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87–689 PDF 2014

S. HRG. 113–257 

STAYING ON TRACK: NEXT STEPS IN IMPROVING 

PASSENGER AND FREIGHT RAIL SAFETY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 19, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

WILLIAM COWAN, Massachusetts 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

DAN COATS, Indiana 

TIM SCOTT, South Carolina 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF CHIESA, New Jersey 

ELLEN L. DONESKI, Staff Director 

JAMES REID, Deputy Staff Director 

JOHN WILLIAMS, General Counsel 

DAVID SCHWIETERT, Republican Staff Director 

NICK ROSSI, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

REBECCA SEIDEL, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on June 19, 2013 ............................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Blumenthal .......................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Blunt .................................................................................... 3 

Statement of Senator Johnson ................................................................................ 42 

Article dated May 13, 2013 from the Washington Post by George F. 

Will ................................................................................................................. 42 

Statement of Senator McCaskill ............................................................................. 46 

Statement of Senator Thune ................................................................................... 48 

WITNESSES

Hon. Joseph C. Szabo, Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. 

Department of Transportation ............................................................................ 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman, National Transportation Safety 

Board ..................................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 19 

Susan A. Fleming, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, United States 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 25 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 27 

Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief Executive Officer, Association 

of American Railroads ......................................................................................... 54 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 56 

Kathryn Waters, Executive Vice President, Member Services, American Public Transportation Association ............................................................................ 80 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 82 

James A. Stem, Jr., National Legislative Director, Transportation Division, 

Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation (SMART) Union ............................ 87 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 89 

James P. Redeker, Commissioner, Connecticut Department of Transportation 151 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 153 

Michelle Teel, P.E., PTOE, Multimodal Operations Director, Missouri Department of Transportation ........................................................................................ 156 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 157 

APPENDIX

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Joseph C. Szabo by: 

Hon. Barbara Boxer ......................................................................................... 169 

Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................................................................................ 171 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to: 

Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman ........................................................................... 172 

Edward R. Hamberger ..................................................................................... 173 

Kathryn Waters ................................................................................................ 173 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John Thune to: 

Hon. Joseph C. Szabo ....................................................................................... 174 

Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman ........................................................................... 177 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman ................................................................................................ 177 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John Thune to: 

Susan A. Fleming ............................................................................................. 178 

Edward R. Hamberger ..................................................................................... 179 

Response to written question submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to Edward 

R. Hamberger ....................................................................................................... 179 

Page

IV 

Response to written question submitted to Kathryn Waters by: 

Hon. John Thune .............................................................................................. 179 

Hon. Deb Fischer .............................................................................................. 180 

Response to written question submitted by Hon. John Thune to James P. 

Redeker ................................................................................................................. 181 

(1) 

STAYING ON TRACK: NEXT STEPS 

IN IMPROVING PASSENGER AND FREIGHT 

RAIL SAFETY 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Blumenthal, 

presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Good morning, everyone. I am calling to 

order this hearing of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

Committee, which has the very important and profoundly significant task of hearing testimony from some really excellent witnesses 

on the issue of rail safety. 

And I want to begin by thanking Chairman Rockefeller for the 

opportunity to have this hearing, which is important not only to 

the Northeast and to the Midwest, Missouri, but really to the entire country. And I know Chairman Rockefeller has demonstrated 

his commitment to improving rail safety over many, many years. 

And I am humbled and honored to have this opportunity. 

And I also want to thank Senator Lautenberg for his tireless and 

relentless effort on this subject. And his loss is a personal loss to 

me, because he was a mentor and model, but also a loss to the 

country as a leader in transportation safety and reliability. 

And I want to thank the staff of this committee for its excellent 

work in putting together this hearing, in calling the really very, 

very well-qualified witnesses that we have, and also in preparing 

for it. 

Let me begin by saying that anybody who questions the need for 

this hearing has only to read today’s headlines. The derailment 

yesterday of a Long Island railroad train, carrying about 1,000 passengers leaving Penn Station, which essentially paralyzed rail traffic in much of the Northeast Corridor for a substantial period of 

time, inconveniencing many, many people, and delaying freight and 

travel. 

During the month of May, in a span of less than 2 weeks, our 

nation witnessed major railroad tragedy, the first of them in 

Bridgeport, Connecticut, where an eastbound train derailed and 

then was struck by a westbound train seconds later. 

2 

Days later, this same commuter line saw one of its own, a dedicated Metro-North worker, killed by a passing train while he was 

inspecting track in that vicinity. 

And on May 25, just about a week later, two freight trains collided in Missouri. 

Only a few days after that event, a railroad grade crossing accident and explosion occurred in White Marsh, Maryland. 

We know that rail safety is improving, but these incidents certainly challenge the public’s trust and confidence in the system, 

and the credibility of claims that rail safety is in fact improving. 

I think that in many instances, pictures speak louder than 

words. In fact, as the saying goes, a picture is worth 1,000 words. 

And we are going to see two pictures in the course of this hearing. 

One of them is of a shunt system that Chairman Hersman will be 

presenting in the course of her testimony. This very rudimentary 

appearing piece of equipment could have saved the life of that 

Metro-North worker who was killed in West Haven. 

The cost? About $200. And thankfully, the NTSB has now recommended, in an urgent recommendation, that Metro-North use 

this equipment systemwide. But for Robert Luden, it is too late. 

And for American railroads, it is too late for adoption and implementation of many of these, literally, life-saving technologies, 

which are simple, feasible, inexpensive, and cost-effective. 

So this hearing is about new technology that may help save lives 

and dollars. But it is also about existing systems that can and 

should be implemented. 

The other picture, which we are going to see, is of the inspection 

report that was released in the wake of the collision in Bridgeport, 

Connecticut. This came to my office just yesterday, but it is the inspection report that was done on May 15, just 2 days before the 

May 17 derailment and collision. 

What it shows, again, as the NTSB has pointed out in its preliminary statement, is that the defect that very likely was responsible for the derailment was found by an inspector at track 4, catenary 734. And the finding was that there were hanging ties and 

pumping load at that point. 

The NTSB has not reached any final conclusions, but I am willing to say at this point that this deficiency very substantially contributed, if it did not actually cause, that derailment. It was found 

2 days before. 

Whether it should have been corrected, in my view, is indisputable. It should have been. Whether it is the only cause or the 

probable cause remains open for debate. 

But what is astonishing about this report is not only that finding, but all the other defects found on that day at different points 

on that same track. Any of them could have caused a similar derailment and collision. 

So the state of our railroads, literally, is in question. And that 

is the reason we are here today. 

A couple points before I go to Senator Blunt, the Ranking Member. 

Clearly, there is a need for infrastructure investment. It may be 

extremely costly. We have not decided how to pay for it. I have proVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
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posed a national rail trust fund, and I will continue to support the 

creation of a national infrastructure bank. 

But the issues for today concern the very simple and cost-effective options out there right now. And one of them actually concerns 

the technology that exists for better inspection, the Sperry Rail, 

which produces a better form of inspection, based in the state of 

Connecticut. 

Another concern of mine is the amount of time it takes to do both 

investigations and rulemaking. Investigations by the NTSB, we are 

going to learn more about the amount of time it takes to complete 

those investigations. But in my view, 12 to 18 months is simply unacceptable as the amount of time to complete investigations. We 

need answers quicker, so that we can solve problems sooner. 

And on rulemaking, I am concerned about delays in the FRA’s 

rules. My understanding is that there were 17 rules that were due 

to be promulgated and finalized, many of them not completed yet; 

others delayed and, in fact, delayed in their effective dates; and 

compliance manuals still due. 

So there is work to be done here. A lot has been done to make 

our rail lines safer, but we can and we should, we must, do more. 

And passenger and rail freight growth is projected to continue. 

At the same time, this industry is really at a crossroads, because 

it has to earn and keep the trust of the American public. 

Again, my thanks to our witnesses for being here today. I look 

forward to your testimony. 

And I am now going to turn to Senator Blunt. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. And thanks for 

chairing this hearing today. 

I know Senator Blumenthal and I and others on this subcommittee, particularly me as the new Ranking Member, looked 

forward to the chance to work with Senator Lautenberg who knew 

so much and cared so much about railroads. And we miss his understanding of these issues and his leadership on these issues. 

But Senator Blumenthal’s efforts to have this hearing today I 

particularly appreciate. 

I am also particularly glad that Michelle Teel is here. She is the 

Multimodal Director from the Missouri Department of Transportation and will be on the second panel. We have two extraordinary 

panels today, and I look forward, as everybody does, to hearing 

from them. 

As Senator Blumenthal has suggested, this is a very current 

issue. A day before yesterday, on the front page of the Wall Street 

Journal, there was a big article about conflicting pressures on the 

industry to do something very expensive and very new, and to 

maintain a system that is challenging to maintain. I mean, the rail 

industry is extremely capital intensive. It involves lots of investment on infrastructure that is needed to last 20, sometimes 30, 

years or longer. 

Knowing those cost considerations, it is good to hear from the 

dedication of all the people who are represented on these panels 

4 

today to both supervise this and to make this important industry 

work. 

It is an industry that is growing as we use it in more aggressive 

ways, both for rail and for passenger. The amount of time, resources, and money that the Federal Government and the private 

rail line operators have put into increasing safety is important at 

rail crossings, increasing awareness about the hazards of trespassing, and basically, increasing the overall safety of our actual 

rail infrastructure. It is a good thing to see this focused on. 

If you did not know any better, you would think, if you were an 

outside observer, that not much was changing. But, of course, in 

the last few decades, an incredible amount of change has occurred 

in the rail industry. And it is a dramatically different industry 

than it was just a few years ago. 

But the technological advancement, what I think has really been 

a nimble regulatory approach by the Federal Railroad Administration and the dedication to improving service has been impressive. 

But we want to hear about how it could be better, and what the 

Government can do to both encourage it to be better and to make 

it less complicated, so that you can achieve those better results. 

I am very interested to hear about the status of the system 

today. I am specifically interested to hear about the progress being 

made on the implementation of positive train control, which, as almost everyone in this room knows, is supposed to be fully operable 

by the end of 2015. Most things I see suggest that is a very hard 

goal to meet. This mandate, of course, requires possibly more than $10 billion 

and hours and hours of work to complete. 

We had the nominated Chairman for the FCC in this very room 

yesterday, and I asked him about building all these towers, 22,000 

towers. How does that happen in 3 years, unless the FCC figures 

out ways to be much more aggressive in their view of this than 

they are on the 2,000 or 3,000 towers that they generally maximize 

out in being able to permit every year? 

I am also anxious to hear about the passenger and commuter rail 

networks, how they are managing this mandate. And so positive 

train control is something I hope to leave here knowing about more 

than I do today, and to know where we should be headed in the 

Senate, in the Congress, and on this committee. 

And again, Mr. Blumenthal, he and I came to the Senate together. We are proud to be in this hearing together. And this is a 

dynamic and important industry that we need to appreciate for 

what it is. 

So, Chairman, thank you for conducting this hearing today. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Senator Blunt. 

Let me introduce the witnesses, and then ask each of you to 

begin with opening remarks. 

First, Joseph Szabo, who is Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration, he was nominated on March 22, 2009, and 

confirmed by the U.S. Senate on April 29, 2009. And he is the 12th 

administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration, and the first 

to come from the ranks of rail workers. 

He leads a staff of over 900 professionals located in Washington, 

D.C., and field offices across the United States who develop and enVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
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force safety regulations. They also manage financial assistance programs, and oversee research and technology development programs. 

Mr. Szabo is a fifth-generation railroader, who between 2006 and 

2009 was Vice President of the Illinois AFL–CIO. And he also has 

served as Mayor of Riverdale, Illinois, and a member of the South 

Suburban Mayors Transportation Committee. He has held various 

other public service positions. 

And we welcome you, Mr. Szabo, to the hearing and particularly 

for your long expertise and your experience in this area. 

Chairman Deborah Hersman of the National Transportation 

Safety Board is recognized as one of the most passionate and visionary safety leaders for all modes of transportation. Among her 

initiatives include the actions and attention focused on distracted 

driving, child passenger safety, and helping accident victims and 

their family. 

She has been a Board Member on the scene for 19 major transportation accidents. And she has chaired dozens of NTSB hearings, 

forums, events, and she regularly testifies before Congress. Her 

leadership has made the NTSB a better organization, and we are 

proud to welcome her today. 

Susan Fleming, who is Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues 

in the Government Accountability Office is with us as well, the 

third witness. She has been a member of the GAO staff for some 

time. The GAO, as you know, is headed by the Comptroller General 

of the United States, who is appointed for a 15-year term by the 

President of the United States from a slate of candidates whom the 

Congress proposes. And the United States General Accounting Office is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for the Congress. It is often called the congressional watchdog. 

And we welcome you, Ms. Fleming, today. Thank you for being 

here. 

So let us begin with Mr. Szabo. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH C. SZABO, ADMINISTRATOR, 

FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. SZABO. Thank you, Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member 

Blunt, and members of the Committee. I appreciate this opportunity to testify. 

Rail is an extremely safe mode of transportation, but I personally 

know firsthand the impact that train accidents can have on families and communities. I have been the mayor of a railroad town 

that has had its share of accidents and hazardous spills. I have 

been a railroader who was lucky enough to survive a close call and 

not fall victim to a fatality. 

As a conductor, I have experienced firsthand my share of grade 

crossing fatalities. And over the course of my railroad career, I 

have had five good friends killed on duty. 

The members of my FRA staff, like me, live and breathe railroad 

safety. As unprecedented private and public investments position 

rail for its growing role in moving both people and freight, FRA has 

sharpened its focus on enhanced safety. 

6 

2012 was the safest year in railroading history. Since the Rail 

Safety Improvement Act was passed in 2008, railroad accidents 

have declined for 5 straight years, part of a 43 percent drop over 

the past decade. 

And this has not occurred by mistake. It reflects our comprehensive approach to railroad safety. We have used good data to increase audits and spot inspections in strategic locations. We have 

taken steps to ensure the competency of locomotive engineers and 

conductors. We have issued requirements to have emergency notification systems at every highway rail grade crossing. We have updated our track and passenger equipment safety standards to ensure the safe introduction of high-speed rail service at speeds of up 

to 220 mph, embracing a performance-based safety approach that 

will allow proven high-speed train set designs to be used in the 

United States. 

But we must always do better. Our goal always is for continuous 

safety improvement. 

So as we work with the industry to install positive train control, 

we have placed an increased emphasis on analyzing human factors. 

This includes advancing risk reduction programs like the confidential close call reporting system, and system safety programs for 

passenger operations. Our most mature confidential close call reporting system pilot project so far has yielded remarkable results, 

a 70 percent reduction in accidents. 

Looking ahead, the President’s 2014 FRA budget request includes funding to expand close call reporting nationally, furthering 

our understanding of root causes behind accidents, which will help 

railroads establish prevention measures in advance of an accident. 

The key here is, we want to know what is going on before an accident occurs. With our two core authorizations set to expire, our 

budget also proposes a new 5-year, $40 billion rail authorization, 

including a national high performance rail system program to fund 

essential development projects for both passenger and freight rail. 

And there is a fundamental link between a higher performing 

rail network and higher levels of safety, achieving both a state-ofgood-repair and advancing new safety technologies. 

Consider our investment in 110 mph service in the Midwest, 

which will upgrade more than 200 grade crossings with what we 

are calling smart technology that will detect any intrusion into that 

grade crossing protected area in advance of an accident occurring. 

Our investments in North Carolina, which, in addition to improving speeds and reliability, will close some 50 grade crossings and 

construct strategically placed overpasses and underpasses, enhancing safety for trains, pedestrians, and vehicles. 

Under our budget proposal, projects would be eligible to compete 

for funding through a national high performance rail program. And 

to fund these efforts, we propose establishing a new rail account 

within the transportation trust fund, putting rail on par with other 

transportation modes that benefit from sustained funding sources. 

And we can provide the predictability in funding that will empower 

states, local governments, and the private sector to invest in a rail 

network that is unquestionably safe. 

Rail is an extremely safe mode of transportation. But like you, 

I am not satisfied. With your support, we can lay a deeper foundaVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
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tion for continuous safety improvements. We can increase the use 

of advanced technology, capture and analyze data from programs 

like close calls, and close dangerous grade crossings. 

Together, we can ensure that rail remains safe, reliable, and efficient. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Szabo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH C. SZABO, ADMINISTRATOR, 

FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today, on behalf of Secretary LaHood, to discuss 

the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) rail safety program. Rail is a particularly safe mode of transportation, and one that Americans are choosing more than 

ever before. In this testimony, I will detail recent accomplishments, including the 

status of FRA’s implementation of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA), 

and I will discuss current challenges. We would like to note that some railroad accidents widely reported in the press during the last few months do not reflect the 

positive trends in safety statistics and annual records that we have seen in safety 

data. In closing, I will describe FRA’s preliminary reauthorization proposals, which 

we view as key components for improving our safety program. 

FRA’s mission is to enable the safe, reliable, and efficient movement of people and 

goods for a strong America, now and in the future. This testimony will explain how 

we are fulfilling that mission. 

Recent Accomplishments 

FRA’s top priority is safety, and 2012 was the safest year on record, continuing 

our year-over-year reductions in incidents. Since 2003: 

• Total train accidents have declined by 43 percent. 

• Total derailments have declined by 41 percent. 

• Total highway-rail grade crossing accidents have declined by 34 percent. 

These safety improvements have contributed to 18-percent fewer fatalities and 14- 

percent fewer injuries over ten years, the annual totals falling from 865 fatalities 

to 706 fatalities, and 9,264 injuries to 7,993 injuries. 

This achievement is even more noteworthy because Amtrak ridership reached an 

all-time high, rail was the fastest-growing mode of public transit, and intermodal 

freight traffic surged toward a new record. 

8 

Statistical Accident Reductions since 2003 

FRA is committed to continuously improving safety. Although safety performance 

has steadily improved, we are committed to working towards that goal. Accidents 

in Missouri, Connecticut, and Maryland demonstrate the varied risks to rail safety. 

FRA approaches rail safety comprehensively. We are building on research and development, continuing to establish minimum safety requirements, conducting outreach and collaborating with stakeholders, performing compliance inspections and 

audits, and implementing and administering enforcement policies. 

FRA’s multidimensional safety strategy is intended to foster a safety culture evolution toward hazard analysis, accident prevention, and innovation, leading to a continual process of safety improvement. Positive train control (PTC) systems will be 

the technology backbone that promotes safety improvement through the reduction 

of certain human-factor-related incidents and should complement FRA’s other safety 

efforts, such as implementation of safety Risk Reduction Programs (RRP) as well 

as crash energy management. 

RSIA Implementation and Other FRA Safety Actions 

Congress acted to address rail safety issues in 2008 through the passage of RSIA, 

which reauthorized FRA’s safety program for five years and mandated that FRA develop approximately 40 final rules, guidance documents, model State laws, studies, 

and reports as well as three annual reports and hundreds of periodic accident reporting audits. RSIA also requires certain railroads to implement PTC systems by 

the end of 2015; provides FRA, as the Secretary’s designee, with regulatory authority over the hours of service of passenger train crews; and extensively amends the 

hours of service laws. 

FRA has finalized 59 percent of RSIA-mandated rules and 69 percent of the required studies, while continuing to pursue completion of the remaining provisions 

of the Act. The appendix to this testimony lists the rulemakings, non-periodic reports, guidance, and model State laws that FRA has completed as of June 1, 2013, 

that were mandated, explicitly or implicitly, by RSIA. 


619SZABO1.eps
9 

FRA’s regulatory program maximizes safety by developing rules based on facts, 

incident and accident causation analysis, comparison of alternative mitigation measures, and cost-beneficial solutions. FRA rules consider current and future industry 

capabilities, compliance burden and cost, and other economic and social realities. 

Within this context, FRA makes every effort to reach statutory milestones with its 

available resources. FRA often works with its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee 

(RSAC) to improve the quality and transparency of FRA’s rule development. FRA 

has maintained a continuous planning effort, through the Department’s regulatory 

review process and consultations with stakeholders, since RSIA’s enactment. 

To promote compliance with rules, FRA has built a safety oversight workforce 

that is highly motivated, well trained, and expertly skilled in numerous technical 

disciplines and specialties. Many inspectors and specialists come to FRA with decades of operational experience, which we build on and refine through continuous, 

comprehensive guidance, classroom and on-the-job training, mentoring, and developmental opportunities. New inspectors receive up to 120 hours of formal classroom 

training within their first year on board. They also go through 56 hours of additional formal classroom training related to accident investigation fundamentals. Historical accident and inspection data ensures optimal allocation of resources. FRA 

uses its Staffing Allocation Model for allocating its inspection resources among its 

eight regions and core disciplines and its National Inspection Plan (NIP) to facilitate 

inspectors’ focusing their efforts on specific railroads and locations that are likely 

to have safety problems. NIP provides guidance to an inspector on the amount of 

time that he or she should spend on each railroad in his or her territory based on 

historical risk analysis. An inspector following NIP guidance should be more effective finding unsafe conditions that he or she can bring to the attention of railroad 

officials to correct. 

The NIP also provides guidance to each regional office on how its inspectors, who 

each specialize in one of the five inspection disciplines, should divide their work by 

railroad and by State. The NIP produces an initial baseline plan for each of the 

Agency’s eight regions based on an analysis of historical accident and inspection 

data and then allows the regional administrators to adjust the goals for their respective regions based on local knowledge and emerging issues. FRA also partners 

with participating State rail safety programs in enforcing the rail safety laws. 

As noted, FRA has made significant progress fulfilling unprecedented mandates 

set forth by RSIA, including the following measures to address some of the prevalent safety issues: 

• To address track-caused accidents— 

» FRA issued regulations on concrete ties, completed a study of track inspection 

practices, and issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on rail integrity. 

» FRA has started a research and development program with the goal of achieving reliable long life from concrete ties. The program involves freight railroads, Amtrak, manufacturers and universities. 

» In addition, on its own initiative, using its general rulemaking authority, FRA 

published a final rule on vehicle/track interaction safety standards. The final 

rule achieved unanimous approval by RSAC. The rule was based on research 

into vehicle/track interaction. The rule promotes the safe interaction of rail 

vehicles with the track over which they operate under a variety of conditions 

at speeds up to 220 mph. The rule also adds flexibility for safely permitting 

high cant deficiency train operations through curves at more conventional 

speeds so that both freight and passenger trains may better sustain maximum allowable speeds through curved track. 

• To enhance and improve grade crossing safety— 

» FRA issued standards requiring railroads to establish and maintain toll-free 

‘‘1–800’’ emergency notification systems by which the public can telephone the 

proper railroad about a stalled vehicle or other safety problem at a specifically 

identified grade crossing. 

» FRA promulgated regulations requiring 10 states to issue State-specific action 

plans to improve safety at highway-rail grade crossings. FRA issued model 

State laws on highway users’ sight distance at passively signed crossings and 

on highway motorists’ violations of grade crossing warning devices. 

» FRA published a proposed rule specifying the types of information that railroads would have to report to the Department’s National Crossing Inventory. 

FRA also issued guidance addressing pedestrian safety at or near passenger 

rail stations, developed a five-year strategy to improve highway-rail grade 

10 

crossing safety, and conducts an audit every two years of Class I railroads’ 

highway-rail grade crossing accident reports to ensure that these railroads 

are accurately reporting these incidents and such audits every five years of 

other railroads. 

» FRA continues to research new technologies for improving grade crossing 

safety. One project that has significant potential is implementation of Intelligent Transportation Systems at grade crossings. FRA is also conducting 

human-factors research to understand the behavior of highway users when 

they approach grade crossings. This is expected to lead to recommendations 

for improved signage and warning systems. FRA also released a grade crossing information smartphone application, which is further detailed below. 

• To enhance the accountability of railroads for their own safety— 

» FRA has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that would require 

certain passenger railroads to develop and implement Risk Reduction Plans 

(RRPs), and another NPRM on requiring freight railroads to establish RRPs 

is in clearance in the Executive Branch. These regulations are designed to encourage railroads to develop and implement systematic risk-based approaches 

to ensuring continuous safety improvement. 

• To address human-factors-caused accidents and resulting casualties— 

» FRA issued final rules to enable nationwide implementation of PTC systems 

as well as final rules on camp cars used as railroad employee sleeping quarters and on the hours of service of passenger train employees. The latter 

draws on detailed research into the causes of train operator fatigue and analysis of thousands of operator work patterns. A final rule on minimum training 

standards and plans is under Departmental review. 

» FRA published in the Federal Register detailed interim and final interpretations of the hours of service laws as amended by RSIA, and a second set of 

interim interpretations to be published in the Federal Register, addressing additional issues, is in review in the Executive Branch. 

» FRA issued a final rule requiring owners of railroad bridges to implement programs for inspection, maintenance, and management of those structures. 

In addition to working on RSIA mandates, FRA has been advancing safety 

through other initiatives: 

• FRA is supporting the safety of proposed passenger rail operations, including 

line extensions, and shared-use and high-speed operations by providing technical outreach, including training and information regarding safety regulations 

and system safety, to many new start commuter railroads, and FRA is currently 

working with several new operators. 

• From funding provided for high-speed rail research and development, FRA has 

identified several key risk factors for corridors shared by passenger and freight 

operations. Research to better understand these risks and find mitigations are 

currently underway. 

• FRA is making important strides to address human-factors issues through an 

industry-wide initiative to combat the dangers of electronic device distraction in 

the railroad workplace. 

• FRA is implementing a voluntary, Confidential Close Call Reporting System 

program (C3RS) for railroads and their employees to report close calls without 

receiving disciplinary action. The FY 2014 Budget proposes expanding the C3RS 

from a limited pilot project to a nation-wide rollout. Experience at C3RS pilot 

sites has contributed, we believe, to a nearly 70-percent reduction in certain accidents at one of the most mature pilot sites. Reductions in accidents come from 

a proactive culture of safety that uses real data far beyond that which can be 

pulled from accident investigations on a reactive basis. Effective safety oversight is helped by having accurate data. The magnitude of the information provided from proactive programs like C3RS in comparison to traditional data from 

accidents and injuries is illustrated below: 

11 

These achievements are not cause for complacency, but a foundation to build on, 

as we look for more and better cost-effective ways to improve the safety of our country’s rail network. 

Key Challenges to Railroad Safety 

By law, railroads are required to report an expansive universe of accidents, incidents, and events that occur in the course of operations. FRA also investigates certain railroad accidents, and analyzes the data it receives and collects. This information assists FRA in allocating and deploying inspection and oversight resources effectively, where they have the greatest positive impacts. 

Train Accident Causes—2012 

As illustrated above, 71 percent of all train accidents were the result of either 

human factors or the condition of railroad track in 2012. FRA has focused on the 

reduction of those two accident categories as our highest priority. 


619SZABO2.eps 619SZABO3.eps
12 

Human Factors 

The leading cause of train accidents is human factors. 

Positive Train Control Systems 

RSIA provides that ‘‘the term ‘positive train control system’ means a system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, over-speed derailments, incursions into 

established work zone limits, and the movement of a train through a switch left in 

the wrong position.’’ 49 U.S.C. 20157(i)(3). FRA continues to work to support railroads in their implementation of PTC systems prior to RSIA’s December 31, 2015 

statutory deadline. In our August 2012 Report to Congress on PTC, FRA pointed 

out the technical and programmatic obstacles to meeting the statutory deadline. 

Some railroads have publicly acknowledged that they will not be able to complete 

PTC implementation by the deadline. FRA will continue to provide field engineering 

support and system testing oversight for PTC systems, and hopes to provide formal 

approval and system certification for the Southern California Regional Rail 

Authority’s PTC system this year. 

Further, FRA is working to eliminate obstacles to timely PTC system implementation by working with railroads, suppliers, and other government agencies to resolve 

critical path issues. In the coming years, FRA will continue to work towards the certification of the systems used by other railroads and provide additional engineering 

support. FRA will also work with Congress if it decides to change the statutory 

deadline. 

Defective Track 

The second-leading cause of train accidents is defective track. Track defects comprise a wide universe of conditions, some serious and some relatively innocuous or 

inconsequential. Some defects develop simply due to rail’s exposure to the natural 

environment, while others are the result of the stress of routine operations. FRA’s 

Track Safety Standards govern all aspects of track structure and geometry, and require specific inspection and maintenance actions by railroads. In addition to the 

recent and pending track rulemakings, which have already been discussed, FRA has 

embarked on an aggressive program to focus its track-related enforcement efforts on 

the most likely accident causes. These efforts have helped move the track-caused accident rate in the proper direction. Here, too, our research and development efforts 

are a critical component of our regulatory efforts and provide the basis for revisions 

to those regulations and best industry practices. 

Most track-caused derailments occur at slow speed and are of minor consequence. 

FRA has safety standards for all track, including low-speed track and the types of 

yard and industrial track on which the majority of these incidents occur. However, 

more serious derailments can occur on mainline tracks that support passenger and 

high-tonnage freight trains at higher speeds. 

To reduce the likelihood of track-caused derailments, FRA has taken action on 

several fronts: 

• Our track inspection program includes FRA track experts who routinely accompany railroad track inspectors as they perform their duties inspecting all types 

of railroad track, switches and station areas. 

• FRA track personnel help assure that track defects are discovered, properly documented, and repaired to monitor the condition of the track structure better. 

• FRA uses a small fleet of very specialized railcars that accurately measure 

track geometry. These cars find track defects and send out notifications to FRA 

and to the individual railroad that owns the track. These cars are also used as 

‘‘platforms’’ on which new inspection technologies can be tried and perfected. 

These new technologies have improved the accuracy of track defect detection. 

FRA geometry cars are world-class in their technology and accuracy. Research 

and development are underway to automate many of these inspection technologies, which will enable FRA and the industry to monitor cost-effectively the 

state of repair of the rail network on a regular basis. 

Highway-Rail Grade Crossing and Trespasser Safety 

More than 90 percent of all rail-related fatalities in recent years have been the 

result of either trespassing on railroad rights of way or else accidents at highwayrail grade crossings. 

Highway-Rail Grade Crossings 

In recent years, highway-rail grade crossing accidents have resulted in the secondlargest number of rail-related deaths in the United States, 33 percent of the total. 

Yet grade crossing safety has shown vast improvement, as a result of substantial 

public investment in crossing warning devices and greater public awareness of the 

13 

risks at grade crossings. Accordingly, the number of grade crossing accident deaths 

has declined by 30 percent over the last decade. FRA is fully committed to reducing 

the number, frequency, and severity of collisions at highway-rail grade crossings. 

Our multi-faceted approach to addressing highway-rail crossing safety is referred 

to as the ‘‘Three Es’’: Engineering, Enforcement, and Education. Engineering activities include numerous rulemakings (Locomotive Auxiliary Lights; Rail Car 

Reflectorization; Inspection, Testing and Maintenance Procedures for Grade Crossing Signal Systems; Use of Locomotive Horns at Public Crossings; and Telephonic 

Emergency Notification Systems) and advancing the state of technologies that improve safety for drivers, rail employees, and passengers. FRA has long partnered 

with Operation Lifesaver, Inc., and State and local law enforcement authorities to 

facilitate grade crossing collision investigation courses and encourage consistent enforcement of highway traffic laws governing motorist behavior at crossings. 

With funding from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), states have installed and upgraded crossing warning devices, especially at high-risk crossings. 

Currently, $220 million is authorized annually for states to use to improve highwayrail grade crossings, and more than $4 billion has been spent on crossings since 

1974. Determinations about which projects receive funding are made by State departments of transportation or public utility commissions, and must be based on objective analysis of the relative safety risks associated with each public highway-rail 

crossing. In addition, under the grant program pursuant to the Intermodal Surface 

Transportation Efficiency Act, section 1103(c), highway-rail grade crossings along 

designated high-speed rail corridors were eligible to receive Federal funding for a 

number of grade crossing hazard elimination activities. FRA and FHWA jointly 

managed this program. This funding was continued in subsequent surface transportation bills through SAFETEA–LU, and in FY 2012, $15 million was available for 

grants under the program. Applications were received from 12 states for $25.5 million. 

Because fully one-half of all train-highway vehicle collisions occur at crossings 

that are equipped with active warning devices reported to be functioning as intended, FRA believes that rigorous enforcement of State laws with stiff sanctions 

for motorist violations of grade crossing signal and traffic laws is an effective strategy to reduce violations and collisions at crossings. In September 2011, FRA provided model State legislation on highway-rail grade crossing violations by motorists. 

FRA reviewed and evaluated existing State laws and drafted a model law that can 

be used by states seeking to strengthen their traffic laws. 

New Technological Applications 

Just this week, FRA announced the launch of a new smartphone application, 

available in the Apple App store, designed to help reduce the number of highwayrail grade crossing accidents. The Grade Crossing Locator Application allows people 

to access information about highway-rail grade crossings in their area, helping them 

to make better decisions around the more than 200,000 highway-rail grade crossings 

in the United States. 

The Grade Crossing Locator Application will enable people not only to locate highway-rail grade crossings in their area, but also to find out what type of traffic control devices are present, the physical characteristics of the crossing, and how many 

trains pass through daily. FRA is using technology to innovate and connect with 

Americans about grade-crossing safety because we believe more information leads 

to smarter choices, driving down the number of accidents and saving lives. 

14 

Crossing and Trespassing Fatalities since 2003 

Trespassing 

The number of trespassing fatalities has decreased by 12 percent since 2003 

(there were 498 fatalities in 2003 and 439 fatalities in 2012), but crossing fatalities 

have decreased more quickly. Extremely difficult to address, trespassing is the most 

significant cause of death attributable to railroad operations in the United States. 

Approximately 60 percent of all rail-related fatalities occur to individuals that are 

not authorized to be on railroad rights-of-way. 

FRA, through its research and development program, also developed a five-year 

strategy addressing trespassing and conducted a trespasser demographic study to 

better target trespass prevention efforts. The study will be released shortly. In addition, FRA sponsored a targeted, trespass prevention effort in West Palm Beach, 

Florida to develop a community-oriented mitigation measure that can be utilized by 

other communities. In 2012, FRA co-sponsored with the Federal Transit Administration a Right-of-Way and Trespass Prevention Workshop that was attended by 174 

industry stakeholders. Twenty-three initiatives were identified for reducing trespass 

accidents. These will form the core of FRA’s research and development work on this 

topic for the next two or three years. 

Reauthorization Priorities 

As you know, portions of two important rail laws expire at the end of FY 2013: 

RSIA and the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA). 

The President’s FY 2014 budget for FRA lays out a comprehensive, multi-year reauthorization blueprint for moving forward. The fundamental goal of this proposal is 

to take a more coordinated approach to enhancing the Nation’s rail system–an integrated strategy that addresses safety and passenger and freight service improvements. This new approach better reflects the complex reality of how rail works in 

the United States–most track is privately-owned and carries a mix of passenger and 

freight trains. Safety is improved not just through regulations and inspections but 

also through capital investments; chokepoints often hinder the efficient movement 

of intercity passenger, commuter, and freight trains, while the elimination of grade 

crossings with strategic placement of overpasses and underpasses enhance rail, vehicular, and pedestrian safety. 

FRA’s reauthorization proposal’s key priorities include the following: 

• Enhancing world-class rail safety. Rail is already among the safest modes of 

transportation, and rail safety has only been improving in recent years. Nevertheless, better safety performance is imperative, and with innovative safety 

practices and new technologies, the railroad industry can achieve this goal. 

• Modernizing our rail infrastructure. Past generations of Americans invested 

heavily in building the infrastructure we rely on today. Most segments of the 

Northeast Corridor were built more than a century ago, for example. Maintaining and modernizing these assets will lower long-term costs and result in a 

safer, more reliable rail system. 


619SZABO4.eps
15 

• Meeting the growing market demand. With 100 million more Americans expected by 2050, the national transportation system must be prepared to handle 

substantial increases in the movement of people and goods. Given the existing 

capacity constraints on other modes, rail will play an increasingly vital role in 

balancing America’s transportation system by accommodating this growth, resulting in public benefits such as reduced reliance on foreign oil, reduced air 

pollution, increased safety, and more travel options. This budget incorporates 

market-based investments in building or improving passenger rail corridors, 

eliminating rail chokepoints, adding freight capacity, and conducting comprehensive planning. 

• Promoting innovation. FRA’s vision is for the domestic rail industry to be again 

world-leading–we want U.S. companies to develop patents for state-of-the-art 

rail technology, to supply rail operators throughout the world, and to employ 

the best engineers and railway workers. The United States should be exporting 

intellectual capital and rail products, not importing them. 

• Ensuring transparency and accountability. Accomplishing the priorities described above can only occur if these programs are managed through a transparent process that makes it clear what public benefits and service improvements the American people are ‘‘buying’’ with their investments. The roles and 

responsibilities of the Federal government, States, Amtrak, freight railroads, 

and other stakeholders must be clear and based on sound public policy. 

Need for Predictable Funding 

An overarching issue that runs across all of these priorities is the need for sustained and predictable Federal funding for rail programs, similar to the treatment 

of other modes of transportation. Congress has for decades funded highway infrastructure and safety, transit, and aviation programs through multi-year authorizations that provide guaranteed funding. This enables States, local governments, and 

other stakeholders to plan for and make large-scale infrastructure investments on 

a year-to-year basis. Likewise, internationally, other major rail systems have been 

planned and developed through a predictable multi-year funding program. 

The Administration proposes adopting this budgeting approach for rail, including 

authorizing mandatory contract authority through FY 2018 for FRA’s new rail programs. The programs would be funded from resources in a new Rail Account of the 

Transportation Trust Fund. 

Rail Safety Reauthorization Proposals 

RSIA was a key piece of legislation to enhance rail safety comprehensively. The 

Act authorized 200 new safety positions over a five-year period, but less than a 

quarter were funded through appropriations. The Act also required FRA to establish 

a railroad safety technology grant program with $50 million in funding annually for 

FYs 2009 through FY 2013, but FRA received only one year of funding. For the last 

four and a half years, FRA has focused on establishing and implementing the regulations, programs, and other measures required by RSIA. Looking ahead, FRA is 

poised to begin fully implementing these regulations in an effort to drive safety 

rates to further record lows. In FRA’s FY 2014 budget proposal, we have requested 

30 new safety staff including 10 regional safety inspectors and 20 railroad safety 

specialists to directly support implementation of RSIA. The culture of continuous 

improvement in FRA’s safety programs requires forward-thinking policies and 

proactive work to address future challenges. FRA is exploring options for addressing 

a number of important safety regulatory issues, including the following: 

• PTC—As discussed earlier, RSIA mandates that PTC be implemented across a 

significant portion of the Nation’s rail network by December 31, 2015. With limited exceptions and exclusions, PTC is required to be installed and implemented 

on Class I railroad main lines (i.e., lines with over 5 million gross tons annually), over which any poisonous-or toxic-inhalation hazard commodities are 

transported; and on any railroad’s main lines over which regularly scheduled 

intercity passenger or commuter operations are operated. 

- In all, approximately 70,000 miles of track and 20,000 locomotives will have to 

be equipped with interoperable PTC technology. While some railroads will meet 

the deadline, many are likely to be challenged by technological and programmatic barriers. 

- In a report to Congress last year, FRA highlighted radio frequency spectrum 

challenges that could impact timely PTC system implementation. In addition, 

the railroads must secure licensing approval from the Federal Communications 

Commission to install the approximately 22,000 antennas necessary to implement PTC. 

16 

- FRA’s report also detailed obstacles faced by the industry and outlined mitigation strategies for Congressional consideration, including the extension of the 

PTC implementation deadline and alternative methods of mitigating the risks 

prevented by PTC systems. 

• Hours of service—In 2011 FRA issued fatigue-science-based hours of service regulations for passenger train employees under new authority granted by RSIA. 

FRA would like to evaluate the benefits and costs of continuing on this course 

and focus on addressing other fatigue issues with possible expanded authority 

to regulate the hours of service of other train employees, signal employees, and 

dispatching service employees based on sound science. Other modal administrations within the U.S. Department of Transportation already have broad safety 

regulatory authority over hours of service. It may not be necessary to regulate 

in these areas. 

• Grade crossing analyses—FRA would welcome the opportunity to work with 

Congress to establish an appropriate framework for addressing grade crossing 

issues related to blocked crossings and commercial motor vehicle accidents and 

incidents at crossings. 

• Harmonize operating rules—FRA plans to evaluate the benefits and costs of 

harmonizing railroad operating rules. Each railroad has its own set of operating 

rules that may differ significantly from one division to another and from one 

railroad to another. Many operating crew employees are required to learn multiple different operating rules in order to operate safely in a single tour of duty. 

Harmonizing operating rules will likely reduce unnecessary confusion and create a safer working environment. 

• Improve protection of risk reduction and system safety analyses with respect to 

property damage claims—For a risk reduction program to be effective, FRA 

must have confidence that railroads are conducting robust analyses to accurately identify risks present. FRA will continue to work to balance the interests 

of safety and the public interest with respect to the litigation protection afforded 

the railroads in conducting these analyses. 

• Modernize statutory safety requirements—FRA would also like to modernize certain existing statutory requirements to better reflect current and future innovations and technologies. For instance, statutory requirements related to the 

movement of defective equipment could be updated to provide greater flexibility 

to FRA in handling such issues. Similarly, existing statutory language related 

to locomotives could be revised to account for modern locomotive and locomotive 

tender design and allow FRA to more readily tackle the safety issues related 

to the industry’s recently expressed desire to achieve fuel efficiencies through 

use of liquefied natural gas-powered locomotives. 

• Encourage noise mitigation—Current Environmental Protection Agency rules 

for railroad noise emissions do not consider the use of noise mitigation technologies and may be an obstacle to the deployment of high-speed passenger rail. 

Alternative rules may encourage railroads to reduce the impact of noise emissions on communities surrounding rail operations. 

• Research, Development, and Technology—To date, FRA’s research has centered 

on core rail safety issues such as hours of service and train control systems. The 

President’s vision for rail includes expanding passenger service across the Nation and increasing train speed. While developing a modern rail system, FRA 

must continue to ensure that rail remains an extremely safe mode of transportation. Consequently, FRA must undertake a new line of research that solves 

the technical and associated issues necessary for implementing a comprehensive 

high-performance rail system. FRA proposes a new Research Development and 

Technology Program, funded at $55 million in FY 2014. Through this program, 

FRA will make upgrades to the Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo, 

Colorado that will allow new rail equipment to be tested. This will result in 

stronger safety standards and early identification of reliability issues, saving 

maintenance costs over the long run, developing a domestic workforce for rail 

initiatives, and ensuring better passenger service. 

Conclusion 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. Safety is FRA’s number 

one priority, and we appreciate your attention and focus on such an important issue 

for the American public. We look forward to working with this Committee to pursue 

improvements in our safety programs and make our rail network as safe, reliable, 

and efficient as possible. I will be happy to respond to your questions. 

17 

APPENDIX

FRA Rulemakings Completed as of June 1, 2013, that Were Mandated, 

Explicitly or Implicitly, by RSIA 

1. To specify the essential functionalities of mandated PTC systems, define related 

statutory terms, and identify additional lines for implementation. (Sec. 104). 

2. To establish substantive hours of service requirements for passenger train employees. (Sec. 108(d)). 

3. To update existing hours of service recordkeeping regulations. (Sec.108(f)). 

4. To require State-specific action plans from certain states to improve safety at 

highway-rail grade crossings. (Sec. 202). 

5. To require toll-free telephone emergency notification numbers for reporting problems at public and private highway-rail grade crossings. (Sec. 205). 

6. To require the certification of conductors. (Sec. 402). 

7. On concrete ties. (Sec. 403(d)). 

8. To require owners of railroad bridges to implement programs for inspection, 

maintenance, and management of those structures. (Sec. 417). 

9. On camp cars used as railroad employee sleeping quarters. (Sec. 420). 

10. On prohibition of individuals from performing safety-sensitive functions for a 

violation of hazardous materials transportation law. (Sec. 305). 

11. On emergency waivers. (Sec. 308). 

12. Increase the ordinary maximum and aggravated maximum civil penalties per 

violation for rail safety violations to $25,000 and $100,000, respectively. (Sec. 

302). 

13. Amending regulations of the Office of the Secretary of Transportation to provide 

that the Secretary delegates to the Administrator of FRA the responsibility to 

carry out the Secretary’s responsibilities under RSIA. 

Completed RSIA-Mandated Guidance and Model State Laws 

1. On pedestrian safety at or near rail passenger stations (guidance). (Sec. 201). 

2. For the administration of the authority to buy items of nominal value and distribute them to the public as part of a crossing safety or railroad trespass prevention program (guidance). (Sec. 208(c)). 

3. Model State law on highway users’ sight distances at passively signed highwayrail grade crossings. (Sec. 203). 

4. Model State law on motorists’ violations of grade crossing warning devices. (Sec. 

208). 

Completed RSIA-Mandated Non-periodic Reports or Studies 

1. Report to Congress on DOT’s long-term (minimum 5-year) strategy for improving 

rail safety, including annual plans and schedules for achieving specified statutory 

goals, to be submitted with the President’s annual budget. (Sec. 102). 

