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38–977 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–96]

MEASURING AND INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

OCTOBER 18, 2007

(II)

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas, Chairman

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

JEFF MILLER, Florida

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

GREG MARCHAND, Professional Staff Member

THOMAS HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member

ROGER ZAKHEIM, Professional Staff Member

SASHA ROGERS, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, October 18, 2007, Measuring and Increasing the Effectiveness of

Provincial Reconstruction Teams ........................................................................ 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, October 18, 2007 .................................................................................... 29

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 2007

MEASURING AND INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROVINCIAL

RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ............................................................. 2

Snyder, Hon. Vic, a Representative from Arkansas, Chairman, Oversight

and Investigations Subcommittee ....................................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Bowen, Stuart W., Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction ........ 3

Perito, Robert M., Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace

and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace ............................................. 5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Akin, Hon. W. Todd .......................................................................................... 34

Bowen, Stuart W., Jr. ....................................................................................... 37

Perito, Robert M. .............................................................................................. 48

Snyder, Hon. Vic ............................................................................................... 33

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Dr. Snyder ......................................................................................................... 57

(1)

MEASURING AND INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, October 18, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vic Snyder (chairman

of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VIC SNYDER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS, CHAIRMAN, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Dr. SNYDER. The hearing will come to order.

Good morning. I appreciate you both being here. Welcome to the

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations’ hearing on measuring and improving the effectiveness of provincial reconstruction

teams, that we know as PRTs.

Over the past one and a half months, the subcommittee has held

a number of hearings and briefings to examine PRTs in Iraq and

Afghanistan, as part of an interagency case study. These sessions

have included military and civilian personnel who have worked on

PRTs, government officials with PRT oversight responsibilities, and

outside experts who specialize in civil-military affairs and reconstruction-related activities. We are so impressed with these really

magnificent and thoughtful and brave people who serve on these

PRTs.

One question that we have not heard sufficiently addressed to

this point is whether PRTs, as currently constituted, are effectively

accomplishing the missions they have been given. Some of you may

recall at a hearing a couple of weeks ago, Mrs. Susan Davis from

California put this question directly to our Department of Defense

witnesses: How are we measuring the effectiveness of PRTs?

Their answer was that there are no standardized metrics for determining whether PRTs are effective, because it is too difficult to

establish such standards in a way that also accounts for the different regional conditions faced by each team.

I am pleased that we have the opportunity at today’s hearing to

consider the newly-released third report of the special inspector

general for Iraq reconstruction on PRTs. SIGIR has played a leading role in examining the development of PRTs in Iraq, and today’s

report is an important step along the way to measure the effectiveness of PRTs.

Our witnesses today are Mr. Stuart Bowen, the special inspector

general for Iraq reconstruction; and Mr. Robert Perito, a senior proVerDate 22-MAR-2001 10:02 Sep 05, 2008 Jkt 038977 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-96\291160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
2

gram officer with the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability

Operations at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Thank you both for being here.

Mr. Akin, I will recognize you for any comments you want to

make.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Snyder can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to the committee here. We have had some very interesting hearings on PRTs. This is the third public hearing, and the

focus is on measuring the effectiveness of PRTs. While the subcommittee has studied the concept of how an interagency team

comprised of civilian and military personnel works to extend the

reach of the government in regional provinces and local areas, we

have not investigated how the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan are

performing.

Measuring the PRTs, it would seem to me, is an art and not really a science. As our witnesses’ testimony reveals, each PRT faces

a unique set of challenges that make it difficult to judge one

against the other. As a result, success in Ninewa province in the

northern region of Iraq may look entirely different from an effective

PRT in Baghdad or Anbar province.

The ethnic composition of a province, the relative permissiveness

of the area, and the education and skills of the population are just

a few variables that will shape the conditions and challenges a

PRT will face and determine its potential for success. Thus, what

may be a great success in one province may look like marginal

progress when compared to another province. Nevertheless, as the

Congress continues to fund PRTs, it is our responsibility to assess

the effectiveness of the project.

I would thank both of our witnesses. You have done an admirable job in completing this task.

So finally, the subject of stabilization operations generally is critical to transitioning a local area from a combat zone to business

and development zone or a quiet residential neighborhood. In my

view, sufficient troop strength, combined with increasing the numbers of PRTs, is a formula we should continue to use to stabilize

both Iraq and Afghanistan. The exact moment when the PRTs’

work is done, however, is unclear, as these countries will be in a

perpetual state of improving governments and increasing economic

development. I would like our witnesses to comment on how they

would determine when a PRT’s work is done.

Thank you very much for joining us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for another interesting hearing topic.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 34.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Akin.

Your written statements are made a part of the record, as is your

complete report, Mr. Bowen, from the very beginning introductory

page to every attachment, will be made a part of the written

3

record. When you are done with any oral comments you want to

make, we will ask questions. We will put ourselves on a fiveminute clock, and we will go in order of people here at the sound

of the gavel, in the order in which they come in.

We will put the timer on you so when the red light goes off, it

will be at the end of five minutes, but we want you to, if you have

other things to tell us beyond the red light territory, you go ahead

and do that. That is primarily just to give you an idea of where

you are at.

So we will begin with you, Mr. Bowen.

STATEMENT OF STUART W. BOWEN, JR., SPECIAL INSPECTOR

GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you.

Good morning, Chairman Snyder, Ranking Member Akin and

members of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to present the

findings of our latest report on PRTs, a review of the effectiveness

of the provincial reconstruction team program in Iraq.

I am pleased to be joined this morning by the lead auditor, Pat

Dickriede, who traveled all over Iraq and visited over 20 of the

PRTs and really did an outstanding job of putting together one of

our very best audits, and a very important audit because, as this

committee rightly has recognized, the PRT program is an essential

element to success in Iraq.

As SIGIR as described it in our quarterly reports, the PRT program is the most important nationwide—that is country-wide—capacity building program the United States is supporting right now.

Its focus is on building government capacity among the provincial

councils and promoting recovery, economic and otherwise, within

each of the 18 provinces.

About $2 billion has been appropriated already by the Congress

to support this program. Another $1 billion, roughly, is in the mix,

and 600 persons have been identified and deployed on the ground

or enroute to Iraq to work in this program. So this is a good moment to have a detailed review like this of what has happened and

what has been achieved thus far.

The PRT program is a civil-military integrated program run by

the Department of State and the Department of Defense. It is a

joint effort, an integrated effort to assist Iraq’s provincial and local

governments to develop democracy. That is the core issue economically, politically and otherwise. It employs integrated multidisciplinary teams composed to U.S. and Coalition civilian and military

personnel to teach, coach and mentor provincial and local government officials in their core competencies.

It has evolved since it started in November of 2005, when the

first three PRTs were stood up in Mosul, Kirkuk and Hillah. As of

this past August, the program comprises 10 PRTs from the original

program, 7 provincial support teams which help provide additional

capacity building in those provinces that don’t have a permanent

standing PRT, and 15 of the recently deployed embedded PRTs, or

ePRTs, part of the surge program. Those ePRTs are focused primarily in Baghdad and in Anbar province.

4

This report is our third one, and it provides a detailed review of

what has been accomplished in each region and looks at each region’s PRT performance in five areas: governance, rule of law, economic development, reconstruction and reconciliation. The core

finding is that there is work to be done in developing effective and

measurable strategic plans and milestones for the existing PRTs.

That was a finding we had one year ago. It was renewed in our

July report, and we renew it again here.

The other finding we have is the need to coordinate Commander’s Emergency Response Program funding within the PRT system,

especially now that the quick reaction force funds, QRF funds, are

moving out. These are the PRDC funds and others that will help

build and recover each of the provinces.

With respect to each of the subject areas that we looked at

among the PRTs, in governance the prevailing theme was that the

key obstacle was the failure of the council representatives to pass

the provincial powers law. It is the enabling legislation that authorizes what the provincial councils and local councils will be able

to do once stood up. It is a long-overdue piece of legislation and one

of the five key elements that are currently being pushed by the embassy with the Iraqi government right now.

Rule of law, it speaks for itself. It has been problematic for the

last four years in Iraq. General Jones’s report identified the challenges within the MOI at the national level. Those challenges, of

course, filter down to the local level. When I was in Baghdad this

last August, I met with a judge who complained about continuing

intimidation, and that is not just in Baghdad, but it is elsewhere.

Economic development, there is some progress there. The

microloan program has been working reasonably well, and we have

seen signs of new factories open and employment, but unemployment continues to be a key issue and will be essential to making

progress.

Reconstruction, the PRDCs continue to move forward on projects,

continue to build their own capacity locally to execute and oversee

key reconstruction elements. Political reconciliation, the PRTs

played a significant role in the Anbar awakening, if you will, the

fact that Anbar, once a place where the provincial council could not

meet at all and the PRT could not even operate. They would operate from Baghdad, and now operate in Ramadi and progress has

been made there significantly.

This is a key update on what has been going on nationwide

among the various PRTs. The staffing issues I know continue to be

a concern of this committee and are a valid concern. The funding

is appropriate to push this initiative forward, but for you to understand how they are doing, specific plans need to be developed for

each PRT that provides metrics and milestones, and thus provide

you feedback on that progress.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bowen can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

By the way, our ranking member, Mr. Akin, has responsibilities

on another subcommittee so he will be jogging in and out of here.

Mr. Perito.

