GPSandGalileo

FriendlyFoes?
Brig Gen Kenneth Newton Walker

Kenneth Walker enlisted at Denver, Colorado, 

on 15 December 1917. He took flying training 

at Mather Field, California, getting his commission and wings in November 1918.

After a tour in the Philippines, he returned 

to Langley Field, Virginia, in February 1925 

with a subsequent assignment in December 

1928 to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. 

Retained on the faculty as a bombardment instructor, Walker became the epitome of the 

strategic thinkers at the school and coined the 

revolutionary airpower “creed of the bomber”: 

“A well-planned, well-organized and well-flown 

air force attack will constitute an offensive that 

cannot be stopped.”

Following attendance at the Command and General Staff School at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1933 and promotion to major, he served for three 

years at Hamilton Field, California, and another three years at Luke Field, 

Ford Island, and Wheeler Field, Hawaii. Walker returned to the United States 

in January 1941 as assistant chief of the Plans Division for the chief of the 

Air Corps in Washington, DC.

He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1941 and colonel in March 

1942. During this time, when he worked in the Operations Division of the 

War Department General Staff, he coauthored the air-campaign strategy 

known as Air War Plans Division—Plan 1, the plan for organizing, equipping, 

deploying, and employing the Army Air Forces to defeat Germany and Japan 

should the United States become embroiled in war. The authors completed 

this monumental undertaking in less than one month, just before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor—and the United States was, in fact, at war.

In June 1942, he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned by Gen 

George Kenney as commander of Fifth Air Force’s Bomber Command. In this 

capacity, he repeatedly accompanied his B-24 and B-17 units on bombing 

missions deep into enemy-held territory. Learning firsthand about combat 

conditions, he developed a highly efficient technique for bombing when aircraft faced opposition by enemy fighter planes and antiaircraft fire.

General Walker was killed in action on 5 January 1943 while leading a 

bombing mission over Rabaul, New Britain—the hottest target in the theater. 

He was awarded the Medal of Honor. Its citation, in part, reads, “In the face 

of extremely heavy anti aircraft fire and determined opposition by enemy 

fighters, General Walker led an effective daylight bombing attack against 

shipping in the harbor at Rabaul, which resulted in direct hits on nine enemy 

vessels. During this action, his airplane was disabled and forced down by the 

attack of an overwhelming number of enemy fighters. He displayed conspicuous leadership above and beyond the call of duty involving personal valor and 

intrepidity at an extreme hazard to life.” Walker is credited with being one of 

the men who built an organization that became the US Air Force.
GPS and Galileo Constantine

Friendly Foes?

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Cut along dotted line

After you have read this research report, please give us your 

frank opinion on the contents. All comments—large or small,

complimentary or caustic—will be gratefully appreciated.

Mail them to AFOPEC/FO, 325 Chennault Circle,

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6006.

Thank you for your assistance.

AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE OFFICER PROFESSIONAL

EDUCATION CENTER

AIR FORCE FELLOWS

GPS and Galileo

Friendly Foes?

Roftiel Constantine

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Walker Paper No. 12

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5962

May 2008
ii

Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data

Constantine, Roftiel.

GPS and Galileo : friendly foes? / Roftiel Constantine.

p. ; cm. – (Walker Paper, 1555-7871 ; no. 12)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-1-58566-177-0

1. Global Positioning System. 2. Galileo Joint Undertaking. 3. Artificial satellites 

in navigation. I. Title. II. Series.

623.893­—dc22

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, 

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: 

distribution unlimited.

This Walker Paper and others in the series are available 

electronically at the Air University Research Web site 

http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web 

site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
iii

Since 1958 the Air Force has assigned a small number of 

carefully chosen, experienced officers to serve one-year tours 

at distinguished civilian institutions studying national security 

policy and strategy. Beginning with the 1994 academic year, 

these programs were accorded in-residence credit as part of 

professional military education at senior service schools. In 

2003 these fellowships assumed senior developmental education (SDE) force-development credit for eligible officers.

The SDE-level Air Force Fellows serve as visiting military ambassadors to their centers, devoting effort to expanding their 

colleagues’ understanding of defense matters. As such, candidates for SDE-level fellowships have a broad knowledge of key 

Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force issues. SDE-level 

fellows perform outreach by their presence and voice in sponsoring institutions. They are expected to provide advice as well 

as promote and explain Air Force and DOD policies, programs, 

and military-doctrine strategy to nationally recognized scholars, 

foreign dignitaries, and leading policy analysts. The Air Force 

Fellows also gain valuable perspectives from the exchange of 

ideas with these civilian leaders. SDE-level fellows are expected 

to apprise appropriate Air Force agencies of significant developments and emerging views on defense as well as economic and 

foreign policy issues within their centers. Each fellow is expected to use the unique access she or he has as grounds for 

research and writing on important national security issues. 

The SDE Air Force Fellows include the National Defense Fellows, 

the RAND Fellows, the National Security Fellows, and the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows. In addition, the Air Force 

Fellows program supports a post-SDE military fellow at the 

Council on Foreign Relations.

On the level of intermediate developmental education, the 

chief of staff approved several Air Force Fellowships focused on 

career broadening for Air Force majors. The Air Force LegislaAir Force Fellows
iv

tive Fellows program was established in April 1995, with the 

Foreign Policy Fellowship and Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency Fellowship coming under the Air Force Fellows 

program in 2003. In 2004 the Air Force Fellows also assumed 

responsibility for the National Laboratories Technologies Fellows.

AIR FORCE FELLOWS
v

Contents

Chapter	 Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

1 INTRODUCTION TO THE GPS AND

GALILEO PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2 HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION . . . . . . . 3

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3 GALILEO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

4 GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

5 FIVE STEPS THE US GOVERNMENT

SHOULD UNDERTAKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Illustrations

Figure	

1 Transition of selective availability to zero . . . . . 8

2 Effective radiated power needed to fully jam

GPS signals at a given range (KM) . . . . . . . . . . . 12
vi

Page

Table

1 GPS operational performance summary . . . . . . 11

CONTENTS
vii

Foreword

In GPS and Galileo: Friendly Foes?, Lt Col Roftiel Constantine, 

United States Air Force (USAF), analyzes the heated competition 

to provide service from high in the skies of medium earth orbit. 

The European Union (EU) is developing Galileo, its own global 

positioning and navigation satellite system, scheduled to be operational by 2010. The EU states that Galileo will provide greater 

precision to all users than is currently available from the United 

States’ (US) global positioning system (GPS) through improved 

coverage of satellite signals at higher latitudes, and, unlike GPS, 

Galileo will be guaranteed to be always available—even during 

war or political disagreement. Regarding the enormous importance of GPS to the United States and millions of users worldwide, the prospect of a second, competing, and potentially interfering global satellite navigation system could have serious 

military, foreign policy, and industrial implications. The US government would benefit from the heightened awareness of the 

risks and opportunities Colonel Constantine presents for the 

United States surrounding the Galileo program. 

The author recognizes the Galileo program as a watershed in 

EU activity; it is the largest project ever organized on a European scale, and it will be the first public infrastructure owned 

by the European institutions. Many see this program as a way 

of developing European cohesion while providing such important economic benefits as creating over 100,000 EU jobs and 

generating a positive revenue stream by charging fees for enhanced positioning and navigation services. In addition, Galileo can be seen as a political statement of European independence from the United States, as Galileo furthers EU sovereignty 

and provides an alternative to US military and political hegemony in global navigation. Galileo will assert Europe’s independence by giving the EU countries guaranteed access to a 

critical service that the United States currently provides. 

Colonel Constantine highlights the effects the emergence of the 

Galileo system will have on the transatlantic alliance, the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the US dominance in defense 

and security of Europe, and several serious commercial and industrial concerns. In addition, he discusses China’s heavy involvement 

in the Galileo project and the national security dilemma this pre-
viii

sents for the United States, as Galileo technologies shared by EU 

nations would certainly enhance China’s military modernization 

and intelligence programs, not to mention China’s own evolving 

satellite navigation system. 

Regarding the military and civilian communities’ ever-increasing

reliance on GPS signals, the United States has become heavily 

invested in its GPS program during the past three decades. With 

this backdrop, Colonel Constantine focuses on the challenges that 

Galileo poses to US interests and presents several distinct actions 

to be taken by the US government to protect its industrial, military, 

and national security interests, namely:

• Ensure that the EU does not impose mandatory use requirements for Galileo and that access to the Galileo hardware market remains fair and does not discriminate against 

non-EU companies. 

• Strongly encourage US allies to adopt formally the GPS 

military code and equip their militaries appropriately, ensuring their ability to operate continuously with the United 

States during all levels of training and operations, which 

will not be the case if US allies equip with Galileo. 

• Set the record straight. Counter EU claims to the international audience that Galileo will be available when the United 

States turns GPS off due to a national crisis. In all likelihood, the United States will cut off both GPS and Galileo 

during a national crisis to prevent hostile misuse of positioning signals, and only the encrypted GPS military code 

will be available. In addition, counter the EU assertion of 

Galileo’s greater precision; publicize that by the time Galileo 

is operational, on-going GPS modernization will deliver precision on par with that of Galileo.

• Address China’s major involvement in Galileo and the development of China’s own satellite positioning and navigation system. The United States should collaborate with the 

EU and enter into negotiations with China, similar to the 

successful US-EU discussions, and address concerns in 

all multilateral venues.