2. Report to Congress on the progress of railroads’ implementation of PTC. (Sec. 

104). 

3. Conduct study to evaluate whether it is in the public interest to withhold from 

discovery or admission, in certain judicial proceedings for damages, the reports 

and data compiled to implement, etc., a required risk reduction program. (Sec. 

109). 

4. Evaluate and review current local, State, and Federal laws regarding trespassing 

on railroad property, vandalism affecting railroad safety, and violations of highway-rail grade crossing warning devices. (Sec. 208(a)). 

5. Report to Congress on the results of DOT research about track inspection intervals, etc. (Sec. 403(a)-(b)). 

6. Conduct study of methods to improve or correct passenger station platform gaps 

(Sec. 404). 

7. Report to Congress detailing the results of DOT research about use of personal 

electronic devices in the locomotive cab by safety-related railroad employees. 

(Sec. 405). 

8. Report to Congress on DOT research about the effects of repealing a provision 

exempting Consolidated Rail Corporation, etc., from certain labor-related laws 

(45 U.S.C. § 797j). (Sec. 408). 

9. Report to Congress on the results of DOT research about exposure of railroad employees and others to radiation. (Sec. 411). 

18 

10. Report to Congress on DOT study on the expected safety effects of reducing inspection frequency of diesel-electric locomotives in limited service by railroad 

museums. (Sec. 415). 

11. Report to Congress on model plans and recommendations, to be developed 

through a task force to be established by DOT, to help railroads respond to passenger rail accidents. (Sec. 503). 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Administrator Szabo. 

Chairman Hersman? 

STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN, CHAIRMAN, 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

Ms. HERSMAN. Thank you. Good morning, Senator Blumenthal, 

Senator Blunt, and members of the Committee. 

The NTSB sent investigative teams to Connecticut, Missouri, and 

Maryland last month for four different accident investigations. In 

each of these accidents, there were problems that the NTSB has 

seen in our prior investigations. 

On May 17, during the evening rush home, a Metro-North eastbound train derailed in Bridgeport. About 20 seconds after that 

train came to rest, it was struck by a westbound train. There were 

over 70 injuries. 

Two days prior to the crash, a Metro-North inspection found a 

lack of ballast support at an insulated rail joint near the point of 

derailment. While this problem did not violate FRA track safety 

standards, the NTSB is evaluating the damaged section of track, 

as well as the adequacy of existing inspection standards. 

A second Metro-North accident occurred on May 28, when a track 

foreman was struck and killed by a train that was on track that 

should have been out of service. 

The NTSB has issued previous recommendations to the FRA to 

require redundant signal protection, such as shunting, to prevent 

this type of accident. 

On Monday, we reiterated this recommendation to the FRA, and 

issued an urgent recommendation to Metro-North to require this 

redundant protection. 

A track shunt is a device that crews can attach to the rails in 

work zones that alert the controller and give the approaching 

trains a stop signal. Shunting tracks is simple, feasible, and the 

equipment is readily available for a few hundred dollars. Workers’ 

lives will be saved as a result of redundant protection. 

In Baltimore County, Maryland, on May 28, a dump truck was 

struck at a highway rail grade crossing by a CSX freight train. 

This was a passive crossing, meaning that it had no lights or crossing gates. The markings that were present were dilapidated and 

faded. The collision resulted in the release of hazardous materials 

and a subsequent fire. The truck driver was seriously injured, and 

one responder and three nearby workers were also injured. 

On May 25, in Chaffee, Missouri, a BNSF freight train was occupying the tracks in an interlocking when it was struck by a Union 

Pacific freight train. The resulting derailment caused a fire and the 

highway overpass above to collapse. Two U.P. crewmembers were 

injured and five motorists were injured as a result of the bridge 

collapse. 

19 

1 Back on Track: The Quiet Success of America’s Freight Railways, The Economist, April 13, 

2013. 

We believe that positive train control, or PTC, which the NTSB 

has called for since the 1970s, could have prevented or mitigated 

this crash. 

Just yesterday, the NTSB held a board meeting on a head-on collision between two U.P. freight trains that resulted in three crewmember fatalities near Goodwell, Oklahoma, that also could have 

been prevented by positive train control. 

PTC is a technology that serves as a backup for human error. 

When trains approach a red signal without slowing, PTC would 

stop the train. 

Congress has imposed a deadline of 2015 for implementing PTC. 

Some railroads will meet this deadline. For those railroads that 

have made the difficult decisions and invested millions of dollars, 

they have demonstrated leadership. 

For those railroads that will not meet the deadline, there should 

be a transparent accounting for actions taken and not taken to 

meet the 2015 deadline, so that regulators and policymakers can 

make informed decisions. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and I 

look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hersman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Good morning Senator Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members of the 

Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to address you today concerning the 

National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) ongoing efforts to ensure rail transportation safety, including our ongoing investigations of the recent Metro-North passenger train derailment and sideswipe in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and the collision 

and derailment of two freight trains in Chaffee, Missouri. 

Rail Transportation Safety in General 

The NTSB has been extremely active in investigating train collisions and 

derailments. During the past 12 months, we have launched 12 rail investigations, 

including 2 that involve highway-rail grade crossings. Of these 12 rail launches, 4 

have occurred within the past 5 weeks. In addition to tragic fatalities and serious 

injuries to passengers, crew members, and other individuals resulting from these 

crashes, 3 of the derailments also involved the release of hazardous materials that 

required the evacuation of local residents in Columbus, Ohio, Paulsboro, New Jersey, and Rosedale, Maryland. Also, yesterday the NTSB met to consider and take 

final action on the agency’s investigation of the head-on collision of two freight 

trains in Goodwell, Oklahoma, on June 24, 2012. 

Despite the workload of the NTSB rail investigators and the spate of train collisions and derailments during the past year, overall, train crash numbers are improving. According to Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) data, total rail accident/incident rates have declined from 19.67 occurrences per 1 million train miles 

in 2004 to 14.18 in March 2013, a 28 percent decrease. In addition, the highwayrail grade crossing accident rate has improved significantly in the past decade. 

These rail safety achievements have occurred during a period of increased demand 

for rail transportation in the United States. In 2011, the seven largest freight rail 

carriers had operating revenues of $67 billion compared to $47.8 billion in 2009— 

an increase of over $19 billion.1 Also, intercity passenger rail and commuter rail 

providers have recently experienced load factor increases. For example, according to 

Amtrak, a record 31.2 million passengers rode its trains last year and data compiled 

by the American Public Transportation Association also show increased public 

transportation ridership levels in calendar year 2012 compared to the previous year. 

Although the transportation of people and goods by rail has played an increasingly important role in the Nation’s economy, we must not become complacent when 

20 

2See Collision of Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Train 322 and Track Maintenance Equipment near Woburn, Massachusetts, January 9, 2007, Railroad Accident Report 

NTSB/RAR–08/01 (Washington, D.C.: NTSB, 2008) and Recommendation R–08–06 to the FRA: 

Require redundant signal protection, such as shunting, for maintenance-of-way work crews 

who depend on the train dispatcher to provide signal protection. 

it comes to rail safety. The following summary of three of the rail collisions and 

derailments subject to NTSB investigations demonstrate the need for additional investments in safety technology. The NTSB’s Most Wanted List also highlights important rail safety initiatives like Positive Train Control (PTC), limiting distraction, 

and investments in transportation infrastructure. Finally, safety would benefit from 

additional efforts to enforce rail safety legislative and regulatory requirements. For 

all of the ongoing investigations that are described, a probable cause has not yet 

been determined. 

Derailment and Collision—Bridgeport, Connecticut, May 17, 2013 

As described in the NTSB’s preliminary report, at 6:01 pm on Friday, May 17, 

2013, eastbound Metro-North Railroad passenger train, 1548, derailed. About 20 

seconds after the eastbound train came to rest, it was struck by westbound MetroNorth passenger train, 1581. As a result of the collision, 73 passengers, 2 engineers, 

and a conductor were transported to local hospitals with injuries. Damage was estimated by Metro-North at $18.5 million. 

The Metro-North Commuter Railroad’s New Haven Line runs east-west between 

Bronx, New York and New Haven, Connecticut. In the vicinity of the crash, the 

track structure consists of four main tracks. The maximum authorized speed on the 

four main tracks in the vicinity of the crash is 70 mph with no posted speed restrictions. 

Train movements on the New Haven line are governed by the Metro-North Commuter Railroad operating rules and the signal indications of a traffic control signal 

system supplemented with cab signals and train control. 

The more than 60 miles of track on the New Haven Line are visually inspected 

by Metro-North personnel three times per week. This track inspection is performed 

with the use of a hi-rail vehicle or on foot. The last track inspection prior to the 

derailment was performed on May 15, 2013, by hi-rail. The inspection found an insulated rail joint with inadequate supporting ballast and indications of vertical 

movement of the track system under load at catenary No. 734 on track 4 near milepost (MP) 53.3. It is important to note that this inspection finding did not disclose 

a violation of the FRA’s Track Safety Standards (49 CFR Part 213). As part of its 

ongoing investigation, however, the NTSB is undertaking a comprehensive review 

of Metro-North track inspections and follow-up work and is also looking at the adequacy of the FRA’s Track Safety Standards. 

Preliminary indications are that the derailment occurred at MP 53.3. Sections of 

this rail containing rail joint bars are at the NTSB materials laboratory in Washington, DC, for further examination. 

Initial information obtained from onboard event recorders indicates that the eastbound train was traveling at about 70 mph when it derailed. After the eastbound 

train came to rest, it was fouling the adjacent track, track 2, and was struck about 

20 seconds later by the westbound train. Initial information from the event recorders indicates that the westbound train engineer applied the emergency brakes, slowing from 70 mph to 23 mph prior to striking the eastbound train. 

The parties to the investigation include Metro-North Railroad, the FRA, the Association of Commuter Rail Employee, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police Department, Connecticut Department of Transportation, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, United Transportation Union, and the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division. 

The NTSB will conduct a thorough investigation of this event, complete it in an 

expeditious manner, establish its probable cause, and issue recommendations to prevent this type of event in the future. 

Railroad Employee Fatality, West Haven, Connecticut, May 28, 2013 

The NTSB is also investigating the tragic death of a Metro-North track foreman 

in a track work zone in West Haven, on the New Haven Line. We are working with 

the FRA, Metro-North, and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police Department and, among other things, examining the communications with the MetroNorth rail traffic control center. 

We have issued safety recommendations to the FRA in the past concerning additional safety requirements to protect maintenance-of-way work crews.2 The NTSB 

submitted comments in response to an FRA notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 

21 

issued last August to amend its Roadway Worker Protection regulation (49 CFR 

Part 214). In the NPRM, the FRA specifically asked for comments in response to 

one of the two NTSB safety recommendations concerning additional safety requirements for rail work crews. 

Railroad Grade Crossing Crash, Rosedale, Maryland, May 28, 2013 

On May 28, a three-axle roll-off straight truck approached and crossed a rail 

grade crossing consisting of two tracks. The truck was struck by a CSX freight train 

while it was crossing the tracks. This crossing is a passive crossing, which means 

there were no lights or crossing gate in place. The crossing was marked with cross 

buck signs and non-standard stop signs which were yellow. The paint on both stop 

signs was significantly faded and both were displaced from their original location, 

including one that hung upside down and faced away from oncoming traffic. The 

truck driver did not stop at the grade crossing. 

The train, travelling at 49 miles per hour, struck the truck on the right side near 

the rear axle. The impact caused 15 train cars to derail. The seventh car carried 

sodium chlorate and the ninth through twelfth cars carried terephthalic acid, and 

these cars released their products. Additionally, there was a post-crash fire and subsequent explosion that was felt at least one mile away. 

The truck driver was seriously injured, and four people responding to the accident 

or working nearby sustained injuries from minor to serious. 

Railroad Train Collision, Resulting in a Highway Bridge Collapse, Chaffee, 

Missouri, May 25, 2013 

On Saturday, May 25, 2013, at about 2:30 a.m., central daylight time, Union Pacific Railroad (UP) freight train, 2ASMAR–25, collided with BNSF Railway (BNSF) 

freight train U-KCKHKMO–O5T near Chaffee, Missouri. The crash occurred where 

UP and BNSF tracks cross at grade at a railroad interlocking (Rockview Junction). 

The BNSF train was occupying the interlocking when the UP train struck the 12th 

car behind the locomotives of the BNSF train. As a result of the collision, 13 cars 

of the BNSF train were derailed. Two locomotives and 11 cars of the UP train were 

derailed. Spilled diesel fuel from the derailed UP locomotives caught fire. Missouri 

State Highway M Bridge is above the Rockview Junction interlocking; collision 

forces resulted in the collapse of portions of the highway bridge. Thankfully, there 

were no fatalities on the trains or the roadway, but the UP engineer and conductor 

were injured and transported to a local hospital. Also, subsequent to the highway 

bridge collapse, two motor vehicles struck damaged highway elements and were involved in fires. Five occupants of the motor vehicles were injured and transported 

to a local hospital. 

The UP train consisted of 2 locomotives and 60 cars. The BNSF train consisted 

of 3 locomotives and 75 cars. The weather was clear and 48° F at the time of the 

crash. The preliminary damage was estimated to be $11 million. 

Event recorder data from the locomotives of both trains, as well as recorded data 

from the signal system, is being examined to determine train speeds and signal aspects prior to the collision. Initial data review indicates that the UP train was traveling about 49 mph when it struck the side of the BNSF train, which was traveling 

about 22 mph. Preliminary data indicate that the BNSF train received a signal indication permitting it to proceed through the interlocking, while the UP train received 

a stop signal indication at the interlocking. No PTC system is currently installed 

at this location. 

Parties to the investigation are the FRA, Missouri Department of Transportation, 

Scott County Emergency Management Agency, Union Pacific Railroad, BNSF Railway, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, United Transportation 

Union, and the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen. 

The NTSB’s Most Wanted List and Rail Safety 

Each year, the NTSB issues a Most Wanted List of top transportation safety priorities designed to increase industry, Congressional, and public awareness of these 

important issues and recommended safety solutions. The current Most Wanted List 

includes three issue areas that pertain either specifically or more generally to the 

rail industry. These issues are: Positive Train Control, Distraction, and Preserving 

the Integrity of Transportation Infrastructure. Next, I will address each of these 

areas. 

Positive Train Control (PTC) 

In the NTSB’s nearly half century of investigating railroad crashes, including 

hundreds of train collisions and over-speed derailments, we have seen mechanical 

defects, maintenance issues and track failures, but the biggest safety challenge is 

human error—and that’s the area where technology can be so important. Since 

22 

2005, the NTSB has completed 16 investigations of rail crashes that could have been 

prevented or mitigated with positive train control. These 16 crashes claimed 52 lives 

and injured 942 more. The damages totaled hundreds of millions of dollars and in 

each of these crashes, the NTSB concluded that PTC would have provided critical 

redundancy that would have prevented the crash. 

PTC prevents train-to-train collisions and overspeed derailments. Although 

human error cannot be eradicated, PTC technology is capable of supplementing the 

human operation of trains. Such systems provide a safety redundancy by slowing 

or stopping a train that is not being operated in accordance with signal systems and 

operating rules, as was the case in each of the 16 crashes referenced previously. For 

years, it has been in place on Amtrak trains in the Northeast and Michigan, but 

for PTC to reach its greatest safety potential, it must be implemented on all passenger and freight lines. With this technology, even if the train operator has fallen 

asleep or is distracted in some way, human lives will not be at risk. PTC however, 

would not have prevented the derailment and crash of the Metro-North trains in 

Bridgeport because they were operating on separate tracks. Nonetheless, in numerous rail collisions investigated by the NTSB, including the Goodwell, Oklahoma, 

crash the NTSB reviewed yesterday, the agency has concluded that had a PTC system been available, the collisions would have been prevented. 

Because of the NTSB’s repeated findings that technology based collision avoidance 

systems could provide the needed safety redundancy to prevent rail crashes, PTC 

was placed on the NTSB Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements 

at the inception of that list in 1990. Following the tragic head-on collision between 

a passenger train and a freight train in Chatsworth, California, on September 12, 

2008, which resulted in 25 fatalities and more than 130 injuries, Congress enacted 

the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA). This law requires each Class I 

railroad over which poisonous-by-inhalation or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials is transported and regularly scheduled intercity or commuter rail passenger 

transportation travel to implement a PTC system by December 31, 2015. Encouraged by this legislative action, the NTSB’s Safety Recommendation calling for PTC 

to be installed on railroads, was classified as closed and was removed from the Most 

Wanted List in October 2008. 

As a result of the May 2011 rear-end collision between two CSX freight trains in 

Mineral Springs, North Carolina, and last June’s collision of two UP trains in 

Goodwell, Oklahoma, collisions which killed five crewmembers, destroyed cars and 

goods, and put tracks out of service for days, the NTSB decided to refocus on rail 

safety and added PTC to our 2013 Most Wanted List. 

In 2005, NTSB held a symposium on PTC to learn about the industry’s progress 

on this issue and to reinvigorate dialogue among rail carriers, component manufacturers and government agencies. During that 2-day meeting, the NTSB examined 

each of the major aspects of PTC systems including safety, efficiency, and operational issues. This past February, the NTSB held a 1-day public forum on PTC. 

In opening the forum, I acknowledged there are real hurdles to clear in meeting the 

RSIA’s December 31, 2015, mandate to implement PTC technologies. In particular, 

many public operators do not have the available capital they need to not only maintain but also upgrade their systems. Although a number of presenters at the forum 

addressed a variety of regulatory, technical, budgetary, product and spectrum availability, and legal issues associated with implementing PTC, the NTSB also heard 

from other presenters who described various success stories where carriers’ PTC 

systems have already received type approvals and certification by the FRA. 

There is much debate by policymakers over whether to extend the 2015 deadline 

established by RSIA. There are some railroads that have already met and others 

that plan to meet the 2015 deadline. For those railroads that have made the difficult decisions and invested millions of dollars, they should not be penalized for 

their leadership. For those railroads that will not meet the deadline, there should 

be accountability. Lives depend on it. 

Distraction 

As we all know, the serious public health and safety issues associated with distraction are not limited to road and highway travel. The NTSB has been concerned 

for many years about the danger of distraction across all transportation modes. For 

example, within the rail industry, in 2003, the NTSB issued an accident report concerning the May 28, 2002, head-on collision of two Burlington Northern Santa Fe 

(BNSF) freight trains near Clarendon, Texas, that resulted in the death of one of 

the train’s engineers, injuries to the three other crewmembers, and damages exceeding $8 million. The NTSB determined the probable cause of the collision was one 

of the engineer’s uses of a cell phone during the time he should have been attending 

to the requirements of the track warrant his train was operating under. 

23 

3www.infrastructurereportcard.org (March 2013). 

The NTSB focused again on the danger of distraction in the rail industry in investigating another head-on collision of two BNSF freight trains that occurred near 

Gunter, Texas, on May 19, 2004. The NTSB had determined that 25 calls were 

made by crewmembers from both trains during the trip and up to the time of the 

collision, and that 22 of those calls were of a personal nature. Similarly, in the tragic Chatsworth, California, Metrolink crash mentioned above, the NTSB determined 

that during the time periods the engineer was responsible for operating a train, the 

train operator sent 21 text messages, received 20 text messages, and made four outgoing telephone calls. 

As a result of the Clarendon, Texas, collision, the NTSB issued a recommendation 

in 2003 to the FRA to issue regulations to control the use of cellular telephones and 

other wireless communication devices by railroad operating employees while on 

duty. In response to the recommendation, the FRA and its Rail Safety Advisory 

Committee closely examined the issue and, on October 7, 2008, published in the 

Federal Register Emergency Order No. 26, to restrict on-duty railroad operating employees from improperly using cellular telephones and other distracting electronic 

and electrical devices. On September 27, 2010, the FRA issued a final rule that supplanted Emergency Order No. 26 and codified most its requirements in a new subpart C, titled ‘‘Electronic Devices,’’ to Part 220, of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. This recommendation has been closed because of this positive action by the 

FRA. 

Preserving the Integrity of Transportation Infrastructure 

As the American Society of Civil Engineers’ 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure points out, the U.S. freight and passenger rail network consists of more 

than 160,000 miles of track, 76,000 rail bridges, and 800 tunnels. The Report notes 

both freight and passengers railroads have made significant investments in their infrastructure, using both public and private funding, but meeting capacity demands 

will be an increasing challenge as rail ridership and freight rail continue to increase. Of the 16 infrastructure categories evaluated in the Report Card, including 

aviation, inland waterways, ports, roads, and transit, Solid Waste (trash disposal) 

received the highest assigned rating—B– (Good). Rail and Bridges received the second highest assigned rating—C+ (Mediocre).3

The NTSB Most Wanted List item on transportation infrastructure points to the 

need for periodic, standard railway inspections for railcars and track used to replace 

defective segments as well as track originally laid down. For example, after investigating a March, 2001, derailment of Amtrak’s California Zephyr, near Nodaway, 

Iowa, while operating on track owned by BNSF, resulting in 1 fatality and injuries 

to 78 people, the NTSB determined the probable cause of the derailment was the 

failure of the rail beneath the train, due to undetected internal defects. 

Similarly, the NTSB investigated the January 18, 2002, derailment of 31 of 112 

cars of a Canadian Pacific Railway freight train near Minot, North Dakota. Five 

tank cars carrying anhydrous ammonia, a liquefied compressed gas, catastrophically 

ruptured, and a vapor plume covered the derailment site and surrounding area. One 

resident was fatally injured, and 60 to 65 residents of the neighborhood nearest the 

derailment site were rescued. As a result of the crash, 11 people sustained serious 

injuries, and 322 people, including the 2 train crewmembers, sustained minor injuries. Damages exceeded $2 million, and more than $8 million was spent for environmental remediation. The NTSB’s report indicated the probable cause of the derailment was an ineffective inspection and maintenance program that did not identify 

and replace cracked joint bars before they completely fractured and led to the breaking of the rail at the joint. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the catastrophic failure of five tank cars and the instantaneous release of about 146,700 gallons of anhydrous ammonia. 

Other Important NTSB Rail Safety Recommendations 

The NTSB has long advocated in-cab recording devices in order to better understand crew activities leading up to serious accidents. As a result of its investigation 

of the collision between a Maryland Rail Commuter train and an Amtrak train near 

Silver Spring, Maryland, on February 16, 1996, in which all operating crewmembers 

were fatally injured, the NTSB was unable to determine whether certain crewmember activities leading up to the crash may have contributed to the crash. Consequently, the NTSB recommended that the FRA 

Amend 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 229 to require the recording of 

train crewmembers’ voice communications for exclusive use in accident invesVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
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4See Collision of BNSF Coal Train 322 With the Rear End of Standing BNSF Maintenanceof-Way Equipment Train, Red Oak, Iowa, April 17, 2011, Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR– 

12/02 (Washington, D.C.: NTSB, 2012) 

tigations and with appropriate limitations on the public release of such recordings. (Safety Recommendation R–97–9) 

After its investigation of another railroad crash with no surviving crewmembers 

that occurred in 1999 in Bryan, Ohio, the NTSB reiterated Safety Recommendation 

R–97–9 to the FRA. The FRA responded that it 

. . . has reluctantly come to the conclusion that this recommendation should 

not be implemented at the present time. . . . [The] FRA appreciates that, as 

time passes and other uses are found for recording media that may create 

synergies with other public and private purposes, the Board‘s recommendation 

may warrant re-examination. 

Based on this response and further meetings, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation R–97–9 ‘‘Closed—Unacceptable Action.’’ 

Since the refusal by the FRA to act on the recommendation regarding in-cab recorders, the NTSB has continued to investigate crashes in which such recorders 

would have provided valuable information to help determine probable cause and develop safety recommendations. As a result of its investigation of the July 10, 2005, 

collision of two CN freight trains in Anding, Mississippi, the NTSB made the following safety recommendation to the FRA: 

Require the installation of a crash-and fire-protected locomotive cab voice recorder, or a combined voice and video recorder, (for the exclusive use in accident 

investigations and with appropriate limitations on the public release of such recordings) in all controlling locomotive cabs and cab car operating compartments. 

The recorder should have a minimum 2-hour continuous recording capability, 

microphones capable of capturing crewmembers’ voices and sounds generated 

within the cab, and a channel to record all radio conversations to and from 

crewmembers. (Safety Recommendation R–07–3) 

Most recently, as a result of the investigation into Chatsworth, California, headon collision between a Metrolink commuter passenger train and a Union Pacific 

freight train, the NTSB reclassified Safety Recommendation R–07–03 ‘‘Closed—Unacceptable Action/Superseded.’’ In that investigation, the NTSB noted that: 

In all too many accidents, the individuals directly involved are either limited 

in their recollection of events or, as in the case of the Chatsworth accident, are 

not available to be interviewed because of fatal injuries. In a number of accidents the NTSB has investigated, a better knowledge of crewmembers’ actions 

before an accident would have helped reveal the key causal factors and would 

perhaps have facilitated the development of more effective safety recommendations. 

The NTSB reclassified Safety Recommendation R–07–3 ‘‘Closed—Unacceptable 

Action/Superseded,’’ when it issued Safety Recommendation R–10–1 to the FRA: 

Require the installation, in all controlling locomotive cabs and cab car operating 

compartments, of crash- and fire-protected inward-and outward-facing audio 

and image recorders capable of providing recordings to verify that train crew 

actions are in accordance with rules and procedures that are essential to safety 

as well as train operating conditions. The devices should have a minimum 12- 

hour continuous recording capability with recordings that are easily accessible 

for review, with appropriate limitations on public release, for the investigation 

of accidents or for use by management in carrying out efficiency testing and systemwide performance monitoring programs. (R–10–1) 

The NTSB also issued the following Safety Recommendation to the FRA: 

Require that railroads regularly review and use in-cab audio and image recordings (with appropriate limitations on public release), in conjunction with other 

performance data, to verify that train crew actions are in accordance with rules 

and procedures that are essential to safety. (R–10–2) 

Recommendations R–10–1 and R–10–2 are currently classified as ‘‘Open—Acceptable Response.’’ 

Based on the important safety and investigative role of inward-facing video and 

audio monitoring devices, the NTSB reiterated Safety Recommendations R–10–01 

and –02 in its report 4 concerning collision of a BNSF coal train with the rear end 

25 

of a standing BNSF maintenance-of-way equipment train near Red Oak, Iowa. As 

a result of the collision, both crewmembers on the striking train were fatally injured. Damage was in excess of $8.7 million. 

As the NTSB stated in its report, the rear-end collision near Red Oak again demonstrated the need for in-cab recording devices to better understand (and thereby 

prevent) serious railroad crashes that claim the lives of crewmembers, passengers, 

and the public. While video recorders will assist in the investigation of crashes, 

their value in preventing crashes cannot be overstated. Installation of inward-facing 

cameras can also assist railroads in monitoring rules compliance and identifying fatigued engineers. Such monitoring can lead to interventions before a crash occurs. 

Closing 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss rail safety and 

I am prepared to answer your questions. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Chairman Hersman. 

Ms. Fleming? 

STATEMENT OF SUSAN A. FLEMING, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL 

INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. FLEMING. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Blunt, and other members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss rail safety. 

As you heard, 2012 was the safest year in railroad history. And 

overall, rail safety has improved significantly with the accident 

rate dropping by almost 50 percent between 2004 and 2012. 

However, as we heard, recent accidents in Connecticut, Missouri, 

and Maryland demonstrate the need for vigilance and further improvements in rail safety. 

My statement is based on work currently being performed at the 

request of this committee and other members of the Senate, and 

will cover FRA’s rail safety oversight, including existing and 

emerging challenges, as well as positive train control implementation. Our reports will be issued later this fall. 

FRA is charged with regulatory oversight of the safety of U.S. 

railroads, both passenger and freight. Combined, the freight and 

commuter rail systems, plus Amtrak, have about 230,000 employees, over 1 million cars, and 200,000 miles of track in operation. 

FRA primarily monitors railroad compliance with Federal safety 

regulations through routine inspections at specific sites on railroad 

systems. FRA’s relatively small safety staff, about 640, including 

State inspectors, makes the railroads with their own inspectors the 

principal guarantors of railroad safety. 

FRA has developed two models that use past accident, incident, 

and inspection data to help focus its oversight efforts. One targets 

inspection and the other seeks to allocate FRA’s inspectors across 

its eight regions. 

Both models are updated at least annually and are reviewed by 

FRA officials who may suggest modifications. 

However, several FRA regional officials told us that the staffing 

decisions based on model results do not necessarily align inspectors 

with their perspective of the needs of the region, nor does it take 

a region’s geography into account. 

As we continue our work, we will further assess how FRA officials use these tools to accommodate changing safety risk and allocate inspectors. 

26 

Based on our work to date, we have identified several existing 

and emerging challenges affecting rail oversight. 

First, rail safety stakeholders, including FRA, face a continued 

challenge of trying to reduce highway rail grade crossings and trespasser incidents. Stakeholders told us that this involves educating 

the public about the potential safety hazards and cooperating with 

other Federal, State, and local government agencies that have responsibility for funding road projects or closing those crossings. 

Additionally, changes to freight flows such as the recent increase 

in train and truck traffic due to gas and petroleum drilling in the 

Midwest can increase the risk of highway rail grade crossing accidents. 

Second, in the next 5 years, over 30 percent of FRA inspectors 

in its current safety disciplines will be eligible to retire. FRA does 

not have a specific plan to replace its aging inspector work force. 

In addition, it can take from 1 to 4 years to hire, train, and certify 

an inspector, depending on the inspector’s level of experience. 

Finally, FRA officials told us that they do not yet have sufficient 

staff with the required expertise to provide safety oversight of PTC 

and other emerging safety technologies. 

Moving on to PTC implementation, as you know, the Rail Safety 

Improvement Act of 2008 called for PTC implementation on rail 

lines carrying either inner-city or commuter passengers, or cargo 

that carries certain toxic materials, by December 31, 2015. However, we have heard that most railroads report that they will not 

meet this deadline. 

There are numerous interrelated challenges that are causing this 

delay, including the development of PTC components and their installation; system integration and field testing; and limited FRA resources to review railroads’ PTC implementation and safety plans, 

and to certify those systems. 

Commuter railroads face these same exact challenges and more, 

including dependency on implementation by the freight railroads 

and Amtrak, whose tracks they use, and obtaining sufficient radio 

frequency spectrum for radios. 

It appears unlikely that PTC will be implemented by more than 

a small number of railroads by the deadline. 

In its August 2000 report to Congress, FRA requested authorities, such as granting provisional certification of PTC systems to 

railroads, which would provide flexibility to meeting the deadline. 

FRA officials say these authorities could enable them to conduct 

oversight more realistically, by acknowledging the current state of 

implementation, and in turn could help better manage their and 

the railroads’ limited resources. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes my statement, and I 

would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fleming follows:] 

Rail Safety 

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON FEDERAL RAIL SAFETY OVERSIGHT

AND POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION

Why GAO Did This Study 

The rail network is one of America’s safest modes of transportation, although several recent rail accidents have reinforced the need for constant effort from the priVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
27 

vate and public sectors to ensure safety for rail passengers, the public, and railroad 

employees. FRA, the Federal agency responsible for railroad safety, works with 

freight, commuter, and intercity passenger railroads and certain states to ensure the 

safety of the U.S. railroad network. 

In 2007, FRA developed and implemented a risk-based approach to its safety inspections of the railroad network. In 2008, RSIA was enacted and, among other 

things, reauthorized FRA’s rail safety program and included several new rail safety 

provisions, such as the implementation of PTC and creation of rail safety risk reduction plans. 

This statement discusses GAO’s preliminary observations about (1) how FRA 

oversees rail safety, (2) challenges to rail safety, and (3) PTC implementation by the 

U.S. rail industry. GAO examined FRA’s overall rail safety framework and interviewed state rail safety officials and officials from FRA; selected Class I, II, and III 

railroads; and Amtrak on rail safety and PTC implementation. 

GAO plans to issue reports on reviews of rail safety and PTC in the fall of 2013. 

What GAO Found 

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) primarily monitors railroads’ compliance with Federal safety regulations through routine inspections by individual inspectors at specific sites on railroads’ systems. Thirty states also employ railroad 

safety inspectors, who participate in a partnership program with FRA to conduct 

supplemental safety oversight activities based on FRA rail safety regulations and 

enforce state railroad safety laws. FRA applies a quantitative, risk-based approach, 

the National Inspection Plan, to inform its rail safety oversight efforts using analyses of past accident and inspection data and other information to target inspections 

in each region. FRA also uses a planning and evaluation tool, the Staffing Allocation 

Model (SAM), to distribute its inspection resources across each FRA region. However, according to several FRA regional administrators that GAO spoke with, the 

staffing decisions based on SAM results do not necessarily align with their perspectives on the inspector needs for their regions. 

Based on GAO’s work to date, there are several potential challenges affecting 

FRA’s rail safety oversight. First, the Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) required 

FRA to issue regulations requiring certain railroads to submit risk reduction plans 

within 4 years. FRA has not yet issued a final rule on the plans. Second, FRA does 

not have a specific plan to replace its aging inspector workforce. According to FRA 

officials, in the next 5 years, about 32 percent of FRA inspectors will be eligible to 

retire. Although FRA officials said that they anticipate being able to replace inspectors, it can take 1 to 2 years to find, hire, train, and certify a new inspector. Finally, 

FRA faces other ongoing and emerging safety challenges like addressing adverse 

weather conditions and their impact on railroad operations and equipment, educating the public on the potential hazards of rail-highway crossings, accommodating 

changes in rail safety risks including new freight flows that affect the need for inspections, and hiring and training a specialized inspector workforce to provide adequate safety oversight for emerging technologies including positive train control 

(PTC), a communications-based system designed to prevent train accidents caused 

by human factors. 

GAO’s work to date indicates that railroads may not be able to fully implement 

PTC by the 2015 deadline established in RSIA. This is because of the many interrelated challenges caused by the complexity and breadth of PTC implementation. 

For example, PTC components, such as the back office servers, which are needed 

to communicate vital information between locomotives and wayside signals, are still 

under development. In addition, the need to integrate PTC components and field 

test the system is a time- and resource-consuming process. Finally, some railroads 

had concerns with FRA’s limited resources and ability to verify field testing and certify the system once it is fully implemented. Officials from freight railroads and FRA 

stated they will not compromise PTC safety functions and will ensure PTC is implemented to meet the requirements of the RSIA mandate. However, in attempting to 

implement PTC by the 2015 deadline, railroads may be making choices that could 

introduce financial and operational risks. For example, freight railroad representatives told us that without adequate time for field testing, PTC systems could potentially malfunction or fail more frequently, causing system disruptions. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUSAN A. FLEMING, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

ISSUES, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members of the Committee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing to discuss the Federal 

Railroad Administration’s (FRA) rail safety oversight activities. The rail network is 

28 

1The Surface Transportation Board classifies railroads based on annual revenues. As of 2011 

(the last year of data available), Class I freight railroads are those railroads that earn more 

than $433 million annually, Class II earn from about $35 million to $432 million annually and 

Class III railroads earn less than about $35 million annually. 2These figures do not include highway-railroad grade crossing or trespasser accidents. 

one of America’s safest modes of transportation, although several recent rail accidents, including the Metro-North commuter rail accident in Bridgeport, Connecticut, 

the collision of BNSF and UP trains in Chaffee, Missouri, and the collision of a CSX 

train and a truck in Rosedale, Maryland, have reinforced the need for constant effort from both the private and public sectors to ensure that rail transportation remains safe for passengers, the public, and railroad employees. My statement will 

discuss our ongoing reviews of FRA’s rail safety oversight and the implementation 

of positive train control, a communications-based system designed to prevent train 

accidents caused by human factors. 

This testimony provides our preliminary observations from our ongoing work, 

being performed at the request of this committee and other Members of the Senate, 

regarding: (1) FRA’s framework for safety oversight, (2) existing and emerging challenges to rail safety, and (3) PTC implementation. Our preliminary assessments of 

FRA’s rail safety framework and the quantitative tools FRA uses to implement that 

framework are based on our reviews of FRA documentation and interviews with 

FRA headquarters and regional officials. In addition, we interviewed state rail safety officials and freight railroad officials from selected Class I, II, and III railroads.1

We selected the railroads based on the class of railroad (as a proxy for size), types 

of railroads (long distance versus local service or a railroad that serves a small area 

such as a port or rail yard), and type of ownership (publicly held, privately held, 

or owned by a public agency) to get a range of different kinds of freight railroads. 

For our assessment of PTC implementation, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials from FRA and railroad associations, the four largest freight railroads, commuter railroads that were selected based on PTC implementation status 

and ridership levels (among other things), and Amtrak. We also selected PTC suppliers and independent PTC experts based on their involvement with PTC and recommendations from FRA, industry associations, and others. 

We conducted our ongoing work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We provided a draft copy of this statement to FRA for 

their review. The agency had no comment. We plan to report the final results of 

our reviews in the fall of 2013. 

Background 

According to FRA data, 2012 was the safest year in railroad history. Overall, rail 

safety—measured by the train accident rate per million train miles—has improved 

markedly since 1980, as shown in figure 1. In addition, the accident rate dropped 

by almost 50 percent from 2004 to 2012. 

Source: FRA. 

Even with the significant reduction in accident rates, however, roughly 300 people 

were injured and 10 people were killed in train accidents on average each year, from 

2003 to 2012.2 Further, recent rail accidents underscore the importance of continued, consistent efforts to ensure rail safety. 


619GAO1.eps
29 

3Pub. L. No. 110–432, div. A, 122 Stat. 4848. 

4Failure to complete PTC system installation on track where PTC is required prior to the 

deadline is subject to a $16,000 penalty per violation and $25,000 per willful violation. See 49 

C.F.R. Appendix A to Part 236. 5 In September 2008, a commuter train operator missed a red signal, causing the train to collide with a Union Pacific freight train, resulting in 25 deaths and over 100 injuries. 6Major freight railroads in the United States are implementing Interoperable Electronic Train 

Management System (I–ETMS) and Amtrak, which provides intercity passenger rail and predominantly owns the Northeast Corridor track that runs from Washington, D.C., to Boston, is 

implementing Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES). Although ACSES and I– 

ETMS are functionally the same, they represent different technical approaches. 7GAO, Rail Safety: Federal Railroad Administration Should Report on Risks to the Successful 

Implementation of Mandated Safety Technology, GAO–11–133 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2010) 

and Federal Railroad Administration, Report to Congress: Positive Train Control Implementation 

Status, Issues, and Impacts (August 2012). 

FRA provides regulatory oversight of the safety of U.S. railroads, both passenger 

and freight. FRA develops and enforces regulations for the railroad industry that 

include numerous requirements related to safety, including requirements governing 

track; signal and train control systems; grade-crossing warning device systems; mechanical equipment, such as locomotives and tank cars; and railroad-operating practices. FRA also enforces hazardous materials regulations that relate to the safe 

transportation of such materials by rail. 

The Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008 was the first authorization of 

FRA’s safety activities since 1994 and is due to be reauthorized in 2013.3 RSIA overhauled Federal rail safety requirements by directing the FRA to, among other 

things, promulgate additional new rail safety regulations and guidance in areas 

such as railroad risk reduction plans, track inspections standards, and highway-rail 

grade crossing safety. 

RSIA also required railroads to develop and submit a plan to FRA for implementing a PTC system on rail lines that carry intercity or commuter passengers or 

toxic-inhalation-hazard cargo by December 31, 2015.4 Under RSIA, FRA is responsible for approving railroads’ PTC implementation plans and certifying PTC systems 

prior to installation. PTC is a communication-based system designed to prevent 

some accidents caused by human factors, including train-to-train collisions and 

derailments caused by exceeding safe speeds. It is also designed to prevent incursions into work zones and movement of trains through switches left in the wrong 

position. By preventing trains from either entering a segment of track occupied by 

another train or moving through an improperly aligned switch, PTC could prevent 

accidents such as the one in the Chatsworth neighborhood of Los Angeles, California.5 Railroads that are required to implement PTC can choose different PTC systems; however, railroads’ PTC systems must be interoperable. This means that the 

components of different PTC systems must be able to communicate with one another 

in a manner to provide for the seamless movement of trains as they cross tracks 

owned by different railroads that may be using different PTC systems.6,7

30 

8 Inspectors in this specialty inspect railroad locomotives, passenger and freight cars, and 

their safety appliances such as air brakes. 9For Fiscal Year 2012, FRA’s final civil penalty assessments and settlements totaled about 

$16.6 million for about 6,400 violation reports. 

Source: GAO. 

aTrain location information is determined through various methods depending on the specific 

PTC system, including through satellite-based positioning systems and sensors installed along 

the track. 

b Although RSIA does not require PTC systems to issue such warnings, the PTC systems that 

most railroads are implementing will do so. 

FRA’s Rail Safety Framework Includes Data to Inform Its Rail Safety 

Oversight Efforts but Faces Potential Oversight Challenges 

FRA’s Oversight Framework Primarily Uses Federal and State Inspectors to Oversee 

Railroad Safety Efforts 

Our work to date indicates that FRA primarily monitors railroads’ compliance 

with Federal safety regulations through routine inspections by individual inspectors 

at specific sites on railroads’ systems. This inspection approach focuses on direct observations of train components, related equipment, and railroad property—including 

the track and signal systems—as well as operating practices to determine whether 

they meet FRA’s standards. Inspectors also examine railroads’ inspection and maintenance records. FRA’s inspectors generally specialize in one of five areas, called inspection disciplines: (1) operating practices, (2) track, (3) hazardous materials, 

(4) signal and train control, and (5) motive power and equipment.8 Inspectors typically cover a range of standards within their discipline during inspections. FRA’s 

policy is for inspectors to encourage railroads to comply with Federal rail safety regulations voluntarily. When railroads do not comply voluntarily or identified problems are serious, FRA may cite violations and in certain instances take enforcement 

actions, including the assessment of civil penalties, to ensure compliance.9


619GAO2.eps
31 

10Six of these states (California, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia) comprise over 50 percent of the total number of state inspectors. 11There are currently 28 commuter railroads. 12FRA established the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) in 1996 to develop new 

regulatory standards, through a collaborative process, with all segments of the rail community, 

including railroads, shippers and other stakeholders, to fashion mutually satisfactory solutions 

on rail safety regulatory issues. 13 Railroads are required to report monthly accident data within a month of the accident occurring and it may take 2 to 3 more months for FRA to review the information and make it 

available for use in the NIP. The NIP excludes highway-rail grade crossing and trespasser accidents from its analysis. 

Our preliminary work has found that thirty states also employ railroad safety inspectors, who participate in a partnership program with FRA to conduct safety oversight activities, supplemental to FRA’s activities, based on FRA rail safety regulations and to enforce state railroad safety laws. FRA trains and certifies state inspectors and includes them in its inspection planning efforts. However, FRA’s relationship and coordination with each state is unique. For example, according to one state 

rail safety administrator we talked to, the Federal and state track inspectors have 

divided one state’s territory to ensure that the inspectors’ territories do not overlap. 

In addition, an FRA regional administrator mentioned that while his FRA and state 

inspectors’ territories overlapped, effective coordination between inspectors avoids 

duplicative inspections. According to FRA officials, while state inspectors ensure 

compliance with state requirements, state inspectors are also responsible for ensuring compliance with Federal safety regulations. 

In addition to Federal and state inspectors, the railroads have their own inspectors who are responsible for ensuring that railroad equipment, track, and operations 

meet Federal rail safety standards. Each railroad has its own inspectors or contracts 

with third parties to conduct the required inspections depending on the railroad’s 

resources and FRA-mandated inspection responsibilities. 

FRA is a small agency relative to the railroad industry, making the railroads 

themselves the primary guarantors of railroad safety. Based on our work to date, 

FRA has about 470 inspectors in its headquarters and regional offices, in addition 

to about 170 state inspectors.10 In contrast, the U.S. railroad system consists of 

about 760 railroads with about 230,000 employees and 200,000 miles of track in operation. FRA is also responsible for developing and enforcing regulations for commuter railroads and Amtrak.11 Amtrak and commuter railroads operating outside 

of the Northeast Corridor operate largely over freight railroad tracks and carry over 

670 million passengers a year over 23 billion miles. The FRA works with railroads 

to get their input on proposed regulations and rules through the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) process.12 Several railroad officials we spoke with thought 

that the RSAC process was an improvement over the prior process, that they believe 

had been less collaborative and did not promote discussions among FRA, the railroads, and labor unions to share and understand each other’s views on proposed 

Federal railroad safety regulations. 

FRA Targets Its Inspections Based on Analyses of Past Accident and Inspection Data 

and Other Information 

In 2006, FRA implemented a risk-based approach, using its National Inspection 

Plan (NIP), to allocate its limited inspection resources to ensure rail safety. The NIP 

consists of three elements: (1) a baseline plan that establishes safety goals for each 

railroad and state, (2) review and adjustment by regional administrators, (3) monitoring and evaluation of inspection activity. 

