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SIGIR 

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction 

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs at

(703) 428‐1100 or PublicAffairs@sigir.mil Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Summary of Report: SIGIR 09-022 

Why SIGIR Did This Study 

Since April 2003, private security companies 

and individuals, commonly known as private 

security contractors (PSCs), have provided 

physical security services to protect U.S. 

personnel, facilities and property as well as U.S. 

government contractors, subcontractors, and 

other parties supporting the U.S. mission in Iraq. 

The use of contractors, however, has not been 

without problems, including incidents between 

PSCs and Iraqis and between PSCs and U.S. 

forces. In late 2007, the Departments of 

Defense (DoD) and State (DoS) began making 

organizational and procedural changes to 

strengthen their oversight, coordination, and 

control of PSC activities, including PSC 

movements in areas of combat operations. 

This audit was conducted to determine whether 

the changes have improved the oversight, 

coordination, and control of PSC missions in 

Iraq. It also addresses Section 842 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) which states 

that audit agencies shall examine one or more of 

a number of issues relating to the control of 

PSCs, including (1) the extent to which field 

commanders were able to coordinate or direct 

the performance of contractors in an area of 

combat operations and (2) the nature and extent 

of any activity by contractor employees that was 

inconsistent with the objectives of operational 

field commanders. 

What SIGIR Recommends 

This report contains no recommendations but 

reinforces previously identified lessons learned 

that apply to other contingency operations, such 

as Afghanistan.

Management Comments 

We provided a draft of this report for comment. 

However, the responsible agencies were not 

required to provide comments to the draft of this 

report because there were no recommendations. 

Agencies chose not to provide written 

comments but provided technical comments 

which we incorporated as appropriate. 

July 28, 2009 

FIELD COMMANDERS SEE IMPROVEMENTS IN CONTROLLING AND 

COORDINATING PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTOR MISSIONS 

IN IRAQ

What SIGIR Found 

To determine the effect of recent changes to improve the oversight of PSCs, 

SIGIR interviewed or questioned DoD, DoS, and PSC company officials 

responsible for the oversight and coordination of PSC security missions. 

These personnel reported that the recent organizational and procedural 

changes have improved the control and coordination of PSC missions. For 

example:

Field Commanders: Nineteen current and former field commanders 

described the new coordination procedures as effective in exerting their 

control and oversight over PSC missions. None of the field commanders 

identified any recent PSC activities that were inconsistent with their military 

operations, and none identified problems with the current mission oversight 

process. 

Contractor Operations Cells (CONOC) Officials: Officials at all six 

Contractor Operations Cells, which were established to coordinate the 

movement of DoD and DoS PSCs with military units and to respond to 

incidents involving PSCs, uniformly said that the organizational and 

procedural changes have effectively resolved the coordination and oversight 

problems that existed prior to their implementation. 

DoS Regional Security Officers: DoS Regional Security Office officials 

also said that coordination between DoD and DoS has improved. These 

officials provide a unique perspective on the oversight of PSCs because they 

are responsible for both ensuring the safety of U.S. Mission personnel and 

ensuring that their PSCs meet contract requirements and abide by all 

applicable laws and regulations. 

Conclusion 

Field commanders and CONOC officials generally believe that the new PSC 

control and coordination procedures have been effective in ensuring that 

such activities are not inconsistent with ongoing combat operations. In an 

earlier report on reporting, investigating, and remediating serious incidents 

involving PSCs, SIGIR similarly found that improved oversight and 

coordination of serious incidents could be achieved by establishing core 

standards, policies, and procedures early in a contingency. SIGIR identified 

this as a lesson learned, and this report provides further evidence of the 

importance of these activities. 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202

July 28, 2009 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

U.S. SECRETRY OF STATE 

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS – IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Field Commanders See Improvements in Controlling and Coordinating Private 

Security Contractor Missions in Iraq (SIGIR 09-022) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. It includes information on the 

views of military field commanders on the extent to which they are able to coordinate or direct 

the performance of private security contractors in their respective combat operational areas and 

whether private security contractors engaged in activities that were inconsistent with the 

objectives of operational field commanders. This audit was conducted as Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Project 8031. The audit was performed under the 

authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities 

of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978.

