Brig Gen Kenneth Newton Walker

Kenneth Walker enlisted at Denver, Colorado, 

on 15 December 1917. He took flying training 

at Mather Field, California, getting his commission and wings in November 1918.

After a tour in the Philippines, he returned 

to Langley Field, Virginia, in February 1925 

with a subsequent assignment in December 

1928 to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. 

Retained on the faculty as a bombardment instructor, Walker became the epitome of the 

strategic thinkers at the school and coined the 

revolutionary airpower “creed of the bomber”: 

“A well-planned, well-organized and well-flown 

air force attack will constitute an offensive that 

cannot be stopped.”

Following attendance at the Command and General Staff School at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1933 and promotion to major, he served for three 

years at Hamilton Field, California, and another three years at Luke Field, 

Ford Island, and Wheeler Field, Hawaii. Walker returned to the United States 

in January 1941 as assistant chief of the Plans Division for the chief of the 

Air Corps in Washington, DC.

He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1941 and colonel in March 

1942. During this time, when he worked in the Operations Division of the 

War Department General Staff, he coauthored the air-campaign strategy 

known as Air War Plans Division—Plan 1, the plan for organizing, equipping, 

deploying, and employing the Army Air Forces to defeat Germany and Japan 

should the United States become embroiled in war. The authors completed 

this monumental undertaking in less than one month, just before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor—and the United States was, in fact, at war.

In June 1942, he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned by Gen 

George Kenney as commander of Fifth Air Force’s Bomber Command. In this 

capacity, he repeatedly accompanied his B-24 and B-17 units on bombing 

missions deep into enemy-held territory. Learning firsthand about combat 

conditions, he developed a highly efficient technique for bombing when aircraft faced opposition by enemy fighter planes and antiaircraft fire.

General Walker was killed in action on 5 January 1943 while leading a 

bombing mission over Rabaul, New Britain—the hottest target in the theater. 

He was awarded the Medal of Honor. Its citation, in part, reads, “In the face 

of extremely heavy anti aircraft fire and determined opposition by enemy 

fighters, General Walker led an effective daylight bombing attack against 

shipping in the harbor at Rabaul, which resulted in direct hits on nine enemy 

vessels. During this action, his airplane was disabled and forced down by the 

attack of an overwhelming number of enemy fighters. He displayed conspicuous leadership above and beyond the call of duty involving personal valor and 

intrepidity at an extreme hazard to life.” Walker is credited with being one of 

the men who built an organization that became the US Air Force.
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to CADRE/AR, Building 1400, 401 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112–6004.

The Influence of Politics, Butler

Technology, and Asia on the

Future of US Missile Defense

Thank you for your assistance.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Cut along dotted line

AIR FORCE Fellows

COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

The Influence of Politics,

Technology, and Asia on the

Future of US Missile Defense

Jeffrey T. Butler

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Walker Paper No. 7

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5962

August 2007
Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data

Butler, Jeffrey T.

The influence of politics, technology, and Asia on the future of US missile defense / 

Jeffrey T. Butler.

 p. ; cm. – (Walker paper, 1555-7871 ; no. 7)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-58566-167-8

1. Ballistic missile defenses—United States. 2. United States—Foreign relations—Asia. 3. Asia—Foreign relations—United States. I. Title. II. Series.

358.1/74/0973––dc22

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, 

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: 

distribution unlimited.

This Walker Paper and others in the series are available 

electronically at the Air University Research Web site 

http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web 

site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

ii
iii

Since 1958 the Air Force has assigned a small number of 

carefully chosen, experienced officers to serve one-year tours at 

distinguished civilian institutions studying national security 

policy and strategy. Beginning with the 1994 academic year, 

these programs were accorded in-residence credit as part of 

professional military education at senior service schools. In 

2003 these fellowships assumed senior developmental education (SDE) force-development credit for eligible officers.

The SDE-level Air Force Fellows serve as visiting military ambassadors to their centers, devoting effort to expanding their 

colleagues’ understanding of defense matters. As such, candidates for SDE-level fellowships have a broad knowledge of key 

Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force issues. SDE-level 

fellows perform outreach by their presence and voice in sponsoring institutions. They are expected to provide advice as well 

as promote and explain Air Force and DOD policies, programs, 

and military-doctrine strategy to nationally recognized scholars, 

foreign dignitaries, and leading policy analysts. The Air Force 

Fellows also gain valuable perspectives from the exchange of 

ideas with these civilian leaders. SDE-level fellows are expected 

to apprise appropriate Air Force agencies of significant developments and emerging views on defense as well as economic and 

foreign policy issues within their centers. Each fellow is expected to use the unique access she or he has as grounds for 

research and writing on important national security issues. 

The SDE Air Force Fellows include the National Defense Fellows, 

the RAND Fellows, the National Security Fellows, and the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows. In addition, the Air Force 

Fellows program supports a post-SDE military fellow at the 

Council on Foreign Relations.

On the level of intermediate developmental education, the 

chief of staff approved several Air Force Fellowships focused on 

career broadening for Air Force majors. The Air Force LegislaAir Force Fellows
iv

tive Fellows program was established in April 1995, with the 

Foreign Policy Fellowship and Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency Fellowship coming under the Air Force Fellows 

program in 2003. In 2004 the Air Force Fellows also assumed 

responsibility for the National Laboratories Technologies Fellows.

AIR FORCE FELLOWS
v

Contents

Chapter	 Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2 Déjà vu All Over Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3 Evaluation of Current National

Missile-DEFENSE PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

4 Asia and the US Missile-defense

Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Tables

1 Deployed ballistic missiles by type 

and country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

2 Current space acquisition difficulties . . . . . . . . 67
vi

Page

Photographs

Airborne laser test aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Launch of ground-based interceptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Launch of standard missile-3 from an

Aegis BMD cruiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

GMD exoatmospheric kill vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Patriot (PAC-3) missile launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Sea-based X-band (SBX) radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

CONTENTS
vii

Foreword

In recent years the phrase “since the end of the Cold War” 

has constituted the prologue for scenarios based on the assumption that we have entered a somehow less dangerous 

phase of world affairs. That is far from self-evident. To mention 

that but two elements bring this supposition into question:

1. Proliferation has confronted us with regimes compared 

with which the late Soviet Union appeared “rational,” or at 

least predictable, certainly if viewed within its own context. 

Consequently, even a highly questionable supposition like 

“mutually assured destruction” could act as a stabilizer, 

at least for a short period. Now, however, one has to deal 

with international actors (rogue states and their terrorist 

clients) that must be regarded as “irrational” by any standards of international behavior.

2. Russia itself, while certainly no longer an ideological opponent, has embarked upon a neo-imperial path (initially 

against the other former Soviet republics) that has been 

shrugged off by many because of the visible decline of 

Russia’s military capability. What has been overlooked is 

the fact that this very weakness in “conventional” weapons has driven Russia to place far greater emphasis on 

nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. In that sense, a 

putative confrontation seems more likely to precipitate resort to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In the light of these developments, missile defense has become a key factor in US strategic planning. The problem, of 

course, lies with the stage of current technological development. Mid-course or terminal-phase systems appear closer to 

feasibility just now, at least theoretically. Unfortunately, these 

constitute the least satisfactory answers to missile attacks. 

Much further away from realization is a (putative) spacebased system aimed at destroying hostile missile launchings 

during the boost phase. That, however, seems to be the one way 

missile defense can come close to eliminating the threat without huge collateral damage (that would result from a terminalphase system). Unfortunately it provides only a very brief time 
viii

span for making the decision that a launch is taking place and 

acting accordingly. Failing an effective boost-phase system, the 

only effective answer would lie in preemptive action, with all of 

its international ramifications.

It is one of the many virtues of Col Jeffrey Butler’s deeply reflective and expert analysis of this complex and highly troubling 

issue that he does not avoid confronting all of the problematic 

and, at this stage theoretical, solutions to what may be deemed 

the number one security threat facing the United States. He approaches the political issues no less deftly than the complex 

technical questions. Despite the need for the latter, the result is 

a fluent and highly readable product. This is a very important 

work, and one hopes that it will receive the attention it deserves. 

The US Air Force is to be congratulated, not merely for producing such outstanding officers, but for having had the vision to 

create a symbiotic relationship with the, alas relatively few, academic institutions that have not only welcomed this association 

but have known how to make the most of the academic-military 

relationship. 

The Institute for the Study of Conflict Ideology and Policy 

(ISCIP) has been a particularly fortunate beneficiary of the Air 

Force’s National Defense Fellows program. Under it, these officers have been integrated fully into ISCIP’s in-depth, analytical 

research program, which addresses the problems posed by developments in the post-Soviet arena. The result has enhanced 

immeasureably the military insights reflected in the program’s 

publications, while providing the Air Force officers with unusual information concerning the political context. 

Colonel Butler’s work, as has been the case with some of his 

predecessors in the program, constitutes the culmination of a 

mutually beneficial relationship, and we are deeply appreciative to have been given the opportunity to be associated with 

this publication.

Uri Ra’anan

Director, Institute for the Study 

of Conflict Ideology and Policy

Boston, Massachusetts

FOREWORD
ix

Lt Col Jeffrey T. Butler, USAF, is a National Defense Fellow at 

Boston University, Massachusetts, performing research on 

Russia, Central Asia, and international military affairs. His experience spans a wide variety of acquisition, technology, space, 

and intelligence assignments. Colonel Butler holds an undergraduate degree in mathematics from the US Air Force Academy, 

graduate degrees in military studies and electrical engineering, 

and a doctorate in computer engineering from the Air Force 

Institute of Technology. He is also a graduate of Air Command 

and Staff College and Air War College.

About the 

Author

Lt Col Jeffrey T. Butler

xi

Abstract

This paper discusses the United States’ need for a limited 

missile-defense system and the political, technical, and diplomatic forces which define the requirements. The end of the 

Cold War, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and rise 

of terrorism challenge the utility of mutually assured destruction. This new context demands renewed consideration of strategic defense with emphasis on the true technical maturity and 

political costs. Like nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defenses 

have high political and psychological value that must be evaluated as intensely as the technology. Thus, the US engagement 

strategy toward Asia must also be informed by an understanding of security relationships, technology, and the unique role of 

domestic US politics. 

In the near term, the United States should only pursue a 

limited ballistic missile-defense system with emphasis on theater systems and countering long-range missiles from the 

handful of rogue states that are pursuing them. Concurrently, 

the United States must improve threat definition, demand increased technical maturity and testing, and pursue flexible 

systems that can perform militarily significant missions in addition to missile defense. Furthermore, engagement with friends 

and foes is essential to developing an effective missile-defense 

system, maximizing deterrence value and supporting other 

critical efforts such as WMD counterproliferation and intelligence gathering. This strategy will reduce the technical risk of 

missile defense, increase the United States’ freedom of action 

against a rising cadre of WMD-capable actors, and avoid unnecessary escalation in tension between the United States and 

Asia.

xiii

Preface

As the son of a United States Army infantryman growing up 

in Cold War Germany, I was fascinated and encouraged by 

Pres. Ronald Reagan’s vision to create a missile-defense shield 

that would end the threat of nuclear-tipped missiles. The post–

Cold War world is in many ways more chaotic than it was 20 

years ago. Furthermore, the ballistic missile threat is also more 

chaotic, which has reinvigorated a personal desire to once again 

investigate the usefulness and feasibility of missile defense. For 

the purposes of this study, “Russian” and “Russia” will be used 

to refer to the successor state of the Soviet Union.

The US government has a moral obligation to defend its 

people, and the idea of intentionally remaining vulnerable to 

attack is unsettling. Yet technology has limits, and it is not 

possible to eliminate or defend against all threats. As the old 

cliché goes, “those who attempt to defend against everything 

will defend against nothing.” Critics argue President Reagan’s 

dream is unachievable due to the limits of technology and diplomacy. However, there is a definite role and need for a more 

limited missile-defense vision if it is bounded by realistic and 

accurate assessments of threats, technology, and the international environment.

I extend my sincere appreciation for everyone who assisted 

in the preparation of this paper. I am thankful for the support 

and camaraderie of Boston University’s Institute for the Study 

of Conflict Ideology and Policy with special thanks to Prof. Uri 

Ra’anan, soon to be Dr. Susan Cavan, Lt Col John Kafer, and 

LCDR Marcel Leblanc. I also owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)/Lincoln 

Lab engineers and program managers who provided outstanding 

insight and background on missile-defense technology. One of 

my best experiences as an Air Force Fellow was participating in 

seminars with Professors Theodore Postol (MIT), Rob Pfaltzgraff 

(Tufts/Fletcher School), Neta Crawford (Boston University), 

and Don Babai (Harvard). Their knowledge, experience, and 

enthusiasm were superb. 

Finally, I give my highest thanks to God who placed me at 

Covenant Church. This was a great blessing for me as well as 
xiv

my wife, Dawn, and daughters, Sarah and Gracie, all of whom 

I love very much.

PREFACE


Chapter 1

Introduction

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that 

their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. 

retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept 

and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached 

our own soil or that of our allies?

I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may not 

be accomplished before the end of the century. Yet, current 

technology has attained a level of sophistication where it’s 

reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will take years, probably 

decades of efforts on many fronts. There will be failures and 

setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs.

—Pres. Ronald Reagan

23 March 1983

Since the World War II terror bombings of London by German 

V-1 and V-2 rockets, nations have desired a means to protect 

their homeland, populace, and fielded forces from missile attack. The addition of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

to ballistic missiles further increases the motivation for defense. However, ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a difficult 

challenge, and the massive buildup of missiles in the Cold War 

reflected the dominance of strategic offense over the limited 

ability to defend.

The end of the Cold War reduced nuclear tension between 

the United States, Europe, and Russia; but conversely, the 

threat of ballistic-missile attack has increased. Several reasons 

for the increased threat include the rise of global terror, proliferation of missile technology and WMDs, the acceptance of the 

use of theater ballistic missiles in conventional combat, and 

the increasing number and belligerence of unstable states primarily in the Middle East and Asia. For example, the “war of the 

cities” between Iran and Iraq demonstrated the confluence between missile technology proliferation and an emerging willingness to use ballistic missiles in combat as opposed to merely a 

deterrent. Moreover, the single, most costly Iraqi attack against 
INTRODUCTION

US forces in Operation Desert Storm resulted from a Scud ballistic missile.1

The change in the nature of the ballistic-missile threat reinvigorated the flame initially sparked by President Reagan’s “star 

wars” or Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Indeed, missile defense was signed into law by Pres. William J. “Bill” Clinton in 

1999 and is one of the highest priorities of Pres. George W. 

Bush’s administration. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 

2001 (9/11) and the subsequent military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq pushed the missile-defense issue off the 

front page. While the public debate is less vocal, much uncertainty still remains on which policy the United States should 

pursue on national missile defense and the resultant impact on 

global affairs. Among the chief issues are the true nature of the 

threat, the technical and operational feasibility of fielding missile defenses, and the impact on global stability.

The US strategy toward national missile defense should also 

be informed by an understanding of foreign defense priorities 

and perceptions. Understanding perceptions is important because much like nuclear weapons, BMDs have high political 

and psychological value which must be appreciated as intensely 

as technical capability. For example, the public debate on missile 

defense in the US tends to focus on intercontinental ballistic 

missiles (ICBM). However, many nations are more concerned 

about short- or medium-range theater ballistic missiles because their arch rivals are right next door. For example, a poorly 

planned introduction of theater missile defense in Taiwan will 

create a strong regional response from China which considers 

the issue of vital national interest. Consequently, US missiledefense policy must accurately appreciate the strategic impact 

of all forms of missile defense on other nations to include shortas well as long-range missile defense.

The political impact of US missile-defense policy is particularly important with respect to Asia as this continent will be the 

geopolitical focus of ballistic-missile and WMD concerns for the 

next decade. There are several critical actors with regard to missile 

defense in Asia. Russia has unique importance for US policy in 

the near term. Russia’s overall military decline is well documented, but it continues to promote and improve its ballisticmissile force as the primary source of deterrence and military 
INTRODUCTION

relevancy. Russia also recognizes its own vulnerability to Islamic 

extremism and WMD proliferation as illustrated by the bloody 

insurgency in Chechnya. Russia’s unique combination of WMD 

know-how but strong incentive to maintain the status quo in 

the region makes it a potential partner in maintaining stability 

in Asia.

