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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-22-00290-CR

__________________

CHARLES BRETT BOREN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 252nd District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 15-22594

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

In 2015, a grand jury indicted Appellant Charles Brett Boren for possession 

of a controlled substance (namely methamphetamine) in an amount of four grams or 

more but less than two hundred grams, a second-degree felony. See Tex. Health & 

Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(d). In a plea agreement, Boren pleaded guilty to the 

offense and waived his right to a jury trial. The trial court found Boren guilty, 
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deferred adjudication, placed Boren on community supervision for ten years, and 

imposed a $500 fine.1

On December 15, 2021, the State filed a Motion to Revoke Unadjudicated 

Probation, alleging Boren violated two conditions of his community supervision. On 

April 11, 2022, the State filed a First Amended Motion to Revoke Unadjudicated 

Probation, alleging Boren committed seven violations of the terms of his community 

supervision. At a hearing on August 4, 2022, Boren acknowledged that he had 

previously pleaded true to one allegation (the sixth alleged violation) in the motion 

to revoke, which alleged the following:

. . . Boren provided a urine sample on or about the 29th day of March, 

2022, for scientific analysis that showed the presence of the metabolic 

by-products of Methamphetamine and Amphetamines, in violation of 

Condition (10) of Defendant’s Deferred Adjudication order.

At the hearing, the State announced it had abandoned the first three allegations, and 

the State presented evidence in support of the fourth, fifth, and seventh alleged 

violations.

2 After hearing evidence, the trial court found Boren violated the terms of 

his community supervision, found him guilty of the second-degree offense of 

1 We note that the Order of Deferred Adjudication listed the incorrect statute 

for the offense.

2 Because Boren pleaded “true” to one of the other alleged violations of the 

conditions of his community supervision and proof of a single violation is sufficient 

to support revocation, a discussion of this evidence is not necessary. See Garcia v. 

State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
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possession of a controlled substance (namely methamphetamines), and imposed 

punishment at ten years’ confinement. Raising six issues, Boren appeals. We affirm.

Trial Court’s Finding of “True” to the Third Alleged Violation

In his first issue, Boren argues that his conviction should be reversed and 

remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the trial court found the third alleged 

violation in the State’s motion to revoke “true,” but the State had abandoned that 

alleged violation. According to Boren, the trial court’s finding of “true” to the third 

alleged violation was not supported by sufficient evidence and resulted in reversible 

error.

We review a trial court’s order revoking community supervision for an abuse 

of discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) 

(citing Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). To prevail 

in a revocation hearing, the State must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that the defendant violated at least one term or condition of the community 

supervision order. See Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) 

(noting that one violation is sufficient to affirm a trial court’s decision revoking an 

order placing a defendant on community supervision). In general, “[a] plea of true, 

standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation of community supervision and 

adjudicate guilt.” See Tapia v. State, 462 S.W.3d 29, 31 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) 

(citing Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)). 
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Generally, establishing that a defendant violated a single condition of a community 

supervision order allows an appellate court to affirm the trial court’s ruling revoking 

the order used to place a defendant on community supervision. See Garcia v. State, 

387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (stating that “proof of a single violation 

will support revocation”).

Even if the trial court erroneously found “true” to the third alleged violation

(which had been abandoned by the State), Boren pleaded “true” to the sixth alleged 

violation. Because a plea of “true” to any one violation will support revocation of 

community supervision, on this record, revocation was within the trial court’s 

discretion.3 See Tapia, 462 S.W.3d at 31; Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26. Accordingly, 

we overrule issue one.

Credit for Time Served

In issue two, Boren argues the trial court erred in not awarding Boren “full 

time served credit for his time spent undergoing rehabilitation with Cenikor” as part 

of Boren’s sentence.

4 In his third issue, Boren argues the trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to award Boren time served for his Cenikor service and SAFPF 

3 As noted herein, the trial court, after hearing evidence, found “true” three of 

the other alleged violations (the fourth, fifth, and seventh alleged violations) that 

were not abandoned by the State. On appeal, Boren does not challenge those 

findings. 

4 One of the agreed conditions of Boren’s community supervision was to 

successfully complete the Cenikor Foundation Program. 
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service, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

U.S. Constitution. Boren acknowledges that the Judgment Adjudicating Guilt 

credited him with 921 days for the dates set out in the judgment, but he argues that 

he was not credited for time spent participating in Cenikor for “at least the period 

running from December 15, 2015 through December 16, 2016” and for time that 

may not have been credited him for successfully completing a substance abuse 

felony punishment facility (SAFPF) program.5 According to Boren, not crediting 

him time for time spent in Cenikor would “not only violate the Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process Clause, but would also constitute Cruel and Unusual 

Punishment under the Eighth Amendment, U.S. Constitution.” 

Boren was entitled to receive credit for time spent in a substance abuse 

treatment facility operated by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice under 

section 493.009 of the Texas Government Code or any other court-ordered 

residential program or facility as a condition of his deferred adjudication community 

supervision if Boren successfully completed the treatment program at that facility. 

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 42.03, § 2(a)(2), 42A.755(d). We have 

authority to modify the trial court’s judgment to make the record speak the truth 

5 On appeal, Boren does not state what dates he participated in a SAFPF 

program, but he states he “may have been partially credited” for time spent in that 

program. In his reply brief, he argues that certain dates can be inferred based on 

assumptions.
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when we have the necessary date and information to do so. See Tex. R. App. P. 

43.2(b); see also Warren v. State, No. 12-17-00363-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 

3674, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 23, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (because the appellate court had the necessary information, it modified 

the judgment to credit appellant for dates the record showed appellant spent in 

SAFPF that had not been credited in the judgment). In this case, however, the record 

does not establish that Boren successfully completed treatment at Cenikor. Also,

Boren has not established, nor does the record reflect with certainty, the dates that

he spent in SAFPF that were not included in the time credited in the Judgment 

Adjudicating Guilt. Accordingly, we overrule issues two and three.

Drug Treatment

In issues four, five, and six, Boren argues that, instead of sentencing Boren to 

prison, the trial court should have evaluated drug treatment or rehabilitation 

alternatives for Boren because he was a non-violent offender with chronic diabetes,

“high security” drug treatment was appropriate because he was “consistently an 

informant[,]” and that Boren has a “right to treatment in the least restrictive 

alternative environment[.]”

Once sufficient evidence was presented of a violation of a condition set forth 

in the order the trial court used when it placed Boren on deferred adjudication 

community supervision, the trial court had broad discretion in choosing whether to 
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continue, modify, or revoke his community supervision. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. 

arts. 42A.751(d), 42A.752(a), 42A.755(a); Flournoy v. State, 589 S.W.2d 705, 708 

(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). As stated above, because a plea of “true” to any 

one violation will support revocation of community supervision, revocation was 

within the trial court’s discretion.6 See Tapia, 462 S.W.3d at 31; Garcia, 387 S.W.3d 

at 26. And the sentence the trial court imposed here is within the range provided in 

the Penal Code for this offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33 (second-degree 

felony offense of possession of a controlled substance carries a punishment range of 

confinement from two to twenty years). We overrule issues four, five, and six. 

We note that the section of the judgment entitled “Statute for Offense[]” 

recites “481.117(d)[.]” The indictment for the underlying offense listed the offense 

as “possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine)[,]” noted that the 

statute for the offense was “SEC. 481.115[,]” and tracked the language of section 

481.115(d) of the Texas Health & Safety Code. This Court has the authority to 

reform a trial court’s judgment to correct clerical errors. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); 

Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). We therefore reform the 

6 As noted herein, the trial court, after hearing evidence, found “true” three of 

the other alleged violations (the fourth, fifth, and seventh alleged violations) that 

were not abandoned by the State. On appeal, Boren does not challenge those 

findings. 
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judgment to reflect that the “Statute for Offense[]” is “Sec. 481.115(d) of the Texas 

Health & Safety Code[.]”

Having overruled Boren’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as 

reformed.

AFFIRMED AS REFORMED.

 LEANNE JOHNSON

Justice

Submitted on June 30, 2023

Opinion Delivered September 13, 2023

Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.