alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
HomeRemarks and Releases – Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs...Assistant Secretary Medina’s Remarks for CITES COP19 UNODC Side-Event on “Gaining Better Insights into Illegal Wildlife Trade:  A Foundation for More Effective Action”

# 									Assistant Secretary Medina’s Remarks for CITES COP19 UNODC Side-Event on “Gaining Better Insights into Illegal Wildlife Trade:  A Foundation for More Effective Action”							

Remarks

Monica Medina, Assistant Secretary  Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Panama Convention Center

Panama City, Panama

November 22, 2022

Thank you so much Angela for the warm introduction. And thank you to UNODC for organizing this event.

It’s important for governments, NGOs, academia, and other relevant stakeholders to come together and discuss ways we can support a holistic approach to combatting illegal wildlife trafficking.

We can all agree that nature is facing threats from numerous sources. Some of the most severe threats, with the widest range of impacts are nature crimes – criminal forms of logging, mining, wildlife trade, as well as crimes associated with fishing.

Today, we are discussing wildlife trafficking, which undermines the rule of law, fuels corruption, drives species to the brink of extinction, and spreads zoonotic disease. As with other forms of transnational organized crime, wildlife trafficking does not respect national borders.

That means we must work together to identify who participates, where poaching occurs, where the transit routes reside, and where are the demand centers for the illegal wildlife and wildlife products.

We also know that wildlife trafficking and nature crimes often take place in conjunction with other illegal and criminal activities.

The United States firmly believes that accurate data and robust evidence-gathering are all essential to assess and understand the global scope of wildlife crime.

Better data can inform better policy approaches to tackling this challenge.

To that end, we are proud to support UNODC’s World Wildlife Crime Report. This report continues to be important as a predictor of future species under threat from illegal trade and as guidance on preventing wildlife crime.

We cannot afford to lose this war to the perpetrators of these crimes.

We must join forces and raise ambition to tackle wildlife trafficking and other nature crimes, through fact-based informed decision-making, and we must act now. Thank you.

Tags

Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific AffairsBureau of Western Hemisphere AffairsPanamaWildlife Trafficking

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AFS-16-4625-E February 22, 2016

Exemption No. 14930 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2015-8760

Mr. Stephen M. Dickson Senior Vice President, Flight Operations Delta Airlines, Inc.

1010 Delta Boulevard Atlanta, GA 30354

Dear Mr. Dickson:

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your request for exemption. It transmits our decision, explains its basis, and gives you the conditions and limitations of the exemption, including the date it ends.

The Basis for Our Decision

By letter dated December 14, 2015, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf of Delta Airlines, Inc. (Delta) for an exemption from part 121, Appendix H Level C Training and Checking Permitted, subparagraphs 2b, 3b, and 3c and § 61.157 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) to the extent necessary to allow Delta to use Level C simulators for pilot in command (PIC) initial and upgrade training and checking and reduces the upgrade/transition pilot experience requirements of part 121, Appendix H.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition in the Federal Register because the requested exemption would not set a precedent, and any delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to Delta.

The FAA has issued a grant of exemption in circumstances similar in all material respects to those presented in your petition. In Grant of Exemption No. 5400 (copy enclosed), the FAA found that as indicated in your petition, Delta had been operating under Exemption No. 5400
39838.

#### HOGAN v. MALCOM et al.

*242Decided January 22, 1963.

*Mark Dunahoo,*for plaintiff in error.

*William L. Preston,*contra.

Hall, Judge.

1. Special ground 7 complains that the trial judge charged the jury on comparative negligence when the evidence did not authorize a finding of negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The defendant makes the point that the charge complained of is not set forth in the plaintiff’s assignment of error. “A special ground of a motion for a new trial is not complete within itself so as to present a question for adjudication where, to make it intelligible, it is necessary to refer to other parts of the record, including the charge of the court.” *Bryant v. State,*104 Ga. App. 496, 497 (121 SE2d 920).

2. There is no merit in special ground 8 which complains that the court failed to charge the jury on the measure of damages for diminution in the plaintiff’s capacity to earn money. The court’s charge included an instruction on this subject. See *Hunt v. Williams,*104 Ga. App. 442, 450 (122 SE2d 149), respecting proof of such damages.

3. The contention made by the plaintiff to support the general grounds and special ground 6 is that the juiy’s verdict established that the defendant was liable but the verdict was inadequate because it was for less than the actual damages proved.

*243The ease of *Tallent v. McKelvey,*105 Ga. App. 660 (125 SE2d 65), cited by the plaintiff is different from this case. There the evidence “authorized the finding of the jury establishing the liability of the defendant, and the undisputed evidence showed actual [special] damages to the plaintiff resulting from the injuries sustained” of a greater amount than the jury’s verdict; and the verdict was set aside as being inadequate under the undisputed evidence. In the present case, however, the record does not disclose any proof of the special damages alleged in the petition. There is evidence of pain and suffering by the plaintiff. As the court charged the jury, there is no mathematical rule by which damages for pain and suffering may be ascertained; the only rule recognized by law for determining such damages is the enlightened conscience of fair and impartial jurors. *Redd v. Peters,*100 Ga. App. 316, 318 (111 SE2d 132). The jury was authorized to award the verdict in the present case as damages for the plaintiff’s pain and suffering.

