UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-5164

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

KEVIN WAYNE MCDANIELS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge. 

(7:06-cr-00036-HFF-1; 7:08-cv-70005-HFF) 

Submitted: July 16, 2009 Decided: August 14, 2009 

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Russell W. Mace, III, THE MACE FIRM, Myrtle Beach, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States 

Attorney, A. Lance Crick, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Kevin Wayne McDaniels pled guilty to possession of a 

firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 

(2006). The district court sentenced him to two hundred months’ 

imprisonment. McDaniels raises two issues on appeal. First, he 

contends that the district court erred in failing to 

sufficiently investigate the effect of prescribed medication on 

McDaniels’s competence to enter a guilty plea. Second, 

McDaniels asserts that the district court erred in counting his 

prior conviction for burglary in the third degree as a predicate 

offense, resulting in his designation as an armed career 

criminal and the enhancement of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e) (2006). We affirm. 

I. Competence to Enter Guilty Plea

 Because McDaniels did not move to withdraw his guilty 

plea in the district court, our review of this issue is for 

plain error. See United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 527 

(4th Cir. 2002). To establish plain error, McDaniels must “show 

that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the 

error affected his substantial rights.” United States v. White, 

405 F.3d 208, 215 (4th Cir. 2005).*

 

(Continued) 

*

 Even if such a showing is made, the decision to correct 

the error is within our discretion, based on a determination 

that the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or 

2 
 Prior to accepting a defendant’s guilty plea, it is 

the responsibility of the court to determine that the defendant 

is competent to enter the plea. See United States v. Damon, 191 

F.3d 561, 564 (4th Cir. 1999). In furtherance of this end, Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 11 requires the court to personally inform the 

defendant of, and ensure he understands, the possible 

consequences of pleading guilty and the nature of the charges he 

is facing. See Damon, 191 F.3d at 564. Thus, when an answer 

given by the defendant during a plea colloquy “raises questions 

about the defendant’s state of mind, the court must broaden its 

inquiry to satisfy itself that the plea is being made knowingly 

and voluntarily.” Id. at 565. With a medicated defendant, a 

court should ascertain the effect, if any, of the medication on 

the defendant’s ability to make a knowing and voluntary plea. 

See id. (finding error in the district court’s failure to 

determine the effect of defendant’s medication on defendant’s 

ability to enter a voluntary plea). 

 During McDaniels’s plea colloquy, he stated that he 

was taking two drugs for his mental health. However, it is 

clear that the district court adequately ensured that 

 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (internal quotation marks, 

alteration and citation omitted). 

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McDaniels’s medication did not interfere with his ability to 

understand the proceedings and enter a knowing and voluntary 

plea. The judge questioned McDaniels regarding the medication, 

and McDaniels affirmed that he was sober, and knew where he was 

and what was happening in the proceeding. Further, McDaniels’s 

attorney, who advised the district court he had had “numerous 

conversations” with McDaniels, opined that the medication did 

not affect McDaniels’s competence, and McDaniels agreed with 

this conclusion. Accordingly, we find that McDaniels’s first 

contention is without merit. 

II. Armed Career Criminal Designation

 McDaniels’s second contention on appeal is that the 

district court erred in counting his prior conviction for 

burglary in the third degree as a predicate offense, resulting 

in his designation as an armed career criminal and imposition of 

an enhanced sentence. McDaniels asserts that the district court 

incorrectly considered the burglary conviction to be a “violent 

felony” under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b)(ii). Because 

McDaniels failed to object to the application of this 

enhancement during sentencing, our review is for plain error. 

Olano, 507 U.S. at 732; White, 405 F.3d at 215. 

 A defendant is an armed career criminal when he 

violates § 922(g)(1) and has three prior convictions for violent 

felonies or serious drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A 

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violent felony is one that “has as an element the use, attempted 

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 

another,” or “is burglary, . . . or otherwise involves conduct 

that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 

another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). This definition 

specifically includes burglary. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

 To determine whether an offense under state law falls 

within the definition of a violent felony, we typically use a 

categorical approach, which “takes into account only the 

definition of the offense and the fact of conviction.” United 

States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 2002). The 

particular label or categorization under state law is not 

controlling. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590-91 

(1990). If the state defines burglary more broadly, such as by 

broadening the locus of the unlawful entry to include places 

other than buildings, the categorical approach “may permit the 

sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction.” Id.

at 602. For purposes of the ACCA, “a person has been convicted 

of burglary . . . if he is convicted of any crime, regardless of 

its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of 

unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building 

or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Id. at 599. 

Generally, an offense will constitute burglary if the jury was 

required “to find all the elements of generic burglary in order 

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to convict the defendant, and the indictment or information and 

jury instructions show that the defendant was charged only with 

burglary of a building,” so “the jury necessarily had to find an 

entry of a building to convict.” Id. 

 Under South Carolina law, “[a] person is guilty of 

burglary in the third degree if the person enters a building 

without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein.” 

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-313 (2003). For purposes of South 

Carolina’s burglary statutes, a building means “any structure, 

vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft . . . where any person lives, 

. . . people assemble, . . . [or] goods are stored.” S.C. Code 

Ann. § 16-11-310 (2003). Therefore, because South Carolina 

defines third-degree burglary more broadly than the generic 

definition, we must determine whether the jury would have been 

required to find McDaniels guilty of generic burglary in order 

to convict him. 

 A district court is entitled to rely on a prepared 

presentence investigation report (“PSR”) when determining 

whether a prior crime qualifies as a predicate offense under the 

ACCA. See United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 285 (4th 

Cir. 2005). The PSR prepared for McDaniels’s sentencing reveals 

that the object of McDaniels’s prior burglary was a building; 

therefore, it is clear that this offense constituted generic 

6 
7 

burglary for purposes of the ACCA. Thus, the district court did 

not err in applying this enhancement. 

 Accordingly, we deny McDaniels’s pro se motion for 

leave to file supplemental material and affirm the judgment of 

the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately expressed in the 

materials before the court, and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED