1 Filed 5/27/15 P. v. J.S. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELL ATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. J.S., Defendant and Appellant. E062416 (Super.Ct.No . FELJS1404413) OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino Count y. Lorenzo R. Belderrama, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Barbara A. Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal , for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Ge rald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Julie L. Garland, Arlene A. Sevidal, and Elizab eth M. Carino, Deputy Attorneys General, for Pl aintiff and Respondent. Defendant and appellant J.S., a mentally disordered offender (MDO) as defined by Penal Code section 2960 et seq., appeals fro m an order authorizing Patton State Hospital2 to administer antipsychotic me dication to her involuntarily. She argues that the order was not supported by substantial evidence. We di sagree, and therefore affirm the trial court’s ruling. Additionally, we correct a clerical er ror in the minute order, so that it accurately reflects the oral ruling of the trial court.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1 On March 6, 2014, defendant was committed to Patton State Hospital as an MDO. Pursuant to an administrative hearing conducted on July 30, 2014, beginning on July 16, 2014, she was medicated involuntarily on an interim basis, as allowed under California Code of Regulations, title 9, section 4210, a nd Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (g). Those interim proceedings aut horized involuntary medication through January 26, 2015. On September 16, 2014, the Department of State Hospitals filed a petition requesting the trial court to authorize continued involuntar y administration of medi cation for a period of one year from the date of the order. On October 24, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition. The court heard testimony from Dr. Shana Nguyen, wh o had been J.S.’s tr eating psychologist from July 2014 through September 2014, and had reviewed the notes of the psychologist who had taken over that responsibility as of the beginning of October 2014. Dr. Nguyen testified that defendant has a “longstanding chronic psychiatric history,” and a diagnosis of “bipolar affective disorder, manic, with ps ychotic features,” as well as substance abuse

1 We do not attempt an exhaustive factua l and procedural hist ory of this case, limiting our discussion to matters either directly relevant to the issues at bar or necessary for context.3 issues regarding alcohol and methamphetami ne. She had found defendant’s thought process to have been “very di sorganized,” and described he r as initially “quite manic” and “easily agitated.” Dr. Nguyen further observed defendant to “harbor[] a few delusions,” including “somatic” delusions—m eaning that she imagin ed she had various medical conditions—as well as persecutory delusions. Dr. Nguyen noted that defendant had resp onded somewhat to the medication that had been administered to her involuntarily on an interim basis, since July 16, 2014. In particular, a new antipsychotic medication was successful in reducing defendant’s symptoms of mania. But she continued to ha ve somatic delusions, fixating in particular on having a urinary tract infec tion. Testing showed defendant ’s urine to be contaminated with feces—suggesting that she may have “i ntentionally smeared feces on her urethra to induce UTI,” or at least that “her persona l hygiene was unclean”—but showing no signs of infection. Additionally, defendant complained of side effects from medication, but there was no indication those side effects were actually occurring. Dr. Nguyen’s opinion was th at defendant did not understand that mental illness affects her behavior—indeed, defendant had deni ed having any ment al illness, and expressed the belief that she should not be on any medications. Dr. Nguyen further opined that defendant should take psychotropic medication, because there is evidence that it helps her. Dr. Nguyen believed that she would likely refuse to cooperate with a treatment program, and would attempt to ma nipulate any treatment regime by claiming side effects she was not in fact suffering.4 The court also received testimony from defendant, who conceded that she has “anxiety,” but denied having a ny mental illness, including bipo lar disorder or paranoid delusions. She complained of a “severe allergic reaction” from her medication. And she expressed the opinion that she was not in fa ct being medicated to help her with her illness—stating “the meds they’re giving me has [ sic ] nothing to do with me”—but rather because it was a “money oriented situation,” in which she was being used as a “guinea pig” for a new drug.