Beyond Russia, the emerging nuclear powers of Asia also impact US missile-defense policy. US plans may have the most impact on China which maintains a minimum nuclear-deterrent 

force of approximately 20 ICBMs capable of reaching the United 

States. China is already engaged in a massive military expansion campaign, and even a limited US missile-defense system 

could cause further escalation in the number of Chinese ballistic missiles. Similarly, India and Pakistan are drawn into the 

mix as multiple, competing alliances create uncertainties and 

possibly destabilize the region. The political utility of missile 

defense is readily apparent by its value in negotiations such as 

with North Korea and alliance building with nations such as 

Japan and Israel. Clearly, Asian diplomacy will influence the 

success or failure of US missile-defense plans.

Chapter 2 provides a background in the genesis of the current US missile-defense program that is essential to understanding the political, technical, and diplomatic forces which 

shaped the existing strategy. Chapter 3 assesses the systems 

in development and early stages of deployment with emphasis 

on system architecture, affordability, and technical realism. 

Asian reaction to the US missile-defense program is described 

in chapter 4 along with an analysis of the forces that drive 

Asian strategic defense policies. Recommendations and conclusions for the US missile-defense program are defined in 

chapter 5.

Note

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry 

in the bibliography.)

1. Donovan, Terrorism Project.



Chapter 2

Déjà vu All Over Again

The decision to build a defense to protect the United States 

from missile attack is a crucial political issue facing the Bush 

administration and Congress. This is the third time that missile defense has risen to the top of the national policy agenda. 

—Senator John Warner

Senate Armed Services Committee

Failure is not a crime. Failure to learn from failure is.

—Walter Wriston

The United States has pursued BMD at varying levels of intensity since early in the Cold War as alluded to by Senator 

Warner’s quote. Early incarnations of missile defense were focused against the Soviet Union; however, the prospects for adequately defending against a massive attack were slim resulting 

in the acceptance of the mutually assured destruction (MAD) 

doctrine. This conclusion was codified in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 

Missile (ABM) Treaty which severely curtailed ABM deployments. 

The ballistic missile debate reemerged in the 1980s with 

President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. The technical 

and political realities of the 1990s reduced the SDI vision from 

an all-encompassing global defense to the more limited system 

now in development. A key milestone in the current debate was 

the dissolution of the 1972 ABM Treaty by the United States in 

2002. Internationally, the ABM Treaty was considered a pillar 

of global nuclear stability. The end of the ABM Treaty, along 

with a concerted effort by the United States to field a layered 

defense, has intensified the international debate on the merits 

and dangers of missile defense. The following sections detail 

events from 1960 to the present in order to demonstrate the 

substantial influence of politics, technology limitations, and 

international relations on US missile-defense policy.
DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN

Missile Defense in the Cold War

The US and Soviet investigation into missile defense began 

after World War II. The unprecedented German V-1 and V-2 

terror bombings of London were a chief culprit in initiating a 

desire to defend against ballistic-missile attack. Following the 

war, both nations rushed to acquire German missile technology 

to add to their own arsenals. This process uncovered German 

plans to build multistage long-range missiles potentially capable 

of ocean-spanning strikes around the world. While the emerging missile technology provided the potential for global range, 

the advent of nuclear weapons provided a compact payload capable of horrific destruction. Not surprisingly, the combination 

of ballistic missiles with WMDs initiated a serious investigation 

into strategic defense by both the Soviet Union and the United 

States.

Missile defense, as well as virtually the entire national-security 

enterprise, received heightened attention following the successful launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957. Russia’s ability to 

launch a satellite into orbit removed any doubt about the reality 

of the ICBM threat; and in 1958, the US Army accelerated development of the first US missile-defense system, the NikeZeus, that was successfully tested in 1962.

The Nike-Zeus system achieved several technical objectives, 

but it also revealed numerous issues that continue to plague 

missile-defense systems even today. First, the overall system was 

extremely complex and expensive. The system required four 

different types of radars that had to work in conjunction with

• detecting the incoming missile,

• discriminating the warhead from other objects,

• tracking the warhead,

• and then guiding the Nike-Zeus missile to the intercept 

point.

Beyond the complexity, radar technology of the era was illsuited to performing target discrimination at the required 

ranges resulting in a high likelihood of tracking the rocket body 

as opposed to the warhead. The cost for the system was also 

unattractive as estimates for fielding even a limited system 
DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN

were much greater than $15 billion for a system with questionable effectiveness.1

A second major issue was developing an effective kill vehicle. 

The quality of radar tracking was not adequate for a conventional warhead; therefore, the Nike-Zeus and all other ABM 

systems of this era used nuclear warheads to compensate for 

the lack of accuracy. Indeed, the Nike-Zeus and Spartan systems used megaton-plus warheads because the guidance systems were accurate only to a few kilometers. For reference, the 

atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were less 

than 20 kilotons. 

The use of nuclear warheads on the ABM interceptors created 

several issues. A prime concern was the potential for catastrophic collateral damage. The Starfish Prime experiment of 

1962 demonstrated the devastating effects of detonating a nuclear weapon in space.2 The radiation and ionization (electromagnetic pulse or EMP) created by the detonation would cause 

immediate physical damage to satellites in the line of site as well 

as disrupt ground radars and communication systems. Consequently, the first detonation would likely blind the missiledefense radars and the command-and-control system disrupting the ability to intercept subsequent missiles. An additional 

issue was the prospect of an ABM warhead falling on friendly 

soil due to a malfunction or unsuccessful intercept. These concerns in addition to other issues created tremendous controversy over the use of nuclear warheads in ABM missiles.

Finally, the rapidly increasing number, complexity, and geographic dispersal of ballistic missiles decreased the likelihood 

of fielding a credible missile defense in the 1960s. By the middle 

of the 1960s, the United States and Russia were firmly engaged 

in an ICBM arms race with rapidly expanding arsenals which 

could easily overwhelm any realistically conceivable defense. In 

addition, ICBMs were becoming more difficult to intercept with 

the development of multiple-warheads/single-missile combinations with the intentional inclusion of decoys and electronic 

countermeasures such as chaff to overwhelm the already weak 

target discrimination and tracking radars. Targeting complexity 

also increased as both the United States and Russia developed 

tactics for ingress (e.g. multiple approaches, leader/follower, 

and staged arrival) that would easily render the available mis-
DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN

sile defenses impotent while allowing the majority of missiles to 

reach their objectives.3 Additionally, the locations of deployed 

missiles increased during the 1960s to include the arrival of 

the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The need to 

constantly search for thousands of warheads coming from virtually any direction with effective decoys was too much for a 

realistic defense.

The policy and strategy debate continued strong in the United 

States, but the clear inadequacy of the available missile-defense 

technology along with Soviet willingness to discuss arms limitations led to the 1972 ABM Treaty. While there was little disagreement over the validity and nature of the threat, the US 

missile-defense debate in the 1960s was nonetheless intense 

and acrimonious. Advocates of missile defense acknowledged 

technical limitations but believed that even a defense of limited 

utility would save lives. Moreover, many advocates pointed to a 

moral issue with the doctrine of MAD which would put the 

United States at risk without even trying to defend itself. Conversely, opponents of missile defense pragmatically highlighted 

the clear inability to field an effective missile defense at any cost.

Ultimately, the belief in the overwhelming superiority of offensive strategic forces ended the pursuit of a comprehensive 

strategic defense. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and 

many other influential defense strategists became increasingly 

skeptical of missile defense and embraced offensive deterrence 

through MAD.4 Missile defense was considered potentially destabilizing because the United States and Russia might engage 

in an even greater arms race to overcome the opponents defense leading to larger numbers of weapons. Convinced of the 

futility of missile defense, McNamara advocated abandoning 

the effort; however, international and political factors conspired 

to keep the program alive in a more limited role. 

Competition with Russia, increasing concern over China, and 

domestic politics led to Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson supporting a 

limited ABM system. In 1964 US intelligence discovered the 

development and deployment of the Soviet Galosh ABM system 

situated around Moscow.5 President Johnson and McNamara 

lobbied the Russians to abstain from fielding the missiledefense system, but Russia disregarded the overture and continued unabated. As Soviet premier Alexey Kosygin stated, 
DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN

“When I have trouble sleeping at night, it’s because of your offensive missiles, not your defensive missiles.”6 Furthermore, 

China surprised the world by detonating its first nuclear weapon 

in 1960, launching a guided nuclear missile in 1966, and then 

demonstrating a hydrogen bomb in 1967.7 Russia’s intransigence combined with the emerging China threat reenergized 

the missile-defense debate.

Politically, President Johnson feared the perception of an 

“ABM gap” would hurt the Democrats in the 1968 elections and 

consequently tasked McNamara to find a compromise. McNamara 

strongly believed that a defense against Russia was not feasible. 

Instead, he proposed a limited system designed to counter the 

Chinese threat. This system would appease the ABM lobby by 

providing a US capability while not escalating the arms race 

with Russia. Hence, in 1967, the Sentinel program was born 

that sought to protect a limited number of population sites by 

fielding a “layered” defense against Chinese missiles. Much like 

the current missile-defense programs, “the Sentinel decision 

represented a political compromise—an attempt to balance 

conflicting strategic, technical, and diplomatic considerations.”8

The Sentinel decision temporarily quelled the political debate, 

but it led to a more public debate on missile defense that once 

again impacted the nation’s missile-defense plans. Academic 

and scientific groups such as the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) became increasingly vocal opponents of missile defense. Several leading academics, including members of influential 

presidential advisory panels, published articles describing the 

vulnerability of missile defenses. In addition, public opposition 

materialized in areas where the Army planned to locate missiledefense sites as local citizens feared their homes becoming attractive targets for Chinese or Russian missiles. Hence, by 1969, 

support for even a limited missile defense was losing ground 

prompting yet another shift in missile-defense policy.

Pres. Richard M. Nixon elected to make more changes to the 

missile-defense program early in his presidency which set the 

final course for its demise. As is often the custom with troubled 

programs, the program name was changed from Sentinel to 

Safeguard. In addition, Nixon changed the focus of the system 

from population defense to protecting strategic missiles from 

attack. This had the politically expedient advantage of moving 
DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN

10

the missiles away from population centers to more-remote areas. 

However, the change in focus undercut the already tenuous 

credibility of defending the US population against Chinese missile attack. Thus, by the end of 1969, no coherent imperative 

remained to field a missile defense, and the primary value of 

the Safeguard system was as a bargaining chip in the ongoing 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as clearly detailed in 

declassified memos from the Nixon administration.9

The SALT discussions produced a watershed agreement between the United States and Russia to accept mutual vulnerability and virtually eliminate strategic defense. This agreement 

was codified in the 1972 ABM Treaty, which limited each nation 

to two land-based ABM sites with no more than 100 missiles at 

a site. A subsequent agreement in 1974 reduced the number of 

sites from two down to a single location. The acceptance of the 

ABM Treaty and other aspects of the SALT agreement dealt a 

crippling blow to US missile-defense plans. In 1975 the United 

States fielded a Safeguard site in North Dakota, but Congress 

cancelled funding for the program due to high costs, likely ineffectiveness, and fears over the use of nuclear-tipped interceptors. The Safeguard site was shut down in 1976, just five 

months after startup at a cost of over $5 billion (fiscal year [FY] 

76) which is nearly $30 billion today.10 Curiously, the secretary 

of defense presiding over the shutdown of the Safeguard system was Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, a man who would later become 

very instrumental in resurrecting the effort decades later.

Star Wars

The US missile-defense program and debate from the 1980s 

to the present has much in common with the previous phase 

from World War II to 1976. Although technology has advanced, 

the ability to hit a “bullet with a bullet” remains a difficult and 

financially costly challenge. Beyond technology, the role of domestic politics, international security, and fear of the unknown 

greatly affected missile-defense policy early in the Cold War 

and continue to play a foundational role in post–Cold War decision making. Similar to nuclear missiles or terrorism, discourse 

on long-range ballistic missile defense transcends purely technical discussions and evokes strong passion in both support-
DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN

11

ers and advocates. President Reagan tapped into these passions when he ignited the second era of national-missile-defense 

discussions with SDI.

President Reagan initiated the largest peacetime military 

buildup in US history upon his entry into office. His initial plan 

did not include missile defense, but supporters seized the opportunity to lobby for missile defense, given the increasing size 

of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and a nascent belief in emerging 

“hit-to-kill” technology. The Army continued with ABM research 

after the end of the Safeguard program by focusing on kinetic 

kill technology that would eliminate the need for a nuclear interceptor. Army test results in the late 1970s and early 1980s 

demonstrated improved interceptor accuracy. ABM advocates 

used these results as evidence of the ability to guide an ABM 

interceptor to destroy a ballistic missile through a direct physical 

impact without the need for a nuclear warhead.

In 1983 Reagan stunned the world by announcing the SDI to 

investigate the feasibility of providing a global shield against 

nuclear missiles. Reagan’s grand vision was to render nuclear 

weapons unnecessary through development of a nonnuclear, 

impenetrable shield to shoot down ICBMs. While derisively called 

“Star Wars” by critics, much of the defense establishment 

jumped on the missile-defense bandwagon following Reagan’s 

landslide reelection in 1984.11 Thus, reminiscent of the push 

following the Sputnik launch, missile defense received new birth 

in the growing nationalism and idealism inspired by Reagan.

Remarkably, just as questions of technical maturity, cost, 

and politics battered missile-defense programs of the 1960s, 

these same issues changed the course of SDI. By 1986 the euphoria over SDI subsided. Moreover even supporters acknowledged costs to field a comprehensive missile shield would be 

hundreds of billions of dollars. Internationally, relations with 

Russia were improving and arms control agreements, such as 

the elimination of intermediate range ballistic missiles, raised 

questions over the need for SDI. As Pres. George H. Bush took 

office in 1989, he faced a similar dilemma as Presidents Johnson and Nixon faced more than 20 years before: how to proceed 

with missile defense given security and political concerns over 

feasibility, need, and affordability.
DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN

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SDI was significantly reduced and refocused with the fall of 

the Berlin Wall and the power of partisan politics. Improving 

East-West relations eliminated the urgency and rationale for 

the grand SDI vision. Consequently, the Bush administration 

sought to preserve the ABM program by changing the focus to 

prevention of limited or accidental missile attacks against the 

United States. The new program, global protection against limited strikes (GPALS), was a compromise designed to appease 

Republicans by continuing work on a missile-defense system 

while reducing the scope and cost to placate Democrats.

The GPALS program enjoyed a brief period of optimism but 

soon faded under the tyranny of domestic politics. In October 

1991, Premier Mikhail S. Gorbachev proposed a joint US-Soviet 

defense system as part of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

(START) II discussions. This proposal received bipartisan congressional support and was followed by passage of the Missile 

Defense Act of 1991.12 This act directed the president to seek 

amendments to the 1972 ABM Treaty and to field a treatycompliant defense system by 1996. In 1992, Russian president 

Boris Yeltsin and President Bush agreed to parameters for 

START II as well as committing to cooperation on a Global Protection System. Unfortunately, the short-lived consensus on missile defense was derailed by the US recession which turned US 

attention to domestic issues and a demand for a “peace dividend” 

through reduced defense spending. This focus on domestic issues was a key contributor to President Clinton’s successful 

election. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia in 

disarray and soured US-Russian relations which curtailed pursuit of a joint missile-defense effort. As a result of the ascending primacy of domestic politics, missile defense was dealt a 

tremendous setback as President Clinton took office in 1993.

President Clinton and Defense Secretary Les Aspin initiated 

the “Bottom Up Review” (BUR), which resulted in radical change 

to the missile-defense program. The BUR slashed funding for 

missile defense from $39 billion over the next five years to $18 

billion. In addition, the BUR placed top priority on theater as 

opposed to national missile defense (NMD) with the additional 

caveat that all systems remain compliant with the 1972 ABM 

Treaty. As Secretary Aspin famously stated, “We’re taking the 

‘Star’ out of Star Wars.” This effectively reduced work on space-
DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN

13

based sensors and interceptors to basic research and development. In traditional fashion, Aspin also made a name change 

as the Strategic Defense Initiative received the more subdued 

moniker of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).13

Current Era of Missile Defense

Just as domestic politics signaled a downturn in NMD in 

1992, the “Republican Revolution” of 1994 along with security 

issues in Asia resuscitated the program. One of the planks of 

Newt Gingrich’s Contract with America was a clarion call for 

“renewing America’s commitment to an effective national missile 

defense.”14 The Contract with America was highly influential 

and gave the Republicans leverage to cast Democrats as soft on 

defense and unconcerned with national security. Much as 

Johnson had done 30 years prior, the Clinton administration 

offered up a missile-defense compromise to diffuse political 

criticism. In 1996 the “three-plus-three” approach was unveiled, 

which committed the US to three more years of NMD research, 

and then a deployment decision based on cost, technical maturity, and security needs. A system could then be fielded three 

years later if all factors favored deploying the system.

In 1998 a series of events put missile defense on the front 

page and set the stage for the Missile Defense Act of 1999. The 

first event was the release of the Welch panel findings, which 

severely criticized the technical feasibility and planning for the 

“three-plus-three” program. Citing numerous delays, overruns, 

and test failures in theater systems, the report called the BMDO 

plan to field an NMD system a “rush to failure.”15 The Welch 

report was initially a big blow to missile-defense advocates, but 

their hopes were revived later in the summer by release of the 

Rumsfeld commission report on the ballistic-missile threat to 

the United States.16

The Rumsfeld report was highly critical of available intelligence estimates predicting 15 years before rogue nations would 

develop long-range ballistic missiles. The report highlighted 

flaws and deficiencies in US intelligence practices and predicted 

countries such as North Korea or Iran could obtain credible 

missile capability in only five years.17 Released on 15 July 1998, 

the Rumsfeld report was immediately validated by the launch 
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of an Iranian medium-ranged missile a week later.18 The crowning confirmation occurred in August when North Korea unexpectedly launched a three-stage Taepo Dong I missile theoretically capable of reaching Alaska or Hawaii. Subsequent analysis 

determined North Korea could possibly attack the continental 

United States if it added a third stage to its larger Taepo Dong 

II missile.19

The combination of the Welch and Rumsfeld reports with 

Asian ballistic-missile proliferation reinvigorated funding and 

urgency for missile defense. While the Welch report initially 

hurt missile-defense advocates, it also highlighted issues in 

funding and priority, which called into question the Clinton 

administration’s sincerity to the “three-plus-three” plan. Indeed, within six months Defense Secretary William S. Cohen 

added $6 billion to the NMD program.20 Moreover, the newfound missile-defense urgency led to the passage of the Missile 

Defense Act of 1999 which states: “It is the policy of the United 

States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective NMD system capable of defending the territory of the United 

States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, 

unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual 

authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation 

of funds for NMD.”21 Thus, as the Clinton administration left 

office in 2001, the fortunes of NMD turned from precipitous 

decline to new life with a mandate for limited defense against 

ballistic-missile attack.

The Bush administration entered office with sincere intentions to field an NMD and acted to overcome hedges from the 

Clinton administration. The first obstacle to go was the 1972 

ABM Treaty. The Clinton administration sought desperately to 

find a politically acceptable missile-defense position that would 

be compliant with the ABM Treaty. The fear was that abrogating the ABM Treaty would derail arms control and counterproliferation efforts with Russia. However, the treaty’s limitations 

on sensor and launcher locations were intentionally designed 

to reduce the effectiveness of ABM systems. For example, the 

ABM Treaty did not allow sea- or space-based interceptors. In 

addition, the treaty did not permit missile tracking sensors to 

be widely separated from the missile launcher. This limits the 

effective range of the system as sensors need to be close to the 
DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN

15

threat in order to maximize response time. Consequently, even 

a limited NMD was not feasible within the bounds of an unmodified ABM Treaty. The Bush administration was unable to 

reach an agreement with Russia on a modified ABM Treaty and 

consequently withdrew from the accord in 2002.

The elimination of the ABM Treaty enabled rethinking of strategic deterrence theory and doctrine. The US goals for originally 

signing the ABM Treaty in 1972 were no longer compelling in 

2002. The Soviet Union was irreversibly disintegrated, and the 

US and Russia were significantly decreasing nuclear arsenals. 

Moreover, the emerging ballistic-missile threat does not share 

the same characteristics as the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union 

was a single, well-known, strategically stable, and rational opponent. The modern threat is diverse, difficult to understand, 

unpredictable, and often irrational. As a result, the radically 

new threat required a new approach to strategic security policy. 

Just as the Air Force transformed from a Cold War construct of 

strategic and tactical forces to expeditionary forces, the Bush 

administration embraced a fundamental change in the construct for strategic deterrence as described in the 2001 Nuclear 

Posture Review (NPR).

The NPR unveiled the most significant shift in US strategic 

nuclear policy since the end of the Cold War. The NPR established a new triad of strategic and conventional strike forces, 

missile defenses, and responsive infrastructure to replace the 

Cold War triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. The NPR also 

represents the most serious attempt in US history to formally 

integrate NMD into US strategic policy. Indeed, the 2001 NPR

was followed by National Security Presidential Directive 23/ 

NSPD-23: National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense which is a 

clear and strong affirmation of the importance of missile defense: “The new strategic challenges of the 21st century require 

us to think differently, but they also require us to act. The deployment of effective missile defenses is an essential element of 

the United States’ broader efforts to transform our defense and 

deterrence policies and capabilities to meet the new threats we 

face. Defending the American people against these new threats 

is my highest priority as commander in chief, and the highest 

priority of my Administration.”22
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Although the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan pushed missile 

defense out of the limelight, the Bush administration continues 

strong support for the missile-defense program. In keeping with 

tradition, the Bush administration changed the name of the 

BMDO to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in 2002 giving the 

organization more status as a declared Department of Defense 

(DOD) agency. More importantly, funding for the missile-defense 

program was significantly increased and was near $8 billion in 

2006 with over $10 billion requested for 2007.23 Progress on fielding the first ICBM defense system is proceeding with a rudimentary system currently in place that is available in case of national 

emergency.24 A suite of additional capabilities are in development 

and will be incrementally fielded over the next decade.

Conclusion

The US missile-defense legacy reveals several common 

threads that shed light on the ongoing debate. First, missile 

defense is strongly impacted by domestic and partisan politics. 

The role of domestic politics is clear as missile defense has 

been alternately nurtured or reviled as much for political gain 

as for military effectiveness. Every decision to field a missiledefense system prior to 2001 was heavily motivated by partisan 

politics as exemplified by President Johnson’s Sentinel program, 

President Clinton’s “three-plus-three” effort, and President Bush’s 

GPALS system.

Second, international politics also strongly influence missiledefense programs. For example, the relationship with Russia 

and China drove the Cold War arms races resulting in a nuclear 

standoff, acceptance of assured destruction, and the 1972 ABM 

Treaty that temporarily ended missile-defense efforts. The influence of international diplomacy is readily evident in declassified memos written during the ABM Treaty negotiations such 

as this excerpt from President Nixon to the lead US negotiator 

explaining why the United States agreed to allow two ABM sites: 

“It is my conclusion that pressing for a complete ban on ABMs 

would risk jeopardizing the understanding already achieved 

with the USSR. This is all the more true because if we went to 

a zero ABM proposal we would have to ask for more sweeping 

offensive limitations than seem immediately negotiable. Our 
DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN

17

objective should be to consolidate gains we have made, and 

translate our mutual commitment into a viable agreement.”25

Moreover, missile-defense systems have a legacy of long development cycles as a result of perturbations from politics, international security considerations, and the immense technical 

challenge. The long development cycle leads to faster change in 

the strategic environment and in the threat than technology 

can adapt to resulting in poor cost versus benefit assessments. 

For example, the Cold War Sentinel and Safeguard systems 

were rendered obsolete by the rapid buildup of ICBMs. Likewise, the need for Star Wars succumbed to the end of the Cold 

War effectively ending the second era of missile defense. The 

current systems were also hampered until 2002 by political 

mandates to abide by the limits of the 1972 ABM Treaty. This 

politically driven limitation is one of the key reasons leap-ahead 

missile technologies did not advance beyond research and development in the late 1980s and 1990s. Consequently, history 

suggests that the next system needs to (1) correctly anticipate 

the future threat and (2) focus on systems and technology that 

can be deployed in time to make a difference.

Finally, the history of the debate over NMD shares much in 

common with the debate over WMD with one critical difference—lack of an intellectual consensus on technical feasibility. 

While there is much debate over the use of nuclear weapons, 

there is little argument over whether a nuclear weapon will 

function as designed. Clearly, the long legacy of use from the 

Manhattan Project, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and decades of 

testing has put to rest questions of technical feasibility for nuclear weapons. On the other hand, a common thread through 

the half-century debate on missile defense is the crippling lack 

of consensus on the technical feasibility and cost of an effective 

NMD. Missile-defense systems have an inconsistent record of 

performance in testing and many fundamental questions remain. In order to address this issue more closely, chapter 3 

describes and analyzes the status and likely technical effectiveness of the current US NMD program.

Notes

1. Yanarella, Missile Defense Controversy, 70–82.
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2. Wikipedia, “Starfish Prime,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starfish_Prime.

3. Prof. Theodore Postol, MIT, interview by the author, October 2005.

4. Graham, Hit to Kill, 6–7.

5. Ibid, 5.

6. Ibid, 7.

7. Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “China’s Nuclear Force.”

8. Graham, Hit to Kill, 7–8.

9. Burr, Missile Defense Thirty Years Ago.

10. Union of Concerned Scientists (UCSUSA), Missile Defense.

11. Graham, Hit to Kill, 15.

12. Ibid, 20–21.

13. Missile Defense Agency, “History of Ballistic Missile Defense.”

14. US House, Republican Contract.

15. FAS, Report of the Panel on Reducing Risk.

16. FAS, Executive Summary.

17. Ibid.

18. Katzman, Iran.

19. Graham, Hit to Kill, 64.

20. Missile Defense Agency, “History of Ballistic Missile Defense.”

21. Ibid.

22. FAS, National Security.

23. Roosevelt, “MDA Requests.”

24. Butler, “Boosting Confidence.”

25. Burr, ed., Missile Defense Thirty Years Ago.
19

Chapter 3

Evaluation of Current National 

Missile-Defense Programs

The new strategic challenges of the 21st century require us 

to think differently, but they also require us to act. The deployment of effective missile defenses is an essential element of 

the United States’ broader efforts to transform our defense 

and deterrence policies and capabilities to meet the new 

threats we face. Defending the American people against 

these new threats is my highest priority as Commander in 

Chief, and the highest priority of my Administration.

—Pres. George W. Bush

NSPD-23

The current missile-defense effort is the most comprehensive 

attempt by the United States to field a national BMD system. 

The US missile-defense program is managed by the MDA with 

specific guidance from the president and secretary of defense. 

The MDA translated the strategic objectives into a portfolio of 

systems and technology programs designed to field an effective 

missile-defense system. The following sections discuss the 

overall strategy, the MDA’s suite of programs, and an analysis 

of how well the effort is proceeding.

The Current Strategy

National Security Presidential Directive 23 lays out the US 

commitment to fielding a limited defense as well as provides 

goals and guidelines for implementation. The goal of the missile-defense program is to be a contributing element of the new 

triad of strategic forces including nuclear and conventional 

strike forces, strategic defense, and responsive infrastructure. 

The specific goals for the missile-defense system are to

• assure allies and friends that the United States will not be 

coerced by missile threats,
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

20

• dissuade potential adversaries from investing in ballistic 

missiles,

• deter ballistic missile use by denying benefits of any attack, 

and

• defend against ballistic missiles should deterrence fail.1

Another major goal of the missile-defense program is to enable US cooperation with friends and allies: “The threats of the 

21st century also endanger our friends and allies around the 

world, it is essential that we work together to defend against 

these threats. Missile-defense cooperation will be a feature of 

U.S. relations with close, long-standing allies, and an important means to build new relationships with new friends like 

Russia.”2

Presidential guidance also directs the secretary of defense to 

implement an evolutionary acquisition strategy:

The Defense Department plans to employ an evolutionary approach to the 

development and deployment of missile defenses to improve our defenses 

over time. The United States will not have a final, fixed missile defense 

architecture. Rather, we will deploy an initial set of capabilities that will 

evolve to meet the changing threat and to take advantage of technological 

developments. The composition of missile defenses, to include the number 

and location of systems deployed, will change over time.3

The MDA is charged with implementing the evolutionary acquisition policy and fielding the US ballistic missile-defense 

system. The MDA’s plan to fulfill its mission is to develop and 

deploy a nonnuclear, layered defense against ballistic missiles 

by delivering capability in two-year blocks. The first block increment occurred in 2004 through 2005 (Block 04) and will be 

followed in two years by a Block 06 update. Block 04 provides 

an initial defensive capability for the United States against 

North Korean long-range missiles while providing protection 

for deployed forces from theater ballistic missiles (TBM).4 Block 

06 seeks to add protection from long-range threats from the 

Middle East while expanding coverage of allies and improving 

capability against countermeasures. New sensors, interceptors, 

and response to the changing threat are planned for Blocks 08 

and beyond.

Another aspect of the MDA’s implementation strategy is to 

develop and deploy primarily ground-based hit-to-kill intercep-
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

21

tors that use kinetic impact or directed energy to destroy incoming missiles. Previous missile-defense systems such as the 

US Spartan, Sprint, and the Soviet Galosh systems used nuclear warheads. Nuclear warheads are effective, but potential 

collateral damage and political costs of nuclear-tipped interceptors lead to a preference for conventional kill technology. In 

addition, the United States has stepped back from deploying 

space-based interceptors due to the technical immaturity and 

high political and economic costs of space-based weapons. Hitto-kill technology is rapidly maturing, but there are many challenges remaining including basing options, engaging targets in 

a realistic environment, and fielding an integrated commandand-control system.

Missile Engagement Regimes

The MDA’s layered defense is based on engaging threat missiles in one or more of the three phases of missile flight: boost, 

midcourse, or terminal. The first phase of missile flyout is the 

boost phase, which is defined as the period from launch until 

the booster burns out. The boost phase is typically very short 

with a maximum duration of five to six minutes for long-range, 

liquid-fueled ICBMs. The midcourse phase consists of the period 

of flight beginning with booster cutoff and ending with reentry 

into the atmosphere. Thus, the midcourse phase includes the 

majority of the exoatmospheric flight. This is also usually the 

longest phase of a ballistic missile’s flight (~30 minutes) but can 

vary dramatically depending on flight profile and range. The 

final segment of a missile’s trajectory is the terminal phase which 

lasts from reentry until surface impact. The MDA’s layered approach consists of developing systems to attack ballistic missiles in the different phases to maximize flexibility and increase 

the probability of kill by allowing multiple engagements.

Each of these regimes has significant advantages as well as 

technical and political challenges. For example, some advantages of boost-phase intercept (BPI) are the ability to defend 

large areas with a small deployment footprint and a low likelihood of encountering deceptive countermeasures. Conversely, 

the ability to go through the entire kill chain in a few minutes 

and intercept a ballistic missile is a daunting technical chal-
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

22

lenge coupled with political issues of basing, situational awareness, and consequence management. Likewise, midcourse and 

terminal defense strategies have associated strengths and 

weaknesses that must be understood to make a sound assessment. The following sections will describe the various systems 

in development by engagement regime. The evaluations will focus primarily on the interceptors since the various layers use 

essentially the same sensor network and centralized commandand-control system.

Boost-Phase Defense Systems

The MDA’s current BPI elements are the airborne laser (ABL) 

and the kinetic energy interceptor (KEI). The ABL is the MDA’s 

baseline boost-phase system and consists of a high-powered 

chemical laser mounted in a Boeing 747 aircraft. The ABL concept is to destroy missiles by lasing a hole in the booster, inducing failure and resulting in the warhead falling short of its 

intended target. Hypothetical estimates for maximum effective 

range vary from 300 kilometers (km) against solid-fuel rockets 

to around 600 km for thin-skinned, liquid-fueled boosters.5 In 

December 2005, the “first light” test was successfully accomplished in a ground facility and demonstrated the ability of the 

laser to achieve the desired power output. The MDA will next 

integrate the laser into the Boeing 747 with hopes of a live-fire 

test against a target missile in 2008. As mentioned previously, 

the boost phase is relatively short; consequently, the ABL must 

be in-theater, airborne, and able to quickly maneuver into position to be effective. The MDA anticipates that a fleet of seven 

aircraft will enable at least two aircraft to be airborne 24/7 to 

patrol a designated area.6

The ABL has suffered significant cost and schedule delays 

leading the MDA to establish the KEI system as an alternative 

boost-phase concept. The goal of the KEI system is to develop a 

sea- or ground-launched missile with sufficient acceleration to 

perform BPIs. Extremely high acceleration is required because 

the boost-phase interceptor must “outrun” the accelerating 

target missile before the end of the boost phase. The ABL solves 

this problem with directed energy that travels at the speed of 

light. Unfortunately, current interceptors do not have enough 
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

23

acceleration and maneuverability to effectively perform BPI. 

