alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter II
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to subchapter A appear at 78 FR 60697, Oct. 2, 2013.

§ 205.18 Are administrative costs subject to this part? ( a ) A State and Fiscal Service may agree, in a Treasury-State agreement, to the following funding conventions for indirect costs and administrative costs: ( 1 ) The State will draw down a prorated amount of administrative costs on the date of the State payday. For example, the State would draw one-third of its quarterly administrative costs if payroll is monthly, or one-sixth of its quarterly administrative costs if payroll is semi-monthly.
( 2 ) If an indirect cost rate is applied to a program, the State will include a proportionate share of the indirect cost allowance on each drawdown by applying the indirect cost rate to the appropriate direct costs on each drawdown.
( 3 ) If costs must be allocated to various programs pursuant to a labor distribution or other system under an approved cost allocation plan, the State will draw down funds to meet cash outlay requirements based on the most recent, certified cost allocations, with subsequent adjustments made pursuant to the actual allocation of costs.
( b ) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, no interest liabilities will be incurred or calculated for indirect costs and administrative costs, provided the funding conventions described in paragraph (a) of this section are properly applied.
#### Old American Life Ins, Co. et al v. David Lewis

5-4831

438 S.W. 2d 22

Opinion Delivered March 10, 1969

*322
      *Alfred J. Holland*for appellants.

*Guy Brinkley*for appellee.

Lyle Brown, Justice.

Appellee David Lewis was awarded judgment against appellants, Old American Life Insurance Co. and National Security Life Insurance Co. Defendants below petitioned the court to set aside the judgment, alleging unavoidable casualty as justification for their failure to appear on the day set for trial. In dismissing that petition the trial court specifically found that they had not complied with Act 123 of 1963; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-2106.3 to 27-2106.6 (Supp. 1967). That act provides for the extension of the time for giving notice of appeal in cases where certain specified motions are filed. The sole question on appeal is whether the trial court applied the applicable law in denying the petition to vacate the judgment.

We discussed Act 123 in *St. Louis S.W. Ry.*v. *Farrell,*241 Ark. 707, 409 S.W. 2d 341 (1966). “Act 123 was evidently intended to remedy an awkward situation created by Act 555 of 1953. ’ ’ Act 555 required a notice of'appeal to be filed within thirty days after entry of judgment by the trial court. That requirement had to be abandoned for the benefit of a losing party who might have good reason to file a post-judgment pleading, such as a motion for a new trial, or one of the several motions enumerated in Act 123. Consequently, Act 123 established a procedure whereby the time for filing notice of appeal could be postponed pending the determination of such a post-judgment pleading.

Act 123 does not affect the long established procedures for the setting aside of judgments. It is clear from an examination of the act that the principal subject of all four sections is “notice of appeal”; in fact *323that phrase appears in ¡every section and a total of seven times in the comparatively short act. Any donbt about the act not affecting existing procedures for review by the trial court of ifs proceedings is dispelled by the last sentence: “Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to limit the right of any party to review of proceedings upon any motion which the law may permit to be filed after expiration of the time for giving notice of appeal.”

Appellants are entitled to have a hearing and determination of their petition under the appropriate statutory procedure.

Beversed and remanded.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 4135** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. HENRY MORRIS HAYES, JR. , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina , at Greensboro
. Catherine C. Eagles , District Judge. ( 1:12

- cr - 00177

- CCE

- 1 )

Submitted : September 13, 2013 Decided: October 3, 2013

Before AGEE, WYNN, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Jorgelina E. Araneda, ARANEDA LAW FIRM, P.C., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Frank J. Chut, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions a re not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Henry Morris Hayes pled guilty to two counts of embezzlement by a bank officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656 (2006) , and was sentenced to twenty

- seven months in prison. On appeal, Hayes argues that the district court erred by : (1) enhancing his offense level two levels under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3B1.3 ( 2011 ) , because the district court determined that Hayes abused a position of trust ; and (2) refusing to grant him a downward departure sentence based on his alleged “extraordinary acceptance of responsibility
. ” W e affirm. We find no clear error in the district court’s decision to enhance Hayes’ offense level under USSG § 3B1.3
. See United States v. Ebersole , 411 F.3d 517, 535

- 36 (4th Cir. 2005) (providing standard). Rather, t he record reveals that Hayes’ business banker position aided his crime s and provided him with authority beyond “an ordinary bank teller.” USSG § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1 (2011)
. Moreover, w e decline to review t he district court’s denial of Hayes’ motion for a downward departure because the district court gave no indication that it did not understand its authority to depart downward. See United States v. Brewer , 520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008) (“ We lack the au thority to review a sentencing court ’ s denial of a downward departure unless the3 court failed to understand its authority to do so. ”)
. In fact , the district court explicitly acknowledged the reasons Hayes believed he was entitled to a departure sentence a nd, although the district court stated it took these reasons into account, it explained that it believed a sentence at the top of Hayes’ Guidelines range wa s more appropriate because of the nature and circumstances of the offense. Because the district cou rt clearly understood its authority to depart from Hayes’ Guidelines range, but nonetheless rejected Hayes’ request that it impose a lesser sentence, we will not disturb the district court’s refusal to impose a departure sentence
. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment
. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE>           5
<LEGEND>
                    The Schedule contains summary financial 
                    information extracted from the financial
                    statements for P-B Capital Return Futures Fund 3, L.P.
                    and is qualified in its entirety by reference
                    to such financial statements
</LEGEND>

<RESTATED>          
<CIK>               0000857850
<NAME>              P-B Capital Return Futures Fund 3, L.P.
<MULTIPLIER>        1

<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               Dec-31-1997

<PERIOD-START>                  Jan-1-1997

<PERIOD-END>                    Jun-30-1997

<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS

<CASH>                          18,236,654

<SECURITIES>                    912,673

<RECEIVABLES>                   0

<ALLOWANCES>                    0

<INVENTORY>                     0

<CURRENT-ASSETS>                19,149,327

<PP&E>                          0

<DEPRECIATION>                  0

<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  19,149,327

<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           549,827

<BONDS>                         0

<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0

<PREFERRED>                     0

<COMMON>                        0

<OTHER-SE>                      18,599,500

<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    19,149,327

<SALES>                         0

<TOTAL-REVENUES>                (369,543)

<CGS>                           0

<TOTAL-COSTS>                   0

<OTHER-EXPENSES>                1,476,247

<LOSS-PROVISION>                0

<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0

<INCOME-PRETAX>                 0

<INCOME-TAX>                    0

<INCOME-CONTINUING>             0

<DISCONTINUED>                  0

<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0

<CHANGES>                       0

<NET-INCOME>                    (1,845,790)

<EPS-PRIMARY>                   (16.04)

<EPS-DILUTED>                   0

</TABLE>
# L_2020231EN.01001701.xml

| 17.7.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 231/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.7.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 231/17

---

Corrigendum to Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/510 of 7 April 2020 implementing Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran

(
  Official Journal of the European Union L 113 of 8 April 2020
  )

On page 15, the Annex, Persons, entry 74, first column (‘Name’):

for:

‘REZVANMA- NESH Ali’,

read:

‘REZVANMA-NESH Ali’.

---
HomeBiographies...Jason McInerney

# 				Jason McInerney			

															Deputy to the Ambassador at Large						Office of International Religious Freedom												

				July 24, 2023 -									Present							

Jason McInerney is Deputy to the Ambassador at Large in the United States Department of State’s Office of International Religious Freedom. He previously served as Team Lead in the office of Science and Technology Cooperation. Prior to that, he served as senior aviation negotiator in State’s Economic Bureau. He has previously served as Environmental Unit Chief in Hanoi, Vietnam; and as Economic Unit Chief in San Jose, Costa Rica. He has also served in Honduras; in Okinawa, Japan; at the Operations Center; and with the Office of the United States Trade Representative. Prior to joining the State Department, Mr. McInerney served in the United States Air Force.

Mr. McInerney holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Astronautical Engineering from the U.S. Air Force Academy, an MBA from the University of La Verne, and a Masters in Developmental Economics from Yale.

Tags

Office of International Religious FreedomState Department Official

## Related Articles

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Order entered April 22 , 2019

In The



## Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 18

- 01258

- CV

CATHERINE ROSSI, Appellant

V.

CAE INC. AND CAE SIM UFLITE, INC., Appellee s

On Appeal from the 14th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC

- 17

- 02898



### O RDER

Before the Court is appellant’s April 17, 2019 motion for an extension of time to file her

reply brief. We GRANT the motion and extend the time to April 25, 2 019

.

/s/ BILL WHITEHILL

JUSTICE
Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter II
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to subchapter A appear at 78 FR 60697, Oct. 2, 2013.

§ 205.30 What are the Federal oversight and compliance responsibilities? ( a ) A Federal Program Agency must designate an official representative to coordinate all interaction with us and the States concerning this subpart A, and must notify us in writing of the representative's name and title. A Federal Program Agency must notify us immediately of any change in the official representative.
( b ) A Federal Program Agency's implementation of this subpart A is subject to review pursuant to procedural instructions that we issue.
( c ) We will consult with Federal agencies as necessary and appropriate before entering into or amending a Treasury-State agreement.
( d ) We will distribute Annual Reports to Federal agencies, as set forth in § 205.26. Upon our request, a Federal Program Agency must review a State's Annual Report for reasonableness and must report its findings to us within 30 days.
( e ) A Federal Program Agency must notify us in writing if the program agency has knowledge, at any time, that: ( 1 ) A State's clearance pattern does not correspond to a Federal assistance program's clearance activity; or
( 2 ) Corrective action needs to be taken by a State, us, or another Federal Program Agency, with respect to the implementation of this subpart. We will notify the State or Federal Program Agency as appropriate in writing with a description of the Federal Program Agency's assertion.
( f ) A Federal Program Agency must notify us in writing of new Federal assistance programs listed in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.
( g ) If a Federal Program Agency causes an interest liability by failing to comply with this subpart A, we may collect a charge from the Federal Program Agency. A Federal interest liability resulting from circumstances beyond the control of a Federal Program Agency does not constitute noncompliance. We will determine the charge using the following procedures: ( 1 ) We will issue a Notice of Assessment to the Federal Program Agency, indicating the nature of the noncompliance, the amount of the charge, the manner in which it was calculated, and the right to file an appeal.
( 2 ) To the maximum extent practicable, a Federal Program Agency must pay a charge for noncompliance out of appropriations available for the Federal Program Agency's operations and not from the Federal Program Agency's program funds.
( 3 ) If a Federal Program Agency does not pay a charge for noncompliance within 45 days after receiving a Notice of Assessment, we will debit the appropriate Federal Program Agency account.
( 4 ) In the event a Federal Program Agency appeals a charge imposed under the Notice of Assessment, we will defer the charge until we decide the appeal. If we deny the appeal, the effective date of the charge may be retroactive to the date indicated in the Notice of Assessment.
#### Freddie B. JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ana M. OLIVAREZ; W. Moors, Chaplain; George Dibble, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99-16857.

D.C. No. CV-96-525-DFL.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 8, 2001 1.

Decided Feb. 2, 2001.

*322Before BEEZER, O’SCANNLAIN, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.

1

. The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM2

Freddie B. Jackson, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging an equal protection violation and race discrimination. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment, *see Barnett v. Centoni,*31 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam), and we affirm.

Because the limitations placed on Jackson’s access to the prison chapel library were related to a legitimate penological interest and Jackson failed to present any evidence to the contrary, the district court’s grant of summary judgment was proper. *See Freeman v. Arpaio,*125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir.1997).

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Jackson failed to present any evidence raising a triable issue that the defendants’ actions were motivated by racially discriminatory animus. *See Magana v. Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands,*107 F.3d 1436, 1448 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that mere conclusory statements of discriminatory intent are insufficient to avert summary judgment).

We have considered Jackson’s remaining contentions and they are not persuasive.

AFFIRMED.

2

. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1312 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1312

    To establish a freeze on bank fees for accounts held by average 
                               taxpayers.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 23, 1995

  Ms. Waters introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
              Committee on Banking and Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To establish a freeze on bank fees for accounts held by average 
                               taxpayers.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Freeze on Bank Fees Act of 1995''.

SEC. 2. FREEZE ON BANK FEES OF AVERAGE TAXPAYERS.

    Section 18 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1828) is 
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(s)  Freeze on Bank Fees for Average Taxpayers.--
            ``(1) In general.--During the 2-year period beginning on 
        the date of the enactment of the Freeze on Bank Fees Act of 
        1995, no insured depository institution may impose any fee of 
        any sort on any average taxpayer account in an amount in excess 
        of the amount imposed for such fee, if any, as of such date of 
        enactment.
            ``(2) Average taxpayer account defined.--For purposes of 
        this subsection, the term `average taxpayer account' means any 
        transaction account held by any person other than a corporation 
        in which the average daily balance (determined on a monthly 
        basis) does not exceed $3,000.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Guzman, Appellant.

[804 NYS2d 410]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Rockland County (Resnik, J.), rendered June 28, 2002, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in seventh degree (two counts), criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree, resisting arrest, and driving while ability impaired by drugs, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a *580hearing, of those branches of the defendant’s omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement officials.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the People established that the police had probable cause to search his car. Following a lawful traffic stop, a State Trooper observed a glassine envelope on the floor of the car, which, based on his training and field experience, he believed contained heroin. In addition, the conduct of the defendant and his passenger, coupled with the defendant’s inability to produce a registration or a rental agreement, supported the finding of probable cause *(see People v Yancy,*86 NY2d 239, 245 [1995]; *People v Rives,*237 AD2d 312, 313 [1997]; *People v Baldanza,*138 AD2d 722, 724 [1988]). Accordingly, the hearing court properly denied suppression of the gun, drugs, and drug paraphernalia found in the defendant’s car, and the drugs found on his person upon his arrest.

The hearing court also properly denied suppression of the defendant’s statements on the ground that they were involuntarily made. The evidence established that the defendant waived his *Miranda*rights *(see Miranda v Arizona,*384 US 436 [1966]; *People v Moran,*246 AD2d 607 [1998]), and that his injuries did not interfere with his ability to intelligently respond to the State Trooper’s questions *(see People v Frejomil,*184 AD2d 524 [1992]). The defendant’s remaining contention, that the State Trooper was required to readminister the *Miranda*warnings before questioning him, is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, is without merit, because the defendant was continuously in custody and answered questions within a reasonable period of time after being read the warnings *(see People v Myers,*17 AD3d 699 [2005], *lv denied*5 NY3d 766 [2005]).

The defendant did not preserve for appellate review his challenge to the procedure pursuant to which he was sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender and, in any event, any error was harmless *(see People v Bouyea,*64 NY2d 1140, 1142 [1985]; *People v Alston,*289 AD2d 339 [2001]). Prudenti, P.J., S. Miller, Spolzino and Dillon, JJ., concur.
#### § 1021.315 Exemptions.

Refer to § 1010.315 of this chapter for exemptions from the obligation to file reports of transactions in currency for casinos.
Exhibit 32.1
                                                               ------------


             STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
             SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

The undersigned, Mary Lynn D. Lenz, is the President and Chief Executive
Officer of Slade's Ferry Bancorp. (the "Company"). This statement is being
furnished in connection with the filing by the Company of the Company's
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2005 (the
"Report").

By execution of this statement, I certify that:

      1)    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
            13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
            U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and

      2)    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of
            operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods
            covered by the Report.

This statement is authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the Report so
that this statement will accompany the Report at such time as the Report is
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not
intended that this statement be deemed to be filed for purposes of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.


Date:  November 14, 2005               /s/ Mary Lynn D. Lenz
       ----------------------       ---------------------------------------
                                    Mary Lynn D. Lenz
                                    President/Chief Executive Officer


<PAGE>