The NIP’s baseline plan attempts to minimize the predicted number and severity 

of railroad accidents given the number of available FRA inspectors in each FRA region. The quantitative model uses data including: (1) the most recent 3 years of accident data from reports that railroads are required to file about accidents that occur 

on their tracks; (2) data from FRA’s inspection activity; and (3) information on railroad activities such as train miles and other data, to determine the scope of what 

FRA’s inspectors should inspect in a given year.13 In the middle of each calendar 

year, FRA updates the NIP with new accident data to estimate where the highest 

safety risks are and uses the results to create annual inspection targets for each 

inspector. 

Our preliminary work indicates that after the baseline is established, FRA’s regional management propose modifications to the inspection targets produced for 

each region using their judgment and knowledge of which railroads or disciplines 

may require more FRA oversight than the NIP’s model indicates. Subsequently, 

FRA allows for a mid-year correction of the NIP, based on input from FRA’s regional 

management. FRA regional administrators we spoke with indicated that this flexiVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
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14Specifically, RSIA required all Class I freight, intercity passenger, and commuter railroads 

(as well as any railroad whose safety performance was determined to be inadequate by the Secretary of Transportation) to develop and submit plans for DOT to review that would identify 

and propose to manage the rail safety risks on the railroad, such as rail safety technology and 

human fatigue management. 

bility allows them to accommodate new or emerging rail safety risks by deviating 

from the original NIP targets. For example, they stated that they sometimes re-allocate inspectors to railroads that have had recent accidents, or because inspectors indicate a need for more oversight at a certain railroad based on assessments made 

during their regular inspection duties. Additionally, the effects of hurricanes, 

storms, or prolonged periods of adverse weather, such as heat or cold that could 

cause track failures, may require the reallocation of inspection resources. Throughout the year, FRA headquarters and regional management monitor the inspection 

activities against the modified inspection baseline to determine if the inspection targets are being met. 

FRA has also developed the Staffing Allocation Model (SAM), which is a planning 

and evaluation tool used to assess its inspection resources from a nationwide perspective. Our work to date shows that FRA uses the SAM to establish targets for 

the number of inspectors in each FRA region and inspection discipline. In using the 

targets to help allocate and balance staff among disciplines and regions, FRA expects to minimize the resulting casualties and estimated costs of train accidents. 

FRA uses the SAM results to determine where they may need to adjust the number 

of inspectors in a given region and discipline. FRA rebalanced its workforce using 

the SAM model in 2007 and officials stated that more recent SAM results have not 

indicated the need for major movements of inspectors between regions or disciplines. 

However, FRA officials stated that when the SAM has shown a change in the distribution of their inspectors they are somewhat constrained from implementing the 

model’s results due to budget constraints. FRA officials also told us that while the 

SAM model has been refined based on what they have learned from making improvements to the NIP, the SAM is not designed to take into account certain 

changes—such as increasing freight train volume or accidents in a particular region—as the SAM uses past accident data to provide a baseline for the nationwide 

distribution of its inspectors. FRA officials stated that they handle those types of 

changes on an as-needed basis through temporary detail assignment of FRA inspectors from other regions or headquarters. 

In addition, our preliminary review indicates that FRA regional administrators 

also can provide input on the model’s results based on their views on how many 

inspectors the region needs. However, FRA regional officials we talked to stated that 

the staffing decisions based on SAM results do not necessarily align their inspectors 

with their perspective of the needs in their region nor does it take a region’s geography into account. While FRA headquarters officials anticipate that there may be 

minor variations from SAM’s targets as a result of natural turnovers of inspectors 

(e.g., retirements), they do not believe that these variations will have long-term impacts on FRA’s safety activities in the regions. However, regional administrators expressed concern over the staffing pressures this can create. For example, one FRA 

regional administrator stated that when the staffing decisions did not provide for 

a replacement for a certain discipline, he was forced to cover that discipline’s inspection load with inspectors from other states for 3 years until a replacement could be 

approved, hired, trained, and qualified. 

As we continue our on-going work on rail safety oversight, we will further assess 

how FRA officials use these tools to accommodate changing rail safety risks and allocate inspectors across regions and inspection disciplines. 

FRA Faces Several Potential Challenges to Its Rail Safety Oversight Mission 

Based on our work to date, we have identified several potential challenges affecting FRA’s rail safety oversight, including lack of a final rule requiring the submission of Risk Reduction Plans by specified railroads, lack of succession planning to 

ensure sufficient staff numbers and expertise, and other ongoing and emerging challenges. 

Risk Reduction Plans 

RSIA required FRA to develop a rulemaking requiring certain railroads to submit 

risk reduction plans, within 4 years of enactment, which was October 2012.14 Our 

preliminary work has identified several reasons why a final rule has not yet been 

issued, according to FRA, including the need to resolve the issue of protection of 

sensitive business and safety information in the railroad’s risk reduction plans. FRA 

officials told us that these plans would allow them to have a more proactive view 

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33 

15 In its May 2013 report, the Association of American Railroads noted that most railroads 

would not make the deadline. 16The four major freight railroads included in our review are BNSF, Norfolk Southern, CSX 

and Union Pacific—the largest Class I railroads based on operating revenue. 

based approach. FRA officials also told us that they anticipate issuing a final rule 

in September 2014 and that they expect that the railroads will have risk reduction 

plans in place by 2016. 

Succession Planning 

Our work to date has found that FRA does not yet have a specific plan to replace 

its aging inspector workforce. According to FRA officials, in the next 5 years, 150 

of FRA’s 470 inspectors (about 32 percent) will be eligible to retire. FRA officials 

told us, however, that they have been able to find and hire qualified candidates in 

the past. However, other FRA headquarters officials and regional administrators we 

spoke with stated that replacing qualified inspectors is difficult, especially for the 

signal discipline, and getting inspectors fully qualified takes time. For example, 

FRA regional officials stated that it takes about 1 to 2 years to find, hire, train, and 

certify a new experienced inspector and 3 to 4 years to get an inexperienced trainee 

certified by FRA as a qualified inspector. Additionally, FRA officials stated that 

budget constraints may prohibit their current practice of hiring new inspectors before retiring inspectors leave so that some overlap can occur to facilitate the transfer 

of knowledge. 

Other Challenges 

Our preliminary work has identified several other ongoing and emerging rail safety challenges that FRA faces. 

• The effects of weather on railroad operations are an ongoing challenge. FRA and 

the railroads continuously keep abreast of adverse weather conditions that can 

cause accidents, such as high temperatures that can cause tracks to go out of 

alignment and cause a derailment. FRA has issued several weather-related regulations concerning tracks, operating practices, and railroad equipment, and the 

railroads we spoke with adjust their operating practices to account for adverse 

weather. 

• All rail safety stakeholders face the continued challenge of trying to reduce highway-rail grade crossing and trespasser incidents. Reducing these kinds of accidents represents a different challenge to FRA’s current rail safety framework. 

Rail safety stakeholders stated that this involves educating the general public 

about the potential safety hazards that trains represent to cars, trucks, and pedestrians at grade crossings as well as cooperating with several other federal, 

state, and local government agencies that have responsibility for funding road 

projects or closing those crossings. Changes to freight flows, such as the recent 

increase in train and truck traffic experienced due to increased gas and petroleum drilling in the upper Midwest, can add train or truck traffic to previously 

low traffic areas increasing the risk of highway-railroad grade crossing accidents. 

• New technologies, such as PTC systems, are another challenge that FRA will 

have to incorporate into its rail safety oversight framework. For example, because PTC systems are extremely complex command, control, and communications systems, the FRA believes it will require a specialized inspector workforce—which FRA currently does not have—to provide adequate safety oversight. 

As we continue our on-going work, we will further assess the extent to which FRA 

is incorporating these existing and emerging challenges into its safety oversight 

framework. 

Most Railroads Report They Will Miss the 2015 PTC Implementation 

Deadline Due to a Number of Challenges 

Our work to date indicates that most railroads will not complete PTC implementation by the 2015 deadline due to numerous, interrelated challenges caused by the 

breadth and complexity of PTC.15 Of the four major freight railroads we included 

in our review,16 only one railroad expects to meet the 2015 deadline. Of the three 

remaining freight railroads we spoke to, representatives believe they will likely not 

have PTC fully implemented until 2017 or later. Commuter railroads, which primarily operate on routes that are owned and managed by freight railroads, generally must wait for freight railroads and Amtrak to roll out their PTC systems. Our 

34 

17Wayside interface units receive information from signals and in turn communicate signal 

aspect information to the locomotive directly or through railroads’ back offices. 18 According to the FCC website, new tower construction must go through an FCC approval 

process and also a three stage review process depending on its location which includes: 1) environmental impact review, 2) state historical impact review, and 3) tribal land impact review. 

FCC notifies federally recognized tribes, Native Hawaiian Organizations, and State Historic 

Preservation Officers of proposed communications towers and allows these organizations to respond directly to the companies about their concerns. 19The PTC safety plan must include information about planned procedures for testing the system during and after installation, as well as information about safety hazards and risks the system will address, among other requirements. 

preliminary analysis indicates that freight and commuter railroads’ inability to meet 

the 2015 deadline is due to a number of challenges. 

• Developing PTC components and PTC installation: Some PTC components are 

still in development—most notably the PTC back-office server. One or more of 

these servers will be installed in over a dozen railroads’ back offices and are 

needed to communicate vital information between the back office, locomotives, 

and waysides. According to the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and 

the railroads, back office system delays are due to system complexity, interfaces 

to other systems, and lack of supplier resources. Nearly all of the freight railroads included in our review anticipate they will not have a final version of the 

back office system until 2014 and have identified it as one of the significant factors preventing them from meeting the deadline. In addition, PTC installation 

is a time-and resource-consuming process. For example, railroads collectively 

will have to install approximately 38,000 wayside interface units.17 According 

to AAR and freight railroads, the volume and complexity of installing these 

units is another significant reason most railroads cannot meet the 2015 deadline. Our ongoing work has found that railroads have also encountered unexpected delays while installing PTC. For example, in May 2013, FRA officials 

told us the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently requested railroads to halt their construction of radio antennae towers to allow FCC to clarify 

regulatory oversight of the towers being installed for PTC.18 According to FRA 

officials, FCC halted the construction of these towers to ensure proper installation procedures were being followed including consulting with either the tribal 

or state historical authorities prior to the towers construction and installation. 

FRA officials told us they did not anticipate this issue but are working with 

FCC to resolve it as quickly as possible. However, the impact of halting construction on the towers may result in additional delays in railroads’ time 

frames. 

• System integration and field testing: Our work to date indicates that successful 

PTC implementation involves several components working together, many of 

which are first-generation technologies being designed and developed. All components must function both independently and together, or the PTC system 

could fail. To ensure successful integration, multiple testing phases must be 

conducted by the railroads—first in a lab environment, then in the field—before 

components are installed across the network. Most of the freight railroads we 

spoke with expressed concern with the reliability of PTC and emphasized the 

importance of field testing to ensure the system performs the way it is intended. 

Multiple phases of testing must take place to identify any defects, which then 

must be analyzed and corrected, and the system re-tested. One railroad representative with whom we spoke said that the PTC system components behaved 

differently in some field tests than in the laboratory tests. Identifying the 

source of such problems, correcting them, and re-testing could further contribute to railroads not meeting the 2015 deadline. 

• FRA resources: Although most railroads we spoke with said they have worked 

closely with FRA throughout the PTC implementation process, some railroads 

cited concerns with FRA’s limited resources and the agency’s ability to help facilitate railroads’ PTC implementation. Our work to date indicates that these 

concerns were based around two activities: field testing and certification. First, 

FRA officials must verify the field testing of PTC. However, FRA reported that 

it lacks the staffing resources to embed a dedicated FRA inspector at each railroad for regular, detailed, and unfiltered reporting on a railroads’ PTC progress. 

To address the lack of staff to verify field testing, FRA has taken on an audit 

approach, whereby railroads submit field test results for approval as part of 

their safety plans.19 Second, a PTC system must be certified before a railroad 

can operate it in revenue service. FRA certifies a PTC system by approving a 

railroad’s safety plan. FRA set no specific deadline for railroads to submit the 

35 

20 Railroads have developed common portions of the safety plan and submitted drafts to FRA 

for preliminary review to expedite final review. This way FRA staff will be familiar with portions of the plan that are common across plans before the finalized plan is submitted. 21 Radio frequency spectrum is the medium for wireless communications and supports a vast 

array of commercial and governmental services. Commercial entities use spectrum to provide 

a variety of wireless services, including mobile voice and data, paging, broadcast television and 

radio, and satellite services. 22Secondary market policies and rules allow spectrum permit licensees to share their spectrum resource through spectrum lease arrangements. Users negotiate their own terms for sharing spectrum and FCC tracks these secondary market transactions. For more information on 

spectrum markets, see Spectrum Management: Incentives, Opportunities, and Testing Needed to 

Enhance Spectrum Sharing, GAO–13–7 (Washington, D.C.: November 2013). 23Presentation to the National Transportation Safety Board. ‘‘Positive Train Control: Is it on 

Track?’’ FCC, February 27, 2013. 24Seven freight railroads (Norfolk Southern, Union Pacific, BNSF, CSX Transportation, Canadian National, Canadian Pacific, and Kansas City Southern) together comprise PTC 220 LLC, 

a company that owns spectrum licenses. According to a PTC 220 LLC representative, these 

seven freight railroads will lease spectrum from PTC 220 LLC and will lease spectrum to other 

railroads based on availability for a fee. 25 Amtrak officials also report that securing spectrum has been a major challenge in PTC implementation for them and has led to implementation delays. 

safety plans, and according to FRA, to date only one railroad has submitted a 

final plan, which FRA has approved. As FRA stated in its 2012 report to Congress, FRA’s PTC staff consists of 10 PTC specialists and 1 supervisor who are 

responsible for the review and approval of all PTC system certification documentation for 38 railroads. FRA has expressed concern that railroads will submit their safety plans to FRA at roughly the same time. Our initial analysis 

suggests that this timing creates the potential that FRA’s review of these plans 

will become backlogged, since each of the railroad’s plans will consist of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of pages of detailed technical information. FRA officials told us that they are dedicated to the timely approval of safety plans and 

that their oversight will not impede railroads from meeting the deadline. However, railroads report that their time frames are based on a quick turnaround 

from FRA; if quick turnaround does not occur, it could further delay PTC implementation.20

Based on our work to date, it appears that commuter railroads face these same 

PTC implementation challenges as well as others. First, because commuter railroads 

are generally using the PTC systems developed by freight railroads and Amtrak, 

they are captive in many respects to the pace of development of these entities and 

have few means to influence implementation schedules. In addition, commuter railroads also face challenges in funding PTC implementation due to the overall lack 

of federal, state, and local funding available to make investments in commuter rail. 

According to the American Public Transportation Association, PTC implementation 

will cost commuter railroads a minimum of $2 billion. Commuter railroads are nonprofit, public operations that are funded by passenger fares and contributions from 

federal, state, and local sources. Economic challenges such as the recession have 

eroded state and local revenue sources that traditionally support commuter rail capital expenses, and competing expenses such as state of good repair upgrades, leaving 

the commuter railroads limited in their funding to implement PTC. 

Finally, commuter railroads report that obtaining radio frequency spectrum—essential for PTC communications—can be a lengthy and difficult process.21 The FCC 

has directed commuter railroads to secure spectrum on the secondary market.22 According to the FCC, spectrum is available in the secondary market to meet PTC 

needs.23 While freight railroads have secured most of the spectrum needed for PTC 

implementation, commuter railroads have reported difficulty acquiring spectrum in 

the 220 MHz band, which is required to operate the data radios that communicate 

information between PTC components.24 In particular, railroad officials have said 

that obtaining spectrum is a critical challenge in high density urban areas. Based 

on our preliminary work, without acquiring sufficient spectrum, railroads may be 

unable to adequately test their PTC systems, potentially causing further delays in 

meeting the 2015 PTC deadline.25

Our work to date also indicates that by attempting to implement PTC by the 2015 

deadline, railroads may be making choices that could introduce financial and operational risks to PTC implementation. Representatives from freight railroads and 

FRA told us railroads will not compromise the safety functions of the PTC system 

and will ensure that PTC is implemented meeting RSIA requirements. However, 

freight railroad representatives also told us that they compressed time frames and 

undertook processes in parallel rather than sequentially—potentially increasing the 

financial and operational risk of PTC implementation. For example, railroads took 

36 

26 ‘‘Double touch’’ installation refers to partially installing groundwork equipment on thousands of locomotives, which will later need to be taken out of service to install the remaining 

equipment. 27 According to FRA, this would allow a railroad to apply for provisional certification to operate a PTC system pending final submission, review, and approval of the railroad’s safety plan 

by FRA. 

a ‘‘double touch’’ approach to equipping locomotives, which involves taking locomotives out of service twice in order to begin installation while software was being 

developed.26 Railroad representatives told us this approach is more expensive than 

installing the equipment once after the software is fully developed, as it involves 

more labor hours and more time that locomotives are offline rather than in operation. In addition, representatives from all freight railroads we spoke to expressed 

concern regarding the reliability of PTC and noted the importance of field testing 

as much as necessary to identify and correct problems. These representatives noted 

that without adequate testing, PTC systems could potentially malfunction or fail 

more frequently, causing system disruptions. FRA officials also expressed concern 

that if pressured to meet the 2015 deadline, railroads may rush through field testing and potentially implement a PTC system that is not entirely reliable leading to 

operational inefficiencies through slower trains or congestion. 

In its August 2012 report to Congress, FRA identified areas for consideration in 

the event that Congress chooses to amend RSIA. Specifically, FRA requested the authority to extend the deadline for certain rail lines, grant provisional certification 

of PTC systems and approve the use of alternative safety technologies in lieu of 

PTC.27 FRA officials told us these authorities could enable them to conduct oversight more effectively by acknowledging the current state of PTC implementation 

and better manage FRA’s limited resources. Although to date there are few details 

on how these authorities would be applied, according to FRA officials, these authorities could assist in better managing resources allowing the agency to oversee and 

manage PTC implementation past the current deadline of December 31, 2015. 

Based on our preliminary work, it appears unlikely that PTC will be implemented 

by more than a few railroads by the December 31, 2015, deadline. As we have discussed, PTC implementation is a massive, complex, and expensive undertaking— 

with valid challenges to meeting the deadline. However, although most railroads 

will not meet the PTC deadline, it does not necessarily suggest that they have not 

made a concerted effort to make progress in the implementation of PTC. Railroads 

and FRA both report continuing to search for ways to speed progress while maintaining safe rail operations in order to achieve complete deployment as soon as possible. Nonetheless, given the state of PTC technology and the myriad of PTC components that are required to work seamlessly in order for PTC to work reliably, concerns regarding the potential risks railroads may be taking in attempting to meet 

the deadline should be considered. Accordingly, FRA has requested authorities that 

could provide railroads the flexibility they need to successfully implement PTC. 

Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members of the Committee, 

this concludes my prepared remarks. I am happy to respond to any questions that 

you may have at this time. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Ms. Fleming, for calling attention to the array of potential dangers, in terms of rail safety, and, 

in particular, the succession problem, which is a major challenge 

for this industry. A lot of people have observed on it. 

And, Administrator Szabo, thank you for also highlighting the 

need to be concerned about the safety of the folks who work on our 

railroads. 

And with that in mind, let me begin by asking Chairman 

Hersman, if this shunt had been used at the time that Robert 

Luden was working in West Haven, and a rail traffic controller in 

New York returned to service the track on which he was working, 

would his life had been saved? 

Ms. HERSMAN. We believe if the shunt had been used properly, 

that both the controller in New York and a train trying to enter 

that track would have received an indication that that track block 

was occupied. 

37 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And the train, therefore, would have been 

stopped? 

Ms. HERSMAN. Yes, we expect that those redundant safety measures could have saved that track worker’s life. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And that is the reason that you have recommended in the past that this kind of system, which by the way, 

I think costs about $200; am I right about that? 

Ms. HERSMAN. Yes, sir. That is correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. You have recommended that it be adopted 

by Metro-North and other railroads around the country? 

Ms. HERSMAN. That is right. MBTA experienced several worker 

fatalities in Woburn, Massachusetts when a shunt was not used, 

despite having shunting policies. The track was inappropriately released, a train entered that track, killing the track workers. 

Some railroads do use shunts, and we have recommended that 

all of them do it. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And you have with you, do you not, the 

inspection report that was done on May 15, 2 days before the May 

17 collision? 

Ms. HERSMAN. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I would like to ask you to submit your 

copy for the record. You were very kind in providing me with a 

copy. 

And if there is no objection, I will ask that it be made a part of 

the record. 

[The information requested follows:] 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Chairman Hersman, as you look at this 

report, calling your attention to the line that you pointed out to me 

yesterday when we discussed it, that makes reference to track 4, 

catenary 734, could you read that, so folks here can know what it 

says exactly? 

Ms. HERSMAN. There is a handwritten notation on this page, 

under insulated joints, frogs and switches, that says ‘‘track 4, catenary 734, insulated joint, hanging ties, pumping under load.’’ 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And if I understand correctly, I am going 

to try to put it in layman’s terms, essentially, the tie was insufficiently supported. And, therefore, the track was unstable, so that 

the joint linking the two tracks at their connection was weakened 

by repeated travel over the track. And very likely, the cause of the 


619KAUF1.eps
38 

derailment was eventually the splitting of that rail, when the joint 

failed to work properly. Is that correct? 

Ms. HERSMAN. The joint joins two separate sections of rail that 

are already separate. It is the joint bars that join those two sections of track. The hanging ties indicates that the rail and the ties 

were unsupported underneath, with insufficient ballast. And that 

concern, when they saw loads going over that section of track, the 

pumping that they describe, is that flexing that is occurring at the 

joint over and over again as the train wheels pass over that section 

of track, creating, certainly, a risk area and unstable condition. 

The NTSB identified the point of derailment at that location. We 

are examining those fractured joint bars in the rail in our lab now. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So if I said to you, my view is that this 

defect caused the derailment, you wouldn’t disagree with me, would 

you? 

Ms. HERSMAN. At the NTSB, we conduct a very thorough investigation, and we ensure that we gather all of the facts before we 

reach any conclusions. 

Yesterday, the NTSB held a Board Meeting on an accident that 

occurred in Oklahoma about one year ago, and this investigation 

contained facts relevant to the probable cause that were not revealed until months into the investigation. 

When we first went on scene in this investigation, we knew a 

crew had run a red signal, but we did not know why. When we 

looked at their medical records, they had passed the required vision and hearing tests, but we dug deeper to see if there was something else that we should understand about this. 

We issued requests for his medical records, and we found that 

this engineer, in the 33 months prior to the accident, had 12 procedures on his eyes and over 50 visits to eye care providers. We did 

not get that from U.P. in the beginning of the investigation. But 

about halfway through from his optometrist, ophthalmologist, and 

physician, we were able to get this. 

We had a locomotive engineer who was colorblind and whose visual acuity would not pass the tests. He could not see the signals. 

Two years before the crash, he had told his eye doctors that he 

could not see train signals. 

In the end, our probable cause for that accident was based on his 

inability to see those signals. But we also defined, in our investigation, that the vision testing standards that currently exist, testing 

vision and hearing every 3 years, are not adequate. They are not 

consistent with what we see in the medical standards required for 

pilots, for mariners, and for truck drivers. We recommended 

changes that we would like to see the FRA and the railroads make. 

Our investigations do take a long time before we reach a probable cause, but the parties involved in an investigation can take action at any time to address safety issues. 

Metro-North and FRA can move immediately on the things we 

are finding today, and the NTSB can issue urgent recommendations, as we did in the West Haven accident. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Don’t you think your report and final conclusions ought to be done more quickly than 18 months after the 

May 17 and May 27 accidents? 

39 

Ms. HERSMAN. Senator, I absolutely believe that we would like 

to have them done sooner. The reality is that, due to our workload, 

we simply cannot complete everything. 

I know you have two accidents. Senator Blunt, you have one that 

we are investigating. 

We have about 20 investigators in our rail pipeline and hazardous materials division, and they are handling 11 concurrent rail 

accidents. Some of those investigators traveled straight from one 

accident site last month to another. They are handling multiple investigations at the same time. 

Our work requires us to take a look at a lot of different factors 

and really develop comprehensive solutions. 

Through our party process, we do make sure that people have information to act on quickly. Metro-North and FRA are parties to 

the investigation, and they can act on safety issues at any time. 

Just last week, I met with Metro-North. They are working to address over 200 of those joints on their property during the summer, 

to put them in a better state of safety. 

These improvements should take place immediately, and we support parties taking those actions. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I am going to turn to Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. 

Mr. Szabo, Ms. Fleming said that on positive train control, if I 

heard her comments correctly, and I guess I could have checked the 

testimony, but I didn’t, I think as I made notes here that PTC components were not available at this point, that field testing had not 

been done yet in an adequate way, that you had limited capacity 

to review what was happening, and the frequency to communicate 

had not been obtained yet. I guess I have a couple questions. One 

is, what have I left out of that list? And two is, do you think, based 

on those factors, it is workable to get there industrywide by 2015? 

Mr. SZABO. If you go back and take a look at the report that we 

provided to Congress last fall, it really articulates the range of 

challenges that the industry has in meeting full PTC deployment 

by December 31, 2015. 

And I think that is the key word there, full deployment. We absolutely believe that partial deployment can and will be achieved. 

But between the availability of spectrum; the availability of radios; 

the ability to get the technology necessary to set up back offices; 

the fact that the entire industry, as well as my agency sometimes, 

are competing for a very limited pool of expertise in implementing, 

there is no question that there are challenges that are going to be 

a roadblock to full deployment. 

I think Chairwoman Hersman said it well, that should Congress 

consider an extension? What we recommended in our report was 

that FRA be given limited flexibility to, in essence, extend on a 

case-by-case basis. It should not be a blanket extension. 

We really have to find this appropriate balance between keeping 

feet to the fire for expeditious implementation while also making 

sure that we allow the appropriate amount of time to ensure that 

it is done safely and reliably. And that is the challenge. 

And so we would like to have the ability to actually weigh that 

due diligence. Actually, the terms that the chairwoman used was 

accountability for actions or the lack of actions on implementation, 

40 

to actually be able to measure that as we determine what type of 

extension might be necessary on a case-by-case basis. 

Senator BLUNT. But your view is that case-by-case extension 

made by your agency would be what you would prefer to see happen? 

Mr. SZABO. You know, again, it is part of ensuring that balance 

between timely implementation while also making sure that it is 

done safely and reliably. 

Senator BLUNT. Do you have an estimate of cost of what this sys- tem—some of the notes I have here is over $10 billion, some say 

$12 billion. What is your—— 

Mr. SZABO. I can provide it to you for the record, but you are in 

the right range. It is a significant cost. It presents a challenge for 

the commuter industry. 

Senator BLUNT. Have you had any discussions with the Federal 

Communications Commission about this, the spectrum, and the 

permitting? And how would you characterize those discussions? 

Mr. SZABO. Yes, we have been having conversations with FCC on 

both of those, spectrum availability as well as the need to find a 

much better approach to siting these antennas. 

I would call the conversation on spectrum availability considerably more of a challenge. FCC is conflicted in their mandate between the need to ensure resources are used efficiently, government resources used efficiently, and the need, from their perspective, to not give it away, vs. what we believe is a legitimate public 

safety issue, in particular for the commuter agencies and public 

agencies. 

I think the conversations relative to siting the antennas are in 

a much better place, that there is a clear recognition now of the 

urgency of finding an alternative means, given the fact that there 

are some 22,000 antennas that need to be sited, and FCC’s traditional process sites about 2,000 a year. 

And, in particular, given that the vast majority of these, better 

than 95 percent, I believe, by one estimate, are just stick antennas 

that have minimal obstruction, minimal environmental impact, 

that perhaps we can find a way to be much more expeditious in 

siting those as we work through an alternative approach on the 

bigger antennas that may have some environmental issues. 

Senator BLUNT. Ms. Hersman, this is just to clarify for me, you 

mentioned I think one head-on collision where a train derailed, and 

20 seconds later, another train hit it. 

Do I have that 20 seconds right? 

Ms. HERSMAN. Actually, in that one, there was a train that derailed, and it was struck by another train that was on a different 

track from the train that derailed. 

Senator BLUNT. Headed in the opposite direction on a different 

track that they would have passed, right? 

Ms. HERSMAN. That is right. If the train had been upright, they 

would have passed each other. But the train was not upright and 

was fouling the track area, as the other train was passing through. 

Senator BLUNT. I am just assuming that no system could totally 

prevent that, that you are going to have trains that pass each other 

in opposite directions, and at some second interval, no system is 

going to stop a train from derailing that does not get hit by the 

41 

train that is approaching it? I am not sure how many seconds that 

would be, but 20—no system prevents that. 

But train maintenance, track maintenance, and other things go 

a long way toward anticipating it, and equipment maintenance. 

But not a system, am I right, in thinking that? 

Ms. HERSMAN. Absolutely. Attention to track and a maintenance 

could have prevented the initial derailment. This is not an accident 

that would have been prevented by positive train control. But I will 

tell you that the engineer on the oncoming train saved a lot of 

lives. He threw the train into emergency and was able to get it 

slowed down to 23 mph when the collision occurred. 

Senator Blumenthal saw firsthand the incredible damage, even 

at 23 mph. There would have been much more damage and potential lives lost if the train had not been slowed. 

Human beings are still very good at making decisions in unusual 

situations. And in this case, the engineer could see the threat 

ahead and stop the train. 

Senator BLUNT. Right, but nothing in positive train control would 

stop—— 

Ms. HERSMAN. No, sir, this was not—— 

Senator BLUNT.—trains from passing each other on opposite 

tracks at the same time, obviously, or you would not have a system 

that worked. 

Ms. HERSMAN. Right. That is true. 

Senator BLUNT. You said in your testimony that some rail operators have already complied, or will have complied by 2015. You 

want to tell me what you are saying there? 

Ms. HERSMAN. Yes. We held a forum in February about the status of positive train control implementation. We heard from a number of witnesses. We asked the FRA who they thought would comply by the 2015 deadline. We were told that four operators would 

likely meet the 2015 deadline: Amtrak, Metrolink, Alaska Railroad 

and BNSF freight line. 

Senator BLUNT. So, Ms. Fleming, in the case of all the sort of obstacles, there would be ways around all those obstacles for at least 

some people by 2015? The equipment availability, the testing, the 

FRA capacity, you think there is a way around that? 

Ms. FLEMING. I think that Metrolink and BNSF are unique examples, in the sense that because of the accident, they were able 

to hit the ground running. BNSF has been using and testing PTC 

for decades, and so they have been on the forefront of that. 

Metrolink, right after the accident, really moved forward on that. 

And one or both of them basically is not waiting for the first generation back-office server and is in fact purchasing their own and 

doing things a little bit differently than some of the other railroads 

are. So they have made a conscious effort to put the money into 

it. 

Amtrak, it’s our understanding that they will be in compliance 

with Michigan and the Northeast corridor, but they do not have the 

financial resources to actually equip their locomotives. So again, 

that is more of a partial 2015 implementation. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you. I will probably have more questions 

for the record. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

42 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. We can also do a second round, a brief 

second round of questions, for this panel, because it is a very important panel. 

I’m going to call on Senator Johnson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RON JOHNSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Szabo, the FRA, do you do Pareto analysis, Pareto charts, on 

the causation? Or maybe NTSB, do you do that analysis of what 

is the primary cause of these accidents? 

Mr. SZABO. We do very deep root-cause analysis. In fact, if you 

take a look at the 43 percent reduction in accidents we have had 

over the past decade, it has been by aggressively using the data, 

the accident data that is available, to be much more strategic in 

coming up with our solutions. 

Senator JOHNSON. Can you tell us the top five categories of 

causes of rail accidents? 

Mr. SZABO. From the broadest standpoint, the number one risk 

area would be human factors. Second would be track-caused. And 

combined, those two probably are the chief causation for about 72 

percent of all railroad accidents. 

So, so much of our efforts over the last 5 years have been on 

drilling down on human factors and track causation, because we 

believe that gives us the biggest opportunity for continuous safety 

improvement. 

Senator JOHNSON. I have heard the word resources used a couple 

times. I believe Ms. Fleming said limited resources, which is true. 

Does anybody have the information in terms of how much capital 

expenditure per year is available to the industry? How much do 

they spend on capital improvements? 

Mr. SZABO. We can get you that for the record. Perhaps Ed Hamberger on the second panel would be able to address that for the 

class I railroads, for the private railroads. And certainly we can get 

it to you for Amtrak and try to get it on the commuter railroads. 

But it is substantial. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. There was an interesting article, a column written by George Will on May 31, 2013 I would like to enter 

into the record. 

[The information requested follows:] 

‘‘A MANDATE THAT IS OFF THE RAILS’’ 

By George F. Will 

WASHINGTON—Texting while driving is dangerous, especially if you are driving 

a train. A commuter train engineer was texting on Sept. 12, 2008, near Los Angeles, 

when he missed a stop signal and crashed into a freight train. Twenty-five people 

died. 

Congress supposedly is incapable of acting quickly, and we are supposed to regret 

this. In 2008, however, Congress acted with dispatch. We should regret that it did. 

Herewith another lesson about the costs of the regulatory state, especially when it 

is excited, eager to make a gesture, and propelled by an uninformed consensus. 

On Jan. 6, 2005, nine people had been killed in Graniteville, S.C., by chlorine gas 

leaking from a derailed freight train, but Congress did not spring into action. In 

2008, however, California’s 53-person congressional delegation was 12 percent of the 

House, and 24 percent of a House majority. So in less than a month after the commuter train collision, Congress, with scant opposition from railroads, and without 

43 

meaningful cost-benefit analyses, passed legislation requiring most railroads to implement, by 2015, Positive Train Control (PTC), a technology to stop trains by overriding some human mistakes. 

So far, railroads have spent more than $2.7 billion on a system estimated to cost 

$10 billion to $14 billion—plus perhaps $1 billion in annual maintenance. PTC has 

not been installed, partly because it is not sufficiently developed. CSX Corp., which 

includes railroads among its assets, says the railroad industry is the Nation’s most 

capital-intensive—and the $11 billion combined capital investments of all U.S. railroads in 2010 were approximately equal to the cost of PTC. The 2015 mandate will 

not be met. 

The Federal Railroad Administration estimates that were PTC to be installed on 

thousands of locomotives and tens of thousands of miles of track, it would prevent 

perhaps 2 percent of the approximately 2,000 collisions and derailments, preventing 

seven deaths and 22 injuries annually. But because a dollar spent on X cannot be 

spent on Y, the PTC mandate must mean the sacrifice of other investments crucial 

to railroad safety (and efficiency). 

Before returning to Harvard Law School, Cass Sunstein was Barack Obama’s administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, measuring the benefits of regulations against their costs. Testifying to a House subcommittee on Jan. 

26, 2011, Sunstein was asked if he could identify an administration regulation 

whose ‘‘benefits have not justified the cost.’’ He replied: 

‘‘There is only one big one that comes to mind. It is called Positive Train Control, and it is a statutory requirement, and the Department of Transportation 

had to issue it as a matter of law even though the monetizable benefits are 

lower than the monetizable costs. There aren’t a lot like that.’’ 

Concerning Sunstein’s sanguine conclusion, skepticism is permitted. Wayne Crews 

of the Competitive Enterprise Institute has recently published his ‘‘Ten Thousand 

Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State.’’ This year’s 

20th-anniversary edition notes that regulation, the ‘‘hidden tax,’’ costs almost $2 

trillion not counted among the official Federal outlays. Using mostly government 

data, Crews concludes: 

The cost of regulations ($1.806 trillion) is now more than half the size of the 

Federal budget and 11.6 percent of GDP. This costs $14,768 per U.S. household, 

equal to 23 percent of the average household income of $63,685. Regulatory 

compliance costs exceed the combined sum of income taxes paid by corporations 

($237 billion) and individuals ($1.165 trillion). Then add $61 billion in on-budget spending by agencies that administer regulations. 

Crews’ ‘‘Anti-Democracy Index’’ measures ‘‘the ratio of regulations issued by agencies relative to laws passed by Congress.’’ In 2012, the index was 29, meaning that 

29 times more regulations were issued by agencies than there were laws passed by 

Congress. ‘‘This disparity,’’ Crews writes, ‘‘highlights a substantial delegation of lawmaking power to unelected agency officials.’’ 

Congress relishes such delegation of lawmaking because responsibility is time-consuming and potentially hazardous politically. Hence the Senate refuses to pass legislation the House passed in 2011 to require Congress to vote approval of any ‘‘major’’ 

regulation, defined as any with an economic impact of $100 million or more. If Congress were more clearly responsible for burdening the economy with such regulations, it would be less likely to pass them as sincerity gestures. 

Internal Revenue Service misbehavior in the regulation of political advocacy, combined with the imminent expansion of the IRS to enable it to administer the coercions that are Obamacare, is sensitizing Americans to some of the costs of the regulatory state. There are many others, hidden but huge. 

George Will’s e-mail address is georgewill@washpost.com. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Without objection. 

Senator JOHNSON. He is talking about positive train control. The 

number he is using is that so far the railroads have spent about 

$2.7 billion on it. They are estimating somewhere between $10 billion and $14 billion of CapEx, about $1 billion per year in annual 

maintenance. He is listing that, in 2010, the total capital investment of the railroads is about $11 billion. 

He is also, in this article, saying that Cass Sunstein, who was 

the former administrator of the Office of Information and ReguVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
44 

latory Affairs, when he was testifying before Congress, talked 

about positive train control in this way, he said that it is a statutory requirement of the Department of Transportation issued as a 

matter of law, even though monetized benefits are lower than monetized costs. He said there are not a lot like that. 

So, I guess, with limited resources, I guess I just kind of want 

to get your evaluation, as much as we all love the concept of that, 

are we devoting too many resources, and are we imposing that too 

quickly? I mean, earlier in the column, he said this was really 

passed a month after a train accident in California, very rapid response by Congress. 

Did we think that thing through well enough? And are we really 

demanding the railroads put too much money toward this one, 

again, potentially lifesaving and very wonderful technology, but is 

that at the expense of other potentially more beneficial technologies 

or capital expenditures on other safety areas? 

Mr. SZABO. There is no question that PTC is a game changer in 

safety for the industry. 

When I talk about human factors being the number one causation for roughly 40 percent of all railroad accidents, that is exactly 

what PTC is designed to prevent. 

And so we have to recognize the tremendous safety benefits. It 

will, without question, drive down accident rates and lead to that 

continuous safety improvement. But we also have to be smart 

about how we implement it. 

And that is why we are looking to see it implemented as expeditiously as possible while ensuring that it is done safely and reliably. 

There is a balancing act here, Senator, and we have to make 

sure that we achieve it, that if we force deployment without having 

the chance to work the kinks out, we do run the risk of actually 

making the industry, on a short-term basis, less safe, as well as 

gumming up capacity. 

And so there is a lot that has to be balanced to make sure that 

it is done right, while also being done expeditiously. 

Senator JOHNSON. Do you disagree with Cass Sunstein’s characterization that the monetized benefits are lower than the monetized 

costs? 

Mr. SZABO. No, he has the actual figures there. But again, this 

was a congressional mandate. So our job was to implement what 

Congress required of us, and do it in the most cost-effective way 

possible. 

Senator JOHNSON. So again, you are not disputing the fact that 

this is going to cost more than the benefit, which is not a real good 

sign for Federal regulation. 

And the problem with that is that it is going to cost money, it’s 

going to spend limited resources that may be spent better elsewhere. That is my question. 

Mr. SZABO. I do not dispute the numbers that are in the calculation there. They are our numbers. My economists came up with 

those numbers. 

But I will also say, in regulations of this nature, there are always 

benefits we believe that are not adequately measured. 

45 

Let’s not dismiss the game-changing impact PTC can have on 

railroads. 

Senator JOHNSON. Again, I am always concerned about unintended consequences. And the unintended consequence I am concerned about here is money spent on PTC not getting very good 

bang for the buck, relatively. Could that money be spent better 

elsewhere? 

That is really what I was talking about with the Pareto analysis, 

in terms of directing those dollars spent in different areas. 

I am just asking, what other areas would we be spending that 

money on, had you not been directed by Congress to spend it in 

PTC? 

Do you understand the question? I will open it up to anybody 

who would like to respond to that. Are there other areas that the 

industry would rather spend the money on to improve safety that 

might be more effective, that might actually have a better benefit 

than the cost? 

Mr. SZABO. I think the question would be better answered by the 

industry. But certainly, from our perspective, driving down human 

factors has to be first and foremost in our minds from a safety regime. 

Senator JOHNSON. Ms. Hersman, do you have anything to add to 

that? 

Ms. HERSMAN. Well, I would certainly defer to the industry to 

share what they would invest in otherwise. 

But I will say this is a technology that we have recommended 

since the 1970s. It is a technology that the Federal Government 

has been funding through pilot programs for decades. And we know 

that there will be more accidents that PTC would prevent. 

We are investigating accidents right now that could have been 

prevented by PTC. 

PTC prevents the most catastrophic accidents, the ones where 

you have loss of life. And yes, you are right, I think the last straw 

that finally triggered congressional action was the Metrolink accident that killed 25 in Southern California. We had a texting locomotive engineer who ran a red signal. It was a PTC preventable 

accident. 

But we also would like to see PTC prevent accidents that result 

in major hazmat releases and evacuations from communities, and 

the things that are the most catastrophic. We know that PTC is the 

solution to these catastrophic accidents. It is expensive, but it is 

important. 

Senator JOHNSON. Could you just name the one area that you 

might spend money on next then? If this is number one, what 

would be the number two? 

Ms. HERSMAN. I would agree with Administrator Szabo. When I 

look at the 11 investigations that we have ongoing right now, they 

basically break down into human factors and track. 

And so improving rail infrastructure, that is also an issue that 

the NTSB has focused on. We have 10 items on our most wanted 

list of transportation safety improvements. PTC is one of them, but 

so is maintaining the integrity of our nation’s infrastructure. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Ms. FLEMING. May I add a comment? 

46 

Senator JOHNSON. Sure. 

Ms. FLEMING. I think one thing that we are not talking about 

here is reducing highway rail grade crossing and trespasser accidents. And actually, if you look at that, it has obviously gone down 

as well, but it is actually a higher percentage of overall accidents 

and fatalities. And it is something that is difficult to address, but 

it really involves working with multiple stakeholders. But it is 

something that really has to be tackled. 

So I think when you think of rail safety, you have to really address it on a number of fronts. 

Technology, I think, PTC is very promising. Our point is that it 

has to be installed in a way that ensures that the system functions 

as intended and is reliable. Our work has shown that there are a 

number of interrelated challenges that also pose risk and should be 

considered. 

And I think other things, other technologies hold promise as well. 

So from our perspective, we can’t overlook reducing highway rail 

grade crossings and trespasser accidents, and really make sure 

that PTC is ready for prime time. 

Senator JOHNSON. Can I just ask, what makes for the most dangerous rail crossing? Is it just traffic flow? Is there one big cause 

there? 

Ms. FLEMING. I would probably defer to Administrator Szabo or 

Ms. Hersman. But I think, obviously, if you have a high traffic 

area, that certainly poses a risk. But I am probably not the best 

person to answer that. 

Mr. SZABO. I do not know if there is one definitive risk that 

drives grade crossing accidents. I mean, more than 50 percent of 

them occur at grade crossings that are fully protected with gates 

and flashing lights and bells. 

Really, we are trying to advance the position that the safest 

grade crossing is one that does not exist at all. And we really need 

to take a look at a more systematic approach. We proposed in our 

budget proposal eliminating grade crossings, strategic placement of 

overpasses and underpasses. And this advances safety for the rail 

network, for vehicles, for pedestrians, and improves the fluidity of 

traffic for all of the above also. 

But the fundamentals in grade crossing safety come back to 

three Es: education, enforcement, and engineering. And so we need 

to continue to engineer improvements. We need to continue to work 

with local communities to enforce the laws that are in place. And 

we need to continue to work with educating drivers to not put 

themselves at risk by illegally trespassing through a crossing. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Senator Johnson. 

Senator McCaskill? 

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator MCCASKILL. In talking about PTC, and I know that before I arrived, you discussed it with Senator Blunt, about a caseby-case basis extension. To quote you in your last answer, you said 

that we have to be careful that we do not make it less safe and 

gumming up capacity. 

47 

Aren’t you a little bit worried that, rather than just biting the 

bullet and acknowledging that we are not going to be ready to roll 

this out in a way that is sound and safe and universal, that you 

are going to get a piecemeal approach that could do exactly what 

you indicated you are worried about doing, which is making it less 

safe and gumming up capacity? 

Mr. SZABO. Senator, obviously, we have responsibility to ensure 

that does not happen. Believe me, a lot of people are doing a lot 

of good work in making significant progress. 

And so the approach that we are proposing is to make sure that 

we find that right balance between ensuring that good progress 

continues to be made, that people are making that legitimate effort 

while also recognizing the challenges that are there, the risk to not 

getting it right, and making sure that the appropriate amount of 

time is provided for those tweaks that are necessary to ensure we 

get it right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think I kind of get it. You want and not 

let—— 

Mr. SZABO. There cannot be a full ride. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You don’t want to let the pressure off of getting this done. 