The KEI program is investigating new technologies in an attempt to improve booster acceleration.7 Additionally, KEI breakthroughs will also benefit interceptors designed for midcourse 

and terminal phase as improved acceleration and maneuverability are critical to all classes of kinetic kill vehicles.8

Assessment of Boost-Phase Systems

The proposed BPI systems have many technical and strategic 

deficiencies and are not likely to be useful to US missile-defense 

goals in the near term. First, the extremely limited missileengagement timelines will pose an unacceptable challenge to 

decision-making and command-and-control systems. The window for the complete event is a maximum of five minutes to 

include detection, tracking, identification, and then engagement. Indeed, the decision to fire needs to be made in the first 

few minutes or even seconds in order to have sufficient time for 

engagement.9 Investigations into the friendly-fire incidents involving the Patriot missile in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrate the immense difficulty in making the right decision in 

USAF Photo

Airborne laser test aircraft
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

24

such a short period with ambiguous information. In OIF these 

pressures conspired to cost the lives of aircrew when a missile 

operator launched a missile based on conflicting data.10 The 

stakes for error in BPI are possibly even higher given the potential for a nuclear, biological, or chemical warhead to detonate in 

an unexpected area thereby requiring extensive consequence 

management. A BPI engagement will likely result in launching 

missiles or lasers over foreign soil and will require diplomatic 

coordination. In the event of a successful intercept, there is the 

additional worry of collateral damage as BPI systems attack the 

booster, which means that the warhead is very likely to be undamaged and will continue on an altered path that is difficult 

to predict. For example, the warhead from a missile launched 

from North Korea against Washington, DC, could easily land in 

Canada or the Midwest in the event of a “successful” intercept.

The operational and basing requirements and limited intercept range of BPI systems are also a concern. Operationally, all 

elements of the complex defense system, such as battle management, command-and-control, and sensors integration, must 

stay on high alert as any lapse could eliminate the opportunity 

for an effective intercept. This level of constant readiness is 

costly and taxing, leading to increased risk of mistakes. In addition, the limited range of BPI systems requires the interceptors to be physically close (several hundred km) from the target 

which will often require assistance from neighboring countries; 

but even this does not guarantee success. For example, two 

ABLs patrolling just outside the borders of Iran would still leave 

large areas undefended even assuming a generous 500 km range 

and complete cooperation from all neighboring countries.11 As 

illustrated by the recent US eviction from Uzbekistan, basing 

rights are difficult to achieve and sustain in many areas of the 

world. Sea-based defenses offer some reprieve but are obviously also limited against inland threats.

Midcourse Systems

Midcourse systems are the focal point of the MDA’s Block 04 

layered-defense strategy against long-range threats. The primary components of the suite of midcourse systems are the 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system and the sea-
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

25

based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense. The GMD system is the 

first element to reach limited defensive operations (LDO) status 

and is currently focused on deterring missile launch from North 

Korea. The GMD system consists of a network of sensors, 

ground-based interceptors, and battle management systems. 

Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites provide launch detection and early warning. An array of radars distributed 

throughout the Pacific and West Coast provide tracking and 

guidance data to the ground-based interceptors (GBI) located 

at Fort Greely, Alaska, with an additional complement of GBIs 

based at Vandenburg AFB, California.

MDA Photo

Launch of ground-based interceptor
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

26

The GBI are multistage missiles that place a maneuverable 

exoatmoshpheric kill vehicle (EKV) on a trajectory to intercept 

the target missile. After separation from the booster, the EKV 

acquires the threat missile with an onboard seeker and then 

maneuvers to an intercept point to destroy the target. The entire enterprise, including fire control and battle management 

for the GMD system, is coordinated by the Joint National Integration Center at Schriever AFB, Colorado.

Navy Photo

Launch of standard missile-3 from an Aegis BMD cruiser
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

27

The Aegis BMD is a ship-based BMD system consisting of 

upgrades to the existing Aegis-class vessels to enable midcourse and terminal missile defense. The Aegis BMD is one of 

the most versatile elements of the US missile-defense arsenal 

as it is highly mobile, has a very effective radar sensor, and 

employs an advanced interceptor. The system is capable of 

tracking and engaging short-range ballistic missiles (<1,000 

km) (SRBM) and medium-range ballistic missiles (1,000–3,000 

km) (MRBM) autonomously or can be used as a sensor or 

shooter as part of a larger “system-of-systems” construct. For 

example, the upgraded Aegis radar recently demonstrated the 

ability to track ICBM-class targets as part of the network supporting the GMD system.12 Aegis also employs an upgraded 

standard missile (SM-3) that delivers a maneuverable kinetic 

kill vehicle capable of intercepting targets in the upper atmosphere or even in low exoatmospheric conditions. The MDA plans 

to incrementally modify Aegis ships to perform the missiledefense function with 12 ships planned to be available as part 

of Block 04 with additional ships upgraded to the BMD role in 

subsequent blocks.13

Assessment of the MDA Midcourse Systems

The MDA’s midcourse systems have limitations and challenges but are making progress. First, the basing requirements 

are less demanding than either boost- or terminal-phase systems. It is possible to defend the entire United States from 

North Korea and Iran with only three interceptor sites, which 

can be located well away from the threat country. The addition 

of a third site in Europe to the operational GMD interceptor 

sites in Alaska and California would accomplish this goal.14

Moreover, the flexibility in locating interceptor sites allows 

decision makers to maximize the deterrence value of the system without undesired provocation such as basing an ABL on 

Iran’s borders. In addition, ground-based missiles are much 

easier to keep on 24/7 alert than air- or sea-based interceptors 

providing a more credible and persistent defense.

Finally, the GMD allows the best opportunity for near-term 

defense against long-range ballistic missiles. The GMD system 

builds on the legacy of 20-plus years and $100 billion of NMD 
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

28

investment since the 1980s. Hit–to-kill technology has had 

many bumps in the road, but the systems which comprise the 

GMD have demonstrated a limited level of capability that should 

not be casually dismissed. Furthermore, the GMD architecture 

incorporates existing assets, such as the nation’s suite of early 

warning radars, and has “hooks” to accept new systems and 

technology. Thus, the GMD system has many of the characteristics sought in NSPD-23, but there are substantial issues.

A major criticism of the GMD system is the vulnerability to 

countermeasures. Countermeasures against a midcourse defense 

system are relatively easy to conceive, design, and implement. 

One reason for this is the lack of atmospheric drag during midcourse flight. The lack of drag allows countermeasures, such as 

chaff or decoys, to travel at the same speed and along the same 

trajectory as the warhead. The close proximity of the countermeasures to the warhead makes it difficult for radar to distinguish between the warhead, debris from launch, and the decoys. 

Ground-based sensors can at best guide the kill vehicle to a cloud 

of targets of which only one may be the warhead. Thus, the kill 

vehicle must perform its own target discrimination with onboard 

sensors while moving at incredibly fast-closing velocities of up 

to 10 km per second, which is literally faster than a speeding 

bullet.15 Even the slightest error can cause the kill vehicle to miss, 

and six inches equals a mile in the hit-to-kill scenario.

The kill vehicle’s onboard systems are also susceptible to decoys and countermeasures due to the fast closure rates and a 

limited field of view. The GMD and Aegis interceptors use passive infrared (IR) sensors and discrimination algorithms to 

identify the warhead and then guide the kill vehicle on a collision course. IR sensors are used due to their small size, which 

allows them to fit in the kill vehicle and the ability to passively 

detect the thermal signature of the warhead and other objects 

in the threat cloud. In addition, optical trackers such as the kill 

vehicle’s IR system provide very accurate angle tracking data 

that is needed for a direct hit.

Onboard algorithms sort through the IR data and attempt to 

identify the warhead by looking for specific thermal features. 

This is one of the most difficult tasks for the kill vehicle as decoys can easily duplicate or mask the IR signature of the warhead.16 Moreover, while the small size allows the IR sensor to fit 
MDA Photo

GMD exoatmospheric kill vehicle
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

30

in the kill vehicle, the downside is that it does not have very 

high resolution. The small IR focal plane will initially only see 

an amorphous thermal cloud and will not be able to distinguish between individual objects until moments before impact. 

Consequently, the kill vehicle is very susceptible to countermeasures because it has little opportunity to react, limited field 

of view and resolution, and must quickly home in on an object 

in the threat cloud with limited external guidance.

The MDA recognizes the countermeasure challenge and is 

developing a set of techniques to improve the discrimination 

capability of the kill vehicles. Specific techniques and data are 

classified, but the overall thrust is to increase the ability and 

opportunity of the kill vehicle to correctly identify the warhead 

prior to having to commit to intercept. One obvious solution is 

to launch multiple kill vehicles at a single target. The current 

plan is to launch salvos of multiple interceptors per target.17

Furthermore, the MDA initiated the multiple kill-vehicle program to investigate placing two or more kill vehicles on a single 

interceptor. This would greatly enhance the opportunity for the 

kill vehicles to approach from slightly different aspect angles or 

concentrate on different targets to improve the likelihood of 

identifying the warhead. Other efforts include improvement to 

focal plane resolution or IR frequency response to increase the 

distance at which the kill vehicle can reliably identify the warhead.18 These efforts will improve the capability of the GMD 

system against simple decoys, but a responsive adversary could 

introduce more sophisticated countermeasures necessitating 

an ongoing commitment to improved target discrimination.

Other major criticisms of the GMD system include test failures and the lack of realistic testing. The GMD system has a 

checkered history of flight-test results as the Government Accounting Office reports only seven successful intercepts in 18 

attempts since the 1980s.19 The sources of failure include killvehicle hardware and software errors, target launch issues, and 

booster launch issues with no discernable pattern. Moreover, 

most of the testing to date has been of a developmental nature, 

which makes it difficult to determine the operational utility of 

the system. Future tests are designed to incorporate more operational equipment and personnel, threat representative targets, and more challenging scenarios to improve test realism.
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

31

Terminal-Phase Systems

The MDA’s terminal defense interceptor portfolio relies mainly 

on theater missile defense developed by the services. The current 

list of systems includes the Army’s Patriot advanced capabilities 3 

(PAC-3) and terminal high-altitude area defense (THAAD) as well 

as the Navy’s Aegis BMD system. These systems have the most 

maturity since they have been in development for decades by the 

services for the air defense mission. Multiple versions of the Patriot were used in the Gulf War with mixed results. Claims of successful intercepts by the Patriot PAC-2 (proximity warhead) against 

Iraqi Scuds in Desert Storm have been largely disproved.20 However, the PAC-3 and its new hit-to-kill interceptor performed far 

better in OIF although some of the luster was marred by tragic 

friendly-fire incidents against allied aircraft.

MDA Photo

Patriot (PAC-3) missile launch
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

32

Assessment of Terminal-Defense Systems

Terminal-phase missile defense can only protect a limited 

area as compared to boost-phase or midcourse systems. The 

high speed and steep attack angle of incoming warheads in the 

terminal phase requires the interceptors to be based near the 

protected target. Hence, a large and costly number of terminaldefense systems are needed to protect a large area such as the 

continental United States. There are no plans or requirements 

to permanently base terminal defenses on US territory to defend 

population centers or military targets. The MDA’s commandand-control system is designed to integrate these systems into 

the national command structure to support use in protecting 

deployed forces or overseas allies should the need arise. Consequently, the terminal missile-defense systems available to 

the MDA represent primarily a theater military capability which 

will not play a central role in countering long-range missile attack against the United States.

However, terminal-defensive systems have a critical role internationally due to the wide proliferation and use of shorterrange ballistic missiles on a global scale. Moreover, these systems are vital to defending our deployed forces and allies. 

NSPD-23 recognizes this fact by stating that “The terms ‘theater’ 

and ‘national’ are interchangeable depending on the circumstances, and thus are not meaningful ways of categorizing missile defenses. For example, some of the systems being pursued 

by the United States to protect deployed forces are capable of 

defending the entire national territory of some friends and allies, 

thereby meeting the definition of a ‘national’ missile-defense 

system.”21 From World War II to OIF, SRBMs have been used in 

combat and will almost certainly be used in future conflicts as 

SRBM technology is readily available to any rogue state or even 

nonstate actor. Moreover, there is an emerging global norm accepting the use of conventionally armed TBMs.22 Consequently, 

terminal-phase systems may not be the primary means of defending the US mainland, but these systems often drive strategic missile-defense policy because of their immense operational 

military value and importance to allies.
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

33

Conclusion

The ability of the US missile-defense program to achieve all 

of the technical performance goals outlined in NSPD-23 remains uncertain. The ability to defend the homeland against 

long-range attack is a difficult technical challenge, and the current missile-defense capability is indeed limited. However, defense against short- and medium-range missiles is showing 

promise, which is critical since these systems were needed in 

the past and are the most likely to be called upon again to defend US interests and allies abroad.

The baseline boost-phase system, the airborne laser, has experienced severe cost overruns and delays and will not conduct an 

airborne live-fire test until 2008 at the earliest. Moreover, basing 

issues, limited operational persistence, and extremely short response timelines cloud the missile-defense utility of the ABL even 

if the technology issues are solved. Funding for the KEI program 

has repeatedly been cut leaving doubt that a ground- or sea-based 

BPI system can be fielded in the near term.23

The GMD system is the centerpiece of the MDA’s near-term 

missile defense against long-range missiles and provides the 

best hope for a credible, albeit limited, capability against this 

class of threat. The GMD has the flexible basing and persistent 

operation necessary to defend against a surprise attack. In addition, many elements of the GMD are technically mature with 

all key elements having at least been demonstrated in flight 

testing. The downside of the GMD is the susceptibility to countermeasures and an uneven record of success in developmental 

testing. Hence, the GMD is not likely to provide a foolproof defense against tens of hostile missiles with countermeasures in 

the near term but may be able to deter and defeat a more limited long-range attack against the United States by ICBMs 

without countermeasures.

The terminal-defense systems are the most technically mature 

and show promise for defending against short- and mediumrange ballistic-missile attack. These systems can be integrated 

into the national missile-defense system to provide additional 

capability. The improving success of the Patriot PAC-3 and Aegis 

BMD demonstrate that after decades of development, these sys-
CURRENT NATIONAL MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAMS

34

tems are approaching an acceptable level of operational utility 

and are the best hope for international defense and cooperation.

The technical maturity and likely effectiveness of the planned 

US missile-defense system is a critical factor in evaluating the 

overall impact on national security and international relations. 

As a vital part of the new strategic triad, ballistic missile defense has high political and diplomatic value separate from 

combat use. Hence, missile-defense systems must have enough 

technical credibility to assure our allies while deterring and 

dissuading adversaries and must effectively defend US interests when needed. Consequently, unrealistic or false assessment 

of technical capability and threats can lead to political instability 

and unnecessary security risks. These concerns are particularly 

important given the uncertain capability of US missile-defense 

systems and the considerable impact US missile-defense policy 

will have on the rest of the world with special emphasis in Asia 

as discussed in chapter 4.

Notes

1. Jamison, briefing.

2. The White House. “National Policy.”

3. Ibid.

4. Obering, address, 9–10.

5. American Physical Society, Report of the APS Study Group.

6. Tirpak, “Airborne Laser,” 30–34.

7. Barnard, “KEI Now Seen.”

8. Ibid.

9. American Physical Society, Report of the APS Study Group.

10. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board.

11. American Physical Society, Report of the APS Study Group.

12. “Aegis Tracks,” C4I News.

13. Jamison, briefing.

14. Liang, “Decision on Europe-based GMD Interceptor,” 2.

15. American Physical Society, Report of the APS Study Group.

16. Garwin, “Holes in the Missile Shield,” 70–79.

17. MIT, Lincoln Laboratory, seminar.

18. Congressional Budget Office, Alternativesfor Boost.

19. Hildreth, “Kinetic Energy Kill.”

20. Kariya, “Patriot’s Second Chance,” 17–18.

21. FAS, National Security Presidential Directive.

22. Feickert, “Missile Survey.”

23. Trachtenberg, “Off the Radar,” 12–15.
35

Chapter 4

Asia and the 

US Missile-Defense Program

Japan is the first country in the world to experience terrorism 

using chemical gas in an attack in the subways that happened 10 years ago. . . . two-thirds of Japanese supported 

the introduction of the Missile Defense system. . . . We hope 

the Missile Defense system will contribute greatly to international efforts for countering the proliferation of WMD and its 

means of delivery.