I can recommend this paper to all who wish to learn more 

regarding the historical development of positioning and navigaFOREWORD
ix

tion systems, the current state of these systems’ technology 

and capabilities, and the complex military, political, and industrial issues surrounding these vital systems as the United 

States looks to the future. There is no question that the Galileo 

system has much to offer and will be a great benefit to the 

global community; yet, at the same time, it presents many and 

varied implications. Understandably, the United States must 

oppose anything that would degrade the GPS’s civil or military 

signals, diminish its ability to deny access to positioning signals to adversaries in time of crisis, or undermine NATO cohesion, the United States must continue to seek to cooperate—

and not compete—with the Galileo program.

William T. Hobbins

General, USAF (Ret)

FOREWORD

xi

Lt Col Roftiel Constantine serves as chief of the Operations 

and Exercises Branch in the J-6 Division of North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization’s Joint Force Command, located in Brunssum, the 

Netherlands. He has served as the assistant executive officer to 

the Air Force chief of staff, Headquarters Air Force; and as the 

chief of the Architecture Integration Division; secretary of the 

Air Force, Office of Warfighting Integration; and chief information officer at the Pentagon. He has a broad background of experience in communications and information systems and has 

served in a variety of leadership positions including flight commander, squadron commander, executive officer, and branch 

chief on two major command staffs.

Lieutenant Colonel Constantine was born in Fairfax, Virginia, in 

May 1967 and graduated from Fairfax High School in 1985. He 

received an Air Force ROTC scholarship, graduated from Georgetown University, and entered the Air Force in September 1989. 

Colonel Constantine holds an undergraduate degree in computer 

science from Georgetown University and graduate degrees in systems engineering and political science. He has served as a National 

Defense Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is 

currently working on a master’s degree in business administration 

at the University of Maastricht, the Netherlands.

About the

Author

Lt Col Roftiel Constantine

xiii

Abstract

The European Union’s global navigation satellite system, Galileo, poses concern for the United States’ global positioning system (GPS). Areas of exploration include a brief history of satellite 

navigation and the GPS program, an in-depth overview of the 

Galileo system, its multifaceted justification, expected economic 

benefits and revenue streams, and its four-year frequency battle 

with the GPS. Critical to this discussion is understanding Galileo as an expression of European sovereignty and the United 

States’ corresponding reaction, the importance of the significant 

international interest in, and cooperation with Galileo, and the 

strategic implications of China’s evolving satellite navigation 

system. Five distinct actions by the United States government 

are necessary to protect its industrial, military, and national security interests: acknowledge the existing situation; ensure fair 

competition for satellite navigation hardware manufacturers; 

compel allied militaries to adopt GPS now; drive home the fact 

that, counter to European claims, the availability and precision 

of GPS will be on par with or better than Galileo; and secure 

China’s cooperation in satellite navigation.

xv

Preface

The European Union (EU) is developing Galileo, its own global 

positioning and navigation satellite system, scheduled to be 

operational by 2010. The EU states that Galileo will provide 

greater precision to all users than is currently available from 

the United States’ global positioning system (GPS), improve 

coverage of satellite signals at higher latitudes, and will be 

available during war or political disagreement. In light of the 

enormous importance of the GPS to the United States and hundreds of millions of other users worldwide, the prospect of a 

second competing and potentially interfering global satellite 

navigation system could have serious military, foreign policy, 

and industrial implications. The Galileo system will affect the 

transatlantic alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 

the US dominance in defense and security of Europe, and other 

serious commercial and industrial concerns as well. The US 

government will benefit from a heightened awareness of the 

risks and opportunities for the United States surrounding the 

Galileo program.



Chapter 1

Introduction to the GPS and

Galileo Programs 

Competition has been shown to be useful up to a certain point and no further, but cooperation, which is the 

thing we must strive for today, begins where competition leaves off.

—Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945)

The United States launched its original global positioning system (GPS) satellite in 1978 as the first constellation of 24 satellites that has provided the global community with increasingly 

accurate positioning, navigation, and timing data at no cost for 

nearly three decades. Now the European Union (EU) has 

embarked on developing and launching Galileo, its autonomous 

global positioning and navigation satellite system, scheduled to 

be operational by 2010. Galileo’s constellation of 30 satellites––

each flying with the most precise atomic clocks ever launched 

into space––is intended to provide greater precision and more 

reliable high-altitude coverage to its users than is currently 

available from GPS. In addition, the EU emphasizes that civilian 

control of Galileo and its commercial focus guarantee its availability during war or political disagreement. 

Overview of Major Galileo Issues 

The Galileo program represents a watershed in EU activity; it is 

the largest project ever organized on a European scale, and it will 

be the first public infrastructure owned by the European institutions. Many see it as a way of developing European cohesion while 

providing such important economic benefits as creating more 

than 100,000 EU jobs and generating a positive revenue stream 

by charging fees for enhanced positioning and navigation services. 

Galileo can be seen as a political statement of European independence from the United States, as Galileo furthers EU sovereignty 

and provides an alternative to US military and political hegemony 
in global navigation. Galileo will assert Europe’s independence by 

giving the EU countries guaranteed access to a critical service 

that currently is provided by the United States. Similar drives for 

operational autonomy led to the Airbus consortium of European 

airplane manufacturers and the Ariane space rocket program. 

In light of the enormous importance of the GPS to the United 

States and hundreds of millions of other users worldwide, all 

facets of a potentially competing, global satellite navigation 

system must be closely examined to uncover possible operational, industrial, military, and national security implications. 

China’s heavy involvement in the Galileo project presents a 

national security dilemma for the United States, as Galileo 

technologies shared by the EU nations will enhance China’s 

military modernization and intelligence programs–––not to 

mention China’s own evolving satellite navigation system. 

Chapter Previews

Chapter 2 documents the evolution of satellite navigation by 

examining the GPS program, its augmentation systems, and 

modernization plans and by introducing Russia’s global navigation satellite system (GLONASS) and China’s Compass navigation satellite system. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth focus of 

the Galileo program, its multifaceted justification, Galileo’s 

expected economic benefits and revenue streams, and the fouryear frequency battle with the GPS. 

Chapter 4 examines Galileo as an expression of the EU sovereignty, the corresponding US reaction, the importance of the 

significant international interest and cooperation with Galileo, 

and the strategic implications of China’s Compass system. 

Chapter 5 presents five actions the US government could 

undertake to protect its industrial, military, and national security interests: acknowledge the existing situation; ensure fair 

competition for satellite navigation hardware manufacturers; 

compel allied militaries to adopt the GPS; drive home the fact 

that, counter to European claims, the availability and precision 

of the GPS will compare favorably with Galileo; and secure China’s cooperation in satellite navigation.

INTRODUCTION 


Chapter 2

History of Satellite Navigation 

Throughout time people have developed many methods to 

determine their position on earth and the means to navigate 

from one place to another. Early mariners relied on angular 

measurements to such celestial bodies as the sun and stars to 

calculate their location. The magnetic compass was invented in 

the early 1200s and was followed soon by the sextant, which 

underwent refinement over the next several centuries. Marine 

chronometers, developed in the late eighteenth century, provided precise timing measurements that, when coupled with 

sextant sightings of planets and stars, signified the only reliable means of determining a ship’s position in unfamiliar 

waters.1 In the 1920s, several nations constructed radio beacons along their coastlines to aid sea navigation, but the military recognized that surface-based beacons suffered at least 

one strategic flaw—they were vulnerable to enemy attack. The 

space race provided a solution to this by placing the beacons in 

earth-orbiting satellites. Following the 1957 launch of the 

Soviet Union’s Sputnik 1, the world’s first artificial satellite, a 

team of US scientists monitored Sputnik’s radio transmissions. 

They discovered that, because of the Doppler effect, the frequency of the signal being transmitted by Sputnik was higher 

as the satellite approached, and lower as it moved away. They 

realized that since they knew their exact location on the globe, 

they could pinpoint where the satellite was along its orbit by 

measuring the Doppler distortion. 

The first US satellite navigation system, Transit, was a constellation of five navigational satellites that was declared operational in 1964. The US Navy developed and deployed Transit to 

help guide its Polaris ballistic missile submarines and missiles. 

The system provided a two-dimensional navigational fix approximately once per hour, with a rated accuracy of 200 meters.2

During the next 10 years, the United States experimented with 

several satellite navigation systems, but these were largely ineffective, as none provided dependable global coverage. In August 

1974 the deputy secretary of defense declared the navigation 
satellite timing and ranging (NAVSTAR) GPS––a program that 

combined the best elements of all existing radio navigation 

technologies––would be a tri-service program, with the Air 

Force serving as the program manager.3

Global Positioning System 

The GPS baseline constellation consists of at least 24 satellites, 21 of which perform the navigation mission and three 

that serve as active spares. Their orbits are arranged so that 

five to eight satellites are always within line of sight from almost 

anywhere on Earth. The launching of GPS satellites began in 

1978, and the program officially reached full operational capability in April 1995. As of February 2007, there were 30 actively 

broadcasting satellites in the GPS constellation.4

The ground portion of GPS synchronizes the atomic clocks 

on board the satellites into a common GPS time and tracks 

their flight paths. It consists of the master control station at 

Schriever AFB, Colorado, five Air Force monitoring stations 

(Hawaii, Kwajalein Atoll, Ascension Island, Diego Garcia, and 

Colorado Springs), and three ground antennas located throughout the world (Ascension Island, Diego Garcia, and Kwajalein). 

A user’s GPS receiver locates four or more of these satellites, 

calculates the distance to each, and uses these measurements 

to determine its location, speed, and time.5

GPS Services

Positioning, navigation, and timing technology is inherently 

dual use, and GPS is no exception. In “Space Diplomacy,” the 

authors point out that “The precision, availability, and speed of 

its two service levels have made it essential to bankers, network administrators, hikers, pilots, drivers, infantry, and generals alike.”6 The standard positioning service (SPS) is available 

to all users on a continuous worldwide basis, is free of any 

direct user charge, and is broadcast on a single frequency. The 

more secure and survivable precise positioning service (PPS) is 

encrypted, incorporates antispoofing measures, and broadcasts using two frequencies; the additional frequency provides 

an added degree of jamming resistance. Access to the PPS is 

HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

restricted to the US armed forces, US federal agencies, and 

selected allied armed forces and governments equipped with 

classified PPS receivers and a current cryptographic key.7 To 

prevent an enemy from accessing the PPS through a military 

receiver, the cryptographic key can be erased with the flick of a 

switch on the receiver.8 If a keyed military receiver is recovered 

by an adversary, access to the PPS will be short-lived because 

the crypto key must be updated frequently. 

Selective Availability 

J. A. Lewis argues that “Selective availability was the intentional degradation of the GPS signal that made it less precise 

for civilian users and was initially intended to ensure that the 

US military and selected allies obtained greater benefit from 

GPS than anyone else.”9 Foremost, GPS was designed to provide the US and allied military forces with a positioning and 

navigational advantage when engaged with other military 

forces, while still providing a reasonable positioning service to 

the civil community. In 1983, after Soviet interceptor aircraft 

shot down the civilian airliner Korean Air Lines 007 in restricted 

Soviet airspace (killing all 269 people on board), Pres. Ronald 

Reagan announced that GPS would be made available for civilian use once it was completed. During that same year, however, 

the Department of Defense (DOD) announced that GPS would 

provide no better than 100m precision to civilian users by using 

selective availability (SA) to degrade the signal. The DOD, in 

accordance with the Federal Radionavigation Plan, first activated SA in March 1990, much to the dismay of the civil GPS 

user community.10

The 1990–91 crisis in the Persian Gulf, the first major test of 

GPS in a combat situation, proved beyond a doubt its importance and utility, even though “the satellites available in 1991 

provided . . . 16.75 hours of three-dimensional GPS service 

daily.”11 “Some say that GPS revolutionized combat operations 

on the ground and in the air during Operation Desert Storm 

and was, as one Allied commander noted, one of two particular 

pieces of equipment that were potential war winners (the other 

was night-vision devices).”12 However, the shortage of military 

GPS receiver units and the wide availability of commercial ones 
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

among coalition forces resulted in a decision to disable SA from 

August 1990 through 15 November 1991. This was ironic, as 

SA had been introduced specifically for these situations, allowing friendly troops to use the signal for accurate navigation 

while denying use to the enemy. But since SA was also denying 

the same precision to thousands of friendly troops, turning it 

off presented a clear benefit. Michael Russell Rip and James M. 

Hasik contend that “Fortunately, Iraq did not possess a weapon 

system that depended on GPS for guidance.”13

During the 1990s SA presented a problem for such US civilian agencies as the Federal Aviation Administration, the Coast 

Guard, and the Department of Transportation that require 

accurate positioning data. However, citing security concerns, 

the US military repeatedly rejected requests from these agencies to turn off SA. This led to the development and operation 

of several differential global positioning systems (DGPS) that 

locate ground receivers at surveyed locations, determine the 

GPS signal error by comparing the received GPS positioning 

data to the known location, and broadcast this error measurement to user receivers. Depending on the amount of data being 

sent in the DGPS correction signal, correcting these effects can 

reduce the error significantly; the best implementations offer 

accuracies of about 5 millimeters.14

To encourage greater civilian, commercial, and scientific use 

of GPS, Pres. Bill Clinton’s March 1996 Presidential Decision 

Directive (PDD) on GPS stated the United States would turn off 

SA by 2006. Further, it promised the United States would continue to provide basic GPS signals worldwide, and these services would be free of charge to users.15

GPS remained a military program, and the US Air Force continued to oversee its day-to-day operations. The US Air Force 

had provided this global service with superb results since its 

inception, and no other agency was prepared to manage or to 

fund GPS.16 Lewis says “The dilemma was that there was little 

real internal incentive for the US Air Force to optimize GPS 

services for civilian and commercial use. The Air Force objective was a satellite navigation system that met present and 

future military needs. Surprisingly, these can be less demanding than civilian applications, which often require a higher 

degree of reliability and redundancy.”17 Anticipating that GPS’s 
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

military oversight would remain a point of contention––as GPS’s 

commercial use outpaced its military use––President Clinton’s 

1996 PDD created the Interagency GPS Executive Board. This 

civil-military executive board (co-chaired by the DOD and the 

Department of Transportation) was charged with GPS oversight.18 Pres. George W. Bush issued a policy memo in December 2004 expanding membership to include equivalent-level 

officials from the Departments of State, Commerce, and Homeland Security; Joint Chiefs of Staff; and National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration, while the chairman of the Federal 

Communications Commission will participate as a liaison.19

Discontinuation of Selective Availability 

Partly in response to demands of commercial users, the precision provided by DGPS, and to the threat of the EU’s Galileo 

and Russia’s GLONASS, the White House decided in May 2000 

to turn off SA—six years ahead of schedule. Lewis writes that 

“This decision was part of a larger effort to make GPS more 

responsive to civil and commercial users around the globe. 

Principally, the decision was driven by a fear that continuation 

of SA created doubts about the willingness of the United States 

to provide what had become a critical global infrastructure, 

and it had acted as an incentive for other nations to build their 

own satellite navigation systems.”20

The dramatic improvement in the SPS, following the removal 

of SA at 0000 hours on 2 May 2000, is represented in figure 1.21

Rip and Hasik write that the “Spherical Error Probable [SEP] is 

the radius of a sphere containing 50 percent of the individual 

fixes—somewhat analogous to the three-dimensional median 

location. The two-dimension equivalent of SEP is circular error 

probable, the radius of a circle which has a 50 percent probability of encompassing the true horizontal position.”22

The end to SA was a significant acceptance of the needs of 

civilian GPS users around the world in an ever-widening set of 

applications, including air, road, marine and rail navigation, 

telecommunications, emergency response, oil exploration, and 

mining. It recognized GPS’s dual-use nature and expressed the 

US government’s wish to treat civilian users as much like military users as possible. As President Clinton stated in his May 
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

2000 decision to stop degrading GPS precision, the improvement in precision caused by elimination of SA meant that “civilian GPS users would be able to pinpoint locations 10 times 

more accurately,”23 from no less than 100-meters resolution to 

below 10-meters resolution. Perhaps more importantly, it 

removed “a significant irritant which constantly reminded users 

of the US military’s control of GPS.”24

While recognizing that global transportation safety, scientific, and commercial interests could best be served by discontinuation of SA, the Clinton administration reserved the right 

to deny civilian access to GPS in circumstances where it compromised national security. As President Clinton stated in his 

1 May 2000 statement, “We have demonstrated the capability 

to selectively deny GPS signals on a regional basis when our 

national security is threatened.”25 Shortly after Operation 

Enduring Freedom began in early October 2001, a Schriever 

AFB, CA, spokesperson added that a denied GPS region could 

be very well defined. That would mean only military GPS receivFigure 1. Transition of selective availability to zero. (Reprinted from US Air Force 

Space Command.)
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

ers with a current crypto key “such as those in planes, ships 

and in the hands of US Special Forces operators, would work 

within the targeted area.”26

GPS Modernization

Long before the European Commission (EC) was developing its 

initial plans for Galileo in the mid-1990s, the United States was 

upgrading its GPS satellites to promote further military and commercial use and to significantly improve precision, availability, 

and reliability. Eleven first-generation GPS satellites, known as 

Block I or developmental satellites, were launched between 1978 

and 1985. They had neither SA capability (and were therefore 

fully available to civilian users) nor any anti-spoofing security features, they validated the GPS concept, and some were still functioning 10 years after launch despite their design life of five years. 

