Brig Gen Kenneth Newton Walker

Kenneth Walker enlisted at Denver, Colorado, 

on 15 December 1917. He took flying training 

at Mather Field, California, getting his commission and wings in November 1918.

After a tour in the Philippines, he returned 

to Langley Field, Virginia, in February 1925 

with a subsequent assignment in December 

1928 to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. 

Retained on the faculty as a bombardment instructor, Walker became the epitome of the 

strategic thinkers at the school and coined the 

revolutionary airpower “creed of the bomber”: 

“A well-planned, well-organized and well-flown 

air force attack will constitute an offensive that 

cannot be stopped.”

Following attendance at the Command and General Staff School at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1933 and promotion to major, he served for three 

years at Hamilton Field, California, and another three years at Luke Field, 

Ford Island, and Wheeler Field, Hawaii. Walker returned to the United States 

in January 1941 as assistant chief of the Plans Division for the chief of the 

Air Corps in Washington, DC.

He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1941 and colonel in March 

1942. During this time, when he worked in the Operations Division of the 

War Department General Staff, he coauthored the air-campaign strategy 

known as Air War Plans Division—Plan 1, the plan for organizing, equipping, 

deploying, and employing the Army Air Forces to defeat Germany and Japan 

should the United States become embroiled in war. The authors completed 

this monumental undertaking in less than one month, just before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor—and the United States was, in fact, at war.

In June 1942, he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned by Gen 

George Kenney as commander of Fifth Air Force’s Bomber Command. In this 

capacity, he repeatedly accompanied his B-24 and B-17 units on bombing 

missions deep into enemy-held territory. Learning firsthand about combat 

conditions, he developed a highly efficient technique for bombing when aircraft faced opposition by enemy fighter planes and antiaircraft fire.

General Walker was killed in action on 5 January 1943 while leading a 

bombing mission over Rabaul, New Britain—the hottest target in the theater. 

He was awarded the Medal of Honor. Its citation, in part, reads, “In the face 

of extremely heavy anti aircraft fire and determined opposition by enemy 

fighters, General Walker led an effective daylight bombing attack against 

shipping in the harbor at Rabaul, which resulted in direct hits on nine enemy 

vessels. During this action, his airplane was disabled and forced down by the 

attack of an overwhelming number of enemy fighters. He displayed conspicuous leadership above and beyond the call of duty involving personal valor and 

intrepidity at an extreme hazard to life.” Walker is credited with being one of 

the men who built an organization that became the US Air Force.
After you have read this research report, please 

give us your frank opinion on the contents. All 

comments––large or small, complimentary or 

caustic––will be gratefully appreciated. Mail them 

to CADRE/AR, Building 1400, 401 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112–6004.

The Limits of Friendship McCarthy

US Security Cooperation in 

Central Asia

Thank you for your assistance.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Cut along dotted line

AIR FORCE Fellows

COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

The Limits of Friendship

US Security Cooperation in

Central Asia

Michael J. McCarthy

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Walker Paper No. 9

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5962

October 2007
Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data

McCarthy, Michael J., 1962-

The limits of friendship : US security cooperation in Central Asia / Michael J. 

McCarthy. 

 p. ; cm. – (Walker paper, 1555-7871 ; no. 9)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-1-58566-172-5

1. United States—Military relations—Asia, Central. 2. Asia, Central—Military 

relations—United States. 3. Military assistance, American—Asia, Central. 4. Asia, 

Central—Strategic aspects. I. Title. II. Series.

355.0310973058––dc22

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, 

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: 

distribution unlimited.

This Walker Paper and others in the series are available 

electronically at the Air University Research Web site 

http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web 

site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

ii
iii

Since 1958 the Air Force has assigned a small number of 

carefully chosen, experienced officers to serve one-year tours 

at distinguished civilian institutions studying national security 

policy and strategy. Beginning with the 1994 academic year, 

these programs were accorded in-residence credit as part of 

professional military education at senior service schools. In 

2003 these fellowships assumed senior developmental education (SDE) force-development credit for eligible officers.

The SDE-level Air Force Fellows serve as visiting military ambassadors to their centers, devoting effort to expanding their 

colleagues’ understanding of defense matters. As such, candidates for SDE-level fellowships have a broad knowledge of key 

Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force issues. SDE-level 

fellows perform outreach by their presence and voice in sponsoring institutions. They are expected to provide advice as well 

as promote and explain Air Force and DOD policies, programs, 

and military-doctrine strategy to nationally recognized scholars, 

foreign dignitaries, and leading policy analysts. The Air Force 

Fellows also gain valuable perspectives from the exchange of 

ideas with these civilian leaders. SDE-level fellows are expected 

to apprise appropriate Air Force agencies of significant developments and emerging views on defense as well as economic and 

foreign policy issues within their centers. Each fellow is expected to use the unique access she or he has as grounds for 

research and writing on important national security issues. 

The SDE Air Force Fellows include the National Defense Fellows, 

the RAND Fellows, the National Security Fellows, and the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows. In addition, the Air Force 

Fellows program supports a post-SDE military fellow at the 

Council on Foreign Relations.

On the level of intermediate developmental education, the 

chief of staff approved several Air Force Fellowships focused on 

career broadening for Air Force majors. The Air Force LegislaAir Force Fellows
iv

tive Fellows program was established in April 1995, with the 

Foreign Policy Fellowship and Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency Fellowship coming under the Air Force Fellows 

program in 2003. In 2004 the Air Force Fellows also assumed 

responsibility for the National Laboratories Technologies Fellows.

AIR FORCE FELLOWS
v

Contents

Chapter	 Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

 acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Evaluating US Security Cooperation . . . . . . . 1

US National-Security Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Defining Security Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Structure of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2 Conception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Denuclearization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Democratization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

A Modest Beginning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3 Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Roots of Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Denuclearization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Proliferation Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Democratization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Regional Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Reaching the Summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

4 Reassessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Roots of Reassessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Denuclearization and Proliferation 

Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Democratization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Military Contact Program and 

Education and Training Programs . . . . . . . 66

Regional Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
vi

Chapter	 Page

Military Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

On the Eve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

5 Rewards and Rebalance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

High Watermark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

New Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Military Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Proliferation Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Regional Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Democratization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Current Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

6 Constraints and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . 111

Environmental Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Bureaucratic and Policy Constraints . . . . . . . 119

Programmatic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Constraints and Limitations in 

Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

7 Measuring Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Building Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

Building Military Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Gaining Access and Basing Rights . . . . . . . . . 161

Relative Accomplishments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

8 Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Integrate Efforts within the Defense 

Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

Integrate Efforts within the US 

Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

Integrate Efforts with NATO and 

Allied and Partner Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

Focus Security-Cooperation Efforts 

on Kazakhstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Focus Security-Cooperation Efforts 

on a Limited Range of Objectives . . . . . . . . 176

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

CONTENTS
vii

Appendix	 Page

A US Security Cooperation

Funding in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

B US Security Cooperation Training 

Programs in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

C Expanded International Military 

Education and Training Program . . . . . . 219

D Allied Security Cooperation

Efforts in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

Illustrations

Figure

1 Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2 US-funded English language laboratory . . . . . . 20

3 Kazakhstani Cadet Elena Milyuk with 

US general Richard Myers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

4 Uzbekistani army contingent of 

CENTRASBAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

5 US ambassador Joseph Pressel delivering 

first high mobility multipurpose wheeled 

vehicle (HMMWV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

6 Central Asian participants in the 

Regional Cooperation 05 exercise . . . . . . . . . . . 102

7 Selected US security-cooperation 

funding in Central Asia, 1993–2006 . . . . . . . . . 105

8 US Military personnel with deputy 

commander of Kazakhstani Air Force . . . . . . . . 128

CONTENTS
viii

Figure	 Page

9 International Counterproliferation 

Program (ICP) training flowchart . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

 10 US and Kazakhstani personnel during a 

transport aviation military contact event . . . . . . 154

Tables

1 Examples of security-cooperation activities . . . . 7

2 State Partnership Program (SPP) 

agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3 Partnership for Peace (PfP) program 

framework documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

4 Interoperability programs eligible for 

Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) funding . . . . . . . . 36

5 Military contact events planned with the 

Central Asian states, 1996–1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

6 Excess defense articles (EDA) deliveries 

to Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

7 Proposed focus areas for US security 

cooperation in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

CONTENTS
ix

Foreword

Looking back 20 years, it is astounding to contemplate the 

profound changes that have occurred in the political geography 

of Eurasia. The massive geopolitical shifts witnessed in this 

period rival those of any previous era in modern history. From 

the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent unraveling of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, the birth (or rebirth) of 

democracy in the states of Central and Eastern Europe, and 

the expansion of NATO and the enlargement of the European 

Union into these former communist countries, the pace and 

scope of political, social, and economic change has been breathtaking. From the wreckage of the Soviet empire there emerged 

15 new states, all formerly constituent “republics” of the former USSR. Among them are the five new states of Central 

Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 

Uzbekistan. Although far removed from the dramatic events 

occurring in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine, 

and other western regions, the terrible events of September 

2001 thrust the distant and exotic lands of Central Asia into 

the center of American strategic thought. 

Until then only a small number of academics, human rights 

activists, and oil company executives were familiar with Central 

Asian cultural, political, and economic dynamics. However, unknown to most Americans for almost a decade, the US military 

has been discretely establishing relationships with the armed 

forces and security services of these nations through a variety 

of security-cooperation programs. As America’s interest in the 

region grew, so did the volume and range of military activities. 

But to what ends? Are these programs simply payoffs for access 

to the region in order to conduct operations in Afghanistan? Or 

do they represent more complex reasons? What have these programs really accomplished? Have these military-cooperation 

programs produced tangible, long-term results?

In the first comprehensive study of US security cooperation 

in Central Asia, Michael J. McCarthy explores these efforts, 

seeking to understand not only the details of the individual 

programs but, more importantly, to understand the objectives 

of those activities and the policies and strategies that drive 
them. The Limits of Friendship: US Security Cooperation in Central

Asia unravels 15 years of military activities in this pivotal region, tracing the ebb and flow of the bilateral and multilateral 

relationships and how they translate into specific securitycooperation programs. In this historical context, McCarthy illuminates the differences between the successful implementations 

of policy into practice and the unintended consequences when 

these programs become disconnected from their original intents.

The title, The Limits of Friendship, captures the essence of 

McCarthy’s thesis, that there are constraints on security-policy 

objectives that can be accomplished through security-cooperation 

programs. Foreign military forces can only absorb a finite 

amount of assistance, and the US military, for a variety of operational, budgetary, and programmatic reasons, can only provide so much assistance. Further, each type of cooperative activity has its own strengths and weaknesses. The patron-client 

dichotomy, present in every bilateral relationship, adds friction 

to even the most well-intentioned programs, especially in countries (such as the Central Asian states), where the political system is not in harmony with democratic principles or transparent 

governance. McCarthy explores deeply into these limitations, 

addressing not only how they have shaped the bilateral and 

regional relationships, but he also draws out methodologies for 

planning and implementing security-cooperation programs in 

ways that could help to mitigate the limitations that seem to be 

inherent in security-cooperation programs.

McCarthy’s work crosses many boundaries. The Limits of

Friendship offers a unique insight into an aspect of US relations 

in Central Asia that, until now, has not been fully explored. 

Most academic works on Central Asia address US relations 

only to the extent of describing how diplomatic initiatives indicate a shift in policy one way or the other. This work provides 

policy makers a range of concrete proposals for using security 

cooperation to advance US interests with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Recent events 

underscore the need for informed and in-depth analyses such 

as those McCarthy provides. The resurgence of Russia as a 

major player in the region, the creation and strengthening of 

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (bringing Russia, China, 

and the Central Asian countries together into a fledgling, but 

x

FOREWORD
xi

strengthening military/political alliance), the crucial petroleum 

and natural gas export routes from Central Asia to the world 

market, and the potential for further political turmoil in a region plagued by civil war and authoritarianism all demand the 

attention of both the academic and policy communities.

Finally, many of these policy considerations have value and 

applicability beyond Central Asia. Policy makers would be well 

advised to draw from them when crafting guidance for use in 

other regions. Additionally, The Limits of Friendship gives 

security-cooperation practitioners a valuable set of techniques 

that, if properly implemented, can help ensure successful results. McCarthy’s analysis has already set the framework for 

the revision of US Central Command’s Theater Security Cooperation strategy for Central Asia and the Middle East, and many 

of his recommendations are being adopted throughout the Department of Defense. This work is the product both of extensive 

research and a career spent in the field, a combination that 

makes this a major addition to our knowledge of this increasingly vital region and to the practice of military-security programs. As such, the author is to be commended for his devotion to the subject and the contribution he makes to the 

furtherance of US national security.

Ralph S. Clem, PhD

Florida International University

Maj Gen, USAFR, Retired

FOREWORD

xiii

About the Author

Lt Col Michael J. McCarthy, USAF, is chief of the Central and 

South Asia Branch of the Security Cooperation Division, US 

Central Command (USCENTCOM), MacDill AFB, Florida. Colonel McCarthy’s past operational assignments include squadron 

intelligence officer in the 309th Tactical Fighter Squadron, and 

then as chief of both the Intelligence Operations and Target 

Operations Branches in the 31st Tactical Fighter Wing Intelligence Division, Homestead AFB, Florida; watch officer, Base 

Warning Office, Ramstein AB, Germany; command intelligence 

briefer, Headquarters, US Air Forces in Europe; senior analyst 

for Russian political and military affairs, National Air Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, Washington, DC; the speechwriter 

for the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. He helped establish the Special Programs Office, the Office of the Assistant 

Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, US Air Force (HQ 

USAF). Other assignments included serving as information 

warfare requirements officer; the executive officer to the Director of Plans and Programs, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff 

for Intelligence, HQ USAF; a plans and exercises officer, Joint 

Intelligence Center (JIC), Central, USCENTCOM; the chief of 

the Central Asia Analysis Team, JIC, USCENTCOM; operations 

officer, 23d Information Operations Squadron, Lackland AFB, 

Texas; United Nations (UN) military observer, senior liaison officer in the UN Headquarters; and the commander of assigned 

US forces, UN Observer Mission in Georgia, Tbilisi, Republic of 

Georgia. Colonel McCarthy also was assigned as country director for Russia, Caucasus, and Central Asia, Office of the Deputy 

Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs, the Pentagon, Washington, DC; and senior executive officer and military assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, 

International Affairs.

Colonel McCarthy was made National Defense Fellow of the 

Center for International Relations, Queen’s University, Kingston, 

Ontario. He is a graduate of the Air War College, US Marine 

Corps (USMC) Command and Staff College, the Air Command 

and Staff College, Squadron Officer School, and Officer Training 

School. He also holds a bachelor of arts degree in International 

Studies of the Soviet Union, the Ohio State University; a di-
xiv

ploma in Russian Language, Pushkin Institute of the Russian 

Language, Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and 

master of science degrees in International Relations, Catholic 

University, Washington, DC; in Military Science, USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia; 

and in Air Warfare, American Military University, Manassas, 

Virginia.

Colonel McCarthy is married to Col Muriel R. McCarthy, 

USAF, who currently serves as the mobilization assistant to the 

Chief of the Air Force Reserve, HQ USAF, the Pentagon, Washington, DC. They have a Yorkshire terrier named Webster.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
xv

Abstract

This research paper explores the history of US securitycooperation programs in Central Asia from 1993 to the present, 

identifying five distinct phases of development as those programs sought to achieve US objectives in denuclearization and

proliferation prevention, democratization and military reform, regional cooperation, and improvement of military capabilities. These 

security-cooperation efforts were limited by a variety of factors, 

including the lack of political and economic reform in the region, Russian influence through bilateral cooperation agreements and multilateral security institutions, constrained resources, diffuse objectives and multiplying recipients, and US 

policies that restrained commitment to Central Asia. Each of 

the programs available to US planners had strengths and weaknesses, but these programs were not always integrated in a 

fashion to achieve the best results. The linkages between the 

specific activities and the ultimate objectives have not always 

been constant and still may not always be clear. As a result, the 

United States has had mixed results in building relationships, 

developing capabilities, and providing access. The United States 

should focus its efforts on Kazakhstan, more closely integrate the 

existing security-cooperation programs within the Defense Department and across the US government, leverage the assistance programs of North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners, 

and seek to employ a strategy of persistent engagement against 

a limited number of clearly defined objectives. 

Acknowledgements

I was first exposed to the complex dynamics of US security 

cooperation in Central Asia during a tour at USCENTCOM in 

the late 1990s. A subsequent assignment as a country director 

in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, 

International Affairs, provided the opportunity to be a part of 

the process of developing and implementing specific initiatives 

for the region. When I was selected for a research fellowship, I 

immediately decided to more rigorously examine and evaluate 

the role of US security cooperation in Central Asia. That my research identifies limitations inherent in US security-cooperation 

efforts in Central Asia should in no way detract from the dedication, perseverance, and patriotism of the many civilian and 

military personnel who plan and execute these programs. 

I thank the many people who assisted with my research, 

most of whom provided information or perspectives that may 

have seemed inconsequential to them at the time but to me 

were invaluable. This research was jointly sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and USCENTCOM, and 

many in those two organizations gave freely of their time to assist me in gathering data and responding to my many questions. 

In particular, I thank Col Dan Groeschen at USCENTCOM, Col 

Jon Chicky and Paul Watson of the OSD, and Deborah Bereda 

at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for their time, 

support, and assistance. I also thank Col Michael Howe and 

Lt Col Eric Nelson who originally promoted the topic as a viable 

research paper. I simply could not have accomplished this 

project without their willingness to provide information, answer questions, share their experiences, and invite me to their 

conferences.

Several others responded to my many requests and questions with the professionalism that is the hallmark of this business. At the risk of omitting someone, I offer my appreciation to 

the following individuals: William Aseltine, LCDR Rebecca 

Badders, Hussam Bader, Gregory Baker, Ronald Battaglia, Lt 

Col Dashdondog Bayarsaikhan, Lt Col Paul Bigelow, Maj Edward Black, Lt Col Taft Blackburn, Jeannie Borden, Barbara 

Braese, Col Matt Brand, Lt Col David Brigham, Maj Kent 

Broome, Maj Mark Campbell, Lorain Cardenas, David Cate, 

xvii
John Charlton, Leslie Christensen, Maj Padraig Clark, Anna 

Crockett, Dr. Judy Damewood, Alice Deery, Maj Ted Donnelly, 

Maj Scott Dullea, Maj Neal Edmonds, Lt Col James Fain, Ronald 

Fine, Lt Col Helmut Fritsch, Alan Gorowitz, Janice Gould, Lt 

Col Kelsey Harris-Smith, Maj Daniel Hash, Col Roy Hawkins, 

Lt Col Russ Hittinger, Maj Amir Hussain, Scott Jasper, Gloria 

Jenkins, Kay Judkins, Timothy Kelly, Maj Harry Lane, Dr. Amer 

Latif, Sharon Latzen, Maj Ben Louma, Lt Col Stephen Mariano, 

David Martin, Kenneth Martin, Cristina Matei, Ken McFarling, 

John McKane, James McNaughton, Col Assylbek Mendygaliev, 

Lt Col Kurt Meppen, Walter Monroe, John Moseley, Thomas 

Nankervis, Steven Peterson, Mark Pirritano, Martin Poffenberger, 

Allan Polley, Lt Col Jeff Predmore, Heidi Reisinger, Capt Will 

Santos, Maj Paul Schmitt, Silvia Serben, Terri Smith, Capt 

Jessica Soderbeck, Lt Col Robert Timm, Dr. Marybeth Peterson 

Ulrich, Roman Vassilenko, Linda Wesley, Maj Kevin Westley, Col 

Thomas Wilhelm, Brett Wise, Lt Col Wiu Chaing Yong, Maj 

Michael Yuschak, Maj Michael Zabrzeski, and Col Albert Zaccor. 

I also thank Dr. Ralph Clem (Maj Gen, USAFR, retired.) at 

Florida International University for his guidance and support 

on this project. Because of his phenomenal academic background in Russian and Soviet affairs and his extremely successful career as a military intelligence officer, Dr. Clem has 

been an invaluable mentor for many years. I offer my appreciation as well to Dee Taylor at the College of Aerospace Doctrine 

Research and Education for the outstanding support she provided during this year. 

I offer a special thanks to my parents, Jim and Alice McCarthy 

of Monument, Colorado, who supported me on this and countless other endeavors. Finally, but most importantly, I thank my 

wife, Col Muriel McCarthy, for her support, guidance, and encouragement through our many wonderful years together, and 

for taking care of the thousands of minor crises at home while 

I was away in Canada on this fellowship. Without her by my side 

and in my heart, this project would have been impossible.

MICHAEL J. MCCARTHY

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

xviii


Chapter 1

Introduction

In 1999, teams of Green Berets arrived at former Soviet 

garrisons outside the capital here. They were some of 

the Army’s finest soldiers, they traveled in small groups 

and in the two years that followed they came and went 

every few months. The mission was straightforward: to 

train the army of a former foe, in part to prepare its 

inexperienced conscripts for skirmishes with the Islamic 

Movement of Uzbekistan, a terrorist group accused of 

setting off bombs in Tashkent earlier that year. The 

long-term goal was more ambitious. The Green Berets 

were one element of an accelerating security arrangement in which the two nations were laying the groundwork for more extensive military cooperation. In recent 

weeks this relationship has blossomed into the largescale American deployment of Special Forces units and 

aircraft on what was once enemy soil.

—C. J. Chivers, New York Times, 25 October 2001

Evaluating US Security Cooperation

In the days and weeks following the terrible terrorist attacks 

against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon 

in Washington, DC, American military forces quietly began to 

deploy to forward bases in Central Asia (fig. 1) to begin combat 

operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. At 

the time, few Americans knew anything of these exotic countries in this far off region, but soon Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan began to figure 

prominently in the news reports of the campaign. The “Stans,” 

as they were called, were identified as critical partners in America’s 

new war on terrorism, and the American public began to learn 

that the seeds of this partnership had actually been planted 

years before.
INTRODUCTION

The Central Asian nations proved surprisingly willing to 

support American combat operations in Afghanistan. All five 

offered overflight privileges, allowing US military aircraft to 

transit their airspace. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 

Uzbekistan also offered the use of their military facilities to station US forces (Turkmenistan permitted refueling privileges for 

humanitarian flights); ultimately, the Pentagon selected KarshiKhanabad in Uzbekistan and Manas International Airport in 

Kyrgyzstan for its deployments (Dushanbe in Tajikistan hosted 

a small US contingent). Among other nations, France and the 

United Kingdom deployed combat units to Dushanbe, and Germany deployed to Termez in southern Uzbekistan.1 The value of 

this support cannot be overstated: the early successes of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) against Taliban and al-Qaeda 

Figure 1. Central Asia (Reprinted from Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] 

Web site, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/

maps/802868.jpg.)
INTRODUCTION



forces simply would not have been possible without the cooperation of the Central Asian states.

Most observers viewed these deployments as a visible success for US security-cooperation programs in Central Asia. One 

of the earliest reports, a New York Times article by C. J. Chivers 

published on 25 October 2001, described reunion scenes—

“hearty bear hugs and backslaps”—when US Army Green Berets met with their Uzbek counterparts at Karshi-Khanabad. 

The Green Berets had been rotating through Uzbekistan since 

1999, training Uzbek military forces to deal with a growing fundamentalist Islamic insurgency and laying the groundwork for 

a stronger and deeper relationship between the two militaries.2

Implied in this article, and others like it, was the belief that the 

security-cooperation activities the United States had been conducting since the early 1990s directly led to the overflight privileges and basing rights offered by the Central Asian states in 

late 2001.

Within a few years, however, the situation had dramatically 

changed. In December 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell’s 

refusal to certify Uzbekistan as having made progress in respecting 

human rights put a freeze on most security-cooperation activities 

between the two countries, and in July 2005, facing condemnation of its response to civil unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan directed 

the withdrawal of all US military forces from Karshi-Khanabad. 

Immediately before Tashkent’s ultimatum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional security forum that 

included Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 

Russia, and China, urged the United States to set a specific 

date for the withdrawal of all American military forces from 

Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan, not demanding an immediate withdrawal of US forces, was asking millions of dollars as payment 

for the use of the facilities at Manas; in the wake of the KarshiKhanabad withdrawal, these demands have escalated with the 

importance of Manas to the US military that Bishkek perceives. 

In Turkmenistan, the government publicly denied that the visit 

of a US commander was the first step in allowing American 

military forces into the country. The relationships that had 

seemed so successful in late 2001 appeared to be stumbling 

badly by late 2005.
INTRODUCTION



The reality of both situations—the apparent successes of 

2001 and failures of 2004–2005—may be less dramatic than 

the media reports would suggest. US security-cooperation efforts in Central Asia began in the early 1990s with a simple goal 

of eliminating the nuclear weapons left stranded in Kazakhstan 

as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Over time, additional objectives were added, but gaining basing rights was 

never one of them. Uzbekistan had offered permanent bases as 

early as 1998, but US officials politely brushed aside the invitations: until the dramatic attacks on 11 September 2001, few in 

the US military could conceive of conducting military operations from or in Central Asia. And while security-cooperation 

efforts with Uzbekistan are currently limited, US military relations with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are excellent (notwithstanding the current negotiations over Manas), those with Tajikistan are 

steadily growing, and those with Turkmenistan remain relatively 

untroubled.

The collapse of the security-cooperation relationship between 

the United States and Uzbekistan, however, offers the opportunity to evaluate these programs. How did US security-cooperation 

efforts in Central Asia develop? What are the US national-security 

interests in Central Asia, and how can security-cooperation initiatives work to achieve them? What were and are the specific 

objectives of the security-cooperation programs, and how successful has the United States been in achieving them? What changes 

should the United States implement to improve the effectiveness 

of these programs? In evaluating US security-cooperation efforts 

in Central Asia, this paper seeks understanding on how specific 

activities have and can assist in building relationships, developing capabilities, and providing access; and how they may be limited by internal and external factors. It will do so in the context 

of evaluating the particular themes that have run through US 

security-cooperation efforts since 1992: promoting denuclearization, democratization, regional cooperation, and improving military capabilities.

US National-Security Interests

Daniel Fried, assistant secretary of State for European and 

Eurasian Affairs, offered the most recent official explanation of 
INTRODUCTION

US security interests in Central Asia. Testifying in front of the 

House International Relations Committee on 27 October 2005, 

Assistant Secretary Fried identified three interconnected sets 

of interests: ensuring security, in which he grouped efforts to 

counterterrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; promoting energy development and economic cooperation; 

and supporting political reform, including respect for human 

rights. As these objectives are indivisible, mutually reinforcing, 

and ultimately interconnected, US policy is to advance all three 

sets of interests simultaneously, seeking to maintain a balance 

between them: “failure in one area will undermine the chance 

of success in another.”3

The US national-security interests for Central Asia, as outlined by Assistant Secretary Fried, have evolved and expanded 

over the past 15 years, but the three fundamental objectives 

were evident as early as 1995. Given the nuclear arsenal in the 

newly independent Kazakhstan, security issues arose first. As 

US energy companies began to invest in the region and reform 

efforts in Eastern Europe began to demonstrate success, more 

emphasis was placed on economic and political considerations. 

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, raised the importance of this region in US security planning and brought an 

increased emphasis on security issues, but they did not fundamentally change the goals that had developed over the 1990s. 

Concerns generated by the Kyrgyz revolution and the Andijon 

situation in 2005 have resulted in a new focus on developing 

integrated strategies for addressing these concerns and ultimately 

a new balance in pursuing the national-security objectives.

Security cooperation is one of many tools used by the United 

States to advance its national objectives in Central Asia. These 

objectives are interrelated and often complementary—programs 

that contribute toward building capabilities will usually result 

in stronger relationships, and programs designed to establish 

relationships can contribute to developing capabilities. However, they can at times be contradictory—for example, creating 

capabilities for participation in coalition operations can detract 

from efforts to improve defensive capabilities. These objectives 

should be directly related to the national-security objectives for 

the region; but, again, they can be supporting, or, at times, 

contradictory in the actual execution of the programs.
INTRODUCTION



 Defining Security Cooperation

The initial challenge for a study such as this is defining the 

meaning of security cooperation. The Department of Defense 

(DOD) officially defines security cooperation more in terms of 

what it is supposed to accomplish rather than what it is: “All 

Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific 

US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host 

nation.”4 In this sense, it addresses and includes those positive 

activities that strengthen military ties between the US armed 

forces and those of allied and partner nations. Security cooperation is not altruistic, nor is it conducted without purpose. 

With this definition, security cooperation has three objectives: 

to build relationships so that the United States can influence 

other countries and their military forces, to develop capabilities 

of foreign military forces so they can conduct operations on 

behalf of or in coalition with the United States, and to provide 

access so that the US military has strategic flexibility to conduct 

its own operations. Security cooperation is, at its core, specifically 

intended to achieve specific US national-security objectives.

Security cooperation is a relatively new term within the DOD, 

encompassing the traditional programs of security assistance

that provide equipment and training to foreign military forces, 

as well as the programs of military engagement such as joint 

exercises, senior leader visits, and military contact events.5 Security cooperation also includes a range of other activities which 

serve to promote defense relationships.6 Some examples of 

security-cooperation activities are shown in table 1.

Despite the official definition and examples above, there is 

still considerable debate within the DOD as to what constitutes 

security cooperation. Often this challenge comes from bureaucracies, fearing a loss of control over specific programs, which 

resist having their activities fall under this definition. Col Albert 

Zaccor, USA, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United 

States, relates one example: “Officials in [the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD)] Counter-proliferation Policy office 

refused to admit that activities intended to improve the mari-
INTRODUCTION

time security capabilities of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in support of counter-proliferation would be included under the definition of Security Cooperation and declined to integrate their 

program formally with other DOD Security Cooperation efforts” 

(emphasis in original).7 The result of these types of disagreements over definitions, of course, has been the “proliferation of 

narrowly focused, redundant, and generally uncoordinated assistance programs,” an issue that will be raised later in this 

paper.8

The definition does not specify whether the “interactions with 

foreign military establishments” include only those that occur 

in peacetime, or if they embrace the range of cooperative interactions that occur between allied and coalition partners engaged in peacekeeping, humanitarian, or combat operations. 

Given the history of major security-cooperation efforts, such as 

the Lend-Lease program and the military assistance programs 

of the Cold War, and nature of the current war on terrorism, 

Table 1. Examples of Security-Cooperation Activities

• Appointment of defense attachés 

• Appointment of exchange officers, liaison officers, military advisors, or security assistance personnel

• Visits of senior defense and military leaders

• Contact visits of military delegations, including ship visits or air deployments, for orientation or familiarization

• Participation in military workshops, seminars, symposiums, and conferences

• Training of foreign military and civilian defense personnel, including attendance at 

language schools, technical training, or combat training

• Professional military education of foreign military and civilian defense personnel, 

including attendance at service academies and war colleges

• Combined exercises

• Sales of defense equipment and material goods, including appropriate logistics support

• Cooperative weapons development or coproduction

• Cooperative logistics support agreements

• Intelligence exchanges

• Cooperative use of military communication and information systems

• Integration and joint command of specific military units

• Provision of permanent basing and port rights and overflight privileges 

• Cooperative efforts to reduce or eliminate specific categories of weapon systems

Adapted from Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defense Diplomacy: New Roles for 

Military Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper 365 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 

7; and Security Cooperation with the United States Army Forces Central Command Brochure, US 

Army Forces Central Command, undated.
INTRODUCTION

most DOD policy and doctrinal publications imply that security cooperation extends up to, but does not include, actual 

operations. Likewise, most US security-cooperation practitioners view their role as preparing for, rather than participating 

in, combat operations.

Given the rather broad definition, security cooperation cannot be easily defined by the source of funding, known within 

the US federal budget process as programs. Many individual 

programs lie clearly and completely within the scope of security 

cooperation: Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Excess Defense Articles (EDA), and the international military education and training (IMET) programs are 

governed by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and are inherently and completely part of security cooperation. However, the 

funding for other initiatives, such as allowing foreign cadets to 

attend US military academies or providing flight training under 

the Aviation Leadership Program (ALP), are absorbed by the 

DOD within its normal operations budget. 

Likewise, security cooperation cannot be easily defined by 

the organizations which conduct the activities. Some DOD organizations are dedicated to security-cooperation activities, 

such as the Air Force Security Assistance Center (AFSAC) or 

the US Army’s Security Assistance Training Field Activity 

(SATFA). Others conduct security-cooperation activities based 

on functional expertise, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency 

(DIA) or the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). However, 

almost every organization within the US military has or may be 

called upon to contribute in security-cooperation efforts, whether 

it is hosting a foreign military delegation or participating in a 

combined exercise. 

Despite the relatively short period of cooperation and rather 

limited scope of its engagement, the United States has employed most of the activities described above in its securitycooperation efforts in Central Asia. The definitional debates, 

wide range of programs and funding sources, and variety of 

organizations that have participated in security-cooperation 

events make it difficult to identify all of the activities that have 

occurred in or with the Central Asian nations. In particular, the 

historical record is very weak on the details of military contact 

events, exercises, and training programs. This paper makes no 
INTRODUCTION

claims to have captured all of those activities, but it includes 

the majority of them, and certainly a sufficient quantity to allow 

for an evaluation of their role in meeting US national-security 

objectives in the region.

It is also important to note the wide variety of other programs 

executed by other US government agencies that have similar 

objectives as the DOD’s security-cooperation program. The US 

Coast Guard, for example, has helped develop the maritime 

security capabilities of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; the State Department’s export control and related border 

security (EXBS) program provides equipment and training to 

border services in the region. Non-DOD security-cooperation 

efforts comprise almost half of the security and law enforcement 

funding to Central Asia in recent years.9 These efforts, while they 

are often very similar and complement the DOD efforts, lie outside of the scope of this study. In this regard, this paper only 

addresses military security cooperation—generally speaking, 

those activities conducted by the DOD with other military organizations. The need for greater integration, however, is briefly 

addressed in the recommendations. 

Structure of the Study

US security-cooperation activities with the Central Asian 

states span just over a dozen years, having started in 1993. 

Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 trace the evolution of those activities, 

addressing the six stages of development between 1993 and 

the present, and describing the various programs introduced 

by US national-security policy makers to meet changing 

and multiplying national-security objectives for the region. 

This review is necessary for two reasons: first, securitycooperation efforts take years, sometimes decades, to 

achieve results, and only a historical perspective can fully 

illustrate the linkages between the original goals, current 

programs, and ultimate results. The review will help establish the framework for understanding the current status of 

US security-cooperation efforts in Central Asia and their 

prospects for success in the future. Second, a historical review can help identify lessons from previous successes or 
INTRODUCTION

10

failures and demonstrate how those lessons may be applied to 

current programs.

These perspectives influence the execution of current US 

security-cooperation efforts and shape the development of 

those for the future. Many observers view Central Asia as a new 

“Great Game” played with Russia and China; others see these 

nations as “front-line states” in the long war on terrorism. 

Chapter 6 examines the external and internal constraints on 

US security-cooperation programs in Central Asia that limit 

them from meeting the objectives set by the US government. It 

explores the different types of programs, describing their 

strengths and weaknesses in a manner that addresses the best 

methods for utilizing them. Chapter 7 offers an evaluation of 

the effectiveness of US security-cooperation programs in Central Asia. Given the absence of accepted measures of effectiveness and the paucity of data from which to make an assessment, this evaluation must be considered tentative. Chapter 8 

offers specific recommendations for national-security policy 

makers and security-cooperation practitioners, and analyzes 

the prospects for US initiatives in the future.

US security-cooperation efforts in Central Asia are limited by 

a host of internal and external factors, and the linkages between the specific activities and the ultimate objectives is not 

always clear. In the years ahead, Central Asia will remain a 

critical region in America’s long war against terrorism. Security 

cooperation has been and can be a valuable tool in building 

relationships with allies and partners, developing capabilities 

of foreign militaries so they can join in this struggle, and providing access so American forces can take the war to the enemy.

Notes

1. Ehsan Ahrari, “The Strategic Future of Central Asia: A View from Washington,” Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), 164.

2. C. J. Chivers, “Long Before War, Green Berets Built Military Ties to Uzbekistan,” New York Times, 25 October 2001.

3. Daniel Fried, A Strategy for Central Asia: Statement Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House International Relations 

Committee, 27 October 2005, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/55766.htm 

(accessed 14 December 2005).
INTRODUCTION

11

4. Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 

as amended through 22 March 2007, http://131.84.1.34/doctrine/jel/doddict/

data/s/04830.html.

5. Some have termed this latter category military diplomacy or defense 

diplomacy. Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defense Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper 365 

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 5.

6. The Department of Defense also conducts humanitarian assistance 

programs, disaster relief, and demining programs which fall under the rubric 

of security cooperation. However, as the partners and recipients of these activities are generally the civilian population rather than the military forces or 

political leadership, these activities fall outside the scope of the paper and are 

not discussed.

7. Col Albert Zaccor, USA, Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A 

Call for an Integrated Strategy (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the 

United States, August 2005), 34.

8. Ibid., 1.

9. In 2004, the last year for which comprehensive figures are available, 

DOD security-cooperation efforts accounted for $75.48 million, or 57.5 percent, 

of the $132.63 million of US funds budgeted for security and law enforcement 

assistance to Central Asia. Non-DOD efforts through the Departments of 

State, Energy, and Agriculture, US Agency for International Development, 

National Science Foundation, Environmental Protection Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, comprised 42.5 percent. If the funding for 

DOD’s nuclear, chemical, and biological dismantlement programs, which are 

inherently destructive rather than productive, is excluded, then DOD efforts 

comprise only 23.9 percent of the total funding. U.S. Government Assistance 

to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, Fiscal Year 2004 (Washington, DC: 

US Department of State, 2005), appendix, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/

rpt/c16112.htm (accessed 12 January 2006).

13

Chapter 2

Conception

The Safe, Secure Dismantlement [SSD] Agreement 

marks the beginning of an entirely new relationship 

between Kazakhstan and the United States.

—Vice Pres. Al Gore at the signing of the 

SSD Agreement in Almaty, Kazakhstan, 

December 1993

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, 

Pres. George H. W. Bush sought to develop an aid program for 

the newly independent states in Eurasia. The resulting Freedom Support Act, signed into law on 24 October 1992, was 

largely intended for the European states of the former Soviet 

Union, but it also laid the foundation for a variety of assistance 

programs, including the beginnings of a security-cooperation 

relationship, with the new states of Central Asia. Beginning in 

1993, when the first programs were officially established, the 

United States slowly built a web of ties to the military forces of 

the Central Asian nations. Progress was slow and uneven, largely 

due to limited funding, multiplying objectives, and the effect of 

outside factors, such as reversals in democratic reform and the 

insurgent attacks in the region in 1999 and 2000. This development went through three distinct stages prior to the turning 

point of 11 September 2001, and two more stages afterward.

In December 1991, when the new states of Central Asia were 

handed their independence, the United States had little intention of establishing lasting security relationships in the region. 

Within Eurasia, the foreign and security policy focuses of the 

Bush administration were on the political, economic, and military disintegration in Russia, and, to a lesser extent, on the 

dynamic transformation in the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe. Central Asia, tacitly acknowledged to be within 

Russia’s sphere of influence, was an exotic, distant, and strategically unimportant region in which the United States had few 

national-security interests and even fewer reasons for security 

cooperation. Equally important, the US military was recrafting 
CONCEPTION

14

its view on the use of security-cooperation tools: instead of the 

Cold War programs designed to develop foreign military forces 

capable of defeating Communist threats, military-to-military 

contacts, exercises, and security-assistance programs were 

now intended primarily to promote and permit “forward presence”—the stationing or deployment of US troops overseas.1

With little intention of deploying forces to Central Asia, the US 

military had little interest in, or need for, security cooperation 

with these countries.

Denuclearization 

The exception to the relative neglect of Central Asia was the 

critical concern of securing the nuclear weapons stranded in 

the region, and, as a corollary, eliminating the potential threat 

of the proliferation of the materials, technology, and knowledge 

needed to develop nuclear weapons. Even this concern, however, was seen in the larger context of relations with Moscow: 

Kazakhstan, one of the four successor states that now possessed nuclear weapons, had to be convinced to relinquish 

them to Russia, and Moscow had to be convinced to accept and 

destroy them.

Fortunately, the US military had been involved in denuclearization efforts in Kazakhstan since 1988. When the Intermediaterange Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed by the United 

States and the Soviet Union in December 1987, it established 

four points of entry in the former Soviet Union for inspectors, 

one of which was located in Almaty, Kazakhstan. (In Central 

Asia, only Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have facilities subject to inspection under the INF Treaty; the last two 

have only a single facility each and do not participate in on-site 

inspection activities or the related meetings.) Beginning in July 

1988, US inspection teams from the On-Site Inspection Agency 

(OSIA) routinely visited the four sites in the Kazakhstan Soviet 

Socialist Republic that had missile and missile-related facilities 

subject to inspection under the treaty. For the first few years of 

inspections in Kazakhstan, these teams most often visited the 

elimination facility at Saryozek to monitor the destruction of 

SS-12 and SS-20 missiles. Under the eyes of US military officers, 

the first SS-12 missiles were destroyed at Saryozek on 1 August 
CONCEPTION

15

1988; the final missile was destroyed on 27 October 1989, with 

Capt John Williams, USN, serving as the chief of the American 

inspection team.2

Although short-notice inspections under the INF Treaty 

continued irregularly after 1989, the primary concern after 

December 1991 was Kazakhstan’s new strategic nuclear arsenal. Almaty had inherited 1,040 nuclear warheads mated 

to 104 SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), 320 

nuclear warheads for AS-15 cruise missiles, and 40 TU-95 

strategic bombers as launch platforms.3 Initially, the new 

Kazakhstani government was reluctant to denuclearize, citing its two nuclear-armed neighbors—Russia and China—as 

potential threats. Ultimately, with the promise of substantial 

US aid, Pres. Nursultan Nazarbayev consented to relinquish 

these weapons. On 13 December 1993, the Kazakhstani parliament ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a 

nonnuclear state. On the same day, Nazarbayev and US vice 

president Al Gore signed the SSD Framework Agreement and 

a series of subordinate implementing agreements that established a wide range of efforts between the two nations designed to eliminate the nuclear weapons, the delivery platforms, and the corresponding infrastructure.4

The signing of these agreements opened the gates for significant US financial assistance via the cooperative threat 

reduction (CTR) program. The CTR program, also known as 

Nunn-Lugar, had been initiated in 1991 by Senators Sam 

Nunn (D-GA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) in response to concerns about the control of the nuclear arsenal throughout 

the former Soviet Union, but primarily in Russia, Ukraine, 

Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The DOD initially allocated $85 

million to fund projects for withdrawing the nuclear weapons and destroying the missile silos, strategic bombers, and 

weapon storage areas (table A.1, figure A.1, appendix A). 

The program also provided emergency response equipment 

for use during the transport of nuclear weapons from 

Kazakhstan to Russia and established a government-togovernment communications link with the Kazakhstani 

Ministry of Defense (MOD) to manage the arms control notification requirements.5
CONCEPTION

16

Although these efforts started slow, within 18 months, two 

highly successful goals had been accomplished: the transport 

of almost 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU), 

sufficient for at least 20 nuclear weapons, from the Ulbinsky 

Metallurgy Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan, to the Oak 

Ridge Plant in Tennessee in November 1994 (an effort known 

as Project Sapphire); and the final transfer of all deployed nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan to Russia in April 1995. The 

successes of the CTR program in initially eliminating the nuclear 

legacy established a solid foundation for security cooperation 

between Kazakhstan and the United States that continues to 

the present. 

Related denuclearization efforts progressed as well. The first 

INF inspection in independent Kazakhstan was made at Petropavlovsk in February 1994, although a practice inspection 

had been conducted at Saryozek earlier to ensure the Kazakhstani side was prepared for the actual event. Short-notice inspections at the four facilities continued irregularly thereafter. 

Kazakhstan acceded to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

(START) on 5 December 1994, and OSIA teams began visiting 

the five facilities subject to inspection under that agreement 

soon thereafter. (In Central Asia, only Kazakhstan has facilities 

subject to inspection under the START and Conventional Forces 

in Europe [CFE] Treaties.) These denuclearization efforts led to 

increasing interaction between the armed forces of Kazakhstan 

and the United States.6

Democratization

The CTR program also offered the opportunity for a broader 

security-cooperation relationship with Kazakhstan. Among the 

subordinate documents of the SSD Framework Agreement was 

the “Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on Defense 

and Military Relations” between the MOD and DOD, signed by 

Kazakhstani minister of defense Gen Sagadat Nurmaganbetov 

and US secretary of defense William Perry on 14 February 

1994.7 This agreement established a broad program of defense 

and military contacts (DMC) between the two nations and outlined specific actions that each agreed to undertake. It was the 

first establishment of a US military-to-military contact program 
CONCEPTION

17

in Central Asia, and it later served as the model for others in 

the region. The military contact program was designed “to increase understanding and promote more stable military relations between the U.S. and the FSU [former Soviet Union] 

states, to encourage support for reform and the development of 

military forces under civilian control which are more responsive 

to democratically elected officials, to promote denuclearization 

of forces in the FSU, and to encourage cooperation in regional 

crises.”8 These military contact events, therefore, were part of 

an objective much broader but much more nebulous than securing the nuclear weapons: they also were intended to “democratize” the military forces of Kazakhstan. The DOD initially 

notified Congress of the intent to allocate approximately $1.9 

million from the CTR program to the military contact program 

with Kazakhstan, although much of this funding remained unspent (table A.2, figure A.2, appendix A).9

Military Contact Program

During this early period, these military contact events were 

planned and executed by several different commands and organizations in a rather unsystematic manner and funded 

through a variety of programs beyond just CTR.10 Kazakhstan 

and the rest of Central Asia, like the other regions of the former 

Soviet Union, were not assigned to any of the geographic unified commands under the US Unified Command Plan, which 

establishes missions and delineates areas of responsibility to 

the major commands in the US armed forces. As such, there 

was no single headquarters tasked to establish and maintain 

military relationships with these countries. (The Joint Staff retained responsibility, but was unable to provide much more 

than guidance and oversight.) Based on the success of its Joint 

Contact Team Program (JCTP) in Eastern Europe, US European 

Command (USEUCOM), based in Stuttgart, Germany, initiated 

many of the first contacts with Kazakhstan, but US Pacific 

Command (USPACOM) in Honolulu, Hawaii; US Atlantic Command (USACOM) in Norfolk, Virginia; the US Coast Guard in 

Washington, DC; and others also began to conduct military 

contact activities and establish relationships.11 Each command 

funded, planned, and executed the events it perceived as use-
CONCEPTION

18

ful, but the program lacked an overall plan or schedule that 

could coordinate and deconflict the range of events conducted 

with each country. In all cases, Central Asia was seen as peripheral to the other regions within the commands’ areas of interest. The initial military contact events, although few in number 

and limited in scope, were a patchwork quilt of disparate activities with little integrating strategy beyond the idea that contacts, in and of themselves, would foster open, positive relationships and promote the democratization of these countries. 

Unfortunately, the ad hoc nature of the military contact program meant few records were kept that would provide details 

on the number or type of events that were conducted. By October 1995, at least eight military contact events were conducted 

with Kazakhstan using CTR funds, including visits to Kazakhstan by a US Army general officer and a US Coast Guard aviation assessment team; and visits by Kazakhstani delegations to 

the United States to participate in defense conversion meetings, 

a disaster relief conference, and an orientation visit to US Coast 

Guard facilities.12

Training and Education Programs

Along with the military contact program, the Central Asian 

states also benefited from other security-cooperation initiatives 

originally designed to promote democratic transitions in the 

emerging nations in Eastern Europe and the European portion 

of the former Soviet Union. The final year of the Bush administration brought recognition that security-cooperation activities could do more than promote forward presence, but 

could also promote the transition process within these 

countries to democratic governments and market-based 

economies: “It is time to refashion our security assistance. 

. . . We need to increase funding for military and defense 

contact programs and other activities designed to facilitate 

the successful transition of foreign militaries to democratic 

systems.”13 The Clinton administration expanded this concept, linking the existing IMET program, funded by the Department of State (DOS) but executed by the Department of 

Defense, to this goal.14 The Department of State advocated 

for these funds under the Freedom Support Act within the 
CONCEPTION

19

broader construct of assisting political- and economic-reform efforts throughout the former Soviet Union. The proposal 

argued:

Providing professional education to foreign defense personnel, both civilian and military, particularly in the proper role of the military in a 

democracy[,] is an effective way to support countries in transition to 

democracy. This training helps produce a professional and politically 

neutral armed forces under civilian control. . . . [D]irect civil-military 

relations training will: 1) promote the development of institutions and 

processes that will permit a more thorough integration of the armed 

forces into the larger national society; 2) encourage military personnel 

to respect their national constitutional framework, and its implications 

for the role of the military in a democracy; and 3) promote the development of civilian specialists in military affairs.15

But this effort was largely for Russia and Eastern Europe; 

the small amount of funding for Central Asia was included almost as an afterthought. In 1993 Congress first authorized 

$163 thousand for Kazakhstan, sufficient for the training of 

only eight students. It approved funding for Kyrgyzstan and 

Turkmenistan the following year and for Uzbekistan in 1995. 

(Tajikistan, embroiled in a civil war until 1997, would not receive funding until 2002.) IMET funding remained symbolic for 

the first few years: in 1995 the State Department requested 

$900 million for transition assistance in the former Soviet 

Union, of which $2.375 million was for the IMET program. Only 

$250 thousand was allocated for Central Asia (table A.5, figure 

A.4, appendix A).16 The funds were intended to be used specifically for English language training and for instruction, via orientation tours, professional training, and mobile training 

teams, on appropriate civil-military relationships.17 The modest 

level of funds was sufficient for a single language lab for each 

defense ministry and the training of a small number of students, most of whom received instruction to be English language teachers (fig. 2). From 1993 through 1995, Kazakhstan 

had 42 students come to the United States for training, while Uzbekistan had five, Turkmenistan had four, and Kyrgyzstan only 

three (table B.1 and figure B.1, appendix B).18 Most of the training was accomplished at the Defense Linguage Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) in San Antonio, Texas (table 

B.2 and figure B.2, appendix B).
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The Central Asian states were also included in another initiative designed to promote democratic transitions in Eastern 

Europe. In June 1993, using the facilities of the US Army’s 

Russian Institute in Garmisch, Germany, USEUCOM established the George C. Marshall European Center for Security 

Studies “to positively influence the development of security 

structures appropriate for democratic states.” The Marshall 

Center offered a series of resident educational courses for civilian 

and military officials, and beginning in 1994, individuals from 

all five of the Central Asian states began to participate. (Of note, 

this was one of the very few US security-cooperation programs 

during the 1990s in which Tajikistan participated.)19 The original 

curriculum consisted of a five-month course offered twice a 

year titled Program in Advanced Security Studies (PASS) on 

national security and defense planning in democratic societies. 

(The course is now three months long and offered three times a 

Figure 2. US-funded English language laboratory, Ministry of Defense, 

Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, July 1998 (Reprinted from Author’s Personal 

Collection.)
CONCEPTION

21

year.) In 1994 15 military officers and senior defense civilians 

representing all five Central Asian states attended the Executive PASS course; in 1995 another 26 completed the program 

(table B.5 and figure B.3, appendix B).20 The Marshall Center, 

which also offered a variety of shorter courses and conferences, 

would play a significant role in the efforts to democratize the 

armed forces of Central Asia.

