## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re David M. , 2013 IL App (4th) 121004

Appellate Court Caption In re: DAVID M., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission and Administration of Psy chotropic Medica tion, THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I

NOI S, Petitioner-Appellee
, v. DAVID M., RespondentAppellant.

District & N o. Four th District Docke t No. 4-12-1004

Filed August 5, 2013

Held (Note : This syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t o

f the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) In proce eding s on a petit i o n s eeking responde nt’s hospitaliz ation in a

m en tal health fac ility
, the trial court did not abuse its discretion i n denying responde nt’s reque st to transfe r the case to his home county and proof that he was subject to involuntary ad m ission was established by clea r and convincing evidenc e, but th e o rd er authorizing involuntary
treatment with psychotropic medications was reve rsed due to the State’s failure to g ive responde nt timely notice of the petition for such treatment, the fa ilure to conduct a

separ ate he aring

on that petition, and the fa ilure to satisfy other statutory

require ments for such a

reque st.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court o f Adams County
, No. 12-MH-76; the Hon. J ohn C. W ooley

han, Judge, pr esiding

.

J udg ment Affir med in part a

nd reve rsed in par

t.Counsel on

Appea l E. J ohn Clark, of Quinc y , for a ppellant.

J onathan H. Ba

rnar d, State’s Attorney
, o f Qu incy (Patrick Delfino, Robert J

. Bide rman, and L uke McNe ill, all of State’s Attorney s Appellate Prosecutor’ s Offic e, of c ounsel), for the People.

Panel J USTI CE HARRI S delivered the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion.
Presidin g J ustice S teig mann and J ustice Holder Whit e concurre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 The trial court found responde nt, Da v id M., subject to involuntary admission and orde red him hospit al i z ed fo r no more than 90 day s. The same date, it authorized hospital staff to adm i n i s t er psychotropic medication to responde nt for a period not to exceed 90 day s. Respondent appea ls, arguing (1) the court err ed in ref using to grant his reque st to move the
proce eding s to his home county pursuant to section 3-800(a ) of the Ment al Health and Deve lopmental Disabilities Code (Mental Hea lt h Code) (405 I L CS 5/3-800(a) (West 2010)); (2) the State failed to prove by clea r and convincingevidenc e that he w as a pe rson subject
to involuntary admission; and (3) reve rsal of the court’s i n voluntary treatment order is

war rante d beca

use (a) he was no t advised in writing reg arding the rec ommended
psychotropic medication as require d by section 2-102(a -5) of the Mental Hea lth Code (405 I L CS 5/2-102(a- 5) (West 2010)), (b) he was not g iven proper notice of the petiti o n for administration of psychotropic medication pursuant to section 2-107.1(a -5)( 1) of the Mental Hea lth Code (405 I L CS 5/2-107.1(a- 5)(1) (West 2010)), and (c) the court failed to conduct

a separ ate hearing on the petit i o n fo r the administration of psychotropic medication as require d by section 2-107.1(a -5)( 2) of the Mental Hea lth Code (405 I L CS 5/2-107.1(a- 5)(2) (West 2010)). We aff

irm the court’s order for involuntary admission o f re s p ondent to a mental-he alth fac ility but reve rse its order for the administration of psychotropic medication.

¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 On September 10, 2012, police transporte d responde nt to Ble ssing Hospital in Adam s County
, I llinois

. The same date, responde nt’s hospital thera pist filled out a petition seeking
to have him involuntarily admitted to a mental-he alth fac i l ity

. The thera pist alleg ed responde nt was a mentally ill per s o n who, unless treated on an inpatient basis, was (1)

rea sonably expected to eng ag e in conduct placing himself or another in phy sical harm or in

rea sonable expectati o n of being phy sically harme d or (2) unable to provide for his basic phy sical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm without the assistance of family or

-2-others. The petition named responde nt’s brother and sister as witnesses and, as a fac tual basis

for the petition, stated responde nt stopped taking medication a year earlier, beca me para noid,

acc used his family of stealing
, b ro k e into his brother’ s trailer, defe cate d into a cooler
, flooded the trailer with natura l g as, ran up a lar g e water bill using over 100,000 g allons of
water in one month, and bar

rica ded his proper

ty

. ¶ 4 On September 19, 2012, the trial court co n du ct ed a hearing on the matter. It noted a petition for the administration of psychotropic medication had also been fil ed

