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S. HRG. 110–1241 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OVERSIGHT: 

SECURITY OF OUR NATION’S NUCLEAR PLANTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR 

SAFETY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND 

PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 28, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress.senate 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

BETTINA POIRIER, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ANDREW WHEELER, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

BARBARA BOXER, California (ex officio) 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma (ex officio) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

MAY 16, 2007 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware ................... 7 

Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio ........................ 8 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland ................ 16 

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 17 

Craig, Hon. Larry E., U.S. Senator from the State of Idaho ............................... 19 

WITNESSES 

Casey, Hon. Robert P. Jr., U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania .......... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4 

Specter, Hon. Arlen Specter, U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania ...... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Klein, Dale E., Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ............................... 20 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 23 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 30 

Senator Casey ............................................................................................ 32 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 33 

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 38 

Senator Specter ......................................................................................... 39 

Jaczko, Gregory B., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ................ 41 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 45 

Senator Casey ............................................................................................ 46 

Lyons, Peter B., Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission ...................... 47 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

Response to an additional question from Senator Casey .............................. 52 

Crane, Christopher M., Chief Operating Officer, Exelon Generation ................. 69 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 72 

Response to an additional question from Senator Inhofe ............................. 77 

Response to an additional question from Senator Specter ............................ 77 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 77 

Senator Casey ............................................................................................ 78 

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 79 

Wilson, Eric, Chief Executive Officer, Regulated Security Solutions, Formerly 

Wackenhut Nuclear Services .............................................................................. 80 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 83 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 88 

Senator Casey ............................................................................................ 88 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 90 

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 91 

Lochbaum, David, Director, Nuclear Safety Project, Union of Concerned Scientists .................................................................................................................... 91 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 94 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 102 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 102 

Senator Voinovich ..................................................................................... 102 

Page

IV 

Fertel, Marvin, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Nuclear 

Energy Institute ................................................................................................... 103 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 107 

(1) 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OVERSIGHT: SECURITY OF OUR NATION’S NUCLEAR PLANTS 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 

406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R. Carper 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Carper, Cardin, Craig, Inhofe, Specter and 

Voinovich. 

Senator CARPER. Welcome everyone. 

Normally, we don’t swear in our witnesses, but I would just suggest to Senator Voinovich, we talked earlier and we were thinking 

about swearing in our first witness to get the straight skinny here. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. We are delighted our colleague Senator Casey 

is here from Pennsylvania. Since Peach Bottom is in your State, 

one of your corporate constituents, and a lot of your constituents 

actually work there, it is great that you are here to testify. I know 

you have been to visit Peach Bottom in the last week or two. We 

look forward to hearing from you. 

I would invite you to come and join us and to sit on this side of 

the dais once you have concluded your statement, and after we 

have the opportunity to grill you with a whole lot of questions of 

your own. We are happy that you are here, and we look forward 

to hearing from you and then from our other witnesses who have 

joined us. 

Please proceed. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. We appreciate this opportunity to testify and I am grateful for the time that 

you have given me and other witnesses who will be here today. I 

want to thank you and also thank Senator Voinovich and Senator 

Inhofe and Senator Craig for being with us today. 

I especially appreciate this because of the importance of this 

issue, the issue of nuclear security, not only to the Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania, but indeed to the Country. I come from a State 

that has 5 nuclear plants and 9 reactors, and we have 10 million 

2 

people in Pennsylvania that live within 50 miles of those reactors, 

so nuclear safety and nuclear security is extremely important to 

our State and the Country. 

The recent incident with a team of sleeping guards at the Peach 

Bottom atomic power station in York County, Pennsylvania has 

raised the profile of nuclear security across the Country. The incident, in a word, was inexcusable. There is no other way to say it 

than that, but it has highlighted some of the problems with the 

way security is implemented in our Country and overseen. So I 

think it is our duty as members of the U.S. Senate, but also as citizens, to learn from this mistake. 

We know that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently reported a ‘‘white’’ Peach Bottom incident. The finding, as many people here know, is based upon the agency’s color coded threat analysis. A white finding means that the problem with the sleeping security team presented a low to moderate safety significance. But I 

would argue, and I think anyone on this panel would argue, that 

the 10 million Pennsylvanians living near nuclear plants, for them 

a low or moderate safety threat is still too great a threat to those 

families. 

But for good fortune in this case, a serious security issue could 

have occurred at the Peach Bottom plant while security guards 

who were supposed to standing ready to provide rapid response 

were in fact sleeping. I don’t think anyone here is willing to leave 

the safety of people in Pennsylvania or the safety of Americans and 

the peace of mind of Americans to something as unpredictable and 

as unreliable as luck, pure luck in some instances. 

So we need to do a couple of things to address this problem. I 

think there are at least five. First of all, what I believe we must 

do is make sure that we fully understand what happened in this 

instance. Today’s hearing is a good first step to do that, and that 

is why I am so grateful that we have the opportunity to talk about 

what happened at Peach Bottom, but also to take steps to prevent 

it from happening there and in other places across the Country. 

My staff and I personally have met with many of the witnesses 

who will testify today. I also met this past Monday with Mr. Kerry 

Beal, who is a constituent of mine, but also was the whistleblower 

who alerted us to the sleeping guards in the first place. This past 

Monday, I toured the Peach Bottom plant to get a better understanding of what happened, and also what Exelon, the company 

that runs that plant, what they have changed in their own security 

operations. Senator Carper, I know that you were there not too 

long ago, and I think you were actually at the plant longer than 

I was. We are grateful for the time you spent there. I was there 

about 2 hours, and I know you were there even longer than that. 

I think as a Senator from a neighboring State, to take that kind 

of time to come to Pennsylvania to visit Peach Bottom, we are 

grateful for that. I think it speaks volumes about the commitment 

of this Subcommittee and your leadership to this issue. We are 

grateful that you did that. 

I think the second thing we have to focus on here is restoring 

faith, the faith of the American people in our Nation’s nuclear security. I say that not extrapolating from one incident, but I think 

what happened here is serious enough that it bears scrutiny and 

3 

attention from the Country overall. So even though in this case no 

imminent security threat took place, the knowledge that those in 

charge of guarding a potential target and securing the surrounding 

communities has caused a lot of local residents to ask questions 

about what happened here. 

So I think a lot of work is ahead of us at public officials to earn 

the trust of the public with regard to public safety and in particular nuclear safety. 

No. 3, we must make changes to a system that allows a serious 

security problem to go undetected for many months, even after it 

was brought to the attention of the Federal agency, the plant 

owner and the security contractor. I am pleased that the NRC, 

Exelon and Wackenhut Nuclear Services, the three parties that 

have responsibility here, have taken actions to correct the problems 

that occurred at Peach Bottom, but we have to make sure these actions actually do the job as they must do to ensure this doesn’t 

happen again. 

Finally, I think we must do this: We must ensure that the people 

who report incidents at our nuclear plants, whatever they are reporting, whether it is security or otherwise, but especially if it is 

a security matter, can do so freely and with peace of mind when 

they make those reports. These whistleblowers must know that if 

they make the difficult decision to report a safety or security problem, they will be treated with respect and that their concerns will 

be carefully and thoroughly investigated. 

As the Chairman knows, I was an elected official in Pennsylvania for a decade, basically being a CEO of two State agencies, 

one with about 800 employees and the other with 500 employees. 

So I have a sense in the context of government how difficult it is 

to balance a budget, to run an agency, and to deal with all of the 

difficulties that you face running an agency. I think the same is 

true in private industry. Running Peach Bottom or running a nuclear plant is a difficult assignment. 

But when an employee of a company or a government agency reports a problem, whether it is a personnel matter or a security 

matter, whatever it is, there must be a procedure in place for that 

employee to follow and for the company to follow or the agency. 

And also, there must be followup to ensure that that problem is indeed addressed. That is the responsibility of the leadership, the 

leadership of a government agency, the leadership of a private company, and certainly the leadership of a nuclear power plant. That 

agency must ensure that every employee has the peace of mind to 

know that they can report confidentially and that action will be 

taken. 

That is what we need to implement here, and I am looking forward to listening to the witnesses today to bring some light to what 

happened, but more importantly in the long run, to make sure that 

this never happens again at Peach Bottom or any other nuclear 

power plant. 

Mr. Chairman, I will take any and all questions that you or the 

other members of the panel have. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Casey follows:] 

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5 


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6 

Senator CARPER. Just one quick question. Of the five factors you 

listed, which is most important in your judgment? 

Senator CASEY. I think making sure going forward that we put 

in place procedures, especially with regard to what the NRC does, 

but also to demand that companies put procedures in place to prevent this from happening again. So literally, it is almost as if you 

have to look into the mind of a whistleblower and create conditions 

for them so that when they have a concern, it may be unfounded, 

it may be something that is not that serious, but especially if it 

something serious, they have to, in their own mind, feel that their 

complaint or their concern is addressed and addressed quickly, not 

months down the road, not weeks down the road, but very quickly, 

especially if it involves security. 

Part of that is creating a culture that foster this. My sense of 

this, having read news articles, having talked to some people involved, this is my sense, and I don’t profess to be an expert on 

what happened there, but my sense of this is the culture was contrary to everything I just said, that the culture was not such that 

this employee felt free to report it, and that he had a sense that 

it would be followed up on very quickly and very thoroughly. In 

fact, it was resistance the other way. Don’t be a team player, that 

was one of the phrases that came out of this. So I think that is 

really the most important. 

Senator CARPER. I will just say to my colleagues, one of the 

things that I learned on our visit there with Chairman Klein and 

others was I think there was a policy in place with Wackenhut of 

zero tolerance. One screw-up and you are fired from the security 

force. As a result, there was a reluctance on the part of some who 

were behaving appropriately to turn in the others because they 

knew that their colleagues would be out of there right away. I 

think that kind of reduced the likelihood that people would step 

forward and blow a whistle because it would mean somebody’s career and livelihood and so forth. 

Other questions of Senator Casey? 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, just out of curiosity, Bob, you mentioned 

that in Pennsylvania that your elected position put you in two 

groups. What were they? 

Senator CASEY. Auditor General and State Treasurer. 

Senator INHOFE. I see. OK. 

Senator CRAIG. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions of the Senator. I have some brief opening comments. 

Senator CARPER. We will have an opportunity to do that. 

Senator CRAIG. That is what I thought, so I will wait. Thank you. 

Thank you, Bob. 

Senator CARPER. I would just say before you come up to join us, 

Senator Casey, one of the reasons why I felt a sense of ownership 

and wanted to come to our neighboring State, to Peach Bottom, is 

there was a time in the history of Pennsylvania and Delaware 

when we were the same State, as you may know. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. And you never know how some of this history 

repeats itself, so it was an early excursion. 

Senator CRAIG. And Bob, we also must remember he was once a 

Governor. He is probably looking for territory. 

7 

Senator CARPER. That is true. 

Senator INHOFE. When that was true, we weren’t a State. 

Senator CARPER. People used to say to me, when you are no 

longer Governor of Delaware, what would you like to do next when 

your term expires. I don’t know what George used to say, but I 

used to say I want to move to another State and be their Governor, 

too. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. We didn’t have any takers so I had to find another job. 

Senator CASEY. We would love to have you move the entire population of Delaware into Pennsylvania. 

Senator CARPER. Three great counties. 

Well, please feel free to join us. 

We are going to take a few minutes and have opening statements. I am going to ask my colleagues and I to try to hold ourselves to maybe 5 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

Senator CARPER. I think along with everyone who is sitting up 

here on the dais with me, I have been a long-time supporter of nuclear power. I believe clean, safe energy is what this Country needs 

and what nuclear power has to offer. 

Nuclear power provides solutions to a number of the challenges 

that face our Country today. It can help to reduce our growing reliance on foreign oil and to unchain our economy from the whims of 

hostile governments. It can also reduce air pollution that damages 

our environment, harms our health, and contributes to global 

warming. 

In short, our Country needs nuclear power, and luckily nuclear 

power just might be on its way, more new nuclear power just might 

be on its way. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as represented 

here today by three of its commissioners, has already received five 

license applications for the first new reactors to be built in some 

30 years and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is expecting several more applications this year. If all goes well, we will have the 

first of possibly 30 new reactors built within the next seven or 8 

years, not only providing clean electricity, no emissions, no increased reliance on foreign oil, but also providing extraordinary 

employment opportunities for tens of thousands of people throughout our Country to work to build those plants and then to turn 

around and to operate them. 

While that one reactor 7 years down the road is important, and 

the others that might be built are important, the 104 reactors that 

are currently operating in the United States must remain our top 

priority. If any one of our current reactors fails to continue to operate safely and securely, it will undermine the nuclear renaissance 

we are beginning to witness. 

In short, we have to get it right every day at every plant. Perfection cannot just be a lofty goal. It has to be a goal that is diligently 

pursued every single day. I said to Chairman Klein and the folks 

up at Peach Bottom when we were up there, I often say to my teenage boys, there is nothing wrong with making a mistake. We all 

8 

make mistakes. In this industry, there is less margin for error and 

mistakes can have extraordinary consequences. But when there are 

mistakes, we have to learn from them and fix them. 

When it comes to the Peach Bottom incident last fall, we failed 

to get it right. Last year, the NRC and Exelon were warned that 

security guards were sleeping on duty and failed to address the 

issue until video evidence was leaked to the press. Obviously, the 

security guards implicated in this incident failed to properly carry 

out their jobs, but the reason we are here today is because the 

NRC apparently failed to carry out its job. By its own admission, 

the NRC, and I commend the NRC for basically saying, we screwed 

up, too. We all make mistakes and I appreciate the spirit that you 

have brought to this, Mr. Chairman and commissioners. But the 

NRC failed to adequately respond to the concerns that were raised, 

and the Commission was overly reliant on Exelon to investigate 

these concerns. 

The role of the NRC is to regulate the nuclear industry, not just 

ask the industry to do it for them. When the NRC is perceived to 

be weak or passive, there is opportunity to cut corners and to do 

things outside the lines. A strong, robust future for the nuclear industry requires a strong and robust Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Chairman Klein and the commissioners have made that clear 

to me. We understand that and they do, too. 

Two weeks ago, as others have suggested, I went to the Peach 

Bottom plant to personally see what happened and to find out how 

it is being addressed. While there, I had a chance to talk with the 

facility’s employees. In closing, let me repeat what I said to them. 

I told them that I will do all that I can to promote safe nuclear 

power and to provide the NRC with the resources and tools necessary to do its job and do it well. I know my colleagues take the 

same spirit to their responsibility here, too. But all of our efforts 

on this Subcommittee will be meaningless without a commitment 

to excellence from the industry and from the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

I will now recognize my colleague, Senator Voinovich, with whom 

it is a pleasure to serve in this oversight capacity. 

Senator Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OHIO 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to welcome the witnesses. I want to thank you for 

being here to examine the status of security at our Nation’s nuclear 

power plants. 

With increasing environmental constraints, particularly the desire for limits on carbon emissions, expanding nuclear power’s 

share of the baseloading generating capacity is both logical and 

necessary. The 104 nuclear power plants operating today represent 

over 70 percent of the Nation’s emission-free electric generation 

portfolios, avoiding 681 million metric tons of carbon dioxide. By 

comparison, wind power avoids about three million tons and solar 

energy avoids about a half million tons. 

Indeed, the Clean Air Task Force modeling of the WarnerLieberman climate bill which passed out of this Committee, indiVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:23 May 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\85523.TXT VERN
9 

cates that 117,000 megawatts of new nuclear generation must be 

in operation by 2030 to meet the objectives of the bill. That is the 

equivalent of doubling the number of nuclear plants we have today 

within the next 22 years, which obviously, I think from many of 

our perspectives, is a little unrealistic. 

Nevertheless, I think we can agree on one thing. If we are to 

meet the growing electricity needs in this Country and also address 

global climate change, nuclear power has a crucial role to play. 

That is why we focused a great deal of effort on ways to achieve 

secure and safe growth of nuclear power. Last fall, Senator Carper 

and I held a nuclear energy roundtable with representatives from 

organized labor, industry, academia, professional societies and government agencies, along with Senators Isakson and Domenici, to 

talk about what it is that we need to do to make the nuclear renaissance a reality. I have worked on a paper with several people 

in this room and copies of it are available at the back table, which 

outlines the things that we need to do in terms of making sure the 

renaissance takes place. 

But there is an old challenge that has been dogging both the 

NRC and the nuclear industry for a long time. That is public confidence. Without public confidence in NRC as a strong and objective 

regulator, and without public confidence in the nuclear industry 

workers as highly competent and safety-conscious professionals, I 

am afraid the future of the nuclear renaissance is in doubt. Without public confidence, we can’t get there from here to there. 

In my view, nothing will damage public confidence more than 

giving the appearance of not taking each employee-raised concern 

seriously. A video message of sleeping security guards at a nuclear 

power plant airing on CNN certainly doesn’t help. 

Mr. Chairman, that is why this hearing is so important and 

timely. We need to better understand exactly what happened and 

the extent of the problem which led to the situation, and what is 

being done to make sure that it doesn’t happen again. 

This Committee has held 10 NRC hearings since September 11, 

in which security enhancements at the Nation’s nuclear facilities 

and protection and control of radioactive materials was examined. 

Through these hearings, we learned the NRC issued interim compensatory security measures and numerous orders to enhance security at these facilities. One of these orders specifically restricted security officer work hours, established new security force training 

and qualification requirements, and increased the design basis 

threat the nuclear forces must be able to defend against. We understand that nuclear power plant operators spent about $1.5 billion 

to implement these new NRC regulations. 

I have toured two plants in Ohio, at Davis-Besse and Perry. I 

was very impressed with what they have in place at those two facilities. I should also note that the safety record of the Nation’s nuclear power plants has steadily improved. NRC oversight of these 

plants has improved by applying lessons learned from Davis-Besse 

back in 2002, understanding that public perception and confidence 

in the industry is only as good as its weakest link. 

I was recently pleased to meet with the President of the Institute 

of Nuclear Power Operation, Jim Ellis, concerning his efforts in the 

industry to control the whole industry. In other words, this is a 

10 

watchdog within the industry. The industry understands that 

things like Peach Bottom hurt everyone. The industry is doing everything they can to make it clear to the people that run these operations, what you do impacts on us and you had better do the job 

that you are supposed to be doing, not only for yourself, but for the 

entire industry. 

I think that is it. The NRC, the industry itself, and then oversight from this Committee is going to really make the difference in 

terms of restoring people’s confidence in this industry. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Voinovich, thank you. 

Under early bird rules, Senator Cardin would be recognized next, 

but he has been graciously willing to defer. 

Senator INHOFE. I would defer also to Senator Specter. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. Thanks for joining us. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator SPECTER. I want to thank you for the deference. I have 

never had that much deference in the Senate. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SPECTER. I think I may come to this Committee more 

often, with the congeniality. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. We will leave the light on. 

Senator SPECTER. I would ask consent that my full statement be 

made a part of the record, and I will summarize it in a brief way. 

Senator CARPER. Without objection. 

Senator SPECTER. I think there is no doubt that we need to develop nuclear energy in America because of the grave problems associated with dependence on foreign oil. The issues about safety are 

in pretty good shape as long as people stay awake. 

I recall the days very vividly back in 1978, March 28, when there 

was the Three Mile Island incident in Pennsylvania. There was 

really a lot of worry that day. I was in Philadelphia at the time 

and reports were being given as to how long it would take the air 

to come back in a contaminated form and what the risks were. But 

I think we are a long way from that, with that kind of a mechanical breakdown over at Chernobyl, but I think we need to look to 

nuclear. 

Also in the context of the issues on global warming which we are 

talking about. Legislation has been proposed in this Committee. 

Senator Lieberman, Senator Warner, Senator Bingaman and I 

have proposed legislation, and nuclear has a lot to offer because it 

is clean, so it would ease up on our problems of global warming as 

well. 

We have problems at Yucca Mountain which we have not yet 

solved, and the waste matters have to be taken care of, but there 

is nothing as fundamental as safety. I have made it a point to visit 

the facilities in my State. I couldn’t make the last one because we 

were at a Republican convention in Harrisburg at the same time 

and we had to endorse a Presidential nominee. But what happened 

at Peach Bottom is inexcusable, inexcusable. 

11 

That is especially troublesome, not only because of the inherent 

dangers in nuclear, but because of the terrorism factor. That is a 

prime target in a prime location. I commend the Chairman and 

others, Senator Casey, for focusing attention on the issue. We can’t 

emphasize too strongly the importance of having the security operational, especially where you have a professional organization and 

the issue in the area where the guards were located was very bad. 

They have to stay awake. That is the issue not only for the contracting party, but for the principal. 

We are really dealing here with matters that are so serious, they 

are really in the non-delegable category. The law makes a sharp 

distinction, depending on the nature of the danger, as to what can 

be delegated. These are really non-delegable items. 

My distinguished colleague, Senator Casey, has taken the lead 

on legislation, which I expect to join him on. I am very glad to see 

this Committee very much on top of this issue. 

I am going to excuse myself because the Judiciary Committee is 

meeting at this time. 

Thank you for the deference, colleagues. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Specter follows:] 

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85523.006
16 

Senator CARPER. Thank you so much for coming and for your testimony. 

Senator Cardin, you are recognized, and then we will turn to 

Senator Inhofe. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our colleagues from Pennsylvania for joining us, 

Senator Specter and Senator Casey. 

It is a pleasure to have Chairman Klein here. I appreciated his 

hospitality when I recently visited the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and was very impressed by the dedication of the men and 

women who serve at that Commission and the work that they are 

doing in order to carry out a very challenging mission not only 

dealing with the safety of our nuclear facilities, but also the application process that is moving forward to deal with the energy policies of this Country. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to agree with you in your statement. I 

think nuclear energy is very important for this Country, but it 

must be done in a safe manner. We have had lapses. We need to 

learn from those lapses to make sure that that does not take place 

in our Country. 

What happened at Peach Bottom is inexcusable. Peach Bottom 

may be located in Pennsylvania, but it is right near the people of 

Maryland. If there had been an incident there, it would have affected the health of the people in my State of Maryland and as far 

as the entire region. So we all have an interest in what is happening in regards to security issues. 

I am also concerned about the GAO undercover operation that 

was able to get a license. That is something that we need to make 

sure never happens and that we have the right protections in 

place. 

So I would ask that my full statement be made part of the 

record. I just really want to join in thanking you, Mr. Chairman, 

for holding this hearing to make sure that we do everything we can 

as a Congress to support efforts for the safety of our communities. 

I was in Chernobyl last year and saw the consequences of the 

most extreme circumstances of failure of government to properly 

protect not only the citizens of Ukraine, but basically the international community. We have a major responsibility. The NRC is 

our principal agency that has that responsibility. We need to work 

together to make sure that every safety precaution is taken as we 

deal with this most important subject. 

I thank you for holding this hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Cardin follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF MARYLAND

Mister Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and for allowing me to join 

your subcommittee for the day. I am grateful for your courtesy. Because we have 

so many important witnesses to hear from today, I will keep my opening statement 

brief. 

For the first time in 30 years, the nuclear industry is moving forward with plans 

to construct and activate a new generation of nuclear power plants. Already, TVA 

has begun to expand its nuclear capacity with the recent restart of a reactor at 

17 

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant in Athens, Alabama. In his testimony today, NRC 

Chairman Klein states that, just over the last few months, the Commission has received five complete combined license applications for new nuclear power plants. 

Dozens of new plants could be online by 2015. 

If we are to going to expand the nuclear power industry in the United States, 

then Americans need to have confidence that the nuclear plant operations are dependable and plant operations must, in fact, be secure. I want to impress just how 

weighty this matter is. 

NRC’s No. 1 priority must be to ensure that adequate security systems and processes are in place, and that they are working properly and efficiently at all times. 

We have seen two recent instances in which security shortcomings have come to 

light. The first of these was uncovered in July •07 after investigators from the Government Accountability Office fraudulently secured a license from the NRC which 

would have allowed them to buy the radioactive materials needed to make a dirty 

bomb. 

The only portion of the GAO’s security test that did not work was when it attempted to obtain a license from the State of Maryland, which said it would require 

a visit to the business first. While I am proud of Maryland regulators, I am disappointed that my State government could recognize a danger my national government overlooked. 

The second instance of security failures was the unsettling scenes of security 

guards at Peach Bottom Nuclear Plant in Pennsylvania asleep on the job when they 

should have been protecting the plant from security breaches. 

Peach Bottom is only a matter of miles from the border of my home State of 

Maryland. The consequences of a security failure there could be catastrophic for 

Maryland residents and many others. 

I am glad to hear Chairman Klein has instituted Maryland’s licensing procedures 

at the national level to prevent the type of licensing fraud GAO was able to undertake. And I am pleased to see the NRC’s thorough evaluation of its response to the 

Peach Bottom allegations. 

I want to hear assurances from the Commissioners that the review team’s recommendations will be implemented. I want to hear that the Commission is developing ways to expand on those recommendations and share those lessons beyond the 

region that surrounds the Peach Bottom facility. I want to hear that all that can 

be done is being done to ensure that the nation’s Nuclear Plants are being well run 

and adequately protected. 

In my home State of Maryland, 28 percent of electricity generation is in the form 

of nuclear energy. The Energy Information Administration is forecasting output of 

nuclear energy will grow by 42 percent by 2030. 

It is essential that we be 100 percent confident in our assertions that the public 

in Maryland and across the United States are secure, and will remain secure as we 

move forward with plans to expand our nuclear energy infrastructure and capacity. 

I look forward to hearing answers today to their concerns and my own. 

Thank you, Mister Chairman. 

Senator CARPER. We are delighted that you are here. Thanks so 

much for your statement. Your entire statement will be made part 

of the record, without objection. 

Senator Inhofe. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will make the 

same request that my statement be made a part of the record. 

Senator CARPER. Without objection. 

Senator INHOFE. Let me say that I have another reason for appreciating your holding this hearing today, and that is that it is 

continuing this vigorous oversight that we started. It is hard for me 

to believe it was a little over 10 years ago I became Chairman of 

this Subcommittee. At that time, we had gone something like 12 

years since we had any kind of oversight. We started a tradition. 