This report does not contain recommendations; accordingly, the addressees were not required to 

provide comments. However, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Department of State’s 

Regional Security Office provided technical comments, which we considered in preparing the 

final report. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the 

report, please contact Joan Hlinka, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Washington, 

DC), (703) 604-0945/ joan.hlinka@sigir.mil, or Nancee Needham, Deputy Assistant Inspector 

General for Audits (Baghdad), (240)-553-0581, ext. 3793/ nancee.needham@iraq.centcom.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents 

Introduction 1

Background 2

DoD and DoS Have Adopted New Control Procedures 2

Officials With Knowledge of PSC Activities See Improvements in 

Coordination and Control 5

Contractor Operations Cells Officials 5

DoD Field Commanders 5

DoS Regional Security Office Officials 6

Private Security Contractors 6

Conclusions and Recommendations 8

Conclusion 8

Recommendations 8

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 9

Appendix B—Acronyms 13

Appendix C—Audit Team Members 14

Appendix D—Management Comments 15
1 

Field Commanders See Improvements In Controlling And 

Coordinating Private Security Contractor Missions In Iraq 

SIGIR 09-022 July 28, 2009

Introduction 

Since April 2003, private security companies and individuals, commonly known as private 

security contractors (PSCs), have provided physical security services to protect U.S. personnel, 

facilities, and property as well as U.S. government contractors, subcontractors, and other parties 

supporting the U.S. mission in Iraq. The use of contractors, however, has not been without 

problems, including incidents between PSCs and Iraqis and between PSCs and U.S. forces. The 

most widely reported of these was a September 2007 incident in Baghdad involving contractors 

working for the Department of State (DoS) that resulted in the death of 17 Iraqi civilians. In the 

aftermath of this incident, the Department of Defense (DoD) and DoS made organizational and 

procedural changes to strengthen their oversight, coordination, and control of PSC activities, 

including PSC missions in areas of combat operations. 

The objective of this review was to assess whether the new DoD and DoS organizational and 

procedural changes have improved field commanders’ oversight, coordination, and control of 

PSC security missions in Iraq. The review also addresses Section 842 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) which states that audit agencies 

shall examine one or more of a number of issues related to the control of PSCs, including (1) the 

extent to which field commanders were able to coordinate or direct the performance of 

contractors in an area of combat operations and (2) the nature and extent of any activity by 

contractor employees that was inconsistent with the objectives of operational field commanders. 

SIGIR recognizes that the recent U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement on the withdrawal of U.S. forces 

from Iraq that went into force on January 1, 2009,1

 will change how PSCs operate in Iraq. 

Nevertheless, the lessons learned in Iraq may prove valuable in managing PSCs in other 

contingencies. 

To assess how the new organizational and procedural changes have affected field commanders’ 

oversight, coordination, and control of PSC missions, SIGIR reviewed relevant documents from 

the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) and the DoS’ Regional Security Office (RSO). SIGIR 

officials also interviewed or questioned officials at the Contractor Operations Cells (CONOC), 

field commanders, and RSO officials who were directly involved in coordinating and controlling 

PSC operations and who had first-hand knowledge of security mission-related incidents 

involving PSCs to obtain their views of the effectiveness of the new procedures. 

 

1

 The agreement was signed on November 17, 2008. 
2 

Background 

In a report on October 30, 2008, SIGIR identified 77 companies that had provided PSC services 

to U.S. agencies in Iraq since 2003. The services included guarding coalition bases and work 

sites, escorting individuals and equipment convoys, and providing security advice and planning.2 

According to an October 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, complete and 

reliable data was not available to determine the number of contractor personnel performing 

security functions.3 However, an August 2008 Congressional Budget Office report estimated 

that approximately 25,000 to 30,000 employees of private security companies were operating in 

Iraq.4

 SIGIR’s report identified the estimated cost of these services as approximately $6 billion 

from 2003 through March 2008. This high level of dependence on private contractors to provide 

security, along with incidents attributed to their activities, raised concerns in the Congress and 

elsewhere about the ability of the U.S. government to oversee and effectively manage PSCs. 