A Modest Beginning

Between 1993 and 1995, the US military had taken a few 

tentative steps toward building security relationships in Central 

Asia. These first efforts were almost entirely with Kazakhstan, 

although there were some tenuous ties with the armed forces 

of the other nations. But these programs, and their objectives, 

were largely viewed as a subset of the security-cooperation efforts in Eastern Europe and the European portion of the former Soviet Union—an afterthought, small efforts added on to 

the much larger initiatives conducted elsewhere. The goals—

denuclearization and democratization—were ambitious. While 

the resources for denuclearization were extensive—and probably 

sufficient for the task—those for democratization were modest: 

adequate only for a few military contact events and some limited 

training opportunities. Given the very limited resources, US attempts to promote democratization within the armed forces of 

Central Asia could have made little progress.

Notes

1. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: The White House, 1991), 9, 27, and 7.

2. George L. Rueckert, On-Site Inspection in Theory and Practice: A Primer on 

Modern Arms Control Regimes (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1998), 26; Diane L. Smith, 

Breaking Away from the Bear (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 74–75; and Joseph P. Harahan, On-Site Inspections under 

the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (Washington, DC: Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency, 1996), http://www.dtra.mil/about/media/historical

_documents/books/infbook/ch6e.cfm (accessed 30 March 2006).

3. Kazakhstan: Reducing Nuclear Dangers, Increasing Global Security

(Washington, DC: Embassy of Kazakhstan and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 

2004), 62.
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22

4. Emily E. Daughtry, “Forging Relationships, Preventing Proliferation: A 

Decade of Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] in Central Asia,” In the Tracks 

of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s Path to the Twenty-First Century, edited by Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2004), 325.

5. This funding would reach $172.9 million by 31 January 1999. Kazakhstan: The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, “Defense and Military 

Contracts,” http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/kazakst/forasst/thectrpr.

htm#contacts (accessed 10 February 2006); Daughtry, “Forging Relationships,” 325 (see chap. 2, note 4); and Rueckert, On-Site Inspection, 193 (see 

chap. 2, note 2).

6. Rueckert, On-Site Inspection, 26 (see chap. 2, note 2); Smith, Breaking 

Away, 74–75 (see chap. 2, note 2); Harahan, On-Site Inspections (see chap. 2, 

note 2); “US Experts Advise Kazakhstan on Implementation of START,” Remarks by US ambassador Linton Brooks and nuclear expert Dr. Edward Ifft, 

19 August 1994, http://www.fas.org/news/kazakh/940819-357639.htm 

(accessed 30 March 2006); and “DTRA Fact Sheet: Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (START) Inspection and Monitoring Sites in the Former Soviet Union, 

March 2006, http://www.dtra.mil/newsservices/fact_sheets/display.cfm?fs 

=start-fsu (accessed 30 March 2006).

7. President Nazarbayev signed this agreement in Washington, DC, during 

a state visit to deposit the signed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the United 

States, United Kingdom, and Russia are the three depository states). Robert 

V. Barylski, “Kazakhstan: Military Dimensions of State Formation over Central Asia’s Civilizational Fault Lines,” Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and 

Yugoslav Successor States, edited by Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel 

Zirker (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 136; and Daughtry, “Forging 

Relationships,” 337 (see chap. 2, note 4).

8. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The 

Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces (Ann Arbor, MI: The University 

of Michigan Press, 1999), 53; and Daughtry, “Forging Relationships,” 324 

(see chap. 2, note 4).

9. For a number of reasons, the Defense and Military Contact (DMC) program within the CTR program faced challenges in the early years in expending funds, and therefore funding has been erratic: the total 1994 allocation 

(for all of the former Soviet Union) was $13.6 million; 1995, $5 million; and 

1996, $10 million. Katherine E. Johnson, “Sustaining Nuclear Threat Reduction Programs: The ‘Bottom-Up’ Approach,” in Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. 

and NIS [Newly Independent States] Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, eds. John M. Shields and William C. Potter, 

(London, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), 247 and 408 (appendix: CTR Funding by 

Country, 1 July 1996); and Kazakhstan (see chap. 2, note 5).

10. Initially, these other funding sources included Official Representation 

Funds (ORF), used primarily to support dignitary visits, and commander in 

chief (CINC) Initiative Funds (CIF), the latter now known as Combatant Commander Initiative Funds (CIF). CIF, authorized under Title 10 United States 

Code (USC) section 166a, had been used since at least January 1990 for bi-
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23

lateral and multilateral activities with foreign military personnel, including 

joint exercises, military training and education, and bilateral and regional 

cooperation programs; USEUCOM used it extensively for its military contact 

programs during the early years of the program. DOD Directive 7250.13, Official Representation Funds, 17 February 2005, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/725013p.pdf; DOD Directive 7280.4, Commander in 

Chief’s (CINC’s) Initiative Fund (CIF), 26 October 1993; and Smith, Breaking 

Away, 43 (see chap. 2, note 2).

11. For a history of the development of USEUCOM’s military contact program, see Robert T. Cossaboom, The Joint Contact Team Program: Contacts 

with the Former Soviet Republics and Warsaw Pact Nations, 1992–1994

(Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, 1997).

12. “U.S.–Kazakstan Agreement to Seal Up World’s Largest Nuclear Test 

Tunnel Complex,” DOD News Release. Reference number 536–95, 3 October 

1995, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctr/news/95-10-03.html

13. National Security Strategy, 20 (see chap. 2, note 1).

14. IMET provides military training and education to selected foreign military and defense-associated civilian personnel on a grant basis. Training is 

provided in the United States or overseas by US military or civilian personnel 

or contractors. In 1976 Congress separated military training from the Military Assistance Program by establishing the IMET program. The original intent was twofold: (1) to encourage effectively mutual beneficial relations and 

increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in 

furtherance of goals of international peace and security; and (2) to improve 

the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their own resources, 

including defense articles and services obtained from the United States, with 

maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such 

countries. IMET is not the only program through which foreign countries can 

receive US military training—it may also be purchased through the FMS program using national funds or FMF grant funds. John A. Cope, International 

Military Education and Training: An Assessment, McNair Paper 44 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, October 1995), 5–6; and Management 

of Security Assistance (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, June 2001), 543–46, 808.

15. Cope, International Military Education and Training, 42 (see chap. 2, 

note 14).

16. Fiscal Year 1995 allocations were Belarus, $100 thousand; Estonia, 

$200 thousand; Georgia, $75 thousand; Kazakhstan, $100 thousand; Kyrgyzstan, $50 thousand; Latvia, $200 thousand; Lithuania, $200 thousand; Moldova, $50 thousand; Russia, $700 thousand; Turkmenistan, $50 thousand; 

Ukraine, $600 thousand; Uzbekistan, $50 thousand. Congressional Presentation for Building Democracy, Fiscal Year 1995 (Washington, DC: Department 

of State, 1995), 27, 43–44.

17. Ibid., 89, 91, 124, 127, 136–37.

18. Ibid., 137; Congressional Presentation, Foreign Operations: Fiscal Year 

1996 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1996), 199–200; and Congres-
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24

sional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1997 (Washington, DC: 

Department of State, 1997), 155.

19. History of the George C. Marshall Center, http://www.marshallcenter

.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-mc-about-1/xdocs/mc/factsheets-history/ 

01-center.htm (accessed 27 February 2006; and author with Graduate Support Office, Marshall Center, correspondence, 13 February 2006.

20. Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries, 65 (see chap. 2, note 8); 

and Program in Advanced Security Studies, http://www.marshallcenter.org/

site-graphic/lang-en/page-coll-pass-1/xdocs/coll/pass/pass-overview.htm 

(accessed 27 February 2006). The Web site offers the following description of 

the program:

The PASS is a 12-week advanced course of study for security affairs professionals. It consists of both a core curriculum, which all participants take, and a series of elective seminars, from which participants may select based on their 

professional needs and interests. Designed for military officers in the ranks of lieutenant through colonel, as well as 

Ministry of Defense civilians, diplomats, national law enforcement officers, and officials from all ministries that deal with 

domestic and international security matters, the PASS will be 

offered three times in 2006.

The PASS, taught in English, German, and Russian, consists of core studies, electives, and field studies augmented 

by assigned readings, seminar discussions, debates, panels 

and role-playing exercises. Students must be proficient in 

one of the three languages . . . .

The Executive Program in Advanced Security Studies (EPASS) is designed for men and women, over the age of 35, that 

serve [sic] as lieutenant colonels, colonels, senior diplomats, 

parliamentary staffers, or equivalent ranks in internal, national security or border control agencies. The Leaders Program in Advanced Security Studies (LPASS) provides a forum 

for younger men and women, ages 25–35, serving as lieutenants through majors, young diplomats, and civilian counterparts serving in government agencies responsible for security 

issues. 
25

Chapter 3

Expansion

The goal is to prepare in advance, so that if we are ever 

called to do a mission like this, we are not meeting people 

for the first time.

—Brig Gen Martin R. Berndt

explaining the CENTRASBAT

exercise in September 1997

The period from 1996 though 1998 marked a steep increase 

in US security-cooperation efforts in Central Asia. Although 

funding for the denuclearization efforts began to decline, funding for the IMET program tripled, funding for new initiatives 

such as the ICP and FMF was initiated, military contacts and 

exchange visits expanded and deepened, and many of the securitycooperation programs began to focus on a new unit, the 

CENTRASBAT. By the end of this period, USCENTCOM had 

assumed responsibility for military relationships in Central 

Asia. Most of the increase in activities was with Kazakhstan 

and Uzbekistan, and, to a lesser degree, Kyrgyzstan. Turkmenistan, with a foreign policy of positive neutrality, limited its 

interaction with the US military; Tajikistan was still suffering 

from its civil war.

Roots of Expansion

There are a number of factors that contributed to the dramatic expansion of the security-cooperation programs in Central Asia. Most importantly, by the end of 1995, the nuclear 

weapons in Kazakhstan had been secured, eliminating what 

had been the primary and most immediate concern for the 

United States. The ballistic and cruise missile warheads were 

returned to Russia by April 1995, and the last nuclear device 

in Kazakhstan, in limbo at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site 

since 1990, was destroyed in May. Although much more work 

remained on the program (the SS-18 ICBMs were returned to 

Russia in September 1996 and the missile silos destroyed in 
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26

September 1999), the initial concerns regarding the nuclear 

warheads had been resolved.1 Both the United States and 

Kazakhstan viewed these initial denuclearization efforts as 

successes in military cooperation, and senior policy officials 

and military officers in both countries were ready to build on 

those achievements. 

Additionally, US perspectives on the role of security cooperation had continued to evolve during the early years of the Clinton administration. Security-cooperation activities were now 

seen as valuable tools to support engagement, the process of 

assisting the political and economic transformations in Eurasia, and in doing so expanding the number of nations with 

democratic governments and open economic systems. Engagement, in short, would lead to enlargement of stable, secure, 

prosperous, and free states—as described in the 1995 National 

Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.

2 This new 

perspective fundamentally altered the role of US military forces 

in peacetime. Armed forces were no longer simply preparing 

and training for the next war. Instead, they were a critical tool 

used to promote US foreign policy objectives: 

The U.S. military plays an essential role in building coalitions and shaping the international environment in ways that protect and promote 

U.S. interests. Through means such as the forward stationing or deployment of forces, defense cooperation and security assistance, and 

training and exercises with allies and friends, our armed forces help to 

promote regional stability, deter aggression and coercion, prevent and 

reduce conflicts and threats, and serve as role models for militaries in 

emerging democracies.3

In 1995 the United States still had hopes that the Central 

Asian states would continue the modest steps taken toward 

political and economic reforms, although in reality very little 

had been accomplished. But a new concern arose: potential 

Russian monopolization of the energy infrastructure in Central 

Asia. By this time, it was clear that the oil and natural gas deposits in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan could 

form a significant percentage of the world’s energy resources, 

and Washington wanted to ensure Moscow did not control their 

exploitation and shipment to the West. At the time, all of the 

existing oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia transited Russia, 

giving Moscow a monopoly in the export and distribution process. Promoting new pipelines that did not transit Russia had 
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27

both a practical and a political aspect: while it would help guarantee free access to these resources, Washington also saw the 

development of the oil and gas deposits as the platform for economic prosperity and political development in Central Asia.4

These factors drove the Clinton administration to adopt a 

more active foreign policy in Central Asia, but also to alter its 

foreign policy toward Russia with regard to Moscow’s involvement in the Caucasian and Central Asian states and their energy resources. Washington had originally viewed a democratizing Russia as a source for stability and security in these 

southern areas. By the mid-1990s, however, US officials had 

concluded this approach had failed. Although Russia had strategically and militarily withdrawn from the region, except for 

the deployment of forces in Tajikistan, it continued to deal with 

the Central Asian states with a heavy hand. The United States 

sought to promote the independence and sovereignty of the 

Central Asian states as a means of decreasing Russian influence, and in doing so increase the potential of these nations to 

adopt political and economic reforms. This challenge toward 

Russian hegemony in Central Asia marked the beginning of a 

new rivalry.

Washington’s approaches to Central Asia were not unwelcome. 

By the mid-1990s, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan 

were eager to develop new military ties with Western nations, 

particularly the United States. The defense structures of the 

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had proved to be 

completely inadequate, and Russia had quickly established bilateral military agreements with each nation to provide structure and continuity to the relationships. The Central Asian 

states largely welcomed the support, but by the mid-1990s had 

recognized its limitations. The Russian military was collapsing—

deployments in Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan and the strategic morass in Chechnya left little to offer. Almaty, Bishkek, 

and Tashkent began searching for additional security partners, 

particularly in the West. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan sought to 

balance new relationships with their existing ties to Russia, 

but Uzbekistan sought a strategic shift, and ultimately saw the 

United States as its primary partner.5

An important element of the desire to seek outside partners 

was the state of development of the armed forces of these nations. 
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28

Through this period, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, 

and Uzbekistan continued to grow, stabilize, and mature their 

armed forces. All had established their own defense ministries, 

and most had created specific offices within them responsible 

for international military cooperation.6 Kazakhstan’s first defense 

attaché to the United States, Lt Col Muslim M. Altynbayev, the 

son of Defense Minister Col Gen Mukhtar Altynbayev, was accredited by the DOD in May 1997.7 The establishment of these 

organizations and the growth of indigenous capabilities meant 

these forces were better poised to absorb the increased programs offered by the United States.

A bureaucratic constituency similarly began to develop within 

the Departments of Defense and State that could advocate for 

increased resources and attention. By 1995 defense attachés 

had been assigned to the embassies in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan; attachés would be assigned to the other countries in 

1997.8 Desk officers within various offices in the Defense and 

State Departments were specifically assigned to manage these 

growing programs in Central Asia and, by extension, the relationships with these countries. Offices, organizations, and commands no longer viewed security cooperation with Central Asia 

as a adjunct to the programs in Eastern Europe and Russia, 

but strategically important in its own right.

By the mid-1990s, the conditions were set for the United 

States to increase its military cooperation activities in Central 

Asia. Additional resources were found, new programs were 

added, and new relationships were built. Through its security 

-cooperation programs, the United States sought to balance its 

relationship to Kazakhstan with a new one involving Uzbekistan. At the time, many observers saw Uzbekistan to be the key 

to regional stability and advocated that Tashkent should receive primacy in US foreign policy in the region. Frederick Starr, 

soon to be the director of the new Central Asia–Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University, argued in an influential Foreign Affairs article in early 1996 that Uzbekistan was “uniquely 

positioned to anchor the security of the region.”9 His thoughts 

were echoed by Zbigniew Brzezinski and others, including Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, who praised Uzbekistan as 

“an island of stability.”10 Nonetheless, US policy sought a balance between Tashkent and Almaty in this period, and security 
EXPANSION

29

assistance funding continued to favor Kazakhstan, if only by a 

small amount.11

The United States and Uzbekistan initiated this new relationship when, on 13 October 1995, Secretary Perry and Uzbekistani 

minister of defense Lt Gen Rustam Akmedov signed a “Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on Defense and 

Military Relations,” similar to the framework document agreed 

to by Kazakhstan in early 1994.12 Both of these agreements 

established bilateral working groups (BWG) between the United 

States and each country. These working groups would meet on 

an annual basis to negotiate the broad areas of cooperation the 

two countries would undertake during the following year. The 

results of the BWGs were captured in a Plan of Cooperation 

that was signed by the secretary of defense and the respective 

minister of defense. The United States conducted separate 

BWGs with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan that outlined cooperative efforts for 1996, providing a certain measure of structure 

to the activities. Washington wanted to avoid favoring one over 

the other, so along with relatively equal levels of funding and 

comparative levels of interaction, it promoted multilateral initiatives such as CENTRASBAT to encourage regional cooperation 

and reduce Russian influence.

Denuclearization

Denuclearization and democratization continued to be important objectives for the expanded security-cooperation efforts, but they became increasingly disconnected. Although the 

denuclearization effort originally spawned the military contacts 

program, one of the original methods for promoting democratization, by the mid-1990s these activities were almost completely 

separate. Part of this was due to the elimination of nuclear 

weapons in Kazakhstan, which meant there was no longer a 

need to establish military ties designed specifically to defuse a 

potential nuclear crisis; instead, the defense ties established 

through the military contact programs primarily were used to 

promote other objectives. Additionally, the CTR program increasingly used US (and occasionally Kazakh or Russian) contractors to carry out the actual activities in Kazakhstan, thereby 

reducing the interaction between uniformed members of the 
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30

two military forces. Bureaucratically, the denuclearization effort was executed by the OSD, the Defense Special Weapons 

Agency (DSWA),13 and the OSIA, while the military contact programs generally were conducted by the combatant commands 

such as USEUCOM, USACOM, and USPACOM.14 Likewise, the 

bureaucratic structures in the Central Asian states separated 

the two activities. In Kazakhstan, denuclearization and arms 

control activities were managed by the Kazakhstan Center for 

Monitoring Arms Reductions and Supporting Inspection Activities (established in 1992, but beginning actual operations in 

1995), while other security cooperation programs were managed by the International Military Cooperation Department 

within the Ministry of Defense.15 As DOD agencies (including 

those conducting the CTR Program) began to increase their attention on proliferation issues, they began to work more closely 

with nonmilitary organizations within Kazakhstan, such as the 

Customs Service and Border Guards. (Although frequent restructuring and reorganization of governments ministries 

within Kazakhstan meant these services were occasionally subordinated to the Ministry of Defense.) Finally, USEUCOM, 

which conducted a significant percentage of the military contact events during the early years, increasingly linked those 

activities with programs such as the Marshall Center to reinforce the concept of democratization.

Proliferation Prevention

The CTR program continued to eliminate the remaining vestiges of the nuclear weapons infrastructure in Kazakhstan, but 

the emphasis and funding slowly began to shift toward securing and eliminating biological and chemical weapons and toward preventing the proliferation of the materials, technology, 

and knowledge needed to develop any type of weapon of mass 

destruction (WMD).

Based on the personal relationships established through the 

denuclearization effort, US and Kazakh officials agreed in June 

1996 to jointly eliminate a legacy of the vast Soviet biological 

weapons program, the anthrax production facilities at Stepnogorsk, (for which $5 million was specifically authorized by Congress). Other initiatives soon followed, including an agreement 
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31

to eliminate partially constructed chemical weapons facilities 

at Pavlodar and the expansion of the CTR program to Uzbekistan. In 1997, under a temporary umbrella agreement with the 

Uzbekistani Ministry of Defense, DOD began a five-year program to eliminate the chemical weapons production facility at 

Nukus, and, in October 2001, started to demilitarize the biological weapons testing range at Vozrozhdeniye Island.16 Securing and eliminating biological and chemical weapons formed the 

core of the CTR program’s work in Central Asia for the next six 

to seven years (table A.6 and figure A.5, appendix A).

The CTR program also initiated proliferation prevention efforts 

in Central Asia, but these were soon shifted to other agencies. 

From its inception, the CTR program included the objective of 

improving export controls and border security in recipient nations in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials. 

In Kazakhstan, this effort included assistance in drafting the 

necessary legislation to support the new State Border Service 

and Customs Service and building infrastructure, but it also 

included the first transfer of equipment to Kazakhstani security forces. Six patrol boats, including five 27-foot Boston Whalers and one 42-foot Sea Ark, were delivered in late 1995 and 

early 1996 to assist with enforcement capabilities on the Caspian Sea. Originally intended for the Kazakhstani Customs 

Service, a ministerial restructuring meant these boats were ultimately delivered to the new Kazakhstani Navy, which was 

given the responsibility of maritime security. (Another ministerial reorganization in 1999 shifted these patrol boats to the 

State Border Service.) In conjunction with the transfer of the 

patrol boats, the US Army Corps of Engineers conducted a Port 

Engineering Infrastructure Survey at Aktau and Bautino, Kazakhstan, in July 1996. At the time, the Kazakhstani Ministry 

of Defense planned to establish a naval headquarters and training institute at Aktau, and the port survey was intended to 

determine its suitability for military use.17

At the end of 1995, however, the export controls initiative 

was removed from the CTR Program and the Defense Department and transferred to the Department of State, becoming the 

EXBS Program.18 In 1995 Congress mandated DOD and the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) establish a joint program 

to “deter, interdict, and prevent the possible proliferation and 
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32

acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by organized crime groups and individuals” within the former Soviet 

Union, primarily through law enforcement training and the 

provision of some equipment. Similarly, in 1997 DOD established a joint effort with the US Customs Service (USCS), now 

part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to improve 

the counterproliferation capabilities of border services. While 

this program included some training, it primarily focused on 

providing equipment.19 These two programs have been combined under the title of the ICP. Funding for the program has 

been modest—just over $3 million was spent in Central Asia 

from 1995 through 1999 (table A.4, appendix A).20

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were the first nations in Central 

Asia to benefit from the ICP. Joint DOD-FBI teams traveled to 

Almaty and Tashkent in late 1996 to explain the program and 

conduct country assessments. Both countries were invited to 

send delegations to the DOD-FBI-sponsored WMD Executive 

Seminars held in Budapest, Hungary; the Kazakh representatives attended in June 1997 and the Uzbeks in August. Kyrgyzstan was also admitted to the program in August 1997 and 

attended the seminar the following February. Soon the ICP program began executing events in Central Asia: ICP teams managed a colloquium on legal issues in Uzbekistan in April 1998 

and conducted a series of training events in Druzbha, Aktau, 

and Almaty in July. Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek delegations also 

attended training through the ICP at the Department of Energy’s 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Radiation Academy in 

Washington State in October 1998.21

Democratization

Simultaneously, the efforts to promote democratization within 

the military forces in Central Asia also began to narrow its focus toward more specific objectives, although this development 

was slow, uneven, and generally applicable only to Kazakhstan. Two specific objectives were deliberately identified through 

bilateral Plans of Cooperation—noncommissioned officer professional development and defense resource management—and 

one emerged through opportunity rather than deliberate planning—civil-military relations in the context of disaster response. 
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33

Military Contacts Program

The military contacts program matured and expanded during this period, assisted by several new initiatives. In 1992, as 

USEUCOM solidified its JCTP as the military contact program 

with nations of East Europe and the European portion of the 

former Soviet Union, the National Guard Bureau in Washington, DC, proposed creating a parallel State Partnership Program

(SPP) to link specific state National Guard organizations with 

these same nations. The SPP started in the Baltic region (largely 

because the withdrawal of Soviet forces left these new states 

with no military forces, institutions, or equipment) with agreements signed in early 1993 with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 

but soon grew to include most of the nations in the region.22

Kazakhstan was partnered with Arizona in 1993, but events 

did not start until 1995; Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were partnered in 1996 (table 2). (Tajikistan was eventually partnered in 2002.) 

The SPP offered many advantages: having the National Guard 

as a resource ensured the military contact programs were not 

unduly affected by the major reductions in the active duty force 

structure through the 1990s; the Guard’s role as citizen-soldiers 

provided increased exposure to the concepts of civil-military 

relations, and the SPP included opportunities for broad governmental, academic, and commercial ties between these states 

and nations.23 The National Guard units began to conduct an 

increasing number of the military contact events each year.

The second initiative started with NATO. In January 1994 at 

the Brussels Summit, NATO leaders established the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program as a means of developing practical 

Table 2. State Partnership Program (SPP) agreements

Country Partner State Date of Agreement

Kazakhstan Arizona 31 August 1993

Kyrgyzstan Montana 30 July 1996

Tajikistan Virginia 20 October 2003

Turkmenistan Nevada 30 July 1996

Uzbekistan Louisiana 30 July 1996

(Reprinted from National Guard Bureau, International Affairs [J5-IA)] http://www.ngb.army.mil/ia/

states/states_map%5B1%5D.htm.)
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34

military ties with its former adversaries in the Warsaw Pact 

that would lead to partnerships, and for some, membership. 

These ties were bilateral between NATO and the partner nation, 

but the structure and many of the specific events conducted 

under this program fostered increased multilateral ties. A nation joined the PfP program by signing a Framework Document, 

in which it commits:

to preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles of international law; to fulfill obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and international 

disarmament and arms control agreements; to refrain from the threat 

or use of force against other states; to respect existing borders; and to 

settle disputes peacefully. . . . to promote transparency in national defense planning and budgeting to establish democratic control over 

armed forces, and to develop the capacity for joint action with NATO in 

peacekeeping and humanitarian operations . . . The Framework Document also enshrines a commitment by the Allies to consult with any 

Partner country that perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, 

political independence or security.24

The partner nation defines the areas in which it wishes to 

cooperate through a presentation document and then develops, 

in concert with NATO, an Individual Partnership Program (IPP) 

describing specific events that will help it meet its goals. These 

events could be conducted by a NATO organization or by a 

NATO member state under the PfP program. Over time, this 

process can ultimately lead some nations to a Membership Action Plan, which identifies the specific actions necessary to be 

eligible for full membership within NATO (table 3).

Most nations in Central Asia joined PfP soon after it was announced but it took until mid-1996 for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

and Uzbekistan to develop their first IPPs. NATO’s interest and 

Table 3. Partnership for Peace (PfP) program framework documents

Country Date Signatory

Kazakhstan 27 May 1994 Foreign Minister Saudabayev

Kyrgyzstan 1 June 1994 President Akayev

Tajikistan 20 February 2002 Ambassador Rahimov

Turkmenistan 10 May 1994 Foreign Minister Shikmuradov

Uzbekistan 13 July 1994 Foreign Minister Saidkasimov

(Reprinted from NATO Partnership for Peace Web site http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm.)
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involvement in Central Asia remained limited throughout the 

1990s with only a limited number of multinational events such 

as personnel exchanges, exercises, seminars, and conferences, 

often conducted by the United States or Turkey. The Central 

Asian states have been reluctant participants in NATO activities, 

however, preferring bilateral relationships whenever possible, 

and in recent years a number of NATO nations have established bilateral security cooperation programs to complement 

those done via the NATO channels. Often specific NATO activities are conducted by a single lead country such as Turkey and 

are often portrayed or perceived in country as bilateral activities.25 Until 2002 the focus of these efforts was largely on civilmilitary cooperation, defense reform, civil defense and emergency 

response, peacekeeping, and with a few scientific and educational exchanges. While many of these efforts have continued, 

much more effort is now given to counterterrorism and counterdrug trafficking initiatives. But the PfP program helped reinforce US objectives of denuclearization and democratization 

and offered additional tangible objectives for its security cooperation efforts—increasing the interoperability of the Central 

Asian military forces so they could participate in NATO-led 

peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.26

To encourage the development of the PfP program, in July 

1994 at a NATO meeting in Warsaw, Poland, Pres. William J. 

Clinton announced his intent to ask Congress for up to $100 

million in funding for a new Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF).27

These funds could be used to fund partner nation participation 

in exercises, seminars, conferences, and other events that were 

either part of the nation’s PfP program or that were agreed to be 

“in the spirit of” the PfP objectives. WIF could also be used to 

fund interoperability programs, including equipment transfers 

(table 4).

Only a few of these WIF interoperability programs, including 

the environmental exchanges, defense planning seminars, and 

defense resource management studies (DRMS) were implemented in Central Asia, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were 

the primary recipients. Some were more successful than others: the defense environmental assessments and exchanges 

later became an important element of the military contact program, but the resource management studies were ultimately 
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cancelled in 1998–1999 because USCENTCOM planners believed the training was not effective and the Kazakhstanis and 

Uzbekistanis were not focused on the effort.28

Beyond promoting increasing interoperability and integration with NATO, the WIF program offered the practical benefit 

of offering an additional source of funding, beyond CTR and 

Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (CIF), for the military 

contact programs. This funding became available in 1996, with 

$1.125 million allocated for events with Kazakhstan, $25 thousand for Kyrgyzstan, $25 thousand for Turkmenistan, and 

$1.375 million for Uzbekistan allocated for that year. 

Another source of funding for military contact events, known 

as the traditional commander in chief (CINC) activities (TCA) 

program, was initiated in 1996 specifically to support the foreign military interactions by the unified commanders. With 

certain restrictions, TCA funds could be used for:

•  Military liaison teams

•  Traveling contact teams

•  State Partnership Programs

•  Regional conferences and seminars

•  Personnel and information exchanges

•  Unit exchanges

Table 4. Interoperability programs eligible for Warsaw Initiative Fund 

(WIF) funding

Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence studiesRegional airspace studies

Logistics exchanges Navigation aids studies

Public affairs exchanges Civil-military planning seminars

Legislative affairs exchanges Infrastructure assessments

Environmental exchanges Defense assessments and studies

Inspector general exchanges Defense planning seminars

Comptroller exchanges Defense resource management studies

Parliamentary exchanges Partnership information management

(Reprinted from DOD Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual [Washington, 

DC: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, March 2006], 514.)
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•  Staff assistance/assessment visits

•  Training program review and assessments

•  Ship rider programs

•  Joint/Combined exercise observers

•  Combined exercises

•  Humanitarian civic assistance projects

•  Bilateral staff talks

•  Host nation medical and dental support meetings

•  Guard and Reserve participation in these types of programs

•  Program administration29

CTR and WIF, however, remained the most common sources of 

funding for military contact programs, and USCENTCOM, after 

it took over responsibility for the military contact program in 

Central Asia in 1999, seldom used TCA, reserving it for use 

with nations in the Middle East that were not eligible to receive 

CTR and WIF funding.30

In 1995, for the first time, the DOD developed bilateral annual military contact plans with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 

that attempted to capture all of the contact events scheduled 

for the following year. The number of events for each country 

grew dramatically as well. The program with Kazakhstan, for 

example, had 19 scheduled events for 1996, 26 for 1997, and 

41 for 1998; for Uzbekistan 14, 18, and 39, respectively (table 5).

Table 5. Military contact events planned with the Central Asian states, 

1996–1999

1996 1997 1998 1999

Kazakhstan 19 26 41 40

Kyrgyzstan 12 22

Turkmenistan 7 15

Uzbekistan 14 18 39 34

Adapted from Director of Strategy and Plans, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bilateral Military Contact 

Plans, Planning Reference Book, 2000 Joint Chiefs of Staff/Office of the Secretary of Defense Planning Conference for the NIS Peacetime Engagement, Washington, DC, June 1999.

Note: Although military contact events may have been conducted with Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan 

prior to 1998, formal plans were not developed until then.
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The plans do not tell the entire story, as some events each 

year were cancelled while others were added, but the growth in 

the program is evident. In August 1998, the US defense attaché 

in Tashkent, for example, noted that while 17 events were actually conducted in 1995, 27 were conducted in 1996, and 54 

events in 1998.31 Unfortunately, few records were kept on the 

number, type, or details of the military contact events that were 

executed in these countries. 

As these events were conducted by a variety of commands 

(USEUCOM, USPACOM, USACOM, USCENTCOM, and the national guards from the SPP states), there was little focus to the 

individual military contact plans. Kazakhstan, which had the 

largest quantity of military contact events from 1996 through 

1999 (for which the planning was done in 1995 through 1998), 

also had the largest range of visits, covering 25 separate topics 

over the four year period. Many of these topics, including the 

counternarcotics, legal, military police, air traffic control, communications, chaplain, financial management, personnel management, public affairs, engineering, logistics, and transportation functional areas, had only a single information exchange 

visit, raising the question of how useful these visits were in 

practical terms of influencing the development of the Kazakhstani armed forces. However, three main themes for cooperation began to figure prominently in the military contact plans 

of these countries through this period: officer and noncommissioned officer professional development programs, civil-military 

cooperation in response to natural disasters, and military medical 

operations. These three themes accounted for over 40 percent 

of the military contact events conducted in Central Asia during 

this period.32

However, the military contacts program was not coming close 

to achieving its primary objective of democratizing the armed 

forces of the Central Asian states, and it is not clear that the US 

planners involved in developing the events recognized democratization as a goal. The Military Contacts Program is authorized under United States Code Title 10, Section 168, specifically states: “The Secretary of Defense may conduct 

military-to-military contacts and comparable activities that are 

designed to encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries.”33 As de-
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scribed by Dr. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, “the legal basis of 

the program clearly supports military democratization activities aimed at influencing the ideological orientation of the participant states.” Yet only about 40 percent of the planned contact events during this period could be considered as promoting 

a democratic orientation in this region. Surprisingly, almost 80 

percent of those planned for Turkmenistan fall in this category 

(primarily because of the emphasis on events relating to civilmilitary responses to disasters), while the statistics for the other 

countries fall off dramatically: 53 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 40 

percent in Kazakhstan, and 30 percent in Uzbekistan.34

Education and Training Programs

Commensurate with the expansion in military contacts was 

a vast expansion of the training and education programs, including increased attendance at the Marshall Center (which, 

incidentally, was included on the military contact plans for 

each country). Whereas only 14 individuals from Central Asia 

attended courses at the Marshall Center in 1994, on average 

26 attended each year between 1995 and 1997, and 46 in 1998. 

(Many others attended shorter conferences at the Marshall 

Center.) The Marshall Center also began sponsoring conferences within the region that focused on democratization; the 

first of which was in Tashkent in August 1996 on “Democratic 

Oversight, Civil-Military Relations, and Regional Stability and 

Security in Central Asia” and the second in Almaty in December 1997.

Significant increases in IMET funding began in 1996.35 IMET 

funding for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which totaled $370 thousand in 1995, more than tripled 

to $1.125 million in 1996, and grew steadily for the next several 

years. The State and Defense Departments continued to advocate for the IMET funding by stressing its role in promoting 

democratic reform in the region, arguing that the training provided by these funds would help establish military forces supportive of the “democratic and economic transition and committed to a durable pattern of cooperation with the West.” 

Initially most of this funding continued to be used primarily for 

English language training, both for student attending follow-on 
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courses and for training English language instructors, but the 

increased funding allowed Central Asian military officers to 

also attend courses in maritime search and rescue, military 

justice, defense resource management, and infantry training.36

Central Asian officials were eager to take advantage of this opportunity; even Turkmenistani president Niyazov allowed one 

of his lieutenants to attend infantry officer training in the 

United States.37

Another of the important aspects of the expansion of the IMET 

program was having sufficient funding to allow offering seats to 

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan at US staff and war colleges.38 Each 

of the US military services operates its own tiered educational 

system, known collectively as professional military education 

(PME), for the development of its officer corps, with specific 

schools and colleges for selected officers as they progress in 

rank. Initially, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were invited to attend the staff colleges for mid-grade officers (majors and lieutenant colonels, lieutenant commanders and commanders); the 

curriculum at these schools lasts a full academic year. The first 

Kazakhstani officers graduated from the Army Command and 

General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and 

the College of Naval Command and Staff (CNSC) in Newport, 

Rhode Island, in 1997 and from the Air Command and Staff 

College (ACSC) at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in 1998; the first 

Uzbekistani officers graduated from ACSC in 1997 and CNSC 

in 1998 (table B.4, appendix B). These courses, although 

among the most expensive offered through the IMET program, 

are the best methods for providing professional education, appreciation of US perspectives on democratic principles, and 

exposure to American life because of their length, exposure to 

American military counterparts, and opportunities to live in 

American communities. 

Expanded IMET Program

The continuing emphasis on using security cooperation program to promote democratic reform was encouraged by a modification to the IMET Program mandated by Congress in 1991. 

Known as Expanded IMET (E-IMET), it had two significant implications. First, training could be provided to civilian personnel 
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outside of the ministries of defense whose duties include defense 

or security-related issues, such as individuals in the legislative 

branch or members of a nongovernmental organization. Second, a percentage of each country’s IMET allocation was required to be used for courses that emphasized themes that 

supported democratization:

•  Respect for democracy and civilian rule of law, including 

the principle of civilian control of the military

•  Respect for internationally recognized standards of human 

rights

•  Military justice systems in democratic societies

•  Responsible defense resource management39

Some countries with poor human rights records, such as Indonesia and Guatemala, were permitted to take only courses 

that qualified under the E-IMET program (this restriction was 

lifted from Indonesia in 2005). Initially the requirement to use 

a certain percentage of funding on E-IMET courses was politically sensitive in some countries, but as a condition of receiving aid it proved very effective. After a few years it was dropped 

as increasing numbers of courses had their curriculums modified 

to qualify as E-IMET and as countries requested valued courses, 

such as attendance at staff and war colleges (described below), 

that met the criteria. Currently, security assistance program 

managers simply seek to find a balance between E-IMET 

courses and technical training, and E-IMET courses have consistently made up a significant portion of the education and 

training courses offered to the Central Asian military forces 

under the IMET program. Appendix D provides a listing of 

courses that qualify under the E-IMET Program.

The Expanded IMET program spawned institutes which offered programs specifically designed to meet the goals of promoting military justice systems, defense resource management, 

and civil-military relations. The Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS), which originated as the International Training Detachment of the Navy Justice School at Newport, Rhode Island, began providing courses named Disciplined 

Military Operations and Military Justice in Kazakhstan and 
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Uzbekistan, respectively, in 1996, and to date has trained over 

400 students from Central Asia (table B.5, appendix B). The 

Defense Resource Management Institute (DRMI) at the Naval 

Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California, received its 

first in-residence students from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 

1996, and subsequently trained a total of 87 students from the 

region through in-residence courses and mobile education 

teams (MET) (table B.6, appendix B). A third specialized institution, the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), also at 

the NPS, accepted its first students from Central Asia in 2003 

(table B.7, appendix B).

Military Academies and Flight Training

Two other specialized training and education opportunities, 

not part of the IMET program, were also offered in Central Asia 

during this period: attendance at the military service academies and participation in flight training. In 1998 the United 

States invited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan to 

nominate promising young individuals to attend the US service 

academies: the US Military Academy at West Point, New York; 

the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, and the US Air 

Force Academy at Colorado Springs, Colorado.40 The nominees 

were required to meet the same stringent physical and educational application requirements as US applicants to be selected. 

(Frequently foreign nominees are academically deficient because of the differences in education systems or due to poor 

English language skills.) There are nearly 10 thousand applicants each year for each academy, and less than 20 foreign 

students are admitted to each one. Foreign students are fully 

integrated into every aspect of the academy program and upon 

graduation are awarded a bachelor’s degree and are expected 

to be commissioned in the armed forces of their parent nation.

Kyrgyzstan was the first to have a nominee selected—Cadet 

Marat Davletshin entered West Point in 1998 and graduated 

with the Class of 2002—and has been the most successful, with 

a total of five individuals accepted at three academies. Kyrgyzstan currently has two students at West Point, both of whom will 

graduate in 2008 and, despite a lack of a navy or a significant air 

force, a student at the US Naval Academy and one at the US Air 
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Force Academy, both in the class of 2007. Kazakhstan has had 

two graduates from West Point (in 2004 and 2005), with another 

graduating in 2007 (table B.8, appendix B, and fig. 3).41

The second specialized training opportunity was the ALP, 

funded by the US Air Force through its normal operating budget. Established first in 1996, ALP offered a year of English 

language training followed by a year of flight training at Columbus AFB, Mississippi, in T-37 trainers, the same type of aircraft used by US Air Force pilots as they begin flight training. 

Upon graduation, the foreign officer is awarded US Air Force 

flight wings. Only 20 such invitations are extended to foreign 

air forces each year, and Uzbekistan was offered a slot in 1998. 

The ALP program was discontinued between 1999 and 2001 

because the increased requirement for flight training quotas 

by the US Air Force left few available for optional security assistance programs, but when it resumed, invitations were offered to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 

(table B.9, appendix B).

Including the Central Asian states in these specialized, long 

duration, training and education opportunities such as the 

service academies and the ALP program, while supporting the 

Figure 3. Kazakhstani Cadet Elena Milyuk with US general Richard 

Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the West Point graduation, 

June 2005 (Reprinted from the collection of Col Assylbek Mendygaliev, 

defense attaché of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Used with permission.)
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objective of promoting democratization within the armed forces, 

had a secondary objective. These programs were considered to 

be long-term investments in the future military leadership of 

the armed forces of Central Asia. It was assumed that the US 

military education and training offered through the war colleges, academies, and flight training was so superior to other 

avenues that these young officers would quickly rise to positions of authority and influence as they progressed in their careers. In short, these programs specifically sought to groom 

future commanders of foreign militaries: “An ALP candidate 

should be a top graduate of the participating country’s air force 

academy or other young officer with potential to achieve top 

leadership positions in their air force.”42 The experiences these 

foreign officers gained through their long study programs in 

the United States, side-by-side with young American military 

officers and cadets, would leave them with a fundamentally 

favorable perspective of the United States, and the personal 

friendships created through these two- and four-year programs 

would pay great benefits in future years when both the American and foreign officers reached higher positions.

Regional Cooperation

A key component of US policy in Central Asia in this period 

was reducing Russian influence and integrating Central Asia 

into Western economic and political structures, and the strategy 

used to achieve this goal was to increase the national sovereignty of the Central Asian states and promote regional cooperation among them. In this way, it was believed, each of the 

nations could individually and collectively oppose Russian 

pressures in political, economic, and security matters, while 

simultaneously advancing their own political and economic reforms. Regional cooperation became a new and important objective in US security cooperation programs.

US planners, searching for a means to put policy into action, 

turned to a new initiative—the Central Asian Battalion, or 

CENTRASBAT—a combined peacekeeping unit consisting of 

companies from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. From 

the US perspective, CENTRASBAT would provide an alternative 

to Russian predominance in managing regional crises and would 
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give the Central Asian states a means to respond on their own.43 

Soon this unit and its related annual exercise would come to 

dominate US security cooperation efforts in the region.

Central Asian Battalion

In December 1995, the Council of Defense Ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan proposed the creation of a 

combined peacekeeping battalion that could operate in UNsponsored missions. This proposal was approved by the presidents of the three nations, and the concept was expanded to 

include requesting NATO assistance in training and equipping 

CENTRASBAT under the PfP program.44

With a strength of approximately 500 men, CENTRASBAT 

was to consist of a headquarters staff, three motorized rifle 

companies (one from each nation), reconnaissance and medical 

detachments, mortar and air defense batteries, and grenade 

launcher and engineering platoons. All elements of the unit, 

including those from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, were to be 

garrisoned at Zhibek-Zholy in the Chimkent region of Kazakhstan, near the border with Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan each contributed 40 percent and Kyrgyzstan 20 percent to 

the estimated $2 million annual cost of maintaining the unit.45

NATO did not rush to assist in the creation of the unit, but 

US officials were eager to get involved. CENTRASBAT offered 

several benefits. First, it could serve as a visible and active 

method for promoting regional cooperation, and it would help 

distance these nations from Russia. From the US perspective, 

even President Nazarbayev appeared to agree with this approach 

when he stated in May 1996 that the unit was not meant to 

support territorial claims against another nation, “but we don’t 

want other states to have territorial claims against us.”46 Second, 

it would help provide a nexus to focus the expanding elements 

of US security cooperation programs. Third, following its experiences in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the United States 

was eager to train other nations to take over peacekeeping duties 

in troubled spots around the world. USACOM, which had already 

hosted Kyrgyz and Uzbek detachments at Fort Polk, Louisiana, 

for Cooperative Nugget 95, a peacekeeping and refugee assistance exercise, stepped forward to lead the US participation.
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USACOM conducted two major CENTRASBAT exercises. The 

first started in August 1997 with detachments from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan undergoing airborne refresher training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. On 14 September, these 40 soldiers plus 500 members of the US 82d Airborne 

Division embarked on an 18-hour, 7,700 mile nonstop flight in 

six C-17 cargo aircraft from Pope AFB, North Carolina, to Chimkent, Kazakhstan, for the longest airborne drop in history. 

There they were joined by another 80 troops from Turkey and 

Russia, who also arrived directly from their home countries, 

and the 620 airborne troops, hit the landing zone within a short 

two-hour period. Marine Corps general John Sheehan, commander of USACOM, led the airborne drop as the first one out 

of the aircraft. On the ground, the forces practiced securing the 

Sairam airport against a simulated adversary. Joined by the 

remainder of the CENTRASBAT unit, they practiced peacekeeping skills such as controlling checkpoints, inspecting vehicles, providing humanitarian assistance, and maintaining separation 

zones. After two days of training, all but 120 of the US soldiers 

returned home, and the exercise shifted to Uzbekistan for the 

second stage, which consisted of additional peacekeeping training with Turkish, Russian, Latvian, and Georgian troops.47

CENTRABAT 97 served its purposes. First, it visibly demonstrated to Russia that the United States was engaging in a new, 

active role in promoting stability and security in Central Asia. 

General Sheehan emphasized both points when he remarked 

that the exercise indicates “the US interest that the Central 

Asian states live in stability,” and the fact that “there is no nation on the face of the earth where we can’t go.”48 These sentiments were not lost in Moscow. In less than a week, the Russian State Duma issued a statement condemning the exercise, 

claiming: “Under the guise of statements on the peacekeeping 

nature of such maneuvers, the US Armed Forces are intensively developing new potential theaters of military actions in 

the immediate vicinity of Russia’s frontiers. It cannot be ruled 

out that in the course of such long-range troop landings, a possible landing of US Army units on Russian territory is also being developed.”49

CENTRASBAT 97 also demonstrated to the Central Asian 

leaders that mutual cooperation can bring results. Sheehan 
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laid the credit directly at their doors: “Three years ago, people 

said this type of operation was not possible. I say, look at what 

is happening today. It did happen, because the three presidents [of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan] wanted it to 

happen, and the three ministers [of defense] made it happen.”50

But CENTRASBAT 97 also carried with it the seeds of its own 

demise. The exercise scenario was artificially constructed to 

include the first stage in Kazakhstan and the second in Uzbekistan to avoid slighting one of the two major participants. Seeking balance, or at least avoiding the appearance of favoritism, 

became a fundamental rule for US planners. The exercise also 

included elaborate opening and closing ceremonies which 

tended to overshadow the more mundane training aspects. In 

time, CENTRASBAT would become more of a showcase unit 

and exercise rather than one preparing for potential combat or 

peacekeeping operations. And while the Central Asians were 

generally enthusiastic participants, even to the point of painting their vehicles white with big blue UN markings, American 

observers were disappointed in their skills and concluded it 

would be years before CENTRASBAT became a viable unit. Retired US Army major general James Johnson, then serving as 

DOD’s military representative to Central Asia, remarked: “As 

far as it went, the training conducted for this exercise was good, 

but it didn’t teach proficiency. The 82d’s training doctrine is to 

teach soldiers to crawl, walk, and run. Here, they are learning 

to crawl and beginning to walk, but they aren’t learning to run. 

That’s going to take a lot more time.”51 It is not clear, however, 

that this assessment was ever passed to the ministers of defense of the Central Asian states, and their frustration with the 

slow progress of the unit would soon become evident.

USACOM repeated the exercise in September 1998, this time 

with 259 soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division from Fort 

Drum, New York, and 272 members of CENTRASBAT. Another 

200 soldiers from Turkey, Russia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan also 

participated in the peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance 

exercise. Again, the exercise was split, starting at the CENTRASBAT 

garrison in Zhibek-Zholy in Kazakhstan, moving to Chirchik in 

Uzbekistan for seminars, and then to Osh in Kyrgyzstan for 

field training (fig.4). Notably, the Kazakhs angered their Uzbek 

hosts by conducting their airborne drop ahead of schedule.52
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Multilateral and Bilateral Exercises

CENTRASBAT was not the only exercise used to promote regional cooperation. The United States also invited these nations to a series of multilateral exercises it had been conducting under NATO’s PfP program. As mentioned above, in August 

1995, even before formal military cooperation programs had 

been established with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, platoons 

from those two countries were invited to Fort Polk, Louisiana, 

to participate in Cooperative Nugget 95, a peacekeeping and 

refugee assistance exercise. Along with being the first PfP exercise held in the United States, Cooperative Nugget 95 was the 

first time US and Central Asian troops had trained together in a 

combined exercise. The following year, a platoon from Kazakhstan’s CENTRASBAT element joined them at Camp Lejeune, 

North Carolina, for a peacekeeping and amphibious assault exercise called Cooperative Osprey 96. These exercises, conducted 

by USACOM, soon became a routine part of the growing military cooperation program during this period, and the three nations generally sent elements of their CENTRASBAT unit to 

Figure 4. Uzbekistani army contingent of CENTRASBAT, Chirchik, 

Uzbekistan, July 1998 (Reprinted from author’s personal collection.)
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participate. All three nations returned to Fort Polk in June–

July 1997 for Cooperative Nugget 97 and then again to Camp 

Lejeune in June 1998 for Cooperative Osprey 98. The Central 

Asian states also participated in NATO PfP exercises sponsored 

by USEUCOM; including the communications and information 

systems interoperability exercise Combined Endeavor 98 in 

Sembach, Germany. These exercises offered the Central Asian 

states opportunities to train with other NATO nations as well 

as work together in a relatively benign training environment. 

(Kazakhstan was to participate in the Combined Endeavor exercise each year thereafter.)53

Concurrent with these multilateral exercises, but not directly 

designed to promote regional cooperation, the United States also 

began a series of bilateral special operations forces exercises 

(SOFEX) with the special forces of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.54 As Central Asia was not assigned to any of the regional 

unified commands, US Special Operations Command, Pacific 

(USSOCPAC) in Hawaii initiated the program, turning to its 1st 

Special Forces Group (SFG) at Fort Lewis, Washington, for the 

personnel. This was an unusual choice, as the 1st SFG’s skills 

include Asian languages such as Korean, Chinese, or Japanese, rather than Russian, Uzbek, or Kazakh, but it reflects the 

challenge of establishing a new program and the multiple commands operating in the region during this period. Balance 

Kayak exercises were held in Kazakhstan in August 1996, June 

1997, August 1998, and spring 1999, focusing primarily on 

combat medical training and civic action. Balance Ultra exercises were held in Uzbekistan in autumn 1996, June 1997, 

September 1998, and June 1999 in the Ferghana Valley, and 

focused on combat medical training and mountain training. In 

1999 US forces planned to expand the program to Turkmenistan with a counter-drug exercise using personnel from the 

5th SFG at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, subordinate to US Special Operations Command, Central (USSOCCENT), but it is not 

clear whether this exercise ever took place.55

Equipment Transfers

The emphasis on the CENTRASBAT unit, peacekeeping operations, and NATO interoperability through the PfP program 
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also opened the door to the first set of military equipment transfers from the DOD to the armed forces of Central Asia.56 Under 

certain conditions governed by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) 

of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, and the 

International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), foreign military forces are permitted to purchase defense goods from the 

United States via the FMS program. On 19 March 1997, President Clinton issued Presidential Determination 97-19 authorizing Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 

to use the FMS program—and, except for Tajikistan, the last of 

the post-Soviet states to gain this approval. As for all countries, 

however, this authorization was not a carte blanche—all requests for military equipment were carefully controlled by DOD 

and DOS, with significant Congressional oversight on major 

weapon sales. Simultaneous with the Presidential Determination, the State Department requested Congress authorize FMF 

grant funds in 1997 for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to purchase US defense goods and services. The State Department justified this request by linking it 

with the missions of the CENTRASBAT unit: “to enhance . . . 

capability to operate jointly with NATO forces in peacekeeping, 

search and rescue, humanitarian and other operations,” a rationale that stayed consistent for the next several years.57

In 1997 the first year FMF was authorized for Central Asia, 

Kazakhstan received $1.5 million; Kyrgyzstan, $800 thousand; 

Turkmenistan, $500 thousand; and Uzbekistan, $1 million. In 

1998 these amounts increased by about 50 percent, and then 

stabilized for the next several years (table A.6 and fig. A.5, appendix A). In 1998 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, 

and Uzbekistan were also authorized to receive surplus US military equipment at no cost through the Euro-Atlantic Excess 

Defense Articles (EDA) program.58 The provision of FMF and 

the authorization for EDA, however, did not lead to immediate 

deliveries. It would take several more years before US military 

equipment began arriving in Central Asia.

Reaching the Summit

From 1995 to 1998, US security cooperation objectives in 

Central Asia expanded; while some become more diffused, oth-
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ers became more focused. The major programs for denuclearization were completed in Kazakhstan and efforts to address 

proliferation and export control issues began. US efforts to promote democratization became somewhat more focused during 

this period, with military contact events and education programs starting to focus on defense resource management and 

officer and noncommissioned officer professional development, 

particularly in Kazakhstan. And only in Kazakhstan, however, 

was this objective formally stated in the planning documents. 

But the military contact program also became much more diffuse, with multiple commands executing events across a broad 

range of topic areas. And despite the fact that both the military 

contact program and the training and education programs were 

justified as promoting the democratization of the armed forces 

in Central Asia, there was little evidence that US securitycooperation planners saw themselves in that role and actively 

pursued that fairly vague objective, except in the case of defense resource management and officer and noncommissioned 

officer professional development. Likewise, US and Central 

Asian forces began to exercise together in both multilateral and 

bilateral forums, including in the hallmark annual CENTRASBAT event, and the United States initiated the FMF and 

EDA programs to offer military equipment to these nations. 

The rapid growth in security cooperation programs appeared to 

be having some impact, but the Central Asian states were still 

waiting for the true benefits to appear.

This growth, however, must be put into context. Central Asia 

remained strategically unimportant in US security cooperation 

planning, greatly overshadowed by larger and more complex 

programs conducted in other regions such as Eastern Europe. 

The US military planned approximately 100 military contact 

events with Kazakhstan from the beginning of the program 

through 1998, while it planned almost 700 events with the 

Czech Republic in essentially the same period.59 The State Department provided just over $4 million in IMET funding from 

1996 to 1998 to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and 

Uzbekistan, a combined total of only 80 percent of what was 

provided to the three Baltic States during the same period. 

Likewise, FMF funding in the same period totaled $9.4 million 

for the four nations, roughly equivalent to what was offered to 
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Uganda. Despite the relative expansion of the programs compared to what had been conducted through 1995, Central Asia 

remained a backwater in US security cooperation efforts.

Notes

1. Kazakhstan, 63–64 (see chap. 2, note 3).

2. A National Security Strategy, 9–10 (see chap. 2, note 1).

3. A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: The 

White House, 1997), 8.

4. Stephen Blank, “The United States and Central Asia,” in Central Asian 

Security: The New International Context, edited by Roy Allison and Lena Jonson 

(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 130–31.

5. Marina Pikulina, Uzbekistan in the Mirror of Military Security: A Historical 

Preface to Current Events (Surrey, United Kingdom: The Conflict Studies Research Centre), 1999, 1–3.

6. Kazakhstan established its Ministry of Defense in May 1992, Kyrgyzstan in August 1993, Tajikistan in December 1992, Turkmenistan in July 

1992, and Uzbekistan in early 1992. Susan Clark, “The Central Asian States: 

Defining Security Priorities and Developing Military Forces,” in Central Asia 

and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, ed. Michael Mandelbaum, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 

1994), 206.

7. Author with Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), correspondence, February 2006.

8. The Defense Attaché Office in Almaty, Kazakhstan, was established in 

January 1994; in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in November 1995; in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in February 1997; in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, in July 1997, and in 

Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in October 1997 (Although, the attaché for Tajikistan 

was normally based in Almaty and traveled to Tajikistan on an irregular basis 

with an armed escort.) Author with DIA, correspondence, April 2006.

9. Frederick Starr, “Making Eurasia Stable,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 1 (January/February 1996), 85.

10. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Uzbekistan and the United States: Authoritarianism, Islamism, & Washington’s Security Agenda (New York: Zed Books, 

2005), 62–65.

11. From 1995 to 1999, Kazakhstan received $1.844 million in IMET 

funds, $5.550 million in FMF, and four war college slots; Uzbekistan received 

$1.657 million in IMET, $4.200 million in FMF, and three war college slots. 

Only in one area did Uzbekistan receive more than Kazakhstan: Tashkent 

was offered an Aviation Leadership Program scholarship in 1998. See tables 

A.1–A.6, appendix A.

12. Turkmenistan would eventually sign a similar, although much shorter 

and vaguer, “Joint Statement on the Results of US–Turkmenistani Defense 

Consultations” in April 1998; the United States and Kyrgyzstan never established a framework agreement. Director of Strategy and Plans, US Joint 
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Chiefs of Staff, Planning Reference Book, 2000 Joint Chiefs of Staff/Office of 

the Secretary of Defense Planning Conference for the NIS [newly independent 

states] Peacetime Engagement, Washington, DC, June 1999.

13. Formerly the Defense Nuclear Agency.

14. Rueckert, On-Site Inspection, 170 (see chap. 2, note 2); and Harahan 

and Bennett, Creating the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 10–12 (see chap. 

2, note 2).

15. Rueckert, On-Site Inspection, 184 (see chap. 2, note 2); and Trip Report, Central Asia Orientation Visit, Maj Michael J. McCarthy, US Central 

Command (USCENTCOM) Directorate of Intelligence, 31 July 1998. Of note, 

Col Assylbek Mendygaliev, who was the director of the Kazakhstani Center 

for Arms Reduction in 1998 during the first official USCENTCOM visit to the 

region, is now the defense attaché of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Washington, DC.

16. Daughtry, “Forging Relationships,” 330–33 (see chap. 2, note 4).

17. Kazakhstan Port Engineering Infrastructure Survey, (Stuttgart, Germany: 

US Army Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Programs Center, Europe, 1996), 1.

18. Cooperative threat reduction (CTR) funds continued to be used for 

these programs until 1997, at which time Congress appropriated separate 

funding accounts. “Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling: International Counterproliferation Program,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/e_research/

cnwm/interdicting/index.asp; Daughtry, “Forging Relationships,” 326–27 

(see chap. 2, note 4); and “Cooperative Threat Reduction Assistance to Kazakhstan,” (see chap. 2, note 12).

19. Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to the NIS, U.S. Government 

Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of 

the Former Soviet Union, FY2000 Annual Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2001), 239–40; and “Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling (see chap. 

3, note 18).

20. Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to the NIS, U.S. Government 

Assistance To and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of 

the Former Soviet Union, FY2000 Annual Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2001), 240, Appendix 1; Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to the NIS, U.S. Government Assistance To and Cooperative Activities 

with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, FY2001 Annual 

Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2002), 260, Appendix 1; Office 

of the Coordinator of US Assistance to the NIS, U.S. Government Assistance 

To and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former 

Soviet Union, FY2002 Annual Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 

2003), Appendix 1; Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to the NIS, U.

S. Government Assistance To and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, FY2003 Annual Report (Washington, 

DC: Department of State, 2004), 240, Appendix 1; Office of the Coordinator 

of US Assistance to the NIS, U.S. Government Assistance To and Cooperative 

Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, FY2004 

Annual Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2005), Appendix 1.
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21. Author with Defense Threat Reduction Agency, correspondence, April 

2006.

22. Of interest, USEUCOM also attempted to establish relationships using 

units from the Army Reserve, thereby increasing both the bilateral ties and 

the units available for military contact events. Kazakhstan was partnered with 

the 63d Army Reserve Command (63d ARCOM), which consisted of reserve 

combat service and combat service support units in California, Arizona, and 

Nevada. That relationship apparently never developed, as there is no indication that the 63d ARCOM played a role in the military contact events of the 

mid-to-late 1990s and is not part of the current program. Cossaboom, The 

Joint Contact Team Program, 19–20 (see chap. 2, note 11).

23. John R. Groves Jr., “PfP and the State Partnership Program: Fostering 

Engagement and Progress,” Parameters XXIX, no. 1 (Spring 1999), 43–53.

24. The Partnership for Peace, NATO, http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html (accessed 22 March 2006).

25. Robin Bhatty and Rachel Bronson, “NATO’s Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” Survival 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2000), 132–33.

26. Jennifer D. P. Moroney, “Building Security in Central Asia: A Multilateral Perspective,” in In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s Path to the 

21st Century, ed. Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf (Washington, 

DC: National Defense University Press, 2004), 348–49.

27. The total amount of $100 million for the Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF) 

program in 1996 was split between the budgets of the Departments of State and 

Defense. In a bureaucratic slight-of-hand, the State Department recoded $60 

million of FMF funds already designated for these nations as its contribution 

to WIF, so only the $40 million from the Defense Department were actually 

new funds. Director of Strategy and Plans, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Planning 

Reference Book, 1999 Joint Chiefs of Staff Planning Conference for the NIS 

Peacetime Engagement, Washington, DC, May 1998; and Director of Strategy 

and Plans (see chap. 3, note 12).

28. Director of Strategy and Plans (see chap. 3, note 12); and author with 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, correspondence, September 2005 and 

March 2006; and “DRMS Participants,” DRMS, [Defense Resource Management Studies] http://drms.ida.org/drmsindex .htm (accessed 16 April 

2006).

29. OSD, talking paper, traditional combatant commander activities (TCA) 

funding summary, 3 June 1999; Director of Strategy and Plans (see chap. 3, 

note 12).

30. The military contact programs use Combatant Commander’s Initiative 

Fund less frequently through this period and not at all by 1998. Director of 

Strategy and Plans (see chap. 3, note 12).

31. Trip Report (see chap. 3, note 15).

32. Director of Strategy and Plans (see chap. 3, note 32).

33. United States Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chap. 6, Section 168. 

Military-to-military contacts and comparable activities, http://www.law.cornell

.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00000168----000-.html.
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34. I am indebted to Dr. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich for this methodology, 

who used it with much greater skill and effect in her book Democratizing 

Communist Militaries (see chap. 2, note 8). Data derived from Bilateral Military Contact Plans (see chap. 3, note 31).

35. IMET funding had dropped dramatically in 1994 and 1995 for all 

countries; total funding for 1995 was only $26.350, million, a 43 percent 

reduction from the 1988–1993 median of $46.100 million. Cope, International Military Education and Training, 13–14 (see chap. 2, note 14).

36. Congressional Presentation, 320–25, 367–68, 373–74 (see chap. 2, 

note 18); Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1997

(Washington, DC: Department of State, 1997), 332–39, 350–51, 357–59; and 

Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1998 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1998), 605–10, 620–22, 627–29.

37. “Turkmenistan: Military Officers to Receive Training in U.S.,” Moscow 

Interfax, 10 February 1996; and author with Defense Language Institute 

English Language Center, correspondence, November 2005.

38. The US military professional military education (PME) system generally has three levels, one each for junior officers (captains), mid-grade officers 

(majors), and senior officers (lieutenant colonels and colonels), although this 

varies somewhat by service. In most cases, the institutions at each level are 

designated as colleges and are grouped into a single university for each service, with joint colleges grouped under the National Defense University at 

Fort McNair in Washington, DC. Although some Central Asian officers have 

attended the junior-level PME colleges (most often the US Air Force Squadron 

Officers College at Maxwell AFB, AL), this discussion focuses on Central 

Asian attendance at the mid-grade and senior-grade colleges. For ease of 

discussion, the term “war college” will be used throughout this paper.

39. Cope, International Military Education and Training, 6 (see chap. 2, 

note 14).

40. Attendance at the service academies cannot be funded using the IMET 

program, but generally DOD will waive the tuition costs given the economic 

conditions in these countries.

41. Author with Service Academy Exchange Program Coordinator, correspondence, US Military Academy, 16 February 2006; Author with Service 

Academy Exchange Program Coordinator, correspondence, US Naval Academy, 

13 February 2006; and Author with Service Academy Exchange Program Coordinator, correspondence, US Air Force Academy, 13 February 2006.

42. Air Force Instruction 16-108, Managing the Aviation Leadership Program, 1 September 1995, 4.

43. Neil MacFarlane, Western Engagement in the Caucasus and Central 

Asia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999), 53.

44. “CENTRASBAT,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/

military/ops/centrasbat.htm (accessed 6 January 2006); and “Central Asian 

Military Unit Nears Birth,” The Jamestown Foundation Monitor 2, Issue 89 (7 

May 1996), http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id= 

20&issue_id=1061&article_id=9869 (accessed 29 January 2006).
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45. Pikulina, Uzbekistan in the Mirror of Military Security, 8 (see chap. 3, 

note 5); and “Central Asian Military Unit Nears Birth,” (see chap. 3, note 45).

46. “Central Asian Military Unit Nears Birth,” (see chap. 3, note 45).

47. “CENTRASBAT,” (see chap. 3, note 45); Douglas J. Gillert, “After 

Jumping, Battalion Learns to Crawl,” American Forces Press Service News 

Articles, 1 October 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx

?id=41525 (accessed 17 March 2006); Linda D. Kozaryn, “Parachutes Ready: 

Next Stop Kazakhstan,” American Forces Press Service News Articles, 3 September 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=41131 

(accessed 17 March 2006); “Historic U.S.-Led Military Exercise Begins,” The 

Jamestown Foundation Monitor 3, no. 172 (17 September 1997), http://www

.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=2&issue_id=234&

article_id=2653 (accessed 10 February 2006); “Uzbekistan: Uzbek President 

Calls Military Exercise ‘Historic Event’,” Moscow Interfax, 19 September 1997; 

and “Uzbekistan: Military Exercises End, Defense Minister Comments,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 20 September 1997.

48. “Historic U.S.-Led Military Exercise Begins,” (see chap. 3, note 48).

49. “Russia: Duma Criticizes Government Over US Exercises in CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] States,” Moscow Interfax, 26 September 

1997.

50. Gillert, “After Jumping, Battalion Learns to Crawl,” (see chap. 3, note 48).

51. Ibid.

52. “CENTRASBAT,” GlobalSecurity.org, (see chap. 3, note 45); “Kazakhstan: Almaty Conference Prepares for NATO Peacekeeping Exercise,” Moscow 

Interfax, 5 February 1998; and Lyle J. Goldstein, “Making the Most of Central 

Asian Partnerships,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 31 (Summer 2002), 83.

53. Kenley Butler, “U.S. Military Cooperation with the Central Asian 

States,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 17 September 2001, http://cns

.miis.edu/search97cgi/s97_cgi?action=View&VdkVgwKey=..%2F..%2Fcnsweb

%2Fhtdocs%2Fresearch%2Fwtc01%2Fuscamil.htm&queryzip=Kenley+Butler

&Collection=CNS+Web+Site (accessed 17 February 2006); “Cooperative Nugget 95 Closing Ceremony,” Department of Defense News Release no. 467-95, 

24 August 1995, http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?release

id=602 (accessed 12 February 2006); Memorandum For Correspondents 088-m, 

“Exercise Cooperative Nugget ’97 Scheduled,” 29 May 1997, http://www.defense

link.mil/news/May1997/m052997_m088-97.html (accessed 12 February 

2006); and “CIS: Central Asian Battalion to Participate in NATO Exercises,” 

Moscow Interfax, 7 August 1996.

54. Some sources identify the Balance Kayak and Balance Ultra exercises 

as part of the joint combined exchange training (JCET) program, but they were 

not. These events, and others conducted in the region during this period, 

were special operations forces exercises (SOFEX), which were conducted by 

the special operations component command within the theater (first US Special Operations Command, Pacific, and later US Special Operations Command Central), and in the case of Central Asia, were funded through the CTR 

program. (Although in more recent years counternarcotics funding has been 

used.) On the other hand, the JCET program, established in 1991, was de-
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signed to provide an opportunity for US special forces units to hone their own 

skills in a foreign environment similar to one in which they may conduct future operations. JCET events (which are technically not exercises) have the 

additional but secondary benefit of providing training to the host nation. Details on JCETs are usually classified, so it is impossible to assemble a complete picture of the program in Central Asia. Other special operations units, 

such as the US Air Force’s 6th Special Operations Squadron, may have also 

conducted SOFEXs or JCETs in Central Asia during this period. Author interviews at USCENTCOM, September 2005; author with the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, correspondence, April 2006; and author with USCENTCOM, correspondence, April 2006.

55. Col Shamil’ Gareyev, “Military Cooperation: Uzbekistan and the U.S.A.” 

Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Winter 1997), http://www.pacom.mil/forum/

winter_97/UZBEK_r.html (accessed 10 February 2006); Col S. A. Zhasuzakov, 

“JCET Balance Kayak 97—Kazakhstan and the U.S.: Training Together,”

Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Summer 1998), http://www.pacom.mil/forum/

Summer_98/KAYAK_r.html (accessed 10 February 2006); “Uzbekistan: U.S. 

General Expected in Tashkent Today,” Moscow Interfax, 6 June 1997; Director of Strategy and Plans (see chap. 3, note 12); and Director of Strategy and 

Plans (see chap. 3, note 28).

56. The provision of the patrol boats to the Kazakhstani Customs Service 

in 1995–1996 under the CTR program did not fall under the FMS program as 

the Boston Whalers and Sea Arc were considered commercially-available civilian equipment rather than military equipment, and therefore not subject 

to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Directorate of Defense Trade 

Controls, US Department of State, International Traffic in Arms Regulations 

(ITAR), http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/itar_index.htm.

57. Identical language is used in the FMF justifications for Kyrgyzstan, 

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1997 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1996), 334, 

338, 351, 359.

58. Author with the Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance for Europe 

and Eurasia, US Department of State, correspondence, March 2006; and 

Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1999 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1998), 1006.

59. Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries, 189–203 (see chap. 2, 

note 8).

59

Chapter 4

Reassessment

The goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia would be not to 

dominate the region, but to make it free of other powers’ 

domination, thus making it possible for the five Central 

Asian states to become stable and peaceful. In other 

words, instead of dominating Central Asia, the United 

States would be satisfied to see it as a no-man’s land.

—Dr. Eugene B. Rumer, National 

Defense University, Washington, DC

By 1999, the dramatic increase in security-cooperation programs reached a plateau. The foundations of US securitycooperation efforts with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, 

and Turkmenistan had been established, and the programs 

proceeded for the next few years without significant changes. 

The contact programs had reached a sustainable level of interaction between the partner militaries, although coordinating 

the events was beginning to tax the resources of the US defense 

attachés in the region. US special operations forces were routinely conducting small but focused training exercises with 

their counterparts. The four nations were receiving modest levels 

of IMET and FMF funding for training and equipment. Improving the capabilities of the CENTRASBAT unit provided the focus for many of the programs, and its annual exercise served 

as the centerpiece of the US security-cooperation efforts. In the 

words of Kyrgyz defense minister Lt Gen Esen Topoyev, meeting with US Marine Corps general Anthony Zinni, commander 

of USCENTCOM, in the spring of 2000, the relationship “had 

acquired a continual and steady nature.”1 In total, these programs were very modest compared to US efforts in other regions, but seemed sufficient for the limited interests Washington had in the region. But other geopolitical currents began to 

unsettle the ties that had been built; all participants were beginning to reexamine the newer, stronger, relationships and reevaluate whether these linkages were meeting their objectives.
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60

Roots of Reassessment

This period of reassessment was most evident in US–Uzbekistani 

relations, and it derived from Washington’s increasing concerns 

over Pres. Islam Abdughanievich Karimov’s growing authoritarianism. Since Uzbekistan’s independence in 1991, the Karimov 

regime has been noted for its systematic abuse of human rights 

in attempts to eliminate opposition and maintain political stability. Both the Clinton administration and Congress were becoming increasingly frustrated with the lack of progress on political and economic reform and the abysmal state of human 

rights. But, by the late 1990s, the persecution of the relatively 

moderate opposition groups and increasing instances of “harassment, arrests, beatings, and attempted assassinations,” 

fostered the creation of more radical groups.2

In February 1999 Tashkent was rocked by a series of explosions set off by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a 

militant Islamic group that sought to establish a caliphate based 

in the Ferghana Valley. The Uzbekistani government reacted 

strongly to the bombings, seeing them both as an attempt to 

assassinate Karimov (who was traveling by car nearby) and to 

overthrow the government. The bombings were followed by an 

IMU invasion of the Batken Valley in Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and 

a second invasion in 2000. Along with military operations coordinated with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan stepped up its internal repressive measures and human 

rights abuses.3

The United States reacted with mixed signals. At USCENTCOM 

(which had recently assumed responsibility for the region), 

General Zinni sought to increase military engagement programs 

in order to try to influence the Karimov regime, but the Clinton 

administration and State Department were unwilling to expand 

the security-cooperation activities for fear of being seen as rewarding repressive regimes.4 Visiting officials routinely lectured 

Karimov on the importance of respecting human rights, but 

took little other action.5 Trying to balance the competing aims 

of security and promoting human rights, Washington neither 

expanded the cooperation programs nor reduced them; instead, 

it maintained them at a level that ensured it could not accomplish any of its strategic objectives. It also demonstrated to 
REASSESSMENT

61

Karimov that he could safely ignore American pressures to 

improve Uzbekistan’s internal political situation and that he 

could not rely on the United States to satisfy his fundamental 

security concerns. 

The IMU invasions in 1999 and 2000 also undermined US efforts to promote regional security cooperation. While Uzbekistan, 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan made some attempts to 

coordinate their military response to the incursions, the first three 

did not use the joint CENTRASBAT unit to counter the threat, and 

instead used other national forces. The states then began a series 

of mutual recriminations, blaming each other for conditions that 

permitted the attacks. Uzbekistan also established minefields along 

its border with Kyrgyzstan to prevent future attacks through that 

country, which dramatically reduced cross-border trade and resulted in several deaths. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had 

been concerned about the growth in Uzbekistan’s military capabilities, and now both began to see Tashkent as a possible future 

threat. US efforts to promote regional cooperation through programs began to meet with resistance, as the fundamental distrust 

between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan began to overshadow the modest attempts at collaboration.6

Washington was also reassessing its relationship with Almaty. Kazakhstan may have adopted some of the trappings 

of democracy, but had never implemented them in practice. 

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

(OSCE) considered the March 1994 parliamentary elections 

neither “free nor fair,” and by the middle of 1995 Nazarbayev 

had dissolved the parliament, instituted presidential rule, 

and adopted a new constitution which gave him far-reaching 

powers. But, until the late 1990s the Clinton administration 

still hoped that these trends could be reversed. The January 

1999 presidential elections and the October 1999 parliamentary elections, both of which were orchestrated by Nazarbayev 

to ensure favorable results, were seen as final death blows to 

any efforts toward democratic reform. Instead of offering 

congratulations, Clinton’s post-election letter to Nazarbayev 

recommended that “a deeper commitment by Kazakhstan to 

democracy and market reform” would be “very important” for 

both Kazakhstan and bilateral relations.7 Nazarbayev rejected the recommendation because he considered it inap-
REASSESSMENT

62

propriate and threatening to his hold on power. In April 2000 

at the Eurasian Economic Summit, he declared “We in Central 

Asia are not going to blindly run for [all] our worth after the 

United States in the issues of democratizing our countries.”8

In Washington’s view, Kazakhstan appeared to be backsliding on cooperation in security issues as well. In March 1999 

senior Kazakh defense officials, including Minister of Defense 

Altynbayev, were implicated in a scheme to smuggle MiG-21 

fighter aircraft to North Korea. Altynbayev was removed from 

office, but in November 1999 a similar episode led to the dismissal of his successor, acting Minister of Defense Bakhytzhan 

Ertaev, and head of the National Security Council Nurtai Abukaev. 

Although Almaty removed the offending leaders, they were not 

severely punished (and Altynbayev returned later as Minister 

of Defense). Both sides recognized these events severely strained 

US–Kazakhstani relations. Foreign Minister Kaymzhomart Tokaev 

remarked: “We used to be very good partners. Big damage has 

been brought to our cooperation. I as Foreign Minister understand 

the seriousness of the situation. We are ready to do our part.”9

Washington curtailed many of its security-assistance programs, 

and some military aid packages were completely cancelled.

Washington was also concerned about the continual backsliding on democratic reform in Kyrgyzstan. Pres. Askar Akayev, 

the darling of Western observers, in the early 1990s when he 

instituted a broad set of political and economic reform initiatives, had slowly increased his personal control over the Kyrgyz 

government, reduced the role of civil society, and clamped down 

on his political opposition. In 1998, presidential pressure convinced the constitutional court that Akayev was eligible to run 

for president for a third time in 2000, sidestepping the constitutional clause that permits only two terms by claiming the 

first, which started before independence, did not count. Parliamentary elections in 2000 fell short of international standards, 

and the presidential elections the same year were worse. Kyrgyzstan was clearly backsliding on democratic reform.10

Struggling with the competing interests of influencing these 

regimes through military cooperation, while trying to punish 

them for violating human rights, the Clinton administration 

tried to walk a fine line in the 1999 National Security Strategy: 

“With countries that are neither staunch friends nor known 
REASSESSMENT

63

foes, military cooperation can serve as a positive means of 

building security relationships today that will contribute to improved relations tomorrow. At the same time, we will remain 

firmly committed to ensure that we do not train or assist known 

human rights violators.”11

Denuclearization and 

Proliferation Prevention

Despite the leveling off of security-cooperation programs and 

setbacks caused by political events, two organizational changes 

brought new structure, focus, and objectives to the US securitycooperation efforts in Central Asia: the establishment of the DTRA 

and the assignment of the Central Asian states under the Unified 

Command Plan to USCENTCOM. Additionally, the creation of the 

Central Asia Border Security Initiative (CASI) in April 2000 marked 

the first attempt to synchronize security-cooperation programs 

across departments within the federal government.

A series of terrorist attacks in 1995, including the Aum Shinrikyo use of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system in March 

and the Oklahoma City bombing in April, deeply influenced 

Senator William S. Cohen’s thinking on the nature of future 

threats against the United States. When he became secretary 

of defense in 1997, Cohen argued that proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction and their potential use by terrorists was 

the most important security challenge faced by America. In a 

major reorganization that took affect in October 1998, he combined the OSIA, DSWA, Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), CTR, and chemical/biological defense programs 

previously executed by OSD into a new organization, the 

DTRA.12 The reorganization placed greater emphasis on proliferation prevention, by ensuring that chemical, biological, and 

nuclear materials and technology did not get passed from the 

former Soviet Union to states or terrorist organizations that 

might use them against the United States, linking (but not integrating) the biological and chemical weapons elimination programs conducted under CTR and the border security programs 

under the International Counterproliferation Program (ICP).
REASSESSMENT

64

The merging of these organizations did not have an immediate effect on the execution of the proliferation prevention programs in Central Asia, which, like the other security-cooperation 

efforts, experienced a general slowdown during this period. 

DTRA continued slow but steady efforts via the CTR program to 

eliminate nuclear weapons infrastructure in Kazakhstan and 

the biological and chemical weapons facilities in Kazakhstan 

and Uzbekistan. DTRA officials managing ICP attempted to expand the program into Tajikistan and Turkmenistan with no 

success; delegations from both countries attended a WMD 

executive seminar in May 2001 but otherwise shunned the program. There were no ICP activities in Kyrgyzstan, and those in 

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan stalled. Funding dipped in 2000 

and only 12 training events occurred between 1999–2001, 

compared to 19 between 1996–1998.13 Despite these setbacks, 

the proliferation prevention programs began to show some 

modest results. In early 2000, a shipment of 10 lead-lined 

boxes containing radioactive material was stopped by Uzbekistani officials at the border with Kazakhstan using a $1,200 

detection device provided by the ICP, and the following year 

Kazakhstani officials who had received ICP training in 1998 

seized another illegal shipment.14

The ICP was one of several programs executed in Central 

Asia by the United States that were designed to improve border security capabilities in these countries. For most of the 

1990s, these programs had been relatively small and independently managed. The IMU invasions in 1999, however, 

prompted Clinton administration officials to try to link these 

programs together to better meet this regional threat. In April 

2000, during a tour of Central Asia, Secretary of State Madeline 

Albright announced the new CASI that encompassed six assistance programs, including EXBS, ICP, and other counterterrorism, counternarcotics (CN), law enforcement, and customs reform efforts, that had been designed to improve border 

security operations. ICP was the only DOD program under 

CASI, and it is unclear whether the subsequent funding increases in later years was as a result of this connection. But, 

CASI marked the first real attempt to harmonize these programs across federal agencies.15
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Democratization

As with the consolidation of denuclearization and proliferation prevention programs under DTRA, changes in the unified 

command structure centralized the programs that promoted 

military democratization and regional cooperation. As previously indicated, Central Asia had remained a responsibility of 

the Joint Staff, and a number of commands were conducting 

military cooperation activities in the region. USCENTCOM began to take a more active role in the region starting in early 

1997 and was ready to assume control of the security-cooperation 

efforts when the decision was publicly announced in February 

1998.16 In fact, in July 1998 General Zinni, who became the 

commander of USCENTCOM in August 1997, hosted General 

Altynbayev, minister of defense of Kazakhstan, the first senior 

military officer from Central Asia to visit CENTCOM in Tampa, 

Florida.17 General Zinni was a strong proponent of increased 

engagement with Central Asia, advocating that the region’s energy resources and potential instability from terrorism, drug 

trafficking, and corruption (largely stemming from Talibancontrolled Afghanistan) made these countries “front line 

states.”18 General Zinni made his first trip to Central Asia in 

September 1998, a year before USCENTCOM officially assumed 

full responsibility for the region, and made a total of five trips 

before his retirement in the summer of 2000.19

USCENTCOM’s assumption of responsibility for the region 

brought greater structure to the security-cooperation programs. Secretary of Defense William Cohen had directed each 

regional commander to create theater engagement plans, outlining how they intended to create positive and constructive 

relationships with the friendly military forces in their respective areas of responsibility. General Zinni leveraged this effort 

to create the first US military strategy for Central Asia. He recognized that USCENTCOM was institutionally focused on the continual confrontation with Iraq, and any remaining attention 

was devoted to planning for a potential conflict with Iran. To 

avoid other important but less critical efforts being overlooked, 

General Zinni divided Central Command’s area of responsibility 

into four separate subregions: East Africa, Persian Gulf, Egypt 

and Jordan, and South and Central Asia (the latter of which 
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included Afghanistan and Pakistan). Although there were many 

issues that crossed boundaries, each subregion had unique 

challenges and required specific strategies. General Zinni understood the long-term imperative of building security relationships in Central Asia, as reflected in his strategy: “the importance of the South and Central Asian subregion will continue to 

grow as the economies of these countries and access to the 

subregion’s natural resources develop.”20 General Zinni also assigned each subregion to one of his subordinate commanders; 

USSOCCENT was tasked to act as the lead agency for building 

relationships with South and Central Asia.21

Military Contact Program and 

Education and Training Programs

Despite the new strategy, there was little immediate change 

in the military contact or training and education programs. 

USCENTCOM exercised influence over the development of the 

1999 plan and had complete authority over the development of 

the 2000 plan. USACOM, USPACOM, and USEUCOM (with the 

exception of the Marshall Center) withdrew from participating 

in military contact events in Central Asia. Nonetheless, the military 

contact programs continued to emphasize largely the same functional areas as before, including officer and noncommissioned 

officer professional development, medical information exchanges, 

and civil-military responses to environmental disasters. The 

notable exception was an increase in senior-leader and staffexchange visits to Central Asia, a reflection of USCENTCOM’s 

efforts to become more familiar with the region. But the military planners also started to propose, plan, and execute events 

that built on the experiences of previous events, rather than 

simply repeat an exchange or offer an event on a completely 

new topic. This trend is particularly evident in officer and noncommissioned officer development, civil-military responses to 

environmental disasters, defense resource management, and 

defense planning. Additionally, in 1999 and 2000 USCENTCOM 

planned 21 events with the CENTRASBAT elements of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan on peacekeeping and search 
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and rescue as a means to help prepare these detachments for 

the annual CENTRASBAT exercise.22

IMET funding was advocated by the State Department generally using the same arguments, although regional stability and 

cooperation began to gain equal billing with democratization. 

IMET funding and the number of students trained remained 

consistent through this period, with a slight dip for Kazakhstan 

in 1999 due to the MiG-21 incident.23 Given the amount of 

available resources, there were few alternatives, so USCENTCOM continued with the modest programs it had inherited. 

However, increasing numbers of military students attended 

combat training courses as opposed to English language instructor courses, professional courses such as defense resource 

management, or war colleges. This trend toward increasing 

combat skills is addressed in more detail below. 

Regional Cooperation

USCENTCOM inherited the CENTRASBAT program when it 

assumed responsibility for the region, and it conducted the 

May 1999 exercise as a peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance seminar in a hotel in downtown Tampa, just outside of 

its headquarters at MacDill AFB. The seminar format allowed 

the USCENTCOM staff to become more familiar with the needs 

and perspectives of the Central Asian states and also gave the 

delegations from Central Asia an opportunity to become familiar 

with USCENTCOM’s perspective on the region. For the first 

time, Turkmenistan participated as an observer.24

The Demise of CENTRASBAT

But by late 1998, US efforts to encourage regional cooperation through CENTRASBAT were faltering. Originally conceived 

as a combined battalion with a company from each of the three 

participating nations and rotating command structure, it never 

achieved this goal. Despite the original plan, each company 

was garrisoned in its own country and the battalion came together only for the annual exercises.25 The command and control structure, with rotating commanders and geographically 

dispersed elements, were too challenging to overcome. The 
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battalion was never used in an operational mission, despite opportunities in post-civil war Tajikistan and against the IMU incursions in 1999 and 2000.26 CENTRASBAT may have been 

overly ambitious—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan 

were new nations still attempting to establish their own sovereignty and develop indigenous armed forces, and the establishment of a joint rapid reaction/peacekeeping force detracted 

from both objectives. In the end it proved to be counterproductive. 

Although the concept originated with the three participating 

nations, the United States assumed ownership of the effort 

when it began funding and orchestrating the annual exercises. 

In time, CENTRASBAT came to be seen as an “American project,” and the Central Asian states lost a sense of ownership. 

Kyrgyzstani Defense Minister Topoyev captured this sense in a 

July 2004 interview:

This was a good example of how any international program should primarily meet the interests of the country where it is being carried out. It 

is necessary to take into account the interests and positions of the region’s countries on regional security issues. The degree to which they 

[the interests] coincide with foreign programs’ goals should be taken 

into consideration as well. The peacekeeping battalion created in Central 

Asia did not prove relevant exactly for these reasons [emphasis added].27

By 1999, General Zinni recognized Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

and Uzbekistan were discouraged with the program. He had 

observed the 1998 exercise in Central Asia and participated in 

the 1999 seminar, so he recognized the limitations of the program. The apparent irrelevance of CENTRASBAT in the face of 

the IMU incursions brought the issue to a head, particularly 

when one Kazakh observer noted: “The question arises of what 

the real significance of the CENTRASBAT exercises is for 

strengthening security.”28 General Zinni and other US officials 

abandoned the concept of a joint CENTRASBAT unit as a means 

for promoting regional cooperation and encouraged each of the 

three nations to form separate battalions which could operate 

independently, collectively, or with other international peacekeeping forces.29 The multinational unit was disbanded at the 

end of 1999, although the CENTRASBAT name continued to be 

used for exercises for a few years. Planning for the September 

2000 exercise was based on each country providing an entire 

battalion, and it ultimately became the largest in the series 
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with approximately 1,400 participants. But the IMU incursions in 

the summer of 2000 forced Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to withdraw from the exercise in August, only to reconsider and rejoin 

prior to the opening ceremonies. In response to the new threats to 

the region, last minute changes to the scenario allowed the exercise to focus more on border security and counter­insurgency 

rather than on peacekeeping operations. In 2001, the exercise 

was renamed Regional Cooperation and was executed as a small 

command post drill at the US training facilities at Ramstein Air 

Base, Germany.30 The United States cancelled the exercise in 

2002 because of ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan, the 

one for 2003 remained on the books for a while but was also cancelled because of the invasion of Iraq.31 While CENTRASBAT was 

the centerpiece of the US security-cooperation programs with 

Central Asia in the late 1990s, few officers at USCENTCOM today 

even know what it was.32

Disaster Response and Environmental 

Security

But the demise of CENTRASBAT did not end US efforts to 

promote regional cooperation. General Zinni saw new opportunities with a theme that had started with the expansion of the 

military contact program in the mid-1990s—disaster response 

and environmental security. The National Guard had always 

played an important role in responding to natural disasters in 

the United States, primarily in its responsibility to the state 

governor, so the Arizona and Louisiana National Guards included a small number of disaster response events in their proposals for the military contact plans with Kazakhstan and 

Uzbekistan. The 1996 plans, for example, included a proposal 

for a Kazakhstani delegation to observe a disaster response exercise at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station in Arizona, 

in which the Arizona National Guard would participate. Two 

proposals for Uzbekistan were made to observe the Louisiana 

National Guard in a disaster response command and control 

exercise in New Orleans, and to have an Uzbek platoon participate in a Combat Engineer disaster response exercise with the 

225th Engineering Group in Pineville, Louisiana. 
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Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan quickly appreciated the value of 

these events. Central Asia is subject to devastating natural disasters such as seasonal flooding, landslides, and earthquakes, 

the latter of which have completely destroyed Almaty, Ashgabat, 

and Tashkent at various times over the last century. In both 

countries, the military would be called upon to respond to a disaster, whatever the source. These military contact events helped 

them formulate plans and requirements. From General Zinni’s 

perspective, these events also fostered democratization of the 

military as they demonstrated in a very practical manner the 

civil-military coordination needed to address these catastrophes: 

“We decided to hold conferences on disaster assistance in some 

of these countries. They brought their fire, police, emergency 

service units, and military; we brought experts from the U.S., 

who showed them how to intermix the civilian and military and 

cooperate with each other; and we did all this in the name of 

the U.S. ambassador.”33

General Zinni also used the growing set of disaster response 

activities to promote regional cooperation. In 1999 the military 

contact plans included a three-phase International Workshop 

on Earthquake Response (IWER), later renamed International 

Workshop on Emergency Response. IWER was hosted by the 

Arizona National Guard and conducted in both Phoenix, Arizona, 

and Almaty, Kazakhstan. IWER included large delegations from 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and 

represented the first US-sponsored regional exercise beyond 

CENTRASBAT. The Arizona National Guard sponsored a second exercise on flood management in 2000, and the IWER exercises became a significant pillar of US security-cooperation 

efforts in the region. The Montana National Guard and Kyrgyzstan hosted IWER 2002 in Bishkek, again with an earthquake 

scenario, and the Louisiana National Guard and Uzbekistan 

hosted IWER 2003, focusing on petrochemical disasters, in 

Baton Rouge.

Concurrent with these efforts were military contact events, 

including assessments and information exchanges, which focused on environmental security. In the second half of the 1990s, 

these were primarily conducted with Kazakhstan, which suffers from the effects of over 470 nuclear explosions at the Semipalatinsk test site during the Soviet era. At least one event was 
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also executed in Uzbekistan. General Zinni built on these early 

bilateral efforts on environmental security to support his objective of regional cooperation. In April 2000, USCENTCOM sponsored an environmental security conference in Oman that included 

delegations from the Central Asian states. Subsequent conferences in 2001 and 2002 were hosted by the Marshall Center. 

Kazakhstan hosted the conference in 2003, and the following 

year it was combined with the IWER exercise in Tashkent.34

Military Capabilities

Although it was becoming more apparent that CENTRASBAT 

would be unsuccessful in its role of promoting regional cooperation, US planners still saw value in developing the peacekeeping capabilities of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. 

Additionally, as the Central Asian military leaders became more 

discouraged at the lack of US response to the IMU incursions, 

US security-cooperation officials saw the need to focus more 

attention on building indigenous military capabilities for each 

country. Developing military capabilities through exercises, 

training courses, and equipment deliveries began to develop as 

a distinct objective for US security-cooperation programs.

Equipment Deliveries

The United States continued to provide funding (FMF) for 

equipment purchases in small amounts to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan through this period. 

The total amount provided to these nations each year, on average, was $5.7 million; not much more than the total provided in 

1998. This aid was again justified as supporting CENTRASBAT, 

NATO interoperability, and the development of capabilities for 

peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations. 

The only new proposal was the request for FMF for Turkmenistan, where the State Department indicated Ashgabat was considering a project that would provide “Western-standard, day/

night, all-weather approach capability for a Turkmen airfield 

that will be open to US Air Force aircraft.” Unfortunately, this 

initiative, which could have directly supported future US military operations, was later cancelled. Despite the concerns in 
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Central Asia over the IMU incursions, there was no mention in 

the 2000 or 2001 FMF justifications of using the aid to develop 

counterinsurgency capabilities in these countries.35

Ironically, just as CENTRASBAT was collapsing, the military 

equipment purchased for it under the FMS program began to 

arrive in Central Asia. Despite having first received FMF in 

1997, the Central Asian states did not begin to receive equipment deliveries under the FMS program until 1999, and the 

first deliveries were so inconsequential as to almost be insulting. 

When the new security assistance officer arrived in Almaty in 

May 2001, he found that of the $7 million in FMF allocated for 

Kazakhstan since 1997, only $29 thousand worth of flight suits 

had actually been delivered.36 USCENTCOM officials began to 

under­stand Central Asian frustrations with the FMS program on the first official visit to the region in the summer of 

1998. In Tashkent, Minister of Defense Gen Hikmetulla Tursunov pleaded for USCENTCOM assistance in receiving the 

16 high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) 

Uzbekistan had ordered, wanting to receive them prior to the 

CENTRASBAT exercise in September. Those vehicles would not 

arrive until February 2000 (fig. 5). In Turkmenistan, Gen 

Danatar Kopekov, the minister of defense, castigated American 

officials, stating he had been unable to use the approximately 

$1 million in FMF funds promised to date: “We don’t owe you, 

and you don’t owe us, but if you make a promise we would like 

an answer. I am fed up with promises and I have seen no results.”37 In fact, Turkmenistan was not to come to an agreement with the United States on equipment sales until 2002, 

and the first deliveries did not occur until 2003.38

Some equipment did start to slowly trickle into Central Asia, 

with most of it going to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In February 2000, Tashkent finally received its HMMWVs, a delivery 

many observers, not fully appreciating the slowness of the FMS 

system, claimed was a US response to the IMU incursions the 

previous year. Uzbekistan also started to receive several English language laboratories and Kyrgyzstan received uniforms, 

mountaineering equipment, and radios. Kazakhstan, dismayed 

at the lack of responsiveness to its requests, cancelled its open 

FMS agreements, and directed all available funds be used to 

refurbish the barracks at the Atyrau Naval Base on the Caspian 
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Sea, a project that would take four years to complete. Fortunately, by December 2001, $2.500 million worth of radios and 

communications gear and $850 thousand worth of web belts, 

rucksacks, and body armor arrived. These were the first deliveries for the Kazakh element of CENTRASBAT, over five years 

after military aid under the FMF program was first proposed.39

Likewise, some of the Central Asian states began to receive 

US equipment under the EDA program. This equipment, no 

longer deemed useful by the US military, is offered on an “as is, 

where is,” and usually on a “first-come, first-serve” basis. In 

1998, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 

were first authorized to receive grant EDA.40 The State Department initially advocated approval by arguing that it would provide radios and other communications equipment for the CENTRASBAT unit (and for Turkmenistan, which was not a part of 

Figure 5. US ambassador Joseph Pressel delivering first high mobility 

multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) provided under the foreign 

military sales (FMS) program, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, February 2000 

(Reprinted from US Embassy, Tashkent. Used with permission.)
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CENTRASBAT). But, it was unlikely that NATO-interoperable 

communications equipment would be available through EDA. 

It was not until 2000 that equipment under this program 

was first delivered, and most of the EDA provided to the Central Asian states was miscellaneous office or kitchen equipment, tools, or uniform items. The primary exception was the 

82-foot patrol boat, Point Jackson, delivered to Turkmenistan 

for maritime security on the Caspian Sea. Given the type of 

equipment and timing, it is possible that some of it was surplus 

materials left behind after the CENTRASBAT 2000 exercise. Of 

note, Kazakhstan was slated to receive the USCGC Mariposa

(WLB-397), a Basswood-class 180-foot buoy tender originally 

built in 1944, through the EDA program. However, due to the 

disruption in the security-cooperation programs caused by the 

MiG-21 sale to North Korea, the deal was cancelled in 1999 

(table 6).41

Table 6. Excess defense articles (EDA) deliveries to Central Asia

Recipient Delivery 

Date Equipment Acquisition Value

Delivery 

Value

Kazakhstan 2000 Office furniture and 

computer equipment

$159,283 $55,749

Kazakhstan 2004 2 UH-1 helicopters $922,704 $185,440

Turkmenistan 2000 Point Jackson patrol boat $575,000 $230,000

Uzbekistan 2000 Hand tools $113,783 $0

Uzbekistan 2000 Clothing and individual equipment$113,783 $105,777

Uzbekistan 2000 Textiles $113,783 $52,817

Uzbekistan 2000 Miscellaneous kitchen 

equipment

$113,783 $0

Uzbekistan 2000 Rope, cable, chain, and fittings$113,783 $0

Uzbekistan 2000 Mountaineering equipment $113,783 $50,575

(Reprinted from Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2002 [Washington, DC: Department of State, 2001], 511; and Defense Security Cooperation Agency EDA Database http://www.dsca.mil/programs/eda/search.asp.)

Note: Given the identical acquisition values reported for all equipment transferred to Uzbekistan in 

2000, this data likely has been incorrectly reported. Additionally, the total delivery value of these 

items reflected in the EDA Database, at $209 thousand, differs slightly from the value of $239 

thousand which was reported to Congress in 2001.

Not all US offers to help build necessary military capabilities 

met with success. On a visit to Ashgabat in 2000, General Zinni 

proposed assisting the Turkmen government in addressing pipe-
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line security issues. The Turkmen minister of defense brushed 

aside this offer, stating “Well, this will be addressed as soon as 

the pipeline is arranged.”42 Ashgabat had limits on the type of 

military aid it would accept from the United States, and clearly 

assistance in securing the pipelines was outside of those limits.

Training Courses

As previously mentioned, during the three-year period 1999–

2001 there was a shift in the type of training courses provided 

through the IMET program. Previously, the IMET program in 

Central Asia had focused primarily on English-language courses 

to build a cadre of in-country English-language instructors, and 

later on professional courses that would advance military democratization and defense reform. As late as 1998, less than 32 percent 

of the students from Central Asia attending IMET courses in the 

United States were gaining combat skills in such courses as infantry, armor, or field artillery officer training.43 Additionally, almost 

320 students attended Disciplined Military Operations, Military 

Justice, Peace Operations, and Defense Resource Management 

courses taught by DIILS and DRMI METs in Central Asia.44

From 1999 to 2001, almost 55 percent of the IMET courses 

were focused on combat skills. Central Asian military personnel 

came to the United States for Ranger training, Special Forces 

operations qualification, Special Forces sergeants course, airborne training, winter mountain leader course, and infantry, 

armor, and field artillery officer courses.45 Attendance at the 

war colleges dropped by a third, and only a single MET visited 

the region, training only 16 Uzbekistani students. The emphasis on CENTRASBAT had finally caught up with the IMET program, as most of the personnel attending these courses were 

assigned to that unit. But it is clear that the IMET program had 

started shifting away from promoting military democratization 

and defense reform toward providing combat skills. This trend 

was partially offset by a 50 percent increase in the number of 

students attending the Marshall Center, which is not funded 

through IMET. What is not clear is whether this shift was deliberate or simply a function of the emphasis on CENTRASBAT. 
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Exercises

Officers and enlisted personnel from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

and Uzbekistan continued to participate in NATO PfP exercises 

such as Cooperative Nugget, Cooperative Osprey, Combined 

Endeavor, and others more often in Europe than in the United 

States. The US- and NATO-funded Central Asian participation 

was funded with WIF and matching PfP funds. US officials encouraged Central Asian military leaders to take part in as many 

exercises as possible, believing that increasing the linkages to 

Western institutions such as NATO would help reform Central 

Asian military establishments. These exercises became a routine 

but important element of the security-cooperation program.

While the NATO exercises continued unchanged, the rest of 

the exercise schedule underwent a transformation. The most 

important change to the exercise program stemmed from General 

Zinni’s decision to task USSOCCENT, his special operations 

component command, to act as the lead agency for building 

relationships in Central Asia. In a 1999 interview, US Army 

Brig Gen Frank J. Toney Jr., then USSOCCENT’s commanding 

general, outlined his new mission: “We’ve just been given responsibility for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 

and Uzbekistan. General Zinni has made us the operational 

lead, and he wants to use SOF [special operations forces] with 

our military-to-military peacetime engagement techniques to 

open up those particular countries for training with US forces.”46

General Toney ramped up the SOFEX and JCET programs to meet 

this need and he turned to the subordinate 5th Special Forces 

Group (5 SFG) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, for the A-Teams.

Each of the seven SFGs in the US Army specializes in operating in a particular area of the world, and the 5 SFG’s region 

was the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Some members spoke 

Russian, Uzbek, Tajik, or another of the indigenous languages 

of Central Asia. With approximately 54 A-Teams, each with 12 

personnel, available for missions, the 5 SFG began conducting 

month-long exercises up to four times a year in Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Those in Kyrgyzstan were known 

as Balance Knight and Balance Knife exercises. Balance Umbra 

was held in April 2000 with Uzbekistani special forces in Chirchik 

and focused on counterinsurgency operations in mountain en-
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vironments; Balance Empire was held in June 2001 and focused 

on desert operations. Some sources suggest exercises were also 

conducted in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan during this period. 