And even those who are here today, they want the oversight. So 

I think that is good. 

18 

I know the purpose of this hearing is to talk about the safety 

problems that are out there. I think that we probably will be able 

to do that. 

Let me agree with the comments that were made by Senator 

Voinovich on the necessity of nuclear. You just can’t run this machine called America without the component of nuclear energy. 

This is a time when we have to accelerate our activity there. The 

question that I am going to ask, in fact, some members of the NRC 

might want to do this in their opening statement, is respond to a 

concern that I have on the budget request. Maybe you did or maybe 

you didn’t hear. 

I was a little bit critical when we had the EPA hearing on their 

budget request, that there are some things like the SRF, some 

things that are very popular, that they fund way low knowing that 

we are going to raise it up. This has been happening in the 22 

years since I have been here, so I don’t think it is going to stop 

overnight, but I suspect that is what is happening here with the 

budget request. You have a budget increase in the reactor licensing of only $3.1 

million. Everything that we have seen indicates to us that it is 

going to have to be more than that if you are going to stay on the 

track that we, as oversighters, want you to stay on and continue 

to be aggressive. So I suspect that that is happening again and I 

hope that you will address that because if we are going to be as 

aggressive and ambitious as we need to be, and as I think every 

member of this Committee wants to be, we are going to have to be 

willing to fund it and make it happen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE

STATE OF OKLAHOMA

I commend Senators Carper and Voinovich for holding this hearing today, continuing the tradition of rigorous oversight that I started when I assumed the Chairmanship of this Subcommittee over 10 years ago. The safety and security of our nation’s nuclear plants is essential. Responsibility for maintaining security rests not 

only with the industry’s security forces, as they are vigilant and thorough in their 

protection of the facilities, but with the NRC as a regulator and with this Committee in its oversight role. It is our job today, as Members of this Committee, to 

ensure that the NRC remains a strong and independent regulator, true to its mission of protecting public health and safety, and promoting the common defense and 

security. 

The NRC cannot condone, and this Committee cannot ignore, security guards 

sleeping on duty in violation of procedures. I appreciate that Mr. Crane shares my 

extreme disappointment to learn that a group of security officers did just that. I am 

eager to learn what conditions created this situation and what has been done to prevent it from happening again. Inappropriate behavior on the part a few guards 

should be firmly addressed but it should NOT be allowed to tarnish the reputation 

of the dedicated, vigilant professionals that comprise the vast majority of these security forces or to undermine public confidence in them. 

In addition to security issues, I’m glad to have this opportunity to ask questions 

about the NRC’s budget proposal. The NRC has repeatedly acknowledged the challenges associated with the growing number of new reactor license applications that 

will likely be filed. Yet, the requested budget increase for new reactor licensing is 

only $3.1 million. There are reports that NRC staff recommended an additional $22 

million for new reactor licensing that was NOT included in the final budget request 

and that the shortfall will lead to delays of 8 months or more in reviewing applications filed in FY’09. If this is true, then I am very concerned to hear that the NRC 

may already be jeopardizing its ability to conduct thorough reviews in a timely fashion by setting the stage for a funding shortfall. 

19 

In contrast, the requested budget increase for reactor oversight—a process that 

even GAO has found to be logical and well-structured—is $16.1 million, over 5 times 

the increase for new reactor licensing. Testimony from our October hearing certainly 

didn’t indicate program shortcomings requiring a strong funding increase as a remedy. 

I’m concerned by this disparity and I’m eager to understand the basis for it. 

Senator CARPER. You bet. Thank you very much, and thank you 

for your leadership and for setting a good example that we have 

tried to follow under Senator Voinovich’s leadership and for the 

last year under mine. 

Senator Craig, thank you for being here today. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY E. CRAIG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF IDAHO 

Senator CRAIG. Mr. Chairman, let me join the chorus of all of us 

thanking you for due diligence in oversight. That is a critical tool 

that we have and can use and oftentimes don’t use across the face 

of Congress when we should be using it. I thank you for that. 

Let me track on where Senator Inhofe is coming from, but in a 

slightly different way. Let me not address this to the Commission, 

but to us. 

Fellow Senators, let me approach this by saying, where is the 

outrage? Listen to me. Where is the outrage? Senator Casey has 

said, no security threat took place, but there should be an outrage 

that people who were prepared and ready and alert to go out on 

a moment’s notice were asleep. That is a part of the outrage. 

But there is something else here that is not being addressed 

today that we are politically letting slide. By June, Greg Jaczko, if 

we don’t act, his term will expire and there will be two commissioners left in a five commissioner body. There are two commissioners, Greg is one, or proposed renomination, and another one, 

Kristine Svinicki, sitting at the desk in our Senate and we will not 

act. We won’t act because of politics. It is blunt and it is simple 

and it is direct and we ought to be honest about it. 

Now, there is even a suggestion that we won’t act until after the 

Presidential elections because maybe we can get three Democrats 

instead of two Democrats and one Republican. Where is the outrage on that? If we are so hand-wringingly concerned that this 

Commission do its job and get its budgets, then we ought to fully 

staff it with responsible, knowledgeable Americans, and we are not 

doing it, and I will be honest, because the majority leader isn’t allowing it to come to the floor for a vote. So where is the outrage 

there? 

A major utility came to my State not long ago, spent $10 million, 

bought property and 25,000 acre feet of water to build a new 1,500 

megawatt reactor. They chose not to proceed, and their pockets are 

as deep as anybody’s in America. They don’t have to go to Wall 

Street to finance it. And the reason they chose not to proceed was 

the uncertainty of licensing over a five or 6 year period of time because time was critical to them. They wanted to be in production 

in 10 yeas, and not 15 years, to meet their needs. They chose to 

stop. That is a little bit of the secrecy behind what is going on now, 

or the reality of timeliness. 

That is not a criticism of the Commission. That is a criticism of 

us. We are not allowing the Commission to be fully operational 

20 

based on its total load of commissioners, and yet we are asking 

more of it today, to be more responsible, more effective than they 

demonstrated possibly at Peach Bottom. 

I will stop. Mr. Chairman, where is the outrage? We are quietly 

letting politics dictate to us a Commission unfilled at a time when 

we are speaking glowingly about nuclear renaissance, 30 plus reactors on the drawing boards, the need for 115,000 new megawatts 

of power by a given time to keep our climate and our globe from 

warming. And yet we will not staff, because of political purposes, 

a full Commission. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. I will just respond very briefly. 

As Chairman of the Subcommittee responsible for oversight, I 

have no interest in seeing this Commission trying to operate with 

two members. It is not good for them and even more it is not good 

for our Country. We just need to work together to make sure that 

when Commissioner Jaczko’s term is going to expire, he will be in 

a position to be reconfirmed and have at least one person to join 

him, maybe two. Thank you. 

Senator CRAIG. He is in position right now. All we have to do is 

have one vote on the floor of the U.S. Senate and it would happen 

tomorrow, two new commissioners. 

Senator CARPER. I understand. 

All right. I think that is it for opening statements. 

I am going to invite our commissioners to come forward, led by 

Chairman Klein at this time. 

Chairman Klein, I understand that you are joined today by your 

boss. I am going to ask you to introduce her. If any other commissioners have a family member they would like to introduce, you are 

welcome to. It is not every day that the spouse of the Chairman 

of the Commission comes by, so we would like to certainly recognize and welcome her. 

I will be watching carefully to see if her lips move while you 

speak. That is usually the way it works with my family. 

STATEMENT OF DALE E. KLEIN, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR 

REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always a pleasure to 

introduce my real boss, my wife Becky is in the audience today. As 

we have said, we have been living together separately since 2001 

when I came up at the Department of Defense, so we have been 

commuting. So it is nice that she is able to join today. 

Senator CARPER. Mrs. Klein, thank you for sharing your husband 

with our Country, literally. 

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Voinovich, and 

members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you 

today with my colleagues, Mr. Jaczko and Commissioner Lyons. On 

behalf of the Commission, I would like to thank you for your continued support of the NRC as we work to protect the public health 

and safety, common defense and security, and the environment. We 

are particularly grateful for your help recently in addressing our 

space needs as we continue to grow and accommodate our increasing workload. 

21 

Let me first say a comment about Tuesday’s power outage in 

Florida before I begin. Contrary to the early press reports, the nuclear plants at Turkey Point were not the initiating event of the 

outage in Florida. The automatic trip of the reactors, which was observed by the NRC resident inspectors, is a standard safety measure. The automatic trip at Turkey Point worked exactly as it 

should. So it is nice to know that contrary to the report, the nuclear plants were not the initiating event. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask that my written testimony be entered into 

the record. 

Senator CARPER. Without objection, your full testimony will be 

entered into the record, as will the testimoneys of each of the commissioners who joined you. 

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you. 

This statement describes a number of security issues in detail, 

but the important message I wish to convey to you today is that 

the NRC is aware that there are things we need to fix. As I have 

heard you say before, Mr. Chairman, if it isn’t perfect, make it better. 

Senator CARPER. You have been listening. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. KLEIN. We know we are not perfect, and we are identifying 

and implementing steps to become better. 

First, on the matter of security officers at the Peach Bottom 

plant who were found to be inattentive in the ready room. I want 

to make it very clear that this behavior is unacceptable. The NRC 

has taken actions to address the specific issues at Peach Bottom 

and is taking appropriate action aimed at precluding similar incidents from occurring at any nuclear plant. 

Let me emphasize that at no point did we have reason to doubt 

that the overall security at Peach Bottom was adequate. Nuclear 

power plants have redundant and overlapping security measures 

based on defense in depth principles and the security program at 

Peach Bottom continued to ensure that the health and safety of the 

public was adequately protected at all times. 

The NRC takes allegations very seriously. To provide some perspective, our agency receives between 500 and 600 allegations 

every year. Only about one in ten is substantiated and warrants 

enforcement action. Nevertheless, we are reviewing our own procedures and are taking actions to position us to detect inattentiveness better and to evaluate the effectiveness of our response to 

these allegations. 

Mr. Chairman, my written testimony also addresses the issue of 

possible aircraft impacts. As part of a comprehensive review of security of NRC-licensed facilities, the NRC conducted detailed, specific engineering studies at each site, which confirmed that the 

likelihood of both damaging the reactor core and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety is low. 

Nevertheless, in response to the orders from the NRC, operating 

owners have implemented mitigating strategies that further reduce 

any effects of any aircraft impact on public health and safety. 

Mr. Chairman, another issue is source control for medical, industrial and research applications of radioactive materials. After 9/11, 

the NRC worked with Federal, State and international partners to 

22 

identify which radioactive sources would be the first to receive increased regulation and orders were issued to accomplish that. 

Furthermore, the NRC is implementing a comprehensive action 

to address concerns identified by the GAO, the Senate Permanent 

Subcommittee on Investigations, and NRC’s Office of Inspector 

General regarding all of the security of radioactive sources. The 

NRC is also considering the recommendations of the National 

Academy of Sciences’ report that was issued this month. 

In addition, the Commission has been developing a national 

source tracking system that we expect to be implemented by December 2008 for these high-risk sources. The NRC is also conducting a series of rulemakings to establish a clear regulatory basis 

for the security of new power plants. This includes specific revision 

to the design basis threat requirements, which was published as a 

final rule in March 2007. 

An ongoing rulemaking would revise a number of security requirements applicable to both current and future nuclear power 

plants, including the requirements for physical security, access authorization, fitness for duty, and training and qualification of security officers. 

Finally, allow me to say a word about research and test reactors 

in light of the recent report by the GAO that raised questions 

about the adequacy of the security at these facilities. As we communicated to GAO, we believe that the report provides a misleading and incomplete picture of our actions to ensure the safe 

and secure operation of research and test reactors. NRC’s assessment of research and test reactor security is based on well-founded 

technical and security practices, as well as expertise from numerous outside sources. 

Of course, the NRC will continue to evaluate the threat environment and the effectiveness of these security measures and will take 

additional steps if necessary. 

Mr. Chairman, in closing, let me emphasize that the Commission 

remains dedicated to ensuring public health and safety and that 

the conduct of all our activities flows from that fundamental commitment. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions, and 

I also will answer Senator Inhofe’s questions about the budget at 

that time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klein follows:] 

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RESPONSES BY DALE KLEIN TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENTOR BOXER

Question 1. The NRC received word of security lapse at Peach Bottom in March 

07, but did not respond adequately until September 2007 when you learned of the 

video tape obtained by the media. Why did the NRC’s response change once the 

media got involved? 

Response. In March 2007, the NRC received an allegation indicating that security 

officers at the Peach Bottom Station had been sleeping on duty while in bullet resistant enclosures (BREs), and in other (unspecified) areas, due to fatigue from 

working excessive overtime and from not being able to adjust to 12 hour shift schedules. There was no mention at that time of more than one security officer at anyone 

location being inattentive on duty or of any effort by other officers to conceal that 

inattentiveness. At that time, the alleger did not indicate that any video evidence 

of inattentiveness existed, nor was any corroborating information provided other 

than the statement made by the alleger. While the NRC Allegation Review Board 

(ARB) considered reaching out to the alleger for further information, the concerned 

individual explicitly stated in the allegation that he did not want to be contacted 

by the NRC. 

In response to the allegation, NRC Region I conducted an ARB meeting on March 

29, 2007, as well as an additional ARB meeting on April 11, 2007, to determine appropriate follow-up actions to address the allegation. Based on the ARB discussions, 

NRC Region I decided to request information from, and an evaluation by, the licensee of the concerns, then review the licensee’s written response to determine if 

the licensee adequately evaluated the concerns. Before making that decision, Region 

I conducted a historical review of allegation records involving security related issues 

at the Peach Bottom Station. 

NRC Region I determined that there was no immediate safety significance to the 

assertions in the March allegation based on the results of the staff’s review of previously identified security related issues at the Peach Bottom Station. From a process standpoint, it is agency policy for an ARB to consider providing technical allegations to a licensee for evaluation since the licensee has responsibility for ensuring 

safe operation of its facility and, in most cases, can promptly address issues through 

ready access to site personnel and documentation related to the issues that are the 

subject of the allegation. The NRC always requires the licensee to respond with the 

results of its review, and the NRC then evaluates the adequacy of the licensee response. 

When a subsequent allegation was received by the NRC in September 2007 from 

a WCBS-TV reporter indicating that he possessed video evidence of inattentive security officers at Peach Bottom, the NRC not only promptly informed Exelon senior 

management of the allegation so that they could initiate a prompt investigation of 

the matter and take appropriate compensatory actions, but also increased resident 

inspector monitoring of security officer activities and subsequently initiated an Augmented Inspection Team review of the matter. The potential safety significance of 

this allegation was considered to be greater than the original March allegation since 

multiple security officers may have collaborated to conceal their inattentiveness, and 

corroborating evidence in the form of a video made substantiation of the allegation 

more likely. 

Question 2. You mention in your testimony that the NRC issued a Security Bulletin to gather information about licensees’ programs to prevent and correct inattentiveness and ensure that employees report security concerns. What did you find 

from the information you gathered? Are there best practices that can be shared 

among plants? 

Response. The NRC has received licensee responses to NRC Bulletin 2007–01: 

‘‘Security Officer Attentiveness.’’ The staff performed an initial review of the responses and has concluded that although all licensees provided answers as required 

by the Bulletin. the answers lacked sufficient detail for a qualitative analysis. Additional information will be requested from most licensees to better understand the 

results of their assessments. After obtaining and evaluating the additional information, the staff will recommend to the Commission whether further regUlatory action 

is warranted. 

At this time, the staff is still reviewing licensee responses and therefore has not 

identified best practices that can be shared across the industry. However, prior to 

licensee submittal of responses to NRC Bulletin 2007–01, the industry developed 

draft guidance for licensee evaluations of security officer inattentiveness. The purpose of this guidance is to provide a standard methodology to licensees for evaluating conditions that may impact the ability of security personnel to perform their 

31 

assigned duties and responsibilities. The staff will issue final guidance after it completes its review of the adequacy of licensee submissions. 

Question 3. In your testimony you mention that NRC receives 500–600 allegations 

a year, but only about 1 in 10 is substantiated and warrants enforcement action. 

How can you be sure you aren’t missing real problems if you are only able to substantiate about 10 percent of all allegations? How do you know there aren’t more 

Peach Bottoms where you didn’t significantly follow up on an allegation? 

Response. To clarify, about 30–40 percent of the allegations NRC receives each 

year involve a substantiated concern. This substantiation rate is similar for those 

allegations that involve a written request for response from the licensee and those 

that are independently evaluated by the NRC. About 10 percent involve a substantiated concern that warrants formal NRC enforcement action (e.g., notice of violation 

of a regulatory requirement). 

Allegations are an important source of information to the NRC and programs and 

processes are in place to address every allegation the NRC receives. The implementation of the NRC allegation program at specified NRC offices is assessed biennially 

by the NRC Office of Enforcement, the program office with lead responsibility for 

allegations at the NRC. Self—assessments are conducted by offices in years when 

the office does not receive an independent assessment. Historically, the results of 

the program assessments and self-assessments have shown that NRC follow up is 

effective. It is also noted that every alleger whose identity is known, in receiving 

closure documentation related to his or her allegation, is offered an opportunity to 

re-contact the NRC if he or she feels that NRC’s response was, in some way, insufficient, inaccurate, or otherwise unacceptable. In such instances, NRC reviews the 

alleger’s feedback and responds appropriately. The percentage of allegations involving such feedback has been historically small (1–2 percent). 

NRC is evaluating the circumstances of the Peach Bottom situation to identify opportunities that may have been missed and to consider appropriate changes to improve the effectiveness of the NRC allegation program. 

Question 4. In your testimony you mention proposed NRC regulations that would 

require applicants for new standard design certificates to assess the effects of a 

large, commercial aircraft hitting their nuclear power plant. Why wouldn’t this same 

requirement apply to existing facilities or facilities that have yet to be constructed 

but whose designs have already been certified? Do you believe existing plants should 

meet the same security standards as newly constructed plants? 

Response. For the existing operating, commercial, nuclear power plants, the NRC 

staff and its contractors have conducted detailed, state-of-the-art analyses to evaluate the physical behavior of systems, structures, and components of the plants as 

a consequence of aircraft impact. These classified studies have confirmed that there 

is a low likelihood that an airplane attack on a nuclear power plant would affect 

public health and safety, thanks in part to the inherent robustness of the structure. 

A second study identified new methods that plants could use to minimize damage 

and risk to the public in the event of any kind of large fire or explosion. NRC staff, 

working with industry, has developed mitigation strategies for minimizing damage 

to the containment, spent fuel pool and reactor core. These mitigation strategies 

have been incorporated into the license of all operating nuclear power plants. The 

staff is in the process of codifying these strategies in a 10 CFR Part 50 rulemaking. 

Thus, all existing plants and all future plants will be required to meet these requirements. 

Whether already certified or not, NRC staff has completed assessments of aircraft 

impacts on four of the five new light-water reactor (LWR) designs expected to be 

included among the combined license applications over the next few years. These 

four new LWR designs are the Advanced Passive Reactor (AP1 ODD), the Advanced 

Boiling-Water Reactor (ABWR), the Economic Simplified Boiling-Water Reactor 

(ESBWR), and the U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (EPR). The staff is currently 

conducting an assessment of the Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor (APWR). 

Further, the Commission issued a proposed rule for public comment that will codify aircraft impact assessment requirements in 10 CFR Part 52. The objective of this 

rule is to require nuclear power plant designers to perform a rigorous assessment 

of design features that could provide additional inherent protection to avoid or mitigate, to the extent practicable. the effects of an aircraft impact. with reduced reliance on operator actions. The public comment period has closed and the NRC is 

evaluating the comments. The NRC staff is scheduled to provide a draft final rule 

to the Commission in summer 2008. 

32 

RESPONSES BY DALE KLEIN TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR CASEY

Question 1. On March 27, 2007, the NRC received the whistleblower’s allegation. 

Rather than directly investigating, the Commission’s Review Board forwarded the 

concerns on to Exelon. It was not until June 2007 that Exelon reported back with 

its finding that it had not found any instance of inattentive security personnel. But 

footage surfaced in September showing the contrary was true. How would you 

strengthen coordination between NRC, the plant owners, and the security contractors to ensure that important information like this is uncovered sooner? 

Response. The March 2007 allegation only provided a general concern about security officer inattentiveness without providing details or direct evidence. Current 

NRC policy calls for the Allegation Review Board (ARB) whenever possible and appropriate, to refer the allegation on to the licensee and require a response. Therefore, NRC requested Exelon to evaluate the allegation and provide a response, believing that Exelon would be better able to inconspicuously observe such conditions. 

Exelon’s evaluation did not identify any instances of inattentive security personnel. 

The video footage provided in September 2007 provided direct evidence of security 

officer inattentiveness in an area not mentioned in the March 2007 allegation. This 

prompted immediate notification of Exelon and independent inspection by the NRC. 

NRC is evaluating the circumstances of the Peach Bottom situation to identify opportunities that may have been missed and to consider appropriate changes to improve the effectiveness of the NRC allegation program. The evaluation includes an 

assessment of and recommended changes to, how NRC ensures licensee understanding of the allegation concerns, and how the NRC conveys its expectations with 

regard to the licensee’s response quality and timeliness. The results of the evaluation will be used to determine whether coordination with the licensee in a different 

manner and/or at different times would contribute to more effective and timely review. 

Question 2. According to information gathered by my staff, the letter sent to the 

NRC concerning the sleeping guards was written anonymously. But the letter was 

delivered via a person who provided the NRC with his name and contact information, including contact information for his lawyer. It is my understanding that the 

NRC never made contact with this person or his lawyer about the allegations. If this 

is true, how can the NRC say it didn’t have enough information to pursue the allegations when attempts to get further information were not attempted? 

Response. The allegation received by the NRC in March 2007 was in the form of 

a letter from a former security manager for Wackenhut (the company contracted by 

Exelon to provide security services at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station) who 

expressed concerns with aspects of the security program at the Peach Bottom Station. The former security manager did provide his name, but indicated that he was 

providing the information on behalf of other security officer(s) who wished to remain 

anonymous. The letter was mailed to the NRC resident inspector office at Peach 

Bottom and did not contain contact information for the alleger’s lawyer. Although 

the NRC was aware that the alleger had been represented by an attorney in a prior 

issue raised to the NRC, the alleger did not indicate in his March correspondence 

that the attorney still represented him, nor did that letter indicate that the attorney 

could be contacted. 

The alleger specifically requested in the letter that the NRC: (1) provide complete 

anonymity regarding the letter; (2) not inform the licensee or the security contractor 

of the letter’s existence; (3) not tell the licensee or the security contractor that any 

security employee had voiced concerns captured in the letter; and (4) not contact 

him in any manner. Consistent with NRC practice to avoid alienating allegers, 

which could make them reluctant to bring forward other concerns to the NRC in 

the future, NRC honored the alleger’s requests. Specifically, while the NRC paraphrased the alleger’s concerns and provided them to Exelon, the NRC did not reveal 

the alleger’s name, the licensee was not informed of the existence of the letter, the 

licensee was not informed of the source of the allegation, and the alleger was not 

contacted by the NRC. 

NRC is evaluating the circumstances of the Peach Bottom situation to determine 

opportunities that may have been missed and to consider appropriate changes to improve the effectiveness of the NRC allegation program. 

Question 3. The Peach Bottom incident highlights the important function of allegations. They serve as a check on dangerous practices that can-and too often dogo unnoticed. It is vitally important that we not only encourage the employees to 

continue to make these allegations, but to have in place the right system to effectively respond to them. What procedures would ensure that the NRC work with the 

33 

individual to understand the allegation and better tailor an investigation plan? 

Please provide a chart that shows the process for responding to allegations. 

Response. The Office of Enforcement (OE), the NRC office with lead responsibility 

for allegations at the NRC, has been meeting on a frequent basis with the allegation 

staff throughout the agency to discuss and implement enhanced practices identified 

by various lessons learned initiatives. Formalized changes to the process guidance 

documents have been developed and will be issued after internal and external stakeholder review. 

To date, OE has: 

• Revised allegation process terminology and correspondence templates. The term 

allegation ‘‘referrals’’ was changed to ‘‘requests for information’’ (RFI) to more clearly reflect that, with respect to the process by which the NRC requests a licensee 

to develop information regarding an allegation at its facility, NRC maintains responsibility and authority to assess and respond to every allegation concern. • Reemphasized the need for NRC staff to contact an alleger whose identity is 

known, even if initially s/he indicates that s/he does not want to be contacted by 

the staff. The alleger would be contacted to request additional information, if needed, to assist in the assessment of the allegation, and to stress that further NRC contact will help ensure: • NRC’s understanding of the alleger’s concerns; 

— the alleger’s understanding of the NRC’s plan for assessing the allegation, including the use of an RFI if the alleger has no objection; and, 

— the adequacy of the NRC’s conclusions with regard to the concerns. 

• Emphasized to the staff the need to include direction in the RFI that the licensee specifically address how their evaluation was independent, of sufficient scope 

and depth, and, if samples were taken, that they were appropriate. • Reemphasized the need for NRC staff to clearly document the agency’s assessment of a licensee’s response to an RFI and to specifically articulate the agency’s 

conclusion regarding each allegation concern. 

The staff continually looks for enhancements to the agency’s Allegation Program, 

through annual assessments and incident analyses. A Senior Executive Review 

Panel recently evaluated the agency’s handling of the Peach Bottom concerns and 

their report is being reviewed by the Commission and is expected to be issued shortly. Additionally, the NRC Office of Inspector General’s investigation into the agency’s handling of allegations is ongoing. The staff will assess any findings or observations resulting from these efforts and work to ensure changes are appropriate. 

RESPONSES BY DALE KLEIN TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question 1. The U.S. military is responsible for many sensitive security operations, including protection of the airspace over the Capitol and protection of our 

nation’s nuclear deterrent. Has the NRC consulted with any branches of the military regarding best practices for addressing inattentiveness in comparable security 

situations? 

Response. Yes. As part of NRCs effort to update its fitness-for-duty requirements 

applicable to personnel at nuclear power plants, including security personnel, the 

NRC consulted with representatives of the Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard regarding their guidelines and research and development efforts to address personnel 

fatigue. The NRC also consulted with other Federal agencies including the Department of Transportation, the National Space and Aeronautics Administration and the 

Department of Justice. 

