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ESTABLISHING A SYRIAN WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL?

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 30, 2013

Serial No. 113–110

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KAREN BASS, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Jeremy Rabkin, professor of law, George Mason University 

School of Law ........................................................................................................ 8

Mr. David M. Crane, professor of practice, Syracuse University College of 

Law (former chief prosecutor, United Nations Special Court for Sierra 

Leone) .................................................................................................................... 16

Alan White, Ph.D., president, AW Associates (former chief investigator, 

United Nations Special Court for Sierra Leone) ............................................... 32

The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker, national security project advisor, Bipartisan Policy Center ......................................................................................... 47

Mr. Richard Dicker, director, International Justice Program, Human Rights 

Watch .................................................................................................................... 58

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Jeremy Rabkin: Prepared statement ........................................... 11

Mr. David M. Crane: Prepared statement ............................................................. 19

Alan White, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................ 37

The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker: Prepared statement .............................. 51

Mr. Richard Dicker: Prepared statement .............................................................. 60

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 92

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 93

The Honorable Mark Meadows, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of North Carolina: Prepared statement .............................................................. 94

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: Statement 

of Mr. Michael A. Newton, Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt 

University Law School ......................................................................................... 95

(1)

ESTABLISHING A SYRIAN WAR CRIMES 

TRIBUNAL? 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittees will come to order, and good 

afternoon, everybody. 

The 2-year-old Syrian Civil War has produced increasingly horrific human rights violations, including summary executions, torture, and rape. Most recently, both government and rebel forces 

have targeted the medical and humanitarian aid personnel. Snipers—and I read this and I was sickened by it—are reportedly targeting pregnant women and children, and actually passing around 

cigarettes when they kill an unborn child who was put into their 

sights. 

Since the Syrian Civil War began, more than 100,000 people 

have been killed, and nearly 7 million people have been forced to 

leave their homes. By December of this year, it is estimated that 

neighboring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Iraq could see 

as many as 3.5 million Syrian refugees. 

Those who have perpetrated human rights violations among the 

Syrian Government, the rebels, and the foreign fighters on both 

sides of this conflict, must be shown that their actions will have serious consequences. 

H. Con. Res. 51, introduced on September 9, calls for the creation 

of an international tribunal that would be more flexible and more 

efficient than the International Criminal Court to ensure accountability for human rights violations committed by all sides and by 

more people. This hearing will examine the diplomatic, political, 

legal, and logistical issues necessary for the establishment of such 

a court. 

Today’s hearing will examine the controversial issues such as 

sovereignty, the ICC versus ad hoc regional tribunals, and the 

sponsorship of such a tribunal. 

Perhaps the most famous war crimes tribunals were the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials—the post-World War II trials of Axis miliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:42 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\131030\85316 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

tary officers and government functionaries responsible for almost 

unimaginable crimes against humanity. The Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union prevented the international cooperation necessary for war crimes tribunals to be convened by the U.N. 

After the end of that international political conflict, there have 

been three particularly notable international tribunals to hold accountable those guilty of genocide or crimes against humanity, in 

the former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, and in Sierra Leone. 

Each of these tribunals have achieved a level of success that has 

escaped the International Criminal Court. The Yugoslavia tribunal, 

for example, has won 69 convictions, the Rwanda tribunal has won 

47, and the Sierra Leone tribunal has won 16 convictions. Meanwhile, the ICC, costing about $140 million annually, has thus far 

seen only one conviction. 

The ICC process is distant and has no local ownership of its justice process. It is less flexible than an ad hoc tribunal, which can 

be designed to fit the situation. The ICC requires a referral. In the 

case of the President and Deputy President of Kenya, it was Kenya 

itself that facilitated the referral. 

This is highly unlikely in the case of Syria. Russia and the U.N. 

Security Council would likely oppose any referral of the Syrian 

matter to the ICC, but might be convinced to support an ad hoc 

proceeding that focuses on war crimes by the government and by 

the rebels, one that allows the plea bargaining for witnesses and 

other legal negotiations to enable such a court to successfully punish at least some of the direct perpetrators of increasingly horrific 

crimes. 

And Syria, like the United States, never ratified the Rome Statute that created the ICC, which does raise legitimate concerns 

about sovereignty, with implications for our country with this 

panel, which will also be addressed today. 

There are issues that must be addressed for any Syria war 

crimes tribunal to be created and to operate successfully. There 

must be sustained international will for it to happen in a meaningful way. An agreed-upon system of law must be the basis for proceedings. 

I remember when we were discussing the tribunal for the former 

Yugoslavia. Sitting right here in this room, not only did I convene 

hearings on it, I actually passed a resolution that was passed on 

the Senate side by Alfonse D’Amato, I did it on the House side, because we were so concerned that important information was not 

being transferred to the chief prosecutor to allow a successful indictment and prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic and others. 

I remember also there was concerns about—there were people 

concerns, a number of very, very interested parties—that it was designed to fail because it was so grossly underfunded, particularly 

at its onset, so that the kind of work that needed to be done was 

not being done. 

An agreed-upon structure, a funding mechanism, and a location 

for the proceedings must also be found. There must be a determination on which and how many targets of justice will be pursued. A timetable and time span of such a tribunal must be devised 

3

as well, and there are even more issues that must be settled. If 

there is a will, they will be. 

David Crane, one of today’s witnesses, has suggested five potential mechanisms for a Syrian war crimes tribunal. One, an ad hoc 

court created by the U.N.; second, a regional court authorized by 

treaty with a regional body; an internationalized domestic court; a 

domestic court comprised by Syrian nationals within a Syrian justice system; and of course the fifth would be the ICC itself. 

Each of these first four models have some benefits, some more 

than others. The ICC can be ruled out, and a domestic court in the 

near future seems highly unlikely. However, we are not here today 

to decide which of these models will be chosen. Rather, our objective in this hearing is to promote the concept of a Syrian war 

crimes tribunal, whatever form it eventually takes. 

Again, those who are now even perpetuating crimes against humanity must be told that their crimes will not continue with impunity. Syria has been called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. 

According to the World Health Organization, an epidemic of polio 

has broken out in northern Syria because of declining vaccination 

rates. One might reasonably also consider it the worst human 

rights crisis in the world today. Therefore, the international community owes it to the people of Syria and their neighbors to do all 

that we can to bring a halt to these actions while creating an accountability effort. 

We have assembled a highly distinguished panel to discuss the 

pros and cons of creating and sustaining a Syrian war crimes tribunal. This is not an academic exercise. We must understand the 

difficulties of making accountability for war crimes in Syria a reality, and we must do it now. 

Therefore, we must understand the challenges involved, so that 

we can meet and overcome them and give hope to the terrorized 

people of Syria. Their suffering must end, and the beginning of that 

end could come through the results of today’s proceedings. 

I would like to yield to my friend and college, Ms. Bass, for any 

opening comments. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Chairmen Smith and Ros-Lehtinen. Thank 

you for your leadership and holding today’s joint subcommittee 

hearing. 

As members of these subcommittees are well aware, the Syrian 

crisis is in its third year. And unless something is done to end 

atrocities it may well continue. While I am pleased with news reports that indicate the Syrian Government has cooperated with 

international officials toward dismantling and disposing of illegal 

chemical weapons, the human tragedy remains deeply disturbing 

and unanswered. 

The Congressional Research Service reports that over 100,000 

Syrians have been killed just since March 2011. Globally, estimates 

indicate that some 2 million Syrians have fled the country, and 

more than 4 million people have been internally displaced. But it 

is the indiscriminate slaughter of people, particularly women and 

children, that is and should move all nations to act to end this 

tragedy and hold those who have committed crimes against humanity and human rights violations accountable. 

4

We are all aware of the air strikes that have killed thousands, 

and we know of the attacks by opposition forces that have also 

killed innocent civilians, fracturing families and leaving mothers 

and fathers without their children and children without their parents. These attacks, whether by the Syrian Government or opposition forces, are, without question, Syria’s human rights violations 

and stand in stark contrast to international laws and norms created to preserve life and peace. 

The international community is unfortunately all too familiar 

with establishing mechanisms to address war crimes and crimes 

against humanity, and yet we find ourselves here once again debating what course should be taken to address the evils of war. We 

have seen the establishment of International Criminal Tribunal for 

the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for 

Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Khmer Rouge tribunal, and, of course, the ICC. 

Each of these and other mechanisms were created to address the 

tragic and deplorable actions of those who cared so little for human 

life and dignity. While these subcommittees can debate whether a 

new tribunal for Syria should be established, or whether the current mechanisms that exist are sufficient, I am reminded of the 

tireless effort of human rights defenders around the world who 

often put themselves in grave danger in order to both gather evidence and document human rights violations. 

One such effort is being conducted by the Syria Justice and Accountability Center, or SJAC. The SJAC is an independent organization that collects, preserves, and analyzes information on alleged 

human rights violations and other relevant data to inform and contribute to the transitional justice process for Syria. The SJAC is 

currently reviewing nearly 300,000 videos and 200,000 documents 

in an effort to track and prepare files for the day when justice can 

be served. 

The SJAC receives support from 40 nations. It is a Syrian-led 

initiative, and the aim of the center is to document violations of 

human rights and humanitarian law in Syria in order to support 

future transitional justice processes that might be adopted by the 

Syrian people themselves. 

We all know the Syrian crisis is not merely a crisis that impacts 

Syrian people; it is an international crisis that requires global attention. It is my hope that today’s hearing and the hearing that 

will undoubtedly follow will cast a light on policies that will wisely 

and swiftly end this crisis and heal the lives of those caught in the 

balance. 

Thank you, and I look forward to today’s testimony. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank my friend. I would like to now yield to the 

co-chair of this hearing today, but also the former chairman of the 

full committee, who served with great distinction, and now chairs 

the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, Chairman Ileana 

Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, thank you very much, Chairman 

Smith. Thank you for your leadership on this important issue, and 

thank you to my good friend Ranking Member Bass for jointly holding this hearing today. 

5

Now in its third year, the Syrian conflict has caused unspeakable 

damage to the people of Syria. It has placed a heavy burden on 

Syria’s neighbors, like our ally, Jordan, which has taken in over 

600,000 refugees, even though it strains the kingdom’s security and 

economic situation. Refugees have also gone to Lebanon, to Turkey, 

to Iraq, to Egypt. It has seriously jeopardized the safety of our 

friend and ally, the democratic Jewish state of Israel. 

This humanitarian tragedy has resulted in the deaths of at least 

100,000 over the last 2 years and has forced more than 2.2 million 

Syrians—around 10 percent of the population of the country—to 

flee to neighboring countries, and over 5 million Syrians are classified as internally displaced persons, IDPs. The situation remains 

bleak and continues to get only worse with each passing day. 

Disease outbreaks are rampant in Syria with polio, measles, typhoid, and hepatitis A all on the rise. Children are malnourished, 

they are not getting an education, and they can be easily 

radicalized by those extremists who prey upon those most susceptible. Anti-American attitudes are being spread by extremists as 

refugee camps become breeding grounds for terrorist groups to 

spread their radical ideologies and recruit young people to join 

their ranks. 

The harsh living conditions in these camps also leave women vulnerable to exploitation by sex traffickers, where girls are forced 

into short-term marriages for money to help support their families. 

Christian communities in Syria have taken a huge toll in this conflict as Christians are being targeted for kidnapping, torture, and 

murder, by radical Islamists who hate them just for being Christians. 

And many of their homes, churches, and neighborhoods have 

been destroyed. And there is no end in sight, yet this administration, whose foreign policy has been plagued with inconsistencies 

and paralyzed by indecision, has not moved to take decisive action, 

and not just in Syria but across the region, in Egypt and Iran and 

elsewhere. 

Time and time again the administration takes half-measures or 

no measures, and its indecision has eroded our credibility in the region, has greatly reduced our leverage over some of these nations, 

and it has severely strained our relations with many of our allies. 

And it has done so all for what? 

Assad still remains in power, even though he has used chemical 

weapons to murder hundreds of his people. Extremists still roam 

the country targeting those who do not share their strict view of 

Islam, and yet the administration thinks it would be a good idea 

to provide arms to those people who hate us as much as they do 

Assad. 

So we have sacrificed our standing in the region for the possibility of eliminating chemical weapons, but we still leave the ruthless dictator in power. And no one has been made accountable, not 

for the chemical weapons use, not for the deaths of over 100,000 

Syrians, not for the targeted attacks on Christians or other religious and ethnic minority groups. 

President Obama took quite some time to get around to the idea 

that Assad must be removed from office, but now after the chemical weapons use and the U.S.-Russian framework agreement, it 

6

seems that the administration’s position is now that Assad can stay 

as long as he plays nice on chemical weapons. 

We took a back seat to Moscow when it has been Russia who has 

been backing Assad and giving him the supplies and the weapons 

he needs to continue to murder his own people. And it is the same 

Russia that blocked every effort we tried to make at the U.N. to 

hold Assad accountable for his action, and stonewalls our attempts 

to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear-capable. And now we expect 

Russia to take the lead and really hold Assad’s feet to the fire over 

his transgressions. 

What kind of message does this send to the people of Syria who 

are being slaughtered and forced to flee, or to our enemies, and 

mostly importantly to our allies? Assad must be held accountable, 

Mr. Chairman, I agree with you. And when it comes to the Syrian 

war crimes tribunal, we must ensure that those behind these atrocities are held accountable without placing our brave men and 

women in jeopardy and out of our jurisdiction. 

I thank the chairman and Ms. Bass for holding this hearing. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Madam Chair, thank you very much for your very 

powerful statement. Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I just 

want to thank the witnesses for being here on such an important 

topic as we try to learn about the best ways, and some of the ways, 

that we can try to make sure that we hold those accountable for 

some of the atrocities that we have been seeing and witnessing 

over the past several months and years. 

And I want to thank the chair and ranking member for putting 

together an important hearing and giving us an opportunity to 

learn from some experts about the best way to do that. So thank 

you very much. I look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Chairman Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I just want to thank Chairman Smith 

and Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, as well as the ranking member, for 

calling this hearing today. And I want to thank our panel of distinguished witnesses for taking the time to join us as well. 

Violence in Syria has been spiraling out of control, and I think 

most of my colleagues would agree that some measure should be 

taken to hold the responsible parties accountable for the atrocities 

committed throughout this brutal conflict. I sincerely hope that our 

discussion here today will offer some potential solutions for bringing to justice those guilty of the ongoing war crimes in Syria. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Chairman. Ms. Frankel. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just thank you all for 

being here. We will listen with interest. I think everybody agrees 

that what is happening in Syria is tragic. We would like to have 

the wrongdoers—it seems like there are many of them—held accountable. But the big question is, realistically, what can we do? 

So I will be listening with an open mind. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Madam Chairman, for holding this joint hearing, and Ranking 

7

Member Bass. In the interest of time, what I am going to do is just 

submit my opening statement for the record. 

I will yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Would any other member like to be heard? 

[No response.] 

If not, I would like to now introduce our very, very distinguished 

panelists, beginning with The Honorable Jeremy Rabkin. Dr. 

Rabkin is a professor of law at George Mason University School of 

Law. Before joining the faculty in June of ’07, he was for more than 

two decades a professor in the Department of Government at Cornell. 

Professor Rabkin serves on the Board of Directors of the U.S. Institute of Peace. He also serves on the Board of Academic Advisors 

of the American Enterprise Institute, and on the Board of Directors 

of the Center for Individual Rights, a public interest law firm here 

in DC. He has published several books, and his articles have appeared in major law reviews, political science journals, and a range 

of magazines and newspapers. 

We will then hear from Mr. David Crane, former chief prosecutor 

for the United Nations’ Special Court for Sierra Leone. Mr. Crane 

was appointed a professor of practice at Syracuse University College of Law in December of ’06. He was the founding chief prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, an international war 

crimes tribunal. 

Professor Crane’s mandate was to prosecute those who bore the 

greatest responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, 

and other serious violations of international human rights, committed during the Civil War in Sierra Leone in the 1990s. He 

served for more than 30 years in the Federal Government and held 

numerous key managerial positions during his three decades of 

public service. And, again, many of those prosecutions that put 

some of the worst perpetrators of crimes against humanity is a direct result of the work that he did as chief prosecutor. 

We will hear then from Dr. Alan White, former chief investigator, U.N. Special Court for Sierra Leone. Dr. White is currently 

president of AW Associates, a global consultancy specializing in 

international criminal investigations and training involving crimes 

against humanity, war crimes, human rights, fraud, and anti-corruption. 

As the founding chief investigator of the U.N.-backed Special 

Court for Sierra Leone, he directed all international criminal investigations involving war crimes. He is a 30-year Federal law enforcement veteran where he last served in the Department of Defense 

and directed global operations and all criminal investigations involving terrorism, cyber crimes, bribery, corruption, kickbacks, 

major fraud, and other major crimes. 

We will then hear from Mr. Stephen Rademaker from the Podesta Group, who has a wide-ranging experience working on national 

security issues in the White House, the State Department, U.S. 

Senate, and House of Representatives, and once sat right here as 

one of the top counsels for this committee. And he currently advises the Podesta Group’s international clients. 

Serving as an Assistant Secretary of State from 2002 through 

2006, he headed at various times three bureaus of the State DeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:42 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\131030\85316 HFA PsN: SHIRL
8

partment, including the Bureau of Arms Control and the Bureau 

of International Security and Non-Proliferation. He also directed 

the Proliferation Security Initiative, as well as non-proliferation 

policy toward Iran and North Korea, and led strategic dialogues 

with Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. 

We will then hear from Mr. Richard Dicker, who has been director of Human Rights Watch’s international justice program since it 

was founded in 2001, and has worked at Human Rights Watch 

since 1991. He started working on international justice issues when 

Human Rights Watch attempted to bring a case before the International Court of Justice charging the Government of Iraq with 

genocide against the Kurds. 

Mr. Dicker led the Human Rights Watch’s multi-year campaign 

to establish the International Criminal Court and has spent the 

past few years leading advocacy efforts urging the creation of effective accountability mechanisms. He monitored the Slobodan 

Milosevic trial in The Hague and made many trips to Iraq before 

and at the start of Saddam Hussein’s trial. 

If we could go first to you, Professor Rabkin, and then each of 

our witnesses. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEREMY RABKIN, PROFESSOR OF LAW, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF 

LAW 

Mr. RABKIN. Well, I am not sure why I was chosen to open this 

discussion. Maybe it was to lower expectations. I want to start by 

saying, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, I agree with you it is very 

disturbing that the Obama administration just seems to be floundering and doesn’t seem to have a serious policy, and we do really 

seem to be forfeiting support in that region. 

However, that is not going to be fixed by a tribunal. So we should 

all understand that. Right? This is, at best, a contribution and 

probably a somewhat marginal contribution. We started the modern era of international trials with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and that was in 1993 when a lot 

of people were saying we need to intervene before the situation in 

the Balkans gets even more out of hand. 

And at that time, the Clinton administration said, ‘‘Well, we 

don’t want to send troops. We don’t actually want to be involved 

in bombing. Let us send lawyers.’’ And that was not a particularly 

effective response. 

And the first thing I want to say is, I mean, let us all be cautious 

about this. Sending lawyers is not going to fix the situation in 

Syria. 

The next thing I want to say is if you set up an international tribunal, even an ad hoc international tribunal, our experience in Sierra Leone is a little different because it was based there and had 

involvement from people there. But the tribunals for Rwanda and 

the former Yugoslavia, I don’t think they were very well received 

in the countries that they were supposed to help. 

And the people on those tribunals, both of which started in The 

Hague, the Rwanda one later shifted to Tanzania, but they got organized in The Hague, you start a tribunal in The Hague and you 

take, as your constituency, not the country that you are actually 

9

supposed to be helping but the community of international lawyers 

because you are in the headquarters of international lawyers, The 

Hague. 

And so they did a lot of things which didn’t impress people in 

Rwanda or in Yugoslavia but made lawyers think, oh, yeah, that 

is pretty good, that is interesting. I think the particular thing they 

did which everybody feels is very regrettable is they were excruciatingly slow. They went on and on and on. 

In the first 5 years, the Rwanda tribunal didn’t have a single 

conviction as they were getting organized. And this is after the 

murder of nearly 1 million people, right? And if you compare that 

to Nuremberg, within 1 year we started the proceedings, and then 

the people who had to be hanged were hanged. 

We were just incredibly slow. I say ‘‘we’’—the international tribunal was. And when challenged about this, they said, ‘‘Well, it is 

really important to show that we have followed international 

standards of due process.’’ Why was that really important? And I 

think it is because they took as their constituency the people they 

were trying to impress—international lawyers. 

That is I think a very bad path to go down. If what you want 

to do is make a contribution to Syria, we have got to focus on Syria 

and not what people think in The Hague. 

There is very fine testimony on this by Michael Newton. I understand he wasn’t able to make it today, but I just want to commend 

his statement; he had experience advising the Iraqi tribunal that 

tried Saddam Hussein. And the main point he makes there, one of 

the main points he makes in his testimony which is I think absolutely central, is you have to understand this as not so much a 

legal process but the legal application of a political process. And 

the political process cannot just be determined by outsiders. There 

needs to be a lot of negotiation with people in Syria before we get 

this going. 

I think it is really out of the question to launch a tribunal while 

Assad is still in power. And even if, within the next year or so, I 

hope he is succeeded by something else, we are going to have a lot 

of difficulties working out how this should be organized, and the 

focus should be what they will support and what will make them 

feel that this is justice. 

Let me just conclude with a last point. If peace does come to 

Syria, there is going to be a tremendous amount of bitterness and 

hatred directed at foreign fighters, because a lot of the worst atrocities are by people who came in from outside. We should all bear 

that in mind. Are they going to think, ‘‘Well, the foreign fighters 

were horrible, but the foreign lawyers, they are really great. They 

are our friends.’’

If we say, ‘‘No, no, no. They are lawyers from the good countries,’’ 

why are they the good countries? They are the countries that stood 

on the sidelines while they were all being massacred. I think we 

shouldn’t start with the assumption that they are really eager for 

American or Western European assistance. I think there is assistance that we can give to them, but let us not start from the assumption that we mean well; therefore, they are happy to have us. 

So I would suggest this. Before we get to a tribunal, we really 

need to gather evidence. I think we have a model that is worth 

10

thinking about from Lebanon, which is this independent investigative commission that they had starting in 2005 to investigate the 

assassination of Prime Minister Hariri. That experienced a lot of 

frustration, but it did gather a lot of evidence. And afterwards the 

Security Council was persuaded to establish a tribunal. 

That is maybe a model here, some kind of investigative commission which perhaps can work with the Syrian Justice and Accountability Commission, but gather more evidence and then we can see 

what kind of tribunal that can be handed off to. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rabkin follows:]

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Testimony on H. Can. Res. 51 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

U.S. House of Representatives 

October 30, 2013 

By Jeremy Rabkin 

Professor of Law 

George Mason University 

Arlington, Virginia 

I thank the committee for inviting me to testify on this important initiative to 

address the humanitarian crisis in Syria. I am sympathetic to the underlying aim of 

H. Con. Res. 51. I would like to suggest grounds for caution, however, before we 

urge the UN to establish a formal tribunal to judge war crimes in Syria. Instead. I 

urge the committee to consider a somewhat modified approach, one that might 

better adapted to the current situation and more feasible to establish, as an interim 

measure. 

Before expressing my concerns about the proposed tribunal, however, I want 

to express appreciation for two basic aspects of the concurrent resolution proposed 

by Rep. Smith and others. First, the resolution rightly calls attention to the whole 

range of atrocities inflicted on civilians in Syria. The United States government has 

so far focused almost all its diplomatic efforts on removing chemical weapons from 

Syria. That is a worthy aim. Still, more than 100,000 people have already been killed 

in Syria - all but a small proportion ofthem by conventional weapons. We should 

not minimize the suffering of victims or the gross indifference to international 

standards that has generated such massive civilian casualties. We risk doing exactly 

that by focusing almost all our attention on chemical weapons. 