—Mr. Yoshinori Ohno (2004)

Minister of State for 

Defense of Japan

When the Islamic world acquires atomic weapons, the strategy 

of the West will hit a dead end—since the use of a single 

atomic bomb has the power to destroy Israel completely, 

while it will only cause partial damage to the Islamic world.

—Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (2001)

President of Iran (1989–97)

Asia is the continent most impacted by the political and strategic implications of US missile-defense policies for the next 

decade. As illustrated in chapter 2, Russia is traditionally a 

focus of US missile-defense policy since the end of World War II 

and will continue to be a key player. China is viewed as the 

emerging peer competitor to the United States and has voiced 

definite opinions on US missile-defense policy. Beyond these 

two nations, WMD proliferation, rogue states and actors, and 

nuclear tensions are also concentrated in Asia. Globally the 

trend has been for non-Asian nations to renounce WMD and 

ballistic missile aspirations such as Brazil, South Africa, and 

Libya. However, Asia contains all of the nations overtly pursuing 

nuclear ambitions other than the original five Non-Proliferation 

Treaty (NPT) nuclear states: the United States, Great Britain, 

France, Russia, and China. Other than the NPT nuclear states, 

Israel, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and India are the only coun-
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

36

tries known or suspected of active nuclear weapons and ballistic 

missile programs.1 Table 1 also illustrates that the preponderance 

of medium- to long-range ballistic-missiles- (or ICBMs with 

>5,000 km range) wielding states are in Asia. In addition, nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda operate in Asia and seek to acquire 

WMD to find an asymmetric leverage against the United States. 

The concentration of key strategic actors and issues clearly signifies Asia as a focal point for US missile-defense efforts.

Table 1. Deployed ballistic missiles by type and country

Ballistic-Missile Type and Range Countries

Intercontinental/Intermediate Range 

(ICBM/IRBM)

(Land- and Sea-based)

>3000 km

Known: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, 

United States

Possible: India, Iran, North Korea

Medium Range

1000–3000 km

Israel, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, China, India, 

Pakistan, Iran

Short Range

70–1000 km

Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, 

Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, 

Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, 

Libya, Netherlands, North Korea, Pakistan, 

Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, South Korea, 

Syria Taiwan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 

United Arab Emirates, Vietnam, and Yemen

Adapted from Joseph Cirincione, “The Declining Ballistic Missile Threat, 2005,” Policy Outlook: 

Carnegie Non-Proliferation, February 2005; and Andrew Feickert, “Missile Survey: Ballistic and 

Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries,” Congressional Research Service, RL30427, 5 March 2004; 

and Federation of American Scientists, Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate: 

Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015, National Intelligence 

Council, December 2001.

Asia also contains the world’s most contentious nuclearpossessing and nuclear-aspiring powers; for example, disputes 

between North Korea and Japan, China and Taiwan, India and 

Pakistan, and Iran and the West. The most extensive use of ballistic missiles since World War II has been confined to Asia: 

some 1,600 Russian TBMs used in Afghanistan, 350 TBMs 

used in the Iran-Iraq war, and nearly 100 TBMs used by Iraq in 

the Gulf Wars.2 Indeed, Asia is the scene of the only use of modern US ABM systems and the near-term focus for the GMD 

system. Thus, the near-term strategic and political value of the 

current US missile-defense program will be largely determined 

by its impact in Asia.
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

37

The following sections investigate the influence and role of 

missile defense on key Asian countries and relationships. Any 

assessment on missile defense in Asia should surely include 

the known WMD- and ballistic-missile capable states in Asia 

which are Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel. In addition North Korea and Iran have demonstrated ballistic-missile 

capability and are actively pursuing nuclear weapons. Japan is 

another key actor due to its substantial economic might and 

growing assertiveness in military affairs. Asian-based nonstate 

actors, such as al-Qaeda and transnational corporations, also 

impact US missile-defense policy.

Russia

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the relationship between Russia and the United States on missile defense has 

moved from optimistic to suspicious. Early in the 1990s there 

was a brief period of hope for genuine missile-defense cooperation between Russia and the United States as the two countries 

investigated possible modifications to the 1972 ABM Treaty 

and even explored a joint missile-defense system. However, 

Russia’s ability and later desire to continue with these initiatives waned as the country plunged into disarray.

The late 1990s were a disaster for Russia and its military leading to increasing tension with the United States. Boris Yeltsin 

and other Russian civilian leaders were fearful of the military 

following the coup attempt in 1991. Consequently, few resources 

were provided to the Russian military in an effort to keep the 

generals weak and amenable to civilian control.3 There was a 

precipitous decline in military funding and an 80 percent reduction in manpower along with tremendous chaos and corruption. Unfortunately, the “shock therapy” attempt to convert 

Russia into a Western-style democracy and market-based 

economy failed miserably. By the time Pres. Vladimir Putin assumed office in 2000, the general Russian population, and especially the military, had soured on further cooperation with 

the West. Indeed, by 2001 a majority of Russians believed the 

United States was not a country that could be trusted and had 

intentionally tried to subvert their nation with predatory economic policies.4 Hence, President Putin has steered Russia on 
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

38

an increasingly independent course from the West resulting in 

decreased cooperation for missile defense.

Current Position and Policy Drivers

Russia has publicly taken a “wait and see” and dismissive 

posture in response to recent US missile-defense policy; however, closer review of Russian military strategy and commentary reveals concern. Russia’s conventional forces retain only a 

fraction of their Soviet-era capability. The poor military performance in Chechnya is an example of how far the conventional 

forces have fallen. Russian military leaders are quite aware of 

the prowess demonstrated by allied conventional forces in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and the Balkans. As a result, Russia now leans 

heavily on its vast nuclear arsenal for deterrence as it attempts 

to transform its Soviet-era army into a more capable, professional force similar to Western militaries.5 Moreover, Russia is 

not enamored with US plans to deploy missile defense, as this 

directly threatens its nuclear deterrence which is the foundation of Russian national security and a cornerstone of Russia’s 

struggle to retain world-power status.6

Russian leaders remain skeptical of US pledges that the current missile defense is only targeted against rogue states as 

demonstrated by several actions. Russian deputy prime minister 

Sergei Ivanov outlined Russia’s commitment to its nuclear 

forces in a January 2006 Wall Street Journal article: “Russia 

does not intend to give up its nuclear capability, as it is still a 

key deterrent and a crucial instrument in protecting our national interests and achieving certain political objectives.”7

In order to preserve the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence, 

Russia is developing new ICBMs, the Bulava and Topol-M, with 

maneuvering warheads specifically designed to defeat missiledefense systems.8 Russia also withdrew from the START II 

Treaty following US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002. 

As a result, Russia continues to maintain a significant force of 

multiple warhead missiles dealing a blow to years of nucleararms-reduction negotiations. Russian cooperation in programs, 

such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 

program, has cooled as well.9 Indeed, Russia is generally threat-
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

39

ened by US missile-defense plans and is increasingly charting 

an independent course for its national security.

Likely Future Response

Russia’s opinion of the US missile-defense program is not 

likely to change unless the United States begins to significantly 

expand the GMD system or weaponize space, at that point the 

relationship will worsen. Russia tolerates the current US missiledefense program because it still retains a large nuclear arsenal 

that can easily overwhelm the intentionally limited US system. 

Moreover, Russian leaders believe their new missiles have 

countermeasures that should be effective against the nascent 

US capability, and they are even threatening to reintroduce 

IRBMs if necessary to maintain the strategic balance.10 Russia 

also continues to operate its own BMD system which further 

mutes criticism of US efforts to field a limited ABM system. 

Even a reduction or the elimination of the US missile-defense 

system is not likely to improve US-Russian relationships, as 

the current cooling in friendly interactions is driven by several 

unrelated issues. Some of these issues include competing interests in Central Asia, NATO expansion, renewed competition 

in arms exports, Russia’s slide away from democracy, and 

growing Russian concern over perceived US imperialism.

An area which does bear special attention is the impact of 

missile-defense policy on future counterproliferation efforts 

with Russia. Stopping the flow of WMD at the source is widely 

acknowledged as the best way to combat the use of nuclear 

weapons by terrorists and rogue states.11 Moreover, counterproliferation is one of the few remaining areas where US and 

Russian national interests overlap and continued cooperation 

is necessary. The cooperative threat reduction program between the United States and Russia has effectively reprocessed 

500 tons of weapons grade material which is equivalent to 

10,000 warheads.12 However, this is only half the currently 

known material. In addition, more material will need to be 

safely disposed as US and Russian stockpiles draw down to the 

2002 Moscow Treaty limits.

Unfortunately, the relationship between the United States 

and Russia is deteriorating as Russia becomes more indepen-
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

40

dent and assertive. A March 2006 report from the influential 

Council on Foreign Relations suggests that the very idea of a 

“strategic partnership” between the United States and Russia 

no longer seems realistic in the near term.13 The report recommends that the United States reevaluate foreign policy towards 

Russia in order to improve relations in the long term. An example of the difficulty is that while the United States and Russia are allegedly partners in dissuading proliferation of nuclear 

technology in Iran, Russia is quietly selling Iran $1 billion worth 

of air defense missiles in anticipation of a possible US invasion.14 Consequently, US decision makers must consider missile defense, counterproliferation, and many other issues within 

the framework of a complicated and increasingly adversarial 

relationship with Russia.

China

During the Cold War, China was the secondary focus of US 

missile-defense efforts after the Soviet Union. Unlike the United 

States and Soviet Union, China adopted a strategic policy of 

minimum deterrence much in the fashion endorsed by the 

Waltz school of strategic thought (after Kenneth N. Waltz) that 

considers overwhelming nuclear force unnecessary to prevent 

attack.15 Consequently, China fielded a small ICBM force of 

20–30 missiles under the belief that this was sufficient to deter 

US or Soviet aggression without the huge expense and excesses 

of nuclear parity. Not surprisingly, China was one of the most 

vocal critics of US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty.16

Even though China was not a signatory nation, Chinese deterrence was predicated on US vulnerability to long range missile 

attack under the pretext that even one nuclear weapon landing 

on a US city was sufficient deterrence.

Since the end of the Cold War, US-Chinese relations have 

become increasingly complex. On one hand, trade and economic 

interactions between the two countries has expanded dramatically and is critically important to both countries. China’s 

economy will soon eclipse Great Britain as the fourth largest in 

the world partially due to increasing trade with foreign partners like the United States.17 Chinese leaders have intention-
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

41

ally nurtured economic growth in order to avoid a Soviet-style 

collapse.

Despite the mutually beneficial economic relationship, significant tension remains between the two nations. First, the issue of 

Taiwan’s independence creates persistent friction as the United 

States walks a fine line between protecting Taiwan from Chinese 

occupation and maintaining the “one China” policy. Second, 

China aspires to regional hegemony in Asia that creates direct 

competition with the United States which has similar aspirations. 

Furthermore, the United States increasingly identifies China as 

an emerging peer competitor militarily and economically, as China 

has five times the US population and an economy growing two to 

three times faster than the US economy.18 Events, such as the 

Chinese response to the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in 

Belgrade and the US response to the P-3 Orion mishap, highlight 

the latent tension in the US-Chinese relationship.

Current Position

The two current missile-defense-policy drivers for China are 

maintaining control of Taiwan and strategic deterrence. China 

has dramatically increased its arsenal of SRBMs and MRBMs 

with many of them arrayed to deter Taiwan from thoughts of 

independence. China currently has an estimated 700 TBMs deployed against Taiwan and is expected to add an additional 

75–120 TBMs per year.19 Chinese doctrine is to use “active defense” to protect its interests in Taiwan by preemptively attacking and overwhelming any possible US defense of the island 

through sheer numbers.20 In addition, China has voiced opposition to sale or deployment of Patriot PAC-3 or the Aegis BMD 

systems to Taiwan and even Japan, as this would threaten a 

vital national interest and its “active defense” doctrine. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesman recently stated that the sale 

of theater missiles defense systems to Taiwan “would undermine national security and the unification of China and harm 

relations between the United States and China.”21

China is also committed to maintaining an acceptable nuclear deterrence against US aggression. Chinese leaders felt 

bullied by US threats of nuclear attack in the Korean War and 

committed to maintaining a credible deterrent to US nuclear 
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

42

forces as a cornerstone of Chinese security.22 The awesome displays of US conventional forces in the past decade combined 

with the decision to field a missile-defense system motivated 

China’s current investment in its long-range missile force. 

China is expanding and improving its arsenal of ICBMs to include fielding of the mobile, solid-fuel DF-31, which is a significant improvement over previous generation missiles. Experts estimate China will increase its ICBM force from the 

current 20–30 missiles to anywhere from 75 to 100 missiles.23

Further escalation is anticipated in proportion to the size and 

capability of the United States, Japanese, and Taiwanese missiledefense capability.

Likely Future Response

Much like Russia, China’s response to the planned US missiledefense system is not likely to change in the near future unless 

there is significant escalation in the numbers of deployed missiles or a push to weaponize space. Deployment of US missiledefense systems to Taiwan and Japan will likely be met with a 

correlated increase in deployed missiles. Furthermore, China’s 

leaders have clearly articulated that placing interceptors in 

space will create a strong negative response.24 Moreover, the 

cancellation of the planned US missile-defense system will not 

stop China’s missile buildup, as China was already committed 

to massive military modernization prior to the current US 

missile-defense effort. Indeed, the buildup started during the 

Clinton administration before the Missile Defense Act of 1999.25

China planned a 15 percent increase in defense spending in 

2006 in large part due to Taiwan’s politically provocative actions such as dissolving the government organization responsible for reunification with the mainland.26 Thus, China’s tangible response to US missile-defense efforts has been to increase 

an already ongoing arms buildup and reaffirm the commitment 

to “one China” with regard to Taiwan.

India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan are relative newcomers as nuclearweapon states and are also impacted by US missile-defense 
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

43

policy. Both countries surprised the world in the late 1990s 

with a series of nuclear tests and later entered into a brief military conflict representing one of the few times two nucleararmed states engaged in direct military confrontation. The 

United States is pursuing strong ties with both India and Pakistan. President Bush recently concluded a precedent-setting 

agreement to share civil nuclear technology with India.27 In addition, the United States has also offered Patriot missile-defense 

systems to New Delhi, which has traditionally looked to Russia 

for military technology.28 The United States also values Pakistan’s support in the global war on terror and is also cultivating 

strong relations as exemplified by President Bush’s recent visit 

despite violent public protests and the killing of an American 

diplomat.29

India and China have an adversarial relationship due to direct competition for hegemony in South Asia. Hence, India’s 

nuclear arsenal provides deterrence and also international 

prestige as a rising power in Asia. India also has tense relations 

with Pakistan highlighted by territorial disputes in the Kashmir 

region. However, India enjoys a significant military and economic 

advantage over Pakistan. Similar to China, India embraces 

minimal deterrence as the most effective nuclear strategy.30

India’s strategic policy considers nuclear weapons as primarily 

political tools. Therefore, India sizes its nuclear force to be a 

credible deterrent against China with the assumption that 

Pakistan’s lesser threat will also be deterred.

In Pakistan, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are a deterrent against Indian aggression and a great source of national 

pride. Despite a weak economy and political difficulties, Pakistan’s army invests heavily in its missile force to counter India’s 

growing might.31 In addition, Pakistan has forged strong ties 

with China and North Korea as a means to acquire nuclear and 

missile technology to keep pace with India. Pakistan’s nuclear 

strategy is explicitly linked to India’s nuclear arsenal declaring 

a policy of matching any increase in Indian nuclear forces with 

a corresponding increase in Pakistan.32

US missile-defense policy is likely to have an indirect effect 

on India and Pakistan. As discussed previously, US missiledefense policy could result in a further increase in Chinese ballistic missiles. Accordingly, India may increase its nuclear mis-
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

44

sile force to maintain a minimum deterrent against its primary 

nemesis in China. The next domino in the chain reaction is a 

possible Pakistani military expansion to match India’s escalation. However, there are other factors that could moderate the 

likelihood of Indian and Pakistani increases in nuclear weapons. 

For example, India may not increase its forces if China only 

increases long-range ICBMs clearly targeted at the United 

States. In addition, China, India, and Pakistan are increasingly 

investing in mobile- or sheltered-ballistic-missile systems which 

will be difficult to target.33 Consequently, the increased survivability may eliminate a perceived need for additional quantity. 