The trial court did not err in overruling the motion for new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Carlisle, P. J., and Bell, J., concur.*
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 138 Introduced in House (IH)]

                                    

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 138

To amend the Controlled Substances Act to require that courts, upon the 
    criminal conviction under that Act, notify the employer of the 
                           convicted person.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 1995

 Mr. Solomon introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Controlled Substances Act to require that courts, upon the 
    criminal conviction under that Act, notify the employer of the 
                           convicted person.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Employer Notification Act''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT.

    (a) In General.--The Controlled Substances Act is amended by adding 
at the end of part D the following:

                      ``Notification of Employers

    ``Sec. 423. Upon the conviction of a person for an offense under 
this title or title III, the court shall notify the employer of such 
person of that conviction.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 is amended by inserting 
after the item relating to section 422 the following:

``Sec. 423. Notification of employers.''.

                                 <all>
```
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1237 Introduced in House (IH)]

  1st Session
                                H. R. 1237

To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a certificate of 
   documentation with appropriate endorsement for employment in the 
             coastwise trade for the vessel DOPPLER EFFECT.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 14, 1995

 Mr. Oberstar introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To authorize the Secretary of Transportation to issue a certificate of 
   documentation with appropriate endorsement for employment in the 
             coastwise trade for the vessel DOPPLER EFFECT.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That notwithstanding 
section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 883), the 
Act of June 19, 1886 (46 App. U.S.C. 289), and section 12106 of title 
46, United States Code, the Secretary of Transportation may issue a 
certificate of documentation with appropriate endorsement for 
employment in the coastwise trade for the vessel DOPPLER EFFECT (hull 
identification number MY137081C787).
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 32.1

                          CEO CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350



In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of  Emclaire  Financial  Corp.  (the
Corporation) on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2008 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date here (the Report),  I, David
L. Cox, Chief  Executive  Officer of the  Corporation,  certify,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted  pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in
                  all material respects,  the consolidated  financial  condition
                  and result of operations of the Corporation.



/s/  David L. Cox
-----------------

David L. Cox
Chairman of the Board,
President and Chief Executive Officer


November 14, 2008
EXHIBIT 32


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, the
undersigned officer of Rough Sound Acquisition Corporation
(the "Company"), hereby certify to my knowledge that:

The Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,
2017 of the Company fully complies, in all material respects,
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the
Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by
the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.


                             /s/ James Cassidy
                                 Chief Executive Officer
                                 Chief Financial Officer
Date: April 9, 2018
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000857644
<NAME>  TEPPCO PARTNERS, L.P.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                          26,796
<SECURITIES>                                     2,105
<RECEIVABLES>                                   13,263
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     22,174
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                68,261
<PP&E>                                         744,483
<DEPRECIATION>                                 176,058
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 690,391
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           25,788
<BONDS>                                        389,699
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     229,654
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   690,391
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                50,205
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   30,691
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,156
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 13,289
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             13,155
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               (72,767)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (59,612)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (3.75)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (3.75)
        

</TABLE>
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter II

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to subchapter A appear at 78 FR 60697, Oct. 2, 2013.

###### Editorial Note on Part 360

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 360 appear at 79 FR 8860, Feb. 14, 2014.

#### § 360.21 Payment to judgment creditors.

(a) *Purchaser or officer under levy.* The Department of the Treasury will pay (but not reissue) a savings bond to the purchaser at a sale under a levy or to the officer authorized under appropriate process to levy upon property of the registered owner or coowner to satisfy a money judgment. Payment will be made only to the extent necessary to satisfy the money judgment. The amount paid is limited to the redemption value 60 days after the termination of the judicial proceedings. Except in the case of a levy by the Internal Revenue Service, payment of a bond registered in coownership form pursuant to a judgment or a levy against only one coowner is limited to the extent of that coowner's interest in the bond. That interest must be established by an agreement between the coowners or by a judgment, decree, or order of a court in a proceeding to which both coowners are parties. Payment of a bond registered in coownership form pursuant to a levy by the Internal Revenue Service will be made if the levy is against either coowner on the bond.