Twenty-eight Block II satellites (and Block IIA for advanced satellites) were launched between 1989 and 1997 and incorporated SA 

and anti-spoofing security features. From 1997 to 2004, the US 

Air Force launched 12 Block IIR (for replacement) satellites. These 

satellites enhanced system accuracy by using a technique of ranging and communication between the Block IIR satellites and by 

increasing the design life to 10 years.27 Since 2005 three of eight 

planned Block IIR-M satellites have entered orbit and have broadcast the new military M-code and a second civilian SPS frequency.28

Whereas military receivers currently require access to GPS’s 

coarse acquisition signal to acquire the PPS, the M-code has been 

designed for autonomous acquisition, enabling receivers to acquire 

the M-code directly.29 The M-code is backward compatible with 

existing military receivers, is less susceptible to jamming, and 

enables over-the-air rekeying of military receivers.30

Scheduled for launch in 2008, the fourth-generation satellite, Block IIF (for follow-on), will have many improvements over 

its predecessors, including a 15-year design life, advanced 

atomic clocks, improved reliability, increased and adjustable 

signal power, and the addition of a third civil signal for services 

where lives are at risk as in the case of commercial aviation.31

Scheduled to begin launching in 2013, GPS Block III (commonly referred to as GPS III) satellites will be the first to be fully 

compatible with the Galileo satellites expected to increase sig-
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

10

nal transmitter power 500-fold, multiplying its resistance to 

jamming. In addition to all the features of the previous GPS 

satellites, GPS III will transmit a more robust signal and provide near one-meter precision, as more GPS III satellites are 

placed in orbit. This would improve to less than one-meter precision when augmented by signals from Galileo satellites.32 This 

way, GPS III-precision could likely rival the performance of 

Galileo. Boeing, the prime contractor for GPS III satellites, 

stated in a January 2007 press release that “GPS III sets a new 

standard for space-based navigation. . . . GPS III will provide 

transformational capabilities, such as anti-jamming, to our 

customer and our war fighters, along with better precision and 

interoperability with Europe’s Galileo system for our commercial and civil users.”33

GPS Accuracy

GPS’s high level of accuracy is largely due to the extremely 

accurate atomic clocks on board each satellite, ensuring that 

the pulse of each satellite is sent at precisely timed intervals. 

Depending on the model, a GPS satellite has either three or 

four clocks, yet only one clock is operational on each satellite 

at a time: the others are backups. During Operation Desert 

Storm, “most users in the Persian Gulf region obtained positional accuracies within 7.5 to 13 meters” and velocity accuracy to within 0.1 meter/second, based on 11,000 navigation 

solutions for the various monitoring stations and comparing 

them to their known locations.34 With SA now turned off, the 

SPS delivers near-equivalent position accuracy as the PPS, 

though PPS has the advantage of dual frequency for improved 

ionospheric correction. This is not a significant factor in the 

mid-latitudes with little to no sunspot activity.35 There will be 

no difference between PPS and SPS accuracy when, beginning 

in 2012, the 24 GPS satellites in orbit will broadcast SPS on 

two frequencies (a current function of the Block IIR-M). 

As a part of its core mission, the Air Force Space Command’s 

GPS Operations Center (GPSOC) monitors GPS PPS performance and periodically reports operational performance trends 

and characteristics. Table 1 compares GPSOC’s GPS performance measurements during calendar year (CY) 2005 to the 
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

11

previous three years. The table shows that GPS performance 

followed a general trend of improvement in 2005. (The last row 

of table 1 combines horizontal and vertical predicted-precision 

values into a single three-dimensional [3D] position-error 

parameter.)

Table 1. GPS operational performance summary

Ops Performance

Parameter CY 2002 CY 2003 CY 2004 CY 2005

PPS 95% Horizontal Error 2.36m 2.06m 1.86m 1.78m

PPS 95% Vertical Error 4.13m 3.59m 3.22m 3.08m

PPS 95% 3D Position Error 4.77m 4.18m 3.76m 3.59m

Source: GPS Operations Center, GPS Operational Performance Report for Calendar Year 2005, 27 

January 2006, 1.

The GPSOC stated that as older GPS satellites, which perform 

relatively poorly compared with current models are decommissioned and replaced by newer GPS satellites, the constellation 

will become more precise and thus continue the trend of increasing GPS’s positioning precision.36 Several technical improvements to the ground portion of GPS have further enhanced overall system accuracy by adding more monitoring stations, 

conducting more frequent atomic clock updates, and minimizing 

the effects of atmospheric distortions on GPS signals.

GPS and Navigation Warfare

The more the US military depends on GPS, the more it must 

contemplate navigation warfare against the United States and 

other allied forces. The objective of navigational warfare is to 

deny navigation capability to an enemy. Although the integrity 

of the GPS signal was maintained during the 2001 war with 

Iraq, attempts to corrupt it underscore the need to protect 

weapons and navigation systems that rely on GPS. 

There are two kinds of GPS countermeasures. The simpler is 

jamming, where a noise signal covers the GPS signal and causes 

the receiver to break track. GPS’s low-signal strength is its 

Achilles heel, and the graph in figure 2 shows how vulnerable 

the GPS signal is to jamming. Less than one watt of jamming 
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

12

Military Code Track

Code Track

Signal Acquisition

Range to Target/Jammer

Jammer Effective Radiated

Power (ERP) (W)

10.000

1.000

0.100

0.010

0.001

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Figure 2. Effective radiated power needed to fully jam GPS signals at a given 

range (KM). (Reprinted from Michael Russell Rip and James M. Hasik, Precision 

Revolution: GPS and the Future of Aerial Warfare [Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 

2002, 278].)

will prevent a civil receiver from tracking GPS across a range of 

25 kilometers. A one-watt jammer, antenna, and battery for 24 

hours of operation will fit into a container the size of an aluminum beverage can and is relatively simple to construct. GPS 

jammers producing several hundred watts of effective radiated 

power (ERP) could be easily mounted with their power supplies 

in pickup trucks.37

The technology and capability of GPS receivers to resist jamming varies greatly. Acquiring the PPS signal (only possible 

with a military receiver and a current crypto key) improves 

jamming resistance by 10 decibels, and using a nulling antenna 

can boost a receiver’s jamming resistance by 15 decibels.38

While some US military anti-jam receivers lock onto eight rather 

than four satellites and average some of their data, others 

employ different techniques. US defense contractor Lockheed 

Martin developed an anti-jam GPS receiver in 2000 for its joint 

air-to-surface stand-off missile, which relies on GPS to provide 
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

13

guidance to a target. Lockheed’s antijammer “uses digital technology to detect jamming signals and null them,” and it “digitally steers the GPS receiver’s antenna toward the GPS satellites and away from signals from the jammer.”39 In January 

2003, the US Air Force asked Boeing to develop an anti-jam 

antenna for its $20,000 GPS-guided joint direct attack munitions. The new antenna—comprised of a tail kit attached to a 

dumb bomb including adjustable fins; a control computer; an 

inertial guidance system and a GPS receiver—will be able to 

recognize and ignore a jammer’s signals.40

An extreme method of handling GPS jamming signals would 

require first localizing the jammer and second dispatching an aircraft or missile to destroy it, which could be costly if there were 

multiple jammers. The US military does possess such an offensive capability. For example, the Block V upgrade to the AGM-88C 

high-speed anti-radiation missile, fielded in 1999, was a software 

update that introduced a home-on-jam capability, including the 

option to home on high-power GPS jamming equipment.41

GPS’s known vulnerability to jamming drove Iraq to purchase 

GPS jammers from Aviaconversiya Limited, a Russian company 

that has been promoting its GPS jamming systems at military 

hardware shows since 1999. Aviaconversiya claimed its products could jam GPS signals for a radius of several miles, and 

“the Iraqi military used at least six of these high-powered GPS 

jammers, which cost at least $40,000 each, during the war in 

2003. All six were quickly eliminated by US forces over the 

course of two nights.”42 GPS jamming can be traced to its origin: “We’ve killed every GPS jammer that’s come up—with a 

GPS weapon—so that hasn’t worked out very well for them,” 

said then Air Force Lt Gen Michael Moseley, commander of the 

United States-led coalition air forces, at a press conference in 

April 2003.

43

The other GPS countermeasure is spoofing, or broadcasting 

a pseudo-GPS signal to confuse GPS receivers by providing 

false and potentially misleading positioning data to the user, 

especially problematic when GPS is used to compute target 

location coordinates based upon its position, range, and azimuth to the target. “If the GPS receiver gives the user a false 

reading for his location, the target location coordinates based 

on this false position will also be wrong by the same amount 
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

14

and could result in collateral damage,” according to a 2005 

video published by the NAVSTAR joint program office.44 Due to 

the inherent anti-spoofing qualities of the PPS signal, a civilian 

GPS receiver using the SPS signal is much more likely to succumb to spoofing and to report a false position than a military 

GPS receiver using the PPS signal.45 For this and other reasons, 

the DOD mandates that its combatant users acquire, train 

with, and use GPS systems capable of receiving the encrypted 

military PPS signal.46 In addition, many missiles and aircraft 

employ tightly coupled inertial navigation systems and GPS 

receivers, making the GPS receiver not only significantly more 

resistant to broadband jamming but also to signal spoofing, 

where the inertial inputs can be used as a sanity check on the 

GPS receiver’s data.47

European Geostationary Navigation

Overlay Service

Recognizing the fast-growing military and economic applications of satellite navigation, the EC embarked on its first venture into satellite navigation in 1995, when it called for the 

development of a space-based differential GPS system. The 

European geostationary navigation overlay service (EGNOS), 

fully operational since July 2005, consists of three geostationary satellites and a network of ground stations. It uses the signals from the American GPS and Russian GLONASS satellite 

constellations to provide users in a geographical area covering 

Europe, the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean, South America, 

Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia with a high-performance 

navigation and positioning service superior to the unaugmented 

GPS signal currently available in Europe.48 The European Space 

Agency (ESA) believes EGNOS will provide precision of 2–4 meters 

vertical and 1–3 meters horizontal.49

 The EGNOS is the first phase—global navigation satellite 

system (GNSS) 1—of the European Union’s policy on a GNSS; 

the second phase, GNSS 2, calls for the launch of a second 

generation of systems that independently provides a full civilian satellite navigation system, which the EC later renamed as 

“Galileo.” Experience with EGNOS helped European scientists 
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

15

to develop much of the required technical capability and expertise in the advanced sector of satellite radio navigation, essential to the development and fielding of Galileo.50

The EC highlights two significant advantages of EGNOS over 

GPS and GLONASS, both of which the EU will incorporate into 

Galileo. First, EGNOS’s purpose is purely civilian, and its civilian management will guarantee reliability and availability. Second, EGNOS provides the user with information on the reliability of the system by transmitting integrity messages within six 

seconds whenever the quality of the signals received falls below 

certain thresholds. “When you get a GPS navigation signal, how 

do you know you can trust it? EGNOS will tell you whether you 

can trust the signal,” said Laurent Gauthier, the EGNOS project manager at the European Space Agency.51

Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System

GLONASS, developed and deployed as the counterpart to the 

American GPS, is run for the Russian government by the Russian space forces, and its functioning is coordinated by units 

within Moscow’s defense ministry. Like GPS, the complete 

nominal GLONASS constellation consists of 24 satellites; 21 

broadcasting satellites, and three on-orbit spares. Also, like 

GPS, GLONASS was designed for partial civil use and broadcasts its civil signal on one frequency and its precision military 

signals are broadcast on two frequencies. GLONASS does not 

have an SA feature, and the Russian government has claimed 

that it has no plans to intentionally degrade its civil signal, and 

therefore, the full accuracy of GLONASS will be available to 

users at all times.52

The Soviet Union placed the first operational and test 

GLONASS satellites in orbit in 1982, and at peak efficiency the 

system offered a horizontal positioning reading accurate to 

within 57–70 meters. During 1995 the Russians launched nine 

GLONASS spacecraft, enabling completion of the GLONASS 

constellation with 24 primary and one spare satellite. No 

launches occurred for the following three years, however, and 

due to their relatively short three-year average lifespan, only 11 

spacecraft were operational on 30 December 1998.53
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

16

GPS and GLONASS signals are not compatible, though a 

handful of companies offer combined GPS-GLONASS receivers 

with two sets of signal-processing hardware, principally for the 

surveyor market. Thus far, GLONASS has been a good GPS 

augmentation system, filling in during periods when not enough 

GPS satellites are visible for high-precision use. But that may 

change as more Galileo satellites broadcast their signals and 

GLONASS risks fading into obsolescence. The GPS-GLONASS 

Interoperability and Compatibility Working Group held its third 

meeting in December 2006 to address this issue. A statement 

from the meeting claimed that it “resolved many questions 

regarding interoperability and compatibility between GPS and 

GLONASS systems,” but it did not indicate whether GLONASS 

would modify its signal, a costly endeavor, to be compatible 

with GPS and Galileo.54

In November 2006, Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov 

laid out the plans for GLONASS, noting that, “Today, 14 spacecraft are in orbit,” with another three satellites to be launched 

25 December 2006. By the end of 2007, GLONASS is intended 

to cover all of Russia, which will require 18 satellites. (Three 

GLONASS satellites were successfully launched into orbit on 

25 December 2006.)55 He added that the planned global coverage of the system by the end of 2009 will require 24 satellites.56

This aggressive schedule is facilitated by a Russia-India joint 

venture, concluded at the December 2005 summit between 

Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh and Russian president Vladimir Putin, in which India would launch two GLONASSM satellites (an advanced GLONASS satellite with a seven-year 

lifespan) on its geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle platforms and share development costs of the next-generation Kseries GLONASS satellites (several internal improvements, half 

the weight of the M-series spacecraft, and a 10–12 year lifespan). In addition, Russia and India will jointly develop and 

market GLONASS receivers for commercial use.57 “At present 

India is the only country with which we want to develop all 

aspects of GLONASS,” Defense Minister Ivanov said during the 

seventh Indo-Russian summit in Bangalore on 23 January 

2007.58 India’s search for a GPS system had seen it engage in 

negotiations with the Galileo project, but the deal fell victim to 

security concerns. Indian negotiators were not satisfied that 
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

17

the information accessible on the proposed system was adequately protected against individuals and possible military 

users. GLONASS will attract international interest only if users 

can be assured that the system will meet its navigational 

requirements; India’s satellite launch capabilities and technological expertise will help GLONASS make great strides toward 

establishing a record of consistent performance characteristic 

of a mature and reliable navigational system. 

China’s Compass Navigation Satellite System

On 11 April 2007 a Beidou (Big Dipper) navigation satellite 

was successfully launched into geostationary orbit about 

22,300 miles above the earth. The Chinese previously had 

launched four other Beidou satellites: two in 2000, one in 2003, 

and one in February 2007.59 These Beidou satellites are the 

first group in a series of space-based navigation platforms 

called the Compass navigation satellite system. According to 

China’s state-run Xinhua news agency, the fleet should become 

operational in 2008 for much of China, but it could take several more years before it can be used worldwide. Xinhua further stated that China’s vast size warranted a domestic system 

that would improve on the rough details provided by the civilianside GPS used around the world.60 Iain Thomson observes that 

“Experts said that the system is operating well and has played 

a significant role in cartography, telecoms, water conservation, 

transportation, fishery, prospecting, forest fire monitoring and 

national security.”61 Previous reports said Compass would provide positioning accuracy within 10 meters, velocity accuracy 

within 0.2 meters per second, and timing accuracy within 50 

nanoseconds.62 In general, China is substantially ramping up 

its space activity, and this launch came only a few weeks after 

China prompted expressions of concern from the United States 

by destroying one of its own aging meteorological satellites with 

a missile-launched “kinetic kill vehicle.”

GPS, Galileo, and GLONASS use satellites that orbit Earth. 

Compass will position five of its satellites in geostationary orbit 

above China; they will not move relative to the earth’s surface. 

Thirty other satellites will orbit similarly to the other three 

GNSS systems.63 To date, the plans for this network have been 
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

18

shrouded in secrecy, with officials repeatedly declining to comment on the project. However, Xinhua lifted the veil slightly 

and said that there were plans to launch other navigation satellites in 2007 to create a network covering the whole of China 

and parts of some neighboring countries by 2008. The Compass system would then expand to offer global coverage with 

the creation of a constellation of 30 medium earth orbit satellites, Xinhua said, but the news agency gave no timetable for 

when this would be operational. John Walko recounts that 

“Analysts have suggested that the expanded Compass system 

would use the same radio frequencies as Galileo and possibly 

GPS, making it more difficult for adversaries to jam the network in case of war.”64

The expansion of Compass into the civilian arena could pose 

a challenge to the commercial success of Galileo. Experts had 

believed that China planned to use its Compass system only to 

support its military forces, and EU backers of Galileo planned 

to sell receivers and commercial signal subscriptions throughout China. But in November 2006, China announced that in 

addition to its encrypted military service, the Compass system 

would begin providing an open level of service with 10-meter 

precision for commercial users in 2008.65 This will likely place 

a large pool of potential Chinese Galileo customers in a position 

to take the best offer available, possibly significantly impacting 

Galileo’s business plan. Ironically, while China’s government 

and firms are investing 200 million euros (€) in the Galileo 

project with related facilities and research into commercial 

applications, Compass is at the same time shaping up as a 

potential competitor to Galileo.66

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate 

entry in the bibliography.)

1. Logsdon, Understanding the NAVSTAR, 3.

2. Friedman, Sea Power and Space, 49.

3. Hofmann-Wellenhof, GPS: Theory and Practice, 11.

4. US Naval Observatory GPS Timing Operations Web site.

5. Forssell, Radionavigation Systems, 293–96.

6. Braunschvig, Garwin, and Marwell, “Space Diplomacy,” 156.
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

19

7. US Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and 

Department of Transportation, “Availability of the 2005 Radionavigation 

Plan,” 2–2. 

8. Ackroyd and Lorimer, Global Navigation, 139.

9. Lewis, “Galileo and GPS,” 3.

10. Rip and Hasik, Precision Revolution: GPS, 91.

11. Friedman, Sea Power and Space, 267.

12. Rip and Lusch, “The Precision Revolution,” 245.

13. Rip and Hasik, Precision Revolution, 91.

14. Ibid., 96.

15. Lewis, “Galileo and GPS,” 3.

16. Ibid., 2.

17. Ibid.

18. Kim, “Interagency GPS Executive Board Briefing.”

19. National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Executive Committee Fact Sheet.

20. Lewis, “Galileo and GPS,” 3.

21. Air Force Space Command, “GPS Fluctuations Over Time on May 2, 

2000.”

22. Rip and Hasik, Precision Revolution, 88.

23. Clinton, “The United States’ Decision.” 

24. Larsen, “Issues Relating to Civilian and Military Dual Uses of GNSS,” 9.

25. Clinton, “The United States’ Decision.”

26. McCullagh, “US Could Deny GPS to Taliban.”

27. US Naval Observatory GPS Timing Operations Web site.

28. GPS Wing Fact Sheet. 

29. MITRE Corporation, “Overview of the GPS M Code Signal,” 4–5.

30. Ibid., 7.

31. Navstar Global Positioning System Joint Program Office, “GPS Overview, Fact Sheet.”

32. Kim, “The Global Position System,” 24. 

33. “Boeing Passes GPS III Milestone and Receives Follow-on Funding.”

