In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 08-1762

RONALD ROMANELLI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DALIA SULIENE AND CHRISTOPHER KUHL,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 07-cv-19—Stephen L. Crocker, Magistrate Judge.

ARGUED MAY 26, 2010—DECIDED AUGUST 11, 2010

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises out of a

42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit in which prisoner Ronald

Romanelli claimed that Dalia Suliene, a jail physician,

and Christopher Kuhl, a jail sergeant, violated his right

to receive acceptable medical care during his pretrial

detention at Columbia County Jail. Romanelli alleged

that during his incarceration, Dr. Suliene and Sergeant

Kuhl were deliberately indifferent to what Romanelli con-
2 No. 08-1762

sidered serious medical needs, particularly with respect

to his needs for Crohn’s disease treatment and replacement eyeglasses. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding that neither of the

alleged health concerns constituted a serious medical

condition. Romanelli raises two issues on appeal: that the

district court erred in denying his three pre-trial motions

for court-appointed counsel, and that the district court

erred in admitting evidence of his prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Then-Chief District Judge Barbara Crabb, who initially

presided in this case, granted Romanelli leave on

March 13, 2007, to proceed on his civil rights claims

under § 1983 against Dr. Suliene, Sergeant Kuhl, and

several other defendants. Before any of the named defendants answered the complaint, Romanelli filed a motion

for court-appointed counsel. Judge Crabb denied his

motion without prejudice on March 20, stating that it

was premature to make such a determination, and that

under Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1072 (7th

Cir. 1992), Romanelli failed to demonstrate that he had

made reasonable efforts to secure counsel on his own,

or conversely, that he was prevented from doing so.

(Appellant App. at 22-24.)

Less than three months later, Romanelli filed a second

motion for court-appointed counsel. Romanelli contended that due to his indigence and incarceration he
No. 08-1762 3

would be unable to adequately represent himself. The

district court denied his motion on June 15, with

Judge Crabb concluding that Romanelli was sufficiently

capable of such representation under the law. The court

reasoned that the allegations made by Romanelli in his

complaint were both “comprehensible and literate,” and

that the case was fairly straightforward. (Id. at 26.) The

court added that under Luttrell v. Nickel, 129 F.3d 933,

936 (7th Cir. 1997), civil litigants are not, as a matter of

right, entitled to court-appointed counsel in federal court,

and that pursuant to Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 322

(7th Cir. 1993), only under “exceptional circumstances”

will a court appoint counsel for indigent litigants. (Appellant App. at 26.) Judge Crabb observed that if a

plaintiff like Romanelli received appointed counsel

merely because of his indigence and incarceration, an

“overwhelming number of pro se prisoner litigants

would become entitled to counsel.” (Id. at 27.)

The defendants moved for summary judgment in

October 2007. That motion was granted in part and denied

in part on January 10, 2008, the result being that Romanelli

successfully survived Dr. Suliene’s and Sergeant Kuhl’s

motions for summary judgment. His case against them

then proceeded to trial.

Romanelli filed his third and final motion for appointment of counsel on February 4, 2008. In support of his

motion, Romanelli pointed out that although he had not

deposed the defendants, they had scheduled his deposition, and “it would not be equally right for the plaintiff

to proceed to trial with a blind eye.” (Id. at 28.) He also
4 No. 08-1762

claimed that his recent diagnosis of depression and

prescription of an anti-depressant gave rise to exceptionally changed circumstances. Judge Crabb denied his

motion on February 12. Relying on Pruitt v. Mote, 503

F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc), the court reasoned that Romanelli had competently represented

himself in the case thus far, he had successfully

defeated Dr. Suliene’s and Sergeant Kuhl’s motions for

summary judgment, he had been provided detailed

instructions with regard to the applicable governing law

and trial procedures, and the case was not factually or

legally complex. Judge Crabb also observed that “[t]he

whole point of [taking anti-depressants] is to allow the

person taking them to think and act rationally.” (Appellant

App. at 29.) With respect to Romanelli’s other claim, the

court noted that Romanelli had been free throughout

the proceedings to depose the defendants, and that if

cost was the issue, “appointing counsel for the mere

purpose of shifting cost of litigation to the lawyer is

neither required nor appropriate.” (Id. at 30.)