. The rec ord ref lects that petition was prepa red by responde nt’s phy sician and dated September 19, 2012, but file stamped with the date of September 20, 2012. Respondent’s phy sician alleg ed responde nt ref

used psychotropic medication and exhibi ted psychotic, para noid, bizarre, and dang erous behavior s. The petition further stated the benef its of medication outweighed the harm, responde nt lacke d the capa city to make a rea soned decision about medication, and other less re strictive servic es we re e x plored but found inappr opriate. ¶ 5 At the hearing, responde nt’s counsel made an oral motion to transfe r the matter to Scott County
, responde nt’s county o f re sidence

. In support of the motion, counsel argued the incidents that formed the basis for the involuntary admission petiti o n o cc urre d in Scott County and re spondent had no connec tions with Adams County “other than being *** dumped in this county

by Pike and/or Scott County law enf orce ment.” The State indicated it was prepa

red to proce ed with the hearing, noting its expert witnes s wa s prese nt and “re spondent was transporte d here due to the fac t that [th e h o s p i t al ] is the mental health provider f or this reg ion.” The tria l court denie d responde nt’s motion, st atingas follows: “The re is a provision under the mental health code for a responde nt to reque st that
proce eding s be transfe rre d to the county of residenc e. There are also provisions, case s talking about what a proper forum is for a hearing, and the Court has to take those things into considera

tion also. There ’s nothing in the rec ord that’s been filed so far that would show the n am es o f any witnesses who the responde nt would intend to call from Scott County or any other county other than Adams. The rec ord does show that the responde nt is curre ntly

a patient at a mental hea lth facility in Adams County .” ¶ 6 At t h e h ea ring
, the State prese nted the expert testimony of Dr. Salvador S an ch ez , a psychiatrist at Ble ssing Hospital. Dr. S anche z testified he was familiar with responde nt as

a patient at Ble ssing Hospital. He clarified that re spondent ref used to ta lk w ith him and, as

a result, most of the information he rec eived about responde nt was from responde nt’s sister, Althea Moore. Dr. Sanchez testified responde nt was diagnosed with schizoaffe ctive disorder in 1995 and had been treated in the past, including treatment for o n e y ea r at the Chester Mental Hea lth Fa cility

. He stated responde nt quit taking his psychotropic m ed i ca tion
ap p rox imately one year earlier, resulting in him “bec oming para noid psychotic” an d exhibi ting bizarre behavior s. ¶ 7 Dr

. S anche z testified respondent used t o live with his 82-year -old fathe r but his fa t h er beca me scar ed of responde nt’s err atic behavior
, was afr aid he would be hurt, and moved out. He noted responde nt’s fat h er would wake in the middle of the night to find responde nt staring at hi m. Dr. Sanche z further testified responde nt allowed his brother to move i nto a trailer on responde nt’s proper ty . On various occa sions, r espondent broke into his brother’ s

-3-trailer, filled the trailer with g as, took food from the ref rig erator and threw it in the trash, and d efe cate d in a cooler

. On an occa sion when his brother was home, responde nt repe at ed l y turned the lights on and off and told his brother he neede d to move out or he would be killed. ¶ 8 Acc ording to Dr. Sanchez, responde nt’s other err atic behavior s included stepping in a nd
out of oncoming traff

ic, placing water bowls in front of ceme nt animals at h i s home,
neg lecting his persona l car e and hyg iene, and being obsessed with water

. He noted responde nt left a sprinkler sy stem running
, wasting around 100,000 g allons of water in one month, and left water fauc ets runnin g when no one was home. Dr. Sanchez also testified responde nt believed taking psychotropic medication would cause his death. He stated responde nt’s conduct of brea king into his brother’ s trailer, making threa ts, and stepping into traff ic had be en ong oing sinc e ar ound J une 2012. ¶ 9 Following responde nt’s hospitaliz ation, Dr. Sanchez had daily conta ct wi th h i m and perf ormed mental status examinatio n s

