[Cite as Lewis v. MedCentral Health Sys., 2024-Ohio-533.]

COURT OF APPEALS

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CHRISTINE LEWIS JUDGES:

Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.

 Plaintiff-Appellant Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.

Hon. Andrew J. King, J.

-vsCase No. 2023 CA 0043

MEDCENTRAL HEALTH SYSTEM

dba OHIOHEALTH MANSFIELD

HOSPITAL, ET AL.,

 Defendants-Appellees O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Richland County Court of 

Common Pleas, Case No. 2022 CV 544N

JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 13, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendants-Appellees –

Anand Patel, M.D. and Mid-Ohio 

DANNY M. NEWMAN, JR. Emergency Physicians, LLP

The Donahey Law Firm, LLC .

580 S. High Street, Suite #200 KEVIN M. NORCHI, ESQ.

Columbus, Ohio 43215 BRENDAN M. RICHARD, ESQ.

Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP

LOUIS E. GRUBE, ESQ. 3201 Enterprise Parkway, Suite #190

PAUL W. FLOWERS, ESQ. Cleveland, Ohio 44122

KENDRA DAVITT, ESQ.

Flowers & Grube

Terminal Tower, 40th Floor

50 Public Square

Cleveland, Ohio 44113
For Defendant-Appellee - For Defendants-Appellees -

MedCentral Health System dba TotalMed and Jacqueline Schmitz, R.N.

OhioHealth Mansfield Hospital

BRADLEY L. SNYDER, ESQ.

KENNETH R. BEDDOW, ESQ. Roetzel & Andress, LPA

Bonezzi Switzer Polito & Perry Co., LPA 41 South High Street

24 West Third Street, Site #204 Huntington Center, 21st Floor

Mansfield, Ohio 44902 Columbus, Ohio 43215

For Defendants-Appellees -

Pluto HealthCare Staffing, LLC and

Lauren Clapsaddle, R.N.

MARY McWILLIAMS DENGLER, ESQ.

Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C. 

10 West Broad Street, Suite #1950

Columbus, Ohio 43215
Hoffman, P.J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Christine Lewis appeals the judgment entered by the 

Richland County Common Pleas Court dismissing her complaint against Defendantsappellees Anand Patel, M.D. and Mid-Ohio Emergency Physicians, LLP.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On February 14, 2022, Appellant was a patient in the emergency 

department of a medical facility operated by Defendant MedCentral Health System, dba 

Ohio Health Mansfield Hospital (hereinafter “Mansfield Hospital”). She was treated by 

Appellee Anand Patel, M.D. (hereinafter “Dr. Patel”), who was employed Appellee MidOhio Emergency Physicians, LLP (hereinafter “Mid-Ohio”). Appellant fell out of her 

hospital bed, fracturing her neck.

{¶3} Appellant filed the instant medical malpractice action against Mansfield 

Hospital and ten John Doe defendants on October 18, 2022. The John Doe defendants 

were identified as “physicians, nurses, hospitals, corporations, health care professionals, 

or other entities that provided negligent medical care to CHRISTINE LEWIS individually 

or by their agents, apparent agents, or employees, names unknown.” 

{¶4} With the consent of Mansfield Hospital, Appellant filed an amended 

complaint on April 14, 2023, eliminating the John Doe defendants, and adding Appellees 

and several nurses as defendants to the action. The amended complaint recited the 

action was filed pursuant to R.C. 2323.451(C) and (D). 

{¶5} Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the one-year statute of 

limitations for medical claims expired on February 14, 2023, and the action against them 

was barred. Appellant argued pursuant to R.C. 2323.451, a plaintiff pursuing a medical 

claim may join additional defendants within 180 days following the conclusion of the one-
year statute of limitations. Appellees responded R.C. 2323.451 requires compliance with 

Civ. R. 15(D), and because Appellant failed to serve the John Doe defendants as required 

by the Rule, the amendment was untimely as to Appellees.