5

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. PERITO, SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER, CENTER FOR POST-CONFLICT PEACE AND STABILITY

OPERATIONS, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Mr. PERITO. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very

much, members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity

to appear before the subcommittee and to talk about the U.S. experience with provincial reconstruction teams in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

I would like to share with you some observations that I have on

the U.S. PRT program and some recommendations I have as to

how it might be improved. I am required to say that these are my

own views and not those of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does

not advocate specific policy positions.

Provincial reconstruction teams, as we heard, are small civilmilitary units that assist provincial and other levels of government

to govern more effectively and deliver essential services. The original PRTs were started in Afghanistan in 2002. The idea was to

combine Army civil affairs teams, called ‘‘chiclets’’ at the time, with

a force protection unit and with civilian representatives from government agencies. The idea was to provide a platform which would

allow civilian government agencies to operate in secure environments.

As we have heard, there are now 25 PRTs in Afghanistan operating under a NATO-led international security assistance force.

These PRTs are led by the United States and 12 other NATO and

Coalition partners, and another dozen or so countries contribute

personnel, financial and material support.

On November 11, 2005, Secretary of State Rice inaugurated the

first of ten PRTs in Iraq. Unlike their counterparts in Afghanistan,

these PRTs are mostly civilian, led by the State Department. They

include private contractors and Iraqis. Then on January 10, the

President announced the creation of ten additional PRTs as part of

his New Way Forward in Iraq. These PRTs, so-called ‘‘embedded’’

PRTs or ePRTs, are part of military brigade combat teams that operate in Baghdad and Anbar province. In addition to the U.S. PRTs

in Iraq, there are three PRTs that are operated by our Coalition

partners, the U.K, Italy, and South Korea.

It is difficult to discuss PRTs because there has been such a proliferation of styles and models. In Afghanistan, the U.S. practice

was to establish PRTs and then hand them off to Coalition or

NATO partners. The result has been a proliferation of different

kinds of styles and models. For example, the German PRTs, in contrast to our own, have over 300 people, a very large civilian component, that operates very separately from a small and highly restricted military component.

The U.S. has three models for PRTs. The Afghan model has 80

personnel. All but three of them are military. Civilian representatives are from the Department of State, generally a junior officer

or retiree, a USAID contractor, and a volunteer from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The force protection unit is a U.S. National Guard platoon, and then there are two teams of civil affairs.

In Iraq, the original ten PRTs were composed mostly of civilians

from State, from the Justice Department, and from the Agriculture

Department. The only military were a couple of civil affairs teams,

6

some odd civil affairs soldiers that did jobs that no one else can fill,

and somebody from the Army Corps of Engineers. There were also

civilian contractors and some Iraqis that provided translation and

other services.

And then the new PRTs, the embedded PRTs, are very small.

Each has a core group of someone from State, DOD, civil affairs,

and a translator-interpreter cultural affairs adviser. And then

there are from 8 to 12 civilian specialists who make up the team,

and they operate as almost advisers to the commander of the brigade combat team.

PRTs not only have different organizations, but they also have

very different missions. In Afghanistan, the mission of U.S. PRTs

is to extend the authority of a weak central government into the

provinces where warlords and what the military called ‘‘regional

influentials’’ have traditionally held sway. In Iraq, it is the exact

opposite. The mission is to strengthen the provincial governments

against the traditionally strong center.

Beyond some rather vague mission statements for the embedded

PRTs and talk about enabling moderates and dissuading extremists, there is really no agreement within the U.S. Government or

between the U.S. and its allies on what PRTs should accomplish.

The priorities and programs often reflect local conditions and obvious opportunities. There is no interagency-approved concept of operations for PRTs. The Army’s lessons learned program recently

published a PRT playbook on its website, but this playbook was not

approved by the civilian government agencies State, USAID, et

cetera that participated in drafting the document.

PRT priorities, programs and effectiveness are strongly dependent on the personalities of those who serve on the teams. In the

absence of an overall concept of operation doctrine or other guidance, personalities are able to determine what the teams do. It is

also very important that personalities get along. In teams that gel,

things go smoothly. In teams where people have their own agencies

or can’t get along for some reason, then things go very badly.

The staffing of PRTs has highlighted a problem that affects our

government particularly. U.S. civilian government agencies do not

have any kind of surge capacity to staff PRTs or any other kind of

post-conflict operations. This does not just involve providing bodies.

It involves providing skilled specialists who are Federal employees

with a broad range of critical skills who can go out and represent

their agencies and do the job.

In the new ePRTs, because the State Department did not have

any people to take the civilian slots, the slots were filled by Army

Reservists and members of the National Guard. State now has the

funds to hire contractors, but the handover will not be completed

until next summer.

There is a myth that PRTs provide security because they involve

military personnel, but this is simply not true. In Afghanistan,

PRTs do form part of the ISAF general security presence, but PRTs

have no offensive capability, and their only security mission is to

protect themselves. The role of the PRT platoon is to provide convoy security when people decide to go outside the wire.

PRTs in Iraq live on U.S. military bases and depend on base security and on U.S. military forces to provide their security. Under

7

a February, 2007 MOU, State and DOD finally agreed, after a year

of wrangling, that the military would provide convoy security for

PRTs, but this was not before incidences where State was very disturbed to find that when convoys were attacked carrying PRT

members, soldiers did what they were trained to do—they stood

and fought—or that they combined escorting PRT members with

patrols against insurgents.

PRTs have contributed to improved governance and economic development in some areas. PRTs have been successful in facilitating

cooperation between provincial governors, representatives of central government ministries, and elected provincial councils in Iraq.

They also have been able to prod the central government to approve funding for provincial-level project proposals and to release

funds so that projects can be implemented. Increasingly, PRTs are

demonstrating that these efforts have resulted in improved conditions in provinces in Iraq.

EPRTs, which operate at a sub-provincial level dealing with municipal and district officials, perhaps are just too new to be able to

demonstrate such success. In Afghanistan, PRTs work with provincial governors and the provincial police chief on the general assumption that since these people are appointed by the central government, they represent President Karzai and his priorities and his

programs. In some cases, this is true. In others where regional

leaders or provincial leaders have their own agendas, then PRTs

are either stymied or they use all their energy to try to get these

officials removed.

While PRTs vary in size, organization and function, they share

several common problems which could be solved if they receive

proper attention. The first of these could be summarized under the

phrase ‘‘improvisation is not a concept of operations.’’ PRTs really

need an agreed concept of operations and an agreed organizational

structure with a single chain of command.

In PRTs in Iraq, there is a bifurcated chain of command. A State

Department official is responsible for political and economic issues.

His military deputy is responsible for security and movement.

There is no one in charge, thus no one to referee disputes. Even

simple things like who gets the security escort to go out on a daily

call can be an issue of some concern and dissension.

The second problem might be summarized by the phrase, ‘‘Without agreed objectives, it is difficult to judge effectiveness.’’ There is

need for an agreed set of objectives for PRTs and an agreed set of

measurements for measuring their performance. Absent a means of

determining whether PRTs are effective, it is difficult to determine

whether alternative mechanisms might better achieve our purposes.

As one colonel in Afghanistan told me, ‘‘Well, we just sort of look

at the province. If it is doing well, we figure the PRT must be doing

its job.’’ The lack of means for evaluating PRTs, however, has not

prevented their proliferation. As we have seen, there are five new

PRTs operating in Iraq without any real judgment having been

made or any real scrutiny applied as to whether this form of organization does a better job than perhaps others.

The next problem might be summarized with the phrase, ‘‘Stability operations is not a game for pickup teams.’’ U.S. civilian agenVerDate 22-MAR-2001 10:02 Sep 05, 2008 Jkt 038977 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-96\291160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
8

cies need to recruit Federal employees with expertise and the skills

required to staff PRTs. This is a new requirement for government

service. The government needs to create the capacity to meet this

need.

Permanent agency representatives can serve and train alongside

their military counterparts and represent their agencies. This is

not possible using commercial contractors or relying on military reservists and National Guardsmen to staff civilian functions.

If I could digress for just a minute, when I came into the foreign

service way back in the late 1960’s, in the midst of the Vietnam

War, we were involved in something called the CORDS program in

Vietnam. There were 15,000 AID foreign service officers at that

point. Thousands of them and hundreds of my fellow foreign service officers served in CORDS in Vietnam. This is a capacity which

we had and we have lost. We need to regain it.

Finally, I would say that ‘‘Silence is not a public information program for PRTs.’’ The U.S. PRT program suffers from a lack of public information on the nature and the results of its efforts. Other

than these very helpful reports produced by SIGIR, it is very difficult to tell what PRTs are doing. In the massive amount of media

reporting that is going on about Iraq and Afghanistan, it is very

difficult to find articles that are written about what PRTs are up

to.

AID recently has published a magazine called ‘‘Iraq PRTs,’’ both

in English and Arabic, which talks about PRT operations. This is

a commendable step forward, but long overdue. In this regard, I

would like to express my appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman and

to the members of the subcommittee for this series of hearings. I

think it is very important to shed light on this operation and to

raise questions about this program and to subject it to some kind

of systematic analysis and scrutiny.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Perito can be found in the Appendix on page 48.]

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you both for your testimony.

Our systematic analysis will be delayed for a few minutes while

we go to vote. We have one vote. I will come back, and with the

arrival of the first Republican member, we will begin our questioning. After that, we should have well over an hour before we are interrupted again.

We are recessed.

[Recess.]

Dr. SNYDER. We will come back to order here. We will go ahead

and start the five-minute clock. If we don’t have any other members return by the time my five minutes is up, I will just keep rolling.