Mr. SZABO. Right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I get that. You want to ‘‘hold their feet to 

the fire’’ to push. But my sense is that everyone is really working 

on this and trying to make this happen. And this is just one of 

those areas, we see it with available technology and capacity in 

many other areas that the Federal Government tries to influence 

in terms of rules and regulations. 

Do you get a sense that anybody is dragging their feet on this? 

Mr. SZABO. For the most part, I think the effort is there, in that 

due diligence is being applied. But we need to make sure that we 

do not create an environment where people feel that there is a free 

out, and that that effort can be reduced. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I hope that you can do that in a way 

that does not lead to this case-by-case basis. Because first of all, 

case-by-case basis, whenever you do a case-by-case basis with the 

Federal Government, you are talking about something that is hard 

on its face, because that means each individual company has to figure out the Rubik’s cube of how do they get the extension. And the 

amount of time, energy, and resources that goes into figuring that 

out, when if a really thorough look at the efforts that are being 

made and the timetable that is reasonable would indicate that 

maybe 2015 is not the right moment in time to say everybody has 

to be compliant, maybe it is 2016, but with maybe some way you 

can have a—forcing them to show you, which I think they are 

doing now. Aren’t they showing you the progress as it goes along? 

Mr. SZABO. Well, they have implementation plans, which we 

have reviewed and approved. But actually, we do believe that we 

can very systematically achieve this case-by-case approach that we 

are talking about by working with each one of the carriers on the 

amendments to their implementation plan. Since each one has already had to develop one now, all right, let’s go back and do the 

assessment of where they are at, what are the very specific challenges that each railroad is facing, because while many of them are 

48 

the same, some are different. And then work with them to make 

an amendment in each case to their implementation plans, and 

manage it accordingly. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, I think we obviously need to continue 

oversight in that way. And if you manage case-by-case basis without any byzantine bureaucratic problems, then we have got to 

somehow lift you up and celebrate you in this town, because I am 

not sure that a case-by-case basis is music to the ears of anybody 

who is regulated by the Federal Government. So hopefully we can 

accomplish that. 

I would also like to talk about the train horn rule. I promised 

one of my colleagues who is not on this committee that has strong 

feelings about this, Senator Bennet from Colorado, that I would inquire about this. 

I know that there is a workaround for communities for quiet 

zones, but can you talk a little bit about the flexibility on those 

workarounds and whether or not we have embraced sufficient flexibility where we obviously are protecting safety, but obviously the 

horn thing is a huge problem for many communities that are ‘‘bedroom communities.’’ 

And what is being required of them in terms of a workaround, 

I think, in some instances may be slightly too onerous, but I am 

certainly willing and open to hear your views on it. 

Mr. SZABO. No, thank you for that question, because it is a great 

one. And as I said at the opening, I would like to remind you, I 

am a former mayor of what was a railroad community, two major 

rail yards, five railroads slicing through town. So I have lived both 

as a citizen as well as a municipal leader these challenges on a 

daily basis. 

We are open to the utmost, highest level of flexibility, provided 

that an equivalent level of safety can be achieved. And that is the 

goal. That is all we need, is that good science be applied to show 

that whatever creative approach a community is choosing to use 

will generate an equivalent or superior level of safety. 

There is no question, if you take a look at the statistics, that the 

whistleblower regulation has worked, how significantly grade crossing accidents have come down since my agency implemented that 

regulation about a decade ago. 

So we are here today talking about a tragic grade crossing accident in Baltimore. So we need to make sure that, you bet, we will 

provide flexibility. Our goal is to be performance-based in our approach to safety. What we care about is the outcome, not telling 

you that you must do it this one and only way. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK, thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Senator Thune? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the hearing today. We are here because we have had a lot of rail accidents 

of late, and that has brought additional attention to the importance 

of rail safety. And I want to thank our witnesses, both this panel 

49 

and the one to follow, for coming today to tell us about some of the 

lessons we can learn from these accidents. 

I think it is important to look at the overall context of the rail 

industry over a long period of time. If you look since the passage 

of Staggers back in 1980, where the industry was partially deregulated, the train accident rate has fallen by 76 percent. So there has 

been a lot of progress made, a lot of gains made. 

The railroads also last year invested $25 billion—I think somebody was asking a question earlier—in capital improvements. 

These are investments that help keep the railroad system safe, and 

ensure the efficient movement of freight throughout our country, 

which is something that many of us who represent states who are 

dependent upon railroads to move freight are very interested in. 

And I think it is important that we, as a Congress, be careful not 

to impose undue regulation on the railroad industry, especially if 

these regulations force the railroads to spend money that might 

otherwise be used for needed infrastructure improvements. 

I have been and continue to be especially concerned about the 

subject that my colleagues are talking about today, and that is the 

mandate that freight railroads and passenger rail lines install PTC 

technology by December of 2015. I think that is an overly aggressive timeline that railroads are going to have a very difficult time 

meeting for a number of reasons. 

In order to implement PTC by the date mandated, they are going 

to have to defer more pressing maintenance and infrastructure improvements. 

So I hope to introduce legislation in the coming weeks, along 

with others, that will reasonably extend the deadline for PTC implementation. I think we need to have additional flexibility for the 

railroads, if we truly want to see PTC systems installed in a manner that recognizes the technological challenges that currently exist 

for wide adoption and ensures that other necessary safety measures are not sidelined. 

So I guess I would count myself among those who have expressed 

concern about that mandate and what it is going to mean in terms 

of overall safety and the investment that could be made in other 

areas. So I appreciate the insights that you all are sharing with us 

today. 

And I guess I would like to ask, if I might, one question, and it 

has kind of been touched on in different ways today, Mr. Chairman. But this whole issue of case-by-case analysis vs. a sort of a 

blanket extension, there was a 5-year extension proposed in the 

House. The Senate had proposed allowing FRA to approve PTC extensions on a case-by-case basis. 

And, Mr. Szabo, I am interested in knowing, if the FRA were to 

consider extensions on a case-by-case basis, based on the technological, financial, and logistical challenges that would be associated 

with that, how long would it likely take FRA to consider an application and to make a decision? 

Mr. SZABO. You mean to get through our process? 

Senator THUNE. Right. 

Mr. SZABO. Assuming all information was complete, we believe 

that we could have it done in 30 to 45 days. 

50 

Senator THUNE. And how much would you have to devote in 

terms of resources? Is that a resource-intensive process? 

Mr. SZABO. Well, it certainly consumes resources, but in our 2014 

budget request, we are comfortable that we have requested the personnel necessary to execute our entire safety regime, which would 

include implementation of PTC. 

Senator THUNE. Well, if I might just express a concern that has 

already been raised here, and that is there is not a high level of 

confidence, I would argue, right now, particularly, with regard to 

government agencies evaluating these issues on a case-by-case 

basis, which has already been alluded to. And it strikes me, at 

least, that it would make a lot more sense if we are talking about 

doing some sort of an extension for compliance with this, to do it 

in a way that recognizes that all the railroads are going to have 

to comply with that and do some sort of a blanket extension. 

But again, we certainly welcome your input as we consider that. 

And I think it is really important that this be done in the right 

way, because if it is not, if it is rushed, I think it puts, perhaps, 

people even at greater peril and greater risk. 

Mr. SZABO. Senator, ultimately, Congress acts, and we execute. 

So we will execute whatever direction Congress provides for us. 

And I think we are all saying the same thing, that, ultimately, 

it is about finding that right balance between ensuring that this is 

done expeditiously while also making sure that it is done in a safe 

and reliable manner. 

So I think we want the same outcome. And it is just a matter 

of working through details on how we get there. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

I have some additional questions, which I am going to ask now, 

as part of a brief second round, anyone else who has additional 

questions. 

But just very briefly, you are not saying, are you, Administrator 

Szabo, that you are willing to forgo or abandon PTC? It is just a 

question of timing? 

Mr. SZABO. Again, ultimately, that decision is made by Congress. 

But we believe that this is a game-changing safety technology. And 

again, if you take a look at where the biggest risk is in railroad 

accidents, it has a significant impact on safety for the public, as 

well as rail workers. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And I want to bring you back, Chairman 

Hersman, to the report of December 15. As I read through this report, I see references to erosion of dirt, the same kind of weakness 

in ballast that almost certainly contributed to, if it did not cause 

that derailment and collision; the need for new ties; the need for 

other kinds of correction and repair on different parts of that track 

and neighboring tracks in that vicinity. 

Wouldn’t you agree, and you spoke earlier of infrastructure, 

bringing it down to the real life, so to speak, isn’t this a searing 

indictment of the quality of that track? 

Ms. HERSMAN. What this demonstrates is an inspection over 30 

miles of track. You have two employees riding in a high rail vehiVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
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cle, and they are inspecting four lines, four separate tracks during 

a shift. They are identifying the defects that they have found. 

This is certainly indicative of what we see in our investigations, 

and I know what the FRA sees in the railway environment. The 

track environment is one that is constantly deteriorating. You have 

to maintain it. You have to be vigilant. You have to be on top of 

it. You have to identify these defects. You have to put them into 

your workplan, figure out how they are going to be addressed. It 

is important for them to do inspections. 

They are required to do inspections twice a week. Metro-North 

told our investigators they were doing them three times a week. 

But yes, you are right. Here we have recorded defects that are 

similar to the one that we have identified that was near the point 

of derailment. These are all risks, and they need to be addressed. 

And so what we need to understand is, this is one inspection. 

The NTSB will look back at all previous inspections, to see if this 

is a chronic problem, if it was dealt with effectively over time, if 

the fixes were appropriate, if their prioritization was appropriate, 

if their inspection intervals were appropriate for the circumstances. 

This document tells us that they did an inspection and identified 

a number of defects. We have to understand if the FRA standards 

are adequate, or if things need to change and standards need to be 

strengthened. 

Mr. SZABO. Senator, if I may add, just one comment on that. To 

me, my bigger concern as we drill down on this is better understanding the safety culture that exists on the property. And in due 

time, we will determine for sure whether this was or was not a violation—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, the safety culture, I do not mean to 

interrupt, but the safety culture is a somewhat vague term. There 

are FRA standards. And apparently, these defects did not violate 

those minimal standards. 

Mr. SZABO. And that is my point, Senator. That is actually the 

point I am trying to make, that we should not be approaching this 

as to whether it meets a minimal standard or not, but if something 

is identified that could cause risk, the culture needs to be that we 

immediately take the safe course of action. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. So if these were not violations of present 

FRA standards, maybe they should be? 

Mr. SZABO. That is possible. In fact, we are not willing to say yet 

that it is not a violation. 

I know NTSB has drawn that conclusion. We continue to hold 

that open. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me—— 

Ms. HERSMAN. Just to be clear—— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Yes, Chairman? 

Ms. HERSMAN.—this is Metro-North’s position that it did not rise 

to the level of an FRA defect. If Metro-North believed that it had 

risen to the level of an FRA defect, it would have been noted on 

the front of the report that it was to be repaired immediately. 

The NTSB is still investigating. We are providing commentary on 

what Metro-North has presented. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. That is a very important point. You may 

well find that these defects violated the existing Federal standards. 

52 

Mr. SZABO. That is correct. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Let me just close by asking you, Mr. 

Szabo, speaking of standards and rules, my understanding is that 

the FRA missed deadlines set by law in a number of the 17 rail 

safety rulemakings that were required by the FRA. In fact, your 

agency has yet to finalize nine remaining rules, that two out of the 

five compliance manuals have been completed, but three remain 

outstanding to be done, and in fact, in the final rules, the effective 

date of those rules have sometimes been postponed. 

Can you give us an explanation for the delays and the failure to 

meet deadlines? 

Mr. SZABO. Sure. The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 mandated FRA complete more than 40 rulemakings, major studies, reports. It also promised us 200 more individuals, and, ultimately, we 

were only allowed to hire 31 of those 200. 

But with more than 40 major rulemakings, reports, studies, we 

had to prioritize and try to work through them in a systematic 

order in approaching those first that we felt would have the most 

significant impact on safety, the greatest impact, the most immediate effect on safety. 

So obviously, positive train control was made the highest priority 

and consumed the majority of our resources. 

So we have continued to work down that list in a systematic 

manner. I look forward to completing the remaining work that is 

outstanding. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. I know you do not disagree 

that meeting those Federal deadlines is important. 

Mr. SZABO. It is always important. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Not just because it is the law, but it is important to the rail workers as well as passengers and businesses 

that depend on the reliability and safety of freight transportation. 

I want to thank all of this panel. I have additional questions that 

I am going to be submitting for the record. I do not want to keep 

both my colleagues and our next panel waiting, but I do want to 

just close by thanking all of the dedicated people who work for you 

in your agencies. 

I have worked, for example, with the NTSB folks who came to 

Connecticut in the wake of that collision and derailment, and I 

know how much time they put in and how promptly they responded. 

So thank you very much for your testimony, and thanks for the 

work that your agencies are doing. Thank you. 

We will follow with the next panel. Let me welcome our next 

panel, equally distinguished and important, and say to you, thank 

you for being here. 

First of all, let me introduce Ed Hamberger, who is President 

and CEO of the Association of American Railroads based here in 

Washington, D.C. Mr. Hamberger joined AAR in July 1998. He was 

a Managing Partner in the office of Baker, Donelson, Bearman and 

Caldwell, and he came to that firm in 1989 after serving as Assistant Secretary for Governmental Affairs at the Department of 

Transportation. 

He began his career in transportation in 1977 as General Counsel of the National Transportation Policy Study Commission. And 

53 

in 1985, he was appointed as a member of the private sector advisory panel on infrastructure financing. And in 1994, he served as 

a member of the Presidential Commission on Intermodal Transportation. He has served on a variety of public service assignments. 

For example, he serves on a blue ribbon panel of transportation experts appointed by the National Surface Transportation Policy and 

Revenue Study. 

He received his juris doctorate and both master of science and 

bachelor of science in foreign service from Georgetown University. 

Kathryn Waters is Executive Vice President for Member Services 

at the American Public Transportation Association. She came to 

APTA in November 2007 from the Maryland Transit Administration in Baltimore, where she was Senior Deputy Administrator and 

responsible for all public transit operations departments, as well as 

the transit police. 

She has more than 25 years of experience in the transit and railroad industry, serving in positions of leadership, including vice 

president of commuter rail and railroad management with the Dallas Area Rapid Transit District. She worked for 20 years with 

MTA’s MARC train service. 

Before joining the APTA staff, she chaired the APTA commuter 

rail committee and was Vice Chair of commuter and inner-city rail 

on APTA’s executive committee. She too has been cited with numerous industry awards and recognition. 

And we welcome you here, Ms. Waters. 

Mr. James Stem is National Legislative Director of the transportation division, International Association of Sheet Metal Air, Rail, 

and Transportation Workers. His railroad career began in 1966 as 

a trainman for the Seaboard Air Line Railroad in Raleigh, and he 

joined the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. He has worked as a 

trainman, switchman, hostler, helper, fireman, locomotive engineer, 

and he currently holds seniority as a locomotive engineer on CSX 

between Richmond, Virginia, and Abbeville, South Carolina. 

He became interested in the union movement and became active 

in Local 1129 in Raleigh. He worked part-time as a special UTU 

organizer from 1973 through 1976, and was elected SecretaryTreasurer of Local 1129 in 1975. He also held the elected position 

of local Chairman and Legislative Representative, and has served 

as a delegate to five UTU international conventions from 1979 to 

1995. 

I want to extend a particular welcome to our next witness, Jim 

Redeker. He is Commissioner of Connecticut’s Department of 

Transportation, and he has a long and distinguished career in 

transportation, most particularly, beginning with his career in the 

New Jersey Transportation Department. In 1978, he joined NJ 

Transit when it was first created. The following year he helped to 

build NJ Transit into the third-largest transit agency in the country. 

In 30 years since, he has held positions of increasing responsibility. His portfolio of experience includes strategic planning and 

policy, capital programming, transportation planning, transit service planning and scheduling, and many other areas of expertise and 

experience. But perhaps most prominently, and importantly, he has 

served with extraordinary dedication and success as the CommisVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
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sioner of Transportation for Connecticut. He has pioneered and 

championed with great vision and courage new means of transit 

and new developments and investment in our Connecticut railroads 

and other areas of transit in Connecticut. 

He has been a very strong environmental steward, as well as a 

champion of better, cleaner, more efficient transportation in Connecticut, and has worked closely with me and other officials, members of our delegation and other State officials. 

And I thank Commissioner Redeker for joining us today and 

bringing to us the firsthand experience that he has had with some 

of the problems that we have been discussing with the earlier 

panel. 

And to Michelle Teel, also a very hearty welcome. She is now 

head of the Missouri Department of Transportation’s multimodal 

division. She has worked at Missouri DOT for 15 years and most 

recently as the local program’s administrator for the design division, and assistant director of the motor carrier services division. 

In her new capacity, Ms. Teel will oversee the division responsible for administering State and Federal programs that fund and 

support aviation, railroads, transit, waterways, and freight development. 

She has a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from Washington 

University in St. Louis and a master’s degree in business administration from the William Woods University in Fulton. And she is 

a licensed professional engineer and also a certified professional 

traffic operations engineer. 

We welcome all of you and will begin with Mr. Hamberger. 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN 

RAILROADS 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here on behalf of members of the Association of 

American Railroads. 

For our members, commitment to safety is job number one. It is 

not only good business, but it is the right thing to do, and we are 

committed to making sure that each of our 200,000 employees gets 

home after their shift safely every day. 

And in fact, our record is good and getting better. 2012 was the 

safest year on record, and that exceeded the previous safest year 

on record of 2011, which itself exceeded the previous safest year on 

record of 2010. 

According to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, railroads 

today have lower employee injury rates than other transportation 

modes and most other industries, including agriculture, mining, 

manufacturing, and construction. 

Available data also indicate that U.S. railroads are safer than 

most major foreign railroads. 

One of the reasons, and Senator Johnson put your finger on it, 

is the amount of money that we invest back into the infrastructure, 

$25 billion this year and $25 billion last year, $.40 of every dollar 

of private sector money back into the infrastructure. 

Now, what does that mean? In the last 5 years, we bought 22,669 

new state-of-the-art locomotives. We have installed nearly 77 milVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
55 

lion new crossties, 2.9 million tons of new rail, and poured nearly 

61 million cubic yards of ballast. 

And I submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that the very foundation of 

rail safety is a network that is well-maintained. And if we did not 

believe that before, the testimony from the NTSB today certainly 

underscores that a well-maintained network is a safer network. 

Another product of industry investment is the development of 

trackside instruments and inspection vehicles that traverse over 

the rail. These use technologies such as acoustics, radar, machine 

vision, lasers, optical geometry to identify safety issues in the 

track, on the wheels, and on the axles as the cars go by. 

Many of these technological advances have been incorporated 

into the rail industries’ equipment health monitoring initiative. It 

is a predictive and proactive maintenance system designed to detect and report potential safety problems and poorly performing 

equipment before they result in accidents or damage. 

As an aside, Mr. Chairman, much of this work is being done at 

the Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo, Colorado, which 

is a research center the AAR runs under contract to the FRA. And 

the center has just been hired by Metro-North to help them develop 

track inspection procedures, so we are pleased to be able to bring 

our expertise to bear. 

Let me turn to the technology that we have been talking about 

today, positive train control. Such a system requires highly complex 

technologies able to analyze and incorporate a large number of 

variables that affect train operations. A simple example: the length 

of time it takes to stop a train, what we affectionately call the 

breaking algorithm, depends on train speed, terrain, the weight 

and length of the train, the number and distribution of locomotives, 

the number of loaded or empty freight cars on the train, and other 

factors. This system must be able to take all these factors into account automatically, reliably, and accurately, and be able to do it 

across every operating railroad company, including passenger and 

freight. 

PTC development implementation includes a daunting array of 

tasks that railroads must perform and technologies that must be 

developed. 

I agree with both Chairwoman Hersman and Administrator 

Szabo, this must be a transparent process. And that is why last 

year, both APTA and the AAR submitted a white paper on the 

progress to date and the work yet to be done. As part of my testimony today, we have submitted an update as to where we are by 

railroad, what needs to be done by year. 

We want to be transparent, but we do believe that while there 

will be some PTC in operation by 2015, 60,000 miles, 22,000 locomotives, the interoperability will not be achievable. Therefore, we 

are asking Congress to consider a straight 3-year extension from 

December 31, 2015, to December 31, 2018. I agree with Senator 

McCaskill and Senator Thune, this cannot be done piecemeal. 

We are a network. One-third or more of our traffic intertwines 

between two railroads on any given day. We operate with commuter rail, Amtrak. This must be something we can depend on, 

some certainty in a 3-year extension. 

56 

Beyond that, I think there could be some authority given to the 

Department of Transportation to extend, if something that we do 

not know about pops up. And so that would be something that the 

Department of Transportation could do for a year or two. 

And additionally, to ensure that railroads can operate safely and 

efficiently with the PTC system, the imposition of PTC-related 

operational requirements and associated penalties should be deferred until all PTC systems are fully integrated and testing has 

been completed. 

My last point, Mr. Chairman, and I will make it brief, the FCC 

and PTC antennas, I know Mr. Blunt brought that up with the 

first panel and with Mr. Wheeler yesterday at his confirmation 

hearing. We appreciate you putting that on his radar screen. We 

are meeting with the FCC and FRA over the next couple days. We 

hope to be able to resolve that so we can go forward. But right now, 

we are under a stop order to not install any of the 22,000 antennas 

yet to be installed. 

Thank you, and I look forward to answering any questions, and 

I apologize for running a minute late. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamberger follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS

On behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads, thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss rail safety. AAR freight railroad members, which include the seven large U.S. Class I railroads as well as approximately 170 short line 

and regional railroads, account for the vast majority of freight railroad mileage, employees, and traffic in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Amtrak and several 

commuter railroads are also members of the AAR. In my testimony below, I will discuss several important topics associated with rail safety, ways that railroads are 

working to advance safety in those areas, and steps that we believe policymakers 

should take to promote rail safety. 

Overview of Rail Safety 

It’s important to note at the outset that for our nation’s freight and passenger 

railroads, pursuing safe operations is an absolute imperative. It makes business 

sense and it’s the right thing to do. Through massive private investments in safetyenhancing infrastructure, equipment, and technology; cooperative efforts with rail 

labor, suppliers, customers, communities, and the Federal Railroad Administration 

(FRA); extensive employee training; and cutting-edge research and development, 

railroads are at the forefront of advancing safety. 

The rail industry’s strong and pervasive commitment to safety is reflected in its 

excellent safety record. In fact, 2012 was the safest year ever for America’s railroads, breaking the previous record set in 2011. From 1980 to 2012, the train accident rate fell 80 percent, the rail employee injury rate fell 85 percent, and the grade 

crossing collision rate fell 82 percent. Since 2000, the declines have been 44 percent, 

51 percent, and 45 percent, respectively, indicating that rail safety continues to improve. 2012 saw record lows in each of these categories. 

57 

According to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, railroads today have lower 

employee injury rates than other transportation modes (including trucks, inland 

water transportation, and airlines) and most other major industries, including agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and construction. Available data also indicate that 

U.S. railroads have employee injury rates well below those of most major foreign 

railroads. 

Virtually every aspect of rail operations is subject to strict safety oversight by the 

FRA. Among many other areas, railroads are subject to FRA regulation regarding 

track and equipment inspections; employee certification; allowable operating speeds; 

and the capabilities and performance of signaling systems. Hundreds of FRA perVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE

619BEEF1.eps 619BEEF2.eps
58 

1TIH materials are gases or liquids, such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia that are especially hazardous if released into the atmosphere. 2 A switch is equipment that controls the path of trains where two sets of track diverge. 

sonnel perform regular inspections of rail facilities and operations throughout the 

country. In many states, FRA safety inspectors are supplemented by state safety inspectors. Railroads are also subject to safety oversight by additional Federal agencies, including the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Pipeline and 

Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security. 

A Healthy Balance Sheet is Important to Safety 

A commitment to safety demonstrated day in and day out in the workplace is critical to promoting safety. Railroads have this commitment. That said, a financially 

viable railroad is in a much better position to invest in safety enhancements and 

risk reduction strategies than a financially challenged railroad. 

In recent years, railroads have been reinvesting more private capital than ever 

before in their infrastructure and equipment, including a record $25.5 billion in 

2012. From 2008 to 2012, Class I railroads purchased 2,669 new state-of-the-art locomotives and rebuilt another 845 locomotives to improve their capabilities. Over 

the same time period, railroads installed nearly 77 million new crossties, installed 

2.9 million tons of new rail, and placed nearly 61 million cubic yards of ballast. In 

addition, as described later in this testimony, railroads in recent years have devoted 

substantial resources to developing and implementing innovative new technologies. 

These investments have made railroads much safer. In fact, as the charts below 

show, there is a clear correlation between rail reinvestments and rail safety improvements. 

Positive Train Control 

The term ‘‘positive train control’’ (PTC) describes technologies designed to automatically stop or slow a train before certain accidents caused by human error occur. 

The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA) requires passenger railroads and 

U.S. Class I freight railroads to install PTC by the end of 2015 on main lines used 

to transport passengers or toxic-by-inhalation (TIH) materials.1 Specifically, PTC as 

mandated by Congress must be designed to prevent train-to-train collisions; 

derailments caused by excessive speed; unauthorized incursions by trains onto sections of track where maintenance activities are taking place; and the movement of 

a train through a track switch left in the wrong position.2

Unprecedented Technological Challenge 

Positive train control is an unprecedented technological challenge. A properly 

functioning, fully interoperable PTC system must be able to determine the precise 

location, direction, and speed of trains; warn train operators of potential problems; 

and take immediate action if the operator does not respond to the warning provided 

by the PTC system. For example, if a train operator fails to begin stopping a train 

before a stop signal or slowing down for a speed-restricted area, the PTC system 

would apply the brakes automatically before the train passed the stop signal or entered the speed-restricted area. 


619BEEF3.eps
59 

Such a system requires highly complex technologies able to analyze and incorporate the huge number of variables that affect train operations. A simple example: 

the length of time it takes to stop a train depends on train speed, terrain, the 

weight and length of the train, the number and distribution of locomotives and loaded and empty freight cars on the train, and other factors. A PTC system must be 

able to take all of these factors into account automatically, reliably, and accurately 

to safely stop the train. 

PTC development and implementation includes a daunting array of tasks that 

railroads must perform, including: 

• A complete physical survey and highly precise geo-mapping of the 60,000 miles 

of railroad right-of-way on which PTC technology will be installed, including 

geo-mapping of nearly 474,000 field assets (mileposts, curves, grade crossings, 

switches, signals, and much more) along that right of way. 

• Installing PTC technology on approximately 22,000 locomotives. 

• Installing approximately 36,000 ‘‘wayside interface units’’ (WIU) that provide 

the mechanism for transmitting information to locomotives and the train dispatching office from signal and switch locations along the right of way. 

• Installing PTC technology on nearly 4,800 switches in non-signaled territory 

and completing more than 12,300 signal replacement projects at locations where 

the existing signal equipment cannot accommodate PTC technology. 

• Developing, producing, and deploying a new radio system and new radios specifically designed for the massive data transmission requirements of PTC at 

4,200 base stations, 33,700 trackside locations, and on approximately 22,000 locomotives. 

• Developing back office systems and upgrading dispatching software to incorporate the data and precision required for PTC systems. 

• Installing more than 20,000 new antenna structures nationwide to transmit 

PTC signals. 

Freight railroads have enlisted massive resources to meet the PTC mandate. 

They’ve retained more than 2,200 additional signal system personnel to implement 

PTC, and to date have collectively spent approximately $3 billion of their own funds 

on PTC development and deployment. Class I freight railroads expect to spend an 

additional $5 billion before development and installation is complete. Currently, the 

estimated total cost to freight railroads for PTC development and deployment is 

around $8 billion, with hundreds of millions of additional dollars needed each year 

after that to maintain the system. 


619BEEF4.eps
60 

3 Interoperability means that the PTC system on any railroad’s locomotives can seamlessly 

interface with the systems of any other railroad. 

Despite railroads’ best efforts, due to PTC’s complexity and the enormity of the 

implementation task—and the fact that much of the technology PTC requires simply 

did not exist when the PTC mandate was passed and has been required to be developed from scratch—much work remains to be done. Most of the effort to date has 

been directed toward development, deployment, and initial testing of technology 

that can meet the requirements of the legislation and which can be scaled to the 

huge requirements of a national system. 

The task is made particularly complex by the need to ensure that PTC systems 

are fully interoperable 3 across all of the Nation’s major railroads, and that the 

many potential failure points and failure modes in PTC systems are identified, isolated, and corrected—all without negatively affecting the safe movement of freight 

and passengers by rail throughout the country. In addition, the FRA must review 

each railroad’s PTC safety plan and certify the railroads’ PTC systems after the development and testing of the components are complete. Only then can a fully operable PTC installation be completed. 

The FCC and PTC Antennas 

Railroads also face non-technological barriers to timely PTC implementation. One 

such challenge that railroads are struggling to overcome right now involves regulatory barriers to the construction of antenna structures. 

As part of PTC implementation, railroads must install tens of thousands of new 

antenna structures nationwide to transmit PTC signals. Approximately 97 percent 

of these structures will be relatively small poles, between 6 and 60 feet high, installed on railroad rights-of-way alongside railroad tracks. The remainder, approximately three percent, will be larger base stations similar to traditional telecommunication towers. Depending on the location, these larger structures may or 

may not be located on a railroad’s right-of-way. 

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains that all PTC antenna 

structures, regardless of their size or location on the right-of-way, are subject to the 

National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). The FCC’s current interpretation of its rules implementing these 

acts would subject every PTC antenna structure to a separate environmental evaluation process at the FCC. Depending on the outcome of this evaluation, a more 

comprehensive environmental assessment (EA) might be required. 

According to the FCC, as part of each environmental evaluation, railroads must 

provide certain information on each antenna structure (height, location, etc.) to historic preservation officers within state governments and Native American tribes (depending on where the antenna structure will be installed) so that the state or tribe 

can determine if the installation will negatively impact areas of historic, cultural or 

religious significance. Notice of the construction must even be provided to tribes 

that do not currently reside along the railroad right-of-way but who have previously 

expressed interest in the county in which the antenna structure will be installed. 

61 

On May 15 of this year, representatives of the railroads met with FCC staff to 

discuss the PTC antenna issue. The railroad representatives explained why the 

FCC’s current approval process is unworkable for a deployment on the scale of PTC 

in the time-frame mandated by the RSIA and FRA’s rules. Meanwhile, the FCC 

staff stated that railroads should not construct any antenna structures for PTC that 

have not gone through the complete environmental evaluation process, including 

tribal notice, while they consider ways to streamline the state and tribal approval 

processes. The railroad industry, the FRA, and the FCC are consulting to try to find 

a workable solution that will protect the interests of Native American tribes and 

allow the timely deployment of PTC. While the AAR is hopeful that a solution can 

be found, today construction of antenna structures is on hold. If our efforts with the 

FCC and the FRA cannot reach a workable solution to avoid antenna-by-antenna 

review, the timeline for ultimate deployment of PTC will be delayed. 

Pending FRA Regulations 

There are important PTC regulatory issues that are unresolved. For example, the 

current rules inadvertently subject yard movements over PTC-equipped main line 

track to PTC requirements. There are a number of technical and operational reasons making PTC impractical for yard movements. It was never anticipated that 

yard movements would be subject to PTC and doing so would adversely affect the 

efficiency of rail transportation. Another issue concerns en route failures of locomotives equipped with PTC. The current regulations impose operational restrictions 

so severe that, again, the fluidity of the rail network would be drastically impaired, 

despite the existence of the underlying safety systems and additional safety precautions that could be put in place. Finally, the regulations purport to exempt lines 

where there are very small amounts of TIH traffic and no passenger traffic, but the 

de minimis regulations are constructed so that they fail to achieve this objective. 

It is important to resolve these issues and AAR appreciates that FRA is considering 

them in a current rulemaking proceeding. 


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4Government Accountability Office, ‘‘Rail Safety: Federal Railroad Administration Should Report on Risks to the Successful Implementation of Mandated Safety Technology,’’ Report No. 

GAO–11–133, December 2010. The quotes are from pages 22 and 46, respectively. 5Federal Railroad Administration, ‘‘Positive Train Control: Implementation Status, Issues, 

and Impacts,’’ August 2012, p. 1. 

Extending the Statutory Deadline 

In addition to the challenges presented by both the FCC and FRA issues, another 

critical variable to the successful implementation of a nationwide PTC network is 

the question of the proper operation of the system. Does the system work? To effectively answer this question, railroads will need adequate time to ensure that PTC 

works as intended and that the systems are communicating accurately. The industry believes it can achieve the objectives of the mandate with an implementation 

schedule that allows the technology to be developed as well as tested and proven 

so the safety and operational efficiency of the Nation’s rail system are not put at 

risk. 

Freight railroads will continue to aggressively pursue the implementation, activation and testing of PTC systems. However, due to both technological and non-technological uncertainties associated with the development and installation of PTC, it 

is a challenge to identify an exact date of completion of all necessary components 

to ensure the successful implementation of an interoperable system. Critical aspects 

include, but are not limited to, the testing and activation of PTC systems. 

Consequently, the current PTC implementation deadline mandated by the Rail 

Safety Improvement Act of 2008 should be extended by at least three years from 

December 31, 2015, to December 31, 2018. Given the unprecedented nature of PTC 

and the uncertainties—both known and unknown—flexibility beyond December of 

2018 should also be addressed, with the authority for that flexibility residing with 

the Secretary of the Department of Transportation. Additionally, in order to ensure 

that railroads can operate safely and efficiently with the PTC system, the imposition 

of PTC-related operational requirements and associated penalties should be deferred 

until all PTC systems are fully integrated and testing has been completed. 

Railroads have been working extremely hard to meet the 2015 deadline. While the 

deadline for completion is important, ensuring that the testing and development of 

PTC proceeds appropriately is paramount. The intent and the goal is to ensure a 

new system that enhances safety. 

A December 2010 report by the Government Accountability Office supports this 

view. The GAO noted that ‘‘implementing an immature system to meet the deadline 

could pose serious safety risks,’’ and that ‘‘[i]dentifying and mitigating risks sooner, 

rather than later, would better ensure a reliable PTC system can be fully implemented to provide the intended safety benefits of this technology without resulting 

in unintended consequences.’’ 4

In an August 2012 report, the FRA confirmed that, ‘‘Given the current state of 

development and availability of the required hardware and software, along with deployment considerations, most railroads will likely not be able to complete full 

RSIA-required implementation of PTC by December 31, 2015.’’ 5 The FRA report 

notes that PTC implementation on the scale required by the RSIA has never been 

attempted anywhere in the world. 

For a more thorough analysis and understanding of freight rail industry efforts, 

implementation progress, and existing challenges, the Association of American Railroads’ 2013 report, PTC Implementation: The Railroad Industry Cannot Install PTC 

on the Entire Nationwide Network by the 2015 Deadline, is included as ‘‘Attachment 

A.’’ 

Highway-Rail Grade Crossings and Trespassers 

Collisions at grade crossings, along with incidents involving trespassers on railroad rights-of-way, are critical safety problems. These two categories typically account for more than 95 percent of rail-related fatalities. Although these incidents 

usually arise from factors that are largely outside of railroad control, and even 

though highway-rail crossing warning devices are properly considered motor vehicle 

warning devices there for the benefit of motorists, not trains, railroads are committed to efforts aimed at further reducing the frequency of crossing and trespasser 

incidents. 

Much success has already been achieved. From 1980 through 2012, the number 

of grade crossing collisions fell 82 percent; injuries associated with collisions fell 76 

percent; and fatalities fell 72 percent. Since 2000, the declines have been 44 percent, 

24 percent, and 45 percent, respectively, indicating that grade crossing safety continues to improve. The grade crossing collision rate has fallen nearly every year 

since 1980; from 1980 through 2012, it fell 82 percent. And because total exposure 

63 

(train-miles multiplied by motor vehicle-miles) has risen sharply over time, the reduction in crossing incidents and casualties per unit of exposure has been even 

higher. 

America’s freight railroads spend hundreds of millions of dollars each year to 

maintain and improve grade crossings. They also: 

• Cooperate with state agencies to install and upgrade warning devices and signals, and bear the cost of maintaining them in perpetuity. 

• Help pay to close unneeded crossings. 

• Support Operation Lifesaver, a nationwide non-profit organization that educates 

the public about the need for proper behavior at grade crossings and on railroad 

property. 

• Work with law enforcement and others to keep grade crossings safe. 

• Solicit assistance from the public. In June 2012, the FRA issued a final rule 

requiring railroads to install signs at grade crossings with telephone numbers 

the public can use to alert railroads to unsafe conditions. 

Under the Federal ‘‘Section 130’’ program, $220 million in Federal funds are divided among the states each year for installing new active warning devices, upgrading existing devices, and improving grade crossing surfaces. Several years ago, FRA 

noted that the Section 130 program ‘‘has helped prevent over 10,500 fatalities and 

51,000 nonfatal injuries.’’ Those figures are surely much higher now. 

Without a budgetary set-aside like the Section 130 program, grade crossing needs 

would fare poorly in competition with more traditional highway needs such as highway construction and maintenance. Indeed, one of the primary reasons the Section 

130 program was created in the first place was that highway safety—and especially 

grade crossing safety—traditionally received low funding priority. The surface transportation bill signed into law on July 6, 2012 will continue dedicated funding for 

this important program for two more years and will mean more injuries averted and 

more lives saved. 


619BEEF6.eps
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The vast majority of grade crossing collisions are the result of motorists’ actions. 

Consequently, grade crossing accidents can best be reduced through a mix of education, engineering, and enforcement. 

An organization that deserves special commendation for its efforts to educate the 

public about the dangers of grade crossings and trespassing on railroad rights-ofway is Operation Lifesaver. Operation Lifesaver—a non-profit whose mantra is 

‘‘look, listen, and live’’—started in Idaho in 1972 and now has chapters in the 48 

contiguous states, Alaska, and the District of Columbia. Operation Lifesaver’s presenters, many of whom are current or retired rail industry employees, have provided 

free safety presentations to millions of Americans, including school children, driver’s 

education students, business leaders, truck drivers, and bus drivers. I urge you to 

generously fund this important educational organization. Railroads also believe that 

grade crossing safety should be part of commercial driver’s license educational curricula. 

Education alone is not enough to reduce the number of tragic grade crossing accidents. Engineering and enforcement actions are also critical. Railroads support research regarding the effectiveness of innovative types of warning devices, such as 

four quadrant gates. Because maximum safety can be realized if crossings are eliminated, the closing of crossings (and, where appropriate, grade separation) is the ultimate engineering improvement. In that regard, we recommend that Congress consider measures that would help incentivize grade crossing closures. Finally, there 

should be tough penalties for grade crossing traffic violations. 

Grade crossing safety is only part of the public safety challenge. Trespassing is 

another area of concern. It is an unfortunate reality that too many people inappropriately use railroad property for short cuts, recreation, or other purposes, sometimes with tragic results. Railroads are engaged in ongoing efforts with Operation 

Lifesaver and others to educate the public that, for their own safety, they should 

stay off rail property. 

The Transportation of Hazardous Materials by Rail 

Although many types of chemicals pose little or no threat to anyone or anything, 

some chemicals are classified as hazardous. Depending on the year, U.S. railroads 

transport around 1.8 million carloads of hazardous materials. ‘‘Toxic inhalation hazard’’ (TIH) materials—gases or liquids, such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia, 

that are especially hazardous if released into the atmosphere—are a subset of hazVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE

619BEEF7.eps
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ardous materials. In 2010 (the most recent year for which data have been tabulated), U.S. railroads carried some 77,000 TIH carloads. Hazardous materials accounted for 6 percent of rail carloads in 2010; TIH materials accounted for 0.3 percent. 

The rail hazmat safety record is excellent. In 2010, 99.998 percent of rail hazmat 

shipments reached their destination without a release caused by a train accident. 

Rail hazmat accident rates are down 91 percent since 1980 and 38 percent since 

2000. 

In fact, railroads are the safest mode for transporting hazmat. Railroads and 

trucks have roughly equal hazmat ton-mileage, but railroads have only about 5 percent of the hazmat incidents that trucks have. In other words, trucks are about 20 

times more likely to have a hazmat incident than a train. Since 1982, railroads have 

incurred 15 fatalities due to hazmat transport; trucks have incurred 113. 

Railroads and tank car builders are taking concrete steps to make chemical and 

hazmat transportation safer and more reliable. For example, they are enhancing 

tank car safety. Nearly half of all chemicals, and nearly all TIH materials, are 

transported in tank cars. Tank cars built today are vastly improved over earlier generations of tank cars, with higher grade steel, better thermal protection, improved 

valves and fittings, often thicker tanks, and many other improvements. 

The industry committee responsible for establishing tank car design standards 

has adopted a proposal that will enhance the robustness of tank cars that carry TIH 

materials. That standard was the basis of a recent FRA rulemaking on TIH tank 

cars. Another proposed industry standard addresses ways to make petroleum and 

ethanol cars safer. 


619BEEF8.eps 619BEEF9.eps
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The railroad industry is also a key partner in the ‘‘Advanced Tank Car Collaborative Research Program’’ (ATCCRP), a cooperative effort involving the railroads, 

shippers (represented by the American Chemistry Council, the Fertilizer Institute, 

and the Chlorine Institute), tank car builders and owners (represented by the Railway Supply Institute), and several U.S. and Canadian government agencies. The 

program is sponsoring cutting-edge research aimed at further improving TIH tank 

car safety. 

In addition, railroads work cooperatively with various Federal agencies—including 

the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), the FRA, 

the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA)—to help ensure safe and secure rail transport. For example: 

• FEMA, FRA, PHMSA, TSA, and the railroads have jointly developed the Rail 

Corridor Risk Management System (RCRMS), a sophisticated statistical routing 

model designed to ensure that TIH materials are transported on routes that 

pose the least overall safety and security risk. The model uses a minimum of 

27 risk factors to assess the safety and security of rail routes, including hazmat 

volume, trip length, population density along the route, and emergency response 

capability. When transporting TIH materials, railroads must use the routes 

deemed safest and most secure by the routing model. 

• Railroads follow stringent TSA ‘‘chain of custody’’ requirements for rail cars carrying TIH materials. Transfer of TIH cars from a shipper to a railroad, from 

one railroad to another, and from a railroad to a receiver must be carefully documented. Rail cars carrying TIH materials cannot be left unattended while in 

certain high-threat urban areas. 

• TSA regulations require railroads to track TIH shipments. Within five minutes 

following a TSA request, railroads must be able to identify the location of a particular tank car carrying TIH. Within a half hour, railroads must be able to report the location of all TIH tank cars currently on the rail network. 

• PHMSA requires railroads to develop and implement security plans that include 

an assessment of security risks for hazmat shipments; background vetting and 

training of employees who work in hazmat transport; measures to restrict unauthorized access to hazmat cars; and coordination with shippers and receivers to 

minimize the duration of storage in transit. 

• Railroads equip train dispatchers and crews with information about hazmat on 

individual trains and detailed emergency response information. In addition, 

railroads maintain contact lists for local emergency response agencies. 

• Railroads provide hazmat awareness training to all employees who are involved 

in hazmat transportation. Employees responsible for emergency hazmat response efforts receive far more in-depth training. 

• Rail industry personnel are in constant communication with the TSA, other 

agencies within DHS, the Department of Defense, DOT, the FBI, and state and 

local law enforcement agencies to share intelligence and security information. 

• More than 25 years ago, the AAR established what is now the Security and 

Emergency Response Training Center (SERTC), a world-class facility that is 


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67 

part of TTCI in Pueblo, Colorado. The SERTC has provided in-depth hazmat 

emergency response training to more than 40,000 emergency responders and 

railroad and chemical industry employees. 

The rail transport of crude oil, which is considered a hazardous material, has been 

the subject of much discussion lately. Over the past couple of years, technological 

advances, along with relatively high crude oil prices, have led to sharply higher U.S. 

crude oil production. Historically, most crude oil has moved from production areas 

to refineries by pipeline. However, much of the recent increases in crude oil output 

has moved by rail. In 2008, U.S. freight railroads originated just 9,500 carloads of 

crude oil. In 2012, they originated nearly 234,000 carloads. Based on the approximately 97,000 rail carloads of crude oil in the first quarter of this year, more than 

400,000 carloads are possible in 2013. Today, railroads transport approximately 10 

percent of U.S. crude oil production, up from a miniscule percentage just a few years 

ago. 

Railroads have an excellent crude oil safety record. Based on data from PHMSA, 

the ‘‘spill rate’’ for railroads from 2002–2012 was just 2.2 gallons per million crude 

oil ton-miles generated. The fact is, both pipelines and railroads are safe, reliable 

ways to transport crude oil. Each enhances our energy security and benefits consumers. 

Safety-Enhancing Technologies 

At a very basic level, railroading today seems similar to railroading 150 years ago: 

it still consists of steel wheels traveling on steel rails. This apparent similarity, however, masks a widespread application of modern technology and a huge variety of 

ongoing initiatives to research, test, and apply advanced technologies to promote a 

safer and more efficient railroad environment. 