{¶6} The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The trial court found the 

purpose of R.C. 2323.451(D) is to allow for amendment of a complaint past the statute of 

limitations when new claims are discovered through the discovery process, and does not 

provide for the substitution of parties known but unnamed in the original complaint. The 

trial court held Appellant was required to follow the procedure under Civ. R. 15(D) for 

identifying and serving John Doe defendants, who were originally contemplated when the 

complaint was filed. The trial court dismissed the complaint against Appellees with 

prejudice, including language there was “no just cause for delay” pursuant to Civ. R. 

54(B). It is from the July 21, 2023 judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes her 

appeal, assigning as error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING DEFENDANTS MIDOHIO EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, LLP AND DR. ANAND PATEL, M.D., 

WITH PREJUDICE.

{¶7} The instant case was dismissed against Appellees pursuant to Civ. R. 

12(B)(6). When reviewing a judgment on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, our standard of review is de novo. 

Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5. A 

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint. State ex rel. Hanson v. 

Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992), citing 

Assn. for the Defense of the Washington Local School Dist. v. Kiger, 42 Ohio St.3d 116, 

117, 537 N.E.2d 1292 (1989). In considering a motion to dismiss, a trial court may not 

rely on allegations or evidence outside the complaint. State ex rel. Fuqua v. Alexander,

79 Ohio St.3d 206, 207, 680 N.E.2d 985 (1997). Rather, the trial court may review only 

the complaint and may dismiss the case only if it appears beyond a doubt the plaintiff can 

prove no set of facts entitling the plaintiff to recover. O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants 

Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975), syllabus.

{¶8} Appellant initially named John Doe defendants in her complaint in 

accordance with Civ. R. 15(D), which provides:

(D) Amendments Where Name of Party Unknown. When the 

plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, that defendant may be 

designated in a pleading or proceeding by any name and description. When 

the name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended 

accordingly. The plaintiff, in such case, must aver in the complaint the fact 

that he could not discover the name. The summons must contain the words 

“name unknown,” and a copy thereof must be served personally upon the 

defendant.
{¶9} Personal service was not attempted on the John Doe defendants. Appellant 

filed her amended complaint, which specifically named Appellees as defendants, 

pursuant to R.C. 2323.451(C) and (D), which provide:

(C) The parties may conduct discovery as permitted by the Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Additionally, for the period of time specified in division 

(D)(2) of this section, the parties may seek to discover the existence or 

identity of any other potential medical claims or defendants that are not 

included or named in the complaint. All parties shall provide the discovery 

under this division in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

(D)(1) Within the period of time specified in division (D)(2) of this 

section, the plaintiff, in an amendment to the complaint pursuant to rule 15 

of the Rules of Civil Procedure, may join in the action any additional medical 

claim or defendant if the original one-year period of limitation applicable to 

that additional medical claim or defendant had not expired prior to the date 

the original complaint was filed. The plaintiff shall file an affidavit of merit 

supporting the joinder of the additional medical claim or defendant or a 

motion to extend the period of time to file an affidavit of merit pursuant to 

rule 10(D) of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the amendment to the 

complaint.

(2) If a complaint is filed under this section prior to the expiration of 

the one-year period of limitation applicable to medical claims under section 

2305.113 of the Revised Code, then the period of time in which the parties 
may conduct the discovery under division (C) of this section and in which 

the plaintiff may join in the action any additional medical claim or defendant 

under division (D)(1) of this section shall be equal to the balance of any 

days remaining from the filing of the complaint to the expiration of that oneyear period of limitation, plus one hundred eighty days from the filing of the 

complaint.

{¶10} The trial court held the purpose of R.C. 2323.451(D) is to allow for the 

amendment of a medical complaint past the statute of limitations when new claims are 

discovered during the discovery process, and not to simply substitute names for parties 

known but unnamed in the original complaint. The trial court held the procedure set forth 

in Civ. R. 15(D) is the only way to join defendants contemplated but not identified at the 

time of the filing of the complaint. We disagree.

{¶11} The statute as set forth above, although it refers to Civ. R. 15 for the 

procedure required to amend a complaint, does not clearly set forth it applies only to 

newly discovered claims or newly discovered defendants. The statute also does not 

specifically require Civ. R. 15(D) to be used for defendants contemplated but not identified 

at the time the complaint is filed. In fact, subsection (C) specifically states during 

discovery, the parties may discover the existence or identity of claims or defendants. 

The use of the word “identity” appears to directly address the circumstances of the instant 

case, where at the time the complaint was filed, the identity of Appellees was unknown. 

The use of the word “additional” defendants or claims is subject to the interpretation set 

forth by the trial court that only new claims or defendants may be added pursuant to this 
statute. However, the use of the term “additional” is also subject to the interpretation a 

newly identified defendant or claim may be added, even if the defendant or claim was 

generally contemplated in the original action, as subsection (C), specifically refers to the 

discovery of the identity (as opposed to the existence) of a claim or defendant. We find 

the statute is ambiguous on its face as to whether it applies solely to newly discovered 

claims or defendants, or also to newly identified but originally contemplated claims and 

defendants. 

{¶12} If a statute is ambiguous courts may look to the purpose of the statute in 

order to determine legislative intent. State v. Jackson, 102 Ohio St.3d 380, 2004-Ohio3206, 811 N.E.2d 68, ¶ 34. Representative Robert Cupp, a sponsor of the bill which 

included the provisions of R.C. 2323.451 at issue in this case, submitted written testimony 

before the House Civil Justice Committee, which stated in pertinent part:

The bill seeks to reduce the need to sweep into the lawsuit 

unnecessary defendants when litigation is commenced. When a lawsuit is 

filed within the statute of limitations, a plaintiff will be granted a period of 

time (180 days) after the initial filing of a medical claim to name additional 

defendants where there is evidence to believe they may have liability. As a 

result, the less than desirable practice under current law of initially joining 

numerous defendants in a lawsuit who are subsequently dismissed from the 

case after discovery gets underway (and it becomes evident they are not 

implicated), can be minimized.1

1 Available online at https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/132/hb7/committee.
{¶13} Thus, the history of the statute indicates the intent was to end the practice 

of initially joining any defendant who could possibly have been involved in the patient’s 

treatment which led to the malpractice claim, whether by specifically naming a large 

number of defendants or by naming and attempting to identify and serve numerous “John 

Does,” and subsequently eliminating defendants as more information is uncovered during 

discovery. Instead, the process set forth in R.C. 2323.451(C) and (D) is intended to allow 

the plaintiff to file the action against the larger entity, such as the hospital and/or any 

known and identified defendants, within the applicable statute of limitations of one year, 

and after identifying through discovery any other specific defendants involved in the 

plaintiff’s care, or any other claims of negligence, add those via amendment to the 

complaint within the 180 day time frame set forth in the statute.

{¶14} In addition, statutes of limitation “are remedial in nature and are to be given 

a liberal construction to permit cases to be decided upon their merits, after a court 

indulges every reasonable presumption and resolves all doubts in favor of giving, rather 

than denying, the plaintiff an opportunity to litigate.” Flagstar Bank, F.S.B. v. Airline 

Union's Mtge. Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 529, 2011-Ohio-1961, 947 N.E.2d 672, ¶ 7, citing 

Draher v. Walters, 130 Ohio St. 92, 196 N.E. 884 (1935). We find R.C. 2323.451, which 

provides an extension of the statute of limitations for additional claims and defendants, is 

by analogy also remedial in nature, and is to be liberally construed in favor of giving the 

plaintiff an opportunity to litigate the case on the merits. 