Secondly, I commend the resolution seeking a new forum to address the 

Syrian situation, instead of simply urging a Security Council resolution to confer 

jurisdiction on the International Criminal Court. The ICC is an experiment in which 

the United States has declined to participate. There are sound reasons for U.S. 

caution about the ICC. Down the road, the Court may prove a threat to American 

military flexibility, by threatening to second-guess our commanders and inhibiting 

potential allies. So we should always be wary of helping to build up the ICC's 

authority. 

But there are more immediate objections to calling in the ICC here. The 

Court has so far devoted all its efforts to prosecutions in Africa. It has achieved so 

little in these efforts that African countries, even signatories to the ICC Statute, have 

openly challenged its authority and declined to assist it in even the most basic ways. 

The least one can say is that the ICC has no proven capacity to persuade people in 

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conflict zones that it is seeking real justice. It makes sense to tailor our response to 

the Syrian civil war to the particular circumstances ofthat conflict. 

We should not, however, be naive about the difficulties that even a new, 

special tribunal for Syria would face. The first thing to remember is that 

cooperation from local authorities cannot be taken for granted. Even in Rwanda, the 

new government was so angry at the priorities ofthe UN tribunal that it declined 

after a while to allow UN officials to enter Rwandan territory. And that was a Tutsi 

government, which had already secured its control over Rwanda and was very eager 

to see Hutu officials of the deposed government punished for the genocide they had 

implanted against the Tutsi population. 

In Syria, things will be much more difficult. Ifthe conflict is still continuing, 

when the special court starts to operate, it may have great difficulty persuading 

witnesses to give public testimony. Even if some sort of peace returns to Syria 

within the next few years, we cannot assume the government in place will want to 

cooperate. Ifthe post-war government is headed by Assad or a Baathist or Alawite 

successor, it will not want to allow close scrutiny of atrocities committed by their 

own, victorious forces. If the new government is drawn from rebels, they will not 

want to publicize atrocities committed by their forces during the civil war. 

Even in the most hopeful scenario, in which Assad is succeeded by a coalition 

drawn from a range of Syrian factions, we cannot assume that they will all be 

equally inclined to cooperate with an international tribunal. It is much more likely 

that a new government will give priority to accommodating the various factions and 

so allow particular groups to resist prosecutions that seem most threatening to their 

own leaders. If there is a broad coalition in charge of Syria in the next few years, we 

should expect that many of the participants at the top level will have blood on their 

hands - or owe their success to the ruthlessness oflocal commanders or supporters 

with very bloody hands. 

The preamble to the current resolution asserts that "any lasting, peaceful 

solution to civil war in Syria must be based upon justice for all .... " That may be 

true, but Syria's immediate future will probably be a search for some attainable halt 

to all-out war, even ifthat "resolution" is not, in itself, assured of being "lasting" or 

entirely"peaceful." Most countries that made a transition to democracy in the 

1990s accepted a general amnesty. That was true in South Africa, in most countries 

in Latin America and almost all countries in Eastern Europe. They preferred to 

sacrifice justice in order to strengthen prospects for peace. I do not at all mean to 

recommend that approach in Syria. I simply want to emphasize that what outsiders 

regard as the best hope for peace may not be what locals regard as the best hope. 

Then we need to acknowledge that international jurists are bound to have 

different priorities from locals. I don't think that is simply because "western" or 

"advanced" countries have developed a different legal culture. International 

tribunals have developed their own legal culture. So, for example, Rwandan Tutsis 

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were bitter that the International Tribunal for Rwanda was barred by its charter 

from imposing the death penalty. When Europeans sentenced fellow Europeans for 

comparable crimes after World War II, they were quite prepared to impose capital 

sentences. The United States still allows capital punishment for aggravated murder. 

In unstable countries, a long prison term may be an invitation to the supporters of 

the convicted mass murderer to break into the prison or extort a pardon through 

terror threats. Iraqis preferred to forfeit most international cooperation in the trial 

of Sad dam Hussein, rather than forego a capital sentence (as Europeans demanded). 

The "justice" delivered by international tribunals in the last twenty years has 

been excruciatingly slow because international jurists have given priority to 

procedural fairness. I don't think that is a matter of western values, per se. The 

International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg lasted only one year, from the opening 

gavel to the execution of capital sentences on the worst offenders. In post-war 

France, Pierre Laval was dispatched to the guillotine with comparable speed. But 

the Rwanda Tribunal did not achieve a single conviction in its first five years; after 

ten years, it had reached convictions on only twenty perpetrators, promising to 

reach verdicts on another twenty-five defendants before the end of fifteen years. 

The government of Rwanda, with one tenth the funding of the international 

tribunals, reached verdicts in 5,000 cases within five years of starting its own justice 

program. If the point is to reassure local people that justice is being done, making 

them wait for a decade will not be reassuring - nor helpful to a new government. 

To cite another example of differing priorities: the International Criminal 

Tribunal for Yugoslavia decided it was important to allow Slobodan Milosevic all the 

time he wanted to speak in his own defense - and denounce NATO for what he 

depicted as its own war crimes against Serbia. The ICTY thought it was important 

to have these speeches televised and broadcast into Serbia. The result was that 

Milosevic, who had been overthrown by his own people, had a perfect forum to 

rehabilitate his reputation as champion of beleaguered Serbs. Surveys showed that 

after so much broadcast time to present his own views, Milosevic made himself 

more popular than any politician in Serbia. That was not helpful to Serbian efforts 

to stabilize a new democracy. It is not surprising that Iraqis sought much tighter 

control over what Saddam was allowed to say in his trial - which was also, by 

design, a much less extended proceeding. 

Past problems do not prove that an international tribunal would necessarily 

work badly in Syria. A hybrid tribunal, involving international assistance to a 

special Syrian institution (in some adaptation ofthe model developed for Sierra 

Leone), might be feasible and effective in the future. But this is not a project that 

can have credibility if established in partnership with the current Assad 

government. In the meanwhile, we can't plan for cooperation with a different 

government until we see what sort of government actually does emerge when Assad 

leaves power (if he does leave power). 

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What might therefore be most appropriate in the near future is an 

International Independent Investigative Commission, somewhat similar to the 

commission created by the Security Council to investigate the assassination of 

former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005. For Syria, a commission of 

this kind should have a much broader mandate. Where past tribunals have taken 

years to get started, an investigative commission might get to work very quickly. It 

could investigate war crimes while the evidence remains fresh. And it might be of 

immediate help in establishing basic facts about particular episodes of the sort that 

are now shrouded in conflicting claims: how many people were killed, how many 

were civilians, how many associated with combatant forces, how they died, what 

was going on at the time, what weapons seem to have been involved, etc. 

Investigations of this kind would help the international community 

understand what is actually occurring in Syria. Their findings might provide 

material for future trials. The mere fact that abuses are being investigated - now -

might help persuade all factions in Syria that they need to reckon with the likelihood 

of determined prosecutions in the future. It is at least a plausible hope that this will 

have some restraining effect on military commanders. It will register international 

concern for victims - especially those, like Syrian Christians, who do not now have 

major armed factions to champion their claims. 

There will certainly be problems for such an institution. The mc in Lebanon 

seems to have experienced a great deal of frustration. But it did accumulate 

evidence that helped persuade the Security Council to establish a special criminal 

tribunal to prosecute suspects in this episode. It kept the crime in the spotlight, 

even as rival factions in Lebanon became distracted by their ongoing political 

maneuvers. 

lfthe international response needs the backing ofthe Security Council, we 

may find that likely opponents of an international tribunal - including Russia and 

China - may be more willing to support an investigative commission. The United 

States is by no means the only country on the Security Council which has concerns 

about international criminal tribunals. Governments that are skeptical of the ICC or 

other judicialized forums may be prepared to endorse an investigative commission, 

since it does not commit them to anything beyond that. Still, it is a plausible hope 

that ifthe investigators compile a sufficiently compelling record, even skeptical 

states on the UNSC will be more open to the notion of a formal tribunal - or an 

international role in a Syrian tribunal- down the road. The mc for Lebanon did 

generate support for a follow-on tribunal in just this way. 

It does not make sense for Congress to debate the most suitable institutional 

arrangements for this sort of project - certainly not now. Congress can urge the 

executive to negotiate with other governments. It can't draw up its own plan. When 

it comes to international negotiations, the President and State Department will need 

great flexibility to deal with changing facts on the ground in Syria and evolving 

international priorities. 

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But I think Congress can make a valuable contribution by focusing attention 

on the challenge and giving a nudge to the executive to pursue a serious and 

practical international response. The United States still has a role to play in 

addressing the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria. There are genuine limits on what 

we can do, given our unwillingness to take sides in the conflict. But that is no 

excuse for doing nothing. 

5 
16

Mr. SMITH. Professor Rabkin, thank you very much for your testimony. I look forward to asking you some questions when we get 

to it. 

We will take a very brief time off because there are three votes 

on the floor of the House. 

I would just—you know, we will go to Mr. Crane next. I will have 

a number of questions to ask you, because, you know—and I just 

want this on the record because I hope members will come back. 

Sending lawyers wasn’t the only thing we did with Yugoslavia. 

And as I said in my opening, and we will get into it a little bit 

later, but part of the problem was many of us thought it was designed to fail because it was not being adequately resourced, and 

I was the one who introduced, along with Steny Hoyer—he was the 

chief co-sponsor of my bill—to lift the arms embargo because it was 

a one-sided fight, Milosevic versus two countries at least. Slovenia 

set them back, but certainly Croatia and the Bosnians had no way 

of defending themselves. 

So what we are trying to do here is a lessons learned, and I 

agree with you fully it was too slow and I felt there was a disingenuous effort by some to do a Yugoslav war crimes tribunal that was 

more of a showcase rather than a workhorse, and that is what we 

hope to learn from. But I do appreciate your testimony. If you want 

to respond briefly, and then we will take a brief recess. 

Mr. RABKIN. Just one thing. I mean, later on we did what we had 

to do. I mean, later on we had real military intervention. At the 

beginning, though, I think this illustrates the moral hazard of 

international legal process, which is people feel they are doing 

something when they are not doing something. And I think in 1993 

the Clinton administration didn’t really want to do anything, and 

so they said, ‘‘Yeah, let us have a legal process,’’ right? And that 

is not, by itself, serious. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. We stand in short recess, and I apologize 

to our witnesses. I do hope the members will come back. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. The hearing of the subcommittees will resume. And, 

again, I apologize to our witnesses and all assembled for the 

delays. 

I would like to now recognize Mr. David Crane. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID M. CRANE, PROFESSOR OF PRACTICE, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW (FORMER 

CHIEF PROSECUTOR, UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COURT 

FOR SIERRA LEONE) 

Mr. CRANE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is indeed an 

honor to be here this afternoon, and I do want to say for the record 

that I have submitted my remarks to you and the members of this 

panel, along with two appendices which I believe you do have, one 

on the Syrian Accountability Project, an information PowerPoint, 

as well as the Chautauqua Blueprint, which is also a methodology 

by which we can create a court. And so I would humbly ask that 

this be submitted into the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, your statement and those of all of 

our distinguished witnesses and appendices to it will be made a 

part of the record. 

17

And I know normally 5 minutes is what people are allotted. 

Please feel free to use whatever time you feel necessary, and I say 

that to all of our witnesses. 

Mr. CRANE. Well, we thank you for your time, sir. I do want to 

note before I continue that you and I go way back, along with a 

couple of members of this panel. 

Once again, sadly, we are back considering justice for another 

country that is being destroyed by another head of state. You were 

in your leadership, along with Chairman Royce and others, a bipartisan issue on both sides of the aisle. 

We do appreciate the support that you gave the Special Court for 

Sierra Leone and the work that myself and Dr. White were doing 

in trying to seek some justice for the victims of the atrocities in Sierra Leone. So I commend you, sir, for that continued leadership 

when we move into Syria. 

I am going to address two items for you that are in my remarks, 

one of which is what you wanted me to talk about and that certainly is the five possible justice mechanisms related to Syria. But 

I also want to talk a little bit about the Syrian Accountability 

Project and the Chautauqua Blueprint just to highlight that there 

is an international effort working all across the board, to include 

our Syrian colleagues, to have in place a cornerstone mechanism by 

which a regional, local, or international prosecutor can start building a trial-ready case. 

And the reason why we are doing it such is we have already done 

it once before, and that is the takedown of President Charles Taylor of Liberia. We have taken the lessons learned there, and we 

have modified them and are developing this package called the Syrian Accountability Project. 

But, first, let us go to the questions that you are most interested 

in first, Mr. Chairman, and that is the five possibilities of a justice 

mechanism in Syria. And I don’t have them in order; I am just listing them as the five possible mechanisms. 

The first is the International Criminal Court. Why the International Criminal Court? Because it is the permanent criminal 

court that possibly would have both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction over potential perpetrators of the atrocities in 

Syria. 

It is the world’s only permanent international court, and it certainly is one of the viable mechanisms that the international community may consider in seeking justice for the people of Syria. 

A second option is an ad hoc court created by the United Nations. We have had two ad hoc courts. They are continuing their 

work now. It has been a stop-start process, but the ad hoc tribunals 

are moving forward and finishing their work, and there has been 

justice for the people of Rwanda as well as Yugoslavia. 

However, I must caution the chairman and members who are 

present that an ad hoc tribunal practically and frankly is a political 

non-starter. It is too expensive and their reputation of being too 

long and too nimble to create a justice mechanism probably would 

not get very far as far as an option before the Security Council, because it would be the Security Council itself under Chapter 7 of the 

U.N. Charter that would have to agree to that. And I don’t think 

that that would happen, but I think for—to be open and in general, 

18

that still is an option. And of course certainly we don’t have any 

idea how this is going to play out over time. 

A third option would be a regional court, something very much 

like the international hybrid tribunal in Sierra Leone, and that 

model of course certainly has proven in general to have been a good 

model for that particular region of the world. I am not saying that 

it would be for Syria, but, again, it is another one of those options 

which we might want to consider as far as justice. 

A fourth option is an internationalized domestic court. We would 

have a chamber within the Syrian justice system, but it would be 

backed by and supported by the international community, and we 

have done that before. We have one that is very similar in Cambodia, and what have you, but it is certainly working well in the 

Balkans where we have international experts and practitioners assisting the Syrians, or whatever country that is trying these cases 

actually assisting them and helping them in their work. 

A fifth and final option would be a domestic court, a pure domestic court. In consideration of all of these, and having worked with 

the Syrian leadership and the Syrians, talking to Syrians, working 

with Syrians over the past 2-plus years, this is starting to evolve 

into the preferred system. 

You know, what is wrong with Syrians trying Syrians for violations of Syrian law? And that is starting to become a more specific 

option for both this House and this committee to be thinking about, 

but also the international community, which leads me to my final 

part to my remarks, Mr. Chairman, and that is, how do we do 

that? In other words, we have these five mechanisms. Some of 

them have their challenges and some of them are viable options. 

For 21⁄2 years, and we have been working with the Syrians, the 

international community, as well as non-governmental organizations, putting together a cornerstone package called the Syrian Accountability Project and the Chautauqua Blueprint, where we have 

mapped the conflict, we have developed a crime-based matrix of all 

of the major incidents that have taken place in this tragedy on both 

sides, on all sides I should say, because, again, it used to be both 

sides and now that civil war has grown to where we have all kinds 

of actors. But this is a neutral effort ensuring that we are accounting for all of the violations of international as well as Syrian law. 

We also have a mapping exercise, a unit mapping exercise. We 

have a team looking at crimes against women and children, as well 

as developing sample indictments, so that a future prosecutor, be 

they domestic, regional, or international, will have a sample of 

what an indictment would look like. 

We have done this in West Africa, so that this has already the 

true test of time and practice. And all of this work is put together 

by some of the best and brightest at the international level, along 

with our Syrian colleagues, working hand in hand. 

At this point, what I will do, Mr. Chairman, is I will just leave 

these remarks with this, and I look forward to any questions that 

you might have. And, again, thank you for this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crane follows:]

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85316a-1.eps

Testimony of 

David M. Crane1 

Before the 

United States House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and 

International Organizations 

October 30, 2013 

The civil war in Syria has now entered its third year, Started initially by, of 

all things, children protesting in Daara, the protests blossomed into full 

scale civil war the following month. A part of the so-called "Arab Spring", 

the unrest in Syria has now turned ugly. The conflict has become personal 

and with that the brutality by all sides against combatants and civilians 

caught up in the melee has intensified. This was no more so than on 

August 21, 2013 when the regime of President Bashir Assad launched 

sarin gas projectiles into a suburb of his own capital, Damascus. The 

results were horrific, Almost 1500 people perished, hundreds of them 

children. For the third time in 30 or so years chemical weapons were used 

in the Middle East in violation of international law, clearly a war crime. 

Mankind is better than this. Over the past 20 years the international 

community, in most instances led by the United States, has developed 

what I call the modern international criminal law system, Through trial and 

in some cases error, mankind has finally resolved to punish dictators, 

tyrants, and thugs who murder, rape, maim, and mutilate their own citizens. 

The two ad-hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the hybrid courts to 

include Sierra Leone and Cambodia have created the proper procedures, 

evidentiary rules, and the jurisprudence to deal with heads of state who kill 

and destroy, We have made great strides, but we are only at the beginning 

of a beginning. 

1 Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. Founding Chief Prosecutor of the international war crimes tribunal 

in West Africa called the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2002-2005, Founder of Impunity Watch, 

www.lmpunitywatch.com . Co-founder of the Chautauqua Blueprint, Syrian Accountability Pfoject and the "I am 

Syria ..... Campalgn, www.lamsyrl.a.org . 

1 
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As the world's only permanent court, the International Criminal Court, tries 

to finds its place in this evolution, we have come to realize that the future of 

modern international criminal law is not with the ICC but with domestic legal 

systems. This was even contemplated and called for in the Rome statute 

that created the ICC. It must be noted here that the ICC was designed to 

be a court of last resort, not one of first instance, therefore it is incumbent 

on the states-parties themselves to prosecute those who commit war 

crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide it they are willing or able to 

do so. 

We can prosecute heads of state for international crimes. The law now 

provides for this and we have done it once before in the likes of Charles 

Taylor, the now former President of Liberia a convicted international 

criminal whom I indicted in March of 2003. So how do we do this in Syria? 

Allow me to digress and to brief this committee on efforts to date to build a 

case against Bashir AI Assad and his henchmen as well as the Syrian 

Resistance. Shortly after the Syrian unrest evolved into a civil war, Syrians 

and others began to discuss transitional justice mechanisms to hold 

accountable the Assad regime and over time, members of the resistance 

who violated both international and domestic law. Governmental and 

nongovernmental organizations began work on documenting and 

cataloging the atrocities committed in Syria. Human rights groups within 

Syria itself began to report and to feed key dala 10 these organizations. Of 

note, the Syrian Human Rights Nelwork has been a key source of 

information and they are to be commended for their dedication and bravery. 

It soon became apparent that these organizations were at times working at 

cross purposes or were unaware of the work of other groups. Dala was 

being collected in multiple systems unknown to the other. In the early days 

of all this, the Syrian resistance struggled, and slill struggles, with a viable 

organizational structure from which to govern. This hampered human 

rights organizations who attempted to develop methodologies to assist the 

resistance in developing a justice mechanism should the conflict end 

favorably for them. Coordination became essential. 

Over time the major organizations came together and meet twice a month 

to brief one another on their work, discuss areas of mutual support, and 

highlight upcoming training, conferences, and meetings. The Syrian 

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Accountability Project of which I founded and now chair, has become an 

umbrella organization in which all of these efforts are coordinated, pending 

perhaps the formal creation of a single data entry point. 

Not only has an enormous amount of raw open source data and 

information been collected, the Syrian Accountability Project has taken that 

data and built a framework by which President Assad and his henchmen 

along with members of the opposition can be prosecuted openly and fairly 

either internationally, regionally, or domestically. Now into its third phase 

the project has mapped the entire civil war, developed a crime base matrix 

which catalogs most of the incidents chronologically and highlights the 

violations of the Rome Statute, the Geneva Conventions, as well as 

domestic Syrian criminal law. There even have been indictments drafted 

as templates for a future international or domestic prosecutor to consider. 

We have given the first two phases to the Prosecutor of the ICC, the United 

Nations, the US Department of State, and the Syrian resistance leadership. 

The methodology above has worked before as it was that methodology that 

I developed against a sitting head of state, Charles Taylor, President of 

Liberia back in 2003. 

There are five possibilities for a justice mechanism in Syria. I will take them 

one at a time and review their strengths and weaknesses. I will then, Mr. 

Chairman, give you my recommendation and then take questions. 

The first mechanism, the International Criminal Court. As the world's 

permanent international tribunal the so-called ICC was set up in Rome in 

the late 1990's to prosecute violations of the gravest of crimes. Under the 

principle of complementarity member states are encouraged to prosecute 

their own, the ICC being a court of last resort or if and when that member 

state is unwilling or unable to prosecute. The track record over the first 

decade of the ICC is spotty and questionable at best. It lacks the capability 

and the political and diplomatic sophistication to handle such a mandate. 

Coupled with the challenge of gaining jurisdiction over the atrocities the 

reality is that the ICC is not just up to the task. It can barely handle its 

current caseload and investigations. 

A second option, an ad hoc court created by the United Nations. There 

have been two adhoc tribunals, one for the Balkans the other for Rwanda. 

Each approaching their second decade, these tribunals have brought some 

justice and accountability to the victims of those atrocities, but at a huge 

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financial cost. Inherently inefficient and hampered by unrealistic mandates, 

location, and the byzantine personnel rules of the United Nations, adhocs 

are creatures of the past, politically unacceptable as a viable justice 

mechanism and model for future prosecutions. As an aside, the creation of 

such a mechanism would require UN Security Council approval under 

Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and that is unlikely given the position of 

Russia on Syria. In the end Russia or even China would veto any resolution 

creating such an adhoc tribunal. 

A third option for justice is a regional court. A possible solution might be a 

regional court, a hybrid, fashioned along the lines of the Special Court for 

Sierra Leone where I was its founding Chief Prosecutor. Located at or near 

the scene of the crimes in Syria, such a model would be a visible 

mechanism for justice to the victims of the Syrian Civil War. Its mandate 

would be to prosecute those who bore the greatest responsibility for the 

war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated during that civil war 

on both sides. The effort could or would be an option backed by the Arab 

League with Arab jurists supplemented by Syrian jurists. It must be noted, 

Western assistance in anyone of these options would be viewed 

skeptically in my view. Arabs trying Arabs, Muslims trying Muslims or 

Syrians trying Syrians is the preferred option. It must be noted, this tribunal 

would require some form of international sanction in the form of a Security 

Council resolution. 

The fourth option is an internationalized domestic court. Similar to a hybrid 

regional court, an internationalized domestic court would be a Syrian 

chamber set up exclusively within the Syrian criminal system and 

supported by international personnel where needed. Again it would be 

mainly Al'ab personnel. This court might not need international sanction, 

but only region sanction. 

And finally. a domestic court system. This is the preferred option. Lei the 

Syrian people try those who committed violations of Syrian law. They do 

have the capacity to do this if given the leeway and time to settle into a 

sustainable piece. Justice and accountability are important, but first Syria 

needs to transition into a sustainable peace before viable accountability 

can be achieved, but I must reiterate this can be done. 

Having been in this business of facing down impunity and tyranny for 

almost 40 years, and having taken down a sitting head of state under the 

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85316a-5.eps

rule of law it is my considered opinion that an extraordinary chamber within 

the Syrian domestic court system is what the international community must 

support. Again, let the Syrians try Syrians under Syrian law for what 

Syrians have done to each other. We must ask ourselves, is the justice we 

seek the justice they want. Modern international criminal law is essentially 

western justice, a justice that does not take into account unique and 

important cultural and historical dynamics that only Syrian law can deliver. 