The training in these exercises focused on combat skills: patrolling, small arms training, and explosives handling.47

The 5 SFG was not the only special operations unit to exercise in Central Asia. The Air Force’s 6th Special Operations 

Squadron (6 SOS), specializing in training foreign aviation units 

in internal defense, deployed operational detachments to Central Asia several times during this period. Two members of the 

unit were in Uzbekistan for language training in September 

2001 and played a minor role in coordinating basing rights at 

Karshi-Khanabad. And on at least one occasion, US Navy seaair-land teams (SEAL) passed through the region.48

One of these events was expanded to meet a specific Kazakh 

desire for bilateral field training. In late 1998, as Kazakh military leaders debated the future of CENTRASBAT, they wanted 

to continue field exercises with the US military in order to train 

their peacekeeping company as it expanded to a battalion. They 

invited the United States to participate in a bilateral exercise in 

the summer of 1999 called Zhardem. Linked to the Balance 

exercises, it is often referred to as Balance-Zhardem. From 14 

July–10 August, 54 Americans and over 150 Kazakhs from the 

peacekeeping unit conducted a crisis response, humanitarian 

assistance, and refugee management exercise that included 

combat drills such as mountain training, artillery raids, and 

defending against combined arms assaults. Zhardem was a 

success and became a permanent element of the exercise 

schedule, with evolutions in March 2002 and March 2005.49

Following the IMU incursions in the summer of 1999, these 

special operations training exercises took on a new significance 

as the most responsive and effective means of providing US 

support to the Central Asian military forces. Other elements of 

the security-cooperation toolset were not flexible enough to 

meet this new need. Training courses available through the 

IMET program took too long to schedule and generally provided 

only basic skills. The bureaucracy of the FMS program meant 

that it could take years before new equipment could be delivered. (The HMMWVs delivered to Uzbekistan in February 2000 

had been on order since 1998.) The CENTRASBAT exercise 
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program, concerned with peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, was focused on the wrong skill sets. But the special 

operations exercises provided a means to quickly and effectively train counterinsurgency forces in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

On the Eve

In the final months of 2001, few expected many major changes 

to the security-cooperation efforts in Central Asia. Funding levels 

and programs had generally reached a plateau and political 

developments in the region appeared to have placed a cap on 

what Washington was willing to provide. Central Asian political 

and military leaders began to appreciate the limits to which the 

United States was willing to assist in their security. As it would 

turn out, they had expected more funding, more equipment, 

more training, and more security guarantees than they actually 

received. Some programs generated more frustrations than others. The slowness of the equipment deliveries and the increasing irrelevance of the CENTRASBAT unit made it clear that US 

aid would not fundamentally transform the capabilities of these 

military forces. And the struggle to find additional resources 

made it clear to US officials that they had few available means 

to influence political and military developments in the region.

When USCENTCOM assumed responsibility for Central Asia 

in 1999, few in the headquarters thought that the relationships 

they needed to build through security-cooperation programs 

would so quickly be put to the test. Most probably assumed the 

programs would continue in the long, slow process common to 

these efforts. Perhaps a few dreamed of small improvements 

such as those being gained through the JCETs and special operations exercise programs. On the eve of 10 September, most 

US officials engaged in the security-cooperation programs in the 

region expected another year of modest advancements. The 

terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, would change those 

perspectives overnight, and the security-cooperation programs in Central Asia would see growth on a scale never 

before seen.
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Notes

1. Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s 

Military (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 115.

2. Leila Kazemi, “Domestic Sources of Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy, 1991 

to the Present,” Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), 210–11.

3. Ibid., 210–13.

4. Priest, The Mission, 100–101 (see chap. 4, note 1).

5. Kazemi, “Domestic Sources of Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy,” 212 (see 

chap. 4, note 2).

6. Annette Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 (May 2004), 487, 495.

7. Robert Legvold, “U.S. Policy Toward Kazakhstan,” in Thinking Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus, ed. Robert 

Legvold (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 92–93.

8. Ibid., 93–94.

9. Ibid., 94.

10. Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance (Washington, DC: 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 43.

11. A National Security Strategy, 11 (see chap. 3, note 3).

12. Joseph P. Harahan and Capt Robert J. Bennett, Creating the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency (Washington, DC: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 

2002), 2–20.

13. Defense Threat Reduction Agency correspondence (see chap. 3, note 

21).

14. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, “Success Stories: Impact of the ICP 

[International Counterproliferation Program] on Proliferation,” http://www.dtra 

.mil/Toolbox/Directorates/OSI/Programs/icp/success.cfm (accessed 28 April 

2006); Bruce B. Auster, “Nation & World, Speed-Reading the Book of Life; The 

Cigarette Spies; Stopping ‘Dirty’ Bombs; Selling Hate Online; How They Got 

Here,” U.S. News and World Report, 17 April 2000, http://www.usnews.com/

usnews/culture/articles/000417/archive_018014.htm (accessed 28 April 2006); 

Harahan and Bennett, Creating the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 38 (see 

chap. 4, note 12); and Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe 

and Eurasia, U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, FY 2001 Annual Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2002), 

260.

15. Director of Strategy and Plans, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Central Asia 

Border Security Initiative (CASI) Background Paper,” undated, in Addendum 

to the Peacetime Engagement Planning Reference Book, 2001 Joint Chiefs of 

Staff/Office of the Secretary of Defense Russia-Eurasia Policy and Strategy 

Conference, Washington, DC, 2–6 April 2001.

16. Ronald H. Cole, Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, 

and Willard J. Webb, The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946–1999

(Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, 2003), 109. USCENTCOM, which had conducted Operation 

Desert Storm against Iraq, also received responsibility for contingency plan-
REASSESSMENT

80

ning and executing military operations in the region, a point which was not lost 

on Russia. This responsibility became critical after 11 September 2001, when 

USCENTCOM staged out of Central Asia to conduct operations in Afghanistan.

17. Tom Clancy, Gen Tony Zinni (retired), and Tony Koltz, Battle Ready

(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004), 338.

18. Priest, The Mission, 104 (see chap. 4, note 1).

19. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, 342–43 (see chap. 4, note 17); 

and Priest, The Mission, 103 (see chap. 4, note 1).

20. Bhatty and Bronson, “NATO’s Mixed Signals,” 134 (see chap. 3, note 25).

21. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, 311–34 (see chap. 4, note 17).

22. Director of Strategy and Plans, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Peacetime 

Engagement Planning Reference Book, 2001 Joint Chiefs of Staff/Office of the 

Secretary of Defense Russia-Eurasia Policy and Strategy Conference, Washington, DC, 2–6 April 2001.

23. Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1999

(Washington, DC: Department of State, 1998), 680–86, 696–98, 702–704; 

Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2000 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1999), 660–68, 684–87, 693–97; Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2001 (Washington, DC: 

Department of State, 2000), 491–95, 504–06, 510–12; Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2002 (Washington, DC: Department 

of State, 2001), 363–67, 373–75, 379–80.

24. Author’s personal experience as a participant, May 1999, Tampa, FL.

25. Trip Report (see chap. 3, note 15).

26. Martin C. Spechler, “Regional Non-Cooperation in Central Asia: A Pathology,” Economic Developments and Reforms in Cooperation Partner Countries: The Interrelationship Between Regional Economic Cooperation, Security, 

and Stability; NATO Economic Colloquium, Bucharest, Romania, 2–4 May 

2001, 269.

27. “Kyrgyzstani Defense Minister Says NATO Cooperation Crucial for 

Military Policy,” Moscow Interfax, 5 July 2004.

28. Lyle J. Goldstein, “Beyond the Steppe: Projecting Power into the New 

Central Asia,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17, no. 2 (April–June 2004), 

194.

29. Embassy of the United States, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Press Release, 

“Head of US Central Command Visits Uzbekistan,” 16 May 2000, http://

www.usembassy.uz/home/index.aspx?&mid=216&lid=1&overview=623 (accessed 8 March 2006); and Sherman W. Garnett, Alexander Rahr, and Koji 

Watanabe, The New Central Asia: In Search of Stability—A Report to the Trilateral Commission, (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 2000), 28.

30. “CENTRASBAT,” (see chap. 3, note 45); and Lt Col James DeTemple, 

“Central Asia,” The NIS Observed: An Analytical View 5, no. 14 (17 September 

2000), http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol5/ed0514.html#centasia (accessed 

12 March 2006); Butler, “U.S. Military Cooperation” (see chap. 3, note 54); 

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “Building Cooperative Security Ties in Central 

Asia,” Stanford Journal of International Relations 3, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2002), 

http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjir/3.2.06_sherwoodrandall.html (accessed 
REASSESSMENT

81

17 February 2006); and “Uzbeks, Kyrgyz ‘disappointed’ at NATO inaction over 

militants – Kazakh paper,” Eurasianet.org, 22 September 2000, http://www

.eurasianet.org/resource/kazakhstan/hypermail/200009/0051.html (accessed 17 February 2006).

31. Robert Karniol, “Antiterror Needs Cancel CENTRASBAT Exercise,” 

Janes Defense Weekly 37, no. 4, 23 January 2002.

32. USCENTCOM personnel, interviewed by author, 27–29 September 2005.

33. Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, 320 (see chap. 4, note 17).

34. Edward L. Hughes, Ken H. Butts, Bernard F. Griffard, and Arthur L. 

Bradshaw Jr., eds., Responding to Environmental Challenges in Central Asia 

and the Caspian Basin, USCENTCOM Central Asia States Environmental Security Conference, 6–8 March 2001, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, Report (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, 

2001), 11, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423651& 

Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf; and Bernard F. Griffard, “Enhancing Regional Stability and Security in Central Asia: Implementing the U.S. Central 

Command Disaster Preparedness Program,” Center for Strategic Leadership 

Issue Paper, vol. 10-04 (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, November 2004), 2, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/

publications/ 10-04.pdf (accessed 23 January 2006).

35. Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, (see chap. 4, note 23).

36. Lt Col William Lahue, USA, “Security Assistance in Kazakhstan: Building a Partnership for the Future,” The DISAM Journal of International Security 

Assistance Management 25, no. 1 (Fall 2002/Winter 2003), 10.

37. Trip Report (see chap. 3, note 15).

38. Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military 

Assistance Facts (Washington, DC: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 

2004), 13, 28–29.

39. Embassy of the United States, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Press Release, 

“U.S. Government Delivers Military Transport Vehicles to Uzbekistan,” 14 

February 2000, http://www.usembassy.uz/home/index.aspx?&mid=216&lid 

=1&overview=646 (accessed 8 March 2006); Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) correspondence (see chap. 3, note 38); Lahue, 

“Security Assistance in Kazakhstan,” 10 (see chap. 4, note 36); and “Fiscal 

Year 2002 U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with 

Eurasia” (Washington, DC: Department of State, January 2003), http://www 

.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10251.htm (accessed 8 March 2006).

40. Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance for Europe and Eurasia, US 

Department of State, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal 

Year 1999 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1998), 1006.

41. Marat Kenzhetaev, “Kazakhstan’s Military-Technical Cooperation with 

Foreign States: Current Status, Structure and Prospects,” http://mdb.cast 

.ru (accessed 6 March 2006).

42. Priest, The Mission, 116–17 (see chap. 4, note 1).

43. Director of Strategy and Plans (see chapter 3, note 28).

44. Author with Defense Institute for International Legal Studies, and Defense Resource Management Institute, correspondence, January 2006.
REASSESSMENT

82

45. Director of Strategy and Plans (see chap. 3, note 28); Director of Strategy 

and Plans (see chap. 4, note 22); Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest, vol.1, FY 1999 and 2000 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2000), http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc 

.html; and Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest, vol. 1, FY 2000 and 2001 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2001), 

http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc.html.

46. Glenn W. Goodman Jr., “Low-Key Spadework By Green Berets Reaps 

Valuable Benefits For War In Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Journal International, 

January 2002, 60.

47. Ibid.; Chivers, “Long Before War” (see chap. 1, note 2); “U.S., Uzbekistan military hold joint training,” United Press International, 22 June 2001; 

“To Which Extent is Realistic the Threat of Armed Incursion into the Southern Border of Uzbekistan?” Uzbekistan Local Press Digest, Eurasia.org (undated) http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/uzbekistan/press_digest/digest 

4_1.shtml; Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, 

US Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities With Eurasia, Fiscal 

Year 2001 Annual Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2002), 98; 

and Director of Strategy and Plans (see chap. 4, note 22).

48. Chivers, “Long Before War” (see chap. 1, note 2); Lt Gen Michael W. 

Wooley, “America’s Quiet Professionals: Specialized Airpower—Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow,” Air and Space Power Journal 19, no. 1 (Spring 2005), 

59; and Robert Burns, “Commandos Specialize in Secret Missions,” Associated Press, 29 November 2002.

49. “U.S.–Kazakhstani Military Exercises Previewed,” Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 27 June 1999, 7; “Plan, Goals for Zhardem Exercises Assessed,” 

Moscow Obshchaya Gazeta, 15–21 July 1999, no. 28, 7; and “Solemn Closing 

Ceremony of the Kazakhstani–American Combined Exercise ‘Balans-Zhardem’ with Participation,” Kazakhstani Ministry of Defense Public Affairs Office, August 1999, http://www.mod.kz (accessed 18 April 2006).
83

Chapter 5

Rewards and Rebalance

Can we count on overflight rights for the duration? 

And where do we stage? Where do we base? . . . In 

the north, maybe we can strike a deal with President 

Karimov in Uzbekistan. Maybe even with the Turkmenbashi . . . Uzbekistan, of course, will be vital to 

the operation. . . . But President Karimov is sitting on 

the fence. But we’ve got to convince him we’ll stay 

the course once we go in. . . . I think we can work out 

our issues with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

—Gen Tommy Franks, US Central Command 

speaking to his staff on 12 September 2001

In the weeks following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 

2001, the Central Asian region, which had for so long been 

under­appreciated by strategic planners in Washington, gained 

new value. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State B. Lynn Pascoe 

asserted in testimony before Congress that “it was critical to 

the national interests of the United States that we greatly enhance our relations with the five Central Asian countries” to 

prevent them from becoming harbors for terrorism.1 US military forces deployed to bases in Central Asia to conduct offensive operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. All five of the Central Asian states granted the US and 

coalition forces overflight privileges and most offered basing 

rights. US forces were established primarily at Karshi-Khanabad 

in Uzbekistan and Manas in Kyrgyzstan, but were also permitted to use, with certain restrictions, facilities in Kazakhstan, 

Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. 

Army general Tommy Franks, the successor to General Zinni 

as USCENTCOM commander, knew the overflight and basing 

rights came at a price.2 Although these nations were reimbursed 

for costs associated with using the facilities,3 General Franks 

wanted to do as much as possible to ensure rapport with the 

civilian and military leaders in these countries so he could 

maintain access into Afghanistan. General Franks sought every 

opportunity to increase the existing security-cooperation pro-
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

84

grams and develop new ones as a means of rewarding the Central 

Asian nations for their support in Operation Enduring Freedom. He told his staff he wanted to bring “goodies” each time 

he traveled to the region, making four trips by January 2002.4

High Watermark

From September 2001 to August 2002 marked the high watermark of US security-cooperation efforts in Central Asia. Instead 

of being viewed as the backwater in Washington’s and USCENTCOM’s security-cooperation calculus, Central Asia moved to the 

forefront. Resources were redirected and new programs were 

established. Among the first steps in this expansion was establishing a security-cooperation relationship with Tajikistan.

For the previous decade, Tajikistan had been left out of most 

US security-cooperation initiatives. Until 1997 the civil war 

and resulting turmoil provided few opportunities for securitycooperation activities, and concern over human rights and the 

integration of the opposition forces meant Washington kept 

Dushanbe at arms length. Tajikistan was not eligible for WIF 

funds as it had not joined NATO’s PfP, and with no nuclear, 

chemical, or biological weapons facilities, there was little justification for including Tajikistan in the CTR program.5 The only 

program Tajikistan participated in was attending the Marshall 

Center, and by the end of 2000 some 42 Tajik officers and civilians had graduated.6 By 2001, however, US policy makers believed the country had stabilized enough to allow for a few tentative links, and in January, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense Jeffrey Starr visited Dushanbe to initiate discussions.7

General Franks followed with a visit in May 2001 during which 

he conveyed Pres. George W. Bush’s message that Tajikistan 

was considered to be a “strategically significant country” for 

stability and security in Central Asia and offered to initiate specific security-cooperation programs.8 Little of substance had 

been accomplished by September, but Tajikistan was soon to 

benefit from its willingness to host US forces. When Tajikistan 

joined the NATO PfP program in November 2001, it became eligible for WIF funding and began participating in related military contact events and exercises.
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

85

The United States also formalized and expanded its security relationships with the other countries in the region, most notably 

Uzbekistan. On 12 March 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell 

and Uzbekistani foreign minister Adulaziz Kamilov signed a Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework which offered the 

strongest statement Washington had ever issued regarding security in Central Asia: “The U.S. affirms that it would regard with 

grave concern any external threat to the security and territorial 

integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan.”9 It was much less than 

President Karimov wanted, but it marked a significant, if only temporary, step in the relationship between the two countries. Likewise, USCENTCOM sought to reinvigorate its relationship with 

Turkmenistan, particularly by way of the SPP with the Nevada National Guard which had been dormant for several years.10

With a supplemental authorization from Congress, over $55.650 

million in FMF funds were provided to the Central Asian states in 

2002—almost twice as much as had been provided for the entire 

region from 1997 through 2001. The overwhelming majority, 

$36.207 million, was given to Uzbekistan, but Kyrgyzstan received 

$11 million and Kazakhstan $4.750 million. Tajikistan received 

$3.700 million, almost as much as longtime partner Kazakhstan. 

Although all four nations were willing to host US forces, the increase in FMF was clearly directed to those countries chosen by the 

United States for its basing needs. Fortunately, over $8.462 million 

in equipment previously ordered also began to arrive in Central 

Asia, more than twice as much as had been delivered to that point, 

and much of that went to Kazakhstan (the radios and individual 

equipment for KAZBAT identified in the previous chapter). Training 

and education programs also saw an increase: IMET funding almost doubled to over $3 million, and war college quotas doubled. 

New programs were initiated as well. The Regional Defense 

Counterterrorism Fellowship, established in March 2002, supplemented IMET by providing Defense Department (as opposed to 

State Department) funds for attendance in nonlethal counterterrorism training and education courses. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan began to receive funds in 2003 

(table A.9, appendix A). In most cases, this funding was used to 

attend courses that would have normally been funded through 

IMET, such as Air Command and Staff College, Signal Officers 

Basic Course, and the International Defense Management Course. 
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

86

However, in some cases, the Regional Defense Counterterrorism 

Fellowship (RDCTF) program was used to fund attendance at new 

courses specifically focused on counter­terrorism, such as Combating Terrorism in a Democratic Society and Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism offered primarily at the same institutions 

that had previously seen students from Central Asia, such as the 

Center for Civil-Military Relations at NPS and the DIILS.11

Similarly, in June 2002, Uzbekistan, while considering using 

its FMF to purchase radios and other communications gear, 

requested an assessment of its communications systems and 

networks. USCENTCOM tasked the US Air Force’s Electronic 

Systems Center to conduct a command, control, communications, computers (C4) study under the Regional Airspace Initiative Program, one of the interoperability programs eligible for 

WIF funding. This study was completed in September 2003.12

Not all programs showed such a dramatic increase. Because 

of ongoing combat operations in Afghanistan, the special operations exercise program had to be scaled back and some 

military contact events were cancelled due to the lack of available US forces to participate. In Uzbekistan, for example, three 

of eight special operations exchanges and 14 of 37 military 

contact events scheduled for 2002 were cancelled.13 Fortunately, some critical events continued: for example, the 6 SOS 

was still able to deploy to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2002, 

and the 10 SFG from Fort Carson, Colorado, sent a twelveman team to train Kazakhstani forces in counter­terrorism operations in February and March, 2002.14 The Regional Cooperation exercises for 2002 and 2003, which had supplanted 

CENTRASBAT, were also cancelled. To make up for these cancellations, the Central Asian states, particularly Uzbekistan, 

were invited to participate in many more multilateral NATO 

PfP exercises, hosted by USEUCOM and US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). Uzbekistan, for example, participated in 

Cooperative Endeavor 02, Cooperative Nugget 02, Cooperative 

Safeguard 02, Cooperative Zenith 02, and Strong Resolve 02.15

The Central Asian states reciprocated to Washington’s overtures 

by sending liaison officers to USCENTCOM headquarters in Tampa. 

Five Uzbek officers arrived in December 2001, five from Kyrgyzstan 

arrived in May 2002, and three from Kazakhstan in June 2002.16

Although the purpose of assigning these officers to USCENTCOM 
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

87

was to facilitate the coordination of support for Operation Enduring 

Freedom in Afghanistan and, in the case of Kazakhstan, Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, their presence at the headquarters marked a major 

step in the bilateral relationships and occasionally assisted in planning and executing security-cooperation activities. Likewise, as a 

reflection of the new relationship between Uzbekistan and the 

United States, in June 2002, Tashkent sent Lt Col Ilkhomjon Bekmirzaev, who was serving as a liaison officer at USCENTCOM, to 

Washington to serve as its defense attaché, the first new attaché 

since 1997.17

New Equilibrium

As quickly as the programs increased in the fall of 2001, they 

began to decrease a year later. FMF allocations, which exceeded 

$55 million in 2002, dropped to just over $16 million in 2003 and 

then below $10 million in 2004. The downward trend continued 

through 2006 and the projections for 2007. IMET funding continued to increase for a year, but then returned to its 2002 level of 

approximately $3 million per year. Part of this decrease is a reflection of the end of combat actions in Afghanistan and the perceived 

decreasing need to reward the Central Asian states for their support, but there were other factors that led to a rebalance of the 

security-cooperation programs in the region. Increasing concern 

over human rights abuses led to a slow but steady decline in US 

relations with most of the Central Asian states, culminating in an 

almost complete severing of the security-cooperation relationship 

with Uzbekistan following the Andijon incident in May 2005 and 

the subsequent eviction of US forces from Karshi-Khanabad. Simultaneously, the increasing pressures of the war in Iraq led to 

additional tensions and distractions.

Human Rights and the Colored Revolutions

Some Central Asian leaders saw the new relationship with 

the United States in the war on terrorism as an opportunity to 

eliminate any remaining opposition to their rule. US officials 

continued to advocate that human rights considerations would 

continue to factor heavily in US policy toward the region, but 

Central Asian elites, particularly in Tashkent and Bishkek, be-
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

88

lieved their cooperation with the United States would inoculate 

them against US disapproval for their repressive actions and 

quickly labeled any opposition group as terrorist. Within 

months, both the US State Department and international political activists were noting that the human rights situation had 

demonstrably worsened since the US involvement started. In 

March 2002, US assistant secretary of state Lorne Craner admitted the Uzbekistani government was using the war on terrorism as a pretext for cracking down on domestic political opponents, but argued that more US involvement, rather than 

less, would eventually influence President Karimov to permit 

greater freedoms.18 By December 2003, US secretary of state 

Powell declined to certify Uzbekistan as having made progress 

in respecting human rights an act which put a freeze on most 

security-cooperation activities between the two countries. Military contact events could continue, but Uzbekistan would not 

be granted any additional IMET or FMF funding.

Uzbekistan was not the only Central Asian state with a worsening human rights record during this period. An assassination attempt against President Niyazov on 25 November 2002, 

led to harsh repressive measures against opposition groups in 

Turkmenistan. While Niyazov has never been afraid of using 

force to maintain his hold on power, the aftermath of the attack 

brought particularly egregious abuses, including arresting family 

members of the accused conspirators, an unauthorized search 

of the Uzbekistani embassy, and the expulsion of the Uzbekistani ambassador. The United States, instead of backing Niyazov 

as he expected, called for an investigation into human rights 

abuses and condemned Turkmenistan for violating international 

conventions protecting diplomats. The relationship between 

the United States and Turkmenistan cooled as Niyazov turned 

to Russia for support.19

In November 2003, following what many believed to be rigged 

parliamentary elections, popular opposition overthrew the government of Pres. Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia in what 

came to be known as the “Rose Revolution.” Central Asian leaders were quick to note that Georgia had sided with the United 

States in the war on terrorism and hosted US forces under the 

Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP). The following autumn, 

a similar political upheaval—the “Orange Revolution”—in 
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

89

Ukraine after fraudulent presidential elections once again drew 

an apparent linkage between military cooperation with the 

United States and internal instability and an overturning of the 

existing political order. 

Soon the colored revolutions would come to Central Asia. In 

March 2005, demonstrators chased Pres. Askar Akayev from 

power. Although the US forces at Manas were not involved, 

President Karimov in Uzbekistan began to believe that the US 

military presence at Karshi-Khanabad, rather than serving as 

a force against insurgents such as the IMU, offered no protection to his regime and may in fact be a source of instability. 

When the United States called for an independent investigation 

of the deaths of hundreds of civilians at Andijon in May 2005, 

Karimov began to distance his government from the United 

States. Restrictions were placed in US operations from KarshiKhanabad and on 29 July 2005, Karimov exercised a provision 

in the original basing agreement and gave US forces six months 

to leave.20 By the spring of 2006, US Army major Paul Schmitt, 

the US SAO in Tashkent, characterized his work as “trying to 

conduct security cooperation in a hostile environment.”21

The War in Iraq

Washington was increasingly concerned over the human rights 

situation in Central Asia becoming increasingly sensitive to 

charges that its security-cooperation efforts with these authoritarian leaders were exacerbating the abuses. But other factors 

were also impinging on Central Asia’s primacy in securitycooperation affairs. Within USCENTCOM, the effort required 

to plan for the invasion of Iraq began to divert attention away 

from Central Asia. President Bush began seriously considering 

options against Iraq as early as November 2001, and planners 

at USCENTCOM immediately began updating and modifying 

existing war plans. When the original war plans proved inadequate, they developed a new concept of operations which General Franks briefed to President Bush on 5 August 2002. The 

president approved the concept and the following day General 

Franks issued orders to his subordinate commanders to start 

detailed planning actions.22 Two weeks later he left Tampa on 

what was to be his last trip to Central Asia as the USCENTCOM 
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

90

commander. When he returned, his attention and that of the 

USCENTCOM senior leadership and staff was focused increasingly on the coming conflict with Iraq. Despite the continuing 

operations in Afghanistan and continuing deployment of US 

units to the region, Central Asia again became a secondary 

consideration. Without the constant attention and influence of 

the senior leaders, the security-cooperation efforts in Central 

Asia began to lose momentum.23

The Iraq war had a negative impact on relations throughout 

most of Central Asia. With the exception of President Karimov 

(at least initially), Central Asian leaders were opposed to US 

operations against Saddam Hussein. Almaty was concerned 

that a successful US invasion would lead to a drop in oil prices 

and reduced investment in Kazakhstan’s growing oil industry. 

Most of the leaders were also concerned that the war in Iraq 

would bring a resurgence in Islamic radicalism and terrorism 

throughout Central Asia. Soon, however, they began to understand the implications of the US efforts to overthrow the despotic regime of Saddam Hussein for their own futures—if Washington was willing to invade Iraq to install a new regime, what 

would it be willing to do against Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan?24 The Iraq war both decreased US attention and increased 

Central Asian concerns.

Planning and Organizational Changes

Since the establishment of the JCTP program by USEUCOM in 

1989, there had always been a distinction between securityassistance activities and military-engagement activities. This bifurcation was perpetuated by the military organizations that conduct each type of activity. Training and equipping programs were 

(and are) largely conducted by the military services (Army, Navy, 

Air Force, and Marine Corps) within their respective systems of 

training and acquisition organizations—often referred to as the 

institutional element of the service—as part of the military services’ organize, train, and equip responsibilities under Title 10 of 

the US Code. Security-assistance training and education programs conducted by the Air Force, for example, are executed by 

Air Education and Training Command (AETC) as an embedded 

subset of the larger training and education programs for the US 
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

91

Air Force. Likewise, the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) is 

responsible for executing foreign military sales within the processes used to acquire weapon systems and military equipment. 

However, engagement activities such as military contact 

events and exercises are usually conducted by the combatant 

commanders and their subordinate component commands. 

USCENTCOM, is responsible for military contact programs and 

joint exercises, and relies on its subordinate commands—US 

Army Central Command (USARCENT); US Central Command 

Air Forces (USCENTAF); US Naval Forces, Central Command 

(USNAVCENT); US Marine Component, Central Command 

(­USMARFORCENT); and USSOCCENT—to execute these activities. Although security-assistance programs and engagement 

activities could be directed toward the same goal, as they were 

for CENTRASBAT, they were viewed as independent and distinct 

activities governed by separate regulations and bureaucracies.

The publication of the Quadrennial Defense Review in late 

September 2001 for the first time drew together these separate 

activities and organizations under a new term, security-cooperation.

25

Security cooperation encompassed virtually all of the activities 

conducted by the US military during peacetime with the military forces of other nations, including the activities outlined in 

table 1. The process of integrating these activities and improving 

the long-term planning process for security-cooperation programs was significantly advanced in 2003 with the publication of 

the first DOD Security Cooperation Guidance. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wanted to bring more structure and integration to the various security-cooperation programs and initiatives the United States was conducting around the world, 

and he wanted to have those programs linked to specific goals 

and objectives for each region and country rather than the 

broad “show the flag” engagement activities of the 1990s. The 

2003 Security Cooperation Guidance (a classified document 

not available to the public) provides that focus, and each regional command was tasked to revise its Theater Security Cooperation Plans (now called Theater Security Cooperation Strategies) to match this guidance.26

These two structural changes, along with the massive increase 

in security-assistance funding in 2002, forced USCENTCOM to 

reevaluate how it was organized to execute security coopera-
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

92

tion within the command. Within the region, security-cooperation 

programs had largely been executed by the US defense attachés assigned to the US embassies as an additional responsibility. With the expansion of the programs in the late 1990s, it 

became clear that additional personnel were required. Permanent billets had been authorized as early as 1998, but were 

never filled. Instead, Army officers (usually captains and majors) undergoing training to become foreign area officers (FAO) 

at the Marshall Center were detailed to the embassies on threeor six-month rotations.27 While this eased the workload of the 

defense attachés, the constant rotation of officers undermined 

continuity and the ability to develop and execute long-term 

programs. The first full-time security assistance officer (SAO), 

US Army lieutenant colonel William Lahue, arrived in Almaty 

in May 2001. USCENTCOM assigned full-time SAOs to Bishkek and Tashkent soon thereafter and in Tajikistan a full-time 

officer was assigned in the summer of 2004.28 In Turkmenistan, the relatively small security-cooperation program is still 

managed by the US defense attaché.29

By mid-2002, it was clear to the security-cooperation planners in Tampa that simply pushing assistance to the region 

was counterproductive and they searched for ways to integrate 

the programs and build long-range plans. Within USCENTCOM, there traditionally had been little synchronization between the IMET and FMF programs, which resided in the logistics directorate, and the military contact program in the plans 

and policy directorate. In the spring of 2001, even before the 

new Quadrennial Defense Review introduced the concept of 

“security cooperation,” General Franks reorganized his headquarters staff to combine these programs into a single, expanded “engagement” office to facilitate integration. Still, 

change came slowly. The normal rotation of staff officers 

brought in new personnel who were more receptive to the 

merger of the offices. With his attention more focused on Iraq, 

General Franks made his last trip to Central Asia in August 

2002. After that, there was less pressure on the USCENTCOM 

staff to find “deliverables” and more time to develop long-term 

integrated programs. Staff members began developing strategies to harmonize the various programs, including those executed by DTRA that were previously seen as unrelated to secu-
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

93

rity cooperation, as well as some outside of DOD’s purview, 

such as the State Department’s EXBS program.30

Similarly, the newly established SAOs in the region began to 

tie together the various programs within their areas of responsibilities. Lieutenant Colonel Lahue in Almaty worked with his 

counterparts in the Kazakhstani Ministry of Defense to establish a five-year plan of military cooperation. First, he invited a 

MET from the DISAM at Wright-Patterson AFB to help explain 

the intricacies of the IMET and FMS programs to the appropriate officials within the Ministry of Defense. This instruction 

helped ensure the plan would be developed on a realistic understanding of what the United States could provide, how the 

programs actually worked, and how the MOD could manage 

those resources within its own national defense budget.31

Following this MET, the SAO and the MOD jointly produced 

the five-year plan based on an understanding of common US 

and Kazakhstani security interests in the region. This plan was 

intended to “integrate and focus all available assets . . . in a 

targeted force development effort that meets both U.S. and Kazakhstani strategic objectives.” The plan also cemented the primacy of the development of military capabilities over other considerations: “Support for systemic reform will be focused on 

those reforms required to meet the force development objectives.”32 The new plan, signed in September 2003, included the 

following goals:

•  Force development

• • Develop a NATO-interoperable peacekeeping force

• •  Develop a ground, maritime, and air-defense force in 

the Caspian Sea region

• •  Develop rapid-reaction and special-operations forces

•  Systemic Reform

• •  Officer/NCO personnel management

• •  Professional noncommissioned officer corps

• •  Vehicle and equipment maintenance systems

• •  English-language training system33
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Similar efforts occurred in the other Central Asian states. In 

2002 Lt Col Jon Chicky, the USCENTCOM desk officer for Uzbekistan, developed a security-assistance strategy for Tashkent 

that meshed FMF, EXBS, and IMET over a five-year period in 

such a way that the armed forces of Uzbekistan, including 

troops from the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Emergency 

Situations, Committee for Protection of State Borders, and National Security Service, would be “transformed from legacy Soviet mechanized/motorized force to a professional, lighter, and 

mobile force eventually interoperable with U.S./NATO and able 

to defend the nation from external and certain internal threats.” 

His plan, which was approved by USCENTCOM and the Uzbekistani Ministry of Defense, focused on six critical efforts:

•  Expanding and equipping Uzbekistani special forces 

•  Improving communications interoperability within the 

Uzbekistani armed forces and with US and NATO

•  Enhanced training/planning by creating a modeling and 

simulation capability

•  Creating a professional officer corps and officer personnel 

management system

•  Creating a professional noncommissioned officer corps

•  Improving infrastructure and capabilities to secure borders34

By April 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Chicky’s strategy had been 

turned into a five-year security-cooperation plan. The Ministry 

of Defense, which had participated in the development of the 

plan and in principle approved it, declined to sign it in order “to 

maintain flexibility;” although the SAO and MOD planners referred to it when coordinating security-assistance activities. 

Eventually the disruption in relations after Andijon made the 

document irrelevant.35

Similarly, in November 2003, the Marshall Center hosted a 

conference in Dushanbe to help the Tajikistani army build an 

unclassified military strategy which was used by the SAO to 

help coordinate assistance. This conference helped the SAO 

and Tajikistani MOD create a five-year bilateral plan, but this 

document was never signed and eventually was abandoned by 
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the United States because of lack of follow-through by the Tajikistani MOD.36 By the end of 2004, a five-year bilateral plan 

had been established with Kyrgyzstan.37 These plans were useful for focusing security-cooperation efforts, but they often had 

the unintended consequence of being perceived by the MODs 

as promises rather than intentions, despite the caveats by the 

SAOs that executing the programs was dependent on annual 

FMF and IMET funding.

These organizational and planning changes further increased 

the integration of the military contact events and the securityassistance programs, particularly FMS, and USCENTCOM began 

planning and executing additional activities to be mutually 

supporting. For example, in 2004 the Montana National Guard 

hosted a series of military contact events on developing noncommissioned officer training syllabi to support the establishment of the NCO Academy in Koi Tash, built using FMF funds. 

Likewise, the Air Force sponsored a series of visits to C-130 

bases in Arkansas and Kentucky to highlight the capabilities of 

the C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. The Kazakhstani air force 

was interested in acquiring several through the EDA program.38

However, there was no apparent integration with other programs such as those conducted by DTRA. The organizational 

and planning adjustments also served to focus US securitycooperation activities on concrete aspects of building military 

capabilities rather than on less tangibles.

Military Capabilities

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review first used the term 

security cooperation and also marked the shift in emphasis for 

security-cooperation programs. Unlike the perspectives of the 

1990s, there was no discussion about the utility of securitycooperation tools to promote less tangible objectives such as 

military democratization. Published just weeks after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the new focus was on 

building military capabilities (or partner capacity, as it was later 

to be called) in allied and partner nations to deter aggressors 

and prosecute the war on terrorism: 

A primary objective of U.S. security cooperation will be to help allies and 

friends create favorable balances of military power in critical areas of 
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96

the world to deter aggression or coercion. Security cooperation serves 

as an important means for linking DOD’s strategic direction with those 

of U.S. allies and friends. . . . It requires that U.S. forces train and operate with allies and friends in peacetime as they would operate in war. 

This includes enhancing interoperability and peacetime preparations 

for coalition operations, as well as increasing allied participation in activities such as joint and combined training and experimentation. . . . A 

particular aim of DOD’s security cooperation efforts will be to ensure 

access, interoperability, and intelligence cooperation, while expanding 

the range of pre-conflict options available to counter coercive threats, 

deter aggression, or favorably prosecute war on U.S. terms.39

President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy further emphasized countering terrorism as the primary role of security 

cooperation, and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirmed 

this approach. State Department justifications for FMF became 

specific in requesting funds to build military capabilities, primarily counterterrorism and border security forces, in Central 

Asia. The 2005 request for Kazakhstan, for example, stated additional funding:

will continue to enhance Kazakhstan’s capability to combat terrorism in 

the region through security enhancements and counterterrorism support . . . will continue to provide assistance to the Peacekeeping Battalion 

and help support development of a rapid reaction brigade near the Caspian oil field in Atyrau . . . will enhance Kazakhstan’s capability to respond 

to major terrorist threats to oil platforms or borders, while also enhancing its interoperability with NATO, U.S., and Coalition forces . . . will 

support the purchase of interoperable communications equipment, basic 

individual soldier equipment, vehicles, and power generator systems.40

Despite this shift, however, funding for FMF continued to drop, 

from $16.090 million in 2003 to an estimated $5.500 million in 

2007. Much of this drop is attributable to the elimination of 

FMF funding for Uzbekistan, but the funding for Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan also slowed, totaling together 

only $2 million in 2007. Only for Kazakhstan did the funding 

remain steady. FMF to Almaty averaged $3.500 million each 

year from 2003 to 2007.

As a result of the large FMF allocations the previous year, 

deliveries reached a new peak in 2003, with over $42 million 

worth of equipment delivered and construction completed. Uzbekistan was the primary recipient, with almost $34 million 

worth of communications gear and other items provided. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan received deliveries under the FMS system for the first time in 2003. Ashgabat first received FMF in 
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1997, but, other than funding the transportation of the patrol 

boat provided under the EDA program in 2000, chose not to 

use it until 2002. Much of Kazakhstan’s FMF was used to build 

barracks at Atyrau, which opened in July 2004, but it also received five HMMWVs in August 2004, supplementing the two it 

received in December 2001.41 Almaty also advanced another 

step when it requested, and received, two UH-1 Huey helicopters 

through the EDA program, with refurbishment to the HUEY-II 

configuration provided through FMF. Likewise, Ministry of Defense officials initiated serious discussions on the possibilities 

of acquiring used C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, which 

would represent the first ever transfer of fixed-wing military 

aircraft to a post-Soviet state. Although the aircraft would be 

provided through the EDA program, Kazakhstan would be expected to absorb all costs for refurbishment, sustainment, and 

training through its national funds, another first for Central 

Asia. The HMMWVs, helicopters, and transport aircraft are intended to improve Kazakhstan’s capabilities to rapidly respond 

to threats in any part of its vast territory, and, if completed, 

would dramatically improve the capabilities of its mobile forces.

Likewise, approximately a third of the military contact events 

also continued to emphasize the development of military capabilities, but they expanded in scope to include interaction with 

a wider variety of military and nonmilitary units on an increasingly large set of specialties. An increasing number of these 

events (anywhere from 10 to 40 percent of the number planned) 

focused on counterinsurgency, border security, counternarcotics, and aviation capabilities rather than on the previous specialties of peacekeeping and search and rescue. 

They began to more frequently include visits and contacts with 

nonmilitary units such as the Ministry of the Environment and 

Emergency Situations, Border Guards, Ministry of the Interior, 

and the National (presidential) Guard.42 Even the Marshall 

Center adjusted to this new environment, adding a course named 

Program on Terrorism and Security Studies to match the previous course that addressed national security issues in democratic states. In 2004 and 2005 nine students from Central 

Asia attended.43

As combat operations in Afghanistan began to wind down, 

US special operations forces were once again available to par-
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98

ticipate in bilateral exercises and training events in Central 

Asia. In some cases, the units came directly from Afghanistan 

to attend. The third special operations exercise in Kyrgyzstan 

since September 2001 began in January 2003 and was known 

as Balance Knight. Lasting a month, it then transitioned to 

Balance Knife, which included the 6th Special Operations 

Squadron. Balance Knife focused on mountain warfare, navigation and communication, and medical training, the latter was 

provided by the South Korean medical contingent at Manas. 

US forces also provided a C-130 aircraft from Manas for airborne training. Five SOFEXs were planned for Uzbekistan in 

2003, although some were later postponed or cancelled.44

Proliferation Prevention

The changes in the proliferation prevention efforts in Central 

Asia must also be seen in the context of increasing the capabilities of the indigenous forces. While activities designed to 

destroy nuclear-, chemical-, and biological-weapons infrastructure continued, the real focus of these programs almost completely shifted toward improving the ability of these nations to 

secure and control their own borders. There was less of a focus 

on eliminating facilities and more emphasis on providing equipment and training to border forces. The war in Afghanistan 

brought attention to the porous borders in Central Asia, but it 

took a year for this to manifest in additional resources for the 

proliferation prevention programs. Funding for the ICP, which 

had been bumped up to $1.200 million in 2002, more than 

doubled to $2.890 million in 2003, with roughly equal amounts 

going to projects in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Fourteen 

training events were held in 2002 and another 12 in 2003. In 

Uzbekistan this training culminated in an integrated exercise 

held in Chirchik in October and November 2004. Soon thereafter, the disruption in Uzbekistani-American relations impacted the program and Tashkent cancelled the remaining 

scheduled courses. In 2005 and 2006 the focus of the ICP 

shifted toward Kazakhstan and new, more successful, efforts 

were initiated in Tajikistan.

DTRA also initiated a new proliferation prevention program 

through CTR in 2003. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Prolif-
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99

eration Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) appears to have many 

of the same objectives as ICP, EXBS, and other efforts designed 

to improve border security throughout the former Soviet Union. 

Reminiscent of the export control efforts executed by the CTR 

program in the early 1990s, WMD-PPI goals in Central Asia 

include improving Uzbekistan’s ability to detect radiological 

materials at key border crossing points and providing surveillance radars, communications equipment, and small vessels to 

Kazakhstan to improve its ability to monitor the Caspian Sea.45

Central Asian border security was becoming more important 

for another reason as well. The growing recognition that the 

drug trade in Afghanistan was undermining the security and 

economic stability in the Central Asian states led to additional 

funding under DOD’s CN program to improve border security, 

interdiction capabilities, and special operations forces in the 

region. Managed from the office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, this 

funding had actually started on a small scale in 2001 in Uzbekistan, with $230 thousand provided for programs that year 

and a similar amount was offered in 2002. The massive explosion in the drug trade coming from Afghanistan, however, drove 

DOD planners to funnel over $6.500 million to Uzbekistan for 

counternarcotics programs in 2003, with an additional $500 

thousand to Tajikistan and $351 thousand for regional programs within Central Asia. Funding dropped in 2004, but 

spiked again in 2005 to over $20 million, with large amounts 

offered to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. By this 

time political events in Uzbekistan had caught up with the 

counternarcotics program, and only $47 thousand had been 

spent before the United States temporarily halted the program. 

In 2006 DOD requested over $55 million in CN funding to 

support a wide range of border security improvements throughout Central Asia, including the construction of facilities, provision of equipment, and training and conferences. In Kazakhstan, CN funding would provide the border security forces with 

three rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIB) and improve the port 

facilities at Bautino. In Kyrgyzstan, it would be used to improve 

three border crossings, renovate garrisons for the Panther and 

Scorpion Special Forces units, and provide a small amount of 

customs equipment and a variety of training courses and con-
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100

ferences. In Tajikistan, which used CN funding in 2005 to initiate a communications upgrade and establish a border crossing 

at the Nizhn-Pianj Bridge. Additional funding would be used to 

complete the communications project, establish two additional 

border crossings, and refurbish several border outposts. In 

Turkmenistan, two-border crossing points, one on the TurkmenIran border and another on the Turkmen-Afghan border, were 

established in 2005; funding in 2006 would complete an interagency communications equipment project, establish three 

more border crossings, and provide training through a combined exercise with the Nevada National Guard. Should additional funding be granted for Uzbekistan, it would be used to 

provide RHIBs and border sensors.46

With a proposed 2006 budget of $55 million, counternarcotics 

activities are now the single largest element of the US securitycooperation program in Central Asia. In fact, border security— 

whether those efforts are to prevent narcotics WMD smuggling, 

human trafficking, or terrorist movement—has become the 

single most important objective of US security-cooperation efforts in Central Asia. It is not clear whether the establishment 

of this priority resulted from a deliberate policy decision or simply reflects of the relative strength of the various bureaucracies 

in the US national security establishment. Border security programs are being planned and executed by various offices, but 

they appear to lack the integration and synchronization necessary to be most effective. Yet these programs appear to be 

largely discrete and conducted by various organizations within 

DOD (such as DTRA, OSD, and USCENTCOM). Border security 

also requires integration.

Regional Cooperation

Promoting regional cooperation continued to be important, if 

less emphasized. Disaster response and environmental management activities and exercises maintained the contacts established 

between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 

The Marshall Center courses and conferences continued to promote collaborative solutions to regional issues such as disaster 

preparedness, narcotics trafficking, and Caspian Sea security.
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Two new exercises, however, were also established to support this goal. Along with its regular Combined Endeavor exercise, which has included participants from Central Asia since 

1999, USEUCOM had been conducting RESCUER/MEDCUER 

exercises for several years “in the spirit of” the NATO PfP program. The scenario was based on a mass casualty situation, 

RESCUER addressed brigade-level responses to a humanitarian disaster while MEDCUER provided field training for medical personnel. Beginning in 2005, USEUCOM invited some of 

the Central Asian states to participate. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan sent delegations (Uzbekistan declined), in September 2005, 

to Vaziani in the Republic of Georgia for the event. Kazakhstan, 

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are expected to participate in RESCUER 06, scheduled for August 2006 in Yerevan, Armenia.

The more significant initiative was the reestablishment of the 

Regional Cooperation exercises in 2004. The last one occurred in 

2001 and is often referred to as CENTRASBAT 01. It had been 

held as a command post exercise at the US training facilities in 

Einsiedlerhof, Germany. Regional Cooperation 04 followed that 

model with a battalion-level command-post exercise with a disaster-response scenario in early September 2004. At the same facilities. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan participated while Turkmenistan sent observers. Uzbekistan declined to 

participate because of the presence of Pakistani delegates. 

US exercise coordinators noted there was little interaction between the Central Asian delegations during the first planning 

conference held in January 2004. Each delegation attempted to 

work directly and exclusively with the US coordinators and all 

questioned the presence of the Pakistanis. The Pakistani delegation even questioned their own participation in what they saw as 

a “Central Asian” exercise. The US coordinators were surprised 

but pleased when the environment changed dramatically but 

inexplicably during the March 2004 planning conference—all of 

the delegations were enthusiastic about working with each other, 

and the exercise proceeded in September with apparent collaboration between the participating delegations.47

The 2004 exercise highlighted the need for increased crossborder coordination through a regional coordination center 

(RCC), which was established for the 2005 exercise. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan participated, while 
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102

Turkmenistan, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates were invited to send observers. Held at the Joint Warfighting Center in 

Suffolk, Virginia, in July 2005, Regional Cooperation addressed 

operational-level tasks and relationships, as opposed to the 

tactical focus of the previous exercise, in a scenario that emphasized border security, illegal migration, narcotics trafficking, and consequence management. The need for the RCC was 

validated as was the need to establish formal diplomatic agreements between the nations in the region to permit the exchange 

of information in the event of an emergency (fig.6). 

Figure 6. Central Asian participants in the Regional Cooperation 05 

exercise, Suffolk, Virginia, July 2005 (Reprinted from US Central Command. Used with permission.)

The 2006 exercise, planned for July in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 

will build on these lessons and will be open to Afghanistan, 

Uzbekistan, and Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, 

Qatar, and Bahrain.48 Based on the experiences in the Regional 

Cooperation exercises, in March 2006 USCENTCOM announced 

its intention to establish a regional disaster preparedness center 

in Central Asia, likely in Kazakhstan, in the next few years.49
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103

Democratization

Democratization ceased to be a stated primary objective for 

the security-cooperation programs in Central Asia, but, legacy 

efforts in several countries ensured it remained an important 

element. Over 20 percent of the military contact events were 

dedicated to officer and noncommissioned officer professional 

development. A significant portion of those events, however, 

consisted of exchange visits by military academy cadets. There 

is probably some long-term value in having junior officer candidates from Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan visit the United States 

to experience, if only for a brief period, the opportunities available to their American counterparts. On the other hand, little 

linkage to the US security-cooperation objectives is seen in 

having US cadets visit Central Asia. Further, there is not now 

an established way to measure and evaluate the success of this 

kind of program. The majority of the military contact events for 

officer and noncommissioned officer professional development, 

however, addresses the more appropriate issues of establishing 

professional forces in these nations. The importance of these 

programs vary by country. While a quarter to a third of the 

events in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan were dedicated to professional development topics, only three such 

events were planned for Tajikistan out of the 48 total events 

planned for 2004–2005. In Kyrgyzstan, noncommissioned officer professional development also resulted in Bishkek’s first 

use of FMF for construction: over $5.700 million was dedicated 

to upgrade facilities at Koi Tash for use as a joint brigade and 

professional development training centers.50

Likewise, approximately 15 percent of the military contact 

events supported disaster management, environmental security, 

or medical issues, which support democratization objectives by 

promoting appropriate civil-military relationships. More recently, the military contact plans for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have included exchanges on public affairs in the military, 

which promote US objectives of defense transparency.51

Similarly, the increase in IMET funds beginning in 2002 continued for the next two years. Over $10 million in IMET was 

authorized in these three years, more than had been provided 

to the region between 1993 and 2001. This massive increase in 
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104

funding brought a corresponding increase in the number of 

Central Asian defense personnel attending US military courses—

over 650, more than twice as many as had attended US courses 

previously. Eighty-four students, including 54 from Kazakhstan, 

attended English-language training at DLIELC in 2004. In an 

impressive use of its security-assistance funding, Kazakhstan 

requires its personnel to attend intensive training at its own 

Military Institute of Foreign Languages, established in part 

with US security-assistance funding, to achieve basic Englishlanguage proficiency before traveling to the United States. This 

has reduced the duration of each student’s overseas tour and 

has permitted sending twice as many students to DLIELC.52

Other training and education programs showed a similar increase through 2003 and 2004. Attendance at the Marshall Center jumped to 104 in 2004, twice as many as had attended each 

year from 1998 to 2002. The Central Asian states continued to 

receive quotas at the mid-level US war colleges. In 2003, for the 

first time, Kazakhstan was offered a quota at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), a prestigious senior-level war 

college under the National Defense University. Almaty chose Col 

Muslim Altynbayev, the first Kazakhstani defense attaché in 

Washington, to attend the course. The following year, Kazakhstan 

received an invitation to send an officer to the National War College (NWC). Lt Col Merey Bisenov, who had previously attended 

Air Command and Staff College in 1997–1998, graduated from 

the NWC in the summer of 2005. Only two previous ALP scholarships had been offered in Central Asia, to Uzbekistan in 1998 and 

2002. In 2003, as a result of Central Asian support for US operations in Afghanistan, ALP invitations were offered to Kazakhstan, 

Turkmenistan (which declined), and Uzbekistan. A similar number of invitations were offered in 2004 to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 

(which declined), and Uzbekistan. 

Current Status

The United States need for bases and relationships in Central 

Asia brought an immediate spike in many aspects of security 

cooperation, but the needed resources were not long sustained. 

Within a year, IMET- and FMF-funding levels began to drop, 

and they have now reached a new, lower equilibrium. But the 
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105

funding for the counternarcotics program rose dramatically in 

2005 and now constitutes the single largest funding source for 

security-cooperation programs in Central Asia. The objective for 

most programs is now to improve the security of the borders in Central Asia, for counternarcotics, counterproliferation, or counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations (fig. 7). 

At the beginning of 2006, US efforts in the region range from 

working in a “hostile environment” in Uzbekistan to a steady, relatively integrated approach to Kazakhstan. An assessment of the 

challenges these programs face in planning and execution follows. 