(b) *Trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, or similar court officer.* The Department of the Treasury will pay, at current redemption value, a savings bond to a trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver of an insolvent's estate, a receiver in equity, or a similar court officer under the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section.
Exhibit 10.2


 


Targeted Medical Pharma, Inc.


2980 Beverly Glen Circle


Suite 301


Los Angeles, California 9077


 





July 25, 2012




 





 


AFH Holding and Advisory, LLC


9595 Wilshire Boulevard


Suite 700


Beverly Hills, California 90212


 


Gentlemen:


 


Reference is hereby made to the letter agreement
(the “Letter Agreement”), dated as of the date hereof, by and between Targeted Medical Pharma, Inc. (the “Company”)
and AFH Holding and Advisory, LLC (“AFH Advisory”). The parties desire to clarify the Letter Agreement and clarify
their understanding of certain provisions of the Letter Agreement as follows:


 


		1.	The parties acknowledge that their understanding of Paragraph 5 (“Board Oversight”) is as follows:



 


For a period of two (2) years from the date of the
Letter Agreement, AFH has the right to disapprove of two nominees for director chosen by the board of directors of the Company.


 


		2.	The parties acknowledge that their understanding of Paragraph 6 (“Advisory Role”) is as follows:



 


With respect to any specific financing or merger/acquisition
the Company engages in during this two-year period, the Company may choose not to retain AFH as an advisor.


 


Please acknowledge your acceptance of your
agreement to the foregoing by signing and returning to the undersigned as soon as possible a counterpart of this letter agreement.


 


 


	 	 	Very truly yours,
	 	 	 
	 	 	TARGETED MEDICAL PHARMA, INC.
	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	 	 	By: 	/s/ William E. Shell
	 	 	 	Name: William E. Shell, MD
Title: Chief Executive Officer
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	ACCEPTED AND AGREED TO AS OF JULY 25, 2012:	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	AFH Holding and Advisory, LLC	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 
	By:	/s/ Amir F. Heshmatpour	 	 
	 	Name: Amir F. Heshmatpour	 	 
	 	Title: Managing Director
2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-27-2012

In Re: Anthony Lionetti

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-3880

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"In Re: Anthony Lionetti " (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 1518.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1518
1

AMENDED HLD-001 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 11-3880

___________

IN RE: ANTHONY LIONETTI,

Petitioner

____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

(Related to Civ. No. 10-cv-4720)

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

November 3, 2011

Before: Chief Judge MCKEE, ALDISERT and GARTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 27, 2012)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

On October 26, 2011, Anthony Lionetti filed a petition for a writ of mandamus 

seeking an order directing the District Court to act on his motion filed pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2255. On November 18, 2011, the District Court denied Lionetti’s § 2255 

motion. Thus, his request for an order directing the District Court to act on his motion is 

now moot.
2

Lionetti also requests the recusal of the District Court Judge. While mandamus is 

available to review a District Court’s refusal to recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a),1

For the above reasons, the mandamus petition will be denied

see Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1993), Lionetti did 

not move for recusal in the District Court. Thus, he is not entitled to mandamus relief on 

that ground. 

 1

 Section 455(a) provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in 

which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”
40300.

#### ADDISON v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

Decided September 16, 1963.

*315*Oliver, Oliver & Gunter, Jack N. Gunter,*for plaintiff in error.

*Wheeler, Robinson & Thompson, B. Carl Buice,*contra.

Nichols, Presiding Judge.

The plaintiff’s amended petition alleges an implied contract under which the plaintiff would be entitled to recover on a quantum meruit basis. The motion for summary judgment and the sworn testimony in connection therewith show a contract (actual or implied), between the plaintiff and the United States Post Office Department under which the plaintiff was a “mail messenger” employed to transport mail between the Post Office where he was employed and the defendant railroad, that at the time he first began such employment the necessary labor to load and unload mail from trains operated by the defendant was furnished by the defendant, but that later the employees of the defendant performing such labor were discharged and the plaintiff was then required to perform the task of loading and unloading mail from such trains. Other evidence showed that the plaintiff expressed to the defendant’s agent his belief that he should be paid for such additional services rendered in connection with the handling of the mail but that the plaintiff, when the services were begun, was never hired to do the job.

In *Brightwell v. Oglethorpe Tel. Co.,*47 Ga. App. 521, 526 (171 SE 162), it was held: “'The rule as generally stated is that where one renders beneficial services for another, the law ordinarily presumes a request and promise to pay what such services are reasonably worth, . . . unless they were rendered under circumstances which repel this presumption.. But the law will not imply a promise to pay for services contrary to the intention of the parties.’ 20 Cyc. 2802. 'There can be no recovery for services rendered voluntarily and with no expectation at the time of the rendition that they will be compensated, *316and this is true whether the services were or were not beneficial. Under such circumstances no obligation, whether legal or moral, is incurred. A subsequent change of intention by the parties performing the services does not alter the rule.’ 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), 1079.” From the evidence adduced with regard to defendant’s motion for summary judgment it appeared that at the time the services were rendered neither the plaintiff nor the defendant anticipated that the defendant would compensate the plaintiff for the services rendered. Under such circumstances the trial court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Generally, as to summary judgments, see *Studstill v. Aetna Cas. &c. Co.,*101 Ga. App. 766 (115 SE2d 374); *McGeeney v. Robertson,*102 Ga. App. 318 (116 SE2d 252); *Scales v. Peevy,*103 Ga. App. 42 (118 SE2d 193).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Frankum and Jordan, JJ., concur.*