We appreciate your testimony. I just want to make a comment

before I ask a couple of questions. I was struck I think it was a

couple of weeks ago in the newspaper by a newspaper photo of an

Iraqi man holding the body of his three-year-old son that was

wrapped in a carpet. Apparently, the boy had been kidnapped, and

I don’t know what the result was, if this was what he received in

return for a ransom, but anyway he ended up with the dead body

of his three-year-old son. If you think about the expectation of peoVerDate 22-MAR-2001 10:02 Sep 05, 2008 Jkt 038977 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-96\291160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
9

ple somehow trying to do economic development and raise a family

and get their kids educated in that kind of environment.

So I was struck in response to your report, Mr. Bowen, the suggestion that perhaps some people should be removed from some of

these areas for security, and the embassy came back and said, ‘‘No,

they shouldn’t; we think that our people need to keep working in

those areas.’’ I think it is consistent with the impression we had

from some of these really fine people working on PRTs that they

are very committed to what they are doing, and they understand

the risks, and they understand that they can only do their job

when they are out on the road. So once again, I commend them for

their work.

On page 34 of your report, it seems to be the whole gut of the

thing. In fact, I think I will read it. ‘‘We recommend the U.S. ambassador to Iraq and the commanding general MNF Iraq take these

actions: number one, in an expeditious manner, jointly establish a

comprehensive plan for the PRTs, including embedded PRTs, with

elements tailored for each PRT.

‘‘At a minimum, the plan should, (a), clearly define objectives and

performance measures; (b), clearly define milestones for achieving

stated objectives; (c), be linked to funding requirements; and (d),

identify the organizations within each agency that are accountable

for the plan’s implementation.

‘‘To provide senior-level attention to this issue, the plan should

be approved by the office of the chief-of-mission and the MNF Iraq

commander to demonstrate each agency’s commitment to this effort; two, develop guidance on the use and synchronization of

CERP funds to support the U.S. government’s capacity development mission.’’

My question for both of you is, at what level should these clearly

defined objectives and performance measures, clearly defined milestones, at what level in these agencies should this occur? This has

been one of the concerns of the committee, I think, on the broader

issue of a lot of folks in this town about the lack of coordination

between different agencies. At what level should these kinds of objectives and performance measures and milestones be established?

Mr. BOWEN. Well, we raise it up a level here in our recommendation, asking the ambassador and General Petraeus to review it and

sign-off on it to give it the authority that we think it needs, given

that this is the third time that this, or a recommendation like it,

has been put forward in our reporting.

There is an Office of Provincial Authority over there already. It

is administering the program. OPA was stood up in the spring, succeeding the previous organization, but it is still getting its own organizational sea legs. It has a new director as of six weeks ago.

That is why it is important to get a higher level buy-in in-theater

about how to measure the progress so ultimately you in the Congress can ascertain, is the PRT program achieving its goals.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Perito.

Mr. PERITO. As someone who has served about 35 years in the

U.S. Government, including a stint on the National Security Council staff and at both State, Justice and Commerce, I believe very

strongly that this should be done in Washington at an interagency

10

level equivalent to, say, the deputies committee currently, if not

the principals committee on the NSC.

It is very difficult and perhaps somewhat unfair to foist this off

on an embassy or on a field staff without Washington providing

any kind of direction. I was invited to participate in the interagency working group that came up with the PRT playbook. I was

struck by the fact that people at that level simply did not seem to

want to engage. It just seemed too hard to them to do this.

Based on my own experience in government going back years,

this strikes me as somewhat unusual. In previous Administrations

dealing with previous problems that also looked extremely difficult,

the interagency engaged and decisions were made and they were

brought to high levels of authority and signed off on by people with

real responsibilities in their agencies. So I don’t see why this

should be any different. It is difficult, but why should this be any

different. Without that, then people in the field are really left to

their own devices.

Dr. SNYDER. I would like us to continue to have a conversation

about this, because I can understand, Mr. Bowen, why you say

what you said, which is different than what Mr. Perito said.

Mr. PERITO. But it is not inconsistent.

Dr. SNYDER. No, it is not inconsistent. I guess that is right. You

could still have your Washington group and then have your group

at that level.

Mr. PERITO. Right. It has to go out to the field. What is decided

in Washington has to reflect input from the field and has to go out

and be acceptable to the field.

Dr. SNYDER. We currently have wars in two nations and PRTs

in two nations, Afghanistan and Iraq. If I understood what you

said, that it ought to be at the General Petraeus-and Ambassador

Crocker-level, then we are not going to have the kind of, I don’t

know if you want to say lessons learned or consistency. I mean, I

recognize that Afghanistan and Iraq have some dramatically different challenges.

On the other hand, I think we would all agree that there are lessons to be learned from work done in other countries, and if everything is decided at the country commander-level, don’t we lose out

on the kind of consistency or the lessons learned? Help me with

that, Mr. Bowen, and your thinking there.

Mr. BOWEN. It is a great point. It is exactly what our latest lessons learned report is focused on, and that is the need—but this

is a bigger need—to develop within the interagency a more effective

approach, a more effective structure to taking on post-conflict contingency relief and reconstruction operations, of which the PRTs

are a big part.

If the story of Iraq reconstruction tells anything, teaches any lesson, it is that the U.S. Government is not well structured and was

not well poised in 2003 to engage in the kind of post-conflict relief

and reconstruction operations that we have faced for four years.

Lessons have been learned. We have done three: one on human

capital management, one on contract procurement, and the latest

one on program and project management. They have been applied,

but they have been applied along the way or ad hoc. That is not

the way to run a post-conflict operation. In our latest lessons

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learned report released last March, and the focus or our next one—

our capping report will come out next year—we be in putting forth

the body of evidence that will allow this issue to be addressed and

solutions to be developed.

We will provide some recommendations on that, on how integration—we call it the ‘‘beyond Goldwater-Nichols’’ initiative—how the

integration of agencies can be more effectively structured so that

the execution of these problem doesn’t have to be figured out while

the problem is being addressed.

Dr. SNYDER. I know there is a lot of interest by members of this

committee on that issue, as you are probably aware. Mrs. Davis

and Mr. Davis from California and Kentucky have an ad hoc group,

their working group on interagency reform, but it is to get at that.

I think it came out at one of our hearings, but I think you discussed it some in your statement, Mr. Perito.

When we met with some of our folks from Iraq and Afghanistan

who were working on PRTs, one of their very specific—or at least

one of them kind of overstated it—but just said, ‘‘you need to

change the names; we use ’provincial reconstruction team’ in Iraq

and ’provincial reconstruction team’ in Afghanistan like they are

doing the same work.’’

And they say, they are not. In their view—and this is from the

people on the ground—the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan were like project builders. They did bricks-and-mortar

projects. They did water projects, and it was all good stuff. In Iraq,

folks felt like, no, what they were doing was kind of government

capacity building, that they are helping other people decide, local

people, how they are going to do a water project and find funding

and sustain it and get it repaired and all that kind of thing. But

they felt like they had dramatically—and ‘‘dramatically’’—I don’t

think it was an overstatement, it was dramatically different functions.

And yet, I am not sure we are getting—and I don’t think the

American public understands that, and I don’t think the Congress

understands that—and that may come from what you are talking

about, Mr. Perito, that we don’t have that kind of whatever up-thestovepipe somewhere interconnection coming across.

Mr. PERITO. One of the ways this works out is that you hear a

lot of loose talk within government circles about, well, why don’t

we send a PRT off to this situation or that situation, with people

not really understanding what you just said. And that is that PRTs

are kind of amorphous. We really need something which is much

more descriptive to describe the kind of capacities that we are

going to provide. PRTs are a misnomer. That term is often misleading. In Iraq, many PRTs don’t even work with provincial-level authorities.

Dr. SNYDER. Yes. That is a good point.

Let’s see. I have lost page 34. Mr. Bowen, this is your chance to

educate us at a very basic level. I don’t know what the difference

is between a performance measure and a milestone.

Mr. BOWEN. A milestone is an interim achievement along the

way to an ultimate goal—in other words, a chronology of milestones eventually leads to success. That is the plan. Performance

measures are a finer calibration, perhaps, between milestones.

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They are related, obviously. It is about the PRTs doing what they

need to do to achieve those goals. It has to do with the performance, the personalities involved.

As we have seen, absent a strategic plan, the story in Iraq has

been somewhat personality-driven, as Mr. Perito pointed out. Having more concretized performance measures and defined milestones

will hopefully limit a personality-driven enterprise.

Dr. SNYDER. Before I go to Dr. Gingrey here—I will give him a

minute to get his thoughts together—could the two of you put your

heads together here and give me a couple of examples, let us say

one from economic development and one from education, of a clearly defined objective, a performance measure, and a milestone?

I will throw one out. If I am a PRT, my objective would be, I

need to have a functioning educational system for grade school children to age 12, and then would some of my performance measure

objectives be—I have to have in this area, I need 10 schools in secure areas, with teachers that are getting paid.

Is that the kind of thing we are talking about? And then a milestone—I don’t know what the milestone would be. I guess the milestone would be we actually made it through a school year, and everybody was safe. Is that the kind of specificity? I see some heads

nodding behind you, so maybe I am not totally off-base here. Is

that the kind of thing we are talking about?

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, sir, I think it is. I think the key element in this

recommendation is they have to be tailored for each PRT.

Dr. SNYDER. Right.

Mr. BOWEN. The provinces vary greatly in north, central and

south, by region, and by locale.

Dr. SNYDER. I am with you there. I just need to——

Mr. BOWEN. You are right. Concretizing it like that is good.

Dr. SNYDER. Because you are asking these groups in a very difficult environment to come up with things measurable, and I just

want to get some specific examples, because I didn’t see that kind

of specificity in your statement. I assume that folks that do this

work have an understanding of this kind of specificity. I just don’t.

