COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Kelsey, Petty and Seni or Judge Bumgardner

KELLYN WILSON AND BOBBY JOE WILSON MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2477-10-1 PER CURIAM APRIL 12, 2011 JAMES CITY COUNTY DIVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY Samuel T. Powell, Judge (Bill H. McKinnon; Mara Medvin Matthews; Montgomery, Kelley & McKinnon, on brief), for appellants. (Leo P. Rogers; Angela M. King; LeeAnn N. Barnes, Guardian ad litem for the infant children; Count y Attorney’s Office, on brief), for appellee.
Kellyn Wilson and Bobby Joe W ilson appeal the termination of their parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) of their children, J.W., born on October 18, 2005, and D.W., born on July 2, 2008. Appellants argue the children were removed due to a lack of housin g and a lack of income, but they rectified both problems prior to the date of the continued termination hearing. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm th e decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prev ailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fa irly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Human
Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991).

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - In October 2008, Tina Sawyer , a social worker with the James City County Child Protective Services, became aware that appellants and the children were living in hotels with the assistance of local churches and the Salvation Army, but the assistance was no lo nger available. Sawyer learned that the Chesapeake Depa rtment of Social Servic es had contact with the family in July 2007, the York County Department of Social Services had contact with the family in July 2008, and the City of Williamsburg Social Se rvices assisted the family during this same time period. On October 10, 2008, Sawyer located appellants and the children at a library and learned that appellants and the children had spent the previous night inside a Wa l-Mart. J.W., who is auti stic, was enrolled in but not attending a special program. Sawyer was conc erned about J.W.’s need for services. Sawyer investigated the possi bility of family memb ers taking custody of the chil dren, but no one was able to do so. 1 After Sawyer met with appellants at the library, appellants voluntarily agreed that respite placement was in the best interests of their childr en. During the meeting, father disappeared for a period of time and mother signed the appropriate pa perwork. Sawyer testified that in October 2008, D.W. was three months old and had a severe diaper rash and J.W. wa s throwing himself on the floor and hitting his head on the floor. A few days after the children were placed in respite care, appellants met with Sawyer. Appe llants agreed that they needed to obtain stable housing and employment. At the en d of October 2008, appellants had not obtained stable housing and employment and they ag reed that foster care was the best option for the children. J.W.’s foster mother testifie d she was a special edu cation teacher of preschool children. She testified when she took cu stody of J.W., he frequen tly banged his head on the floor, he scavenged food from the trashcan, and he wa s unable to communicate his needs. The foster mother testified