Over the last five years, DoD and DoS have been the two primary U.S. government 

organizations contracting for PSC services in Iraq. DoD employs most of the U.S. contracted 

PSCs, primarily for static protection of military facilities and to protect the movements of senior 

military officials and supply convoys. DoS uses PSCs for two types of missions: 

• Tier 1 missions augment and support U.S. government security operations protecting 

personnel and facilities under Chief of Mission authority, high-level government officials 

visiting Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development personnel, and other U.S. 

government agencies. 

• Tier 2 missions support all other embassy operations.5

DoD and DoS Have Adopted New Control Procedures 

Following the September 2007 incident, DoD and DoS took steps to improve oversight, 

coordination, and control of PSC missions in battle areas in Iraq. These steps are discussed in 

detail in DoS Inspector General and GAO reports (cited in Appendix A). The Multi-National 

Force-Iraq (MNF-I) established the Armed Contractor Oversight Division,6

 and it became 

operational in May 2008, to provide oversight and serve as its overall point of contact on policies 

that govern DoD’s PSC incidents. MNF-I also published comprehensive guidance related to the 

oversight of DoD’s PSCs and made military units more responsible for providing oversight of 

PSC missions, incident reporting, investigations, and contract management. In December 2007, 

DoD and DoS signed a Memorandum of Agreement to define the agencies’ authority and 

responsibility for the accountability and operations of PSCs in Iraq. In addition to establishing 

common rules for the use of force and preparing serious incident reports and investigations, the 

agreement also established coordination and control procedures for PSC missions and assigned 

 

2 Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors (SIGIR-09-005, 10/30/2008) 3 Contingency Contracting: DoD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan

(GAO 09-19, 10/1/2008). 

4 Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, CBO, 8/2008. 5

 DoS also uses PSCs to provide security to affiliated activities and refers to these as Tier 3 missions; these missions 

operate within the MNC-I/CONOC system. For the purpose of this report, SIGIR has included these missions in its 

discussion of Tier 2 missions. 

6

 In April 2009, the Division was renamed the Armed Contractor Oversight Branch. 
3 

liaison officers to monitor and coordinate the operations of their separate PSCs. In accordance 

with the agreement, RSO and MNC-I exchanged liaison officers who are now embedded in the 

MNC-I/CONOC and the RSO Tactical Operations Center, respectively. 

Early in 2008, MNC-I established six CONOCs throughout Iraq to coordinate the movement of 

DoD and DoS PSCs with military units; the central CONOC is located at MNC-I headquarters at 

Camp Victory, and the other five are located at the five divisions that control the battle spaces in 

Iraq. These CONOCs also respond to incidents involving PSCs. Under DoD’s new rules, PSCs 

are required to give the central CONOC at least 72- hours advance notice prior to entering its 

area of responsibility. Additionally, DoD gave field commanders the authority to approve, alter, 

or deny most PSC mission requests in their area of responsibility. 

The MNC-I/CONOC has become the critical link between most PSCs and the battlefield 

commanders, and it plays a critical role in overseeing and coordinating PSC activities within 

Iraq. Because officials working in the CONOCs are now integrated with and report to the 

tactical operations centers in each of the divisions that control the corresponding battle space, 

and because they have visibility over RSO missions and coordinate with MNC-I’s Commercial 

Movement Division,7

 they can view PSC movement requests in context with other battle space 

activities. In addition, CONOC officials receive and distribute daily DoD PSC movement 

requests and other reports, coordinate Quick Reaction Forces, and support post-incident 

consequence management activities. Figure 1 shows the current process for handling and 

controlling DoD and DoS-managed Tier 2 PSC movement requests, and the key role played by 

the CONOCs in the process. 