34. Rip and Lusch, “The Precision Revolution,” 88–89. 

35. Kelly, “PPS Versus SPS,” 2. 

36. GPS Operations Center, “GPS Operational Performance Report,” 9. 

37. Rip and Hasik, Precision Revolution, 278–79.

38. Ibid., 279, 282.

39. Brewin, “GPS Anti-Jammer Available.”

40. Kaufman, “Anti-Jam Kits.”

41. US Navy Airborne Weapons, “Agreement on the Promotion, Provision, 

and Use of Galileo.” 11.

42. Vizard, “Safeguarding GPS,” 1.

43. Kaufman, “Anti-Jam Kits.”

44. Navstar Global Positioning System Joint Program Office, “Commercial 

GPS Receivers.”

45. Ibid.

46. 2005 Federal Radionavigation Plan. 
HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION

20

47. Friedman, Sea Power and Space, 280–81.

48. “Integration of the EGNOS Program,” 1. 

49. European Space Agency (ESA), “EGNOS Frequently Asked Questions,” 5.

50. “Integration of the EGNOS Program,” 5.

51. ESA, “EGNOS.”

52. Logsdon, Understanding the NAVSTAR, 126.

53. Rip and Hasik, Precision Revolution, 109.

54. “Radical Change in the Air for GLONASS.” 

55. GLONASS status Web page from the Russian Space Agency.

56. “Russia to Lift GLONASS Restrictions.”

57. “China Wants One of Its Very Own.”

58. Singh, “26 January 2007 Putin’s Day Out.”

59. “China Launches Compass Navigation Satellite.”

60. Clendinen, “China Launches Satellite.”

61. Thomson, “China Launches GPS Rival.”

62. “China Launches Compass Navigation Satellite.” 

63. Atkins, “Chinese Beidou Navigation Satellite.”

64. Walko, “China Set to Launch Rival to GPS.”

65. “China Wants One.”

66. Dickie, “China Launches Navigation Satellite.”
21

Chapter 3

Galileo

A Program Overview

As early as June 1994, the European Commission displayed 

dissatisfaction with its strategic dependence on the United States’ 

global positioning system. The EC stated that if Europe did not 

act promptly, it would not only remain dependent on the United 

States, but would also be shut out of the “huge associated market 

for user equipment,” as the United States was setting requirement standards and certification schemes.1

In 1998 the EC identified several concerns with continued 

reliance on third countries’ positioning and navigation systems, 

including the following: 

1. A perception by the EC that European sovereignty and 

security would be compromised if Europe’s key navigational safety systems were beyond European control; 

2. The judgment by the EC that present systems could not 

fully meet civil users’ performance requirements;

3. The desire to ensure that European users are not at risk 

from changes in the service or excessive future charges or 

fees; faced with a dominant position or virtual monopoly, 

it would be difficult to resist such charges and perhaps 

impossible to develop alternatives quickly;

4. The capacity for the European Union industry to compete 

in this lucrative market (predicted at the time to become a 

global market of €50 billion by 2005) would be seriously 

constrained. Europe’s capacity to compete in the market 

for services could be undermined if it did not have equal 

access to the technological developments in the system 

itself.2

 Galileo Takes Form

Citing several GPS shortfalls—specifically weak and intermittent GPS signal penetration, poor precision, and the ever-
present risk of civil users being cut off from GPS in the event of 

a crisis due to the predominantly military character of GPS—

the European Union’s Transport Council asked the EC in July 

1999 to begin the Galileo definition phase, the initial step in 

providing the first satellite positioning and navigation system 

specifically for civil purposes. The Galileo program was officially initiated at the December 2001 EC meeting at the Royal 

Palace of Laeken in Brussels, Belgium, when the EU—represented by the EC—and the European Space Agency (ESA)3

committed to the development of a space-based positioning and 

navigation system of its own that met the criteria for precision, 

reliability, and security. Facilitating this decision was ESA’s 

prediction of an associated program for equipment and services 

valued at around €10 billion each year and the expected creation of more than 100,000 highly skilled jobs.4 

An obvious benefit of the Galileo program is its potential to 

deepen European integration and strengthen the EU’s identity. 

With the European political identity seemingly inchoate, a unified European effort to take the technological lead in a highprofile strategic system—in keeping with the Lisbon growth 

strategy to make EU “the most competitive dynamic knowledgebased economy in the world” by 2010, as put forward by the EC 

in Lisbon in March 2000—is a strong political message, albeit 

an expensive one, intended to strengthen European integration 

by developing key strategic sectors.5 

One of the principal strategic sectors is space, and many 

Europeans recognize Galileo as an optimal vehicle for pursuing 

development in that sector. In the summer of 2003, the EC and 

the ESA formally entered into the Galileo joint undertaking 

(GJU) to manage the developmental phase (launching the first 

experimental satellite, developing four more satellites, and validating the concept) of the Galileo program, to mobilize the 

required funds, and to manage the integration of Galileo and 

EGNOS. The EU’s stated goal was that, when fully operational, 

Galileo would offer precision superior to the fielded version of 

GPS due to the structure of its satellite constellation and the 

robust ground control system. Precision of less than 1 meter 

has been frequently claimed by the EU and the ESA. In addition, the EC has consistently stated that Galileo will offer superior reliability because it will convey signal integrity informa22

GALILEO
GALILEO

23

tion to the user in near real time and because it is intended to 

cover areas of northern Europe that GPS does not cover.6

Declarations of Galileo’s superior precision over GPS’s appear 

prominently in the EU’s numerous Galileo marketing brochures 

that are designed to attract large amounts of foreign investment 

capital—a bold claim to make of a system that has fielded only 

one experimental satellite (the production satellites is yet to 

begin) of 30 satellites in comparison to a system that has been 

fully operational for more than two decades. The Galileo brochures state that, due to the geometry of Galileo’s proposed satellite constellation and the modern technology of its satellites 

and ground stations, Galileo’s signal will be more precise than 

that of GPS. However, the upcoming GPS III satellites will improve 

GPS’s precision from three meters in 2007 to one meter, and 

GPS users could see a further improvement in precision to less 

than one meter when augmented by signals from Galileo’s compatible satellites.7 In this way, GPS III’s precision will very likely 

rival that of Galileo when both systems are operational. 

The core of the Galileo system will be the global constellation 

of 30 satellites in medium earth orbit. The mechanism for creating the constellation will be a series of rockets, each carrying 

multiple satellites, with a dispenser to deliver into orbit up to 

six spacecraft simultaneously. Galileo’s ground station network 

will consist of sensor stations to monitor the satellites, two control centers to manage the satellites’ navigational signals and 

monitor the system’s integrity, and uplink ground stations to 

communicate with the satellites.8

Program Phases and User Services 

The Galileo infrastructure is being implemented in three 

phases. Phase 1, the development and validation phase (2002–

8), includes the launch of the first experimental satellite, development of four more satellites and ground-based components, 

and validation of the system in orbit. This phase’s €1.1 billion 

cost is being shared equally by the EC and the ESA.9

Phase 2, the deployment phase (2009–10), will consist of 

construction and launch of the remaining 26 satellites and 

installation of the complete ground segment. A consortium of 

eight European aerospace and defense companies, communi-
GALILEO

24

cations device makers, and satellite manufacturing companies 

is expected to contribute two-thirds of the €2.3 billion needed 

to launch the satellites.10 The remaining one-third of the funds 

will come from EU transportation funds.11

Phase 3, the commercial operating phase (2011 and beyond), 

will include routine operations and maintenance of the system 

for at least 20 years. The GJU will select a commercial operator, 

or concessionaire, to lead Galileo through this phase. The concessionaire will have to meet the annual operations, maintenance, and replenishment charges, calculated at around €220 

million.12 The ESA anticipates public funding will be required 

until 2015, when the revenues generated from the sale of Galileo services should exceed maintenance costs.13

Galileo is expected to offer several layers of service. The open 

service will be oriented toward mass-market applications, providing free-of-charge accessibility by any user with a receiver. It 

will use a combination of Galileo and GPS signals to improve 

performance when necessary, such as in urban areas, but will 

not have a service guarantee. The safety-of-life service will be 

as precise as the open service, but it will be optimally integrated with EGNOS to deliver a high integrity and guaranteed 

signal. This service will be certified and oriented toward transport applications (such as aircraft landing assistance and ship 

guidance through coastal waters) where human lives could be 

endangered if the performance of the navigation system 

degrades without near-real-time notice. The fee-based commercial service will add two encrypted signals to increase positioning precision and will be aimed at market applications 

requiring higher than open service performance, such as those 

that offer service guarantees or precise timing services. The 

search and rescue service will enable a user to send a distress 

signal and obtain acknowledgement of its receipt. Such civil 

authorities as police departments, emergency medical services, 

fire departments, coast guards, and customs agencies will use 

the encrypted and anti-jam public regulated service (PRS), and 

its robust signal will resist jamming and spoofing.14

Galileo will broadcast its signals on two frequencies, one of 

which is already used by GPS. Sharing this band with GPS will 

be on a non-interference basis to avoid affecting GPS services 
GALILEO

25

while offering users simultaneous access to GPS and Galileo 

and minimizing terminal costs and complexity.15

Economic Benefits

Only two independent global satellite navigation systems 

currently exist, and both were designed for national security 

needs during the Cold War: Russia’s GLONASS and the United 

States’ GPS. GLONASS is not fully operational and is plagued 

by low levels of precision and reliability––problems that have 

worsened with Russia’s political and economic crisis during 

recent years. Although this system will likely improve with 

India’s contribution of launch support and technical assistance 

to the Russian program, GLONASS cannot realistically be considered a competitive threat to European ambitions. 

The ESA has argued that Galileo is not an expensive program. In 2005, the ESA estimated the development and deployment costs, including launching the 30 satellites and installing 

the network of ground stations, to be €3.8 billion; annual operations, maintenance, and replenishment costs were estimated 

at €220 million. As ESA was quick to point out, this was equivalent to the cost of building 150 kilometers of highway and was 

even less than the cost of the fifth terminal being built at Heathrow Airport.16 Furthermore, the international accounting and 

consulting firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers, conducted an independent analysis of Galileo’s proposed infrastructure and services in 2001 and concluded Galileo’s cost/benefit ratio to be 

much higher in comparison to any other European infrastructure project thus far completed.17

Galileo proponents have consistently stressed the potential 

commercial benefits from the construction and operation of an 

independent European satellite-based positioning and navigation system since the EC feasibility studies in 1999. In discussing the implications of Europe’s GPS dependence on its common foreign and security policy, the EC stated that “Europe is 

now in a position to decide whether to develop a new system. 

By contrast, failure to act would strengthen the present US 

market dominance and leave Europe entirely dependent on the 

US for many security-related matters.”18 The EC recognized 

both the economic benefits Europe would gain by developing 
GALILEO

26

Galileo and the sense of security from controlling the system 

on which its safety critical services would depend. Accordingly, 

EU discussions leading up to the decision to proceed with Galileo focused on job creation, technological spillover effects, and 

monetary benefits—provided the EU could break into the satellite navigation market at the right time, that is, before the 

advanced GPS III constellation becomes fully operational and 

marginalizes the advantages of Galileo over GPS.

Europe’s approach to Galileo is unique in its stated focus on 

civilian and nonmilitary applications of space research programs 

and the diffusion of knowledge and related advantages to the 

benefit of the Galileo community. In a key aspect of their 1999 

argument for Galileo, the EC emphasized that the presence of 

European industry in this high-technology field would greatly 

help secure and augment employment. It estimated that putting 

the satellite navigation infrastructure into place would create 

20,000 jobs; expected its operation would create 2,000 permanent jobs with new employment opportunities in applications 

(hardware and services); and anticipated that by 2008 approximately 100,000 jobs in direct, indirect, and induced employment depended on going ahead with Galileo.19 In 2006, the EC 

increased its job creation estimate to 150,000, primarily in hightech sector jobs.20 Building Galileo’s infrastructure and creating 

a large number of highly skilled jobs will likely have significant 

spillover effects on the rest of the EU economy. Galileo’s high 

value-added manufacturing can lead to gains in the EU’s innovation, productivity, rapid development of advanced products, 

and the accumulation of intellectual capital.21

Galileo’s EU proponents see the potential for significant economic benefit to the Galileo operator community if they can 

break into the market quickly. According to the EC, European 

industry’s share in satellite navigation markets in the late 

1990s was only around 15 percent of the European market and 

5 percent of the global market. The satellite industry and its EU 

supporters framed the need to support Galileo for ensuring a 

future European position in the space segment and end-user 

equipment markets around the world. According to the EC’s 

estimate in 2004, the global market in products and services 

linked to satellite-based positioning and navigation technology 

was nearly €10 billion per year; growing at an annual rate of 25 
GALILEO

27

percent, it was due to rise to about €300 billion in 2020. The 

EC estimated that some three billion receivers would be in service by 2020.22 However, PricewaterhouseCoopers’s 2001 analysis stressed that Galileo begin Phase 3 operations by 2008 to 

secure an increased share for Europe of the user equipment 

and related technologies markets. These markets would be in a 

rapid growth phase by then, and GPS III was expected to commence operations one or two years thereafter. According to 

PricewaterhouseCoopers, Galileo will become established only 

if it is in the market in time to gain acceptance in the launch of 

new equipment and services that will accompany this change. 

If this happens before GPS III comes on line, the 2001 PricewaterhouseCoopers’s review estimated that the annual sale of 

Galileo receivers would increase from 100 million units in 2010 

to some 875 million units by 2020, which represents market 

share rising from 13 per cent to 52 percent.23 Since that 2001 

estimate, the launch of the Galileo satellite constellation has 

slipped to 2010, but Galileo’s window of opportunity is still 

open, as GPS III’s launch has slipped to 2013. 

Revenue Streams

Several potential Galileo revenue streams have been identified, some of which depend on regulatory action. The future 

concessionaire, leading Galileo’s Phase 3 operations, would 

receive payment for the sale of the various services generated 

by the Galileo system. 

One potential revenue stream would be the controlled-access 

services (those fee-based services controlled by way of encryption, 

including reliable signals for such safety-of-life applications as 

civil aviation and maritime transport) available to subscribers for 

certain fees. In some cases, such as access to infrastructure or 

monitoring fishing activities, freight and coach transport, and 

road safety services, these services might be mandatory. Insofar 

as Galileo allows existing ground-based air navigation facilities to 

be replaced and provides a better and more reliable service to 

airlines, it can be expected that airlines will contribute to the revenue stream.24 There is precedent for this as the International 

Maritime Organization has required internationally registered 

ships to carry GNSS equipment since 2000, and GNSS is an inte-
GALILEO

28

gral part of the communications, navigation, surveillance/air 

traffic management concept adopted by the International Civil 

Aviation Organization.

25 However, industry officials believe that 

persuading airlines, shipping companies, and civil engineering 

groups to pay for the extra precision will be difficult. “Our position 

is that it is not really clear at this point that we need this paid 

service; we already have GPS for free, and we will have basic Galileo free of charge, and for now those are sufficient,” said Vincent 

De Vroey, general manager for technical operations for the Association of European Airlines in Brussels, which represents more 

than 30 European airlines.26 If revenue from industry does not 

come through, European taxpayers could end up footing the bill 

for the system for several years, according to Peter Marchlewski, 

general counselor of the GJU until December 2006.27

Another possible revenue source would be a tax on receivers 

and for satellite-based radio-navigation services. The tax would 

need to be introduced throughout the EU and be applicable to 

all receivers sold in or imported into the EU, including equipment for in-car navigation, leisure activities, and so forth. 

According to the EC, “This would be entirely in line with the 

general EC philosophy of marginal infrastructure cost charging 

and could be limited to very small sums.”28 Similar taxes are 

already used in a large number of EU member states for such 

products as photocopiers and video cassettes and for such services as public television and radio broadcasting.29 A tax of €20 

on each receiver would provide a revenue stream of €140–205 

million annually and could go a considerable way to filling the 

financing gap for long-term operations and maintenance of 

Galileo.30 It would also be possible to introduce, although more 

difficult to implement, an annual operating license fee for the 

reception of satellite navigation signals.

Frequencies:

From Competition to Cooperation

In 2001, GPS and Galileo seemed poised to compete for the 

same radio frequency spectrum. Galileo planned to use a frequency for its public regulated service that would conflict with 

the frequency the United States would begin to use in a few 
GALILEO

29

years for its second military signal, the GPS M-code, which was 

planned to be broadcast initially from seven GPS-IIR-M satellites, three of which have been launched since September 

2005.31 The signal characteristics of GPS’s M-code would enable 

the United States to jam its own civilian frequency in a conflict 

zone to prevent enemy forces from using it, without affecting 

the M-code’s availability, thus providing the United States and 

its allies exclusive and uninterrupted positioning and navigation services. Likewise, the United States wanted the ability to 

jam Galileo without rendering ineffective the GPS M-code signals. Some US observers speculated that this signal fratricide 

envisioned for Galileo and the GPS military signal was intentional, designed to force the United States to jam its own signal 

to deny Galileo services to an opponent.32

In December 2001 this situation prompted US deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz to write to the ministers of defense 

in those EU countries that were North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members to convey US concerns over the signal 

competition, highlighting potential damage to future NATO 

operations. Wolfowitz noted that the addition of any Galileo 

services in the same spectrum “will significantly complicate our 

ability to ensure availability of critical GPS services in time of 

crisis or conflict and at the same time assure that adversary 

forces are denied similar capabilities.” He added that it was in 

the interest of NATO “to preclude future Galileo signal development in the spectrum to be used by the GPS M-code.”33

Galileo’s potential signal interference with GPS raised much 

resentment in the United States and both sides entered into 

four years of difficult negotiations. J. A. Lewis maintains that 

“Success in the negotiations was not predetermined, as Galileo 

had become an irritant in the transatlantic relationship.”34 But, 

in the end, the parties agreed to make the two systems compatible and interoperable rather than competitive. 

In June 2004, a cooperation agreement was signed between 

the EU and the United States that recognized the full autonomy 

of Galileo. In return for modifying Galileo’s signals to protect the 

GPS M-code, the United States agreed to provide Europe with 

technical assistance in developing Galileo and to ensure that 

GPS III satellites would conform to Galileo’s broadcast standards.35 It would make Galileo’s signal “the de facto international 
GALILEO

30

standard,” said Charles Ries, the US State Department’s principal deputy assistant secretary for Europe.36 This cooperation 

would aid the interoperability of the two systems, supporting a 

commercial desire of both the United States and the EU to 

develop straightforward and fully interoperable receivers. 

Out of the Gate:

Early Programmatic Challenges 

Despite all its promise, Galileo faces some tough challenges. 