Question 2. Mr. Lochbaum has expressed concern about ‘‘zero-tolerance’’ policies, 

that security officers would be fired the first time they are found to be inattentive, 

suggesting that such policies might have a chilling effect, discouraging employees 

from raising concerns if they feel they’d be responsible for getting a colleague fired. 

Is that concern valid? If so, what actions is the NRC taking to address the issue? 

Response. The NRC has taken a number of actions to ensure that employees can 

report concerns without fear of retaliation. As early as May 1996, the NRC issued 

a Commission Policy Statement entitled, ‘‘Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation,’’ to emphasize that licensees and their contractors are responsible for achieving and maintaining a work 

environment which is conducive to the reporting of concerns without fear of retaliation. All NRC licensees and contractors are expected to establish and maintain such 

a work environment, called a safety conscious work environment (SCWE). 

In August 2005, after continuing to note weaknesses in some SCWEs at both reactor and materials facilities subject to NRC regulation, the staff issued supplementary guidance on how licensees can fulfill this expectation. This guidance, found 

34 

in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005–18, ‘‘Guidance for Establishing and Maintaining a Safety Conscious Work Environment,’’ includes specific advice on effective 

ways for licensee management to prevent a chilling effect’’ on workers’ willingness 

to raise safety concerns potentially resulting from disciplinary or other employment 

actions. The RIS includes guidance for conducting reviews of proposed employment 

actions to determine what, if any, effect the employment action may have on the 

SCWE, and to take mitigating actions to minimize potential chilling effects, if necessary. Ensuring that disciplinary policies, as well as specific disciplinary actions, 

do not have a significant effect on the SCWE is part of the licensees’ responsibility, 

as outlined in the NRC’s policy documents. 

The NRC assesses licensees’ SCWEs primarily through inspections, as well as allegation activities. About 6 percent of allegations received at the NRC in calendar 

year 2007 concerning reactor licensees involved unhealthy or ‘‘chilled’’ work environments. Assessments of a SCWE involve interviews with plant personnel in the impacted area; observations of management interactions with the work force during 

meetings that typically include discussion of safety concerns; and document reviews, 

including licensee policies, training modules, corrective action program/employee 

concerns program use records, etc. Allegation trends in general are also reviewed 

on a periodic basis to assess the licensee1s SCWE. If the allegation of a chilled work 

environment is substantiated, or the trend analysis indicates a concern in this area, 

the NRC considers issuing a ‘‘chilling effect letter’’ to the licensee or otherwise engaging the licensee in a public forum. The purpose of such engagement is to pUblicly notify the licensee of NRC’s concern that their SCWE may not be effective and 

to request information on what corrective actions will be taken to address those concerns. Unlike issues handled within the Allegation Program, chilling effect letters 

are pUblic documents. This ensures public notification of an NRC concern and sends 

a message to the licensee’s workforce that the NRC is requesting the licensee take 

action to establish a SCWE. 

The NRC also conducts periodic baseline inspections that include a series of interview questions designed to address NRC expectations for establishing and maintaining a SCWE, as outlined in the 1996 Policy Statement. Questions address: Finally, 

pursuant to the requirements of ‘‘Fitness for Duty Programs’’ 10 CFR Part 26, licensees are required to take specific actions in response to confirmed misuse of alcohol, valid prescriptions, and over-the-counter drugs. Part 26 does not require, prohibit, or make specific reference to sanctions in situations involving worker fatigue. 

In a related manner, the agency also provided clarification to the industry in May 

2002 (RIS 2002–07, ‘‘Clarification of NRC requirements of Applicable to Worker Fatigue and Self-declarations of Fitness-For-Duty’’) of the regulatory requirements associated with worker fatigue and self-declarations of fitness-for-duty concerns. The 

guidance specifically addressed the potential for licensee sanctions, policies, and 

practices related to worker fitness-for-duty issues to discourage declarations, in particular, self-declarations of fatigue, to highlight the NRC’s concerns in this area. 

(a) employee willingness to raise concerns; 

(b) management behaviors to encourage raising concerns; 

(c) the effectiveness of concern resolution processes, including the Corrective Action Program 

and Employee Concerns Program; and 

(d) the effectiveness of management in detecting and preventing retaliation and 

chilled SCWE. 

Question 3. Regarding the proposed increase tor reactor oversight activities, was 

any effort made to find offsets among projects or programs that are ramping down 

or no longer necessary? 

Response. Yes. As part of our budget development process, NRC looked for ways 

to achieve efficiencies in our programs and applied the resources saved to the program. 

Question 4. The fiscal year 1909 budget requests 121 additional FTE’s. Please indicate which activities the new employees will be assigned to and how many FTE’s 

to each activity. 

Response. (See table and additional information presented below.) 

35 

THE ACTIVITIES TO BE CONDUCTED BY THE NEW

EMPLOYEES ARE AS FOLLOWS: 

Nuclear Reactor Safety 

New Reactors 

Continued development of the Construction and Vendor inspection program and 

reactivation of licensing and construction oversight for Watts Bar Unit 2; 

Licensing Tasks 

Conduct power uprate applications (increase from 4 in fiscal year to 11 in fiscal 

year 9), detailed fire protection reviews, and research on materials degradation 

issues; 

License Renewal 

Work on license renewal applications and guidance revisions (e.g. Generic Environmental Impact Statement); 

Reactor Oversight 

Improve Force-on-Force program and conduct security inspections, increasing license renewal inspections (6 to 8 license renewal inspections per year starting in 

fiscal year 9), generic issue inspections, and allegation/enforcement activities. 

Nuclear Materials and Waste Safety 

Fuel Facilities 


85523.045
36 

Support the review of two new uranium enrichment facility applications and continuation of licensing and inspection activities for existing fuel facilities; 

Nuclear Materials Users 

Support increasing regulatory oversight activities in response to a GAO materials 

licensing investigation; 

Decommissioning and Low-Level Waste 

Support uranium recovery licensing activities and initiation of related environmental reviews. 

Question 5. The NRC’s enforcement policy was recently revised with regard to 

contractors of a licensee. What enforcement action can the NRC take against contractors and subcontractors? 

Response. The NRC has regulatory authority to take enforcement action against 

contractors and subcontractors in three specific areas. Specifically, the NRC can 

take enforcement action against contractors and subcontractors who: 

(1) engage in deliberate misconduct or knowingly submit incomplete or inaccurate 

information as provided in the rule on deliberate misconduct (e.g., 10 CFR 30.10 and 

10 CFR 50.5); 

(2) violate 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance; and 

(3) violate the Commission’s employee protection regulations, (e.g., 10 CFR 50.7). 

The enforcement actions available to the NRC for viorations of these regulations 

include Notices of Violations, Orders, and civil penalties. In addition, Notices of 

Nonconformance can be issued to contractors who fail to meet commitments related 

to NRC activities, but are not in violation of specific requirements. Specific guidance 

regarding enforcement actions against individuals and non-licensees, including contractors and subcontractors, is contained in NRC Enforcement Policy (Sections VIII 

and X). 

Question 6. Please summarize the safety-significant findings in the Inspector General’s audit report OIG–07-A–15 entitled ‘‘Audit of NRC’s License Renewal Program,’’ and describe any actions taken to address them. 

Response. The NRC Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) report noted that overall the NRC has developed a comprehensive license renewal process to evaluate applications for extended periods of operation. The OIG report findings were specific 

to the documentation of the technical review, not the sufficiency of the technical review. 

In response to the OIG’s recommendations, the staff is enhancing its report-writing guidance. In addition, staff training was conducted to ensure the staff was 

aware of the OIG’s recommendations and management’s expectations. Until the 

staff confirms that corrective actions have been effective, it is using internal peer 

reviews to ensure the quality of the safety evaluation report documentation. The 

OIG has told the staff that the OIG regards the staff’s response as having resolved 

the seven recommendations the OIG directed to the staff. 

Question 7. Please describe the rulemakings or other actions that the NRC would 

need to undertake in preparation to consider a license application for a reprocessing 

plant. Please include the timeframe to complete those actions and the resources 

needed. 

Response. The NRC currently has the authority to license a reprocessing plant 

under its regulations in 10 CFR Part 50. Use of the current Part 50, however, would 

require a lengthy two-step licensing process: issuance of a construction permit followed by issuance of an operating license. Moreover, the terminology and the logic 

of Part 50 are based upon the licensing of a light-water reactor, not a reprocessing 

facility. Due to these factors, the NRC does not consider Part 50 to be an ideal regulatory mechanism to license the construction and operation of a reprocessing facility. 

The NRC is conducting a regUlatory ‘‘gap analysis’’ to determine which of its regulations would need to be revised to allow for a thorough, safe, and predictable licensing review of a spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication facility. The 

purpose of this effort is to identify what NRC regulations clearly apply, what regUlations clearly do not apply and identify and characterize gaps in the regulations 

that would need to be addressed through rulemaking. Both 10 CFR Parts 50 and 

70 are being reviewed, as well as other applicable regUlations. Preliminary results 

of the gap analysis indicate that significant changes would need to be made to NRC 

regulations and associated regulatory guidance before a license application for a reprocessing facility could effectively and efficiently be considered. Part 70, (Domestic 

Licensing of Special Nuclear Material) which is both risk-informed and performancebased, appears to be the NRC regulation best-suited, after rulemaking amendments, 

for the licensing and regulation of a reprocessing facility. The NRC has internally 

reprogrammed about two full-time equivalents (FTEs) to support this activity in fiscal year 2008. 

37 

After completing the gap analysis, the NRC plans to prepare a technical bases 

document to support rulemaking. The NRC staff anticipates completing the technical bases document approximately 1 year after completing the gap analysis. At 

that time, the NRC will make a decision on whether to move forward with rulemaking. 

The necessary rulemaking effort would involve multiple, simultaneous 

rulemakings and parallel development of the associated regulatory gUidance documents. This process would take approximately 2 years to complete and expend a 

total of 10 to 14 FTE. It would take another one to 2 years to issue the final rule. 

The amount of effort for the final rule is estimated to be an additional four to six 

FTE. 

Question 8. Please summarize the actions being taken to address the ‘‘red oil’’ 

issue that has been raised in an August 9, 2007, memo to the Commission in connection with construction of the MOx plant at Savannah River Site. 

Response. A red oil explosion event is one of many safety issues currently being 

evaluated by the NRC in its review of Shaw Areva MOx Services’ (the applicant’s) 

license application to possess and use radioactive material at the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). The evaluation of red oil safety strategies, as described in 

the license application and supporting documentation, began in January 2008 as 

part of the NRC’s normal safety review. A decision on this and other issues will be 

documented in a draft safety evaluation report, which is scheduled to be issued in 

December 2010. 

The NRC is conducting its review of the MFFF in two stages. The first stage of 

the review pertained to DOE’s construction authorization request. The NRC approved DOE’s construction authorization request on March 30, 2005. A red oil explosion event is one of the chemical safety issues that the applicant addressed in its 

construction authorization request and that the NRC evaluated in its safety evaluation report prior to issuing a construction authorization. Based on the applicant’s 

multi-tiered approach, the NRC determined that there was sufficient defense-indepth to provide reasonable assurance that the applicant had an adequate strategy 

for preventing and mitigating red oil events. However, the NRC staff also understood that this approach would have to be further developed and evaluated during 

the review of the subsequent possession and use license application. 

The applicant submitted a license application in November 2006 to support the 

second stage of the MFFF review. Since NRC’s approval of the construction authorization, the applicant has revised its safety strategy with respect to red oil to focus 

more on prevention than mitigation. This new strategy is described in the license 

application and supporting documentation and is currently under review by the 

NRC. The NRC has also requested that Brookhaven National Laboratory update a 

previous study on the risks of a red oil explosion to reflect this new strategy in order 

to help inform NRC’s decisionmaking process. The conclusions of the earlier study 

were consistent with the consensus staff view. 

Question 9. Please describe the actions being taken to address the Inspector General’s findings in Case No. 05–46 regarding potential problems with the use of 

Hemyc to protect electrical cables in the event of a fire. 

Response. The following actions are being taken to address the OIG’s findings: 

OIG finding: The NRC did not communicate the results and perform further testing following 1993 NIST small-scale testing. 

Staff response: The purpose of the small-scale tests was to determine if any of the 

non Thermo-Lag fire barrier materials exhibited the same failure mechanisms as 

Thermo-Lag (e.g., burnthrough). These tests were not designed to evaluate the performance of the barriers in large-scale tests. During this time period, the NRC was 

focused on resolving the more safety significant Thermo-Lag issue. These activities 

eventually led to improved testing and acceptance criteria for fire barriers, and an 

expanded and improved NRC inspection program to more effectively identify safety 

significant fire protection design concerns. 

OIG finding: The NRC did not require licensees to take corrective actions in 2000 

following inspection findings regarding Hemyc. 


85523.046
38 

Staff response: When the NRC concluded that the Hemyc fire endurance results 

were inconclusive, the staff engaged the industry and the specific affected licensees 

to address the questions regarding Hemyc. During meetings with the industry and 

licensees, the industry declined to participate in addressing the questions regarding 

Hemyc. After concluding that further testing was necessary regarding Hemyc fire 

resistance, the NRC initiated a program to perform full-scale confirmatory fire endurance tests in 2001. 

OIG finding: The NRC April 2005 Information Notice did not require licensees to 

take action or provide a written response. 

Staff response: NRC Information Notices provide timely operating experience to 

licensees. While Information Notices do not require licensees to take action or provide a response, pursuant to the NRC approved fire protection program, each licensee is required to consider all operating experience to determine the need for 

compensatory measures and corrective actions. The NRC followed the issuance of 

the April 2005 Information Notice with a Generic Letter in April 2006. The generic 

letter required licensees to provide a written response, and to establish compensatory measures and initiate corrective actions, as appropriate. 

OIG finding: The NRC has not scheduled or bUdgeted for inspections to review 

licensees’ Hemyc resolution. 

Staff response: The NRC is inspecting licensees’ resolution of Hemyc fire barrier 

issues. The NRC annually budgets resources for fire protection inspections. The 

schedules for these inspections performed by the staff include quarterly fire protection field inspections and annual inspections of fire brigade training and capability. 

The NRC also performs triennial fire protection design and operational safety inspections. 

OIG finding: In 1993, the NRC Chairman committed to conduct assessments of 

all fire barriers used to protect electrical cables. 

Staff response: The NRC has completed the actions committed to by the Chairman 

in 1993 in assessing fire barrier capabilities. In 1993, the NRC obtained and reviewed design and test information from all fire barrier vendors, and observed installed fire barrier configurations at selected nuclear plants. The NRC also performed small-scale fire barrier tests of selected fire barriers. Finally, the NRC 

issued updated guidance on fire barrier testing and acceptance criteria in Generic 

Letter 1986–10, Supplement 1. 

RESPONSES BY DALE KLEIN TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1. Chairman Klein, in your testimony, you mentioned that NRC has an 

ongoing. rulemaking that would revise a number of security requirements applicable 

to both current and future nuclear power plants. Could you please give us a sense 

of breakdown on how much of this rulemaking involves codifying requirements imposed in various post 9–11 orders versus new requirements not addressed in the orders? 

Response. In developing the proposed rule the NRC considered experience and insights gained during the implementation of the Commission’s Orders as well as the 

implementation of the current requirements over the past 30 years. A significant 

percentage (approximately 90 percent) of the rulemaking would codify the Commission Orders, fulfill certain provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), 

or update the regulatory framework in preparation for receiving new reactor license 

applications. This rulemaking would add new requirements to assess and manage 

the safety/security interface, and would add new requirements that resulted from 

the NRC’s review of revised site security plans, lessons learned from the enhanced 

baseline inspection program, and lessons learned from force-on-force inspections. 

Question 2. In one of our recent periodic meetings together with Senator Carper, 

you suggested that the industry might consider having security officers carry an 

electronic device which senses inactivity and alerts the security command center. I 

think something like that could be a very good, practical solution to security officers 

working the midnight shift. Have you pursued that idea with the industry? 

Response. Based on licensee responses to the Security Bulletin, some have already 

implemented the use of these devices for their security force and others are considering their use and application for their security programs. Given that only a few 

licensees have recently started using these devices, the effectiveness has not been 

determined. Over time, as more experience is gained, we will have a better appreciation of their benefits to curb inattentiveness. After NRC staff completes their final 

reviews of licensee responses to the Security Bulletin, the staff will report their recommendations to the Commission which may include, among other recommendations, best practices that can be shared among licensees. The staff may also recVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:23 May 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\85523.TXT VERN
39 

ommend the appropriate methods to communicate those best practices to the industry and whether further regulatory action is warranted. 

Question 3. The new reactor program is just getting off the ground. I know you 

have hired staff and have received several applications. Do you have everything you 

need in terms of resources for accomplishing your mission? 

Response. Resources in the fiscal year budget request will enable the agency to 

continue review of the 14 combined license (COL) applications that have been received or are anticipated to be received during fiscal year 8, and perform acceptance 

reviews of 6 additional COls expected in fiscal year 9. 

However, resource constraints in fiscal year may necessitate a delay in initiating 

the review for these 6 applications. 

Additional resources would enable the agency to initiate review of the 6 COls expected to be received in fiscal year without any delay and support industry plans 

and schedules for new electric power sources. 

Two additional areas that would benefit from increased resources are the advanced reactor/next-generation nuclear plant (NGNP) program and the new reactor 

construction inspection program. Increased resources to conduct research necessary 

to support NRC’s licensing responsibilities for the NGNP, and resources to develop 

adequate staff knowledge and expertise for the new technology, technical basis for 

requirements, guidance, and independent analytical capabilities to confirm safety 

analyses and results will allow NRC to meet its responsibilities under the Energy 

Policy Act of 2005. The new reactor construction and inspection program would benefit from additional resources to develop the program to train and qualify inspectors 

to meet the anticipated inspection requirements in 2011 and 2012. The lead time 

necessary to recruit, hire, train, qualify, and deploy a qualified inspector is 2 years. 

RESPONSES BY DALE KLEIN TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR SPECTER

Question 1. One of the issues here is NRC’s failure to respond to whistleblower 

allegations. In a statement NRC chairman stated that NRC receives ‘‘between 500 

and 600 of these allegations per year and only about 1 in 10 is serious enough to 

warrant an enforcement action of some kind against a plant.’’ What is happening 

with the majority of these allegations? Has the NRC changed the way it looks at 

these allegations in light of the incident at Peach Bottom? How do you determine 

if an incident warrants enforcement action? 

Response. To clarify, about 30–40 percent of the allegations NRC receives each 

year involve a substantiated concern. This substantiation rate is similar for those 

allegations that involve a written request for response from the licensee and those 

that are independently evaluated by the NRC. About 10 percent involve a substantiated concern that warrants formal NRC enforcement action (e.g., notice of violation 

of a regulatory requirement). 

Allegations are an important source of information to the NRC and programs and 

processes are in place to address every allegation the NRC receives. NRC is evaluating the circumstances of the Peach Bottom situation to identify opportunities that 

may have been missed and to consider appropriate changes to improve the effectiveness of the NRC allegation program. The implementation of the NRC allegation program at specified NRC offices is assessed biennially by the NRC Office of Enforcement (OE), the NRC office with lead responsibility for allegations, and self-assessments are conducted by those offices in years when the office does not receive an 

independent assessment. Historically, the results of the program assessments and 

self assessments have shown NRC follow up to be effective. 

Since the incident at Peach Bottom, OE has been meeting on a frequent basis 

with the allegation staff throughout the agency to discuss and implement enhanced 

practices identified by various lessons learned initiatives. Formalized changes to the 

process guidance documents have been developed and will be issued after internal 

and external stakeholder review. 

To date, OE has: 

• Revised allegation process terminology and correspondence templates. The term 

allegation ‘‘referrals’’ was changed to ‘‘requests for information’’ (RFI) to more clearly reflect that, with respect to the process by which the NRC requests a licensee 

to develop information regarding an allegation at its facility, NRC maintains responsibility and authority to assess and respond to every allegation concern. 

• Reemphasized the potential need for NRC staff to contact an alleger whose identity is known, even if initially s/he indicates that s/he does not want to be contacted 

by the staff. The alleger would be contacted to request additional information, if 

needed, to assist in the assessment of the allegation, and to stress that further NRC 

contact will help ensure: 

40 

• RC’s understanding of the alleger’s concerns; 

— the alleger’s understanding of the NRC’s plan for assessing the allegation, including the use of an RFI if the alleger has no objection; and, 

— the adequacy of the NRC’s conclusions with regard to the concerns. 

• Emphasized to the staff the need to include direction in the RFI that the licensee specifically address how their evaluation was independent, of sufficient scope 

and depth, and, if samples were taken, that they were appropriate. 

• Reemphasized the need for NRC staff to clearly document the agency’s assessment of a licensee’s response to an RFI and to specifically articulate the agency’s 

conclusion regarding each allegation. 

The staff continually looks for enhancements to the agency’s Allegation Program, 

through annual assessments and incident analyses. A Senior Executive Review 

Panel recently evaluated the agency’s handling of the Peach Bottom concerns and 

their report is being reviewed by the Commission and is expected to be issued shortly. Additionally, the NRC Office of Inspector General’s investigation into the agency’s handling of allegations is ongoing. The staff will assess any findings or observations resulting from these efforts and work to ensure changes are appropriate. 

The NRC considers both allegations that result in findings under the Reactor 

Oversight Program (ROP) and those that result in enforcement action issued under 

10 CFR Part 2, Subpart B, to comprise those allegations ‘‘warranting enforcement 

action.’’ The ROP, initiated in 2000, comprises the NRC oversight and assessment 

program at all nuclear plants, and uses objective, timely, and risk-informed criteria 

to assess plant performance. The NRC uses inspection findings together with objective performance indicators to assess plant performance. The NRC addresses any 

significant performance issues and follows up any other performance issues until 

they are corrected. When a safety problem or failure to comply with requirements 

is discovered, the NRC requires prompt corrective action by the licensee and takes 

appropriate enforcement action. The NRC’s procedures exercising its enforcement 

authority (issuing notices of violation, issuing orders, and assessing civil penalties) 

are set forth in 10 CFR 2.201, 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR 2.205, respectively, and 

implemented through its Enforcement Policy. 

Question 2. Despite Exelon terminating its relationship with Wackenhut, it is my 

understanding that Wackenhut is still providing security at a number of nuclear facilities. At how many facilities is Wackenhut providing security, and is the NRC 

confident in Wackenhut’s ability to carry out the task? 

Response. At this time, 27 NRC-regulated nuclear facilities use Wackenhut for security services. However, all of Exelon’s nuclear facilities are in transition from 

Wackenhut contractor forces to a proprietary security force. These transitions are 

scheduled to be completed by July 2008. After the Exelon transition, the number 

of NRC-regulated nuclear facilities using Wackenhut for their security services will 

be 18. The NRC is conducting inspections of these facilities to oversee transition activities. 

Yes, based on continued NRC oversight of all licensee programs, and a focus on 

recent issues, the staff is confident in the current security forces’ ability to protect 

licensed facilities. NRC licensed nuclear facilities continue to be among the best protected private sector facilities in the Nation, and through the inspection and oversight processes, the NRC is committed to ensuring strong security at these facilities, 

inclUding the role performed by security officers regardless of which company provides the security force. 

Question 3. Both NRC and Wackenhut contend that plant security was not in 

jeopardy. It would seem on the face of it, that sleeping or inattentive guards would 

jeopardize security. Chairman Klein, you stated on February 8th that you were 

‘‘confident-that the overall security of the plant was adequate’’ and that ‘‘Nuclear 

power plants have redundant and overlapping security measures’’. Could you Elaborate on that point, and touch on some of these overlapping measures? 

Response. NRC regulated nuclear power plants have been implementing strong 

physical protection programs for several decades. The plants were already surrounded by fences with continuously monitored perimeter detection and surveillance 

systems, and they were guarded by well-trained and well-armed security forces. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued a series of Orders from 

February 2002 through April 2003 to enhance security at all nuclear power plants. 

Some enhancements included, increased vehicle standoff distances, augmented security forces, enhanced security force training, additional security posts, increased security patrols and improved coordination with local law enforcement and intelligence communities. 

The concept of overlapping security measures as I have discussed in my testimony 

refers to a licensee’s protective strategy and a defense in depth methodology emVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:23 May 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\85523.TXT VERN
41 

ployed by our licensees. The concept of defense in depth is utilized so as to maximize 

security through a variety and combination of physical barriers, electromechanical 

sensors and devices and human interdiction. Defense in depth at NRC nuclear facilities consists of: 1) formidable physical and vehicular barriers extending the time 

needed by an adversary for a successful intrusion into the Protected and Vital areas, 

2) redundancy of alarm and detection devices, 3) interdiction by the security force 

to neutralize an adversary threat by interposing themselves between vital components of the facility and the adversary, and 4) prompt support and response by local 

law enforcement agencies. 

Based on the duties that were assigned to the inattentive security officers at 

Peach Bottom, our assessment has indicated that the site protective strategy would 

have still been able to defeat a Design Basis Threat attack. I want to assure you 

that the NRC takes the matter of inattentive security officers very seriously and the 

robust defense in depth methodology employed by each of our nuclear power plants 

provides me the confidence that while this situation was not acceptable, the potential degradation of one component of a facilities’ defense in depth is not indicative 

of a total failure of the implementation of the security program. This potential degradation of one component is mitigated by the continued operation of other security 

program components to assure the adequate protection of the facility. A facility’s 

protective strategy, from a perspective of armed response, consists of multiple layers 

of responding security officers that can arrive in time and are suitably armed to defend the facility from an adversary attack with prompt support and response by 

local law enforcement agencies. 

Senator CARPER. Fair enough. Chairman Klein, thanks very 

much not just for joining us and for your testimony today. Thanks 

for your leadership. We look forward to asking you a series of questions. 