The other alternatives carry the weight discussed above and could be 

viable but are overwhelmed by the practical, political, and diplomatic 

hurdles each presents. 

At the end of the day it is for and about the victims. The Syrian people 

want vengeance, retribution, and justice. We have to consider this and 

note and respect their views. If they, the people of Syria, the victims, feel 

justice was not served than getting them to resort to the rule of law in the 

future rather than the rule of the gun will be difficult and the efforts of this 

committee, the US, the international community writ large will have been to 

no avail. 

I thank the Chairman for this time and stand ready for your questions. 

NOTE THERE IS AN APPENDIX TO THIS TESTIMONY RELATED TO 

THE SYRIAN ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT. 

5 
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What is the Syrian Accountahility Project? 
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85316a-7.eps

Who ate SAP's Partners? 

Who are SA V's Clients? 

4@ " '"' " ..... 

.. _ ••• 

'''''n c._ .... ' •• .. 0_' 
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Objectives of the Sy.riall Accountability Project 

Work Product 

Tilt' Pl'<Jjcr( organizes ilS work l'rodur! i" IIVO 'll;,i" dOU'IIl('llh: 

• (;()uUil'Jllirr;lIiv!.:: (lrganizl'(! I,), "H,nlh, .lall', aud rq',iotl, Ih .. (:",,!\iu 

N"n"tiw Il'(OHlIll~ Ibl' ~illlo11i'''1 ,on (II<.' ground i'l Syri'\ ~s ~ ~l l'i", .,1 

('\'l'll(~. ') 'h .. (;o!\Jliu Nallali"l' ab" inciud('s ;11"""1I"li'>1\ '''' h'y 

)",""pojitintl dt'"l'ioplIlellls rdall\,<, h> 111\' m'lIor 1'1,,),n, in thl' conlliet 

'\;~\la!Jii4 (hgani<",! rei;,li\'{' t{> al'j)li(",i)i,' sla('II'''), hlW, Ih" 

(;,.i",c i~~sl' rV10itrix cat,ilol'.ul'S [ho,," ""o,ls whid, 1("1'1'<,,'"111 l'i()I~lIo"~ 

oj ill<.' Laws "f \V"I' ~I\(l Syrian Pellal L,w, 
27


85316a-9.eps

Sources fOJ: Incident Reports 

Sources for GcopoJiticaJ Developments 
28


85316a-10.eps

Conflict Natrarive 

-.~--- --....... -........... ..

_ ... .. _ ~-........ ~_" 

--'"-... _ .... ...-. .. ..... __ -.. -h .. ~ -- ----...... , ...... -,--... ,-.~-" .... _-..._-_ ....... ..-. .-..- ....... - ... _ .. _-_ .......... _ .... .... . _"-""--'---"-'" .., .... ~ "' .. , ..... _.-.... _--_._".,. ~~~-=..'!-i$tt';:-..E::- _ ... .. !!.:':"...=:::-~.:-...:" ... ""=:=r:~ .. ~ 

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.,. .. ~_ ....... _~_.M ___ ._ ...... ~ 
29


85316a-11.eps

(jime Base Mattix 

Organi:.mtion of the 

Syrian Accowltability Project Phase IV 
30


85316a-12.eps

Future Work 'Product 

• \'(Ihilo SAl' J~ce"d)' fini,h~,1 ii, I'I",,~ III w,,,k I'Wducl, ,.,,, 1""icc1 i. r'lI ftolll ,·ondudrd. TIl<' 

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• S""'I'I,· 11',~;'W"'lIl1' I i,<i"f, 'he ;"f"" ".,, ',,". r,,"n ,J~- I i,w ~I ,l r'I' '''~ I'" ""'''''''. w" wLl II", ,I, ,dl;"!~ '''''pi, 

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Uoit Mapping Projection: Flasbp()ints 
31


85316a-13.eps

The Big Picture: the Chautauqua Blueprint 
32

Mr. SMITH. That is great. Thank you so very much for your testimony. 

Dr. White. 

STATEMENT OF ALAN WHITE, PH.D., PRESIDENT, AW ASSOCIATES (FORMER CHIEF INVESTIGATOR, UNITED NATIONS 

SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE) 

Mr. WHITE. Yes, sir. Chairman Smith, I am honored and pleased 

to be able to testify before these subcommittees on such a significant issue. I am profoundly aware of the chairman’s outstanding 

global leadership on the protection of human rights. I have experienced the chairman’s support firsthand while serving as the chief 

of investigations for the United Nations-backed Special Court for 

Sierra Leone. 

In large part, the court’s success in bringing some of the world’s 

most notorious war criminals to justice, such as former Liberian 

President Charles Taylor, would not have been possible without 

your support and other Members of Congress. Former President 

Taylor’s involvement in support of the rebels who committed unspeakable war crimes and crimes against humanity impacted over 

1.2 million victims in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 

Today we are faced with a similar crisis in Syria as we experienced in Sierra Leone. We have another brutal dictator who is embroiled in civil war and engaged in wide scale and systematic 

killings of innocent human beings with impunity. It is alleged 

President Assad has taken evil to the next level by employing the 

use of chemical weapons, killing thousands of defenseless innocent 

women and children. 

Unfortunately, he is protected by his staunchest ally, Russia, 

which will undoubtedly block any formal referral from the United 

Nations Security Council to the International Criminal Court, allowing Assad to escape accountability with no justice for the victims. Most would agree an immediate alternative needs to be aggressively pursued. 

To ensure Assad and other perpetrators committing war crimes 

and crimes against humanity within Syria are held accountable 

and brought to justice, there must be an independent criminal 

court created to achieve justice. The establishment of a Syria war 

crime tribunal proposed in your congressional resolution is a legitimate and a viable solution. 

Further, in my judgment, the tribunal must be created immediately with the full support of the U.S. Government and the international community. A Syrian war crimes tribunal could be established as an international hybrid tribunal with international authorities specifically mandated to investigate and prosecute those 

who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of war 

crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. 

A Syrian war crimes tribunal could be backed by the United Nations similar to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. It would be unwise and dangerous to establish the main tribunal in Syria while 

the country is engaged in a civil war. However, to expedite operation and minimize costs, the tribunal could be established in The 

Hague utilizing the current office space of the Special Tribunal for 

33

Lebanon with a regional office set up in a neighboring country to 

Syria. For example, Turkey would be an example, and Jordan. 

As mentioned previously, it is imperative that the tribunal be accountable to the victims and geographically located nearby. We now 

have years of experience to draw upon, and it is important we benefit from such experience, ensuring this tribunal is set up correctly, 

staffed properly, and financed definitively. 

It is my experience that most of the evidence used by prosecutors 

in International Criminal Court will be witness testimony. Maintaining a trusted and close professional relationship is essential in 

making sure witnesses will be available and willing to testify when 

necessary. Unfortunately, this has been a major problem plaguing 

the International Criminal Court. 

Consequently, it will be absolutely crucial the investigators develop a trusted relationship at the onset to secure the best evidence 

and witness testimony. I know from my own experience that our 

physical presence in the region greatly contributed to our success 

and effectively gathering witness testimony. 

Being able to access witnesses and informants regularly unequivocally contributed to the success of the Special Court’s prosecutions. The trusted relationship between our witnesses provided 

them with the necessary confidence to be able to provide courageous testimony on the world stage. Undoubtedly, the strong witness testimony was the bulk of our evidence and contributed significantly to the successful prosecution of all cases. All of our convictions and sentences were upheld by the appeals chamber, which 

is a testament to the strong evidence presented in court. 

Although witness testimony is vital at any trial, it is especially 

true when prosecuting war crimes and crimes against humanity involving countries engaged in civil war or have emerged from civil 

war. All too often physical and documentary evidence may have 

been destroyed during the war, so witness testimony is weighted 

heavily. 

Many of the witnesses will be victims, and a great deal of them 

will have been traumatized by the atrocities committed. For example, rape is often a tool of war, and many victims are reluctant to 

talk about what happened, particularly with strangers. 

War crimes investigations are routinely complex by their very 

nature and require a unique skill set to be able to conduct such investigations. It can take months for investigators to be able to develop a trusted relationship with a victim as well as witnesses. In 

many cases, witnesses will tell you stories if they have witnessed 

a crime personally, yet they are only passing on a story they heard 

from a family member or friend. This is particularly true in developing countries where tribes and clans living in villages are 

present and oral history is a tradition and common day practice. 

Thus, it will require an investigator who is skilled and experienced in conducting such investigations to be able to get the facts 

in a timely manner. Inexperienced investigators may take statements later deemed to be inaccurate because the witnesses did not 

actually observe any atrocity being committed, which can create 

unnecessary exculpatory issues. 

This is a major reason that investigators need to be located in 

the country or in the region for sheer logistical purposes. The inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:42 Mar 06, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\131030\85316 HFA PsN: SHIRL
34

vestigators will be continuously conducting investigations, gathering facts and evidence. There will always be a need to conduct 

routine followup interviews on a regular basis. 

The key elements of proof in war crimes involve determining who 

was involved, was there a plan, was it wide scale and systematic, 

military structure, chain of command, weapons involved, command 

responsibility, as well as identified crime-based events. 

Conducting war crimes investigations is one of the most challenging, if not the most, and demanding type of investigation within the international criminal justice system, requiring the most 

highly skilled, competent, and talented criminal investigator. In my 

judgment, war crimes investigators must be experienced criminal 

investigators. I would recommend 10 to 15 years’ experience, international, they be of high moral character, good judgment, well educated, preferably a graduate degree, overseas experience, multilingual, excellent interpersonal skills, witness protection training, 

confidential informant training, and war crimes investigation training and/or experience. 

In my own experience, I met regularly with witnesses from Liberia and Ivory Coast, and during my tenure both countries were engaged in civil war. Being situated nearby, my staff and I were able 

to meet with witnesses regularly, allowing us to develop a trusted 

relationship and execute our duties in a timely manner. 

For example, some witnesses had vital inside information, yet 

reticent to cooperate for fear of being identified and/or suspected of 

being a witness, which would undoubtedly pose an immediate danger to themselves or family members. Without a trusted relationship, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to convince witnesses in a war-torn region to come forward and become a witness 

unless they have complete trust and faith in you being able to provide for their safety and well being. 

In those instances where witnesses’ testimony was deemed vital 

for prosecution, you must be able to act immediately and decisively 

to demonstrate to the witness you can deliver on any assurances 

provided. Otherwise, investigators’ credibility could be questioned 

and the operational effectiveness could be marginalized. 

Personally, I faced many exigent circumstances which required 

immediate action and a need to make command decisions. Being in 

a region and equipped with appropriate resources allowed me to 

deal with very challenging and dangerous matters. For example, 

one of my key witnesses was a former commanding general of the 

Liberian Armed Forces and as in Accra, Ghana, at a military medical facility receiving treatment for torture injuries inflicted by 

Chucky Taylor, the son of former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, and is currently serving a 97-year sentence in U.S. prison for 

torturing my witness. 

The injuries were life-threatening and so severe the general’s 

wife pleaded with Taylor to allow her husband to go to Ghana for 

treatment. In return, she offered herself and family as human collateral as a guarantee her husband would return. At the time, Taylor knew of the Special Court’s existence and was very paranoid 

about anyone who could be a potential witness for the court leaving 

Liberia. 

35

While undergoing treatment in Ghana, I made contact with the 

general and received vital evidence about Taylor and the rebel 

groups he supported in Sierra Leone. After vetting this information, a decision was made that he would be a major witness for 

prosecution and he needed to be relocated out of the region. Without an established witness protection program in place, I coordinated with the U.S. Department of State, sought the support to 

allow me to relocate the general and his family to the United 

States under the significant public benefit program. 

The U.S. was the only place I could relocate the general without 

fear of Charles Taylor being able to physically harm him or his 

family. With my operational contacts in the region, I was able to 

smuggle the wife and eight children, one by one, to Accra, Ghana 

and then on to the U.S. with the assistance of the U.S. Embassy 

and the International Migration Office. 

While this was ongoing, Taylor had sent some of his henchmen 

to Accra looking for the general. And once he learned he was no 

longer at the military hospital, they started canvassing the U.N. 

Liberian refugee camps in Accra as well as the entire city. The day 

we left Accra they learned the whereabouts of the hotel where the 

general was staying and we narrowly escaped their pursuit and 

went to the U.S. Embassy. 

Taylor’s henchmen later showed up that same night at Accra 

International Airport and located us in the lounge while we were 

waiting to board. They attempted to breach security and were held 

at bay by the local airport authorities at the request of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service agent who was armed and intervened while we boarded the aircraft. 

Meanwhile, the general’s wife and children had been smuggled 

out of Liberia and were en route to Ghana. Due to the safety concerns for the general, we departed Ghana, flew to Amsterdam, and 

then on to the United States without incident. The family was later 

reunited 1 month later in the United States safe and sound. 

The moral of this story is quite simple. If I had not been in a 

region and had contacts in place, I could not have been able to 

carry out this mission and a key witness could have been killed as 

well as his family. Currently, due to funding and staffing issues the 

ICC has been unable to establish a full-time presence in many of 

the countries where they are actively engaged. As a result, they are 

experiencing serious witness issues involving their willingness to 

testify. 

The lack of a trusted relationship will have a major impact on 

any investigation and subsequent prosecution. This reinforces the 

need to establish a Syrian war crimes tribunal singularly focused 

and accountable to the victims of Syria and located closest to the 

people. Clearly, the witnesses associated with having any knowledge of war crimes being committed in Syria will undoubtedly have 

trust issues and an obvious reluctance to reporting information to 

anyone outside their family, their tribe, their clan and/or their village. 

Consequently, developing a trusted relationship from the immediate onset, in my opinion, is the most crucial stage of any investigation, especially a war crimes investigation. Therefore, it is absolutely vital an investigator be regularly and personally engaged to 

36

nurture the trust with the witness. Otherwise, it will dissipate and 

have a major impact on the investigation and related prosecution. 

There isn’t a robust witness management and witness protection 

program in place. The risk of a witness being killed, seriously injured, or physically threatened can occur. And if it does, it will undoubtedly have a chilling effect on any investigation and prosecution. 

The recent reports of ICC witnesses being killed, bribed, and 

threatened in regards to the ongoing trial of Kenya’s Deputy President, as well as the impending trial of Kenya’s President, highlight 

this very issue. 

We had over 600 witnesses at the Special Court. And although 

not all of them were deemed necessary to testify, many did and did 

so credibly, which accounted for the convictions attained. Although 

witness protection is the responsibility of the Registrar, we felt 

strongly that the Office of the Prosecutor must have the capacity 

to carry out our mission. 

As a result, with the concurrence of the Registrar, we created our 

own witness management unit to manage the witnesses of the Office of the Prosecutor. Based on our experience, the witness management and protection responsibility should rest with the Office 

of the Prosecutor and not the Registrar. 

This must be taken into consideration when creating this tribunal. This is a major flaw and impacts investigations and prosecutions and certainly needs to be addressed if a Syrian war crimes 

tribunal is created. Witness testimony and vital information will 

dry up quickly if this very important phase of the criminal justice 

process is not implemented properly at the onset. 

Finally, I would like to address the accountability of a court to 

the victims and not merely to the international community. The 

ICC is also plagued with being viewed as a political instrument 

and not as a system of justice for victims. The recent investigations 

in the Ivory Coast, which has led to the prosecution of three members of the former government, including the former President, his 

wife, and former Minister of Sports, are being viewed as politically 

motivated and not balanced. 

Members of the current administration, including the current 

Speaker of the Parliament, have been documented by the United 

Nations and numerous human rights organizations as perpetrators 

of war crimes, yet no one has been prosecuted. It is important that 

all warring factions be aggressively investigated and prosecuted. 

Otherwise, the lack of balanced prosecution can undermine the 

peace and reconciliation process. 

It must be kept in mind the rule of law and Ivory Coast must 

be built on restorative and retributive justice, and the best way to 

achieve these goals is through local accountability. Towards that 

end, specifically and singularly mandated hybrids, such as the Syrian war crimes tribunal, with international authorities conducting 

its affairs under international law responsible to the victims, is the 

best way forward. 

In conclusion, I believe the subcommittee’s influence, support, 

and persistence can lead to the creation of a Syrian war crimes tribunal, which will ultimately lead to the prosecution of those involved committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. 

37

By bringing Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia to 

justice, we have demonstrated that no one is above the law. Now 

we all need the political will to support and do the just and noble 

thing. 

I want to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and other distinguished Members of Congress, for allowing me the opportunity to 

share my thoughts and experiences in pursuit of a successful outcome for the victims of the Syrian Civil War. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. White follows:]


85316b-1.eps
38


85316b-2.eps

Resolution, is a legitimate and viable solution. Eill:the(, in my judgIllCllt, the tribunal nlllst be created 

immediately with the full support of the US govcTlIIIlmlt and the international community. 

A Syrian War Crimes TribWlal could be established as.a hybrid tribunal with international 

authorities specifically mandated to investigate and prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility ffrr 

the commission of war crimes, crimes againsl humanity, and genocide, The Syrian Wnr Crimes Tribunal 

could be backed by the United Nations similar to the SpecIal Court for Sierra Loone. It would be unWise and 

dangerous toesmblish the m aln tribunal in Syria while the coun:try is engaged in a civil war. However, to 

expedite operations and minim"e CDsts the tribunal could be established in The Hague. utilizing the current 

offi~e space of the Special Tnbunal for Lebanon with 8 regional of Ike· set up in a neighboring C<luntry 10 

Syria. As mentioned previously, it is impe1'3tivG that the tribunal be accountable to the victims and 

geographically located nearby. We now have years of experience to draw upon and it important we benefit 

from such experience ensuring this is tri bmml is set up correctly, staffed properly. and financed definitively. 

It is my experience that most of the evidence used by prosecutors in an international 

criminal court will be witness testimony, Maintaining trusted and close professionaLrelatimmhip is essential 

in making sure witnesses will be available and willing to testifY when necessary, Unfortunately, this has 

been a major problem plaguing the International Criminal Courl, Consequently, it wilt be absolutely crncial 

the investigators develop a trusted relationship at the Onset to secure the be&t evidence and witness testimony. 

I know from my 0,,'11 experience that our physical presence in the regiDn greatly contributed to our success in 

effectively gathering witness tcstimDny. Being able to access wittlesses and informants regularly 

mtequivocally contributed to the success of the Special Court's prosecutions. The trustoo relationship with 

our witnesses provided them with the necessary confidence to be able to provide courageous testimony on 

the world stage. liDdollbtedly the strong witness testimony WDS the bulk of oar evidence and contributed 

significantly to the successful prosecution of all cases .. All oflhe wnviclions and sentences were upheld by 

the Appeals Chambers whicl:t is a testament to the strung evidence presented in court. 
39


85316b-3.eps

Although ·"itness testimony is 'Vital at any trial it isespccially Ime when prosecuting war 

crimes and crimes against humanity involving CO\l1ltry's eugaged in ciVil war or have emerged from civil 

War. All too often physical and documentary evidence may have been desClr<>yed during the war 50 witness 

lestimony is weighted. heavily. Many of the witnesses will be victims and a great deal (lfthem will have 

been traumatized by theattacities committed. For example, rape is often a tool of war and many victims are 

reluctant to talk about what happened particularly with stran~. War crimes investigations are routinely 

complex by their very nature arul.require a Wlique skill sl'l to be·abJe cooduct such investigations. 

It can take months for investigators to be able develop a trusted relationship with a victim as 

well witnesses. In many cMes ",ilnesses will tell you a slory as if they had·witnessed the crime personally, 

yd they are only passing fln a story they heard from a fumily member Of friend. Tills is particularly true in 

developing countries where tribes and clans living in villages are present and oral history is 11 traditiol1 and a 

common day practice. Thus, it will require an investigat'" who is skilled and experiel1ced in cOl1ducting 

such investigations to be able to get the facts in a timely manner. ,Inexperienced. investigators may take 

slatemel1ts later deemed to be inaccurat.e beca1,J5e the witness did notactualJy observe il11 atrocity being 

committed which can create unne~essary excnlpatory issues:. This is another major reason that investigators 

need.to be located either in the country or in the region for shear logistical purp.oses. The investigators wil1 

be continuously cOOOuctinS investigations, gath.ering facts and evidence. there wlll always be a need to 

conduct routine follow up interviews on a regalar basis. The 'key elements of proof in war crimes cases 

involve determilllng wbo was involved; was there. a plan; Was it wide-scale <U1d systematic; military 

structure; chain of cot!:ll1iand; weapons involved; command responsibility, as well as idel1lifying crime based 

events. 

Conducting 'War crimes investigation is one ofthe.mmj challenging, ;fnot the Illost difficult 

and demanding type of investigation v.ithin the international criminal justice system requiring the most 

highly skiJled. competent aud talented crirrdnal investigator, In myjlldgtuent. war crimes ilwestigators mIlS! 
40


85316b-4.eps

be experienCed criminal investigatnl'll (10-15 yeaTS) with international experience, hi gil moral character, good 

judgroCl\t, wen educated (Graduate degree preferred), overseas elllPerience, multi-lingual, excellent 

int~rpe(sonal skills, witness protection training, confidential informant tl"mng, and war crimes 

investigations training and/or experience. 

In my own experience 1 met regularly with witnesses from Liberia amI Ivory Coast and 

during my tenure both countries were engaged in "ivil war. Being sitwMd nearby my staff and I Wete able 

10 meet with witnesses tegularly allowing us to develDp a trusted relationship and execute our duties in a 

timely manner. For example, some witnesses had vital inside inibrnlation, yet reticent to cooperate for fear 

of being identified and/or su~pected of being a witness whi<>h would undoubtedly pose an immediate daoger 

to themselves or family members. Without a trusted relationship it i. extremely difficult, ifnot impossible to 

cOllvince witnesses in a war torn region to come forward and become" witness unless they have complete 

trust and fuith in you being able to provide for then-safety aJld well-being. 

In those instances where the wftness testimony was deemed vital for prosecution you must 

be able to act immediately and decisively to demonstrate to the witness yrmcan deliver on any assurances 

provided. Otherwise the investigators credibility could I:reqnestioned anq the operational elfectivenesscould 

be marginalized. Personally, I faced many exigent cireumstanees which required immedia:te action and a 

need to make command decisions. Being in tho Eogion and equipped with the appropriateresuurces allowed 

me t() deal with very challenging and dangerous mattets, For exantple, one of my key witnesses was the 

former Commanding General of the Liberian Armed Forces and was in Accro, ('mana at 1he military medical 

facility receiving treatnllmt for torture injuries inflicted by Chucky Taylor, the son of former President of 

Liberia Charles TllYlor and currently serving a97 yearsentenee in a US Prison fottorturing my witness. The 

injuries were lite threatening and SO severe the General's wife pleaded with Taylor to allow her husband to 

go to Ghana for rrearment and in return she offered herself and f<J!!lily as human collateral as a guaraJltec her 

husband would retum. At the time, Taylor knew of the Special Court" existence aod was very paranoid 

4 
41


85316b-5.eps

about anyone who could he a potential witness for the court leaving Liberia. While undergoing treatment in 

Ghana I made conta"t with the General and receive<i vital evidence against Taylor and the rebel groups he 

supported in Sierra Leone. After v<ltting this in±onnation a decision was made that he would be· a major 

1"I11neSS for the prosecution and he nee<ied to be relocated out or the region. Without an estabUshed \\-;tness 

protection program in place I coordinated with the OS Department of State aJJ.d sought their support wallow 

me to relocate the General and his famiJy to the United Statl:S Wldef the Significant Public Benefit Program. 

The US was the only place I could relocate the Gener-41 without fear of Charles Taylor being able to 

physically harm him Of his frunily. 

With my operal1onal contacts in the region I was able to smuggle tbe wife and eight children 

one by one !o Accra, Ghana and then onto the US with the assistance of the US Embassy and the 

International Migration Office. While this was ongoing Tayl"!' had sent some of his henchman to Accra 

looking for the General and once they learned he was no longer at the Lnilitary hospital they started 

canvassing the UN Liberian Refugee cmops in Accra as well as the cit)!. Tile day we left Accra they learned 

the whereaMms of the hotel where the ClCneral was staying and we narrowly escaped their pursuit and wem 

to the US Embassy. Taylor's henchman later showe4 np that same night at the Accra International Airport 

and located lL~ in tbe lounge aTea while waiting 10 bOlll'd. They. attempted to breach securily and were held at 

bay by the local airport authQrities at the request of 3. US lmmigmtion II11d Naturali;r.atioll Service Agent, who 

was armed and intervened while We boarded the aircraft. Meanwhile the General's wife and children. had 

been smuggled out of Liberia and were enroute to Ghana. Due to saiety concetll$ for the General. We 

d.eparted Ghana, flew to Amsterdanl and then onW the United States without inddent The fruniIy wru; later 

reunited safely one month later in the United States safe and sound. The moral to this story is quite simple, if 

I had not been in the region and had contacts in plac~ I could not have been able to cany out this mission and 

key witness and his fumily likely killed. 
42


85316b-6.eps

Currently, due to funding and staffing issues the ICC has been uDable to esmblish a full·time 

presence in many of the country's where they are actively engaged.. As a result, they are experiencing 

serious witness issues involving their willingness to testify. The lack of a trusted relationship ",m have a 

major impact On any investigation and subsequent prosecution. 'ntls reinforces the need to establish a Syrian 

War Crimes Tribllnal singularly fOcused and acc()untable to the yic!ims of Syria and l()cated closest to the 

people. 

Clearly, the witnesses associated with havin.g any knowledge of war crimes being 

committed in Syria will \J1Idoubtedly have trust issues and art ohviousreluctance to reporting info.ntlation to 

anyone outside of their farrrlly, their tribe, their clruJ and and/or their village. Consequently, developing a 

trusted relationship from the immediate onset is in my opini(m the most crucial stage of any investigation, 

especially a war crimes investigation. Therefore, it is absolutely vital an investigator be regularly and 

personally engaged to nurture the mISt with the witness, otherwise it will dissipate and have a major impact 

on the investigation and related prosecution. If there isn't a robust witness mruJagement and witness 

protection program in place the risk of a witness heing killed, seriously injured, or physically threatened can 

occur and if it does it will undoubtedly have a cbilling effeel on lillY investigalion and prosecution. 

The .tecent reports of ICC witnesses being .ilIed, bribed, and threatened in regards to the 

ongoing trial of the Kenya Deputy President as well as theiml'ending trial of the Kenya President highlight 

this very issue. We had over 600 witnesses at the Special C()U£I and althoush ub! all of them were deemed 

necessary to testify, lUany did and did so credibly which accounted for the convictiotlS attained. Although 

witness protection is the responsibility of the Registrut, we felt strongly that the Office of the Prosecutor 

mllst have this capacity to effectively carr)' out our mission. As a result, with the C{)ncurrence of the 

Registrar we created our own Witness M~l1J\gement Unit t(} manage all the witnesses of the Office of the 

Prosecutor. Based 00 our experience the Wi.tness Management and Protection responsibility should rest with 
43


85316b-7.eps

the Office of the Prosecutor and nat the Registrar. This mllst betaken into consideration when creating this 

tribunal. 

This is a mllior flaw and impacts investigations and prosecutions and certainly needs to be 

addressed if a Syrian War Crimes Tribuna! is created. Witness testimony and vital information will dry up 

quickly if this very important phase of the criminal juslice pTQCess is not implemented propedy at the onset. 

f'iual1y, I would Eke to address the acrountability of a court to the victims and 110t merely to 

the iutemational commnnity. The ICC is also plagued with !>eiug viewed as 11 political instlument and not as 

a system of.iustice for the victims. The recent iuvestigati{)DS in the Ivory Coast which have led. only to Ihe 

prosecution ofthl'ee members ofilie fonner government, iududing the fonnef President, his wife, and fonner 

Minister of Spolts are being viewed as politically motivated and not balanced. Members of the current 

administration, including the current Speaker of the Parliament nave been documented by the United Nations 

and num.erous human rights organi?.ations as perpetrators ufwat crimes, yet no one bas been prosecuted. [t 

is import aut that all warriug factions be aggressively investigated al1d prosecuted; otherwise the lack of a 

balanced prosecution can undcnnine the peace and reconciliatio [l process. It rollst be kept in milld the 

rule of law in 1he Ivory Coast rollS! be built on restorative and retributive justice lUldthe best way to achieve 

these goals is through local accountability. Towards that end a specifically and singularly mandated hybrid 

lribW1al, such as the Syria War Crimes Triblinal v.dth international authorities conducting it aftlrirs under 

intemationallaw responsible to the victims is the best way forward. 

In conclusion. I believe this Subcommittee's influence, support, and persistence can lead to 

the creation Df a Syrian War Crimes Tribunal wbich win ultimately lead to the prosecution of those involved 

iu c()mmilling war crimes and crimes against htlinanity. By bringing Charles Taylor, former President of 

Liberia to .iustice wc've demonstrated that 00 one is above Ihe law, Now at! We need to political will to 

support this jusi and noble cause. 

7 
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85316b-8.eps

I want to thank you again Mr. Chairman and other distinguished Members of Congress for 

allowing me the opportunity to share my thoughts an.d experiences in pursuit of a successful outcome for the 

victims of the Syriancivit war. 
45


85316b-9.eps

SYRIAN WAR CRJM fS TRIBUNAL 

TH E ltAGUE, THE NETHERLAND 
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85316b-10.eps

SYRIAN WA.R C RIMES TRI.BUNAL 

REG IONAL OFFICE 
47

Mr. SMITH. Dr. White, thank you. Thank you for that very extensive testimony, and with a particular focus on the importance of 

the witnesses and all things related to. Thank you. 

Secretary Rademaker. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, 

NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT ADVISOR, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having me here today. And, Chairman Chabot, nice to see you as well. 

I have prepared remarks, which I will not read to you. I will 

summarize a few of the key points and try and emphasize what I 

think are the most important issues before us. 

I am here today to testify in support of your resolution, Chairman Smith, and I should say that fact would probably come as a 

surprise to many of my friends, because I have a long record of 

criticizing war crimes tribunals of all stripes. And I spent the better part of my testimony offering additional criticisms of most of 

the war crimes tribunals that have gone before us. 

The only exception in my prepared testimony to that is the Sierra Leone tribunal, or Special Court for Sierra Leone, where I actually have some positive things to say about the work that they 

have done. But I am critical of all of the others, but I come down 

differently on your proposal for a number of reasons, which I discuss toward the back end of my prepared statement. 

Maybe I will summarize the reasons why I think unlike the previous cases the idea that you are proposing with respect to Syria 

is actually a good idea. First, I think a lot of times war crimes tribunals are established because the international community is 

frustrated, and they can’t think of anything else to do. 

And so as Professor Rabkin I thought very eloquently stated in 

his testimony, you know, in the absence of any sort of meaningful 

or serious policy, the U.N. decides to dispatch lawyers to address 

the problem and then pats itself on the back thinking that they 

have done something useful to address the problem. 

There was some dialogue between you and Professor Rabkin 

about the Yugoslavia tribunal, and I personally am critical of the 

Yugoslavia tribunal, not because I think it has failed to bring war 

criminals to justice. I am critical of it because I think it is a historical matter. It was a very unfortunate compromise, in 1993, between essentially the Government of the United States and the 

governments in Europe, which had peacekeepers in Bosnia. 

And at that point there was a fairly significant disagreement between the United States and the European governments about 

what to do in Bosnia. It was clear that the international efforts 

were failing and the war was spiraling out of control, casualties 

were increasing. 

The key issue at that time was the arms embargo on Bosnia, 

which you referred to. The United States was proposing, and Members of Congress like yourself were offering legislation, to end the 

arms embargo on Bosnia, which would have leveled the playing 

field. Europeans didn’t want to do that. They had peacekeepers in 

Bosnia. 

48

And so the compromise that was worked out was, let us not do 

anything except send in lawyers. And my personal belief is that 

that delayed by about 21⁄2 years serious measures that did eventually solve the conflict in Bosnia. And those serious measures were 

taken once your arms embargo legislation passed both the House 

and the Senate by veto-proof margins. That is when President Clinton decided, ‘‘Okay, I need a new policy,’’ and he immediately commenced NATO bombardment of Serbian positions in Bosnia. And 

that led, within a matter of months, to the Dayton Peace Accords 

and the peace arrangement that is still in place in the Balkans to 

this day. 

My personal belief is that could have happened sooner, but for 

the delay that was brought about as a result of the decision to create a war crimes tribunal. And so I don’t actually fault the tribunal 

for its work, but I do fault the decision to create it, because I think 

that decision was taken to avoid taking harder decisions that governments didn’t want to take at that time. 

But the point I make about your idea is I think in the case of 

Syria—and I hate to say this, I wish it weren’t true—but I think 

unlike in Yugoslavia in 1993 and 1994 there are no other serious 

steps that the international community is going to be able to take. 

You know, it is clear that the Security Council is not going to even 

impose sanctions on the Assad regime due to the position taken by 

the Governments of Russia and China. 

I think the United States is not going to be prepared to act unilaterally, as it threatened to do in the Balkans. The most recent 

diplomatic arrangement between the United States and Russia 

with respect to chemical weapons I think guarantees that in fact 

the U.S. policy is no longer even to overthrow or change the Assad 

regime. 

I mean, the Assad regime is now the diplomatic partner of the 

United States and Russia in trying to dispose of chemical weapons. 

And serious efforts to overthrow the government while we are 

working with it I think will not work. And I am not sure the 

Obama administration has yet recognized that, but that is where 

U.S. policy is headed. 

And I think unlike in the Balkans in the 1990s when Members 

of Congress like yourself were providing leadership on the issue, it 

is very clear from the debate that we had 2 months ago here in 

Congress about whether to authorize the use of force by President 

Obama in Syria, Congress is not going to be pushing for more 

forceful action in Syria. 

So in the absence of any prospect of more meaningful action by 

the international community, I think this is not a case like Yugoslavia where establishing a war crimes tribunal can serve as a pretext for not taking action that could otherwise be taken, because 

no other action is going to be taken, in my opinion. 

Second, I think this is a conflict where there are bad actors on 

all sides. That is increasingly apparent. And I think investigations 

by an ad hoc tribunal and eventual prosecutions could delegitimize 

not just the Assad government but also those radical elements who, 

on the pretext of trying to free their country, are actually carrying 

out another, more radical agenda in their country. 

49

And today those groups are receiving outside assistance from 

some governments and individuals, and I think it might be harder 

for that assistance to continue in the face of international condemnation in the form of action by an ad hoc criminal tribunal 

against them. 

And then, the third reason I can support your idea is because it 

is not the International Criminal Court that you are proposing. 

You are proposing to establish an ad hoc tribunal. And I want to 

speak particularly to this issue of the International Criminal Court 

because I do believe, as has already been pointed out, should the 

idea of acting against war criminals in Syria gain traction, we will 

certainly hear from the Europeans and others that the only possible way to do that is through the established international mechanism for handling these sorts of things, the International Criminal Court. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I want to state more emphatically with regard to this than anything else, the worst possible thing the international community could do in Syria is to deploy the International 

Criminal Court to go after war criminals in that country. We 

should do absolutely nothing before we do that, because it will—

actually, I will read one paragraph from my prepared remarks because I think this articulates my objection to the International 

Criminal Court’s potential involvement more clearly than I can do 

it off the cuff. 

The ICC is an extremely blunt instrument. It is not an instrument of diplomacy, but, rather, an instrument of justice. By design, 

it exalts justice over all other objectives. This is the meaning and 

intention of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which provides that 

once the court has taken up a case it can never permanently be divested of jurisdiction to proceed with it, and not even the U.N. Security Council can defer the investigation or prosecution of the case 

for more than 1 year. 

Of course, Article 16 permits the Security Council to renew such 

deferrals once a year for so long as it may wish to do so. But the 

message of this provision to potential defendants is crystal clear. 

Once the ICC prosecutor has begun to pursue you, no power on 

earth can ever permanently rid you of him. 

So my concern is that should the international community decide 

to turn on ICC jurisdiction with respect to Syria, the message to 

President Assad is he is either going to end up dead or in prison. 

Those are his two choices. And I think the international community 

needs to decide what it wants in Syria. If what it wants is justice, 

it wants to bring Assad to justice, it wants to bring his henchmen 

to justice, it wants to bring leaders of the al-Nusra rebel groups to 

justice, the ICC is the appropriate instrument. 

But if what we want to do is end the war, if we want to promote 

a democratic transition and try to bring to power a government led 

by someone else other than President Assad, sending in the ICC is 

the worst possible way to achieve that objective, because if we want 

President Assad to give up power, you can imagine the conversation. 

The diplomats who speak to him are going to have to say—they 

are going to have to make it attractive to him to give up power. 

And it will not be attractive to him to say, ‘‘Give up power and 

50

then we are going to send you to prison.’’ We have to offer him carrots if we want him to give up power. Threatening and promising 

him that he is going to prison will lead him to dig in. It will ensure 

that he never gives up power, that he ends up like Ghadafi. Why 

did Ghadafi stay in Libya and fight to the death? Unlike in Tunisia 

where the dictator gave up and went into exile, unlike in Egypt 

where Mubarak gave up and went into internal exile. 

In Libya, Ghadafi stayed and fought to the death. Now, maybe 

that had to do with the character of Ghadafi, but there was another element. The U.N. Security Council had conferred jurisdiction 

on the ICC to investigate war crimes in Libya, and it was crystal 

clear that Colonel Ghadafi was going to be the number one defendant before the International Criminal Court. 

The international community said to Ghadafi, ‘‘No, no, you don’t 

have Mubarak’s option. You can’t retire peacefully. We are coming 

after you.’’ And so he stayed and fought to the death. If that is 

what we want in Syria, we want this civil war to go on until somebody, you know, corners Assad in a street and shoots him, you 

know, the way to get to that objective is to bring in the International Criminal Court because they will pursue him relentlessly, 

they will guarantee that he does not go peacefully. 

But I submit though that may be from a purist point of view that 

you want a pursuit of justice above all other objectives, that might 

be the right way to go. I think there are more important values, 

more important objectives for the international community, most 

importantly saving human lives of the Syrian people. And for that 

reason, I think we need to avoid solutions which will perpetuate 

the conflict. 

We need to look, instead, for solutions that will make it possible 

to expeditiously end the conflict. And I think an ad hoc tribunal, 

which is not subject to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, an ad hoc 

tribunal which could be turned off by Security Council action, 

should there be a diplomatic settlement acceptable to all sides, that 

would make sense. That would be a useful diplomatic tool. The ICC 

is the antithesis of a useful diplomatic tool in the case of Syria. 

So I will end my testimony with those observations, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker follows:]

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STATEMENT OF STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER 

National Security Project Advisor, Bipartisan Policy Center 

Principal, The Podesta Group 

"Establishing a Syrian War Crimes Tribunal?" 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International 

Organizations 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

U.S. House of Representatives 

October 30, 2013 

Chairman Smith, Chainnan Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Bass, Ranking Member 

Deutch, Members of the Committee, I appreciate the invitation to appear before you today to 

discuss Chainnan Smith's resolution, H. Con. Res. 51, calling for the establishment of an ad hoc 

war crimes tribunal for Syria, as well as the broader issue of accountability for the horrific 

human rights violations we have witnessed in Syria over the past two and a half years. 

While I am not ordinarily a supporter of war crimes tribunals, Chainnan Smith, I am 

pleased to say that I support your resolution. I support your resolution not only because of the 

unique circumstances that exist today in Syria, but also because you have carefully drafted it to 

call for the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal, rather than referral of Syria to the International 

Criminal Court (ICC), as some others have proposed. Pennit me to emphasize at the outset of 

my testimony that I would oppose conferring jurisdiction on the ICC to investigate and prosecute 

war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Syria. This is because I believe that, due 

to fatal defects in the Rome Statute creating the ICC, such a referral would risk perpetuating the 

cont1ict in Syria rather than help curtail it 

I was the Republican Chief Counsel of this Committee when the first war crimes 

tribunals were created in 1993 and 1994, for the Fonner Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 

respectively. And I was Chief Counsel throughout the negotiation, signature, and entry into 

force of the Rome Statute, as well as when the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone was created. 

was responsible for Committee oversight of all of these efforts, and that experience has made me 

a skeptic of war crimes tribunals generally. 

Based on what I have observed, I would say that while such tribunals often seem like a 

convenient answer to the human rights tragedy of the moment, they are usually the wrong 

answer. I will illustrate my reasons for saying this by reviewing the history of some of the most 

pertinent cases. 
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Fomler Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals 

The first ad hoc tribunal was created in 1993 to deal with the conflicts in the Former 

Yugoslavia. It was created at a time when intemational efforts to contain the deadly conflict in 

Bosnia were clearly failing A UN peacekeeping force, composed largely of units from countries 

in Westem Europe, had been deployed in Bosnia, and over time it became as much a hostage to 

the contending forces as a stabilizing element. Many in Congress, including you, Chairman 

Smith, recognized that a more robust policy was required to resolve the conflict, and to that end, 

you were one of the original co-sponsors of legislation introduced that year to end US 

participation in the one-sided UN arms embargo on Bosnia. This was something that would have 

leveled the playing field and given the beleaguered Bosnians a fighting chance against Slobodan 

Milosevic's well-armed Yugoslav National Army. 

The Europeans adamantly opposed this idea, however, because tl1ey had boots on the 

ground and worried that more weapons in Bosnia might increase the risk to their peacekeepers. 

But, of course, they were equally opposed to changing the mles of engagement governing their 

peacekeepers, or deploying more of them, so the conflict was intensifying and the international 

community looked increasingly feckless. 

In August 1995, following the massacre at Srebrenica and other infamous acts of 

genocide, your legislation passed the House and Senate by veto-proof margins. As a result, 

President Clinton realized he needed a new policy, so he commenced a NATO-commanded 

bombing campaign in Bosnia that led within a matter of months to the Dayton Accords and the 

peace settlement that remains in etl'ect in that country to the present day. 

But in 1993, all of this was for the future. In 1993, a bitter argument was taking place 

between the United States and the Europeans about what to do in Bosnia. There was no 

consensus on what to do, except everyone realized that something needed to be done. In that 

context, the idea of establishing a war crimes tribunal emerged as a low-risk, least common 

denominator that both the United States and Europe could embrace. 

Maybe we can't agree on allowing the victims to buy the anm they need for self-defense, 

or sending more peacekeepers to protect them, the thinking went, but at least we can demonstrate 

our concern by sending lawyers. Not to Bosnia, of course, but to The Hague, where they can 

draw up indictments and bring the perpetrators of atrocities to justice aiter the fact. And who 

knows, maybe the creation of such a mechanism will actually deter the commission of additional 

atrocities. The existence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal did not seem to have that etl'ect two years 

later at Srebrenica, or in 1999, when Milosevic and his army began gearing up another genocide 

in Kosovo, but these failures are not my main objection to the Yugoslavia Tribunal. 

My main objection to the Tribunal is that its creation in 1993 provided cover for the 

international community to avoid taking more meaningful action that might actually have saved 

lives in Bosnia. Two years were wasted while the Tribunal sought to establish itself, and tens of 

2 
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85316d-3.eps

thousands of additional Bosnian Ii ves were lost before the international community finally acted 

decisively to end the conflict. In this sense, I believe that creating the Tribunal inadvertently 

prolonged the Bosnian conflict and raised the cost in human lives. 

The story with the Rwandan war crimes tribunal is only slightly different. It was not 

created as an alternative to taking meaningtul action, as in the case of Yugoslavia. Rather, it was 

created in 1994 out of a sense of collective guilt over the failure to take meaningful action to stop 

the Rwandan genocide. By the time the Tribunal was established, 800,000 Rwandans had 

already perished, so the principal objective was not to prevent more killing, but to establish 

responsibility for killings that had already taken place. 

In practice, however, an ad hoc UN tribunal was ill-suited for this mission. Over the past 

twenty years, the Rwanda Tribunal has spent almost $2 billion to try to bring to justice fewer 

than 100 of the most culpable perpetrators of war crimes in Rwanda. Meanwhile the 

Government of Rwanda has been essentially on its own in trying to deal with the approximately 

125,000 other suspected participants in the genocide. The resources made available by the 

international community to assist Rwanda in processing these cases have been a pittance 

compared to what was spent on the UN tribunal. 

Worse still, a two-tiered system of justice emerged that, among other things, convinced 

the government of Rwanda that the UN was really on the side of the organizers of the genocide. 

If you were one of the 125,000 lower-level participants in the genocide, you languished in an 

overcrowded Rwandan prison and ate to the extent family members brought you food or you 

were able to earn money, waiting for the hopelessly understaffed Rwandan judicial system to 

figure out a way to process your case. But if you were one of the fewer than 100 high-level 

organizers of the genocide, you were held in a modern prison and atIorded UN-funded defense 

counsel and private investigators-in some cases friends or relatives from Rwanda who you 

could get on the Tribunal's payroll-while your case wended its way through the Tribunal's trial 

and appeals system. Further, until 2007, defendants in the Rwandan system potentially faced the 

death penalty, while the higher-level defendants prosecuted before the Tribunal faced a 

maximum penalty oflife in prison. 

Justice would have been better served in Rwanda had the international community not 

acted on its sense of shame and guilt to create the Rwanda Tribunal, but rather had devoted a 

fraction of the resources ultimately devoted to the Tribunal to develop local capacity to hold 

perpetrators responsible for the genocide. 

The UN appears to have drawn a similar conclusion trom the Rwanda experience. It has 

created no new ad hoc international criminal tribunals since 1994. Instead, when contronted 

with situations where there is a need for criminal accountability, it has opted for mixed tribunals 

that combine international and local elements. This has been done in Sierra Leone, Lebanon, 

Cambodia and East Timor. Of these, the Special Court for Sierra Leone has been the most 

3 
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85316d-4.eps

successful. This approach is clearly preferable to the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals. 

The limitation, of course, is that this approach can only work when the country in question is 

ruled by a government willing to cooperate in the pursuit of justice. 

International Criminal Court 

With regard to the ICC, 1 will not comment on how the Court has managed to deal with 

cases arising in countries that have accepted the Court's jurisdiction. Syria, of course, is not one 

of those countries, so the only way the ICC will be able to exercise jurisdiction there is if the UN 

Security Council refers the Syrian conflict to the ICC in accordance with Article 13 of the Rome 

Statute. The Security Council has done this twice before-in Sudan with respect to Darfur in 

2005, and in Libya in 2011. In both of these cases, 1 believe the Security Council referral was a 

mistake that reduced prospects for negotiated peace settlements and arguably prolonged and 

intensified the conflicts. 

The situation in Sudan in 2005 was in many respects similar to the Former Yugoslavia in 

1993. The international community was frustrated with its inability to end a pattern of gross 

violations of human rights, but unwilling or unable to take more meaningful action to end the 

cont1ict, so once again it decided to send lawyers to sort out the mess. It was hoped that doing 

this would increase the pressure on the government of President Omar al-Bashir to negotiate an 

end to the contlict in Darfur and create a dynamic that would reduce the loss of life in that 

region. In this it backfired, however. 

The ICC is an extremely blunt instrument. It is not an instrument of diplomacy, but 

rather an instrument of justice. By design, it exalts justice over all other objectives. This is the 

meaning and intention of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which provides that once the Court has 

taken up a case, it can never permanently be divested of jurisdiction to proceed with it, and not 

even the UN Security Council can defer the investigation or prosecution of the case for more 

than one year. Of course, Article 16 permits the Security Council to renew such deferrals once a 

year for so long as it may wish to do so, but the message of this provision to potential defendants 

is crystal clear: once the ICC prosecutor has begun to pursue you, no power on Earth can ever 

permanently rid you of him. 

In Sudan, the most immediate consequence of the Security Council's decision to confer 

jurisdiction on the ICC was to encourage President al-Bashir to drag his feet on etTorts to deploy 

a UN peacekeeping force to Darfur. Government spokesmen explained at the time that they 

were not doing this out of principled opposition to UN peacekeepers-they had agreed just 

months earlier to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in South Sudan-but rather out of 

fear that, following the referral of Sudan to the ICC, such a force might eventually seek to 

enforce ICC arrest warrants against government officials. 

A few years later, when the ICC prosecutor first requested an arrest warrant for President 

al-Bashir, the government curtailed humanitarian relief activities in Darfur and scaled back its 

4 
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diplomatic cooperation. Former Bush Administration Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios 

commented at the time "The regime will now avoid any compromise or anything that would 

weaken their already weakened position because if they are forced from office they face trials 

before the ICC." 

Two years later, the ICC issued a second arrest warrant for President al-Bashir, and 

President Obama's Special Envoy for Sudan, Scott Gration, offered similar criticism. The TCC 

action "will make my mission more difficult and challenging," Gration complained. President 

al-Bashir is, of course, still in power despite being twice indicted by the ICC, and the conflict in 

Darfur continues to fester. Regrettably, as illustrated by the comments above, the ICC's 

involvement has undermined rather than supported efforts by American and other diplomats to 

bring peace to the region. 

The Security Council's referral of Libya to the ICC was even more short-sighted. The 

Council acted in February 2011 as momentum in the Libyan civil war appeared to be shifting 

from the rebel s to the government of Col. Muammar Gaddafi. The Council acted out of a c1 ear 

desire to shift the momentum back in favor of the rebels and expedite Gaddafi's removal from 

power. The effect of the referral, however, was the opposite of what was intended. 

In the neighboring countries of Tunisia and Egypt, the Arab Spring forced longtime rulers 

to reluctantly give up power and go into either foreign or internal exile. As a result, neither 

country descended into civil war. That would have been the preferred outcome in Libya as well. 

By injecting the ICC into the mix, however, the Security Council effectively removed this option 

for Libya. The message to Col. Gaddafi was clear unlike President Ben Ali of Tunisia and 

President Mubarak of Egypt, he would not be allowed to retire peacefully into exile. Should he 

give up power, the ICC would be on his heels, and no diplomatic settlement was possible that 

could b'llarantee him against eventual imprisonment by the ICC. At best, consistent with Article 

16 of the Rome Statute, he could be given a one-year respite by the UN Security Council. There 

could be no assurance, however, that the respite would be extended for a second year after he 

gave up power, much less once a year every year for the rest of his life. 

As a result, Col. Gaddafi made what was probably a rational decision for a dictator in 

such a situation: he decided to hold his ground and fight to the death with his opponents. And 

die he did, but not before thousands of other Libyans died as well. Whether some of these other 

lives could have been spared had Col. Gaddafi not been denied the option of peaceful exile will 

never be known. But certainly the ICC referral made no positive contribution to mitigating the 

intensity and duration of the conflict. 

The Conflict in Syria 

At this point, Chairman Smith, you are probably wondering how it is that I can support 

your resolution if I am so critical regarding these other cases. The answer is that there are 

several unique features to the Syrian conflict that lead me to believe that the creation of an ad 

5 
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hoc war crimes tribunal for that country could make a positive contribution to international peace 

and security. 

First, we face a humanitarian catastrophe in Syria, and we have a moral obligation to try 

to address it. 

Second, this is not a case like Bosnia in the early 1990s or Darfur eight years ago, where 

there are alternative measures that realistically could be adopted to address that humanitarian 

catastrophe. For starters, it is clear that Russia and China will use their veto at the UN Security 

Council to block even mild measures such as international sanctions on the Syrian government, 

much less UN authorization to deploy peacekeepers or use anned force to end the bloodshed. 

Nor is the United States going to take any sort of unilateral action of the type it was 

prepared to take in the Former Yugoslavia. The Obama Administration is no longer in the 

business of seriously working to remove Bashar al-Assad's regime from power. Instead, 

following the agreement with Russia to destroy Syria's chemical weapons, the Assad regime is 

now the Obama Administration's partner in that destruction effort. The Administration's 

rhetoric may not have caught up with the reality of its policy, but over time the Administration 

will realize that one consequence of the deal with Russia is that it has to quietly set aside its 

professed policy of forcing President Assad from power. 

In further contrast to Bosnia and Darfur, the U.S. Congress is not going to push for a 

more robust U.S. policy. This was the lesson of the abortive debate two months ago over whether 

to authorize President Obama to conduct airstrikes in response to President Assad's use of 

chemical weapons against his own people. So for all these reasons, the civil war in Syria appears 

likely to go on for a long time with no relief in sight. 

Third, there are in fact villains on both sides of the conflict. The Assad government's 

culpability is evident. But increasingly we see evidence of atrocities perpetrated by radical 

elements among the rebels, including the al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant. An ad hoc war crimes tribunal could seek to establish accountability for crimes 

committed on both sides. 

Some will claim that the existence of such a mechanism will discourage more atrocities. 

I would like to believe this is true, but I see little evidence the Yugoslavia Tribunal had that 

effect in the Balkans. Surprisingly, determined perpetrators of genocide and other war crimes 

seem not to worry too much about the long-term consequences of their actions. 

I do believe, however, that the establishment of accountability could perform the useful 

function of further delegitimizing both the Assad regime and those among the rebels who are 

committing crimes under the guise of fighting for their country's freedom. This in turn could 

make it more difficult for governments and other donors outside of Syria to continue to support 

the government and radical rebel elements. Because an ad hoc tribunal could pursue war crimes 

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perpetrators on all sides of the conflict, it is not hopeless to believe that Russia and China might 

ultimately agree at the Security Council to establish such a tribunal. A long shot, to be sure, but 

not hopeless. 

Fourth, it is possible to construct an ad hoc tribunal that will reinforce diplomatic efforts 

to remove President Assad from power. Most importantly, pressure to refer Syria to the ICC 

must be resisted, because the most immediate consequence of such a referral would be to ensure 

that President Assad will never voluntarily relinquish power. A properly constructed ad hoc 

tribunal would not close the door to a bargain with the Assad regime that potentially could end 

the conflict, thereby saving tens or hundreds of thousands of Syrian lives. 

I would, of course, prefer a mixed tribunal of the kind that has functioned etJectively in 

Sierra Leone to an ad hoc tribunal like those created for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 

But so long as the Assad regime remains in power, there is no government in Syria with which 

the international community could work to establish such a mixed tribunal. 

For all these reasons, Chairman Smith, I support your initiative to create an ad hoc 

tribunal for Syria. We should get into this with our eyes wide open, however. If such a tribunal 

is created, it will be expensive to operate, have limited capacity, and work painfully slowly The 

tribunals in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have both been operating for about 20 years, and 

recently have been costing well in excess of $100 million each per year. The lifetime cost of 

each of these tribunals will be in the neighborhood of $2 billion. And when they finally 

conclude their work, the Rwanda Tribunal will have handled fewer than 100 cases arising from a 

genocide in which 800,000 were killed-mostly by people wielding machetes-and the 

Yugoslavia Tribunal will have handled fewer than 200 cases. 

Ideally, if a new democratic government comes to power in Syria, the costs can be 

minimized by referring cases back to Syria, or to a mixed tribunal along the lines of the Special 

Court for Sierra Leone that is set up with the support of that new government. As in the Fonner 

Yugoslavia and Rwanda, if most perpetrators are to be brought to justice, Syria is where it will 

have to happen in any event; no international tribunal will have the capacity to handle any but 

the most egregious cases arising from a conflict in which over 100,000 people have already been 

killed. 

With these observations, I will conclude my remarks and invite questions. 

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Secretary Rademaker, for that 

explanation. And, again, your full statement will be made a part 

of the record. 

I would like to ask, Mr. Dicker, if you would proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD DICKER, DIRECTOR, 

INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROGRAM, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Mr. DICKER. I am grateful to the subcommittees for inviting me 

to testify. And, Mr. Chair, I want to thank you for convening this 

important hearing. 

My organization, Human Rights Watch, has conducted extensive 

research in Syria over the last 21⁄2 years. We have issued, by my 

count, 11 in-depth reports documenting horrific human rights 

crimes. We have conducted 10 in-country field missions to document and support our findings, and my comments today are based 

on that experience and the experience of reviewing justice mechanisms over the last 20 years. 

Let me start by saying that criminal prosecutions of the crimes 

perpetrated in this conflict would present challenges for any court 

system. And certainly as has been remarked, justice is not a panacea to all the problems that are besetting Syria today. Trials can 

only be but one part of a larger package, sir, to bring some healing 

and accountability to the situation. 

It is, therefore, essential, I believe, to think strategically in overcoming what are quite steep hurdles. And this requires, I believe, 

making use of a range of judicial and non-judicial tools at both the 

international and national level in a mutually reinforcing spiral 

that avoids pitting one against the other. 

Given the exigencies that we see, we believe a three-pronged approach sequenced in time offers the best possibilities for justice, 

and I will walk through those. But I want to say with respect, Mr. 

Chairman, I do take some exception to a single-minded focus on an 

ad hoc tribunal. Normally, in these type situations the starting 

point would be with the national courts and strengthening those as 

the first line of protection for civilians at risk. 

I think we all know at this table, and in this room, that in the 

near term any reliance on Syrian courts, even post-conflict, is unrealistic. And while strengthening a revitalized Syrian judiciary is an 

essential goal, it is a long-term one. 

My point here, sir, is that the need for credible national justice 

is clear, but the path to achieving it, frankly, is a long one. I think, 

given that, we want to draw your attention to the need for the establishment of a specialized judicial mechanism embedded in a reconstituted Syrian justice system with the active participation of 

international experts. We believe over time that could work to 

strengthen domestic capacity. 

And, sir, I would suggest the War Crimes Chamber in the state 

court of Bosnia offers important lessons in this regard. This will 

not be easy in Syria. But if done correctly, it would help bridge—

build a bridge to the ordinary Syrian courts through joint training 

and experience-sharing to bolster the capacity there. 

Now, on this difficult terrain, we believe the International Criminal Court has a crucial role to play in prosecuting those most responsible and being a reference point for the special mechanism 

59

and evolving national courts already mentioned. The ICC would 

look at all sides to the conflict and have potential positive spillover 

effect on future national proceedings as happened in fact in the 

former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 

In spite of that positive impact, I think it is important to acknowledge that, given the ICC’s daunting mandate, the lack of sufficiently robust state support and some policy missteps over its first 

10 years, there has been a shortfall in ICC practice. Fortunately, 

the new leadership team at the court I believe is cognizant of these 

problems and attempting to take those challenges in hand. 

Now, we know that the ICC could only obtain jurisdiction 

through a Security Council referral. Is it impossible because of 

Russia’s implacable opposition to date to think that such referral 

could occur? We have seen, as the situation on the ground in Syria 

has changed, changes in Russia’s position on chemical weapons and 

humanitarian access to populations in need. 

I argue it would be a major mistake to preclude the possibility 

of Russian support for a referral. I would also add, unfortunately, 

the U.S. administration has allowed Russia much more space by 

failing to itself, from Washington and New York, come out strongly 

in favor of an ICC referral. 

In conclusion, I think that the U.S. Government support for an 

ICC investigation as one mechanism would encourage close allies 

on the Security Council and raise pressure on the Russian Federation to change its obstructive stance. I believe with respect, Mr. 

Chairman, the solution most likely to provide justice is not a standalone tribunal for Syria, because this comes with significant practical obstacles. 

Reference has been made to the delays in creating and standing 

up a complex institution from scratch. And I believe that such 

delay would remove any potential deterrent effect that could be 

achieved by formally investigating crimes in Syria now. An ad hoc 

tribunal would be more costly than using an existing mechanism, 

and at the end of the day what would its source of legitimacy be, 

both for the people of Syria and internationally? 

We recommend, in conclusion, that the administration continue 

supporting documentation efforts, including the preservation of evidence. This could be vital to future prosecutions. We believe the administration should consider the kind of Sarajevo-type chamber as 

playing an essential role, and that the U.S. should stand up and 

support an ICC referral instead of demurring behind concerns that 

Russia or China would veto any Security Council referral. 

And we think, lastly, strategy should be formulated with a specialized mechanism and ICC investigation very much in mind. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dicker follows:]

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Me Richard Dicker 

Director, futemational Justice Program 

Human Rights Watch 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and futemational Organizations 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

October 30,2013 

"Establishing a Syrian War Crimes Tribunal?" 
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I. Introdnction 

Testimony to Subcommittee 

October 30, 2013 

I am grateful to the Joint Subcommittee for inviting me to testify today, and thank both 

Chairman Chris Smith, Madame Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and members of the 

subcommittees for holding this hearing to discuss the important issue of justice and 

accountability in Syria - a topic which does not often get enough time in the public domain but 

which is so critical. 

My organization, Human Rights Watch, has issued eleven in-depth reports on horrific 

human rights crimes committed in Syria over the last two and half years. My colleagues have 

conducted over ten field missions interviewing hundreds of victims of and witnesses to these 

abuses. Most recently, we documented massacres by armed insurgents on a series of Alawite 

villages near the city of Latakia. 

As you know, serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law have 

been committed on a vast scale in Syria. Human Rights Watch has concluded that government 

forces have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes and has repeatedly called for an 

end to abuses. As you may know, the Syrian government continues to conduct indiscriminate air 

and artillery strikes on residential areas, and to arbitrarily detain, torture, and extra-judicially 

execute civilians and combatants. In August, hundreds of civilians, including many children, 

were killed in a chemical weapons attack on areas near Damascus. A United Nations 

investigation detennined that the nerve agent Sarin was used. While the Syrian government 

denies responsibility, a Human Rights Watch report, based on independent analysis and 

documentation, found that available evidence strongly suggests that government forces were 

responsible for the attack. 

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Human Rights Watch has also documented and condemned serious abuses amounting to 

war crimes, including the indiscriminate use of car bombs, kidnapping, torture, and extrajudicial 

executions by some opposition groups. Foreign fighters and groups linked to Al Qaeda have 

been among the worst perpetrators of these abuses. In one operation documented by Human 

Rights Watch in the Latakia countryside of Syria in August, evidence strongly suggests that the 

abuses committed by some anned groups taking part in that particular military operation rise to 

the level of crimes against humanity. Some armed opposition groups fighting in Syria are also 

using children for combat and other military purposes. 

One fundamental track toward accountability for these extensive and grave violations 

involves the credible investigation and prosecution of those individuals responsible in a court of 

law. Criminal justice can yield short and long-term benefits. Importantly, the fair prosecution of 

persons for serious crimes under international law may assist in restoring dignity to victims by 

acknowledging their sutfering. It also acts an expression of condemnation and outrage at the 

commission of these violations and ensures that the perpetrators are duly punished. Moreover, by 

providing means of redress for victims, criminal justice may deter future violations and build 

respect for, and confidence in, the rule of law. The failure to hold those responsible for the most 

serious international crimes to account, on the other hand, can fuel future abuses. 

Yet, criminal prosecutions of the crimes perpetrated during the Syrian contlict present 

challenges for any court system. It is therefore essential to be objective and clear-eyed about the 

difficulties in achieving the desired results in a situation as polarized as Syria is and will be. 

Beyond the practical difficulties posed by the scale of the violations, including the 

collection and preservation of evidence, delivering meaningful justice in a manner that upholds 

the principles of impartiality and independence will also prove a daunting task. In most cases, it 

will also be difficult to ensure that investigations and prosecutions resonate with the concerns of 

victims and affected communities, be they in Aleppo or Latakia. Tn other locales, pursuing 

justice may turn out to be deeply unpopular, including among segments of the population who 

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believe that those who committed serious crimes were justified in doing so, or because those 

implicated in abuses retain positions of authority or are close to those in power. It is this complex 

landscape that frames the pursuit of criminal justice for grave abuses from the outset. 

One must therefore think objectively and strategically in overcoming the obstacles that 

exist in addressing the crimes committed. This will require a comprehensive, long-term vision 

that makes use of a range of judicial and non-judicial tools at both the international and national 

level in a mutually re-enforcing fashion, and in a way which avoids pitting one measure against 

others. 

With respect to achieving credible criminal justice for the crimes committed, Human 

Rights Watch believes that the most etl'ective path to accountability should include prosecutions 

by Syrian courts, the contribution of a specialized 'bridging' mechanism embedded in the Syrian 

justice system, and the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC), acting as a critical 

reference point for the domestic system. 

II. National Courts 

Nonnally the starting place would be with the national courts because these should be the 

first line of protection and justice for victims. Indeed, prosecutions by domestic courts are 

necessary to achieve fuller accountability. 1 submit that this is unlikely to happen in the shortterm in Syria. Critically, the political will to permit the independent and impartial investigation 

and prosecution of the serious crimes committed in the past two and half years is absent. The 

domestic justice system lacks independence from political control and security forces are 

shielded by law from prosecution. This means that pursuing sensitive cases, which may implicate 

governmental policies or actors, is impossible in the current political landscape. 

Moreover, beyond the acute hurdles that exist with respect to the political will to realize 

credible and effective justice, several steps will also need to be taken to develop the capacity of 

the domestic justice system to address these crimes. Cases involving grave crimes such as war 

crimes and crimes against humanity tend to be extremely complex to investigate, prove, defend 

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against, and adjudicate. Extensive evidence and scores of witnesses are usually involved. 

Prosecuting individuals who may have ordered the crime rather than personally having 

committed it or are responsible as a matter of command responsibility is also difficult -

international experience shows that identifying these individuals and proving links between acts 

on the ground and orders or acquiescence from above requires extensive prosecutorial and 

judicial experience. Even the most sophisticated legal systems-which mainly deal with ordinary 

crimes-may lack the capacity to effectively address serious crimes committed on a large scale. 

At the same time, stark deficiencies will exist in the Syrian justice system which will aggravate 

these challenges, including a shortage of personnel, a lack of training in addressing serious 

criminal cases, concerns about the bias of national judges and prosecutors, limited court 

infrastructure, outdated rules of procedure, corruption, and limited case management. 

So while the need for credible national justice is clear, the path to achieve it is by no 

means straightfonvard or within reach. Even where there is political will to see perpetrators from 

one side held to account, the local justice sector will be in disarray. As such, refonns and 

external assistance will be needed to equip the Syrian judicial system, over the long run, to carry 

out credible and independent domestic proceedings which are meaningful to the local population, 

including, for example, putting measures in place to ensure: (i) the independence of judges and 

prosecutors; (ii) the full protection of witnesses, lawyers, and judicial personnel; (iii) as well as 

the ability of investigators to gather evidence. Financial and diplomatic support for such future 

efforts could assist in bolstering national capacity to handle these violations, but this will all take 

a lot of time. 

III. Specialized Mechanism Embedded in the National Justice System 

While this long-term judicial construction work is undenvay, the creation of a dedicated 

and specialized judicial mechanism embedded in the national justice system with the active 

participation of international investigators, prosecutors and judges could work to narrow the 

impunity gap. If appropriately structured, such a mechanism could, in time, strengthen the 

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capacity of the national justice system to handle grave international crimes. The War Crimes 

Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina's State Court and the Special Department for War Crimes 

in the Prosecutor's Office offer important lessons for poli cym akers and donors in this regard. 

This will not be easy in Syria, but if done right, this would help to build "bridges" with 

the ordinary Syrian courts through sharing training, knowledge, and experience to bolster the 

capacity of the entire Syrian justice system. 

The involvement of internationals with experience in trying complex cases carries a 

number of crucial benefits. Beyond enhancing the short and long-term capacity of professionals 

and institutions in Syria to conduct fair and effective war crimes trials, the presence of impartial 

international statl could also help insulate the mechanism from political interference and 

strengthen its perceived and actual independence. Lastly, presence of international staff may 

bolster victims and witnesses' willingness to give testimony, as well as witness protection. The 

internationals can be phased out over time, according to certain benchmarks, as the local judicial 

authorities gain experience, establish their legitimacy, and assert their independence. 

It cannot be stressed enough though that without the necessary political commitment to 

fair and impartial trials at the outset, it will not be possible to legitimately pursue broader 

national prosecutions, let alone establish a meaningful "bridge building" mechanism. 

IV. The Role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 

On this difficult terrain, we believe that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has a 

crucial role to playas a "reference point" for the national system. If possible, the court's 

involvement in the course of the ongoing conflict in Syria would send a clear message to all 

parties that grave crimes will not be tolerated and carry serious consequences. In the short-term, 

it would therefore put those in senior positions, no matter their political allegiance, on notice that 

they could be held responsible for crimes they order or commit, or for crimes they fail to prevent 

or punish - whatever the outcome of the conflict. This credible threat of prosecution may help 

stem further abuses. In addition, the record from other conflicts, such as those in the Balkans, 

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also confirms that criminal indictments of senior political, military, and rebel leaders while 

conflicts are ongoing can actually strengthen peace efforts by delegitimizing and marginalizing 

those who stand in the way of resolving the conflict. 

Over a longer term, there are indications that it could have a potentially positive 

"spillover" or catalytic effect on future national proceedings. There is basis in practice for this 

trend. In particular, the ad hoc tribunals for the fonner Yugoslavia and Rwanda played a 

beneficial role in this regard. For example, the desire to have cases transferred from the 

international ad hOG tribunals propelled both Rwanda and the countries of the former Yugoslavia 

to engage in serious domestic legal reform in order to meet the tribunals' standards to have cases 

transferred to their national courts. This wish to try cases handled by the ad hoc tribunals also 

propelled some of these countries to create specialized judicial chambers and prosecutorial 

mechanisms to address atrocity crimes. 

In many countries where the International Criminal Court is carrying out an investigation, 

steps have been taken-at least nominally-to start domestic proceedings. Even in countries 

where ICC investigations are being considered but have not been opened, efforts have been made 

to hold perpetrators to account that otherwise may not have occurred in order to keep the cases in 

national courts. 

Yet, in spite of the positive impact the ICC could have in Syria, it is important to 

acknowledge that given its daunting mandate, the lack of sufficiently robust state support 

afforded the institution to date, and some performance failings over its first ten years, there have 

been shortcomings in the court's practice. With investigations in eight country situations, the 

court is overextended and Syria would pose the steepest challenge yet to the institution. 

Meaningful justice delivered by the ICC will mean investigations regardless of the 

affiliation of the perpetrator and trials on charges reflecting the underlying patterns of ICC 

crimes committed in a situation. A robust approach will also mean, where possible, presence in 

the field and engagement with atTected communities in order to inform ICC policy decisions, to 

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ensure that justice is not only done but seen to be done through public information and outreach 

activities, and to facilitate witness protection, fair trial rights, and the right to victim participation 

afforded under the Rome Statute. Practically speaking, the need for robust engagement means 

that an ICC intervention will be resource-intensive. 

F or the court to be able to implement its mandate, including by taking on important but 

politicall y unpopular cases, securing arrests, and guarding its independence, the ICC will need 

increased international political commitment-whether at meetings of its states parties, in 

strategic forums such as the UN Security Council and regional organizations, or in bilateral 

contacts-and the implementation of that political commitment in practice. Additional resources 

would likely be needed, including resources to support additional investigations and cases in 

Syria. Court officials and staffwill also need to heighten their efforts to ensure that the ICC can 

meet its full potentiaL Indeed, the effective implementation of its mandate in practice will not be 

possible without the steadfast support and commitment on the part of a number of actors. 

For now, the ICC cannot prosecute grave abuses committed in Syria since it is not a 

member state of the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the ICe. Unless the Syrian 

government ratifies the treaty or accepts the jurisdiction of the court through a declaration, the 

ICC could only obtain jurisdiction if the l)N Security Council refers the situation there to the 

court. The Security Council, with what is called an "ICC referral," could give the court 

jurisdiction stretching back to the day the Rome Statute entered into force, on July 1, 2002. The 

ICC would have jurisdiction to investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide 

committed by all sides to this conflict, whether by government forces, opposition fighters, or 

other militias. 

We have seen, as the situation on the ground shifts in Syria, changes in Russia's position 

on chemical weapons and humanitarian access to populations in need inside Syria. It would be a 

mistake to preclude circumstances where Russia would not block a referraL This will require 

active US government support. Frankly, the administration could do a lot more to make its views 

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known. Such support will encourage its closest allies on the Council and raise pressure on the 

Russian Federation to change its obstructive stance. It will also underscore the administration's 

commitment to impartial justice. 

V. Recommendations and ConcInsion 

In sum, given the exigencies, we believe this three-pronged approach, sequenced in time 

between the prongs, offers the best possibilities for justice in an extremely difficult situation. 

After considering the situation on the ground and the most relevant experience from other 

country situations, 1 believe, with all respect, that the solution most likely to provide justice is 

not a stand-alone ad hoc tribunal for Syria. Establishing a separate, ad hoc entity to prosecute 

crimes in Syria comes with significant practical obstacles. 

There are delays inherent in creating another highly complex institution from scratch, as 

was done with the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia or 

the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Defining the legal framework, finding appropriate facilities, 

recruiting competent personnel and ensuring cooperation of states represent considerable 

challenges, require time and are likely to be more costly than if a pennanent institution is tasked 

with investigation and prosecution. The delay involved in creating such an entity from the 

ground up would remove any potential deterrent effect that could be achieved by examining 

crimes in Syria now, as abuses persist. Another key concern relates to the current security 

situation in Syria, which precludes the presence of such an ad hoc entity. It is also unrealistic to 

assume that Syria would support the establishment of such an institution, let alone fully respect 

its independence. 

Funding is also an issue of concern for mixed or hybrid judicial entities where financial 

contributions by states are not compulsory (as is the case for the Special Court for Sierra Leone 

and the Extraordinary Chamber of the Courts in Cambodia). Financial constraints drastically 

undermine the ability to effectively and independently provide justice for victims. The example 

of the Cambodian model also shows that internationalized structures which are integrated in the 

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national justice system can be exposed to a considerabfe risk (J{ undue if!ffuencing which 

impedes the impartial delivery of justice. 

It is noteworthy that the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, in its February 2013 report, 

concluded that the ICC is the most appropriate judicial institution for the fight against impunity 

in Syria and enumerated a series of reasons why an ad hoc entity would not present a viable 

option to adequately ensure accountability for crimes committed in Syria 

With the foregoing in mind, there are some concrete steps that could be taken to signal 

greater support for justice in Syria. Human Rights Watch would like to suggest: 

First, the administration has already started supporting documentation etl'orts, including 

the preservation of potential evidence. This process will continue to be very important going 

forward and could be vital to future domestic and international accountability processes. 

Congress should support these efforts 

Second, the US government should make clear its position on the ICC instead of 

demurring behind concerns that Russia and/or China would veto any Security Council resolution 

which aimed to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC. While I recognize the ICC is often 

considered a lightning rod of sorts for many in this body, there is simply no reason to reject the 

idea out of pocket. There are now 64 countries supporting such a referral, including six Security 

Council members, so the administration would be smart to at least begin talking about how the 

court can playa constructive role. In this connection, the administration's overall justice strategy 

on Syria should take the ICC into account. Congress is well placed to press the administration on 

this point and I hope these subcommittees will consider doing so. 

Thank you. 

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Dicker, for your testimony. 

Chairman, would you like to—Chairman Chabot I think——

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. You said you had to——

Mr. CHABOT. I do have a flight to catch, so I will try to be relatively brief. Just a couple of questions. This week international 

news sources have been highlighting President Assad’s forces laying siege to suburbs near Damascus, and the resulting starvation 

of women and children. 

How do you determine how far up and how far down you go? For 

example, the soldiers say at the checkpoints that are blocking people from coming in, do they go to the court? Who do you—and I 

will just ask one of you, if you want to take that on. How is that 

determination made? 

Mr. CRANE. Well, thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman. I 

think it goes to really the challenge that one has when one is trying to seek justice for victims of any atrocity anywhere. It also depends on the mandate of the court itself. 

For example, if it was a local Syrian court, then they would be 

looking at all of the perpetrators and to include the privates, the 

sergeants, what have you, whatever that particular perpetrator 

may be. As you go up the various options, which I highlighted to 

the subcommittees, then it just depends on the mandate. 

The Special Court for Sierra Leone’s mandate was prosecute 

those who bear the greatest responsibility, those who created the 

conditions—aided, abetted, and caused—these horror stories. So 

we, in West Africa, did not go after the foot soldier. We went after 

the leaders, very much like Nuremberg where we went after the 

top 23 so to speak. 

So it varies. Everybody is culpable. The challenge that we have 

here is we really can’t prosecute everyone. It is almost impossible—

one, is to find out exactly who pulled the triggers, what have you, 

but it is just politically not sustainable to prosecute all of the individuals who commit these horrific crimes. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. CRANE. So, therefore, justice will be done, but I am not sure 

that we would go all the way down to the individual private at that 

particular time. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Mr. Rademaker, let me go to you next. 

You had made a reference, and I would just like to kind of maybe 

put it in the form of a question. The current administration had 

in effect called for Assad to step aside early on, and then Assad 

used his chemical weapons against his own people. And now we are 

working with the Russians and with Assad, and you don’t hear too 

much anymore about, ‘‘Well, he has got to go.’’ Now we are working 

with the guy. 

What message does that send to other rogue leaders across the 

globe who do nasty things sometimes to their own people? Sometimes if they do horrific things, maybe they are going to end up 

getting rewarded for it. Is that a message we don’t necessarily 

want to send, but maybe it was sent in this case? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yes. Chairman Chabot, regrettably, I think the 

suggestion of your question is correct. It will be interesting to see 

71

how historians look back on this current—the last few months of 

what happened in Syria and how they explain or interpret the sequence of events. 

But I worry that the historical judgment will be that President 

Assad very cleverly decided to use chemical weapons against his civilian population, killed about 1,500 people, and the consequence of 

that was that he was able to remain in power, that he pivoted and 

he focused the attention of the international community on the existence of his chemical weapons, he volunteered to get rid of them, 

but as a practical matter the price of his cooperation in getting rid 

of those chemical weapons had to be that he would remain in 

power. 

I don’t think that the Obama administration today would concede 

that their policy on the question of the outcome they would like to 

see in Syria has changed. I suspect they would still say, ‘‘No, no, 

we want to bring about the removal of President Assad and his replacement by a democratic government.’’ But as we and the Russians work with that very government to dismantle these chemical 

weapons over a long period of time, and, you know, you heard my 

resume, I used to be in charge of chemical weapons dismantlement 

for the State Department, you know, we are still dismantling our 

chemical weapons here in the United States. 

It is phenomenally costly, phenomenally time-consuming, and I 

don’t know what the latest estimates are for Syria, but I would say 

multiply by two or three whatever people are saying because that 

is—in the real world that is how long it will take. And so this is 

a process that will play out over a long period of time, and I do 

think the de facto change in policy has been disconcerting. 

I mean, there have been a lot of stories recently about how upset 

the Saudis are, because they thought America was going in one direction and now it seems to be going in a different direction, both 

respect to Syria and also potentially with respect to Iran. And it 

is really an astonishing turn of events that we have witnessed. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, if I have time for one 

more question. 

Mr. SMITH. Of course. Please. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you. Maybe I will address this to the 

other two panel members who I didn’t ask yet. So there has been 

some media attention recently to Syrian snipers targeting pregnant 

women for sport, apparently. Is there evidence? Could you cite previous examples where either a criminal court has been set up and 

it actually does modify the behavior of people on the ground? You 

know, if I do this, I may be prosecuted for this? So the people do 

perhaps not carry out atrocities that they might otherwise have 

carried out? Is there something you can tell us along those lines, 

either one or both? 

Thank you. 

Mr. DICKER. Thank you. What comes to mind is, first and foremost, the handling or recruitment of child soldiers in Eastern 

Congo, Congressman. After the indictment issued or charges issued 

against a Congolese warlord by the International Criminal Court, 

our researchers in eastern Congo reported a release of large numbers of child soldiers forcibly recruited in many instances into 

armed militias, precisely because of that charge against one of 

72

their own who was now in the dock at the International Criminal 

Court. That is one example. 

I want to be careful in not overstating, however, the deterrent effect of justice because, let us be frank, it is new and it is fragile. 

But I think part of the value of early—‘‘early,’’ 21⁄2 years after the 

start of the conflict—but quick action through a referral to the ICC 

is it will put those most responsible on notice that they could face 

criminal charges. I think that stigmatization would be very helpful. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Mr. White, did you want to add anything to that? 

Mr. WHITE. Yes, just real quickly. From my own personal experience, not only as a Federal agent but certainly serving in West Africa where we had some of the worst atrocities that you could ever 

imagine occur, clearly accountability will address the impunity 

issue. If you do not think that you will be held accountable, you 

will continue to perpetrate these crimes. 

I know many of the rebels that I personally interviewed, and 

some of which became insiders, had committed serious atrocities, 

from determining whether a pregnant lady, for fun, had a boy or 

a girl, they would take a 5,000 leone bet between the two rebels. 

‘‘Is it a boy, or is it a girl? I will bet you 5,000 leones it is a boy.’’ 

And they would determine that by taking a machete and slicing 

open a pregnant woman and taking the unborn child and determining whether or not it was a boy or girl and then discarding it 

as a piece of rubbish. 

I would submit to you that things have changed in Sierra Leone, 

and holding them accountable, just like we did Charles Taylor, that 

is the way to do it, because once they know that they are not above 

the law and you do hold them accountable, no matter where you 

are, that is why I support the singularly focused tribunal. You get 

laser-focused on those that are committing the crimes. You hold 

them accountable, and you tell them that you are not going to be 

able to do this with impunity anymore. 

I think we did it. Things are calm in Sierra Leone. I don’t kid 

myself that it won’t come back. But that is how you do it. And I 

know from talking to these rebels personally they were scared to 

death of being prosecuted. Once we landed and we showed up, and 

they knew that they were going to be held accountable, things 

started to change. That is what I submit to you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. And I would like to thank Chairman 

Smith for offering this legislation. I would like to commend him for 

that. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Chairman Chabot. 

Just a couple of questions to start off with. Mr. Crane, in looking—and I did read extensively your Syrian Accountability 

Project—one of the questions that I still have, who else is doing 

something that might be parallel to what you are doing? Because 

I know you have many stakeholders and many people who are part 

of this effort. 

And I am wondering, for purposes of prosecution, how legally actionable is the evidence that is currently being collected? You 

know, as you cite a time and place when people were butchered or 

73

where mass rape occurred, you know, Dr. White focused extensively on the centrality of the witness. 

And I remember when we were debating the Yugoslav war 

crimes tribunal here. We had—as a matter of fact, one of the studies, the Shell study, suggested that we were losing and almost like 

the dew in the early morning as the sun came out. We were actually losing witnesses—forgetfulness, some were dying, some were 

deciding ‘‘I have had enough of this, I am so traumatized.’’ So time 

is of the essence to benignly capture the witness, so that he or she 

or they can bear witness to the atrocities in a meaningful way. 

So I am wondering how much of that information/witness files 

are we assembling that potentially could be turned over to prosecutors with all of the protections of a witness protection effort underway? 

Mr. CRANE. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. First, it 

is important to note that there are good-hearted people around the 

world trying to seek justice for the people of Syria. And they are 

doing it in many important ways. The Syrian Accountability 

Project is an attempt to take almost terabytes of information that 

is being gathered by these organizations and be a bridge between 

that information. 

Some of it is credible; some of it is not. A lot of it is not. And 

build a bridge between this information and creating a mechanism, 

a cornerstone, by which a local prosecutor, a regional prosecutor, 

or an international prosecutor can then build a case-ready case 

against these individuals who commit war crimes and crimes 

against humanity. 

So that is our purpose. It is, to my knowledge, the only effort, 

but backed by a lot of good people. And I am honored to be representing all of them, to include students from Syracuse University 

College of Law who were here today who are working diligently pro 

bono also to assist. 

But, again, we are approaching this practically. Again, with Dr. 

White and myself and many others from around the world, we are 

looking at these from a practical point of view, not an academic exercise. Can this case be proven? Can we prosecute, regardless of 

what the forum may be? And the answer is yes, it can be done, and 

it will be done. 

Justice must happen for the people of Syria. How that characterizes itself goes the panoply from the ICC, a variation of that, all 

the way down to a local court. Your resolution I think is important 

in that it lists the central item of that resolution, and that is justice for the people of Syria. And I applaud these subcommittees and 

you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing the attention of the American people to this, and that is justice for the people of Syria. 

But at the end of the day, this case can be tried in an appropriate forum so that justice can be done openly and fairly. And the 

Syrian Accountability Project is just an effort, not the effort, but an 

effort to assist that prosecutor in that justice mechanism. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. White, did you want to comment? 

Mr. WHITE. No, I don’t really having anything to contribute. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could ask you, Dr. White, then, in your comments, your testimony, you really went into great length about how 

important it is for the prosecutors, for the court, to establish a 

74

trust relationship with the victims. You also point out, and I know 

that, at least from witnesses that I have met with, as a matter of 

fact, I chaired a number of hearings. One of our witnesses brought 

women with her who had been raped in Bosnia, and that was 

Bianca Jagger. 

And when I met with the women, the trauma and the emotional 

just pain and suffering and agony that they conveyed was just—

it was numbing. And then they were then being called upon to be 

part of a prosecution, in the case of at least one of those women, 

you know, very, very difficult. And I am wondering, over time, particularly as, God willing, healing sets in with someone who has 

been so traumatized, to relive it, all the more reason why the sooner the better. 

Delay is denial, because, again, important witnesses who may 

have been hurt themselves or observed it are less likely to come 

forward. I think the longer this clock plays out—Professor Rabkin 

said that it is out of the question to launch while Assad is in 

power. 

I think if we follow that, and I think Secretary Rademaker’s 

point about the disingenuousness of standing up the Yugoslav 

court, I remember contemporaneously as well it was like there was 

a cynical side to that, but there was also many of us who just wanted it to work and to work, you know, robustly and to hold the bad 

actors to account. But in lieu of doing nothing, that was their default. 

So the question is, if you could really elaborate a little bit further—and anyone who would like to take it—on the importance of 

the witness. And, again, looking at your suggestions, Mr. Crane, 

you said the domestic option is probably—it is the preferred option, 

but of course that has a built-in delay because there is no peace, 

sustainable peace, as you point out in order for all of that to happen. 

And you talked about the third option, a regional court, with 

Arabs trying Arabs, Muslims trying Muslims, and Syrians trying 

Syrians, as a preferred option rather than the Westerners. Of 

course there could be a support capacity there, you know, to help 

stand this thing up and as well as financial. 

But if you could talk about witnesses even further, because I 

don’t think that sense of urgency is understood in Europe, the 

United States, that—like to do a warning. These witnesses will go 

away. 

Mr. WHITE. Well, you are absolutely right, and that is why in my 

written testimony I strongly encourage this. I know there is a lot 

of debate as to how this should be set up, whether it is the ICC, 

should it be a separate standalone, should it be domestic, I would 

just make the point today that whatever forum is pursued it must 

be done immediately, because these witnesses will dry up, not only 

for fear of being harmed but some will be killed. 

And also, if they don’t feel that you are there—and this is why 

it took us months and almost years to be able to extract the trust 

in the witnesses. And if you are not there, they are not going to 

come forward because they have to be fearful that they will lose 

their life and life of other family members. 

75

So the sense of urgency, if you do want to collect the evidence, 

which I mentioned is principally witness testimony, it needs to be 

done in a very short order. 

Mr. CRANE. I would support that statement. That is one of the 

reasons why this international effort, the Syrian Accountability 

Project, is putting in place on the shelf quickly so that when it is 

time, when it makes sense, we can move forward quickly. In any 

criminal situation, you do have to preserve evidence. You may need 

to make sure that witnesses are protected and that witnesses are 

alive for the future court. 

So I think that it is important for these subcommittees to understand that is why we have the Syrian Accountability Project, and 

the Chautauqua Blueprint, copies of which these subcommittees 

have, which is a statutory framework to create any options that we 

have been talking about this afternoon, to include the contemplation that perhaps the ICC prosecuting those who bear the greatest 

responsibility, but the statute itself also contemplates the prosecution of the next 100. 

So there is a combination there, but I can assure you that appropriate expediency is in the back of our mind. We want to have this. 

It has never been done before, quite like this. We usually wait, 

then we react, then we decide. What we are trying to do here is 

to have something in place so that when the appropriate political 

solution is finished then the international community, the local and 

regional groups, are ready to in fact put in place an appropriate 

justice mechanism. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, I think all of us are greatly indebted to the 

work that you are doing to get this in place, so we don’t wait until 

after the fact. So thank you, and of course all of you are bringing 

your extensive experience to bear on trying to find solutions, and 

the subcommittees deeply appreciate that. 

One of the things that Professor Rabkin said that I was hoping 

to ask him about was that the work of the tribunals is not well received. I was in Vukovar a month before it fell with Congressman 

Frank Wolf. And the ‘‘Vukovar Three’’ were eventually held to account at the tribunal. The atrocities that were committed were horrible. 

Well, I, along with Mr. Wolf, have met with a number of people 

who were victims, and they couldn’t have been happier with the 

outcome that finally somebody was held to account. And the same 

goes for Mladic and certainly Milosevic, who died. I mean, it seems 

to me that the snapshot of, well, somebody might be unhappy, well, 

the news media that was pro-government and pro-Serbia and proMilosevic might not be happy. 

And the disinformation and the propaganda, you know, it takes 

a while to wean people away from that. But, you know, it seems 

to me that well received ought to be seen in a larger timeframe as 

well, because when you hold these people to account, future generations as well as the victims, do feel a sense of justice has prevailed. 

And I wonder if any of you have any comment on that, because 

I was struck by that. And whether or not, David Crane and Dr. 

White, you experienced that yourselves. I mean, I know that you 

had a tremendous rapport with the people. I remember talking to 

you contemporaneously. You went out and held town meetings and 

76

talked to people to explain the process, very often at grave risk to 

your own security, but you did it anyway. And so as explained, it 

seems to me that potential hurdle could be overcome as well. 

Yes? 

Mr. DICKER. Mr. Chairman, if I may start this ball rolling, two 

thoughts here. One I think there is a need to push these international and internationalized mechanisms to recognize their responsibility in making what happens in the courtroom accessible to 

the communities most affected by the crimes. And that is the challenge for all of these institutions, all the more so, because they 

render justice in highly divisive, polarized situations, as you were 

suggesting. 

And I think it is important to remember, while we often and 

should cite the Nuremberg precedent, it wasn’t as if those trials the 

following day seemed to bring the German people to confront the 

crimes committed in their name. This takes a while for these lessons, for this confronting who did what for what reasons, to really 

seep down. 

And I think we have got to allow a bit of a timeframe and not 

impose on it snap judgments. I think that is very important. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Mr. Crane. 

Mr. CRANE. I have got two examples of why and how justice for 

people who are victims of horrors that are almost undescribable in 

any forum, victims of atrocity. But when I unsealed the indictment 

against sitting President Charles Taylor in June 2003, it created a 

beginning, a political dialogue, as well as a legal process that at the 

end of this, over a period of 2 years, even though there was a lot 

of diplomatic and political angst, it laid a foundation by which the 

Liberian people could elect for the first time, freely and without 

fear, a President, a female President, the first female President in 

the history of Africa, and it allowed Liberia to move forward with 

that new election. 

The indictment of Charles Taylor created that political, legal, 

practical condition by which Liberia possibly may have a new future. That is a specific and direct result of an international tribunal seeking justice. So that indictment created that possibility. 

But for that indictment, it would not have happened. 

I also want to underscore, and I have said this probably too 

many times in this hearing, and I do appreciate this time, but let 

me just give you a small vignette that brings it home. Yes, I did 

walk the countryside. In fact, Richard Dicker and I and Al White 

also walked the countryside together, listening to the people of Sierra Leone tell us what took place. 

I was in Makeni, the headquarters of the infamous Revolutionary 

United Front, Forday Sankoh’s group, and Samuel Bockarie, the 

Mosquito, because he liked to drink the blood of his victims. And 

I was giving a town hall meeting in a school for the disabled, many 

of them disabled by the RUF themselves, blinded, maimed, mutilated. And I was—as is my custom, I stood in the middle of the 

group as opposed to at a high table. I wanted to let them know that 

I am listening to them at their level. 

And a young man stood up. He was deafened by the RUF intentionally, and he was also maimed. He looked me dead in the eye 

and he said, ‘‘I killed people. I am sorry. I didn’t mean it.’’ And he 

77

fell into my arms weeping. And as he wept, I looked over and another young woman stood up, about 20 years old, holding her child. 

She was missing a vast portion of her face, and through cracked 

lips clearly looked me in the eye as well, her only remaining eye, 

and said, ‘‘Seek justice for us.’’

So this is why we do this. Regardless of comments by individuals, 

this is why we do it. It is for the victims. It is for the voiceless who 

cannot speak for themselves. So this is an honorable thing to do. 

And modern international criminal law is not perfect. It is two 

steps forward, one step back. But it needs to be supported in whatever capacity it is so the voiceless currently in Syria can have some 

sense that life can go on under the rule of law. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Dr. White. 

Mr. WHITE. I just want to add one quick comment. I think right 

now we could build on the recent example of Charles Taylor as a 

former sitting head of state. With his conviction in April 2012, in 

his recent appeals that was upheld—11 counts and a 50-year conviction. Right now we have credibility that we can bring people to 

justice and hold them accountable. 

And just one quick story that I will not forget, as David pointed 

out. We were out in the countryside, not only Sierra Leone but Liberia, and when Charles Taylor left Liberia on August 11, 2003, he 

looked the people in the eye and said, ‘‘God willing, I will be back.’’ 

That sent a shiver down the spine of people not only in Liberia but 

Sierra Leone, and they were fearful he was never coming back. And 

my witnesses repeatedly would call me and say, ‘‘Doc, Papay cannot come back.’’ I said, ‘‘I promise you Papay will not be coming 

back.’’

And when we were at The Hague during—his recent appeals verdict was read. We were in the chambers. I had a number of witnesses call me from Sierra Leone and Liberia, and for the first time 

in their lives, at least in modern times, the last 10, 15 years, they 

could breathe a sigh of relief because they said, ‘‘Doc, you said he 

is not coming back. Now I can go to sleep tonight, because I know 

he is not coming back.’’ That is about as powerful as you can get, 

that you know you can’t get everybody, but you need to hold these 

people accountable and it needs to happen quickly. 

We have learned a lot of lessons. This doesn’t have to take a long 

time to get done. However it turns out, it needs to get started, and 

it needs to get started now. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. So would that add additional merit to Secretary 

Rademaker’s argument that Article 16 of the Rome Statute makes 

it less likely that a guy like Charles Taylor could, on the interim 

basis, go to Nigeria and then be apprehended to The Hague under 

the Sierra Leone Special Court and then prosecuted? 

Is the ICC that rigid? I mean, one of the additional points—and 

maybe, Secretary Rademaker, you might want to further elaborate 

on this—and why I believe that the Russians—and I could be 

wrong, but why I believe the Russians are less likely to obstruct 

the creation of such a court is that it holds all sides to account. 

