IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-10874

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff–Appellee

versus

RONNIE KEARBY, 

 Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

Before OWEN, Chief Judge, JONES and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Ronnie Kearby has had more than one brush with the law. His latest

exploits led to a guilty plea of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 

methamphetamine (“meth”). The district court sentenced him to, among other 

things, 235 months. He appeals, challenging the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 25, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

During May and June 2016, Kearby daily received between one and 

three ounces (28.35 and 85.05 grams, respectively) of meth from Nicole Herrera, whose supplier was Pablo Morales, who had imported the drugs from 

Mexico. Kearby consumed some of the meth but mainly distributed it around 

Dallas-Fort Worth. He was arrested in late June 2016. Fifteen months later, 

he pleaded guilty (without a plea agreement) of conspiracy to possess with 

intent to distribute meth in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) 

and 846.

Section 2D1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) established

Kearby’s base offense level by reference to the quantity of drugs involved in his

conduct. To calculate that quantity, the presentence investigation report 

(“PSR”) estimated (conservatively) that Kearby had purchased one ounce of 

meth per day. That estimate came from Herrera’s statement to investigators 

that she’d given Kearby one to three ounces per day. The PSR multiplied that 

quantity by sixty days—the period that Herrera said Kearby had participated 

in the conspiracy. All told, the PSR’s “conservative estimate” was 1,701 grams, 

yielding a base offense level of 32.

Next, the PSR applied a two-level importation enhancement under 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5) because the drugs had come from Mexico. It also recommended a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The net 

offense level was 31, and because of Kearby’s lengthy past, the criminal history 

category was VI. The PSR thus recommended a guideline range of 188 to 235 

months.

Kearby objected to the PSR on three main grounds.1 First, he contested 

 

1 Kearby had a fourth objection that he doesn’t press on appeal, relating to the PSR’s 

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Herrera’s reliability in providing information for the drug-quantity estimate. 

He pointed out that Herrera had faked cooperation with the Drug Enforcement 

Administration and duped an agent into returning her cellphone, at which 

point she promptly deleted her text messages from after June 2016, which 

destroyed critical evidence. Kearby also said that he had participated in the 

conspiracy for less than the sixty days Herrera alleged. Next, Kearby objected 

to the importation enhancement. There was “no evidence,” he claimed, that he 

had “ever directly or indirectly imported any [meth] from Mexico” nor that he 

knew the drugs were imported. Finally, he complained that he should have 

received a minor-participant reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, since he had 

participated for (in his view, less than) two months in a conspiracy that 

spanned forty.

The probation office refused to change its recommendations. The PSR’s

addendum noted that Herrera had been a credible and reliable source; that it 

was irrelevant whether Kearby knew the drugs had been imported; and that 

Kearby was an average, not minor, participant in the conspiracy.

Fast forward to sentencing. Kearby called Special Agent Brian Finney, 

who had interviewed Herrera, hoping that Finney’s testimony would help show 

that the PSR had overestimated the quantity of drugs. Things didn’t go as 

Kearby wished. Finney confirmed that Herrera’s phone didn’t have any text 

messages between her and Kearby from before May 22, 2016, and that Herrera 

had deleted relevant information from it. But Finney also testified that Herrera had stated she sold one to three ounces a day to Kearby; not all of Herrera’s sales had a corresponding text message; Herrera’s scoops had proven 

reliable and accurate in Kearby’s and others’ cases; with Herrera’s help, 

 

calculation of the criminal-history score.

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investigators had tracked down many other defendants; and the government 

had corroborated most of Herrera’s statements. The upshot: Finney “felt confident, based on what we were able to corroborate through her Facebook and 

text messages, as well as our own independent investigation, that [Herrera]

was being honest with us.”

The court overruled Kearby’s objections to the drug-quantity calculation, 

the importation enhancement, and the refusal to apply the minor-participant 

reduction. It found that the PSR had reasonably estimated the quantity based 

on “reliable information” and that Herrera was a credible informant. Citing 

our precedent, the court concluded that the importation enhancement applied

regardless of Kearby’s knowledge. And it adopted the PSR’s finding that 

Kearby did not deserve a minor-participant reduction. Accordingly, it calculated a guideline range of 188 to 235 months and concluded that a 235-month 

sentence was appropriate in view of Kearby’s criminal history.

Kearby appeals the sentence. He insists, among other things, that the 

district court erred in calculating the quantity of drugs, applying the importation enhancement, denying a minor-participant reduction, assuming the guidelines were mandatory, imposing an alternative sentence, and handing down a 

substantively unreasonable sentence.

II.

We review sentences for reasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 46 (2007). “Using a bifurcated review process, we first examine whether 

the district court committed any significant procedural error. If the district 

court’s decision is procedurally sound, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” United States v. Nguyen, 854 F.3d 276, 280 (5th 

Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

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A.