Commissioner Jaczko, you are up next. Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF GREGORY B. JACZKO, COMMISSIONER, 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. JACZKO. I, too, want to thank you, Chairman Carper and the 

rest of the members of the Subcommittee, for having us here to testify on this very important issue of how the NRC oversees the security of the Nation’s commercial nuclear reactors. 

I, too, was very concerned to discover that security guards on 

duty at Peach Bottom conspired to sleep during their shift. My concern in many ways was more heightened by the fact that they had 

conspired to do this, rather than simply that it was a matter of fatigue. This is absolutely unacceptable. There were failures not only 

in the security officer’s ability to perform their functions, but also 

in the program to identify behavior among security officers that 

would identify them as individuals who weren’t willing to perform 

their jobs successfully, something we call a behavioral observation 

program. 

As an agency, we are focused on two things: investigating those 

directly involved and taking a long, hard look at our own performance as an agency. We have made some positive initial changes in 

our security oversight program to look for these types of issues, but 

I do not believe that that is enough. We should make several 

straightforward improvements to another program that we have 

that deals with allegations specifically, and also conduct a more 

comprehensive review than we have done so far. 

Any broader changes the Commission decides are necessary 

should be informed by this broader, more comprehensive review, 

along with the consideration of findings from our own Inspector 

General. 

42 

My colleagues and I have also directed the staff recently to develop a Commission policy statement on safety culture. This gets 

to a point that many people talked about about the importance of 

culture in this incident. This statement will for the first time make 

clear the Commission’s safety culture expectations for its licensees, 

and most importantly for this hearing, it will expand consideration 

of safety culture to include the idea of security culture as well, to 

reinforce with licensees that security is just as much an important 

part of safety as operations, maintenance and engineering. 

Another way that the agency will ensure security is better integrated in plant operations is through the implementation of fitness 

for duty requirements the Commission approved last year. Based 

on my discussions with staff and discussions I have had with security officers at several facilities, I think these new work hour limitations are a substantial improvement on what we did in orders following September 11th. I am very interested in looking at ways 

that we can accelerate some or all of the provisions of that rulemaking, in particular as they apply to security officers to ensure 

that we get the advantages of that rulemaking as early as possible. 

Before concluding, I did want to briefly mention that I remain 

concerned that the agency has not yet completed a rulemaking to 

add new security requirements for nuclear power plants. In addition, the Commission is proceeding with a rulemaking I proposed 

a year ago to require new plants to be designed to withstand the 

impact of an aircraft crash. 

Right now, we are in the process of reviewing comments that we 

have received from members of the public on that rule, and I am 

encouraged by many of the comments that we have received that 

I think we will be able to move forward with an effective rule. But 

I strongly believe that the key to the successful rulemaking will be 

ensuring two important points: one, that the rule applies to any 

new plant built in this Country; and two, that it has very clear criteria on how we determine that a plant will be designed to withstand the impact of an aircraft. 

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear today and to 

provide this testimony. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaczko follows:] 

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45 

RESPONSES BY GREGORY JACZKO TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. In your testimony you stated that the NRC should take a more active 

role in investigating allegations rather than sending the allegation to the licensee 

for investigation. Does the NRC defer safety allegations to the licensee? Please explain how you think the NRC should respond to security allegations and whether 

this differs from how they respond to safety allegations. 

Response. Current allegation policy calls for the agency to consider requesting information from the licensee in writing in support of allegation closure whenever possible and appropriate, because the licensee is responsible for safely operating the facility. I believe, however, that we should consider some fundamental changes to the 

current program. The agency should change the presumption that we request information about the allegation from licensees unless certain circumstances are present. 

Instead, the presumption should be that the agency will seek to obtain the information itself unless extraordinary circumstances are present that would dictate the 

need to request it from the licensee. 

The policy as written sends the message that we generally send the allegations 

on to the licensee, when in fact in a majority of cases, the opposite is true. According 

to recent staff statistics, only 35 percent to 40 percent of allegations are currently 

forwarded to the licensee for information. Thus, it appears that changing the presumption would be a more accurate reflection of current practice. The agency has 

changed the allegation terminology from ‘‘referral’’ to ‘‘request for information.’’ 

Using the correct language is important and this represents both a better focus and 

more transparently captures the agency’s actual practice. 

Additionally, the agency should stay more involved in those few cases where it 

is determined that the more appropriate path forward is to request information from 

the licensee. More active NRC oversight of a licensee as it develops its responses 

to the agency will both highlight the seriousness with which the agency reviews allegations and make for a more efficient process. It also makes clear that the NRC 

is ultimately responsible for the evaluation and closure of every allegation it receives. 

Regarding the assessment of security and safety allegations, the Allegation Review Board (ARB) evaluates both in terms of their significance to plant security and 

plant safety to determine the appropriate course of action. NRC staff knowledgeable 

about the issues meet with the ARB and provide insights into the significance of 

the allegation so that an informed decision may be made. Because of the sensitivity 

of information associated with security related allegations and their disposition, the 

NRC policy for responding to individuals with such security concerns differs somewhat from the practice for responding to safety concerns. I believe the goal of the 

staff is to be as responsive to an alleger as is possible, while continuing to protect 

any information that could be used by an adversary to exploit potential security 

vulnerabilities. 

Question 2. In your testimony you stated that the NRC needs to strengthen its 

proposed rule on aircraft impact. Do you believe existing plants should meet the 

same security standards as newly constructed plants? What do you think a final 

rule should encompass? 

Response. The purpose of the aircraft impact rule should be to require that any 

new plant built in the U.S. is designed to withstand the impact of a large commercial aircraft. All current vendors have stated an intention to address this issue and 

public comments received during the rulemaking support meeting this standard. 

There are, however, two major deficiencies in the current proposed rule. First, it 

only requires nuclear power plant designers to perform an assessment of design features that could provide additional inherent protection to avoid or mitigate the effects of an aircraft impact, while reducing or eliminating the need for operator actions, and to only do even that ‘‘where practicable.’’ The proposed rule does not require vendors or licensees to include these design features and there are no clear 

criteria for making a determination about the benefit of the optional design features. Second, the proposed rule language does not apply to designs already certified 

by the time the rule is finalized. 

The NRC received public comments suggesting the need to expand the scope of 

the rule to include existing design certifications and to include specific criteria that 

plants would be required to meet. They included industry comments which reinforced my conclusions that relying on a practicability standard is ambiguous and 

subjective. Such an approach fails to require and then convey the extent to which 

a design addresses aircraft impacts, is not good public policy, and will not engender 

public confidence in the safety of new reactor designs. The staff is currently evaluVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:23 May 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\85523.TXT VERN
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ating the public comments in preparation of the final rule, and I am hopeful it will 

be substantially improved based on the comments received from stakeholders. 

It was not easy to address new security threats for the fleet of existing reactors, 

but the Commission thought it was vital to do so following September 11, 2001. The 

agency, therefore, issued orders requiring licensees to identify and implement strategies to maintain or restore cooling for the reactor core, containment building, and 

spent fuel pool. The NRC directed licensees to identify mitigative strategies—or 

measures they could take to reduce the potential consequences of a large fire or explosion—that could be implemented with resources already existing or readily available. I believe this was an acceptable approach for the existing fleet of reactors. Nuclear power plants are robust and it is difficult to alter their features. This is not, 

however, a sufficient reason to miss an opportunity to design away the need for 

these mitigating strategies in new plants. 

RESPONSES BY GREGORY JACZKO TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR CASEY

Question 1. What protocols and procedures did the NRC have in place for dealing 

with security incidents? How have these protocols or procedures changed as a result 

of the Peach Bottom incident? Does NRC have plans to take further action through 

regulation or other internal measures? 

Response. The agency uses a variety of programs to respond to security incidents. 

When incidents come to the agency’s attention, as did the Peach Bottom incident. 

through an allegation, the concern is handled through the agency’s allegation program. As a result of the allegation, or if the security incident is identified as part 

of the agency’s inspection program, the agency may also determine that the use of 

our incident investigation program is warranted. This program allows for more indepth inspection and investigation when a specific incident is brought to the agency’s attention that warrants a review beyond that provided as part of the routine 

annual baseline inspection program. 

In the case of Peach Bottom, in March 2007 the NRC received an allegation from 

a former security manager for Wackenhut (the company contracted by Exelon to 

provide security at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station) expressing concerns with 

aspects of the security program at Peach Bottom Station. The concerns were that 

security officers had been sleeping on duty due to fatigue from working excessive 

overtime; security officers were fearful of retaliation if they raised concerns; and 

that Exelon managers were aware of inattentiveness but had not taken proper actions to address it. The NRC informed Exelon of these concerns in April and requested that the licensee investigate the allegations, take appropriate corrective actions, and provide the NRC with a written response. In that sUbsequent response 

in May, Exelon concluded it was not able to substantiate the concerns and in August 

the NRC made a determination that the licensee’s response was adequate to resolve 

the allegation. 

It was not until September 2007 when the NRC was presented with video-taped 

evidence of on duty security officers sleeping in a ready room (a tape made by a 

security officer employed by Wackenhut at the time) that the agency initiated its 

own investigation. At that time the agency performed an augmented inspection of 

this incident under our incident investigation program to ensure that Exelon and 

Wackenhut had taken appropriate corrective actions to address this unacceptable 

performance. 

I believe that the agency acted appropriately in September, but we clearly missed 

an important opportunity to discover and correct this issue 6 months earlier—an opportunity that an earlier whistleblower had provided us. Rather, it took a second 

individual who felt he had to go to such lengths as obtaining actual video of officers 

conspiring to sleep before anyone took direct action. 

In response to the events at Peach Bottom the agency has changed some aspects 

of the allegation and inspection program. In the allegation area, the agency has 

changed the allegation terminology from ‘‘referral’’ to ‘‘request for information.’’ 

While this is may appear to be a minor change, using the correct language is important and more clearly reflects that NRC maintains responsibility and authority to 

assess and respond to every allegation concern. Additionally, in the inspection area, 

I support staff efforts currently underway to expand the scope of the NRC resident 

inspectors at each nuclear power plant to focus more on security issues such as that 

identified at Peach Bottom, and I believe we must focus on the requirements for behavioral observation programs that should be able to identify people prone to the 

type of collusion demonstrated by the security team in question. 

I believe we must continue to make improvements. The agency is continuing to 

evaluate the Peach Bottom incident to determine what other changes to our allegaVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:23 May 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\85523.TXT VERN
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tion, inspection and behavioral observation program may be necessary to improve 

the programs and ensure that our response to security incidents is as effective as 

possible. 

Question 2. NRC’s Review Board decided that NRC did not need to initiate its 

own investigation into the allegations at Peach Bottom. Instead, it referred the issue 

back to the licensee for investigation. How does the Review Board determine which 

allegations rise to the level of an NRC investigation versus a licensee investigation? 

What were the factors that led to the decision that an allegation concerning a team 

of sleeping guards was not an NRC-level investigation. 

Response. In response to the three concerns provided in the March Peach Bottom 

allegation, NRC Region I conducted an Allegation Review Board (ARB) meeting on 

March 29,2007, as well as an additional ARB on April 11, 2007, to determine appropriate follow-up actions to address the subject allegation. Based on the ARB discussions, NRC Region I decided to request information from and an evaluation by the 

licensee of the allegation concerns and then review the licensee’s written response 

to determine if the licensee adequately evaluated the concerns. Unfortunately, this 

decision clearly turned out to be wrong. The licensee did not substantiate any part 

of the allegation that security guards were sleeping on duty. If the agency had taken 

a larger role in this investigation, it may not have taken the revelation of 

videotaped evidence 6 months later to initiate corrective action. 

Current allegation policy calls for the agency to consider requesting information 

from the licensee in writing in support of allegation closure whenever possible and 

appropriate, because the licensee is responsible for safely operating the facility. I believe, however, that we should consider some fundamental changes to the current 

program. The agency should change the presumption that we request information 

about the allegation from licensees unless certain circumstances are present. Instead, the presumption should be that the agency will seek to obtain the information 

itself unless extraordinary safety circumstances dictate the need to request it immediately from the licensee. 

The policy as written sends the message that we generally send the allegations 

on to the licensee, when in fact in a majority of cases, the opposite is true. According 

to recent staff statistics, only 35 percent to 40 percent of allegations are currently 

forwarded to the licensee for information. Thus, it appears that changing the presumption would be a more accurate reflection of current practice. After I raised this 

as an issue last Fall, the agency has changed the allegation terminology from 

‘‘referralll to IIrequest for information.’’ Using the correct language is important and 

this represents both a better focus and more transparently captures the agency’s actual practice. 

Additionally, the agency should stay more involved in those few cases where it 

is determined that the more appropriate path forward is directly to request information from the licensee. More active NRC oversight of a licensee as it develops its 

responses to the agency will both highlight the seriousness with which the agency 

reviews allegations and make for a more efficient process. It also makes clear that 

the NRC is ultimately responsible for the evaluation and closure of every allegation 

it receives. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Jaczko, thank you so much. I look forward 

to asking some questions. 

Mr. Lyons, welcome. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF PETER B. LYONS, COMMISSIONER, 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. LYONS. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today with my fellow commissioners to 

discuss the Commission’s oversight of the security of our Nation’s 

nuclear power plants. I will just briefly summarize my written 

statement. 

Our security activities encompass many areas, including our 

roles in intelligence gathering and assessment and in information 

sharing. These capabilities support the Commission’s screening 

process whenever potential new threats are evaluated. In the last 

year, the Commission improved our screening process by involving 

other agencies, removing cost considerations, and ensuring considVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:23 May 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\85523.TXT VERN
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eration of the integrated threat mitigation capabilities of Federal, 

State and local agencies. 

We have also supported completion of the comprehensive reviews 

of security led by the Department of Homeland Security at each of 

the nuclear plants. I believe the security of the nuclear sector will 

excel when compared to other elements of our critical infrastructure in these reviews. 

Last year, we completed the first cycle of realistic force on force 

tests for all of our plants. Security of these plants is stronger today 

because of those tests. 

A number of events of concern involving nuclear plants occurred 

during the last year. The Chairman and Commissioner Jaczko addressed Peach Bottom. But as another example, let me mention the 

issue of safety culture at Palo Verde, where our inspectors identified weaknesses in 10 of our 13 safety culture components. In this 

area of safety culture, as Commissioner Jaczko just mentioned, the 

agency is currently assessing the possible expansion of our current 

policy in order to address security. 

This Subcommittee’s support for work force development has 

been essential and helped toward the appropriation of NRC resources to foster educational programs supporting the entire nuclear industry. The agency’s 2009 budget shortfall is an issue for 

which we may need to seek your support. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, we remain 

committed to fulfilling our statutory role. We appreciate the support we have received from the Subcommittee and the full Committee, and we look forward to working with you in the future. I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lyons follows:] 

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85523.018
52 

RESPONSE BY PETER LYONS TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION

FROM SENATOR CASEY

Question 1. Throughout these testimoneys, the NRC has repeatedly mentioned the 

need to improve communications between resident inspectors and regional inspectors. Opening these lines of communication, especially when allegations are received, seems like common sense. How is it that this issue has yet to be addressed? 

Response. The lines of communication between each NRC Region and its inspectors are open and strong. Nevertheless, assessment of the Peach Bottom case 

showed that improved information-sharing with inspectors regarding allegations 

may have afforded additional opportunities to identify inattentiveness among security officers. The NRC is considering a number of ways to enhance the sharing of 

allegation-related information with resident and region-based inspectors while still 

maintaining appropriate protection of allegation-related information and allegers’ 

identities. 

Current Communications with Inspectors Regarding Allegations 

Each NRC Region communicates daily with its resident inspectors regarding current plant conditions and promptly shares significant safety and security issues that 

reqUire immediate action or attention by the resident. When an immediate safety 

or security concern is raised through an allegation, the resident is informed of the 

concern and cautioned to act upon the concern in a manner that does not identify 

the alleger, if possible. 

Typically, only those inspectors who are assigned to evaluate or inspect a particular allegation have access to information regarding the allegation. This policy, 

which limits allegation information to those who have a ‘‘need to know,’’ limits the 

dissemination of information that could identify an alleger. That, in turn, reduces 

the risk that an alleger’s identity might be compromised. Accordingly, the status of 

all open allegations may not be known by, or communicated to, all inspection staff. 

However, in the Peach Bottom case the initial allegation was received anonymously 

and the resident inspection staff clearly should.have been informed of the allegation. 

Even in cases where an alleger reveals their identity, the resident inspection staff 

should be kept informed of the nature of all safety and security allegations, so they 

can be alert for evidence useful to other inspector(s) who may be assigned to follow 

up. 

A Region may also assign a resident inspector to evaluate an allegation even 

when it does not present a significant safety or security concern requiring immediate action. For example, if a resident has an ongoing or near-term inspection in 

a functional area related to the allegation, the Region may assign the resident to 

also evaluate the allegation. Similarly, a Region may choose to assign a ‘‘regionbased’’ inspector rather than the resident inspector to evaluate an allegation that 

is related to one of his or her regularly scheduled inspections. A Region may also 

request the licensee to evaluate an allegation and then assign a resident or regionbased inspector to review or inspect the licensee’s evaluation. 

In summary, each Region currently shares allegation information with resident 

and region-based inspectors who have a ‘‘need to know’’ in order to perform their 

inspection duties. 

Changes to Current Practice Under Evaluation 

As a result of the Peach Bottom case, the NRC is considering options for sharing 

allegation related information with resident and region-based inspectors based on 

the principle that resident or region-based inspectors automatically have a ‘‘needto-know’’ status regarding open allegations at their facilities. This approach would 

ensure that such inspectors maintain an awareness of asserted concerns as they accomplish daily inspection activities. 

The NRC is also considering how to clarify guidance used by the Regions to determine when region-based inspectors should be informed of open allegations at facilities other than those they may be assigned to inspect directly. For example, as in 

the Peach Bottom case, it may have been beneficial for the Region to direct all region-based inspectors visiting the facility for a specified period of time after receipt 

of the initial allegation, to be cognizant of asserted inattentiveness issues related 

to security officers. Finally, the NRC is considering whether changes to its current 

allegation-tracking data base are needed to simplify data extraction and information 

sharing with inspectors. 

The Commission is currently considering the extent to which changes are needed, 

even as some of the above changes are already being implemented, and we will provide the final Commission decisions to the Committee. 

53 

Senator CARPER. Thank you so much for your testimony. 

What I would like to suggest to my colleagues is that we use 

roughly 5 minutes for an opening round. There will be a second 

round. If we run a little long, that is quite all right, but let’s try 

to stick fairly close to that. 

Let me just start by saying, Senator Voinovich and Senator 

Casey both heard me refer in the past to the time I spent in the 

Navy. I was a naval flight officer with 5 years on active duty, and 

another 18 years at Willow Grove Air Station where I was a mission commander of a Navy P3 airplane. 

Chairman Klein heard me say this to the folks up at Peach Bottom that the most important thing that we did every day in our 

job in the Vietnam War was to fly low-level missions off the coast 

of Vietnam and Cambodia and track Soviet and other surface targets. And when we weren’t doing that, to track Soviet nuclear submarines in the oceans of the world. That is what I did for a living 

for a number of years. 

The most important thing that we did every day in the service 

in my squadron wasn’t the work that we did flying missions off of 

Vietnam and Cambodia. It wasn’t being out there chasing Soviet 

nuclear submarines in all the oceans in the world. The most important thing that we did every day was to take off safely and come 

back and land safely so that at the end of the day everybody on 

my crew, all 13 men, and at the time we had no women on our 

crew, but all 13 men went home to their families and we made that 

our priority, and it permeated everything that we did. 

That was a culture of safety, where the leadership set the tone. 

Not just the leadership of our squadron, but the Chief of Naval Operations, and it permeated down throughout the organization. One 

of the reasons why we focus so much on safety and a culture of 

safety is because we believe that the leadership starts with us. If 

we are not attentive to these details and set the right tone, why 

should we expect the NRC and its leadership to feel that way? Why 

should we expect the folks who own and run these nuclear power 

plants to feel that way? 

So it really starts right here, and we are attempting to provide 

through our oversight and our attention to detail the kind of leadership that is needed. Going back to the time that Senator Inhofe 

provided the leadership for this Subcommittee, we have endeavored 

to play that role. It is important and I think it is actually helpful. 

I am quite sure it is helpful. 

I am going to take us back to Peach Bottom with my first question or two. I am just going ask the commissioners, and we will 

start with you, Chairman Klein. Would you just give us a brief description of the investigation of the sleeping guards allegation at 

Peach Bottom, including why Exelon was unable to substantiate 

the report of inattentive guards and why wasn’t some attempt 

made to followup with the whistleblower when there was no substantiating evidence uncovered? 

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, I think all of us have been very frustrated at the specific events at Peach Bottom. It clearly is unacceptable behavior. So we are learning a lot about how did it happen 

and what steps do we take so it doesn’t happen again. 

54 

The original allegation was interesting, and I read through that 

at some length when it first came in. The initial allegation was by 

a former employee and was allegating on behalf of some of the 

other individuals there. As you probably know, that initial allegation focused a lot on what is called the BREs, the bullet-resistant 

enclosures and of inattentiveness in those. 

Senator CARPER. You all have been excellent so far in not using 

acronyms and so I would urge you to continue that as much as possible. Stay away from those things. 

Mr. KLEIN. That is why I wanted to explain that the BRE was 

the bullet-resistant enclosure. 

So as you know, when we walked up to that, it is fairly hard to 

sneak up on an individual that is in there because it is up in a 

tower with metal stairs on the way up there. So it was very difficult to find those initial sleeping allegations, or the inattentiveness. 

The other thing that made this one particularly disheartening, as 

Commissioner Jaczko had indicated, was there was collusion. That 

is something you very seldom find at the level that we found it in 

that area. So it was difficult. 

I must say on our behalf on the NRC, we were not as rigorous 

as we should have been. We were not as rigorous in challenging the 

utility in their investigation, and we were not as rigorous as we 

should have been on followup. So we have lessons to learn from 

that and we will learn from that. 

But the initial allegation, we made a mistake in the initial 

alleger that said specifically, do not contact me again. We should 

not have honored that. We should have followed up and contacted 

that individual. That is one of the mistakes that we made and we 

followup with that in the future. 

Senator CARPER. Why was the request not to followup with this 

person? I am sure you have asked that question. What is the answer? 

Mr. KLEIN. I am sure the next panel can talk a little bit more 

in detail, but the individual had been terminated for cause. I think 

there were some hostile feelings. In his initial allegation he said 

specifically, do not contact me at all. It was very clear. We honored 

that, but we should not have. We should have followed that up. 

Senator CARPER. I agree. 

I have a followup to that. Let me just ask my followup and then 

I will yield to Senator Voinovich. 

At Peach Bottom, the NRC relied almost exclusively on Exelon 

to actually investigate the allegation. When evaluating your methods for investigating allegations, what did the NRC conclude in 

terms of its reliance on licensees to investigate allegations of 

wrongdoing? Any of you are welcome to respond to that. 

Mr. KLEIN. Commissioner Jaczko. 

Mr. JACZKO. At this point, we haven’t finished answering that 

question. Right now, the NRC has a process that whenever we get 

an allegation, we will look at several factors to determine who does 

the primary investigation. Our general assumption going in is that, 

the standard response is to send a letter to the licensee asking 

them to provide information. We right now have a series of internal 

reports from a variety of different groups at the agency, the priVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:23 May 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\85523.TXT VERN
55 

mary one being a self-assessment from Region I that has looked at 

that particular issue. 

I think right now, we don’t have any firm conclusions about what 

the right way is to address that. My personal view is that instead 

of having an assumption going in that we would refer the allegation, I think the assumption going in should be we should ask the 

question, can we get this information with our own inspection resources, with our own investigators first? If that is not possible, 

then we would consider going to the licensee for the information. 

So it is certainly something that was brought to my attention in 

this incident as something we might need to change in our process 

as we review it. But those reviews are still ongoing and we are 

really waiting to collect information from a variety of sources before we complete the review. 

Senator CARPER. Commissioner Lyons, Chairman Klein, do you 

want to add anything to that? 

Mr. LYONS. I would concur with what Commissioner Jaczko has 

already said. I would note that in the past in about 60 percent of 

the allegations, we have investigated about 40 percent have been 

referred. But as Commissioner Jaczko indicated, as part of the ongoing exploration of how to improve, we may well seek to change 

that ratio and possibly change our criteria. 

Senator CARPER. All right. 

Mr. KLEIN. One point, our No. 1 concern when anyone raises allegations is that we protect the identity of the alleger. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Thank you. 

I have used 7 minutes. Co-Chairman Voinovich, you are recognized for 7 minutes, my friend. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

In my view, the silver lining in this incident of the sleeping 

guards is it provides the NRC and the industry with a very timely 

opportunity to do some serious self-assessments on how do you 

handle whistleblower cases. From a management perspective, handling these things are fraught with difficulties. You just mentioned 

that the person said, don’t contact me. How do you decide whether 

you are going to contact him or not contact him? It gets into personalities, verification of what may appear to be questionable allegations and so forth. 

Anyhow, in your testimony, you mentioned that NRC receives between 500 and 600 allegations per year. I would be interested to 

know, and maybe you can’t give me the answer to that, about how 

does that fit in with some other regulatory agencies in the number 

of whistleblowers they might get, the Securities and Exchange 

Commission or whatever. 

And can you give us a sense of the criteria your agency is using 

to determine which ones would be turned over to licensees and 

which ones would be handled by the agency employees and do you 

have any numbers on it. You know, turn this over to the licensee 

or, red light, we better get in there and do this ourselves. How do 

you handle that, and how is that going to change, if any, because 

of what happened? 

Mr. KLEIN. Senator Voinovich, we take allegations very seriously. 

As you might expect, being a regulatory body, we have procedures 

56 

that we follow. I think in summary for this particular Peach Bottom event—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. By the way, how many people handle that? 

For 600 a year, is that a part-time job for somebody to handle 

these, or how does that work? 

Mr. KLEIN. It depends on where they come in. For example, if 

they come in, the resident inspector is one that might see these 

first. We also have a review board that will at the region determine 

what level of involvement it should be, whether we do it; where it 

is handled. Again, we have the Office of Investigation that follows 

up on all of the allegations and whistleblower activities. So we 

have a complete structure and a complete office that handles these 

allegations. So we have an office that is called the Office of Investigation that focuses on those. 