But am I in the ballpark of what we are talking about? Mr. Perito,

do you have any comments?

Mr. PERITO. Yes, although I want to kind of bring this down to

what the realities are, particularly the realities in Iraq. Just looking at a report yesterday about PRT activities, the PRT in Kirkuk,

its objective is to get the provincial council to meet. The provincial

council has not met for a long time and there are divisions between

the various ethnic groups in the provincial council.

What the PRT has been doing is working with two of these

groups, talking to them about how to do negotiations and actually

has now gotten them to engage in negotiations, and they are working out an understanding between them so they will agree to come

to a meeting.

That is the level, I think, on which a lot of this work is being

done. As one fellow from Fallujah told me, ‘‘Our job, what we are

doing now is we are trying to go out. Our rule of law work right

now is we are going out and we are trying to find the judges that

are still alive and still around, and get them to come to work.’’ I

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mean, it is not in Iraq very often that we are setting up education

systems. The PRTs are doing these very, very fundamental things.

Dr. SNYDER. But let us use that as an example. So your objective

would be in this town, you want to have an ability of citizens to

see a judge on a relatively regular basis—weekly or monthly or

something like that. And your objective is, you have to find this

many judges, be sure they are paid, be sure they are secure. And

your milestone is going to be at the end of the year, have we had

them meet 30 times in a year. Is that a reasonable way to look at

that of thing?

Mr. PERITO. Or have we got a working court.

Dr. SNYDER. Have we got a working court, and what does that

mean.

Mr. PERITO. These are very rudimentary, often.

Dr. SNYDER. I understand.

Mr. PERITO. At this point in Iraq, PRTs are working at a very

rudimentary level, often.

Dr. SNYDER. Yes.

Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I want to thank the witnesses for being with us this morning. I

apologize as usual for the break.

Mr. Bowen, in your testimony, of course you were talking about

the five measurements. I want to have you speak a little bit more

to that.

Mr. Perito, I really enjoyed your testimony as you kind of explained to the committee once again how these PRTs work, both

first in Afghanistan, and then subsequently in Iraq, and then you

explained the difference in embedded PRTs versus another. There

are a lot of different models out there. We have heard about that

from other witnesses, but I think you did a very excellent job of

summarizing that for the committee, and I appreciate that.

Inspector General Bowen, the first report, I guess, and you were

asking for both the Departments of State and Defense to get some

metrics and some measurements that we could evaluate in a better

way. I think that was back in October of last year, so here we are

October of 2007, a year later. It seems that we are not really getting the kind of information that we need in regard to performance.

One of you testified that it seems that the measurements are

based almost anecdotally on the personalities of the different PRTs,

particularly civilian members. Of course, you have these different

models in the two countries, and even within the country of Iraq,

you have these two different models of the embedded being so different from the original ten that we created.

So I want some information on why we don’t have good metrics

to measure, and not just hoping that the personalities gel, and you

get good people, and they all get motivated and they are fired up

and it is a good team and they do a good job, but you don’t really

have any standards of measurement. So you have bad personalities

that don’t gel, and they don’t accomplish anything and maybe make

matters worse.

I think I probably would have done very well in the military because I like rules and regulations and standards of behavior in regVerDate 22-MAR-2001 10:02 Sep 05, 2008 Jkt 038977 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-96\291160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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ular order. I don’t see that we really have that yet in these PRT

teams. So I would like for both of you to speak to that.

Mr. BOWEN. You asked directly the core finding of our audit. It

is full of information about what the PRTs have done, but that is

not helpful in to unless you have some standards to determine

whether those activities have achieved milestones, have achieved

the goals of the PRTs. That, as you rightly point out, was our recommendation of a year ago.

I would like to have been able to come today and tell you that

those plans have been developed and those metrics are being applied, but they haven’t. Our audits speak for themselves, and it is

information for you that that is job one, I think, for the new OPA

director to ensure that there are well-tailored, clear, fundamental

metrics, measures and milestones for measurement of how the

PRTs are doing.

The other important issue is that it is not one-size-fits-all. As you

noted, first of all there are two very different groups. The ePRTs

are reporting to the battalion commander and are part of the surge

element. The original ten PRTs are carrying out their mission, that

is governance-oriented capacity building. And so the tailoring has

to be very specific.

Mr. PERITO. Yes, I think in order to establish metrics, you first

have to establish objectives. You have to know where you are going

before you can measure where you got there or not. As we have discussed before, there really are no objectives for this program. And

so beyond a rather vague series of mission statements and beyond

things like ‘‘bolster moderates, assist with counterinsurgency’’ and

things of that general nature, there really are no objectives here.

I had a conversation which I thought was very instructive yesterday with someone from the State Department who said, ‘‘Well, we

now have a metric. We have demonstrated in Iraq that PRTs can

be very effective at the provincial level in assisting the Iraqis to go

through the budget process, produce proposals, take them up to the

center, get the center to release money, and actually have the

money come down to the provinces and distribute it. Now we have

a metric. We can say this proves it works.’’

Well, you know, that is sort of circular reasoning. What they discovered sort of through trial and error is that PRTs can do this,

and it is very useful and it helps, but that is very different, and

that is not really a metric. That is just kind of, well, you know,

through trial and error we have done this. Now, that is very useful,

but maybe you should be doing other things.

It takes a kind of objective top-down view, like we have talked

before, of setting objectives, deciding what PRTs should be doing,

are we best utilizing these resources that are available, and then

coming up with measures to see whether we have achieved these

objectives.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin for five minutes, followed by Mrs. Davis.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am sorry. I have these committees going on at different times,

and I missed some of your statements.

It seemed to me that what you are saying would probably help

at least in certain ones of the PRTs to have a very clearly defined

statement up front that this is what we are trying to do, and this

15

is some way of measuring. I used to do a lot of that when I worked

in the business world.

Even things that are simpler, like one of the things I was responsible for was railroad tracks and a steel mill. Well, you know, if you

have a lot of trains off the track, you know something is going

wrong, and you would think that is something you could measure.

But even so, trying to put specific measurements and everything

on it can be pretty tricky. I think that it would be even more so

with the diversity of the different environments where these PRTs

are working. That shouldn’t be an excuse for not having a clearly

defined mission, though.

Are the PRTs that are—and I don’t know where we came up with

this ‘‘capacity building’’ word; it sounds like political correctness to

me. I mean, we are just trying to help stand up local governments,

I gather. Those PRTs that do that, who do they work for?

Mr. BOWEN. They work for the chief of mission. The ten original

PRTs that are in the provincial support teams have PRT team

leaders that report.

Mr. AKIN. What is the chief of mission? Who is the chief of mission? What does that mean?

Mr. BOWEN. The ambassador.

Mr. AKIN. So that is going through State, then?

Mr. BOWEN. That is right.

Mr. AKIN. Okay. In this case, that would be Ambassador Crocker?

Mr. BOWEN. That is right.

Mr. AKIN. So these ten teams all report directly to him?

Mr. BOWEN. Through the OPA. There is an ambassador-level appointee who works for Ambassador Crocker who runs the program.

Mr. AKIN. Okay. So in other words, there is an in-between guy?

Mr. BOWEN. Yes.

Mr. AKIN. That is the chain of command for these.

Mr. BOWEN. That is the program. That is right.

Mr. AKIN. Now, is there a clear-cut definition for what they are

supposed to be doing, written down on paper somewhere?

Mr. BOWEN. There is a generalized objective, as Mr. Perito pointed out, that is a bit vague, to use his term, but what is missing,

what the core of our finding is that there are not comprehensive

plans for what the PRT should be doing to achieve building the capacity, which is really, as you say, teaching the Iraqis how to do

local government.

Mr. AKIN. In addition, did I gather from just before we got called

out at the bell, is it also true that the financing that comes from

the parliament and the central government is completely at their

discretion, whether they are going to give that to the local provinces?

Mr. BOWEN. If it comes from the minister of finance?

Mr. AKIN. Right.

Mr. BOWEN. About $6 billion, as I recall, is allocated and has

been distributed. That is an area of progress, as our report points

out—budget execution, another term of art—how are the provinces

doing in spending the money that is committed.

Mr. AKIN. Here is my question. To put it in our terms, if the Federal Government controls all the money, then the state government

16

basically, they are just going to be a lapdog for whatever the Federal Government wants. So my question is, is there in the distribution of the oil money to the local provinces, is there a guarantee

that they are going to get a certain percent of the cut based on population or something, so that they can start working federalism?

Because federalism doesn’t work if your local government, every

last penny they get is coming out of the centralized government. Is

that problem being dealt with?

Mr. BOWEN. That is the revenue distribution portion of the hydrocarbon law that has yet to be passed by the council of representatives. They are using an interim measure now.

Mr. AKIN. Yes. So there is no federalism until that gets fixed, is

there?

Mr. BOWEN. That is right. And then next year when the regions

law kicks in, a very much strengthened federalism will occur in

Iraq.

Mr. AKIN. Say again?

Mr. BOWEN. There is a provision in the constitution for the formation of regions that will concentrate power in two or more provinces that choose to form a region.

Mr. AKIN. So that is going to become even more centralized?

Mr. BOWEN. No, that will decentralize.

Mr. AKIN. It will decentralize it?

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKIN. Okay. Is there anything in their constitution which

specifically forbids the central government from doing certain functions so that you can guarantee, for instance, police and hospitals

and schools or whatever are done locally, as opposed to centrally?

Or do we not have any limitation on what the central government

can do?

