Filed 7/19/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

YISROEL GOLDSTEIN et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN 

DIEGO COUNTY,

Respondent;

 D081587

 (San Diego County

 Super. Ct. No. 37-2020-00016638-

 CU-PO-CTL)

SAN DIEGO GUNS, LLC,

Real Party in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Kenneth J. Medel, Judge. 

Petition granted.

Artiano Shinoff, Daniel R. Shinoff, Sheldon Ostroff, and Maurice A. 

Bumbu, for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Law Offices of Adrienne D. Cohen, Adrienne D. Cohen and Sean R. 

Ferron, for Real Party in Interest.
2

In this litigation arising from the April 2019 shooting at the Chabad of 

Poway synagogue, the plaintiffs in two consolidated lawsuits against San 

Diego Guns, LLC (San Diego Guns) seek a peremptory writ of mandate

directing the trial court to vacate its ruling that granted summary 

adjudication to San Diego Guns on plaintiffs’ causes of action seeking to 

recover against San Diego Guns based on the doctrine of negligence per se. 

Plaintiffs’ theory of negligence per se is that San Diego Guns violated

California law in selling the 19-year-old shooter a rifle. According to 

plaintiffs, the shooter did not qualify for the then-existing exception that 

allowed a person under the age of 21 to be sold a rifle if that person possessed 

a “valid, unexpired hunting license.” (Former Pen. Code, § 27510, 

subd. (b)(1).)1 

The trial court granted summary adjudication based on its conclusion 

that the shooter’s hunting license was valid and unexpired in April 2019 even 

though, on its face, the license stated that it was “Valid 07/01/2019 to 

06/30/2020,” i.e., for a period beginning more than two months after San 

Diego Guns sold him the rifle. The trial court distinguished between the time 

period “when the license is ‘valid’ or effective for purposes of hunting,” which 

began on July 1, 2019, and the time period when “the license is valid for 

purposes of sale of the weapon,” which, according to the trial court, began 

when the license was issued in April 2019. 

As we will explain, the meaning of the statute’s reference to a “valid, 

unexpired hunting license” is ambiguous. However, in light of the 

Legislature’s subsequent enactment of section 16685, which clarifies that “a 

valid and unexpired ‘hunting license’ means a hunting license . . . for which 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the 

Penal Code. 
3

the time period authorized for the taking of birds or mammals has 

commenced but not expired,” the trial court erred in concluding that the 

shooter’s hunting license was valid for the purpose of purchasing a firearm. 

We accordingly grant plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandate.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 27, 2019, 19-year-old John T. Earnest opened fire with an AR15 style semiautomatic rifle at the Chabad of Poway synagogue, killing one 

person and wounding others. The rifle was sold to Earnest by San Diego 

Guns. 

As relevant here, two groups of plaintiffs (Plaintiffs), who were present 

at the Chabad of Poway synagogue on the day of the shooting, filed lawsuits 

against San Diego Guns. Plaintiffs’ two lawsuits were subsequently 

consolidated, along with two others.2 Among the causes of action asserted by 

Plaintiffs against San Diego Guns were claims of negligence that depended 

on the doctrine of negligence per se. 

To understand Plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence per se, some 

background is required. Evidence Code section 669 “codifies the common law 

doctrine of negligence per se” and “allows proof of a statutory violation to 

create a presumption of negligence in specified circumstances.” (Elsner v. 

Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 927.) Under that provision, “The failure of a 

person to exercise due care is presumed if: [¶] (1) He violated a statute, 

ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; [¶] (2) The violation proximately 

caused death or injury to person or property; [¶] (3) The death or injury

2 The Plaintiffs who bring this petition for writ of mandate are the 

plaintiffs in Goldstein v. Earnest et al. (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2020, 

No. 37-2020-00016638-CU-PO-CTL) and Almog v. Earnest et al. (Super. Ct. 

San Diego County, 2021, No. 37-2021-00022519-CU-PO-CTL).
4

resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or 

regulation was designed to prevent; and [¶] (4) The person suffering the 

death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons 

for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.” 

(Evid. Code, § 669, subd. (a).) The presumption may be rebutted if the 

defendant shows that it “did what might reasonably be expected of a person 

of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to 

comply with the law.” (Id., subd. (b).) “ ‘[T]he doctrine of negligence per se is 

not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that 

affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence.’ ” (Turner v. 

Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516, 534.)

In April 2019, California law prohibited a licensed gun dealer, such as 

San Diego Guns, from selling, supplying, delivering, or giving possession or 

control of a firearm to any person under 21 years of age unless a specific 

statutory exception was applicable. (Former § 27510.) Although Earnest was 

19 years old at the time, San Diego Guns sold the rifle to Earnest based on its 

belief that Earnest qualified for the exception set forth in former 

section 27510, subdivision (b)(1). Under that exception, San Diego Guns was 

permitted to sell, supply, deliver, or give possession or control “of a firearm 

that is not a handgun to a person 18 years of age or older who possesses a 

valid, unexpired hunting license issued by the Department of Fish and 

Wildlife.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) The AR-15 style rifle purchased by Earnest was 

indisputably “not a handgun,” and thus Earnest was eligible to purchase it 

under the exception set forth in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) if he

possessed a “valid, unexpired hunting license.” (Ibid.)3

3 Section 27510 was amended as of January 1, 2020 to remove 
5

Earnest paid for his rifle at San Diego Guns on April 13, 2019. He then 

obtained a hunting license on April 15, 2019, which he presented to San 

Diego Guns on April 16, 2019, when he completed the required paperwork for 

the transaction. The hunting license consisted of a single piece of paper, 

which stated that it was an “ANNUAL HUNTING LICENSE [¶] Valid 

07/01/2019 to 06/30/2020.” After a background check and the 10-day waiting 

period required by law, Earnest took possession of the rifle from San Diego 

Guns on April 26, 2019. 

Plaintiffs alleged in their operative complaints that the doctrine of 

negligence per se applied because San Diego Guns violated former 

section 27510 when it sold the rifle to Earnest. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged 

that the exception in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) allowing a 

person under 21 years of age to buy a rifle was not applicable because

Earnest did not possess a “valid, unexpired hunting license” (former § 27510, 

subd. (b)(1)) at the time San Diego Guns sold him the rifle. 

San Diego Guns filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the 

alternative, for summary adjudication against Plaintiffs. San Diego Guns 

“semiautomatic centerfire rifle[s]” from the exception set forth in subdivision

(b)(1) for a person under the age of 21 who possesses “a valid, unexpired 

hunting license.” (Stats. 2019, ch. 737, § 3.) Thus, under current law, an AR15 style semiautomatic centerfire rifle would no longer fall under the 

exception in subdivision (b)(1) for someone with “a valid, unexpired hunting 

license,” but certain other types of firearms still qualify. Specifically, the 

current version of section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) states that the prohibition 

on selling, supplying, delivering, or giving possession or control of a firearm 

to any person under 21 years of age “does not apply to or affect the sale, 

supplying, delivery, or giving possession or control of a firearm that is not a 

handgun, semiautomatic centerfire rifle, completed frame or receiver, or 

firearm precursor part to a person 18 years of age or older who possesses a 

valid, unexpired hunting license issued by the Department of Fish and 

Wildlife.” 
6

argued that Plaintiffs would not be able to successfully rely on the doctrine of 

negligence per se to show a breach of duty of care because the exception set 

forth in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) permitted San Diego Guns to 

sell the rifle to Earnest. According to San Diego Guns, the exception applied 

because Earnest had a validly issued and unexpired hunting license when he 

purchased the rifle in April 2019. In their opposition, Plaintiffs argued that 

(1) the hunting license was not valid and unexpired because it stated, on its 

face, that it did not become valid until July 1, 2019; and (2) even if the 

hunting license was “valid” within the meaning of former section 27510, 

subdivision (b)(1) when it was issued to Earnest on April 15, 2019, San Diego 

Guns sold the rifle to Earnest before that date because it accepted payment 

from Earnest for the rifle on April 13, 2019.