In addition, in a case like Peach Bottom, after this surfaced, I 

asked the Inspector General to look at our procedures to see how 

we can make those better. We haven’t gotten that information back 

yet, but we have a variety of levels that we look at. 

In terms of the criteria, as I indicated, the first one is we protect 

the identity of the alleger because we believe that we need open 

and honest communications in the business that we are in, more 

than other agencies. I don’t know what the record of other agencies 

is on the number of whistleblower allegations that they might 

have, but we believe very strongly in open communication. The 

men and women that work at these power plants should feel free 

to raise questions anytime, anywhere and we take those very seriously. 

One of my concerns on this particular allegation was did we get 

back to the individual. As I read the letter, and then I was rather 

surprised at how strong this individual said, don’t contact me at 

all. But we have a criteria to determine whether we handle it or 

whether we ask the licensee to address it. As Commissioner Lyons 

indicated, on average 60 percent of the allegations are handled by 

the NRC and 40 percent are referred back to the licensee for initial 

information. We hold the licensee accountable, but we should also 

hold ourselves accountable. 

Senator VOINOVICH. You had somebody in residence. How many 

in-residence did you have from NRC at Peach Bottom? 

Mr. KLEIN. At Peach Bottom, we have two resident inspectors. At 

Palo Verde, for example, as Commissioner Lyons indicated, because 

of the concern of their performance, we have an additional resident 

inspector. So at that site, we have four, for three operating plants. 

So typically, we will have at least two resident inspectors at a twounit site. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Should the resident inspector, is that part of 

their responsibility to mosey around and look at things and see 

whether or not they are doing things like that or not? 

Mr. KLEIN. Absolutely. We expect the resident inspectors to walk 

through the plants, to observe, to look at activities. So we expect 

them to find those. In fact, the resident inspector was aware of the 

allegation, and obviously had looked, had walked around during 

backshifts and at other times of operation to find if there was any 

inattentiveness, and was able to verify those allegations. 

57 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, the question I have is, what kind of action has the Commission taken in regard to the inspectors that 

were there? 

Mr. KLEIN. We are clearly not finished with all of the actions 

that we expect to result from this investigation. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I am talking about the individuals that are 

on your payroll that at there, have the responsibility to get around, 

and in this particular case they didn’t observe anything like this 

activity of somebody sleeping on the job. Correct? 

Mr. KLEIN. That is correct. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. The issue then is were they doing their 

job and what action has the Commission taken in regard to those 

specific individuals in terms of their behavior, et cetera? 

Mr. KLEIN. For the guards that were inattentive, that is an issue 

that they have been addressed. For our resident inspectors, we 

don’t believe that because of the collusion that they necessarily 

were derelict in their duties. In other words, the resident inspectors were thorough in the way that they conducted themselves. 

Knowing what we know now, we should have provided those resident inspectors with additional support. 

So we don’t believe that the resident inspectors particularly 

failed in their duties, because of the difficulty. For example, in the 

ready room that Senator Carper and I had observed, this was 

where they were inattentive, not on post. This was basically in an 

area that they should have been ready to respond. 

What we have done since, there are now cameras in those ready 

rooms so they can be observed at the command post. So there have 

been a lot of actions. But for the resident inspectors, we believe 

that this was an event that for their training and for how this was 

conducted, it would have been very difficult for them to have observed. 

Commissioner Lyons. 

Mr. LYONS. If I could add to that. As you have already indicated, 

Senator Voinovich, as well as several of your colleagues, this needs 

to be a learning experience. I am sure it will also be a learning experience for the resident inspectors. But to followup slightly on 

what the Chairman said, the original letter that came in referred 

to bullet-resistant enclosures and other areas. It said nothing about 

the ready room. It is my understanding that our resident inspector 

did focus his attention on the bullet-resistant enclosures and did 

not detect inattentiveness in those areas. 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator, if I could add. Before this incident, security 

inspections were generally handled by regional inspectors only. We 

did not have a lot of responsibilities that we had given to the resident inspectors to be looking for areas of security violations. There 

is always a balance and a tradeoff. If they are looking in one area, 

it means they certainly can’t be looking at something else. 

So one of the things we did immediately after this incident was 

to change that. We sent out notice to all our resident inspectors 

that this was something that they should particularly be looking 

out for as they do their activities. So as the Chairman indicated, 

we don’t consider this to be something where the resident inspectors were at fault here in not identifying this. 

58 

Senator VOINOVICH. In other words, it wasn’t part of their 

charge. 

Mr. JACZKO. It was not part of their charge, no. And it is something that we are really looking at, is seeing how we balance that 

security responsibility between the regional inspectors and the residents. We are looking at providing more responsibility for the resident inspectors in this particular area. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Casey, you are recognized. You have 7 

minutes, if you would. Thanks. 

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

As a guest of this Committee, we are honored to be a part of this 

discussion. 

Chairman Klein and the commissioners, we want to thank you 

for your work and your testimony today. 

I have a couple of questions about the process and procedure 

here, before and after this incident. One thing that I wanted to, 

Chairman Klein, direct your attention to is that one of your responses to Senator Carper’s question about what happened with 

the initial allegation here. It is my understanding based upon work 

that our staff has done and people they have spoken to, that even 

though in this instance you had an anonymous letter, which triggered this ultimate inquiry, that letter was in fact delivered to the 

NRC by an individual who left their name, address and their lawyer’s name. I think that alone should have triggered action by the 

NRC that a minimum contact would be made to the lawyer of this 

person, and certainly that there should have been followup done. 

Even though where this thing started it is anonymous, but that 

was in fact delivered. 

What can you tell me about the details of how this information 

came to the attention of the NRC? 

Mr. KLEIN. Senator Casey, the letter was not anonymous. The individual actually signed it, and he did not refer initially to a lawyer. So when the allegation came in, it came in to the resident inspector. The resident inspector, according to procedures because of 

the nature of this, sent the letter to the region. We have an Allegation Review Board that then determines how to handle that activity. 

So it did not fall in a crack, in other words. This allegation was 

taken seriously. It was followed up, but because the individual that 

had signed the letter that said don’t contact him, that again is a 

lessons we have learned. Fundamentally, we should have gone 

back and contacted the individual. 

In the letter, as Commissioner Lyons and Commissioner Jaczko 

indicated, the primary complaint that the initial allegation letter 

had was alleging long work hours and inattentiveness in the bulletresistant enclosures. Again, what the photographs that were taken 

later demonstrated, the inattentiveness was in the ready room, 

where people were supposed to be waiting in order to respond. In 

those ready rooms, I am sure you saw the same room that Senator 

Carper and I saw, the initial ready room was not very conducive 

to maintaining attentiveness. It was not well cooled. It was warm. 

There were not activities in which they could work on. So there are 

a whole variety of reasons why inattentiveness occurred in that 

room. 

59 

Senator CASEY. But I ask you, how do we get from March 27, 

2007, when NRC received the whistleblower’s allegation, and it 

wasn’t until June 2007 that Exelon reported back with its finding 

that it had not found any instance of inattentive security personnel? How does that happen, to have that much time transpire? 

I don’t care how incomplete the allegation is or how off target it 

may have been compared to what was happening in the ready 

room. How does that happen that that much time passes when you 

have an allegation which involves security? 

Mr. KLEIN. Again, what we did is we followed our procedures. As 

I indicated earlier, our procedures were there, but the outcome was 

not what we expected. The resident inspector passed that allegation to the regional office. The regional office had an Allegation Review Board that determined, yes, this is serious. 

Again, we get a lot of allegations. We treat all of them seriously, 

but some are handled differently than others. Because of this nature, it went to the Allegation Review Board in Region I. Region 

I then put it in their process to administer and followup. Part of 

that followup put the responsibility back on the licensee and said 

we have this allegation; tell us what you have done; how you can 

verify that this is not occurring. 

In other words, we then put the burden on Exelon, the licensee, 

to tell us, convince us that this is not happening. Once they conducted their interview process. They talk to people, and then they 

write their response. We then review it. 

So it was a process of allegation going to region; region coming 

back to the licensee; licensee conducting their assessment; and then 

getting back to us. 

Senator CASEY. What is different now? 

Mr. KLEIN. What is different now is that we will contact the 

alleger directly. We will followup. 

Senator CASEY. Let me just interrupt for a second. You are saying that in this instance, the individual signed it, but my point on 

anonymity is they wanted to remain anonymous. Is that correct? 

Mr. KLEIN. This individual was actually reflecting conditions on 

the plant. This individual had been terminated about 2 years earlier. So he indicated of his concerns, and was representing other 

guards. So the individual that signed the letter, the complaint, had 

been terminated 2 years earlier. So he was no longer an employee, 

but he was expressing these concerns on behalf of the other guards. 

Senator CASEY. OK. I think we are talking about two different 

things here. We are talking about whistleblowers, in this instance 

Mr. Kerry Beal. And you are talking about a second person, are 

you not? 

Mr. KLEIN. No. Kerry Beal was the second, the first alleger, the 

written response. 

Senator CASEY. But we are talking about two people here? 

Mr. KLEIN. Yes. 

Senator CASEY. I think that has to be clear for the record. 

Mr. KLEIN. The second person, unfortunately, never contacted 

the NRC. Again, that was disappointing for us, the fact that he did 

not come forward and express those concerns to us. But Mr. Beal 

was the one who had the evidence. In other words, the first alleger 

60 

was a written letter claiming facts. What Mr. Beal had was actual 

evidence. We didn’t hear of that information until September. 

Senator CASEY. Tell me what is different now. If something like 

this transpired now, what specifically have you changed in your 

process? I think in these instances, the procedure—I should use the 

word procedure, process is not the right word—the procedure is 

very important, and then how it is implemented and followed is obviously critical. 

What has changed specifically with regard to procedure and also 

with regard to how that procedure is implemented or followed up 

on when you have an allegation? 

Mr. KLEIN. I will talk initially, and then I will ask Commissioners Jaczko and Lyons to followup. 

Senator CARPER. I am just going to ask you to go ahead and be 

fairly succinct in responding to this question so we can recognize 

Senator Craig. But go ahead and respond. 

Mr. KLEIN. OK. 

What we are doing is, we are not finished with all of our improvements because we still have to hear from our Office of Enforcement and the IG. What we have done now is that an allegation like this that will come in, we will be much more rigorous. We 

will followup immediately and we will be notified from the resident 

inspector all the way up through the region to the commissioners. 

Senator CASEY. When you say followup, what does that mean? In 

other words, my understanding is prior to this, you had a review 

board. In this instance, that was referred back to the company. 

What is different about that initial activity that takes place? When 

the allegation come to NRC, what happens? What events are triggered in that initial time period? 

Mr. KLEIN. Our allegations, if it comes into the resident inspector, will still go to the region to make sure that we handle it appropriately, but we will be much more thorough and much more timely. 

Senator CASEY. When you say it will go to the region, do you 

mean—— 

Mr. KLEIN. In this case, it would be near Philadelphia for Region 

I. We have four regional offices in the United States. 

Senator CASEY. You mean the regional inspector will be the first 

level of review, is that what you are saying? 

Mr. KLEIN. The resident inspector will probably get the initial allegation, and we will make sure whether we handle it internally, 

how it is handled, or whether it goes back to the licensee. For a 

case like this, obviously everyone’s expectations and antennas have 

been raised. We will handle it much more thoroughly and much 

quicker. 

Senator CASEY. OK. I just want to take another couple of minutes. 

The allegation comes to your attention. Who reviews it at that 

moment? 

Mr. KLEIN. Initially, whoever receives it, probably the resident 

inspector. 

Senator CASEY. The resident inspector. Then when does the regional part of this come in? 

Mr. KLEIN. Probably about 30 minutes later. 

61 

Senator CASEY. OK. And then what happens after that? 

Mr. KLEIN. The region will determine how to handle it, whether 

we handle it totally internally or whether we go back to the plant. 

Senator CASEY. Do you have a timeframe for this within which, 

30 days, 60 days? 

Mr. KLEIN. I think in a case involving security, it will be very 

quick. 

Senator CASEY. But you don’t have any final procedure in place? 

Mr. KLEIN. Our procedures now say within 30 days, but again we 

are modifying those procedures. 

Senator CASEY. OK. I want to come back, because I know that 

Senator Craig has been waiting, but I will try to come back to this. 

Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. And you will have a second round. 

Senator Craig, thanks for your patience. You are recognized. 

Senator CRAIG. Thank you very much. 

I am going to take a slightly different track because I think these 

questions have been very thorough and are getting to the heart of 

it. I guess my only reaction, Commissioner Klein, is that don’t 

make it too bureaucratic. Make is nimble and responsive in a very 

timely fashion when these kinds of things happen. I am always 

fearful, you know, clouds can have silver linings, and in this instance where clearly a whistleblower exposed, there was not a security breach, but from it we can learn a great deal. You are learning 

a great deal. 

My only cautionary note would be won’t make the process so bureaucratic that somewhere along the line, someone doesn’t respond 

in a timely fashion. 

My question is of you, Commissioner Lyons, in a slightly different tack, but something that does relate to security. You are familiar with the advanced test reactor at the Idaho National Laboratory. We have now designated it as a national user facility for 

research for all universities to use onsite and even remote for research projects. 

Now, I move to two, could you please take a moment to reflect 

on your views of the importance of university reactors and user facilities such as ATR in teaching, and how important it is to maintain these reactors as we teach the next generation of nuclear professionals, and this third caveat, in the context of GAO’s recently 

issued report on the security of university reactors and their questioning of the NRC’s risk assumptions. 

Now, that may be a little bit of a convoluted question, but I think 

when we are talking security, there are reactors that are intensely 

safe and secure, even though we have slips within them, and then 

there are a lot of other reactors out there that are secure, but possibly less secure in the sense of where they are and how they are 

handled and who deals with them, and the protocols. And now we 

have had a GAO audit in part that I question as to its assumptions. 

Would you react in that context? 

Mr. LYONS. Senator Craig, as you said, you had a number of different questions embedded with that. Let me try to briefly address 

several of them. 

Senator CRAIG. All right. Thank you. 

62 

Mr. LYONS. You asked about the importance of support for university reactors and the importance of supporting the educational 

program in general. I think the whole Commission has been very 

outspoken in past visits with this Committee on our very strong 

support for a national educational program that supports the overall nuclear power industry. This Committee, and I believe other 

committees, have had some concern with the way the Department 

of Energy has chosen—I am not sure how to say it—with the 

DOE’s program that has been authorized in this area, and that led 

to appropriations to the NRC in the current year for us to undertake an educational program in support of this national need. 

We strongly support, the need for that education. We are moving 

as expeditiously as humanly possible to set up a strong national 

educational program in these areas. That educational program, of 

course, needs to be supported, and must be supported by university 

reactors, the research reactors that are around the Country. ATR, 

I believe, that you referenced, is strictly speaking a DOE reactor 

and not considered one of the RTRs. It is regulated by DOE. But 

there certainly are a number of research and test reactors around 

the Country which have absolutely critical missions. 

There are many, many differences, as I think this Committee is 

well aware, between the research reactors and the power reactors, 

starting with a gigantic factor, multiple decades of difference in 

power levels and potential concerns from the amount of radioactive 

materials involved. 

You asked for brief comments on the recent GAO report about 

which our Chairman spoke in his testimony. He indicated very 

strong concerns. I certainly share those very strong concerns. We 

believe, based on the evaluations that we have done, very extensive 

evaluations, that the research reactors at universities around this 

Country are safe and secure, based on the level of threat that they 

present. We can expand on that answer as you wish with details 

on the GAO report, but perhaps I should stop there on initial answer. 

Senator CRAIG. And that satisfies me. Obviously, you are on 

point and that is what is critical here as we look at the GAO report 

and move from that, and your reaction to it. 

Mr. Chairman, I have not seen your full testimony and I will 

look at it in response to that. That is important because there is 

a broader range of security here, but you have said it well, Commissioner Lyons, in relation to mission. I don’t know that the average citizen in our Country can distinguish the difference, and I 

think it is important that we help shape the distinguishing of difference between a commercial production reactor and a test facility 

and what it does or doesn’t mean to the average person as it relates to security, and therefore methods of operation. 

Thank you. 

Mr. JACZKO. Senator. 

Senator CRAIG. Yes. 

Mr. JACZKO. If I could offer one point on something that Commissioner Lyons mentioned where I think there is some disagreement 

among the commissioners, and it does have to do with the university programs that he referred to. While those programs are cerVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:23 May 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\85523.TXT VERN
63 

tainly valuable programs and I personally believe at $15 million, 

that program is probably significantly underfunded. 

I don’t believe that that program is appropriately placed at the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As the regulatory body that often 

may interact with the university reactors and others in that community in a regulatory capacity, I think it calls into question and 

raises issues of public confidence and potentially conflicts of interest between the Commission and the regulated if we are the same 

entity that is giving out grants to those same entities that we regulate. 

So I certainly understand the Congress’s interest in this program, but I think fundamentally that is a program that belongs 

back at the Department of Energy or at some other agency that 

may have an interest in educational programs, but not fundamentally long term at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Senator CRAIG. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. KLEIN. As Commissioner Jaczko indicated, this is not one in 

which I agree, and Commissioner Lyons agrees. We believe education is very important for the work force that not only the Nuclear Regulatory Commission needs, but also other Federal agencies and also the industry. So the nuclear education program that 

is proposed and we are now operating at Congress’ request is a 

work force initiative. It includes trade schools, new faculty, individuals, and also scholarships and fellowships. This has nothing to do 

with regulatory activities. This is a work force initiative education 

program and it is one which the Country needs. 

Senator CRAIG. Yes. I thank you. 

With 47 seconds left, Mr. Chairman, let me suggest that the 

work force issue and the training issue, the educational issue is a 

component that is critical out there at the moment as we grow ourselves back into a capability as a Country to respond to what appears to be the demand and the need to build these reactors. I had 

mentioned a major utility that chose to stand down. 

They gave a lot of reasons for standing down. One of them just 

happened to be the licensing process and its timing. The other one 

was simply the ability to staff, the ability to find the right and 

properly trained people, and all of that as we now compete in a 

world market for these trained individuals. So those educational 

tools, wherever they are placed, we ought to focus on them, and 

they are critical in the overall growth of this industry for all the 

reasons that we are now and appropriately support it. 

Thank you. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Senator Craig. 

Commissioner Jaczko, if I could, I think in your prepared statement you discussed the NRC’s new rules, I think they are proposed 

rules, to restrict work hours for security guards. Let me just ask, 

is security guard fatigue a serious issue across the fleet of 104 nuclear power plants? And what is the timeline for implementing 

these new fitness for duty requirements? 

Mr. JACZKO. To clarify, it is a final rule for the Commission at 

this point, but it is still undergoing the subsequent bureaucratic 

process for OMB review and other processes that happen before it 

64 

actually becomes a final regulation. So that is working its way 

through. 

The question about whether fatigue is an issue is something that 

we have recently asked our licensees. Following the Peach Bottom 

incident, we sent out a request for information from licensees to 

tell us what their work hours are and what are the kinds of hours 

that we are seeing. 

But there have been, since 2004 over 20 incidents of inattentive 

security officers, some of which have been identified by NRC inspectors, some of which have been self-reported. So there is clearly 

evidence that these kinds of incidents are occurring. 

We will have better information when we complete our review of 

the responses to this request for information that the licensees provided. 

Senator CARPER. One of the things I want to better understand 

is the timeline for completely implementing the new requirements. 

Mr. JACZKO. The new requirements won’t go into effect probably 

for about another 22 months. We are hoping to get the rule finalized in March, and then it has an 18 month implementation timeframe. So what I have certainly asked the staff to look at is are 

there ways we can accelerate some of those components, particularly on the security side, for the fatigue requirements. I think 

there are some areas, particularly in the programmatic elements of 

the new rule, things like having a better process in place for individuals who are fatigued to be able to report that to their supervisors and not have an adverse employment decision because of 

that. Getting that kind of program in place earlier I think would 

be a real enhancement. 

Senator CARPER. I am not interested in trying to micromanage 

that process, but one of the questions I will ask for the record, and 

I will just telegraph it now, is whether or not it might make sense 

for Senator Voinovich and I, and maybe others on this Subcommittee, to consider legislation that would somehow reduce that 

18 months. It seems like a long time. So I just wanted you to know 

we are thinking about that, and we would ask you to think about 

it as well. We will reach out to you in writing for your thoughts. 

The last question I wanted to explore deals with the composite 

adversary force. As I understand it, the NRC tests every facility security force using what they call force on force exercises. The composite adversary force that is used to challenge each plant’s security is contracted by the Nuclear Energy Institute. 

Let me ask, why doesn’t the NRC have its own security force to 

test each plant’s security? 

Mr. KLEIN. Senator Carper, I will start and then I will delegate 

to our resident expert on force on force, Commissioner Lyons. 

We have looked at a variety of ways on how we can better challenge and verify the force on force activities. Having spent 5 years 

at DOD watching a lot of force on force activities and then coming 

to the NRC and observing those, we do it well. So the system is 

working. 

I will let Commissioner Lyons give additional guidance on that. 

Senator CARPER. Yes, as I understand it, the folks who do that, 

who actually come in as the adversary force, are people who are 

drawn from the industry itself, who come in and maybe cycle 

65 

through an 18 month to 36 month commitment, and then go back 

to work within their own plant. Is that the way it works? 

Mr. LYONS. That is correct, Senator Carper. Those individuals 

are not drawn only from Wackenhut facilities. They are drawn 

from all facilities. 

I have to admit that when I was on Senate staff and when I first 

joined the NRC, I was quite skeptical about the current situation 

which has continued in which the NEI contracts for the composite 

adversary force. However, despite my skepticism, I have been very 

pleasantly impressed to learn how the NRC has maintained oversight of the activities of the composite adversary force. Frankly, it 

is a very, very impressive record. 

One of the concerns that I have heard expressed is whether that 

composite adversary force, since it is contracted by NEI to 

Wackenhut, would find issues at a Wackenhut site. And they most 

certainly have found issues at Wackenhut sites. Furthermore, with 

the change in Exelon’s practices, the number of sites with 

Wackenhut will be substantially reduced. 

I have continued, therefore, to support the current situation, 

even though I came in very skeptical of it. I believe that the composite force is doing an outstanding job under the oversight of the 

NRC. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Well, thanks for that observation. 

Commissioner Jaczko, and then I am going to ask Senator 

Voinovich if he has any closing questions for this panel. 

Mr. JACZKO. If I could just briefly say, I think the issue that we 

are dealing here is an appearance of a conflict of interest. As I am 

sure you are aware, in those kind of situations an appearance can 

be as significant sometimes as an actual conflict of interest. So I 

think it is an important issue that we need to address and explore 

other possibilities about how we could conduct this. 

The Commission does have in front of us right now a voting 

paper to decide this issue and look at alternative approaches. One 

of the biggest drawbacks right now to an alternative approach of 

having the NRC itself contract and manage that adversary force is 

fundamentally cost. We would be talking about a program that 

would be in the range of several million dollars to do that. So in 

many ways, I think that is the real impediment in my mind to 

moving forward in a different direction. 

As others have said, the issue here, from what we have seen, is 

really more of an appearance of a conflict than an actual conflict 

at this point, but sometimes those can be as significant as an actual conflict. 

Senator CARPER. Good. OK, well, thank you for adding that. 

Senator Voinovich, anything else for this panel? 

Senator VOINOVICH. No, thank you. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Senator Casey, you are recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Senator CASEY. Very briefly. Thank you very much. 

I think in the interest of time, in order to supplement the record 

to followup on some of the questions that I was posing to Chairman 

Klein, I would ask that the NRC provide to the Committee for the 

record a fairly detailed summary or flow chart of how allegations 

are handled. Because of the time period within which the change 

66 

in regulations may not be able to be expedited, it sounds that way 

that it won’t be, you won’t be able to accelerate that, that you annotate or add to that flow chart anything that is new in terms of— 

in other words, procedures you can follow without having to go 

through the regulatory process. I think it would be important to 

know that. 

Commissioner Jaczko, I wanted to highlight something that you 

had in your written testimony, which struck me. You talked about 

the report done by the regional office regarding the allegation at 

Peach Bottom, and then you say, and I am looking at the fifth 

paragraph of your testimony, you say, ‘‘We have already begun 

making changes such as those I just mentioned, but I believe there 

is more agency-wide work that needs to be done to fully evaluate 

the agency’s handling of this issue.’’ I am happy to read that. But 

then you go on to say, ‘‘The foundation of the Commission’s additional allegation program improvements must be built on a more 

comprehensive review than we have allowed the staff to conduct so 

far, along with consideration of forthcoming findings by the Inspector General.’’ 

In the context of that statement and the context of some of the 

questions that I posed to Chairman Klein, where do you think the 

NRC is with regard to having learned from this incident? And 

where do you think it needs to go? Because I have no doubt that 

Chairman Klein and the Commission have and will learn from this, 

but the Congress and I think the American people need to see evidence that you have learned. I just want to get your perspective on 

this, as well as Commissioner Lyons, in the time that I have. 

Mr. JACZKO. In my view, we are still early in the process of 

learning. For me, the most important thing is that we learn the 

right lessons, not that we learn something quickly. I think the 

focus of our effort so far has been on self-assessment from the region in which this incident occurred. We haven’t yet fully integrated all the allegation individuals and other experts in other regions, for instance, into the process to really independently evaluate what happened in Region I. 

So far what I think the indications I have are is that it was not 

strictly a procedural problem, that there may have also just been 

issues with implementing the procedures that we have. So we want 

to take a look in other regions about how they may implement the 

procedures, to make sure that we are learning all the right lessons. 

So I think there is still a lot that we have to learn, but I think 

it is worth taking the time to get it right and make sure we talk 

to all the experts. The Chairman mentioned we have an Office of 

Enforcement that actually has the responsibility for this allegation 

program. We want to make sure that they are fully involved and 

that their experts are able to provide information on this process 

as well. Really, the most important piece that I think is missing 

is really bringing in the other regions as well, and getting their insights and their input into the process. 