Many of these advancements were developed or refined at the finest rail research 

facility in the world: the Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI) in Pueblo, 

Colorado. TTCI is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads. Its 48 miles of test tracks, highly-sophisticated testing equipment, metallurgy 

labs, simulators, and other diagnostic tools are used to test track structure, evaluate 

freight car and locomotive performance, assess component reliability, and much 

more. The facility is owned by the FRA but has been operated (under a competitively-bid contract with the FRA) by TTCI since 1984. TTCI is responsible for all 

the facility’s operating costs and some capital costs. We extend a standing invitation 

to all members of this committee and others in Congress to visit TTCI and see firsthand the tremendous research and emergency response training that is being done 

there. 

Among many other things, TTCI has been actively involved in the rail industry’s 

research and technology development efforts to improve the performance of track 

and freight car component designs and materials. The most significant of these are 

improved suspension truck designs, improved maintenance of the wheel-rail interface, wheel inspection and cleanliness standards, and improved wheel and rail metallurgy. 

In addition, TTCI continues to work with track suppliers and railroads to test and 

evaluate wear-and fatigue-resistant rail steels, innovative special track work and 

bridge designs, improved tie/fastener systems, and maintenance practices at its Facility for Accelerated Service Testing (FAST). As a result of these efforts, 

derailments caused by broken rails have decreased significantly over the past ten 

years. 

A few of the many other examples of new safety-enhancing rail technologies developed in recent years or now being developed include: 

• Wayside detectors identify defects on passing rail cars, including overheated 

bearings and damaged wheels, dragging hoses, deteriorating bearings, cracked 

wheels, and excessively high and wide loads. 

• Trackside acoustic detector systems use ‘‘acoustic signatures’’ to evaluate the 

sound of internal bearings to identify those nearing failure. These systems supplement or replace systems that measure the heat bearings generate to identify 

those in the process of failing. 

• Rail defect detector cars detect internal flaws in rails which are caused by fatigue and impurities introduced during manufacturing. A prototype of an advanced system dubbed the ‘‘phased-array’’ rail inspection system is being developed and tested at TTCI to detect hard-to-find internal rail defects. 

• Advanced track geometry cars use sophisticated electronic and optical instruments to inspect track alignment, gauge, curvature, and other track conditions. 

A new system called the ‘‘vehicle track interaction system’’ is also used to locate 

68 

6 In terms of rail cars, ‘‘truck’’ refers to the complete four-wheel assembly that supports the 

car body. 

difficult-to-find track geometry defects. This information helps railroads determine when track needs maintenance. 

• Ground-penetrating radar is being used to help identify problems below the 

ground (such as excessive water penetration and deteriorated ballast) that 

hinder track stability. 

• Because a relatively small percentage of freight cars causes an inordinately 

high percentage of track damage and have a higher than usual propensity to 

derail, TTCI is working on ways to use optical geometry detectors to identify 

poorly performing freight trucks.6

• New automated detector systems are being tested and evaluated at TTCI to inspect the under carriage, safety appliances and truck components using machine-vision-based car inspection systems. 

• Railroads are expanding their use of advanced communications systems. For example, the Integrated Railway Remote Information Service (InteRRIS), an advanced Internet database with wide potential applicability, was developed at 

TTCI. An early project using InteRRIS collects data from wheel impact load detector systems (which identify wheel defects by measuring the force generated 

by wheels on tracks) and detectors that monitor the undercarriage of rail cars 

(which identify structural defects or missing components such as key fasteners). 

InteRRIS processes the information to produce vehicle condition reports. 

Many of these technological advances have been incorporated in the rail industry’s 

Equipment Health Monitoring Initiative, a predictive and proactive maintenance 

system designed to detect and report potential safety problems and poorly performing equipment before they result in accidents or damage. In addition to reliably 

detecting cars that exhibit high levels of stress and reduce derailments, one of the 

purposes of EHMS is to work with freight car owners to develop efficient methods 

to proactively maintain the freight car fleet and keep out-of-service time to a minimum. 

Rail industry safety will also be enhanced by the Asset Health Strategic Initiative 

(AHSI), a multi-year rail industry program initiated in December 2011 that will 

apply information technology solutions and processes to improve the safety and performance of freight cars and locomotives across North America. 

In a nutshell, AHSI aims to improve safety and reduce costs across the rail industry by addressing mechanical service interruptions, inspection quality, and yard and 

shop efficiency. It is based on the recognition that improving asset health means 

more than just focusing on railcar and locomotive repair. Rather, it encompasses the 

entire rolling stock health cycle, incorporating prevention, detection, planning, 

movement, and repair. 

For example, the Comprehensive Equipment Performance Monitoring (CEPM) 

program, which is just one part of the AHSI initiative, is a web-based application 

that captures data for railcar equipment components, including repair histories, the 

mileage the freight cars incorporating the components have traveled, and the current and past health status of the equipment. CEPM will make it much easier to 

track the health of individual railcar components and will provide crucial information on the health of entire classes of components, making early identification of potential safety problems much more likely. 

As noted above, in recent years railroads have been reinvesting more than ever 

before back into their networks. These investments have had a pronounced positive 

impact on asset health and, as a result, improved safety. However, a strategic focus 

at the network level—like that provided by AHSI—will provide more significant returns and greater efficiencies than furthering incremental or local efforts. AHSI 

builds on existing industry capabilities and defect detector systems, including many 

of those described above, to provide a more comprehensive assessment of rail car 

and locomotive health. It’s just one of many efforts by railroads to harness the 

power of advanced technologies for the benefit of their customers, their employees, 

and the communities they serve. 

Safety and Passenger Rail 

In the United States, freight railroads provide the foundation for most passenger 

rail. Around 70 percent of the miles traveled by Amtrak trains are on tracks owned 

by freight railroads, and dozens of commuter railroads operate, or plan to operate, 

at least partially on freight-owned corridors. In addition, most of the high speed and 

69 

intercity passenger rail projects under development nationwide plan to use freightowned facilities. 

Freight railroads agree that passenger railroading can play a key role in alleviating highway and airport congestion, decreasing dependence on foreign oil, reducing pollution, and enhancing mobility. But safety has to come first when it comes 

to passenger trains sharing track or rights-of-way with freight trains. Among other 

things, this means that in some cases—depending on train speeds and frequency, 

track standards, and other factors—separate tracks for passenger and freight trains 

might be needed. AAR believes that safety would be enhanced if these separate 

tracks were sufficiently far apart to minimize the likelihood that a derailment on 

one track could foul an adjacent track and lead to a collision involving a freight and 

passenger train. 

Railroads and Fatigue 

Railroads want properly rested crews—it’s not in a railroad’s best interest to have 

employees who are too tired to perform their duties properly. That’s why railroads 

have long been working to find innovative, effective solutions to fatigue-related 

problems. Combating fatigue in the rail industry is a shared responsibility: employers need to provide an environment that allows employees to rest during off-duty 

hours, and employees must set aside time when off duty to obtain the rest they 

need. 

Because factors that can result in fatigue are multiple, complex, and frequently 

intertwined, there is no single solution, and efforts to combat fatigue should be 

based on sound scientific research, not on anecdotes or isolated events. That’s why 

railroads and their employees are pursuing a variety of scientifically-based fatigue 

countermeasures. Not every countermeasure is appropriate for every railroad, or 

even for different parts of the same railroad, because circumstances unique to each 

railroad influence the effectiveness and practicality of specific countermeasures. 

That said, individual railroads have been using the following countermeasures 

(among others) to help combat fatigue: 

• Increasing the minimum number of hours off duty and providing more predictable calling assignments and rest opportunities between shifts. 

• Focusing, when possible, on returning crews home rather than lodging them 

away from home and making away-from-home lodging more rest-inducing. 

• Allowing employees to request an extra rest period when they report off duty 

if they feel excessively fatigued. 

• Devising systems (including websites, e-mails, pagers, and automated telephone 

systems) to improve communication between crew callers and employees. 

• Allowing employees who have been off work more than 72 hours (e.g., on vacation) to begin their first shift in the morning rather than at night. 

• Encouraging confidential sleep disorder screening and treatment. 

• Offering fatigue education programs for employees and their families. Education 

is critical, since the effectiveness of fatigue initiatives depends on the actions 

of employees while off duty. Employees must make appropriate choices regarding how they spend their off-duty time, and education is important in encouraging sound decision making. 

Conclusion 

Railroads are proud of their safety record, which results from their recognition of 

their responsibilities regarding safety and the enormous resources they devote to its 

advancement. At the same time, railroads want rail safety to continue to improve. 

The rail industry is always willing to work cooperatively with you, other policymakers, the FRA, its employees, and others to find practical, effective ways to make 

this happen. 

70 

1This paper is based on information provided by the following eight railroads, which have to 

install PTC on routes over which TIH or passengers, or both TIH and passengers, are transported: the Alaska Railroad (ARR), BNSF Railway (BNSF), Canadian National (CN), Canadian 

Pacific (CP), CSX Transportation (CSX), Kansas City Southern (KCS), Norfolk Southern (NS), 

and Union Pacific (UP). passengers, or both TIH and passengers, are transported: the Alaska 

Railroad (ARR), BNSF Railway (BNSF), Canadian National (CN), Canadian Pacific (CP), CSX 

Transportation (CSX), Kansas City Southern (KCS), Norfolk Southern (NS), and Union Pacific 

(UP). 2This 2013 Update is intended to be read in conjunction with and as a supplement to the 

ISP. Attachment B updates the information in the various tables that were included in the ISP. 

ATTACHMENT A—ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS

PTC Implementation: The Railroad Industry Cannot Install PTC on the 

Entire Nationwide Network by the 2015 Deadline—May 2013 Update 

Table of Contents 

I. Introduction and Executive Summary 

II. PTC Components 

A. Locomotives 

B. Wayside Technology 

C. Switches 

D. Communications 

E. PTC Back Office 

1. Back Office Server 

2. Geographical Information System (GIS) 

3. Dispatch 

III. The Integration Challenge and Testing 

IV. The Certification Process Could Take Considerable Time 

V. Interoperability: The Current Implementation Schedules Could Adversely Affect 

the Reliability and Effectiveness of PTC 

A. Phasing in PTC 

B. Interoperability Standards 

VI. Rolling Out PTC 

VII. Conclusion 

PTC Implementation: The Railroad Industry Cannot Install PTC on the 

Entire Nationwide Network by the 2015 Deadline—May 2013 Update 

I. Introduction and Executive Summary 

On January 18, 2012, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) submitted a 

status paper to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) titled ‘‘PTC Implementation: The Railroad Industry Cannot Install PTC on the Entire Nationwide Network 

by the 2015 Deadline’’ (‘‘ISP,’’ Attachment A). The ISP discussed the challenges 

faced in developing an interoperable PTC system and provided detailed data showing the progress that had been made.1 The ISP concluded by stating that a nationwide, interoperable PTC network cannot be completed by the December 31, 2015, 

statutory deadline. 

On February 10, 2012, the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) 

filed a companion paper with FRA, concurring with AAR that a nationwide interoperable PTC network is not achievable by December 31, 2015. In addition, in August 2012 FRA issued a report to Congress titled, ‘‘Positive Train Control Implementation Status, Issues, and Impacts.’’ In this report, FRA reached a similar conclusion, stating, ‘‘[b]ased on the results of this report, FRA believes that the majority 

of railroads will not be able to complete PTC implementation by the 2015 deadline.’’ 

This paper updates the ISP and the tables that were attached to the ISP.2 While 

enormous challenges remain in regard to developing a nationwide interoperable 

PTC system, there were many positive developments during 2012. These include: 

• the first Geographical Information System (GIS) subdivision validations with 

FRA; 

• the development and manufacture of 220 MHz radios; 

• significant progress with locomotive installations; 

71 

• improvements in the availability of Wayside Interface Units (WIUs); 

• radio frequency propagation studies of Chicago, Kansas City, Los Angeles, New 

Orleans, New York, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Toledo, and other congested metropolitan areas have been completed or are in progress; 

• FRA’s modification of its regulations that permits railroads to base PTC installation on projected traffic in 2015; 

• progress on the PTC Safety Plan that must be submitted to FRA before a PTC 

system can be certified; and 

• FRA’s recognition that activation of PTC should proceed from less complex to 

more complex areas. 

Despite the positive developments in 2012 and the railroads spending approximately $2.8 billion to date to install PTC, the year confirmed and increased our understanding of the challenges that remain to completing a nationwide, interoperable 

PTC system. The most significant are: 

• Wayside implementation continues to be constrained by the limited number of 

firms that provide signal design services. The signal system must still be individually redesigned and replaced at more than 7,000 locations before PTC wayside technology can be installed at those locations. Approximately 26,000 WIUs 

remain to be installed. This work must be accomplished without compromising 

signal system safety or the ability of the railroads to efficiently move the Nation’s freight. Based on current experience and available resources, it is likely 

that wayside design and installation will extend into 2018. 

• The track database, including critical features such as the presence of signals 

and switches, must be validated. The railroads must ensure that what is displayed to the train crew via the track database and onboard system reflects 

what is shown by railroad signals. It is a time-consuming and labor-intensive 

process. 

• There is limited expertise available to accelerate design and development. The 

railroads have been developing expertise as they build the onboard, wayside, 

and back office segments. 

• Core software delivery dates continue to slip, particularly in connection with the 

Back Office Server (BOS) for I–ETMS. The railroads do not expect the final release of core software, which is necessary before the PTC system can be lab and 

field tested, certified, and used in revenue service, until mid-2014. 

• Full system testing will likely continue into 2015, as will the need to address 

issues with PTC components and software identified by the testing. 

• Over 75 percent of the industry’s employees must receive PTC training. From 

the perspective of the employee retaining the material and understanding its 

relevance, the optimal time to train an employee is when PTC is rolled out on 

the employee’s territory. 

• Once testing is complete, the limited number of FRA personnel available to 

work on PTC must still review each railroad’s individual Safety Plan and certify 

the PTC system. While the provisional certification concept advanced by FRA 

could reduce the delay associated with certification, even a provisional certification will require time and review by FRA. 

• Portions of the PTC regulation are still not final, with potential changes that 

could impact the scope of the implementation effort. 

• As the potential for failure of individual components became clear, systems have 

been designed with more redundancy, thus lengthening the design process. 

• PTC cannot be rolled out on an entire railroad all at once. Implementation of 

PTC must occur in phases and location by location, starting with less complex 

areas and proceeding to the more operationally complex areas, incorporating 

lessons learned at each step. 

It is abundantly clear that the railroad industry cannot install interoperable PTC 

on the entire nationwide network by the December 31, 2015, deadline. 

72 

3 All the estimates in this paper are premised on the PTC regulations in existence on April 1, 

2013. The industry has requested amendments to those regulations that would reduce certain 

estimates, including the number of locomotives that would need to be equipped with PTC. 4 ISP at 4. 

5 ‘‘Double touch’’ refers to shopping locomotives twice to equip them with PTC, partially installing PTC equipment at the first shopping. 6See Table 1 in Attachment B. 

7 ISP at 6. 

8See Table 2 in Attachment B. 

9See Tables 3 and 4 in Attachment B. 

II. PTC Components 

A. Locomotives 

Approximately 22,000 locomotives, which constitute most of the Class I railroads’ 

locomotive fleet, must be equipped with PTC technology.3 The ISP identified several 

reasons why equipping locomotives with PTC technology is taking longer than projected in the railroads’ original implementation plans.4 However, several of those 

challenges were resolved or became less of a concern in 2012: 

• vendor supply chain issues and capacity have improved and available hardware 

(but not software) components are generally being delivered on time; 

• production of the 220MHz locomotive radio began in 2012; and 

• hardware design changes necessary to support the messaging system on some 

railroads were completed. 

These positive developments aided the railroads in making significant progress on 

their ‘‘double touch’’ strategy for equipping locomotives in 2012.5 Over 3,000 locomotives were equipped or partially equipped in 2012; over 6,000 locomotives have 

been equipped or partially equipped to date. While the good news is that the number of equipped or partially equipped locomotives continued to climb in 2012, most 

of these locomotives were only partially equipped and will have to be cycled back 

through a shop to complete installation and perform PTC commissioning tests. 

A significant development hurdle remains with the development of the onboard 

software that runs on the Train Management Computer (TMC) for the railroads 

using I–ETMS. The complexity of the software, combined with the many interfaces 

with other components of the PTC system, has resulted in multiple reviews of the 

design. The delivery date for this critical software component slipped several times 

over the course of 2012 and at the present time there is no delivery date for the 

final version of the onboard software. Nevertheless, sufficient progress has been 

made so that railroads plan to begin fully equipping locomotives with all necessary 

PTC equipment in 2013 rather than continuing to employ the double touch strategy. 

While much work remains to be done in regard to equipping locomotives, the industry plans to have approximately 3⁄4 of the locomotives required to be equipped 

with PTC technology fully equipped by December 31, 2015.6

B. Wayside Technology 

For the reasons described in the ISP, tens of thousands of miles of existing signal 

system infrastructure still need to be replaced. As discussed previously, each of the 

approximately 12,300 replacement projects is complicated and lengthy, requiring individual analysis and design and signal replacements or upgrades before the WIU’s 

can be installed at these locations.7

Qualified signal personnel are needed for design, installation, and validation, both 

in the lab and in the field. The limited number of qualified signal design firms and 

personnel available to the railroad industry continues to constrain how quickly railroads can complete the design, upgrade, installation, and testing required for PTC 

signal projects. The railroads have hired over 2,200 signal personnel specifically for 

PTC.8 However, the great majority of these new hires provide assistance only with 

the installation of PTC at wayside locations, not with the more complicated analysis 

and design work that is typically handled by established signal design firms. Personnel hired for installation work are, of course, limited to performing work at locations where designs have been completed. Product availability has improved, although it continues to be a concern along with the extensive lab and field testing 

required for these products. 

Despite these factors, railroads made considerable progress with installation of 

wayside technology in 2012. Over 7,000 WIU’s were installed in 2012, bringing the 

total installed to approximately 9,700. That leaves approximately 26,000 WIU’s of 

the approximately 36,000 total WIU’s needed remaining to be installed.9 Similarly, 

approximately 3,700 signal replacement projects were completed in 2012, bringing 

the total completed to over 5,000. However, that still leaves over 7,000 of the apVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
73 

10See Table 5 in Attachment B. 11See Table 6 in Attachment B. 12 ISP at 8. 13See Table 7 in Attachment B. 

proximately 12,300 PTC signal replacement projects identified by the industry to be 

completed.10 The sheer volume and complexity of this safety-critical work, which impacts the functioning of railroad signal systems as well as PTC, is one of the most 

significant reasons that the railroad industry cannot meet the 2015 deadline. This 

work is expected to extend into 2018. 

C. Switches 

Most of the work involved in upgrading switches in non-signaled territory remains. In analyzing the technology required for switches, railroads have determined 

that these will be mostly turnkey solutions currently under development by several 

suppliers. In 2012, 227 switches were equipped with power, bringing the total so 

equipped to 436; 236 were equipped with WIU’s, bringing the total so equipped to 

361; and 36 were equipped with switch monitors, bringing the total so equipped to 

148. Over 4,400 switches still need to be equipped with power and WIUs, and approximately 3,400 switch position monitors still need to be installed.11

D. Communications 

As explained in the ISP, all PTC wayside locations and all PTC-enabled locomotives must be equipped with a complex, interoperable, wireless communications 

infrastructure.12 Railroads have created a private radio frequency network capable 

of transmitting and receiving the data necessary to support an interoperable PTC 

network using spectrum in the 220 MHz band as the interoperability communications standard. To date, the seven Class I railroads have invested approximately 

$40 million in acquiring and managing 220 MHz spectrum. 

Production quantities of PTC radios were first available in May 2012. Since then, 

railroads have been procuring and installing them. In parallel, railroads have undertaken numerous associated activities, including coverage analyses, site selection, 

antennae installation, and upgrading power supplies. 

One of the key challenges that has emerged is deploying a national 220 MHz communications network for PTC that includes adequate coordination between railroads 

to avoid interference. Various tools are being developed to help mitigate interference, but this will continue to be a substantial task. 

Some additional complexities associated with the design and implementation of 

the communications system became apparent in 2012. Complete signal wayside design and GIS data and train movement data are all necessary to properly design 

the radio network; each of these data elements must be taken into account to ensure 

there is adequate capacity to handle all the data. In addition, as new users roll out 

their PTC systems in locations where other railroads are already testing or using 

PTC, railroads will likely have to re-engineer their radio networks to address potential interference and ensure the additional demand for data can be met. Another 

issue that has emerged is the potential for delays associated with the Federal Communications Commission’s environmental rules, including the separate completion of 

the environmental and historic preservation processes for each of the over 20,000 

antenna structures required for PTC. Four railroads have invested approximately $180 million to date in the development and installation of 220 MHz radios for base stations, wayside locations, and 

locomotives, each of which requires a distinct type of radio. Still, over 3,800 base 

station radios, over 31,000 wayside radios, and over 21,000 locomotive radios need 

to be manufactured and installed.13

Finally, in 2012 railroads studied spectrum needs in congested metropolitan areas 

and confirmed that railroads will need to acquire additional spectrum in Chicago. 

Other areas being studied include Kansas City, New York, Toledo, St. Louis, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and New Orleans. The adequacy of coverage in congested metropolitan areas will not be fully known until the PTC system is implemented and 

operational in those areas. 

E. PTC Back Office 

The pace of development of the Back Office Segment and PTC-related back office 

systems remains challenged by design complexity, availability of supplier resources, 

and scalability of the solution. Insofar as the I–ETMS BOS is concerned, the railroads and their contractors continued development in 2012, but a ‘‘final’’ version is 

not expected to be available until mid-2014. 

The need to test thoroughly the PTC back office systems, including the BOS, and 

address issues and defects identified during the testing process also significantly imVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
74 

14See Table 8 in Attachment B. 15See Table 9 in Attachment B. 16 ICDs contain the format for how systems communicate with each other. 

pact the pace of development. Lab testing of the related technologies and systems 

will generally find some defects, as was the case with the initial software release 

for the BOS, requiring subsequent revisions of the technologies or systems that fix 

the defects. Unavailability of the final production version of the BOS is one of the 

critical factors preventing the railroads from installing PTC on the entire nationwide network by the current 2015 implementation date. 

1. Back Office Server 

For the over one dozen railroads implementing the I–ETMS BOS, the software 

version that includes essential requirements for vital overlay PTC system certification is now scheduled to be ready for testing in mid-2014. A production version 

of the BOS software will be unavailable until after the required lab testing, likely 

late 2014 at the earliest. While the railroads are considering all possible strategies 

to expedite this schedule, at this time there is no apparent alternative strategy or 

approach that would significantly accelerate the delivery date. As with the software 

for the locomotive, the complexity of the BOS software combined with the many 

interfaces with other components of the PTC system has required detailed design 

and analysis to ensure proper operation. 

2. Geographical Information System (GIS) 

The railroads made substantial progress with respect to the GIS component of 

PTC systems in 2012. The industry developed a common approach to validation and 

verification of the data to ensure all essential data elements are captured. A common approach facilitates review by FRA and also provides non-Class I railroads a 

template they can use. Over 13,000 track miles were GIS mapped in 2012, bringing 

the total miles GIS mapped to approximately 80,000; approximately 15,800 track 

miles were data processed in 2012, bringing this total to over 41,000; and over 6,000 

track miles of GIS data were converted to PTC subdivision files in 2012, bringing 

the total of converted track miles to over 9,000. However, much work remains to 

be done. Over 17,000 track miles remain to be GIS mapped; almost 56,000 miles 

remain to be data processed; and almost 88,000 miles remain to be converted to the 

PTC subdivision files needed for the locomotive’s PTC system.14 Furthermore, substantial work remains to be done to develop and implement sustainable processes 

to document and update the GIS coordinates every time one of the over 470,000 critical PTC assets are moved by more than 1 foot. 

3. Dispatch 

The dispatch system must interact with the PTC system via a common interoperable interface with the BOS. For some railroads, the enhancements needed for the 

dispatch system are extensive and have taken considerable analysis and effort to 

design, code, and test. Additionally, changes made to the BOS require an analysis 

of the effect on the interface of the dispatch system with the PTC system. At least 

four railroads will not have a PTC-capable dispatch system until 2014.15

III. The Integration and Testing Challenge 

The challenges and risks associated with integrating and testing the many components of PTC have not diminished. Many of the 20 plus PTC components have been 

tested by the supplier and some ‘‘nearest neighbor’’ testing of interfacing components has started with preliminary releases of software during 2012. However, endto-end testing of the final system of interoperable software, with all known hazards 

mitigated, is still one to two years away. 

Railroads have been nimble in adjusting to the testing challenge. As component 

releases are delayed due to the complexity of the design or the need to fix defects, 

the interaction of those components can quickly get out of sync on the release cycle 

timeline. Nevertheless, railroads have revised test plans and realigned resources to 

conduct nearest neighbor testing with intermediate versions of software as software 

delivery schedules have slipped. They have taken advantage of opportunities to test 

releases of software and hardware to ferret out defects and issues early in the release continuum, when more extensive integration testing is not yet possible. To 

keep the schedule moving forward to the extent possible, railroads have undertaken 

preliminary testing using software written to interim versions of ‘‘interface control 

documents’’ (ICDs) and written translators to bridge the gap between the different 

ICDs.16 In some cases these stop-gap assemblages of software have been tested in 

the field with a hi-rail vehicle. 

75 

17FRA Report to Congress, p. 41. Based upon the nearly 18 months that it took for FRA to 

approve the PTC Development Plan, a less complex document, the approval period could take 

even longer than estimated by FRA. 18FRA in its August 2012 Report to Congress suggested a legislative change that would permit FRA to provisionally certify PTC systems. Once provisionally certified, a railroad could operate its PTC system pending final review. While a constructive suggestion that could assist in 

evaluating PTC systems in operation, this change would not alter the fact that the railroads 

cannot install PTC on the entire nationwide network by the 2015 deadline. Even provisional certification will require a review and approval process for FRA. It is difficult to imagine that process will take less than 6 months. 19FRA Report to Congress, p. 41. 

Railroad testing has identified more than 600 software defects to date, underscoring the importance of thorough testing to ensure the integrity of the PTC system. While these efforts successfully identified potential defects, only true end-toend testing with final software will determine whether the integration of all the 

PTC components is effective. Based on current schedules, this will not begin until 

late 2014. At that time any additional defects discovered will have to be analyzed 

and remediated, further delaying the time at which widespread PTC implementation can proceed. 

IV. The Certification Process Could Take Considerable Time 

AAR remains concerned that the certification process could take a considerable 

amount of time and that FRA will not have the resources to review and certify PTC 

systems expeditiously. As FRA acknowledged in its August 2012 Report to Congress, 

FRA will need at least 6 to 9 months to review PTC Safety Plans, and approximately 38 railroads will need certification.17 In an attempt to expedite final review, 

in 2012 the Class I railroads’ Joint Rail Safety Team (JSRT) developed a format and 

common portions of a PTC Safety Plan and submitted drafts for FRA review and 

comment. In addition, in 2012 FRA and the JRST began holding quarterly meetings 

to facilitate communications between the parties, discuss FRA’s concerns about implementation, and clarify FRA’s interpretation of the PTC regulations. The meetings 

continue to foster a good working relationship between the industry and FRA. However, while this joint effort of the railroads and FRA is helpful, each railroad will 

have a unique PTC safety plan that FRA will need to review and approve. Furthermore, while railroads have been and will continue partial installation of PTC equipment prior to certification, the time required for FRA certification is one of the critical elements impacting the date by which the PTC mandate can be implemented.18

As FRA also noted in its Report to Congress, the shortage of qualified people extends to FRA. FRA noted that its PTC staff consists of 10 PTC specialists and 1 

supervisor, who are responsible for monitoring PTC system installation and testing 

nationwide and for the technical review and approval of all documentation associated with the statutorily-required PTC system certification.19 Railroads will be submitting PTC Safety Plans, amendments to their PTC filings, and other related documents. FRA, as do the railroads, faces the challenge of key personnel retiring as 

well as other resource constraints that impact the agency’s ability to review, comment, and approve the required documentation. As FRA noted in its Report to Congress, the industry remains concerned that the continued shortage of FRA resources 

could delay the implementation of an interoperable PTC system. 

V. Interoperability: The Current Implementation Schedules Could Adversely Affect the Reliability and Effectiveness of PTC 

A. Phasing in PTC 

Attachment B to the ISP discussed problems that could arise from implementation schedules under which PTC is deployed first in locations presenting complex 

interoperability issues. The railroads suggested a phased approach to PTC under 

which PTC will be implemented in less operationally complex areas first, which is 

a departure from current implementation plans. FRA has indicated that it agrees 

with this general approach. Accordingly, the railroads intend to update the implementation schedules in their respective PTC Implementation Plans to take these 

complex interoperability issues into account. 

The PTC Reliability Study recently provided by AAR to FRA raises significant 

concerns over the reliability of the fully assembled PTC system. The Study underscores the need for a phased approach for implementation that will allow the railroads to assess the PTC system in operation so that failures, while they will occur, 

can be reduced to the extent possible and the efficiency of the railroad network 

maintained to the greatest extent feasible. The time needed to phase in PTC is another reason why the industry cannot meet the current 2015 deadline to implement 

PTC on the entire nationwide network. 

76 

20See Table 10 in Attachment B. 

B. Interoperability Standards 

Ensuring the interoperability of PTC requires numerous interoperability standards. AAR and its member railroads made considerable progress towards developing 

those standards in 2012. Attachment C describes the status of the interoperability 

standards required for PTC. Of the 34 standards being developed, 18 have been finalized. Drafts of 12 more have been published for public comment. 

In 2012 it became clear that the railroads also need to adopt industry standards 

for the ongoing use and operation of PTC. These standards are necessary in order 

for the railroads operating a PTC system to ensure that updates to PTC hardware 

and software are acceptable. In the absence of such standards, there is no assurance 

that upgraded PTC components and software will be compatible with and continue 

to work with other components of the PTC system or that interoperability will be 

maintained. 

VI. Rolling Out PTC 

As noted above and in the ISP, PTC cannot be rolled out on an entire railroad 

system at the same time. It must be implemented in phases and location by location, typically on a subdivision basis. 

Furthermore, as also stated in the ISP, training employees remains a daunting 

task that places practical limits on the speed with which PTC can be safely and effectively rolled out across a railroad system. While training courses and materials 

continue to be developed, the railroads recognize that this training must occur in 

a phased approach. Employees on each subdivision will have to receive significant 

training immediately prior to activation of PTC on the subdivision where they work. 

On the Class I railroads alone, approximately 68,000 engineers and conductors, 

7,200 signal employees, 2,500 dispatchers, and thousands of others, including mechanics, electricians, and supervisors, will have to be trained on PTC. Delays in designing and installing PTC affect the pace of training railroad employees. 

VII. Conclusion 

The railroad industry has invested a tremendous amount of time, effort and 

money to complete a nationwide interoperable PTC-system as quickly as possible. 

As of the end of 2012, the railroads had invested approximately $2.8 billion (up from 

$1.6 billion at the end of 2011) and had also devoted millions of man-hours to the 

development of PTC.20 However, as demonstrated above, the railroads will not be 

able to implement PTC on the entire nationwide network by December 31, 2015. 

Because of all the uncertainties associated with the development and installation 

of PTC, it is impossible to set forth a precise timeline for completion of a nationwide, 

interoperable PTC network. Factors that affect a railroad’s timeline for completion 

of PTC on its system, include variations in geography; type and age of the railroad’s 

wayside signaling infrastructure (legacy relay technology must be converted to solid 

state technology); the density of train operations; the number of rail-to-rail 

interlockings; the number of connections with other railroads; and the number of 

operating environments (with different combinations of these factors) that must be 

addressed. In addition, until a railroad tests and installs its PTC system, it is impossible to know what other difficulties will be encountered and how they might affect progress in completing the railroad’s PTC network. As discussed previously, the 

critical software for the back office server for I–ETMS will not be fully tested and 

ready to be installed until late 2014 at the earliest. Finally, the scope of the PTC 

network will impact a railroad’s ultimate completion date. 

Taking into account the above factors, the eight railroads providing data for this 

paper anticipate that by December 31, 2018, all PTC hardware will be installed and 

PTC will be in operation on most of the mandated PTC routes. (The date by which 

PTC will be in operation on all of a railroad’s mandated PTC routes will vary by 

railroad.) The industry continues to seek ways to speed progress while maintaining 

safe operations in order to achieve complete deployment as soon as possible. Thus, 

while current projections show that a portion of the PTC network will not be completed by the end of 2018, that certainly could change. 

Keeping in mind the uncertainty in projecting a completion date, Table 11 shows 

the railroads’ current expectations regarding future annual PTC expenditures and 

annual installations of wayside interface units, base station radios, and PTC equipment on locomotives, as well as the number of employees they expect will be 

trained. (Table 11 is premised on the PTC network required by the current regulations.) Table 11 also shows by year the extent to which the railroads will have installed PTC on the routes that will have PTC capability. The year ‘‘2018 and beyond’’ column includes data for what the railroads currently project will remain to 

77 

1The data in this Attachment is based on estimates as of December 31, 2012, current PTC 

implementation plans on file with FRA (including amendments to plans that have been approved by FRA), and the regulations in existence on December 31, 2012. 

be done in and beyond 2018. The eight railroads anticipate they will have spent $8 

billion by the end of 2018 on PTC. 

This paper shows that the railroad industry has done its utmost to install a nationwide, interoperable PTC network. However, much work remains to be done. 

While substantial progress toward completing the network will have been made by 

the end of 2015, the entire project will not be complete by that date. 

ATTACHMENT B 

PTC Data 1

Table 1.—Equipping Locomotives with PTC 

Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total 

# to be equipped 54 4,000 1,000 1,143 4,100 591 3,811 7,267 21,966 

# partially equipped 

to date 53 917 58 163 1,705 40 1,383 1,591 5,910 

# fully equipped 0 146 0 0 0 0 0 0 146 

Table 2.—Railroad Signal Personnel 

Hired or Retained Due to PTC 

ARR 4 

BNSF 820 

CN 32 

CP 35 

CSX 494 

KCS 36 

NS 300 

UP 539 

Total 2,260 

Table 3.—Integrated WIU Installation 

Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total 

# integrated WIUs 

required to be deployed 54 5,709 1,061 491 5,029 620 4,249 11,895 29,108 

# integrated WIUs 

deployed to date 0 4,518 67 49 487 238 597 3,003 8,959 

# integrated WIUs 

remaining to be 

deployed 54 1,191 994 442 4,542 382 3,652 8,892 20,149 

Table 4.—Stand-alone WIU Installation 

Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total 

# stand-alone WIUs 

required to be deployed 38 1,180 699 620 1,167 217 1,096 1,934 6,951 

# stand-alone WIUs 

deployed to date 0 209 0 15 10 42 39 452 767 

# stand-alone WIUs 

remaining to be 

deployed 38 971 699 605 1,157 175 1,057 1,482 6,184 

Table 5.—Signal Replacement Projects 

Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total 

# locations of signal 

replacement required 0 3,965 134 66 1724 364 1,850 4,200 12,303 

# locations replaced 

to date 0 2,490 89 26 561 180 597 1,255 5,198 

# locations remaining to be replaced 0 1,475 45 40 1,163 184 1253 2945 7,105 

78 

Table 6.—Switches in Non-Signal PTC Territory 

Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total 

# needed 64 1,180 227 481 973 148 728 974 4,775 

# non-signaled switch 

locations 

needing 

power & 

WIUs 

# equipped 

with power 

to date 

4 209 0 11 85 30 39 58 436 

# remaining 

to be 

equipped 

with power 

60 971 227 470 888 118 689 916 4,339 

# equipped 

with WIUs 

to date 

4 209 0 11 10 30 39 58 361 

*# remaining to be 

equipped 

with WIUs 

60 971 227 470 963 118 689 916 4,414 

# non-signaled switch 

locations 

needing 

switch position monitors 

# needed 0 0 227 481 973 148 728 974 3,531 

# equipped 

to date 

0 0 0 11 10 30 39 58 148 

# remaining 

to be 

equipped 

0 0 227 470 963 118 689 916 3,383 

Table 7.—Communications Deployment 

Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total 

# needed 33 731 181 134 1,285 120 700 1,036 4,220 

# Base station 220 

MHz radios 

# installed 3 297 0 0 30 0 62 4 396 

# of future 

installations 

needed 

30 434 181 134 1,255 120 638 1,046 3,838 

# Wayside 

location 220 

MHz radios 

# needed 78 5,863 1,751 687 5,299 828 5,478 13,700 33,684 

# installed 0 1,282 0 0 748 0 78 102 2,210 

# of future 

installations 

needed 

78 4,581 1,751 687 4,551 828 5,400 13,598 31,474 

Locomotive 

220 MHz 

radios 

# needed 54 4,000 1,000 1,143 4,100 591 3,811 7,267 21,966 

# installed 0 146 0 1 20 0 0 2 169 

# of locomotives remaining to 

be equipped 

54 3,854 1,000 1,142 4,080 591 3,811 7,265 21,797 

79 

Table 8.—Status of PTC GIS Projects 

Railroad ARR BNSF CN CP CSX KCS NS UP Total 

# PTC assets to be *

mapped and extracted 

for GIS consumption 

2,800 95,925 25,630 17,802 114,731 9,641 77,000 130,000 473,529 

# track 

miles 

required 

to be GIS 

mapped 

# miles 

mapped to 

date 

600 13,925 80 865 21,455 1,977 16,107 25,000 80,009 

# miles to 

be mapped 

0 10,562 4,300 1,871 110 250 0 0 17,093 

# track 

miles 

required to 

be data 

processed 

# miles 

processed 

to date 

600 9,758 20 273 7,742 153 231 22,500 41,277 

# miles remaining to 

be processed 

0 14,729 4300 2,463 13,823 2,074 16,107 2,500 55,996 

# track 

miles GIS 

data to be 

converted 

to PTC 

subdiv files 

# converted 

to date 

600 6,455 0 273 1,420 153 231 300 9,432 

# remaining to be 

converted 

0 18,032 4,300 2,463 20,145 2,074 16,107 24,700 87,821 

*The calculation of assets to be mapped includes the following: integer mileposts; signals; crossings; switches; interlockings/control point locations; permanent speed restrictions; the beginning and ending limits of track 

detection circuits in non-signaled territory; clearance point locations for every switch location installed on the 

main and siding tracks; and inside switches equipped with switch circuit controllers. 

Table 9.—Status of PTC Dispatch 

System Projects 

Railroad Date System will be 

PTC-capable 

ARR April 2013 

BNSF Completed 

CN 1st quarter 2014 

CP June 2014 

CSX 3rd quarter 2014 

KCS 1st quarter 2014 

NS 3rd quarter 2013 

UP Completed 

Table 10.—PTC Investment 

Railroad PTC investment through 

December 31, 2012 ($) 

ARR 34,000,000 

BNSF 739,694,000 

CN 55,900,000 

CP 102,340,000 

CSX 585,000,000 

KCS 50,374,000 

NS 443,466,772 

UP $759,000,000 

Total $2,769,774,772.00 

80 

ATTACHMENT C 

ITC Sourced Specifications Total Started 

Delivered to 

AAR and 

Published for 

Comment 

Revised and 

Sent to 

Railway 

Electronics 

Standards 

Committee for 

Adoption 

Final 

Version 

Released 

by AAR 

Interface Control Documents 8 8 4 3 3 

Requirements Specifications 14 14 12 9 8 

Architectural Specifications 2 2 2 2 2 

Database Definitions 2 2 4 3 2 

Protocol Specifications 3 3 3 3 2 

Recommended Practices 1 1 1 0 0 

Test Plans 1 1 1 1 1 

Test Reports 0 0 0 0 0 

Total Specifications 31 31 27 21 18 

Table 11.—PTC Timeline Based on PTC Regulations as of 12/31/2012 

Railroad Class 1s 

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 

2018 

and 

beyond* 

Totals 

Component Thru 

2012 

Locomotives Partially 

Equipped 6,031 4,242 1,365 678 650 314 77 13,357 

Locomotives Fully 

Equipped 224 987 6,948 7,425 4,425 1,509 448 21,966 

Percent Complete 1% 6% 37% 71% 91% 98% 100% 

Wayside Interface Units 

installed 9,726 5,300 4,950 5,837 4,210 3,988 2,048 36,059 

Percent Complete 27% 42% 55% 72% 83% 94% 100% 

Base Station Radios 

Installed 403 976 1,285 1,267 222 52 34 4,239 

Percent Complete 10% 33% 63% 93% 98% 99% 100% 

PTC Route Miles 

Implemented 207 1,085 8,320 15,516 11,983 12,760 12,341 62,213 

Percent Complete 0% 2% 15% 40% 60% 80% 100% 

Employees Trained 5,724 4,013 10,930 28,692 16,520 13,276 17,545 96,700 

Percent Complete 6% 10% 21% 51% 68% 82% 100% 

PTC Spending ($M) 2,770 1,377 1,403 1,221 572 393 241 7,978 

Cumulative Spending 

($M) 2,770 4,147 5,549 6,771 7,343 7,736 7,978 

*The year 2018 and beyond column includes data for what the railroads currently project will remain to be done in and 

beyond 2018.Because of all the uncertainties associated with the development and installation of PTC, it is impossible to set 

forth a precise completion date. The railroads currently project that by the end of 2018, all hardware will be installed and 

PTC will be in operation on approximately 90 percent of the mandated PTC routes, by mileage. The industry continues to 

seek ways to speed progress while maintaining safe operations in order to achieve complete deployment as soon as possible. 

Assumptions: 

1—70% confidence factor in accomplishing the above metrics. 

2—No FRA accomodation on yard movements in PTC territory. The spreadsheet only reflects the cost of equipping yard 

locomotives. The spreadsheet does not reflect the potential cost of operational impacts such as reduced operational efficiency 

and potential expenses that will be associated with resolving technical issues such as overloaded communications systems 

and the potential impossibility of accommodating PTC equipment on remote control locomotives. 

3—Costs represent capital expenses only, no operating or maintenance expenses. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Hamberger. 

Ms. Waters? 

STATEMENT OF KATHRYN WATERS, EXECUTIVE VICE 

PRESIDENT, MEMBER SERVICES, AMERICAN 

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION 

Ms. WATERS. Good morning, Chairman Blumenthal, Senator 

Blunt, and members of the Committee. On behalf of the American 

Public Transportation Association, I thank you for the opportunity 

to testify on commuter rail safety. You have our written submission, and I will now try to summarize the key points. 

As you said, my name is Kathryn Waters. I am APTA’s Executive 

Vice President for Member Services. Before coming to APTA, I 

served as Senior Deputy Administrator in the Maryland Transit 

Administration in Baltimore. Before that, with Dallas Area Rapid 

Transit as Vice President for Commuter Rail and Railroad Management, where I had responsibility for the commuter rail system beVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
81 

tween Dallas and Fort Worth. And for many years, I worked in different capacities with the MARC train service in Maryland, culminating as Chief Operating Officer. 

APTA is committed to safety. Passenger and employee safety is 

our number one priority for our commuter railroads. 

Since 1882, APTA and its predecessor associations have been advocates for safety improvements. With that said, we are always 

working to make our industry safer. 

While our testimony speaks to PTC, an effective safety system is 

about more than one specific procedure or technology. A culture of 

safety begins with a commitment by the senior leadership working 

with employees to adopt and adhere to common safety goals and 

practices. APTA’s voluntary standard development program and 

the safety audit program are examples of the ways that the industry promotes safety. Both programs are described in my written 

statement. 

APTA has consistently supported the concept of PTC, long before 

the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, provided that proven 

technology, resources, and radio spectrum were available. APTA is 

working with its member railroads as we speak to meet the law’s 

requirements on the Nation’s commuter railroads. 

We want to work with this committee on the best way to get PTC 

systems installed on commuter railroads. PTC, as you know, is defined as a system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, overspeed derailments, incursions into established work zone limits, 

and the movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position. 

Some commuter railroads already have collision avoidance systems, some of which have been in place for many years. However, 

there is still no off-the-shelf technology capable of achieving all of 

the law’s safety objectives today. 

Key components of PTC systems, such as the software upgrades 

and revisions, and the roadway worker protection components, are 

still under development. This technology is also heavily dependent 

on the transmission of huge amounts of digital data, requiring 

newly designed radios and significant amounts of radio spectrum to 

deliver information to trains. 

All of this is essentially untested in the actual commuter rail operating environment. Moreover, implementation costs are challenging, especially for publicly operated commuter railroads trying 

to deal with hundreds of state-of-good-repair projects unrelated to 

PTC, but many of which impact directly and significantly on the 

safety of operations. 

Congress has appropriated only $50 million of the $250 million 

authorized for PTC, while implementation costs for commuter railroads are well in excess of $2 billion, and that excludes operating 

and inspection costs. As you know, many railroads in the East 

Coast are now also trying to deal with repair and rehabilitation 

costs related to Hurricane Sandy. 

