alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1086 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1086

To direct the Secretary of the Army to complete work for the protection 
   of Point Chehalis as part of the operation and maintenance of the 
  project for navigation, Grays Harbor and Chehalis River, Washington.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 28, 1995

   Mrs. Smith of Washington introduced the following bill; which was 
     referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To direct the Secretary of the Army to complete work for the protection 
   of Point Chehalis as part of the operation and maintenance of the 
  project for navigation, Grays Harbor and Chehalis River, Washington.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. GRAYS HARBOR AND CHEHALIS RIVER, WASHINGTON.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, as part of the 
operation and maintenance of the project for navigation, Grays Harbor 
and Chehalis River, Washington, authorized by the River and Harbor Act 
of 1948 (62 Stat. 1173), the Secretary of the Army shall complete work 
for the protection of Point Chehalis by extension of the existing 
revetment or by other methods determined by the Secretary to be in the 
public interest.
                                 <all>
```
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: In the Interest of E. O., a Child

Appellate case number: 01-19-00207-CV

Trial court case number: 93697-F

Trial court: 300th District Court of Brazoria County

Appellant has filed an accelerated appeal from an alleged order signed by the associate 

judge on March 21, 2019. The clerk’s record was filed on April 1, 2019 and contained no final 

judgment. On April 4, 2019, appellant filed a motion to abate the appeal to allow the trial court to 

sign a final judgment. 

When an appellant files a premature notice of appeal, the Court may “allow an appealed 

order to be modified so as to be made final.” TEX. R. APP. P. 27.2. If the trial court signs a final 

judgment, the prematurely-filed notice of appeal will be deemed filed on the day of, but after the 

signing of the final judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 27/1(a).

Accordingly, we grant appellant’s motion and order the appeal abated for 30 days to 

allow the trial court to sign a final judgment. Once a final judgment is signed, appellant shall ensure 

that a supplemental clerk’s record containing the final judgment is filed with this Court 

immediately. If no final judgment is signed within 30 days, the Court may dismiss the appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: ___/s/ Justice Richard Hightower____

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: __May 7, 2019____
#### Noblitt et al. *v.*Metropolitan Planning Com., etc. et al.

[No. 19,680.

Filed June 5, 1963.

Rehearing denied August 8, 1963. Transfer denied February 1, 1965.]

*626
      *John H. Baldwin,*Indianapolis, for appellants.

*Steers, Klee, Jay & Sullivan, Arthur J. Sullivan, David L. Millen,*Indianapolis, for appellee, Bruce Lindenberg. *William B. Patrick,*Indianapolis, for appellee, Metropolitan Board of oZning Appeals of Marion County.

Ryan, J.

This and *Noblitt et al.*v. *The Metropolitan Plan Commission of Marion County,*Indiana, *Board of Zoning Appeals et al.*(No. 19676) are companion cases.

This is a second appeal, and arises from the trial court’s action in dismissing the cause following our opinion previously rendered. See *Noblitt*v. *Metropolitan Plan Comm., etc.*(1961), 131 Ind. App. 503, 172 N. E. 2d 583.

The original appeal was from a judgment of the Marion Circuit Court which sustained the granting of a variance by the Metropolitan Plan Commission of Marion County, Indiana, and the Board of Zoning Appeals. The appellants had petitioned the Circuit Court for a writ of certiorari pursuant to the statutory authority granted by Burns’ §§53-974 and 53-975, 1962 Cumulative Pocket Supplement.

Burns’ §53-975, *supra,*specifically states the procedure to be followed on the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari, and clearly directs the petitioner to cause a *“notice to be issued and served by the sheriff of the county upon the adverse party or parties, if any, as shown by the record of the appeal in the office of the board of zoning appeals."*(Emphasis added.)

*627
      *626Our original opinion in following the eases of *627
      *Kupfer et al.*v. *Board of Zoning Appeals*(1959), 130 Ind. App. 55, 162 N. E. 2d 110, and *McArdle*v. *Board of Zoning Appeals, etc.*(1960), 131 Ind. App. 5, 167 N. E. 2d 608, held that the parties who received the grant of a variance are both necessary and indispensable and must be named as party defendants, and since the judgment below had been made by the trial court without the indispensable parties, the judgment was void.

As our Supreme Court stated in *Ballman*v. *Duffecy*(1952), 230 Ind. 220, 102 N. E. 2d 646, a failure to comply with the statute is jurisdictional and therefore the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the parties or of the particular case. This rule has been recently reiterated by this court in the case of *Molton et al.*v. *Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Hammond, etc. et al.*(1963), 136 Ind. App. 607, 190 N. E. 2d 199.

The court has the inherent power to dismiss those actions in which it does not have jurisdiction. *State ex rel. Terminix Co. of Ind.*v. *Fulton C. C.*(1956), 235 Ind. 218, 132 N. E. 2d 707; *Cook et al.*v *Herring et al.*(1959), 130 Ind. App. 72, 162 N. E. 2d 108.

The appellants having failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of the statute, the only proper course of action for the trial court was to dismiss the same.

Affirmed.

Carson, P. J., and Clements and Cooper, JJ., concur.

Note.—Reported in 190 N. E. 2d 665.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk June 28, 2010

d0621 

# Order

June 28, 2010

140222

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 140222 COA: 293425 Wayne CC: 08-004412 AARON NICHOLAS HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the November 16, 2009 order of the Court of Appeals is consider ed, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
#### § 29.321 General principle.

Any service performed after June 30, 1997, may never be credited toward Federal Benefit Payments.
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases...Ambassador Fick’s Travel to Finland and Estonia

# 									Ambassador Fick’s Travel to Finland and Estonia							

Media Note

Office of the Spokesperson

May 28, 2024

Ambassador at Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy Nathaniel C. Fick will travel to Helsinki, Finland and Tallinn,Estonia from May 28 to31, 2024.

In Finland,Ambassador Fickwill meet with Finnishgovernment officialsto discussdeepeningcooperationon cyber,digital, and technologyissues. He will also meet with private sector representatives to discuss promoting secure and trustworthy information and communications technologies(ICTs) globally.

InEstonia,Ambassador Fickwill give a keynote address at theNATO Cooperative CyberDefenceCentre of Excellence’s16th InternationalConference on CyberConflict(CyCon)to detailtheobjectivesoftheUnited States’recently releasedInternational Cyberspace and Digital Policy Strategyonbuilding digital solidarity to collectivelycountercyber threats.He will also meetwithofficials fromEstoniaandNATOto discuss international cyberspace security issues.

Follow the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy on Twitter/X and LinkedIn @StateCDP.

Tags

Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital PolicyBureau of European and Eurasian AffairsCyber IssuesCyber SecurityEstoniaFinlandNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganizationOffice of the Spokesperson

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(Cincinnati Sup. Ct.,

Gen. Term., Nov., 1901.)

#### GEORGE HIEBER v. THE COMMERCIAL —TRIBUNE COMPANY.

Error will not be considered upon the petition of one in whose favor the jury found all t'be substantive issues.

*M. F. Galvin,*for Plaintiff in Error.

*T. M. Hinkle,*contra.

Per Curiam.

In this case the plaintiff in error had in the court below a verdict and judgment in his favor; the damages recovered by him were merely nominal. He prosecuted error here because of various alleged errors occurring at the trial below, and because of the court’s action in overruling a motion for a new trial directed to the weight of the evidence.

All of the alleged errors complained of except the action of the court on the complaint that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, are rendered immaterial in this court by reason of the fact that, assuming the court below did commit error, the plaintiff in error was not prejudiced, because, notwithstanding such error, the jury found all of the substantive issue in his favor. The only question left for us to determine is whether the amount of the damages was against the weight of the evidence.

There was conflicting evidence on that question, and following the well known rule of this court on that subject, we can not disturb the action of the court and jury below, unless such action was clearly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. We can not say that it was. The judgment must, therefore, be affirmed.
39678.

#### HARDWICK v. AVARY etc.

Decided November 29, 1962.

*Poole, Pearce & Hall, Richard P. Perry,*for plaintiff in error.

*Robert Lee Avary, Jr.,*contra.

*80Jordan, Judge.

1. The note sued upon in this case being made payable to “A. G. Smith, Trustee,” the legal title to said obligation was vested in Smith individually *(Dozier v. Mc*Whorter, 117 Ga. 786, 789, 45 SE 61); and upon his death the legal title descended to his personal representative and not to the successor in trust. Consequently, the right to collect said note in an action at law accrued to the personal representative and not to the successor in trust. *Kennedy v.*Gelders, 7 Ga. App. 241 (2) (66 SE 620); *Zellner v. Cleveland,*69 Ga. 631; *Saffold v. Banks,*69 Ga. 289. Accordingly, while the successor trustee could have brought this suit in the name of the personal representative of Smith for the use of the plaintiff as trustee, he could not sue in his representative capacity as successor trustee to Smith in an action at law.

This case is distinguishable from *Bright v. Auto Finance &c. Co.,*52 Ga. App. 841 (184 SE 786), cited by the plaintiff, in that in this petition there is no allegation that a transfer was made to the plaintiff by written indorsement or for value without an indorsement.

The trial court erred therefore in overruling the defendant's general demurrer to the petition.

2. The erroneous overruling of the general demurrer to the petition rendered the subsequent proceedings in the case nugatory.

3. Counsel for defendant in error asks, in the event the judgment of the lower court is reversed, that we affirmatively specify that the defendant in error be allowed to amend by making the suit proceed in the name of the personal representative of A. G. Smith suing for the use of Avary as trustee for Mrs. Tucker. This request is granted. See *Kennedy v. Gelders, 7*Ga. App. 241 (3), supra.

*Judgment reversed with direction.*

*Nichols, P. J., and Frankum, J., concur.*
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ben Tellmer PRINES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-4495.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 31, 2001.

Decided Feb. 15, 2001.

*179Robert E. Frank, Norfolk, VA, for appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Melissa R. Sternlieht, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, VA, for appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Ben Tellmer Prines was convicted pursuant to his guilty plea under 18 U.S.C. §§ 287 (1994) and 2 (1994) to four counts of false claims and four counts of theft of public money under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 641 (West 2000). On appeal, he alleges that the district court erred by increasing his base offense level by two levels for more than minimal planning under *United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual*§ 2Fl.l(b)(2)(A) (1998). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

We review the district court’s determination that Prines’ actions constituted more than minimal planning for clear error. *United States v. Pearce,*65 F.3d 22, 26 (4th Cir.1995), Prines’ contention that he did not qualify for the enhancement because he illegally procured federal treasury checks on only two occasions lacks merit. The record amply supports the district court’s finding that Prines engaged in numerous acts of planning and preparation prior to the dates he actually procured the checks. These findings are sufficient to support the enhancement. *Id.*

Accordingly, we affirm Prines sentence, and the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court, and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter II

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to subchapter A appear at 78 FR 60697, Oct. 2, 2013.

#### § 321.15 Liability for losses.

Under the governing statute, as amended (31 U.S.C. 3126(a)), an agent cannot be relieved of liability for a loss resulting from an erroneous payment unless the Secretary of the Treasury can make a determination that the loss resulted from no fault or negligence on the agent's part.
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1336

To suspend through September 30, 1995, the duty on certain textile

manufacturing machinery.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 28, 1995

Mr. MONTGOMERY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To suspend through September 30, 1995, the duty on certain

textile manufacturing machinery.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SUSPENSION OF DUTY ON CERTAIN TEXTILE4 MANUFACTURING MACHINERY.

5 Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized Tar6 iff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting

7 in numerical sequence the following new heading:
2

•H 1336 IH

‘‘ 9902.84.53 Used machinery for

the manufacture of

nonwoven textiles

by hydroentanglement, valued at not

more than $800,000

each (provided for

in subheading

8449.00.50) ........... Free No change No change On or before

9/30/95 ’’.

1 SEC. 2. EFFECTIVE DATE.

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The amendment made by section

3 1 shall apply with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn

4 from warehouse for consumption, on or after the date that

5 is 15 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

6 (b) RETROACTIVE PROVISION.—Notwithstanding sec7 tion 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930 or any other provision

8 of law, upon proper request filed with the Customs Service

9 within 180 days after the date of the enactment of this

10 Act, any entry, or withdrawal from warehouse for con11 sumption, of goods described in heading 9902.84.53 of the

12 Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (as

13 added by section 1)—

14 (1) which was made after October 15, 1993,

15 and before the date that is 15 days after the date

16 of the enactment of this Act, and

17 (2) with respect to which there would have been

18 no duty if the amendment made by section 1 applied

19 to such entry or withdrawal,
3

•H 1336 IH

1 shall be liquidated or reliquidated as if such amendment

2 applied to such entry or withdrawal.

Æ
Editorial Note on Part 10
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 10 appear by T.D. 9359, 72 FR 54544, Sept. 26, 2007.

§ 10.20 Information to be furnished. ( a ) *To the Internal Revenue Service.* ( 1 ) A practitioner must, on a proper and lawful request by a duly authorized officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service, promptly submit records or information in any matter before the Internal Revenue Service unless the practitioner believes in good faith and on reasonable grounds that the records or information are privileged.
