefore, consume scarce public agency staff time. Before undertaking**~n** exercise, the planning committee should carefully identify and estimate all likely expenses and evaluate all available means of**re~ucing** those expenses. Step 6: Provide for Staging and Set-Up, Pre-Exercise Check, and Briefing for Participants After weeks or.months of planning and**coordinati~g,** performance of the exercise should not be jeopardizedby last-minute problems. Staging and setup of the exercise shouldbe done a day in advance if possible. This will provide for last-minute problems with the site or equipment and, time and resources permitting, a shake-down or trial-run of all props and special effects. Omissions or oversights may be caught at this time and corrected. Immediately before the exercise, the pre-exercise check shouldbe performed as a last-minute run through of checklists and logistics. The pre-exercise briefing may be used to inform participants of last-minute changes or · problems that may require alternative actions and resolve any uncert.ainties the participants may have.
4. GUIDELINES .FOR CONDUCTING THE EXERCISE The major exercise development steps, discussed above, set the stage for the smooth conduct of the exercise by the exercise coordinator. On the day of the event, the exercise coordinator must assume direct responsibility for the conduct of the exercise'to ensure adequate accomplishment of its objectives. The exercise coordinator's job is to:
• Describe the "ground-rules" for the exercise, including the roles that the various participants are to play;
• Present the players with the exercise narrative;
• Announce the first event of the scenario;
• Stimulate player responses, without intervening in a way that assumes control of the play, unless it appears likely that the players will not initiate a response critical to the**~­** objectives of the exercise;
• Control the flow and pace of the exercise by introducing the · remaining events in sequence; and
• Keep the exercise on schedule and terminate play at the specified end time.-12- In general,· it is best to let the exercise play develop naturally, with participants responding to prescribed evj:mts as they deem appropriate. Some anticipated responses, however, may be so critical to the completion of the simulation that the exercise coordinator will have to intervene in the play to assure that such'responses take place. (The fact that intervention is requiredwill, of course, represent a very important lesson for the exercise participants and shouldbe noted for further discussion in the post-exercise debriefing and evaluation.) An example, based on the scenario inAppendixA, wouldbe the activation of the evacuationprocess (one of the objectives on which the scenario wouldhave beenbased). If the participants in an exercise using the AppendixA scenario did not respond to messages or cues with activation of the evacuationprocess, the exercise coordinator would intervene.
5. GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING A POST-EXERCISE DEBRIEFING AND EVAIDATION Apost-exercise debriefing and evaluation canbe as valuable an experience as the exercises. These post-exercise sessions are critical for capturing the lessons of the field exercise so that they canbe used to revise and improve emergencyplans and procedures. The exercise coordinator should first conduct a debriefing sessio·n, in which the primary objective is to review the experiences of the participants during the exercise. A debriefingworks best if the exercise coordinator leads the participants through an event-by-event recapitulation of the exercise, discussing the actual responses andhow they compared to the anticipated responses. The debriefing may cover all events and responses before they are evaluated, or itmay proceed one event at a time, allowing an opportunity for evaluation as well.Once the debriefing is completed, the exercise coordinator should elicit evaluations from the participants concerning both their own performance during the exercise and the characteristics of the exercise as a whole. This process will be enhanced if the participants understand that the purpose of the evaluation is to develop a set of recommendations for improving the response system, rather than to find fault with the performance of the participants. These recommendations may include actions to improve emergency response plans, procedures, and equipment as well as additional training needs for members of the response system. Appendix Dprovides criteria that may be useful in conducting the debriefing or exercise evaluation. It is important that problems in the response system (e.g., lack of plans or procedures) be separated from problems related to the specific exercise design or conduct (e.g., a scenario event that did not match conditions in the community or a special effect that failed). Thus, the exercise coordinator should allow opportunity for the participants to evaluate the exercise itself. The exercise coordinator shouldbe alert to both the possibility that the participants may be more critical of the exercise than of their own performance and the fact that problems with exercise design and conduct may have produced some responses that do not reflect existing plans, procedures, or response capabilities of the participants. Following the debriefing and self-evaluations by the participants, the exercise coordinator or exercise sponsors may want to open up discussions-13- with community.groups, local industries, and the press. Amock or actual press conference may be called. An open forum to discuss the exercise may aid in community relations and cooperationby allowing citizens and representatives of perhaps controversial local industries to comment on the exercise and emergency response system. This type of evaluation, conducted some time after the exercise, may prove to be a useful complement to the immediate debriefing session. Intervening time and the participation of a broader cast of evaluators may provide fresh or at least additional perspectives.

6. USING EXERCISES TO IMPROVE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, PLANNING, AND RESPONSE The results of the debriefing/evaluation period, in the form of improvements in the response system, need to be implemented if the exercise is to be of maximum benefit. These results shouldbe included in the continuing planning and preparedness activities of the community. Local planners should initiate efforts to revise existing plans.andprocedures or develop new ones to reflect the lessons from the exercise (e.g., revise notificationprocedures, clarify responsibilities for providing services to an evacuatedpopulation). Exercise planners shoulduse the evaluation of the exercise itself to improve future exercises. All other parties (e.g., police, fire, emergency, medical) should take actions appropriate to their roles in the preparedness effort. Approximately three to six months following the exercise, the contingency plans and procedures shouldbe reviewed to ensure that appropriate changes and revisions have been incorporated.Appendix A B 

## c D
E F -14- 

### LIST OF APPENDICES

Tit1e Sample Field Exercise Scenario Sample Sequence of Events Sample Planning Checklists Criteria for Assessing State and Local Preparedness Regicmal Federal Agency Contacts References to Additional InformationA-1
APPENDIX A Sample FieldExercise Scenario The PQX Chemical Co. plant, located on Lee Highway, manufactures a variety of corrosive, toxic, and flammable chemicals. Many of these chemicals are stored at the plant pending shipment to customers. The plant occupies 50 acres of land and is situated in an area composed of commercial, industrial, and residential buildings. The plant property is bounded on the northby Lee Highway, on the east by a rail line, on the south by Interstate 20 and on the west by the Black River. Beyond the river to the west, is the BlackRiver Estates housing development. South of Interstate 20 is the Clover Hill housing development. On the north side of Lee Highway lies a mixture of commercial and industrial buildings. East of the railroad line, there are a variety of industrial facilities. Arailroad siding extends

**in~o** the plant property to the outside storage area. One clear Saturday morning, a day when the plant is not operating, a repair crew is working on replacing a section of pipe that is connected to the top of·an empty tank. After disconnection, a crane is used to lower the pipe onto a flat bed truck. As the crane boom is swung over a nearby tank of liquid sulfur trioxide, the cable snaps, thus, dropping the pipe. The falling pipe shears off the S03 tank's feedline between the tank wall and the first blockvalve. The four-inch diameter feedline leading from the tank to the process plant begins leaking immediately. An excess flow valve between the leak and the tank limits the rate of flow to 30 gallons per minute. Spilled liquid from the S03 tank collects within the containment dike surrounding the tanks. Upon contact with the moisture in the air, the spilled S03 vaporizes into a white mist resembling steam. The wind, coming from the northwest at 5 mph, blows· the vapors directly onto the nearby repair crew that had removed the oldpiping. ·Three of the four repairmen are affectedby the vapors, with two of them lying unconscious on top of the tank they hadbeen working on. The lone conscious repairman drags the remaining workers from the hazardous area and then runs into the mainplant to report the accident.

**Experienci~g** burning eyes and difficult breathing, he decides to remain indoors awaiting the arrival of the fire department.