In any event, the existence of the US missile-defense system is 

not a primary issue for India and Pakistan but could lead to 

increased arsenals due to perturbations in regional security 

relationships.

North Korea, Iran, and Iraq

One of the main objectives of MDA’s limited long-range 

ballistic-missile-defense capability was to dissuade and deter 

threats from countries such as members of the axis of evil: 

Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. The US invasion and occupation 

has mitigated ballistic-missile concerns in Iraq, but North 

Korea and Iran continue as threats. Unfortunately, the United 

States has adversarial relations with Iran and North Korea with 

repeated threats of military action from all parties. Moreover 

US military interventions over the past decade have justifiably 

heightened fears of military operations against these two countries. North Korea’s Kim Chong-Il has consistently threatened 

to preemptively launch WMD attacks against the United States, 

South Korea, Japan, or any other US ally. North Korea’s launch 

of the Taepo Dong ballistic missile over Japan is clear indication of the seriousness of the threat. Likewise, Iran’s radical 

president has promised to “wipe Israel off the map” and has 

also threatened WMD attacks against the United States for 

interfering with Iran’s internal activities.34 Iran’s threats are 

not to be taken lightly given its use of ballistic missiles and 

WMD to target Iraq’s population during the “war of the cities” 

in the Iran-Iraq war and its current pursuit of uranium enrichment technology.35 The decision to focus US missile-defense 
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

45

efforts against Iran and North Korea is justified given the acrimonious relationships.

Beyond ill will, both North Korea and Iran possess credible 

WMD and ballistic-missile programs. North Korea is widely assessed to already possess nuclear capability, while Iran recently 

announced plans to resume research in uranium enrichment. 

Iran claims its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, but 

there is ample evidence that it aspires to possess a nuclear 

weapon capability. The development of an indigenous uraniumenrichment capability would open the door for Iran to produce 

weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Both countries also 

possess domestic ballistic-missile capability. North Korea’s 

Taepo Dong missile, in a three stage configuration, has an estimated range of 15,000 km which could hit anywhere in North 

America. Likewise, Iran has a large inventory of short-to-medium 

range ballistic missiles including the Shahab-3 which can 

reach Israel with its 1,300 km reach.36 Moreover, both countries have a history of illegally proliferating ballistic missile 

technology thereby increasing the overall threat to the United 

States.37

North Korea continues to engage in negotiations to renounce 

its WMD programs in return for international support and security guarantees. The “Six Party” talks involving North Korea, 

South Korea, Russia, China, Japan, and the United States are 

making progress, but North Korea’s history of irrational behavior and reneging on promises suggests caution is in order.

North Korea is uniquely vulnerable to missile defense due to 

its low number of missiles, geography, and failing economy. 

First, North Korea’s limited number and relatively unsophisticated missiles create doubt that it could overwhelm or fool the 

existing and planned US missile-defense system. Second, geography works against North Korea as it is a small country on a 

peninsula. Consequently, US sea- , land- , and air-based missiledefense assets can flank the country and maximize the likelihood of intercept. Finally, North Korea has a failing economy 

and can not afford the arms buildup needed to guarantee defeat of the US missile-defense system.

North Korea runs the risk of imploding, much as Reagan’s 

strategic defense initiative created uncertainty for Russia and 

contributed to Soviet economic collapse. There is little public 
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

46

evidence from North Korean officials to evaluate how significant a factor the US missile-defense program was in their decision to pursue negotiations. However, it is likely more than 

coincidence that North Korea agreed to more substantive disarmament discussions in the same timeframe that US missiledefense interceptors began their operational deployment. 

Therefore, even a limited US missile-defense program could 

contribute to the overall US goal of dissuading and deterring 

North Korea.

Iran continues to defy the West and is unlikely to be dissuaded from pursuing its WMD and ballistic-missile programs. 

Iranian leaders believe Iraq was vulnerable to US invasion, because it did not have nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic 

missiles.38 Moreover, Iran’s new, more radical leadership has 

cultivated strong ties with Russia and China. Indeed, Russia is 

building Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant, has defended 

Iran’s right to civilian nuclear technology, and has significantly 

increased arms sales including a billion-dollar sale of surfaceto-air missiles announced in the midst of international efforts 

to stop Iran from its uranium enrichment program.39 China 

has also invited Iran to be an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is emerging as a cohesive bloc to 

counter US interests in central Asia.40 Finally, Iran’s religious 

extremism leaves little room for negotiation with the West and 

particularly the United States.

Iran is not as vulnerable as North Korea to the planned US 

missile-defense system. First, Iran is a relatively large country, 

and the United States will not be able to count on basing rights 

or cooperation from neighboring countries given their instability 

and shifting allegiances. Indeed, Iran will have significant flexibility in moving its missiles to evade the limited range of the 

currently planned US boost-phase BMD systems much as 

Scuds avoided early intercepts in the first Gulf War. This will 

place the burden on the GMD and terminal-defense systems. 

At present, the GMD system cannot intercept many important missiles trajectories from the Middle East due to the lack 

of a suitably located interceptor site. A third GMD interceptor 

site to defend against ballistic missiles from the Middle East is 

planned for the future. As mentioned in chapter 3, a disadvantage of terminal BMD is that the interceptors must be physically 
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

47

close to the defended target. Thus, the defender must have 

enough terminal-defense systems to protect every possible target. The United States and its allies do not have enough terminalBMD systems to cover all of the potential targets within reach 

of Iran’s growing missile force. Finally, Iran enjoys substantial 

profit from oil and can afford to increase and modernize its 

missile force to overwhelm and defeat the US midcoursedefense system.

Israel and Japan

Israel and Japan are the two most receptive countries to US 

missile-defense plans in Asia and are actively involved in joint 

programs. The missile threat to Israel and Japan’s homeland is 

possibly more tangible than for even the United States. Israel 

in particular is surrounded by sworn enemies who have repeatedly attacked the nation through various means including 

ballistic missile attack. Japan is also threatened by neighbors 

in close geographic proximity in North Korea with China becoming more of a concern for the long term.

The history and cooperation between the United States and 

Israel illuminates some of the key dynamics of missile-defense 

systems. First, missile-defense systems have tremendous political value, but these systems can lose that value very quickly 

if they do not perform up to expectations. In the first Gulf War, 

the deployment of the Patriot TMD system was politically critical 

to keeping the Arab coalition together, as Israel was willing to 

forgo retaliation against Iraq in lieu of defense. However, it was 

the poor design of the Scud missile which minimized damage 

and not the Patriot PAC-2, which was not designed for missile 

defense and actually performed poorly.41 The course of the war 

could have changed significantly if the Scuds had caused more 

damage leading to Israeli military retaliation and subsequent 

chaos in the US-Arab coalition.

Realizing the imperative need for improvement over the PAC-2, 

Israel and the United States collaborated on the Arrow missile 

which is an Israeli theater BMD system.42 The Arrow started as 

a joint venture in 1988 with a first flight in 1990. However, a 

substantial upgrade, the Arrow 2, began after the Scud attacks 

in the 1991 Gulf War. The first Arrow 2 battery was deployed in 
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

48

2000 after $1 billion in investment between the United States 

and Israel. Operational testing continues as highlighted by a 

successful December 2005 test in the United States.43 The Arrow is expected to be fully integrated into Israel’s tiered defense 

system by the end of the decade to include interoperability with 

selected US missile-defense systems.

Japan and the United States began missile-defense cooperation in 1999 after North Korea’s test firing of a ballistic missile 

over Japan. The initial agreement focused on research and development with the level of cooperation increasing in recent 

years to include agreements on fielding new systems. In December 2005, the two countries confirmed plans to build a 

large tracking radar in Japan to support both Japanese and US 

missile-defense efforts.44 The location of a high-power tracking 

radar in Japan will provide a substantial boost in detection and 

tracking capabilities for both countries. Japan’s government also 

approved a nine-year, $1.2 billion plan to field its own Aegis 

BMD capability along with Patriot PAC-3 in order to form a layered defense.45 The first missiles are scheduled to come online 

in 2007. In addition, Japan is cooperating with the United 

States on a new sea-based interceptor, improved command and 

control, and intelligence sharing. Japan is clearly the most significant missile-defense partner in East Asia, and the increasing 

level of cooperation is essential for success of the US missiledefense program.

Nonstate Actors

Nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda and the Khan Research 

Laboratories also impact US missile-defense policy in Asia. The 

likelihood of a terrorist-sponsored, long-range, ballistic-missile 

attack against the United States is low due to the magnitude of 

resources required.46 However, terrorist groups are more than 

capable of acquiring and launching theater ballistic or cruise 

missiles against the United States, deployed forces, or allies. 

Events such as 9/11 and the USS Cole attack demonstrate 

that assaults of this scale are possible, and modern terrorist 

groups have the will to do them. Moreover countries, such as 

Iran, sponsor terrorists and can provide ballistic-missile systems 

to rogue groups willing to use them. The Rumsfeld report is 
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

49

often cited for predicting the North Korean long-range ballisticmissile threat; however, the report also highlighted the far more 

likely occurrence of short-range off-shore attacks.47 Congress 

and the MDA are becoming increasingly concerned with this 

issue and are moving to further investigate the threat.48

Transnational corporations are also key players in Asia and 

missile defense. The rise of globalization and multinational corporations allow individuals and companies to operate beyond 

the reach of any single government. A. Q. Khan and his Khan 

Research Laboratories are now recognized as one of the most 

damaging conduits for nuclear proliferation in the past two decades. His clandestine efforts to acquire foreign technology enabled Pakistan’s surprising entry into the nuclear club in 1998 

by stealing and buying technology.49 In 2001 Khan was arrested 

after he was discovered to have masterminded an international 

nuclear-proliferation ring that included customers in Iran, 

Libya, and North Korea.50 Moreover, Khan later confessed that 

his network operated worldwide with operatives in nations as 

diverse as Dubai, China, and Germany with numerous middlemen and suppliers.51 Hence, the modern era of globalization 

and technology sharing permits individuals and private groups 

to also impact issues, such as WMD and missile defense, which 

were formerly the exclusive domain of nation-states.

Intelligence, awareness, and flexibility are keys to defending 

against a potential terrorist ballistic-missile attack; and these 

characteristics should also drive missile-defense requirements. 

Global and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are required since there will be little intentional warning; 

and attacks can come from a wide range of locations and methods. Consequently, the US missile-defense system must have a 

global network of sensors and intelligence-gathering agencies 

feeding an efficient command-and-control system.

Furthermore, a flexible, layered defense is essential to providing multiple engagement opportunities against a surprise 

attack. Indeed, theater-defense systems will likely play a great 

role in deterring and defeating terrorist ballistic-missile attacks 

due to the need for mobility and flexible employment. While the 

interceptors get much of the attention, the unique aspects of 

terrorist attacks and transnational-technology proliferation in 
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

50

Asia also drive the need for a robust, global intelligence network and highly integrated command-and-control system.

Conclusion

Asia’s complex political and strategic environment will strongly 

influence the success or failure of the current US missile-defense 

program. Unlike the Cold War where US strategic policy was 

centered on a single, well-understood country, the new Asian 

landscape hosts multiple and competing alliances with several 

nations vying for regional hegemony. No other continent promises as many challenges after the breakup of the Soviet Union, 

the rise of Asian economic power, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, and the process of globalization. Hence, the United 

States must find a coherent missile-defense policy that will 

best handle the range of actors from emerging transnational 

terrorists to new nuclear states to tried and true Cold War adversaries.

The current US policy of limited missile defense and engaging international partners is the best course of action. The 

United States does not have the technical means or the funding 

to field a credible missile defense against Russia’s nuclear 

ICBM force. In addition, China is already substantially improving the quality of its nuclear force and, with time, could also 

overwhelm the US missile defense against long-range ballistic 

missiles. A significant increase in China’s arsenal could ripple 

through Asia inducing destabilizing force-level escalation in 

India, Pakistan, and Japan. However, this could happen even 

without the existence of missile-defense systems. For example, 

US and Soviet missile inventories increased in the 1970s and 

1980s after the signing of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Conversely, eliminating the missile-defense system leaves 

US territory, deployed forces, and allies vulnerable to attack 

which will not be deterred by offensive nuclear forces alone. 

Ballistic-missile-attack is a reality and no longer an academic 

exercise. Deployed US forces, Afghanistan, Israel, Iran, Iraq, 

and Saudi Arabia have all been recipients of ballistic-missile 

attacks. Moreover, the widespread proliferation of Soviet-era 

missiles and technology increase the likelihood for attacks in 

the future. Rogue nations and terrorists are far less likely to be 
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

51

deterred by nuclear retaliation as the United States and the 

Soviet Union were during the Cold War. As a result, ballisticmissile-defense becomes imperative for US interests in Asia.

Notes

1. Cirincione, “Declining Ballistic Missile Threat,” 2–4.

2. MIT, Lincoln Laboratory, seminar.

3. Miller and Trenin, Russian Military, 27–28.

4. Cohen, Failed Crusade, 98–106.

5. Miller and Trenin, Russian Military, 7–8.

6. Schneider, Nuclear Forces, 10.

7. Ivanov, “Russia Must Be Strong.”

8. Schneider, Nuclear Forces, 10–12.

9. Goldgeier and McFaul, “What To Do About Russia, 46.

10. Sieff, “BMD Focus.”

11. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, 15.

12. “Megatons to Megawatts.”

13. Edwards and Kemp, Russia’s Wrong Direction, 5.

14. Farah, “Russia Equips Iran.”

15. Wirtz and Larsen, Rockets’ Red Glare, 187.

16. Ibid.

17. Morgan, “China’s economy.”

18. Ibid.

19. Annual Report to Congress.

20. Martin, “Theater Ballistic Missiles,” 5.

21. “China says US weapons.”

22. Krepon, Cooperative Threat Reduction, 138–39.

23. FAS, Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate.

24. Krepon, Cooperative Threat Reduction, 142.

25. Wirtz and Larsen, Rockets’ Red Glare, 184.

26. Oster, “China Plans 15% Boost.”

27. “Bush, India’s Singh Sign.”

28. Hali, “Should Pakistan Panic?” 1.

29. Hunt, “Bush Celebrates India Nuclear Deal.”

30. Wirtz and Larsen, Rockets’ Red Glare, 244.

31. Krepon, Cooperative Threat Reduction, 153.

32. Ibid., 150.

33. FAS, Unclassified Summary.

34. “Iranian’s ‘Wipe Israel Off Map.’ ”

35. Ali, “Chemical Weapons,” 43.

36. FAS, Unclassified Summary.

37. Langewiesche, “Wrath of Khan,” Part II, 62–85.

38. Nuclear Threat Institute, WMD411: Your Information Resource.

39. Meyer, “Russian Defense Minister.”

40. “Iran, China Study.”
ASIA AND THE US MISSILE-DEFENSE PROGRAM

52

41. Conyers, “Opening Statement.”

42. Miller, “Israel’s Arrow Defense.”

43. Katz, “Arrow Can now Intercept.”

44. Igarashi, “US to Deploy Radar.”

45. Roosevelt, “MDA Moves Forward.”

46. Krepon, Cooperative Threat Reduction, 4.

47. FAS, Executive Summary.

48. “Obering: Decision.”

49. Langewiesche, “Wrath of Khan,” Part I, 63.

50. Ibid., 64.

51. GlobalSecurity.org, “Weapons of Mass Destruction.”
53

Chapter 5

Conclusions

I believe that it is strategically and morally necessary to build 

a missile defense. Strategically, because of the proliferation 

of weapons of mass destruction and the missile technology 

to deliver them. Morally, because the doctrine of mutual 

assured destruction, which I have opposed in my writings for 

at least thirty years, is bankrupt. It may have had a limited 

theoretical sense in a two-power nuclear world, but in a multinuclear world, it is reckless.

—Henry Kissinger

Testimony to Congress, 1999

The US missile-defense program is an essential element for 

assuring allies and successfully dissuading, deterring, and defeating asymmetric threats to US interests worldwide and especially in Asia. US missile-defense policy was buffeted by international and domestic politics during the Cold War leading to a 

lack of consensus on the utility, cost, and technical capability. 

Consequently, missile defense was marginalized and yielded to 

the strategic doctrine of MAD. However, the post–Cold War world 

is quite different, and strategies which worked in a bipolar 

world of peer competitors are no longer sufficient to handle the 

broad range of threats now in existence. Nowhere is this phenomenon more apparent than in Asia where the breakup of the 

Soviet Union, proliferation of WMD, rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and emerging regional powers collude to create an exceedingly complex strategic environment. Furthermore, this complex 

new environment requires a new and more balanced approach 

to strategic thinking which incorporates strategic defense.