Notes

1. Jim Nichol, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for 

U.S. Interests, CRS Issue Brief for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, Library of Congress, 2004), 3.

2. General Franks also understood that the price had just gone up. Prior 

to September 2001, he had initiated general discussions with Uzbekistani 

Figure 7. Selected US security-cooperation funding in Central Asia, 

1993–2006 (adapted from data found in appendix A.)

Note: This chart reflects a compilation of relevant data included in the funding charts contained in 

appendix A except CTR funding, which largely focused on WMD elimination. It does not include all 

US security funding that has been spent in Central Asia, as many programs do not break out budget lines by country or region. However, it captures most of the spending and therefore portrays a 

fairly accurate historical perspective of US outlays in the region.
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

106

president Karimov on the potential use of Karshi-Khanabad. General Franks 

was aware that Karimov knew the value of the airbase had gone up dramatically. Gen Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier (New 

York: Regan Books, 2004), 256.

3. Payment for the use of the airfields was handled in different ways. As 

Manas was a civilian airfield, Kyrgyzstan receives both a rental payment, approximately $2 million per year, and a payment for each takeoff and landing. 

Some sources estimate this at $5–$7 thousand per event. As the air bases in 

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were primarily military facilities, Dushanbe and 

Tashkent received payments through the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), intended to offset costs that would otherwise have not been incurred had the 

country not been supporting US operations in the war on terrorism. In 2002 

Tajikistan received $2.399 million which was used to repair the runway at 

Dushanbe ostensibly damaged by US aircraft, and Uzbekistan received 

$15.747 million which was used to upgrade facilities at Karshi-Khanabad 

and purchase other equipment through the FMS system. In 2005 Uzbekistan 

received an additional payment of $22.985 million which was the subject of 

much controversy. Although the proposal was developed and approved before the Andijon incident, it was paid afterwards. Many outside of the Bush 

administration advocated that the payment should be withheld to ensure 

Tashkent was not rewarded for the situation. The positions of the Defense 

and State Departments were that the US government should always pay its 

bills as a matter of principle. Author with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2006; Bruce Pannier, “Kyrgyzstan: Bishkek Presents New AirBase Terms to U.S.-Led Coalition,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 25 January 2006, http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=01&y

=2006&id=E377D17F-622A-41E0-B9EA-1C9D4698B453 (accessed 26 January 

2006); and Goldstein, “Beyond the Steppe” (chap.4, note 28).

4. Author with former US Central Command (USCENTCOM) staff members, correspondence, March 2006; and “Uzbekistan: Russian Agency Reports on US General’s Meetings with Top Leaders,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 23 

January 2002.

5. Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest, vol. 

1, FY 1999 and 2000 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2000), http://

www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc.html (accessed 8 March 2006).

6. The Marshall Center also hosted two conferences regarding Tajikistan 

prior to 2001. In August 1999, in support of the first post-civil-war national 

elections, it hosted Building Political Parties in Tajikistan: Cooperation and 

Competition, the only forum that included all of the opposition-party leaders, 

and in April 2000, in support of post-civil-war economic development, it 

hosted Building Institutional and Economic Foundations in Tajikistan. Author with George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, correspondence, February 2006.

7. Goldstein, “Making the Most” 85 (chap. 3, note 52),

8. Ahmed Rashid, “Western Powers Bolster Tajikistan as it Faces Renewed 

Threats to Stability and Security,” Central Asia—Caucasus Analyst, 23 May 
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

107

2001, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=102 (accessed 

23 March 2006).

9. “United States–Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership 

and Cooperation Framework,” Embassy of the United States, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 12 March 2002, http://www.usembassy.uz/home/index.aspx?&=

&mid=218&overview=457 (accessed 8 March 2006).

10. “Nevada National Guard State Partnership Program in Turkmenistan,” 

The National Guard Bureau Office of International Affairs, http://www.ngb

.army.mil/ia/states/states/nv_turkmenistan%5B1%5D.htm (accessed 8 

March 2006).

11. Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest, 

vol. 1, FY 2002 and 2003 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2003), 

http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2003/ (accessed 8 March 2006).

12. Sara Bette Franken, “Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellows Program,” The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management

26, no. 1 (Fall 2003), 12; Office of the Secretary of Defense correspondence 

(see chap. 5, note 3); Office of the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations 

correspondence, March and April 2006; and author with the Air Force Electronic Systems Center, correspondence, February and March 2006.

13. USCENTCOM correspondence (see chap. 5, note 4).

14. “6th Special Operations Squadron Factsheet,” 1st Special Operations 

Wing Public Affairs Office, http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets/

factsheet.asp?id=3492 (accessed 8 March 2006); and James Doran, “Americans Covertly Training Kazakh Troops,” Times of London, 30 March 2002.

15. Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia, FY 2002 (Washington, DC: Department of 

State, 2003), http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/c10251.htm (accessed 14 

March 2006).

16. Elizabeth Wishnick, Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College 

Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 2–4.

17. Defense Intelligence Agency, correspondence ( see chap. 3, note 7).

18. Jeffrey Donovan, “U.S.: State Department Releases Human Rights Report Criticizing New Allies,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 5 March 2002, 

http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/03/05032002084601.asp (accessed 28 

April 2006).

19. Ata Khaitov, “A New Role for Russia: Niazov’s Best Friend,” The Jamestown Foundation Russia and Eurasia Review 2, no. 3 (4 February 2003), 1–2.

20. Adam Ward, ed., “Uzbekistan Casts Out America: Setback or Opportunity for Washington?” IISS Strategic Comments 11, no. 6 (August 2005), 1–2.

21. Lt Col Dan Groeschen, Chief, Central and South Asia Branch, USCENTCOM, interviewed by the author, March 2006.

22. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 

30–153.

23. Author with former USCENTCOM personnel, correspondence, April 2006.
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

108

24. Ata Khaitov, “Central Asian Responses to the Iraq Crisis: Hope and Fears,” 

The Jamestown Foundation Russia and Eurasia Review 2, no. 5 (4 March 2003); 

and Wishnick, Strategic Consequences, 14–17 (see chap 5, note 16).

25. Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, 2001), 11.

26. Thomas S. Szayna, Adam Grissom, Jefferson P. Marquis, ThomasDurell Young, Brian Rosen, and Yuna Huh Wong, US Army Security Cooperation: Toward Improved Planning and Management (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

2004), 17.

27. Trip Report (see chap. 3, note 15).

28. Lahue, “Security Assistance in Kazakhstan,” 10 (see chap. 4, note 36).

29. Groeschen interview (see chap. 5, note 21).

30. Author with former USCENTCOM staff members, correspondence, 

September 2005 and March 2006; and Priest, The Mission, 73 (see chap. 4, 

note 1).

31. Lahue, “Security Assistance in Kazakhstan” (see chap. 4, note 36); 

Craig M. Brandt, and Mark T. Ahles, “Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management Mobile Education Team Travels to Kazakhstan,” DISAM Journal 

of International Security Assistance Management 25, no. 1 (Fall 2002/Winter 

2003), 19.

32. Lahue, “Security Assistance in Kazakhstan,” 13 (see chap. 4, note 36).

33. Ibid., 13–14; and “Kazakhstan to Purchase Military Hardware in US,” 

Moscow ITAR-TASS, 20 February 2004.

34. CCJ5-E [USCENTCOM Joint Staff Office-5-E, Security Cooperation 

Division], Issue Paper, “Uzbekistan’s Five-Year Security Assistance Plan,” undated.

35. Author with the US Security Assistance Office, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 

correspondence, April 2006.

36. Author with the Marshall Center, correspondence, April 2006.

37. “High-Level Kyrgyzstan–US Defense Talks Outline Military Cooperation to 2010,” Bishkek Kabar News Agency, 5 October 2004.

38. Groeschen interview, March 2006 (see chap. 5, note 21).

39. Quadrennial Defense Review, 11 (see chap. 5, note 25).

40. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 

2005 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2004), 371.

41. “U.S. Government Aid Helps Defense Ministry Build Barracks in 

Atyrau,” Embassy of the United States, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 23 July 2004, 

http://www.usembassy-kazakhstan.freenet.kz (accessed 8 March 2006); 

“U.S. Government Donates Five Humvee Ambulances to Kazakhstan’s Peacekeeping Battalion,” Embassy of the United States, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 17 

August 2004, http://www.usembassy-kazakhstan.freenet.kz (accessed 8 

March 2006).

42. USCENTCOM correspondence (see chap. 5, note 30).

43. “Program on Terrorism and Security Studies,” George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/

lang-en/static/xdocs/coll/static/ptss/ptss-overview-en.pdf (accessed 28 

April 2006).
REWARDS AND REBALANCE

109

44. “Bishkek Hosts US–Kyrgyzstani Military Exercises,” Moscow Interfax, 

17 March 2003; “US–Kyrgyz Military Exercises Underway in Bishkek,” News 

Agency Prima, 19 March 2003; Roger M. McDermott, Countering Global Terrorism: Developing the Antiterrorist Capabilities of the Central Asian Militaries

(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 22.

45. Senate, Testimony of Ms. Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation, Before the 

Senate Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats 

and Capabilities, 108th Congress, 2d sess., 10 March 2004, http://armed

-services.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?wit_id=3024&id=1077 (accessed 28 April 

2006).

46. Office of the Secretary of Defense correspondence (see chap. 3, note 55).

47. Lt Col Dan Groeschen, chief, Central and South Asia Branch, USCENTCOM, interviewed by author, September 2005; and USCENTCOM correspondence (see chap. 3, note 55).

48. Ibid.

49. Joshua Kucera, “CENTCOM Sets up Disaster Management Centre,” 

Janes’ Defense Weekly, 1 March 2006.

50. USCENTCOM correspondence (see chap. 5, note 30).

51. Ibid.

52. Author with DLIELC, correspondence, January 2006; and “Kazakhstan’s Defense Ministry to Set up Language Institute,” Almaty InterfaxKazakhstan, 20 July 2004.

111

Chapter 6

Constraints and Limitations

The system is badly broken. . . . We use chewing gum 

and bailing wire to keep it together.

—Gen Anthony Zinni

Commander, 

US Central Command

Security cooperation is an inherently complex and difficult 

undertaking. Regardless of the countries involved, security‐ 

cooperation programs require years of effort and vast amounts 

of resources to have an impact, whether that be improved rela‐

tionships or enhanced military capabilities. Often these pro‐

grams must overcome significant cultural and language differ‐

ences between the two armed forces, and those undertaken by 

the US military must accommodate the overwhelming differ‐

ences between the size, capabilities, and available resources of 

the two forces. Beyond the general limitations of time and cost, 

each of the various security-cooperation activities has specific 

strengths and weaknesses that must be taken into account 

when building programs. And with little or no effort to measure 

and clinically analyze the results, it is difficult to best allocate 

resources (including canceling efforts that do not measure up) 

or adjust programs to maximize results. These challenges are 

inherent in all security-assistance programs, and have been 

part of all such efforts since Lend-Lease began in 1940. 

There are other limitations, however, that are unique to US 

security-cooperation programs in Central Asia. Some of these 

are a function of the Central Asian environment and exist 

largely as a result of the history and development of these 

nations over the past fifteen years. Others are a function of 

US policies toward the region and the manner in which those 

policies have been executed through security-cooperation 

programs. These constraints and limitations—environmental, 

bureaucratic and policy, and programmatic—as well as 

thoughts on how to minimize or eliminate them, are ad‐

dressed in this chapter.
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

112

Environmental Constraints

Despite the promise of the early 1990s, the Central Asian 

states have not made significant progress on political and 

economic reform, which directly and indirectly limits 

security-cooperation efforts. The population in all five 

states enjoys considerably fewer political freedoms than they 

did as Soviet citizens during the last few years of the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics’ existence. Of course, there are de‐

grees of control: Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are the most au‐

thoritarian states in the region, followed closely by Tajikistan, 

while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the least repressed.1

Lack of Political and Economic Reform

The lack of progress on political reform also creates a direct 

tension between the US objectives of promoting human rights 

and improving military capabilities. US policy has been consis‐

tent in pressing for greater political and economic freedoms 

while providing support on security issues. In theory, these two 

objectives are mutually reinforcing and security-cooperation 

programs can help achieve both. But critics have charged that 

US security cooperation in the region may have the unintended 

consequence of delaying political reform, particularly in the 

most autocratic countries. Human rights activists have three 

concerns over the increased US presence and programs since 

11 September 2001: 

“Antiterrorism” can serve as a convenient blanket excuse for those govern‐

ments to act aggressively even against opponents who have little or 

nothing to do with terrorism; incoming resources can artificially extend 

the life of governments that had been close to failure; and the US govern‐

ment, with troops on the ground and bases and other resources to pro‐

tect, could oppose political change that could jeopardize its investment.2

While the first concern has been validated by the increas‐

ingly repressive tactics in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan over 

the past few years, it is unclear whether US assistance has 

been indirectly propping up the most repressive governments. 

However, it is clear that the third concern has not panned out. 

The US forces in Kyrgyzstan played no role in the 2005 Tulip 

Revolution and US policy was to support a peaceful resolution 

of the unrest in a legal manner consistent with the desires of 
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

113

the Kyrgyz people. The status of the base at Manas apparently 

did not play a significant role in US efforts to find a solution. 

Furthermore, the United States was willing to risk eviction from 

Uzbekistan rather than to excuse Karimov’s repression against 

the demonstrators in Andijon.

Beyond the tension between human rights and security as‐

sistance, the lack of political reform undermines the ability to 

use security cooperation to promote military reform that is nec‐

essary to create an environment that fundamentally accepts 

the values promoted by the United States. These include civil‐

ian control of the military and respect for human rights. Politi‐

cal systems are the determinants of the structure of civilmilitary relations in a society and authoritarian and 

democratic political systems produce different forms of civil‐

ian control and military professionalism.3 Most studies on 

military reform in post-communist societies assume the de‐

sire for political reform is a necessary precondition. Experi‐

ences in Eastern Europe are mixed, however. In Bulgaria mili‐

tary reform largely stalled until 1997 when the pro-reform 

Union of Democratic Forces led by Ivan Kostov assumed power. 

Conversely, some observers suggest Ukrainian military reform 

proceeded without corresponding political progress.4 Most ana‐

lysts would probably agree that reform must proceed on all 

fronts. Reform in only one arena (political, economic, or mili‐

tary) is unlikely to last or have significant impact without cor‐

responding reform in the others. Despite adopting some of the 

trappings of military professionalism, such as the elimination 

of conscription, institution of civilian oversight, and the estab‐

lishment of a senior noncommissioned officer corps, these 

countries will not fully achieve democratic military profession‐

alism unless there is concomitant political reform. 

The slowness of political reform has also tended to perpetu‐

ate the legacy of Soviet suspicion toward Westerners. Often 

Central Asian officers, particularly those trained in Soviet or 

Russian military institutions, are still hesitant to work with 

Western officers, particularly when they know their own counter‐

intelligence services are monitoring their activities. This suspi‐

cion pervades the bureaucracy as well. As previously mentioned 

the defense ministries in Central Asia—adopting the practice of 

most countries—had established specific departments for han‐
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

114

dling external relations with foreign defense attachés. These de‐

partments, however, were tightly controlled by counterintelligence 

and saw their role as controlling or limiting contact. The offi‐

cers assigned to these departments tended to treat securitycooperation activities as protocol matters requiring formal writ‐

ten requests for information, meetings, or contact events. These 

requests were translated into Russian or the local language 

and sent through the bureaucracy to the appropriate staff or‐

ganization or unit, and when the response returned it was 

translated back into English. Setting up meetings could take 

weeks or months, and often attempts to adjust the dates of a 

military contact event would usually result in a cancellation. In 

Kazakhstan this issue was only resolved in 2003 with the es‐

tablishment of an international cooperation center with full 

authority to work directly with foreign officials on securityassistance matters.5

In Uzbekistan, however, the authoritarian rule of Pres. Islam 

Karimov severely restricts the interaction between government 

officials and their US counterparts. In the words of one senior 

Uzbek official: “We don’t know from one day to the next what 

the president is going to order us to do in changing foreign or 

domestic policy. Yesterday’s enemies are today’s friends, and 

there is little coherent advice we can give when we are not 

asked, and policy changes without reason or justification.”6

USCENTCOM security-cooperation planners state they have a 

good relationship with their counterparts, who they describe as 

cordial, hospitable, and friendly—but also note that in meet‐

ings, the Uzbekistanis are guarded and hesitant to discuss cer‐

tain issues for fear of “getting on the wrong topic.”7

The more authoritarian regimes in Turkmenistan, Tajiki‐

stan, and Uzbekistan have established strict controls over US 

security-cooperation programs. All are cautious about allow‐

ing impressionable junior officers to have too much contact 

with the United States through security-cooperation programs. 

Pres. Sapamurat Niyazov closely regulates opportunities for 

military officers to attend training programs, contact events, and 

exercises outside of Turkmenistan. Officers in the MOD have 

stated Niyazov personally approves each request, a process 

that requires excessive staffing and often results in disapprov‐

als. Many invitations are never forwarded to the presidential of‐
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

115

fice but are either ignored or politely declined by lower-level 

officials.8 This restriction is not unique to military-cooperation 

programs—Niyazov has banned the teaching of foreign lan‐

guages, including English, in public schools and has prevented 

students from accepting scholarships to foreign universities.9

The same is true in Tajikistan, where Pres. Emomali Rahmonov 

must personally approve the absence of any officer from the 

country. Over the past five years, several Uzbekistani students 

attending English-language training in San Antonio have de‐

serted, some claiming political asylum in the United States. As 

a result, President Karimov has also imposed overt controls on 

his military officers, refusing to permit any to attend academic 

programs in the United States and significantly restricting the 

quantity and type of military contact events with the United 

States. Since 2005, President Karimov has eliminated all mili‐

tary contact events for young officers conducted outside Uzbeki‐

stan to ensure they will not be influenced by Western ideals.10

The political and economic situation in these countries, par‐

ticularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is evident in the low pay 

and poor funding for military units and personnel. These fac‐

tors foster pervasive corruption in these countries, including 

corruption within the military forces, which negatively impacts 

security-cooperation efforts both directly and indirectly. Power 

cables for the computers in the US-provided language labs in 

Kyrgyzstan were cut to make extension cords for other equip‐

ment. Some US-provided equipment is simply stolen by the 

personnel in the units and sold on the black market. Officers 

in Kyrgyzstan, for example, have loaded US uniforms in the 

back of their cars and sold them in the markets in Osh. The US 

SAO in Dushanbe considered a program to provide uniforms to 

a Tajikistani Army unit a success when she returned to the 

unit months later and saw the soldiers still wearing them. US 

efforts to build a noncommissioned officer professional devel‐

opment program in Kyrgyzstan suffered a setback when almost 

an entire class of students were recalled to their units well be‐

fore the training had been completed. The commanders of these 

units use the soldiers as contract labor, and the length of the 

course was undermining their profits.11 The indirect impact 

arises when the US military presence is seen to be fostering 

corruption. The US contracts for fuel deliveries to Manas in 
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

116

Kyrgyzstan, for example, are reportedly controlled by family 

members of Pres. Kurmanbek Bakiyev, and the frozen food de‐

liveries in Uzbekistan were managed by a member of President 

Karimov’s family. 12

Russian Influence

Every country in Central Asia retains very strong political, 

economic, and military ties to Russia. Even after 15 years of 

independence, the Central Asian states still conduct 40 to 50 

percent of their trade with Russia.13 Most of these relationships 

are bilateral, but all except Turkmenistan have security and 

defense ties with multilateral forums that are dominated by 

Russia. In parallel to the development of the CIS structures in 

early 1992, Russia established bilateral military relationships 

with each state in Central Asia. Russia signed agreements on 

friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with Kazakh‐

stan on 25 May, Uzbekistan on 30 May, and Kyrgyzstan on 30 

June, an agreement on friendship and cooperation with Turk‐

menistan on 8 June, and a series of military agreements with 

Tajikistan on 25 May 1993.14 It is these bilateral military agree‐

ments, and the many that have been signed since, that con‐

tinue to ensure Moscow’s continuing strong influence in the 

security affairs of the Central Asian states. 

This influence suffered some reduction in importance through 

the mid-1990s as each state worked to develop its own military 

forces from their inheritances from the Soviet Union. The de‐

sire for increased autonomy, sovereignty, and the use of the 

military as a socializing mechanism for these new states de‐

creased the dependence they had on Russia. Likewise, internal 

economic difficulties in Russia meant that equipment deliv‐

eries to the Central Asian states dropped dramatically in the 

early 1990s. This reliance varied by state, as well. Tajikistan 

was almost totally dependent on Russia, while Uzbekistan 

made the most progress in its goal of limiting interaction 

with Moscow. 

All of these agreements, and many others that have since 

been signed, include provisions for Russian equipment and 

training for the Central Asian states. Russia’s recent windfall 

profits from oil and gas industries have permitted an even 
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

117

greater role in Central Asia, and Moscow is actively courting 

these governments with military aid. By the summer of 2003, 

for example, over 1,500 Kazakhstani personnel had graduated 

from Russian military educational institutions, and another 

800 were enrolled at 43 separate military schools and war col‐

leges. Since 2001, Kazakhstan has not had to pay tuition for its 

students; instead, those costs were deducted from Russian 

payments for leasing military facilities within Kazakhstan.15

Likewise, Kyrgyzstan has sent many of its military personnel 

to Russia for training. By November 1998 some 269 had gradu‐

ated from Russian military schools. That number rose to more 

than 1,000 by September 2005. Similar patterns are found in 

the other Central Asian states to a greater or lesser degree. 

Turkmenistan resumed sending personnel to Russia for mili‐

tary training in 1996 and Uzbekistan in 2000. After Tajikistan’s 

civil war ended in 1997, 72 Russian military advisors joined 

the staff of the Tajikistan Ministry of Defense to help create the 

unified armed forces. At least 10 remain at the Tajikistani State 

Border Troops training center and 10 more at the MOD Military 

Institute as of 2005, but it is likely that a large number of advi‐

sors remain throughout the Tajikistani military structure. 

Since 1993, about 100 Tajiks were admitted each year to Rus‐

sian military schools and academies, and as of April 2005 some 

400 Tajik cadets were attending Russian military schools and 

“tens of officers” were in advanced training. As of 2005, Russia 

was offering free military training to members of the Common‐

wealth Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).16

The Soviet military equipment inherited by all of the Central 

Asian states continues to form the vast majority of each na‐

tion’s arsenal. Russian deliveries of spare parts and end items 

decreased in the early and mid-1990s as the defense industry 

underwent a dramatic reduction and reorganization, but trans‐

fers started to increase in the late 1990s. Kazakhstan currently 

receives military equipment from Russia at no charge as part of 

the leasing agreement, including up to $20 million worth of 

weapons and supplies in 2001. Russian support to the Kyrgyz‐

stani military expanded after the 1999 IMU invasions, when 

Moscow delivered more than $1 million in uniforms, weapons, 

and ammunition. Since 2003, Russia has provided up to $3 

million worth of equipment each year to Kyrgyzstan, including 
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

118

small arms, trucks, and helicopters. In 2001, Turkmenistan 

brokered a deal to pay for armaments, including coastal patrol 

boats, with shipments of natural gas. To reinforce its status as 

a major weapons supplier to Central Asia, Russia has also es‐

tablished repair facilities in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.17

Russian influence in Central Asia is reinforced not only 

through bilateral ties and the multilateral forums, but also via 

bilateral military relations that the Central Asian nations main‐

tain with other post-Soviet states. Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, 

Azerbaijan, and Armenia all also rely on Soviet and Russian 

training, doctrine, and equipment to a great extent. Azerbaijan, 

for example, has opened its military schools to cadets from 

Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. Belarus provides air defense 

training for many officers from all of the Central Asian states 

using Russian equipment and techniques, and Minsk recently 

announced reserved quotas in six military academies and uni‐

versities for members of the CSTO. Ukraine provides training 

and a wide variety of military equipment, including patrol boats, 

radars and electronic equipment, aircraft, and ammunition to 

Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Granted there 

have been some national modifications to the equipment and 

training, but much is based on Soviet and Russian design and 

doctrine. (Which doctrine is taught using the Russian language, 

thereby indirectly reinforcing Russian influence.)18

Russia’s security-assistance programs are not without prob‐

lems, however. Kazakhstani military personnel complained to 

US officials about the difficulties in obtaining spare parts for 

legacy Soviet aircraft, and Moscow’s promises to provide equip‐

ment are not always fulfilled.19 In September 2005, one Tajiki‐

stani official criticized a Russian protocol that had been signed 

the previous year, “the Russian side promised to supply us with 

two helicopters, but we have not yet received them . . . so far the 

Russian side has not supplied one piece of military equipment.”20

However, the legacy of Soviet equipment, training, and doctrine; 

and the absolute volume in Russian support still overwhelms 

US assistance efforts. In 2005, for example, approximately 70 

Tajikistani officers were attending advance training and war 

colleges within Russia. In the same year, six attended courses in 

the United States—all at the DLIELC. The continued provision 

of training and equipment reinforces the use of Soviet and Rus‐
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

119

sian doctrine, tactics, procedures, planning processes, and or‐

ganizational structures throughout these military forces, which 

decreases the impact of US-supplied equipment and training. 

Bureaucratic and Policy Constraints

While US security-cooperation programs are limited by Rus‐

sian influence in the region, they are also constrained by poli‐

cies of limited US defense commitment to Central Asia. Since 

the mid-1990s, US policy sought to exclude Russia from hav‐

ing a significant influence in security issues in Central Asia, 

but failed to offer replacements for the Soviet legacy and Rus‐

sian support. Efforts to promote the Partnership for Peace pro‐

gram led to a very modest increase in NATO involvement in 

Central Asia, but it did not (and was not intended to) bring 

NATO security guarantees. Unlike the bilateral and multilateral 

security-cooperation programs conducted by NATO and the 

United States in Eastern Europe throughout the 1990s, which 

were largely driven by the ultimate goal of NATO membership, 

US and NATO security-cooperation programs were simply 

means to advance defense reform and democratization, im‐

prove indigenous military capabilities, and, to a limited extent, 

promote regional cooperation. The limits of US defense support 

became evident in 1999 and 2000, when Washington offered 

little additional support to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in re‐

sponse to the IMU incursions, which were the most serious and 

direct military threat these countries had faced.

Restrained Commitment

Likewise, the United States has emphasized an intention not 

to have a permanent or long-term military presence in the re‐

gion. American military officials discounted Uzbekistan’s first 

offers to allow US military bases on its territory in the mid1990s, and this disinclination to offer long-term security as‐

surances continued after September 2001. President Karimov 

sought such guarantees as payment for using Uzbek facilities 

for operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda—his first re‐

quests were for immediate membership in NATO and a bi­lateral 

mutual defense treaty with the United States, neither of which 
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

120

he received.21 Placated with promises of a strategic partnership 

and increased aid, Karimov ultimately agreed. Similarly, Kyr‐

gyzstan wanted the United States to sign a 99-year lease on 

using Manas Air Base, but US officials declined. Instead, US 

officials were quick to make public announcements that the 

deployments to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 2001 were tem‐

porary, lasting only until the terrorist threat in Afghanistan 

was defeated.22

The effect of these policies has been to reinforce to the Cen‐

tral Asian leadership that there is a limit to US interest, in‐

volvement, and presence in the region and that the United 

States should not be considered a reliable security partner. 

This undermines the efforts of the United States to reform and 

transform the defense establishments of these nations.

Short-Term Perspectives

As the history of US efforts in Central Asia demonstrate, 

security-cooperation programs often take years to achieve 

meaningful results, and even then, the results are not con‐

firmed in a measurable way. US programs must first over‐

come the challenge of the federal budget cycle which can 

necessitate forecasting requirements two to three years in 

advance of obtaining funding. Most FMS programs must 

then meet the requirements of the normal military acquisi‐

tion process, which can result in several more years between 

the initial request and the actual delivery of equipment. For 

example, in 1996 the State Department first advocated for 

FMF for Uzbekistan, and in 1997 provided the first alloca‐

tion. However, Tashkent received its first equipment deliveries 

only in 2000—16 HMMWV.23 But, the delivery of a weapon 

system or the provision of a training course does not mean 

the country has acquired the needed military capability. De‐

pending on the complexity of the system or nature of the 

trained skills, it can take several more months or even years 

until the individual or unit is fully mission ready and the 

desired capability has been achieved. 

However, US security-cooperation efforts are constrained by 

bureaucratic imperatives within the US government that force 

a short-term perspective in developing and executing programs. 
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

121

Security-cooperation planners at all levels are focused on exe‐

cuting the current-year programs and forecasting for the fol‐

lowing year, leaving little time to address longer-term goals and 

objectives. Much of this is driven by the budget cycle. Congress 

authorizes funding for most programs on an annual basis, and 

the final amounts can vary widely from year to year. Long-term 

plans can easily be undermined when expected levels of fund‐

ing do not materialize. For example, the program to provide 

Kazakhstan with six UH-1 Huey II helicopters has been broken 

into multiple smaller programs, each with only two helicopters, 

to match the expected FMF authorizations for several years. A 

significant decrease in authorized funding could mean that 

fewer aircraft are procured or critical support elements, such 

as training and spare parts, are not provided, thereby under‐

mining the success of the entire program.24 Likewise, USCENT‐

COM planners develop bilateral military contact programs with 

each country in advance of knowing the funding levels that will 

be available, often resulting in having to cancel or postpone 

events that later cannot be supported. USCENTCOM’s military 

contact plan for 2004 was budgeted at over $9 million, but less 

than $4 million was actually authorized, thus eliminating over 

half of the proposed events.25

The relatively frequent turnover of personnel and the lack of 

readily-available historical data also contribute to a short-term 

perspective. Lessons from previous activities are lost—by 2005, 

few planners at USCENTCOM remembered the existence of 

CENTRASBAT, much less the reasons for its demise. Except for 

the most recent years, the bilateral military contact plans, 

after-action reports, and annual expenditures of funds are 

generally unavailable, therefore planners for the military con‐

tact programs are unable to track trends or assess progress 

over time. Incomplete data suggests identical contact events 

have been conducted multiple times over the years. While oc‐

casional repetitions may be reinforcing, recurring visits could 

be perceived as “military tourism” rather than as meaningful 

contributions to building relationships and capabilities.
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

122

Insufficient Resources

Security-cooperation programs can also be very expensive, 

particularly when purchasing advanced weapon systems. Al‐

though US military equipment is generally more capable and 

reliable, it also tends to be relatively more expensive than that 

from other major suppliers. Transportation costs also can have 

a long-term impact on the costs of sustainment programs—the 

shipment of spare parts and travel of support personnel can 

easily become a significant portion of overall program costs. 

This is particularly true for security-cooperation programs 

with Central Asia, which must account for the underdeveloped 

transportation links with the West. Military contact event plan‐

ners usually budget $10 thousand per person, per visit, in 

travel and related costs when using commercial transporta‐

tion methods. Fortunately, since 2000, and perhaps earlier, 

Congress has authorized the use of DOD funds to offset the 

transportation of certain types of defense items to the Central 

Asian states.26

The low level of funding for security-cooperation programs in 

Central Asia is a significant external constraint. Allocations for 

FMF provide a useful benchmark. In 2004, for example, Con‐

gress authorized $4.633 billion in FMF for security-assistance 

programs around the world. Of that, however, $3.530 billion 

was earmarked for Israel, Egypt, and Afghanistan—the remain‐

ing funds, less than 17 percent of the total authorization, were 

divided up among the other qualifying nations. None of the 

Central Asian states were in the list of the top 20 recipients. 

Whereas Ecuador received $6.950 million and BosniaHerzegovina $14.900 million, Kazakhstan received a paltry 

$2.980 million.27 Total FMF funding for the entire Central 

Asia region from 1997 to 2005 was just over $115 million, more 

than half of which was provided in 2002. The small sums al‐

located for Central Asia each year meant that, for the most 

part, equipment transfers are limited to relatively small amounts 

of supplemental gear, such as uniforms, radios, and medical 

equipment, rather than major end items. 

The restraints of the funding programs diffuse the impact of 

US security-cooperation efforts in Central Asia. Generally, nei‐

ther the OSD nor USCENTCOM have the ability to easily trans‐
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

123

fer funds from the various accounts to meet more pressing con‐

cerns in another area—monies allocated for counternarcotics 

efforts must be spent in that fashion, even if the requirement to 

improve counter­insurgency capabilities is more important. 

While new funding sources such as the RDCTF program have 

been created since 2001, they often duplicate other existing 

programs, such as IMET, but with narrow restrictions on their 

use. This complicates the planning efforts of securitycooperation practitioners.

Limited funding also tends to create sustainment issues. De‐

fense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) mandates a “Total 

Package Approach” for sales of major weapon systems under 

the FMS program, whether they are funded by FMF, EDA, or 

national funds. The recipient military force is strongly encour‐

aged to plan for and obtain all the necessary support needed to 

operationally and effectively utilize and sustain the weapon sys‐

tem, including training, technical assistance, spare parts, and 

technical manuals. Training programs, for example, address 

not only how to properly use the equipment, but also demon‐

strate the steps to build an appropriate training program within 

the armed forces of the recipient nation (known as “train the 

trainer”). But, funding constraints often result in subsequent 

long-term logistics and training shortfalls as sustainment pro‐

grams get cut in favor of new equipment purchases.

This is not to suggest the United States should completely 

fund the equipment modernization programs of the Central 

Asian military forces. However, these nations, like many others 

in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, tend to com‐

partmentalize the assistance received from the United States. If 

the initial equipment item, such as a patrol boat, was provided 

at no charge through the EDA program and the initial training 

and support was funded through IMET and FMF, the patrol 

boat becomes an “American program.” Despite the constant 

advice and recommendations by the SAOs, the defense minis‐

try assumes all future support will continue to be provided by 

the United States.

The small programs in Central Asia face an other challenge—

the security-assistance bureaucracy. As one of the most visible 

and politically-sensitive tools of US foreign policy, security as‐

sistance has become one of the most highly regulated and in‐
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spected programs in the federal government. US securityassistance organizations are often criticized as being 

overly bureaucratic, wasteful, unresponsive, and unwieldy. 

This paper is not the place to review those criticisms, and 

personal experience suggests most security-assistance pro‐

grams are well managed and executed by professionals seek‐

ing to do their best. However, personal experience also sug‐

gests that large programs with major allies get visibility 

and attention, while the smaller programs with lesserknown nations risk getting lost in the shuffle. A set of com‐

puters for a command center in the Kyrgyz MOD, for ex‐

ample, was shipped to Bishkek with the wrong power cords. 

A simple solution would be for the US SAO at the embassy 

to procure the cords locally. Security-assistance regula‐

tions, however, mandate FMF funds can only be used to 

purchase goods from American-owned businesses, so a local 

purchase is not permitted. But the simple matter of the 

new cords has gotten lost in the bureaucracy, still un‐

resolved, while the computers sit quiet and unused in the 

ministry, a reflection of the perceived unresponsiveness of 

US security-assistance support.28

Insufficient resources include the availability of units for mili‐

tary contact events and exercises. US military operational com‐

mitments can also limit the ability to meet security-cooperation 

objectives. Special operations forces, which have always had a 

very high operations tempo, have become even more operation‐

ally stressed with ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the 

Philippines, and other locations. This has reduced the avail‐

ability of these units to conduct SOFEX and JCET worldwide, 

including with the partner militaries in Central Asia.

Training programs will also suffer from reduced resources. 

Over the next few years the US Army’s Training and Doctrine 

Command will lose 1,900 military instructor positions, shifting 

these billets to operational units. This restructuring will impact 

the availability of training courses that can be offered to the 

Central Asian militaries—fewer courses, offered less frequently, 

and for shorter durations. Many courses will be taught by DOD 

civilians or by contractors. While the content of the courses 

may not substantially change, the interaction with uniformed 

US military personnel and the opportunities for building mili‐
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125

tary relationships will decrease. To the extent the DOD considers 

interaction between foreign and US military personnel a desir‐

able end, a contributing factor to many other aspects of the 

success of security cooperation, every decrease in interaction 

must be taken very seriously.

The situation becomes more complicated when viewing the 

internal Central Asian dynamics. Each country has a variety of 

security services, and US security-cooperation activities at‐

tempt to interact with most, but not all, of them. For example, 

US policy restricts interaction with internal security agencies 

and prohibits interaction with organizations complicit in hu‐

man rights violations. In Kyrgyzstan, the limited securitycooperation efforts are spread across the MOD, State Border 

Service, Ministry of Emergency Services, Ministry of the Inte‐

rior, and the National Guard.29 This approach is justified by 

asserting it permits US influence in all of the relevant security 

services. Often the political leadership in the country prefers 

this approach so as to balance the strengths and external 

ties of each of the security services and avoid creating a possi‐

ble threat to their authority. But, attempting to engage with 

each security service in a nation diffuses the programs and 

limits their effectiveness. 

Programmatic Constraints

Military contact events, by themselves, are the least effective 

method of achieving specific security-cooperation goals and 

objectives. The period of interaction for a single event is usu‐

ally about a week, which is much too short to develop a mean‐

ingful relationship. Likewise, the depth of the information ex‐

change is limited to familiarization and orientation, which 

offers only marginal utility in transferring skills and knowl‐

edge. Each event, taken individually, could easily be con‐

strued—and has been construed—as being nothing more than 

military tourism. During the early periods of engagement in 

Central Asia, the linkages between the military contact events 

to the overall security-cooperation objectives were weak. In 

fairness, this was not unique to US programs in Central Asia. 

Military contact programs in Europe were primarily based on 

the concept that “all contacts are good” and there was little 
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126

overall structure or focus.30 The wide variety of topics covered 

by the events in Central Asia, particularly during the 1995 

through 2000 period, ensured that many of the events were 

single flashes of interaction without any reengagement or rein‐

forcement or even a unifying theme.

Military Contact Events

Military contact events are also subject to the systemic inef‐

ficiencies of the planning and execution process. DOD, with its 

Security Cooperation Guidance, and USCENTCOM, with the 

Theater Security Cooperation Plan, have made great strides in 

the last seven years in creating deliberate plans with appropri‐

ate objectives for security cooperation in Central Asia. The topdown direction, however, stops at this point. When building the 

annual military contact event plans, USCENTCOM requests 

nominations from its subordinate commands, the National Guard 

units, other agencies, and the partner countries. Generally, 

events that can be viewed as supporting the fairly broad objec‐

tives in the Theater Security Cooperation Plan are accepted 

(although a percentage will not be executed because of 

scheduling difficulties or funding limitations). Planning offi‐

cials have admitted that they use the current year’s plan as a 

starting point for the following year’s plan. In some cases, 

similar events are repeated year after year without any under‐

standing of whether those events are have any impact. But, 

simply accepting nominations for events that somehow sup‐

port the objective does not ensure deliberate forward progress 

toward the objective.

There are inefficiencies in the execution of military contact 

events as well. USCENTCOM, and the other unified com‐

mands prior to 1999––through subordinate component com‐

mands––turns to the military services (primarily the US Army 

and US Air Force) and the National Guard (through the SPP) 

to find units to participate in the military contact events. Of‐

ten the US units tasked to participate are not part of US‐

CENTCOM’s normal planning process for the program, so 

the individuals who actually travel to Central Asia or host 

delegations from the region have little or no knowledge of the 

overall US security-cooperation objectives for that particular 
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127

country or how the event and their specific activities fit into 

the larger plan. Those individuals often have little knowledge or 

appreciation of the cultural, political, historic, and economic 

influences shaping another country’s development, and a lim‐

ited understanding of the size, structure, armament, or capa‐

bilities of another nation’s military forces. US delegations are 

seldom briefed on the personalities or positions of the counter‐

parts they will meet in a military contact event. If they are, it is 

usually upon arrival in country, with little time available to ad‐

just presentations or modify events to meet unexpected cir‐

cumstances.31 USCENTCOM provides general guidance to the 

US team conducting the event, but that guidance generally 

does not include a contextual framework. As a result, those 

individuals face great difficulties presenting their information 

in a context and manner that will translate (literally and figu‐

ratively) to their counterparts from Central Asia. This limita‐

tion, of course, is much less apparent in the National Guard 

units that repeatedly engage with their respective partner coun‐

tries. In fact, some Guardsmen that have been involved in the 

military contact program since the SPP was established in the 

early 1990s have had such frequent opportunities that they have 

become the Defense Department’s experts on certain facets of 

the military forces in Central Asia (fig. 8). 

The expansion of the military contact program in the mid1990s and the high operations tempo of the active duty forces 

led to an increased reliance on the National Guard through the 

SPP for the military contact program. While this has many ad‐

vantages as indicated above, it may also tend to influence the 

development of the contact program with each country. Each of 

the five state National Guard organizations has a relatively lim‐

ited range of capabilities. The plans for military contact events 

may reflect more of what is available through the National 

Guard unit rather than what is required to meet specific 

security-cooperation objectives. This tendency may explain 

the frequency of artillery unit familiarization visits between 

Kazakhstan and the Arizona National Guard in the late 1990s, 

despite a lack of linkage to any of the stated security-cooperation 

objectives. Likewise, the Arizona National Guard operates F-16 

aircraft at the 162d Fighter Wing in Tucson, but does not have 

transport aircraft, and tends to offer fighter unit familiarization 
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128

events rather than transport unit events, which would be of 

more use to the Kazakhs. 

Additionally, the organizations responsible for the military con‐

tact program suffer from an institutional mind-set that focuses 

more on developing the annual plan and executing a specific event 

than on ensuring the event achieves its goals. Metrics for the 

military contact programs, when they exist, usually attempt to 

measure the quantity of funds expended or the number of events 

conducted as a percentage of what was planned, rather than the 

more difficult challenge of evaluating whether the events were 

useful. Although US participants are required to submit afteraction reports following the event, many do not. Apparently most 

of the reports are not reviewed to determine whether the event was 

successful in meeting its specific objectives and, if it were reviewed, 

whether it contributed to the advancement of overall US securitycooperation objectives. Newly established procedures compound 

the problem—after-action reports for each event are individually 

forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which will 

Figure 8. US Military personnel with the deputy commander of the 

Kazakhstani Air Force during a transport aviation military contact event, 

Rep Almaty, Kazakhstan, December 2004 (Reprinted from the author’s 

personal collection.)
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

129

try to determine whether the event was successful. Examining each 

discrete report, however, will not provide the answer. The reports 

for a series of events having a common objective or objectives should 

be reviewed together, sequentially, and within context so as to eval‐

uate progress in achieving the events’ purpose or purposes.

Because of the vast differences in the size and capabilities of 

the US armed forces and those of the Central Asian states, 

some military contact events used to familiarize Central Asian 

personnel with US operations may not be particularly relevant. 

For example, military contact events designed to introduce op‐

erations or maintenance procedures of particular types of 

equipment may provide a misleading impression of require‐

ments for support or employment of specific weapon systems. 

A military contact event that shows the huge US Air Force C130 transport aircraft Depot Maintenance Center, Warner Rob‐

ins AFB, Georgia, which is designed to support a fleet of almost 

600 aircraft, may not be particularly relevant to the Kazakh Air 

Force, which hopes to obtain only a handful of these airplanes. 

Similarly, the series of information exchanges conducted by 

the US Air Force in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the late 

1990s on financial management were probably of little value to 

defense ministries that use completely different accounting 

and budgeting systems.

Despite these limitations, military contact events can be very 

valuable security-cooperation tools if properly planned and in‐

tegrated into a broader effort. First, they offer a relatively lowcost, low-impact method of exposing large numbers of US and 

foreign officers to each others’ military structures and cultures. 

A typical familiarization event involves eight to 12 personnel 

traveling to the other country. Twenty to 30 of these events 

each year can provide broad familiarity in a relatively positive 

environment to large numbers of personnel in both countries. 

Most Central Asian participants in military contact events con‐

ducted in the United States have expressed very positive com‐

ments about both the information they received and the overall 

experience of visiting the United States.32

Second, military contact programs offer a means of providing 

“persistent engagement”—repeated interactions with the 

same partner units and individuals over time—that can build 

long-term relationships. A series of military contact events can 
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130

build a “pattern of habitual cooperation.” This can be viewed in 

several ways. A series of events builds the perception within 

the MOD (or any other ministry) that cooperation with the 

United States is a routine, normal, and expected pattern of be‐

havior, so that when the United States suggests cooperation in 

some other fashion, the MOD may be more receptive and in‐

clined to accept the request. The perception of habitual 

cooperation has a practical side as well as it creates familiarity 

with US operational practices and requirements and therefore 

allows the foreign decision makers a context in which to evalu‐

ate US requests for greater cooperation. In this regard, the SPP 

is an invaluable element of a persistent engagement military 

contact program because of the relative availability of National 

Guard units. It is often more difficult to use active duty units 

because of their higher operations tempo. The availability of 

National Guard units allows USCENTCOM to continue to offer 

a fairly large number of events with each country each year. 

Likewise, a series of events that consistently pairs a US unit 

and a foreign unit can create an institutional relationship. Like 

air force sister-squadron pairings, these institutional relation‐

ships surpass the personal relationships that may occur, and 

last well after the normal rotation of personnel wipes out those 

who started the effort. The NATO Tiger Association, comprised 

of fighter squadrons with tigers in their squadron patches, has 

been building institutional ties between NATO air forces since 

1959. Again, using the National Guard offers great advantages, 

as it can create long-term, consistent, reinforcing institutional 

relationships that can, over time, fundamentally influence the 

development of its partner unit. 

Finally, military contact events can serve as an effective 

method for introducing or reinforcing the objectives of more 

complex security-assistance programs: familiarization events 

prior to the more in-depth training programs, transfers of 

equipment, tactical exercises, follow-on events to reinforce con‐

cepts or practices, exchanges of information on standing 

operating procedures, or offers of advanced techniques for 

equipment use. In January 2002, Kazakhstan began receiv‐

ing HMMWVs purchased through the FMS program, and the 

following year the Arizona National Guard began a series of 

contact events with the Kazakhstani Army to develop opera‐
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131

tional concepts for maintaining the vehicles. This culminated 

in a series of maintenance workshops in April, May, and Au‐

gust of 2005, leading to the opening of the FMF-funded mainte‐

nance center in November 2005.33 Similarly in 2002, when the 

Kyrgyzstani MOD inquired about using its FMF funds to refur‐

bish facilities at Koi Tash for a joint training center, the 

Montana National Guard offered to assist the Kyrgyz military 

with establishing a noncommissioned officer (NCO) professional 

development program for the center. In 2004, when the refur‐

bishment plans were finalized, the Montana National Guard 

began a series of military contact events to help build the nec‐

essary course materials.34 Arizona National Guard efforts in 

building the HMMWV maintenance center program in Kazakh‐

stan and Montana’s support to the NCO professional develop‐

ment program are two good examples of how military contact 

programs can be successfully integrated with other securitycooperation efforts. 

Education and Training Programs

Education and training programs have long been promoted 

as the most effective means of developing common understand‐

ing and the personal and professional relationships between 

military personnel that help find solutions to international is‐

sues and influence the development of foreign military forces. 

Proponents of education and training programs advocate these 

efforts (along with other engagement tools) to provide access to 

current and future foreign military leaders, influence in resolv‐

ing crises and developing military forces, exposure to US ideals 

and values, and transfer of specific skills valuable to foreign 

military forces operating with US forces or in support of US 

objectives. All of this may be possible, but, the extent to which 

these objectives are realizable is situation dependent and dif‐

ficult to measure.

The role of education and training programs in granting ac‐

cess to foreign military leaders is relatively undisputed, if dif‐

ficult to measure. Foreign graduates of US military training 

courses are generally favorably influenced by their experience 

in the United States, and American defense attachés and securityassistance officers often note these positive perspectives trans‐
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late into a greater willingness on the part of the foreign military 

officers to meet with their US counterparts or interlocutors. US 

attachés and SAOs, sometimes only field-grade officers, claim 

the US training provides “access at the senior ranks of host 

country military establishments” that they otherwise “wouldn’t 

have or couldn’t have without difficulty.”35 These training and 

education programs also provide a common experience that 

provides rapport and an ease of communication between US 

officers and US-trained foreign officers that can otherwise over‐

come the cultural differences. This access and relationship, al‐

though difficult to quantify, are essential ingredients for ad‐

vancing other aspects of US security-cooperation objectives.

The role of IMET in creating personal and professional rela‐

tionships that help resolve international crises is often debated. 

Former USPACOM Commander, Adm Dennis Blair, an other‐

wise strong proponent of the IMET program, sees less value in 

this concept: “it is fairly rare that personal relationships made 

through IMET come into play in solving a crisis.”36 Lincoln 

Bloomfield Jr., assistant secretary of State for Political-Military 

Affairs, challenged this perspective in 2004: “There are count‐

less examples of how friendships forged through IMET training 

have contributed significantly to the resolution of crises and 

important foreign policy concerns throughout the years.”37 One 

such example apparently occurred during the September 1991 

crisis in Zaire, when a Zairian general officer and IMET gradu‐

ate permitted the evacuation of 450 Americans from a closed 

national airport under his control.38 The reality likely lies some‐

where in between—at least a few incidents have been resolved 

through personal interaction with foreign military officers that 

have trained in the United States, but those numbers are likely 

very small compared to the total number of personnel trained 

through the IMET program. Nonetheless, the number of such 

situations is probably sufficient to judge that the IMET pro‐

gram has value in this regard.39

The evaluation of the relative influence on a specific individual 

of a training experience in the United States is still subjective. 

In his 1993 study of the IMET program, John Cope notes: “It 

is difficult to measure the degree to which a former IMET or 

FMS student officer or civilian is favorably inclined toward the 

United States. A graduate may not have made it a part of his 
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133

judgment until an issue arises that forces him to make a deci‐

sion. More than likely, IMET is just one component of a complex 

decision process.”40

A constant objective of US military training and education 

programs has been the democratization of foreign military 

forces and proponents of the IMET program often argue that 

training foreign military students in the United States provides 

an opportunity to expose them to American values, ideals, and 

culture. They contend that this exposure will, at a minimum, 

help the students to understand the United States and hope‐

fully entice them to adopt those values and ideals—specifically 

the importance of democratic governments, rule of law, free 

enterprise economic systems, appropriate civil-military rela‐

tions, respect for human rights, and the law of armed conflict. 

Also, unfiltered access and exposure directly cuts through any 

anti-US sentiment that remains. In fact, an important compo‐

nent of the IMET program is designed to do just that. The DOD 

Informational Program (DODIP) ensures a certain percentage 

of the time a foreign student spends studying in the United 

States is dedicated to those topics, reinforced by field trips to 

local governmental institutions, religious centers, media, and, 

for students attending selected courses, to Washington, DC.41

Although a voluntary program, all foreign students are highly 

encouraged to participate and the costs are included in the tu‐

ition charged to their home country.

However, attending courses in the United States, even when 

reinforced by the DOD Informational Program can at most ex‐

pose foreign military students to American values and culture, 

but, the experience cannot guarantee that those students will 

adopt those ideals. Some sociologists and social psychologists 

have indirectly challenged the premise that US values can be 

adopted “through osmosis,” the method essentially used by the 

DOD Informational Program. It is equally implausible that the 

attitudes and behavioral patterns of students attending shorter 

courses lasting days, weeks, or even a few months will be so 

malleable that they can be systematically altered by the experi‐

ence.42 One RAND study concluded:

The few months a foreign military student spends in the United States 

are unlikely to radically alter his cultural, social, or political views. Inter‐

national military students [IMS] may acquire an improved understand‐
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134

ing of the American political system and social culture, and some may 

develop an affection for the United States, but studies suggest that the 

majority of IMS will return to their home countries with the same basic 

Weltanschauung [world view] as when they left.43

Personal experience suggests that the more culturally, politi‐

cally, and economically distant the country is from the United 

States, the more unlikely it is that its military students will be 

willing or able to internalize US values and ideals. 