And then, of course, the one that I did specifically mention, 

which is the Inspector General, because that really provides the 

independent look at this. And they are looking at it in really much 

the same way. They are looking specifically at Region I to see what 

they did, and then they are looking to see how other regions handle 

67 

these allegations as well. So they will get both sides, in a way, of 

that picture. 

But the most important focus for me, really, is just to make sure 

that we do this right, and not that we be too concerned with how 

quickly we move. We want to do it quickly, obviously, but we want 

to make sure we get good information. 

If I could just add one other brief point, and it is something that 

hasn’t been highlighted as much here. We have talked a lot about 

the allegations, but one of the areas that we actually identified as 

a weakness at Peach Bottom was in their behavioral observation 

program. This is a very important program in the security arena 

that we use to identify people who could exhibit characteristics that 

would indicate that they are an individual who is not necessarily 

there for the benefit of the facility, that they may have ulterior motives. That is a very important program and it is a very crucial 

part of our force on force exercises. 

The way that we do security is to be able to identify individuals 

who, as I said, are doing things that are intentionally or could intentionally damage the facility. That program failed in this instance, obviously, when you have an entire security shift that is not 

focusing on security, but rather is colluding to be inattentive. And 

we have seen other facilities, Turkey Point for instance, where 

there have been similar instances of a failure in this behavioral observation program among the security officers. 

So that is an area that I think we also need to make sure that 

we fully explore and evaluate as we go forward. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Commissioner Lyons. 

Mr. LYONS. Just to add very briefly. Mr. Jaczko already summarized that we currently have the report of the region. There is a 

senior staff group that is now assessing that report, pulling in more 

information from the other regions, and of course the Inspector 

General. All of those will contribute to a package coming to the 

Commission for our review, and certainly to look toward improvements. 

One comment I wanted to make, though, as Commissioner 

Jaczko mentioned involves, the behavior observation. The behavior 

observation program is certainly very important and ties in with 

the comment that several of the members of the Subcommittee 

have already made with regard to zero tolerance. 

The fact that there has been in the past (and this is not dictated 

by the NRC, but by the licensee and the contractor) a zero tolerance policy to some extent undermines the behavioral observation 

program. To me, part of the answer to the issues that we are facing 

at Peach Bottom is to recognize that there needs to be flexibility 

in that zero tolerance. We need to encourage individuals who are 

fatigued to self-report or perhaps be reported by others into the behavioral observation program. 

There has been some discussion of the so-called fireman’s assistants, the small devices that people might wear. To me, if an indication on one of those devices can be entered into a corrective action 

program, which we would be doing for all other safety aspects of 

the site, instead of leading to immediate termination of the individual, we would have a far different response from the security ofVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:23 May 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\85523.TXT VERN
68 

ficers. I am looking forward to the opportunity to blend all of these 

different points of view into the final set of responses. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

Senator CARPER. Before our commissioners leave, on behalf of all 

of us, thank you for coming today. Thank you for your preparation 

and your responses to our questions. We will be following up with 

some questions in writing, as you know. We would ask that you 

continue to provide thorough and prompt responses there. 

I hoped we would have an opportunity to get more specifically 

into the issue of a culture of safety today. We have not, though several of you have spoken to it directly in your testimoneys and some 

of your responses. What I think we have in mind, and our goal 

should be for everyone of the 104 nuclear power plants that operate 

in this Country, and those that may be built in the future, that 

there is an environment or culture that exists so that when any 

employee or supervisor or an inspector from the NRC sees what he 

or she believes to be a problem that could undermine the safe and 

sound operation of a facility, that they would feel compelled to report it promptly and fully to the appropriate authority. 

The next step would be for the appropriate authority to take that 

report, to take it seriously, to fully investigate what has come to 

them, and as appropriate, to send up the chain of command to others, whether it is the regional offices that you have spoken to here 

today, so that others know that something has been raised and it 

is being investigated. 

Subsequently, after a full vetting, and the concern is deemed to 

be unfounded or not one that we really need to be concerned about, 

that whoever has brought the concern be debriefed or briefed as to 

the outcome, and we explain to him or her that we appreciate what 

they have brought forward, but here is why we have not deemed 

it appropriate to act on. 

On the other hand, when we have a situation like we have at 

Peach Bottom, where there was a problem, and it is a problem that 

could affect all 103 other nuclear power plants, that we take that 

lesson that we have learned at Peach Bottom and we fully spread 

that lesson across the Country so that other plant operators, others 

that are providing security and your inspectors are fully aware of 

this, and that we can learn from the mistakes, in this case at 

Peach Bottom. 

I think that is our goal. My hope in conducting a hearing of this 

nature is that we will help further that goal in the creation of that 

kind of culture of safety at every plant because we need it. 

With that having been said, again we thank you for being with 

us today. 

Again, Mrs. Klein, thank you for joining us, too. Thank you so 

much. 

The third and last panel is welcome to come forward and to join 

us. 

To the members of our third panel, thanks for waiting, and 

thank you for your presence here today and your testimony. We 

look forward to asking you some questions. 

Let me just introduce the panel from our left to our right, and 

Mr. Crane, we will give you the privilege of being our lead-off hitter. 

69 

Mr. Fertel, nice to see you. You can bat cleanup, if you would. 

David Lochbaum is Director, Nuclear Safety Project, Union of 

Concerned Scientists. Thanks for coming. Welcome. 

Second is Eric Wilson. Mr. Wilson is the Chief Executive Officer 

of G4S Regulated Security Solutions, which I believe was formerly 

Wackenhut Nuclear Services. Thank you for coming today. 

Mr. Crane, Christopher Crane, is the Chief Operating Officer of 

Exelon Generation. Thank you. Nice to see you. 

And then we will skip over Mr. Wilson and go right to the real 

David Lochbaum, who is Director of Nuclear Safety Project, Union 

of Concerned Scientists. 

And finally to Marvin Fertel over here. He is the Senior Vice 

President and Chief Nuclear Officer of the Nuclear Energy Institute. 

I think I got it right that time. 

All right. Mr. Crane, in any event, you are No. 1, and we look 

forward to your testimony. Take it away. I am going to ask you to 

limit your testimony to about 5 minutes. If you run a little bit long, 

that is OK, but not much longer, and we will ask our questions. 

Thanks. 

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER M. CRANE, CHIEF 

OPERATING OFFICER, EXELON GENERATION 

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Voinovich, thank you very 

much for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the security 

at our nuclear plants. I want to review what we are doing to ensure that all Exelon nuclear plants are safe and why the public can 

have complete confidence in the continued safety and reliability at 

our plants. 

Exelon is the largest owner and operator of nuclear power plants 

in the United States. We have 17 reactors that we operate at 10 

locations in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Illinois, with over 8,000 

employees, one eighth of those being security personnel providing 

protection on 24/7 at our facilities. 

Although the security-related issues that were uncovered last 

year at Peach Bottom are completely unacceptable, it should not 

disparage the excellent work of the other thousands of employees 

at our facilities. Nuclear plants being part of the critical infrastructure, continue to be some of the best-protected facilities in the 

United States. Since 9/11, Exelon has spent $160 million enhancing 

the architecture and the security forces at our facilities. We are 

proud at Exelon of our continued sustained performance in safety 

and reliability at our facilities, and safety is priority one. 

Because of our strong commitment to safety, our reaction was 

outrage when we saw the video of the clear images of sleeping 

guards at our Peach Bottom facility. I will explain our investigation, what it revealed, and the actions we have taken, but a little 

bit on the ready room. Senator Carper, you have been to the ready 

room so you understand. The ready room is not a guard post. It is 

a staging area for personnel to be ready and able to respond to 

other security officers and posts as needed, based off an adversarial 

attack. 

Although the security at the plant and the health and safety of 

the public were never at risk due to our extensive defense in depth, 

70 

as the Chairman of the NRC previously stated, the behaviors were 

definitely contrary to Exelon standards and were completely unacceptable. 

Equally disturbing, as Commissioner Jaczko stated in his testimony, was the realization of a subculture that existed where the 

poor behavior was tolerated by other security guards. Upon becoming aware of the details, we launched a comprehensive investigation and immediately made changes in the security procedures to 

ensure we had the enhancements as required. 

At the beginning of it was our decision to terminate our contract 

with Wackenhut. I want to make a clear point here. This was not 

to make Wackenhut the scapegoat. The responsibility for having attentive security guards, as with all attentive employees at our facilities, is born by the licensee and that is Exelon. Our decision to 

terminate our agreement with Wackenhut was to greater enhance 

our flexibility for programs like behavior observation, training, selection, and better align the security organization into the site family and feel part of that organization. 

We have increased our oversight by performance of senior management doing direct observations, face to face communications 

with the guards, and believe have put effective measures in place 

to continue to grow the trust of the organization between the work 

force and management. The security transition at Peach Bottom 

has gone well and we believe the security force feels that they are 

part of the team, but it is a beginning of that part and we still have 

actions to go to continue to build their trust and integrate them. 

We also have conducted evaluations at the remaining facilities 

and found no evidence of inattentiveness, but have decided that it 

is the best organization structure to have the security forces at 

those locations brought in-house also. 

Prior to implementing the full transition, we have made some 

changes, modified procedures, and conducted training emphasizing 

compliance, looking at shortened security rotations and random 

post checks. We have a highly trained paramilitary security force 

that is coupled with extensive physical barriers and architectural 

mechanisms to provide additional containment to any potential releases or accidents within our facilities. 

Before I conclude, I do want to comment on our allegation review 

process. As a result of this issue, we have made improvements to 

our process. However, even prior to this issue, our review process 

was robust. It is regrettable that we received the initial comments 

from the NRC in April 2007 and our investigation did not uncover 

the sleeping guards. We have talked about the terminology, the 

wording in the investigation, but we still believe the onus was on 

our process to uncover and to fully evaluate. 

We receive on average about 28 referred allegations from the 

NRC on an annual basis, and 6 of those we substantiate. We receive from internal employee concerns on average a few hundred 

a year and 25 percent of those are substantiated. We have employees reporting on issues within the plants, all of our plants, around 

10,000 individual reports on an annual basis. So there is a culture 

for reporting issues. There is a process in place for taking referred 

allegations and employee concerns and diving into those. We have 

and will continue to make enhancements on the process. 

71 

Exelon is committed to safe operations of our plants, and we provide a strong security program at each site. We continue to make 

significant financial and personnel resources to comply with the 

NRC regulations, but that is not as a minimum. That is just as a 

base, and we continue to drive from the corporation to enhance 

above that. We will continue to work closely with the NRC and all 

appropriate Federal and State agencies to drive this compliance. 

I will end it there, and look forward to your questions. Thank 

you for the opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crane follows:] 

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RESPONSE BY CHRISTOPHER M. CRANE TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION

FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question. Mr. Wilson commented in his testimony that there was ‘‘too much separation’’ between security and other plant operations. Do you agree, and, if so, how 

do you think it should be addressed? 

Response. The creation of Exelon Nuclear Security provides Exelon management 

the opportunity to directly engage the security workforce as Exelon employees. 

Feedback from security officers indicates an overwhelming appreciation for the opportunity to be a part of Exelon. The new security organization now has a complete 

Exelon Nuclear Security site management team versus our previous method of functioning in a contract administrative role. This team, similar to other Exelonsite organizations, is completely integrated within the station and works under the direct 

management of the site leadership team. 

RESPONSE BY CHRISTOPHER M. CRANE TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION

FROM SENATOR SPECTER

Question. Exelon terminated its relationship with Wackenhut in the wake of this 

incident last fall, and decided to make security an in house operation. Regarding 

this, in a December 18 letter to senator Casey, former Wackenhut CEO David Sanders states that ‘‘security is not a core competency of the energy manufacturer . . . 

it will be a challenge for them to conduct security operations better than 

Wackenhut’’. What steps are being taken to ensure that a similar situation doesn’t 

reoccur? 

Response. One of the major causes of the problems at Peach Bottom was inadequate leadership, management, and supervisory oversight of security by the 

Wackenhut leadership team to ensure that Exelon’s expectations were being met. 

By creating the Exelon Nuclear Security Company, Exelon has developed the site 

security management organization in accordance with the proven Exelon management model. The Exelon management model includes focus on excellence in management and supervisory skill sets. Additionally, Exelon has taken a number of steps 

to ensure that we possess and maintain the core competencies necessary to meet 

the challenges of security in today’s world. We have developed a corporate staff of 

security management and specialists that have years of experience in commercial 

nuclear security, military special operations, project management, and labor relations. As part of transitioning our security operations in house, we have added 11 

individuals to the corporate security staff. Our site management teams are made 

up of not only experienced security management personnel but in many cases, managers with significant plant operations experience as well. This blend of talent and 

experience along with the fact that Exelon continues to be very active in industry 

working groups and task forces ensures that we maintain the required core competencies for functioning in commercial nuclear security. 

RESPONSES BY CHRISTOPHER M. CRANE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. In your testimony you stated that the NRC should take a more active 

role in investing allegations rather than sending the allegation to the licensee for 

investigation. Does the NRC defer safety allegations to the licensee? Please explain 

how you think the NRC should respond to security allegations and whether this differs from how they respond to safety allegations. 

Response. My testimony did not State that the NRC should take a more active 

role in investigating allegations rather than sending the allegations to the licensee. 

The NRC does refer both safety and security allegations to Exelon for us to investigate. We recognize that protection of the alleger’s identity is important, but on occasion, valuable details of the concern are removed to assure anonymity is maintained. In these cases, NRC has full benefit of the details and should consider providing that information to ensure that the investigation is complete. 

Security plays an important role in plant safety and I believe that the response 

to security allegations should be handled in the same rigorous manner as safety concerns. This is how we do business today. 

Question 2. In your testimony you stated that the NRC needs to strengthen its 

proposed rule on aircraft impact. Do you believe existing plants should meet the 

same security standards as newly constructed plants? What do you think a final 

rule should encompass? 

Response. While my testimony does not State that the NRC needs to strengthen 

its proposed rule on aircraft impact, Exelon endorses the industry position, as presented in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) letter to Ms. Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

78 

(NRC), ‘‘NEI Comments on NRC Proposed Rulemaking on the Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactor Designs (72 Fed. Reg. 56287) (Oct. 

3, 2007),’’ dated December 17, 2007. Exelon supports the intent of the proposed rule 

(for 10 CFR Part 52) and believes all new plants being licensed should address aircraft impacts. This would be accomplished by requiring the aircraft impact assessment as part of the design certification; by voluntarily amending existing design certifications; or by requiring the assessment at the time of the combined license (COL) 

application. 

Exelon agrees that new plants should be required to meet the proposed rule. The 

proposed rule should not apply to holders of construction permits and plants where 

construction is substantially complete because it would be impractical. 

Exelon believes that the aircraft impact rule should not be applied to existing operating plants. The security programs mandated by the NRC orders, the Design 

Basis Threat rule, and the protection provided by other Federal, state, and local entities, provide an adequate level of protection against the effects of aircraft impacts. 

In regard to final rulemaking, the design features and mitigative activities resulting from aircraft impact assessment are part of the design and are not part of the 

physical security requirements of the plant. As such, it is appropriate for the rule 

to be in 10 CFR Part 52, as opposed to 10 CFR Part 73. The NRC, in conjunction 

with the Department of Homeland Security, sets the standards and provides the 

basis for security regulations at commercial nuclear facilities. The standard for commercial security forces at nuclear power plants is a reasonable expectation standard. 

It recognizes that that there are terrorist scenarios that are beyond the capability 

of a commercial company to provide protection. The protection against such events 

is the responsibility of the Federal Government. 

RESPONSES BY CHRISTOPHER M. CRANE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR CASEY

Question 1. Your testimony lays out Exelon’s basic 4-step procedure for responding 

to whistleblower allegations (first, senior corporate management reviews the NRCreferred allocations; second, management appoints internal and external investigators and provides them with guidelines for conducting an in-depth review; third the 

licensing re-looks at the facts; and finally management reviews the report and, if 

the claim is substantiated, creates a plan of action). Can you provide me with the 

detailed protocol Exelon implements when responding to these complaints? And 

what new protocols have been instituted as a result of the incident with the sleeping 

guards? 

Response. Exelon’s detailed protocol for responding to NRC-referred allegations is 

contained in a procedure titled, ‘‘Responding to Allegations Referred by NRC and 

to NRC Investigations.’’ 

This procedure establishes roles and responsibilities for conducting the internal 

evaluation. An individual in our corporate Licensing and Regulatory Affairs department is assigned to act as the project manager for the allegation response. Investigators, who are independent of the asserted activities and possess the required 

knowledge and skill appropriate for the allegation, are assigned to conduct the investigations. 

These assignments are determined by a senior management committee that includes Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, Human Resources, Nuclear Oversight, 

Legal personnel and a representative from the affected functional area, such as Operations, Maintenance or Engineering. This senior management committee also discusses scope of the allegation. The investigators conduct an evaluation that is sufficient in depth to establish the scope of the problem and to identify potential generic 

implications. 

The results of the investigation are reviewed by selected members of the senior 

management committee prior to being approved and issued to the NRC. This process is typically performed within 30 days of the referral per NRC request. For assertions that have been substantiated, corrective actions are established and entered 

into the appropriate program (e.g., Corrective Action Program). 

New protocols in the allegation procedure have been established since the Peach 

Bottom security personnel inattentiveness event. These changes were identified as 

part of the root cause evaluation conducted for the event. The allegation response 

procedure was revised to include consideration of external legal counsel to assist the 

investigators when an allegation has potential safety conscious work environment 

implications. Explicit direction was added to consider other types of investigative 

techniques when direct interviews are deemed inappropriate or ineffective. For investigations requiring a sampling of the affected population, a comprehensive sampling plan must be established such that the population of individuals interviewed 

79 

is adequate to determine if the problem is isolated to a specific shift/team/crew or 

if it is present at the department or site level. A procedural requirement was added 

to obtain clarification or additional information if needed. Additionally, enhanced requirements for documentation retention have been established; the allegation file 

will contain the investigation plan, the list of documents reviewed and personnel 

interviewed, interview notes, corrective action program search criteria and results, 

disposition of recommended actions, and confidential reports related to the investigation. 

Question 2. How do you think your internal allegation-response protocol could be 

improved to maintain safety and help foster a culture in which employees feel free 

and comfortable with coming forward with such valuable information? 

Response. Safety is our overriding priority. Exelon strongly believes in, and actively promotes, a safety conscious work environment (SCWE). The current policy 

on safety conscious work environment (SCWE) has been revised to strengthen applicability to supplemental personnel (i.e., contractors). The Chief Nuclear Officer 

(CNO) has reissued a letter reinforcing safety culture and SCWE policy. A SCWE 

video, featuring an introductory message from the CNO, and safety culture training 

have been cascaded throughout the entire nuclear organization. Plant Managers discuss our expectations regarding safety culture and SCWE during face-to-face meetings with contractors prior to outages. Contractors and contractor management are 

required to read and sign the SCWE policy. For the SCWE in the security functional 

area, the previous Wackenhut policy of zero tolerance for security infractions is 

being reevaluated in regards to Exelon policies to strengthen and improve the Security Behavior Observation Program as the contractor security forces are being transferred in-house as Exelon employees. 

Additionally, allegation investigators and licensing personnel are more sensitized 

to SCWE when an allegation is referred to us for investigation. We now consider 

other investigative techniques if direct interviews may not ascertain the validity of 

the concern. These changes ensure we identify and correct any impedance to the 

free flow of information so that each of our employees feels free to raise issues and 

assist with their resolution. 

Question 3. How do you expect bringing management and security within Exelon 

will help prevent future incidents? Since a significant portion of your new in-house 

security personnel were retained from Wackenhut, how do you plan to change the 

culture that made it for important information to surface? 

Response. Exelon made the decision to bring the security force in-house to both 

prevent recurrence of the problems at Peach Bottom and to change the culture within the organization to ensure that issues are promptly reported to leadership and 

corrected using our Corrective Action Program. Expectations for oversight and leadership are outlined in the Exelon Nuclear Management Model and the new Exelon 

Nuclear Security organization was designed with the same model. This Management 

Model has been used successfully to create the strong performance that Exelon has 

shown in our nuclear plant operations. Specifically, security leadership teams are 

structured such that security management is directly engaged with the performance 

of the security forces and not merely oversight of a security contract. The Exelon 

Model includes improvements in security work force oversight such as on the job 

inspections to validate individual and organizational performance, improvements in 

the quality and effectiveness of training, and implementation of the corrective action 

program. Because the security force is now part of the Exelonsite operating team, 

they also receive additional oversight and support from the onsite senior leadership 

team. The implementation of the proven Exelon Nuclear Management Model provides Exelon senior leadership adequate opportunity to ensure the desired cultural 

change is occurring and that site and corporate security management is monitoring 

and reinforcing these behaviors. 

RESPONSES BY CHRISTOPHER M. CRANE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1. Mr. Crane, I’m encouraged by your testimony in which you acknowledge the realization of a ‘‘subculture’’ within the Peach Bottom security force which 

tolerated such unacceptable behavior. And it appears that Exelon has taken aggressive steps to address these issues. 

One of the complaints I have heard anecdotally is that nuclear plant security 

guards in general do not feel that they are fully accepted as part of the site organization. And somehow they feel that they are less than equal partners compared to 

other plant workers, such as operators and maintenance workers. I would like to 

get your perspective on this. 

80 

Response. Your comment on security officers not feeling accepted as part of the 

site organization is one of the reasons that Exelon made the decision to bring the 

organization in-house. Security personnel are now part of the Exelon team and employees of the site organization with comparative standing as other station employees. Exelon Nuclear Security officers receive comparative compensation and benefits 

and feedback indicates they appreciate being part of the Exelon team. There is no 

longer the ‘‘less than equal’’ partner connotation, real or perceived, associated with 

being a contract employee assigned to the site. 

Question 2. There is a suggestion that the industry might consider having security 

officers carry an electronic device which senses inactivity and alerts the security 

command center. I think something like that could be a very good, practical solution 

to security officers working the midnight shift. Has Exelon given any thoughts to 

this suggestion? 

Response. We are aware of electronic devices that are being developed that would 

sense inactivity and alert the security control center. Exelon plans to evaluate the 

use of these electronic devices to enhance our ability to oversee security officers once 

they become available. A new device under development could be used to assist security officers in maintaining alertness as well as provide supervisors with assistance in monitoring the officers. Exelon has volunteered two sites to pilot these devices if and when they become available for testing from the vendor. 

Senator CARPER. You bet. Thank you, Mr. Crane. 

Welcome, Mr. Wilson, you are recognized for 5 minutes, please. 

STATEMENT OF ERIC WILSON, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 

G4S REGULATED SECURITY SOLUTIONS, FORMERLY 

WACKENHUT NUCLEAR SERVICES 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for your invitation to be here today. My name is Eric 

Wilson and I am the CEO of Regulated Security Solutions, or RSS, 

a newly formed company owned by G4S. 

I am pleased today to represent the 4,000 professional employees 

of RSS, most of whom like myself have a military background, and 

frequently a law enforcement background. This is a group of people 

whose experience and personal beliefs give them a deep commitment to protecting our Country. I proudly served as an Army Ranger with the 75th Ranger Regiment and was a member of the U.S. 

Army Special Forces before starting my own security consulting 

company within this industry. 

I have held various positions at Wackenhut, including head of 

the Nuclear Services Division. Much of my life has been devoted to 

securing nuclear facilities. I have visited nearly all of the commercial nuclear facilities in this Nation. 

Because of my background, I was hired a little more than a year 

ago by Wackenhut to discuss a thorough assessment of the quality 

of security at all the nuclear facilities that we provided services for. 

Before I get to that assessment, I want to address the incident at 

Peach Bottom. Let me be very clear: the conduct of the Wackenhut 

security officers and supervisors at Peach Bottom was completely 

unacceptable and inexcusable. The inattentiveness of the company’s officers was troubling for me, but even more troubling was 

the inaction of their leadership. 

In my written testimony, I provide greater detail on the immediate and long-term corrective actions we took not just at Peach 

Bottom, but at all the facilities we safeguard. I believe strongly 

that this incident is not reflective of the approximately 4,000 dedicated security officers in our company. 

81 

That said, I am not here today to make any excuses. I take full 

responsibility for the actions of my people at any level, from the 

frontline officer to the Vice President. In my mind, part of taking 

responsibility is to make absolutely sure incidents of this sort do 

not happen again, as well as ensure high quality performance is always sustainable. 

This gets me back to the principal finding of my assessment that 

was conducted a little over a year ago when I assumed the position. 

That is that while security of nuclear facilities today is very good, 

we have an opportunity to make it even better from a human performance standpoint, by developing a new model that will more 

easily adapt to the ever-changing regulatory needs of this industry. 

Through our assessment, we concluded that contract security 

providers have traditionally focused on price as a competitive advantage, and consistent with that, trained security officers to comply with a standard set of regulatory needs and requirements. 

Moreover, we saw too much separation between security and other 

station operations. With focus on price and a tendency to isolate security, we saw a model that performed well to regulatory standards, but needed to be updated in order to keep pace with rapid 

change in the regulatory environment and deliver the highest quality, sustainable level of service in relation to human performance. 

To address this decisively, I believe that security functions must 

be more closely aligned with other station operations, and that we 

can achieve this through focusing on three areas in the contract security arena: developing leaders, forming strategic alliances, and 

greater use of technology. 

First, contract security companies need to provide a significant 

level of ongoing leadership development in a continuous learning 

environment. At the end of the day, effective leadership is the answer to most organizational needs. In my mind, enhanced leadership development is indispensable and should not and will not be 

separated from the security we provide our clients. 

Second, as I mentioned, security must be better aligned with a 

station’s operations through strategic alliances. We must develop 

close partnership with operators based on a set of clear, measurable deliverables. Contract security providers should measure their 

performance on their ability to deliver on specific results and objectives. 

Finally, greater use of technology can significantly help our security officers fulfill their responsibilities and optimize their performance. We have developed software products and handheld devices 

that facilitate better partnerships with our clients, measure performance across facilities, and identify best practices to increase 

quality. 

For me, this is where the contract security industry needs to go. 