### B-1
APPENDIX B Sample Sequence ofEvents
EVENT #1: The northeasterly windblows the vapor cloudcoming off the spilled S03 towards the southwest across plant property. Arriving fire/rescue personnel find anunconscious personjustbeyond the diked area. SimulationMessage: Simulators will set off a white smoke grenade or other smoke/cloud generation device to simulate the S03 vapor cloud. Large portable fans may have to be employed to direct the**v~pors** in the desired direction dictatedby the exercise. An exercise "victim" shouldbe lying outside of the diked area but away from the white smoke/cloud. Water from a hoseline attached to the feedline of the S03 tankwill be flowing at a rate of 30 gpm into the diked area to simulate the leaking S03. VrittenjVerbalMessages: None. ExpectedActions: 1. First arriving fire/rescue units report the**on-s~ene** situation to the emergency communications center and request additional fire/rescue and police units (if necessary). 2. Rescue unconscious person near diked area and provide emergency medical treatment following rescue. 3. Incident commander**take~** command and establishes:
• Commandpost (in safe location) • Communications among response agencies at scene • Staging area for in-coming apparatus • Mechanism for on-going incident assessment 4. Ensure that emergencypersonnel wear appropriate protective gear. 5. Secure area around the incident scene. 6. Attempt to locate a plant official who can identify the leaking material and provide technical expertise concerning the tank, feedline_, control valves, dike, etc.B-2
EVENT #2: The injured repairman that reported the accident advises fire/rescue personnel of the two unconscious workers on top of the tank next to the leaking tank; The repairman tells how the accident occurred andwarns of the hazards of the vapors emanating from the spilled liquid.
SimulationMessage: Simulators will continue to generate a white cloud to simulate the vaporizing S03. The simulated leak will also be continued. The repairman "victim" will be acting as ifhe is having trouble breathing and a burning sensation inhis eyes. Verbal.Message: To: Fire/Rescue Personnel From: InjuredRepairman Message: Joe and Charlie are still up .on the tank. I think they've passed out. Do you see them? They W·ere still up there when the pipe fell from the cable andhit the other tank. I don't know what that leaking stuff is, but watch it, it's nasty. ExpectedActions: 1. Plan strategy for the rescue of the two unconscious workers on top of the tank. 2. Provide emergency medical treatment for the repairman experiencing difficult breathing andburning eyes. 3. Contact CHEMTREC and/or other technical assistance organization for assistance in identifying the leaking chemical. 4. Activate the off-site emergency operations center (EOC) and notify key officials and agencies of the local government. 5. Continue efforts to locate a plant official. 6. Continue efforts to identify the leaking material. 7. Identify strategies and options for controlling the leak. 8. Arrange for specialized equipment to be brought to the scene: 

## • Encapsulated**s~its** 

## • Self-containedbreathing apparatus 

# • Environmental monitors 

# • Patching/pluggingmaterials 

## • Foam 

# • Diking materials 

## • Emergency medical suppliesB-3

9. Notify the following:
• Community Emergency Coordinator • National Response Center • State Environmental ProtectionAgencyB-4
EVENr#3: The vapor cloud is**approachin1~** Interstate 20.
SimulationMessage: Simulators will continue to generate the white cloudbut not in amounts great enough to transport the cloud to the interstate, thus avoiding obstructing the view ofpassingmotorists not involved in the exercise. The purpose of the cloud is fc>r realism at the actual storage·tank area. VerbalMessage: (via two-way radio) To: On-Scene Incident Commander From: Emergency Communications Cente:r Message: Motorists on Interstate 20 are reporting 11white smoke" just north of the interstate. Could that be coming from your location? ExpectedActions: 

### 1. Initiate monitoring ofvapor cloud and spill. 2. Confirmvapor cloudmovement. 3. Close Interstate 20 downwind of the vapor cloud. 4. Consider protective actions for residents south of Interstate 20. 5. Request mutual aid (ifnecessary):
• Fire/rescue • ...tazardous materials team • Emergencymedical services • Law enforcement 6. For arriving mutual aidunits:
• Brief them about incident • Assign tasks to them • Ensure theywear appropriate protective gear • Establish inter-organizational communications 7. Establish communications between the on-scene command post and the EOC, and coordinate all response actions. 8. Expand efforts to secure the area around the incident scene:
• Roadblocks • Rerouting of traffic • Spectator controlB-5


### 9. Establish a media center and appoint a public information officer.B-6
EVENT #4: Fire/rescue personnel have located the two unconscious workmen on top of the tank next to the leaking tank.
SimulationMessage: Simulators will continue to generate the white cloud and allow the 30 gpm flow ofwater into the diked area to continue. The two ttvictims" on top of the tank should lie still to simulate unconsciousness.**~rittenjVerbal** Messages: None. ExpectedActions: 1. Rescue the two unconscious workers if it is decided that adequate protective gear is available at the scene for rescuers. 2. Provide emergency medical treatment for the two unconscious workers following their rescue. 3. Establish an on-scene triage area fCir injuredworkers and emergency response personnel.

### B-7
EVENT #5: The vapor cloudhas moved as far as Interstate 20 and is fast approaching the Clover Hill housing development. Aplant official arrives on the scene and advises the incident commander that the leaking product is liquid sulfur trioxide and that the 70-ton capacity tank was approximately 80 percent full prior to the accident.
SimulationMessage: Simulators will continue to generate the white cloud in the area near the tanks and continue the flow of water into the diked area.
Verbal Messages: To: On-Scene Incident Commander From: Emergency Communications Center Message: Motorists are now reporting a white mist coming across the interstate from·the northwest. They advise that it's irritating to their eyes and throats.
To: On-Scene Police Department Commander From: Patrol Unit Message: The vapors from your locationhave reached Interstate 20 and are heading towards Clover Hill. Please advise.
To: On-Scene Incident Commander From: PQX Chemical Company Official Message: The leaking product is sulfur trioxide. As of close ofbusiness yesterday, it contained approximately 

### 55 tons of 

### so3. ExpectedActions: 1. Evacuate Clover Hill and other nearby residences. 2. Open emergency shelters for evacuees. 3. Disseminate information to all emergency response personnel and agencies involved in the incident that the leaking material has been identified as liquid sulfur trioxide.B-8
4. Contact CHEMTREC and/or other technical assistance organizations for:
• Chemical specific information • Associatedhealthhazards • Recommended control/cleanup actions 5. Ensure that protective gear is compatible with S03 is wornby all emergencypersonnel operating in the vicinity of the leaking tank and vapor cloud. 6. Continue monitoring the vapor cloud. for movement and concentration. 7. Identify strategies and options fot:· reducing the quantity of vapors emanating from the spilled S03. 8. Continue efforts to identify strategies and options for controlling the leak. 9. Coordinate response efforts between the on-scene incident commander, ' plant officials, and the EOC. 10. Provide public information concerni.ng:
• Hazards • Evacuation • Safety/precautions • Details of remedial actionsB-9
EVENT #6: Despite vaporization, the diked area is filling up rapidly with spilled liquid.
SimulationMessage: Simulators will continue to allow the water to flow from the hoseline into the diked area at a rate of 30 gallons per minute. The white cloud will also continue to be generated to simulate vaporization of product.
WrittenMessage: (via messenger) To: On-Scene Incident Commander From: Simulator Message: The diked area contains a considerable amount of S03 and continues to fill at a rapid rate. ExpectedActions: 1. Arrange for the off-loading of the S03 from the damaged tank to other large capacity tanks that are compatible with S03. 2. Identify strategies and options for removing the S03 contained within the dikes.

