United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 29, 2007

Decided January 25, 2008

Before

Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE. S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 06-3683

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GEORGE BROCHES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Western Division

No. 05 CR 50037

Philip G. Reinhard,

Judge

O R D E R

George Broches pleaded guilty to bank fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344. He was

sentenced at the low end of the guidelines range to 97 months’ imprisonment. 

Broches filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel have moved to withdraw

because they are unable to find a nonfrivolous basis for appeal. See Anders v.

California, 386 U.S.738 (1967). We invited Broches to respond to counsel’s motion,

see Cir. R. 51(b), and he has done so. Our review is limited to the potential issues

identified in counsel’s facially adequate brief and Broches’ response. See United

States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973-74 (7th Cir. 2002). 

The government agreed in a written plea agreement that Broches had

accepted responsibility and, absent the discovery of conflicting evidence, was

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-3683 Page 2

therefore entitled to a three-point reduction in his offense level. See U.S.S.G.

§3E1.1(a), (b). But the probation officer recommended in the presentence report

that Broches receive a two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice, see id.

§ 3C1.1, and no reduction for acceptance of responsibility because he had willfully

concealed assets from the probation officer. The probation officer explained that

Broches had failed to disclose his ownership of a piece of real property worth

approximately $30,000 and apparently had tried to conceal that he owned both his

residence (which he transferred to his present landlord just two weeks before he

was indicted) and a restaurant. The probation officer deemed this information

necessary to accurately assess Broches’ ability to pay restitution, which the parties

agreed in the plea agreement he would owe in the amount of $271,997. See 18

U.S.C. §§ 3663(a)(3), 3663A, 3664. The probation officer also agreed with the

government’s recommendation that Broches receive a four-level increase in offense

level for his role as a leader or organizer of the fraud scheme. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.1(a).

At sentencing the district judge asked both defense counsel and Broches

whether they had any objections to the presentence report. Both replied that they

had none. The court, however, sua sponte addressed the proposed increase for

obstruction of justice because it was not contemplated in the plea agreement.

Broches was unable to provide a plausible explanation for his omissions. Defense

counsel posited that they were simply “miscommunication[s] between him and

Probation.” The court disagreed; it found that Broches willfully failed to disclose

assets. The court then adopted the probation officer’s recommendations in full. 

After hearing argument on the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court

sentenced Broches at the low end of the guidelines range. 

 

In their Anders submission, counsel first consider challenging the

voluntariness of Broches’ guilty plea, but properly avoid exploring that potential

issue because Broches has told them that he does not wish to have his plea set

aside. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Counsel next consider whether Broches could argue that it was clear error

for the district court to impose the two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of

justice. See United States v. Dale, 498 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2007). Making a

materially false statement to a probation officer with respect to a presentence

report can form the basis for an obstruction increase if the court finds that the

defendant did so willfully. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt n.4(h); United States v.

Kosmel, 272 F.3d 501, 510 (7th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Sapoznik, 161

F.3d 1117, 1121 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that obstructive conduct includes that

which impedes the court from imposing a justly deserved sentence). It follows that

several courts have upheld an increase for obstruction where a defendant concealed

assets in order to distort his ability to pay restitution. See United States v.
No. 06-3683 Page 3

Anderson, 68 F.3d 1050, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Nelson, 54 F.3d

1540, 1543-44 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Smaw, 993 F.2d 902, 903-05 (D.C.

Cir. 1993). And here we could not deem clearly erroneous the district court’s

finding that Broches’ willfully failed to disclose assets when he knew from the plea

agreement that he was subject to a hefty restitution order. We therefore agree

with counsel that this potential argument would be frivolous. 

Counsel and Broches next consider arguing that the district court erred by

denying Broches a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility, but once again we agree with counsel that the potential argument

would be frivolous. A defendant who obstructs justice, even one who pleads guilty,

is not entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility except in limited

circumstances not applicable here. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.4; United States v.

Davis, 442 F.3d 1003, 1009-10 (7th Cir. 2006).

Counsel and Broches next consider whether Broches could challenge the

reasonableness of his prison sentence. Broches’ sentence is within the properly

calculated guidelines range and thus would be presumed reasonable on appeal, see

United States v. Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (2007); United States v. Gama-Gonzalez,

469 F.3d 1109, 1110 (7th Cir. 2006), and counsel are unable to articulate any reason

why the presumption would be overcome. The district court gave detailed and

meaningful consideration to the relevant factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which is all

it was required to do. See United States v. Laufle, 433 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Broches insists that his 97-month sentence creates an “unwarranted disparity”

between him and a co-defendant who received a one-year sentence. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(6). But Broches fails to say how the difference can be unwarranted when

he was a leader in the offense and engaged in obstructive conduct. See United

States v. Gammicchia, 498 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 2007). We have said repeatedly

that differences in sentences arising solely from the application of the guidelines

cannot be unwarranted, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 479 F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir.

2007), and so this potential argument would be frivolous.

Finally, Broches identifies two potential arguments not discussed in counsel’s

Anders brief. First he wishes to argue that the district court violated the Ex Post

Facto Clause by determining his guidelines range using the guidelines manual in

effect at the time of sentencing, not the manual in effect when he committed his

offense. Had the parties used the latter manual, he argues, his total offense level

would have been reduced by three. This argument is foreclosed by our current

precedent, see United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir. 2006)

(holding that Ex Post Facto Clause is inapplicable to sentencing guidelines), and

would therefore be frivolous. Broches also proposes to argue that the district court

erroneously increased his offense level by four when the court determined that he

was “an organizer or leader” of the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Broches failed
No. 06-3683 Page 4

to object to this increase, so our review would be for plain error only. See United

States v. Wilson, 437 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2006). He asserts without elaboration

that there is “no evidence” to support the adjustment. But in his plea agreement he

admitted that he devised the fraudulent scheme and recruited several accomplices. 

These admissions, which we take as true, see United States v. Logan, 244 F.3d 553,

558 (7th Cir. 2001), are both indicative of a leadership role, see United States v.

Wasz, 450 F.3d 720, 729-30 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus this argument would also be

frivolous.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED and the appeal is

DISMISSED.