In a January 10, 2023 minute order, the trial court granted summary 

adjudication on what it identified as the “theory of ‘negligence per se’ ” pled in 

Plaintiffs’ complaints.4 The trial court concluded that a hunting license 

“validly issued” is a “valid, unexpired hunting license” as that term is used in 

former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1). As the trial court explained, the face 

of the hunting license “states when the license is ‘valid’ or effective for 

purposes of hunting,” but not “for purposes of sale of the weapon.” The trial 

court ruled that San Diego Guns complied with section 27510 because 

Earnest’s hunting license was validly issued and was not expired, even 

4 In the summary judgment/summary adjudication motion that it filed 

against Plaintiffs, San Diego Guns also challenged one of the other 

consolidated lawsuits, Peretz v. San Diego Guns, LLC (Super. Ct. of San 

Diego County, 2020, No. 37-2020-00047963-CU-PO-CTL), on the same basis. 

As to the Peretz plaintiff, the trial court granted summary judgment because 

negligence per se was the sole theory of liability alleged against San Diego 

Guns in the Peretz lawsuit. The plaintiff in the Peretz lawsuit filed a notice of 

appeal but is not participating in this writ proceeding. 
7

though it could not yet be used for hunting.5 The trial court also rejected 

Plaintiffs’ contention that the sale of the rifle took place when Earnest paid 

for the gun on April 13, 2019, prior to issuance of the hunting license on April 

15, 2019. Relying on the definitions of “sale” in the Commercial Code (Cal. U. 

Com. Code, § 2106, subd. (1)) and the Revenue and Taxation Code (Rev. & 

Tax. Code, § 6006, subd. (a)), the trial court ruled that “[t]he ‘sale’ here was 

not simply the acceptance of the money, but the transfer of the purchase,” 

which occurred on April 26, 2019, after Earnest obtained the hunting license.

Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of mandate on February 14, 2023, 

requesting that we direct the trial court to vacate its summary adjudication 

ruling on the causes of action that depend on the doctrine of negligence per 

5 In its minute order, the trial court sustained all of San Diego Guns’ 

objections to the evidence submitted by Plaintiffs in support of their 

opposition. Plaintiffs do not challenge that ruling, although they point out 

that the trial court failed to rule on their request that it take judicial notice of 

two statutes and one legislative history document, two of which were also the 

subject of San Diego Guns’ evidentiary objections. Regardless of the trial 

court’s failure to rule, we take judicial notice, on our own motion, of the 

legislative history and statutory provisions that Plaintiffs submitted, to the 

extent they are relevant. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (a), (c), 459.) In the 

course of our analysis, we will discuss those and certain other legislative 

history materials that are relevant to our interpretation of former section 

27510, subdivision (b)(1) but were not submitted by the parties. We judicially 

notice those items on our own motion. (See Gananian v. Wagstaffe (2011) 

199 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1541, fn. 9 [“We may take judicial notice of legislative 

history materials on our own motion.”].) Plaintiffs also point out that 

although they filed objections to evidence submitted by San Diego Guns, the 

trial court did not rule on those objections. “[I]f the trial court fails to rule 

expressly on specific evidentiary objections, it is presumed that the objections 

have been overruled, [and] the trial court considered the evidence in ruling on 

the merits of the summary judgment motion.” (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 

50 Cal.4th 512, 534.)
8

se. On March 16, 2023, we issued an order to show cause why the relief 

Plaintiffs seek should not be granted. 

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“[A] ruling on a motion for summary adjudication is reviewed de novo.”

(Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 273.) Further, “ ‘[t]he 

interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that this court reviews 

de novo.’ ” (Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651, 662.)

B. Interpretation of Former Section 27510, Subdivision (b)(1)

Our resolution of this writ proceeding turns on the meaning of the 

phrase “valid, unexpired hunting license” in former section 27510, 

subdivision (b)(1). We must decide whether, for the purpose of the former

statute, a hunting license is “valid” (1) only beginning on the date printed on 

the face of the license, showing the date that the license can first be used for 

hunting; or (2) as of the date that it is issued, even if it cannot yet be used for 

hunting. Put another way, does the statutory use of the term “valid, 

unexpired hunting license” mean a license that currently allows the person 

holding it to engage in hunting, or does it mean a license that has been 

validly issued and is not yet expired?

“Our goal in construing a statute is ‘to determine and give effect to the 

intent of the enacting legislative body.’ [Citation.] ‘ “We first examine the 

words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most 

reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] The words of the statute 

should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in 

their statutory context.” [Citation.] If the plain, commonsense meaning of a 

statute’s words is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.’ [Citation.] If, 
9

however, the statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we ‘may 

consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils 

to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory 

scheme encompassing the statute.’ ” (Holland v. Assessment Appeals Bd. 