We have known about these challenges for some time. We have 

told Congress for several years that we are concerned about our 

ability to implement PTC by the deadline. We sought Federal funding to help commuter rail pay for the costs of the implementation. 

We have asked the FCC and Congress to provide radio spectrum 

82 

without cost for PTC implementation. We have also recommended 

the deadline for implementation be extended from 2015 to 2018. 

And as Mr. Hamberger mentioned, we have been working with 

the FRA and with the freight railroads. We did do a report jointly 

with AAR concerning the challenges of meeting the deadline. 

In its report to Congress, FRA recommended that it be allowed 

to approve a railroad to use alternative safety technologies on specified line segments in lieu of PTC, particularly in areas with low 

safety risk, if appropriately and properly justified to FRA. We support the FRA’s recommendation to make such decisions. 

We have also urged Congress to provide resources needed to do 

FRA inspections and reviews for approval of PTC systems, and to 

ensure that open standards on PTC technology are in place so that 

railroads can buy equipment and services in a competitive marketplace. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and would be happy 

to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Waters follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KATHRYN WATERS, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, MEMBER

SERVICES, AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION

Introduction 

Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Thune, Acting Chairman Blumenthal and Senator 

Blunt, and members of the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, on 

behalf of the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) and its more than 

1,500 member organizations, I thank you for this opportunity to testify on rail safety as it relates to the nation’s commuter railroads. In particular, I will update the 

Committee on progress and challenges related to the implementation of positive 

train control (PTC) on the nation’s commuter railroads. 

My name is Kathryn Waters. I am APTA’s Executive Vice President, Member 

Services, here in Washington, D.C. Before coming to APTA, I was Deputy Administrator at the Maryland Transit Administration in Baltimore, where I was responsible for all transit operations departments. Previously, I worked at the Dallas Area 

Rapid Transit (DART) in several positions, including Vice President—Commuter 

Rail and Railroad Management, and earlier, for MARC Train Service in Maryland, 

culminating as manager and chief operating officer. 

As an APTA member, I served as chair of APTA’s Commuter Rail Committee, and 

on APTA’s Executive Committee as vice chair—commuter and intercity rail. I have 

represented APTA for more than 15 years on the rail safety advisory committee of 

the Federal Railroad Administration. 

Overview 

First and foremost, please let me state that APTA is unequivocally committed to 

safety: passenger and employee safety is the number one priority on our Nation’s 

commuter railroads. Since its inception, APTA and its predecessor associations have 

been vocal advocates and active instigators for safety improvements. In the mid1990s, APTA developed the Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards (PRESS) 

program to develop safety standards for commuter rail cars. More recently, our commitment to safety was heralded by the rail industry regulator, Federal Railroad Administrator (FRA) Joe Szabo, who announced safety statistics citing that 2012 was 

the safest year in railroad industry history. With that said, we are always working 

to make our industry safer. 

APTA consistently supported the concept of positive train control (PTC) long before the Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008, provided that proven technology, resources and radio spectrum necessary were available to put PTC into practice. We are working with our member railroads to meet the law’s requirements that 

all of the Nation’s commuter railroads have federally approved systems that help 

protect against accidents. We urge the Committee to focus on how to best install 

these still developing systems on an enormous and complicated network of interconnected railroads in a way that maximizes all of an operator’s safety considerations while efficiently moving toward implementation. Commuter systems provide 

83 

important transportation in and around many of our metropolitan regions, and demand for service and ridership continues to grow. 

Commuter rail safety has improved in recent years, but we continue to strive for 

improved safety. Commuter rail ridership has grown by 42 percent since 1990, going 

from just under 328 million trips then to more than 466 million trips in 2012, and 

safety on the Nation’s commuter systems has improved. Over the past 10 years, fatalities have declined from just above 0.9 per 100 million passenger miles to 0.5 per 

100 million miles in 2011. While commuter rail operators will always seek to improve and enhance safety, it is clear that travel by commuter railroad is among the 

safest modes of travel in the U.S. 

About APTA 

The American Public Transportation Association is a non-profit international association of more than 1,500 public and private member organizations, including 

transit systems and high-speed, intercity, and commuter rail operators; planning, 

design, construction, and finance firms; product and service providers; academic institutions, transit associations and state departments of transportation. APTA members serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient and economical transit 

services and products. More than 90 percent of the people using public transportation in the United States and Canada are served by APTA member systems. 

Culture of Safety 

While we address in this testimony a very significant element of the RSIA in the 

requirement to implement PTC, it is important that we make clear that PTC is but 

one element of an overall integrated approach to system safety. An effective safety 

culture is more important than any one specific procedure or technology. It begins 

with the commitment of the organization and senior leadership, working in collaboration with employees and labor in adopting common safety goals and expectations. 

It involves recognition that responsibility for safety lies at all levels and with all 

staff. One way our commuter rail agencies demonstrate their commitment is by having a comprehensive safety plan in place. It includes having sound policies and procedures, training, maintenance practices that include asset management and state 

of good repair considerations, data tracking for monitoring trends in operational, 

equipment, and infrastructure performance, and systems in place for auditing and 

assessing that performance. The transit and commuter rail industries have been 

leading on safety improvements over a 20 plus year evolution during which a great 

deal of attention and effort has been directed toward development of standardized 

systems and approaches to the delivery of safe service and work environments. 

As an example, all commuter rail agencies have developed Safety Management 

Program Plans, the framework of which was based upon APTA’s Safety Audit Program. The APTA Safety Audit program is a voluntary, comprehensive program developed over a decade ago when a number of North American rail transit systems 

requested APTA to develop and implement a standardized format for rail system 

safety and to provide an auditing service that would enable a transit system to determine the degree to which the standardized elements for rail transit system safety 

were being addressed. By way of the adaptation of existing industry best practices 

and system safety standards from the aerospace industry, the APTA Rail Safety 

Audit Program was inaugurated in 1989. This program was subsequently adopted 

in 1996 by the U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Transit Administration 

as the base guideline for its Federal state safety oversight requirements. 

Currently there are dozens of rail transit systems and bus transit systems participating in APTA safety audit programs. These systems include mass transit/subway 

systems, light rail systems, automated guide-ways, heavy rail commuter systems, 

and bus transit operations across North America and Asia. Modal programs have 

been developed that are specific to urban rail, commuter rail, and bus safety management processes. The benefits derived from participation in the APTA Safety 

Management Program include: 

• Adoption of safety management practices that have been established as an industry standard; 

• Building and enhancing safety management processes for service delivery and 

workplace safety; 

• Providing a tool for demonstrating transit system diligence for safety; and 

• Providing a mechanism for continual improvement of system safety 

Effective Safety Program Implementation includes policies and procedures on: Facilities Maintenance and Inspection; Vehicle Maintenance, Inspection and Repair; 

Rules and Procedures Review; Training and Certification; Emergency Planning and 

Response; Workplace Safety Program; Passenger and Public Safety; Rail Corridor 

84 

Operational Study; and Environmental Management Programs. These are just a 

portion of the lengthy list of considerations involved in ensuring a safe system. 

Additionally, industry developed standards (such as PRESS and others) are contributing greatly to ongoing safety improvement. APTA has written over 270 standards and recommended practices, 71 of which address particular safety needs for 

mainline rail equipment, and over 111 for rail transit alone. Standards help improve 

the safety of public transportation systems by addressing vehicle crashworthiness, 

passenger door systems, emergency lighting and evacuation, and new standards to 

improve the safety of vehicle interiors including seat attachment strength and safer 

workstation tables. APTA has initiated new efforts within its standards body to improve current standards on vehicle design affecting derailments and has initiation 

new studies to better understand the potential for derailments at slow operating 

speed. Standards also define safe operating practices, inspection and maintenance 

of equipment, train control maintenance requirements, electrical propulsion system 

design, catenary electrical distribution wire maintenance, and wheel and axle assembly procedures among many other areas of a general nature including cyber and 

physical security, railcar procurement, tunnel ventilation, and sustainability. 

Finally, APTA partners with the FRA, AAR and labor in developing rules to help 

design, build and operate safe transportation systems. In this regard, APTA is very 

active as an industry representative within the Rail Safety Advisory Committee 

(RSAC). Recently FRA and industry have collaborated on the development of language for new safety rules particular to high speed rail equipment. The public 

transportation industry and especially our commuter rail agencies will continue to 

maintain a strong emphasis on safety. 

RSIA and PTC 

As the members of this committee know, the Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) 

of 2008 mandated that PTC technology be implemented on passenger railroad and 

certain freight railroads by December 31, 2015, and it authorized funding of $250 

million over five years to assist with implementation. As defined in the statute, a 

positive control system is a ‘‘system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, 

over speed derailments, incursions into established work zone limits, and the movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position.’’ When the RSIA was 

drafted in 2008, there was no off the shelf technology capable of achieving these 

safety objectives for all railroads—as is still the case today. Yet many commuter 

railroads have long made use of collision avoidance systems that would have protected against accidents that have occurred in recent years. Since the enactment of 

RSIA, APTA and its commuter rail members across the country have aggressively 

pursued the funding and technology necessary to implement this safety mandate by 

the current statutory deadline. However, challenges beyond our control have presented obstacles to implementation. 

The initial conservative estimate for PTC implementation on commuter railroads 

was more than $2 billion, with more than 4,000 locomotives and passenger cars with 

control cabs and 8,500 track miles to be equipped. Since this initial estimate, as 

commuter railroads have begun their contracting and technology acquisitions, the 

estimated costs of implementation have risen well beyond the initial $2 billion estimate. These estimates do not include costs related to the acquisition and operation 

of the radio spectrum necessary to meet the interoperability requirements set forth 

under RSIA and they do not include costs associated with operating PTC systems. 

To date, Congress has only appropriated $50 million of the total authorized 

amount. At a time when critical State of Good Repair backlogs are creeping above 

nearly $80 billion dollars on our nations public transportation systems, commuter 

railroads are being forced to choose between performing critical system safety maintenance projects and implementing PTC by 2015. Insufficient funding is a significant impediment to implementation for publicly funded railroads. 

While Congress authorized $250 million for PTC implementation in the five Fiscal 

Years 2009 to 2013, only $50 million was appropriated during those years. It has 

also been suggested that Federal funding for high-speed rail projects can be used 

for PTC implementation costs, but this is only the case where existing commuter 

rail service and potential high-speed intercity passenger rail alignments are identical, and unfortunately that is not the case for most of the Nation’s commuter rail 

operators. Similarly, debt financing and Railroad Rehabilitation & Improvement Financing (RRIF) loans have been suggested as a way to pay for PTC implementation, 

but many of the agencies charged with installing PTC on their commuter rail systems are carrying enormous debt service and many have substantial state of good 

repair capital projects—which are also necessary to ensure safe operations—that are 

competing for scarce resources. 

85 

Key components of PTC systems are still in the developmental phase, such as 

software upgrades and revisions, and roadway worker protection. Absent these essential elements, full implementation by 2015 will be impeded, even for those railroads that have secured the necessary funding. Moreover, the inability of most commuter railroads to acquire necessary radio spectrum is also impeding full implementation by 2015. The FCC has not responded to APTA’s requests to make available 

spectrum available as a public safety imperative and insisted that the necessary 

bandwidth can be purchased on the open market. One railroad purchased spectrum 

only to have it now held up while the courts decide who owns the rights to sell the 

spectrum. 

In 2011, after several years of working towards implementation and complying in 

good faith with FRA reporting requirements on PTC implementation plans, the 

APTA Commuter Rail CEOs committee concluded that the industry would not be 

able to fully implement interoperable PTC systems on all commuter railroads by the 

current deadline. Thus, APTA approved a policy position recommending that the 

deadline for PTC implementation be extended to December 31, 2018. It is important 

to add that APTA’s position also states that extending the deadline shall not inhibit 

efforts to implement PTC on some commuter railroads prior to the existing deadline 

and in fact urges Congress to prioritize funding for those efforts. The hope was that 

lessons learned from early implementers such as Metrolink, would serve to facilitate 

and expedite implementation for other commuter railroads. Other APTA positions 

adopted in 2011 included recommendations that Congress appropriate Federal funding to cover 80 percent of PTC implementation costs for commuter railroads and direct the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to provide radio spectrum, 

without cost, required for PTC implementation by publicly funded commuter railroads. 

I should note that representatives from commuter rail systems across the Nation 

and APTA staff have conducted numerous meetings with Members of Congress and 

staff from congressional committees of jurisdiction to explain APTA’s views and the 

challenges faced trying to implement PTC. While we have always expressed a commitment to implement PTC technologies, industry experience indicated that it would 

be difficult, if not impossible, to implement PTC on all of the Nation’s commuter 

railroads by the 2015 deadline. We believe we acted responsibly by coming to Congress well before the deadline, rather than waiting for the deadline to become imminent. 

Further, in January 2012, APTA shared a report with Congress which documented the technical challenges of implementing PTC. This report, which was written jointly with the Association of American Railroads (AAR), also outlined the technical challenges that freight railroads are experiencing in their effort to implement 

PTC and reached the shared conclusion that implementing a fully interoperable 

PTC network was not achievable by December 31, 2015. 

Federal Railroad Administration Report to Congress 

Under the Rail Safety Improvement Act, the FRA was statutorily required to 

transmit a PTC implementation status report to Congress in 2012. The goal of the 

report was to update Congress on the status of implementation, to identify major 

issues and to offer potential risk mitigation solutions. The FRA report which was 

issued in August 2012, stated, as part of the report’s executive summary recommendations: ‘‘Based on the results of this report, FRA believes that a majority 

of railroads will not be able to complete PTC implementation by the 2015 deadline.’’ 

It went on to say: ‘‘FRA recommends that it be allowed to approve a railroad to use 

alternative safety technologies on specified line segments in lieu of PTC, particularly 

in areas with lower safety risks, if appropriately and properly justified to FRA.’’ 

Further, in its report to Congress, the Federal Railroad Administration recommended that: 

‘‘Congress consider legislation that allows FRA to approve the use of alternative 

risk mitigation technologies in lieu of a PTC system on specified line segments 

if: 

• The use of the alternative technologies will not result in a decrease in the 

level of safety from that which currently exists. 

• The alternative technologies proposed provide an appropriate level of risk 

mitigation with regards to preventing train-to-train collisions, overspeed 

derailments, protection of roadway workers within their authorized work 

zones, and movement of a train through misaligned switches. 

• The alternative risk mitigation technology implementation plan, submitted as 

part of a petition to substitute alternative risk mitigation technologies for a 

86 

PTC system, implements the alternative risk mitigation technologies in order 

from areas of least risk to areas of greater risk. 

• The alternative technologies are installed as soon as feasible. 

APTA strongly supports the language contained in the FRA Report to Congress 

and recently adopted a policy in support of the FRA’s recommendation to Congress. 

As adopted, the policy requests the FRA be allowed to consider alternative technologies in lieu of a PTC system on specified line segments. We believe that the 

statutory mandate for PTC implementation will only be strengthened by taking a 

system safety approach, rather than a ‘‘one size fits all’’ approach. 

Additional APTA Recommendations 

Alternative Risk Mitigation Technology 

All APTA member railroads fully support initiatives that enhance safety. Not all 

railroads have the same operating environments, safety challenges or risk exposures. Some commuter railroads already have collision avoidance systems in place 

(some for many years) that protect against the occurrence of a train to train collisions such as Chatsworth. APTA in no way supports any blanket exceptions in this 

regard, but supports the FRA’s recommendation that it be permitted to examine the 

feasibility of the use of alternative technologies on a line by line basis, and permit 

such uses only after rigorous analysis and evaluation of overall risk reductions. 

While the vast majority of railroads would still require PTC, there would be some 

that could then prioritize their safety enhancement projects to address their most 

urgent safety risks first; freeing up the pipeline for procurement of PTC components 

and other resources in order to expedite implementation for other railroads. 

In terms of any concerns regarding interoperability, there is nothing in the APTA 

policy or in the FRA’s report to Congress that would change the statutory and regulatory requirements for interoperability. Any railroad’s controlling locomotive that 

operates on another railroad must be able to communicate with and respond to the 

PTC system that will be installed. Similarly, if FRA is able to approve any alternative technologies, then any controlling locomotive operating on a line or segment 

where the alternative technology is installed must be able to communicate with that 

technology. If rolling stock will operate on lines with different technologies or even 

different PTC systems, more than one type of onboard equipment may need to be 

installed. For example, some commuter railroads that operate on the Northeast Corridor and a freight railroad must be able to interoperate with both the Advanced 

Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) PTC system used by Amtrak as well as 

the Interoperable Electronics Train Management System (I–ETMS) PTC system 

being used by freight railroads, and anticipate having to install onboard equipment 

for both types of PTC systems to achieve interoperability. 

In this regard, and while the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is still 

conducting its investigation and has issued no findings, the unfortunate accident on 

the Metro-North Railroad in Connecticut makes clear that there is no one size fits 

all approach to rail safety for all situations. While we cannot comment on the details of the accident before the NTSB completes its investigation, their press release 

dated May 24, 2013 stated: ‘‘Positive train control is a technology that prevents two 

trains, traveling on a single track, from colliding with one another. The Metro-North 

trains involved in this accident were traveling on two separate but parallel tracks. 

The collision occurred after the eastbound train derailed. Because the trains were 

not traveling on a single track, it is not believed that PTC would have prevented 

the accident.’’ We should also note that the Metro-North passenger rail cars damaged in the accident were designed according to specific strength requirements for 

the ends of cars that are intended to protect occupants in such a collision. They performed as designed, according to standards developed in part under the Passenger 

Rail Equipment Safety Standards (PRESS) program that APTA developed and administered in cooperation with FRA in the 1990s, as mentioned earlier in our testimony. 

Open Standards/Federal Inspections 

In addition to language concerning alternative technologies, APTA also recently 

approved policy positions requesting the FRA to promulgate open interface and communication standards permitting interoperability of products within PTC system 

hardware architecture to foster competition among providers. APTA also approved 

language put forth by Metrolink, requesting that Congress allocate additional funding to the FRA and other regulatory bodies to ensure adequate resources are available to inspect, review and authorize PTC implementation. 

87 

Conclusion 

In closing, we want to reiterate the long standing and continued commitment the 

public transportation and commuter rail industry has for advancing the safety of 

our riders, employees and communities. We would also underscore that none of the 

PTC policies adopted by APTA are intended to prevent early implementation by 

those commuter railroads which seek to implement by or before the existing deadline. In fact, APTA has a long-standing policy and record of urging Congress to 

prioritize funding for early implementation efforts. As with any major initiative for 

nationwide implementation of a complex new technology, PTC implementation has 

posed, and is certain to continue to create, challenges that could not have been foreseen by legislators, regulators or implementers at the time of enactment. 

On behalf of APTA and its members, we appreciate the work that this committee 

has done to enhance safety on our Nation’s railroads. We look forward to continuing 

to work with you and your staff on this and many other common issues that face 

public transportation agencies. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Ms. Waters. 

Mr. Stem? 

STATEMENT OF JAMES A. STEM, JR., NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE 

DIRECTOR, TRANSPORTATION DIVISION, SHEET METAL, AIR, 

RAIL AND TRANSPORTATION (SMART) UNION 

Mr. STEM. Good morning and thank you. Thank you, Senators 

Blumenthal and Blunt and Johnson. I am going to focus my verbal 

comments this morning on PTC and fatigue. 

From the employee’s viewpoint, any discussion concerning rail 

safety should always start with employee fatigue as a first topic. 

Our railroad corporations, as you heard this morning, are reinvesting more than $20 billion annually in upgrading, maintaining, 

and expanding their infrastructure, but are unwilling to invest 

anything in resolving the most pressing human factor and fatal 

safety issue. That is unpredictable work schedule, coupled with employee availability policies applied to the operating crews. 

The Federal Railroad Administration, rail management, and rail 

labor, all agree that passenger hours of service regulations should 

be separated from freight hours of service regulations, because of 

the significant safety advantages of the predictable work schedules 

in passenger service. 

The new passenger hours of service regulation also requires, for 

the first time, the use of scientific models to help create safe and 

efficient work schedules for operating crews. The resulting predictable work schedules in passenger service resolve most fatigue 

issues for these crews. 

Contained in my packet of testimony were the recommendations 

from NTSB for two groups of issues, fatigue and positive train control. 

A review of these recommendations leads to the obvious conclusion that fatigue of operating railroad employees was the basis for 

most of the recommendations, both for positive train control and for 

fatigue mitigation programs. 

Before 1970, operating railroad employees could work and were 

often required to work 16-hour shifts, 7 days a week. The Rail 

Safety Improvement Act of 1970 changed that and reduced that so 

that our crews could only be required to work 12 hours a day, 7 

days a week. 

During the conversations and conferences that occurred after the 

RSIA of 2008 passed the House, the railroads’ only suggestion for 

88 

improving the predictability of work schedules and mitigating fatigue was to limit the total hours that a safety critical employee 

could be required to work to 276 hours each month. That is 23 12- 

hour shifts. That 276-hour limit made its way into the RSIA and 

was signed into law. 

The RSIA did contain provisions for two pilot projects sponsored 

by FRA for improving work schedules and employee notification. 

We have urged all the class I railroads to participate in a pilot 

project, but have not had a single railroad agree to do that. 

Our suggested solution to the employee fatigue provides three options. Number one, give the employee that works in safety critical 

service a regular start time, so he or she knows days in advance 

when they must come to work. A large majority of our members 

have a regular start time and do not consider fatigue to be a safety 

issue. Employees with regular start times are not the employees 

who are dying in fatigue-related collisions that Ms. Hersman discussed earlier today. 

If number one is not available, the second option that we are proposing is to notify the employee before going off duty what time 

they will be required to return to work for their next tour of duty. 

This option actually improves the availability of the employee by 

allowing the employee to return to service after only 10 hours off 

duty. 

If neither one or two options are available, then we are suggesting move the required 10 hour of undisturbed rest that now immediately follows service to 10 hours of rest immediately preceding 

service. This is a 10-hour call which provides a significant improvement in the predictability of the work schedule. The result is the 

employee has at least 10 hours to rest and prepare for service. 

The high level of professionalism and dedication of the operating 

crews running our railroads today are the only reasons that accidents like the one at Chaffee, Missouri, and the other ones highlighted here today aren’t more frequent. 

Positive train control. There are a few segments of our industry, 

as you have heard, that are asking Congress to grant a blanket extension of 3 to 5 years. The current required date for implementation is more than 30 months away today and was 7 years and 3 

months from the time RSIA was passed. 

If Congress chooses to grant a blanket extension for PTC, the 

railroads that are behind on their implementation schedule today 

will further slow or just stop the process until that new extension 

also expires. 

Some railroads, including Amtrak, BNSF, and Metrolink, and 

Alaska Railroad, have announced that they will be able to meet the 

statutory deadline. Others will be partially complete. 

The key point here that I have not heard in any other testimony 

is that, if PTC were applied today to the industry, it only requires 

implementation on 39 percent of the total mainline track. 

So when Mr. Hamberger and others refer to 20,000 locomotives 

and thousands of miles of track, keep in mind that the current regulation only requires 39 percent of the track be implemented. 

PTC also would end a very unsafe practice of using after-arrival 

blocks. That is a separate topic that was discussed in my testimony. 

89 

And I also want to point out and acknowledge that BNSF CEO 

Matt Rose was in the room earlier this morning. He had to leave. 

I think he was embarrassed that Mr. Hamberger would not give 

him his seat. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. STEM. But I would encourage this committee and each individual Senator to discuss with Matt Rose the thought processes 

and how they arranged to have the deadline complied with by 

BNSF. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stem follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES A. STEM, JR., NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, SMART—TRANSPORTATION DIVISION

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, Subcommittee Chairman 

Blumenthal, Senator Blunt, Members of the Commerce Committee, my name is 

James Stem and I am the National Legislative Director of the Transportation Division of the Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, Transportation Union (SMART) The SMART 

Transportation Division, formally the United Transportation Union, is an organization representing approximately 80,000 transportation employees with active rail 

members working in all operating crafts (engineers, conductors, yardmasters, trainmen, switchmen). Our members have a vested interest in the policies that impact 

our freight and passenger national rail network. Our organization has worked jointly with the rail industry and government entities for almost 150 years on transportation policies. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and present our views on improving rail safety. The rail industry is the source of tens of thousands of good middleclass union jobs. Railroad jobs are more than just jobs. . .they are careers with 

many of our members working 30, 40 and even 50 years for a single employer. 

These jobs are highly skilled with many of them requiring Federal certification. 

Overall we are optimistic about the future prospects of the railroad industry. The freight side of the industry is investing more than $20 billion annually in its infrastructure and is well positioned to handle any additional freight that comes its way. 

One bright example of growth is oil shipments from the Bakken oil fields, where 

railroads are now shipping between 60 and 70 percent of that crude oil to destinations across the country. The oil boom in North Dakota would not be nearly as robust if it were not for the ability of the two railroads there to ship the crude out 

of the state. Coal shipments on the other hand are down and could be reduced dramatically in the coming months and years because of low natural gas prices and 

very challenging environmental regulations. Passenger rail is also doing well. With 

America’s continued population growth, passenger rail is in a good position to respond to our Nation’s mobility needs. We are excited about the numerous passenger 

rail service expansions that are occurring across the country and Amtrak’s continued success. 

America’s passenger and freight railroads are involved in a rail renaissance that 

should bring decades of growth to both. 

We are proud to be a part of the industry today, positioned to handle the additional freight which must come to rail from our highways, and also, prepared to provide flexible services like ‘‘mobile pipelines for oil’’, and efficient handling of multimodal containerized shipments. With a significant growth in our population, passenger rail is the most economic and environmentally friendly alternative to the mobility challenges facing our country. Our career rail employees have earned the equity to participate in the policy decisions that will impact our industry. 

We are pro-active in our support for the industry and take an active role in policy 

discussions supporting the expansion of freight and passenger rail across the country. We also work with all segments of our rail and transit industries in legislative 

activities designed to highlight the advantages of rail. The long term growth and 

stability of the industry also relies upon safe and reliable operations. 

While we are optimistic about rail’s future and we take a pro-active role in supporting the industry, the long term growth and stability of the industry relies upon 

operating our railroads safely. UTU (SMART) and most of rail labor have a long history of cooperation and joint efforts in partnership with all segments of the rail industry on a variety of pertinent issues. We think one of the success stories of partnership that should be recognized is the Rail Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) 

90 

that is sponsored by the Federal Railroad Administration. The RSAC was originally 

chartered during the Clinton administration, and was the first time that railroad 

management, rail labor, rail suppliers, and the FRA were all gathered together in 

an informal setting to participate in problem solving, an exchange of thoughts, and 

an opportunity for suggestions on improved safety, with the conclusion being a collaborative rule making process. RSAC continued to function productively through 

the Bush administration, and continues today. Our rail industry today is safer because of RSAC. 

Employee Fatigue 

Any discussion concerning rail safety should rightfully always start with Employee Fatigue as the first topic. Our railroad corporations are re-investing more 

than $20 billion annually in upgrading, maintaining, and expanding their infrastructure, but are unwilling to invest anything in resolving the most pressing and 

fatal of safety issues—Unpredictable work schedules coupled with employee availability policies. 

The Federal Railroad Administration, rail management, and rail labor all agreed 

that Passenger Hours of Service regulations should be separated from freight hours 

of service regulations because of the significant safety advantages of the predictable 

work schedules in long distance and commuter rail passenger service. The new passenger hours of service regulation also requires the use of scientific models to help 

create safe and efficient work schedules for operating crews. The predictable work 

schedules in passenger service prevent most issues with fatigue for these crews. 

However, work needs to be done on the freight side. There is no single issue that 

will provide more positive movement in safety improvement than resolving the employee fatigue issues associated with freight rail operations and many freight rail 

accidents in recent years. The first NTSB recommendations for implementation of 

Positive Train Control (PTC) in the early 1990s were a result of numerous rail accidents caused by employee fatigue and totally unpredictable work schedules of operating rail employees. 

The safe movement of a freight train or a passenger train today is a complex operation requiring train handling skills, years of training and territorial qualifications 

over the specific track segment, and the ability to manage multiple priorities of 

speed restrictions, normal radio communications, and roadway worker authorities, 

highway crossings at grade, signals, and track authorities. One momentary lapse of 

situational awareness by a member of the operating crew can have disastrous results. 

A working definition: ‘‘Fatigue means a complex state that is characterized by a 

lack of alertness and reduced mental and physical performance, often accompanied 

by drowsiness.’’ 

The unpredictable work schedules that apply to a large majority of crews operating trains between terminals require the crews to report for duty with two hours 

of notification, or less, regardless of the commitments that the railroad had made 

to the effected employees with previous lineups and forecasts. Aggravating this dangerous practice even further are the new terminologies of ‘‘Dropped Turns’’ and 

‘‘Paper Deadheads’’. These terms are interchangeable and used by all the railroads 

to identify when the crew management system made a unilateral change in the employees’ position for call. These new practices are used to justify holding the employee accountable for being in place for call well in advance of when his designated 

position should be called. 

The practical application of this process is to require a safety critical employee 

to come to work when called out of turn, or face disciplinary sanctions which often 

times include suspension and termination. 

Also directly connected to the unpredictable work schedules and the new practices 

of ‘‘Dropped Turns’’ and ‘‘Paper Deadheads’’ are the railroads unilateral ‘‘Attendance 

Policies’’ that can only be intended to require a safety critical employee to come to 

work when they are fatigued or sick. 

If the current FRA regulation proposal for PTC were implemented, it would only 

require PTC be installed on less than 39 percent of the main line track in this country, with more than 60 percent of main line track continuing with the same system 

of operation, and, unfortunately, the same failed process of employee utilization. The 

railroads response to requests for pilot projects and improvements in predictable 

work schedules for the unassigned employees that work on call has been more of 

the same failed policies. As the amount of freight continues to grow in coming years, 

the non PTC main line track will have to absorb a large percentage of the growth 

with this major safety issue of fatigue unresolved. 

Today, an employee working in unassigned service receives a ‘‘train lineup’’ when 

going off duty that is intended to provide an estimate about when their next reportVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
91 

ing time will be. These lineups are accurate sometimes, but more often the lineups 

are inaccurate by many hours. 

A human being can prepare for irregular work schedules if they know when they 

must start the tour of duty, but even our youngest and strongest employees cannot 

function safely if told they will go to work at 7 AM in the morning and then are 

called to work at 10 PM the night before. Predictable reporting times and notifying 

the employees when they are going to work are the only solution to this major safety issue. 

We look forward to working with this Committee during the reauthorization of the 

Rail Safety Improvement Act to address these needed improvements in employee fatigue. For the past 18 years, the employees have been asking Congress and the railroads for a solution to fatigue but have met with little success. 

When our operating employees are asked about safety improvements, the number 

one response is always ‘‘Just tell me when I must come to work. I will manage my 

personal life to be rested and alert if I only know when I must report.’’ 

Our suggested solution to employee fatigue provides three options: 

(1) Give the employee a regular start time so he/she knows days in advance when 

they must come to work. A large majority of our employees have a regular 

start time and do not consider fatigue to be a safety issue. Employees with 

regular start times are not the employees who are dying in fatigue related collisions. Or 

(2) Notify the employee before going off duty what time the employee will be required to return to work for the next tour of duty. This option actually improves the availability of the employee by allowing the employee to return to 

service after only ten hours off duty. And if neither (1) or (2) are not a viable 

option, then 

(3) Move the required ten hours of undisturbed rest immediately following service 

that is now required to ten hours of undisturbed rest immediately preceding 

service by giving the employee at least ten hours of notification prior to reporting for service. This is a ten hour call which provides a significant improvement in the predictability of the work schedule. The result is the employee has at least ten hours to prepare for service. 

The high level of professionalism and dedication of the operating crews running 

our railroads today are the only reasons that accidents and collisions are not more 

frequent. Attached with this testimony are references concerning accidents that 

have recently occurred where fatigue was a contributing factor, like the ones that 

occurred near Chaffee, Missouri on May 25, 2013, near Goodwell, Oklahoma in late 

June, 2012, and also near Two Harbors, Minnesota on September 30, 2010. 

Also attached with this testimony are the numerous recommendations (177) that 

the NTSB has made to railroads over the past few decades to deal with employee 

fatigue. Most of these recommendations are still pending. 

Positive Train Control 

There are a few segments of our industry that are hoping Congress will grant a 

blanket extension of three—five years for PTC implementation. The current required date for implementation is more than 30 months away now on December 31, 

2015. 

If Congress chooses to grant a blanket extension for PTC, the railroads that are 

behind on their implementation schedule will further slow their progress, or just 

stop the process until that new extension expires. 

Some railroads, including Amtrak, BNSF, and Metrolink in California, have announced that they will be able to meet the statutory deadline and are continuing 

the implementation and testing of the PTC components. 

Any extension for PTC implementation should be on an individual basis, short in 

duration, and only after identifying the exact reasons that the current implementation date is not obtainable. 

The PTC systems that are being implemented today contain all the information 

on the display screen that is necessary to operate a train safely. This will be the 

first time that the operating crews on the locomotive will have all that information 

contained in one place and displayed in real time. The quality of that information 

on the screen will significantly reduce the complexity of safely operating the train. 

The information contained on the screen is the crux of the safety advantage, not 

the enforcement of the system. 

PTC has been debated for more than 20 years as a significant safety overlay for 

rail operations. It is time for PTC to be implemented to preserve the lives of rail 

operating crews and the safety of the communities served by our rail industry. 

92 

Attached with this testimony are two relevant documents for this discussion on 

implementation of PTC. First are the numerous recommendations (27) that NTSB 

has made the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to mandate PTC, and to our 

railroads concerning the need for PTC Second, is the presentation made at the February 27, 2013 NTSB Public Forum on Positive Train Control Systems by retired 

FRA Associate Administrator of Safety Grady Cothen. Mr. Cothen is recognized as 

one of the leading authorities on PTC, and it is with his permission that I attach 

this document for guidance and reference; this document is a summary of the history of PTC. 

Amtrak 

I need not remind this Committee about the importance of Amtrak. It’s America’s 

passenger railroad, rising up from the ashes of a cadre of bankrupt private service 

providers and charged with providing vital rail passenger service across America. 

Amtrak is a partner with our private freight railroads, and has negotiated operating agreements with them for more than 40 years. Amtrak’s employees, many of 

whom are federally certified, know and understand the complex operating rules that 

govern freight railroads, making Amtrak the right fit to operate this vital nationwide service. 

Since its inception, Amtrak has done a remarkable job with often inadequate resources. While setting ridership records in recent years their safety record remains 

solid. Amtrak’s growing passenger volumes has made them far more self-sufficient 

than in the past recovering 79 percent of their operating costs from ticket revenue. 

The high price of fuel, growing highway and airport congestion, and the significant 

increase in the number of passenger rail options, all contribute to the constant increases in ridership on Amtrak. 

Even with their remarkable progress Amtrak has had no shortage of congressional critics who expect Amtrak to be the world’s only profitable passenger railroad. 

We ask that your Committee take a fresh look at this American success story and 

work with the leaders of Amtrak and others to help ‘‘America’s Railroad’’ build on 

their 40 plus years of success. Amtrak was created because the demand for rail passenger services remained strong, and the private railroads could not make a profit 

operating their own passenger trains. 

Hazardous Material Shipments 

The safest and most efficient form of movement of commodities that qualify as 

hazardous materials is by rail. These haz mat shipments require special handling 

by our rail operating crews, which include documentation and secure hand off procedures at interchange or crew change points. These products are given the extra attention that they require when moved by rail. 

As our American manufacturing industries grow, these industries will require 

new chemical products that are available today. An increase in the quantity and 

number of products that qualify as hazardous materials is the expectation, and this 

will result in significant increases in rail hazmat shipments. 

Switching haz mat cars also requires additional precautions. As some major shippers seek Congressional support for switching haz mat cars much more frequently 

in and out of trains to somehow achieve lower freight rates, we want to make sure 

that you understand the significant safety concerns that are involved in those 

choices. Switching and interchanging containers of very dangerous substances packaged in containers weighing 100 tons or more, is not an academic or a sanitary exercise. 

We would like the opportunity to offer additional input to this Committee, should 

the consideration of mandating additional switching of haz mat cars to require 

changes in freight rates come before this Committee. The employees do have ‘‘skin 

in the game’’ when significant increases in switching of haz mat cars is under consideration. From our vantage point, this debate is not just about one group of large 

corporations attempting to involve Congress in their negotiations with another 

group of large corporations; rather, this debate centers on the safety of the operation 

and the current processes involving the proper handling of placarded hazardous materials. We hope this conversation never occurs in this Committee. 

New Technology 

Our railroads have historically been very slow in accepting and applying new 

technologies in the industry. Change is the hardest thing to accept in most work 

places, and it is also the only thing constant in continuing operations. 

The use of new technologies for detection of flaws in wheels and hot journals is 

not universally applied, or required by FRA regulation. Most railroads choose to use 

some type of defect detectors, but the latest technologies are applied in very few locations. 

93 

New technology for detection of internal flaws in rail also is not required by regulation and used infrequently. The frequency of track inspections by Sperry Rail 

Services and similar rail flaw and track geometry detectors is an appropriate subject 

for additional questions. When a detector of any type discovers a flaw in a segment 

of rail, the FRA regulations require that defect to be either repaired or protected 

immediately. This process often means a multitude of ten mile per hour slow orders 

on a subdivision immediately following the Sperry rail inspections or similar operations. Some railroads indicate that not knowing about the defects and not having 

many slow orders in place are preferable to the new inspection technologies; the defects are then repaired when discovered through traditional means, including signal 

indications, visual inspections, or derailments. 

Also, deferred maintenance normally brings concerns about rail flaws and cross 

tie replacements into many accident investigations. Rail replacement and routine 

track maintenance schedules are based on the amount of train traffic, weather conditions, and the stability of the road bed. 

Our rail industry is also dealing with the distractions that some new technology 

brings to our workplace. The use of cell phones and Smart phones that allow texting 

and Internet connections have proven to be safety concerns for safety critical employees. We are working with the industry and FRA to get the best from technology 

and eliminate the distractions from inappropriate use. 

Training 

With tens of thousands of new employees coming into the freight and passenger 

rail industry in the near future, adequate and appropriate training is a major safety 

concern. 

One requirement of the RSIA of 2008 was to require FRA to implement training 

standards for safety-related employees. The RSAC process collaboratively developed 

proposals for FRA to consider and on February 7, 2012 FRA issued an NPRM. 

Under the proposed rule, railroads will be required to develop comprehensive training programs for safety-related employees and then submit those programs to FRA 

for review and approval. Since the rule has not been finalized and thus there have 

been no training programs submitted the effectiveness of this effort is unknown. We 

are however happy to see that there is this focus on the need for the adequate training or our members. 

Our experience is that the training of our members varies widely from railroad 

to railroad. Some of the larger railroads are reported to have excellent initial training programs for conductors and engineers and then rely almost exclusively on computer based training for follow-up training or what I call ‘‘training on your own.’’ 

Railroads no longer use the traditional model of mentoring or apprenticeship where 

a new employee has the advantage of working with more mature employees with 

experience, skills, and good technique. 

Forty years ago there were five members of a train crew and you spent years 

working as a brakeman before becoming a conductor and likewise years as a fireman before becoming an engineer. Today the standard crew size is two. Now railroads hire people off the street and train them to be a conductor in several short 

months. Then oftentimes this conductor moves right into training to become an engineer and in a year’s time he is operating a locomotive at high speed across the 

country. We have reports of crews where both the conductor and engineer have very 

little experience and are charged with operating trains in challenging operating conditions. We are concerned about the long term impact of insufficient training processes that create employees that lack the confidence in their abilities to stop the 

movement when they suspect something is wrong. 

It’s expensive to train new people, so like some American companies, railroads 

when left to their own desires, will reduce training costs as much as possible for 

the short term gains involved. 

Truck Size and Truck Weight Increases 

Increasing truck weight limits would have serious implications for our environment. Many transportation professionals are working to find innovative ways to 

shift more freight shipments from our highways to our railroads as a congestion 

mitigation strategy, and also as a highway maintenance schedule strategy. Railroads move cargo nearly four times as far as trucks per gallon of fuel and emit onethird the pollutants per ton mile when compared to trucks. By allowing heavier 

trucks on the road and increasing taxpayer subsidies, Congress would be 

incentivizing more shipments of freight by trucks using public highways rather than 

by more fuel-efficient modes like rail. This is the reason why increases in truck 

weights have never resulted in fewer trucks on our highways. 

94 

Our railroads today do an excellent job of moving heavy loads around our country 

on privately owned and privately maintained rights of way. Our public infrastructure cannot absorb this additional burden. 

An increase in highway maintenance expense and highway bridge replacements 

triggered by ignoring the current DOT bridge formulas and the engineering specifications for highways and bridges that created the current limits on truck size and 

weight will also have a negative impact on railroad safety. As many commuter rail 

authorities are seeking help in the funding of new safety technologies, including 

PTC, any increase in highway and bridge maintenance costs will absorb potential 

sources of revenue for safety improvements of rail passenger operations. 

We urge this committee to take no action on any consideration of increases in 

truck size and truck weights until DOT completes the mandated study of costs. We 

think a required decrease in truck weight will be the conclusion drawn by the study. 

Conclusion 

As Congress struggles to deal with problems of inadequate and crumbling infrastructure, environmental concerns and energy issues, we ask that you keep in mind 

railroads as an important means to help address all these problems. 

If many of us sitting in this room today had been successful over the past twenty 

years in getting a National Transportation Policy and a National Energy Policy, 

there is no argument that both freight and passenger rail would be a focus for energy efficiency, relieving highway congestion, preserving existing highway and 

bridge maintenance schedules, and also providing flexible viable options as our population continues to grow. The lack of either a Transportation or Energy policy has 

contributed to the struggle for appropriate solutions for our constant transportation 

problems. 

As the price of fuel in this country continues to spiral upwards, we look forward 

to working with this Committee to find fresh ideas on how best to improve Amtrak 

and other rail passenger services to provide new travel options for our citizens 

around the country. Each time I pass through a major airport, I marvel at the number of flights listed on the board for destinations that are 350 miles or less from 

that airport. Higher speed rail and high speed rail would complement, not compete, 

with air travel services. If we shifted the passengers that are scheduled to fly 300 

miles to higher speed rail, in most cases the passenger would arrive in the same 

amount of time. Open airport slots could then be filled with longer distance flights, 

and postpone the construction of new airports or new runways. 

Faced with the problem of highway congestion, part of the answer should be to 

develop policies that shift freight and passenger traffic to railroads. A single freight 

train can take 280 trucks off the highway with a greatly improved use of fuel resources. The railroads have shared the fact that today our railroads can move one 

ton of freight almost 500 miles with one gallon of fuel oil. A high speed rail corridor 

can transport as many passengers as eight new lanes of interstate highway. 

Looking at ways to address environmental concerns, keep in mind freight and 

passenger trains produce a fraction of the pollutants that trucks and automobiles 

use in moving the comparable number of tons and passengers. 

In attempting to make America energy independent, consider trains are almost 

five times more fuel efficient than trucks. Another point should be under consideration—trains operate on privately owned and maintained rights of way and pay 100 

percent of the cost of their use of that right of way. It is not the rail industry that 

is asking Congress to rebuild all the off ramps of the Interstate Highway system 

and forgive the extra bridge maintenance needed to increase the size and weight 

of big trucks moving on our highways. 

When deciding about whether or not to pour new seas of concrete at airports and 

around cities, I urge this Committee to think about the less expensive and better 

alternative of building high and higher speed rail. A new commuter rail system is 

one of the solutions to local highway congestion. 

Thanks again for the opportunity to appear here today and we look forward to 

working with this Committee to find ways to meet our Nation’s transportation 

needs. 

I will be happy to answer any questions the Committee members may have. 

95 

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Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Stem. 

Commissioner Redeker? 

STATEMENT OF JAMES P. REDEKER, COMMISSIONER, 

CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Mr. REDEKER. Good morning, Senator Blumenthal, Senator 

Blunt, Senator Johnson. I am honored to be here this morning, representing the Connecticut Department of Transportation, as well as 

the Chair of the Northeast Corridor Commission. 

Connecticut’s rail freight and passenger freight system is significant. The New Haven line is the busiest rail line in the country for 

commuter trains. We also have Shoreline East, several branch 

lines, and Amtrak intercity service operates on the Northeast Corridor and through the inland route to Springfield. 

The State of Connecticut has a unique role in the Northeast Corridor, as we are the owner of 46 miles of the Northeast Corridor, 

second only to Amtrak in ownership. 

As owner, we have invested significant amounts of money to provide a safe infrastructure. In the last 10 years alone, we have invested over $3.2 billion in the New Haven line while Amtrak has 

invested only $64 million. Of the $3.2 billion, $2 billion comes from State of Connecticut 

bond dollars, while the remainder is Federal Transit Administration rail formula or discretionary funding. Despite the progress, there is a $4.5 billion backlog in critical 

state-of-good-repair that needs to be addressed in the near term. A 

critical priority is the replacement of cab signal automated train 

control. And while this system is extremely effective, it must be upgraded, and this occurs at the same time as the implementation of 

positive train control, which, as you heard, has both financial and 

implementation challenges. I should note that PTC is estimated to cost Connecticut $130 million in addition to cab signal upgrades, and that it will impact our 

ability to continue the pace of investment and state-of-good-repair. 