The most important element of this model is accountability. I believe strongly in this. Put simply, if we don’t meet set key performance criteria that are predetermined in partnership with our clients, we shouldn’t make any money. 

Let me finish by emphasizing a very important point. America’s 

nuclear power facilities today are among the safest and most secure facilities in this Nation. What I have addressed this morning 

is not only a preventive solution to inattentiveness, but a better 

82 

way to ensure the quality and sustainability of security services at 

nuclear and other regulated facilities in the U.S. 

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to address this committee 

today and am prepared to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:] 

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RESPONSES BY ERIC WILSON TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENTOR BOXER

Question 1. Do you believe Exelon will provide better security than Wackenhut 

provided? 

Response. It is important to stress that nuclear power plants are among the most 

secure facilities in the Nation, regardless of whether security is managed in-house 

or through a contract security provider. Wackenhut’s record at Peach Bottom, excluding the inattentive event isolated to a specific work crew, at a minimum 

achieved and in some cases, exceeded NRC security compliance standards. The main 

purpose behind the creation of G4S Regulated Security Solutions is to make high 

quality security sustainable over the long-term with a specific focus on leveraging 

cost efficiencies. 

I believe that the Strategic Alliance Model offered through G4S Regulated Security Solutions (formerly Wackenhut Nuclear Services) will provide the highest levels 

of performance and service reliability and is the model necessary in today’s environment. Adopting the principles of the Strategic Alliance Model will allow Exelon or 

any other security service organization to perform at the necessary level however, 

I am confident that G4S RSS can provide those services much more cost effectively 

and efficiently. 

Question 2. In your testimony, you mention that security service providers focused 

on price to gain a competitive advantage. How did this focus on price affect security, 

In what areas are there price differentials, and how can we make sure price isn’t 

the focus in the future? 

To be clear, the contract security industry’s pricing structure never negatively affected the level of security at a nuclear power plant. However, the drive to continually reduce cost results meant that the security department was not fully integrated with other plant departments in the post-9/11 security arena. This in turn 

meant that security services were always delivered, but the impact of those services 

on nuclear power plant were never fully quantified, refined or fully optimized in a 

manner that has become imperative in the post-9111 world. 

To address this, we have adopted a new strategic direction through the creation 

of G4S RSS, which essentially measures us against our ability to reduce performance shortfalls and deliver on predetermined outcomes. 

Question 3. If the NRC is correct that fatigue was not the problem at Peach Bottom, what was the problem and how do you think we can prevent similar problems 

In the future? 

Lack of leadership among the shift supervisors was the underlying issue in the 

events at Peach Bottom. Under G4S RSS, we have recognized the need for higher 

levels of training in the areas of leadership, integrity and professional development 

specifically for first and second line supervision. Starting from the Security Officer 

up through Project Manager level, we have initiated additional training requirements targeting the delivery and implementation of the necessary tools and skills 

to perform at the levels required in today’s nuclear security environment. 

RESPONSES BY ERIC WILSON TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENTOR CASEY

Question 1. What procedures did Wackenhut have in place to deal with employee 

concerns and how were these advertised to employees? What changes have you 

made to these procedures since the incident at Peach Bottom? 

There were several specific procedures and policies in effect allowing employees 

the opportunity to bring forth concerns: 

1) G4S RegUlated Security Solutions Policy WPO–1314—Open Door Policy 

Provides specific guidance to employees to bring forth any concern involving the 

degradation of security or any condition that could negatively affect the safety of 

the plant. Employees are encouraged to first use their ‘‘chain of command’’ and if 

they are provided a response not consistent with procedures and regulations or they 

are not comfortable discussing with their supervision, they have the right and obligation to contact facility and/or corporate management. 

2) G4S RegUlated Security Solutions Policy WPO–1318—Safety Conscious Work 

Environment 

Provides specific guidance to our employees of the importance of establishing a 

working environment in which employees have the right and are obligated to bring 

forth issues and concerns—without fear of retaliation. Specific expectations for supervision and management address their responsibility to respond to these concerns, 

elevate the concerns to proper supervisory or management level, when appropriate, 

and to ensure employees are treated with respect and confidentiality in the process. 

89 

Also, incorporated are requirements for monitoring employees’ knowledge of their 

rights and obligations through employee survey assessments. 

3) G4S Regulated Security Solutions Procedure WPR–1313—Safe–2-Say Program 

For those employees that would prefer to submit concerns to a source independent 

to RSS, we have established a program allowing them to formally contact our 

Human Resource Department through a toll-free access line staffed 24/7. 

This program was established to address issues related to harassment. discrimination and retaliation and other issues related to non-ethical treatment of employees. Additionally, employees are directed to use the utility-licensee Employee Concern Program for nuclear safety concerns if they do not feel comfortable submitting 

these to RSS supervision and management through other available RSS processes. 

4) Employee Concerns Program (utility-licensee) Each utility-licensee is required 

to provide a means for all plant employees, whether utility or contracted, to submit 

concerns through an ombudsman’’ program. Utilities have submitted these programs 

for review to the NRC for approval. Specifics of these programs include: (a) the 

rights and obligations of employees to submit concerns of a nuclear safety issue (operations, maintenance, security); (b) employees will be capable of submitting concerns without fear of retaliation and (c) supervision and management have an obligation to address all concerns thoroughly and provide feedback to the employee(s). 

5) NRC Form 3 

All utilities are required to inform employees of their obligation and right to bring 

forth concerns to the NRC if employee concerns are not properly addressed by the 

utility-licensee or contractor. Furthermore, it informs employees that they have protection under the law from retaliation for submitting these concerns. Address and 

phone numbers of NRC offices and representative are provided on the form. 

To ensure employees are informed and knowledgeable of these processes, both the 

utility-licensee and RSS conduct initial and annual re-qualification training on the 

regulations, policies, procedures and programs identified above. These measures are 

extensive as they allow employee multiple avenues to submit concerns. 

RSS elected not to change our processes, as we consider them extensive and more 

than adequate if properly utilized. After the Peach Bottom occurrence, we did conduct employee refresher training of the processes at each RSS fleet location to reemphasize the available avenues, RSS expectations, utility-licensee expectations, 

and NRC expectations. Additionally, we significantly increased our management onshift presence at each fleet location to discuss the incident and again re-emphasize 

our expectations with regards to reporting nuclear safety concerns. 

In a continuing effort to address the issue, RSS has recently prepared a video reemphasizing our performance expectations with regard to inattentiveness and that 

employees are encouraged to use the processes available to them to bring nuclear 

safety issues to the attention of supervision and management. The videos have been 

distributed and are being viewed by our employees. 

Question 2. In your opinion, would there be a benefit In requiring the NRC to deal 

with the licensee and security contracts directly and simultaneously? Would this 

have eliminated the information gap between your onsite management and your corporate managers? 

Response. Yes, there would be significant benefit and RSS encourages a simultaneous communication process for allegations concerning our employee’s performance. 

Recent regulation places more accountability on the contractor with fines being directly leveled against the contractor for non-compliance issues. yet current practices 

with regard to communicating allegations include the utility-licensee only. 

Additionally, we support the position that a simultaneous communication of allegations would have eliminated the information gap between our onsite management 

and our corporate managers and provided RSS the opportunity to conduct a corporate directed investigation that potentially would have properly addressed Mr. 

Beal’s concerns, identified the inattentiveness, and allowed the proper corrective action to be applied. 

Question 3. Kerry Beal, your former employee at Peach Bottom, experienced retaliation at the plant after he went to Wackenhut supervisors with his concerns about 

sleeping guards. The retaliation seems to continue even though he’s no longer employed by Wackenhut or within the nuclear industry. According to a recent newspaper story, Beal’s partial employee records were released by one of his former 

Wackenhut managers (who is also no longer employed by Wackenhut) to the press. 

What actions are you taking regarding this matter? And, more broadly, what kind 

of actions are you taking within Wackenhut as new CEO In G4S to correct this kind 

of behavior at other Wackenhut protected nuclear sites? 

Response. It is not true that Kerry Beal was subjected to retaliation by his 

Wackenhut supervisors after he raised concerns about sleeping officers. Any adverse 

90 

action taken by Wackenhut was based on legitimate reasons. While Mr. Beal was 

not retained as a security officer when Exelon assumed the security functions at 

Peach Bottom, Wackenhut was not involved in the selection and retention of security officers, which was conducted by Exelon. Moreover, no retaliation by Wackenhut 

or its employees occurred after his departure. 

With regard to Mr. Beal’s employee records, Wackenhut took prompt and assertive action in response to the disclosure of draft employee records for Mr. Beal. 

Wackenhut’s understanding is that one of Mr. Beal’s former supervisors had draft 

records because the supervisor worked on administrative tasks on his home computer. On February 1, 2008, the same day that Wackenhut became aware of the release of these draft records to a newspaper, and before the newspaper published the 

article, Wackenhut’s outside counsel contacted the supervisor by letter, which was 

delivered by special courier to his home. Counsel’s letter demanded that the former 

supervisor cease and desist from disclosure of the draft records and return them to 

Wackenhut’s legal counsel. Also that day, Wackenhut’s counsel wrote to the reporter 

for the York Daily Record, requesting in very strong language that the newspaper 

not print the information that had been disclosed without authorization. 

Until February 1, 2008, by which time Mr. Beal’s former supervisor was no longer 

a Wackenhut employee, Wackenhut had no knowledge that this former supervisor 

had any plan to speak to the press. At no time did Wackenhut in any way support 

or encourage the former supervisor’s actions. By the same token, Wackenhut is 

mindful that it should not act to hamper anyone, including a current or former supervisor, from raising concerns about issues like inattentive security officers, nor 

from delivering to the NRC and the press accurate information on such issues, as 

such activity should be protected by ‘‘whistleblower’’ laws. Similarly, Mr. Beal was 

not adversely treated by Wackenhut or its employees for raising concerns about inattentive security officers. 

The former supervisor agreed to return the computer disc with the draft employee 

records that very day, and he did so. The former supervisor also advised 

Wackenhut’s counsel that he informed the newspaper reporter that the newspaper 

should not use or reference the draft documents in any story. 

Exelon, Wackenhut and Mr. Beal settled and resolved all of their disputes in a 

settlement agreement, in which none of the Parties admitted any liability to any 

other Party. The terms of the settlement agreement are confidential. The NRC has 

reviewed the terms of the settlement agreement and accepted it. 

Subsequent to this incident, Wackenhut has reviewed its policy manual and confirmed that prior to February 2008, it has had in place written provisions which articulate sufficiently the confidentiality of employee records. Wackenhut reviews and 

revises its policy manual on an on-going basis. 

RESPONSES BY ERIC WILSON TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENTOR INHOFE

Question 1. Exelon fired Wackenhut following the Peach Bottom problem. That 

has led some to question whether security can be effectively maintained by a contracted force. Mr. Lochbaum contends that the opposite question would be asked if 

the sleeping guards had been utility employees and not contractors. With nearly 

half of our nuclear plants guarded by a contracted security force, please describe 

why we can be confident that those plants are just as secure as an ‘‘in-house’’ force. 

Response. According to most industry and regulatory authorities, including Nuclear Energy Institute and the Union of Concerned Scientists, security services provided by the contract security industry or nuclear power industry itself are very 

comparable (almost indistinguishable). The standards by which nuclear security organizations are held accountable and tested are the same whether the organization 

is ‘‘in house’’ or contracted. In fact, commercial nuclear power plants are the most 

highly secured commercial critical infrastructure in the Nation. Additionally, it’s important to note that a contracted force affords greater flexibility in dealing with abnormal issues such as contingency force requirements, handling support requirements in response to natural disasters as well as leveraging capabilities and best 

practices across a broader range. 

Question 2. The U.S. military Is responsible for many sensitive security operations, including protection of the airspace over the Capitol and protection of our 

nation’s nuclear deterrent. Has your company consulted with any branches of the 

military regarding best practices for addressing inattentiveness in comparable security situations? 

Response. Many of our employees actually come from various military backgrounds, including previous members of special operations units, and provide valuable input into our operations. The challenge we face is operating a highly specialVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:23 May 01, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\_EPW\DOCS\85523.TXT VERN
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ized paramilitary organization within the constraints of commercial enterprise. 

There are fundamental differences in acceptable operational and accountability 

methodologies between military organizations and security organizations within the 

commercial arena. However, I believe that the commercial nuclear industry has 

made great progress in addressing today’s threat, ensuring the security and safe operations of our nuclear reactors. 

RESPONSES BY ERIC WILSON TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENTOR VOINOVICH

Question 1. Mr. Wilson, one of the complaints I have heard anecdotally is that 

nuclear plant security guards in general do not feel that they are fully accepted as 

part of the site organization. And somehow they feel that they are less than equal 

partners compared to other plant workers, such as operators or maintenance workers. I would like to get your perspective on this. 

Response. Traditionally, the security organization has not been viewed as a critical element for energy production, but more as only necessary for regulatory compliance. The events of 9/11 have highlighted the threat we face and the vital nature 

of security however instituting cultural change is a process, one that does not happen over night. As an industry, we feel change regarding the value of security has 

begun. Integrating the security function, but also moving toward measuring performance on outcomes instead of whether or not the service was delivered. is—I believe—the direction which the contract security industry must take. 

Question 2. There is a suggestion that the Industry might consider having security officers carry an electronic device, which senses inactivity and alerts the security command center. I think something like that could be a very good, practical solution to security officers working the midnight shift. I would like to get your 

thoughts on this suggestion. 

Response. We are currently in the final stages of production of such a device 

called the Advanced Security Assistant 100 (ASA–100). The device is equipped with 

motion sensing accelerometers designed to detect periods of inactivity, generating 

local and remote alarms once preset thresholds have been reached. The ASA–100 

provides for not only inactivity monitoring but also other key tracking and monitoring functions to include equipment tracking and patrol logging. Additionally, this 

devise can assist in the deployment and implementation of the defensive strategy 

during drills or in an actual engagement. I believe that this device will provide an 

essential safeguard to ensure accountability and the sustained performance required 

today. 

Senator CARPER. Good. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Lochbaum. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID LOCHBAUM, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR 

SAFETY PROJECT, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to 

present our views on this important topic. 

The NRC has taken many steps since 9/11 to improve nuclear 

power plant security. Last year’s event at Peach Bottom indicate 

that three additional steps are required. 

The first step corrects inadequate responses to security allegations. Last spring, NRC, Exelon and Wackenhut received allegations that security guards were sleeping at Peach Bottom. Their responses were untimely and inadequate until media reports surfaced last fall exposing the same problem. The NRC, Exelon and 

Wackenhut were then able to quickly substantiate facts that had 

been elusive before. 

When workers raise concerns in good faith to Wackenhut, to 

Exelon and then to NRC, Newton’s third law, for every action there 

is an equal and opposite reaction, should have triggered good faith 

responses. But instead, all three applied Newton’s first law, an object at rest tends to stay at rest. Neither Wackenhut nor Exelon 

nor NRC reacted to correct the problems. 

92 

The NRC referred the allegations back to Exelon. Exelon investigated and informed the NRC that it did not substantiate the allegations. Yet last September, warned that a video of the sleeping existed, Exelon was able to quickly substantiate that it existed, that 

it showed security guards sleeping, as well as the identity of the 

videographer. 

The allegations remained exactly the same between Exelon’s initial denial and its subsequent mea culpa. This is not the National 

Football League’s instant replay booth. It should not take and did 

not take indisputable visual evidence for Exelon to substantiate the 

allegations. Hence, when NRC entrusted Exelon to investigate the 

allegations, Exelon violated that trust with its shoddy response. 

The NRC must significantly sanction Exelon for that shortfall. 

By the same token, the NRC should not have waited for the 

video either. After the NRC received the allegations last March, its 

inspectors took no steps to investigate them. After the NRC received Exelon’s response last May, its resident inspectors took no 

steps to verify the response. But when the NRC received the same 

allegations from a reporter last September, backed by an alleged 

video, the agency responded vastly differently. Within hours, its 

resident inspectors at Peach Bottom were directed to investigate 

the charges. The NRC dispatched an inspection team to Peach Bottom about a week later. The different reaction suggests the NRC 

is more interested in protecting its reputation than the lives of 

American civilians. NRC must not stand for Nielsen Ratings Commission. 

The second step restores public communication about security. 

Wackenhut, Exelon and NRC all applied Newton’s first law in response to the security allegations. The full statement of Newton’s 

first law explains why the reactions changed when the video surfaced: an object at rest tends to stay at rest, unless acted upon by 

an outside force. 

In August, 2004, the NRC removed virtually all security information from its website. The removal created a vacuum that is now 

being filled by rumor, supposition, innuendo and occasional facts. 

For example, after the Peach Bottom story broke last fall, the lack 

of context allowed people to extrapolate from that single datapoint 

to whatever conclusion they wanted, from Peach Bottom being an 

isolated case to it being the tip of an iceberg of a total security 

sham. 

Security information can be discussed without compromising national security. Earlier this month, the NRC announced the 

issuance of a ‘‘white’’ finding for the sleeping security guards at 

Peach Bottom. Last month, the NRC announced a $208,000 fine for 

security guards intentionally disabling their weapons at the Turkey 

Point nuclear plant. If the NRC can communicate about these serious problems, then the NRC can also communicate about less serious problems and the lack of problems at other nuclear plants. 

Equally important, public communication of this security information serves as the outside force needed to put resting objects in 

motion. Plant owners falling short of NRC security requirements 

would be publicly identified, providing ample incentive to correct 

those shortfalls. Today, NRC’s refusal to report security information enables underperformers to remain at rest. 

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The third step eliminates the zero tolerance policies. Many people have said already today at the hearing that zero tolerance policies can do more harm than good. We totally agree with that concept. It is clearly wrong for security officers to sleep on duty. Being 

asleep impairs a guard’s ability to perform the job, but slipping on 

ice during an outside patrol and breaking an arm or coming down 

with a stomach virus also impairs that guard’s ability, but those 

are not grounds for immediate termination. 

It could be argued that the zero tolerance policy doesn’t apply in 

those cases because those aren’t deliberate acts. Yet zero tolerance 

policies applied to sleeping assumes that every act of sleeping is an 

intentional function. That is not true. Sometimes people simply fall 

asleep because they are bored or they are fatigued. 

When a security guard falls asleep, the proper response is to 

enter that incident into the plant’s corrective action program. The 

corrective action program is required by Federal regulation to identify causes of human and equipment performance problems and 

correct them. When the corrective action determines that an individual deliberately took steps to sleep, then termination is an appropriate reaction. But when the corrective action program identifies a number of security guards accidentally falling asleep, the appropriate reaction might be shorter working hours, more frequent 

shift rotation, and other things to offset the tedium. A zero tolerance policy is a one size fits all approach that often fails to correct 

the underlying causes. 

In closing, as Senator Voinovich pointed out, the silver lining 

about these problems is the opportunity to be better prepared tomorrow. Adequate nuclear plant security is like adequate car insurance: protecting against an event one hopes never to encounter. 

Adequate nuclear power plant security requires plant owners and 

the NRC to provide timely and effective responses to security allegations. It did not happen last year at Peach Bottom. It must happen the next time. 

The American public has a right to know that the nuclear power 

plants in their backyards have adequate security. The NRC needs 

to restore public communication about security to satisfy that right. 

Security guards have a responsibility to perform their jobs properly. Security guards must not be held to a higher standard than 

other nuclear plant workers, especially with zero tolerance policies 

that cause more harm than good. 

We thank this Subcommittee for holding this hearing and placing 

a spotlight on this important issue. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lochbaum follows:] 

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RESPONSES BY DAVID A. LOCHBAUM TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR BOXER

Question 1. The Peach Bottom incident was reported as an isolated problem. Are 

there other ‘‘isolated incidents’’ of which this Committee should be aware? 

Response. The ‘‘isolated incident’’ at the Turkey Point nuclear plant in Florida 

was significantly more serious than the ‘‘isolated incident’’ at Peach Bottom. Both 

involved security guards conspiring to cover for each other as they slept on duty. 

But the security guards at Turkey Point also took steps to sabotage their equipment, such as removing the firing pins from weapons. But no video exists, to our 

knowledge, of the antics at Turkey Point so these incidents, while far more serious, 

got far less attention. 

Question 2. Do you think Exelon will provide better security than Wackenhut provided? 

Response. No, but I don’t think Exelon will provide worse security either. Security 

will be the same regardless of what emblem appears on the guards’ uniforms because the underlying factors remain unchanged. The NRC’s Augmented Inspection 

Team report documents that mangers and supervisors for both Wackenhut and 

Exelon heard repeatedly about security guards sleeping on duty and did little about 

it. When the videotapes were broadcast, a scapegoat was needed. Wackenhut could 

not fire Exelon, but Exelon could and did fire Wackenhut. This measure provides 

the allusion of remedying the problem without addressing the root causes why did 

Exelon’s managers ignore repeated warnings about sleeping security guards? Because that root cause remains uncorrected, security cannot get better. 

Question 3. Do you agree with Commissioner Jaczko that the NRC should take 

a more active role in investigating allegations rather than sending the allegations 

to the licensee for investigation? In your opinion, will the NRC do a better job investigating allegations than the licensee? 

Response. Yes, but not necessarily active in the same way that Commissioner 

Jackzo proposes. NRC lacks the resources to investigate 100 percent of the allegations it receives. Thus, while NRC may very well investigate a higher percentage 

of allegations, it will not investigate all of the allegations. When NRC refers allegations back to plant owners for investigation, the NRC must become more active in 

two ways: (1) NRC must do a better job monitoring the plant owners’ investigations 

to verify that their efforts were thorough and their results reasonable, and (2) NRC 

must sanction plant owners who conduct incomplete or shoddy investigations. 

RESPONSE BY DAVID A. LOCHBAUM TO AN ADDITIONAL QUESTION

FROM SENATOR INHOFE

Question 1. In your testimony, you stated: ‘‘NRC’s refusal to responsibly report security information enables poor performers to remain at rest,’’ indicating you disagree with the NRC’s restrictions on security information that is available to the 

public. Yet the purpose of the hearing was to publicly discuss security and guards’ 

attentiveness in detail to ensure the proper steps are taken to prevent this situation 

in the future. Wouldn’t you agree that any reporting of security successes or problems should be subject to requirements that protect security information? 

Response. I absolutely agree and appreciate the opportunity to clarify our position 

on this important point. We wholeheartedly agree that information about current 

vulnerabilities at nuclear power plants should not be publicly available. But information about past problems, now resolved, can and should be made public. For example, the NRC’s reactor oversight process (ROP) provides quarterly reports to the 

public on safety performance and used to provide quarterly reports on security performance. By restoring the quarterly reports on security performance to the ROP 

webpage, the many plant owners who are getting the job done and achieving solid 

security performance would have all ‘‘green’’ results reported. When media reports 

like the one last year on Peach Bottom surface, the people living around plants with 

‘‘green’’ security performance results would have little to fear and the owners of 

those facilities would not be guilty by association. And plant owners who didn’t get 

the job done in the past would have thus past failures publicized, giving them extra 

incentive to get the job done properly. 

RESPONSES BY DAVID A. LOCHBAUM TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

FROM SENATOR VOINOVICH

Question 1. Mr. Lochbaum, one of the complaints I have heard anecdotally is that 

nuclear plant security guards in general do not feel that they are fully accepted as 

part of the site organization. And somehow they feel that they are less than equal 

103 

partners compared to other plant workers, such as operators or maintenance workers. I would like to get your perspective on this. 

Response. My 17 years in the industry is consistent with these anecdotes. Although I worked at more than 20 of our reactors, I never worked at a site where 

security was integrated into the work force. Security personnel and other personnel 

were there to do their jobs at the same site, but not as part of the same overall 

team. Eric Wilson of Regulated Security Solutions and another witness during the 

hearing relayed a related conclusion he reached following his examination of how 

the nuclear industry responded to the Three Mile Island accident. That accident revealed weaknesses in training of operators and other key workers. In response, the 

nuclear industry significantly upgraded initial and ongoing training for these workers. As new issues emerged, like safety culture following the Davis-Besse incident, 

the lessons were incorporated into these training platforms. But security officers 

were excluded from this training and no separate training program was provided 

for them. This separation manifests itself in some of the safety culture surveys conducted at plant sites. For example, in recent years the security department scores 

on the safety culture surveys conducted at the South Texas Project (TX) and San 

Onofre (CA) nuclear plants were among the lowest of any group onsite. As a minimum, the ongoing training provided to operators and key plant workers must be 

extended to security officers. 

Question 2. There is a suggestion that the industry might consider having security 

officers carry an electronic device which senses inactivity and alerts the security 

command center. I think something like that could be a very good, practical solution 

to security officers working the midnight shift. I would like to get your thoughts on 

this suggestion? 

I agree that these electronic devices could be very beneficial depending on how 

they are deployed. If the devices are deployed with zero tolerance policies that mean 

one alert back to the security command center results in termination, the devices 

will alienate the security officers. For example, operators and other key workers covering shifts are also subject to fatigue and occasionally fall asleep at work. The security officers may view the devices as further evidence of their being held to a different standard when alarming devices end their careers while sleeping operators 

are treated differently. If, however, the devices are deployed in a constructive way 

to help security officers perform their vital roles more effectively, they can enhance 

security. 

Senator CARPER. And we thank you for your testimony here 

today. 

Mr. Fertel, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF MARVIN FERTEL, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

AND CHIEF NUCLEAR OFFICER, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE 

Mr. FERTEL. Thank you, Chairman Carper, Senator Voinovich. It 

is a pleasure to be here and have the opportunity to testify. 

My testimony will address three subjects: first, the security at 

our Nation’s 65 nuclear power plant sites; the actions that the industry has taken in response to the security officers inattentiveness incidents; and the use of Wackenhut Special Operations as the 

contractor to support the industry’s composite adversary force. 

As you know, prior to 9/11, nuclear power plants had to meet security requirements required by the NRC, and following the September 2001 attacks, NRC increased nuclear facility security requirements numerous times and is now in the process of codifying 

additional requirements in rulemakings. 

Since 9/11, the industry has invested more than $2 billion in additional security at nuclear power plant sites, and has increased 

the number of security officers by more than 60 percent to about 

8,000. Compared to other commercial facilities, nuclear plants start 

with a clear advantage in the area of security. The structures that 

house reactors and critical systems are built to withstand natural 

events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, fires and floods. 

104 

Furthermore, nuclear power plant security is designed with concentric perimeters, with increased security at each level. Both of 

you have visited plants and gone through this, and know you have 

physical barriers to protect against unauthorized personnel and vehicle intrusion, including truck bombs. These security zones are 

protected by trained and armed professionals who use hardened defensive fighting positions located throughout the plants, like the 

BREs that were discussed before. 

In the innermost security zones, access to the vital areas of our 

plants is strictly controlled using biometrics and other technologies. 

Critical areas are constantly surveilled and monitored, and strict 

access control is also maintained, with industry employees with 

unescorted access subject to a systematic fitness for duty program, 

a continual behavioral observation program, and they must undergo comprehensive background checks. 

Every plant also has extensive plans and arrangements with 

State and local law enforcement and emergency response entities. 

A significant security standard mandated by the NRC is the socalled design-basis threat. Every site tests its security forces 

against this standard, and the NRC inspects against it at mandated force on force exercises. Based upon tabletop exercises done 

at all of our sites, and additional simulations done at some sites, 

we would expect to be successful against most credible threats even 

at levels greater than the DBT. 

But at some point, such threats require a more integrated response. So since September 11th, DHS, NRC and the industry have 

recognized the importance of coordinating Federal, State and local 

authorities with the industry to best defend against such an attack. 

As a result, a program was established by DHS to integrate the response planning around nuclear plant sites. This program is called 

comprehensive reviews and brought together the full potential of 

local, State and Federal capabilities. Last year, these comprehensive reviews were completed for every site. 

As I just briefly described, the improvements to an already robust security program since 9/11 have been pretty broad-based and 

significant, and they continue today. 

Let me turn now to the subject of this hearing, which is security 

officer attentiveness. In an environment of strong security and professionalism, we still have had isolated incidents of security officer 

inattentiveness. Every company expects the on duty security force 

to be fully attentive and able to respond when called upon. And 

certainly, that is the predominant situation when you look across 

our sites. 

In 2007, we are aware of 17 incidents of inattentive officers at 

our sites reported to the NRC, and that is out of roughly about 16 

million manhours of security officers on duty. Now, that doesn’t 

make it OK. It shouldn’t be happening at all. As the Chairman 

said, you are going for perfection. But we should keep in mind, we 

have 24/7 security offices on guard at every site and we have had 

12 incidents—not acceptable, but not systemic. 

Immediately following the Peach Bottom situation, NEI communicated with the industry’s chief nuclear officers and recommended 

several immediate actions be taken by each site. Consistent with 

the Chairman’s statement about his P3 experience, one of the 

105 

things we emphasized at that point was the need for leadership at 

the site and encouraged each chief nuclear office to meet with the 

security organization to discuss the importance of offices being attentive to their duties, and too, reinforce the organization’s expectations and standards. 

We also created a task force which is actively engaged examining 

security organization cultural issues, as well as additional measures that may be effective for ensuring security officer attentiveness. The task force is working to define the performance and professional standards needed to promote the security culture desired 

across all of our plants. It is also looking at the behavior observation program and how we can strengthen it. 

This task force is also looking at the appropriate policy for addressing incidents where inattentiveness occurs. Fundamentally, I 

agree with what the Chairman said and what David said on zero 

tolerance. There are cases where zero tolerance is appropriate, but 

it is for egregious behavior, not behavior that you shouldn’t have, 

but isn’t egregious. We can talk about that more later. 

Leadership at every company and every site expects and advocates a safety-conscious work environment program which is designed to ensure individuals feel free to raise concerns and are confident these concerns will be promptly reviewed and resolved with 

the priority appropriate to their significance. Security officers, just 

like other personnel on the site, are therefore encouraged and expected to promptly report concerns and issues to supervision for 

resolution. Our expectation is that those concerns are addressed effectively by management. 

Let me turn now quickly to the force on force exercises and the 

industry composite adversary force. Prior to September 11, NRC 

evaluated force on force exercises roughly once every 8 years at 

each site and there were no NRC requirements for annual exercises 

to be conducted by the site. Also, the pre-9/11 program did not have 

specific performance requirements for the adversary force that participated in the evaluated exercises. 

Since 2004, each plant has been required to conduct force on 

force exercises of security several times each year, with each security shift being tested every year, as well as an annual exercise. As 

Commissioner Lyons mentioned, in 2007 we completed the first 3- 

year cycle with NRC-evaluated force on force security exercises at 

every plant. We are now into the second cycle. 

The NRC has also established standards for the qualification of 

the adversary force that participates in the drills. Given these defined requirements, the industry decided to establish a composite 

adversary force that is skilled in offensive tactics and has the training and qualifications to meet the NRC standards. The adversary 

force is used in the triennial NRC-evaluated exercises and thus 

presents a state-of-the-art challenge to the plants. 

In addition to evaluating the defensive capabilities of the plant, 

the NRC also evaluates the adversary force to ensure a robust exercise. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Fertel, I am going to ask you to wrap up, 

if you would. 

Mr. FERTEL. Yes, I am. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. 

106 

Mr. FERTEL. This is a subject you raised. Let me just touch on 

this. 

The composite adversary force is managed under a contract with 

Wackenhut Special Operations Group. The management team is 

composed of five individuals, all of which have extensive special operations experience. The rest of the adversary team consists of individuals from power plant sites that are trained to meet the NRC 

standards and perform as a team. While some of the team members do come from Wackenhut sites, less than 50 percent do. We 

don’t believe it matters where they come from because they are 

held to a standard by both the NRC and us that it doesn’t matter 

whether they are Wackenhut people or not. They have to meet the 

standard. 

With that, I would be prepared to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fertel follows:] 

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Senator CARPER. Thank you very much. 

Senator Voinovich is going to ask the first round of questions, 

and then I will wrap it up. Thank you. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I would like to put this into perspective, and 

maybe you could shed some light on it. 

First of all, we had a serious matter where somebody slept on the 

job and ultimately somebody took a picture and so on. In terms of 

the overall public, has anybody evaluated on a scale of one to ten 

why terrorists would want to go after a nuclear power plant? We 

have nuclear power plants. We have chemical plants. We have all 

kinds of facilities all over the Country. 

From a threat assessment, and maybe we need to do this in a 

closed session, but if you had a guard sleeping and then something 

did happen, was there enough other stuff in place that it could 

have taken care of it, i.e. the guy wasn’t there, he was sleeping on 

the job, the whistle blows, you have to do this, and he’s not there. 

Could they have handled it if the guy remained sleeping? I am just 

talking practical things. So that is one thing. 

I have been out to see two of our plants, Perry Nuclear and 

Davis-Besse, particularly at Perry Nuclear on the security side of 

this thing. So you have the internal problem of making sure that 

the plant works and things like Davis-Besse don’t occur about the 

head of the gizmo that is there and so forth. 

And then it is the security threat. I recall being at a Federal facility where they were bragging about how they had security in 

place. I said, get in a car and go up to Perry and find out how you 

really secure a place. 

So I think the public ought to know that in terms of security, 

probably these facilities are more protected than anyplace anywhere in the Country, just to put things in perspective. I think so 

often they get the publicity, and I have to believe there may be 

some other things out there that are a lot more dangerous in communities that need to be secured than what we are talking about 

in terms of our nuclear facilities. So that is to put things in perspective. 

And then you have the outside contractor and the internal people. And half of the operations have private people coming in and 

half do it internally. I don’t know, Mr. Fertel, whether or not you 

guys have looked at this and said, when they do it in-house it is 

a little better done than if they hire somebody from outside to come 

into the operation. I think, Mr. Crane, in your testimony you talked 

about some kind of cultural difference there, people feeling they 

weren’t part of the team. I would be interested in your comments 

on that. 

And last but not least, Mr. Crane, when this thing went awry, 

I would be really interested in how did you go about dealing with 

the situation in terms of the people that were in security? I think 

you have now moved to your own people. OK? I would be interested 

in knowing how do you determine what really works in terms of 

security? What methodology? I am talking about a management 

issue here. For example, I would like to ask, do you have quality 

management in your company? Do you know what quality management is? 

Mr. CRANE. We have a program similar to that, yes. 

116 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. What did you do? What have you done? 

Mr. CRANE. Yes, I can start first and go backward on the questions and then turn it over. 

Our decision to bring the program in-house and no longer have 

it as an out-sourced service is wrapped around a few things. One 

is being able to have access to select, train and continue to develop 

the managers. We have a very detailed management training program where we start off and we do behavioral assessments. We 

look at gaps to standards that we want. 

Senator VOINOVICH. You want to take over the H.R. part of this 

thing? 

Mr. CRANE. Not only the HR. That is the first part. Being able 

to select the people. I think the basis of the program is the quality 

of the people and the development of the people, then the oversight 

of the people. The actual mechanism that we secure the plant by 

is set by regulatory standards, design standards. We are very well 

aware of how to operate a security force. What we did not have was 

the security force within our programs as far as assessment, development and continued nurturing, or deciding if the individuals 

should be part of the team or not. So that is one of our primary 

goals, and that is the focus that brought us to bring the program 

in-house. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Are you doing this in all of your plants? 

Mr. CRANE. We are. We are in the process. Peach Bottom is completed and we are in the process by the end of June of this year, 

we will have all the facilities with the guards being Exelon employees, the security personnel being Exelon employees. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Now, when you finish with the job, is the 

NRC going to come in and evaluate what you have done? 

Mr. CRANE. Yes. They have been evaluating Peach Bottom as an 

ongoing inspection, and we anticipate as they have told us that we 

will continue to get these inspections at our other facilities on a 

regular basis. 

Senator VOINOVICH. How about you? Are you going to have a 

team in place to go out there and oversee this thing to make sure 

that it is at the standard where you want it to be? 

Mr. CRANE. We do. We have a special team, an issues response 

team, that was set up at the beginning of this and they will continue on as the change management and oversight organization to 

provide the management support as required. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Fertel, is it INPO? I can never remember the name of it. 

Mr. FERTEL. INPO. 

Senator VOINOVICH. INPO, yes. Because this happened at this 

place, is INPO going to do anything about it? This shed a bad light 

on the industry. What are you going to do about it? Or is that 

something that you don’t touch? 

Mr. FERTEL. Actually, NEI is doing stuff. INPO would stay on 

the safety side of the issue, not the security side. They will keep 

looking at safety-security interface. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So INPO doesn’t do security. They do the internal operation of the plant to make sure the maintenance is 

there, if things are replaced and so forth. 

Mr. FERTEL. Right. 

117 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. 

Mr. FERTEL. But maybe starting at the top of your questions, 

Senator Voinovich, does the public understand this threat, the significance of the threat at Peach? The NRC did do a pretty in-depth 

review of it, and their conclusion was that there was no diminishment of their ability to defend the site, and they have made that 

public. Whether the public has read it is a whole other story. 

The other thing that the NRC did determine, and this goes to a 

question asked earlier by Senator Carper, was that fatigue was not 

an issue. To be honest, we don’t think fatigue is a big issue for security officers as much as boredom. We like them to be bored, just 

like we like the operators to be bored, because that means there 

is nothing happening. But we need to do something so that when 

they are bored, they don’t get inattentive. 

That is another thing. Inattentiveness across our industry, and 

this task force we put together is looking at trying to come up with 

the right standards, is defined pretty broadly. Inattentiveness in 

some companies could be sleeping. In other companies, it could be 

anything from sleeping to actually doing something that is not part 

of the job assignment. Say, I am reading a book and I am not supposed to be doing that. So it depends upon where you are on that. 

I would say that the public is not fully aware at all, Senator 

Voinovich, of the relative threat. We are told, and this is not a safeguards issue, but we are told when we deal with law enforcement 

and the FBI and everybody else is that nuclear plants are always 

on the list, just like the White House is probably always on the list. 

But that from the robustness of the security, we are a very hardened target and not one that most people and most groups want 

to take on. But we are always on the list and we take the responsibility very seriously. 

You asked a question about contractor versus proprietary, versus 

taking it in-house. I think what you heard both Chris Crane say 

what he is trying to do by integrating it into the family, and actually what you heard Eric Wilson say about his new approach, you 

want security to be integral to everything at the site. It is easier 

if it is in-house because it is in-house, but it doesn’t have to inhouse to be integral. It is just a little harder. They should use the 

same systems. They should have the same culture. They should 

know that they are part of the same shift as the operations people. 

And they should feel that they are treated with the same respect 

as operators, maintenance people and anybody else on that site. 

So I have a bias where I think in-house might be better, but I 

don’t think it is the only way you can do it. 

Mr. WILSON. Senator Voinovich, if I could speak to your questions. 

Again, I agree with Mr. Fertel and Mr. Crane on the management piece and the integration and why Exelon looked to go inhouse. Because as I talked about in my written testimony, as well 

as my oral testimony, you will see that a little over a year ago, 

from a contract security perspective, we found that to be one of the 

three main areas that needed to be addressed was that closer relationship operationally with the site. So we are in agreement. 

Obviously, Exelon will make the right business decisions for 

them, but we would disagree obviously that in-house is better than 

118 

contract or vice versa. We think that we all need to do the right 

thing at the end of the day. 

One thing I did want to mention to you that you brought up at 

first, and I think is very important from a public perception standpoint, is I happen to have had the opportunity of doing target analysis on targets in critical infrastructure in this Country and others 

in my military career. I can tell you very comfortably that while 

we see nuclear being targets, it is not because they are vulnerable, 

OK? The only reason why they would be a target, in my mind, is 

the fact that because they are a nuclear facility, because I don’t see 

success as it relates to it, nor do I see them as targets of opportunity, not in this Country. I just got back from the Middle East. 

This country itself and its nuclear facilities are very secure. I don’t 

think there is any question of that. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Senator CARPER. Senator Voinovich and I are supposed to be in 

another place right now. If you feel like you want to slip out, I will 

join you just as soon as we wrap up here. Thanks so much for 

being my partner in all this, and letting me be yours. 

I want to go back to the issue of zero tolerance just for a moment, because I think that really is critical as to why there was 

this collusion and, if you will, a coverup and reluctance of people 

to stand up and say this is wrong and be public about it. 

I understand, Mr. Wilson, that Wackenhut had a zero tolerance 

policy. I agree with Mr. Lochbaum, there are some things you want 

to have a zero tolerance policy about. There are others that maybe 

it is not appropriate. 

Let me just ask you, do you all still have a zero tolerance policy? 

Did you ever have a zero tolerance policy? And how do you think 

it is appropriate or inappropriate in this instance? 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I think again the intent of today is to learn 

from the experiences that we had. 

Senator CARPER. That is what we are trying to do here. 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, and I agree with that. And I agree with Mr. 

Lochbaum. We have talked on prior occasions. I have also talked 

to the NRC. We do have a zero tolerance policy, and I think that 

is a mistake because it is not conducive to wanting to bring forth 

concerns as far as inattentiveness goes. I think that is something 

we need to look at. I think it is something we need to change. 

I have been in discussion with the NRC on that. I will continue 

those discussions at least as it concerns regulated security solutions and Wackenhut and the sites that we provide security for. We 

will continue those discussions with our clients at those sites, too. 

But I am in agreement that we have to change it or you will never 

see people wanting to bring forth an issue. It can’t be black and 

white. I think in this regulatory space, this is an area where we 

can’t be. We need to create a different culture. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you. 

Mr. Lochbaum, in your testimony you stated that Exelon’s firing, 

well, firing may be the wrong word, but discontinued relationship 

with Wackenhut in response to the video of sleeping guards, I 

think you said misses the mark. What do you believe would have 

been a more appropriate response? Do you believe that the safety 

119 

culture at Peach Bottom may be the root of the problem with some 

of the security personnel there? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Well, the video rendered the status quo untenable. If Exelon had been using in-house guard, they would have 

had to bring in security professional like Wackenhut because they 

couldn’t continue the status quo once the video aired. So there had 

to be a change, whatever it was, flipped. 

And that really wasn’t the underlying problem. It didn’t matter 

what hats or shoulder emblems were on the jackets. That had little 

to do with it. At Peach Bottom, conditions existed there where security guards felt that their conditions weren’t cared for. They were 

put in the ready room. The problem had been raised. They had 

been promised fixes for many years. So they got to the point where 

they reacted out of frustration. That was the equal force. They 

were treated badly, so they responded in kind, badly. That was the 

underlying cause. Changing the uniform doesn’t fix that frustration. 

Exelon since then has fixed some of those underlying causes that 

forced the guards into that improper response. But the right thing 

to do was figure out what the causes were that led the guards to 

feel that way and address those, not giving them new uniforms. 

Senator CARPER. I would just say, Mr. Crane, when we visited 

your facility at Peach Bottom, and I might say Exelon has a great 

reputation throughout the industry. You guys aren’t the black hats, 

you are the white hats, or one of the white hats. We appreciate 

very much the work your company did at Salem and Hope Creek, 

taking a couple of facilities that frankly were nothing to be proud 

of in terms of their safety record, and bringing them a long, long 

way. So I just feel compelled to acknowledge that. 

Maybe one more, if I could, for Mr. Fertel. Let me ask you the 

same question I posed to the commissioners a little bit earlier, one 

of the questions. The NRC has discussed efforts needed to integrate 

security forces into the licensee’s organization. I understand that 

the institute that you are representing houses and hires the composite adversary force used in force on force exercises. 

If it is appropriate to integrate security forces in the plant’s operation, similarly shouldn’t it be appropriate to integrate the composite adversary force into the Commission’s operation? 

Mr. FERTEL. Let me explain why we think—— 

Senator CARPER. I know you spoke on this earlier, but I want you 

to come back to again. 

Mr. FERTEL. Yes, fine, Senator. I think it is an important subject. 

There were a couple of motivations when we first decided to go 

forth with the composite adversary force. One was lessons learned 

from the experience on force on force in the past. When the sites 

would exercise force on force training and drills for themselves, 

which before 9/11 wasn’t that often, you got smart and you learned 

that the people who were now attacking were officers that most of 

the time defended. So there is a real difference if I spent most of 

my life defending, and then once or twice a year I am asked to become an attacker. 

What we found was, we needed to figure out how to get better 

adversaries for ourselves. Put aside the NRC for a second. 

120 

Senator CARPER. In my business, I would like to have better adversaries, too. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. Not more successful, but I have had good ones. 

Mr. FERTEL. We should take some lessons. 

Senator CARPER. I have had good ones. 

Mr. FERTEL. But what we decided was that if we put together the 

composite adversary force that met the NRC standards, and we did 

it by having, as you pointed out, individuals from our sites running 

through there on an 18 to 36 month period. When we bring them 

back to the sites, they become trainers and leaders for the adversary forces at the site. So we saw a benefit to us by going that way. 

To be honest, we understood the perception issue. We didn’t have 

our heads in the sand. But we were saying, look, if you are meeting 

the standards that NRC has, and they have set them. If you didn’t 

have them, it would be hard, but you have them. Two, they are 

evaluating the performance of that particular group. So if they actually took it in-house, it would be very hard for them to evaluate 

it. 

I could say there is a perception of conflict if they took it inhouse, potentially, but we were looking at an effective force that 

would give us value at the sites. Wackenhut manages it, but we 

have five individuals that manage it that hardly ever see 

Wackenhut. I think your staff may have met with a couple of them. 

These are individuals from Delta Force. They are all special ops. 

Actually, Eric was one of the first leaders of it. 

The one thing all these people want to do is win. So when they 

go out and try and do this, their goal is to win. 

The other thing in all honesty for the officers at the sites, the officers at the sites are very professional. There are people, and 

maybe they are mistreated as David said, and I am sure Exelon 

and other sites will fix that, but they are very professional. They 

want to do their job right. The last thing they want to do is game 

a force on force exercise and potentially not identify a vulnerability 

that could get them or their colleagues killed if somebody actually 

did show up with real guns and not lasers. 

So we think it works real well. We understand the perception 

problem, but this is one of those where if we changed it, and I 

heard what Commissioner Jaczko said, if we changed this for perception, we would actually be diminishing, in my opinion, the 

strength of a very good program that not only helps in force on 

force, but helps the sites. 

Senator CARPER. OK. Good. 

A concluding word, Mr. Lochbaum? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. I just wanted to add to what Marv said. One of 

our concerns if the NRC took over that function, it would eliminate 

the conflict of interest perception, but if you look at how the NRC 

ensures the safety of the plant. The NRC doesn’t run the test of 

the diesel generators. They don’t run the test of the safety systems. 

They ensure that the plant workers do that right to the standards 

and regulations that the NRC has, but they don’t run the safety 

tests. They make sure it is done right. Likewise, we think the 

NRC’s role is to ensure that the security testing is done right. 

121 

To address the perception issue, Commissioner Lyons on the earlier panel said that Wackenhut’s composite adversary force is identifying problems. That information is generally not publicly known. 

I didn’t know that until I heard Commissioner Lyons say it. If they 

provided that information to the public, not necessarily that Plant 

X did bad, but just overall, that would help the public see that 

there is not a perception. And I think that is the way to address 

the problem, more so than putting NRC hats on the fellows. 

Senator CARPER. Good. I think that is an important point and 

not a bad one to conclude on. 

Before you all pack it up and head out, I will just mention a couple of things in closing. 

One of those is going back to what we observed at Peach Bottom 

and the conversations we had with some of the security guards 

there, who I think used to be part of your force and now are part 

of the team at Exelon. They indicated the ready room where they 

went when they weren’t up in the towers or on some other rotational duties. They indicated that the room was warm; that there 

weren’t a lot of activities to keep them alert. I would suggest as we 

go forward that I think we need to consider the issues of fatigue. 

But just as important, we need to consider the kind of environment, temperature, other activities that are available for the 

guards when they are not on specific duty assignments to have to 

do to stay sharp. 

When I was in my old job as a naval flight officer, in my squadron we would have FE and I might say, Mr. Wilson, thank you for 

your service to our Country in another capacity FE but we had 

ready alert crews. In our job, you had to be ready. When the balloon goes up, you have to go find Soviet nuclear subs and you have 

to be ready to go in 30 or 45 minutes. We would always have a 

ready alert crew ready to go. 

Our ready alert crews would usually pre-flight around five or six 

in the morning and take over around eight. By noon, we all had 

our primary jobs on the ground, in addition to our jobs in the 

plane. Around noon, you had to knock off and go to the ready alert 

room and go to bed or sleep, crew rest. The idea there was quite 

the opposite of what we have in the ready room here in this instance. 

But the reason why this is so important, sometimes the bad guys 

trying to come in and take over a facility may not be the composite 

adversary force. It will be the really bad guys. And we need to have 

whoever is in that ready room ready to head out the door and to 

grab their weapon and to be effective like right now. So it is a different kind of State of readiness. 

I know read alert, because we stayed on duty for 24 hours. These 

guys don’t. They stay on eight, nine, or 10 hours, and they are on 

their way home. So there is just a difference here. 

Let me close, if I may say, I think this has been a most valuable 

hearing. Some of the hearings that I have been privileged to attend 

or preside over, they were of help, but maybe not as much as this 

one, not just in terms of what we have learned, but just in terms 

of the important lesson that we send out across the Country, the 

reminder that we send across the Country to folks that are running 

these important 104 facilities. 

122 

I liked one part of your testimony, Mr. Lochbaum, especially. It 

reminded me of my old physics lessons. I am talking about Newton’s first law: an object at rest tends to remain at rest. And then 

you came back and added on the caveat: unless acted upon by an 

outside force. 

This Subcommittee is one of those outside forces. The Congress 

is one of those outside forces. It is important that we keep that in 

mind and know that when we see an object that is at rest that 

ought not to be at rest, that we ought to be there to make sure that 

we get some action. My hope is by today’s hearing, we will not only 

have put a spotlight on what happened, what went wrong at 

Exelon, both at Peach Bottom not only for Exelon and for 

Wackenhut, and Wackenhut’s successor, but also for the NRC, especially for the NRC and a reminder for them to be vigilant. 

I will close with one of the things I said to the employees that 

I spoke with and we met with when we were there. I said there 

is more for the employees at Peach Bottom at stake than just their 

own safety. There is more at stake than just the safety of the folks 

who live in the community around Peach Bottom. There is a whole 

lot at stake for our Country. 

We have this huge and growing reliance on foreign oil. Over 60 

percent of our oil now is imported and a lot of it comes from people 

who don’t like us too much. I am convinced they take our money 

to hurt us. People sometimes say to me, well, why can a nuclear 

power plant and greater reliance on nuclear power, how can that 

help reduce our reliance on foreign oil? 

I will just say two words: Chevrolet Volt. I went to the Detroit 

Auto Show, the North American Auto Show a year ago last January, one of the coolest cars, neatest cars I saw was the flex-fuel 

plug-in hybrid Chevrolet Volt, which hopefully will be on the roads 

of this Country in the year 2010. It is a vehicle you plug it in at 

your garage, you plug in where you work, go leave the next day 

and go 40 miles, if we can develop a battery to do that, on a charge. 

And use the auxiliary power to recharge the battery so you can go 

further than the 40 miles. 

But we need clean energy that nuclear can provide to help provide the electricity for whether it is a Chevrolet Volt or other plugin hybrids that will follow. So the potential to reduce our reliance 

on foreign oil through ample safe nuclear energy is very substantial. 

The other thing is, in my State and States like Maryland and 

New Jersey and others in the mid-Atlantic States, we live at the 

end of the tailpipe for the rest of the Country in terms of air pollution, air emissions. We have in our region very high levels of child 

asthma and we have a lot of other problems with breathing disorders. That is unacceptable. One of the ways we can help reduce 

that problem, address that problem is by figuring out how to introduce a new generation of nuclear power plants into our Country, 

operate them safely, and make sure that ones that have been 

around for a while continue to operate safely, too. 

So there is a lot riding on this, a lot for our Country. 

You have been generous with your time. We appreciate the preparation that you made in coming here today and for the time you 

123 

spent with us today. We will be sending you some questions to followup and we ask that you respond promptly. 

Again, we thank you, and with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

Thanks so much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m. the committee was adjourned.] 

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