1 Appellants stayed with fam ily members in the past, but were asked to leave because they failed to obtain employment or housing.- 3 - J.W. was three years old when she took custody, but he was f unctioning at approximately eighteen months. At the time of the termination hearin g, J.W. was speaking in phrases, he would speak spontaneously, he was no longer scavenging for f ood, and he was more soci al. When the foster mother took custody of J. W., he was not up-to-date on his immuni zations, but he was at the time of the termination hearing. D.W.’s foster mother testified when she took custody of D.W., he had skin rashes and a milk protein allergy. The foster mother testified D. W. has several food allerg ies, is asthmatic, and requires nebulizer treatments throughout the day and night for his asthma. The foster mother testified D.W. has never slept th rough an entire night, and it takes approximately one hour to settle him down for bed. The foster mo ther must also apply prescription creams to treat D.W.’s skin rashes. When the foster mother took custody of D.W., he had not seen a doctor since birth but, at the time of the termination hearin g, he was up-to-date on his immu nizations and he had seen several medical care providers for his medi al needs. D.W. was also show ing signs of autism, but had not been so diagnosed. Felicia Tyler, a social worker with James City County Divisi on of Social Services (DSS), referred appellants for a parentin g capacity evaluation to help determine what services would benefit them. Tyler referred appellants for a psyc hiatric evaluation, which they completed. Tyler referred appellants to James City County Housing Of fice for assistance, but in April 2009, mother informed Tyler that they were li ving with her father and they had a permanent address. Tyler testified appellants had a long history of unemployment and father reported he was unable to work due to a brain condition. Tyler referred father to a vocation and rehabilita tion center, but he failed to attend. Tyler testified fa ther attempted to secure disability benefits, but hi s application was denied for failing to provide the Soci al Security Admini stration with the ne cessary information.- 4 - Appellants were required to attend parentin g classes for special n eeds children, and Tyler referred them to a program in Hampton, but in July 2009, Tyler learned that to be admitted into the program, the children needed to be living with the parents. Shor tly thereafter, mo ther told Tyler about a parenting program for autis tic children in the Ti dewater area and Tyle r obtained information about the program. Tyle r provided the info rmation to mother. Mother never attended the program in the Tidewater area. Ty ler testified mother failed to inform her the prog ram was not for children with special needs until one week prior to the March 22, 2010 termination hearin g. Tyler testified DSS also provided transportation for appellants and helped appe llants with medi cal bills and prescription medications. On February 21, 2010, mother informed Tyler that appellant s were living in a hotel and mother started working at the front desk at th e hotel the previous night. Mother explained appellants moved out of her father’s home due to an alte rcation. Tyler testifie d that appellants were consistent with their vis its with the children until December 2009, but sin ce that time they have missed several visits. The trial court held th e termination hearing on March 22, 20 10, but father left the courtroom prior to the beginning of testim ony. At the c onclusion of Tyler’s test imony, the trial judge continued the hearing to November 2, 2010 to determine the stability of mother’s employment and of appellants’ housing. The trial judge wanted DSS to investigat e the hotel to determine if it was an appropriate place for children and to determine if mother could obtain training for parenting an autistic child. At the continued hearing, moth er testified she was still employ ed at the hotel and appellants were living in the hotel, but she had just received Section 8 housing and was planning on looking at a residence later that day. Mother testified she obtained a degree in medical assisting, but she did not plan to pursue a career in that field and sh e intended to pursue a career in law enforcement or- 5 - obtain a law degree. Mother had not taken any steps, however, to purs ue a career in law enforcement. Mother testified sh e continued to take medication for mental health issues and was in the process of finding a new ther apist. She claimed father woul d care for the ch ildren while she worked and father’s application fo r disability benefits wa s in the appeal proces s. Mother testified father had to attend anger management classes af ter a conviction arising fro m the altercation at her father’s house. She conceded father still beca me angry at times, but sh e “redirects” him and his anger subsides. Mother a sserted appellants attended parenting classes and did self-study on caring for children with special needs. At the conclusion of the cont inued termination hear ing, the trial judge found that father’s action of leaving the prior termination hearing and hi s demeanor while he listen ed to the evidence at the continued hearing showed a “lack of stability” and that father appeared “t o be almost disengaged with what we’re doing.” The trial judge stated that mother’s plan fo r father to care for the children while she worked was not realistic because father was “incapable of taking care of the children with special needs.” The trial judge noted mother attended programs an d furthered her education, but stated “just attending programs do esn’t make you a better parent.” The trial judge fo und that living in a hotel was not a basis for terminating mother’s pa rental rights, but, based upon the totality of the circumstances and mother’s plan to have father care for the childr en while she worked, the evidence was clear and convincing th at appellants were unw illing or unable within a reasonable period of time to remedy substantially the conditions which led to the placement of the children in foster care. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides that the residual parental rights may be te rminated if it is in the best interests of the child and [t]he parent or parent s, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child wa s placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placem ent notwithstanding the reasonable- 6 - and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. Decisions to terminate parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C) hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that created the original danger to the child, bu t on the demonstrated failure of the parent to make reasonable changes. Considerably more “retrospective in nature,” s ubsection C requires the court to determine whether the parent ha s been unwilling or unable to remedy the problems during the period in which he [or she] has been offered rehabilitation services. Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 46 Va. App. 257, 271, 616 S. E.2d 765, 772 (2005) (citation omitted). “‘In matters of a child’s welfare, trial courts are vested w ith broad discretion in making the decisions necessary to gua rd and to foster a child ’s best interests.’” Logan , 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting Farley v. Farley , 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S. E.2d 794, 795 (1990)). The trial court’s judgment, “when based on evidence heard ore tenus , will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Peple v. Peple , 5 Va. App. 414, 422, 364 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1988). We cannot say that the trial judge erred in finding that the evidence was clear and convincing that appellants were unw illing or unable within a reasonable period of time to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to the pl acement of their childr en in foster care. Following a history of housi ng and employment in stability in other jurisdictions, DSS became involved with the family in October 2008. At the time of the November 2010 hearing, the children have been in foster care for more than two years. At the time of th e March 2010 hearing, mother had been employed for a shor t period of time as a desk clerk at the hotel and appellants were living in the hotel. The trial judge continued the hearing for approximately eight months to determine appellants’ stab ility with housing an d employment. At the time of the November 2010 hearing, mother had obtained a degree in medical assisting, but she did not plan on obtaining- 7 - employment in the field and she planned on pursuing a career in law enforcement. Mother had done nothing to pursue a law enforcement career. At the time of the November 2010 hearing, mother was still working at the hotel, but she planned fo r father to care for the ch ildren while she worked. Based upon the evidence at the hearings, father’s action of voluntarily leaving the hearing in March 2010, and his demeanor at the cont inued hearing in Novemb er 2010, the trial judg e found that father lacked stability and was incapable of caring for the children. Although moth er had obtained assistance for Section 8 housin g sometime after the March 2010 hearing, appellants had not obtained the housing and they cont inued to live in a ho tel. DSS attempted to find a parenting program for children with special needs, and mother gave DSS in formation about a program. DSS provided the contact information to mother in July 2009, and it was not until March 2010 that mother informed DSS that the program was not for children wi th special needs. Although appellants attended parenting classes and did self-s tudy on caring for an autistic child, they never applied their knowledge of caring for children with special needs because, prior to March 2010, appellants’ visits were with the children at the children’s prechoo l. The testimony by the foster mothers proved that the children’ s needs are great. In addition to the children’s needs, father continues to have anger issues requiring mother’s time and attention to “redirect” his behavior. “It is clearly not in the best intere sts of a child to spen d a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capabl e of resuming his responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1 990). Based upon the foregoing, the trial court did not err in termina ting appellants’ parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Accordingly, we summarily affirm the trial judge’s d ecision terminating appellants’ parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Affirmed.