Now, Connecticut is not alone in addressing the backlog of stateof-good-repair investments. The Northeast corridor relies on over 

1,000 bridges and tunnels, many of which were constructed over a 

century ago, and in desperate need of repair. 

Key segments are at capacity or overcapacity. In 2010, the 

Northeast Corridor infrastructure master plan identified a need for 

an expenditure of $2.6 billion in annual expenditures over 20 years 

to achieve state-of-good-repair. 

The Northeast Corridor Commission is now updating that capital 

plan report. There is a critical needs and infrastructure report that 

identifies long-term needs and will be delivering a 5-year plan at 

the end of this year. 

Now turning to the maintenance and operation of the New 

Haven line, Connecticut has an operating agreement with MetroNorth to provide for the delivery of operations, as well as the maintenance of facilities, track, bridges, power signals, and rolling stock. 

Amtrak maintains its portion. 

Metro-North’s track inspection programs all comply with relevant 

Federal guidelines and standards. All track is inspected twice each 

week or more. All bridges are inspected annually. And our track inVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00155 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
152 

spectors are trained to identify deviations and defects. And critically, they have the responsibility and authority to take a track out 

of service or to repair it immediately, if necessary. 

Metro-North also inspects with specialized equipment, Sperry 

rail cars and track geometry cars, twice a year, which exceeds the 

Federal Railroad Administration. 

Our track inspectors meet all the qualifications of FRA. They are 

all foremen possessing high level of skills and experience, so they 

can detect deviations from track standards. 

And we are in compliance with all the Rail Safety Improvement 

Act of 2008 programs that have had deadlines established for them. 

With regard to employee safety, Metro-North has worked to completely transform the safety culture and has been actually commended through the APTA audit of safety and been given kudos for 

its clearly demonstrated leadership in the safety and security of 

customers and employees as a top priority. 

Now the derailment that occurred on May 17 has been talked 

about before. When we look at what happened there, I should note 

that service had to be suspended on the entire Northeast Corridor 

in Connecticut. The derailment destroyed track signals and catenary, and the remaining two tracks that could have been used 

were out of service due to long-term repairs that Connecticut is investing in to deal with the backlog of the state-of-good-repair. 

Now, amazingly, we put 2,000 feet of track back in just a couple 

days. And within 5 days, full service was restored. 

A critical point: Connecticut’s level of investment in that stateof-good-repair is programmed over the next decade to take care of 

that backlog. But it will take a decade where two tracks may still 

be out of service on the Northeast Corridor’s busiest commuter rail 

line—two out of four tracks for a decade. 

The incident with the track foreman that was struck and killed 

was an unfortunate incident. Metro-North has taken many procedures in place to try to address the safety protocols to prevent that 

in the future. 

A preliminary report on June 4 noted that Metro-North inspectors, they found a defect 2 days before the derailment. But, as 

noted, that was not a requirement to immediately take it out of 

service. It was just, rather, put into a priority for future maintenance, as are all inspections in terms of their protocols. 

With regard to the latest NTSB finding and recommendation, 

Metro-North has acted upon that immediately. And they are taking 

both technological and procedural aspects of their protocols to prevent any future incidents. 

I will commend Metro-North for taking action well in advance of 

any NTSB findings and working with the Transportation Technology Center doing extra inspections, increasing the right-of-way 

inspections, and exploring solutions to better employee safety. 

And I am convinced that together, Connecticut DOT, MetroNorth, and NTSB will work together to significantly and even more 

improve the quality and safety of our right-of-way and our service. 

And I appreciate this time, and appreciate any questions at the 

end of the testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Redeker follows:] 

153 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES P. REDEKER, COMMISSIONER, CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Good morning Senator Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members of the 

Subcommittee. I am Jim Redeker, Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of 

Transportation (CTDOT). I am also the current Chair of the Northeast Corridor 

Commission. I am honored to have the opportunity to discuss passenger and freight 

rail safety on the Northeast Corridor and in particular, on the rail lines within the 

State of Connecticut. 

Connecticut’s Rail Infrastructure and Investments 

Connecticut’s rail freight and passenger system is strategically located between 

New York City and Boston. There are numerous freight railroads, ranging from a 

large Class I railroad to shorter regional and local railroads. There are also three 

passenger rail operations; the New Haven Line (NHL) commuter service operates 

between New Haven, Connecticut and Grand Central Terminal in New York City 

with connecting branches to New Canaan, Danbury, and Waterbury; the Shore Line 

East (SLE) commuter service which operates between New Haven and New London; 

and Amtrak intercity passenger service provided along the Northeast Corridor 

(NEC) between Washington and Boston, and the inland route between New Haven 

and Springfield, Massachusetts. 

The State of Connecticut has a unique role on the NEC, since the state owns 46 

miles of the NEC infrastructure between New Haven and the New York border as 

well as three branch lines. In total, Connecticut owns 235 track miles on the NEC 

and the three branch lines. 

As the owner, Connecticut has invested significant state and Federal resources to 

upgrade the rail infrastructure, including track, catenary and bridges. Connecticut 

has funded the complete replacement of 405 New Haven Line electric passenger vehicles and the construction of related new maintenance facilities to support that 

fleet. As a result of the State’s investment, progress toward a State of Good Repair 

has been strong. It is important to note that the Connecticut portion of the NEC 

is not part of the Amtrak capital program. As a result, almost all of the funding 

for the infrastructure is solely a state responsibility. In the last 10 years, Connecticut has invested over $3.2 billion in the NHL, while Amtrak has invested $64 

million in track-related. Of the $3.2 billion, two-thirds, or over $2 billion has been 

funded by state bond funds, while the remainder is Federal Transit Administration 

rail formula or discretionary funding. Despite the progress, there is an estimated $4.5 billion backlog in critical State 

of Good repair needs that have to be addressed in the near-term. Included in this 

backlog are catenary replacement, four major moveable bridges between Greenwich 

and New Haven as well as numerous fixed bridges on the line. The State has invested substantial dollars over the years to maintain these bridges in order to meet 

the demand for passenger and freight service on one of the most heavily traveled 

rail lines in the country. A critical priority is replacement of the cab signal automatic train control system; while this system is extremely effective, it must be upgraded. This occurs at the same time as the implementation of Positive Train Control (PTC). PTC requirements present both financial and implementation challenges. 

CTDOT continues to work collaboratively with MNR to advance this effort by the 

2015 deadline. I should note that PTC is estimated to cost CTDOT $130 million in 

addition to the cab signal upgrades, and that will impact our ability to maintain 

the pace of SOGR normalized replacement of assets as well as desired capacity improvements. 

Northeast Corridor Infrastructure and Investments 

Connecticut is not alone in addressing the backlog of SOGR investments. The 

NEC relies on over 1,000 bridges and tunnels, many of which were constructed over 

a century ago and are in desperate need of replacement or repair. Key segments of 

the NEC are operating at or near capacity, such as the Hudson River Tunnels between NY and NJ, which carry over 70,000 riders daily and have no space for additional trains during rush hour. Major components of the NEC’s electrical and signaling systems date back to the 1910s, making service on the line highly susceptible 

to malfunctions and delay. Major investment in the Corridor is essential to reduce 

delays, achieve a state-of-good-repair, and build capacity for growth. In 2010, the 

NEC Infrastructure Master Plan (Master Plan) estimated that the Corridor required 

approximately $2.6 billion in annual expenditures over twenty years ($52 billion 

total) in order to achieve state-of-good-repair and build infrastructure capable of 

supporting passenger rail demand forecasts for 2030. Investment levels over the 

past several decades have been critical in supporting the NEC’s enviable record of 

continuous safe operation but have barely covered the costs of normalized replaceVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00157 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
154 

ment of basic components. They fall far short of the levels needed to address repair 

backlogs and meet future needs. The NEC Commission is currently in the process 

of developing an updated capital investment plan for the NEC that will address the 

needs of freight, commuter and intercity services. A copy of a report entitled, ‘‘Critical Infrastructure Needs on the Northeast Corridor’’ is available on the NEC Commission website at www.nec-commission.com. The Commission is scheduled to complete the capital plan by the end of this year. 

Safety of Connecticut Rail Operations 

Turning to operations and maintenance of the NHL, CTDOT has an operating 

agreement with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s Metro-North Railroad 

(MTA/MNR) to operate the NHL. This agreement assigns responsibility to MNR for 

maintenance of rail facilities including track, bridges, culverts, power and signals, 

and rolling stock. AMTRAK is responsible for maintaining the infrastructure they 

own and provides those services as part of the operating agreement CTDOT has for 

Shore Line East service. 

Metro-North’s track inspection programs are designed to comply with all relevant 

Federal guidelines and standards. All track is visually inspected twice each week. 

All bridges are inspected annually. Track inspectors are trained to identify deviations and defects. Critically, they have the authority and responsibility to take immediate action, if necessary, such as reducing train speeds or taking the section of 

track out of service entirely. In addition to defects that require immediate action, 

FRA guidelines and standards require track inspectors to make note of ANY deviations to the basic track structure. These other types of deviations are noted so that 

there can be follow-up—either by programmed maintenance or in the next visual inspection. MNR also inspects the right-of-way with specialized equipment (track geometry car/Sperry Rail Car) twice a year—exceeding FRA requirements. 

Federal track safety standards also identify requirements for the qualifications of 

inspectors. All of MN track inspectors are qualified foremen, possessing a higher 

level of experience and knowledge so that they can accurately detect deviations from 

track standards. 

I would also note that MNR is in compliance with all provisions of the Rail Safety 

Improvement Act of 2008 that have had program implementation dates established. 

There are elements of RSIA—such as PTC—that are still in process, but we are in 

compliance with the interim deadlines required under the Act. 

Employee Safety 

With regard to employee safety, Metro-North has worked to completely transform 

the safety culture throughout MNR over the past two decades. As a result, there 

has been a drastic reduction of FRA reportable employee injuries from 1,000 per 

year in the early 1990s to the current, sustained annual average of below 200 per 

year since 2008 (a reduction of 500 percent). MNR was the last recipient of the MTA 

Chairman’s Safety Award (2011) for its stellar safety record amongst the MTA family. 

In 2011, the American Public Transit Association (APTA) conducted an audit of 

the MNR System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) which resulted in the following commendation, ‘‘APTA commends the management staff at MNR for its commitment 

and openness to further improve its system safety and security programs. MNR has 

clearly demonstrated that the safety and security of its customers and employees 

are its first priority. This open commitment to improving safety and security provides an excellent foundation for a proactive safety and security culture that is ultimately supported by all employees. APTA supports this proactive management approach to continuous improvement in the areas of safety and security performance.’’ 

Moving forward, MNR will continue to focus on customer and employee safety as 

the railroad’s top priority. 

Recent Derailment and Employee Fatality 

Despite an excellent safety record and maintenance efforts, MNR experienced two 

safety events this May. At approximately 6 p.m. on May 17, an eastbound NHL passenger train derailed and was struck by a westbound train between Bridgeport and 

Fairfield, Connecticut. About 250 passengers were on each train at the time of the 

incident. 73 passengers and 3 MNR personnel were transported to area hospitals 

with injuries. The NTSB arrived at the scene within hours of the incident. 

Service on the NHL was suspended between South Norwalk and New Haven and 

Amtrak NEC service was suspended between Boston and New York. The derailment 

destroyed track, signal and catenary systems on two tracks. The remaining two 

tracks are out of service due to a CTDOT project to replace 100 year old catenary 

and fixed bridges in the area of the derailment. As a result, the 4 track capacity 

of the NEC was reduced to 2 tracks, and both of those were fouled by the derailVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00158 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
155 

ment. Amazingly, 2,000 feet of the 2 track infrastructure was completely rebuilt, 

tested and restored to service four days later and full service was restored the following day. 

I would like to pause to make an important point. CTDOT’s current level of state 

and rail formula funding has been programmed over the next decade to address the 

backlog of replacement or major rehabilitation of the NHL infrastructure. That includes 20 moveable and fixed bridges, 80 miles of catenary replacement, a new signal system, and PTC. Without additional funding, CTDOT anticipates that additional 2 track outages will be required on sections of the NEC for the next decade, 

eliminating critical capacity and redundancy through Connecticut. 

On May 28, 2013, a Metro-North track foreman was struck and killed by a MetroNorth passenger train traveling at 70 mph in West Haven, Conn. The foreman had 

requested the section of track be taken out of service for maintenance. Two MetroNorth rail traffic controllers, one of whom was a student controller, placed the section out of service. But the student controller reopened the track a little more than 

an hour later without the approval of the qualified controller or the foreman. 

Prior to this incident, on May 4, 2013, another Metro-North rail traffic controller 

mistakenly placed out-of-service track back in service. Two days later, Metro-North 

instituted additional operations control procedures, but these procedures did not 

prevent the May 28 fatal incident. 

NTSB Preliminary Reports and Recommendations 

A preliminary report by the NTSB issued on June 4 noted that Metro-North inspectors found a track defect two days before the May 17 derailment. However, 

NTSB further indicated that the Federal standards and guidelines currently in 

place did not require immediate action for any of those track defects noted. 

On June 17, the National Transportation Safety Board issued an urgent safety 

recommendation to Metro-North Railroad to provide redundant protection for track 

maintenance crews who depend on train dispatchers to provide signal protection. 

The NTSB is urgently recommending that Metro-North require redundant signal 

protection, such as shunting, in these circumstances. A shunt is a device that crews 

can attach to the rails in a work zone that alerts the controller and gives approaching trains a stop signal. 

Metro-North received NTSB’s recommendation and will implement safety improvements as quickly as possible. Metro-North acted immediately after the fatal accident to activate a new procedure to prevent a Rail Traffic Controller from removing a block on a track without the explicit approval of the Chief Rail Traffic Controller. Previously a block could be removed by an RTC with the verbal permission 

of the roadway worker on the scene of the track work. In addition, the railroad already has begun working on a technological solution beyond the current system of 

verbal confirmations. It will require mechanical input from the roadway worker to 

implement and relinquish all blocks. 

Current Actions by Metro-North/MTA 

While the NTSB investigation is ongoing, in consultation with CTDOT, MetroNorth has already taken action to review its existing programs and processes in advance of formal NTSB recommendations. These actions include: 

• Retaining Transportation Technology Center Inc. TTCI is the internationally-renowned research affiliate of the American Association of Railroads which will 

assess our track maintenance and inspection programs, and to identify ways we 

can improve our efforts to maintain our right-of-way. 

• Inspecting and conducting an inventory of all similar joints—it is important to 

note that no joint bar defects were found. 

• Increasing inspections of our right-of-way using specialized equipment on loan 

from other railroads. 

• Exploring solutions to better protect railroad employees working in the rightof-way. 

• Building in additional safeguards to our procedures in the railroad’s operations 

control center regarding returning tracks to revenue service. 

CTDOT and Metro-North will continue to support the NTSB’s investigation and 

will also implement any recommendations. 

Closing 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss rail safety and 

I am prepared to address any questions you have. 

156 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Commissioner. 

And now Ms. Teel? 

STATEMENT OF MICHELLE TEEL, P.E., PTOE, 

MULTIMODAL OPERATIONS DIRECTOR, 

MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Ms. TEEL. Thank you, Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member 

Blunt, and Senator Johnson. I am pleased to be here to share the 

State experience of freight and rail passenger safety. 

Missouri has a long history with railroads, from James Eads 

building the first Mississippi River railroad bridge crossing, to the 

Jesse James gang robbing trains, to today’s unit trains carrying oil 

from northern hydraulic fracking operations. Missouri’s railroads 

have seen and done it all. 

Missouri is the fourth most rail-intensive state. In 2012, Missouri 

railroads carried 438 million tons of goods, more than any other 

mode in our state, even trucks. 

Missouri is home to the second and third largest U.S. rail hubs 

in Kansas City and St. Louis, respectively. Missouri has 4,000 

miles of mainline tracks, 7,000 public and private rail crossings, 

four intercity passenger rail routes. And six of the Nation’s seven 

class I railroads operate in Missouri. 

With such a massive amount of rail traffic, the potential for danger is around every corner, and in every rail yard. 

As you heard, just 3 weeks ago in Southeast Missouri, two trains 

collided at a railroad diamond intersection. When these trains collided, they also hit a MoDOT bridge, causing it to collapse. A total 

of seven people were involved in the incident, and amazingly, the 

worst injury was a broken bone. 

But this incident speaks to the importance of railroad safety and 

the need to systematically and constantly work to improve it. 

One week after this incident, a barge carrying an extremely large 

crane broke loose, floated downriver, and became wedged under a 

Missouri River rail crossing in St. Louis. It took nearly 3 days to 

remove the crane. 

Interstate commerce is the driver of the Missouri and U.S. economy, and incidents like these can have far-reaching consequences. 

Missouri is one of a handful of states with strict State railroad 

safety regulations. It includes requirements for operating practices, 

reporting, grade crossing safety, tariffs, train equipment, and training. 

Missouri assesses each operating railroad for intrastate revenues 

to fund four railroad safety inspectors. These inspectors also enforce Federal regulations, so we coordinate closely with the Federal 

Railroad Administration inspectors. 

Another area of concern is grade crossing safety. From 2008 to 

2012, there were 192 grade crossing incidents resulting in 41 fatalities in our state. This put Missouri as fifth worse in the U.S. The 

funding Congress provides for improving this crossings makes up 

approximately 80 percent of the funds MoDOT has available for 

this purpose. 

Railroads have never been safer, but there is still so much to do. 

Missouri is also home to four passenger rail routes. The Missouri 

River Runner is a State-sponsored route from Kansas City to St. 

157 

Louis. There are also two national routes, the Texas Eagle and the 

Southwest Chief. Finally, an Illinois State-sponsored route, the 

Lincoln Service, originates in St. Louis, Missouri. 

These routes are experiencing high ridership growth, and the 

Missouri River Runners growth is exceptional. Since 2007, ridership is up 74 percent. Ticket revenue is up 112 percent. On-time 

performance is around 90 percent. And customer satisfaction for 

this route has gone from last in the country to seventh. 

Missouri was awarded $50 million in the FRA’s high-speed intercity passenger rail program funding. This leveraged another $20 

million investment from railroads in our state. These investments 

target on-time performance and safety for both freight and passenger rail. 

Missouri, Illinois, California, and Michigan all worked as a team 

to acquire new and safer passenger rail equipment, which is currently in the procurement process. Without Federal investment, 

this new equipment would not be possible. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to share information on 

Missouri’s role in freight and passenger rail safety. The opportunities for additional rail investment are tremendous. Missouri recently completed a rail plan that identified $1.4 billion in unmet 

needs for passenger and freight rail in our state. 

I urge you to continue investment in railroads, as it is key to the 

success of America’s transportation system and economy. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Teel follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHELLE TEEL, P.E., PTOE, MULTIMODAL OPERATIONS

DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Introduction 

Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Thune, for inviting me 

to participate in this hearing. I am Michelle Teel, the Missouri Department of 

Transportation’s Multimodal Operations Director. I’m so pleased to be here to share 

the state experience of freight and passenger rail safety in America’s transportation 

system. The nation’s rail system is an essential part of surface transportation. Missouri has a long history with railroads, from James Eads building the first Mississippi River railroad bridge to the Jesse James gang robbing trains to today’s unit 

trains carrying oil from northern hydraulic fracking operations, Missouri’s railroads 

have seen and done it all. 

I am here today to share Missouri’s unique story regarding railroads and railroad 

safety. 

Missouri’s Rail System 

Missouri is the fourth most rail intensive state. In 2012, Missouri railroads carried 438 million tons of goods, more than any other mode in our state, even trucks. 

This amount of freight equates to nearly 11 million fully loaded trucks. If lined up 

end-to-end, they would circle the earth six times. 

Missouri’s central U.S. location makes it the crossroads for freight. Missouri is 

home to the second and third largest U.S. rail hubs in Kansas City and St. Louis, 

respectively. Missouri is second only to Chicago, Illinois. These figures are based on 

size. If tonnage is used for comparison; Kansas City’s terminal experiences the most 

tonnage in the U.S. Missouri has 4,000 miles of main line track, 7,000 public and 

private rail crossings, four intercity passenger rail routes, and six of the nations 

seven Class I railroads operate in Missouri. With such a massive amount of rail 

traffic, the potential for danger is around every corner and in every rail yard. 

Just three weeks ago, in southeast Missouri, a Union Pacific train collided with 

a Burlington Northern Santa Fe train at a railroad diamond intersection. When 

these two trains collided, they also hit a MoDOT bridge causing it to collapse. A 

total of seven people were involved in the incident and, amazingly, the worst injury 

158 

was a broken bone, but this incident speaks to the importance of railroad safety and 

the need to systematically and constantly work to improve it. 

One week after this incident, a barge carrying an extremely large crane (being 

used on a MoDOT bridge replacement project) broke loose. It floated down river, 

took out major power lines and became wedged under and against Norfolk 

Southern’s Missouri River crossing in St. Louis. It took nearly three days to remove 

the crane. Norfolk Southern’s midwestern train operations came to a grinding halt. 

Interstate commerce is a driver of the Missouri and U.S. economy. Incidents like 

these can have far reaching consequences. 

Freight Rail Safety 

Missouri is one of a handful of states with strict state railroad safety regulations. 

They include requirements for operating practices, reporting, grade crossing safety, 

tariffs, train equipment, and training. Missouri assesses each operating railroad for 

intrastate revenue to fund four railroad safety inspectors. Each of these safety inspectors specializes in disciplines to ensure coverage of the state regulations. Because MoDOT railroad safety inspectors become certified inspectors through the 

Federal Railroad Administration’s program, they also enforce Federal regulations. If 

you recall, I mentioned there are approximately 4,000 miles of main line track in 

Missouri. This is an immense amount of territory for four inspectors to cover, so we 

coordinate closely with the Federal Railroad Administration inspectors. 

Another area of concern is grade-crossing safety. Missouri has 3,800 public crossings scattered statewide. They require significant attention. From 2008 to 2012, 

there were 192 grade crossing incidents resulting in 41 fatalities. This put Missouri 

as fifth-worst in the U.S. The funding Congress provides for improving these crossings makes up approximately 80 percent of the funds MoDOT has available for this 

purpose. This is very important to Missouri and I urge you to continue to invest 

in these critical safety improvements. To give you some scale, Missouri receives approximately $6 million per year in Federal highway funding for 3,800 public crossings. The state invests approximately $1.2 million. Railroads have never been safer, 

but there is still much to do. 

Safety data is a key tool used to address railroad safety. This data helps our 

MoDOT railroad staff prioritize crossing improvements. It also helps our railroad 

safety inspectors focus on particular regions of the state, given what the data is 

showing. For example, in 2012, MoDOT focused on 11 of Missouri’s 114 counties. 

More than 50 percent of all railroad incidents occurred within these counties. 

Through engineering, enforcement, education, and emergency medical services, Missouri makes every attempt to use the data to be as strategic as possible with limited 

resources. 

Passenger Rail Safety 

Missouri is home to four passenger rail routes. The Missouri River Runner is the 

state-sponsored route from Kansas City to St. Louis. There are also two national 

routes, the Texas Eagle and the Southwest Chief. Finally, Illinois’ state sponsored 

Lincoln Service originates in St. Louis, Missouri. These routes are experiencing ridership growth. There is a need for continued investment to help ensure the safety 

of the passengers and crews. In addition, continued investment is needed to address 

capacity issues. Both freight and intercity passenger rail are experiencing growth 

in the same corridor. 

The Missouri River Runner’s growth is exceptional since 2007. Ridership is up 74 

percent, ticket revenue is up 112 percent, on-time performance is around 90 percent 

and customer satisfaction for the route has gone from last in the country to seventh. 

The railroad the Missouri River Runner operates on is a Union Pacific road which 

is also seeing increases in traffic. MoDOT is committed to ensuring the viability and 

safety of both freight and passenger movements. 

Missouri was awarded $50 million in the Federal Railroad Administration’s High 

Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Program funding. This leveraged another $20 million 

in investment from host railroads. These investments along the Missouri River Runner route target on-time performance and safety for both freight and passenger rail. 

They have and will continue to contribute to both of these goals for the foreseeable 

future. However, continued investment in passenger rail is necessary to address increasing passenger movements. 

Passenger rail safety also comes in the way of equipment. Missouri, Illinois, California and Michigan all worked as a team to acquire new and safer passenger rail 

equipment, which is currently in the procurement process. Without Federal investment, this new equipment would not be possible. Missouri is an active member in 

the Next Generation Equipment Committee and committed to the goals and objectives of this important body, consisting of the FRA, Amtrak and interested states. 

159 

Conclusion 

Thank you again for the opportunity to share information on Missouri’s role in 

freight and passenger rail safety. The opportunities for additional rail investment 

are tremendous. Missouri recently completed a state rail plan which identified $1.4 

billion in unmet needs for passenger and freight rail. I urge you to continue investment in railroads, as it is key to the success of America’s transportation system and 

economy. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Ms. Teel. 

We are going to begin our questioning with Senator Johnson, and 

then Senator Blunt and I will follow. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 

I am sorry I am going to have to leave earlier. 

But I just really have one question for as many people who really 

want to speak to the issue. 

Mr. Redeker, you basically were talking about the point I was 

trying to make with the earlier panel. As much as we would all 

love to see positive train control fully implemented and saving 

lives, the investment in that has a cost. And that cost is investment in other areas of safety. 

And my other concern—and again, I want whoever wants to 

weigh in on this to give be given that opportunity. 

There seems to be challenges technologically, whether it is even 

possible. There are challenges in terms of whether the spectrum is 

even going to be made available. 

So I would just like, starting with you, Mr. Redeker, to speak to 

that point. 

Is this even possible? Is Congress trying to force something that 

just simply cannot be done? 

Mr. REDEKER. I would like to point out that Connecticut’s capital 

program identifies PTC as a priority, but I think the timeframes 

are unrealistic in terms of being able to achieve them. 

I also should note that on the New Haven-Hartford-Springfield 

high-speed intercity corridor route, that project includes installation of a new signal system and positive train control, which, frankly, would have been born by Amtrak, if it was not being borne by 

the state of Connecticut in that corridor. 

But we have, as a result, had to spread out some of our other 

investments for state-of-good-repair projects, or capacity expansion 

projects, over a longer period of time. 

So it is a tradeoff that we have made of deferring some additional investments, be it for capacity or for state-of-good-repair, 

with a priority being PTC. And we are partnering with MetroNorth because we are part of their overall system, and actually 

being part of the first pilot segment for the Metro-North system, 

so Connecticut is leading in that. 

So we are committed to safety. We have made some tradeoffs in 

timing for other projects. And we are, frankly, struggling with all 

the issues everyone else is struggling with in terms of spectrum 

and radios and integration and cost. 

Senator JOHNSON. Ms. Waters? 

Ms. WATERS. Yes, I would like to speak specifically to a few of 

our member railroads and what they are doing and what their 

challenges are. 

160 

The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, or 

SEPTA, operates commuter rail, as well as other transit modes in 

the Philadelphia region. SEPTA is one that is anticipating to meet 

the target. They have set that as a priority. You may have read recently, earlier this week, they are putting a bridge out of service, 

probably next month. They have already spent $130 million to stay 

on track to meet the 2015 deadline. Much more in expenditures to 

come between now and then. 

But to get there, they had to defer their bridge replacement program. And so there is a bridge over the Schuylkill where trains will 

not be running most likely next month. And that means that the 

service on that line will be disrupted for some indeterminable 

amount of time with alternate bus transportation. And most of us 

know that, comparing the travel times between the bus and the 

rail, that those customers will be back in their single occupancy vehicle on the highways. 

We have another member, we spoke, I think, Ms. Hersman spoke 

about Alaska Railroad being one that expected to be on time, and 

they certainly do, and are continuing to work aggressively to meet 

the deadline. They are having significant challenges with the spectrum. 

In fact, they are having an interesting challenge in that apparently they are negotiating with PTC–220, and they cannot obtain 

or afford the insurance that is required. 

Hopefully, they will be able to work through that, but that is potential delay, nonetheless, for one railroad that is committed and 

expecting to be on time. 

We have a small Northwestern commuter railroad that, about a 

year ago, essentially went on record to say they just do not have 

the funds. It is a small operation, about 30 trains a day, pretty 

much only in the a.m. and p.m. peak. They operate on a short line 

railroad with very light freight traffic. 

They said, we just simply cannot afford to do this. And their alternatives are, one, to reduce their service by about two-thirds to 

come under the threshold required for PTC, which I believe is 12 

trains a day; or to simply on December 31, 2015, discontinue service. 

Senator JOHNSON. So there are real costs. 

Mr. Hamberger, very quickly. I am about out of time. 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Thank you, Senator Johnson. 

And let me just say, before I answer the question, I want to get 

in on the record, we are not seeking repeal of this mandate. We 

have $3 billion into it. We have too much work into it, and this is 

a decision from the CEO level on down, we are committed to getting this done. We need more time to do it. 

If we were back in 2008 and you said, how could you spend $10 

billion to improve safety, PTC would be part of the mix, but it 

would be more of the roadside detectors, more of the capital 

projects and maintenance projects that I referenced. We have a 

safe railroad. But the list of projects is never ending. And so we 

would be spending even more money on the basic blocking and 

tackling, along with some of these other technologies. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. 

161 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much, Senator Johnson. 

Senator Blunt? 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Chairman. A truly great Chairman 

lets the other members ask their questions so they can get on to 

the things that we are already behind on. And I thank you, Chairman, for doing that. 

Also, great panel. Thanks to all of you for being here. Lots of 

good information. I am sure I will have other questions to ask in 

writing for your response later. 

Mr. Redeker, on the choices you said you were having to make 

about more customer service and maintenance, if you did not have 

the PTC requirement, even though Mr. Hamberger says the railroads want to now finish this up, would you have chosen to 

prioritize PTC? I am going to have to have pretty quick answers 

here. 

Mr. REDEKER. I think we have a very efficient and effective cab 

signaling system today. It needs to be upgraded, and that would 

have been our top priority. 

Senator BLUNT. OK. 

Ms. Teel, thanks for being here. Every state thinks they have the 

top of whatever the hearing is about. I think we do have the busiest rail state in the country. And if you look at a railroad map of 

the country, I believe that would bear that out. 

The Chaffee accident, where I think a bridge went down, a highway bridge, it was the overpass bridge, who takes care of replacing 

that bridge? And how is the process going? 

Ms. TEEL. That process is going well. The railroads have indicated that they are—one in particular is going to take care of the 

cost for that. And once the investigation is final, all those determinations will be finalized. But we have a really good partnership 

with those class I railroads, and we feel confident that those costs 

are going to be taken care of by the railroad. 

Senator BLUNT. And did you say that crossing accidents were the 

big percentage of accidents that happen, in our state, at least? 

Ms. TEEL. Correct. 

Senator BLUNT. And I believe, Mr. Hamberger, between crossing 

and trespassing, you get almost to 100 percent. It is like 90 some 

percent of all—— 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Over 95 percent of fatalities, yes, sir. 

Senator BLUNT. All right, crossings and people who should not be 

on the track, who are on the track. 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Yes, sir. And, unfortunately, our research 

shows that about a third of those trespassers are suicides. 

Senator BLUNT. They intend to be on the track? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Yes, sir. 

Senator BLUNT. About a third. 

Ms. Teel, the working relationship between what you do at the 

Missouri Department of Transportation and both the NTSB and 

the FRA, how would you explain that setup? 

Ms. TEEL. Senator, it is a great working relationship. In fact, we 

also enforce the Federal Railroad Administration regulations and 

work closely with the regional office in Kansas City and have also 

worked with NTSB on the investigation in Chaffee, Missouri. And 

162 

we are proud of the partnership that we have not only with those 

agencies, but also with the railroads in our state. 

Senator BLUNT. Mr. Stem, is there any difference now between 

the way passenger work schedules go out for passenger rail or 

freight rail? 

Mr. STEM. Yes, sir. Passenger rail now has its own hours of service regimen. They are based on predictable work schedules, and 

they do have to, by regulation, apply the science that is available. 

Senator BLUNT. And your testimony was really focusing on making those even better. They are already different, but your testimony was focused that they should be even better? 

Mr. STEM. My testimony indicates that the problem is with the 

freight hours of service and the totally unpredictable work schedules and the new pressures that are being applied by the railroads 

in an attempt to significantly reduce the numbers of safety critical 

employees that they have to have on staff to continue the level of 

service that is present today. 

Senator BLUNT. So if I heard that right, you think the passenger 

service efforts are actually better than the freight? 

Mr. STEM. Yes, sir. They are a model for us to aim for with improvements in the fatigue mitigation strategies and plans that are 

now being required. 

Senator BLUNT. OK. 

Mr. Hamberger, on that topic, and then the topic of only needing 

to apply to 39 percent, I want to be sure I have your sense. 

Mr. HAMBERGER. My sense is that 39 percent is low. We are a 

90,000-mile network, and we are putting PTC on 60,000 miles. 

That does not quite equal 39 percent by my math. 

With respect to fatigue management, Mr. Stem is correct. That 

is something that both labor and management are working on cooperatively across the board in many areas. With respect to the predictability of our network, a freight railroad is not a passenger railroad. We do have predictable time for yard service and for local 

service. But for over the line long-distance trains, that can be dependent upon what our customers want, when they are ready to 

have their shipments go. 

We cannot have a 10-hour call window. If someone is scheduled 

to report at 12 and calls up at 10 and says I am ill, I cannot get 

there, then what? We have to wait to give someone else a 10-hour 

notice, so that train that was going to leave at 12 has to wait 10 

hours until a replacement crew can get there? 

We are a 140,000-mile, including the short lines, outdoor assembly line. We have mudslides, snow, washouts, all of which makes 

this schedule unpredictable. We support the 10-hour uninterrupted 

call, but right after the work ends in the first place. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, and I will have some questions, a 

few more questions for some of you. Thank you all. 

Mr. STEM. Senator Blunt, if I may add, 39 percent figure is not 

my figure. That is the Federal Railroad Administration estimate: 

140,000-mile network, including some short lines that will be required to apply PTC. And I think Mr. Hamberger is close. It was 

60,000 miles of a 140,000-mile segment, and they have been able 

to negotiate that mileage down to 50,000 miles. So that is the FRA 

figure. 

163 

Senator BLUNT. Since we have come back to this, does the system, Mr. Hamberger, have to be interoperable? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Yes, sir. It is so that a railroad, just to use a 

name, a Union Pacific locomotive that goes through Chicago has to 

be interoperable with Metro, the commuter rail there, with Amtrak 

operating there, with every other class I railroad operating there. 

And if that Union Pacific, we have what is called run through 

power, if that locomotive goes through Chicago and continues on its 

way on a CSX track, it has to be able to talk to the CSX back office. 

And that is one of the challenges, that we do not even have that 

software yet for the back office. It is going to be delivered sometime 

this summer. 

Senator BLUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Senator Blunt. 

And thank you, Mr. Stem, for clarifying that point. 

Let me begin my questioning, if I may, with Commissioner 

Redeker. 

You made what, for me, is an extraordinarily important point 

about the investment that Connecticut taxpayers are making in 

these lines. I think the numbers that you used were $3.2 billion 

over the last 10 years, as compared to $60 million invested by Amtrak, which I think attests to the leadership that you have provided, along with the Governors and the continuing vision and commitment going forward to make the investment by State taxpayers, 

which I think is done in other states as well, maybe not to the 

same extent, but certainly not without great fiscal challenge and 

difficulty at a time when State governments face tremendous deficits. We talk a lot here about our Federal deficit, but obviously the 

states have been extremely challenged fiscally. 

And so let me begin by asking you about the continuing work 

that is ongoing on the Northeast Corridor, which has reduced capacity in certain areas from four tracks to two. Did that reduction 

in capacity exacerbate or aggravate the disruption that occurred as 

a result of the collision and derailment? 

Mr. REDEKER. Yes, Senator. We have about 15 miles of two 

tracks out of service. Our bridge structures, which are being rehabilitated concurrently with catenary replacement, are two-track 

structures. So in that section, we are doing several bridges. And 

that means that those tracks are out of service. They have been for 

almost 2 years, and we are about ready to complete that this year. 

But we have about 80 more miles of catenary and several more 

miles, many, many more bridges to do, which means that at the 

pace of the investment that the state has been able to make, which 

is significant, nonetheless, the backlog is extraordinary. And it is 

going to take another decade to complete that, to bring that system 

to a state-of-good-repair. 

Now that is a historical anomaly, in some sense, because the 

state of Connecticut chose to be unique among many, and own the 

Northeast Corridor instead of Amtrak in the time period when 

those decisions were being made. And as a result of legislation, we 

have not been part of the Amtrak capital plan. We are not eligible 

for that funding source. Although the new high-speed rail program 

in its latest incarnation does allow Connecticut to apply for highVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00167 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
164 

speed money, and we are preparing to do that if there is a resource 

available and an appropriation that comes forward. 

So we have a lot to do. We are committed to doing it because of 

the real important economic engine that the Northeast Corridor 

means for the state of Connecticut. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Some of those bridges are more than 100 

years old. Is that right? 

Mr. REDEKER. That is correct. A hundred years is probably our 

average. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And the funding responsibilities may be 

anomalous, but the aging state of our infrastructure is common 

across the United States, is it not? 

Mr. REDEKER. That is correct. We are about 1910 vintage for 

across the Northeast Corridor. So, therefore, the nature of that infrastructure, the need for rehabilitation, and some of the capacity 

constraints, which are felt not just by Connecticut with tracks out, 

but two-track systems in New Jersey, two-track systems in Baltimore that, in the long run, are really the constraints for the Corridor to grow, and to have redundancy in cases where you need to 

rebuild. 

So the Corridor is challenged. Working through the Commission, 

we are trying to identify the next 5-year capital program to address 

the most critical needs based on the utilization and priority, which 

I think is unique for the Commission. It is a new challenge. But 

we think we will be able to be up to that and deliver a capital plan 

that both states and the Federal Government and freight rail partners can invest in to bring that system as quickly as possible to 

state-of-good-repair. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

Ms. Teel, let me ask you also on the issue of state commitment 

and impacts of these kinds of incidents, I look at the picture of 

what happened in Chaffee, Missouri, on May 25, and miraculously, 

apparently, nobody was killed in this incident. But I can see from 

what happened to the highway as a result of the train collision and 

bridge collapse there that there must be very, very substantial 

State costs in repairing this major highway. Is that correct? 

Ms. TEEL. Mr. Chairman, the railroad has worked very closely 

with the state, and we are confident that the railroad is going to 

fully reimburse the state for those costs. In fact, they had the 

bridge that you have that photo of removed in a day. It was absolutely remarkable to see the work that the railroad has put into 

making this as efficient as possible and making the lines correct 

again. 

And I am confident that because of these strong partnerships 

and because of—well, certainly, we will have to wait for the investigation to be complete, but I am confident that the railroad will 

indeed have those expenses and not the state of Missouri. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And are you faced in Missouri with the 

same kinds of need to upgrade infrastructure, not just routine 

maintenance but also bridges that are aging, track that is in need 

of replacement? 

Ms. TEEL. Correct, Mr. Chairman. Certainly, we have those infrastructure needs in our system in Missouri. 

165 

We have a very large highway system in Missouri, 32,000 miles 

of highway, 10,000 bridges. We do not own any railroad track in 

the state. However, we certainly have the grade crossings, 7,000 

grade crossings in our state. Half of those are public. Only half of 

those have lights and gates, so there is huge opportunity for continued State investment and Federal investment to make those grade 

crossings safer. And also, there is the inspection role that we have 

of all of the track in our state that we work together with the Federal Railroad Administration. 

But certainly, Missouri is no different from any other state. We 

have critical funding needs, aging infrastructure, and it is an absolute concern in our state as well. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Mr. Stem, you may have heard Ms. Teel 

talk about the Missouri railroads, and she said that the Missouri 

railroads have seen and done it all. I kind of have the feeling that 

you have seen and done it all in the course of your career in working on the railroads. And I wonder if you could give this committee 

your personal view of the current state of safety on the railroads, 

particularly as it affects the men and women who do the kind of 

work that you have done for your life. 

Mr. STEM. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal, for the question. 

I agree with Mr. Hamberger’s initial statement, that safety is improving in our industry today. We still have work to do. We are reducing the number of fender-benders. We are focusing on reducing 

the minor incidents, and we are being successful at that. 

My testimony indicates that the big-ticket items, the fatal collisions, are going up, not down. And there is a whole menu of reasons for that. 

As you heard Mr. Szabo and Ms. Hersman testify earlier, human 

factors are the number one cause of accidents. Now sometimes 

those human factors are unaccounted for in design or a piece of 

equipment that was manufactured that malfunctioned, and it also 

does not address the specifically deferred maintenance on tracks. 

But knowing what we know today about positive train control 

and fatigue mitigation, that is where the low-hanging fruit is. That 

is the best opportunity for significant improvement in the overall 

safety. 

It is not just for the employees. Every time we have one of these 

major collisions that kills an employee, the surrounding community 

is also involved, many times with evacuations. 

The amount and number of hazardous material products that are 

moving by rail today is growing. That is the safest form of transportation for those products, and that is exactly where they should 

be. But that means that any time there is an incident, anytime 

there is a collision, the local community’s equity goes up in that 

collision. 

So I encourage the Committee to continue to work on that, to 

help us with fatigue mitigation. From the employee’s standpoint, 

that is exactly why PTC was mandated. 

And on that 61 percent of the mainline track that will not be 

equipped with PTC, some of which will be short line track, we will 

continue the same level of operation that we have today, and the 

same fatigue mitigation failures that we have today, unless Congress acts. 

166 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Your view is that the fender-benders have 

diminished in frequency but the higher costs and more disastrous 

kinds of incidents are occurring more frequently? 

Mr. STEM. Yes, sir. That is correct. And, overall, the statistics 

show that safety is improving in our industry. And I am thankful 

for that. And we are overall reducing the number of employee onduty fatalities. 

And many of those were result of switching accidents, which are 

still occurring. 

But fatigue, positive train control, was designed to help us get 

those fatal injuries to employees down. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Ms. Waters and Mr. Hamberger, do you 

agree with that view? 

Ms. Waters? 

Ms. WATERS. Mr. Hamberger? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. No. The employee injury rate, which is, I believe, the single best indicator of ‘‘are we getting safer’’ in terms of 

our employees, continues to go down. And when I said it was the 

safest year on record in 2012, and again in 2011 and again in 2010, 

the employee injury rate is one of those three indicators to say it 

is the safest year on record. That continues to go down. 

2012, there was an unfortunate 16 employees killed. That is 16 

too many. We are dedicated to getting that to zero. 

But it is something that we are focused on, some of those, it is 

my understanding, in fact, were fatalities of employees in automobile accidents while on duty. And so we are focused. 

I want to say to Mr. Stem, he said it, that the professionalism 

of our employee base is what helps drive safety, and that is absolutely right. It is professionalism and dedication, peer-to-peer counseling, and those are important programs. And so we are looking 

forward to continuing on fatigue management, employee training, 

employee education, any number of issues that we are working together on. 

So it is something that we take very seriously and are indeed focused on. So hopefully, I will be back here next year, and tell you 

that 2013 was even safer than 2012 in terms of employee injuries. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I hope so, too. 

Ms. Waters? 

Ms. WATERS. I would concur with Ed. I am not going to expand 

upon that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I have a couple more questions, just briefly. 

Commissioner Redeker, on the plus side, on the bright side of infrastructure investment, am I correct in the view that the investment in the M8 cars, which were involved in the derailment collisions in May, probably prevented more catastrophic injuries and 

even deaths, because of the structural advances that those cars reflect? 

Mr. REDEKER. Yes, we invested as the State and as partner with 

Metro-North on the newest cars manufactured to the newest standards for buff strength for a commuter rail coach. They certainly 

held up well in that accident. I cannot speak to what would have 

happened were they not there, but I think it is a measure of our 

commitment to safety, our investment in that. 

167 

That was another 100 percent State-funded investment in an entire rolling stock to bring the latest standards to the commuters in 

Connecticut. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And reference has been made to the inspection by Sperry Rail cars. Could you describe that method, and 

why it is superior to the high-rail method? 

Mr. REDEKER. I think it is just another means for inspection. We 

have terrific inspectors. They are well-qualified. Their experience 

within high-rail vehicles is probably unmatched, in terms of what 

they can bring to an inspection report. They can feel it, they know 

it, they have experience. 

Technology brings a lot more to the table, and I think adding significant layers of additional inspection help. But not every defect 

is going to be found by a Sperry Rail car and not every defect is 

going to be found, necessarily, by a high-rail vehicle. So by applying several techniques, we are trying to have redundant inspections, maximize what we can prioritize, and then address the defects that are found as quickly as possible in priority order. And 

that is the practice that Metro-North uses, again, all in compliance 

with the current guidelines from FRA. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Have you had an opportunity to review 

the inspection report that we have made a part of the record that 

was done on May 15? 