Mr. BOWEN. Those limitations will accompany the formation of

regions. So when the regions law begins, that sort of dual system

like we have, divided federalism, will begin to develop.

Mr. AKIN. Is there anything in the constitution which guarantees

certain areas to be local responsibility, as opposed to be central, or

not?

Mr. BOWEN. I don’t know if it is that specific with respect to regions. I will have to get back to you on that.

Mr. AKIN. I am just trying to get a handle on how you drive federalism in that environment.

I am out of time, and Vic is going to throw one of his hammers

at me.

Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. No.

In fairness to Mrs. Davis, I need to let her know that I quoted

her in my opening statement, and then referred to you and Mr.

Davis and your ad hoc working group on interagency reform, because you asked a question at one of our hearings about how do

you measure this stuff.

You mentioned, I think, metrics, Mr. Perito. I was in a discussion

several years ago at a full committee hearing. I think it was Secretary Rumsfeld, and he used the term ‘‘metrics,’’ and I thought he

said ‘‘matrix,’’ and we had like the movie with Keanu Reeves. And

he talked about his metrics room, and I thought he was talking

17

about a room like in the movie ‘‘The Matrix.’’ We start pretty basic

here in the House of Representatives.

Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your reference, and I am going to read it in a minute

so I know what you said.

Thank you very much for being here. I know that the issue of

metrics and how we evaluate it has been addressed. I am not sure

that it has been addressed thoroughly, but I wanted to just go to

another question for a second.

Mr. Perito, you mention that this should not be a game for pickup teams, and we should have a surge capacity. You have a lot of

experience in multiple agencies. How would you do this? And also

you mentioned that Germany has about 300 folks on the ground

doing this. How do they organize this? Is there anything that we

can learn from that?

Mr. PERITO. Just to take the first one, I have long believed that

what the United States government means to do, and it can be

done by the State Department of it can be done by a group of agencies, is that we need to recruit professionals who have these skills,

who are a part of the Federal Government, Federal employees that

we deploy in times of need.

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State now has a plan to do this. The plan

calls for the creation of an active reserve corps, which will be made

up of civil servants, of Federal employees who would have these

skills, be located around government agencies, would be on call,

and could deploy rapidly. The money for that, unfortunately, is

being held up by the Senate at this point, so that plan isn’t going

forward.

That active reserve corps would be supported by a civilian reserve corps composed of Americans from across the country who

would be trained, equipped and prepared to deploy on a more

lengthy timetable. All of this reflects some work that I did and the

USIP did several years ago, which recommended that this kind of

capacity be created. So there are plans and they need to be actualized and they need to be funded, and they need to be funded at a

level where we would have several thousand people ready to go.

Right now, the plans call for 200, I think. So that is one answer

to this.

When you look at the way other countries approach this, other

countries bring to the PRT equation their own strengths and their

own weaknesses. The German PRTs reflect the strength of the German economic assistance programs, and so you have this large economic assistance team.

They also reflect the weakness of the military component. On the

German side, the German military component in Afghanistan is

highly caveated and there are very few things that it can actually

do. One of them is take risks at all. So the German military hardly

goes out. That is not because they are not brave, but just because

they are heavily restricted by their own government.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. When you think of this reserve corps,

are these people who would sign up and would have every two

18

months that they would be coming together and doing some training across the board?

Mr. PERITO. Yes, this concept is still kind of unfirm at this

point—that is not a word, probably—but the idea would be that

these would be people who would have required skills. They would

sign Federal contracts. They would be available to deploy. They

would be trained and equipped. They would exercise to the point

where they would be able to function together, and then they would

move out.

But more important than the civilian corps, which I think is critical, is this idea of creating a corps of Federal employees who have

these capacities and who are there working in the government and

on call and can go. That is something we just don’t have at this

point.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And you said the funding has been

tied up.

Mr. PERITO. Yes.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Also, it is the will, too. Is it because

we can’t quite envision this group of people doing this or putting

them at risk in some way? What do you think is underlying the

fact that we have not been able to get this together?

Mr. PERITO. Specifically, as I understand it, and I haven’t

checked in the last week, there is a single senator who has a hold

on the money. There was $50 million in the Iraq supplemental that

was provided to stand up this capacity. The bill required that an

authorizing bill be passed as well, along with the appropriations

bill. The authorizing bill has been held under a Senate hold now.

The Administration has not been able to get the senator to release

it.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. What I am really asking, though, is

this has been going on for a number of years. It isn’t just probably

the senator. Part of it is education.

Mr. PERITO. And part of it—to go to a larger perspective—political will is a critical element here. We have not had the political will

to go forward and create the kind of civilian agency capacity that

we need. We do a very good job on the military side. The U.S. military spends a great deal of time on lessons learned and on improving its performance. We have the best military in the world.

Civilian agencies in post-conflict have operated on the assumption that this is a one-time thing and they are never have to do

it again. They were that way in Somalia and in Haiti and in Bosnia

and in East Timor and all the other places that we have been. And

now we are paying the price.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, we have

people who decide to go into USAID. They have development backgrounds. We have people who go into the Peace Corps, obviously.

Is there something about incentivizing young people to think in

this way? Or is that not the path? Is it just people who are already

in a capacity already, that have the skills?

Mr. PERITO. I don’t really think it is a matter of getting recruits.

I think it is a matter of the size of these institutions. USAID right

now has 1,200 foreign service officers. That is barely enough people

for all of its jobs worldwide. That is barely enough people to provide people to every embassy.

19

When you go out to PRTs in Afghanistan and you meet the

USAID rep, it is very likely to be a contractor, generally a young

person, terribly enthusiastic, extremely brave, but brand new to

the field, not able to draw upon expertise; not able to draw upon

associations with the agency, a deep knowledge of how USAID

functions, with a huge, steep learning curve. And that you find

across the board.

And so, what we need to do is increase the capacity of these

agencies. The foreign service of the United States can staff only 75

percent of its jobs worldwide. It just doesn’t have enough people.

They do a very good job of staffing Iraq because there is a lot of

emphasis on this, but the Foreign Service Association told me the

other day that 40 percent of the foreign service has already served

in Iraq.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

We will go around again, gentlemen, if you want to start the fiveminute clock again.

Just a follow-up question, Mr. Perito, from the line of questioning

Mrs. Davis was going. We had a hearing earlier in the week about

this whole issue of staffing and the issue of the civilian reserve

corps came up. In your statement, you specifically were critical of

using military reservists.

Now, I can understand that kind of across the board you don’t

want the Army Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve to be a substitute for trained people. But in fact, we have certainly had occasions where military reservists might be the perfect person.

We have a mayor of a fairly vigorous, rapidly growing city who

has been mobilized more than once, and I suspect he has some

pretty good thoughts on capacity building. Now, he was not selected for a PRT, but just because somebody is a military reservists

rather than a civilian reserve corps, they may in fact—you know,

we have had thousands of guard and reserve members over there

at any one time.

They may in fact be the perfect people for some of these tasks,

would they not? They certainly would have a different background

than your 23- or 24-year-old who has been in the military for 4 or

5 years. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. PERITO. It is a fair statement.

Dr. SNYDER. I assume what you are saying is that we should not

rely on somehow having guard and reserve.

Mr. PERITO. But there are other considerations which go beyond

what you said, which is true. Police is the area I know best. In the

beginning in Iraq, when we activated the guard and reserve to get

police officers, we got people who, in their civilian lives, were police

officers. Those people came, and they served once.

Now, when you look at the police transition teams in Iraq, you

will find military police. They are mostly guard and reservists.

They were artillerymen before they were given a two-week training

program and made military police. These people are not police officers.

The fact is that you can get on a one-time basis the person you

need for the job, but over a five-year effort, you end up with people

20

that are—you know, the classic is the guy who is sent off to advise

the provincial education representative, and while he works in education, but he is a schoolteacher. And that happens again and

again.

Dr. SNYDER. Right. I understand what you are saying.

Mr. PERITO. Yes.

Dr. SNYDER. One of my towns a few years ago had both their

mayor and their police chief mobilized in the same unit.

I am thinking of how to pursue this. At the hearing a couple of

days ago, we had representatives from different agencies. I don’t

know if you heard anything about that, but we had in the written

statements of the persons from the Department of Agriculture and

the person from the Department of Justice talking about—this was

a hearing on the incentives for their civilian folks to go to Iraq and

Afghanistan, not just in PRTs, but in other capacities as well.

There was a paragraph that I go onto him a little bit about, because it had the exact identical language in both paragraphs that

they acknowledged had apparently come from an National Security

Council staff person who reviewed the testimony and inserted that

language and suggested that language. I actually have no problem

with the language.

I am going to read it again and see if that is the direction you

think that we should be going in, Mr. Perito, and any thoughts you

have, Mr. Bowen: ‘‘To improve our ability to respond to overseas

challenges and provide the personnel expertise needed will require

that we increase our numbers of available, trained and deployable

personnel within our department and others, and that we support

them with a structure in Washington that conducts planning and

coordination.’’

And then in this particular situation, this one means Agriculture,

but the other one was Department of Justice. ‘‘Agriculture is working with interagency partners and the coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization at the Department of State to build that capacity and to support development of a civilian reserve corps of outside experts that we can also call on to fill additional requirements.’’

Well, basically we came out of that hearing and we had both the

Department of Justice and Department of Agriculture and apparently NSC thinking this should be as a fairly strong statement of

where we ought to go. But I read two things into that, or three

things into that. One, civilian reserve corps—everybody seems to be

behind that, although it is still being fleshed out—but then the

first sentence was we need to increase our numbers, a redundancy.