( 2 ) Where the requested records or information are not in the possession of, or subject to the control of, the practitioner or the practitioner's client, the practitioner must promptly notify the requesting Internal Revenue Service officer or employee and the practitioner must provide any information that the practitioner has regarding the identity of any person who the practitioner believes may have possession or control of the requested records or information. The practitioner must make reasonable inquiry of his or her client regarding the identity of any person who may have possession or control of the requested records or information, but the practitioner is not required to make inquiry of any other person or independently verify any information provided by the practitioner's client regarding the identity of such persons.
( 3 ) When a proper and lawful request is made by a duly authorized officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service, concerning an inquiry into an alleged violation of the regulations in this part, a practitioner must provide any information the practitioner has concerning the alleged violation and testify regarding this information in any proceeding instituted under this part, unless the practitioner believes in good faith and on reasonable grounds that the information is privileged.
( b ) *Interference with a proper and lawful request for records or information.* A practitioner may not interfere, or attempt to interfere, with any proper and lawful effort by the Internal Revenue Service, its officers or employees, to obtain any record or information unless the practitioner believes in good faith and on reasonable grounds that the record or information is privileged.
( c ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section is applicable beginning August 2, 2011.
[T.D. 9011, 67 FR 48771, July 26, 2002, as amended by T.D. 9527, 76 FR 32307, June 3, 2011]
40438.

#### HICKS v. KAPLAN.

Decided December 2, 1963

Rehearing denied December 12, 1963.

*758
      *B. P. Jackson, Jr., Peyton Miles,*for plaintiff in error.

*T. Boss Sharpe, T. Malone Sharpe, Marvin Hartley, Jr.,*contra.

Felton, Chief Judge.

The court erred in sustaining the general demurrer to the amended petition. The petition did not affirmatively show that the plaintiff was barred by her own neg*759ligence. *Belk Gallant Co. v. McCrary,*88 Ga. App. 829 (78 SE2d 198); *Building Investments, Inc. v. Jackson,*100 Ga. App. 827 (112 SE2d 359). The facts alleged in this case are similar to those alleged in *Wicker v. Roberts,*91 Ga. App. 490 (86 SE2d 350) where the petition was held good as against a general demurrer. *Roberts v. Wicker,*213 Ga. 352 (99 SE2d 84) is distinguishable from *Wicker v. Roberts,*supra, because the latter case was decided on the pleadings and the former on evidence. In this case actual *and*constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is alleged. Contrary to defendant in error’s contention such knowledge is alleged as a fact on information and belief and the petition does not allege that the plaintiff “is informed and believes” that such knowledge existed. *Pierce v. Rhodes,*208 Ga. 554, 556 (67 SE2d 771). The petition also alleges that the dangerous condition was not immediately apparent to the public. *Scott v. Rich’s, Inc.,*47 Ga. App. 548 (171 SE 201); *Townley v. Rich’s, Inc.,*84 Ga. App. 772, 776 (67 SE2d 403).

*Judgment reversed.*

*Eberhardt and Russell, JJ., concur.*
(Hamilton County Common Pleas,

1899.)

#### MEYERFIELD, BLOOM & CO. v. F. STRUBE, et al.

A chattel mortgage executed to one who has notice of a prior mortgage on the chattels, is subject to such prior mortgage in the hands of the assignee of the later mortgage who himself had.no such notice.

The taking of a new mortgage within the time of refiling the old mortgage, saves and continues the lien on the property, if all things have been done in good faith.

Smith, (S. W.), J.

The court is of the opinion that at the commencement of the replevin suit herein the plaintiffs were entitled to the right of property and possession in the goods and chattels levied on by the constable in this case.

The testimony shows that the plaintiffs knew the mortgagor for ten years as Ella Thomas. The mortgage was given for balance .of purchase price of the goods, and the evidence also shows that at the time that she, Ella Thomas, gave a mortgage to A. Ziner, ■under the name of Strube, she told the mortgagee what articles were paid for and what were not, and disclosed the fact that there was a mortgage on this property to the plaintiffs. This being so, the'Mortgage Loan-Company,' *361the assignee of Ziner, had actual notice of the prior incumbrance, and the assignee of the mortgage would acquire no better rights than the assignor.

Burch & Johnson, for plaintiffs.

As to the taking of a new mortgage within ■the time for refiling the old mortgage, the court is of opinion that such new mortgage would save and continue the lien on the property, if all things had been done in good faith.

A decree may therefore be taken in favor of Ihe plaintiffs.
HomeBiographies...Michael  Hammer

# 				Michael  Hammer			

															Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa						Bureau of African Affairs												

				June 1, 2022 -									Present							

Tags

Bureau of African AffairsState Department Official

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