The United States documented the changing global environment in 2001 by designating a new triad of strategic capabilities including nuclear and conventional offensive forces, strategic defenses, and responsive infrastructure. Strategic defenses 

are now essential because many adversaries, such as terrorists 

or rogue nations, are not deterred by threats of nuclear retaliation. These adversaries are committed to asymmetric warfare 
CONCLUSIONS

54

against the United States, and ballistic missiles and WMD are 

ideal weapons, as they allow a less-capable adversary to 

threaten the United States by striking at a perceived weakness. 

Since the 1972 ABM Treaty, the United States intentionally allowed itself to be vulnerable to Soviet ballistic-missile attack as 

part of MAD doctrine. However, many adversaries now possess 

ballistic missiles, have used them in the past, and will almost 

certainly use them in the future against the United States, deployed forces, and allies. Thus, intentionally remaining vulnerable to ballistic-missile attack is no longer a prudent policy, 

and the United States is committed to fielding a BMD system.

The MDA is tasked with developing the US missile-defense 

system and is pursuing a limited-layered-defense capability. 

The system is limited in that it is only designed to stop a small 

number of missiles, and no pretence is made toward being able 

to stop a large-scale attack. The system is layered in that elements are designed to engage missiles in boost, midcourse, and 

terminal phases allowing the best opportunity for successful 

intercepts. Thus, the current missile defense seeks to strike a 

balance between not recklessly threatening the value of traditional strategic deterrence while maximizing deterrent and operational effectiveness against lower-tier adversaries.

Substantial controversy remains on the cost and technical 

feasibility of missile defense. The United States has spent over 

$100 billion on missile defense since 1983, and the first elements of a nascent operational capability are just now within 

grasp. Moreover, key elements of the missile-defense system, 

such as the GMD, have mixed test results and have not consistently proven themselves in realistic scenarios. The baseline 

boost-phase system, the ABL, is years behind schedule with 

costs already triple the initial $1.5 billion estimate.1 Moreover, 

the ABL has significant operational issues such as limited persistence, short lethal range, and basing requirements. The 

MDA programs that have a longer developmental legacy, such 

as Patriot and the Aegis BMD, show the most consistency and 

promise for operational utility. However, even these systems 

are plagued by skeptics who question their true effectiveness 

such as the controversy over Patriot performance in Iraq. 

Hence, the technical immaturity, lack of realistic testing, and 

questionable operational effectiveness of the MDA’s missile-
CONCLUSIONS

55

defense portfolio creates substantial doubt as to whether these 

systems will do the job.

Beyond technology issues, Asia’s complex political and strategic environment also complicate missile-defense policy. Just 

as in the Cold War, Russia remains the only country capable of 

destroying the United States with its large nuclear arsenal. 

Therefore, Russian foreign policy must be a key consideration. 

Russia is not enamored with US plans to deploy missile defense, as this directly threatens its nuclear deterrence which is 

the foundation of Russian national security and a cornerstone 

of Russia’s struggle to retain world-power status.2 In response 

to US missile-defense plans, Russia is developing new maneuvering ICBMs specifically designed to defeat US missile-defense 

systems and has withdrawn from the START II Treaty following 

US abrogation of the ABM Treaty. Russian cooperation in nonand counterproliferation programs such as the Nunn-Lugar 

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has cooled as well. Indeed, Russia is generally threatened by US missile-defense 

plans and is increasingly charting an independent course for 

its national security.

In addition to Russia, the emerging nuclear powers of Asia 

are also impacted by US missile-defense plans. US plans may 

have the most impact on China, which is estimated to have 

only 20 ICBMs capable of reaching the United States, although 

this number is expected to increase regardless of US missiledefense policy.3 Even a limited US missile-defense system could 

impact China’s perception of its nuclear deterrence and cause 

an escalation in the number of Chinese ICBMs. Similarly, India 

and Pakistan are drawn into the mix as multiple competing 

alliances create uncertainties and possibly destabilize the region as India seeks to match any Chinese missile increase with 

a corresponding expansion. Iran’s WMD and ballistic-missile 

aspirations also drive a need for missile defense, as this country supports terrorism, has used ballistic missiles against Iraq’s 

civilian population, and is openly threatening to attack the 

United States and Israel. The political utility of missile defense 

is also apparent by its value in negotiations, such as with North 

Korea, and in alliance building with Israel and Japan. Clearly, 

the strategic and military implications and imperatives of 
CONCLUSIONS

56

missile-defense systems in Asia must inform US decisions on 

missile-defense policy.

Recommendations

The analysis of the history of missile defense, the planned US 

missile-defense system, and the Asian strategic environment 

highlight specific recommendations. These recommendations 

are grouped under the following areas:

1. Technology and politics mandate a limited missile defense.

2. Ensure we have the right threat.

3. Theater missile defense is more important in the short term.

4. Assure flexibility and versatility.

5. Improve the credibility of the GMD system.

6. Go slow on unproven technology, especially space systems.

7. Foster international partnerships and engagement.

Continue to Pursue Limited Missile 

Defense and Field It Quickly

The foundational US strategy and policy documents call for 

a limited missile-defense system, and this is the right choice 

considering political, strategic, and technical limitations. Strategically, it is no longer advantageous for the United States to 

remain intentionally vulnerable to ballistic-missile attack. The 

United States and its allies have already suffered ballistic-missile 

attacks, and the proliferation of WMD and missile technology 

portends an even more dangerous ballistic-missile threat in the 

future. Moreover, many new adversaries embrace asymmetric 

attacks against the United States and will not be deterred by 

threats of massive nuclear retaliation. The imperative for genuine investment in missile defense is highlighted by the fact that 

virtually every nuclear-weapons-capable state is investing 

heavily in missile-defense systems and technology. Moreover, 

missile-defense systems, such as the US Patriot and Russian 
CONCLUSIONS

57

S-300, are hot items on the global arms market and are actively marketed by both countries.

The likelihood of a long-range missile attack against the US 

mainland is low; however, the impact is tremendously high. 

The terrorist attacks on 9/11 were tragic, but even one nuclear 

weapon landing on a large US city would be at least as traumatic and more likely far worse. There is no guarantee that 

spending a few billion more dollars on levees would have prevented the flooding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, but 

there is little doubt now that it would have been wise to at least 

try reasonable measures to avoid the estimated $50 billion in 

damages, plus human anguish, for which there is no dollar 

value equivalent.

Current technical and political realities obviate pursuit of an 

“unlimited,” all-encompassing missile shield. The best architectures for defense against large-scale missile attack would 

require hundreds to thousands of space-based interceptors.4

Study after study has concluded that this approach is unaffordable, well beyond the state of technology, and would grossly 

exceed the United States’ ability to launch and maintain such 

an enormous satellite constellation.5

Even if the tremendous technical challenges could be overcome, political issues would also preclude an absolute missile 

defense. First, a comprehensive missile shield would threaten 

Russian and Chinese security and could lead to a destabilizing 

and pointless arms race. Both of these countries have the resources to build effective countermeasures and asymmetric 

tactics faster and more cheaply than the United States could 

upgrade a comprehensive missile-defense system. Furthermore, the legacy and impact of US domestic politics also reduces the ability of the United States to field more than a limited missile defense in a timely manner. The divisive nature of 

missile-defense discourse historically leads to compromise as 

exemplified throughout the Cold War and 1990s. A sufficient 

political consensus is not achievable to support the decades of 

research and development, and the additional hundreds of billions of dollars needed to attempt a comprehensive missiledefense system. It is far more preferable to field a limited defense in a timely fashion and mature the technologies needed 

for space.
CONCLUSIONS

58

Make Sure We Have the Right Threat

The United States should conduct a broader review of WMD 

and the missile threat to ensure we are tackling the right problems. The MDA is currently chartered to develop systems to 

defend against ballistic missiles. However, the current focus on 

defending against surface-to-surface ballistic missiles represents straight-line conventional thinking and excludes many 

asymmetric missile threats that may be more likely to occur 

and even more dangerous. Much of the rhetoric on missile 

defense is still focused on yesterday’s well-understood ICBM 

threat, but does not give sufficient voice to new or unconventional missile or WMD threats as described in the most recent 

Quadrennial Defense Review.

6

For example, the current missile-defense system has little 

capability against cruise missiles. Cruise missiles are far easier 

to obtain than long-range ballistic missiles, as there are 130 

cruise-missile types distributed among 75 nations.7 The cruise 

missile is often called the “poor man’s air force” and can conceivably be launched against US interests from small vessels 

off shore.8 Moreover, Scuds and cruise missiles can be purchased for $100K on the open market and will fit in a small 

vessel or standard shipping container.9 At present, very few 

shipping containers are physically inspected due to the immense volume of containers and the limited number of inspectors.10 As Adm Thomas Keating, the commander of United 

States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) stated: “We have a 

very limited capability to deter a cruise missile attack. Someone can pull the tarp off a 110-foot tramp steamer off the coast 

of Boston and shoots [sic] an unguided cruise missile into Boston. Can’t do much about it, we want to get better at that.”11

The FY 2006 Appropriations Report amplifies this concern as 

Congress provided $10 million for the MDA to investigate “the 

possibility of an asymmetric missile threat against the United 

States homeland where terrorists would move short-range missiles closer to the United States on sea-based platforms.”12

Furthermore, Russia, China, and Iran have publicly announced strategies to use unconventional long-range missile 

attack to stun the United States. Russian and Chinese threats 

are well-documented and include planned uses of decoys and 
CONCLUSIONS

59

countermeasures.13 Even Iran’s missile testing indicates it is 

developing the capability for exploding a nuclear weapon high 

above the United States to produce an electromagnetic pulse 

attack.14 An EMP attack could cripple electronic systems 

throughout the United States. This type of attack may not kill 

many directly, but it could dramatically affect all Americans as 

our power, financial, and communications systems are disrupted or destroyed.15 The current missile-defense system will 

have limited capability to deal with this threat for several years, 

as there is no boost-phase system able to intercept the missile 

early, and we have not even selected a GMD site to defend 

against threats from the Middle East. More importantly, there 

is no requirement driving the current system to cover this threat.

The MDA is responsible for defining the threat its systems 

will defeat, and this system may need to be changed. This arrangement has the acquisition benefit of allowing stable requirements, but these stable requirements may not be the right 

requirements. Congress and the MDA are beginning to look at 

additional threats, such as cruise missile and off-shore launches, 

but the pace of threat definition needs to accelerate to ensure 

that the right systems and tactics are developed. This may require organizations other than the MDA, such as United States 

Strategic Command and/or NORTHCOM take the lead or at 

least have greater input into threat definition and requirements. Clearly, stable requirements assist acquisition in building the system right, but more effort and better organization is 

needed to ensure we build the right systems.

Theater Missile Defense Is More 

Important in the Near Term

The United States should maintain priority on ensuring that 

short- and medium-range missile-defense systems are rigorously tested, rapidly deployed, and continuously upgraded. 

The presidential policy directive NSPD-23 eliminated the distinction between national and theater missile defense;however, 

one of the consequences of this action was to obscure the importance of theater missile defenses from the national debate.16 The threat of ocean spanning North Korean or Chinese 

missiles landing on Los Angeles grabs the headlines and stirs 
CONCLUSIONS

60

popular emotion, but short- and medium-range ballistic missiles are far more available, deployed, and used than their ICBM 

brethren.

The global ICBM threat is actually declining while the threat 

from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is increasing 

in diversity and lethality. From 1987 to 2005, the number of 

ICBMs (including SLBMs) dropped 51 percent from just over 

4,000 to under 2,000.17 This number is expected to drop even 

more as the United States and Russia continue to draw down 

in accordance with the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions 

Treaty. Furthermore, deployed IRBMs plummeted 97 percent 

from 1987 to 2005 with China’s 20 DF-4 missiles the only remaining inventory. Outside of the five NPT nuclear states, 

only Iran and North Korea are considered possible candidates 

to field IRBMs/ICBMs over the next decade, and the likelihood of an ICBM attack against the US mainland is deemed 

unlikely.18

Conversely, the proliferation of medium- and short-range 

ballistic missiles is increasing. Since the late 1980s, India, 

Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have fielded 

their first MRBM.19 This represents the most significant increase in the diversity of the ballistic missile threat and is focused in Asia. Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense also announced 

China has accelerated its buildup of theater ballistic missiles 

and will have 1,800 TBMs poised for launch across the Taiwan 

Strait by 2010.20 Moreover, over 30 nations possess SRBM and 

countries such as Russia, China, North Korea, Syria, and Pakistan continue to export systems and technology.21 In reference 

to MRBMs and SRBMs, the 2001 CIA estimate on the ballisticmissile threat predicts: “Emerging ballistic missile states continue to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy of the 

[short- and medium-range] missile systems in their inventories—posing ever greater risk to US forces, interests, and allies 

throughout the world.”22 Moreover, the commander of American forces in Korea announced Pyongyang recently tested an 

advanced, solid-fuel short-range missile and that “North Korea 

in recent years had been focusing its missile program on developing short-range missiles that could be used in a conflict on 

the Korean peninsula.”23 Thus, short- to medium-range ballis-
CONCLUSIONS

61

tic missiles in Asia represent a greater near-term threat to US 

interests than intermediate- or long-range missiles.

A flexible and effective defense against MRBMs and SRBMs 

is the most salient issue for every Asian state or nonstate actor 

analyzed in chapter 4, with the possible exception of Russia. 

However, even Russia is a major factor as it widely exports 

TBMs and ABM systems throughout Asia. Furthermore, the 

use of TBMs is now an accepted international norm after decades of repeated use by many nations.24 TBMs are now well 

integrated into operational military strategy such as China’s 

plan for defending the Straights of Taiwan. Clearly, the United 

States should increase efforts to ensure systems, such as the 

Aegis BMD, Patriot, and THAAD, are well-funded and do not 

get overshadowed or delayed by more controversial systems 

such as the GMD or ABL.

Furthermore, the United States should prioritize evolutionary 

development of theater systems over leap-ahead technology 

when possible. For example, the ABL is the baseline BPI system, but it will not be available for operational deployment for 

many years. A better solution is to anoint a sea- or land-based 

alternative as the baseline system and increase funding for a 

high-speed interceptor suitable to the boost-phase mission. 

This solution could increase theater missile-defense capability 

and is more likely to provide the United States with a credible 

near-term boost-phase capability.

The Aegis BMD has demonstrated substantial ability to track 

and engage midcourse- and terminal-phase targets. Moreover, 

Japan and the United States are already collaborating on a 

high-speed interceptor upgrade for the Aegis BMD. As evidence 

of the near-term benefit of a high-speed interceptor, a Japanese official stated a single Aegis BMD cruiser with a new highspeed missile could defend the entire Japanese mainland as 

opposed to four ships equipped with the current SM-3 missile.25 An Aegis-based high-speed interceptor not only delivers 

a faster path to operational utility, but it also provides an avenue to field the desperately needed multiple kill vehicle as that 

technology matures. 

Thus, an increased emphasis on promising “theater” ballistic 

missile defenses could provide near-term operational benefit 

and a more manageable path to new capabilities such as mul-
CONCLUSIONS

62

tiple kill and boost-phase intercept. This approach is more affordable and achievable than banking solely on unpredictable 

leap-ahead technology which takes decades to develop and 

provides little interim capability.

Finally, the United States needs to expand its missile-defense 

focus from research and development to include supporting 

global operation of TMD systems. Under the capabilities-based 

acquisition construct, the MDA was wisely given license to pursue incremental block upgrades in order to expedite fielding 

new capability. However, some of these systems are now online 

and it is imperative that the MDA develop an effective combatsupport function to ensure the TMD systems are integrated 

into a global missile-defense command-and-control structure. 

This will be a difficult challenge as the MDA, US Strategic Command, and the services attempt to balance competing requirements, limited resources, and complex command relationships. 

This challenge must be overcome as the TMD systems are guaranteed to be needed in combat, and these systems must work.

Emphasize Flexible and Versatile Systems

Flexibility and versatility are tenets of air and space power 

and are also highly desirable attributes for the missile-defense 

system. Many missile-defense elements will only perform their 

ABM mission a small fraction of the time. Therefore, these systems need to enhance their value by seamlessly handling other 

critically important missions. The ability to perform other missions and impact decision makers at the tactical, operational, 

and strategic levels increases the military value and thereby 

constituency of supporters for missile-defense systems.