I talked with Richard Armitage, who said there needs to be redundancy so that when you pull people for emergencies that come

up, you are not gutting the mission in Africa or China or Latin

America or wherever it is. But that is different than a civilian reserve corps that actually has people working in agriculture projects

in Mongolia that you can pull out and say, ‘‘We have to have you

now for the next year.’’

And then the third part of that, which I think gets back to the

questioning some time ago, where it talks about ‘‘we support them

with a structure in Washington that conducts planning and coordination,’’ which may get to the guts of your report, Mr. Bowen,

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which is, your criticism today and your suggestions may reflect the

fact that we don’t have the structure in Washington that does the

kind of planning and coordination, still sensitive to on-the-ground

decision-making and the kind of vagueness of some of these relationships in provinces and so on.

I am not sure what kind of structure we are working on right

now in Washington. You may not have any comments about anything I have said, but if you want to comment on that. Was that

paragraph a pretty good paragraph, from the written statement?

Mr. PERITO. If we had that capacity——

Dr. SNYDER. Maybe you had that in your written statement, too,

Mr. Perito, and I missed it. I don’t know.

Mr. PERITO. No. But in other things I have written, yes. If we

had that kind of capacity, it would be excellent. There needs to be

a place in Washington that has the authority to coordinate postconflict interventions, particularly on the civilian side, and to be a

partner to the military, which we don’t have right now.

There is no place in the Federal Government where you can go

and have somebody who can say, ‘‘Yes, I can bring together all of

this expertise and all of this capacity and deploy it and direct it.’’

That doesn’t happen. We have debated about where this should be

located, but my personal preference is it should be a new independent agency, which would be created with its own culture and its

own staff, and would be made up of professionals who do this professionally.

We would do it over time, so you would have the benefit of people

who gained experienced moved up in the ranks and could direct

these operations. Currently, what we do is we rely on contractors.

Contractors come and go. The firms change. There is no residual.

There is no learning that takes place. Or we don’t do it at all, or

we pass it off to the military, which is unfair because it places

ever-increasing burdens on the military and forces them into areas

where it is just not their expertise.

Dr. SNYDER. You made a pretty strong statement. There is no

place in the Federal Government where that is being done now.

Mr. Bowen, do you have any comments before we go to Mr. Akin?

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, that is exactly the point of our lessons-learned

program and our latest report recommends addressing this. Our

next report will present that kind of recommendation to the Congress to create a new entity. If it is a balkanized problem, we want

to beware of a balkanizing solution.

NSPD–44 creates SCRS and has done some good things and our

lessons-learned report supported their civilian reserve corps efforts,

but 3000.05, the DOD parallel directive, also is moving forward

with bolstering the Department of Defense’s approach to post-conflict relief and reconstruction issues, a new entity that coordinates

those elements and brings them together, and the other agencies’

interests as well.

It is not just AID, State and DOD. Those are the primary players, but as you learned, Ag and DOJ have interests as well and

they need to be addressed appropriately and filtered in. SCRS has

done good work, but it is still awaiting authorization of its own and

its own appropriation. That has been a continuing challenge for it.

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So we will continue to speak to it through our lessons-learned

project.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin for any further questions.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I didn’t hear anything, Mr. Bowen, just at a gut level, taking off

the very specific measurable things. What is your sense of how the

PRTs are doing? You probably have seen more and looked into it

pretty far. Do you feel like just a little American ingenuity is being

applied and that we are making some progress, even if that is a

little bit checkered or varies a little bit from place to place? What

is your overall gut sense as to how we are doing?

Mr. BOWEN. Absolutely, our report demonstrates areas of

progress within the PRT program. There is no doubt that the

progress in Anbar is attributable in part to the work of the PRT

out there. The microloan process, which is helping employ Iraqis locally and get businesses started up, is having an effect.

The provincial reconstruction development councils, which are

Iraqi group-managed and advised by the PRTs, are approving and

submitting projects to the embassy for Iraqis to manage and construct in their provinces. That is $1 billion in U.S. construction aid

that they are helping to decide how to spend. A key lesson learned

is get buy-in from the host nation to ensure that what is being provided is what they need. So I think that the PRTs just in those

three instances, as our report points out, are making an enormous

difference.

The other issues on federalism I wanted to follow up is the provincial powers law, as I alluded to in my opening statement, is a

key element to promoting federalism locally. They need to have

that law passed so they know what their powers are.

Mr. AKIN. So that is not defined yet either. That is all part of

that whole piece that has to come together. Are they trying to bite

off too big a political project of doing that? Can they break it into

pieces or not? I mean, we have that problem here in D.C. Sometimes we say, well, we are going to fix all of Social Security or we

will fix all of Medicare or something, and the thing just gets too

weighty and basically it would be probably better to surgically go

in and fix different pieces.

Mr. BOWEN. They have broken them up into pieces for the hydrocarbon law, which has the revenue sharing issue you were talking

about; the provincial powers law which defines local powers; and

constitutional reform; provincial elections are a key element that

needs to happen. But the challenge is none of the pieces, other

than de-Baathification, and it is not moving very fast. It is moving

forward.

Mr. AKIN. Okay. But your bottom line is you are saying you do

think the PRTs are providing valuable service.

Mr. BOWEN. Yes.

Mr. AKIN. There are very measurable successes in various areas,

maybe not as well coordinated or defined as it might be. Is that a

fairly accurate assessment?

Mr. BOWEN. That is very accurate. The challenge, of course, is

the lack of a permissive environment. The place where the PRTs

are struggling the most is in the south, as our regional recommendation alluded to. The Basrah PRT is having to work from

23

the airport because of the dangerous situation in that very large

city, and is having minimal impact at this point.

Mr. AKIN. I thought the south was one of the safest areas. How

far south are you talking about?

Mr. BOWEN. There are parts of the south and the mid-south that

are safe, but Basrah is not.

Mr. AKIN. Is that Sunni?

Mr. BOWEN. That is Shia.

Mr. AKIN. Shia.

Mr. BOWEN. It is intra-Shia factions that are fighting there.

Mr. AKIN. Okay. They have to have some level of—there has to

be some kind of civilization before these people can get out and

make the contacts and all.

Mr. BOWEN. That is right.

Mr. AKIN. Right. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Mrs. Davis for five minutes.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You just mentioned al Anbar. I was wondering, have the PRTs

been able to help bridge the gap between what is happening there

with the local efforts and the government as a whole, and the Iraqi

government? Is that part of their role at all? What specifically have

they done to help bridge that gap so that in the end you do have

that movement?

Mr. PERITO. It is my understanding that one of the things that

PRTs have been able to do in al Anbar is get the central government to respond to requests for funding from the province, in what

was a very strong reluctance on the part of the central government

to respond to al Anbar because of the Shia-Sunni divide. PRTs

have been able in some circumstances to overcome that and get the

central government to release funds down. That is one of the things

that PRTs can do effectively.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Is that because they are educating

people to ask for those things?

Mr. PERITO. Well, one of the things they have been able to do,

the PRT in Ramadi, for example—the big provincial-level PRT, not

the ePRTs, but the original one—a year ago had six people in it.

It was a non-permissive environment and they were able to do very

little.

I talked to somebody who was there a month or so ago, and he

said, ‘‘Now, we are up to 25 people. The environment is permissive

enough that we can get out. We are getting the provincial council

to move back from Baghdad to the province. We are trying to reconstitute the judicial system and the police and get the organs of

government up and functioning.’’ So that is one thing that the PRT

has been able to do. So yes, they are effective there, and that is

the sort of thing the PRT can do.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I missed some of the discussion about

metrics. What role do you see public opinion polls playing? There

are public opinion polls that seem to state generally that people

don’t necessarily like our presence. But in areas in which PRTs are

actively involved, what is the reach there?

If you went in to a PRT area that you thought was pretty successful, would you expect those opinion polls to be a lot different?

24

Do they do them? Do they use them as a tool to try and register

generally what is going on? How far does it spread in terms of people’s general sense?

Mr. BOWEN. I don’t think that PRTs are doing polling themselves, but I think it is an idea to consider, to judge the impact locally. But it wouldn’t be a metric. I think it would just be another

element of feedback for the PRT team leader to see that the 50

projects that the provincial reconstruction development council approve and execute actually help change the community spirit with

respect to how things are going with respect to the council, not the

council, not the PRT, but with respect to how the council is doing

its business—the provincial council.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And are you saying that they probably

don’t have much idea about that right now? That they haven’t done

that kind of base——

Mr. BOWEN. The PRTs don’t do polling, and part of it is simply

the non-permissive environment. But it would be useful feedback

for the provincial councils, I think. In many areas, the PRTs have

to be careful about revealing themselves and revealing an American face on any project that is U.S.-funded or ongoing because of

the potential controversy and conflict it could stir.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Yes.

Mr. Perito, did you want to comment on that?

Mr. PERITO. Yes. I think that overall, public information and

public affairs programming for PRTs has been a shortcoming. In

the Iraq PRTs, there is supposed to be a State Department officer

who has that responsibility and whose job is to get the word out.

Sometimes that officer is present; sometimes he is not. There is no

counterpart in the Afghan PRTs at all.

One of the things that, of course, PRTs try to do is they try to

put an Iraqi face on success. So in a certain sense, that masks their

participation. But I think in terms of just getting the word out

about what the PRT program has accomplished, that has not happened.

I find it very difficult in Washington to actually find out what

PRTs are doing, and I am sort of inside the government and very

often get invited to government meetings. But it is not open. So I

think public affairs could be something we could do better.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. You are saying that it is a pretty wellkept secret. It sounds like a well-kept secret there. It is also a wellkept secret here. Is that by design, to again not have an American

face on that?