 

7

 Formerly the Gulf Region Division’s Logistical Movement Coordination Center. 
4 

Figure 1—Multi-National Corps-Iraq Private Security Contractor Movement Request and 

Approval Process a 

Notes: 

a Includes all DoD-managed PSCs and DoS-managed Tier 2 PSCs. 

b Decisions to approve or disapprove movement requests are based on the field commander’s assessment of conflicts with operations, problems 

with suggested routes, and intelligence regarding safety factors for movement.

DoS also made a number of changes to its management and oversight of its PSCs. In early 2008, 

DoS issued new directives to improve PSC mission coordination. The new directives established 

separate PSC movement reporting requirements for its two types of missions. Tier 1 missions 

support the Chief of Mission or provide security to other DoS personnel, diplomats, and senior 

government officials. Tier 2 missions support all other embassy operations. Tier 1 missions are 

approved by the RSO in Baghdad and do not require DoD approval to proceed. Instead, the RSO 

is to forward information on the mission to the MNC-I Liaison Officer and the field commander 

where the movement will take place, a minimum of 24 hours in advance. The Liaison Officer 

then shares this information with the MNC-I Joint Operations Center. Although DoD approval is 

not required, field commanders can recommend that the movement be altered or cancelled based 

on their own battle area information. 

DoS Tier 2 missions operate within the MNC-I/CONOC system and follow the same procedures 

as the DoD-managed PSCs. Tier 2 PSCs must submit their movement requests to the central 

CONOC at least 72 hours in advance of the movement. The central CONOC performs quality 

assurance on the request and forwards it to the responsible regional CONOC and the applicable 

field commander for their approval. 
5 

Officials With Knowledge of PSC Activities See 

Improvements in Coordination and Control 

Key DoD and DoS officials responsible for controlling and coordinating PSC operations and 

managing the incident reporting system generally reported to us that the recent procedural 

changes have improved their oversight, coordination, and control of PSC activities. PSC 

officials also believe that their coordination with the military has improved.

Contractor Operations Cells Officials 

We interviewed or received requested written responses to our questions from officials at all six

CONOCs in Iraq. As discussed earlier, the CONOCs are integrated with and report to the 

tactical operations centers in each of the divisions that control the corresponding battle space. 

CONOC officials receive and distribute daily PSC movement requests, coordinate Quick 

Reaction Forces, and support post-incident consequence management activities. As such, their 

responses are based on first-hand knowledge of PSC activities. 

The CONOC officials uniformly said that the recent organizational changes have effectively 

resolved the coordination and oversight problems that existed prior to the September 2007 

incident in Baghdad. The CONOCs are receiving mission request forms from the PSCs and 

forwarding them to the units operating in the area, and the responsible CONOC is provided a 

copy of every e-mail that is sent to a PSC and to the field commanders. In addition, because all 

U.S. government PSCs (except those supporting Tier 1 missions) must receive DoD approval 

prior to a mission, the PSCs and the CONOCs are now communicating more frequently. One 

CONOC official also said that the PSCs’ 72-hour movement notification requirement and the 

required approval of such movements by appropriate subordinate brigade and battalion 

formations were particularly important. These changes have been key to improving control. 

All of the CONOC officials reported that the PSCs’ rules and responsibilities are now more 

clearly defined and that, other than some traffic issues, they were unaware of any recent serious 

PSC operations that have been inconsistent with military objectives. As one CONOC official 

stated, the CONOCs are now able to proactively track all PSC movements and maintain an 

overall situational awareness throughout the day. 

DoD Field Commanders 

We interviewed or received written responses to our questions from 19 current and former DoD 

field commanders. DoD field commanders are particularly affected by PSC activities in their 

areas of operation. As such, a significant concern has been whether PSC activities were 

inconsistent with the objectives of these commanders. MNC-I field commanders who had been 

involved with PSC activities in 2007 but had redeployed noted that there had been significant 

problems in PSC oversight and control. They said that prior to the new rules, the PSC missiontracking process lacked structure and control, and commanders had no authority to limit, modify, 

or deny such movements. Nonetheless, field commanders were unable to identify any PSC 

activities that were inconsistent with their military operations. However, they almost 
6 

unanimously complained of traffic-related incidents and the PSCs’ bad behavior on the roads. 