An even more challenging issue is whether those students 

who do internalize US values and beliefs can implement them 

in their own countries. Even if the experience in the United 

States alters the belief system of a particular student, it does 

not alter the unique cultural, political, and economic structure 

in which that student must exist once he or she returns home 

after training.44 In many countries in Central Asia, that struc‐

ture is characterized by clans, political repression, and corrup‐

tion. That is not to say that such changes cannot take place, 

but only that if changes do occur, they will do so slowly. Retired 

Admiral Blair, when he was the USPACOM commander, promoted 

IMET and other contact programs with closed or problematic 

military forces such as those in Indonesia precisely because of 

the potential long-term affect they may have on influencing the 

development of those forces. He argues that military forces that 

systematically engage in oppressive practices or human rights 

abuses become isolated, but engagement can help them “feel 

kinship with, not isolated from, the norms of more professional 

militaries.”45 Some observers believe that the decade of US 

training and education programs in El Salvador helped dra‐

matically reduce the degree to which the military, as an institu‐

tion, systematically engaged in human rights abuses. Individual 

officers still committed violations, but they were not condoned 

or encouraged as before.46 However, such engagement has not 

always translated into greater respect for human rights, as 

case studies of the Philippines have demonstrated.47 In Central 

Asia the record is not clear. It is not known whether any of the 

Uzbekistani forces engaged in the violence at Andijon in May 

2005, which primarily came from the Ministry of the Interior, 

had been exposed to US training programs. On the other hand, 

US Army colonel Thomas Wilhelm, associate dean for Eurasian 

Studies at the George C. Marshall Center and a previous de‐
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135

fense attaché in Central Asia, noted that Kyrgyzstani alumni of 

the Center believed that the military contact programs and 

training and education opportunities offered by the United 

States helped keep the Kyrgyzstani security services from us‐

ing force against protestors during the fall of the government in 

March 2005.48

Budgetary constraints have a profound impact on the selection 

of training and education opportunities, and this selection can 

have a major impact on the ability to achieve security-cooperation 

objectives. Maximizing influence, for example, means sending fewer 

students to the United States for longer, more in-depth, courses 

that usually last a year or more, such as academies and war 

colleges, promoting professional development rather than tech‐

nical skills. Maximizing exposure, alternatively, means sending 

more students to shorter courses, measured in days, weeks, or 

a few months. (Even these shorter courses can become longer 

if the student lacks English-language skills requiring an ex‐

tended stay at the Defense Language Institute.) These types of 

courses tend to be focused on the development of specific skills, 

such as infantry training or resource management. Having mo‐

bile training teams or MET travel to Central Asia to present their 

courses are much more cost effective, but they lack the ability 

to expose foreign students to American society, culture, and 

values—a fundamental objective of the IMET program.

Foreign military forces occasionally do not send the most 

qualified individual to a US training course. Often the candi‐

dates whose selection would best benefit the foreign military 

force lacked the requisite English language skills, so attending 

a US course implied a commitment of up to a year of Englishlanguage training. For longer professional military education 

courses at war colleges, this could mean a two-year absence, 

but, unit commanders are often reluctant to send their best of‐

ficers because the position would remain vacant for that pe‐

riod. Instead, some foreign military leaders view the opportu‐

nity for training in the United States a way to reward a favored 

officer based on their connections to the senior military leader‐

ship or as a method to dispose of an unwanted officer.49

Training and education programs can improve the skills of a 

particular individual, but cannot guarantee that the individual 

will use them appropriately, or at all. One factor is the willing‐
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136

ness or ability of the Central Asian armed forces to implement 

US training on tactics and doctrine. Much of US tactical and 

operational doctrine, developed for larger, globally-engaged, 

forces with supporting capabilities such as aviation, advanced 

communications, and abundant logistics, simply may not be 

appropriate or applicable for the smaller, less advanced, and 

underresourced militaries in Central Asia. For example, offi‐

cers sent to the Air Command and Staff College are taught the 

fundamentals of developing and executing a joint air campaign 

employing fighters, bombers, tankers, and intelligence, surveil‐

lance, and reconnaissance assets to defeat an integrated-airdefense system—a skill largely unnecessary in Kazakhstan or 

Uzbekistan. However, increasing interaction with the Central 

Asian militaries over the past decade has made elements of the 

US military more familiar with the indigenous training require‐

ments of these forces, and some US units, such as the 5th 

Special Forces Group and the 6th Special Operations Squad‐

ron, are uniquely trained and qualified to modify US tactics and 

doctrine to meet local needs. 

Political factors may also limit the adoption of US tactics and 

doctrine. For example, efforts to encourage the El Salvadoran 

armed forces to adopt US counterinsurgency tactics in the early 

1980s met with substantial resistance as many Salvadoran of‐

ficers saw this influence as an infringement on their national 

sovereignty. Resistance continued during the entire period of 

US involvement, even as late as 1992, when US training efforts, 

by then, resulted in over half of the officers in the Salvadoran 

armed forces having received training in the United States, in‐

cluding every captain and lieutenant. One American officer 

noted: “the Salvadoran Army has been thoroughly trained in 

US counterinsurgency tactics, and they can do them well—the 

problem is getting them to actually use these tactics.”50 Central 

Asian officers, who prefer strong ties to Russia, perhaps be‐

cause of having studied in Russian military schools, may see 

the adoption of US training, tactics, and doctrine as a threat to 

those ties or as unwanted US influence and interference. While 

accepting the training, those officers may simply choose not to 

implement the changes. US training that differs significantly 

from the legacy Soviet- and Russian-influenced tactics and 

doctrine will face greater resistance. Units that may want to 
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137

employ US tactics, but rely on supporting units that do not, 

will face additional challenges.

Despite the uncertainty over the short- and long-term effec‐

tiveness of training and education programs, two factors ap‐

pear to have a significant impact on the utility of these programs. 

First, exclusively sprinkling graduates of US training and edu‐

cation programs throughout the foreign military force is counter‐

productive. They will be isolated and severely hampered in their 

ability to implement any changes against the legacy and iner‐

tia of the existing system. There must be a sufficient number 

of US-trained military personnel within a specific foreign mili‐

tary unit or organization before US training, tactics, tech‐

niques, concepts, or ideals will take hold. The size of the “criti‐

cal mass” of graduates from US training and education programs 

will vary depending on the organization. This process must be 

managed, as experiences in Kazakhstan demonstrate. In 2002, 

with the aid of the US SAO, the MOD reformed its approach to 

the IMET program by establishing a specific office to manage 

foreign training and adopted a personnel administration sys‐

tem to manage the careers of those service members trained 

overseas. As a result, many of the Kazakhstani IMET gradu‐

ates—including graduates from the US Military Academy at 

West Point—have been assigned to the Kazakhstan battalion 

(KAZBAT) and the mobile forces. This concentrated number of 

US-trained officers and noncommissioned officers in one 

place has greatly accelerated the speed and depth of reform in 

those units.51

Second, sending a foreign military member to a single course 

is not usually an effective method of ensuring that the indi‐

vidual gains and retains the necessary knowledge and skills. 

To fully utilize the benefits of US training and education pro‐

grams, they must be reinforced by appropriate refresher or ad‐

vanced courses. For example, when the Marshall Center, DIILS, 

DRMI, DISAM, Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), or 

another educational institution sends an MET to Central Asia 

for a course or a conference, the MET should also include re‐

fresher or advanced training for those foreign military stu‐

dents that have attended the in-residence courses. Alumni 

programs, such as those maintained by the war colleges and 
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138

the Marshall Center (the latter since 1998), can also be an ef‐

fective means of reinforcement.

Most training and education courses are best reinforced by 

exercises that test the skills and knowledge of the foreign per‐

sonnel. In the late 1990s, US efforts to focus IMET courses on 

individuals assigned to the CENTRASBAT unit––those who 

would then participate in the annual exercise––was a step in 

that direction. But, since the national elements of the unit 

were still comprised largely of conscripts, the annual exercise 

generally had a greater emphasis on basic skills training 

rather than on reinforcing advanced techniques learned in 

the United States. 

The DTRA’s International Counterproliferation Program has 

developed a simple but effective methodology for reinforcing 

training through exercises. Each of the three elements of the 

program—counterproliferation infrastructure planning, Border 

Security and WMD Investigations, and WMD Evidence Aware‐

ness and Management—consists of several training courses 

followed by an exercise that reinforces and tests the material. 

These three separate exercises are then followed by an inte‐

grated exercise which brings together all of the personnel re‐

sponsible for a comprehensive proliferation prevention program 

within that country. Implied within this concept is the need to 

have the same individuals attend the full set of training courses 

and exercises. The ICP also includes the option to hold regional 

exercises to promote multinational cooperation as well as followup visits and refresher training (fig.9).

Exercises

Exercises offer many benefits in providing or reinforcing ad‐

vanced skills training or educational concepts, as seen in the 

SOFEX and JCET events (and as demonstrated in the ICP ex‐

ample above). When properly managed and executed, they can 

also serve as a useful means of advancing integration with 

Western military structures via the NATO PfP exercises, pro‐

moting regional cooperation in addressing multinational con‐

cerns such as terrorism, illegal migration, and drug trafficking 

through the aptly named Regional Cooperation exercises 

(formerly known as CENTRASBAT).
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

139

The special operations exercises are perhaps the most effec‐

tive exercises for transferring operational capabilities to a for‐

eign military force. They are small, focused, and intended for 

elite foreign units. They are not intended to provide training on 

basic skills, but instead on advanced tactical skills. However, 

occasionally the units they work with in Central Asia are not 

up to the task. In one instance, the Uzbekistani special forces 

team leader had not even had basic infantry training.52 Current 

Figure 9. International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) training flowchart (Adapted from DOD International Counterproliferation Program Briefing, undated, obtained through author correspondence with Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency, April 2006.)

Policy and Assessment Visits

WMD Executive Seminar

WMD Inspection

Training

WMD Investigation

Training

Investigation/Evidence

Response Training

• Counterproliferation 

Awareness

• WMD Detection and 

Interdiction

• WMD Threat Management

• Dual Use and Specialized 

Equipment

• Responding to WMD Incidents 

at Borders

• Tracking Training

• Counterproliferation 

Awareness

• International WMD 

Investigations

• Counterproliferation Data 

Analysis

• Controlled Delivery

• Undercover Investigation 

Operations

• WMD Case Development

• Forensic Computer Analysis

• WMD Crime Scene Operations

• WMD Crime Scene 

Management

• WMD Criminal Investigations

• WMD Crisis Incident 

Management

• Radiological Detection 

Response

• Advanced WMD Crime Scene 

Operations

WMD Integrated

Exercise

WMD Crisis:

Command

Center Exercise

Regional WMD Seminar

Follow-up Visits

WMD Crime Scene

Skills Recertification
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

140

operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have limited the 

availability of the US special operations forces that conduct 

these exercises. Many of the SOFEXs and JCETs scheduled 

from late 2001 through 2003 had to be cancelled. Because they 

tend to provide training on combat skills, special operations 

training events also occasionally come under criticism as as‐

sisting military forces in nations that routinely abuse human 

rights, including, according to some observers, Kazakhstan 

and Uzbekistan.53

The larger exercises are among the most complex of securitycooperation activities. Many of them, such as the NATO PfP series 

or the Regional Cooperation events, take a year or longer to plan 

and can also be very expensive to plan and execute. The CEN‐

TRASBAT 98 exercise involved approximately 450 personnel, in‐

cluding 160 from the United States, in a two-week exercise, but 

cost over $6 million to conduct.54 Regional Cooperation 05 cost 

$1.300 million to train 70 foreign participants.55 The point is not to 

measure dollars spent against participants trained, but to empha‐

size the importance of ensuring the exercises train the right skills 

to the right participants for the right reasons. 

The failure of CENTRASBAT has previously been covered, 

but two points should be emphasized. First, planners should 

appreciate that regional cooperation can be encouraged, but 

it cannot be forced. The participants from the Central Asian 

states should be responsible for determining lessons learned 

and shaping the course of subsequent programs and exer‐

cises. Second, planners should attempt to limit the “fluff” that 

tends to accumulate around multinational exercises, such as 

opening and closing ceremonies, parades, and dignitary vis‐

its. These activities often detract from the objectives and can 

turn the exercise into a showcase event rather than a venue 

for realistic training.

Equipment Transfers

In most cases, transfers of military weapon systems are usu‐

ally the most expensive, visible, and politically-sensitive ele‐

ment of US security-cooperation programs. This assertion has 

proven valid in Central Asia, as well, but on a much reduced 

scale. The delivery of $2 million worth of armored HMMWVs 
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

141

garners much more publicity and international concern than 

the $30 thousand visit of financial specialists ready to discuss 

defense resource management. 

However, the amounts and types of equipment provided to 

the Central Asian states are greatly limited by the available re‐

sources. The United States provided just over $115 million in 

FMF for all five nations through 2005 (almost half of which 

went to Uzbekistan), over five times the amount of IMET fund‐

ing provided in that same time period. But the FMF provided to 

Central Asia is a relatively small amount compared to both the 

amounts provided to other nations and the cost of most US 

weapon systems, which greatly limit the types and amounts of 

military equipment that can be transferred. (The Central Asian 

states have yet to use national funds to purchase equipment 

from the United States.) Most of the funding has been spent on 

relatively small amounts of relatively inexpensive equipment: 

radios, computers, and communications gear; uniforms, web 

gear and rucksacks, flight suits, mountaineering gear, body ar‐

mor, and helmets; language laboratories and training materi‐

als; medical and dental equipment; tool kits and sewing ma‐

chines for parachutes; and security-assistance and assessment 

teams. There have been only a few transfers of relatively expen‐

sive, high-profile equipment: night-vision goggles, patrol boats, 

HMMWVs, and helicopters. 

Providing equipment is no guarantee that the recipient na‐

tion will use it effectively, if at all. Uzbekistan has acquired a 

large number of English-language labs using both IMET and 

FMF funds, but due to bureaucratic wrangling within the MOD, 

most of the labs remained in storage for years rather than in 

use. One lab was hastily installed at the tank academy when 

there was a rumor of a presidential visit. Another lab was later 

installed but used to store teaching materials and surplus con‐

struction materials.56

Equipment that is interoperable with NATO standards often 

means that the equipment is incompatible with those already 

in use, by that nation’s military forces, particularly the legacy 

Soviet equipment. Such was apparently the case with radios 

and communications equipment provided to Kyrgyzstan. Accord‐

ing to one Kyrgyz analyst, “The Western communications equip‐

ment turned out to be incompatible with the Soviet models 
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

142

used by our army. It was free, I grant you, but it was also use‐

less.”57 If the US-provided equipment is centralized in one unit, 

such as KAZBAT, that unit may become increasingly unable to 

operate with other Kazakh national forces.

Equipment must be properly maintained or it will quickly be‐

come inoperable. This implies not only the ability to obtain spare 

parts, but also the establishment of appropriate operational and 

maintenance procedures and qualitative improvements in the 

training of operators and maintainers. Unfortunately, this has 

not always been the case. The five Boston Whaler patrol boats 

provided under the CTR program in 1995–1996, constituting 

one-third of Kazakhstan’s small Caspian Sea fleet, had broken 

down by 2001 primarily because the Kazakh sailors used the 

wrong type of fuel in the engines.58 According to Kazakh defense 

officials, the 16 HMMWVs provided to Uzbekistan in 2000 are 

currently not in working order and the Kazakhs were hoping the 

United States would recommend that Tashkent send the vehi‐

cles to Kazakhstan’s new HMMWV maintenance center thereby 

clearly illustrating the lack of regional cooperation between these 

two neighboring countries.59 These problems are not unique to 

equipment provided under the FMS program. Specialized radia‐

tion detection equipment provided under the various DOD pro‐

liferation prevention programs also face challenges:

At a January 2002 IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] conference, a 

DOD official provided information about problems with U.S.-supplied equip‐

ment. He noted that audits found that detection equipment in several coun‐

tries had never been used and remained in storage; expensive high-technology 

equipment was only used in the presence of visiting U.S. delegations; and 

equipment was going unused because it needed battery replacement, very 

minor repairs, or major repairs that required out-of-country servicing. The 

DOD official noted that recipient country officials offered numerous reasons 

why the equipment was being underutilized or not used at all, including (1) the 

equipment was too difficult to use; (2) nobody was trained to use it; (3) the 

equipment would be broken; (4) use of the equipment could cause injuries; (5) 

repairs were too difficult; (6) no funds had been provided for new batteries; and 

(7) a lack of knowledge about where or how to send the equipment for re‐

pairs.60

Multilateral Programs

Since the mid-1990s, one of the objectives for the United 

States has been to increase multinational security-cooperation 

initiatives and programs in Central Asia wherever and when‐
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

143

ever possible. Such activities can help build trust and stability 

in the region and assist in finding cooperative solutions to intra‐

regional problems such as border security and disaster re‐

sponse. However, there are many factors that work against this 

method and multinational initiatives must be approached with 

caution or they could prove counterproductive. Planners should 

appreciate that political and military leaders in Central Asia 

tend to value their bilateral relationships with the United States 

more than US-led multilateral relationships within the region 

and they often view multinational initiatives as detracting from 

bilateral ties.

Intraregional dynamics and relationships will continue to 

limit the scope of most US-led multinational programs within 

Central Asia, primarily with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ta‐

jikistan, which at this point seem willing to cooperate. Turk‐

menistan, citing its “positive neutrality” since independence, 

has rejected almost all multinational security-cooperation 

initiatives with the other Central Asian countries and de‐

clined to participate in either the peacekeeping mission in 

Tajikistan or the CENTRASBAT program. Ashgabat loses little 

by not participating in these efforts as it is the most removed 

from the primary cross-border challenges from Tajikistan, 

Afghanistan, and China. Turkmenistan instead focuses on 

bilateral relationships with the United States, Russia, and 

other neighboring countries, and uses the NATO PfP as its 

primary multinational forum.

In a different fashion, Uzbekistan has distanced itself over 

the past few years from security-cooperation relationships with 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. While it previously 

participated with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the peace‐

keeping operation in Tajikistan and in CENTRASBAT, Tash‐

kent now views these countries as actual or potential hosts of 

threats to its internal stability. Following the IMU incursions in 

1999 and 2000, Uzbekistan has closed its border with Kazakh‐

stan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the largest 

and most powerful nations in Central Asia, do not even ex‐

change defense attachés.61 Uzbekistan has also declined to 

participate in recent USCENTCOM-sponsored Regional Coop‐

eration multinational exercises because of the presence of a 

delegation from Pakistan. Tashkent believes the IMU is using 
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

144

Pakistan as a staging area to rebuild its cadres.62 Likewise, Ka‐

zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan view Uzbekistan as a po‐

tential regional hegemon. 

USCENTCOM recently announced its desire to establish a 

disaster response center in Kazakhstan. This center can serve 

as an excellent catalyst for improving regional cooperation in a 

field that would require a coordinated response should a major 

terrorist attack or environmental disaster occur in Central Asia. 

But, the United States should be cautious in establishing ad‐

ditional regional centers. CENTRASBAT and other experiences 

demonstrate that the Central Asian states are generally reluctant 

to maintain permanent integrated organizations or establish de‐

pendency on a neighboring state for core military requirements 

such as training. (Kyrgyz willingness to turn to Kazakhstan for mili‐

tary training and education programs is a notable exception.) This 

experience is not unique to Central Asia. In 1983, the United States 

established a regional military training center in Puerto Castillo, 

Honduras, with approximately 120 military advisors to train soldiers 

from Central American states in counterinsurgency warfare. How‐

ever, approximately 70 percent of the annual training quotas were 

reserved for troops from the El Salvadoran armed forces. The 

remaining 30 percent were distributed among all of the other 

participating militaries in Central America including the Hon‐

duran armed forces. Once the initial honor of being selected to 

host this regional center wore off, Honduras greatly resented 

the US program that not only brought soldiers from El Salvador, 

an historic enemy, onto its soil, but, also reserved the majority 

of the training quotas for outsiders. Instead of promoting re‐

gional cooperation, the regional military training center fos‐

tered increased animosity, both regionally and toward the 

United States. The center was closed in 1985.63

Regional centers for “soft” capabilities such as peacekeeping, 

disaster response, or language training will be more effective in 

promoting regional cooperation in Central Asia than those de‐

signed to promote core military capabilities such as mountain 

warfare or special operations. Administrative matters, such as 

training quota allocations and invitations for other nations to 

participate, should be carefully managed in collaboration with 

the host nation. While the United States should ensure suffi‐

cient funding for the first several years of operation, the host 
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

145

nation should be a collaborative partner and over time assume 

increasing responsibility for the management and operation of 

the center, with milestones and measurable criteria in place to 

ensure consistent progress.

Some of the key US programs for security cooperation, spe‐

cifically IMET and FMF, are structured to promote bilateral 

rather than multilateral relationships. IMET funding and pro‐

cedures are generally structured toward sending individual 

students to specific courses and offer few venues for multi‐

national activities. While students may benefit from interacting 

with students from other Central Asian countries while attend‐

ing US-sponsored training, this cannot be considered a true 

multinational initiative. Likewise, FMF funding and procedures 

establish a specific contractual agreement between the United 

States and a single recipient country for the provision of defense 

goods and services. Experience with multinational programs 

such as National Military Command Centers in Eastern Europe 

suggests that multinational FMS programs can be more complex 

and offer greater risk than offset by the apparent benefits. 

Despite these constraints, appropriate multinational initiatives 

can be effective in meeting some US security-cooperation objec‐

tives in Central Asia. As addressed in the discussion on exercises, 

regional cooperation cannot be forced, but can be encouraged. In 

the near term, the United States should pursue a dual-track 

strategy: continue to develop strong bilateral relationships with 

each of the five Central Asian states, and use multinational events 

such as exercises, symposiums, and conferences to foster regional 

and extra-regional relationships to meet specific needs. 

Constraints and Limitations 

in Perspective

As outlined in this chapter, security-cooperation programs 

face many challenges, sometimes more so in the unique envi‐

ronment in Central Asia. Security cooperation is an inherently 

complex and difficult undertaking which requires years of ef‐

fort and vast amounts of resources to have an impact. Yet they 

are often executed by organizations which face bureaucratic im‐
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

146

peratives that force a short-term perspective and which are 

granted far fewer resources than they would prefer.

Likewise, these programs must overcome often significant 

cultural and language differences between the armed forces, 

and those undertaken by the US military must accommodate 

overwhelming differences in size, capabilities, and available re‐

sources. Beyond the general limitations of time and cost, each 

of the various security-cooperation activities, military contact 

events, training and education programs, exercises, and equip‐

ment transfers, has specific strengths and weaknesses that 

must be taken into account when building programs. 

However, it is important to put these limitations in perspec‐

tive. The improved planning process developed under the OSD 

Security Cooperation Guidance, the USCENTCOM Theater Se‐

curity Cooperation Plan, and the bilateral five-year plans, as 

well as the increasing centralization of security-cooperation exe‐

cution in USCENTCOM and DTRA, has greatly improved the 

ability of planners and practitioners to weave together the various 

programs and elements toward a set of more clearly-defined 

goals. Security-cooperation planners have become innovative 

in finding methods to match strengths in one program against 

weaknesses in another. Although military contact programs, train‐

ing and education opportunities, equipment transfers, and bi‐

lateral and multilateral exercises all face inherent limitations 

in building relationships or improving military capabilities, 

over time these programs can result in some influence and some

development of capabilities, as the next chapter will show.

Notes

1. Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, “A Grand Strategy for Central Asia,” 

Problems of Post-Communism 52, no. 2 (March/April 2005), 46.

2. Cheryl Benard, “Central Asia: ‘Apocalypse Soon’ or Eccentric Survival?” 

in Angel M. Rabasa et al., The Muslim World After 9/11 (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2004), 362.

3. Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries, 2 (see chap. 2, note 8). Dr. 

Ulrich’s work is the best study of the impact of US security-cooperation pro‐

grams on military democratization efforts in Eastern Europe and the former 

Soviet Union.

4. Piotr Dutkiewicz and Plamen Pantev, “Postcommunist Civil-Military Re‐

lations in Bulgaria,” in The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in East-Central 
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

147

Europe and the Former Soviet Union, eds. Natalie L. Mychajlszyn and Harald 

von Riekhoff (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 151.

5. Lahue, “Security Assistance in Kazakhstan,” 9–13 (see chap. 4, note 36).

6. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New 

York: Penguin Books, 2003), 83.

7. US Central Command (USCENTCOM) interviews (see chap. 5, note 38).

8. Ibid.; and author’s personal experience.

9. Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam, 74 (see chap. 6, note 6).

10. Briefing, US Security Assistance Officer, US Embassy Dushanbe, Tajiki‐

stan, 16 March 2006; author with Defense Language Institute English Lan‐

guage Center (DLIELC), correspondence, January 2006; and USCENTCOM 

interviews (see chap. 6, note 7).

11. DLIELC correspondence (see chap. 6, note 10); and USCENTCOM in‐

terviews (see chap. 6, note 7).

12. Kimberly Marten, “Understanding the Impact of the K2 Closure,” PONARS 

Policy Memo No. 401, December 2005, 216, http://www.csis.org/media/

csis/pubs/pm_0401.pdf.

13. Ahrari, “The Strategic Future of Central Asia,” 160 (see chap. 1, note 1).

14. Maxim Shashenkov, “Central Asia: Emerging Military-Strategic Issues,” 

in After Empire: The Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia, ed. Jed C. Snyder 

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 96.

15. Col Assylbek Mendygaliev, Kazakhstani Defense Attaché to the United 

States, interviewed by the author, September 2005; “DM Ivanov Says Over 

800 Kazakhstani Troops Undergo Training in Russia,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 8 

June 2003; “Kazakhstani Military to Undergo Free Training at Russian Acade‐

mies,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 3 September 2002; “Russia to Export to Kazakhstan 

$20m [million] Worth of Arms,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 12 January 2001; and 

“254 Kazakhstani Cadets Join Military Schools in Russia,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 

18 August 2003.

16. “Russia to Supply $3 Million Worth of Weapons to Kyrgyzstan,” ITAR-TASS, 

21 September 2005; “Turkmenistan: Niyazov Says Strategic Partnership with 

Russia Reaffirmed,” Moscow Interfax, 18 October 1996; “Tajikistan Asks Russia 

to Expand Military Experts’ Team,” ITAR-TASS, 22 September 2005; “Russia 

Considers Free Education for Collective Security Organization Cadets,” Agentstvo 

Voyennykh Novostey, 22 June 2005; “Tajikistan grateful to Russia for Help in 

Forming Army,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 22 February 2003; “Uzbekistani to Train 

Army Officers at Russian Academies,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 3 October 2000; 

“Russia: Russia, Kyrgyzstan to Sign Military Cooperation Deal,” Moscow 

ITAR-TASS, 23 November 1998; “Tajikistan: Moscow to Send Contingent of 

Military Advisors,” Moscow Interfax, 26 November 1996; “Tajikistan: Russian 

Military Advisors to Work with Tajik Armed Forces,” Moscow Interfax, 13 April 

1997; “Tajikistani Defense Official Hails Defense Partnership with Russia,” 

ITAR-TASS, 14 April 2005; “Russia to Sell Arms to CSTO States at Domestic 

Prices,” Moscow Interfax, 18 June 2004; “Seventy Tajikistani Army Officers to 

Be Trained in Russia,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 24 August 2004; and “Kyrgyz‐

stan: Russia to Provide $3 Million Worth of Military Aid,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 

14 April 2004.
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

148

17. “Russia to Sell Arms to CSTO States at Domestic Prices,” Moscow Interfax, 18 June 2004; “Kyrgyzstan: Russia to Provide $3 Million Worth of Mili‐

tary Aid,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 14 April 2004; “Russia, Uzbekistan to Boost 

Military Cooperation,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 27 September 2003; “Russia, Kyrgyz‐

stan Agree on Military Cooperation,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 11 September 2001; 

“Turkmenistan to Exchange Gas for Arms with Russia,” Moscow Interfax, 14 

June 2001; “Russia Gives $1 Million to Kyrgyzstan,” Moscow Interfax, 29 

October 1999; “Russia Sending First Batch of Weapons to Kyrgyzstan,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 8 October 1999; “Kyrgyzstani, Russian Defense Ministers 

Sign Aid Agreement,” Kabar News Agency, 21 September 2005; “Itar-Tass 

Provides Further Details of Russian-Uzbek Military Cooperation Agreement,” 

Moscow ITAR-TASS, 16 June 2004; and “Tajikistan’s Defense Minister Hails 

Military Relations with Russia,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 22 February 2004.

18. “Armenia: Military Cooperation Agreements with Kazakhstan Set,” Yerevan SNARK, 19 September 1996; “Azerbaijani Leader Hails Military Coopera‐

tion Accord with Kyrgyzstan,” Baku Turan, 2 June 2004; “Turkmenistan 

Wants Military Training with Azeris,” Baku Turan, 9 March 2000; “Tbilisi 

Plant to Repair Warplanes for Turkmenistan,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 7 August 

1999; “Georgia Repairs 43 Military Aircraft, 8 Helicopters for Turkmen Army,” 

Moscow ITAR-TASS, 23 December 2004; “Tajikistan, Belarus Promote Mili‐

tary Cooperation,” Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service, 16 March 1999; “Turk‐

menistan May Purchase Advanced Weapons in Belarus,” Moscow Interfax, 17 

May 2002; “Tajikistani Air Defense Officers in Belarus for Training,” BELAPAN, 

16 August 2005; “Belarus Ready to Train Military Personnel from Collective 

Group States in Universities,” Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey Internet Edi‐

tion, 28 September 2005; “Ukraine: Closer Kazakh-Ukrainian Military Coop‐

eration Discussed,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 5 October 1996; “Turkmenistan’s 

President Niyazov Says Army to Be Equipped with Most Advanced Weapons,” 

Moscow ITAR-TASS, 6 May 2005; “CIS: Military Cooperation Between Ukraine 

and Turkmenistan Detailed,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Oborzreniye, 3 June 

2005, “Ukrainian, Kazakhstani Defense Ministers Discuss Future Purchases,” 

Interfax-Ukraine, 18 November 2005.

19. Author’s experience on military contact visit to Almaty, Kazakhstan, 

December 2004.

20. “Tajikistan Hopes Russia Will Fulfill Obligations on Delivering Military 

Equipment,” Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 23 September 2005.

21. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 

172–73.

22. US officials continue to stress the temporary nature of its deployments 

to Central Asia. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated this policy in 

Astana, Kazakhstan, in October 2005: “I declare that we in America are not 

seeking a permanent military presence in Kyrgyzstan and anywhere else in 

other parts of Central Asia.” “US Secretary of State Says No Permanent Mili‐

tary Presence Sought in Central Asia,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, 13 October 2005. 

These statements were originally provided as a means of assuring Russia and 

China that the deployments to Central Asia and operations in Afghanistan 

did not pose a long-term threat to their interests in the region. These con‐
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

149

cerns are no longer valid. Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO), Russia and China have gone on record asking the United States to 

establish a departure date, but the rationale for staying longer has strength‐

ened by the recognition that the terrorist threat in the region will not be 

eliminated quickly. This emphasis on the transitory nature of the US pres‐

ence undermines the perception that the United States has long-term inter‐

ests in stability and security in the region and limits the ability of securitycooperation programs to achieve their goals. But the Bush administration 

now recognizes that the war on terrorism will be a long one, lasting genera‐

tions in the way the Cold War spanned a half century. Central Asia will be the 

site of continual battles in that war, not only by supporting the operations in 

Afghanistan but potentially as future safe havens for terrorists. Afghanistan 

is currently experiencing a resurgence in violence, but eventually the political 

and military situation will stabilize and the remaining Taliban and terrorist 

bases will be eliminated. Al-Qaeda, the IMU, and other terrorist organizations 

will seek out new locations. Geography, repression, corruption, poverty, and 

a host of educated but unemployed young men make Central Asia an attrac‐

tive option. Rajan Menon, “ ‘Greater Central Asia,’ Russia, and the West: 

Challenges and Opportunities for Cooperation,” in Russia’s Engagement with 

the West: Transformation and Integration in the Twenty-First Century, eds. Al‐

exander J. Motyl, Blair A. Ruble, and Lilia Shevtsova (Armonk, New York: M. 

E. Sharpe, 2005), 211. Instead of emphasizing when its forces will leave, the 

United States should underscore how long they will stay and take steps to 

establish a more permanent presence. Stressing the limited commitment of 

US security objectives and the temporary nature of US military forces in Cen‐

tral Asia limits other areas of security cooperation because it undermines the 

perspective that the United States can serve as a reliable long-term security 

partner. The difference between a permanent base and permanent access to 

an “operating site” is not lost on the leadership in the region. An operating 

site allows the United States to introduce forces when Washington sees its 

own interests threatened, whereas a permanent base commits the United 

States to assist building long-term stability and security. The best opportu‐

nity for this policy shift has already passed. The first official statement out‐

lining a long-term US military presence in Central Asia should have come 

anytime prior to the US invasion of Iraq when the Central Asian nations and 

surrounding states would have been more accepting of a more permanent 

status. But it is not too late, and there are multiple methods of changing the 

current perceptions. The United States should consider posting exchange of‐

ficers at Kazakh and Kyrgyz military colleges and academies, including those 

for noncommissioned officers (NCO) professional development. US forces 

participating in exercises, both small ones such as JCET or larger ones such 

as Regional Cooperation, should stage from Manas or the divert bases offered 

by Kazakhstan. And USCENTCOM should consider expanding its use of the 

facilities at Dushanbe. By leveraging security-cooperation efforts, the United 

States can emphasize its long-term commitment to stability and security in 

Central Asia, which will, in turn, improve the effectiveness of the securitycooperation programs.
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

150

23. “U.S. Government Delivers Military Transport Vehicles to Uzbekistan,” US 

Embassy Tashkent Public Affairs Office, 14 February 2000, http://www.use 

mbassy.uz (accessed 8 March 2006).

24. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, personnel, interviewed by the 

author, October 2005.

25. USCENTCOM interviews (see chap. 6, note 7).

26. The Management of Security Assistance (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: 

The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 2001), 77.

27. Defense Security Cooperation Agency Briefing, “DSCA Overview,” 6 

October 2004, http://www.dsca.mil (accessed 12 November 2005).

28. Author with Defense Security Cooperation Agency, correspondence, 

September 2005.

29. US Security Assistance Officer, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, interviewed by 

author, March 2006.

30. Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries, 57 (see chap. 6, note 3).

31. This inefficiency in the military contact program is also addressed by 

Kevin Pollpeter, U.S.-China Security Management: Assessing the Military-toMilitary Relationship (Santa Monica: CA: RAND, 2004), 69.

32. Of course there are exceptions and despite best efforts some partici‐

pants will gain little from the military contact events. One Uzbek officer on a 

visit to Shaw AFB, South Carolina, in 2003, told his escorts he did not want 

to come on the trip and wanted to return home as soon as possible. He also 

recently had undergone surgery and his medication was in a lost suitcase, 

but he preferred to suffer rather than ask for assistance. According to his US 

hosts, “He did not appear to enjoy this visit at all. He did not seem to learn 

from any selected portion of the itinerary. He did not seem to enjoy the major 

cultural day activities.” It is clear that this officer did not consider this visit 

to the United States as a positive experience. DLIELC correspondence (see 

chap. 6, note 10).

33. “U.S. Government and Kazakhstani Military Establish HUMVEE Cen‐

ter in Almaty,” US Embassy Almaty Public Affairs Office, 14 November 2005, 

http://www.usembassy-kazakhstan.freenet.kz (accessed 8 March 2006).

34. Author with Montana National Guard, correspondence, December 

2005; and USCENTCOM interviews (see chap. 6, note 7).

35. Cope, International Military Training and Education, 25–26 (see chap 2, 

note 14).

36. Priest, The Mission, 233 (see chap. 4, note 1.

37. Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr., “Education and Training: A Common Foun‐

dation for Security,” eJournal USA 9, no. 3 (November 2004), 6.

38. Cope, International Military Training and Education, 27 (see chap. 2, 

note 14).

39. Despite this assessment, the role of the experience in IMET and other 

training and education programs in resolving crises is still hit-or-miss. It is 

questionable whether these personal relationships, when they do exist, could 

be systematically employed. The US military maintains almost no documen‐

tation indicating which foreign military personnel have participated in mili‐

tary contact visits and only limited information on those who have partici‐
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

151

pated in training and education programs. Those records that do exist are 

often spread through the various institutions that originally provided the 

training, and they generally do not provide information on the subsequent 

utilization of that individual in his or her parent military. US embassies are 

required to maintain this data and periodically report on the career progres‐

sion of the graduates of US training, but whether this is routinely accom‐

plished depends largely on the aggressiveness of the successive defense at‐

tachés and SAO personnel and the willingness of the foreign nation to provide 

such information (even though accepting US training quotas requires report‐

ing this data). Because of the relatively short history and small size of the 

training programs, the attachés and SAOs apparently have had greater suc‐

cess in tracking IMET graduates in Central Asia than their counterparts in 

other regions.

40. Cope, International Military Training and Education, 26–27 (see chap. 

2, note 14).

41. DOD Directive 5410.17, Informational Program for Foreign Military 

Trainees in the United States, 1985, 1–4. This document was apparently re‐

vised in 2000.

42. Jennifer Morrison Taw, Thailand and the Philippines: Case Studies in 

U.S. IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), 55; and Michael Childress, Effectiveness of U.S. 

Training Efforts in Internal Defense and Development: The Cases of El Salvador and Honduras (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), 13nb.

43. Childress, Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts, 10 (see chap. 6, note 42).

44. Ibid., 19.

45. Priest, The Mission, 235 (see chap. 4, note 1).

46. Many other observers dispute this assertion, believing that the Salva‐

doran military continued to institutionally encourage and even carry out hu‐

man rights abuses through this period. Childress, Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts, 35 (see chap. 6, note 42).

47. Taw, Thailand and the Philippines, 55 (see chap. 6, note 42).

48. Thom Shanker and C. J. Chivers, “Crackdowns in Uzbekistan Reopens 

Longstanding Debate on U.S. Military Aid,” The New York Times, 13 July 2005.

49. Lahue, “Security Assistance in Kazakhstan,” 12 (see chap. 4, note 36).

50. Childress, Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts, 23–24, 31 (see chap. 

6, note 42).

51. Lahue, “Security Assistance in Kazakhstan,” 12 (see chap. 4, note 36).

52. Daniel Byman, Going to War with the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College 

Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), 11.

53. John Rudy and Ivan Eland, “Special Operations Military Training 

Abroad and Its Dangers,” CATO Institute Foreign Policy Briefing Number 53

(Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 1999), 7.

54. This includes over $5 million in NATO funds and $1.1 million in USprovided Warsaw Initiative Funds. Butler, “U.S. Military Cooperation with the 

Central Asian States” (see chap 3, note 54).
CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS

152

55. USCENTCOM correspondence (see chap. 3, note 55). Participants in‐

cluded 18 from Kazakhstan, 16 from Kyrgyzstan, 19 from Pakistan, 17 from 

Tajikistan, and 93 from the United States (including interpreters). Turkmen‐

istan, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates each sent two observers.

56. DLIELC correspondence (see chap. 6, note 10).

57. Igor Grebenshchikov, “Kyrgyz Army in Crisis,” Institute for War and 

Peace Reporting, 14 March 2001, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=

177189&apc_state=henirca2001.

58. Kenneth Weisbrode, “Patrol Boat Procurement Makes Waves on the 

Caspian,” Eurasia Insight, 17 August 2001, http://www.eurasianet.org/

departments/insight/articles/eav071701.shtml; and Defense Threat Reduc‐

tion Agency personnel, interviewed by author, March 2006.

59. US Security Assistance Officer, US Embassy Almaty, interviewed by 

author, 22 March 2006.

60. Nuclear Nonproliferation: US Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat 

Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning, US General 

Accounting Office Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Sen‐

ate, GAO-02-426 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2002), 21.

61. Col Assylbek A. Mendygaliev, Defense, Military, and Air Attaché of the 

Republic of Kazakhstan to the United States and Canada, interviewed by 

author, 28 November 2005.

62. USCENTCOM personnel, interviewed by author, 27 September 2005.

63. Childress, Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts, 25–26 (see chap. 6, 

note 42).
153

Chapter 7

Measuring Effectiveness

You get what you measure. So we need to figure out 

what the right measures of effectiveness are in our 

security cooperation programs.

—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,

DOD-DOS (Department of Defense–

Department of State) Security 

Cooperation Conference, April 2006

Security cooperation is one of many tools used by the United 

States to advance its national-security interests in Central 

Asia. As outlined in chapter 1, the official Defense Department 

definition offers some insight to the narrower set of objectives 

within this rubric: “All Department of Defense interactions with 

foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships 

that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and 

friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational 

operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”1 In this sense, it addresses and 

includes those positive activities that strengthen military ties 

between the US armed forces and those of allied and partner 

nations. Security cooperation is not altruistic, nor is it conducted without purpose. Therefore, security cooperation has 

three objectives: to build relationships so that the United States 

can influence other countries and their military forces, to develop capabilities of foreign military forces so they can conduct 

operations on behalf of the United States, and to provide access

so that the US military has strategic flexibility to conduct its 

own operations. Security cooperation is, at its core, specifically 

intended to achieve specific US national-security objectives.

These objectives are interrelated and often complementary. 

Programs that contribute toward building capabilities will usually result in stronger relationships, and programs designed to 

establish relationships can contribute to developing capabilities. However, they can at times be contradictory—for example; 

creating capabilities for participation in coalition operations 
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154

can detract from efforts to improve internal defensive capabilities. These objectives should be directly related to the US 

national-security objectives for the region; but, again, they 

can be supporting or, at times, contradictory in the actual 

execution of the programs. 

The ability to objectively evaluate the effectiveness of the 

security-cooperation programs in Central Asia is hindered by 

several separate but related issues. First, for much of the history of US programs in Central Asia, US security-cooperation 

objectives were poorly defined, if defined at all. Events, activities, and programs were proposed, planned, and implemented 

if they could be seen as supporting an objective, rather than as 

a specific advancement integrated with other activities toward 

the objective (fig. 10). Although planning efforts in the past several years have improved this situation, there are still some 

programs that still lack specific, measurable objectives and 

corresponding activities that directly contribute to the advanceFigure 10. US and Kazakhstani personnel during a transport aviation 

military contact event, Almaty, Kazakhstan, December 2004 (Reprinted 

from author’s personal collection.)
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

155

ment toward a specified goal. It is difficult to measure effectiveness against poorly defined goals.

Second, DOD lacks a readily-accessible, detailed, comprehensive database of security-cooperation activities, including 

plans, funding levels, and execution reports. The historical survey offered earlier in this paper was compiled from a broad range 

of sources and, to date, offers the fullest presentation of those 

activities, but it admittedly does not fully capture all of the US 

security-cooperation activities in the region since 1993. Almost 

every DOD agency contacted during the preparation of this paper acknowledged shortfalls in maintaining historical records 

of its activities, and some admitted to not being able to identify 

activities and events that had occurred as recently as two or 

three years ago. It is difficult to measure effectiveness without 

the historical data that describes what has taken place.

Third, DOD has not yet developed comprehensive criteria for 

measuring the effectiveness of security-cooperation programs. 

Previous evaluations, such as the annual reports prepared by 

the Department of State, have tended to focus on quantities of 

funding, equipment deliveries, or students trained, punctuated 

with anecdotes of how a specific effort brought a specific victory. But to fully evaluate effectiveness requires performance 

metrics measured both before and after the event or series of 

events. Such a database would include collecting information 

that many of the countries in Central Asia would consider 

overly intrusive, such as assessments of the combat capability of 

special forces units before and after a specific exercise or military 

contact event. Likewise, it is not clear, as will be described 

below, that measurable criteria can be developed for some 

aspects of security cooperation.

Finally, it is at this point impossible to separate the impact 

of US security-cooperation programs from that of other influences. A positive relationship established through a military 

cooperation program may be offset by the negative effects of 

other US policies, such as occurred in Uzbekistan. US military 

aid may improve the capabilities of a specific unit, but that unit 

may have also been receiving additional national resources or 

military aid from another country. Over the past few years, for 

example, the Kyrgyzstani Army has received mountain warfare 

training and specialized equipment from the United States, 
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

156

France, Russia, India, Germany, Turkey, Japan, and South 

Korea. It would be difficult to ascribe any improvements in its 

capabilities solely to US security-cooperation efforts. In July 

1998, US officials provided equipment and training to the Kazakhstani Border Guards at a transshipment point in Dostyk 

(formerly called Druzhba) through the ICP. In April 2001, two 

containers were stopped at this checkpoint because border 

officials noted they were emitting radiation. Although ICP officials highlight this incident as a success story, it is not clear 

whether the Kazakhstani officials were using the US-supplied 

equipment or techniques provided three years earlier, or even if 

they were the same officials that had participated in the ICP 

program in 1998.2

However, some appreciation of the effectiveness of these programs can be offered even with these constraints. This paper 

will offer a tentative evaluation of US security-cooperation activities against the three main elements of the definition of 

security cooperation: building relationships, improving capabilities, and obtaining access.

Building Relationships

As described, security cooperation is at best a highly complex, difficult, and expensive process that takes a long time to 

achieve successes that are both largely immeasurable and 

likely transitory. Security-cooperation programs in Central Asia 

face other limitations, as well, because of the unique environment and scarcity of resources. The DOD is struggling with the 

concept of measuring the results of security-cooperation programs. How can relationships be quantified? Planners usually 

count the number of events, number of personnel involved, 

costs of events, or some other measurable figure, but these 

statistics bear little relation to the status of the military relationship between the United States and these nations. Security 

assistance officers are required to report the utilization of IMET 

graduates within the defense establishments of their countries, 

and many seek to identify senior foreign leaders who have studied in the United States under the program. But even when this 

information is available, this method does not capture whether 

that officer internalized what was taught or even if they had a 
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

157

favorable experience while in the United States. Measuring the 

improvement in relationships between institutions is also difficult, largely subjective, and perhaps possible only in a relative 

sense. In any event, as the experience in Uzbekistan shows, the 

results can be perishable. Other factors can intervene resulting 

in the immediate severing of all ties and spoiling the relations 

that had developed over a decade.

Building defense relationships is easily the most important 

but also the most difficult of the three aspects of security cooperation. An individual senior leader visit, military contact 

event, or training class in itself does not accomplish much in 

building significant relationships. But persistent engagement 

over a long period of time; reinforced with other diplomatic, 

economic, political, and military activities; can build personal 

and institutional ties that can translate; at the right time, under the right conditions, and for the right reason; in decisions 

by foreign governments and military institutions that support 

specific US security interests. In Central Asia, these broad 

interests were denuclearization, democratization, and regional 

cooperation. To date, the scorecard is mixed with some successes and some failures.

By any measure, US efforts to denuclearize Central Asia 

must be considered a success. Within a few short years, cooperative efforts by the United States and Kazakhstan resulted in 

both the removal of the nuclear weapons and the destruction of 

the nuclear infrastructure. Despite his initial reluctance, President Nazarbayev fully accepted the US desire to eliminate the 

weapons, and now sees Kazakhstan’s positive experience in denuclearization as a role model for other states to emulate.3

Those successes allowed the expansion of the effort to include 

elimination of chemical and biological weapons and infrastructure throughout the region, generating even more successes: 

eliminating Soviet-era anthrax inventories buried on the Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea and helping to destroy a Soviet 

chemical weapons research, development, and testing facility 

at Nukus, Uzbekistan.4

But the denuclearization initiative must be considered a success in a different fashion as well. Those early efforts created a 

pattern of cooperation between the defense institutions of both 

countries that served as the foundation for the entire structure 
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

158

of collaborative programs throughout the 1990s. It also provided 

an opportunity for those other programs to develop. The CTR 

program (since it was intended for the denuclearization effort) 

provided both funding and a bureaucratic architecture for 

most of the other programs that began in the 1990s—military 

contact events, senior leader visits, certain types of exercises 

and exchanges. If the denuclearization program had not existed or had not been successful, attempts to initiate and develop subsequent cooperation programs would have faced 

even greater challenges.

The denuclearization effort and the related programs to eliminate chemical and biological weapons and facilities are unique, 

however. They are inherently destructive, not constructive, and 

success is measured by what has been eliminated rather than 

what has been created. It is much more difficult to assess the 

effectiveness of the military democratization efforts in Central 

Asia. The military contact program and training and education 

programs have been the primary tools for this objective. During 

the first phase, 1993–1995, the difference between the limited 

resources and the lofty and vague objectives was simply too 

great to make any progress. As no records are available regarding the military contact events conducted during that period, it 

is impossible to evaluate whether they contributed to the goals 

set for them. The training and education programs offer more 

data but not much more confidence. In that three year period, 

less than 100 students from Central Asia attended US military 

training and education programs. Just under half attended 

courses at the Marshall Center, and others attended English 

language training.

Inherent in this model is the assumption that the state will 

continue, albeit possibly erratically, its political reform efforts 

toward a democratic society, thereby providing both the rationale and the opportunity needed to democratize the armed 

forces. This is not the case in Central Asia, where all five countries have largely ceased reform efforts (if they had ever started) 

and many have reversed previous gains. The Central Asian 

states are no longer democratizing and all have governments of 

varying degrees of authoritarianism. Nor are most of them likely 

to restart political reform efforts as long as the current leadership remains in power.
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS

159

Yet despite the limited resources and vague objectives, military democratization and reform efforts have had some small 

but measurable successes, particularly in Kazakhstan. According to the US SAO in Almaty, the noncommissioned officer 

professional development program in Kazakhstan has visibly 

reduced the practice of dedovshina (abuse inflicted on new 

recruits) in certain units. Also, the Kazakh Ministry of Defense established the position of senior sergeant to the minister of defense, who serves as his advisor on matters relating to 

enlisted personnel. The senior sergeant was authorized an 

apartment in Astana and a car with a driver, indicating his 

influence and power.

US efforts to promote regional cooperation in security and 

defense matters have also had mixed success. Throughout the 

late 1990s, these efforts were centered on CENTRASBAT. However, over time CENTRASBAT became a showcase unit with no 

operational utility. The subordinate companies were never 

posted to the same garrison, and the command-and-control 

relationships ensured the unit could never have been effectively used. CENTRASBAT was disbanded by the end of the 

decade and arguably did more to promote discord than cooperation among the partner nations.

Other programs, however, have had greater success. The 

conferences, exercises, and workshops used for promoting cooperative responses to natural and environmental disasters 

and major terrorist attacks have made great progress in helping these militaries appreciate the fact that such events can 

not be managed unilaterally, and they have already fostered a 

series of bilateral and multilateral agreements for joint planning and response between these nations. The true measure of 

effectiveness, however, will come when one of these disasters 

actually occurs. Likewise, efforts to promote cooperation in 

border security has had mixed results. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan appear to have increased their cooperative efforts to 

improve border security, but Uzbekistan has sealed its borders 

with its neighbors. 
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Building Military Capabilities

Unfortunately, there is insufficient available information to 

fully evaluate US efforts to improve the military capabilities of 

these nations. Quantifying the establishment or improvement 

in military capabilities is equally difficult. Measuring the improvement in capabilities of foreign military forces through security assistance programs is usually captured in numbers of 

equipment provided, personnel trained, or exercises conducted. 