Mr. PERITO. No, I don’t think it is by design. I think it is by a

sort of inadvertence. It is something that people haven’t focused on,

but should.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much.

Dr. SNYDER. We have been joined by Mr. Cooper from Tennessee,

for five minutes, for any questions you may have.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to continue the gentlelady’s line of questioning. How

do I explain to my taxpayers back home that the American face on

a project makes it unappreciated? They would probably say that it

is like people biting the hand that is feeding them. They would

probably say, ‘‘Why are we doing this?’’

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Now, we don’t need to stick our chests out and want too much

credit, but is the United States reduced to being the world’s anonymous donor today? So we get no credit for anything and it makes

everybody happier? People are out there risking their lives in these

PRTs to help people and we can’t say they are U.S.? You certainly

can’t wear a uniform because that would militarize it.

This is an untenable situation. So why are we doing it? We are

humanitarian. We are good folks and we want to help the world,

but if they don’t want the help. In fact, an economist would say decrease their marginal utility or something. If they actively despise

us for it, why are we there?

Mr. BOWEN. To the extent that that is answerable, I would say

that it depends on the region in Iraq where the PRT presence is.

Just by definition of how the PRT program is structured is reflective of the difficulty of being there. In the south, there are very few

permanent PRTs.

They are supported by the provincial support teams, the PSTs,

because of the danger of a U.S. citizen traveling across the country.

It is not just being disliked. It is being shot. That has been the

struggle in Iraq with respect to reconstruction for four years.

Mr. COOPER. I know in the scheme of things with government,

it is a relatively small amount of money. For our own self-image

and self-esteem, we would probably do this because we perceive

ourselves as the good guys. But if so few other people do, particularly the folks that we are directly trying to help, isn’t this counterproductive?

Mr. BOWEN. Well, I think that it is a cost-effect balance, is the

question that you are asking. Our report catalogues a series of successes as well, in light of all these limitations. I think the PRT program is aiming at building democracy at the grassroots level by

teaching provincial councils, which didn’t exist before in Iraq, how

to do local government.

That, in conjunction with trying to build some sort of local capacity to plan a recovery and reconstruction program, and then sustain it—a continuing weakness—are all worthy goals of the overall

PRT objective. The point of our audit is those goals need to be better defined, better tracked, and better measured.

Mr. COOPER. You are speaking as an auditor. I am detecting a

marked chamber-of-commerce attitude here. I love chambers of

commerce, and they work well in America. I am not sure they work

well overseas. For example, corruption—it is endemic, and we are

not going to eliminate it in our lifetimes. We are the infidel. We

are not going to persuade them otherwise in our lifetimes. Other

things—tribal, ethnic relations matter far more to them than they

do to us, and we are not going to change that in our lifetimes.

It almost seems like we are doing this for our own purposes, and

not to actually have an impact. If we wanted to have an impact,

we would have to channel the aid through third parties and have

no U.S. fingerprints on it, no U.S. presence, and have it delivered

by non-infidels. This is a strange situation we are in. I am not

aware of in history an effort that is so unappreciated, in fact actively scorned. Has anyone proposed terminating it, the PRTs?

Mr. BOWEN. No.

Mr. COOPER. At least in those areas where——

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Mr. BOWEN. Oh, yes. We did in our original draft report. We proposed pulling personnel out of the dangerous areas in the south,

but as a result of the responses we got from MNFI and from the

embassy, we modified our recommendation.

Mr. COOPER. So you yielded to their pressure?

Mr. BOWEN. No, we were persuaded that they have a plan that

is calculated to succeed, and therefore it is worthwhile to keep

those open for now.

Mr. COOPER. The chamber of commerce-type plan that is completely not understood in many parts of the world.

I see that my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Why don’t we go ahead and start the clock again.

I wanted to ask, and I have several questions that may not take

so long. Mr. Bowen, not in your report, but in your written statement you made mention of the five of your folks that were wounded

or injured. Were all those U.S. Government employees?

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, they were.

Dr. SNYDER. Were you satisfied with the care and the follow-on

care that has occurred for them?

Mr. BOWEN. Yes, I am.

Dr. SNYDER. One of the issues that you bring up in your report

is the issue of the CERP money, where the local military had some

money, our military had money and they could do projects, and you

make the point that it actually seemed to work against ourselves

when you are trying to build capacity of local people to do projects.

How does that get resolved?

I know on my first trip back when General Petraeus was our

commander in Mosul, one of the things he talked to us about was

he wanted the ability to have more money for local projects. That

was, I think, probably the early acute phase of the situation. Is

that how you would look at this, that there would be a progression

in a fairly rapid amount of time from when the military has funds

to where it would need to be coming through the local government?

How do you see that?

Mr. BOWEN. The Commander’s Emergency Response Program is

separate from the PRT spending. However, it is operating in similar locales addressing similar projects. The PRTs now have a quick

response fund program, the QRF program similar to CERP, actually, to rapidly turn around high-value, high-need projects.

The point that we make in our audit is that better coordination

between the PRTs and DOD with respect to the use of CERP funds

is necessary because we ran into situations where the PRTs were

addressing a project through the provincial reconstruction development council, and suddenly it was completed independently by

CERP program.

Dr. SNYDER. That is certainly an indication of the lack of coordination.

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. It is another example of just the need to communicate more clearly on the ground.

Dr. SNYDER. Yes. In one of your introductory—I don’t know the

page, 9, I guess it is—of your report, I will just read this statement

which I think is probably stating the obvious, but I quote: ‘‘Despite

the best efforts of PRT civilian and military officials who are workVerDate 22-MAR-2001 10:02 Sep 05, 2008 Jkt 038977 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-96\291160.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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ing under dangerous and austere conditions to accelerate the rocky

transition to self-reliance, resolving these problems will likely be a

slow process. It will require years of steady engagement and will

depend heavily on a security environment and political settlements

at the national level.’’

I assume by that you are not saying it will take years of PRT

involvement, but the hope is that at some point we can transition

from PRTs to the normal State Department, USAID, Department

of Justice relationship.

Mr. BOWEN. Yes. That is what I am referring to.

Dr. SNYDER. Right. My last question, Mr. Bowen. We have had

some ongoing discussions in this committee, but there have also

been press discussions about the issue of staffing, the civilian side

of things. In fact, there was a reference in either the Post or the

Times yesterday in which is kind of rehashed the criticism that

had come from the military and from Secretary Gates about the inability of the civilian side to staff up some of these positions.

From our testimony from our civilian side as recently as Tuesday, we had somebody from the State Department, the Justice Department, Treasury, Ag and USAID, they felt very strongly that

they were meeting the needs now in terms of what they had been

asked to do in terms of staffing these PRTs.

That is contrary to what Ginger Cruz testified before us a few

weeks ago, or a couple of months ago, I guess, now, in your previous report. This report did not cover that, but we seem to have

either a breakdown of information or there is new information. Do

you have any thoughts about that issue in terms of the staffing on

the civilian side?

Mr. BOWEN. I do. I have some new information on that that I got

from my staff over in Baghdad today. With respect to phase two

of staffing of the ePRTs, that phase concluded on August 31. The

goal was to fill 133 slots; 104 are on the ground there now, and 16

are enroute; 13 still need to be employed and deployed.

With phase three, which we are in now, the deadline is the end

of the year. The goal is 111. There are 20 on the ground right now,

47 enroute, and 44 yet to be filled. So obviously there are some significant staffing issues pending with respect to ensuring that the

ePRTs can do their mission.

At the same time, the ePRTs are about 300 and the existing

PRTs are a little bit over 300. Those existing PRT tours—I don’t

have information on that, but we need to look into it—are going to

expire. There oldest one has been around for two years, and so I

expect there will be some turnover issues ongoing in the existing

PRTs as well.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Akin, any further questions?

Mr. AKIN. That was a good question, and I don’t have any additional.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. No, thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. We appreciate you all being here today. I am sorry

we got interrupted the one time. Members may have questions that

they would like to have you submit a written answer to. I will just

give you an open-ended question, if when you get back to your office you realize you should have said something differently, or your

28

staff says, ‘‘you know, what you said was really dumb,’’ you should

feel free to submit any kind of written statement in response, and

we will be glad to add it to our record.

Thank you both, Mr. Bowen and Mr. Perito, for being here.

Yes, Mr. Bowen?

Mr. BOWEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PERITO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SNYDER. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

OCTOBER 18, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

OCTOBER 18, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

OCTOBER 18, 2007

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. Please provide one or more concrete examples of possible objectives,

measures of effectiveness, and milestones as those terms apply to the PRT program.

Mr. BOWEN. As discussed in our report, each PRT has differing needs and the

plan for each PRT would contain elements tailored to the needs of the province.

An example might be that a particular province has difficulties in budgeting. The

objective might be to help the province develop budgeting and fiscal policies. The

steps leading up to improving the province’s budgeting capacity might be to (1) help

it learn financial forecasting, (2) develop and adopt financial policies, (3) identify the

costs of government services, (4) set government charges and fees, (5) develop a

strategic plan, and (6) develop a capital asset support plan. Each of these steps

would have an achievement plan that identified the steps planned and a timeline

for accomplishing each step. This would give senior management and the Congress

a sense of what we are trying to accomplish, whether progress was being made, and

whether sufficient resources were in place.