Mr. REDEKER. Yes, in fact, I got it yesterday from your staff. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And are you concerned by the findings 

there as to defects in the ballast and support and rail joints and 

other areas of the track? 

Mr. REDEKER. Actually, no. That is a standard inspection report. 

The kinds of things that were found and noted are addressed on 

a regular, routine basis. And they are addressed quickly. 

Any defect, and I think it was mentioned, any defect found on 

the front of that page required immediate attention and is done immediately. And if anything was found that was identified as a real 

safety hazard, that track would have been put out of service or repairs done immediately. 

So I think it is a measure of a system that constantly needs 

maintenance. It is the heaviest utilized commuter railroad in the 

country, and it has significant freight over it each and every day. 

It requires this kind of inspection and then a regular program each 

and every day of going out to maintain. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Do you receive these inspection reports 

regularly? 

Mr. REDEKER. No, I do not. Metro-North collects those, maintains 

them, and Connecticut DOT, as the contractor, has oversight responsibilities. And we do inspect those records and audit them on 

a regular basis. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. How often do you inspect them? 

Mr. REDEKER. We go out on a monthly basis to Metro-North offices and review all of their practices and all their files in terms 

of how they operate and maintain the system. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And then do you check on whether the repairs are made? 

Mr. REDEKER. We do on an audit basis. Otherwise, we leave that 

to Metro-North. 

168 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And how often is the audit? 

Mr. REDEKER. Again, monthly, we go down and check, and we 

will pull a few samples and see how that process worked. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And do you know whether this kind of 

routine practice is in accord with what other states do? 

Mr. REDEKER. I am sure it is, because the routine track inspection and maintenance program is a guideline from FRA, and that 

is what all railroads are following at this point. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you. 

I want to thank the entire panel. This has been an excellent 

morning, both panels, but particularly your panel for the excellent 

hands-on views that you have provided and the perspective that 

you have given us, and we really appreciate your taking the time 

in being with us today. Thank you very much. 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Mr. Chairman, if I might, it has been a long 

morning, and Mr. Stem and I do not always agree on every detail, 

but today is his birthday, so please join me in saying happy birthday. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Congratulations on your 35th birthday. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. STEM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And we will take all of your statements 

for the record, along with the exhibits and keep the record open for 

a week, in case you want to submit anything further. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(169) 

A P P E N D I X 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

HON. JOSEPH C. SZABO

Question 1. When does the FRA anticipate completing its final rules clarifying the 

requirements if a PTC failure occurs en route, and whether or not PTC will be required in railyards? Can you commit to completing those rules by the end of this 

calendar year? The railroads have said that getting those requirements clarified and 

finalized is absolutely essential as they move forward with PTC deployment. 

Answer. As of the date of this hearing, the draft of the PTC final rule is being 

finalized.. FRA understands the importance of regulatory certainty for the industry 

to properly plan for PTC implementation, and FRA will move the rule as quickly 

as possible. 

Question 2. How is the FRA working with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to ensure that spectrum challenges are resolved quickly so that PTC can 

be implemented nationwide? Also, how is the FRA working with the FCC to clarify 

the FCC’s new requirements for tower and antenna applications? 

Answer. FRA is providing the FCC technical advice on the communications requirements of PTC. Ultimately, however, spectrum allocation is in the purview of 

the FCC. The FCC shares spectrum management responsibilities and functions with 

the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). While 

the FCC has authority over commercial spectrum usage as well as that of local and 

State governments, NTIA manages the Federal government’s use of spectrum for defense and other Federal purposes. 

FRA has no statutory or regulatory authority over spectrum allocation or availability. FRA and the FCC are working together with the railroad carriers and Tribal 

and other stakeholders in developing an expedited tower approval process that satisfies FCC and carrier requirements for compliance with National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). The FCC is 

developing a proposed Program Comment to govern review for PTC wayside facilities under section 106 of the NHPA. While a revised FCC process is likely necessary 

to increase the rate of processing of the volume of tower approval requests generated by PTC deployment, the requirement for NEPA and NHPA act requirements 

are not ‘‘new’’; the NEPA was enacted in 1969, and the NHPA, in 1986. 

Question 3. Your testimony stated that the FRA should be able to certify the 

Southern California Regional Rail Authority’s (Metrolink’s) PTC system later this 

year. Most of the passenger and freight rail operators in California have told me 

they will meet the 2015 deadline. Why has California been able to stay on track 

for meeting the deadline, while other regions are struggling? 

Answer. The passenger, commuter, and freight railroads in California have suffered from the same technical challenges experienced by freight railroads elsewhere 

in the country. Resolution of these issues has resulted in significant schedule slippage. With the exception of Metrolink and its freight partners Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) and BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), the other California passenger and commuter railroads are still in the system-design phase and have not 

begun the system-test phase. Based on the technical challenges that Metrolink, UP, 

and BNSF have experienced, and the other railroads’ state of progress, FRA believes 

it unlikely these other railroads will be able to fully complete system development 

and approval by the 2015 deadline. Many will, however, be able to accomplish partial to substantial deployment. Even Metrolink, with the technical support of UP 

and BNSF, has found it necessary to delay the operational start of the PTC system 

from 2012 to 2014. 

As previously indicated in the FRA August 2012 report to Congress, there is a 

limited pool of qualified personnel with PTC implementation experience. Many of 

these people have been diverted to support Metrolink and southern California PTC 

deployment efforts, which have left a shortage of qualified personnel to carry out 

PTC deployment in other locations. 

170 

In addition to personnel shortages, there are component development, supply, installation, and integration/testing issues. Any development must include sufficient 

testing to make sure the systems work as intended. The current requirement, at a 

minimum, makes sufficient testing very difficult. 

Regarding the development of PTC components and the installation of PTC systems, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported in its August 2013 

PTC report that ‘‘some PTC components are still in development—most notably the 

[PTC] back office server. One or more of these servers will be installed in over a 

dozen railroads’ back offices and are needed to communicate vital information between the back office, locomotives, and waysides. According to the [Association of 

American Railroads (AAR)] and the railroads, back office system delays are due to 

system complexity, interfaces to other systems, and lack of supplier resources. Nearly all of the freight railroads included in our review anticipate they will not have 

a final version of the back office system until 2014 and have identified it as one 

of the significant factors preventing them from meeting the deadline. In addition, 

PTC installation is a time-and resource-consuming process. For example, railroads 

collectively will have to install approximately 38,000 wayside interface units. According to AAR and freight railroads, the volume and complexity of installing these 

units is another significant reason most railroads cannot meet the 2015 deadline. 

As to PTC system integration and field testing, GAO has said in the same report 

that its work to date indicates that ‘‘[s]uccessful PTC implementation will require 

numerous components to work together, many of which are first-generation technologies being designed and developed for PTC. All components must properly function when integrated or the PTC system could fail. To ensure successful integration, 

railroads must conduct multiple phases of testing—first in a laboratory environment, then in the field—before installation across the network. Representatives 

from all of the freight railroads [GAO] spoke with expressed concern with the reliability of PTC and emphasized the importance of field testing to ensure the system 

performs the way it is intended and that potential defects are identified, corrected, 

and re-tested. One railroad representative [GAO] spoke with said that in some field 

tests, the PTC system components behaved differently than in the laboratory tests 

because labs do not reflect field conditions completely. Identifying the source of 

these types of problems is an iterative process; consequently, correcting the problems and re-testing can be time-consuming and potentially further contribute to 

railroads not meeting the 2015 deadline.’’ 

Question 4. Some passenger rail operators argue they will miss the 2015 PTC 

deadline because Congress has not provided sufficient funding. However, as you 

know, Congress recently appropriated $10.6 billion for high speed and intercity passenger rail investments, for which PTC was an explicit authorized use. Several California rail operators received grants from this program explicitly for PTC, and plan 

to meet the 2015 deadline. I understand that Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) loans can also be used for PTC. Is it true that few rail operators outside of California chose to apply to the HSIPR or RRIF programs for the 

purpose of implementing PTC, and instead put other capital investments ahead of 

PTC as their top priorities? 

Answer. The mandate for the High-Speed Passenger Rail Program (HISPR) was 

to help address the Nation’s transportation challenges by making strategic investments in an efficient network of passenger rail corridors that connect communities 

across the country through a competitive grant process. HISPR funding was provided to several California railroads to install PTC in support of the California High 

Speed Rail initiative. With the exception of California, which has already made significant infrastructure investments, non-California railroads are at earlier phases of 

high-speed rail infrastructure investment. Completion of these essential track infrastructure improvements are a prerequisite for the installation and use of PTC in 

high-speed operations. 

Unlike grant programs, the Railroad Rehabilitation & Improvement Financing 

(RRIF) program is a direct loan and loan guarantee program. Direct loans may fund 

up to 100 percent of a railroad project with repayment periods of up to 35 years 

and interest rates equal to the cost of borrowing to the Federal government. The 

willingness of railroads to take advantage of the RRIF is governed in a large part 

by their ability (either actual or perceived) to make the required repayments. 

Finally, FRA has anecdotal evidence that some railroads have put ‘‘state of good 

repair’’ projects necessary to provide passenger/commuter service ahead of PTC 

projects. ‘‘State of good repair’’ projects correct past deferred maintenance, or replace 

capital assets that have exceeded their useful life. Failure to make the ‘‘state of good 

repair’’ repairs to existing infrastructure and equipment would increase the probability and gravity of a system failure, thereby decreasing system safety. Failure to 

make the ‘‘state of good repair’’ repairs would also necessitate reduction or termiVerDate Nov 24 2008 08:45 May 02, 2014 Jkt 075679 PO 00000 Frm 00174 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\87689.TXT JACKIE
171 

nation of service, which could adversely impact the public, and in the latter situation make installation of PTC a moot point. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR TO

HON. JOSEPH C. SZABO

Question 1. Mr. Szabo, PTC technology holds great promise to reduce the number 

of train accidents caused by excessive speed, conflicting train movements, and failure to obey signals, but there are significant challenges in implementing these systems. 

Short line railroad companies in Minnesota, for example, have concerns about the 

implementation costs of PTC as well as their ability to meet the deadline. In fact, 

in the FRA report to Congress on the status of PTC deployment, FRA reported that 

‘‘Given the current state of development and availability of the required hardware 

and software, along with deployment considerations, most railroads will likely not 

be able to complete full . . . implementation of PTC by Dec. 31, 2015,’’ adding that 

only partial deployment could be accomplished by the deadline. 

Has there been any consideration given to providing funding for Class II and III 

railroads that are significantly impacted by the initial capital and ongoing maintenance and software upgrade costs associated with PTC in order to help them meet 

the deadline? Has there been any consideration given to re-visit the requirements 

necessary for Class II and III railroads that operate on Class I PTC equipped 

tracks? 

Answer. FRA first notes that the PTC mandate does not apply to Class II and 

Class III railroads directly, but a small number of Class II and Class III railroads 

are required to install PTC where they interoperate with Class I railroads. FRA has 

already provided several regulatory exceptions for small railroads that allow them 

to avoid the installation of PTC in situations where they operate over a Class I railroad’s track (see 49 C.F.R. 236.1006(b)(4) and 49 C.F.R. 236.1019(a)) during the initial PTC roll-out period. 

However, FRA also recognizes that there may be circumstances in previously-executed private agreements under which Class I railroads would be entitled to require 

the Class II or Class III railroad to use a controlling locomotive equipped with PTC 

as a condition of operating. FRA believes that the proposed exceptions, when issued, 

will provide Class II and Class III railroads an appropriate exemption from PTC installation consistent with tenant-host commercial agreements and the statutory 

PTC mandate. If Congress were to amend the PTC mandate, FRA would re-visit the 

exceptions available to Class II and Class III railroads to be consistent with the revised mandate. 

Further, FRA has in the past implemented grant funding programs to support installation of PTC, for which Class II and Class II railroads would be eligible. However, Congress did not appropriate that funding beyond one year. Finally, Class II 

and Class III railroads are also eligible to apply for Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) loans to fund PTC projects. 

Question 2. Mr. Szabo, according to the Department of Transportation there are 

more than 250,000 highway-rail grade crossings in the U.S. Although the highway 

safety picture has improved considerably over the last decade, 300–400 people are 

killed every year and more than 1,100 are injured at grade crossings. According to 

the rail safety group Operation Lifesaver, eight people were killed at rail grade 

crossings in Minnesota in 2012. As you’re aware, the safety at rural crossings remains a significant problem. What is the Federal Railroad Administration doing to 

advance alternative lower cost grade crossing safety technology for better protection 

at the thousands of rural crossings across the country? Federal funding for the 

United States Department of Transportation Railway-Highway Crossings Program 

is $220 million per year. Is this funding level sufficient in your view? 

Answer. In recent years, highway-rail grade crossing accidents have resulted in 

the second-largest number of rail-related deaths in the United States, 33 percent 

of the total. Yet grade crossing safety has shown vast improvement, as a result of 

substantial public investment in crossing warning devices and greater public awareness of the risks at grade crossings. Accordingly, the number of grade crossing accident deaths has declined by 30 percent over the last decade. FRA is fully committed 

to reducing the number, frequency, and severity of collisions at highway-rail grade 

crossings. 

Currently, there are 212,212 at-grade highway-rail grade crossings and dedicated 

pathway-rail grade crossings, which include public, private, and pathway (pedestrian) crossings. Approximately 55 percent of public crossings are equipped with 

automatic warning devices. Many of the public crossings that do not have automatic 

172 

warning devices are in rural areas where highway traffic volumes are low. FRA currently is studying the use of warning signs that are enhanced by the use of flashing 

LEDs, which make the signs more noticeable to an approaching motorist. FRA is 

a participant in the Department’s Connected Vehicle research initiative. With additional research, Connected Vehicle technology, coupled with PTC, may serve as a 

potential future low-cost warning system for highway-rail grade crossings. 

When engineering and construction solutions are necessary to improve safety, 

communities can incur costs. This is why FRA’s Fiscal Year 2014 budget proposal 

includes funding for mitigating community impacts, including safety enhancements. 

The Railway-Highway Grade Crossing Program (section 130 of title 23 of the 

United States Code), which is administered by the Federal Highway Administration 

(FHWA) has proved to be effective in the reduction of highway-rail grade crossing 

collisions and related fatalities. FRA strongly supports the continuation of the program. Additional funding would enable states to treat additional crossings, many of 

which may be in rural areas. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN

Question 1. Some rail operators have suggested that PTC would only be able to 

prevent a small fraction of train accidents. How would you respond to that? 

Answer. The vast majority or railroad accidents are minor in nature and, thankfully, do not result in fatalities or significant injuries. The accidents which the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has investigated involve significant 

damage, including fatalities and injuries. 

Despite more reliable equipment and increased redundancies within the operating 

environment, NTSB investigations continue to reveal human factors that contribute 

to accidents. The two largest causes of accidents in recent years include human-factor and derailments due to track problems. Operational accidents, or those classified 

as human-factor related, can be prevented with technology, notably positive train 

control (PTC). 

Further, PTC preventable human-factor caused accidents can have catastrophic 

consequences. For example, train passenger deaths as occurred in the 1997 Silver 

Spring, Maryland, and the 2008 Chatsworth, California collisions, or significant releases of hazardous materials that affect communities and result in exposure fatalities that occurred in the 2004 Macdona, Texas and the 2005 Graniteville, South 

Carolina accidents can be prevented by PTC. While small in number, these catastrophic accidents are the ones we want to prevent. 

Question 2. When did the NTSB first propose that PTC systems be implemented, 

and when did this issue make it onto the NTSB’s ‘‘Most Wanted List’’? How long 

after that did it take for the FRA and rail operators to begin making a significant 

effort to implement PTC? 

Answer. The NTSB first recommended an advanced train control system, a PTC 

predecessor, in 1970. This recommendation was addressed to the Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA) and recommended: 

If it receives additional statutory authority under legislation now in progress, 

study the feasibility of requiring a form of automatic train control at points 

where passenger trains are required to meet other trains. (R–70–20) 

The NTSB’s original ‘‘Most Wanted’’ list (MWL) of Transportation Safety Improvements was adopted in September 1990. Positive Train Separation was on 

the original MWL. (The NTSB changed ‘‘Positive Train Separation’’ to ‘‘Positive 

Train Control Systems’’ in May 2001.) 

Congressional funding for joint FRA-industry pilot programs addressing PTC development started in the early 1990s. In 1997, the FRA’s Railroad Safety Advisory 

Committee (RSAC), which advises FRA on many of its rulemakings, established a 

working group, which included representatives of the railroad industry, to address 

PTC. The group was tasked to address the Federal regulations and their applicability to new train control systems under development and to draft new regulations 

as necessary. The FRA published a final rule in, ‘‘Standards for Development and 

Use of Processor-Based Signal and Train Control Systems,’’ which was effective on 

June 6, 2005. This rule established performance-based standards for processor-based 

signal and train control systems but did not require implementation. 

Most railroads, however, did not make a significant effort to implement PTC until 

Congress passed the Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008, following the 

2008 Chatsworth, California collision that claimed 25 lives. Some railroads were 

independently developing PTC systems but had not agreed on one design standard 

173 

to allow interoperability. Interoperability is critical in allowing trains to operate 

over tracks owned by various entities, particularly in the case of passenger trains 

that operate on multiple railroads under trackage rights agreements. 

Following the enactment of RSIA, the NTSB closed the following recommendation 

and removed PTC from the MWL. 

Facilitate actions necessary for development and implementation of positive train 

control systems that include collision avoidance, and require implementation of positive train control systems on main line tracks, establishing priority requirements for 

high-risk corridors, such as those where commuter and intercity passenger railroads 

operate. (R–01–6) 

In 2012, the NTSB adopted a new MWL which included PTC in large part because it appeared that implementation plans were stalled in the railroad industry. 

There has been great resistance from some in the railroad community to implement PTC, but there is no greater hazard than two trains colliding. The loss of life, 

property, and the environment can be significant. 

Question 3. The NTSB hosted a forum on PTC in February. What did you learn 

about rail operators’ progress in implementing PTC? Does it appear most rail operators have done everything possible within their powers to meet the 2015 deadline? 

Answer. The NTSB acknowledged during its PTC forum that there are significant 

hurdles towards meeting the December 31, 2015, deadline in RSIA to implement 

PTC. In particular, many commuter agencies do not have the available capital needed to maintain their systems nor upgrade them. A number of presenters at the 

forum addressed a variety of regulatory, technical, budgetary, and legal hurdles to 

implementing PTC. However, the NTSB also heard from other presenters who described various success stories where carriers implementing PTC systems have already received approvals and certifications from the FRA. 

The NTSB learned there are some railroads that have already met, and others 

that plan to meet, the 2015 deadline. Railroads that have made the difficult decisions and invested millions of dollars should be commended for their leadership in 

promoting rail safety. For those railroads that will not meet the 2015 deadline, for 

whatever reason, there needs to be transparency and accountability to comply with 

the PTC mandate that was set by Congress. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

EDWARD R. HAMBERGER

Question 1. The Interoperable Train Control Committee is developing key standards for software and hardware that will allow different rail operators’ PTC systems 

to be fully interoperable. Standards for some key features are months behind schedule, hindering the pace of the entire industry. What is the status of the remaining 

standards the Committee is working to develop? 

Answer. There are a total of 52 Railway Electronic Standards related to PTC. Of 

these, 42 standards have been developed and released for industry use. All of the 

remaining standards are in development and are being progressed. The members of 

the Interoperable Train Control Committee and its various subcommittees are working aggressively to address the remaining standards. The goal is for these standards 

to be published this year. 

Question 2. What pressure can be brought to bear on key software and hardware 

vendors to speed up their process of delivering the necessary components of PTC? 

I understand that they are behind schedule. As their customers, how does the rail 

industry intend to help resolve these delays? 

Answer. The biggest problem has been the development of the back office server 

software which is a year late. This software enables communications between the 

various railroad dispatch centers and all locomotives in operation. In other words, 

this is the key to interoperability. That software was released for field testing on 

July 15 which will likely last well into 2014. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BARBARA BOXER TO

KATHRYN WATERS

Question 1. Administrator Szabo of the FRA testified that the leading cause of 

train accidents is human factors (38 percent). Since PTC is largely designed to prevent accidents caused by human error, does APTA believe investing in PTC be a 

high budgetary priority for passenger rail operators? 

Answer. As a statutory mandate, PTC is already a high budgetary priority for our 

members. However, it should be noted that PTC does not prevent all human factors 

174 

accidents, nor can railroads ignore attending to, and the funding of, necessary activities to reduce the risks associated with the other 62 percent of train accidents. 

In 2010, the FTA released a report stating that the current backlog of state of good repair projects on our Nation’s transit assets totaled nearly $80 billion. This 

number does not include the over $2.75 billion necessary to implement PTC on commuter railroads, nor the millions needed to purchase or lease radio spectrum for 

interoperability. Despite the tremendous cost, Congress has appropriated only $50 

million to assist publicly funded commuter railroads with implementing Positive 

Train Control. 

Question 2. I understand that there are two major technological platforms in use 

as rail operators implement PTC throughout the nation, but some passenger rail operators are considering using other alternatives. How would those technologies be 

interoperable with rail lines using the existing technological platforms? Can you assure me that the alternative technologies would provide an equivalent level of safety? 

Answer. In addition to the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES) 

and the Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I–ETMS), the FRA has 

already approved the Port Authority Trans Hudson (PATH) commuter railroad in 

New York/New Jersey to install Communications Based Train Control (CBTC). 

CBTC is a system more aligned with and in use in some metro/subway operations, 

with protections similar to PTC. It is not interoperable with either ACSES or I– 

ETMS. FRA has also approved Incremental Train Control System (ITCS) for use in 

the Amtrak High Speed PTC systems in Michigan from Chicago to Dearborn, and 

the Communications Based Overlay Signal System (CBOSS), a mix of ITCS and I– 

ETMS, under development by Caltrain in California. 

Similarly, if any alternative technologies are approved for use, ALL trains that 

operate on that system or line segment must be able to communicate with that technology. For example, a train equipped with I–ETMS will not be interoperable with 

the ACSES system installed on the Northeast corridor, unless that train is additionally equipped with ACSES or the waysides are equipped with the capacity to transmit both ACSES and I–ETMS messages; a commuter railroad operating in California that does not operate on the Northeast Corridor will not be equipped with 

ASCES, and therefore will not be interoperable with that system, but it will be 

interoperable with all the trains that operate on its lines in California. 

As we stated in our testimony, not all railroads operate in the same environments 

or face the same risks and hazards, and yet the PTC statute requires that some install a PTC technology to protect against risks that may not be present on that railroad. For example, on low risk line segments with light traffic density, slower 

speeds, and/or reduced comingling of freight and passenger traffic, alternative technologies may provide sufficient mitigation. APTA supports the FRA’s recommendation for possible approval of alternative technologies that are equivalent in protection based on the actual level of risk and exposure, as evaluated by the FRA on a 

line segment by line segment basis, and not a blanket or unilateral approval of any 

technology on an entire line or railroad. 

Question 3. Given the very long lead time to developing a certifiable PTC system, 

any alternative PTC technologies should be well defined and developed by now. 

What specific types of alternative technologies do your members intend to use in 

lieu of existing PTC platforms? 

Answer. As stated in our testimony, all APTA member commuter railroads are 

moving forward diligently to prepare for PTC implementation, as that is the current 

requirement. 

The PTC Interoperable Train Control Committee (ITC), which is composed of 

many members of the freight railroad community, has drafted numerous standards 

covering Positive Train Control systems, subsystems and interfaces. (Passenger railroads are not voting members of the ITC and are therefore dependent upon the ITC 

to include passenger standards.) The expectation is that it will now be possible for 

systems integrators and manufacturers to produce new systems which will interface 

with I–ETMS and be compatible with the requirements of the PTC rule, thus reducing the lead time going forward. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN THUNE TO

HON. JOSEPH C. SZABO

Question 1. In her written testimony, Ms. Fleming of GAO wrote that ‘‘FBA’s PTC 

staff consists of 10 PTC specialists and one supervisor who are responsible for the 

review and approval of all PTC system certification documentation for 38 railroads. 

FRA has expressed concern that railroads will submit their safety plans to FRA at 

175 

roughly the same time. Our initial analysis suggests that this timing creates the 

potential that FBA’s review of these plans will consist of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of pages of detailed technical information.’’ How do you assess this statement 

by GAO? Is there a potential for a backlog of PTC applications? 

Answer. The GAO assessment of the situation is accurate and only adds to the 

myriad issues with the PTC statutory requirement, the most notable of which is its 

billions of dollars in regulatory costs over and above its quantified safety benefits. 

For this issue, in order to help mitigate the potential backlog in PTC applications, 

FRA plans to augment the dedicated PTC staff with support from senior technical 

staff. The additional staff consists of a Senior Scientist/Technical Advisor, a Program Manager for Advanced Technologies, a Senior Electronics Engineer, and two 

Electronics Engineers. Even with the augmented staff, there remains a potential for 

application backlogs, and the addition of these staff members to the review process 

may cause them to be diverted from their primary assignments. 

Indications are that FRA will receive the majority of the safety technical documentation for review simultaneously in the period just before the December 31, 

2015, deadline. 

Let me emphasize that until railroads complete PTC system design, development, 

integration, and testing, they will have insufficient data to finish the required safety 

documentation to be sent to FRA. Let me also emphasize that railroads’ completion 

of PTC system design, development, integration, and testing requires prior resolution of many, if not all of the technical and programmatic issues identified both in 

the FRA August 2012 report to Congress entitled ‘‘Positive Train Control Implementation Status, Issues, and Impacts’’ (http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L03718) 

as well as in GAO’s June 2013 report (http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655298.pdf). 

As you know, FRA’s report listed the following seven types of technical obstacles 

to complete PTC implementation that had been identified so far: lack of necessary 

radio frequency spectrum; lack of necessary radios; lack of necessary design specifications; lack of necessary back office servers (which contain the mechanism that 

enables interoperability of PTC systems between different railroads) and lack of necessary dispatch systems; need for verification of track databases with accuracy more 

precise than that needed in a non-PTC environment; need for engineering related 

to the installation of PTC system components; and need for proof of the reliability 

and availability of installed PTC systems in order both to provide the desired level 

of safety and to minimize any adverse impact on the railroad’s operations. In addition, FRA’s report noted two types of programmatic issues: issues related to budgeting and contracting (e.g., the tightening of public-sector budgets and the need to 

comply with procurement regulations) and issues related to an insufficient supply 

of qualified personnel and essential PTC system components, since railroads subject 

to the PTC mandate are all competing for a limited set of these resources. 

In the same vein, the GAO report cited ‘‘the numerous, interrelated challenges 

caused by the breadth and complexity of PTC.’’ First, GAO highlighted that some 

key PTC components are still in development and that the installation of PTC components ‘‘is a time-and resource-consuming process.’’ Regarding the installation 

phase of PTC implementation, GAO gave the example of the Federal Communications Commission’s request that railroads halt their construction of PTC-related antennas ‘‘to ensure proper installation procedures were being followed including consulting with either the tribal or state historical authorities prior to. . .installation.’’ 

Second, GAO pointed to the need for system integration and field testing of PTC 

components, ‘‘many of which are first-generation technologies being designed and 

developed.’’ Third, GAO underscored its concern about FRA resources, a point I will 

return to now. 

The additional time required to solve all of these technical and programmatic obstacles to PTC implementation, coupled with the statutory completion date of December 31, 2015, results in significant schedule compression, with a subsequent reduction in the time available for FRA personnel to complete the necessary certification review and approval of railroads’ safety documentation submissions before 

the existing 2015 statutory deadline. 

While there may be some commonality in safety documentation submissions because of the use of similar technology that may facilitate the review process, each 

of the railroads is unique, which will require separate review of their individual applications. These two factors (schedule compression and railroad uniqueness) aggravate FRA’s staffing limitations. 

Further, the number of railroad applications requiring FRA review and approval 

has been reduced from 38 to 37. FRA, in conjunction with the 38th railroad, was 

able to qualify the railroad for a regulatory exemption from PTC installation. FRA 

is, however, beginning discussions with a number of ‘‘new start’’ railroads on their 

requirements for PTC installation that may lead to an increase in the number of 

176 

1For this analysis, please see: http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FRA-2008- 

0132-0060. 

railroad applications requiring FRA approval above the 37 applications currently 

identified, which would worsen the FRA staffing issue. FRA’s FY 2014 budget proposal includes funding levels that would be sufficient for implementing the agency’s 

complete safety program, including work associated with PTC implementation. 

Question 2. How would your assessment change if Congress decides to provide a 

PTC extension that requires FRA approval on a case by case basis and these requests for questions are presented at roughly the same time as the safety plans? 

Answer. In general, FRA believes a PTC extension, especially coupled with the allowance of alternative technologies that enhance safety in a more cost-effective way, 

has the potential to generate significant quantifiable regulatory cost savings. As 

FRA’s 2009 regulatory impact analysis showed,1 and several subsequent reports have confirmed, PTC is expected to have about $10 billion in net costs over 20 years 

(costs over and above the quantified safety benefits). FRA expects the costs to be 

about 20 times greater than the benefits. Not only would a PTC extension, together 

with permitting alternative technologies that improve safety more cost-effectively, 

change our assessment of the GAO’s findings on our possible staffing issues, it 

would generate net benefits to society as a whole compared to current law, though 

quantification of these benefits would depend on the industry providing relevant 

cost-benefit information. 

To the extent that railroads have differing completion dates, an extension of the 

completion date mandated by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA) 

would reduce the number of applications requiring concurrent review by FRA. The 

enactment of legislation providing for extension of the PTC implementation deadline 

would have the effect of mitigating backlogs, but the scope of the review process 

would not change. FRA believes that obtaining the authority to approve the use of 

proven, mature, traditional signal and train control systems on low-risk lines in lieu 

of PTC would accelerate PTC-deployment efforts in a way that would greatly enhance railroad safety at lower costs. Existing technologies, such as Automatic Train 

Stop and Automatic Train Control, have over 90 years of safe, successful operation 

and are not relatively high-risk, software-centric development efforts such as PTC. 

If the RSIA were amended so as to provide the Secretary with authority to permit 

an extension in an individual case, FRA would not expect that a railroad would submit a request for such an extension concurrently with its PTC Safety Plan. The review process for such an extension would be addressed separately. 

Question 3. Of the 38 railroads that will need to submit certification documents, 

how many applications do you think will be approved in enough time to have their 

PTC system implemented by December 31, 2015? What percentage of required PTC 

equipped rail lines will this represent? 

Answer. FRA has requested that railroads resubmit their PTC Implementation 

Plans, modifying them to reflect their anticipated completion dates based on known 

technical and programmatic issues. The resubmitted plans are to reflect their ‘‘best 

case’’ estimates for completion, irrespective of the current RSIA deadline. Revision 

of PTC-deployment schedules to reflect the impact of programmatic and technical 

issues, if permitted by Congress, would reduce schedule and cost pressures arising 

from the December 31, 2015 completion date. Once FRA has received and reviewed 

these plans, FRA will be able to better estimate what percentage will be complete 

by the December 31, 2015, deadline. Of course, the current statutory deadline is extremely difficult and expensive for many railroads to meet. 

Question 4. Understanding that not all railroads will implement PTC by the mandated deadline, what options would FRA have? Will these railroads be able to continue to operate? 

Answer. If the existing statutory deadline remains in place, FRA would continue 

its work with stakeholders to ensure PTC is implemented as efficiently, reliably, 

and safely as possible. However, even with efficient and reliable work from FRA, 

the agency continues to emphasize that PTC would impose billions of dollars in 

costs over and above the quantified safety benefits. It is worth noting that the 2009, 

‘‘expected case’’ cost-benefit ratio of 22 to 1 was calculated before FRA and the GAO 

identified the significant implementation challenges associated with PTC, and it is 

reasonable to assume that certain costs have increased as a result of these challenges. 

While taking note of the overall implementation issues, the agency has considerable discretion to decide whether to take enforcement action. FRA has numerous options available if enforcement action is appropriate including civil monetary penalties, emergency orders, and individual liability actions. However the effectiveness 

177 

of these actions is greatly reduced because of the significant costs associated with 

PTC deployment. Railroads, especially passenger railroads, are already facing significant financial shortfalls that are delaying their resolution of the known technical 

and programmatic PTC-deployment issues. Enforcement actions based on an inability to complete deployment by December 31, 2015 would only further delay railroads’ completion of PTC by requiring their reprogramming funds to address FRA 

enforcement actions, away from PTC deployment efforts. 

Although PTC implementation may not be complete, railroads must retain their 

current methods of operation and levels of safety. In calendar year 2012, the train 

accident rate for all accidents for all causes was only 2.34 per million train-miles. 

This represents over a 40-percent decrease in train accidents since 2003. Also, in 

recent years FRA has implemented a number of new regulations to reduce some of 

the human-factor causes of accidents that PTC is intended to prevent. For example, 

FBA’s 2011 final rule governing the hours of service of passenger train crews, which 

draws on detailed, scientific research into the cause of train operator fatigue, should 

help improve the alertness of engineers and conductors operating passenger trains. 

Similarly, another FRA final rule issued the same year sets minimum safety standards for the eligibility, training, testing, certification, and monitoring of train conductors, which should improve the safety performance of train conductors on both 

passenger and freight trains. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN THUNE TO

HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN

Question. It is likely that certain railroads will be able to implement PTC by the 

December 31, 2015, deadline while others will not. Is there any danger to this 

‘‘piecemeal’’ approach? Can all of PTC’s safety potential be met? 

Answer. The full benefits of a PTC system will be realized when railroads operate 

their trains equipped with PTC enforcement on tracks in PTC territory. During implementation, non-equipped trains operating on PTC territories will still pose a risk, 

since non-equipped trains will still be susceptible to the single-point failure that the 

human factors present (dispatcher, train crew, or roadway worker). Once PTC is 

fully implemented, there will still be provisions in the regulations to operate nonequipped trains on PTC territories to accommodate enroute failures, very similar to 

how trains operating in cab signal territory are accommodated presently. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DEB FISCHER TO

HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN

Question 1. Chairman Hersman, I believe that we should possibly be expecting a 

rule on the use of PTC in rail yards. Do you believe the use of PTC in rail yards, 

where the speed is usually less than five miles per hour, is a good use of the technology? 

Answer. Train movements within rail yards can involve the transfer, shuttle or 

switching of rail cars that are done without using the air brake system on the section of cars involved in the movement. These types of movements diminish the effectiveness of any PTC system since PTC calculates braking distance using train consist information and relies on adequate braking from every car instead of just locomotive braking. In addition, train movements in yard limits have limited speed (not 

to exceed 20 mph) and sight requirements. Current PTC technology does not enforce 

train separation for train movements below 20 mph. 

A proposal has been made to the FRA that yard limits be defined as 20 miles in 

all directions on the main track from yards, allowing trains to operate non-equipped 

trains on the main track for a 20 mile radius in conflict with equipped trains. If 

this proposal is agreed upon by the FRA, non-equipped trains will pose a risk within 

this 40 mile distance and be susceptible to the single-point failure that human factors present. 

Question 2. Chairman Hersman, you noted that in-cab recording devices could be 

used to ‘‘better understand crew activities leading up to serious accidents.’’ Do any 

rail companies currently use these devices? Do you know what the cost is for the 

device, and for implementation? It seems like a commonsense recommendation, I’m 

wondering why there would be hesitancy on installing these devices? 

Answer. Some railroads currently use this equipment. Following the 2008 fatal 

collision in Chatsworth, CA, the Southern California Rail Authority (Metrolink) installed inward facing cameras in cabs. BNSF has installed video cameras in motor 

178 

vehicles (highway vehicles) to enhance safe operations and has plans to install this 

equipment on hi-rail vehicles. 

On July 25, 2013, a U.S. District Court issued a ruling that allowed the Kansas 

City Southern (KCS) Railway to install inward facing cameras in the cabs of its locomotives (Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen, et al.). The ruling declared that any disputes between the unions 

and the railroad would be considered as a ‘‘minor dispute’’ under the Railway Labor 

Act and subject to be resolved through binding arbitration. This ruling may pave 

the way for other railroads to move forward with the installation of inward facing 

cameras. 

The NTSB does not have information on the cost of installing this equipment, but 

we can provide contact information for Metrolink, KCS, and BNSF to discuss their 

costs. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN THUNE TO

SUSAN A. FLEMING

Question 1. I understand that GAO is in the process of conducting a study examining the challenges railroads face in fully implementing PTC by the December 31, 

2015, deadline. What are some of these challenges? 

Answer. Challenges to meeting the 2015 deadline are complex and interrelated. 

In addition, PTC installation is a time-and resource-consuming process and to-date 

railroads have encountered some unexpected delays while installing PTC. There are 

three key challenges including: 

• Developing system components and PTC installation: Many of the PTC components had not been developed before RSIA was enacted and some continue to 

be in various stages of development, most notably the I–ETMS back office server. Nearly all of the freight railroads included in our review anticipate they will 

not have a final version of the back office system until 2014 and have identified 

it as one of the critical factors preventing them from meeting the deadline. 

• System integration and field testing: In order to ensure successful integration 

of PTC components, many of which are first generations components, railroads 

must conduct multiple phases of testing before being installed across the network. Representatives from most of the freight railroads we spoke with expressed concern with the reliability of PTC and emphasized the importance of 

field testing to ensure that the system performs the way it is intended. Field 

testing is an iterative process; consequently, correcting the problems and retesting can be time-consuming and potentially further contribute to railroads 

not meeting the 2015 deadline. 

• FRA resources: Concerns with FRA’s limited staffing resources and the agency’s 

ability to help facilitate railroads’ implementation of PTC are focused on two of 

FRA’s responsibilities: PTC field testing and PTC system certification. First, 

FRA has reported that it lacks the staffing resources to embed a dedicated FRA 

inspector at each railroad and has taken an audit approach to field testing, 

whereby railroads submit field test results for approval as part of their safety 

plans. Second, FRA set no specific deadline for railroads to submit the safety 

plans for system certification and according to FRA; to-date only one railroad 

has submitted a final plan, which FRA has approved. FRA and railroads have 

expressed concern that railroads will submit their final safety plans to FRA at 

approximately the same time, resulting in a review backlog particularly since 

each plan is expected to consist of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of pages of detailed technical information. 

Finally, generally commuter railroads face these same PTC implementation challenges, as well as other challenges including an overall lack of funding available to 

make investments in commuter rail and challenges related to difficulties in acquiring spectrum in the 220 MHz band, which is required to operate the data radios 

that communicate information between PTC components. 

Question 2. What obstacles does FRA face in approving applications for PTC systems in a timely manner? In your written testimony you noted that FRA has only 

10 PTC specialists and a PTC supervisor. Is this staffing level adequate to approve 

plans in time to meet the December 31, 2015, deadline? 

Answer. Both FRA and railroads voiced concerns that FRA’s staffing level is not 

adequate to approve plans in time to meet the December 31, 2015 deadline. However, FRA officials told us that they are dedicated to the timely approval of safety 

plans and that their oversight will not impede railroads from meeting the deadline. 

179 

In an effort to help facilitate the safety plan review, some railroads told us they 

have submitted draft portions of their safety plans to FRA for preliminary review 

to expedite the process. This way FRA staff will be familiar with portions of the 

plan that are common across plans before the finalized plan is submitted. In addition, FRA has asked for additional authority for deadline extensions on a case-bycase basis and provisional certification which may also provide an opportunity to 

manage limited resources. 

Question 2a. Assuming it is adequate, if Congress provided a case by case PTC 

extension, would the FRA be able to handle this additional workload? 

Answer. Flexibility in extending the deadline may help FRA better manage limited resources by, for example, preventing a potential review backlog resulting from 

final safety plans being submitted at the same time—a concern raised by both the 

freight railroads and FRA. In addition, we found railroads at various stages in their 

implementation process; providing flexibility in extending the deadline for certain 

railroads acknowledges these differences and also may help railroads mitigate risks 

and ensure PTC is implemented in a safe and reliable manner. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN THUNE TO

EDWARD R. HAMBERGER

Question 1. How much money has the freight rail industry spent to date to implement PTC? 

Answer. To date, railroads have collectively spent approximately $3 billion of their 

own funds on PTC development and deployment. 

Question 2. How much more do you estimate will be needed? 

Answer. Currently, the estimated total cost to freight railroads for PTC development and deployment is around $8 billion, with hundreds of millions of additional 

dollars needed each year after that to maintain the system. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. DEB FISCHER TO

EDWARD R. HAMBERGER

Question. Since the implementation of PTC was mandated by the Federal government, I am wondering if you could give me some insight on other safety measures 

you all have considered, but have been unable to move ahead with due to challenges 

with PTC implementation. What are your other safety priorities, apart from PTC, 

and why? 

Answer. PTC-preventable accidents account for only 4 percent of mainline accidents. In contrast, track-caused accidents account for 35 percent of mainline accidents and equipment-caused accidents account for 21 percent of mainline accidents. 

It is no surprise that the industry devotes significant resources to addressing these 

primary causes of accidents. In fact, the industry is investing more than ever before 

in its infrastructure and equipment, including a record $25.5 billion in 2012. 

In addition, the industry continues to invest in research to improve its performance. AAR operates the leading rail research facility in the world, the Transportation Technology Center, Inc., in Pueblo Colorado. As mentioned in AAR’s testimony, TTCI has undertaken extensive research in the track area, including evaluating steel with potentially improved fatigue resistance, improved track fastener 

systems, and better inspection technologies. On the equipment side, TTCI is investigating improved suspensions, better wheel metallurgy, and trackside detectors 

that can detect rail car defects. AAR’s written testimony contains more information 

on these and other important initiatives. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN THUNE TO

KATHRYN WATERS

Question. How much money have commuter railroads spent to date to implement 

PTC? How much more do you estimate will be needed? 

Answer. Commuter Railroads have informed APTA that, to date, they have spent 

approximately $458.5 million and they currently estimate that their costs to implement PTC will exceed $2.75 billion (2 commuter rail agencies did not respond to our 

inquiry). The latter estimate is already in excess of the $2 billion estimate that 

APTA had previously stated. Given the remaining unknown aspects of this implementation, that cost estimate could continue to change. 

180 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DEB FISCHER TO

KATHRYN WATERS

Question. Ms. Waters, you note in your testimony that the FCC has not responded 

to your requests to make available spectrum for PTC implementation. 

Question 1a. How much spectrum would be necessary, in your estimate, to meet 

the needs of PTC systems? 

Answer. Spectrum Requirements: Commuter rail spectrum needs are localized to 

their operational corridors and the amount required is specific to each Economic 

Area (EA). While it is not appropriate to aggregate the national total of local needs, 

we are seeking individual blocks in the local EAs. Original industry needs were 

specified for each commuter rail operation in a study conducted for APTA and the 

Federal Transit Administration, with funding provided through the Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Project J–6, Quick Response for Special Needs. The 

TCRP is sponsored by the Federal Transit Administration; directed by the Transit 

Development Corporation, the education and research arm of the American Public 

Transportation Association; and administered by The National Academies, through 

the Transportation Research Board. We are providing the Committee with a copy 

of the TCRP J–6 Report (see Appendix A—Spectrum Estimate Details). Also, in response to the inquiry of the Committee, we asked our member agencies whether 

they had new estimates that differed from the TCRP report estimates. Also attached 

with this response is a table reflecting the known differences from the report’s estimates. 

Question 1b. Is it possible to utilize spectrum sharing for these purposes? 

Answer. Spectrum sharing: In some cases, commuter rail agencies are currently 

planning to share spectrum with freight rail hosts or Amtrak, or to piggyback on 

their procurement of the required spectrum. However, in some cases, commuter rail 

agencies simply do not yet have sufficient information regarding the decisions that 

may be made by the freight rail carriers. The findings of the TCRP report indicated 

that ‘‘the freight railroads have acquired various nationwide and regional channels 

in the 220 band (via an organization called PTC–220 LLC) for PTC use along their 

freight rail lines, however they have also indicated sharing of these frequencies is 

possible in shared freight/passenger service rail corridors.’’ 

[Attachment to Ms. Waters’ responses.] 


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181 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. JOHN THUNE TO

JAMES P. REDEKER

Question. At the hearing you mentioned that implementing PTC will cost the 

State of Connecticut $130 million, and will prevent you from performing other needed rail repairs. How can diverting funds to PTC implementation have a negative effect on commuter rail safety? Are there specific projects you have had to delay or 

cancel? 

Answer. First and foremost, rail safety projects are a top priority for the Connecticut Department of Transportation and are treated as such in the development 

of the Department’s Five Year Capital Program. 

The Program for the Office of Rail also includes numerous unfunded state-of-goodrepair, modernization and capacity improvement projects, including: 

Fixed and movable bridge replacement on the New Haven Line 

Signal system replacement on the New Haven Line (last two phases) 

New Haven-Hartford-Springfield corridor improvements 

Rail Station parking improvements and expansions 

High level platform rehabilitation 

Customer service initiatives 

The Department manages all of these systems to maintain safe operations, however, there may eventually be reliability and/or capacity issues that arise. 

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