All parties subsequently consented to the referral of

the case to Magistrate Judge Stephen Crocker, and trial

commenced on March 17, 2008. Before trial, the court read

a series of introductory instructions to the jury, including

instructions regarding witness credibility. The court stated:

A witness may be discredited by contradictory evidence, or by evidence that at some other time the

witness has said or done something, or has failed to

say or do something, that is inconsistent with the

witness’s present testimony.
No. 08-1762 5

If you believe any witness has been discredited, it is

up to you to decide how much of the testimony of

that witness you believe.

If a witness is shown to have given false testimony

knowingly, that is, voluntarily and intentionally,

about any important matter, you have a right to

distrust the witness’s testimony about other matters.

You may reject all the testimony of that witness or

you may choose to believe some or all of it.

(Id. at 4.)

Romanelli delivered his opening arguments first. In the

process of introducing himself to the jury, Romanelli

announced that he was a convicted criminal. During the

defendants’ opening statements, however, counsel merely

stated that the jury would be apprised of Romanelli’s

criminal record during the course of the trial.

Following opening arguments and outside the presence

of the jury, Judge Crocker held a conference with

Romanelli and the defendants. Dr. Suliene and Sergeant

Kuhl moved under Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that they be permitted to impeach Romanelli

with his prior felony convictions for bail jumping and

second-degree sexual assault, as well as his misdemeanor

convictions for twenty-two counts of issuing worthless

checks, resisting/obstructing an officer, and failing to

report as a sex offender. The court considered and

denied the defendants’ motion to use Romanelli’s convictions for resisting/obstructing an officer or failure to

report as a sex offender, finding that the probative
6 No. 08-1762

value was outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. However, the court allowed the use of Romanelli’s

other convictions.

Then, during Romanelli’s case-in-chief, in a strategic

decision apparently designed to preempt the defense

from casting his prior convictions in a negative light,

Romanelli focused on and explained at length his

version of the facts underlying the sexual assault conviction. He then detailed his version of what happened

during his stay at the Columbia County Jail. He claimed

that he suffered from repetitive, debilitating bouts of

diarrhea, but that Dr. Suliene and Sergeant Kuhl ignored

his requests for medical attention. Romanelli stated

that Dr. Suliene declined to perform any lab tests unless

he paid for them up-front. Romanelli did not present

any witnesses to corroborate his version of the events.

On cross-examination, the defendants attempted to impeach Romanelli by citing numerous inconsistencies in

his testimony, his prior written and oral statements, and

his evidentiary documents. Romanelli acknowledged

the fact that his formal written complaints about his

Crohn’s disease were submitted after he was transferred

to a different facility. (Appellant App. at 6.) Romanelli

also conceded that Dr. Suliene had in fact met with him

on several occasions prior to his transfer in order to

address his alleged discomfort, and that he was

simply unhappy with Dr. Suliene’s diagnosis. (Id.)

With respect to Romanelli’s prior convictions, defense

counsel merely confirmed with Romanelli that he had

in fact been convicted for issuing worthless checks and
No. 08-1762 7

sexual assault. Moreover, Judge Crocker specifically

instructed the jury on how it should consider the evidence of Romanelli’s prior crimes: 

You have heard evidence that Ronald Romanelli

has been convicted of a crime. You may consider

this evidence only in deciding whether Ronald

Romanelli’s testimony is truthful in whole, in part,

or not at all. You may not consider this evidence

for any other purpose.

(Appellant Separate App. at 169.)

During Dr. Suliene’s and Sergeant Kuhl’s presentation

of the case, they provided overwhelming evidence to

contradict Romanelli’s testimony, including but not

limited to the fact that Sergeant Kuhl promptly responded to Romanelli’s complaints and followed up

with medical staff on Romanelli’s behalf; Dr. Suliene was

familiar with Crohn’s disease and at the conclusion of

each of three examinations she found him to be healthy,

well-hydrated, and actually gaining weight; Romanelli

refused a blood test when jail staff informed him that

his jail account would be debited the charge for the

service; Romanelli continued to use the balance of his

account to purchase junk food and other spicy food

from the jail commissary; and Romanelli never sought

to obtain medication from home or from the jail canteen. (Id. at 6-8.) The court later observed that “there