Two officials noted that although most PSCs did not cause problems, other PSCs drove 

aggressively and abused the rules of the road. 

More recent MNC-I field commanders who responded to our questions described the new 

procedures as generally effective in giving them the necessary control and oversight of PSC 

activities. None of the field commanders identified any recent PSC activities that were 

inconsistent with their military operations, and none identified problems in the current mission 

movement oversight process. The commanders also believe that DoD and DoS currently 

exercise sufficient control over PSC missions. As one official noted, the current system “is 

effective and does not require additional changes.” Field commanders highlighted a number of 

changes as especially effective in improving the operating environment, including the 

requirement that PSCs submit movement notifications no later than 72 hours prior to the planned 

movement and the establishment of both the liaison officers the DoS Tactical Operations Center 

and the DoD Joint Operations Center. The establishment of liaison officers was identified as 

critical in improving communication and coordination. 

DoS Regional Security Office Officials 

RSO officials also told SIGIR that coordination between DoD and DoS has improved. These 

officials provide a unique perspective on the oversight of PSCs because they are responsible for 

ensuring the safety of U.S. Mission personnel and also ensuring that their PSCs meet contract 

requirements and abide by all applicable laws and regulations of the U.S. and Iraqi governments. 

RSO officials stated that they have enhanced their procedures for sharing information on PSC 

missions with DoD and have improved the accuracy and utility of data regarding movements 

through the battle space. Although information on their Tier 1 PSC operations that directly 

support Mission personnel is not required to be vetted through the CONOCs, RSO officials now 

distribute this information to the MNC-I liaison officer who then forwards the data to the field 

commanders, and coordinate daily with the Tactical Operations Center. When possible, the RSO 

provides information on its Tier 1 missions through DoD’s central information system at least 24 

hours in advance of any movement. Also, RSO officials, through the RSO liaison officer, 

provide daily briefings on the movement of Tier 1 PSCs to the DoD strategic and joint operations 

centers. In this manner, field commanders are informed of the missions and are given the 

opportunity to recommend whether or not the missions should proceed. Although the ultimate 

decision on whether Tier 1 missions should proceed rests with the Chief of Mission, RSO 

officials said that when MNC-I officials have recommended that a planned Tier 1 mission not 

take place, they have cancelled the mission. 

Private Security Contractors 

We interviewed five officials representing five private security companies. These officials stated 

that since the new procedures were put in place, mission coordination has improved. One 

official noted that prior to establishing the CONOCs, unlicensed PSCs could travel through the 

country without being monitored or controlled. Another official noted that PSCs performed their 

missions based on their own company culture, and some were more aggressive than others. A 

representative from the Professional Services Council, a national trade association that supports 
7 

PSCs, noted that prior to the changes, no military entity had the authority to direct movements 

and that communications were dependent on personal relationships. 

Four of the five PSC officials said that the new rules and procedures have addressed these past 

problems. Specifically, they noted that the rules and responsibilities surrounding missions are 

now clearly defined in written documents and that the new procedures have improved the field 

commanders’ visibility of PSC movements. In general, the PSC officials said that planning and 

interaction with the CONOCs and MNF-I has improved and that the improved military visibility 

over their movements will benefit the PSC industry by providing a quicker military response 

when incidents occur and medical assistance is needed. 

 
8 

Conclusions and Recommendations 

Conclusion 

Field commanders and CONOC officials generally believe that the new PSC control and 

coordination procedures have been effective in ensuring that PSC activities are not inconsistent 

with the objectives of operational field commanders. In an earlier report on reporting, 

investigating, and remediating serious incidents involving PSCs, SIGIR similarly found that 

improved oversight and coordination of serious incidents could be achieved by establishing core 

standards, policies, and procedures early in a contingency.8

 SIGIR identified this as a lesson 

learned, and this report provides further evidence of the importance of these activities. 