And we know the al-Qaeda operatives and many of the Syrian 

rebels are doing horrific things. And, you know, when you are getting tortured you don’t say, ‘‘Hey, are you a leftist or a rightist? Or 

78

anybody in between?’’ You know that it hurts and, sadly, often 

leads to your demise. 

So does that lend credibility to why the ICC might not be the 

suitable means for this to go forward? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think the answer to that question is yes. We 

have talked about a number of historical situations here. I think 

a key distinction between the situation in Syria today and, for example, the one in Sierra Leone when you gentlemen began your 

work was Charles Taylor was no longer in power. 

In Syria, President Assad is still in power, and that creates a 

fundamentally different dynamic. And if the desire is to bring him 

and perpetrators of gross violations of human rights under him to 

justice, it is a much more challenging situation than if these individuals have already given up power. 

And I believe that from a purely humanitarian point of view the 

number one priority is to persuade them—well, to bring about a 

change, so that they leave power and are replaced by hopefully 

more democratic, more tolerant officials. And that to me has to be 

the primary objective, and we are going to achieve that through the 

use of diplomatic tools. 

And so I think the first question is, of the various options that 

we are looking at, how effective would they be as diplomatic tools? 

And they all—all of the options suffer from some of the same problems. You know, most of them that we have talked about would require Security Council approval, or they would require a change in 

government, so that the domestic judicial system could function, for 

example. 

But as we look at those tools and evaluate their potential usefulness diplomatically, I submit that the most useful one diplomatically for bringing about a political transition in Syria is the ad hoc 

tribunal. The potential use of the International Criminal Court will 

backfire as a diplomatic tool. It will guarantee and I mean that literally, it will guarantee that Assad will not leave peacefully, because you can imagine the conversation. 

Diplomats go to him and say, ‘‘You know, we think it is time for 

you to go. Will you please leave?’’ And his first question will be, 

‘‘What will become of me once I leave? You have sicced the International Criminal Court on me. Can you make that go away?’’

And I know what the answer to that question is. The answer to 

that question will be, ‘‘We can make it go away for 1 year. The Security Council will adopt a resolution. We guarantee you the Security Council will adopt a resolution that defers the investigation of 

your case by the International Criminal Court for 1 year.’’

And you can imagine President Assad’s followup question will be, 

‘‘Well, that is very good. What will happen at the end of that year? 

I am interested because we are talking about my life and my freedom.’’ And the answer is—I mean, if we are leaning far forward, 

the answer will be, ‘‘Well, we guarantee to use our best efforts a 

year from now to persuade a majority of the members of the Security Council, including all five of the permanent members, to extend that deferral by another year.’’

And he will say, ‘‘Can you guarantee that they will extend that 

deferral for another year?’’ And the answer will be, ‘‘Well, no, we 

79

can’t guarantee that, but we promise to work really hard to try and 

achieve that.’’

And then he will say, ‘‘And what happens a year later? You are 

going to work really hard a year later.’’ You know, he would have 

to be really stupid to buy the notion that he is going to escape 

International Criminal Court prosecution, that for the rest of his 

life, once a year, the United National Security Council is going to 

adopt a resolution deferring by yet another year the ICC prosecution of his case. 

And you can imagine all kinds of problems. You know, one permanent member can object, and that is it. You know, a veto would 

restore ICC jurisdiction. So someone in his case will never buy the 

notion that the ICC can be called off, and that to me is a fatal flaw 

in the design of the Rome Statute and of the International Criminal Court. It makes the International Criminal Court, the most 

useful, the most dangerous tool, the most counterproductive tool we 

could possibly deploy in the current situation. 

An ad hoc tribunal could be constructed differently. It is not subject to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, and so it could be designed 

such that as part of a diplomatic settlement where Assad agrees 

to give up and retire peacefully, the case is withdrawn, the prosecutor stood down. 

I submit that ending the Civil War in Syria is more important 

than sending the people who have committed horrible war crimes 

up until now to jail, especially when we understand that no international institution, no international mechanism, is ever going to 

hold more than 100 or 200 of these individuals accountable. The 

vast majority will either escape justice—the vast majority of people 

who have committed these kinds of offenses in Syria will either escape justice entirely or, if they are held accountable, it will be 

through the courts of Syria under a different government, because 

in the—you know, the Yugoslavia tribunal has handled fewer than 

200 cases, the Rwanda tribunal fewer than 100. 

Eight hundred thousand people died in Rwanda, and most of 

them died because they were hacked to death by people wielding 

machetes. I mean, I can assure you that more than 100 people 

were wielding machetes to kill 800,000 people in Rwanda. But the 

Rwanda tribunal, because of capacity constraints, has only been 

able to look at fewer than 100 cases. 

So, you know, it is a frustrating situation, but, you know, the answer the Europeans are going to give us on this problem is it has 

got to be the ICC. And I think that is a prescription for prolonging 

the conflict in Syria, which is—would be a disastrous—it is a cure 

that would be far worse than the disease. 

Mr. DICKER. If I may, because I think Secretary Rademaker puts 

some very important issues on the table that really do need to be 

addressed—the interface, if you will, between justice and peace. 

The imperative behind this hearing is trying to bring some redress 

for those who have suffered horrifically in Syria. 

I think we make a misstep if reflexively we pit justice and peace 

against one another. Certainly, we want both. We want an end to 

the killing and blood fit in Syria. There is no question of that. I 

think it is how we manage those two objectives, and manage them 

80

smartly, without throwing justice under the bus, and I believe that 

it can be done. 

I think a good example of that, two good examples, though one 

with individuals in power, was the Dayton negotiations wherein 

Slobodan Milosevic attended, Radovan Karadzic. Ratko Mladic did 

not attend because, as you know, they were indictees. That peace 

negotiation went forward. 

And the second example to cite is the one that David Crane is 

most familiar with, the talks on Charles Taylor’s departure from 

power that were taking place in Accra when the prosecutor unsealed his arrest warrant or indictment against Charles Taylor. I 

think it is possible to manage these two carefully, smartly, not just 

throw one against the other. So I would take some exception, of 

course, to what Secretary Rademaker said. 

Lastly, I would fear for any tribunal that had indicted Bashar alAssad to withdraw the indictment because a peace settlement had 

been achieved. Let us go back to the victims in Aleppo or Daraa. 

What will be the response and the confidence in justice if, as a result of a political settlement, a prosecutor says, ‘‘Hey, forget it. 

Here is your get out of jail free card.’’ I think we can do better than 

that. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. Fascinating discussion. 

I guess I want to pick up on what Secretary Rademaker was getting at, which I think is efficacy. And efficacy is, of course, determined by the goal. If the goal is defined as let us end the bloodshed 

in Syria, then it seems to me that Secretary Rademaker has a 

point that even if we have to hold our nose with respect to the status of Bashar al-Assad, the greater good is served by the ending 

of bloodshed and the succession of a government that tries to be 

inclusive. 

The problem with that is it avoids closure, which Dr. White and 

Dr. Crane were both—or Professor Crane were both talking about, 

how important that was in your own experience both in Sierra 

Leone and in Liberia. 

We have models of closure. Some are violent. The Ceausescus 

were apprehended fleeing Romania and were summarily executed. 

Ghadafi was captured and summarily executed. Saddam Hussein 

was captured by U.S. troops, interrogated, handed over to the Iraqi 

authorities, I guess tried, and executed, in a process, however we 

might do such a process. 

All of those examples do not escape the attention of Mr. Assad, 

presumably. And it seems to me the choice for him is at least, you 

know, he has three options he has got to look at. One is the 

Ghadafi choice, in terms of how it ends. And if that is what you 

fear, if that is what you really think is the threat you face, then 

you double down on your military option to try to avoid that fate. 

If you think that there is another option, that you are facing 

unpalatable options, then maybe either the ICC or an ad hoc tribunal is a better option, because at least you continue to breathe. 

The third, which you suggest, Secretary Rademaker, which I 

think unlikely but it could happen, is you get a get out of jail card 

81

pass through the Security Council or some mechanism similar to 

that. 

If those are your three options, Secretary Rademaker, at some 

point if there is a deterioration in the military situation in Syria, 

doesn’t Assad have to look at one of those three options even 

though none of them are very palatable? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Well, I think there was a very important ‘‘if’’ 

embedded there in the questions you just asked. I think today 

President Assad is looking at a fourth option. He is looking at 

fighting and winning. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. And, you know, if he starts to lose and it becomes——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. That he will lose——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Excuse me. I predicated my question with ‘‘if the 

situation deteriorates militarily.’’

Mr. RADEMAKER. Right. Okay. Well, I am pointing out that that 

is a hypothetical situation because——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I understand. 

Mr. RADEMAKER [continuing]. By all accounts today the military 

balance is sort of tipped in his direction. And, you know, I don’t 

think Ghadafi’s plan initially was to be hunted down and killed in 

the street. I think he thought he could fight to the end and, he believed, prevail. And I think there is no reason today for President 

Assad to think that he is losing. I think there is a lot of evidence 

that suggests at the moment he is doing just fine. 

And so, you know, we can all pick our analogies here, so let me 

throw one out. You know, yes, these are unpalatable choices, and 

letting, you know, justice go unrequited is unpalatable, especially 

to the victims. But these kinds of choices get made every day, including in our own legal system. 

And, you know, plea bargaining—I am sure we have some former 

prosecutors here in the room—I mean, plea bargains happen in our 

system all the time, sometimes for purely legal reasons, sometimes 

for other reasons. 

I noticed in the news this morning there were protests in Israel 

today because Prime Minister Netanyahu is releasing, I think, 40 

Palestinians convicted of horrific crimes against the Israelis. Why 

is he releasing these people, you know, long before their criminal 

sentences have been served? Well, I mean, I think the reason he 

is releasing them is because Secretary of State John Kerry broke 

his arm to release them, because he wants to energize the peace 

process and get the Palestinians engaged in negotiations with 

Israel. 

That was the judgment of the Obama administration, to strongly 

lean on the Government of Israel to release terrorists, convicted 

terrorists, from Israeli prison because that would yield a benefit, 

they believed, in a diplomatic process that they think is very important. And Netanyahu capitulated in the face of that pressure 

from the Obama administration. 

Now, was the Obama administration wrong? Was Netanyahu 

wrong? I think if you adhere to the line that Mr. Dicker just put 

forward, yes, they were wrong, because there are victims protesting 

82

in Israel today that the perpetrators of horrific crimes against their 

family members are being let go. But the policy of the United 

States is to favor that, because we see more important issues at 

stake. 

Now, you know, so that is the analogy I put forward for us to 

think about. You know, don’t condemn my idea unless you are prepared to condemn what Secretary Kerry has foisted on Prime Minister Netanyahu. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. I don’t think anyone was condemning your 

idea. I think we were trying to explore it. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Okay. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Professor Crane, Dr. White, what about that? 

You were making the case that—rather forcefully that there is a 

real deterrent effect just with the threat of prosecution, and even 

more strongly so once in fact the indictment is handed down. 

Secretary Rademaker suggests the opposite, that actually it could 

force Assad to figure he has no other escape route other than doubling down to the military situation, and actually, you know, perpetrating even more violence and crime against humanity in Syria. 

What about that, that it could have the unintended effect of actually worsening a situation rather than the deterrent effect you described? And let us stick to Assad and Syria for a minute. 

Mr. CRANE. Certainly. These aren’t cookie-cutter approaches and 

concepts that we are offering these subcommittees. The Secretary 

is correct in that there has to be a political, as well as a judicial, 

as well as a diplomatic mechanism by which the horror that is 

going on in Syria ends. 

We had a civil war going on in Liberia when Charles Taylor—

when I unsealed the indictment and Charles Taylor was removed. 

The political solution at the time, even though we were ready to 

actually receive him, to prosecute him, was to move him off into 

another location for a couple of years. I can see potentially, and it 

is just the potential, that that happen, that he be removed, he 

agree to leave, and that he be removed and a diplomatic and political solution for Syria happens. 

But over time perhaps a legal solution is also worked out, and 

that is what happened with Charles Taylor. He was handed over, 

but it is a political decision. The bright red thread of all of this, 

Congressman Connolly—and, by the way, you used to be my Congressman in northern Virginia. I moved to North Carolina. My 

apologies, but——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Lord Almighty. 

Mr. CRANE. But, you know, the bottom line, the bright red thread 

of all of this is politics. We have a procedure, this jurisprudence, 

the experience to prosecute Assad and anybody else that commits 

these atrocities. But it won’t be a legal decision that happens related to it, however this manifests itself, which could be anything 

in between. It will be a political decision to end this. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But, Professor Crane, if I may—and I want to 

hear Dr. White’s response as well—but Secretary Rademaker 

makes a point that has to be addressed. But what if, despite the 

best of intentions and the need for closure from victims, by taking 

this action we worsen the situation and we actually have him dig 

in his heels, especially in a situation where, as the Secretary points 

83

out, militarily he seems at the moment to actually be on the upswing. 

Mr. CRANE. Well, one is that I am not advocating that we have 

a court now, create a court, indict the individual either through the 

ICC, what have you. I think we have to have a political solution, 

a cease-fire, and a stabilization of the situation. And I think that 

is important. 

But there also has to be justice. It is——

Mr. CONNOLLY. But what is his motivation to do that, if he is 

prevailing on the battlefield, and he knows what awaits him from 

a cease fire and a negotiated settlement, is, you know, prosecution 

in some kind of international court of justice, whether ad hoc or the 

ICC, and an unpleasant fate upon conviction? 

Mr. CRANE. Well, that is a great question, because the bottom 

line is that very well could happen. There are several scenarios, 

from a peaceful settlement all the way to what I call the armageddon scenario where he goes down like Hitler trying to yield his—

put Syria in flames and everybody—everything in between. 

We might wake up tomorrow morning, Congressman, and find 

out that he is in Russia or Iran, he has quietly left. That is another 

scenario. This is kaleidoscopic. You know, the ‘‘what ifs’’ can certainly be argued against any kind of justice. At the end of the day, 

there is going to have to be some justice, whether it is Assad or 

his henchmen or those who perpetrate the crimes. At the end of the 

day, the international community may say, ‘‘Well, it won’t be 

Assad, at least for now; it may be others.’’

It is really going to be, at the end of the day, not a legal one, 

but a political one. And I am certainly not advocating that we start 

a justice process now. I do think there has to be, whatever that 

may be, a type of political settlement. But what we are doing is 

just, should the decision be made that justice be done, in whatever 

capacity that is, greatest responsibility, everybody else. Then, we 

have that capability. 

I know I didn’t answer your question, because I don’t really have 

an answer to be honest with you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. White. 

Mr. WHITE. Certainly, there will be some political input to this. 

But I think—and one of them will be case by case, but I would still 

argue, as a former Federal agent, that we never ran away from justice. And plea bargains, as he rightly states, comes in many different forms. 

But had we not indicted Charles Taylor and unsealed it, he 

would not have left. Okay? And, look, we have got al-Bashir, we 

have all of these other people, that is where we have a credibility 

issue right now. And I will just be candid: That is one of the issues 

facing the ICC right now is not bringing people like this to justice. 

At least if it is singularly targeted, singularly focused, and you 

are dealing with the victims, up there you are in The Hague, you 

are not really talking to the people, so the victims get lost. But 

there is two other things you can do. I think justice still needs to 

be pursued. 

I can tell you right now, many people wanted us to drop the indictment of Charles Taylor and this man held firm. Okay? We just 

84

did not cave in to that. We did the right thing for the people, and 

it all worked out. 

But there is another process that we can go through for the victims, and we had it in Sierra Leone and they had it in South Africa, and that was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It is 

not perfect, but it does allow the victims to come forward, face their 

perpetrators, and have their day in a public court which is another 

mechanism when these atrocities occur. 

So you have retributive justice and restorative justice. So those 

are the two mechanisms that need to be thought through, and they 

are very different. They are very complex. But you can’t let these 

people escape justice for just the fear of not being—‘‘Okay. If I 

agree to this, I am not going to get prosecuted.’’ That should be 

after the fact, that should be part of any sentence or any—perhaps 

in the process along the way taken into consideration. 

But I would never remove the vehicle of justice along the way. 

So restorative and retributive justice are the keys. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Secretary Rademaker, you look like you want to 

respond. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Not so much a response as just an additional 

point that I think might be useful for everyone. Dr. White just referred to the situation in Sudan where President al-Bashir is under 

ICC indictment. He has been indicted since I think 2008, so he was 

indicted 5 years ago for the first time. He was indicted on a second 

count in 2010, so he has been indicted twice. 

And I would submit that one of the reasons he is still there is 

because of the ICC indictment, that he, like Ghadafi, like potentially President Assad in Syria, if he were to be indicated by the 

ICC, he has been denied the option of a graceful exit, which is the 

option that President Mubarak was able to avail himself of in 

Egypt, and former President Ben Ali of Tunisia, he was able to go 

into exile, but——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Idi Amin. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Idi Amin, who was still living in Saudi Arabia. 

But what I wanted to do was read two quotes, which I think are 

informative, because with the Darfur crisis we have had a series 

of United States special envoys whose job it has been to solve the 

Darfur crisis and hopefully bring about a political transition in 

Khartoum and the replacement of the al-Bashir government. 

And so in the Bush administration one of the special envoys was 

Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator. At the time of the 

first ICC indictment of President al-Bashir, Andrew Natsios said 

the following: ‘‘The regime will now avoid any compromise or anything that would weaken their already weakened position,’’ because 

if they are forced from office they face trials before the ICC. 

So that was after the first indictment. Two years later we had 

had a change in administration, we had a new Special Envoy, Scott 

Gration, President Obama’s special envoy. At the time of the second indictment, Scott Gration said the following about the ICC action, ‘‘that it will’’—and I am quoting—‘‘will make my mission more 

difficult and challenging.’’

I mean, these are the diplomats vested with responsibility by the 

President of the United States to try and solve, through diplomatic 

means, the Darfur crisis. One is a Republican; one is a Democrat. 

85

They agree on one thing—the ICC and its criminal indictment of 

a sitting President in Khartoum, with whom they were supposed 

to be negotiating to solve a humanitarian crisis, the ICC action 

made their work much more difficult, if not impossible. 

And I would submit that to the extent anyone in Europe or elsewhere, or if Human Rights Watch wants to encourage us to bring 

in the International Criminal Court, they ought to listen to what 

some of the diplomats who experienced a similar move in a similar 

crisis a few years ago had to say about the upshot of ICC involvement. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And, finally, Mr. Dicker and then, Mr. Chairman, 

I am done. Thank you so much. 

Mr. DICKER. Well, again, these are such fundamental points and 

so important to exchange ideas on. And, Congressman, I thank you 

for focusing on this theme. 

I would say, one, we are at the start or early stages of a new era, 

if you will, and that is the potential liability of sitting heads of 

state or other senior officials for mass slaughter of civilians, the 

use of rape as a weapon of war, forced displacement of populations, 

et cetera. So this is a new development. 

And I think the Secretary is absolutely accurate in his comment 

that, yes, it makes the work of diplomats more difficult. There is 

no question about that. But as law evolves, the challenges become 

greater for not only diplomats but officeholders. And I think that 

is a positive thing, because it is a better world where genocide is 

proscribed as a criminal act. Point one. 

I think, again, we need to manage these tensions, and the Secretary has underscored the tensions, and they can exist, but we 

need to manage these tensions smartly. And my own reflections on 

the Darfur situation was when the arrest warrant was issued in 

2009, there was quite a backlash that it would collapse the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, that Bashir would pull out. 

No such thing happened. 

I think we have got to be more thoughtful and careful-thinking 

and not just projecting reflexively, if you will, the worst-case scenario, though certainly I think we do need to take it into account, 

but really work our way around it. And I think that is essential 

not only to the furtherance of law but to the needs and aspirations 

of victims. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would just say, in conclusion, I think all of you 

have made great points, and one is torn. I refer to the word I began 

with, which is efficacy. What is it we are seeking to accomplish? 

We have to, it seems to me, be on our guard about only making 

a point, even a moral point. Not that it is invalid, but while people 

are being killed that is an indulgence I am not sure they can afford. Maybe we can. 

And the removal of Assad presumably is part of our goal. Who 

replaces him is a very problematic question. So as we use this tool, 

hopefully judiciously, I think Secretary Rademaker’s caution is well 

taken, which is we must be careful that it not be counterproductive 

despite our good intentions, and the result being that we actually 

inflict even more harm on the people of Syria. 

86

So we don’t face easy choices here with this tool. We have examples where it worked. We also have examples where it led—well, 

in Sudan someone indicted not once, but twice, is still very much 

in power, entrenched, and arguably, according to our own diplomats, because we employed the tool, perhaps prematurely, perhaps too crudely, perhaps because it is too rigid. I don’t know. But 

at least so far the story of Sudan counters our good experience in 

Liberia; it didn’t work. 

So what will work in Syria? And what is it we wish to achieve? 

Bringing Assad to justice as the only goal is obviously not satisfying. It can’t be our only goal. I wish it were that simple. And so 

working through this thicket is going to be no easy task, but thank 

you all very much for your thoughts. Very, very enlightening. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly. 

I just have one or two final questions. And you have been very 

generous with your time, and I deeply—we deeply appreciate it. 

Mr. Crane, in your testimony you pointed out that the ICC has a 

track record over the first decade that it is spotty, it is questionable, it lacks the capacity and political and diplomatic sophistication to handle such a mandate, coupled with the challenge of gaining jurisdiction over the atrocities. 

The reality is that the ICC is just not up to the task. It can barely handle the current caseload and investigations. You also point 

out, and I would just note parenthetically, that Greg Sipkins and 

I, from September 22nd to the 24th, were in Jos in Nigeria and observing firsthand the atrocities committed by Boko Haram. 

And we were advised—I did not know that before I went there—

that the ICC is looking into the possibility of indicting or initiating 

investigations into some of the Boko Haram individuals, but they 

are talking about just less than the number of fingers on my right 

hand. And that was in July, and nothing has happened yet. Time 

is going on. 

I would also note parenthetically as well that unless the Web site 

has been updated, there were 18 prosecutions, one conviction of an 

individual in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, yes, a number 

of indictments that are very significant, but very, very high-level 

people like President Bashir and others, Joseph Kony, but very little in terms of anything to show for it. 

And I would also note you make a point, and I think it is an excellent point, about Arabs trying Arabs, Muslims trying Muslims, 

Syrians trying Syrians, as a preferred option. The effort could or 

would be supported—they are talking about the regional court—by 

the Arab League and Arab jurists supplemented by Syrian jurists. 

If you look at the ICC list of judges, it is Kenya, France, Philippines, Mali, Nigeria, Argentina, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Germany, Finland, Botswana, United Kingdom, Japan, 

South Korea, Brazil, Italy, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Belgium. I don’t 

see any Arabs among the lists of judges, making those who would 

sit less likely potentially to be acceptable. 

So I wonder if you just might want to touch on that. Again, this 

capacity idea, Mr. Dicker points out that there could be delays in 

costs with an ad hoc or presumably with a regional as well. But 

it seems to me that the costs, if there is a will, far outweigh the 

87

ongoing humanitarian debacle and crisis we are facing with all of 

those IDPs and refugees, not to mention the horrific spilling of 

blood. 

So if money is an object, I mean, that would be absurd in my 

opinion. Delays—I mean, we have learned from the Special Court, 

from the ad hocs, we have—you know, if we can’t apply quickly a 

lessons learned, shame on us. But it seems to be there is a lack 

of political will. By default, I would respectfully submit the commission on inquiry on Syria in February 2013 says, ‘‘Yes, go with 

the ICC.’’

But I think there is a better option, and I know you—and I deeply respect your view—disagree. But, again, Mr. Crane, if you could 

speak to that issue. I mean, look at those judges. None of them are 

Arabs. And, again, you did talk about the lack of capability on the 

part of the ICC. 