. He diagnosed responde nt with schizophrenia and observe d responde nt to be talking to himself, para noid, guarde d, and suspicious. He strong ly suspected responde nt hear d voices, stating responde nt seeme d to be talking to imag inary people. Dr. Sanchez testified responde nt kept to him s elf, pace d in his room, and was para noid to the extent that he avoided interac tion with peer s and staff. Respondent ate meals in his room, kept the doors closed and denied acc ess into his room. Dr. Sanchez noted responde nt showed a fix ati on with water by leaving water fauc ets open and running and constantly

flushing the toilet. ¶ 10 Dr. Sanchez testified respond en t h ad b ee n offe red medication while hospitaliz ed. He

rec ommended responde nt take Risperdal to treat his schizophrenia but r espondent ref used, resulting in Dr. Sanchez’s reque st that medication be administered ag ainst responde nt’s will. He stated he observe d a deterioration in responde nt’s ability t o fu n ct i on since his hospitaliz ation, noting responde nt refused to eat, kept to himself, stayed in his room, and avoided eating meals. Dr. Sanchez stated responde nt was “only fee ding himself on small portions of cer eal and things like that.” He also testified that the condition he o b s er v ed in responde nt exis ted for a period of time marke d by the continuing prese nce of deterioration. ¶ 11 Dr. Sanc hez opined the bene fits of psychotropic medication would outweigh any harm
to responde nt. He noted possible sid e e f f e cts of Risperdal included weight g ain, sedation, and spontaneous involuntary movements. Be nefits included an improvement in the overa ll level of functioning and de cre ases in psychosis, para noia, hallucinations, and biz arr e behaviors. Dr. Sa n c h e z believed responde nt lacke d the capa city to make a rea sonable decision reg arding medication and that other less restric tive service s for responde nt had been explored but wer e found inapprop ri at e. He testified one-on- one thera py and group thera

py had been

unsucce ssful. ¶ 12 Dr. Sanchez also rec ommended medication called Inveg a Sustenna, which consisted of

a shot in either the g luteal are a or arms taken on a regular basis. Side eff ects and benef

its of that medication we re the same a s those for Risperda l. ¶ 13 Finally
, Dr. Sanchez opined responde nt was a person wi t h a mental illness who was unable to provide for his basic phy sical needs. He believed responde nt was in need of imme d i ate hospitaliz ation and rec ommended ref err al to a state fac ility for a period not to

-4-exceed 90 da y s. ¶ 14 The State submitt ed responde nt’s medical rec ords from Ble ssing Hospital as an exhibi t. The rec ords contain information consistent with Dr. Sanchez’s testimony re gar ding responde nt’s history

. They state responde nt ref used to provide much information to hospital staff and most of the information rec eived “wa s provided indirectly by [respondent’s] sister, Althea Moore, on the judicial writ upon which [respondent] was admitted to [the hospital] .” Additionally
, the rec ords state responde nt was admitted to a mental-he alth fac ility in 1999, afte r beingfound unfit to stand trial on fe lony charg es. ¶ 15 On cr o s s -e x am ination, Dr. Sanchez testified the info rm at i o n h e o b t ai n ed fr o m responde nt’s sister was in the form of a letter she wrote that was forwa rded to him at the time of responde nt’s hospital admission. He stated he had no persona l contac t with responde nt’s sister as the hospital was prohibited by law from contac ting responde nt’s family without his
consent and responde nt ref used to g ive consent. On redire ct, Dr. Sanchez testified the information in Moor e’s letter, his own observations of responde nt, a nd the observa

tions of hospital staff formed the basis for his diagnosis and o p inions. Additionally
, he noted the information in Moore’ s letter wa s consistent with his own observations. ¶ 16 At the conclusion of Dr. Sanchez’s testi mony , the parties eac h prese nt ed arguments to the court. During his argument, responde nt’s attorney noted he had not seen the petition for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication but presumed it was prese nted to the trial cour

t that day . Followingthe parties’ arguments, the court de termined the pe tition for involuntary admissi o n h ad b een proved by clea r and convincing evidenc e, finding the evidenc e showed responde nt suffe red from a mental i l l ness and, as a result, was unable to provide for his own basic nee ds. It ordere d responde nt admitted to a mental-health facility for a period of time not to ex ce ed 90 day s. The court also grante d the petition for the administration of psychotr o p i c m ed ication, finding it too had been proved by clea r and convincingevidenc e. ¶ 17 This appea l followed.

¶ 18 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 19 He re, like with other mental-he alth case s, responde nt’s appea l is m o o t b ec au s e t h e underlying or ders f

or involuntary

admission and treatment were limit ed to 90 day s and the rele vant time periods have passed. “As a g ener al rule, courts in I llinois do not de cide moot questions, rende r advisory opinions, or consider issues wher e the result will not be aff ecte d
reg ardle ss of how those issues are decide d.” In r e A l f r ed H. H.
, 233 I ll. 2d 345, 351, 910 N.E.2d 74, 78 (2009). Although there i s no per se ex ception to mootness which applies to all mental-he alth case s, rec og nized exceptions include (1) the public-intere st exception, (2) the capa ble-of- repe tition-ye t- a

v o idin g

- r e v iew e xc ep ti o n , a n d ( 3 ) the collater al-c onsequenc es exception. Alfred H.H. , 233 I ll. 2d at 355-61, 910 N.E.2d at 80- 83. ¶ 20 On appea l, responde nt acknow ledg es the mootness issue and, in his brief, adequa tely sets forth the rec ogn i z ed exceptions to that doctrine. Both responde nt and the State asser t this

case falls within the public-i n t ere st and capa ble-of- repe tition-y et-a

voiding- revie w exceptions. Howeve r, the a rgument responde nt presents in support of his posi tion consists

-5-of only two sentenc es in which he asser ts that me ntal-hea lth cases “ have be en consistently held to fall within the public interest ex ce p t i o n t o the mootness doctrine” and are also “cle arly of the nature that they are quite capa ble of repe tition yet evading revie w.” We note that “whe ther a case falls within an established exception to the mootness doctrine is a case

by -ca se determination.” Alfred H.H.
, 233 I ll. 2d at 355, 910 N.E.2d at 80. In this instance, responde nt’s arg

ument is inadequate as he has failed to set forth any rea son why an exception
to the mootness doctrine should apply to the fac ts and circ umstances of this particular case

. ¶ 21 Neve rtheless, despite responde nt’s failure
, we find his appea l prese nts an issue that falls

w it h in the public-intere st exception. “The public interest exception allows a court to consi d e r an other wise moot case when ( 1) the que stion presented is of a public nature ; ( 2) there is a need for an authoritative deter mination for the future guidance of p ub l i c office rs; and (3) there is a likelihood of future rec urre nce of the question.” Alfred H.H.
, 233 I ll. 2d at 355, 910 N.E.2d at 80. This exception must be narr owly construed. Alfred H.H.
, 233 I ll. 2d at 355-56, 910 N.E.2d at 80. ¶ 22 As stated, responde nt arg ues the trial court err ed by deny ing his requ es t t o move the
proce eding s to his county of residenc e pursuant to section 3-800(a ) o f the Mental Hea lth Code (405 I L CS 5/3-800(a) (West 2010)). “The proce dures that must be followed befor e an individual, who is suffe ring from a mental illness, is order ed to be involuntarily admitted for
treatment is a matter of pub l i c conce rn.” In re Robert F.
, 396 I ll. App. 3d 304, 311, 917 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (2009). Fur ther, beca use we find no rec ent case s that addre ss the curr ent

v ersion of section 3-800(a ), an authoritative deter mination reg arding that section of t h e Mental Hea lth Code will be a useful guide for public office rs in the future. Finally
, it is also likely t h i s issue could reoc cur in the future. See Robert F.
, 396 I ll. App. 3d at 311, 917 N.E.2d at 1206 (“[D]ue to the s hort du ration of an order for an invol untary admission, the issues raised *** a

re likely to rec ur without an opportunity for a ppellate r eview.” ). ¶ 23 The issue of the trial court’s compliance wi t h section 3-800(a ) falls within the publicinterest exception to the mootness doc trine and we will consider the merits of that issue on appea l. Altho u g h responde nt raises additional issues which may not fall within any

rec og nized exception, beca use we addre ss h is transfe r-of -proc eeding s issue, we choose to also addre ss the merits of his rema ining arguments. See In re A.W

. , 381 I ll. App. 3d 950, 956, 887 N.E.2d 831, 837 (2008) (holding that, wher e the responde nt raised statutory -complianc e arguments that wer e subject to revie w under the public-intere st exception, this court would also consider the merits of the responde nt’s sufficie ncy-of- the-e vidence claim, which did not fall within a re cognized ex ception to the mootness doctrine ). ¶ 24 On appea l, responde nt arg ues the trial court err ed in ref using to grant his reque st to move the proce eding s from Adams County to Scott County
, his county of residenc e. Wit h respe ct to transfe r re quests, the Mental He alth Code provides a s follows:
“To the extent prac tical, hearings shall b e held in the mental health fac ility wher e the responde nt is hospit alized. Any party may request a cha ng e of ve nue or tra

nsfer to any other c ounty

beca use of the c onvenienc e of pa rties or witnesse s or the condition of t he responde nt. The respon d en t may request to have the proce eding s transfe rre d to the county of his residenc e.” ( Emphases a dded.) 405 IL CS 5/ 3-800(a) (West 2010).

-6-¶ 25 R es p o n d en t ci tes In re Muro
, 81 I ll. App. 3d 21, 400 N.E.2d 1042 (1980), for the

proposition that section 3-800(a ) mandates transfe r to a responde nt’s home county upon the responde nt’s reque st. Howeve r, the State contends section 3-800(a ) has been amende d since this court’s dec ision in Muro and a c lose rea ding of that caseshows the statutory languag e applicable to responde nt g ives the t rial court discretion to grant or deny a transfer reque st

. We agree with the State and find no a buse of discr etion by

the trial cour

t. ¶ 26 At the time of Muro , section 3-800( a) of the Mental He alth Code provided a s follows: “Unless otherwise indicated, court hearings under this Chapter shall be held pursuant to this Article. *** Any party may request a chang e of venue or transfe r to any other county beca use of the co nvenienc e of parties or witnesses or the condition of the responde nt. The responde nt may have the proce ed i n gs transfe rre d to the county of his residenc e.” (Emphase s added.) I ll. Rev. St at., 1978 Supp., ch. 91 1/2, ¶ 3-800( a).
Ba sed upon that statutory languag e, this court conclude d “that the plain meaning of section 3-800 mandate[d] the trial court to transfe r the case to the county of responde nt’s residenc e.” Muro
, 81 I ll. App. 3d at 23, 400 N.E.2d at 1044. This court rea soned that the first provision of section 3-800(a ) used the phrase “may reque st” which “cle arly indicate[d] that transfe r for those enumer ated rea sons [was] subject to the trial court’s discretion.” Muro
, 81 I ll. App. 3d at 23, 400 N.E.2d at 1044. Howeve r, we noted t he second provision used the phrase “may have” rathe r than “may reque st” and deter mined “[t] he plain meaning of ‘may have,’ when

rea d with the statute’s prec eding provision, indicate[d] that once the responde nt reque st[ ed]

a transfe r to his county of residenc e, the trial court must order the transfer. ” Mu r o , 81 I ll. App. 3d at 23, 400 N.E.2d at 1044. ¶ 27 Her e, beca

use the statutory languag e has been amende d to state that a “re spondent may request to have the proce eding s transfe rred to the county of his residenc e,” this court’s holding in Muro that transfe r is mandated is no longe r applicable

. Instead, as also stated in Muro
, when “ may

reque st” languag e is used, the trial court has discretion to grant or deny
a tra nsfer reque st. ¶ 28 In this instance, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The rec ord ref lects the hea

ring took place at Ble ssing Hospital in Adams County wher e responde nt was being hospitaliz ed. The only witness to testify at t he procee dings was Dr. Sanchez, who was employ ed by the hospital. Although the petition identified responde nt’s siblings as witnesses and indicated they resided in Scott County
, as the court found, there was no indication from the rec ord that responde n t intended to call any Scott County residents as witnesses. We note section 3- 800(a) states that “[t] o the extent prac tical, hearings shall be held in the mental health fac ility wher e the responde nt is hospitaliz ed.” 405 I L CS 5/3-800(a) (West 2010). Under th ese circumstances, the rec ord demonstrates compliance with section 3-800(a ) and reveal s n o abuse of the cour t’s discretion. ¶ 29 On app ea l
, re spondent next argues the State failed to prove by clea r and convinc ing evidenc e that he was a person subject to involuntary admission. Respondent complains that “vast portions of the State’ s evidenc e” w ere based upon the letter that was not produce d at the hearing and th at wa s alleg edly authore d by his sister, who did not testify

. He also challeng es Dr. Sa n chez’s opinions, arguing the fac tual basis for those opinions was

-7-inadequate to support the trial cour t’s involuntary

admission order. ¶ 30 “A pe tition for involuntary admission mustasser

t that the responde nt is suffe ringfrom

a condition that require s immediate hospitaliz ation in order to protec t himself or others from harm.” Robert F. , 396 I ll. App. 3d at 312, 917 N.E.2d at 1207 (citing 405 I L CS 5/ 3-601(a ) (West 2008)). “The State must prove the alleg ations in the petition by clea r and convincing evidenc e.” Robert F.
, 396 I ll. App. 3d at 312, 917 N.E.2d at 1207 (citing 405 I L CS 5/3-808 (West 2008)). Proof of a mental illness, by itself, is insufficient to war ran t involuntary admission and, “[t] o meet its burden, the State must submit ‘explicit medical testimony ’ that the re spondent is r easona bly expected to be a serious dang er to he rself or others as a

result of her mental i llness.” In re Tommy B.
, 3 7 2 I l l

. Ap p

. 3d 677, 686, 867 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (2007) (quoting In re Jame s , 191 I ll. App. 3d 352, 355, 547 N.E.2d 759, 760 (1989))

. “The
court n ee d n o t wait unt il responde nt actua lly hurts himself or another before involunt arily committing him.” Tommy B. , 372 I ll. App. 3d at 687, 867 N.E.2d at 1221. ¶ 31 “B eca

use the [t rial] court is in a superior position to deter mine witness cre dibilit y and to weigh evidenc e, we gi v e g reat defe renc e to the court’s finding s” ( In re Lisa G.C.
, 373 I ll. App. 3d 586, 594, 871 N.E.2d 794, 802 (2007)) and its decis i o n “will not be overturne d unless it is ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e” ( In re Robin C.
, 385 I ll. App. 3d 523, 528, 898 N.E.2d 689, 694 (2008))

. “A judgme nt will be considere d ag ainst the m an i fest weight of the evidenc e ‘only when an opposite conclusion is appar ent or when the finding s appea r to be unrea sonable, arbitra ry , or not based on evidenc e.’ ” In re Elizabeth McN.
, 367 I ll. App. 3d 786, 789, 855 N .E.2d 588, 590 (2006) ( quoting In re J ohn R. , 339 I ll. App. 3d 778, 781, 792 N.E.2d 350, 353 (2003) ). ¶ 32 Her e, the State prese nted the expert medical opinion of Dr. S an ch ez

. His testimony

s h o wed responde nt had a history of mental illness and treatment. Dr. Sanchez di agn o s ed responde nt with schizophrenia. Further, he opi ned respondent wa s a p er son with a mental illness who was unable to provide for his own basic phy sical needs and in need of immediate hospitaliz ation. ¶ 33 Respondent complains that Dr. Sanchez’s opinions wer e based upon written information that was not produce d and alleg edly obtained from his sister, who d i d not testify at the hearing. This court has stated that “the underly ing fac tual support of the testify ing expert’s opinion need not, as a matter of law, be s ub s t antively admissible,” so long as the expert’s opinion is “supported by a sufficient fac tual b as i s to rende r i t clea r and convincing .” In re Lill ie M.
, 375 I ll. App. 3d 852, 856, 875 N.E.2d 157, 161 (2007). Her e, Dr. Sanchez testified his opinions wer e o n ly based, in part, on the information obtained through responde nt’s sister. He also relied upon his own observations of respon dent while responde nt was hospitaliz ed and found his observations consistent with the information responde nt’s sister provided. Dr. Sanchez also relied on the observa tions of other h o s p i t al s taff members. In observing responde nt, Dr. S anche z found hi m to be talking t o himself, p ar an o i d
, guarde d, and suspi cious. Respondent kept t o h imself and avoided interac tion with peer s or hospi tal staff. Respondent also ref

used medication; ref

used to eat, “fe eding himself on small portions of ce rea l”; denied a cce ss to his room; and had a fixation with water. ¶ 34 On appea l, responde nt does not challeng e the trial court’s finding that he suffe red from