was evidence contradicting every major premise

that Romanelli offered in his testimony and there were

numerous points on which Romanelli was caught in

inconsistencies that reasonably could have been viewed

as self-serving and intentional.” (Id. at 6-7.)
8 No. 08-1762

Throughout the trial, the court and the defendants’

attorneys adopted an informal approach to the proceedings in order to accommodate Romanelli. For example, despite being supplied with detailed instructions

on how to subpoena witnesses, Romanelli chose not

to subpoena any witnesses, or alert the court that

he might wish to present additional witnesses at trial.

Nevertheless, the defendants also permitted Romanelli

to question them and other jail staff freely about the

facts giving rise to his claims. When Romanelli presented

his own oral testimony, the defendants’ attorneys did not

interrupt him with objections, and the court did not

strictly hold Romanelli to the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The court and counsel also took a relaxed approach to

Romanelli’s use of exhibits. Finally, Judge Crocker explained his rulings in careful detail to Romanelli.

The jury returned a special verdict finding that

Romanelli’s Crohn’s disease and his need for replacement eyeglasses did not constitute serious medical conditions. Accordingly, the jury did not address the

questions regarding Romanelli’s state of mind or damages. The district court entered judgment in favor of

Dr. Suliene and Sergeant Kuhl on March 24, 2008.

Romanelli simultaneously filed a notice of appeal, a

Rule 59 motion for a new trial, and an alternative

motion for a judgment as a matter of law. We stayed the

appeal pending the district court’s disposition of the

Rule 59 motion. Romanelli presented virtually identical

arguments in his Rule 59 motion as those that are now

before us. The district court denied Romanelli’s Rule 59

motion in all respects on June 17, 2008.
No. 08-1762 9

II. ANALYSIS

Romanelli argues on appeal that the district court

erred in its denial of his motions for court-appointed

counsel, claiming that the outcome would have been

different had the district court granted his motions.

Romanelli also argues that Judge Crocker’s decision to

allow evidence of two felony convictions for impeachment purposes was unfairly prejudicial. We take each

argument in turn.

A. Court-Appointed Counsel

There is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel

in federal civil cases. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 656; see Johnson v.

Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, the district court has discretion under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(1) to request counsel for an indigent litigant.

Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654 (citing Johnson, 433 F.3d at 1006;

Farmer, 990 F.2d at 323). When a pro se litigant submits a

request for court-appointed counsel, the district court

must first consider whether the indigent plaintiff has

made reasonable attempts to secure counsel on his own,

or conversely, if he has been precluded from doing so.

Id. Next, the district court must evaluate the complexity

of the case and whether the plaintiff appears competent

to litigate it on his own. Id. at 654-55.

We review the district court’s denial of a litigant’s

request for appointment of counsel for an abuse of discretion. Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2008);

Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 658.
10 No. 08-1762

Our review of the district court’s decision is deferential.

Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 658-59. “ ‘A court does not abuse its

discretion unless . . . (1) the record contains no evidence

upon which the court could have rationally based its

decision; (2) the decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) the decision is based on clearly erroneous factual findings; or (4) the decision clearly

appears arbitrary.’ ” Id. at 658 (quoting Musser v. Gentiva

Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2004) (alteration

in original)). We do not engage in an independent

analysis of the plaintiff’s claims and competency; instead

our task is to determine “whether the district court

applied the correct legal standard and reached a reasonable decision based on facts supported by the record.” Id. “We ask not whether the [the judge] was right,

but whether he was reasonable.” Id. (alteraton in original)

(quoting Farmer, 990 F.2d at 322) (quotations omitted).

Although we may determine that the district court

abused its discretion, reversal of a district court’s denial

of counsel is reserved for when the litigant can establish actual prejudice. Id. at 659.

We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Romanelli’s motions for court-appointed

counsel. In response to each motion, the district court

applied the correct legal standard and carefully analyzed

the facts as they existed at the time of the particular

motion.