### B-10
EVENT#7: Winds begin to shift from the northeast to the southeast. The National Weather Service's forecast call:s for temperatures and humidity to increase as winds shift.
SimulationMessage: Simulators will employ the use of large fans (if necessary) to simulate a wind shift so that the white cloudwill blow towards the west instead of the southwest. The simulated S03 spill will be continued at 30 gpm. VrittenMessages: (viamessenger) To: On-Scene Incident Commander From: National Weather Service Message: Be advised that winds will be shifting over the next 

### 10-12 hours to the southeast at 3 mph. Tempel::-atures will rise 5-7 degrees, and humiditywill increase as well
.. Verba1Messages: (via two-way radio) To: On-Scene Police Department Cownander From: PatrolUnit Message: I'm at the roadblock along wes1:bound Interstate 

### 20. It looks as though the vapor cloud is heading more towards the west now, in the direction of BlackRiver Estates.
To: On-Scene Incident Commander From: Emergency Communications Centel: Message: Citizens are reporting irritating vapors in the BlackRiver Estates area. We've received several**c~alls** on this. ExpectedActions: 

### 1. Disseminate information to all emergency response personnel and agencies involved in the incident concerning the wind shift andweather forecast. 2. Evacuate the BlackRiver Estates housing development. 3. Open additional emergency shelters for evacuees.

### B-11
4. Expand efforts·to secure the area to the west of the plant:
• Set up roadblocks • Reroute traffic • Control spectators 5. Consider evacuating the commercial/industrial area northwest of the plant. 6. Continue monitoring the vapor cloud for movement and concentration.B-12
EVENT #8: Anunconscious personhas been spotted in a canoe floating down the BlackRiverjustwest of the plant. In addition, numerous residents west of the planthave been injured. SimulationMessage: Simulators will continue their efforts to direct a white cloud towards the west. Theywill also continue to allowwater to flow at 30 gpm into the diked area. One "victim" will lie in a slumped position in a canoe in a calm spot on the river. Seve:r·al "victims" in the BlackRiver Estates will act as though they are experiencing difficult breathing and burning eyes. Verba1Messages: (via two-way radio) To: EmergencyMedical Services Commander From: Emergency Communications Center Message: Ye've received a report of anunconscious person in a canoe on the BlackRiverbetween the PQX plant and Interstate 20. The caller saw the canoe floating from

**thE~** area affectedby the vapor cloud.·
To: EmergencyMedical Services Comnander From: Emergency Communications Center Message: Police report finding numerous persons in the process of evacuating BlackRiver Estates who have requested emergency medical treatment for irritated eyes andnoses. ExpectedActions: 1. Provide emergencymedical treatment for numerous injuredpersons. 2. Prepare the localhospital for numerous chemical-related casualties and make arrangements for transporting patients to other hospitals, if necessary. 3. Rescue the unconscious canoeist. 4. Evacuate the commercial/industrial area northwest of the plant. 5. Expand efforts to secure the area to the northwest of the plant:

• Set up roadblocks • Reroute traffic • Control spectators 6. Contlnue monitoring vapor cloud for movement and concentration.

### B-13
7. Apply acid-based foam (if available) to the surface of the contained S03 to prevent the release ofhazardous vapors.B-14
EVENT #9: Two railroad tankcars have

**beE~n** brought onto the siding next to the S03 tank. Off-loading operations of the tank will be difficult due to the presence of spilled liquid around thH tank within the diked area. Siau1ationMessage: Simulators will con1:inue to allow water to flow into the diked area and will continue to generate a white cloud and direct it towards the west. VerbalMessages: To: Plant Official From: Railroad Engineer Message: How should I position the two

**~~mpty** tankcars for off-loading operations?
To: On-Scene Incident Commander From: Senior Fire

**Departm~nt** Officer Message: We're going to have a difficult time

**ga~n~ng** access to the unloading outlet on the tankwith all this liquid S03 around the base of the tank. It wouldbe unsafe to have anyone walk through the liquid, even if they're wearing Level Aprotective gear. ExpectedActions: 1. Identify strategies and options for

**ga~n~ng** access to the unloading outle. on the so3 tankwithout endangering the lives of the personnel assigned the task. 2. Off-load the S03 from the tank to the railroad tank cars. 3. Continue monitoring the vapor cloud for movement and concentration.

### B-15
EVENT #10: The product has been completely off-loaded from the tank to the railcars, thus, ending the leak. Vapors, however, continue to be given off from the spilled liquid within the dikes.
SimulationMessage: Simulators will continue to generate a white cloud and direct it towards the west until actions are taken to prevent the vaporization of product and/or pump the product to tanks.
Verbal Messages: To: On-Scene Incident Commander From: Senior Fire Department Officer Message: We just finished off-loading the S03 to the tankcars. The leak has stopped.
To: On-Scene Incident Commander From: Senior Fire Department Officer Message: The contained liquid is still vaporizing.
ExpectedActions: 1. Disseminate information to all emergency responders and agencies involved in the incident that the leak has been stopped but that hazardous vapors continue to·be generated from the spilled material. 2. Continue monitoring.the vapor cloud for movement and concentration. 3. Apply acid-based foam (if available) to the surface of the contained S03 to prevent the release of hazardous vapors (if not already done). 4. Pump liquid.S03 from the containment dikes into rail tank cars·or other compatible tanks. 5. Consider post-incident operations, following the complete elimination of hazards, including:

• Cleanup • Decontamination of personnel, equipment, apparatus, and property • Removal and disposal of hazardous wastes • Re-entry of evacuees to residential areas • Opening of roads and the evacuated commercial/industrial area • Continued air monitoringAppendix C.l


### C.2 C.3 APPENDIX C Sample Planning Checklists

Title List of Possible Simulation Exercise Participants Planning Checklist Equipment Checklist

### C-1 APPENDIX G.12 List of Possible Simulation Exercise Participants

Fire Departments Local Industrial
Medical Ambulance Rescue squads Toxicologists Doctors Poison control center Hospital Red Cross
Police Departments Local County State Highway patrol Sheriff Industrial security

2 This list adapted from "The Day Before
...," a simulation exercise planning guide developed by the EPA Region VII Technical Assistance Team (see Appendix F)
.

### CivilDefense/Disaster Services Local State C-2

Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA)
HealthDepartments Local State Federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
PUblicVorksfUtilities Water Sewage treatment Electric/gas
Environmental Scientists Local State Private Universities
Local EmergencyResponse Contractors Mitigation Removal Heavy equipmentC-3 FederalAgencies U.S. Coast Guard National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Department of Transportation Army Corps of Engineers National Guard Environmental Protection Agency Geologic Survey Fish andWildlife Service
Local Hazardous Materials Carriers Truck Rail Barge
Chemica1 Experts Industry University CHEML{EC Meteorologists National Weather Service Tele·hsion Airport
Communications Radio Television

### Key ThresholdActions C-4 APPENDIX G.23 Planning Checklist

• Has the site of the simulated incident been identified?
• Is there a local contingencyplan or standard operating procedures in effect?
• Have planning issues or response**nE~eds** been identified? If so, what are they?
• What type of simulation do you want: to undertake?
• Who will participate in the exercise?
• How will the exercise be documented?
• Has the scenario descriptionbeen developed?
• Have the sequence of events and control materials beenwritten?
• What equipment is required for the exercise? (See separate list in Appendix G.3.)
Pre-ProductionPlanning andLogistics
• Has the date been set for the exercise?
• Have the participants oeen notified?
• Has the site of the exercise been identified and arranged for?
• Is there an area for observers?
• Is there an area for the narrator?
• Where will video equipment be located?
• Where will the press be located?
• Have special effects been arranged for?