Kearby’s main assertion is that the district court procedurally erred in 

calculating the quantity of drugs. We begin with the contentions that he 

preserved in the district court.

1.

Kearby challenged the reliability of the calculation of quantity. That 

calculation “is a factual determination,” so we will not set it aside unless it was 

implausible in light of the whole record. United States v. Alford, 142 F.3d 825, 

831 (5th Cir. 1998). “When making factual findings for sentencing purposes, 

[the] district court[] may consider any information which bears sufficient 

indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” United States v. Harris, 

702 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted). 

Thus, it may “adopt facts contained in a PSR without inquiry, if those facts had 

an adequate evidentiary basis and the defendant does not present rebuttal 

evidence.” United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929, 943 (5th Cir. 1994). “[A] 

district court may consider estimates of the quantity of drugs for sentencing 

purposes.”2

First, Kearby asserts that because the government didn’t corroborate 

Herrera’s statements about the quantity sold to Kearby, the court clearly erred 

in relying on Herrera’s information. We reject that contention. If uncorroborated hearsay is sufficiently reliable, a district court may rely on it in making

sentencing findings. United States v. Malone, 828 F.3d 331, 337 (5th Cir.

2016). And the court can consider the statements of coconspirators such as

Herrera—even statements that are “somewhat imprecise”—in calculating 

 

2 Alford, 142 F.3d at 832 (quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Medina, 

161 F.3d 867, 876 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The amount [of drugs], moreover, need not be limited to 

the actual quantities seized; the district judge can make an estimate.”).

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drug quantity.3 The information that Herrera supplied about Kearby was 

reliable. Finney noted that Herrera had helped the government track down at 

least fifteen other defendants and that a “large majority” of the information 

she provided had been corroborated. Even if investigators did not specifically 

corroborate her report of the quantity sold to Kearby, Kearby has failed to show 

that it was implausible that her statements were accurate. See Alford, 

142 F.3d at 831.

Next, Kearby maintains that a better estimate is that he received meth 

for 39 days, not 60. He points out that there were no text messages between 

him and Herrera that predated May 22, 2016, and that he was arrested on 

June 29, 2016. But because the 60-day finding was not implausible, we reject 

Kearby’s contention. See id. Finney testified that Herrera didn’t associate 

every transaction with a text message. He also stated that some of Herrera’s 

texts from May 22 indicated that Herrera and Kearby had had “prior contact 

about [meth].” Thus, the 60-day finding wasn’t clearly erroneous.

Finally, Kearby attacks Herrera’s general credibility as a source. He 

notes that she destroyed evidence and claims she had a motive to lie to “receive 

reductions in her own sentence.” Kearby forgets, however, that we defer to a 

sentencing court’s credibility determinations.4 The district court carefully 

questioned Finney about Herrera before concluding that she was credible. 

 

3 Alford, 142 F.3d at 832; accord United States v. Cantu-Ramirez, 669 F.3d 619, 629

(5th Cir. 2012) (affirming reliance on coconspirator’s testimony in calculating the quantity of 

drugs involved in an offense); see also United States v. Rico, 864 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2017) 

(“Statements by coconspirators are sufficiently reliable to form the basis of a finding.”).

4 See United States v. Perez, 217 F.3d 323, 331–32 (5th Cir. 2000) (“At the sentencing 

hearing, the district court adopted the recommendations in the PS[R] in their entirety and, 

in large measure, made credibility assessments . . . . We defer to the trial court’s superior 

position in making such credibility calls.”); United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 799 (5th

Cir. 1996) (“Credibility determinations in sentencing hearings are peculiarly within the 

province of the trier-of-fact.” (quotation marks omitted)).

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That is more than enough to trigger our deference.

2.

For the first time on appeal, Kearby raises several contentions related to 

the drug-quantity calculation. Because they were not preserved, we exercise 

plain-error review. United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 2007). 

The first requirement of plain error is that the “appellant must show (1) an 

error or defect . . . .” United States v. Daniel, 933 F.3d 370, 382 (5th Cir. 2019) 

(and quotation marks omitted). There is no error, plain or otherwise.

First, Kearby contends that the district court erred as a matter of law in 

using a “multiplier method” to calculate the drug quantity. He suggests that 

“[e]stimation of drug quantity using the ‘multiplier’ method is only appropriate 

where a known quantity of drugs is involved in a particular occurrence . . . and 

is extrapolated to other such occurrences.”

We disagree that the court applied a “multiplier method,” and Kearby’s 

formulation proves it. There was a “known quantity of drugs” (one ounce) and

a “known quantity of” days (sixty). Hence, unlike the courts in United States 

v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Cabrera, 

288 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), the court did not extrapolate from a 

known event to predict what had happened in other unknown events.5 Instead, 

all events were “known.”6 That the court had to dust off its calculator and run 

 

5 See Betancourt, 422 F.3d at 248 (“Knowing only the amount of cocaine sold to 

Esparza, the district court properly used this figure as a multiplier for each dealer to whom 

Betancourt claimed he sold cocaine.”); Cabrera, 288 F.3d at 170–72 (affirming extrapolation 

of known number of immigrants smuggled on two occasions to other occasions on which the 

number of immigrants wasn’t known).

6 Kearby disagrees that the quantity of drugs and number of days were “known.” But 

for reasons already described, those estimates were reliable.

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the numbers does not mean it applied some sort of “multiplier method.”7

Relatedly, Kearby contends that the district court erroneously failed to 

apply a “discount” “to arrive at a more reliable estimated [drug] quantity.” We 

reject both the premise and the conclusion. Kearby does not point to any case 

of ours that requires such a “discount,” and the estimate was both reliable and 

conservative.

Finally, Kearby contends that the meth he consumed shouldn’t be 

counted “since [21 U.S.C. §] 841(a)(1) makes distribution unlawful, not purchases.” But he properly concedes that our precedent forecloses that claim. 

E.g., United States v. Clark, 389 F.3d 141, 142 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). 

Accordingly, Kearby has failed to show plain or clear error in the calculation of 

quantity.

B.

Kearby challenges the district court’s application of an importation 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5). That section allows a two-level 

increase 

[i]f (A) the offense involved the importation of amphetamine or 

[meth] or the manufacture of amphetamine or [meth] from listed 

chemicals that the defendant knew were imported unlawfully, and 

(B) the defendant is not subject to an adjustment under §3B1.2 

(Mitigating Role) . . . .

1.

First, Kearby urges that the importation enhancement can’t apply as a 

matter of law because (1) he wasn’t aware that the drugs had been imported;8

(2) the importation didn’t “take place during the ‘window’ of [his] involvement”

 

7 We express no view on when a “multiplier method” might be appropriate.

8 Kearby admits that that contention is foreclosed by this court’s precedent. See 

United States v. Serfass, 684 F.3d 548, 552 (5th Cir. 2012).

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in the conspiracy; (3) it violates due process to apply the enhancement even 

where a defendant doesn’t know the drugs had been imported; and (4) importation wasn’t relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).

Our precedent forecloses all four contentions. As to the first two, the 

“distribution (or possession with intent to distribute) of imported [meth], even 

without more, may subject a defendant to the § 2D1.1(b)(5) enhancement.” 

United States v. Foulks, 747 F.3d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). That 

is, the enhancement applies even if the distributor doesn’t know of the drugs’

foreign origins.9 So, it’s irrelevant whether Kearby knew the drugs had come 

from Mexico; and, by the same logic, the importation needn’t have happened

during the “‘window’ of Kearby’s involvement” in the conspiracy.

Kearby’s due process point is equally barred. In Serfass, 684 F.3d at 553, 

we held that courts don’t violate due process in imposing the § 2D1.1(b)(5) 

enhancement “without requiring knowledge of importation.” Finally, we reject 

Kearby’s contention that the enhancement can’t apply because the importation 

wasn’t relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). We dismissed the 

same in United States v. Croxton, 693 F. App’x 327, 327–28 (5th Cir. 2017) (per 

curiam), on the ground that mere distribution of imported drugs, “without 

more, may subject a defendant to the § 2D1.1(b)(5) enhancement.”

2.

Second, Kearby asserts that his case presents a supposedly unresolved 

question: Whether mere possession (with intent to distribute) of imported

meth “involve[s] the importation of . . . [meth]” under § 2D1.1(b)(5) (emphasis 

added). But we have answered that question—and not in a way that Kearby 

 

9 Id.; accord Serfass, 684 F.3d at 552 (“Thus, the § 2D1.1(b)(5) sentencing enhancement applies if the offense involved the importation of amphetamine or [meth] regardless of 

whether the defendant had knowledge of that importation.” (quotation marks omitted)). 

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would have preferred. In United States v. Rodriguez, 666 F.3d 944, 946 (5th 

Cir. 2012), the defendant pleaded guilty of possession with intent to distribute 

meth, much like Kearby’s guilty plea of conspiracy to do the same. The defendant objected to the importation enhancement, complaining that her “offense 

did not involve the importation of [meth], because the importation was complete before she came into possession.” Id. We disagreed, noting that “[t]he 

scope of actions that ‘involve’ the importation of drugs is larger than the scope 

of those that constitute the actual importation.” Id.

3.

Finally, Kearby attacks the district court’s factual findings on the importation enhancement, urging that there was insufficient evidence that the drugs 

had been imported. But Kearby told the district court that he was not 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. In his written objections to the 

PSR, he conceded that “the evidence shows that Pablo Morales imported the 

[meth] from Mexico, providing it to Herrera, who then sold a small percentage 

of that [meth] to the Defendant.” And at sentencing, after the court asked 

Kearby whether he contended that the drugs “w[ere] not imported,” Kearby 

clarified that he was not doing so. The issue is thus waived.10

C.

Kearby contends that the district court procedurally erred in refusing to 

apply a minor-participant reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), which allows, 

 

10 Kearby also complains that there was insufficient evidence that he was involved 

with the “manufacture of . . . [meth] from listed chemicals that the defendant knew were 

imported unlawfully.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5). But that (understandably) misreads the PSR. 

Though the PSR initially stated that Kearby’s “offense involved the importation of [meth]

from listed chemicals that the defendant knew were imported unlawfully,” that was merely 

an error. The amended PSR later stated that the enhancement applied only because “[t]he 

[meth] the defendant obtained from Herrera was imported from Mexico.”

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among other things, a two-level reduction “[i]f the defendant was a minor 

participant in any criminal activity.” That guideline is intended to account for 

defendants who are “substantially less culpable than the average participant 

in the criminal activity.” Id. at cmt. n.3(A). A minor-participant reduction is 

appropriate for one “who is less culpable than most other participants in the 

criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as minimal.”11

Whether a minor-participant reduction is appropriate turns “on the 

totality of the circumstances.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C). The district court 

should consider five factors concerning the defendant’s knowledge, planning, 

authority, responsibility, and benefit from the illegal scheme. See id. The 

court need not “expressly weigh each factor in § 3B1.2 on the record.” United

States v. Torres–Hernandez, 843 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir. 2016). Instead, the

court sufficiently addresses the factors if the parties cite them and proffer facts 

and contentions relating to them.12

Kearby contends that the § 3B1.2 factors “were not given individualized 

consideration.” He maintains that because the PSR stated “only the bare 

assertion and conclusion that ‘the defendant was an average participant in this 

conspiracy,’” the district court “adopted only a conclusory statement with no 

factual support.” Kearby preserved that contention, so we evaluate “the 

 

11 Id. at cmt. n.5. This court looks to note 5 of the commentary to § 3B1.2 for the 

definition of a minor participant. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 921 F.3d 452, 483 (5th 

Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.5 in defining a “minor participant”).

12 Torres-Hernandez, 843 F.3d at 209–10; accord United States v. Ramirez-Esparza, 

703 F. App’x 276, 279–80 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citation and quotation marks omitted):

Ramirez-Esparza also argues that the district court erred by focusing on this 

one factor rather than considering all of the listed factors. We disagree. A 

district court is not required to expressly weigh each factor in § 3B1.2 on the 

record. The record reveals that the district court was presented with facts and 

arguments implicating other listed factors both in the PSR documents, 

Ramirez-Esparza’s written objections to the PSR, and at sentencing.

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district court’s interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines 

de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Lord,

915 F.3d 1009, 1017 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 320 (2019).

The district court did not err in refusing to apply a minor-participant 

reduction. Before the court ruled, each party presented its contentions about

the enhancement. The court was apprised of the relevant factors in the government’s response to Kearby’s written objections to the PSR. See Torres–

Hernandez, 843 F.3d at 209–10. And, contrary to Kearby’s suggestions, the 

court did not adopt a merely conclusory assertion when it approved the PSR’s 

findings. The PSR’s addendum determined that Kearby “purchased and sold 

[meth],” which is behavior part and parcel of a drug conspiracy. It then properly concluded that Kearby wasn’t entitled to a reduction. There is no error in 

the decision not to apply a minor-participant reduction.

D.

Finally,13 having found no procedural errors, we evaluate whether the 

235-month sentence was substantively reasonable. Nguyen, 854 F.3d at 280. 

Kearby thinks it wasn’t, but he mainly repackages his complaints of procedural 

error that we have already rejected.14 Compounding the problem, Kearby 

didn’t object to substantive reasonableness at sentencing, so we review for 

plain error. United States v. Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 256, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2009). 

 

13 Kearby also contends that the district court erroneously believed that the guidelines 

were mandatory and that it wrongfully imposed an alternative sentence. But “[b]ecause we 

do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief, we decline to address 

[those] issue[s].” United States v. Transocean Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 767 F.3d 485, 492 

(5th Cir. 2014).

14 Kearby asserts, for example, that the district court violated the Constitution in 

sentencing him “on the basis of [in]accurate information”; that purchases for individual use 

shouldn’t have been considered; and that the court shouldn’t have relied on Herrera’s statements to investigators.

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Under that (or any) standard, Kearby doesn’t overcome the “rebuttable presumption of reasonableness” of a within-guideline sentence like his. United 

States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006). The sentence was reasonable in light of Kearby’s extensive criminal history, and the district court adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, the judgment 

of sentence is AFFIRMED.

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