NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

TERRANCE TYRELL EDWARDS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-30138 

D.C. No. 

1:16-cr-00103-SPW-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 7, 2020**

Seattle, Washington

Before: McKEOWN and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and ROTHSTEIN,***

District Judge.

Terrance Edwards challenges the validity of his convictions related to sex 

trafficking. We affirm. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, United States District Judge 

for the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

FILED

DEC 9 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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1. The district court did not commit plain error by instructing the jury that 

the use of the internet, a cell phone, or a hotel room necessarily has at least a de 

minimis effect on interstate commerce, as required for conviction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1591(a). Even if the instruction was erroneous, the error did not affect Edwards’ 

substantial rights. The jury heard evidence that Edwards traveled between multiple 

states in connection with his sex trafficking activities, and that as he did so, he 

booked hotels in which his victims worked and used his cell phone and computer 

to post ads for their services on the internet. Edwards has therefore not established

a reasonable probability that the alleged error affected the outcome of his trial. For 

the same reason, we reject Edwards’ sufficiency of the evidence challenge to this 

element of the offense. The jury heard more than adequate evidence to find at least 

a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Sutcliffe, 

505 F.3d 944, 952–53 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Dela Cruz, 358 F.3d 623, 

625 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), is not clearly 

irreconcilable with our prior decision in United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994 (9th 

Cir. 2001). Taylor held that a conviction for sex trafficking a minor, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2423(a), does not require the defendant to know the victim’s age. Taylor, 239 

F.3d at 997. Although Rehaif states that the term “knowingly” is “normally read” 

to apply to each element of a crime, Rehaif does not present this principle as a 
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hard-and-fast rule—let alone a rule that courts must follow even when there are 

good reasons not to, as we held in Taylor for § 2423(a). See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 

2196. Taylor remains binding precedent.

3. The district court did not commit plain error in its instructions to the jury

regarding the definition of an “attempt.” Although the instructions regarding

obstruction of a sex trafficking investigation, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d), and tampering 

with a witness, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), did not require a finding that the defendant 

took a “substantial step” towards the culpable acts, any error in these instructions

did not affect Edwards’ substantial rights. The jury heard extensive evidence that 

after his arrest, Edwards contacted multiple victims by phone and Facebook to try 

to stop them from cooperating with law enforcement. Given this evidence, 

Edwards has not established a reasonable probability that the alleged error affected 

the outcome of his trial. 

4. With respect to Edwards’ conviction for interstate sex trafficking, 18 

U.S.C. § 2421(a), sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Edwards 

transported victim A.T. across state lines. Transportation under § 2421(a) does not 

require that the defendant operate the vehicle that transports the victim, or even 

that the defendant accompany the victim; it requires only that the defendant 

arrange the trip. See Taylor, 239 F.3d at 996–97. The jury heard testimony that 

Edwards rode in a car with A.T. from Washington to Montana and that this trip
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was arranged by Edwards for the purpose of engaging A.T. in prostitution. This 

evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Edwards transported A.T. under 

§ 2421(a). 

5. Edwards has waived his right to challenge trial venue with respect to the 

count for distribution of marijuana because he did not raise this issue until after the 

jury reached a guilty verdict. See United States v. Powell, 498 F.2d 890, 891–92

(9th Cir. 1974). 

6. The district court did not commit plain error by admitting into evidence 

Facebook messages between Edwards and victim S.E., as any error in admitting 

these messages did not affect Edwards’ substantial rights. With respect to 

Edwards’ message to S.E., even though S.E. was not named in the counts for 

obstruction and tampering, there was ample evidence of similar conduct towards

the named victims, as noted above. With respect to S.E.’s reply, although S.E.’s 

message may have been hearsay, S.E. was subject to cross-examination about its 

contents. S.E. also testified at length about Edwards’ psychological and physical 

abuse, describing in detail many of the same facts referred to in S.E.’s message. 

Given this testimony, Edwards has not shown a reasonable probability that 

admission of S.E.’s reply affected the outcome of his trial. 

7. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence 

Edwards’ prior conviction for promoting prostitution. Edwards argued in his 
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defense that he was helping his victims run their own, non-sexual escort services 

for their benefit. The trial court properly applied Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules 

of Evidence and decided that the prior conviction was probative of his intent to 

commit the charged crimes. 

Evidence of Edwards’ prior charge for failure to register as a sexual or 

violent offender was introduced inadvertently on the same document that presented 

Edwards’ prior conviction. The government concedes that evidence of the prior 

charge should not have been admitted. However, the prior charge was not 

mentioned in Edwards’ motions in limine, and Edwards did not object to this 

evidence at trial. Admission of this evidence did not affect Edwards’ substantial 

rights. Neither side ever referred to the prior charge during the trial, and there is 

no indication in the record that it factored into the jury’s deliberations. Thus, 

Edwards has not shown a reasonable probability that this error affected the 

outcome of his trial. 

AFFIRMED.