Recommendations 

This report contains no recommendations but reinforces previously identified lessons learned 

that apply to other contingency operations, such as Afghanistan. 

 

 

8 Opportunities To Improve Processes for Reporting, Investigating, and Remediating Serious Incidents Involving 

Private Security Contractors in Iraq (SIGIR 09-019, 4/30/2009) 
9 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

Section 842 of Public Law 110-181 requires the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) to develop a comprehensive plan for audits of private security 

contractors (PSCs). These audits are to examine a number of issues, including the extent to 

which operational field commanders are able to coordinate or direct the performance of 

contractors in an area of combat operations and whether contractor activities were inconsistent 

with the objectives of operational field commanders. This audit, conducted as SIGIR Project 

8031, was conducted to address these objectives and was performed under the authority of Public 

Law 108-106, as amended, which incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors 

general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. For a list of acronyms used in this report, see 

Appendix B. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix C. 

To understand the changes in organization and processes beginning in late 2007, SIGIR obtained 

and reviewed Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), Government 

Accountability Office (GAO), Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), and Multi-National CorpsIraq (MNC-I) reports and other public documents. SIGIR reviewed available information from 

the U.S. government and other sources on PSC activities in Iraq throughout 2008 and 

interviewed current and former field commanders to assess the effectiveness of current military 

efforts to oversee and coordinate PSC missions. Background information was obtained from 

several databases, including the one compiled by SIGIR in preparing its October 2008 report on 

the need for improved financial data reporting for PSCs.9

To identify the organizational and procedural changes that have taken place since September 

2007, SIGIR relied on a number of reports and audits, including a GAO report, Rebuilding Iraq, 

DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and Coordination of Private Security 

Contractors in Iraq, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements (GAO-08-966, 

7/2008). SIGIR also obtained information on these changes from MNF-I and DoD documents. 

To obtain viewpoints on the effectiveness of the new procedures, SIGIR interviewed or received 

responses to questions from 19 field commanders who are now or had recently been involved 

with PSC missions in Iraq. Because of the central role played by the Contractor Operations Cells 

(CONOC) in the incident and movement processes, SIGIR interviewed or received written 

comments from senior officials at the central CONOC and at each of the five regional CONOCs. 

SIGIR also interviewed or received written comments from officials of five PSCs. SIGIR also 

interviewed DoS officials assigned to the Regional Security Office (RSO) and MNC-I officials at 

the Armed Contractor Oversight Division. MNC-I field commanders who had been in Iraq in 

2007 gave us their views of the oversight procedures in place at that time and the problems they 

created. From MNC-I field commanders who were involved after the changes were made, 

SIGIR obtained information about their experiences overseeing PSC missions and their views on 

the effectiveness of the changes made to enhance control of PSC movements. To obtain 

information on the effectiveness of these procedures as they relate to controlling PSC 

movements, SIGIR prepared and submitted questions to MNC-I and asked that they be given to 

field commanders who had recently been involved with such movements. In total, officials from 

 

9 Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors (SIGIR-09-005, 10/30/2008). 
10 

nine battalion-sized units responded. Although the data we gathered from all of these officials 

was insufficient to draw broad conclusions, especially on the impact of changes on military 

officials in the field, we believe that the information adds to the body of knowledge on the issue 

and addresses an area of congressional interest. Moreover, the experiences of DoD and DoS 

officials in Iraq can provide key lessons for oversight of PSCs in Afghanistan and other 

contingency operations. We are therefore providing it for the use of Congress and program 

managers as appropriate. 

The field work on this audit was conducted from November 2008 through March 2009 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 

SIGIR plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for its findings and conclusions based on the audit objectives. SIGIR believes 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for the conclusion reached based on our 

audit objective. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

Computer data used to compile this report was obtained for background and informational 

purposes only and is not considered relevant to the audit results. All computer-based data was 

provided by DoD and MNC-I, and SIGIR considers it sufficiently reliable to support the audit 

objectives. 