-8-a mental illness. Additionally
, the rec ord contains no evid e n c e c o ntra d ic tin g the history relied

upon by Dr. Sanchez. We find the evidenc e sufficie nt to support the trial court’s involuntary commitment order

. An opposite conclusion is not appar ent and the court’s decision was not ag ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. ¶ 35 On appea l, responde nt additionally challeng es the trial court’s order au t h o ri z i n g h i s involuntary treatment with psychotropic medication. Specifica lly
, he cont en d s reve rsal of that order is war

rante d beca

use (1) he was not advised in writing reg arding the rec ommended
psychotropic medication as require d by section 2-102(a -5) of the Mental Hea lth Code (405 I L CS 5/2-102(a- 5) (West 2010)), (2) he was not g iven proper notice o f t he petition for administration of psychotropic medication pursuant to section 2-107.1(a -5)( 1) of the Mental Hea lth Code (405 I L CS 5/2-107.1(a- 5)(1) (West 2010)), and (3) the court failed to conduct

a separ ate hearing on the petition for the adm i n i s t ra tion of psychotropic medication as require d by section 2-107.1(a -5)( 2) of the Mental Hea lth Code (405 I L CS 5/2-107.1(a- 5)(2) (West 2010)). The State conce des that t h e court’s order authorizing involuntary treatment should be reve rsed ba sed upon re spondent’s fa ilure t o rec eive tim ely notice of the petit ion and the court’s failure to conduct separate hearing s. We ac ce p t t he S tate’s concession and

reve rse the c ourt’s orde r. ¶ 36 Ini t i al l y , the Mental Hea lth Code provides that a petitioner must deliver a copy of the involuntary treatment petition and notice of the hearing to the responde nt or his attorney “no later than 3 day s prior to the date of the hearing.” 405 I L CS 5/2-107.1(a- 5)(1) (West 2010). Her e, the rec ord shows the petition was fi l ed t h e same date as the involuntary admission hearing but fails to ref

lec t n o tice to either responde nt or his attorney

. Reversa l of the involuntary treatment order is war rante d on this basis. See In re B.K.
, 362 I ll. App. 3d 324, 329, 839 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (2005) (holding the three -day-notice require ment in section 2- 10 7

. 1 (a -5 )( 1) was violated beca use the responde nt failed to rec eive both a copy of the petition and notice of the hearing no later than thre e day s prior to the hea ring ). ¶ 37 Next, the Mental Hea lth Code also require s that a hea ringon the involuntary treatment petition be held “sepa

rate from a judicial proce eding held to deter mine whether a person is subject to i n v o l u n t ary admission.” 405 I L CS 5/2-107.1(a- 5)(2) (West 2010). As the State acknow ledg es, in the instant case , the rec ord clea rly ref lects only a s i n gl e hearing was conducte d on both petitions. Reversa l of the trial court’s involuntary treatment order is also

war rante d on this basis. ¶ 38 Finally
, befor e psychotropic m ed i ca t i o n m ay b e i n v o l u n t ar i l y ad m i n istered to a responde nt, the Mental Hea lth Code requi res that he be advised, “in writing
, of the side eff ects, risks, and benef

its of the trea

tment, as well as alternatives to the proposed treatment, to the extent such advice is consistent with the rec ipien t ’s ab i l ity to understand the information communicated.” 405 I L CS 5/2-102(a- 5) (West 2010). Strict compliance with section 2-102(a -5) “is nece ssary to protec t the liberty interests of the mental-he alth treatment

rec ipient.” In re Linda K.
, 407 I ll. App. 3d 1146, 1151, 948 N.E.2d 660, 665 (2011). Ag ain,

err or occur

red as the rec ord fails to ref lect responde nt was advised in writing reg arding the proposed medic ations. ¶ 39 Her e, the trial court committed no err or in d en y i n g re s p o n dent’s reque st to transfe r

-9-proce eding s to his county of residenc e. Additionally
, its involuntary admission order was

supported by the rec ord and not ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e. We aff irm that

o rd e r

. Howeve r, we agree with responde nt’s contention that the court’s involuntary tre a tm e nt order was enter ed in violation of various provisions of the Mental Hea lth Code, as discussed, and re verse that order

.

¶ 40 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 41 For

the re asons stated, we aff irm in part and r ever se in part the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 42 Affir

med in part a

nd reve rsed in par

t.

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