For example, the Aegis BMD, Patriot, and THAAD systems 

can support air defense as well as missile defense. Consequently, these systems will always have advocates in the services who value their ability to protect fielded forces from aircraft. In addition, these systems are mobile allowing flexible 

operation around the world which is particularly true of the 

Aegis system that can effectively perform a host of functions 

with its long range, sea-based, advanced communications, radar, and variety of armaments. The early-warning-radars and 

command-and-control systems are also tremendously versa-
CONCLUSIONS

63

tile, as they can track an inbound missile for destruction while 

also serving vital national-intelligence and space-control needs 

by providing 24/7 space situational awareness.

Conversely, high-cost ABM systems such as the ABL and 

GMD need to explore secondary missions and better define their 

value when not engaging threat missiles. Much as the F-22 

fighter needed to add a ground-attack role to placate critics, 

the ABL needs to demonstrate important functions that it can 

perform in the vast majority of time that it is not engaged in 

missile defense. Otherwise, these systems will not prove attractive to joint commanders or national decision makers who will 

likely see them as a funding source for other more near-term 

needs. Without an enduring base of support and military value, 

single-mission systems are likely to fall victim to partisan politics 

or budget reductions much as the Nike-Zeus, Sentinel, Spartan, Brilliant Pebbles, GPALs, and NMD systems of the past.

Improve Technical Credibility and 

Performance of GMD System

The technical credibility and performance of the GMD system 

must improve to maximize its deterrent and defense effectiveMDA Photo

Sea-based X-band radar can simultaneously support missile defense and 

space surveillance
CONCLUSIONS

64

ness. The inconsistent record of performance of the GMD system diminishes confidence that it will be able to effectively intercept even a limited ICBM attack. Several internal and 

independent reviews of the GMD system acknowledge this fact 

and recommend increased focus on quality control, testing, 

and systems engineering.26 Indeed, Congress redirected $150 

million in FY 2006 for the GMD program to emphasize these 

areas.27 The sensor and command-and-control elements have 

performed more consistently; however, the United States must 

maintain the emphasis on networking the far-flung array of 

sensors, interceptors, communication links, and battle management to produce a system that will work efficiently in the nonotice, short-timeline world of ballistic-missile defense.

Another needed improvement is to quickly field a third interceptor site to cover missile threats from countries like Iran in 

central and southwest Asia. Chapter 4’s assessment of the Asian 

environment shows that several countries in this region possess the capability and malicious intent to attack US interests. 

However, the current GMD system has no capability to intercept missiles on westward trajectories from Asia. The MDA is 

currently evaluating locations in Poland and elsewhere in Europe for a third site.28 Clearly, political factors will impact the 

location and development of the site, but the fact remains that 

the GMD system will have little deterrent or defensive utility 

against Iran until the third site is operational.

Beyond improving the readiness of the baseline-operational 

system, the MDA must also maintain a focused-development 

program to overcome limitations in target discrimination and 

interceptor performance. To the MDA’s credit, the current baseline system is not advertised to have capability against countermeasures. However, it is widely believed that any actor capable 

of acquiring an ICBM is also likely capable of fielding a wide 

range of, simple but effective, countermeasures.29 Consequently, the MDA must continue to place high priority on technologies and tactics to increase the probability of kill against 

targets employing even simple techniques. For example, promising efforts, such as the multiple-kill-vehicle program, enhanced IR seekers with multicolor-focal planes and increased 

resolution, and improved discrimination algorithms must remain high priority. In addition, a reliable, high-speed, and more 
CONCLUSIONS

65

maneuverable booster would be greatly beneficial and should 

be given high priority in order to improve GMD performance.

Go slow on Unproven Technology, Increase 

Testing, and be Wary of Rushing to Space

The missile-defense program must go slow on high-risk unproven technology. One of the favorite (and most effective) arguments of missile-defense critics is that over $100 billion has 

been spent with little return on investment. Technical overreach is one of the key contributors to this malady. Much like 

national-security space systems, missile defense depends upon 

layers of incredibly complex cutting-edge technology and networks that must work perfectly in order to achieve success. 

Failure of even a single component, software program, human 

operator, or acts of God can easily cause disaster. Complexsystems theorists have proven repeatedly that sophisticated 

systems like the missile-defense network are difficult to accurately model and have unpredictable behavior.30 Therefore, the 

complexity of missile-defense systems demands increased emphasis on systems engineering and extensive testing in operationally relevant environments—modeling and analysis is not 

good enough.

Indeed, in the rush to sell new programs or keep existing 

ones alive, government and industry officials accept risky and 

unproven technology that looks good on PowerPoint briefings 

but is not ready for field use. Thus, it is no surprise that missiledefense systems are plagued by huge cost overruns, schedule 

delays, and performance failures. Consequently, much like the 

current overhaul in space-systems acquisition, missile defense 

must also reduce technical risk through increased testing, reduced reliance on unproven technology, and terminating underperforming programs to increase focus and free up resources.31

The Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) and ABL 

are examples of programs that demonstrate the effects of prematurely base-lining high-risk technology and not hitting the 

brakes fast enough. The STSS is the current incarnation of the 

previous Space and Missile Tracking System and space-based 

infrared sensor (SBIRS) low. In 2001 the GAO declared five of 

six critical SBIRS low technologies were immature more than 
CONCLUSIONS

66

five years after the acquisition start date. After nearly a decade 

of development and billions of dollars in overruns, the STSS 

was finally reduced to a demonstration of two satellites. A decision to develop an operational satellite will now wisely wait 

until after the demonstration in space.32

The ABL is suffering the same unrealistic expectations that 

hampered the STSS, as it is designated the nation’s primary 

boost-phase missile-defense element but has not even demonstrated all of the key technologies in a relevant environment. 

The first airborne live-fire event is not scheduled until 2008, 

which is more than three years later than originally scheduled.33 Much like the STSS, the ABL requires several advancements to the state-of-the-art and is unlikely to be ready for 

primetime use for many years. The MDA is making a wise move 

to slow down the ABL program and take more time to develop 

the technology.34 Even more encouraging is the decision to delay purchase of the second aircraft until after the lethal shootdown demonstration.35 Furthermore, instead of trying to solve 

all of the miracles on one program with artificial need dates, 

the development burden could be spread to other ABL programs such as the current Air Force effort to mount a laser in 

a C-130.36 The MDA can focus on the hardest problems for missile defense while leveraging lessons learned from other efforts.

More tough decisions like the ABL downgrade are needed 

earlier in the development cycle to reinforce a “fly-before-buy” 

strategy, especially for space systems. Many missile-defense 

advocates pine for rapidly fielding space-based interceptors 

and exotic sensors. However, the Brilliant Pebbles, the STSS, 

the ABL, the SBIRS high, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), the advanced 

extremely high frequency (EHF), the wideband gap filler, the 

evolved expendable launch vehicle (EELV), the space radar, 

and the transformational satellite (TSAT) experiences should 

temper enthusiasm for racing to space as these complex systems are costly, challenging, and risky as shown in table 2.

Virtually every major space acquisition is severely over budget 

and years behind schedule largely due to adopting immature 

technology, unrealistic requirements, and optimistic schedules.37

Even with additional time and funding, many of these concepts 

may not reach the field due to unforeseen technical limitations 
CONCLUSIONS

67

or political realities. Consequently, MDA must avoid attempting to field immature technology, terminate concepts which do 

not prove themselves in testing, and reward the efforts that get 

the job done.

Table 2. Current space acquisition difficulties

Space Program Function Status

NPOESS Weather Observation $3 billion overrun and at least 17 months 

latea

SBIRS High Missile Launch Early 

Warning

$6 billion overrun (150%), six years late, 

technical issuesb

SBIRS Low (now STSS 

technical demonstration)

Missile Launch Early 

Warning

Cancelled due to immature technology, 

cost escalated from $10 billion to over 

$23 billion, years behind schedulec

ABL Missile Defense Downgraded to technical demonstration; 

350% overrun, years lated

EELV Satellite Launch >$14 billion overrun, years latee

Space Radar ISR Congress continues to cut funding citing 

immature technology and high costf

TSAT Communications Congress continues to cut funding citing 

immature technology and high costg

Advanced EHF Communications > $1billion overrun, 50% unit cost 

growth, years lateh

Wideband Gap Filler Communications Increasing cost, >two years late on “low 

risk” satellitei

aCongressman Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY), Opening Statement on NPOESS IG [inspector general] 

Report Hearing, US House of Representatives, House Science and Technology Committee, Washington DC, 11 May 2006, http://gop.science.house.gov/hearings/full06/May%2011/sbopening.pdf.

bMarcia Smith, Military Space Programs: Issues Concerning DoD’s SBIRS and STSS Programs, Congressional Research Service, RS21148, 25 November 2005, http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/

06feb/RS21148.pdf.

c

Ibid.

dDefense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004, United States Government 

Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, March 2005, http://www.gao.gov/

new.items/d05243.pdf.

e

Raymond Decker, Defense Space Activities: Continuation of Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 

Program’s Progress to Date Subject to Some Uncertainty, United States General Accounting Office 

Report to Congressional Committees, 24 June 2004, http://www.gao.gov/htext/d03379.html.

f

Marcia Smith, Military Space Programs: Issues Concerning DoD’s SBIRS and STSS Programs, Congressional Research Service, RS21148, 25 November 2005, http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/

06feb/RS21148.pdf.

g

Ibid.

hIbid.

i

Ibid.
CONCLUSIONS

68

Continue Partnerships and Engagement

The United States should continue to pursue international 

partnerships and engagement on missile defense. As demonstrated in chapter 4, missile defense is a critical national-security 

issue throughout Asia and also for much of the rest of the 

world. As a result, allies are looking to the United States for 

support and security guarantees in the face of rapid proliferation of ballistic missiles. Moreover, the United States also needs 

partners for basing rights and to assist in protecting widely 

dispersed interests and deployed forces. The location of interceptor sites, such as the proposed European locale for GMD, 

gets much of the attention; but partnerships are also vital for 

sensor basing such as the large radars in England, Greenland, 

and Japan (future). The global war on terror illustrated the 

value of intelligence sharing among international partners, and 

likewise, US missile defense will also benefit from genuine information sharing from friends and allies.

Engaging Asian nations on missile defense is important to 

maintaining stability and enabling cooperation in other arenas. 

For world powers, missile defense taps into the same body of 

psychological- and strategic-deterrence thinking as nuclear 

weapons. Consequently, the heightened strategic-security implications will increase the complexity of partnering with aspiring 

hegemons such as Russia and China. Missile defense is not the 

driving factor in US relations with Russia or China, but it does 

play a meaningful role in the maintenance of stability and 

should not be ignored. In addition to stability, Russia, China, 

and most other nations also have a substantial interest in minimizing the threat of terrorism and proliferation of WMD. The 

international partnerships formed to fight terrorism, counterproliferation, and deal with rogue nations, such as North Korea 

and Iran, are extremely beneficial to US security. Continuous 

engagement on missile defense provides transparency to Asian 

powers and reduces the risk of misunderstanding or otherwise 

adversely impacting similarly critical areas of cooperation.
CONCLUSIONS

69

Future Research

There are several additional directions for further research 

on US missile-defense policy and development. First, a national 

policy for cruise missile defense is a high-priority endeavor that 

needs attention. Similar to the German combination of V-1 and 

V-2 ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, today’s threat is more 

than simply ballistic missiles. Secondly, other topics for investigation are the key conditions and indicators for pursuing 

space-based interceptors. The United States has no concrete 

plans to use space-based interceptors for missile defense, but 

this may be necessary in the future. Thirdly, defining the upper 

bound for the limited missile defense is an interesting topic. 

The current plan attempts to walk the middle ground between 

no capability and a full defensive shield. What is the upper 

limit for the number of GMD interceptors and sites before this 

situation becomes untenable? A final idea is an investigation of 

the feasibility and implications of conventional and/or nuclear 

preemptive strike as a missile-defense policy. In reality, many 

missile-attack scenarios will be difficult to defeat with a system 

that can only respond after a launch is initiated. A preemptive 

strike may be the only realistic means of defending against 

such threats.

Concluding Remarks

The world is transitioning away from the Cold War paradigm 

of intentional great power vulnerability (MAD) to an era of asymmetric threats that requires a mixture of strategic offense and 

defense. Furthermore, the focus of the world stage is increasingly 

in Asia as nations and cultures emerge from the rubble of the 

Soviet Union, and numerous world powers contend for regional 

control. President Reagan suggested that technology has now 

reached a level of sophistication where it is reasonable to begin 

the missile-defense journey, and he was correct. US missiledefense policy must find firm footing to avoid the pitfalls of 

technical overreach and ill-advised deterioration in global relationships to genuinely protect US forces, population, and allies 

from ballistic-missile attack. The current US missile-defense 
CONCLUSIONS

70

policy is a step in the right direction, but there is extremely 

hard work ahead for diplomats, technologists, and warriors.

Notes

1. Defense Acquisitions.

2. Schneider, Nuclear Forces, 10.

3. Wirtz and Larsen, Rockets’ Red Glare, 186–88.

4. Baucom, “Rise and Fall,” 143–50.

5. American Physical Society (APS), Report of the APS.

6. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review.

7. Feickert, “Missile Survey.”

8. Ibid.

9. Kyl, “Unready for this Attack”; and Sieff, “BMD Watch.”

10. Flynn, “America the Vulnerable,” 60–61.

11. “Obering: Decision Forthcoming.”

12. “Appropriators Call for Study.”

13. FAS, Unclassified Summary.

14. Kyl, “Unready for this Attack.”

15. Foster et al., Report of the Commission to Assess.

16. FAS, National Security.

17. Cirincione, “Declining Ballistic Missile Threat,” 5.

18. FAS, Unclassified Summary.

19. Cirincione, “Declining Ballistic Missile Threat,” 6.

20. Martin, “Theater Ballistic Missiles,” 5.

21. Feickert, “Missile Survey.”

22. FAS, Unclassified Summary.

23. Onishi, “US Confirms Test.”

24. Feickert, “Missile Survey.”

25. Roosevelt, “MDA Moves Forward.”

26. Center for Defense Information (CDI), Independent Review Team.

27. “MDA Director Outlines Allocation.”

28. Burns, “Washington Talking to Warsaw.”

29. FAS, Unclassified Summary.

30. “Perspectives on Complex-System Engineering,” 1–4.

31. Hodge, “Sega Promises;” Pasztor, “U.S.’s Lofty Plans.”

32. Smith, Military Space Programs.

33. Defense Acquisitions.

34. “Troubled Airborne Laser Program.”

35. CDI, Missile Defense Agency Fiscal Year 2007.

36. “Boeing Receives Aircraft.”

37. Levin, “Space Acquisitions,” 7–10.
71

Acronyms

ABL	 airborne laser

ABM	 antiballistic missile

BMD	 ballistic missile defense

BMDO	 Ballistic Missile Defense Organization

BPI	 boost-phase intercept

BUR	 “Bottom Up Review”

CTR	 cooperative threat reduction

DOD	 Department of Defense

DSP	 Defense Support Program

EELV	 evolved expendable launch vehicle

EHF	 extremely high frequency

EKV	 exoatmoshperic kill vehicle

EMP	 electromagnetic pulse

GBI	 ground-based interceptor

GMD	 ground-based midcourse defense

GPALS	 global protection against limited strikes

ICBM	 intercontinental ballistic missile

IR	 infrared

IRBM	 intermediate-range ballistic missiles

KEI	 kinetic-energy interceptor

LDO	 limited defensive operations

MAD	 mutually assured destruction

MDA	 Missile Defense Agency

MRBM	 medium-range ballistic missile

MKV	 multiple-kill vehicle

NMD	 national missile defense

NORTHCOM	 United States Northern Command

NPOESS	 National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System

NPR	 Nuclear Posture Review

NPT	 Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

OIF	 Operation Iraqi Freedom

PAC	 Patriot advanced capabilities

SALT	 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SBIRS	 space-based infrared sensor

SDI	 Strategic Defense Initiative

SLBM	 submarine-launched ballistic missile
ACRONYMS

72

SRBM	 short-range ballistic missile

START	 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

STSS	 Space Tracking and Surveillance System

TBM	 theater ballistic missile

THAAD	 terminal high altitude air defense

WMD	 weapon of mass destruction
73

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