Dr. SNYDER. In your discussion with Mr. Akin regarding central, regional, and

local government authority under the Iraqi constitution, you stated that you would

get back to the subcommittee with additional detail. Please describe your view of

the current state of ‘‘federalism’’ and how it affects relations between the different

levels of Iraqi government under Iraqi law, and your view of how that might change

under a provincial powers law.

Mr. BOWEN. Iraq’s central government has a predominant role in decision-making,

including decisions related to the allocation of resources, especially outside of Iraqi

Kurdistan. In the rest of Iraq, significant decisions must usually be made in Baghdad—the powers of the provinces are vague de jure and scant de facto.

Three legal elements directly affect the state of federalism in Iraq today: the ‘‘regions provision’’ in the Constitution; the nascent new provincial powers law; and the

nascent new elections law.

The effect of the Constitution’s ‘‘regions provision’’ was suspended at the end of

2006. It is scheduled to become effective on April 18, 2008. Once effective, the provision permits two or more provinces to form a region, reducing the central government’s power over the provinces within the region, particularly in the areas of security and fiscal affairs. One reason why there have been delays on a number of significant pieces of legislation long pending before the Council of Representatives is

that the regions law will create a significant shift in the balance of power between

the central government and regional governments, and political forces whose support is concentrated in particular regions appear to be awaiting a shift in power

which may make concessions within the national legislature unnecessary. The regions law (rather than the provincial powers law, discussed below) will be the catalyst for potentially fundamental change in the balance of power between the central

and provincial governments.

The US Mission in Iraq has identified passage of the provincial powers as one of

the five most important priorities in our political engagement with Iraq. Among

other things, the law will clarify the authority of provincial councils. Passage of the

provincial powers Law will enable US Provincial Reconstruction Teams to provide

capacity building programs more clearly focused on the mechanisms to help provinces use the powers they will have in the new dispensation.

A new elections law will permit the holding of new provincial elections, which will

correct the imbalances that now exist in a number of provincial councils. The imbalances occurred because the Sunnis boycotted the January 30, 2005, elections. The

problem is particularly acute in Diyala Province, which has a majority Sunni population but has an all-Shia council. Similar problems exist in Nineveh, where the

Sunnis have no representation on an all-Kurdish Council, despite having a significant presence in the populace.

Dr. SNYDER. Are you are aware, from your investigation of PRTs, of whether the

U.S. conducts or sponsors Iraqi public opinion polls to determine the local impact

of U.S. programs, specifically whether PRT operations have resulted in increased

positive opinion towards the U.S.? Would such polls be a useful tool to help evaluate

PRT progress?

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Mr. BOWEN. In October 2006, SIGIR recommended that the Secretaries of State

and Defense take action to define PRT objectives and performance measures and to

develop milestones for achieving program objectives. To date, OPA and the MultiNational Force-Iraq (MNF–I) have not clearly defined PRT objectives and performance measures. Therefore, neither we nor, we believe, PRT management at any level

can easily report on what the PRTs and ePRTs are accomplishing, individually or

collectively.

Assuming that the PRT program, as a whole and in individual locations, has clear

goals, it may be possible to use polling to help determine if those goals are being

met—changing perceptions may be good evidence of meeting goals. Polling is carried

out in Iraq but it may be difficult to poll a sufficiently representative group in certain geographic areas.

Dr. SNYDER. You provided information regarding current staffing of PRTs in Iraq.

What is your source for those numbers, and have you received additional updates

since then?

Mr. BOWEN. The current information on staffing of PRTs was derived from information provided by the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), which oversees the PRT

program at the US Embassy, Baghdad.

Dr. SNYDER. In its September 10, 2007, response to the draft SIGIR recommendations, the Embassy stated that an interagency working group was actively updating

objectives and developing performance measures, and expected to complete the task

with [sic] a month. Given that it has been over a month since that response, are

you aware of whether they have completed this task?

Mr. BOWEN. SIGIR has been told by OPA and State Department officials (as of

November 9, 2007) that work is nearly complete on updating objectives and performance measures for PRTs. We have asked for copies of those documents and await

their receipt.

Dr. SNYDER. Do you have any specific observation regarding the role to be played

by PRTs in areas that have been turned over to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)? At

what point should we consider security to have progressed to where non-governmental organizations or traditional USAID missions would be capable of taking over

for PRTs?

Mr. BOWEN. In meetings on November 9, we were informed by State Department

officials that there have been assurances from the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Commander, Gen. Odierno, has committed to provide military support for PRT mission

in provinces which have transferred to PIC. PRTs will continue to have an important role around the country as military presence is reduced, but military security

is still needed by PRT staff. When PRT staff have been able to live in and move

around within their areas of responsibility without military support, other modalities for providing assistance to Iraq, which may include traditional USAID missions,

could be substituted for PRTs.

Dr. SNYDER. Is there any additional information you would like to provide to the

subcommittee for the record, or any corrections or clarifications you would like to

make with respect to your testimony?

Mr. BOWEN. While we appreciate the opportunity offered by this question, we

have no additional comments at this time.

Dr. SNYDER. In your testimony you stated ‘‘There is a need for an agreed set of

objective for PRTs and an agreed set of measurement for their performance.’’ Please

provide one or more concrete examples of possible objectives, measures of effectiveness and milestones as those terms apply to the PRT program.

Mr. PERITO. One goal for all PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan are self-sufficient,

transparent, accountable and capable provincial governments. For Iraq, one practical objective on the path to achieving that goal has been budget execution. PRTs

have been able to assist some provincial governments to develop and implement provincial budgets utilizing funds obtained from the central government in Baghdad.

Milestones have included the number of provincial governments that can accomplish

this task. Metrics include the amount of money obtained and disbursed and the

number of projects completed.

Dr. SNYDER. Are you aware if the U.S. conducts public opinion polls in Iraq or

Afghanistan to determine the local impact of U.S. programs, specifically where PRT

operations have resulted in a more positive attitude toward the U.S.? Would such

polls be a helpful tool to evaluate PRT progress?

Mr. PERITO. A far as I know, US authorities have not conducted public opinion

surveys in either country to access popular attitudes towards PRTs. For Iraq, State

Department officials believe such polls might indicate that PRTs were trying to upstage Iraqi officials to take credit for providing services. In Afghanistan, NATO or

ISAF may have done polling. US PRTs are under ISAF. This may affect popular attitudes toward US PRTs.

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I believe polls would be useful in assessing popular attitudes toward PRTs, if done

appropriately. It is not in our interest or either the Iraqis or Afghans for the role

of PRTs to be invisible to the general public. Both governments will require our assistance for the foreseeable future. Host Government officials should get the credit,

but the public should understand that we are providing assistance.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Cooper discussed whether it is worth the U.S. continuing to

sponsor PRTs when in parts of Iraq the U.S. is ‘‘actively despised.’’ Would you care

to address Mr. Cooper’s concerns as to whether it is counter productive to continue

this work in the face of a lack of consideration for U.S. generosity?

Mr. PERITO. In a counterinsurgency, it is important that citizens identify progress

with the efforts of their own government and not with its foreign supporters. US

PRTs try to give credit to the host government whenever possible and to emphasize

the role of local officials.

The opposite approach can be counterproductive. At the start of the PRT program

in Afghanistan, US PRTs built schools without first determining whether the Afghan education ministry could provide teachers. The response from villagers was:

‘‘The US helped us by building a school, but our government failed to send a teacher.’’

PRTs need to coordinate their efforts with local authorities, reflect local concerns

and meet local needs. The target audience is not the small group of extremists that

despise us, but the majority that is looking for reasons to support the government.

Dr. SNYDER. SIGIR and many PRT officials have observed that rule of law issues

are problematic. Are PRTs the appropriate organization to deal with these issues?

Are they adequately resourced and staffed in Iraq or Afghanistan, or do they require

additional support from the Department of Justice, military Judge Advocates, or

others?

Mr. PERITO. In Iraq and Afghanistan, US assistance for police training, assistance

to the justice sector and support for corrections is provided through the US military

training commands and not through the operational commands, which are responsible for the PRTs. In Afghanistan, US PRT support for rule of law is generally limited to paying for construction of police stations and courthouses and advising the

Afghan police, if the PRT has a US military police officer assigned.

In Iraq, the PRT rule of law officer is usually a lawyer from the Justice Department or a commercial contractor working for the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. PRT Rule of Law officers have access to PRT project funds, but their ability to influence the Iraqi judicial system is

limited. PRTs would need substantial increases in staffing, funding and authority

to make an impact on Rule of Law performance. This assistance should be provided

by the Department of Justice and not by contractors of a commercial firm.

Dr. SNYDER. Do you have any observations regarding the role for PRTs in areas

that have been turned over to Provincial Iraqi Control? At what point is security

sufficient to justify turning over PRT operations to traditional USAID missions?

Mr. PERITO. In Iraq, the Italian PRT is located in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar province,

which was transferred to Iraqi control in September 2006. The Italian PRT has a

USAID component that is staffed by American and Iraqi contractors. The Italians

call the Dhi Qar PRT a ‘‘Reconstruction Support Unit.’’ The staff is entirely civilian.

The Dhi Qar PRT has no military component.

For security, the Italian PRT relies upon foreign contract guards and the Iraqi

military and police. It is located in a Shia area that has not experience insurgency

or sectarian strife. As the PRT operates in a permissive environment, it does not

use armored vehicles, nor does it restrict its activities to the provincial capital. The

PRT has successfully established excellent working relations with Iraqi officials and

tribal leaders. The PRT carries out a wide range of development projects. As security improves, other PRTs could transition to this type of operation.

Dr. SNYDER. Is there additional information you would like to provide or corrections to your testimony?

Mr. PERITO. No.

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