With respect to Romanelli’s first motion, the district

court determined that Romanelli had not demonstrated

that he made reasonable efforts to secure his own lawyer
No. 08-1762 11

or that he had been prevented from doing so. Regardless, the court noted the correct legal standard in the

event Romanelli were to make such a showing: “the

court must consider whether plaintiff is able to

represent himself given the legal difficulty of the case,

and if he is not, whether having a lawyer would make

a difference in the outcome of his lawsuit.” (Appellant

App. at 23.) Because at the time Romanelli made his

motion none of the defendants had filed an answer,

the district court properly concluded that the case was

still in its infancy, thereby making it impossible at

that juncture to make any accurate determination regarding Romanelli’s abilities or the outcome of the lawsuit. Therefore, we hold that the district court’s denial of

the first motion without prejudice was reasonable.

When the district court addressed Romanelli’s second motion for the appointment of counsel, it found

that Romanelli had met the threshold burden of showing

an inability to find a lawyer willing to represent him.

The court then considered the complexity of the

case and concluded that the legal issues were “not

overly difficult.” (Id. at 26.) The court opined that “[a]ll

plaintiff needs to show to prevail on his claim is that he

had a serious medical need and that defendants consciously disregarded that need . . . .” (Id. at 26-27.) Based

on its review of the pleadings, the court determined

that Romanelli could competently represent himself.

Because the court found that no exceptional circumstances existed that would merit appointment of

counsel, it denied the motion. We agree and conclude

the second denial was reasonable.
12 No. 08-1762

In considering Romanelli’s third motion for courtappointed counsel, the district court again considered

the complexity of the case and Romanelli’s ability to

litigate. Romanelli alleged that he had been unable to

depose the defendants and that he needed a lawyer in

order to do so. The district court was unpersuaded: 

The record . . . reveals that plaintiff has competently represented himself thus far. All of his

submissions have been coherent and articulate.

Plaintiff has successfully defeated defendants’

motion for summary judgment . . . . He has been

provided with instructions relating to the

conduct of trial and is presently taking steps to

prepare for trial. . . . The governing law of this type

of claim . . . was explained to plaintiff. . . . Plaintiff

is uniquely qualified to testify to his understanding

of the reason he was denied treatment. In sum,

I can conceive of no reason why plaintiff cannot

prosecute his claims on his own.

(Id. at 29.) The court also addressed Romanelli’s claim

that he was incapable of representing himself because

he had been prescribed and was taking an anti-depressant medication. It determined that such facts did not

give rise to the “exceptional circumstances” noted in

Farmer, 990 F.2d at 322.

Like the district court, we see no reason why

Romanelli could not have deposed the defendants or

how his medication adversely affected his ability to

litigate, and we take note of the court’s observation that

such medication might actually have accrued to his

benefit. The district court applied the appropriate legal
No. 08-1762 13

standard, and its decision was reasonable in light of

the facts supported by the record.

Adding further credence to our decision is the fact that

in its order denying Romanelli a new trial, Judge Crocker

addressed a central issue that is in front of us now. Judge

Crocker commented that “[t]he fact that Romanelli ultimately lost at trial . . . will not call into question the

propriety of the court’s decision to deny him counsel. . . .

Having seen and heard Romanelli’s performance at trial,

I have no doubt that he was sufficiently intelligent,

literate, articulate, tenacious and assertive adequately

to represent himself.” (Appellant App. at 12.) As to

whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the outcome could have been different had an attorney been

appointed for Romanelli, see Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 659, the

court said, “as a neutral observer of the entire trial,

I cannot imagine a realistic scenario in which Romanelli

could have prevailed.” (Appellant App. at 13.)

We agree. We find that in each instance the district

court applied the correct legal standard to the circumstances of the case at the time of each motion. At

no time did Romanelli show that he was incapable of

adequately representing himself. This was not an

overly difficult case. Throughout the pretrial and trial proceedings, Romanelli repeatedly showed that he understood the facts and legal principles of his case, as demonstrated by his defeat of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Although the district court provided

detailed instructions on how to secure corroborating

witnesses, Romanelli simply chose not to do so. More-
14 No. 08-1762

over, at trial he testified on his own behalf regarding

his unique personal knowledge of his health and the

treatment he allegedly was denied, he cross-examined the

defendants and other jail employees, and he presented

numerous exhibits relevant to his claims. The jury, however, found that Romanelli was not credible, and that

he lacked sufficient corroborating evidence of his claims

of serious medical conditions.