II. DISCUSSION A. Applicable Law Individuals in custody may refuse to take psychotropic medication. ( In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1 ( Qawi ).) However, the right of a pe rson committed as an MDO “to refuse antipsychotic drugs is qualified . . . .” ( People v. Fisher (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1013 ( Fisher ).) The right of refusal may be ov ercome by a judicial determination that (1) the MDO is incompet ent or incapable of making decisions about his or her medical treatment, or (2) the MDO is dang erous within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 5300. ( Qawi , supra , at p. 27.) “We review an order authorizing invo luntary administration of antipsychotic medication for substantial evidence.” ( Fisher , supra , 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016.) In examining the record for subs tantial evidence, “[o]ur sole inquiry is ‘whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ supporting the court’s finding.” ( Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 822.)5 “‘We must accept as true all ev idence . . . tending to estab lish the correctness of the trial court’s findings . . . , resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment.’” ( Id. at p. 823.) B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Tr ial Court’s Involuntar y Medication Order J.S. argues the evidence is insufficient to support th e trial court’s involuntary medication order. We disagree. The trial court found that defendant was incompetent or incapable of making decisions about her medical treatment. Judi cial determination of whether an MDO is competent to refuse an tipsychotic medication focuses on th ree factors: (1) whether the patient is aware of her situation; (2) whether the patient understands the benefits and risks of the treatment; and (3) whether the patie nt is able to understand and knowingly, intelligently, and rationally evaluate and pa rticipate in the treatment decision. ( Qawi , supra , 32 Cal.4th at pp. 17-18.) Here, there is substantial evidence that these factors each weigh in support of the trial court’s finding. Dr. Nguyen testified, and defendant demonstr ated through her own testimony, that she is not aware that she in fact suffers from serious mental illness. Additionally, defendant’s delusions about side effects, as well as her belief that she is being medicated as a “guinea pig” for new dr ugs, rather than to treat symptoms of her mental illness, severely affect her ability to appropriately weigh the benefits and risks of the treatment. Defendant may well be an intelligent person, as emphasized in her briefing, but if that intelligence is misd irected by somatic and paranoid delusions, it cannot help her understand a nd knowingly, inte lligently, and rationally evaluate and participate in treatment decisions. ( Qawi , supra , 32 Cal.4th at pp. 17-18.)6 Defendant argues that there is no evidence she ever refused all medication, only that she was refusing to take one particul ar medication. Dr. Nguyen testified that defendant had, with several different drugs, complained of side effects that were not observed, and that were apparently the produc t of somatic delusions, rather than actual side effects. Dr. Nguyen’s opinion, based on her past experience with defendant, and defendant’s previous statemen ts that she should not take any medication, was that defendant was unlikely to coop erate with any treatment regime. Moreover, defendant in essence testified that she did not believe sh e needed any medication, denying any mental illness, and insisting that the medication being gi ven to her had “nothing to do with [her]” but rather was being administered based on the financial motives of those treating her. The trial court’s conclusion that defendant wa s “unwilling” to participate in her treatment by taking medications voluntarily was well grounded the evidence. In short, the evidence was mo re than sufficient to suppor t the trial court’s ruling, and defendant’s arguments to the contrary are rejected. C. The Minute Order Must Be Corrected to Accurately Reflect the Trial Court’s Ruling At the October 24, 2014, hearing, th e trial court found defendant to be “incompetent or incapable of making deci sions about her medical treatment.” The minute order describing the trial court’s ruling, however, states that she was found “to be a serious danger to others.” The trial court ma de no such finding. The parties agree that we can, and should, correct that error. We agree. ( See, e.g. , People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186-187 [appellate court may co rrect clerical errors on its own motion or7 upon application of the parties]; People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.Ap p.4th 380, 385-386 [similar].)
III. DISPOSITION The minute order of October 24, 2014, is modified to strike the portion of the order describing defendant “to be a serious da nger to others,” and reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement that she is “incompetent or incapable of making decisions about her medical treatment.” As modified, the trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

HOLLENHORST Acting P. J. We concur: MCKINSTER J. CODRINGTON J.