### 3 This list adapted from "The Day Before
...", a simulation exercise planning guide developed by the EPA Region VII Technical Assistance Team (see Appendix F)

.C-5
• Is there someone designated to manage special effects?
• Have all essential equipment, supplies, and props been acquired?
Simulation Staging
• Are all members of the Exercise Steering Committee prepared?
• Have site arrangements been confirmed?
• Have invitations to and arrangements for observers been confirmed?
• Has the press been notified?
• Has video documentation been arranged?
• Are all equipment, supplies, and props in ready condition?
• Have all necessary manifests or bills of ladingbeen prepared?
• Has set-up and staging help been arranged for?
• Has prop placement and set-up planbeen completed? Follow-up Review and Evaluation
• Has a meeting room been arranged?
• Have necessary audio-visual aids been arranged?
• Has a review and evaluation procedure been determined?C-6 APPENDIX C.34 Field SiDul.ationUquip111.ent List
Props Drums Tanks Boxes Vehicles Moulage Water Simulatedhazardous materials Smoke Pyrotechnic supplies Other Firefighting/Suppression Trucks/apparatus Tools/equipment Foam and equipment Fire extinguishers Other

4 This list adapted from "The Day Before
...", a simulation exercise planning guide developedby the EPA Region VII Technical Assistance Team (see Appendix F)
.Rescue and FirstAid Vehicles Stretchers First aid/trauma kits Oxygen Other
Containment Devices Booms Patches, plugs Sandbags Pneumatic bags Plastic sheetsjtarps Neutralizers Sorbents Shovels Other
Personal Protective Equipment Respirators Pressure demand SCBA Air-purffying respirators Chemical protective clothing Splash suits Fully-encapsulating suits Gloves Boots Disposables C-7Hardhats Eye protection Face shields Duct tape Other Honi;toring Instruments Combustible gas indicators Oxygen meters Detector tubes Organic surveymeters Radiation survey meters Passive dosimeters Specific survey instruments Litmus paper, pH paper Other Sa.plingEquipment Sampl..r..ng devices Containers Labels Packaging Other
Coamunications Equipment Radios/"walkie-talkies" Telephones Megaphones C-8Horns Other
ContaminationReduction Equipment Buckets, tubs, containers Plastic Brushes Water Detergent Sprayers Other
References C-9

EPA Extremely Hazardous Chemicals Profiles Department of Transportation Emergency Response Guidebook
Documentation Equipment Video cameras Still cameras Tape recorders Note pads Other Heavy Equipment Backhoes Dump trucks Vacuum trucks Offload tankers Cranes

### Bulldozers Other Hiscel.laneous Meteorological equipment Clipboards Binoculars Salvage drums Barriers for site control Tools Other C-10

### D-1 APPENDIX

## J>5 Criteria for Assessing State and Loca1 Preparedness

C.1 INTRODUCTION The criteria in this appendix, an adaptation of criteria developed by the Preparedness Committeeofthe NAT in August 1985, represent a basisforassessing a State orlocal hazardous materialsemergencyresponsepreparednessprogram. Thesecriteriareflect the basic elementsjudged to be important for a successful emergency preparedness program. Thecriteriaareseparatedintosixcategories, allofwhicharecloselyinterrelated. These categoriesarehazardsanalysis, authority,organizationalstructure, communications, resources, and emergencyplanning. Thesecriteriamaybeusedforassessingtheemergencyplanaswellastheemergency preparedness program in general. It mustbe recognized, however, thatfewStateor localgovernmentswill havetheneedand/orcapabilitytoaddressalltheseIssuesand meetallthesecriteriatothefullestextent. Resourcelimitationsandthe resultsofthe hazardsanalysiswill stronglyinfluencethe necessarydegreeofplanning and preparedness. Thosegovernmentalunitsthatdonothaveadequateresourcesareencouragedto seekassistanceandtakeadvantageofall resourcesthatareavailable. Other criteria exist that could be used for assessing a community's preparedness and emergencyplanning. These include FEMA'sCPG 1-35 (Hazard Identification,Capability Assessment and Multi-Year Development Plan for Local Governments) and CPG 1-SA. Additionally, States mayhave issued criteriaforassessing capability. C.2 THECRITERIA C.2.1 HazardsAnalysis "HazardsAnalysis" includesthe proceduresfordeterminingthesusceptibilityorvulnerability of a geographical areatoa hazardous materials release, for identifying potential sourcesofa hazardousmaterialsreleasefromfixedfacilitiesthatmanufacture, process, orotherwiseuse, store, ordisposeofmaterialstnataregenerallyconsidered hazardous
·inan unprotectedenvironment. Thisalsoincludesananalysisofthepotentialorprobable

hazard oftransporting hazardous materialsthrough a particulararea. Ahazardsanalysisisgenerallyconsideredtoconsistofidentificationofpotentialhazards, determination ofthevulnerabilityofan area as a result ofthe existing hazards, and an assessmentofthe riskofa hazardousmaterials releaseorspill. The following criteria mayassist in assessing a hazardsanalysis: 

### o Hasahazardsanalysisbeencompletedforthearea? Ifoneexists,whenwasit lastupdated? 

### o Doesthehazardsanalysisincludethelocation,quantity,andtypesofhazardous materialsthat are manufactured, processed, used, disposed, orstoredwithin theappropriatearea? 

### 5 These criteriahave been reprinted from the Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide (NRT-1), preparedby the National Response Team.D-2 0 Was it done in accordance with ccJmmunity right-to-know laws and prefire plans? 0 Does itincludethe routes bywhichthe hazardous materialsaretransported? 0 Have areasof public health concern been identified? 0 Have sensitiveenvironmental areas been identified? 

### o Have historical dataon spill incidents been collected and evaluated? 

### o Have the levels ofvulnerability and probable locations of hazardous materials incidents been identified? 0 Are environmentallysensitiveareas·and population centers considered in analyzingthe hazardsofthetransportation routes and fixed facilities? 0.2.2 Authority "Authority" refers to those statutory authorities orother legal authorities vested in any personnel, organizations, agencies, orother•:mtities in responding toor being prepared forrespondingto hazardous materialsemergc:mcies resulting from releases orspills. Thefollowing criteria may be usedto assessthe**~xisting** legal authorities for response actions: 0 Doclearlegalauthoritiesexisttoestablishacomprehensivehazardousmaterials response mechanism (Federal,**State:~,** county, and local laws, ordinances, and policies)? 0 Dotheseauthoritiesdelegatecommandandcontrolresponsibilitiesbetweenthe differentorganizationswithinthesamelevelofgovernment (horizontal), and/or provide coordination proceduresto befollowed? 

### o Dotheyspecifywhatagency(ies) has (have) overall responsibilityfordirecting orcoordinating a hazardous materials response? 

### o Dotheyspecifywhat agency(ies) has (have) responsibilityfor providing assistance or support for hazardous materials response and what comprises that assistanceorsupport? 

### o Havetheagency(ies) withauthoritytoorderevacuationofthecommunitybeen identified? 0 Haveanylimitations in the legal authorities been identified? 0.2.3 OrganizationalStructure "Organization" referstotheorganizationalstructurein placeforrespondingtoemergencies. Thisstructurewill,ofcourse,varyconsiderablyfromStatetoStateandfromlocality to locality. There aretwo basictypes oforganizations involved in emergency response operations. The first is involved in the planning and policy decision process similarto the NAT and ART. Thesecondistheoperational responsegroupthatfunctionswithinthepreceptsset forth in the State or local plan. Realizing that situations vary from State to State andD-3 localityto localityandthatemergencyplanningforthe Stateand local level mayinvolve thepreparationofmultiplesituationplansordevelopmentofasinglecomprehensiveplan, the criteria should be broadly based and designedto detecta potentialflaw thatwould then precipitatea moredetailed review. 0 Arethefollowingorganizationsincludedintheoverallhazardousmaterialsemergency preparedness activities?
• Health organizations (including mental health organizations)
• Public safety o fire o police o health and safety (including occupational safety and health)
o other responders
• Transportation
• Emergencymanagement/response planning
•**Environmen~al** organizations
• Natural resources agencies (includingtrustee agencies)
• Environmental agencieswith responsibilitiesfor:
o fire o health
o water quality
o air quality
o consumersafety
• Education system (in general)
o public education o public information
• Private sectorinterface o tradeorganizations
o industryofficials
• Labororganizations 

### o Haveeach organization'sauthorities, responsibilities, and capabilities been determined for pre-response (planning and prevention). response (implementing theplanduringanincident),andpost-response (cleanupandrestoration) activities?D-1+ 

### o Has one organization been given the command and control responsibility for thesethree phases ofemergency response? 0 Has a "chain of command" been**•~stablished** for response control through all , levels ofoperation? 0 Arethe roles, relationships, and coordination procedures between government and non-government {private entitit3s) delineated? Are**they~understood** byall affected parties? Howarethey instituted (written, verbal)? 0 Areclear interrelationships, and coordination procedures between government and non-government (private entitit3S) delineated? Arethey understood byall affected parties? Howarethey instituted (written, verbal)? 

### o Arethe agencies ordepartmentsthat providetechnical guidance during a response the same agencies ordepartmentsthat provide technical guidance in non-emergency situations? In otht3rwords, doesthe organizational structure varywiththetypeofsituationto beaddressed? 

### o Does the organizational structure provide a mechanism to meet regularly for · planning and coordination? 0 Doestheorganizationalstructureprovideamechanismtoregularlyexercisethe responseorganization? 

### o Hasasimulationexercisebeenconductedwithinthelastyeartotesttheorganizational structure? 

### o Doestheorganizational structure provide a mechanism to reviewthe activities conducted duringa responseorexercisetocorrect shortfalls? 0 Haveanylimitationswithin theorgMizationalstructure been identified? 0 IstheorganizationalstructurecompatiblewiththeFederalresponseorganization inthe NCP? 0 Havetrained and equipped incidentcommanders been identified? 0 Hasthe authorityforsite decisions beenvested inthe incidentcommanders? 

## o Havethefunding sourcesfora response been identified? 0 Howquicklycanthe response systc3m beactivated? C.2.4 Communication "Communication" meansanyformorformst::>fexchanginginformationorideasforemergencyresponsewithotherentities, eitherinternalorexternaltotheexistingorganizational structure. Coordination: 0 Have procedures been established for coordination of information during a response? 0 Hasoneorganization beendesignatedtocoordinatecommunicationsactivities? ,D-5 

### o Have radiofrequenciesbeenestablishedtofacilitatecoordination betweendifferent organizations? Information Exchange: 

### o Does aformal systemexistfor information sharingamongagencies. organizations, and the privatesector? 

### o Hasasystembeenestablishedtoensurethat "lessonslearned" are passedto the applicable organizations? Information Dissemination: 

### o Hasasystembeenidentifiedtocarryoutpublicinformation/communityrelations activities? 

### o Has oneorganizationorindividual beendesignatedtocoordinatewith orspeak tothe mediaconcerningthe release? 

### o Isthereacommunicationlinkwithan EmergencyBroadcastSystem (EBS) point ofentry (CPCS-1) station? 

### o Doesa communicationssystem/methodexisttodisseminateinformationtoresponders, affected public, etc.? 

### o Is this systemavailable 24-hours perday? 

### o Have alternate systems/methods of communications been identified for use if the primarymethodfails? 0 Doesa mechanismexistto keeptelephone rosters up-to-date? 

### o Are communications networkstested ona regular basis? Information Sources af'!dDatabase Sharing: 

### o Is a system availableto provide responderswith rapid information on the hazardsofchemicalsinvolved in an incident? 

### o Isthisinformationavailableona24-hourbasis? Is itavailableincomputersoftware? 

### o Is a system in placeto updatethe available information sources? Notification Procedures: 

### o Havespecificproceduresfornotificationofahazardousmaterialsincidentbeen developed? 

### o Are multiple notifications required by overlapping requirements (e.g.• State, county, localeach havespecific notification requirements)? 

### o Doestheinitial notificationsystem haveastandardizedlistofinformationthatis collectedfor each incident? 0 Doesanetworkexistfornotifyingandactivatingnecessaryresponsepersonnel?D-6 0 Doesa networkexistfornotifying orwarningthepublicofpotential hazardsresulting from a release? Does this network have provisions for.informing the publicwhathazardstoexpect,what precautionstotake, whetherevacuation is required, etc.? 

### o Hasacentrallocationorphonenumberbeen**establishe~**forinitialnotificationof an incident? 0 Isthe central location orphone numberaccessible on a 24-hour basis? 0 Doesthecentral locationphonesystem havetheabilitytoexpandtoa multiple line systemduring an emergency? Clearinghouse Functions: 

### o Has a central clearinghouse for hazardous materials information been establishedwith access bythe publicancl private sector? C.2.5 Resources "Resource" meansthepersonnel,training, equipment,facilities, andothersourcesavailableforuse in respondingto hazardous matorials emergencies. To the extentthatthe hazardsanalysis hasidentified the appropriate:. levelofpreparednessforthearea,these criteria may be used in evaluating available resourcesofthejurisdiction undergoing review.Personnel: 0 Havethe numbersoftrained personnel availablefor hazardous materials been determined? 0 Has the location of trained personnel available for hazardous materials been determined? Are these personnel located in areas identified in the hazards analysis as: • heavilypopulated;
• high hazardareas- i.e., numbersofchemical (orotherhazardousmaterials) productionfacilities in well-·defined areas;
• hazardous materialsstorage, disposal, and/ortreatmentfacilities; and
• transit routes? 0 Aresufficientpersonnelavailabletomaintainagivenlevelofresponsecapability identified as being required forthe area? 0 Hastheavailabilityofspecialtechnicalexpertise (chemists, industrialhygienists, toxicologists,occupationalhealthphysicians,etc.} necessaryforresponsebeen identified? 0 Have limitationson the use ofabove personnel resources been identified? 0 Domutualaidagreementsexisttofacilitateinteragencysupportbetweenorganizations?D-7 Training; 

### o Have the·training needsforthe State/localarea been identified? 

### o Are centralized responsetraining facilities available? 

### o Are specialized courses available covering topicssuch as:
• organizationalstructuresforresponseactions (i.e., authoritiesandcoordination);
• response actions;
• equipmentselection, use, and maintenance; and
• safetyandfirst aid? 

### o Does the organizational structure providetraining and cross training for orbetween organizations in the response mechanism? 

### o Does an organized training program for all involved response personnel exist? Has one agency beendesignatedto coordinatethistraining? 

### o Havetrainingstandardsorcriteriabeenestablishedforagivenlevelofresponse capability? Is anycertification provided uponcompletion ofthetraining? 

### o Hastheleveloftraining available been matchedtotheresponsibilitiesorcapabilities ofthe personnel beingtrained? 

### o Does a system existforevaluatingthe effectivenessoftraining? 

### o Does the training program provide for "refresher courses" or some other methodtoensurethat personnel remain up-to-datein their level ofexpertise? 

### o Have resources andorganizations availableto providetraining been identified? 

### o Have standardized curricula been established to facilitate consistentStatewide training? Equipment: 

### o Have responseequipment requirements been identifiedfora given level ofresponsecapability? 

### o Arethefollowing types ofequipment available?
• personal protectiveequipment
• first aid and other medical emergencyequipment
• emergencyvehicles available for hazardous materials response • sampling equipment (air, water, soil, etc.) and other monitoring devices (e.g., explosivity meters, oxygen meters)
• analytical equipmentor·facilities available for sampleanalysesD-8
• fire-fighting equipment/other equipment and material (bulldozers, boats, helicopters, vacuumtrucks, tanktrucks, chemical retardants, foam) 0 Aresufficientquantitiesofeachtypeofequipmentavailableon asustainedbasis? 0 Is allavailableequipmentcapableofoperatinginthelocalenvironmentalconditions? 0 Are up-to-dateequipmentlists maintained? Aretheycomputerized? 

### o Areequipment listsavailabletoall responders? 0 Aretheselistsbroken downintothevarioustypesofequipment (e.g., protective clothing, monitoring instruments, medical supplies, transportation equipment)? 0 Is therea mechanismtoensurethatthe lists are kept up-to-date? 0 Haveproceduresnecessarytoobtainequipmentona24-hourbasisbeenidentified? 

### o Does a programexisttocarryout required maintenanceofequipment? 0 Arethere maint.enance and repair nacordsforeach pieceofequipment? 0 Have mutual aid agreements been established for the use of specialized responseequipment? 0 Is sufficient communications equipment available for notifying personnel orto transmit information? Is the equipmentofvarious participating agenciescompatible? 0 Istransportationequipmentavailableformovingequipmentrapidlytothescene ofan incident, and itsstateof readiness assured? Facilities: 0 Havefacilities capable of

**performin~~** rapid chemical analyses been identified? 0 Doadequatefacilitiesexistforstorageandcleaning/reconditioningofresponse . equipment? 0 Havelocationsorfacilitiesbeen identifiedforthestorage,treatment, recycling, anddisposalofwastes resulting from a release? 

### o Do adequatefacilities existforcarrying outtraining programs? 0 Do facilities exist that are capable of providing medical treatment to persons injured bychemical exposure? · 0 Have facilities and procedures been identified for housing persons requiring evacuation ortemporary relocation as a resultof an incident? 

### o Havefacilities been identifiedthataresuitableforcommand centers?D-9 C;2.6 EmergencyPlan Theemergencyplan,whileitrelatestomanyoftheabovecriteria, alsostandsaloneasa means to assess preparedness at the State and local level of government, and in the private sector. The following questions are directed more toward evaluating the plan ratherthandeterminingthepreparednessleveloftheentitythat hasdevelopedtheplan. Itisnotsufficienttoaskifthereisaplan,butrathertodetermineiftheplanthatdoesexist adequatelyaddressestheneedsofthecommunityorentityforwhichtheplanwasdeveloped,. 

### o Have the levels ofvulnerability and probable locations of hazardous materials incidents been identified in the plan? 

### o Haveareasof public health concern been identified in the plan? 0 Have sensitive environmental areas been identified in the plan? 

### o Forthehazardousmaterialsidentifiedinthearea,doestheplaninclude,informationonthechemicalandphysicalpropertiesofthematerials, safetyandemergencyresponseinformation,andhazardmitigationtechniques? (NOTE: Itisnot necessarythatallthis informationbeincluded in the emergencyplan; the plan should, however, at leastexplain where such information is available.) 

### o Have all appropriate agencies, departments, ororganizations been involved in the processofdeveloping orreviewing the plan? 

### o Haveall theappropriateagencies, departments, ororganizationsapprovedthe plan? 0 Has the organizational structure and notification list defined in the plan been reviewed in the lastsix months? 

### o Istheorganizationalstructureidentifiedinthe plan compatiblewith the Federal response organization in the NCP? 

### o Hasoneorganizationbeenidentifiedintheplanas havingcommandandcontrol responsibilityforthe pre-response, response, and post response phases? 

### o

**Do~s**theplandefinetheorganizational responsibilitiesand relationships.among city,

**~ounty,** district, State, and Federal responseagencies? 

### o Areallorganizationsthathavea role in hazardousmaterials responseidentified intheplan (publicsafetyandhealth,occupationalsaf_etyand health,transportation,

**na~ural**resources, environmental,enforcement,educational, planning,and privatesector)? 

### o Aretheproceduresandcontactsnecessarytoactivateordeactivatetheorganization clearly given ir:t the plan for the pre-response, response, and post-response phases? 

### o Doesthe organizational structure outlined in the plan providea mechanism to reviewtheactivitiesconducted duringa response orexercisetocorrectshortfalls? 

### o Does the plan include a communications system/method to disseminate informationto responders, affected public, etc.?

### D-10 

### o Hasasystembeenidentifiedintheplantocarryoutpublicinformation/community relations activities? 

### o Hasacentrallocationorphonenumberbeenincludedintheplanforinitialnotification ofan incident? 

### o Havetrained and equipped incident commanders been identified in the plan? 0 Doestheplanincludetheauthorityforvestingsitedecisionsintheincidentcommander? 

### o Havegovernmentagencypersonnelthat maybe involved in responseactivities been involved inthe planning process? 

### o Havelocalprivateresponseorganizations (e.g., chemical manufacturers, commercialcleanupcontractors) thatareavailabletoassistduringa responsebeen identified in the plan? 0 Doestheplanprovideforfrequenttrainingexercisestotrainpersonnelortotest the localcontingencyplans? 

## o Arelists/systemsthatidentifyemergencyequipmentavailableto response personnel included in the plan? 0 Have locationsofmaterials most**likE~Iy**to be used in mitigatingtheeffectsofa release (e.g., foam, sand, lime) been identified in the plan? 0 Does the plan address the potential needs for evacuation, what agency is authorizedtoorderorrecommendan evacuation, howitwill becarriedout, and where peoplewill be moved? 

### o Hasanemergencyoperatingcenter, commandcenter, orothercentrallocation with the necessary communications capabilities been identified in the plan for coordination of emergency**respons1~** activities? 

### o Aretherefollow-up response activities scheduled in the plan? 0 Arethere proceduresfor updatingthe plan? 

### o Arethereaddendaprovidedwiththeplan, suchas: lawsandordinances, statutory responsibilities, evacuation plans, community relations plan, health plan, and resource inventories (personnel, equipment, maps [not restricted to road maps], and mutual aid agreements)? 

### o Doestheplanaddresstheprobablesimultaneousoccurrenceofdifferenttypes ofemergencies (e.g., poweroutagetandhazardousmaterialsreleases) andthe presenceofmultiplehazards (e.g.,flammableandcorrosive) duringhazardous materialsemergencies?E-1 APPENDIX E Regional FederalAgency Contacts

The following are contacts at the Regional offices of both EPA and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that canbe of assistance in planning and conducting field simulation exercises.
EPA

### REGIONALOFFICES (direct inquiries to "EPA Regional Preparedness Staff") Region I (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont) John F. Kennedy Building, 

### Rm. 2203 Boston, MA 02203 (617) 565-3715 Region

### II (New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico., Virgin Islands) 26 Federal Plaza, Room 900 New York, NY 10278 (212) 264-2525 Region III (Delaware, Washington, D.C., Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia) 841 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19107 (215) 597-9800 Region IV (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee) 345 Courtland Street, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30365 (404) 347-4727 RegionV (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin) 230 S. Dearborn Street Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 353-2000E-2 

### RegionVI (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas) 1445 Ross Avenue Dallas, TX 75202-2733 (214) 655-6444 

### RegionVII (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri,**Neb1~aska)** 

### 726 MinnesotaAvenue Kansas City, KS 66101 (913) 236-2800 

### RegionVIII (Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming)· 999 18th Street, Suite 500 Denver, CO 80202-2405 (303) 293-1603 

### RegionIX (Arizona, California·, Hawaii,, Nevada, American Samoa, Guam) 215 Fremont Street San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 974-8153 

### RegionX (Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington) 1200 6thAvenue Seattle, WA 98101 (206) 442-5810

FEMA

### REGIONAL OFFICES (direct inquiries to "Hazmat Program Staff") 

### RegionI

Region II 442 J.W. McCormack POCH Boston, MA 02109 (617) 223-9540

Room 1338 26 Federal Plaza New York, NY 10278 (212) 238-8200Region

### III

Region IV

RegionV

RegionVI

RegionVII

Region

### VIII

Region IX 

### E-3
Liberty Square Building 105 S. 7th Street Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 931-5500

Suite 700 1371 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30309 (404) 347-2400

4th Floor 175 W. Jackson Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 431-5500

Federal Center AttentionHazmat 800 N. Loop 288 Denton, TX 76201 (817) 898-9399

911 Walnut Street, Room 200 Kansas City, MO 64106 (816) 283-7063

Denver Federal Center, Building 710 Box 25267 Denver, CO 80225-0267 (303) 235-4811

Building 105 Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129 (415) 923-7100RegionX E-4



### Federal Regional Center 130 228th St., S.W. Bothell, WA 98021-9796 (206) 481-8800

### F-1 APPENDIX F 

### References to Additional'Information
The following sources have been used as background information in.the preparation of this Technical Assistance Bulletin and may be useful in planning specific exercises:
• U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency Environmental Response Tea,!Jl (ERT) 26 W. St. Clair St.

-- Cincinnati, OH 45268 (513) 569-7537 The ERT has considerable experience in planning and evaluating field exercises. They can assist directly in state and local exercises; alternatively, theyhave resource material (e.g., sample scenarios and checklists) that canbe used.
• U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency, RegionVII Technical Assistance Team: "The Day Before
...Chemical Response Planning Through Simulation, AProduction Guide." Contact: Regional Preparedness Staff at (913) 236-2800. Avery useful, hands-on guide to planning and conduction field simulation exercises.

·• Federal Emergency Management Agency: "Exercise Design Course Guide to EmergencyManagement Exercises." (See Appendix E 

### for FEMA Regional contacts.) Although this was prepared as an accompaniment to a course taught by FEMA, it is also useful as a stand-alone introduction to designing all types of emergency exercises.
• National Response Team: Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide (NRT-1), March 1987. Contact National Response Team at GWER/12, 2100 2nd St., S.W., Washington, D.C. 20593. This is the Federal "bible" on planning for hazardous materials emergency responses. It is intended to provide state and local agencies with very specific guidance in their own planning efforts. Will be helpful in evaluating the results of a field simulation exercise and in linking exercises to an effective planning process.**~ S~ION**  **~CISE** 

### SCENARIOS

Scenario 1: Anhydrous HydrogenFluoride SpillDuringTransfer Operations

XYZ Chemicals, Inc., produces a small line of acids for sale in the manufacturing and trade markets. XYZ stores andhandles a variety of chemicals on-site for use in its own processes; in addition, XYZ products are often stored onplant grounds pending shipment to customers. XYZ's Lake City plant is located in a neighborhood characterizedby a mix of industrial and residential land uses. Local industrial facilities include two large steel plants, an oil refinery, andnumerous specialty chemical plants. The XYZ facility itself is bounded on the northby a spur of the UnionRailroad; on the southby the Grand River; on the west by Elm Street and a

**ra~l** line; and on the eastby First Street. Beyond the River on the south is an interstate highway that is heavily traveled. Within two miles north of the plant are seven schools and a hospital. Just north of the plant, across the Union tracks, is a residential neighborhood; additional residential zones of Lake City andMiddletown lie one and one-halfmiles to the south and southwest, and three miles to the southeast. Returning from their noon break, two XYZ workers resume the task of transferring anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) from a pressurized rail car to a 15,000 gallon outdoor storage tank at a transfer point 200 yards from the main part of the plant. They had allowed the transferring pump to operate unattended and findupon returning that the failure of an automatic shutoff valve has resulted in a spill of approximately 1000 gallons ofAHF. The liquidAHF has begun to pool, giving rise to vapor. Inhaling these vapors, both workers suffer severe respiratory injury. Although one worker collapses immediately, the other succeeds in activating the plant safety alarm, thereby alerting the shift supervisor that an emergencyhas occurred at the transfer site.The supervisor drives to investigate the accident. Smelling the strong presence ofAHF vapors in the air, the supervisor stops his vehicle 200 feet from the accident site and radios the plant gate to notify the Lake City emergency response authorities by calling 911. In the process of suiting up with protective equipment, the supervisor himself collapses.-2-

Scenario 2: 

### so3 Spill

### From SeveredFeedline



### The PQX Chemical Co. plant, located on Lee Highway inBlackrock City, manufactures a variety of corrosive, toxic, and flammable chemicals. Many of these chemicals are stored at the plantpending shipment to customers. The Blackrockplant occupies 50 acres of land and is situated in an area composed of commercial, industrial, and residential landuses. The plant property is bounded on the northby Lee Highway; on the eastby a rail line; on the southby Interstate 20; and on the west by the BlackRiver.

**Beyo~d** 

### the river to the west, is the BlackRive·r Estates housing development. South of Interstate 20 is the Clover Hill housing development. On the north side of Lee Highway lies a mixture of commercial and industrial buildings. East of the railroad line, there are a variety· of industrial facilities. A railroad siding extends into the plantproperty to the outside storage area. One clear Saturdaymorning, a day when the plant is not

**opera~ing,** 

### a repair crew is working on replacing a section of pipe that is connected to the top of an empty tank. After disconnection, a crane is used to lower the pipe onto a flat bed truck. As the crane boom is swung over a nearby tank of liquid sulfur trioxide, the cable snaps, dropping the pipe. The falling pipe shears off the S03 tank's feedline between the tankwall and the first block valve. The four-inch diameter feedline leading from the tank to the process plantbegins leaking immediately. An excess flow valve between the leak and the tank limits the rate of flow to 30 gallons per minute. Spilled liquid S03 collects within t:he containment dike surrounding the. tanks. Upon contactwith the moisture in the air, the spilled S03 vaporizes into a white mist resembling steam. The wind, coming from the northwest at 5 mph, blows the vapors directly onto the nearby repair crew thathad removed the oldpiping. Three of the four

**repai~uen** 

### are overcome by the vapors, with two of them lying unconscious on top of the tank onwhich theyhadbeen working. The lone conscious repairman drags the remaining worker from the hazardous area and then runs into the mainplant to report the accident. Experiencingburning eyes and difficult breathing, he decides to remain indoors awaiting the arrival of the fire department.-3-

Scenario 3: Petroche.ical/Chlorine Spill FromTruck/TrainCollision
Alpha Transfer Depot,

**In~**.• facilitates the transfer ofvarious bulk commodities from trains to trucks for local deliverywithin the Junction City metropolitan area. Alpha's specialty is the bulkhandling of petroleum and hazardous substances. Alpha's facility is located adjacent to a regional train yard. Alpha's facility and the train yard itself are boundedby an interstate highway, which serves as a commutation route betweenJunction City's outlying suburbs and its Central Business District (CBD), and Small Creek, which is a tributary of Big River, which in turn flows through the CBD. The neighborhood surrounding the depot and trainyard, which are 3 miles from the CBD, is primarily a run-down industrial/warehouse district. On the opposite creekbank, however, is a large mobile home parkprimarily populatedby elderly and low-income people. At 6:00 on a warm summer.morning, anAlpha delivery truck carrying a full load of 55-gallon drums containingvarious petrochemical products accidentally collides with a slow-movinghaul train towing 2 tank cars of liquid chlorine. Both tank cars derail, with substantial denting and a puncture occurring to one, resulting in a rapid leakage of chlorine. The truck overturns,· spilling and rupturing many of its barrels with a resulting leakage of a significant quantity of petrochemicals. Light, directionally variable winds begin spreading chlorine fumes. Liquid chlorine and petrochemicals begin to mix on the ground. The acc·ident is observed from a distance by another truck driver who notifies the manager-on-duty. The conductor of the haul train, although shaken and suffering eye irritation due to chlorine fumes, is able to rescue the truck driver, who has been overcome by chlorine fumes, dragging him away from the accident site. The·exertion of the rescue and additional·exposure to the fumes finally cause the conductor to pass out. Both men are attended to by a skeleton crew of depot workers. Realizing that both the truck driver and conductor are unconscious, and seeing evidence of skinburns, the depot manager calls 911 to ensure that emergency medical personnel andhazmat units are summoned.-4-

Scenario 4: AcidSpill FromRupturedPipeline



### Lakeside Chemicals, Inc., produces a variety of acids for sale as intermediates to other chemical manufacturers. Lakeside stores andhandles a wide variety of chemicals on-site, both for process use and in storage for shipment to customers. Lakeside's plant is located in a neighborhoodwhich is primarily industrial innature. There are several other industrial plants nearby as well as a number ofwarehouses. The

**wart:~houses** 

### are adjacent to port facilities alongMuddy River, which carries a significant volume ofbarge and recreational boat traffic. Lakeside's plant is adjacent to a spur of the IHR Railroad on the north; warehouses on the south and east; and a metal plating facility on the west. Kennedy Boulevard and EisenhowerAvenue, bothmajor arterial streets, intersect one block from the plant gate. Just across the IHR tracks is the Lakeside Community Airport, which provides commuter service to major airports in the region. Muddy River lies a quarter-mile to the east. The nearest dense residential neighborhoc>ds are two miles distant to the north andwest. At 

### 3:30 on a drizzlyweekday afternc>on, a charter plane carrying 6 people takes off from the Lakes_ide Airport. The plane·experiences engine trouble and fails to achieve sufficient altitude. The pilot attempts to make an emergency landing onvacant landwithin Lakeside's plant property. After safely touching down, the plane collides with a pipeline carrying sulfuric acid from a Lakeside storage facility to the IHR rail spur for loading on tank cars. The plane flips over and catches fire 

### 100 yards from the pipeline. The pipeline immediatelybegins to spew acid, which comes in contactwith rainpuddles that have

**formE~d** 

### over two days of rainy weather. Winds are light andblowing from the sou1:h. The incident is observed from a dis1:ance by plantworkers in the midst of a shift change. One of the workers calls the safetymanager, who in turn directs the plant's emergency crew into operation. The emergency crew approaches within 

### 200 yards of the

**accidE~nt** 

### scene, Spotting acid fumes rising from the area of the pipeline,

**thE~** 

### crew stops and radios the safety manager. Informed about the fumes, the safety manager instructs the crewnot to approach any closer. He calls 

### 911 to summon the Lakeside Fire Department. There are no immediate signs of survivors from the plane crash.-5-

Scenario 5: Ammonia Spi11 AtA Pesticides P1ant



### The<Green Fertilizer Company manufactures a variety of fertilizers for sale in the retail market. Their·Exurbia Township plant specializes 

## in ammonia-based fertilizers, which are produced

**a~d** 

### trucked to Green's regional distribution centers around the country. Green's Exurbia plant is located tenmiles outside Centerville, a major regional trading center. Exurbia Township is sparsely populated and is characterizedprimarilyby a mix of agricultural and light industrial_land uses. Along the westernboundary of the is Ample River, which serves as the maJor source of drinking water for Centerville. In the immediate vicinity of the plant are a large truck stop along an interstate highway, 150 yards east of the plant; and a county farm labor housing project, 300 yards south of the plant. At 10:00 on a blusterywinter weekday morning, plant workers hear a loud noise coming from the vicinity of a pipe carrying,Anhydrous Ammonia from a 10,000 gallon storage vessel into the buildinghousing the fertilizer manufacturing process. The pipe has ruptured, resulting in the rapid flow of product onto the ground. Although the Ammonia is rapidlyvaporizing, ithas also begun to pool. The weather is relatively warm, due to a temperature inversion. Winds are blowing out of the northwest.
r A 

### plant worker walks out of the plantbuilding to investigate the noise. Seeing the leaking ammonia and smelling fumes, the worker

**~uickly** 

### retreats inside the building and radios the plant safety manager. The plant manager in turn rad.ios the plant emergency response team to report-for duty, .!!,nd calls.the Exurbia Township Fire Department to request back-up assistance.-6-

Scenario 6: NitricAcid/Diesel Fuel SpillAtAMunitions Plant

PrecisionWeaponry Co. manufactures ordnance for sale to the U.S. Government andprivate companies. Its principal products include explosives and ammunition. Although Precision does store a small quantity of its products on its Middlesex County plant site, it consciously strives to minimize explosionhazards bymaintaining minimum inventories. Precision's Middlesex facility is quite large, with idle ground used as a buffer betweenproduction facilities and the plant fenceline. When itwas constructed after WorldWar II, the plant was in an isolated location. However, development over the last two decades has introduced a variety of low-density industrial and commercial landuses into the immediate neighborhood. A large retiree mobile home village, located two miles south, is the nearest residential development. The Precisionplant lies in the Whisky River Valley, a two mile-wide drainage basin framed by the Saddleback Hills. At 3:00 one weekday afternoon, a tanker truck delivering diesel fuel to the plant collides with an empty Precision delivery truck. The force of the impact drives the Precision truck into a 20,000 gallon tank full of Nitric Acid stored for use inmanufacturing explosives. The Nitric Acid tankbegins to leakprofusely. The delivery truck immediately catches fire. The diesel tanker truck careens into an adjacent utilitybuilding, causing a release valve to open. Diesel fuel begins to leak andmix with Nitric Acid ponding on the ground. Fumes immediatelybegin forming. The driver of the diesel tanker is unhurt and is able to climb out of his cab. Immediately assessing the situation, he runs 100 yards to the nearestbuilding to notify

**pl~nt** management. Shortly thereafter, the driver collapses, suffering from respiratory difficulties. The plant safety manager begins to marshall his emergency response team and calls for assistance from theMiddlesex County Hazmat Squad.