Romanelli further argues on appeal that an attorney

was necessary in order for him to secure expert medical

testimony to support his claims. However, because the

defendants conceded that Romanelli had Crohn’s disease, the only question remaining was whether he was

symptomatic of the condition. This was a credibility

question. The jury chose to believe Dr. Suliene’s and

Sergeant Kuhl’s testimony that they were responsive

to Romanelli’s complaints, that Romanelli appeared

healthy and had actually gained weight, that Romanelli

refused to purchase a blood test or pain medication,

and that Romanelli declined to contact his health care

provider for medication. Although it is conceivable that

an attorney could have helped Romanelli in some ways,

“just because counsel might have added opportunities

to improve the presentation of [the plaintiff’s] case does

not mean that the case itself was so overly complex

that counsel was required. . . . [S]peculating about how

counsel might have done a better job prosecuting the

case is neither necessary nor appropriate.” Jackson, 541

F.3d at 701 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because

this was a relatively straightforward case, and there is

no indication of prejudice, we find that the district

court’s decision to not request counsel was reasonable.
No. 08-1762 15

Romanelli failed to carry his burden to demonstrate

on appeal that the district court misapplied the correct

legal standard or that its decision was unreasonable.

Therefore, we find that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in denying Romanelli’s motions.

B. Prior Convictions

Romanelli also argues that the district court should

have excluded the impeachment evidence of his sexual

assault and bail jumping convictions. Romanelli contends that his sexual assault conviction in particular was

so highly prejudicial that its admission overly influenced the outcome of the trial on the merits. As a result,

Romanelli argues that he is entitled to a new trial.

We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 2006). In

this context, Romanelli faces an uphill battle because

“the district court enjoys broad discretion.” Kunz

v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 2008); Wilson v.

Groaning, 25 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he trial

court’s balancing of probative value and unfair prejudice is highly discretionary and will be accorded great

deference.”). We will reverse “only if an erroneous ruling

has a substantial influence over the jury.” United States

v. Smith, 230 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 2000).

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1), evidence of

prior felony convictions is admissible in a civil case

to impeach the credibility of the plaintiff, subject to

Rule 403. Under Rule 403, the district court must balance
16 No. 08-1762

the probative value of the evidence against the risk of

unfair prejudice to the plaintiff. Even though evidence

may be relevant, it may still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger

of unfair prejudice. Id.

Here, at the time of the court’s rulings on the evidence,

the jury was already aware that the lawsuit was a prisoner’s civil rights case. Furthermore, Romanelli confirmed his criminal history in his opening argument.

With this in mind, the district court exercised its discretion to admit the evidence of his felony convictions

for sexual assault and bail jumping, and his twentytwo misdemeanor convictions for issuing worthless

checks, while excluding evidence of his convictions for

resisting/obstructing an officer and failing to report as

a sex offender. Before the defendants ever questioned

Romanelli regarding his prior convictions, Romanelli

chose to describe in detail his version of the events underlying each conviction. Almost all the facts relating to

the sexual assault conviction that Romanelli contends

were highly prejudicial were brought into the record

by Romanelli himself. Despite having opened the door

to questions further highlighting these convictions, the

defendants limited their cross-examination to two nonsensational, factual questions that merely confirmed

his criminal record. Finally, the district court provided

post-trial limiting instructions detailing how the jury

should consider that evidence.

We conclude that the district court was well within

its discretion in admitting evidence of Romanelli’s prior
No. 08-1762 17

convictions. We note, however, that even if there had

been error as a result of the admission of Romanelli’s

conviction for sexual assault, such error would have

been harmless. The outcome in this case turned on

Romanelli’s utter lack of personal credibility and the

paucity of corroborating evidence to support his

claims—not on what the jury heard with respect to

his prior convictions. We find that the district court

did not abuse its discretion.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district

court’s denial of Romanelli’s motions for courtappointed counsel and the district court’s decision to

allow impeachment evidence in the form of Romanelli’s

prior felony convictions.

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