No. 1 (2014) 58 Cal.4th 482, 490 (Holland).)

Turning to the statutory language, the meaning of the phrase “valid, 

unexpired hunting license” is not clear. It is reasonable to understand the

phrase to mean a license that is currently “valid” for hunting. But it is also 

reasonable to understand it as meaning a license that has been validly issued

and has not yet expired. There are good arguments for either interpretation 

when only the words themselves are consulted. For one thing, if the 

Legislature meant to refer to a validly issued hunting license, why did it 

choose to use the word “valid” and the word “unexpired” to describe the 

hunting license, when the single word “unexpired” would just as well have 

described a hunting license that had been validly issued but had not yet 

expired? In that light, a “valid” license would tend to mean something more

than merely an “unexpired” license, such as a license that is currently valid 

for hunting. (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1010 [“interpretations 

that render statutory terms meaningless as surplusage are to be avoided”].) 

On the other hand, one of the common meanings of the word “valid” is 

“having legal efficacy or force.” (Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary (2023) 

<https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/valid> [as of July 19, 2023], 

archived at <https://perma.cc/EWT3-7UJS>.) It is possible that the 

Legislature intended this definition of the word “valid,” and that it

accordingly wanted to specify that the hunting license had to be a document 

with legal efficacy in that it was properly issued.
10

Because the statutory language is ambiguous, we must consider other 

tools of interpretation. (Holland, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 490.) The parties 

have not supplied us with any of the legislative history materials from Senate 

Bill No. 1100, which enacted the former version of section 27510, subdivision 

(b)(1) that was operative in April 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 894, § 1.)6 We have, 

6 San Diego Guns submitted the legislative history for a different

statutory provision, which, like former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1),

attaches legal significance to the fact that a person seeking to acquire a 

firearm possesses a hunting license. Specifically, under California law, a 

person who wants to obtain a firearm generally must have a firearm safety 

certificate. (§ 31615.) However, under section 31700, subdivision (c), “a valid 

hunting license that is unexpired” will be treated as a substitute, except as to 

handguns. San Diego Guns relies on legislative history indicating that this 

provision was enacted because a person who obtains a hunting license has 

passed an educational course with safety information that is “more extensive 

than that in the safety certificate education component.” The legislative 

history of section 31700, subdivision (c) is inapposite here. It does not show 

the Legislature’s purpose in requiring a “valid, unexpired hunting license” for 

the exception applicable to persons under the age of 21 in former 

section 27510, subdivision (b)(1). Nor does it shed any light on the meaning 

of the term “valid, unexpired hunting license” in that provision. At most, it 

shows that one reason the Legislature might include a hunting license 

exception when enacting legislation is because a person who has a hunting 

license has taken an educational course that includes firearm safety 

instruction. 

Even were we to find the legislative history submitted by San Diego 

Guns to be applicable here, we note that some of the language that San Diego 

Guns identifies in the legislative history of section 31700, subdivision (c) is 

more consistent with Plaintiffs’ contention that a “valid, unexpired hunting 

license” in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) means a license that is 

currently valid for engaging in hunting. Specifically, San Diego Guns quotes 

a legislative analyst as stating that, under section 31700, subdivision (c), 

persons “with valid current-season hunting licenses” would be exempted from 

the generally applicable safety certificate requirement. (Italics added.) 

(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 683 (2013-2014 Reg. 

Sess.) as amended Aug. 7, 2013, p. 1.) That would appear to describe a 
11

on our own motion, consulted the available legislative reports and analyses 

from Senate Bill No. 1100, but none of them suggest a definition for the term 

“valid, unexpired hunting license.” Nor does that legislative history 

specifically set forth the Legislature’s purpose in creating the hunting license

exception for persons under the age of 21 to purchase certain firearms.7 The 

legislative history identifies some of the general policies behind Senate Bill 

No. 1100. However, when we attempt to apply those general policy goals we 

obtain no definitive answer as to whether San Diego Guns, on the one hand,

or Plaintiffs, on the other, have the correct interpretation of the phrase 

“valid, unexpired hunting license” in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1). 

For example, we could look to the observation in the legislative history that 

license that currently permits the license holder to participate in hunting for 

the current season, rather than a hunting license that has been validly issued 

but does not allow hunting until the upcoming hunting season.

7 To support its interpretation, San Diego Guns cites to the discussion in 

a now-vacated Ninth Circuit opinion. (Jones v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2022) 34 F.4th 

704, 727, opn. vacated on rehg. (9th Cir. 2022) 47 F.4th 1124 (Jones).) That 

case cited to the federal district court’s discussion purporting to describe the 

Legislature’s purpose for enacting the exception set forth in former 

section 27510, subdivision (b)(1), as well as for subsequently removing 

semiautomatic centerfire rifles from the weapons that may be purchased 

under that exception. The Ninth Circuit quoted the district court as saying 

that “California’s objective is ‘to increase public safety through sensible 

firearm control and limit access to certain firearms for some Young Adults 

with proper safety training.’ ” (Jones, at p. 727 [quoting Jones v. Becerra

(S.D.Cal. 2020) 498 F.Supp.3d 1317, 1330].) That discussion does not 

materially advance our understanding of the specific meaning of the phrase 

“valid, unexpired hunting license” in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1). 

Not only did the district court fail to provide any citation to the relevant 

legislative history documents in describing the Legislature’s purpose (Jones 

v. Becerra, at p. 1330), the district court’s broad description of the legislative 

intent, whatever its source, does not resolve the specific question of statutory 

interpretation that we address in this opinion. 
12

some persons between the ages of 18 and 20 engage in “ ‘impulsive or reckless 

behavior.’ ” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1100

(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 2018, p. 3.) That fact would 

support interpreting the phrase “valid, unexpired hunting license” to require 

that a young person wait until hunting season has commenced to obtain a 

firearm in order to prevent impulsive and reckless firearm use. On the other 

hand, Senate Bill No. 1100 was intended, generally, as “taking proper steps 

toward public safety.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 

No. 1100 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 2018, p. 3.) In light of 

that general purpose, it could be argued that in creating the exception for a 

“valid, unexpired hunting license,” the Legislature was most interested in 

making sure that a person under the age of 21 had taken the educational 

course that is required before obtaining a hunting license, which includes 

firearm safety instruction. (Fish & G. Code, § 3050, subd. (a)(3); Jones, 

supra, 34 F.4th at pp. 727-728, opn. vacated on rehg. [describing the value of 

a hunter education course in promoting public safety with respect to firearm 

use for persons under the age of 21].) Taking that view, it would not matter 

that the license is not yet valid for engaging in hunting. None of these 

observations are dispositive.8

8 For the first time at oral argument, counsel for San Diego Guns 

advanced another argument for the view that, at the time Earnest purchased 

the rifle in April 2019, the Legislative intent was for “a valid, unexpired 

hunting license” to mean a license that had been issued but not yet expired. 

Specifically, counsel for San Diego Guns argued that any other meaning 

risked creating a statute that was unconstitutional under the Second 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Although making that 

argument, counsel also stated that we did not need to reach the 

constitutional issue. Regardless of whether the constitutional issue could 

have any relevance here, we will not address it because it was raised for the 
13

As Plaintiffs point out, however, effective January 1, 2022, the 

Legislature clarified the meaning of “a valid and unexpired hunting license” 

as that term is used in the relevant part of the Penal Code that deals with 

the control of deadly weapons. Newly enacted section 16685 states, “As used 

in this part, a valid and unexpired ‘hunting license’ means a hunting license 

issued by the Department of Fish and Wildlife . . . for which the time period 

authorized for the taking of birds or mammals has commenced but not 

expired.”9 (§ 16685, Stats. 2021, ch. 250, § 5, italics added.) A legislative 

committee report states that the new law was proposed specifically in light of 

Earnest’s purchase of the rifle he used during the shooting at the Chabad of 

Poway synagogue. (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 715

(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 2021, p. 3.) “In 2019, a 19 year 

old illegally purchased a semiautomatic centerfire rifle from a dealer with 

[a]n invalid hunting license and tragically opened fire at a synagogue in 

Poway, CA. . . . [¶] This bill will address the outstanding circumstances 

uncovered in Poway, ensuring that background checks are done 

comprehensively so the same mistakes do not happen again.” (Ibid., italics 

added.)

first time at oral argument. (People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 990 

[“ ‘Obvious reasons of fairness militate against consideration of an issue 

raised initially’ at oral argument.”]; Kinney v. Vaccari (1980) 27 Cal.3d 348, 

356, fn. 6 [“An appellate court is not required to consider any point made for 

the first time at oral argument, and it will be deemed waived.”].)

9 “This part” in the statutory language refers to Part 6 of the Penal Code, 

Control of Deadly Weapons. Section 27510 falls under Part 6.
14

The definition of a “valid and unexpired hunting license” in 

section 16685 is the same definition advanced here by Plaintiffs.10

Specifically, a hunting license is “valid” and “unexpired” only if it can 

currently be used to engage in hunting. Therefore, the question we must 

address is the extent to which the definition in section 16685 is applicable to 

determine the meaning of former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1).

The general rule is that unless the Legislature expressly states 

otherwise, or it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature must 

have intended a retroactive application, a newly enacted statutory provision 

applies prospectively only. (McClung v. Employment Development Dept.

(2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 475 (McClung); Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 841.)11 However, our Supreme Court has also 

explained that “[a] statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing 

law is properly applied to transactions predating its enactment.” (Carter v. 

California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 922 (Carter).) “We

assume the Legislature amends a statute for a purpose, but that purpose 

need not necessarily be to change the law. [Citation.] Our consideration of 

the surrounding circumstances can indicate that the Legislature made 

material changes in statutory language in an effort only to clarify a statute’s 

true meaning. [Citations.] Such a legislative act has no retrospective effect 

because the true meaning of the statute remains the same.” (Western 

10 Plaintiffs identified section 16685 to the trial court in their opposition 

briefing, but the trial court’s ruling did not mention that provision. 

11 Although not relevant here, it is also presumed that the Legislature 

intended that “[n]ewly enacted legislation lessening criminal punishment or 

reducing criminal liability . . . applies to all cases not yet final on appeal at 

the time of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 

10 Cal.5th 830, 852, citing In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744-745.)
15

Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243 (Western 

Security).)

“In determining whether a statute clarified or changed the law, we give 

‘due consideration’ to the Legislature’s intent in enacting that statute. 

[Citation.] The Legislature’s declaration of an existing statute’s meaning, 

while not dispositive, is a factor entitled to consideration. [Citation.] We look 

to ‘the surrounding circumstances’ as well as the Legislature’s intent when 

determining whether a statute changed or merely clarified the law.” (In re 

Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179, 184.) “Ultimately, the 

interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power the 

Constitution assigns to the courts. . . . Nevertheless, the Legislature’s 

expressed views on the prior import of its statutes are entitled to due 

consideration, and we cannot disregard them.” (Western Security, supra, 

15 Cal.4th at p. 244.) However, “[a] declaration that a statutory amendment 

merely clarified the law ‘cannot be given an obviously absurd effect, and the 

court cannot accept the Legislative statement that an unmistakable change 

in the statute is nothing more than a clarification and restatement of its 

original terms.’ ” (McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 473.)

One circumstance indicating the Legislature intended to clarify an 

existing statute rather than to change the law “ ‘is when the Legislature 

promptly reacts to the emergence of a novel question of statutory 

interpretation[.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘An amendment which in effect construes and 

clarifies a prior statute must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the 

meaning of the original act, where the amendment was adopted soon after 

the controversy arose concerning the proper interpretation of the statute. . . . 

[¶] If the amendment was enacted soon after controversies arose as to the 

interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a 
16

legislative interpretation of the original act . . . .’ ” ’ ” (Carter, supra, 

38 Cal.4th at p. 923.) Viewing a new statutory enactment as an attempt to 

clarify the meaning of an existing statute is especially warranted when, as 

here, the meaning of relevant language in the existing statute is plainly 

ambiguous. (Id. at p. 930 [noting the significance of the “ambiguity that 

existed in the language and legislative history of” the existing statute]; In re 

J.C. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1479-1480 [when the language of a voteradopted ballot initiative was ambiguous and there were “solid arguments 

both for and against” a certain interpretation, the Legislature’s enactment 

clarifying the ambiguity was a clarification of existing law, not a change].)

Here, although the legislative history did not specifically use the word 

“clarify” in describing the Legislature’s intent in enacting section 16685, it 

stated that the purpose of newly enacted section 16685 was to “further define

a valid and unexpired hunting license.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, 

Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 715 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 

2021, p. 2, italics added.) The legislative history unmistakably set forth the 

view that, at the time Earnest bought his rifle in 2019, the exception set forth 

in former section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) already required that the person 

obtaining the weapon must have a hunting license that was currently valid 

for engaging in hunting. Specifically, the legislative history stated that in 

the Chabad of Poway shooting, “[t]he shooter obtained a semi-automatic 

firearm, despite being under the age of 21, with a hunting license that was 

not yet valid.” (Assem. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 715

(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 21, 2021, p. 2, italics added.)

According to the legislative history, San Diego Guns’ sale of the rifle to 

Earnest was a “mistake[ ]” because the hunting license was “invalid.” (Sen. 

Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 715 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as 
17

amended Feb. 19, 2021, p. 3.) The legislative history also quoted the view of 

a group in opposition to the legislation, the California Rifle and Pistol 

Association, stating that under the law as it existed at the time, a “valid” 

hunting license is one that can currently be used for hunting: “[D]o we really 

need legislation to define what a valid hunting license is? Doesn’t the date 

printed on the license do that?” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. 

Bill No. 715 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 19, 2021, p. 5.)12

As in the cases where a recent appellate court opinion made the 

Legislature aware that a preexisting statute was in need of clarification (see, 

e.g., Carter, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 930; Western Security, supra, 15 Cal.4th 

at pp. 241-242), the circumstances surrounding the then-recent Chabad of 

Poway shooting brought to the Legislature’s attention that, unless clarified, 

there was a risk that the term “valid and unexpired” hunting license would 

continue to be misapplied in a manner that the Legislature did not intend. 

By “ ‘promptly react[ing] to the emergence of a novel’ ” question of statutory 

interpretation (Carter, at p. 923) regarding the term “valid and unexpired 

hunting license,” the Legislature enacted section 16685 to clear up the 

ambiguity and prevent any further mistakes like the one made in selling the 

rifle to Earnest.13 Therefore, in light of the legislative history, coupled with 

12 If nothing else, the statement by the California Rifle and Pistol 

Association shows that we would not be giving “an obviously absurd effect” 

(McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 473) to section 16685 in concluding that the 

Legislature intended it to clarify the already-existing meaning of a “valid” 

and “unexpired” hunting license. 

13 Although the version of section 27510, subdivision (b)(1) that was in 

force when San Diego Guns sold the rifle to Earnest in 2019 is no longer 

effective, the Legislature’s clarification of the term “valid and unexpired 

hunting license” in section 16685 is relevant to influence future conduct 
18

our view that the term “valid, unexpired hunting license” in former 

section 27510 is ambiguous, we conclude that in enacting section 16685, the 

Legislature intended to clarify the meaning of the term “valid, unexpired 

hunting license” in former section 27510, rather than to change the law. 

Applying section 16685 to inform our interpretation of former 

section 27510, the undisputed facts establish that Earnest did not possess a 

“valid, unexpired hunting license” in April 2019 when San Diego Guns sold 

him the rifle. Earnest’s hunting license did not become valid until it could be 

used for engaging in hunting on July 1, 2019.14 Accordingly, the trial court 

erred in ruling in favor of San Diego Guns on its motion for summary 

adjudication on the causes of action that were based on the doctrine of 

negligence per se.

because the current version of the statute contains a different exception that 

applies to a person under the age of 21 who possesses a “valid, unexpired 

hunting license.” (§ 27510, subd. (b)(1).) In addition, the Penal Code 

currently refers to a “valid” and “unexpired” hunting license as an exception, 

except for handguns, to the requirement that a person purchasing a firearm

have a firearm safety certificate. (§ 31700, subd. (c).) 

14 Because we rule in favor of Plaintiffs based on our conclusion that 

Earnest’s hunting license was not valid until July 1, 2019, we need not, and 

do not, address Plaintiffs’ argument that the sale of the rifle occurred on 

April 13, 2019, when Earnest paid for it (and before he obtained a hunting 

license on April 15, 2019), rather than on April 26, 2019, when he took 

possession of the rifle.
19

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to 

vacate that part of its January 10, 2023 order that grants summary 

adjudication to San Diego Guns on Plaintiffs’ causes of action seeking relief 

based on the doctrine of negligence per se. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs 

in this writ proceeding.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.