But this does not adequately capture whether that unit is capable of conducting the required mission. Most countries have 

some method for determining combat readiness, but for security 

reasons will not share that data with foreign security assistance 

officers. And the results of the security assistance programs also 

can be transitory or perishable. Personnel rotate out of the unit 

and the experience is dispersed, skills erode if they are not practiced and exercised, and equipment breaks if not properly maintained. At this point, it is not feasible to offer a solid evaluation 

of US efforts to improve border security, proliferation prevention, or counterinsurgency capabilities in these nations. However, a case study of US programs to build peacekeeping capabilities can be offered.

To date, the United States has experienced both success and 

failure in establishing peacekeeping capabilities in the countries of Central Asia, specifically, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Uzbekistan. In terms of regional cooperation, CENTRASBAT 

failed, but it did provide the nucleus for subsequent efforts to 

build peacekeeping units. When CENTRASBAT was disbanded 

in 2000, Kazakhstan used its company-sized element as the 

foundation for the formation of a larger unit, the Kazakhstan 

battalion or KAZBAT. In August 2003, at the request of the 

United States, Kazakhstan deployed an engineering element of 

KAZBAT to Iraq, one of the few Muslim countries and the only 

nation from Central Asia to participate in the post-invasion 

reconstruction operations. As part of the international division 

commanded by Poland, the KAZBAT element conducted demining and water-purification duties, and by November 2005 

had destroyed over four million pieces of ordnance in the region. Since March 2005, the unit has also trained Iraqi soldiers 

in explosives disposal. Most of the personnel are graduates of 
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161

the IMET program and the deputy commander graduated from 

the US Army Command and General Staff College. The 27 

members of the deployed unit, all volunteers for service in Iraq, 

are rotated every six months, spreading the operational experience throughout the battalion. Kazakhstan’s participation in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom with the KAZBAT unit should be considered a success in coalition building, but KAZBAT’s actual 

operations in Iraq also have been widely praised by US, Polish, 

and Kazakhstani officials. In the fall of 2005, Kazakhstan was 

awarded $2 million in CSF to support KAZBAT operations in 

Iraq. These funds will likely be used to purchase additional 

HMMWVs and body armor. Similarly, the Kazakhstani Ministry 

of Defense has requested US assistance to increase KAZBAT to 

a brigade-sized unit, a proposal that will likely gain support.5

Unfortunately, US efforts to build peacekeeping units in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan must be considered a failure. While 

the status of Uzbekistan’s elements of CENTRASBAT is unknown, the Kyrgyzstani element of CENTRASBAT dissipated in 

2000–2001, with the equipment and personnel absorbed into 

other units or otherwise discarded. All the experience, skills, 

and training gained through participating in CENTRASBAT 

were lost. At the present, Kyrgyzstan does not have the capability of participating in international peacekeeping operations. 

In 2006, however, Bishkek requested US aid to establish a new 

peacekeeping unit in order to participate in international operations. Likewise, Tajikistan has also expressed interest in 

building a peacekeeping unit. It is unknown whether these requests will gain much support. 

Gaining Access and Basing Rights

Many observers cited the decisions by the Central Asian 

states to provide overflight and basing rights as a vindication of 

US security-cooperation efforts in the region throughout the 

1990s. Some even traced the establishment of basing rights 

directly to the efforts of particular US units in the region at that 

time, claiming the relationships established during a specific 

deployment were an immediate factor in approving the basing 

of US forces.6 These claims probably overstate the affect the 

previous security-cooperation programs had on the ultimate 
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162

decision to provide access. In fact, it is likely that US security 

cooperation efforts in Central Asia prior to September 2001 

played only a minor and indirect role in this process.

By 2001 the United States had concentrated its securitycooperation efforts on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and, to a 

somewhat lesser extent, Kyrgyzstan. At the other end of the 

spectrum, the security-cooperation relationship with Turkmenistan was weak and with Tajikistan virtually nonexistent. 

Proponents of security-cooperation programs and military 

planners, if asked prior to September 2001 which countries 

would most likely be willing to offer basing rights and overflight 

privileges, likely would have identified Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, 

and Kyrgyzstan. Few would have considered Turkmenistan and 

Tajikistan as reasonable candidates given the limited nature of 

security-cooperation interactions to that point. Despite the lack 

of previous security cooperation programs, Turkmenistan and 

Tajikistan generally were as willing as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

and Uzbekistan to offer support to the United States.

Security-cooperation relationships may be helpful when requesting overflight and basing rights, but the lack of a strong relationship does not prohibit a positive outcome. In fact, officials at the US 

Embassy in Ashgabat reportedly sent the request to the Turkmenistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs without expecting a positive response and were surprised when it was forthcoming.7 Similarly, 

Tajikistan had been left out of US security-cooperation programs 

throughout the 1990s, when the US military was fostering relationships throughout the rest of the region, because of the turmoil and 

aftermath of its civil war. There had been few results by September 

2001. However, Dushanbe readily offered to host US forces as early 

as 25 September, two weeks after the attacks in New York and 

Washington. Secretary of State Colin Powell noted that Tajik president Rahmonov had “given us basically everything we want.” Despite having almost no security-cooperation relationship, Dushanbe 

asked for nothing in return for its support.8

Providing overflight and basing privileges is always ultimately 

a political decision, and military relationships established 

through previous cooperation efforts are but one factor that 

may influence that decision. In the authoritarian states in Central Asia, a decision of that importance is ultimately and exclusively left to the president. Uzbekistani president Karimov was 
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certainly knowledgeable of the military ties that had developed 

since 1995, but he was also aware that the relationship had 

not developed as quickly or as deeply as he had hoped. Tashkent 

had been seeking security guarantees from the United States 

and offering permanent bases since 1995, but Washington had 

discouraged any attempts to build stronger ties. In short, the 

security-cooperation programs prior to September 2001 demonstrated the limits of that friendship.

Ultimately, Karimov had other reasons for approving the request, including the strong possibility that the US operations 

in Afghanistan would eliminate the threat from the IMU and a 

desire to offset growing US and Western condemnations of 

Uzbekistan’s violations of international norms on human rights. 

Karimov also saw this request as a new opportunity to gain 

security guarantees from the United States and help balance 

the growing Russian influence in Central Asia. Additionally, 

the Central Asian presidents, including Karimov, were probably 

influenced by President Bush’s declaration that “the nations of 

the world would either be with us or against us in the war on 

terrorism.” According to General Franks, “They had plenty to 

gain by joining the coalition, and a lot to lose if they did not.”9

While the promise of additional security aid may have contributed to a positive outcome, a recent RAND study concluded 

“there is little to suggest that prior contacts had a significant 

influence on the decision making of the Central Asian leaders.”10

However, US security-cooperation efforts may contribute to 

positive decisions for overflight and basing rights in several indirect fashions. First, they permit US officials to understand 

the personalities and bureaucracies within these countries, 

which helps identify the right interlocutors when making the 

requests.11 Second, they create a pattern of cooperation that 

foreign political and military leaders can use, presumably favorably, to evaluate the request. It is possible that President 

Karimov sought advice from military leaders who, through US 

security-cooperation efforts, were familiar with US capabilities 

and the likelihood of success.12 Third, they create a pool of foreign military personnel who are familiar with US operations, 

equipment, and requirements. These personnel can greatly facilitate the deployment once the political decision has been 

made. Reportedly, an Uzbek officer who had graduated from 
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the US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College coordinated 

the requirements between the Ministry of Defense and US 

Central Command.13

Relative Accomplishments

It is important to distinguish the relative progress made 

by US security-cooperation programs with each of the five 

Central Asian states. The relationship with Tajikistan, established only in 2001 with actual programs initiated in 

2002 is too new to judge. The ties to Turkmenistan have 

been in existence longer, but are very tenuous. Niyazov’s 

authoritarian control and “positive neutrality” stance ensures few changes are likely under his rule. Given the very 

limited defense ties prior to 2001, it is difficult to attribute 

his support for US operations in Afghanistan directly to the 

security-cooperation programs.

Security-cooperation efforts with Uzbekistan were generally 

productive, but it is much more difficult to identify specific 

achievements. Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan’s periodic strategic shifts in foreign policy have hampered strong ties, and the 

breakdown in the relationship since 2005 has all but destroyed 

any progress that may have been made. While Uzbekistan provided access for Operation Enduring Freedom, it is unlikely to 

agree to any US deployments in the foreseeable future.

US security cooperation with Kyrgyzstan has been steady 

and productive, but efforts with Kazakhstan, by almost any 

measure, have made the most progress. That relationship 

had the advantage of starting first and having access to 

more resources, but other factors also played a major role. 

The cooperative efforts with Kazakhstan were based on 

plans that were better defined and the specific objectives, 

from the Kazakh perspective, remained relatively consistent 

over time: removal of the nuclear legacy, development of a 

professional noncommissioned officer corps, improved security for the Caspian area, and development of a peacekeeping unit. Even when CENTRASBAT collapsed, Kazakhstan created its own peacekeeping unit and has employed it 

in Iraq since 2003.
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Notes

1. Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 

as amended through 22 March 2007, http://131.84.1.34/doctrine/jel/doddict/

data/s/04830.html.

2. United States Department of Defense International Counterproliferation 

(ICP) Program—Success Stories: Impact of the ICP Program on Proliferation, Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency Web site, http://www.dtra.mil (accessed 19 March 

2006).

3. Rose Gottemoeller, “Cooperative Threat Reduction Beyond Russia,” The 

Washington Quarterly 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005), 149.

4. Cooperative Threat Reduction History, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Web site, http://www.dtra.mil/oe/ctr/history.cfm.

5. Defense Security Cooperation Agency correspondence (see chap. 6, 

note 28); Roger M. McDermott and Col Igor Mukhamedov, “Kazakhstan’s 

Peacekeeping Support in Iraq,” Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst, 28 January 

2004, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2067 (accessed 

20 March 2006); Roger McDermott, “KAZBAT Deployment in Iraq Faces Uncertainty,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 15 (21 May 2004), http://jamestown

.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=401&issue_id=2961&article_id

=236748 (accessed 20 March 2006); Roger McDermott, “Kazakhstan Suffers 

First Death of Peacekeeper in Iraq,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 2, no. 95 (13 January 

2005), http://jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=407&issue

_id=3194&article_id=2369080 (accessed 20 March 2006); “Kazakhstan Contribution to Normal Life in Iraq Grows,” Kazakhstan News Bulletin 5, no. 47 

(10 November 2005), http://www.homestead.com/prosites-kazakhembus/

November_10.pdf (accessed 20 March 2006).

6. Wooley, “America’s Quiet Professionals,” 61 (see chap. 4, note 48). My 

criticism of this perspective extends only to the mischaracterization of the 

results, and not to the valuable accomplishments of the 6th Special Operations Squadron or other units that have conducted security cooperation activities and built relationships in Central Asia.

7. Olga Oliker and David A. Shlapak, U.S. Interests in Central Asia: Policy 

Priorities and Military Roles (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 17.

8. Woodward, Bush at War, 148, 178 (see chap. 6, note 21).

9. Franks and McConnell, American Soldier, 269 (see chap. 5, note 2).

10. Oliker and Shlapak, U. S. Interests in Central Asia, 11–12 (see chap. 7, 

note 7).

11. Ibid., 11.

12. In a similar fashion, David Welch argues that US security-cooperation 

activities conducted with Israel in the years prior to Operation Desert Storm 

were principal factor in Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s decision not to respond militarily to Iraq’s Scud missile attacks:

But Israel made it clear that its forbearance depended principally on a demonstration of the effectiveness of the American military effort. It was here that the 

closeness of the relationships between the IDF [Israeli Defense Force], on the one 

hand, and the United States army and air force, on the other, came into play. 

These relationships had developed and matured over several decades of close 
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collaboration in a wide variety of fields. Here could be found the crucial elements 

missing in the political relationship: trust and a spirit of genuine co-operation. 

Several Israelis interviewed for this study insist that without these close relationships, Israel’s political leaders could never have been persuaded to set aside—if 

only temporarily—the country’s long-standing and deeply ingrained policy of 

military self-reliance. The IDF’s growing conviction that American soldiers and 

pilots could get the job done made it much easier for Shamir to give them the 

time to try.

David A. Welch, “The Politics and Psychology of Restraint: Israeli DecisionMaking in the Gulf War,” in Janice Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly, eds., 

Choosing to Cooperate: How States Avoid Loss (Baltimore, MD: The Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1993), 168.

13. Goldstein, “Making the Most of Central Asian Partnerships,” 84 (see 

chap. 3, note 53).
167

Chapter 8

Prospects

The sands of Central Asia are littered with the bones of 

Westerners in a hurry.

—British diplomat at the end of the nineteenth century

In testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia on 26 April 2006, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James C. MacDougall 

reiterated the three interrelated national-security interests—

political and economic reform, energy and regional economic 

cooperation, and security—described by Assistant Secretary of 

State Daniel Fried in October 2005. He then outlined in greater 

detail the three core goals for US security relationships in Central Asia: supporting the war on terrorism, strengthening regional border security and reducing the risk of the proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction, and promoting and assisting 

with regional defense sector reform.1 These three goals are 

largely a continuation of the objectives initiated at various 

points in the history of US security-cooperation programs in 

the region since 1993, but they also serve as a road map for US 

effort over the next several years. 

The historical review and discussion on constraints presented in earlier chapters suggest that the United States has 

experienced both successes and failures with its securitycooperation programs in Central Asia over the past 13 years. 

The efforts that have made the most progress are those that 

resulted from improvements in planning and integration of 

the various programs, while the less successful are characterized by disjointed activities against diffuse objectives. As 

such, there are specific lessons from these experiences that 

can help guide future programs.

Central Asia will retain its strategic importance to the United 

States for many decades. The national-security objectives for 

this region have remained consistent for the past 12 years and 

will remain constant for many more, but they will likely grow in 
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urgency over the next 10 to 15 years. Yet, despite the relatively 

large amounts of security-cooperation funding at various stages 

since 1993, the United States has never dedicated sufficient 

resources to achieve many of its security-cooperation objectives 

in Central Asia. Current funding levels in almost every category—the CN program is the sole exception—show a slow, 

steady decrease since the highs of 2002, and in relative terms 

they pale in comparison with funding offered to other, arguably 

less strategic, regions of the world. As a result, there have been 

a relatively modest number of successes for an increasing number of disparate objectives.

Funding for current security-cooperation efforts are the 

seeds for the relationships and capabilities of the future. Given 

the strategic importance of the region, US funding should be 

dramatically increased, commensurate with an increase in 

funding for programs that support political and economic reform. Unfortunately, other budgetary concerns, including the 

response to Hurricane Katrina and the ongoing operations in 

Iraq, ensure any increases will be incremental. With or without 

additional funding, the United States must restructure its securitycooperation efforts in Central Asia so they are increasingly integrated, focused, and persistent. This chapter offers five specific 

recommendations that will assist policy makers and securitycooperation planners to get the most effect out of the existing 

resources.

Integrate Efforts within the 

Defense Department

Two independent organizational changes within the DOD 

helped consolidate US security-cooperation efforts in Central 

Asia. First, the establishment of DTRA in late 1998 integrated 

the denuclearization and counterproliferation activities of the 

OSIA, the DSWA, and the OSD’s CTR Program Office and 

Chemical and Biological Warfare Program Office. Second, the 

1999 publication of the revised Unified Command Plan (UCP) 

assigned the diverse military contact and exercise efforts of the 

USEUCOM, the USACOM, and the USPACOM to the USCENTCOM. Coming simultaneously with the beginning of a period of 
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reassessment, these two separate bureaucratic changes significantly contributed to providing greater structure and focus 

to these programs in the region. Likewise, over the following 

years, several factors helped link the USCENTCOM’s military 

engagement activities and the DSCA’s security-assistance programs, including internal changes within the USCENTCOM, 

the creation in several of the countries of the SAOs (which are 

responsive to both organizations), and the publication of the 

DOD’s Security Cooperation Guidance.

Despite these improvements, the DOD’s efforts remain somewhat disjointed. For example, the USCENTCOM, DTRA, and 

OSD are all conducting activities designed to improve the security of the borders of the Central Asian states, justified as supporting proliferation prevention, CN, counterterrorism, or US 

operations in Afghanistan. But these activities are not fully 

synchronized or integrated. As previously mentioned, some 

DOD organizations use definitional debates to avoid such coordination: “Officials in OSD’s Counter-proliferation Policy office 

refused to admit that activities intended to improve the maritime security capabilities of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in support of counter-proliferation would be included under the definition of Security Cooperation and declined to integrate their 

program formally with other DOD Security Cooperation efforts.”2 The relationship between the USCENTCOM and the 

DTRA has recently grown stronger and each organization has 

taken steps to synchronize their programs, but more can and 

should be done.

Likewise, both USEUCOM and USJFCOM invite the Central 

Asian states to participate in the NATO PfP exercises, often 

without consulting the USCENTCOM to determine whether the 

objectives of the exercise are consistent with the USCENTCOM’s 

Theater Security Cooperation Plan or whether funding is available. When the nations agree to participate, the USCENTCOM—

the command responsible for building relations with these military forces—is placed in the awkward position of having to 

either decline the request or divert resources from other higher 

priority programs. Similarly, other defense organizations occasionally engage in security-cooperation activities in Central Asia 

without coordinating those efforts through the USCENTCOM. 

Such efforts also divert host nation resources and energies, 
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and have the potential to embarrass the DOD by making it apparent to the foreign nation (often the same cadre of officers 

works all these issues with foreign interlocutors) that the various commands do not communicate with each other.

To facilitate this integration, the secretary of defense should 

grant the USCENTCOM the full authority and responsibility to 

coordinate and orchestrate all DOD security-cooperation efforts in Central Asia, including those conducted by the DTRA, 

DSCA, other defense agencies, other unified commands, and 

the military services. Along with the responsibility and authority, the OSD should transfer funding for many of these 

programs—specifically those used for the military contact 

programs—directly to the USCENTCOM for planning and execution. In other cases, such as the DTRA’s proliferation prevention and biological and chemical weapons elimination programs, 

the USCENTCOM and the DTRA should institutionalize procedures to ensure programs and funding are executed in a manner 

consistent with the DOD Security Cooperation Guidance and the 

USCENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation Plan. While the regulations governing the use of each source of funding may limit the 

ability to redirect resources to higher priority objectives, having a 

single lead agency responsible for synchronizing, integrating, and 

deconflicting the various programs will dramatically improve the 

effectiveness of these efforts and provide greater opportunities for 

the United States to achieve its security-cooperation objectives in 

Central Asia. 

The OSD should also task the USCENTCOM to establish a 

comprehensive security-cooperation database that captures 

and retains all relevant information for all activities, regardless 

of which organization funds, manages, and executes them. 

(Multiple databases currently exist, but they are usually narrowly focused on a specific activity and difficult for all members 

of the security-cooperation community to access.) All defense 

organizations, military services, and unified commands would 

be required to populate this database appropriately. Over time, 

the analysis of the information in such a database would permit a more effective evaluation of the total range of US securitycooperation activities in the region and offer additional suggestions for improvement.
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Integrate Efforts within 

the US Government

Some observers have suggested the current explanation of 

security cooperation, as broad as it is, should be expanded. Col 

Albert Zaccor, US Army, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council 

of the United States, proposes the following definition: “Security Cooperation refers to all USG [US government] assistance 

provided to foreign law enforcement, security, and defense establishments in support of national defense, security, and foreign policy objectives.”3 Using this definition, however, would 

require a much more complete integration of the various efforts 

of the entire US government than is evident today, but such an 

approach is needed.

Despite the scarcity of resources, US security-cooperation 

efforts are poorly integrated across the US government. In 

many cases, a variety of US government organizations have 

established separate programs with varying objectives that all 

tend toward the same goal. For example, at least six separate 

federal departments are conducting proliferation prevention, 

CN, or counterinsurgency programs in Central Asia, all of which 

include some aspect of improving border security. However, 

these programs are poorly integrated. This observation is not 

new—a Government Accounting Office report in 2002 made 

the following assessment:

U.S. assistance efforts to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among 

six federal agencies—the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; 

the U.S. Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); 

and the U.S. Coast Guard. . . . U.S. assistance is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall government-wide plan to guide it. Although 

an interagency group, chaired by the State Department, exists to coordinate U.S. assistance efforts, the six agencies that are providing assistance do not always coordinate their efforts through this group. As a 

result, the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense have pursued 

separate approaches to installing radiation detection equipment at 

other countries’ border crossings; consequently, some countries’ border 

crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others.4

Some of the US embassies located in Central Asia have 

started conducting regular staff meetings to deconflict and synchronize the security-cooperation initiatives executed by the 

various US government agencies. This is a superb initiative 

and should be encouraged. But its limits should also be recog-
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nized—the representatives of the different federal agencies that 

serve on the embassy staffs are trying to ensure that planned 

activities and programs do not interfere with each other. What 

is required is a broader integration at the agency level, before 

the programs are pushed out to the embassies.

The OSD should spearhead a concerted effort to fully integrate the US government security-cooperation efforts in Central 

Asia. The first attempt, the CASI announced by the State Department in April 2000, was a step in the right direction but 

only partially met this goal as it simply loosely linked several 

programs under an umbrella concept rather than forcing the 

integration of the programs. CASI has apparently been abandoned, having not been mentioned in State Department reports 

since 2003. Likewise, the OSD-initiated first-ever DOD-DOS 

Security Cooperation Conference held in Washington, DC, in 

April 2006, highlighted on a broader scale the need for integrating security-cooperation programs between these two agencies. But much work lies ahead on actually building the procedures and authorities necessary to fully synchronize those 

efforts. As they develop, other US government agencies must 

be drawn in to the effort. Although this integration is necessary 

in all of the regions in which the United States conducts securitycooperation activities, Central Asia is an ideal location to initiate 

these efforts.

Integrate Efforts with NATO and 

Allied and Partner Nations

Throughout the 1990s, NATO was a reluctant and seldomseen player in the security-cooperation efforts in Central Asia. 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan had 

joined the Partnership for Peace program, but PfP offered little 

more than a handful of training seminars and courses and a 

convenient source of funding for US or Turkish-sponsored national activities. Often the distinction between national activities and PfP programs was muddied by the use of the term “in 

the spirit of PfP,” which meant that the initiatives were national 

in nature but consistent with NATO’s objectives. CENTRASBAT 

is a prime example—carried out “in the spirit of PfP.” It was not 
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sponsored by NATO but by the United States. Even NATO leaders were sometimes confused: one remarked at the CENTRASBAT 

97 exercise that “this will be the first time we’ve [NATO] had 

such a military exercise in Central Asia,” and was immediately 

corrected by his more astute colleagues.5

Central Asia leaders were also hesitant about investing in 

new military relationships with NATO. Alliance membership 

was never a real option, so there was no prospect of meaningful 

security guarantees. Other factors also limited interest. Kazakhstan was cautions about any initiatives that might irritate its 

relationship with Russia, Turkmenistan stood behind its “positive neutrality” foreign policy, and Tajikistan did not join PfP 

because of its ongoing civil conflict. Instead, the Central Asian 

states have preferred bilateral ties with the United States, Turkey, and Germany over institutional ties with NATO.6

NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan in 2003 changed the dynamics of these relationships, and now both NATO and many 

of the Central Asian states are seeking greater interaction. Kazakhstan leads this trend, asking in November 2002 for assistance 

in military reform and strengthening KAZBAT’s capabilities, and 

then in November 2005 signing an Individual Partnership Action 

Plan (IPAP), the most comprehensive web of ties with NATO ever 

agreed to by a Central Asian state. NATO’s links to Kyrgyzstan 

and Turkmenistan are also growing rapidly, and Tajikistan’s 

entry into PfP in 2002 offers new opportunities. NATO’s relationship with Uzbekistan was increasingly robust until the 

Andijon incident and the resulting harsh criticisms of Karimov 

by the international community.

The United States should strongly encourage increased NATO 

security-cooperation activities in Central Asia, and should also seek 

to better integrate its programs with those conducted by NATO. The 

NATO PfP program offers a proven model for defense reform and 

new perspectives on counterterrorism, counter­insurgency, CN, and 

proliferation prevention. Increased interaction with and by NATO 

will help decrease Russian military influence and solidify linkages 

to Euro-Atlantic institutions.

But leveraging NATO’s activities in the region is not the only 

opportunity. During the 1990s, Turkey and Germany were 

the only other two Western nations with significant securitycooperation programs in Central Asia. Since the end of 2001, 
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however, a number of other Western nations have recognized 

the strategic importance of the region, largely as a result of deploying military units to Central Asian nations to support operations in Afghanistan. Some of these nations, including the 

United Kingdom, Germany, and France, have established formal 

security-cooperation programs, with both bilateral efforts and 

via the NATO PfP program, with a number of the Central Asian 

states. A summary of these third-nation efforts is shown in appendix D. Most of these nations share the same fundamental 

objectives in Central Asia as the United States, so these thirdcountry relationships offer opportunities to reinforce and reemphasize US programs. According to Ms. Heidi Reisinger, an 

analyst in the Military Policy Directorate of the Ministry of Defense in Berlin, Germany is promoting goals almost identical to 

those of the United States: stability through democracy and the 

rule of law, regional cooperation through economic growth, 

trustworthy relationships in the effort against terrorism, crime, 

and narcotics smuggling, and reform of the armed forces.7

Some efforts have been made by the United States, German, and Turkish officials in Kazakhstan to synchronize 

their security-cooperation efforts, and these initiatives 

should be encouraged and expanded.8 The United States 

should establish a forum by which key allied nations, including 

Turkey, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France, can deconflict 

and synchronize their bilateral security-cooperation efforts in Central Asia. 

The United States should also seek collaborative securitycooperation efforts with nontraditional partners. For example, 

the United States should encourage Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to continue to send cadets to India’s 

National Defense Academy.9 While sending cadets to non-US 

military schools does not build specific ties with the United 

States, the curriculum of these institutions are usually consistent with the broader US objectives of military democratization 

in that they promote officer professionalism and increase the 

quantity of officers with English-language skills. 

Initiatives to integrate US security-cooperation efforts with 

the programs of NATO and other nations are not without complications, however. As a means of controlling the relationships, 

Russia has been pushing to force NATO to work through the 
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CSTO when dealing with the Central Asian states. So far NATO 

has resisted. Additionally, synchronizing US, NATO, and Western 

European security-cooperation programs could lead to inadvertently de-emphasizing a US objective of establishing partnerships based on mutual respect and overemphasizing the patronclient relationship normally created by assistance efforts. With 

careful management, however, these risks can be mitigated. 

Focus Security-Cooperation 

Efforts on Kazakhstan

The United States will have the greatest opportunities for success if, over the next decade, it focuses its security-cooperation 

programs in the region of Kazakhstan as it offers the best prospects for evolution into a strategic partner in Central Asia. 

While none of the governments in Central Asia could be considered liberal democracies and all of the populations enjoy fewer 

freedoms than they had during the last years of the Soviet 

Union, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan stand in a different class 

than the brutal authoritarian regimes in Turkmenistan and 

Uzbekistan. While the results of the December 2005 elections 

in Kazakhstan are disappointing, only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have functioning civil societies, have the least repressive 

policies against opposition groups, and are most likely to adopt 

democratic reforms, if only slowly. 

Economically, Kazakhstan’s oil wealth brings both resources 

to potentially implement defense reform and modernization, 

and an increased US interest in ensuring the strategic security 

of the energy resources. Almaty has also demonstrated a desire 

to increase its collaborative efforts, and its history with past 

programs shows a level of success unmatched in the region. 

Only Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have the wherewithal to absorb and implement programs that can eventually lead to significant defense capabilities, and for the immediate future the 

cooperative efforts in Uzbekistan will remain limited. Additionally, focusing on Almaty will offer tangential benefits to Kyrgyzstan, because of that country’s reliance on Kazakhstan, and 

possibly Tajikistan. Also, success with Kazakhstan may help 

establish a model to which other nations can aspire.
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Kazakhstan remains the only viable choice in Central Asia, 

also by process of elimination. While Uzbekistan remains the 

other potential regional power and besides Kazakhstan the only 

state able to absorb increased security assistance, Tashkent’s 

decision to sever most cooperative ties and its authoritarian 

government ensure that it will not be a viable partner as long 

as Karimov remains in power. Likewise, Turkmenistan’s repressive regime and foreign policy based on “positive neutrality” limits both Ashgabat’s attraction as a partner and receptiveness to 

increased cooperation. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while important for regional stability, lack the ability to absorb significant 

amounts of security assistance.

US officials have noted that Kazakhstan has the potential to 

be a regional leader in promoting tolerance and respect for human rights, using its energy resources to power economic 

growth and possibly even advancing democratic reform.10 The 

United States should support that potential by focusing its 

security-cooperation efforts on its relationship with Kazakhstan and dedicating the majority of security-cooperation funds 

allocated for Central Asia to bilateral programs with Almaty.

Focus Security-Cooperation Efforts 

on a Limited Range of Objectives

The DOD has made great progress over the past several years 

in basing its security-cooperation programs on a limited set of 

objectives and targeted on specific units to create useful capabilities and real relationships. The most significant improvements in the development and execution of security-cooperation 

programs over the past twelve years have come through the creation of the OSD Security Cooperation Guidance, the USCENTCOM Theater Security Cooperation Plan, and the bilateral fiveyear plans. These planning documents have brought focus and 

a set of objectives to what was otherwise a relatively chaotic set 

of activities. The review of the history of security cooperation in 

the region continues to suggest that too few resources are chasing too many objectives in too many countries. 

In each country, the US should narrow down its efforts to a 

few narrowly defined, measurable objectives (table 7). There 
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should be no more than six to seven in Kazakhstan and two to 

five in each of the others. The key is a limited number of clearly 

defined and measurable objectives. The relationships will develop as the United States delivers on meaningful capabilities.

An important aspect of focusing on a limited number of objectives is ensuring that these efforts do not get sidetracked or 

overtaken by well-meaning but secondary offers of assistance. 

Col Thomas Wilhelm, now at the Marshall Center in Germany, 

recounts this anecdote that occurred while he served as a defense attaché in Central Asia:

My favorite story is of a US Air Force general who desperately wanted to 

provide a “deliverable” at the end of his visit. So while standing at the 

host nation’s airbase, he waved his arms and said that he would send 

out an airfield safety survey team. His arms were waving over the tarmac and huts of a base that was long dead with the corpse stripped 

bare and a squadron of aircraft that was being scraped for metal. Sheep 

were grazing in the potholes of the tarmac. The host nation air force officers, however, were bobbing their heads enthusiastically, though their 

air force did not and would not have a single flying aircraft. It was welcome “cooperation” all the same because it gave them distraction and 

influence at the General HQ level, and, they (wrongly) thought leverage 

to ask for EDA C-130s, etc. It had the summing effect of delaying the 

Table 7. Proposed focus areas for US security cooperation in Central Asia

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

Denuclearization 

(including biological 

and chemical weapon 

elimination)

X X

Democratization 

(PME Programs) X X X X X

Democratization 

(officer and NCO professional development)X X

Regional Cooperation 

(disaster response and 

border security)

X X X X X

Military Capabilities 

(peacekeeping) X

Military Capabilities 

(border security) X X X X X

Military Capabilities 

(counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency)

X X
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process of getting on with the painful growth of real transformation, 

which involved changing their concept of their air force completely.11

DOD senior officials and security-cooperation planners must 

temper desires to frequently shift resources, constantly provide 

“deliverables,” or initiate new programs to meet new objectives. 

Instead, they should remained focused on a limited number of 

clearly defined objectives within the broader goals of denuclearization and WMD elimination, promoting military democratization and regional cooperation, and improving specific military 

capabilities. Security cooperation is a slow, deliberate process 

that takes long-term commitment. Through persistent engagement, these programs will have the greatest opportunity for 

long-term success.

Denuclearization and WMD Elimination

The elimination of the nuclear weapons arsenal and infrastructure in Kazakhstan and subsequent efforts to destroy biological and chemical weapons infrastructure in Kazakhstan 

and Uzbekistan stand as the hallmarks of success for security 

cooperation in Central Asia. However, some of these long-term 

programs have not been fully completed, and the rise of terrorism as the primary threat to the United States brings greater 

urgency to these efforts. The United States must continue to 

locate, identify, safeguard, and destroy these weapons and the 

infrastructure, technology, and materials used to produce 

them. Currently, this objective should be a focus area for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but security-cooperation planners should 

remain open to the possibility that previously unidentified 

weapons or materials may be found in any of the other Central 

Asian states. 

Democratization

In all countries in the region, the United States should continue to emphasize programs and initiatives that promote democratization of the armed forces, while recognizing those efforts will likely meet with only modest success for a long time. 

Until the governments of the Central Asian states truly adopt 

democratic principles, promote human rights, and eliminate 

corruption throughout the political structures, there will be 
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little leeway for broader military reform, even if the senior military leadership in one or more of the nations presses for it. But 

that should not deter maintaining democratization as a major 

objective for US security-cooperation programs. To support this 

goal, the United States should promote courses offered by the 

Marshall Center, DIILS, CCMR, DRMI, and other institutions 

that can assist the Central Asian states to transform their militaries into ones that are responsive to civilian control and legislative oversight, are subject to budget and defense planning 

transparency, and are realistically sized and funded. Additionally, the United States should offer increased opportunities for 

cadets and officers from Central Asia to study in US academies 

and war colleges.

Promoting democratization should be the primary objective 

for security-cooperation programs in Turkmenistan, where United 

States efforts will remain limited for the immediate future. The 

military contact program will be the primary vehicle for interaction, although the United States also can continue to engage 

the Turkmenistani military via the existing modest joint exercises and limited training and education programs. Given Niyazov’s 

authoritarian style and desire to keep foreign influences at a 

minimum, this level of cooperation is not likely to change until 

his regime ends. Niyazov will cling to power until the very end, 

and his “cult of personality,” constant shuffling of ministers 

and advisors, and weak constitutional framework have prevented the emergence of any potential successor and will likely 

result in internal instability when Niyazov passes from the 

scene.12 The United States should shape its security-cooperation 

efforts toward preparing for this succession period by engaging 

all security services in Turkmenistan, not just the military, with 

contact events and training programs that build personal relationships and promote strong command-and-control functions, 

the role of security forces in domestic politics, and the appropriate uses of force in succession crises. In this way, the United 

States may be able to mitigate the possibility of internal conflict 

and influence the nature of the post-Niyazov regime.13

Likewise, the United States should also be preparing for the 

eventual succession of Karimov in Uzbekistan. As in Turkmenistan, the US security-cooperation program should seek to 

build ties with and eventually influence the officer corps of the 
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armed forces and other security services.14 In the interim, however, the United States should use security-cooperation programs to offset the increasing anti-Western and anti-US sentiments developing in Uzbekistan. Cooperative efforts in this 

regard should be characterized as “strategic engagement” much 

as was conducted with the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, Russia in the early 1990s, and China today: aiming “to alter the 

perception within these countries’ armed forces of the US/the 

West as a threat, for example by explaining Western intentions 

and capabilities, emphasizing common interests and highlighting the shared challenges facing military professionals.”15 Already there exists a core of officers in Uzbekistan with a Western outlook, although they are likely to remain marginalized as 

long as Karimov remains in power.16

One important element of promoting democratization in Uzbekistan should be to reinstate IMET funding for Uzbekistan, 

with restrictions. Following the December 2004 decision not to 

certify that Uzbekistan had made progress on protecting human rights, Tashkent was prohibited from using FMF and IMET 

funds, and did not receive any in 2005 or 2006. While a restriction on using FMF funds is appropriate to ensure US military 

equipment is not used for repression, restricting the use of 

IMET funds eliminates one of the most valuable methods the 

United States has available to influence current and future 

leaders in the military and other security services. Instead, 

Congress should permit the use of these funds, but mandate 

they may only be used for E-IMET courses—those that have 

been specifically identified as promoting the concepts of democracy, civilian rule of law, civilian control of the military, 

and internationally recognized standards of human rights. 

Continued engagement, at the right level, for the right reasons, 

and with the right methods is the only way to modify or mitigate the increasing repression in Uzbekistan, and it will help 

ensure that in the post–Karimov era there are civilian and military leaders at all levels who understand and appreciate American perspectives on these issues. To promote this effort, DOS 

and DOD should seek a limited waiver to the Congressional restriction on using IMET funds for Uzbekistan. The waiver would 

permit Uzbekistani personnel to attend specific E-IMET courses 

that directly promote the establishment of a professional mili-
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tary force, appropriate civil-military relations, and respect for 

human rights. 

Unlike in the other three countries, promoting military democratization in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan should include 

support for officer and noncommissioned officer professional 

development programs. The United States has already devoted 

over a decade to these efforts, and Almaty and Bishkek continue to request support for these efforts. To discontinue these 

efforts would undermine the relationships that have been built, 

create the impression that democratic military professionalism 

is not important, and foster the perception that the United 

States can be an unreliable security partner. Likewise, these 

programs have made some progress, and experience in Bulgaria suggests that military democratization and reform efforts 

in the absence of political reform can build a reservoir of military leaders that understand and appreciate the value of these 

concepts, and military reform can progress very rapidly once 

the need for fundamental political reform is accepted. Therefore, the United States should reinforce the officer and noncommissioned officer development programs in Kazakhstan 

and Kyrgyzstan.

Regional Cooperation

The disaster response and border security cooperative initiatives under the IWER program and the Regional Cooperation 

exercises have made progress in promoting regional cooperation. These programs should be continued and expanded. In 

particular, the DOD should continue to encourage Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to participate in these forums, although 

their desire and involvement may be limited. Similarly, the 

United States should extend these programs to include delegations from China, India, Russia, and Afghanistan as the other 

regional players that can both support and benefit from improved regional cooperation in Central Asia.

The USCENTCOM has also begun to establish regional centers of excellence in Central Asia. The first to be announced 

was the Disaster Preparedness Center, which will likely be situated in Kazakhstan as early as 2007. This center can serve as 

an excellent method for improving regional cooperation in a 
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field that would require a coordinated response should a major 

terrorist attack or environmental disaster occur in Central Asia. 

Col Dan Groeschen, the chief of the Central Asian Branch at 

USCENTCOM, envisions other such centers of excellence in the 

region, including ones for noncommissioned officer professional development, modeling and simulation, and language 

training. The DOD should encourage and fund the establishment of centers for noncombat-related activities as a means of 

promoting regional cooperation.

Military Capabilities

The United States should also continue to develop certain 

force capabilities within Central Asia. In all countries, this effort should primarily be devoted to improving integrated border 

security capabilities that address WMD proliferation prevention, CN, and counterinsurgency considerations (including 

maritime security in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). The programs should be geared to improve the specific military capabilities of small, relatively autonomous units. These programs 

must be executed with a strong understanding of how those 

capabilities will fit into the larger force structure of the country, 

and must ensure an appropriate sustainment plan for training 

and logistics.

In most cases, however, the United States should avoid expanding its efforts beyond border security, for in doing so it will 

spread its limited resources too thin and decrease the likelihood that these specific capabilities will be achieved. There are 

exceptions: in Kazakhstan, the United States should support 

the expansion of the KAZBAT peacekeeping forces and the development rapid response forces (including special operations 

forces with counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities). In Kyrgyzstan, the United States should support counterinsurgency and counterterrorism forces, but should not promote the reestablishment of a peacekeeping unit.

Persistent Engagement

As it focuses on these key security-cooperation objectives, 

US planners should seek to integrate these efforts over time for 

persistent engagement. Long-term development plans should 
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integrate military contact visits, mobile training and education 

teams, training courses in the United States, and appropriate 

weapons and equipment purchases to provide depth to those 

capabilities. Exercises and deployments should be crafted to 

evaluate and reinforce those capabilities. These activities must 

not only be integrated and reinforcing within the broader set of 

objectives, they must also be scheduled and executed over an 

appropriate period of time to ensure persistent, recurring interaction with a defined set of recipients within each country. In 

short, this means creating and executing a deliberate, timephased, event-driven plan to “meet” the objective. Since security cooperation takes a long time to have an effect, these plans 

(one for each country) must have a five-year forward planning 

horizon and at least a three-year back assessment window.

Notes

1. Statement of James C. MacDougall, deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Eurasia, before the House Committee on International Relations, 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, 26 April 2006, http://

www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/27230.pdf (accessed 4 May 2006).

2. Zaccor, Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats, 34 (see chap. 1, 

note 7).

3. Ibid., 7.

4. Nuclear Nonproliferation, 2–3 (see chap. 6, note 60).

5. Bhatty and Bronson, “NATO’s Mixed Signals,” 132 (see chap. 3, note 25).

6. Ibid., 133; “Turkmenistan: Official Says NATO Respects Turkmenistan’s 

Neutrality,” Moscow ITAR-Tass, 3 July 1998; “NATO Chief Favours Closer 

Military Ties with Turkmenistan,” Moscow Interfax, 18 January 2001; “NATO 

Ready to Help Uzbekistan in Army Reforms,” Moscow Interfax, 19 March 

2002; “Kazakh President Reaffirms Benefits of Cooperation with NATO,” Moscow Interfax, 22 November 2002; “Xinhua ‘Roundup’: NATO Seeks to Expand 

Military Presence in Central Asia,” Beijing Xinhua, 17 July 2003; “NATO Seeks 

to Step Up Partnership with Turkmenistan,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 16 August 

2003; “NATO Meeting Urges Uzbekistan to Be Open About Army,” Tashkent 

UzReport.com Internet Text, 26 February 2004; “NATO Ready to Expand Security Cooperation with Kyrgyzstan,” Moscow Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey 

Internet Text, 19 October 2004; “Uzbekistani President Hails Ties with NATO,” 

Tashkent Uzbek Radio 1, 20 October 2004; “NATO Envoy Visits Uzbekistan, 

Outlines Cooperation Plans,” Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey Internet Text, 14 

March 2005; and “Kazakhstan, NATO to Prepare Signing of Individual Partnership Action Plan,” Interfax, 11 November 2005.
PROSPECTS

184

7. Author with Military Policy Directorate, Ministry of Defense, Federal 

Republic of Germany, correspondence, March 2006. For those who read German, Ms. Reisinger’s statement is as follows:

DEU setzt tatsächlich auf Ausbildung. Vorrangiges Ziel bleibt die Schaffung von 

Stabilität durch Förderung von Demokratie, Rechtstaatlichkeit, wirtschaftlicher 

Entwicklung und regionaler Kooperation sowie der Ausbau vertrauensvoller Beziehungen als gemeinsame Basis für den Kampf gegen den internationalen Terrorismus, die Organisierte Kriminalität und den internationalen Drogenhandel. Gerade 

die Streitkräfte der zentralasiatischen Staaten spielen dabei eine wichtige Rolle: 

Neben der Sicherung der Region stellen sie ein Instrument der multilateralen 

Zusammenarbeit mit Partnern in der Region als auch euroatlantischen Strukturen 

dar und sind zudem wichtiger Bestandteil der staatlichen Entwicklung: Sowohl ihr 

innerer Zustand wie auch ihre Einbettung in rechtsstaatliche und demokratische 

Strukturen stellen einen wichtigen Faktor dar. Unterstützung der Streitkräftereform wird damit auch als ein bedeutender Beitrag zur Entwicklung und auch Stabilisierung der Region insgesamt gesehen.

8. Sergey V. Golunov, “Border Security in Kazakhstan: Threats, Policies, 

and Future Challenges,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 18, no. 1 (Spring 

2005), 51; and Lahue, “Security Assistance in Kazakhstan,” 13 (see chap. 4, 

note 36).

9. “India: Defense Academy to Update Training Curriculum Following 

Committee Report,” New Delhi Force, 22 June 2005.

10. Fried, A Strategy for Central Asia, (see chap. 1, note 3).

11. Marshall Center correspondence (see chap. 5, note 36).

12. Eugene B. Rumer, “Central Asian Leadership Succession: When, Not 

If,” Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forum Number 203 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, December 2003), 2–4.

13. Steven Sabol, “Turkmenbashi: Going it Alone,” Problems of PostCommunism 50, no. 5 (September/October 2003), 55.

14. Rumer, “Central Asian Leadership Succession,” 2–4 (see chap. 8, 

note 12).

15. Cottey and Forster, Reshaping Defense Diplomacy, 16 (see chap. 1, 

note 5).

16. Svante Cornell, “The United States and Central Asia: In the Steppes to 

Stay?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 2 (July 2004), 248.
185

Chapter 9

Conclusion

Here’s what I learned: our potential partner countries 

want respect more than cooperation, and they are willing to work to get deserved respect. Giving them stuff is 

just symbolic and plays into the current power games. 

Giving them our ideas is giving them nothing. But giving 

them respect by finding out what they could possibly 

do right and concentrating on it, gives them something 

most haven’t truly had: success. And if you give someone 

success, they will become a true and devoted partner. 

—Col Thomas Wilhelm, USA

US security-cooperation activities with the Central Asian 

states span just over a dozen years, having started in 1993. 

From modest beginnings, the United States slowly built a web 

of ties to the military forces of the Central Asian nations. Progress was slow and uneven, largely due to limited funding, the 

involvement of a diverse and often uncoordinated set of US government agencies in the activities, multiplying objectives, and 

the effect of outside factors, such as reversals in democratic 

reform and the insurgent attacks in the region in 1999 and 

2000. This development went through three distinct stages 

prior to the turning point of 11 September 2001, and two more 

stages afterward. 

Through these 13 years, US national-security policy makers 

have introduced various security-cooperation programs to meet 

changing and multiplying national-security objectives for the 

region. Generally, those programs sought to achieve US objectives in denuclearization and proliferation prevention, democratization and military reform, regional cooperation, and improving military capabilities. These security-cooperation efforts 

were limited by a variety of factors, including the lack of political and economic reform in the region, Russian influence 

through bilateral cooperation agreements and multilateral security institutions, constrained resources, diffuse objectives 
CONCLUSION

186

and multiplying recipients, and US policies that restrained 

commitment to Central Asia. Each of the programs available to 

US planners had strengths and weaknesses, but these programs were not always integrated in a fashion to achieve the 

best results. The linkages between the specific activities and 

the ultimate objectives have not always been constant and still 

may not always be clear. As a result, the United States has had 

mixed results in building relationships, developing capabilities, 

and providing access. Much has been done over the last eight 

years to improve the planning, coordination, and execution of 

these programs. These programs are generally evolving in the 

right direction, but there is still room for improvement. The 

United States should focus its efforts on Kazakhstan, more 

closely integrate the existing security-cooperation programs 

within the Department of Defense and across the US government, leverage the assistance programs of NATO partners, and 

seek to employ a strategy of persistent engagement against a 

limited number of clearly defined objectives.

In the years ahead, Central Asia will remain a critical region 

in America’s long war against terrorism. Security cooperation 

has been and can be a valuable tool in building relationships 

with allies and partners, developing capabilities of foreign militaries so they can join in this endeavor, and providing access so 

American forces can take the war to the enemy. 
187

Appendix A

US Security-Cooperation 

Funding in Central Asia

Policy without funding is just a dream.

—Anonymous

Figures

Figure Page

A.1 Trends in cooperative threat reduction 

(CTR) program funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

A.2 Trends in CTR program defense and 

military contacts (DMC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

A.3 Trends in CTR program biological and 

chemical weapon elimination and 

proliferation prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

A.4 Trends in international military 

education and training (IMET) program . . . . . . 198

A.5 Trends in foreign military financing 

(FMF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

Tables

Table Page

A.1 CTR program funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

A.2 CTR program DMC funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

A.3 CTR program biological and chemical 

weapon elimination and proliferation 

prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

A.4 ICP funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
APPENDIX A

188

Table Page

A.5 IMET program funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

A.6 FMF program funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

A.7 FMS agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

A.8 FMS deliveries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

A.9 Regional Defense Counterterrorism 

Fellowship (RDCTF) program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

A.10 Counternarcotics (CN) program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
APPENDIX A

189

Table A.1. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program funding for Central Asia, 1993–2006

(In US$s) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000Strategic offensive arms elimination

– 14,962,637 43,143,697 1,386,341 – – – –

Government-togovernment Communications link – 2,199,433 111,501 – – – – –Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) infrastructure elimination

– 1,405,818 9,785,165 22,849,899 – – – –

Emergency response – 3,987,859 – – – – – –Material control and accounting

– 4,625,106 2,984,011 14,276,910 – – – –

Export control – 2,185,874 4,930,310 – – – – –Defense conversion – 14,999,138 2,142,446 – – – – –Science and Technology Center – – 9,000,000 – – – – –Defense enterprise fund

– – 7,000,000 – – – – –

Biological warfare proliferation prevention

– – – – – 5,000,000 – –

Nukus Chemical Research Facility elimination – – – – 5,862,925 – – –

Total 0 44,365,865 79,097,130 38,513,150 5,862,925 5,000,000 0 0
APPENDIX A

190

Table A.1. CTR program funding for Central Asia, 1993–2006 (Continued)

(In US$s) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 TotalStrategic offensive arms elimination

– – – – – – 59,492,675

Government-to-government Communications link

– – – – – – 2,310,934

WMD infrastructure elimination

– 3,500,000 4,510,000 – – – 42,050,882

Emergency response – – – – – – 3,987,859Material control and accounting

– – – – – – 21,886,027

Export control – – – – – – 7,116,184Defense conversion – – – – – – 17,141,584Science and Technology Center

– – – – – – 9,000,000

Defense enterprise fund – – – – – – 7,000,000Biological warfare proliferation prevention – – – – – – 5,000,000Nukus Chemical Research Facility Elimination

– 2,500,000 – – – – 8,362,925

Total 0 6,000,000 4,510,000 0 0 0 183,349,070

(Source: Ms. Jeannie Borden, Cooperative Threat Reduction Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA. [See also fig. A.1.])Note: Totals shown are for fiscal years. Amounts for 2005 and earlier are budgeted, for 2006 are estimated. This chart does not identify all of the CTR funding executed in Central Asia, but only that funding which was specifically designated for projects in the region. Additional CTR funding may have come from regional programs applicable to the entire former Soviet Union. This table does not include funding for defense and military contacts, which is identified separately. All funds shown here were allocated for projects in Kazakhstan except for those allocated for the Nukus Chemical Research Facility in Uzbekistan. Some elements, such as material control and accounting, were transferred out of the CTR program and continued under the Department of Energy. See John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS [newly independent states] Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, 1997), for more information on the specific programs within CTR. 
APPENDIX A

191

Figure A.1. Trends in CTR program funding for Central Asia, 1994–2007

(Adapted from table A.1.)
APPENDIX A

192

Table A.2. CTR program DMC funding for Central Asia, 1993–2006 

(In US$s) Kazakhstan Former Soviet 

Union

Former Soviet Union 

(Counterproliferation)

1993 – – –

1994 470,862 494,386 –

1995 400,856 3,175,437 –

1996 759,650 955,543 –

1997 – 7,934,594 1,882,000

1998 – 7,337,000 2,000,000

1999 – – –

2000 – 2,000,000 –

2001 – 8,714,864 285,000

2002 – 6,949,000 –

2003 – 10,300,000 –

2004 – 945,625 –

2005 – 7,963,000 –

2006 – 8,000,000 –

Total 1,631,368 64,769,449 4,167,000

(Source: Ms. Jeannie Borden, Cooperative Threat Reduction Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 

Fort Belvoir, VA. [See also fig. A.2.])

