NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. TERRANCE TYRELL EDWARDS,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 18

- 30138
D.C. No. 1:16

- cr - 00103

- SPW

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding Submitted December 7, 2020 * * Seattle, Washington Before: McKEOWN and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN, ** * District Judge. Terrance Edwards challenges the validity of his conviction s related to sex trafficking. We affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

DEC 9 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALSPage 2 of 5

1. The district court did not commit plain error by instructing the jury that the use o f the internet, a cell phone, or a hotel room necessarily has at least a de
minimis effect on interstate commerce , as required for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)

. E ven if the instruction was erroneous , the error did not affect Edwards’ substantial r ights. The jury heard evidence that Edwards traveled between multiple

states in connection with his sex trafficking activities , and that as he did so, he booked hotels in which his victims worked and used his cell phone and computer to post ads for their services on the internet

. Edwards has therefore not established a reasonable probability that the alleged error affected the outcome of his trial

. For the same reason, we reject Edwards’ sufficiency of the evidence challenge to this element of the offense. T he jury heard more than adequate evidence to find at least

a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g. , United States v. Sutcliffe , 505 F.3d 944, 952

– 53 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Dela Cruz , 358 F.3d 623, 625 (9th Cir. 2004)

. 2 . Rehaif v. United States , 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) , is not clearly irreconcilable with our prior decision in United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001). Taylor held that a conviction for sex trafficking a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), does not require the defendant to know the victim’s age. Taylor , 239 F.3d at 997. Although Rehaif states that the term “knowingly” is “normally read” to apply to each element of a crime , Rehaif does not present this principle as aPage 3 of 5

hard

- and

- f

ast rule

— let alone a rule that courts must follow even when there are good reasons not to, as we held in Taylor for § 2423(a). See Rehaif , 139 S. Ct. at
2196

. Taylor remains binding precedent.
3. The distr ict court did not commit plain error in its instructions to the jury regarding the definition of an “attempt .” Although the instructions regarding obstruction of a sex trafficking investigation , 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d), and tampering with a witness, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), did not require a finding that the defendant took a “substantial step” towards the culpable acts, a ny error in these instructions did not affect Edwards’ substantial rights. The jury heard extensive evidence that after his arrest, Edwards contacted multiple victims by phone and Facebook to try
to stop them from cooperating with law enforcement. Given this evidence, Edwards has not established a reasonable probability that the all eged error affected the outcome of his trial.
4. With respect to Edwards’ conviction for interstate sex trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a), sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Edwards transported victim A.T. across state lines. Transport ation under § 2421(a) does not require that the defendant operate the vehicle that transports the victim, or even that the defendant accompany the victim; it requires only that the defendant arrange the trip. See Taylor , 239 F.3d at 996

– 97

. The jury hear d testimony that Edwards rode in a car with A.T. from Washington to Montana and that this tripPage 4 of 5

was arranged by Edwards for the purpose of engaging A.T. in prostitution. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Edwards transported A.T. under § 2421(a)

. 5. Edwards has waived his right to challenge trial venue with respect to the count for distribution of marijuana because he did not raise this issue until after the jury reached a guilty verdict. S ee United States v. Powell , 498 F.2d 890, 891

– 92 (9th Cir. 1974).
6. The district court did not commit plain error by admitting into evidence Facebook message s between Edwards and victim S.E

. , as a ny error in admitting these message s did not affect Edwards’ substantial rights. With respect to Edwards’ message to S.E., even though S.E. was not named in the counts for obstruction and tampering, there was ample evidence of similar conduct towards the named victims , as noted above

. With respect to S.E.’s reply, although S.E.’s message may have been hearsay, S.E. was subject to cross

- examination about its

contents. S.E. also testified at length about Edwards’ psychological and physical abuse , desc ribing in detail many of the same facts referred to in S.E.’s message
. Given this testimony , Edwards has not shown a reasonable probability that admission of S.E.’s reply affected the outcome of his trial.
7. The district court did not abuse its discre tion in admitting into evidence Edwards’ prior conviction for promoting prostitution

. Edwards argued in hisPage 5 of 5

defense that he was helping his victims run their own, non

- sexual escort services for their benefit. The trial court properly applied Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and decided that the prior conviction was probative of his intent to commit the charged crimes. Evidence of Edwards’ prior charge for failure to register as a sexual or violent offender was introduced inadvertently on the same document that presented Edwards’ prior conviction

. T he government concedes that evidence of the prior charge should not have been admitted . However, the prio r charge was not mentioned in Edwards’ motions in limine, and Edwards did not object to this evidence at trial . A dmission of this evidence did not affect Edwards’ substantial rights . N either side ever referred to the prior charge during the trial , and th ere is no indication in the record that it factored in to the jury’s deliberations. Thus , Edwards has not shown a reasonable probability that this error affected the outcome of his trial.
AFFIRMED .