1 

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-16-00421-CV 

________________ 

JAMES ALLEN MARTIN AND VICTORIA MARTIN, Appellants

V.

ARTHUR P. CLARKE, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 16-29628

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Pro se appellants James Allen Martin and Victoria Martin appealed an 

eviction and rent arrearage judgment in favor of pro se appellee Arthur P. Clarke 

from the Justice of the Peace Court to the County Court at Law No. 2 of Montgomery 

County, Texas.1

 We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

 1

Because an appeal from Justice Court is de novo, we will refer to the County 

Court at Law No. 2 as the trial court. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 506.3. 
2 

 Clarke obtained a judgment against James Allen Martin following a bench 

trial. In the judgment, the Justice of the Peace found in favor of Clarke and awarded 

him possession of the premises, costs of $191, and $1400 in damages. The Justice 

of the Peace also found that the monthly rent amount due is $800 and gave Martin 

five days to either vacate the premises or appeal the ruling. Martin appealed the 

Justice of the Peace’s ruling to the County Court at Law No. 2 for trial de novo. See 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 506.3 (providing that appeals from justice court are tried de novo in 

the county court). 

 The trial court set the case for a bench trial on September 30, 2016. The parties 

appeared pro se at trial. Clarke testified that he seeks eviction of the Martins from 

his property and that he regain possession of the property because of the Martins’ 

failure to pay rent. Clarke also testified that he sought a judgment for the Martins’ 

alleged rent arrearage of $5075. Clarke tendered into evidence a rent payment 

summary, which stated that from January through September, the Martins should 

have paid rent in the amount of $13,050, but the Martins only paid $7975, leaving a 

$5075 arrearage; transcribed voice messages from the Martins; a lease inventory and 

condition form; a three-day notice to vacate or quit the premises; Clarke’s petition; 

and a copy of the residential lease agreement, and the trial court marked them as 

exhibits A through F. Clarke testified, “That’s it. Basically, I want my house back.” 
3 

 During cross-examination, Clarke testified that he did not receive payments 

from the Martins through automatic transactions. Clarke testified, “I did receive the 

transactions but they were done by someone, not an automatic transfer.” Clarke 

explained that he received some payments, but not all payments that were due. 

Clarke testified that he agreed to allow the Martins to pay $725 every two weeks 

instead of $1450 in one monthly payment as a favor to the Martins. During 

questioning by the trial judge, the judge noted that with rent being $1450 per month, 

the Martins owed $15,950 for eleven months of rent, and Victoria testified that she 

and her husband had paid $12,374 to Clarke, as well as $1450 into the registry of the 

court. Victoria testified that for July, August, and September, the Martins made one 

payment of $1450 into the court registry. The trial judge took the matter under 

advisement. 

 On September 30, 2016, the trial court signed a final judgment, in which it 

ordered that Clarke shall recover possession of the subject property from the Martins 

via a writ of execution and awarded Clarke damages of $36252

 and pre-judgment 

and post-judgment interest. The Martins then appealed to this Court. The 

Martins’ pro se brief does not contain record references, a statement of the issues 

 2

We note that when the $1450 the Martins paid into the registry of the court 

is subtracted from Clarke’s claim for back rent in the amount of $5075, the result is 

$3625. 
4 

presented, or citations to authorities. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1. However, in the 

interest of justice, we construe the Martins’ brief as challenging the sufficiency of 

the evidence regarding their eviction and the rent they were ordered to pay. 

In a legal sufficiency review, we credit favorable evidence if a reasonable 

factfinder could, and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder 

could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). Evidence is 

legally sufficient if it “would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the 

verdict under review.” Id. The factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility of the 

witnesses and is responsible for resolving any conflicts in the evidence, weighing 

the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. 

Id. at 819-21; Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 625 (Tex. 2004). In a 

factual sufficiency review, we consider and weigh all of the evidence, and we will 

set aside the trial court’s finding only if the evidence is so weak or the finding is so 

against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong 

and unjust. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). As long as 

the evidence falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we cannot substitute 

our judgment for that of the factfinder. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822. 

A forcible detainer action is governed by discrete provisions of the Texas 

Property Code and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 
5 

§§ 24.001-.011 (West 2014 & Supp. 2016); Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.1-510.13. “The 

action is intended to be a summary, speedy, and inexpensive remedy for resolving a 

dispute over ‘who is entitled to possession of the premises.’” McClane v. New Caney 

Oaks Apartments, 416 S.W.3d 115, 118 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no pet.). 

The elements of a landlord’s cause of action for forcible detainer are: (1) a 

landlord-tenant relationship exists between the parties; (2) the tenant can be evicted 

because he is a holdover tenant, tenant at will, tenant at sufferance, or the tenant of 

a person who acquired possession by forcible entry; (3) the landlord made a proper 

demand for possession; (4) the period of time to vacate the property has expired; and 

(5) the tenant has refused to surrender possession to the landlord. Tex. Prop. Code 

Ann. § 24.002 (West 2014); Murphy v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 199 S.W.3d 

441, 446-47 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). Although the only 

issue to be determined is the right to actual possession, a claim for rent may be 

brought with the action. See Murphy, 199 S.W.3d at 446-47; see also Tex. R. Civ. 

P. 510.3(a), 510.8(b). “To prevail in a forcible detainer action, a plaintiff is not 

required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership 

to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession.” Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 

705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). 
6 

Crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could, and 

disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not, we conclude 

that the evidence would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to conclude that 

Clarke was entitled to possession and was owed rent in the amount determined by 

the trial court. Therefore, the evidence was legally sufficient. See City of Keller, 168 

S.W.3d at 827. Furthermore, considering and weighing all of the evidence, we 

conclude that the evidence that Clarke was entitled to possession and was owed rent 

in the amount determined by the trial court is not so weak nor are the findings so 

against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong 

and unjust. See Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 242. Therefore, the evidence is factually 

sufficient. Accordingly, we overrule the Martins’ issues and affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

 AFFIRMED. 

______________________________ 

 STEVE McKEITHEN 

 Chief Justice 

 

Submitted on July 21, 2017 

Opinion Delivered August 3, 2017 

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.