{¶15} Our conclusion the statute is not limited to claims and defendants not 

contemplated at the time the complaint was filed is further buttressed by R.C. 
2323.451(A)(2), which provides, “This section may be used in lieu of, and not in addition 

to, division (B)(1) of section 2305.113 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2305.113(B) provides:

(B)(1) If prior to the expiration of the one-year period specified in 

division (A) of this section, a claimant who allegedly possesses a medical, 

dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim gives to the person who is the 

subject of that claim written notice that the claimant is considering bringing 

an action upon that claim, that action may be commenced against the 

person notified at any time within one hundred eighty days after the notice 

is so given.

(2) A claimant who allegedly possesses a medical claim and who 

intends to give to the person who is the subject of that claim the written 

notice described in division (B)(1) of this section shall give that notice by 

sending it by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to any of 

the following:

(a) The person's residence;

(b) The person's professional practice;

(c) The person's employer;

(d) The business address of the person on file with the state medical 

board or other appropriate agency that issued the person's professional 

license.
{¶16} Clearly in order to comply with R.C. 2305.113(B), the plaintiff must have 

knowledge of both the claim and the identity of the practitioner to whom he or she is 

sending the 180-day letter. Yet R.C. 2323.451(A)(2) states the procedure outlined in R.C. 

2323.541 may be used in lieu of the 180-day letter provided for in R.C. 2305.113(B). If 

R.C. 2323.451 applied solely to claims or defendants not originally contemplated or 

generally known when the complaint was initially filed, the procedure would be 

unavailable to a plaintiff who has sufficient knowledge of the claim and defendants to 

comply with 2305.113(B)(2). The fact the legislature has clearly stated a plaintiff may use 

one procedure or the other, but not “stack” both in order to gain 360 additional days 

beyond the statute of limitations, is an indication the legislature intended R.C. 2323.451 

to not be limited solely to claims and defendants which were not known or contemplated 

by the plaintiff at the time the complaint was filed. 

{¶17} We find the trial court erred in finding Appellant could not amend her 

complaint to add Appellees within the time frame set forth in R.C. 2323.451. The 

remaining question is whether Appellees were sufficiently identified in the original 

complaint to render them parties to the original complaint, and not “additional claims or 

defendants” pursuant to R.C. 2323.451. 

{¶18} The original complaint named ten John Doe defendants, identified as 

“physicians, nurses, hospitals, corporations, health care professionals, or other entities 

that provided negligent medical care to CHRISTINE LEWIS individually or by their agents, 

apparent agents, or employees, names unknown.” Personal service was not attempted 

or perfected on the John Doe defendants, and it is difficult to comprehend how personal 
service could be obtained based on the description of the John Doe defendants2

. Further, 

we find R.C. 2323.451 was intended to avoid the very circumstance the use of Civ. R. 

15(D) in the instant case would necessarily entail: attempting to serve nearly everyone 

who worked in the emergency room department on the night Appellant was treated in 

order to meet the one-year statute of limitations, and later through the discovery process 

pinpointing which of the defendants were allegedly negligent, leading to her injuries. We 

find Appellees are “additional defendants” pursuant to R.C. 2323.451(D) because they 

were not specifically identified in the initial complaint, but were only generally within the 

purview of the description of the unknown John Doe defendants. We find the trial court 

erred in dismissing Appellees from the instant case based on the expiration of the statute 

of limitations.

2

It seems to this Court the purpose of Civ. R. 15(D) would be better served by requiring only a copy of the 

amended complaint, wherein the “John Doe[s]” have been identified, to be personally served. However, 

the Rule clearly states the summons must contain the words “name unknown,” and a copy “thereof” must 

be personally served on the defendant, which appears to require personal service on an unnamed, 

unidentified defendant.
{¶19} The assignment of error is sustained. This case is reversed and remanded 

to the Richland County Common Pleas Court for further proceedings according to law, 

consistent with this opinion. 

By: Hoffman, P.J.

Baldwin, J. and

King, J. concur