Internal Controls 

To achieve the project’s objectives, SIGIR identified the procedures that DoD and DoS 

established in late 2007 and 2008 to strengthen oversight and control of PSC movement, but did 

not evaluate DoD’s internal controls for those processes. SIGIR did not assess MNC-I or 

CONOC procedures to oversee and coordinate activities. SIGIR did not examine the extent to 

which DoD controls its management activities, information systems, or human capital and other 

assets to administer the program. SIGIR also did not assess the extent to which DoD monitored 

the quality of performance of its program. To test the accuracy of the agency data provided, 

whenever possible, SIGIR identified different sources of agency information and other federal 

and private security contractor data to verify the information for accuracy and completeness. 

Related Reports by SIGIR and Others 

SIGIR reviewed the following reports issued by SIGIR, GAO, the Department of State Inspector 

General, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Research Service: 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

• Opportunities to Improve Processes for Reporting, Investigating, and Remediating 

Serious Incidents Involving Private Security Contractors in Iraq (SIGIR 09-019, 

4/30/09). 

• Oversight of Aegis’s Performance on Security Services Contracts in Iraq with the 

Department of Defense (SIGIR-09-010, 1/14/2009). 
11 

• Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors 

(SIGIR-09-005, 10/30/2008). 

• Quarterly Reports to Congress (SIGIR, 1/30/2003 through 7/30/2008). 

• Key Recurring Management Issues Identified in Audits of Iraq Reconstruction Efforts

(SIGIR-08-020, 7/27/2008). 

• Fact Sheet on Major U.S. Contractors’ Security Costs Related to Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund Contracting Activities (SIGIR-06-044, 1/30/2007). 

• Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Activities

(SIGIR-05-029, 1/26/2006). 

Congressional Budget Office 

• Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq (Congressional Budget Office, 8/2008). 

Congressional Research Service

• Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues

(Congressional Research Service, 8/25/2008). 

Department of State

• Status of the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq Report 

Recommendations (Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office 

of the Inspector General Report Number MERO-IQO-09-01, 12/2008). 

Government Accountability Office

• Rebuilding Iraq: DoD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and Coordination 

of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain 

Improvements (GAO-08-966, 7/31/2008). 

• Defense Management: DoD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on Contractors 

and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight (GAO-08-572T, 3/2008). 

• Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and Other Actions Needed to 

Improve DoD’s Oversight and Management of Contractors in Future Operations (GAO08-436T, 1/24/2008). 

• Rebuilding Iraq: Reconstruction Progress Hindered by Contracting, Security, and 

Capacity Challenges (GAO-07-0426T, 2/2007). 

• Military Operations: High Level DoD Action Is Needed to Address Long-standing 

Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces

(GAO-07-145, 12/2006). 
12 

• Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers 

(GAO-06-865T, 6/13/2006). 

• Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers 

(GAO-05-737, 7/28/2005). 

• Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management 

Challenges (GAO-04-605, 6/1/2004). 
13 

Appendix B—Acronyms 

Acronym Definition 

CONOC Contractor Operations Cells 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoS Department of State 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq 

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq 

PSC Private Security Contractor 

RSO Regional Security Office 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
14 

Appendix C—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared, and the audit work conducted, under the direction of David R. Warren, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. Staff members who contributed to the report include: 

Daniel Chen 

Whitney Havens 

George Salvatierra 

Charles Thompson 

Jack VanMeter 

Lovell Walls 

 
15 

Appendix D—Management Comments 

We provided a draft of this report for comment. However, the responsible agencies were not 

required to provide comments to the draft of this report because there were no recommendations. 

Agencies chose not to provide written comments but provided technical comments which we 

incorporated as appropriate. 

 
16 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

• oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

• advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

• deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

• information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the 

American people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil) 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

• Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

• Phone: 703-602-4063 

• Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

400 Army Navy Drive 

Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Daniel Kopp 

Office of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

400 Army Navy Drive 

Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil