COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-16-00066-CR

AARON RENE GLASSPOOLE APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 78TH DISTRICT COURT OF WICHITA COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 53,017-B

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Aaron Rene Glasspoole represented himself at trial with the 

assistance of standby counsel and was convicted by a jury of aggravated 

robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2) (West 2011). The jury 

assessed his punishment at life imprisonment, and the trial court sentenced him 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

accordingly.2In his sole issue, Glasspoole argues that he did not knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to assistance of counsel. We will 

affirm. 

II. BACKGROUND

Glasspoole was charged with aggravated robbery after a convenience 

store clerk identified him as the individual who entered the store, displayed and 

cocked a gun, and stole two tubes from the store’s safe that each contained $50 

in small bills. On the Wednesday before his trial was to begin the next Monday, 

Glasspoole filed a motion for a Faretta3 hearing in which he asserted his right to 

represent himself at trial. On the Friday before his trial, the trial court held a 

Faretta hearing. 

During that hearing, Glasspoole told the trial court that he wanted to 

represent himself at trial. The trial court then inquired into Glasspoole’s 

background, eliciting that Glasspoole was thirty-seven years old, had obtained 

his GED, and had represented himself twice previously. The trial court told 

Glasspoole that it thought he was making a mistake in attempting to represent 

himself and that he would receive no special consideration simply because he 

was untrained in the law. The trial court warned Glasspoole that his lack of 

knowledge of evidentiary rules could be detrimental to his case and that he would 

 

2Glasspoole’s punishment range was enhanced because he had two prior 

felony convictions. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2015). 

3See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975).
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not be able to claim ineffective assistance of counsel if he represented himself. 

The trial court then stated that it would allow Glasspoole to represent himself, but 

the trial court also appointed the assistant public defender—who was 

representing Glasspoole during the Faretta hearing—as standby counsel. 

On the day of his trial, just before the prospective jury members were 

brought in for voir dire, Glasspoole again told the trial court that he wished to 

represent himself at trial. Glasspoole was allowed to represent himself, although 

his standby counsel was present during all three days of his trial. Glasspoole 

conferred with his standby counsel on several occasions during voir dire, and his 

standby counsel and the standby counsel’s assistant answered several questions 

posed by the trial court during both the guilt/innocence phase and punishment 

phase of trial regarding Glasspoole’s attempt to secure the attendance of 

witnesses. Ultimately, the jury convicted Glasspoole of aggravated robbery and 

assessed his punishment at life imprisonment. 

III. WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL

A. The Law

The United States Constitution gives criminal defendants the right to 

assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions in which the defendant may be 

punished by imprisonment. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; see also Tex. Code 

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051 (West Supp. 2015). In lieu of being represented by 

counsel, however, a criminal defendant also has a Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819–20, 95 S. Ct. at 2533. Before the trial 
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court may allow a defendant to represent himself, the defendant must knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel. 

Id. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541; Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353, 356 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2008). In order for a waiver to be effective, the trial court must make the 

defendant “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so 

that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is 

made with eyes open.’” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541 (quoting 

Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236, 242 

(1942)). The defendant should be made aware that there are technical rules of 

evidence and procedure and that he will not be granted any special consideration 

solely because he asserted his pro se rights. Williams, 252 S.W.3d at 356. The 

trial court, however, is not required to follow formulaic questioning or a particular 

script in assuring that a defendant who has asserted his right to selfrepresentation does so with eyes open. Burgess v. State, 816 S.W.2d 424, 428 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Fletcher v. State, 474 S.W.3d 389, 396 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d).

Courts draw a distinction between defendants who solely represent 

themselves at trial and those who have the assistance of counsel. “The term 

‘standby counsel’ usually describes situations when, in response to a defendant’s 

request for self-representation, the trial court instead allows the defendant’s 

attorney to remain as counsel and be available to advise the defendant and 

participate in the case, or not, as requested by the defendant.” Dolph v. State, 
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440 S.W.3d 898, 907 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d) (citing Walker v. 

State, 962 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d)). “In 

such a case, if the defendant thereafter invokes the participation of standby 

counsel, the representation becomes hybrid, which has been described as 

‘partially pro se and partially by counsel.’” Dolph, 440 S.W.3d at 907 (citing 

Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)).

Texas courts have held that Faretta admonishments are not required for 

defendants engaged in hybrid representation. See, e.g., Alexander v. State, No. 

02-15-00033-CR, 2016 WL 2586602, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 5, 2016, 

pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Dolph, 440 S.W.3d at 907; 

Walker, 962 S.W.2d at 126. Some courts, including this one, go even further, 

holding that Faretta admonishments are not required for defendants with standby 

counsel. See, e.g., Bradford v. State, No. 05-14-01610-CR, 2016 WL 326631, at 

*2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 27, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication); Anderson v. State, No. 2-02-00060-CR, 2003 WL 21101519, at *2 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 15, 2003, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication);

Walker, 962 S.W.2d at 127; Robertson v. State, 934 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.). But see Grant v. State, 255 S.W.3d 

642, 647 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (“[I]n our view Faretta 

admonishments should be given regardless of the appointment of standby 

counsel.”).
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The rationale for not requiring Faretta admonishments when a defendant 

has hybrid representation or standby counsel is that “since counsel remains to 

assist the accused [there is] no need to admonish the accused of the dangers 

and disadvantages of self-representation.” Robinson v. State, No. 05-04-00235-

CR, 2005 WL 1670626, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 19, 2005, no pet.) (not 

designated for publication). Indeed, Texas courts have repeatedly held that “no 

question of waiver of counsel is involved” in cases of hybrid representation or 

cases when a defendant has access to standby counsel. See, e.g., Maddox v. 

State, 613 S.W.2d 275, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (op. on reh’g) (holding no 

question of waiver when defendant engaged in hybrid representation); Phillips v. 

State, 604 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (same); Dolph, 440 S.W.3d 

at 907 (same); Jones v. State, No. 14-04-00950-CR, 2005 WL 2787306, at *1 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 27, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (holding no question of waiver when standby counsel 

is appointed); Robinson, 2005 WL 1670626, at *2 (same); Rainwater v. State, 

634 S.W.2d 67, 68 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, no pet.) (holding no question of 

waiver when counsel relegated to an accessory role). 

B. Application of the Law to the Facts

Glasspoole argues that his waiver of his right to assistance of counsel was 

not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made, pointing to the fact that he 

answered many of the trial court’s questions at the Faretta hearing with non 

sequiturs, that the trial court had to ask him multiple times whether he wished to 
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represent himself at trial before he responded, and that he performed poorly at 

trial.4 But the record indicates that Glasspoole had standby counsel during his 

entire trial. The record also indicates that Glasspoole conferred with his standby 

counsel during trial, and that his standby counsel answered several questions 

posed by the trial court regarding his attempt to secure the attendance of 

witnesses. Because Glasspoole had standby counsel during his trial—counsel 

that participated, although to a limited degree, in the trial—“no question of waiver 

of counsel is involved.” Maddox, 613 S.W.2d at 286; Phillips, 604 S.W.2d at 908;

Dolph, 440 S.W.3d at 907; Jones, 2005 WL 2787306, at *1; Robinson, 2005 WL 

1670626, at *2; Rainwater, 634 S.W.2d at 68. We thus overrule Glasspoole’s 

sole issue. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Glasspoole’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

/s/ Sue Walker

SUE WALKER

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and WALKER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

 

4Among Glasspoole’s deficiencies at trial, he avers that he “failed to 

conduct any meaningful voir dire,” “lacked an understanding of evidentiary 

matters,” “was unable to call witnesses . . . because he had failed to issue 

subpoenas,” “failed to cross examine most of the State’s witnesses,” and “failed 

to make any meaningful or even coherent arguments.” 
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DELIVERED: July 28, 2016