Mr. CRANE. Well, I think, just to address the immediate question 

about Arab judges, unfortunately, even though we have I believe 

125 nations who have ascribed to the Rome Statute, very few, if 

any at all, that I recall—Richard, you can correct me, but I don’t 

know of any Arab state that actually has signed on to the Rome 

Statute. It is a vast blank in the world related to the Rome paradigm. 

Be that as it may, then a judge, an Arab judge to put it 

euphemistically, would not necessarily be on that. Just like you 

wouldn’t see an American or a Russian or a Chinese judge on the 

ICC is because they are not members of the state’s party. And the 

Rome Statute contemplates that you must be a member of the state 

party that signed on to the Rome Statute to be in those capacities. 

So that is still problematic in the sense of we don’t have the important cultural gifts that the Muslim world, the Islamic world, 

brings to any table. And that would be problematic should the ICC 

have this referred to them. 

In the general sense, that is my statement. I stand by that statement. I am a disappointed and concerned supporter of the ICC. I 

have seen it begin, I have worked with it, I want to see it succeed, 

and they have their challenges. And so I am also a pragmatist, because, again, I don’t look at it as the ICC, or a hybrid, or an ad 

hoc. 

I go back to what I have said throughout this afternoon and on 

the record for years. It is for and about the victims. And whatever 

mechanism that allows justice for the victims of any atrocity, then 

I am for that, whatever you want to call it, frankly. 

So the ICC exists. It is part of a major international scheme 

signed onto by 125 countries. It is there. So my point is is that we 

have to support that concept, try to make it better, try to make it 

more efficient, seek justice for victims of atrocity in other ways as 

well. It is not the default. In fact, we tend to forget this at this 

table and elsewhere, the ICC is a court of last resort. 

It was never designed to be always in the front row, always leading something. And I think that they have made a mistake about 

that, and that is my concern. That is really—they are always looking for something to be involved in, and in reality they should be 

waiting for something to be referred to them that is appropriate, 

the gravest of crimes. 

88

The principle of complementarity is important. State’s party 

should prosecute their own, or other parties, and we should be 

working on building the capacity of nations to prosecute their own, 

and that is why I think honestly, and with merit, that a Syrian 

type of court, internationalized or a pure domestic, in my mind bolsters the idea of the principle of complementarity. Let those who 

have been victims use their justice mechanism and criminal system 

to seek justice, or, if they can’t or are unwilling or unable, then it 

be referred to the appropriate court such as International Criminal 

Court. 

Mr. SMITH. Comments? If you could maybe for the record, because I am sure—maybe you have it readily at your hands—what 

the possible cost would be of a regional court or an ad hoc court. 

Do you have any sense of what the order of magnitude and cost 

would be? 

Mr. CRANE. Well, let us just look at it anecdotally. 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

Mr. CRANE. The Special Court for Sierra Leone in general costs $25 million to $30 million a year. At first, when Dr. White and I 

first stepped off the airplane with three suitcases and our political 

assistant, which was the Special Court for Sierra Leone, on 7 August 2002, we were pretty cheap. But that first year was about $10 

million. So we were averaging, give or take, $35 million. 

It is my understanding that the ad hoc tribunals cost on the av- erage of $150 million each per year, and you can multiply that by 

essentially 20 years and you can see the cost of that. The International Criminal Court’s budget—Richard, correct me if I am 

wrong—but I believe it is around $150 million a year. So that is 

just a general balance of what these would cost just based on what 

the previous courts cost. 

Mr. SMITH. Any final words? If not, I would like——

Mr. DICKER. If I may, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Of course. 

Mr. DICKER. Just to say I think that we are strong supporters 

of the international court. We are not apologists for it either. And 

by that I mean certainly there have been problems. I think the 

court needs more political and diplomatic support, and it certainly 

will need that in handling a Syria referral. I think it is part of the 

evolving international justice system. 

And looking down the road, unfortunately, with a simple standalone ad hoc tribunal, you are not likely, in the way that one would 

hope, to maximally strengthen what is a new and albeit fledgling 

struggling system. And I would say, sir, that I think that is argument for this government in supporting the emergence of this system. 

Mr. SMITH. With respect, one of the takeaways that I had from 

the Sierra Leone court was it left physical plant structures, prosecutors who knew, investigators who learned from the best of the 

best, and with a country coming out of the terrible agony that 

Syria will have to emerge from it seems to me leaving behind, 

through a regional court or an ad hoc tribunal, that kind of capacity, you know, is far to be preferred to an ICC action that would 

occur at The Hague and would be largely separate from a domestic 

capacity consequence leaving behind. Am I right on that? 

89

Mr. CRANE. Well, certainly, the advantages of the hybrid international tribunal in Sierra Leone, the Special Court for Sierra 

Leone, did allow us to be present at the location. It is the challenge 

of the various other tribunals; they are not at the crime scene. So 

certainly the innate training that goes with incorporating local 

prosecutors and investigators and police, and what have you, goes 

along with that. 

So, yes, there clearly is a legacy left, and at many levels the ability of the people of West Africa and specifically Sierra Leone, to 

have the capacity to manage complex investigations in case it is 

there. It is obvious, if you have a court at the crime scene, like 

Nuremberg, like Special Court for Sierra Leone, the people see that 

justice and, of course, the legacy aspect of it is obvious. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much, gentlemen, for your extraordinary testimony. It is of supreme assistance to these subcommittees, and we will proceed forward with this, and I thank you 

for it. 

Hearing adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:48 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

(91)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations 

Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

October 25, 2013 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You urc respectfully requested to uttcnd an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affuirs. to be held jointly 

b) the SubcommiUee on Africa. Global Health, Global HlmlaIl Rights, and Inlernational OrganiLations and the 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in Room 2172 of the Rayblilll House Office Building (and available 

live on t.he CommiUee website at \\'" \\.forej .. -'-llaIJalrs,ho)lse.120\) 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SlIBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, October 30.2013 

1:30 p.m 

Establishing a Syrian \\I'ar Crimes Tribunal? 

Me David M. Crane 

Professor of Practice 

S~Tacuse University College of Law 

(Former Chie/Proseclftor. United Nations ')IJecwl Court jar Sierra Leone) 

Alml Wbile, Ph.D 

President 

A W Associates 

(Former Chu!,(Investlgator, Umted NatIOns Specral Court/or SlernT Leone) 

The Honorable Jeremy Rabkin 

Professor of Lmv 

George Mason University School of Law 

The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker 

National Security Project Adyisor 

Bipartisan Policy Center 

Me Richard Dicker 

Director, Intemational Justice Program 

Human Rights Watch 

B)' Direction ofthe Chairman 
93

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMIITEE ON _____ 'fl_"_.a_~_'_"""___=~/c3.l''''~.1fl=':,[i=r~'i-..='':,''''!'t=,,~='"~;''_:,,'''r.:''':;_~_"_'"_'-_._; ____ HEARING 

Day Wedn~ __ Date __ Qtf0ber 30,2013 Room 2172 Ravbl/l'lt HOB 

Stal'tinJ:: Time _-L1'w1"'0-J!wp",,,,,-_ElIding Time 4:48 p.m. 

Recesse.I __ ~J (2;Mto £.51L) ( __ to __ ) L-to __ )( __ 10 __ )( __ 10 __ ) L-Io __ ) 

Presiding Memher(,) 

Jlep. Chris Smith 

Check ull o/fhe/ollowlng Nwl apply,· 

Open Session [ZJ 

Executive (closed) Session D Teievised [ZJ 

TITLE OF IIEAillNC: 

E<labllshlng" SYI';I111 W«r Crime" Trlblll1l1/? 

SUlICUMMiTTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Eicctl'OuicaUy Recol'(i!:!!Jtaped) [ZJ 

Stenographic Record LiJ 

Ros-Lehtlnen, Meadows, YOTIO, Bass, Kennedy, DeS(llIIis, Chabot, Frnl/kel, Schneidel', COllI/oily 

NON-SUBCOMMiTTEE MEMBERS PRESENT, (Mark with Gil * ((they ate not membe!'s ~ffllll committee.) 

HF,ARING WITNESSES: SrllUe ilS meeting notice attached? Yes [ZJ No D 

(If 'Inn", please list below (llid include If tie, agency, department, OJ' ol'gollizaOoll.j 

STATEMENTS FUR THE UECUUlJ, (List any statements submit/cd for the record.) 

Prepared statementfi'om Rep" Mark l'.feadoll"s 

Prepared statemellt fi'olll Michael Newton 

TIME SCHEDULElJ TU RECUNVENE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED 4:48p.m. 
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK MEADOWS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


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of seeking justice for the victims of crimes committed during the war inside Syria. In the first 

place, there is very little likelihood of a successful and legitimate war crimes tribunal absent a 

sea change in domestic politics within Syria. Authentic justice is not achieved on the wings 

of vengeance or in pursuit of a politicized vendetta. The judicial functions inherent in 

adjudicating war crimes must be independent and impartial in order to have any colorable 

claim of legitimacy. Judgments must in the end be grounded firmly in regularized law and 

procedures that are manifestly founded on fundamental fairness and equality of anTIS between 

the Office of the Prosecutor and the rights of the defendant. That is why the official policy of 

Syria must align itself with the goals of the accountability mechanism. Phrased another way, 

even if there existed a strong political will to create and to fund an international or 

internationalized tribunal inside Syria, a completely credible and effective justice system 

cannot be superimposed onto a recalcitrant regime 

Secondly, by extension, there must be an equality of process applicable to perpetrators 

charged from all sides of the con±1ict. This modem understanding is re±1ected in the structure 

of the international Criminal Court, by which States Party cannot simply refer political 

opponents to the Court or extend jurisdiction only over crimes alleged against an adversary 

during an armed conflict. For example, once the International Criminal Court is properly 

investigating offenses based on the predicate finding that there is a "reasonable basis to 

believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the court have been committed," the entire 

situation comes within its purview. The Office of the Prosecutor and the judiciary of any 

tribunal created for the crimes committed in the context of the conflict in Syria must serve in 

accordance with re~,'ularized and apolitical procedures. Charges must be based on available 

evidence and prosecutorial preferences and decisions must be made on law and procedure 

rather than party, ethnic identity, or the nature of the allegations 2 Judges should not serve in 

the shadow of political overseers. Though the overarching political context is necessary for 

the creation and operation ofa tribunal, the actual operation of that punitive body should 

operate against all persons within its jurisdiction without being infected by the larger political 

context. 

~ This is one reason why the modern practice requires disclosure to the defense" as soon as practicable" of 

evidence "in the Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she believes shows or tends to sho\v the 

innocence of the accuseu, or to mitigate the guilt of the accuseu, or \vhich may alTed the credibility of 

prosecution evidence. II Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998), m1. 67(2), U.N. Doc 

NCONF.183/9. 2187 U.N.l.S 90, entered into force Julv 1,2002. reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 

Page 2 of8 
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As a final preliminary consideration, it is important to remember that any criminal process in 

a period of societal transition out of full scale civil war involves a mosaic of occasionally 

overlapping purposes and newly created processes. Sustainable peace in Syria may rely on 

the development of authoritative local actors capable of administering justice/reconciliation 

grounded in sociological legitimacy. Formalized investigations and prosecutions are a 

profoundly important dimension of the larger effort to restore the rule oflaw. The optimal 

balance between fonnalized prosecutions, reintegration of particular perpetrators into affected 

communities, truth-telling processes at the local level among fnends and neighbors or at the 

national level in intricate bureaucratic structures, and some combination of forgiveness, 

apology, and reparations is itself most complex. The fundamental nature of the social 

contract between the individual and the state is in flux, just as the nature of the relationship 

between Syria and a newly created tribunal will evolve. The relationship between these 

various elements of a sustainable peace are Syrian choices in the end. The creation of a 

tribunal on the ground will inevitably occur against the backdrop of some combination of 

these alternative transitional justice processes. The political process for establishing a justice 

mechanism would ideally incorporate a comprehensive vision to these various dimensions so 

that there is a holistic sense of the pathway to a better future. 

To reiterate, the political agreements needed to establish and sustain a tribunal will provide 

the necessary underpinnings of its legal authorities, the right to apprehend suspects, and to 

fund its operations. By way of illustration, Judge Kirsch, former President of the 

International Criminal Court, has pointed out that "[tJhe ICC is founded on two pillars. The 

Court is the judicial pillar. The operational pillar belongs to States. ,,3 The political 

agreements needed to establish a tribunal in Syria will determine its ability to perform its core 

tasks and will determine its connectivity to the larger process of restoring a civil order based 

on respect for human dignity and the restoration of a rights based approach to the rule of law. 

I will now discuss the range of political considerations in roughly descending order. The 

most difficult, and foreseeably controversial, approach would be to rely upon the Chapter VII 

authority of the Security Council to refer the Syrian situation to the International Criminal 

Court (ICC) under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. There is some possibility in the future 

3 Philippe Kirsch, PresidenL or the ICC, "CLLITenL Challenges Lo InLemaLional Criminal JLLsLice-ICC Len vears 

nfter adoption of the Rome Statute," remarks made 8t Seminar Organized by the Finnish Institute for 

Intcll1ational AlTair::; in coopcraLion \vilh the Minislry of Foreign AlTairs, JUll(; 12, 20m~ 

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that the government of a reconstituted Syria would fully accede to the Rome Statute and 

affirmatively convey jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory or by its nationals to 

the TCC. Absent the consent of the sovereign state, Security Council action would require the 

affirmative consent of all five of the permanent members of the Security Council. Tn his 

September 17, 2013 statement to the United Nations General Assembly, the Secretary 

General stopped well short of giving his full throated endorsement to this approach, saying in 

part that "There must be a robust effort to bring perpetrators to justice for the serious 

international crimes that have been committed since the beginning by all parties to the 

conflict. The High Commissioner for Human Rights has repeatedly called for a Security 

Council referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. And as has been 

done in other societies that have experienced ci vii war or political upheaval, truth 

commissions and other processes aimed at promoting reconciliation and post-crisis reckoning 

will have an important role to play at an appropriate moment. ,,4 Absent a full scale 

diplomatic push with a variety of concrete incentives, it is difficult to envision agreement 

among the P-5 for the referral of a Syrian situation to the International Criminal Court As 

the world has learned from previous referrals under Article 13(b), a Security Council 

Resolution is not a panacea in any event. 

A Security Council referral of the Syria situation would require ongoing diplomacy to 

provide security in the midst of the conflict to investigators and forensics teams. Failure to 

provide for full diplomatic protections for Court investigators would mean that they would 

only able to secure evidence from outside Syria. Furthermore, the intervention of a treatybased western court mandated by the Security Council would almost certainly be perceived 

as illegitimate in the eyes of the Syrian citizenry. From the perspective of victims and 

community leaders, the external interference of the ICC is in itself a controversial and 

complex aspect of 'justice'. The experience of the Court's first decade reveals beyond any 

doubt that its institutional role will be hotly debated by families, communities, and victims 

most affected by conflicts. Even if the United States could overcome the predictable 

opposition of other P-5 members within the Security Council, a referral to the TCC could very 

well end up in a stalemate analogous to the situation inside Sudan. For the time being, 

approaches to transitional justice matters that flow from western capitals and seek to supply 

'1 S'ee <http://\\,,\,,'1. Uil. org/sg/statements/index. asp ?nid=7 090> 

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the 'solution' to the complex pattern of criminality on the ground would not be well received 

in any quarter in Syria, so it is not hard to imagine that an TCC referral would create the 

perception of progress while actually effecting little change on the ground. 

Tn contrast to an TCC referral over Syria as a non-State Party, the formation of an ad hoc or 

hybrid court would require a great deal more orchestration in terms of the actual mechanics 

of establishing a court, hiring personnel, energizing investigations, and becoming functional. 

Every ad hoc or hybrid tribunal to date has been a sui generis construct that originated from a 

unique confluence of political factors paired with opportunistic diplomatic timing. While this 

might well be slower than simply adopting the structure and established processes of the ICC, 

a newly formed ad hoc or hybrid tribunal could be opposed by capitals both for reasons of 

cost and political preference. An ad hoc or hybrid tribunal would also have to navigate the 

competing expectations of states that support the maturation of the ICC and those who would 

advocate robust domestic systems as the first priority. It is likely that some states would 

oppose creation of an ad hoc or hybrid model for Syria on the grounds that the previous 

efforts largely predated the ICC, and many states could envision a newly created hybrid 

model as a reversion to these 'old' models likely to undermine the ICC in the long term. On 

the other hand, a regionally centered ad hoc or hybrid tribunal could become the fulcrum for 

garnering the support of regional states. Regional states could play an important role in such 

a process through funding, security arrangements, possible provision of judges, and expert 

linguists that can aid in translating evidence and testimony for dissemination to a watching 

world audience. Any ad hoc or hybrid tribunal would require a firm baseline of funding 

along with clearly articulated roles and responsibilities. While any movement towards 

accountability risks raising expectations, there is also a possibility that political actors begin 

to feel frustrated at what they perceive as wasted time and political space. The formation of 

an ad hoc or hybrid tribunal would represent a path-breaking development in the region. 

Experience with other tribunals suggests that stressing the importance of building a credible 

and effective process should take precedence over pushing for quick results. 

The modern trend in many capitals is for the incorporation of international legal principles 

and practices into domestic penal codes. The consequent application by domestic courts 

would comport with the aspirations of the drafters of the ICC who intended that domestic 

states should have the primary role in enforcing international law whilst the TCC functions as 

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a court of last resort based on the necessities of a particular case. 5 Syrian legal professionals 

strongly seek a made-in-Syria solution to which foreign involvement is limited - at most - to 

behind-the-scenes advisors; indeed, this is one of the few areas of agreement between what 

might be tenlled supporters of existing penal-law instruments and those who are on record as 

supporting greater influences for Islamic law in the Syrian legal system. The fact that a 

purely domestic solution would be generated in the midst ofa larger political dialogue inside 

Syria and in consultation with other states could permit a more holi stic approach that would 

create an integrated array of mechanisms and approaches inside Syria. At a minimum, a 

domestic tribunal should incorporate international jurisprudence as well as the substantive 

principles from international criminal law. If Syrian penal law provides the core around 

which a larger system of criminal responsibility is built, then a domestic approach might well 

be more attuned to the evolving needs and expectations of the victims and communities most 

affected by the current conflict 

A domestic process inside Syria would likely be less understandable to westerners, and of 

course would confront the perception that justice could be manipulated to serve domestic 

political goals. There would also likely be policy disputes between those inside Syria that 

support capital punishment and other nations that firmly oppose any process capable of 

dispensing capital sentences. On the other hand, domestic officials would likely be more 

capable of using the trial processes as a highly visible way of undermining damaging social 

narratives that complicate efforts to achieve lasting peace within Syria. For instance, it is 

held widely in popular pro-opposition circles that the governing regime is a uniformly 

Alawite structure which exists to persecute Sunni Muslims. In reality, the facts would 

suggest that the regime is a power-political, multi-ethnic oligarchy which is prepared to move 

aggressively against any and all opposition, irrespective of its origin. This point might be 

illustrated by a domestic tribunal informed with a robust local investigative capacity that 

targets, as warranted by sufficient credible evidence, non-Alawite regime adherents whilst 

proving the victimization of persons identified with sectarian groupings other than (or in 

addition to) Sunni Islam. Equally, regime claims that the armed opposition is a homogeneous 

collection of Sunni extremists determined to destroy physically the Alawite communities of 

5 Michael A. Ne\vtoll, The Quest for Constructive Complementarity. in TIlE lCe AND COMPLE!v1LNTARlTY 

fROM TnCORY TOPRACTICC 304rCarsten Stalm & Mohammed El Zeidy eds., Cambridge University Press 

2011), r1vailable at <h!nu'/parers. s:3nl.conlis() 13lpapcrs.cfm': abstrnct id= 15854C)2> 

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Syria might be challenged through the investigation and prosecution, where the evidence 

warrants, of non-Sunni opposition fighters who have perpetrated crimes against (amongst 

others) non-Alawites. Domestic officials might well be best placed to conduct prosecutions 

that strengthen the larger political processes in an effort to achieve sustainable peace within 

Syria 

One aspect of the political effort to establish a tribunal for Syria that spans each of the 

possible structural solutions is that any etIective and credible judicial process must rely upon 

a robust investigative capacity. At the moment, such an independent investigative capacity 

based on the best practices for securing and cataloguing infonnation related to crimes on the 

ground is found in the Syrian Commission for Justice and Accountability (SCJA). The 

independent collection and collation of potentially admissible evidence could easily evolve 

into the Syrian-national war-crimes investigations and prosecutions unit or be folded into an 

internationalized etIort under the right political circumstances. SCJA is a Syrian 

organization, and in that sense represents precisely the kind of effort that should be supported 

and funded by any state interested in the establishment of a tribunal when the political 

circumstances are opportune. The SCJA is an independent organization led by Syrians for 

the benefit of Syria. The Commission is an apolitical body without allegiance to the 

Government of Syria or to political-opposition bodies such as the Syrian Opposition 

Coalition. The work of the SCJA is driven above all by considerations of Syrian penal law 

and the international laws and customs of war along with the body oflaw related to crimes 

against humanity. 

At the same time, the legal context within Syria is challenged by ongoing expectations of the 

civilian population because the onset of civil war does not automatically mean the suspension 

of property disputes, contract disputes, and the whole range of disputes with which the justice 

system routinely is forced to cope. Following large refugee outflows, many communities are 

looted not only by state actors and fonnalized non-state rebel groups - but also by bandits or 

criminals from within the community. A war crimes tribunal for Syria will be established in 

the context of other legal problems that require adjudication, and which may be seen in the 

eyes of the affected communities as requiring immediate action. A political accommodation 

that serves these more mundane but pressing matters may well be able to leverage greater 

degrees of political support among the population most directly affected by the rampant 

crimes being committed within Syria. 

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Establishment of an effective prosecutorial mechanism for responding to war crimes and 

crimes against humanity is critical to the future of Syria and to regional stability in the longer 

tenll. The ultimate success of any political effort to create such a tribunal will depend on the 

integration of five planning factors in my view. There is no inalterable template for success, 

but the long tenn success and legitimacy of a tribunal depends to a large degree on 

implementation of these five factors within the political dialogue and the foundational 

agreements that pave the way for the pursuit ofj ustice: 

1. Any transitional justice mechanism must be attuned to the Syrian context for its 

operations in order to be accepted by the populace. This may require some participation by 

Syrian judges, lawyers, investigators and others who are vetted, trained, and capable of 

providing justice under current Syrian law - as well as relevant international law 

2. Any transitional justice mechanism would ideally be conducted largely in Arabic and 

have some level of regional acceptance. This could allow for the integration into the 

transitional justice mechanism of judges, lawyers, investigators, and others from within the 

region who can serve as a bridge to the affected communities and victims to increase 

understanding of the justice process and maximize its acceptance and legitimacy. 

3. Any transitional justice mechanism must be fluid and responsive. This necessitates 

small teams that would be capable of deploying to pockets of stability where the jurisdiction 

of the mechanism has been accepted as authoritative by the local community The t1uid 

nature of the current conflict and the risk that the government will not accept such a 

transitional justice mechanism necessitates a high level of community support along with 

rapid response time by the group. 

4. Tribunal judgments may need to be enforced and accepted by the affected 

communities. The overarching imperative for a newly established justice mechanism is the 

enforcement of the adjudication and punishment of perpetrators according to law. Such 

enforcement is frequently assumed, but in Syria, absent the participation of the regime, the 

communities themselves may necessarily be responsible for providing the enforcement of any 

adjudication administered by any transitional justice mechanism unless other states agree to 

do so pursuant to a political agreement. Community-level enforcement of the adjudications 

will require extensive political coordination and ongoing support structures. 

5. The very goal of a tribunal should be to punish key perpetrators, but also to reinforce 

movement towards a sustainable peace on the ground. The political process of establishing, 

supporting, and funding such a tribunal must be carefully considered and calibrated to 

enhance efforts to achieve lasting peace. 

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