Note: Totals are shown for fiscal years. Amounts for 2005 and earlier were budgeted, for 2006 are 

estimated. Until 1997 DOD maintained separate funding lines for DMC in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, 

Kazakhstan, and other former Soviet Union. In 1997 these funding lines were merged.
APPENDIX A

193

Figure A.2. Trends in CTR program DMC funding for Central Asia, 1993–

2007 (Adapted from table A.2.)
APPENDIX A

194

Table A.3. CTR program biological and chemical weapon elimination 

and proliferation prevention funding, 1993–2006

(In US$s)

Kazakhstan 

biological 

weapons 

proliferation 

prevention

Uzbekistan 

Nukus 

Chemical 

Research 

Facility 

elimination

Former Soviet 

Union 

biological 

weapons 

proliferation 

prevention 

(BWPP)

Former Soviet 

Union (except 

Russia) 

chemical 

weapons 

proliferation 

prevention 

(WMD-PPI)

1993 – – – –

1994 – – – –

1995 – – – –

1996 – – – –

1997 – 5,862,925 4,899,808 –

1998 5,000,000 – 2,000,000 –

1999 – – 2,000,000 –

2000 – – 30,000,000 –

2001 – 2,500,000 27,000,000 –

2002 – – 24,100,000 –

2003 – – 67,390,000 39,800,000

2004 – – 67,750,000 29,400,000

2005 – – 68,699,000 36,700,000

2006 – – 60,849,000 40,600,000

Total 5,000,000 8,362,925 354,687,808 146,500,000

(Source: Ms. Jeannie Borden, Cooperative Threat Reduction Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 

Fort Belvoir, VA. [See also fig. A.3.])

Note: Totals are shown for fiscal years. Amounts for 2005 and earlier were budgeted, for 2006 are 

estimated. Only those amounts in the first two columns were specifically allocated for programs in 

Central Asia. Amounts for BWPP and WMD-PPI were executed throughout the Former Soviet Union, 

including Central Asia, but specific allocations by country are not available.
APPENDIX A

195

Figure A.3. Trends in CTR program biological and chemical weapon 

elimination and proliferation prevention funding, 1994–2004 (Adapted 

from table A.3.)

$0

$10,000,000

$20,000,000

$30,000,000

$40,000,000

$50,000,000

$60,000,000

$70,000,000

$80,000,000

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Kazakhstan Biological Warfare Proliferation Prevention

Nukus Chemical Research

Biological Warfare Proliferation Prevention

WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative
APPENDIX A

196

Table A.4. ICP funding, 1995–2005

(In 

US$s)

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

95-99 1,121,000 465,000 0 600,000 873,000

2000 109,000 65,000 0 0 187,000

2001 195,000 154,000 56,000 56,000 521,000

2002 120,000 550,000 30,000 0 500,000

2003 1,200,000 500,000 0 0 1,190,000

2004 160,000 0 0 0 850,000

2005 444,000 0 10,000 0 0

Total 3,349,000 1,734,000 96,000 656,000 4,121,000

(Source: Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to the Newly Independent States, US Department 

of State, U.S. Government Assistance To and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States 

of the Former Soviet Union, FY2000 Annual Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2001), 

Appendix 1; ibid., FY 2001 Annual Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2002), Appendix 1; 

ibid., FY2002 Annual Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2003), Appendix 1; ibid., FY2003 

Annual Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2004), Appendix 1; and ibid., FY2004 Annual 

Report (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2005), Appendix 1.)

Note: Totals are shown for fiscal years. Amounts for 2004 and earlier are as expended.
APPENDIX A

197

Table A.5. IMET program funding for Central Asia, 1993–2007

(In 

US$s)

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 163,000 – – – –

1994 90,000 50,000 – 50,000 –

1995 97,000 60,000 – 118,000 95,000

1996 388,000 231,000 – 213,000 293,000

1997 389,000 257,000 – 262,000 286,000

1998 587,000 336,000 – 336,000 457,000

1999 383,000 383,000 – 261,000 526,000

2000 550,000 350,000 – 300,000 500,000

2001 583,000 380,000 – 258,000 494,000

2002 893,000 600,000 259,000 388,000 880,000

2003 872,000 1,068,000 339,000 216,000 1,104,000

2004 1,233,000 1,047,000 351,000 340,000 484,000

2005 997,000 1,039,000 348,000 389,000 –

2006 990,000 1,089,000 346,000 297,000 –

2007 1,085,000 1,085,000 370,000 395,000 –

Total 9,300,000 7,975,000 2,013,000 3,823,000 5,119,000

(Source: For 1993 through 2004, from the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State. For 2005 through 2007, from Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2007 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2006), 215–216. [See also fig. A.4.])

Note: Totals are shown for fiscal years. Amounts for 2005 and earlier were expended, for 2006 are 

estimated, and for 2007 are as requested.
APPENDIX A

198

Figure A.4. Trends in IMET program funding for Central Asia, 1993–2007

(Adapted from table A.5.)
APPENDIX A

199

Table A.6. FMF program funding for Central Asia, 1993–2007

(In 

US$s)

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 – – – – –

1994 – – – – –

1995 – – – – –

1996 – – – – –

1997 1,500,000 800,000 – 500,000 1,000,000

1998 2,250,000 1,350,000 – 450,000 1,550,000

1999 1,800,000 1,550,000 – 600,000 1,650,000

2000 1,500,000 1,000,000 – 600,000 1,500,000

2001 1,900,000 1,846,000 – 699,000 2,445,000

2002 4,750,000 11,000,000 3,700,000 – 36,207,000

2003 2,900,000 3,900,000 – 690,000 8,600,000

2004 2,980,000 4,075,000 1,995,000 500,000 –

2005 4,960,000 1,984,000 496,000 694,000 –

2006 3,465,000 1,881,000 495,000 297,000 –

2007 3,500,000 1,500,000 250,000 250,000 –

Total 31,505,000 30,886,000 6,936,000 5,280,000 52,952,000

(Source: For 1993 through 2004, from the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State. For 2005 through 2007, from Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2007 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2006), 215–216. [See also fig. A.5])

Note: Totals are shown for fiscal years. Amounts for 2005 and earlier were expended, for 2006 are 

estimated, and for 2007 are as requested.
APPENDIX A

200

Figure A.5. Trends in FMF program funding for Central Asia, 1993–2005.

(Adapted from table A.6.)

$0

$10

$20

$30

$40

$50

$60

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan

Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Total
APPENDIX A

201

Table A.7. FMS agreements for Central Asia, 1993–2004

(In 

US$s)

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 – – – – –

1994 – – – – –

1995 – – – – –

1996 – – – – –

1997 – – – – –

1998 165,000 – – – 1,401,000

1999 – 776,000 – – 2,613,000

2000 2,430,000 872,000 – 657,000 34,000

2001 130,000 – – – 1,786,000

2002 5,951,000 7,516,000 – 962,000 27,408,000

2003 1,317,000 4,751,000 1,804,000 603,000 16,046,000

2004 3,050,000 7,417,000 1,759,000 – 4,347,000

Total 13,043,000 21,332,000 3,563,000 2,222,000 53,635,000

(Source: Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts

(Washington, DC: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2004), 4–7, 13.)

Note: Totals are shown for fiscal years. These figures indicate the value of defense goods and services the United States agreed to provide under the foreign military sales program at the time of the 

signature by both parties of the letter of offer and acceptance (LOA). Depending on the type of 

equipment or services, actual deliveries may come weeks, months, or years later. Totals may not 

add due to rounding. The 2002 amount for Kazakhstan includes $5,951,000 in foreign military 

construction sales (FMCS); the 2004 amount for Kyrgyzstan includes $5,561,000 in FMCS. 
APPENDIX A

202

Table A.8. FMS deliveries for Central Asia, 1993–2004

(In 

US$s)

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 – – – – –

1994 – – – – –

1995 – – – – –

1996 – – – – –

1997 – – – – –

1998 – – – – –

1999 21,000 – – – 25,000

2000 110,000 726,000 – – 2,354,000

2001 – 690,000 – – 348,000

2002 3,086,000 2,250,000 – – 3,126,000

2003 2,371,000 2,746,000 1,159,000 1,823,000 33,971,000

2004 2,466,000 4,722,000 390,000 381,000 1,717,000

Total 8,054,000 11,135,000 1,550,000 2,204,000 41,541,000

(Source: Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts

(Washington, DC: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2004), 20–23, 28–29.)

Note: Totals are shown for fiscal years. These figures indicate the value of defense goods and services the United States delivered under the FMS program. Totals may not add due to rounding. The 

2002, 2003, and 2004 amounts for Kazakhstan include $51,000, $1,957,000, and $1,369,000, 

respectively, in FMCS; the 2004 amount for Kyrgyzstan includes $5,561,000 in FMCS. 
APPENDIX A

203

Table A.9. RDCTF program funding for Central Asia, 1993–2006

(In 

US$s)

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 – – – – –

1994 – – – – –

1995 – – – – –

1996 – – – – –

1997 – – – – –

1998 – – – – –

1999 – – – – –

2000 – – – – –

2001 – – – – –

2002 – – – – –

2003 70,000 12,000 50,000 – 3,000

2004 164,000 120,000 202,000 – 42,000

2005 251,000 123,000 86,000 – 113,000

2006 175,000 175,000 175,000 – 200,000

Total 660,000 430,000 513,000 0 358,000

(Source: Mr. Hussam Bader, CTFP Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.)

Note: Totals are shown for fiscal years. Amounts for 2005 and earlier were expended, for 2006 are 

estimated.
APPENDIX A

204

Table A.10. CN program funding for Central Asia, 1993–2005

(In 

US$s) Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Central Asia Regional

1993 – – – – – –

1994 – – – – – –

1995 – – – – – –

1996 – – – – – –

1997 – – – – – –

1998 – – – – – –

1999 – – – – – –

2000 – – – – – –

2001 – – – – 230,000 –

2002 – – – – 213,000 –

2003 – – 500,000 – 6,564,000 351,000

2004 – – – – 581,000 462,000

2005 – 5,270,000 9,629,000 4,879,000 47,000 705,000

Total 0 5,270,000 10,129,000 4,879,000 7,635,000 1,518,000

(Source: Mr. Mark Pirritano, Counternarcotics Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.)

Note: Totals are shown for fiscal years. Amounts for 2005 and earlier were expended. Data for FY 

2002 and earlier are incomplete since many files were lost in September 2001.
205

Appendix B

US Security Cooperation Training 

Programs in Central Asia

Figures

Figure	 Page

B.1 Trends in Central Asian military students 

trained in the IMET program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

B.2 Trends in Central Asian military 

students trained in Defense Language 

Institute English Language Center 

(DLIELC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

B.3 Trends in Central Asian military and 

civilian students trained in the George C. Marshall 

European Center for Strategic Studies . . . . . . . 211

Tables

Table	 Page

B.1 Central Asian military students trained 

in the IMET program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

B.2 Central Asian military and civilian 

students trained in DLIELC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

B.3 Central Asian military and civilian 

students trained in Marshall Center . . . . . . . . . 210

B.4 Central Asian attendance at US war 

colleges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
APPENDIX B

206

Table	 Page

B.5 Central Asian military and civilian 

students trained in Defense Institute 

for International Legal Studies (DIILS) 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

B.6 Central Asian military and civilian 

students trained in Defense Resource 

Management Institute (DRMI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

B.7 Central Asian military and civilian 

students trained in Center for 

Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

B.8 Central Asian attendance at US service 

academies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

B.9 Central Asian invitations to the Aviation 

Leadership Program (ALP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

B.10 Central Asian military and civilian 

students trained in Defense Institute 

of Security Assistance Management 

(DISAM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
APPENDIX B

207

Table B.1. Central Asian military students trained in the IMET program, 

1993–2007

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 8 – – – –

1994 2 1 – 1 –

1995 32 2 – 3 5

1996 93 15 – 9 77

1997 14 63 – 10 6

1998 16 92 – 11 80

1999 11 13 – 6 14

2000 18 9 – 8 33

2001 12 11 – 5 1

2002 57 16 – 9 75

2003 27 59 100 4 75

2004 46 30 124 5 4

2005 36 26 5 30 –

2006 36 28 5 23 24

2007 43 30 6 23 56

Total 451 395 240 147 450

(Source: Compiled from Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, 1995 through

2007, Department of State, Washington, DC. [See also fig. B.1.])

Note: Totals are shown for fiscal years. Numbers for 2006 are estimated and those for 2007 are projected. A single individual may be counted more than once by attending a sequence of courses, such 

as completing an English language refresher class prior to entering a technical training curriculum.
APPENDIX B

208

Figure B.1. Trends in Central Asian military students trained in the IMET 

program, 1993–2005 (Adapted from table B.1.)

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan

Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Total

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
APPENDIX B

209

Table B.2. Central Asian military and civilian students trained in DLIELC 

resident courses, 1993–2005

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 2 – – – –

1994 – 1 – – –

1995 3 2 – 2 2

1996 8 4 – 4 9

1997 10 1 – – –

1998 11 – – – –

1999 12 4 – 2 5

2000 17 6 – 1 6

2001 13 7 – 6 –

2002 24 14 2 2 2

2003 25 16 3 4 9

2004 54 20 6 4 –

2005 28 29 6 9 –

Total 207 104 17 34 33

(Source: Office of Resident Studies, DLIELC, Lackland AFB, TX. [See also fig. B.2.])

Note: Totals are shown for calendar years when students began English language training.

Figure B.2. Trends in Central Asian military students trained in DLIELC 

resident courses, 1993–2005 (Adapted from table B.2.)
APPENDIX B

210

Table B.3. Central Asian military and civilian students trained in Marshall 

Center resident courses, 1993–2005

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 – – – – –

1994 2 4 2 3 4

1995 5 6 5 2 8

1996 5 8 2 4 8

1997 6 7 2 4 7

1998 10 10 8 4 14

1999 7 12 10 2 14

2000 12 12 13 3 15

2001 12 12 11 2 14

2002 9 16 14 2 11

2003 13 24 18 – 23

2004 20 18 27 7 32

2005 19 20 27 9 15

Total 120 149 139 42 165

(Source: Graduate Support Office, George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies, Garmisch, 

Germany. [See also fig. B.3.])

Note: Totals are shown for calendar years.
APPENDIX B

211

Figure B.3. Trends in Central Asian military and civilian students trained 

in Marshall Center resident courses, 1994–2005. (Adapted from table B.3.)
APPENDIX B

212

Table B.4. Central Asian attendance at US war colleges, 1993–2005

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 – – – – –

1994 – – – – –

1995 – – – – –

1996 – – – – –

1997 CGSC, CNSC – – – ACSC

1998 CNSC, ACSC – – – ACSC

1999 CGSC – – – –

2000 CGSC – – CGSC CGSC

2001 CGSC – – – ACSC

2002 CGSC, ACSC CGSC – CGSC –

2003 CGSC CGSC – CGSC –

2004 CGSC, ACSC, 

ICAF CGSC – – CGSC, ACSC

2005 NWC CGSC – – –

Total 14 4 0 3 6

(Sources: LTC Jim Fain, International Military Student Office, US Army Command and General 

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS; Alice Deery, International Military Student Office, Naval War 

College, Newport, RI; Lt Col Paul Bigelow, International Military Student Office, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL; John Charlton, International Military Student Office, National War College, Washington, DC.)

Note: Courses are for an academic year; year of graduation is indicated. 

College of Naval Staff and Command (CNSC)

Air Command and Staff College (ACSC)

Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)

National War College (NWC)
APPENDIX B

213

Table B.5. Central Asian military and civilian students trained in DIILS 

resident courses or by METs, 1993–2005

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 – – – – –

1994 – – – – –

1995 – – – – –

1996 74* – – – 62**

1997 – 55† – – –

1998 – 56†† – 2 46‡

1999 – – – – –

2000 – – – – –

2001 2 1 – – –

2002 1 – – – –

2003 2 63‡‡ – – –

2004 – – 36§ – –

2005 1 – – – –

Total 80 175 36 2 108

(Source: Walter Monroe, Academic Director, DIILS, Newport, RI.)

*MET “Disciplined Military Operations” in September 1996.

**MET “Military Justice” in September 1996.

†MET “Military Justice” in June 1997.

††MET “Peace Operations” in May 1998 (55 participants).

‡MET “Peace Operations” in June 1998.

‡‡METs “Military Justice” in May 2003 (55 participants) and “Combating Terrorism” in May 2003 

(7 participants).

§METs “Military Justice” in March 2004 (20 participants) and “Developing a Professional Military” 

in April 2004 (16 participants).
APPENDIX B

214

Table B.6. Central Asian military and civilian students trained in DRMI 

resident courses or by METs, 1993–2006

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 – – – – –

1994 – – – – –

1995 – – – – –

1996 – 1 – – 1

1997 1 1 – – 26*

1998 1 2 – – –

1999 1 – – 1 –

2000 – – – – 1

2001 2 – – – 16**

2002 2 2 – – –

2003 1 1 – – –

2004 – – 23*** – –

2005 – 1 – – –

2006 1 2 – – –

Total 9 10 23 1 44

(Source: Walter Monroe, Academic Director, DIILS, Newport, RI.)

 *MET in December 1997.

**MET in August 2001 (15 participants).

***MET in June 2004.
APPENDIX B

215

Table B.7. Central Asian military and civilian students trained in CCMR 

resident courses or by METs, 1993–2005

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 – – – – –

1994 – – – – –

1995 – – – – –

1996 – – – – –

1997 – – – – –

1998 – – – – –

1999 – – – – –

2000 – – – – –

2001 – – – – –

2002 – – – – –

2003 – 4* 7** – 3***

2004 – – 4 – –

2005 – – – – –

Total 0 4 11 0 3

(Source: Christina Matei, International Programs Office, CCMR, Monterrey, CA.)

 *MET “Civil Military Responses to Terrorism”

**MET “Civil Military Responses to Terrorism” (4 participants)

***MET “Civil Military Responses to Terrorism”
APPENDIX B

216

Table B.8. Central Asian attendance at US service academies, 1993–2008

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 – – – – –

1994 – – – – –

1995 – – – – –

1996 – – – – –

1997 – – – – –

1998 – USMA (Enter) – – –

1999 – – – – –

2000 USMA (Enter) – – – –

2001 USMA (Enter) – – – –

2002 – USMA (Graduate) – – –

2003 USMA (Enter) USNA (Enter)

USAFA (Enter) – – –

2004 USMA (Graduate) USMA (Enter)

USMA (Enter) – – –

2005 USMA (Graduate) – – – –

2006 – – – – –

2007 USMA (Graduate) USNA (Graduate)

USAFA (Graduate) – – –

2008 – USMA (Graduate)

USMA (Graduate) – – –

Total 3 5 0 0 0

(Sources: Service Academy Exchange Program Coordinator [SAEPC], USMA [US Military Academy]; 

SAEPC, USNA [US Naval Academy]; and SAEPC, USAFA [US Air Force Academy].)

Note: Courses are for four academic years and both year of entrance and year of graduation are 

indicated. 
APPENDIX B

217

Table B.9. Central Asian invitations to the ALP, 1996–2005

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1996

1997

1998 X

1999 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------

2000 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------

2001 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------

2002 X

2003 X X* X

2004 X X X

2005 X**

Total 2 1 0 1 5

(Source: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs.)

 *Invitation was declined.

**Invitation was declined.

Note: Due to the increased requirement for flight training quotas for US Air Force pilots, ALP was 

in abeyance between 1999 and 2001.
APPENDIX B

218

Table B.10. Central Asian military and civilian students trained in DISAM 

resident courses or by METs, 1993–2006

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan

1993 – – – – –

1994 – – – – –

1995 – 1 – – –

1996 – – – – –

1997 – – – – –

1998 – 1 – – 1

1999 – – – – –

2000 2 1 – 1 –

2001 – – – – –

2002 39* – – – 1

2003 – – 3 – 2

2004 7 – 16** – 2

2005 2 1 – – –

2006 3 – – 1 –

Total 53 4 19 2 6

(Source: Kenneth Martin, International Programs Office, DISAM, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.)

 *Includes 34 trained by a MET.

**Includes 15 trained by a MET.
219

Appendix C

Expanded International Military 

Education and Training Program

The following list represents training and education programs and courses that qualify under the expanded international military education and training program as meeting 

Congressional intent to promote understanding of democracy 

and civilian rule of law, increase appreciation for internationally recognized standards of human rights, improve military 

justice systems, contribute to responsible defense resource 

management, and foster cooperation between military and law 

enforcement personnel in counternarcotics efforts.1 These 

courses range from training classes lasting only a few days to 

graduate programs lasting up to two years. Some of the courses 

may be taught in-country by mobile training teams or mobile 

education teams. This listing should be viewed as representative rather than comprehensive.

Military Professional Development

National Defense University Advanced Management Program

National War College International Fellows Program

Industrial College of the Armed Forces International Fellows 

Program

NATO Staff Officer Orientation Course

International Senior Officer Staff Course

Inter-American Defense College Hemispheric Defense and Security Course

Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA) Company Grade 

Professional Development Course

IAAFA Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development 

Course

Civil-Military Relations

Establishing Democratic Civil-Military Relations and the Rule 

of Law Course
APPENDIX C

220

Civil-Military Relations Course

Democratic Sustainment Course

Equal Opportunity Staff Advisors Course

Human Rights Instructor Course

Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute Course

Civil-Military Operations Course

Civil-Military Responses to Terrorism

Intelligence and Democracy Course

Civil-Military Strategy for Internal Development Course––Latin 

America

Civil-Military Strategy for Internal Development Course––Africa

Civil-Military Strategy for Internal Development Course––Central 

and Eastern Europe

Civil-Military Strategy for Internal Development Course––Middle 

East

Civil-Military Strategy for Internal Development Course––Asia/

Pacific

Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in a Democracy Course

Civil-Military Cooperation: Support of Multinational and Interagency Relief in Reconstruction Operations

Civil Affairs/Civil-Military Cooperation Support of Information 

Operations

Master of Arts Program in International Security and CivilMilitary Relations

Defense Reform

Defense Restructuring Course

International Defense Transformation Course

International Defense Management Course

Executive Program in Defense Decision Making

National Security Affairs

Master of Arts Program in International Security Studies: Defense Decision Making & Planning

Master of Arts Program in International Security Studies: Security Building in Post-Conflict Environments

Master of Arts Program in National Security Affairs––Middle 

East, Africa, South Asia
APPENDIX C

221

Master of Arts Program in National Security Affairs––Far East, 

Southeast Asia, Pacific

Master of Arts Program in National Security Affairs––Europe 

and Former Soviet Union 

Master of Arts Program in National Security Affairs––Western 

Hemisphere

Peacekeeping

Planning Peace Operations Course

Peacekeeping for Decision Makers Course

Preparing for Peacekeeping Deployments: Negotiating Effective 

Support Agreements with International Organizations

Preparing for Peacekeeping Deployments: Reviewing Interministerial Peacekeeping Roles and Missions

Preparing for Peacekeeping Deployments: Reviewing Ministry 

of Defense and Defense Headquarters Peacekeeping Roles 

and Missions

Preparing for Peacekeeping Deployments: Adopting Task Lists 

and Standard Operating Procedures

Military Law

International Operational Law Course

Marine Corps Law of War Course 

Judge Advocate General (JAG) Officer Basic Course

JAG Officer Graduate Course

JAG Officer Military Judge Course

JAG Operational Law Seminar

JAG Contract Attorney’s Course

JAG Law of War Workshop

IAAFA Rule of Law and Disciplined Military Operations Course

Conducting Military and Peacekeeping Operations in Accord 

with the Rule of Law Course

Military Law Development Program

International Law of Military Operations

Legal Aspects of Counter Terrorism
APPENDIX C

222

Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE)

International Maritime Officer Course

MLE Boarding Officer Course 

Advanced MLE Boarding Officer Course

Counternarcotics MLE Boarding Officer Course

Advanced Counternarcotics MLE Boarding Officer Course

Counternarcotics MLE Instructor Course 

Fisheries MLE Boarding Officer

MLE Boarding Team Member Course

MLE On-the-Job Training Course

Maritime Operations Planning and Management 

Maritime Commerce Control and Infrastructure Development 

Course

Model Maritime Service Code Course

Medical and Disaster Response

Medical Strategic Leadership Program

Executive Health Care Resource Management Course

Health Resource Management Course

Health Systems Development Course

Nursing Administration Course

Disaster Planners Course

Preparation, Response, and Consequence Management in Disasters: Mental Health Aspects Course

Leadership Course in Regional Disaster Response and Trauma 

System 

Leadership Program in Disaster Public Health and Public 

Health System 

Leadership Course in HIV/AIDS [Human Immuno-deficiency 

virus/Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome] Program Development Course

HIV/AIDS Planning/Policy Development Course

Defense Resource Management

Defense Resources Management Course 

International Defense Management Course 

Senior International Defense Management Course 
APPENDIX C

223

Multiobjective Decision Making Course

Departmental Resource Management and Logistics Course

Multinational Logistics Course

Security Assistance Management Resource Planning & Management Course

Principles of Defense Acquisition Management Course

International Defense Acquisition Negotiations Course

International Shipyard Management Course

Principles of Defense Procurement and Contracting Course

Principles of Government Contract Law Course

Budget Preparation, Execution, and Accountability Course

Financial Integrity, Accountability, and Transparency Course 

Streamlining Government through Outsourcing, Privatization 

and Public-Private Partnership Course

Base Realignment, Closure and Economic Redevelopment Course

Graduate Program in Logistics Management

Master of Arts Program in Systems Management 

Master of Science Program in Cost Analysis 

Master of Science Program in Manpower Systems Analysis

Master of Science Program in Financial Management

Master of Science Program in Information Systems Technology

Master of Science Program in Resource Planning and Management for International Defense 

Master of Science Program in Acquisition and Contract Management

Master of Science Program in Systems Acquisition Management

Note

1. This list was derived from The Expanded IMET Handbook, 1-68. It is a 

listing of courses that qualify as expanded-IMET if the student is a civilian. 

Duplicate listings and entries representing precourse surveys have been 

eliminated. Department of Defense Manual 5105.38-M, Security Assistance 

Management, 346.

225

Appendix D

Allied Security Cooperation 

Efforts in Central Asia

Turkey was the first NATO nation to seriously engage in military cooperation in Central Asia, an effort strongly encouraged 

by the United States. In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet 

Union, Turkish leaders in Ankara, particularly Pres. Turgut 

Ozal, emphasized the historic cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and 

religious links to build ties with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. (Tajikistan, with its ethnic Persian, 

Farsi-speaking population, was largely ignored.) Turkish military officials immediately offered to assist in establishing the 

necessary military establishments and train officers for these 

new armed forces, and enrollments at Turkish military academies began as early as 1992. Most of the Central Asian states 

were ambivalent about extensive military ties with Turkey, and 

Ankara soon found it lacked the resources to make its proposals 

appear more attractive. Turkmenistan was largely the exception and the first to take advantage of this offer, sending 30 

military cadets for training in 1992. By April 1993 over 300 

Turkmen cadets and junior officers had been trained in Turkey. 

By 1998 over 1,000 Turkmen military personnel had been 

trained and in that year alone 100 to 120 officers from the 

Ministry of Defense (MOD) and another 60 from the State Border Services were in Turkey. Turkmenistan continued to receive the majority of Turkey’s attention. As of January 2006 

Turkey had trained 1,299 personnel from Turkmenistan, 426 

from Uzbekistan, 401 from Kyrgyzstan, 383 from Kazakhstan, 

and three from Tajikistan.1

Turkey’s influence eventually began to be felt in the rest of 

Central Asia as well. Turkey and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on military technical cooperation and military training in 

1996. Ankara began providing military equipment in 1998 and 

established a language center in Almaty in 1999 large enough 

for 27 students to study simultaneously. In 2001 Turkey offered communications equipment, computers, and map-printing 

equipment in April, followed in August with a ten-year, $10 
APPENDIX D

226

million aid program that would eventually include two patrol 

boats, additional communications gear, and vehicles for Kazakhstan’s special forces. Along with this program was the establishment of a Turkish general staff technical representation 

office in Almaty, supplementing the defense attaché office 

which had been established earlier. Turkish forces also began 

training Kazakh special forces in Turkey and in Kazakhstan. 

By 2005 over $6.500 million in aid had been provided since 

1998, including 24 Land Rover vehicles (including four that 

could be used as ambulances), 92 portable radios, and another 

$900 thousand was promised for 2006.2

Following the IMU incursions in the summer of 1999, Turkey 

began to ramp up its military aid to Kyrgyzstan. In December 

1999, Turkey extended $210 thousand in military aid to Bishkek, including communications gear and logistical material 

sufficient to outfit 3,000 soldiers. Two weeks after this initial 

offer came another for $700 thousand worth of communications equipment and in June 2000 another $1 million for communications gear and uniforms was presented. In 2000 Turkish special forces began training with the Kyrgyz special forces 

in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and mountain warfare operations, conducting three to four exercises each year. 

Another $1 million in aid was delivered in 2001, including $300 

thousand worth of uniforms, night vision goggles, and infrared 

sights for sniper rifles in October, and $750 thousand in 2004, 

including clothing, mobile kitchens and baths, computers, and 

other equipment. Turkey’s aid to Kyrgyzstan in 2005 was over 

$1 million and included twelve all-terrain vehicles, including 

three ambulances.3

Although Uzbek military personnel had been training in Turkey 

since the early 1990s, the security relationship between the 

two countries also expanded in 2000 when Turkey and Uzbekistan signed a military-cooperation agreement and began special 

forces training exercises and military contact events. Over $1.5 

million worth of military clothing was sent from Turkey to Uzbekistan in 2001, and another $1.500 million in military aid was 

provided in 2002. In December 2004, Ankara provided $648 

thousand worth of military equipment, including 16 Land Rover 

all-terrain vehicles. Uzbekistan has been somewhat dissatisfied 
APPENDIX D

227

with Turkey’s assistance, however, preferring higher-quality 

US or Russian equipment.4

Like Turkey, Germany was among the first of the European 

nations to establish bilateral military relationships in Central 

Asia, but its efforts were much more modest. Throughout the 

early 1990s, Berlin played an active role in the region, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, because of the large ethnic 

German population in those countries.5 In this period, the bulk 

of Germany’s efforts were conducted with Kazakhstan, and it 

wasn’t until after September 2001 that Uzbekistan figured 

more prominently in Berlin’s programs. In all cases, however, 

Germany’s security-cooperation efforts in Central Asia were a 

function of opportunity rather than a deliberate program designed to serve long-term operational interests.6 In the beginning, Germany leveraged its large stock of former East German 

military equipment and Soviet-trained officers to build relationships, including providing a large quantity of trucks to Kazakhstan in the early 1990s. Germany provided a patrol boat to 

Kazakhstan in 1995–1996, and at some points in the late 1990s 

had a more extensive security-cooperation relationship with 

Kazakhstan than did the United States. In 1996 the German 

defense ministry sent over $26 million worth of surplus military supplies to Uzbekistan, and in May 2001 it donated approximately $120 thousand worth of medical equipment, uniforms, and night vision devices to Kyrgyzstan in response to 

the Islamic extremist incursions of the previous two years. In 

1997 the Bundeswehr began a long-term training program for 

Uzbek armor, artillery, signals, and air defense officers, and by 

February 2002, some 50 Uzbek officers had trained at the 

Bundeswehr Academy. By 2003 the two countries discussed 

expanding the training programs to include mountain warfare 

and pilot training. These efforts undoubtedly played a role in 

Tashkent’s decision to allow the Luftwaffe to use a base at Termez in the southern part of the country to support the German 

contingent in Afghanistan. In 2004 Germany also expanded its 

relationship with Kazakhstan hosting 17 Kazakh military students at its military university, academy, and officer schools.7

The United Kingdom initiated its formal programs in Central 

Asia with the exchange of defense attachés with Kazakhstan in 

the summer of 2001, and subsequently has developed a fairly 
APPENDIX D

228

extensive program of security cooperation in that country. The 

Kazakhstani minister of defense paid his first official visit to 

the United Kingdom in January 2003, and two months later 

the two nations held their first bilateral cooperation working 

group in Almaty. Since then, the working group has met twice 

a year to focus on the five key areas of cooperation: noncommissioned officer training; cooperation with the airmobile 

forces; and training of peace support operations instructors, 

military police, and naval forces. The United Kingdom is providing Royal Navy specialist assistance at the new Kazakhstani 

naval academy in Aktau, and has also provided a variety of 

training courses in the United Kingdom, British training facilities in the Czech Republic and in Kazakhstan, and a 10-day 

seminar, Defense Administration in a Democratic Society, offered by the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom in Almaty in 

September 2004. The British defense attaché also sponsors a 

military English language program that consists of seminars 

and computer training facilities in various locations throughout the country including the Ministry of Defense.8

The hallmark of the military cooperation effort between the 

United Kingdom and Kazakhstan is the annual Steppe Eagle 

exercise, first conducted in July 2003. The first evolution of 

this exercise included 500 Kazakhstani airborne troops, elements of the KAZBAT, Scots Guards from the United Kingdom, 

and US Special Forces (which were in Kazakhstan to participate in the Zhardem exercise). The scenario was based on an 

insurgency incursion into southern Kazakhstan. Steppe Eagle 

2004 was held in August in Kapchagai with 164 members of 

the 3d Motorized Infantry Battalion of the Princess of Wales 

Regiment, KAZBAT, and Kazakhstani airborne and air defense 

units (including Su-27 fighters, Mi-8 helicopters, and An-12 

cargo aircraft), in a scenario based on antiterrorism and peacekeeping operations. United States participation was limited 

due to ongoing operations in Iraq. Steppe Eagle 2005 was held 

in September, again at Kapchagai, with a similar scenario to 

the first two iterations of the exercise. Members of the Arizona 

National Guard participated for the United States. 

The United Kingdom also has a defense attaché in Uzbekistan 

whose responsibilities include coordinating and implementing 

the annual program of cooperative defense activities. This pro-
APPENDIX D

229

gram, which was initiated in November 2001 during a visit of 

British defense secretary Geoffrey Hoon to Tashkent, included 

a proposal to train Uzbek officers in British military colleges such 

as the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Sr Lt Polatjon 

Sotvoldiyev, the first Uzbek officer to attend, won the coveted 

Overseas Award as the best foreign student during the elevenmonth program in August 2004. Uzbek minister of defence Kodir Gulamov paid an official visit to the United Kingdom in late 

October 2003, and Gen Sir Michael Jackson, chief of the General Staff, British Ministry of Defence, made a reciprocal visit to 

Tashkent in May 2004. Following the events at Andijon, the 

British program in Uzbekistan was dramatically reduced and 

now consists primarily of an English language program. The 

United Kingdom MOD also sponsors a military-focused English 

language program in Tajikistan.9

France had established some very tentative military relationships in Central Asia in the 1990s, but its efforts surged in 

early 2002 with the introduction of French combat forces into 

the region for operations in Afghanistan. Paris focused its security-cooperation efforts on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the two 

countries that agreed to host French forces. Defense Minister 

Alain Richard, meeting with Tajik president Emomali Rahmonov 

in Dushanbe on 2 January 2002, stated his desire to set up 

long-term military cooperation between the two countries.10

Within six months, the two countries were conducting a joint 

airborne and mountain warfare exercise near the capital. In 

September Tajik officers were invited to observe mountain infantry exercises in France. These bilateral exercises, usually 

focusing on mountain warfare, have continued at least twice a 

year since. Tajik officers are also attending French language 

courses, attending French military schools, and receiving instruction from visiting French military instructors.11 French 

bilateral security cooperation with Kyrgyzstan progressed along 

similar lines, with agreements starting in 2002 that grew to 

include the training of Kyrgyz service members in France, including at staff colleges, and the provision of mountain warfare, medical, and French language training in Kyrgyzstan. 

France has also donated excess military equipment, including 

navigation aids and vehicles, after its deployments to Manas.12
APPENDIX D

230

In addition, other NATO nations are starting to initiate military relationships in Central Asia, albeit at a much smaller 

scale. Greece, Poland, Belgium, and Lithuania have all established cooperation programs with Uzbekistan of varying types. 

Most include personnel visits and information exchanges, occasionally through the NATO Partnership for Peace program. 

The Greek agreement, which was signed in 1998, also includes 

the offer of training Uzbek officers at Greek military academies.13 It is unclear how active any of these programs remain 

after the strong European reaction to the events in Andijon in 

May 2005, but it is likely they are continuing, possibly on a 

smaller scale. 

European nations are not the only possible US partners for 

security cooperation in Central Asia. Asian nations, as well, are 

seeking to establish security ties to the region. India has been 

the most active, developing military links with all of the Central 

Asian states except Turkmenistan. The primary drivers are energy and security. As India must import over 70 percent of its 

energy requirements, it constantly seeks new suppliers to support its rapidly expanding population and growing economy. 

The strategic concerns over Pakistan and China also play a 

major role—India views improved ties with Central Asia as a 

means to outflank its two major rivals. In this regard, Delhi 

often works cooperatively with Moscow to build security ties to 

Central Asia, ensuring it will not face resistance from Russia.14

India began building military ties in 1997 with a defense cooperation agreement with Kyrgyzstan, but little was done over the 

next few years except for occasional military contacts and a few 

training opportunities. In 2003, however, India offered to send 

instructors to Kyrgyzstan to train special operations units, and 

indicated a desire to purchase weapons produced in Kyrgyzstan, although the specifics were not made public. Delhi soon 

began providing mountain training, English language instruction, and quotas for its military academies, the costs of which are 

covered by India.15 Delhi’s ties with Tajikistan were boosted by 

a visit of Tajik defense minister Col Gen Sherali Khayrulloyev 

in December 2001, in which the two sides agreed that India 

would help reconstruct Ayni Air Base, just outside of Dushanbe. 

A February 2002 reciprocal visit by Indian air force commander 

Vice Marshal S. K. Jain brought offers for new navigation and 
APPENDIX D

231

landing aids for the facility and plans to train Tajik pilots in 

Indian trainer aircraft there. The program has since grown to 

include Russian assistance.16 India is also upgrading Tajikistan’s 

Soviet and Russian military equipment, providing English language instruction, and training Tajik troops. India’s ties with 

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are less extensive, involving a few 

exercises and training opportunities, but they also include weapons purchases—Il-76 tanker-transport aircraft from Uzbekistan 

and torpedoes from Kazakhstan.17

A few other Asian nations have made tentative steps toward 

security-cooperation relationships with the Central Asian states. 

Pakistan had provided flight training to the Turkmen air force 

in the late 1990s, but Ashgabat was dissatisfied with the quality 

of training and cancelled the program. The Turkmenistani State 

Border Service, however, continued to send officers to Pakistan 

for training. More recently, Islamabad, concerned about being 

strategically outflanked by India, began discussions with Tajikistan to explore options for military and technical cooperation in 

August 2005.18 South Korea, which had deployed medical troops 

to support the coalition operations out of Manas and Japan, 

one of the largest aid donors in Kyrgyzstan, also started small 

military-cooperation programs with Kyrgyzstan in late 2005.19

Notes

1. Gareth M. Winrow, “Turkey and Central Asia,” in Roy Allison and Lena 

Jonson, eds., Central Asian Security: The New International Context (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 199, 207–8; Bess A. Brown, 

“National Security and Military Issues in Central Asia,” in Bruce Parrott, ed., 

State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, 

The International Politics of Eurasia, vol. 5 (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 

1995), 236, 247; Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, 53, 73–74 (see chap. 

4, note 10); Bhatty and Bronson, “NATO’s Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and 

Central Asia,” 135 (see chap. 3, note 25); Trip Report, McCarthy, (see chap. 

3, note 15); and “Turkish Armed Forces Military Training Support to Friendly, 

Allied Armies Detailed,” Anatolia, 2 January 2006.

2. “Turkish Armed Forces Opens Language Center in Almaty,” Ankara 

Anatolia, 17 September 1999; “Kazakhstan: Turkey to Give Aid for Military 

Defense,” Moscow Interfax, 24 December 1999; “Turkish Armed Forces Donates 2 Trucks of Equipment, Devices to Kazakh Army,” Ankara Anatolia, 24 

April 2001; “Kazakhstan Receives $10 Million Military Assistance from Turkey,” Moscow Interfax, 3 August 2001; “Kazakhstan, Turkey Agree on Need to 

Revise Defense Cooperation Agreements,” Moscow Interfax, 21 September 
APPENDIX D

232

2001; “Turkey: TSK Grants Military Equipment worth $1.3 Million to Kazakh 

Army,” Anatolia, 10 June 2005; “Turkey Donates Military Equipment to Kazakhstan,” Almaty Interfax-Kazakhstan, 10 June 2005; and “Kazakhstan’s 

Defense Minister, Turkish Chief of Staff Discuss Cooperation Prospects,” 

Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 16 June 2005.

3. Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, eds., Faultlines of Conflict in Central 

Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army (Santa Monica, 

California: RAND, 2003), 202; “Turkey to Extend Military Aid to Kyrgyzstan,” 

Ankara Anatolia, 12 December 1999; “Turkey to Provide Military-Technical 

Aid to Kyrgyzstan,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 13 December 1999; “Turkey to Give 

Kyrgyzstan $1 Million to Aid Armed Forces,” Moscow Interfax, 15 June 2000; 

“Turkish Instructors Supervising Kyrgyzstani Servicemen’s Mountain Training,” Bishkek Kabar News Agency, 18 June 2003; “Turkey to Provide Material 

assistance to Kyrgyzstani military,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 21 May 2003; “Turkey to Extend Military, Technical Aid to Kyrgyzstan,” Ankara Anatolia, 9 November 2004; “FYI-Turkey to Give $1 Million to Kyrgyzstan for Military Reforms,” AKIpress Internet Version, 18 October 2005; and “Delivery of Turkish 

Military Equipment Donations to Kyrgyzstan Reported,” Anatolia, 28 November 2005.

4. Robert McDermott, “The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan 

1992–2002: Threats, Influences, and Reform,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 16, no. 2 (June 2003), 42–43; Oliker and Szayna, Faultlines of Conflict, 

202 (see app. D, note 3); Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, 191 (see chap. 

4, note 10); “Turkish Military Delegation Goes to Tashkent Under Cooperation Accord,” Ankara Anatolia, 20 November 2001; “Uzbek President Supports Greater Military Cooperation with Turkey,” Tashkent Uzbek Radio, 19 

December 2003; and “Turkey Extends Military Aid of $648,000 to Uzbekistan,” Ankara Anatolia, 21 December 2004.

5. Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, 80 (see chap. 4, note 10).

6. German Military Policy Directorate correspondence (see chap. 8, note 7).

7. McDermott, “The Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan.” 43 (see 

app. D, note 4); Oliker and Szayna, Faultlines of Conflict, 207 (see app. D, 

note 3); Kenzhetaev, “Kazakhstan’s Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States” (see chap. 4, note 41); “Uzbekistan: Troops Begin Long-term 

Military Training Program in Germany,” Moscow Interfax, 11 April 1997; 

Bhatty and Bronson, “NATO’s Mixed Signals.” 136 (see chap. 3, note 25); and 

“Germany to Help Uzbekistan Train Army Officers,” Moscow Interfax, 10 August 2003.

8. Roger McDermott, “Kazakhstan’s Western Military Cooperation Sparks 

Tensions with Russia,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 

50, 13 July 2004; British Embassy, Kazakstan, http://www.britishembassy.

gov.uk (accessed 2 March 2006); and “Kazakhstan: UK Defense Experts to 

Train Central Asian Military Officers, Experts,” Almaty Interfax-Kazakhstan, 

3 September 2004.

9. “Uzbekistan: UK Defense Secretary Pledges Expansion of Military Ties,” 

Moscow Interfax, 14 November 2001; “Uzbekistani Serviceman Gets Top Military Award in UK’s Royal Academy,” Tashkent Khalq Sozi, 13 August 2004; 
APPENDIX D

233

British Embassy, Uzbekistan, http://www.britishembassy.gov.uk (accessed 

2 March 2006); and British Council, Uzbekistan, http://www.britishcouncil 

.org, (accessed 2 March 2006).

10. “French Defense Minister says wants military cooperation with Tajiks,” 

Paris Agence France-Presse (AFP), 2 January 2002.

11. “Tajikistani, French Troops Begin Joint Exercise Near Dushanbe,” 

Moscow ITAR-TASS, 26 July 2002; “France to Help Train Tajikistani Servicemen,” Moscow Interfax, 29 July 2002; “France to Hold Joint Military Exercises with Tajikistan—Defense Minister,” Paris AFP, 14 December 2003; and 

“Tajikistan: President, French Defense Minister Discuss Military Cooperation,” Avesta, 19 December 2005.

12. “Kyrgyzstan: President, French Defense Minister Discuss Military Aid, 

Cooperation,” Moscow Interfax, 3 June 2002; “France Transfers $200,000 of 

Military Equipment to Kyrgyzstan,” Moscow Interfax, 15 October 2002; “Kyrgyzstan, France Sign Agreement on Military Cooperation,” Bishkek Kabar 

News Agency, 4 October 2004; and “Kyrgyzstan, France to Expand Military 

Cooperation,” AKIpress, 5 December 2005.

13. “Greece: Greek-Uzbek Military Cooperation Agreement Signed,” Athens 

News Agency, 19 November 1998; “Lithuania, Uzbekistan Lay Groundwork 

for Military Cooperation,” Tallinn BNS, 24 September 2002; “Uzbekistan, Poland to Develop Military Cooperation,” Moscow Interfax, 21 October 2002; 

and “Belgian Top Military Official Visits Uzbekistan to Boost Cooperation,” 

Tashkent Uzbek Television First Channel, 25 November 2004.

14. “AFP: India, Uzbekistan Agree; to Increase Defense Ties with Exercises,” AFP, 5 April 2005; and “Russia, India Agree on Military Cooperation in 

Central Asia,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 4 December 2004.

15. “India, Kyrgyzstan to Develop Military Contacts,” Moscow ITAR-TASS

World Service, 23 February 1999; “India, Kyrgyzstan to Develop MilitaryTechnical Cooperation,” Moscow Interfax, 31 January 2003; “Indian Military 

Delegation in Kyrgyzstan to Discuss Bilateral Cooperation,” Bishkek Kabar 

News Agency, 13 March 2004; and “Kyrgyzstani Defense Minister, Indian 

Envoy Discuss Boosting Military Ties,” Kabar News Agency Internet Version, 

19 November 2005; “Kyrgyzstani, Indian Defense Ministries Considering 

Joint Drills,” Kabar News Agency, 2 December 2005.

16. “Tajikistani Defense Minister to visit India,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 18 

December 2001; “India, not France, to Help Refurbish Strategic Tajik Airfield,” Moscow Interfax, 2 February 2002; “India Extends Strategic Reach 

with ‘First’ Overseas Military Base in Tajikistan,” Bangalore Deccan Herald, 

19 October 2004; and “Defense Minister Ivanov Says Russia, India May Share 

Airbase in Tajikistan,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 5 December 2005.

17. “India Defense Minister Comments on value of working visit to Uzbekistan,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 1 March 2003; “AFP: India, Uzbekistan Agree,” 

(see app. D, note 14); “Kazakhstan Offers Improved Torpedoes to Indian 

Navy,” New Delhi: The Asian Age, 24 February 2002; and “Kazakhstani, Indian Leaders Sign Agreement on Military Cooperation,” Moscow Interfax, 3 

June 2002.
APPENDIX D

234

18. Trip Report, McCarthy (see chap. 3, note 15); and “Tajikistani Minister, 

Pakistani Envoy Discuss Afghan Situation, Military Ties,” ASIA-PLUS, 17 August 2005.

19. “Kyrgyzstani Defense Minister, Japanese Envoy Discuss Military Cooperation,” AKIpress, 2 September 2005; and “Kyrgyzstani Defense Minister, 

South Korean Envoy Mull Cooperation,” AKIpress, 28 October 2005.
235

Abbreviations

6 SOS 6th Special Operations Squadron

ACSC Air Command and Staff College

AECA Arms Export Control Act of 1976

AETC Air Education and Training Command

AFMC Air Force Materiael Command

AFSAC Air Force Security Assistance Center

ALP Aviation Leadership Program

BWG bilateral working groups

BWPP biological weapons proliferation prevention

CADRE College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research 

and Education

CASI Central Asia Border Security Initiative

CCMR Center for Civil-Military Relations

CENTRASBAT Central Asian peacekeeping battalion

CFE conventional forces in Europe

CGSC Command and General Staff College

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CN counternarcotics

CNSC College of Naval Staff and Command

CSF Coalition Solidarity Funds

CSTO Commonwealth Security Treaty Organization

CTR cooperative threat reduction

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DIILS Defense Institute for International Legal 

Studies

DISAM Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management

DLIELC Defense Language Institute English Language Center

DMC defense and military contacts

DOD Department of Defense

DRMI Defense Resource Management Institute
ABBREVIATIONS

236

DRMS Defense Resource Management Studies

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

DTSA Defense Technology Security Administration

DOD-DOS Department of Defense–Department of State

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DODIP DOD Informational Program

EDA Excess Defense Articles

E-IMET Expanded IMET

EXBS export control and related border security

FAA Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

FAO Foreign Area Officers

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FMCS foreign military construction sales

FMF foreign military financing

FMS foreign military sales

FSU Former Soviet Union

GTEP Georgia Train and Equip Program

HEU highly enriched uranium

HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

IAAFA Inter-American Air Force Academy

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICAF Industrial College of the Armed Forces

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

ICP International Counterproliferation Program

IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies

IMET international military education and training

IMSO International Student Management Office

IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

INF Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

IPAP Individual Partnership Action Plan

IPP Individual Partnership Program
ABBREVIATIONS

237

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais 

sance

ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulation

IWER International Workshop on Earthquake 

Response

IWER International Workshop on Emergency 

Response

JAG Judge Advocate General

JCET Joint Combined Exchange Training

JCTP Joint Contact Team Program

KAZBAT Kazakhstan battalion

LOA letter of offer and acceptance

MET mobile education teams

MLE Maritime Law Enforcement

MOD Ministry of Defense

MTT mobile training teams

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NIS newly independent states

NPS Naval Postgraduate School

NWC National War College

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation 

in Europe

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSIA On-Site Inspection Agency

PASS Program in Advanced Security Studies

PfP Partnership for Peace

PME professional military education

RCC Regional Coordination Center

RDCTF Regional Defense Counterterrorism 

Fellowship

RHIBS rigid-hull inflatable boats
ABBREVIATIONS

238

SAEPC Service Academy Exchange Program 

Coordinator

SAO Security Assistance Officer

SATFA Security Assistance Training Field Activity

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SDE senior developmental education

SFG special forces group

SSD safe and secure dismantlement

SOFEX special operations forces exercise

SPP State Partnership Program

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

TCA Traditional CINC Activities

UCP Unified Command Plan

US United States

USACOM US Atlantic Command

USAFA US Air Force Academy

USARCENT US Army Central Command

USCENTAF US Central Command Air Forces

USCENTCOM US Central Command

USCS US Customs Service

USEUCOM US European Command

USG US government

USJFCOM US Joint Forces Command

USMA US Military Academy

USMARFORCENT US Marine Component Central Command

USNA US Naval Academy

USNAVCENT US Naval Forces Central Command

USPACOM US Pacific Command

USSOCCENT US Special Operations Command Central

USSOCPAC US Special Operations Command Pacific

WIF Warsaw Initiative Fund

WMD weapons of mass destruction

WMD-PPI Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation 

Prevention Initiative
239

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The Limits of Friendship

US Security Cooperation in Central Asia

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