Only one satellite had been launched by December 2005. The 

second satellite––originally scheduled for launch in April 2006, 

then September, and then December––was set to launch sometime in 2007, according to ESA’s general director, Jean-Jacques 

Dordain.37 The EU schedule still shows all 30 satellites in orbit 

by the end of the present decade. 

The estimated cost of developing the system has soared far 

beyond the EC’s 1999 cost estimate of between €2.2 and €2.9 

billion38 and is now projected at €3.8 billion.39 EU officials attributed Galileo’s cost overruns to increased security to prevent 

breakdowns, software upgrades, rising labor and marketing 

costs, and two additional test satellites needed to check the frequencies Galileo will use.40 When operational, the EU expects 

Galileo to cost €220 million per year to operate. With fewer satellites than Galileo, the US Air Force places GPS annual operating 

costs at about €576 million,41 suggesting that the EU may be 

underestimating Galileo’s true operating costs. Recent arguments among the EU nations to acquire a portion of Galileo’s 

operations in their territory, in addition to power struggles among 

the eight consortium companies, have caused significant delays 

in Galileo’s development and deployment schedule.42

System Availability: GPS versus Galileo 

Central to the decision to develop and operate a separate, 

independent GNSS service is the EU’s uneasiness with continued US military control over GPS. Despite US assurances that 

the United States intends to make GPS available on a continuous worldwide basis for the near future, the EU has adopted the 

view that GNSS continuity has become too important to be left 
GALILEO

31

to the US military. One of Galileo’s competitive advantages will 

be its continuous and reliable signal for all users, which will 

allow the wider deployment of applications, especially commercial ones. The EU and the ESA highlight Galileo’s guaranteed 

availability as superior to GPS’s availability by citing “the predominantly military character of GPS means there is always a 

risk of civil users being cut off in the event of a crisis.”43 According to Title 10 of the US Code, the DOD––as owner and controller 

of GPS––can interrupt reception for reasons of national security 

without notice.44 However, the likelihood of GPS being turned 

off, even for a limited area of operations, is extremely remote. As 

Ralph Braibanti––director of Space and Advanced Technology 

for the US Department of State and head of the US delegation for 

GPS-Galileo consultations––stated, “The US provides the GPS 

civilian signal to a very high degree. The possibility of a limited 

shutdown is a red herring as we have never done it and do not 

plan to even in situations like we experienced in Kosovo and the 

Gulf region during Desert Storm.”45

Further, if the United States decides to jam the GPS civilian 

signal due to a crisis, not only will it limit that denial to a local 

area of operations to minimize collateral damage, the United 

States will jam Galileo’s positioning and navigation signals in 

that area also. The 2004 US-EU agreement to cooperate on 

frequencies separated Galileo’s civilian signal from GPS’s military signal, enabling the United States to jam GPS and Galileo 

civilian signals without harming GPS’s military signal. This 

way, Galileo’s signal will not be available when the United 

States decides to turn off civilian GPS. Therefore, GPS’s civilian 

signal is just as available as is Galileo’s signal. Ironically, it is 

not Galileo’s signal that offers continuous availability, as the 

EU advertises heavily in its glossy Galileo brochures, but rather 

it is GPS’s encrypted military signal.

Notes

1. “Satellite Navigation Services,” 11.

2. European Commission (EC), “Towards a Trans-European Positioning 

and Navigation Network,” 5.

3. The European Space Agency (ESA) has 15 member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Canada 
GALILEO

32

also takes part in some projects. Norway and Switzerland are members of ESA 

but not the European Union (EU).

4. ESA, “Galileo, the European Program,” 10.

5. Cheli and Darnis, “Towards a European Space Strategy?” 105–6.

6. ESA, “Galileo, the European Program,” 5–8.

7. Kim, “Global Position System,” 24.

8. Ibid., 25.

9. “Progress report on the GALILEO research programme,” 2.

10. The eight European aerospace and defense companies are Astrium, 

the satellite unit of European Aeronautic Defense & Space Co.; Inmarsat 

PLC; Thales SA; TeleOp; Finmeccanica SpA; Aena; Hispasat SA; and AlcatelLucent’s Alcatel Space.

11. EC, “Proposal for a Regulation.”

12. ESA, “Market Prospects and Business Opportunities.”

13. ESA, “Galileo, the European Program,” 13, 33.

14. Ibid., 22–23.

15. Ibid., 26.

16. Ibid., 11.

17. “Inception Study,” 8.

18. EC, “Galileo, Involving Europe,” 2.

19. Ibid., 4. 

20. EC, COM 2006, 2. 

21. Lembke, “Strategies, Politics, and High Technology in Europe,” 254.

22. “Progress report on the GALILEO research programme,” 2. 

23. “Inception Study,” 4.

24. EC, “Galileo, Involving Europe,” 16.

25. Ibid.

26. Jolis, “Problems Run Rampant for Galileo Project.”

27. Ibid.

28. “Galileo, Involving Europe,” 23.

29. Ibid., 16.

30. Ibid., 17. Assuming that by 2010 around 50 percent of new cars are 

equipped with a GNSS-based positioning device and with around 14 million 

car sales in Europe annually, a levy of €20 would raise €140 million per 

year.

31. Navstar Global Positioning System Joint Program Office, “GPS Overview.”

32. “Progress report on the GALILEO research programme,” 12.

33. “US Warns EU About Galileo’s Possible Military Conflicts.”

34. Lewis, “Galileo and GPS: from Competition to Cooperation,” 1.

35. US Navy, “Agreement on the Promotion, Provision, and Use of Galileo,” 

11. 

36. Taverna, “Cross Talk,” 49. 

37. “Galileo Industries Told to Put House in Order.”

38. EC, “Galileo, Involving Europe,” 5.

39. “Galileo Adrift in European Outer Space.”

40. Jolis, “Problems Run Rampant.” 
GALILEO

33

41. GPS Wing Fact Sheet. 

42. Marks, “Political Infighting Threatens Europe’s SatNav Plans.” 

43. Simon, “Galileo, the European Programme,” 7.

44. “Global Positioning System.” 

45. Warner, “EU Transport Ministries,” 1.

35

Chapter 4

Geopolitical Perspectives

The EU’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has 

been criticized for being more of a declaratory policy, one not 

translated into concrete facts. An important landmark was 

reached in 2003 with the publication of the European security 

strategy, the European counterpart to the United States’ 

national security strategy; for the first time, the EU formulated 

joint guidelines for a coherent European international security 

strategy. Furthermore, the EU missions in the Congo (Operation Artemis) and Macedonia (Operation Concordia) were the 

first autonomous EU external military missions, important 

milestones in operationalizing ESDP. These missions, coupled 

with the ESDP’s call for an even greater role for the EU troops 

in humanitarian, peacemaking, and peacekeeping activities in 

conflict theaters outside the EU’s borders require information 

and data transmission on a global scale. Space technologies, 

especially programs like Galileo, represent the backbone of the 

infrastructure for future interventions in crisis theaters.1

Departure from US Hegemony 

The general expansion of the European space sector, including the security-related aspects of European space policies 

affording Europe a greater role in its control of space-based 

information systems, also affects US-EU relations. Satellite 

radio navigation services supporting military and civilian applications across the EU have been provided by GPS. However, 

total dependence on a foreign power for a major feature of 

national infrastructure implies that one could never afford to 

upset that power to the point that it might threaten to withdraw that service. Therefore, the EU’s policies would bind to 

some degree to those policies of the United States. Recognizing 

this issue in 1998, the EC highlighted serious limitations to 

Europe’s sovereignty and security if its safety critical navigation systems remained beyond its control and suggested that 

this would force its continued reliance on other countries’ positioning and navigation services.2
This concept was advanced in the EU’s November 2000 European strategy for space. Still the most current European space 

strategy document, it highlights the strategic importance of 

space for economic and political growth in Europe, the global 

competitiveness of European industry as an industrial policy 

priority, and the importance of Galileo. When first written, it 

represented a “sharp break from the past, with space contributions to security and defense being seriously considered for the 

first time above the national level. The strategy calls for the EU 

to provide a common policy framework by integrating European space and making its history of fragmentation along 

national lines a thing of the past.”3 The March 2005 report of 

the EC’s panel of experts on space and security concludes that 

during the Cold War, it made sense for Europe to rely on nonEuropean (i.e., United States) space-based systems to support 

the EU’s security, as Europe largely relied on the United States 

for its collective security and had no need for an organic expeditionary capability. The report goes on to note that since the 

end of the Cold War, Europe’s security situation has been rather 

different, and, with the establishment of the European Defense 

Force, Europe and its member states are increasing their capabilities to operate outside their borders in expeditionary forces 

on a variety of multinational military and civil operations. This 

panel of experts stressed that Europe no longer could assume 

a fortuitous coincidence of interest with the United States.4

Galileo’s business plan clearly has provided strong economic 

and commercial justification in its own right, but the Galileo 

program is unquestionably a political initiative as well. Underpinning the EU support for Galileo is the strong desire for political autonomy, and developing a stand-alone European satellite 

system is evidence of the EU’s desire to free itself from its US 

dependency in this area. In addition, given Galileo’s expected 

technological spillover to military and aeronautical sectors, the 

decision to proceed with Galileo has wider significance in terms 

of EU autonomy. Overall, Galileo has become a symbol of 

Europe’s technological capabilities and its quest for further 

political independence. A central conclusion of the European 

strategy for space is that Europe should not remain dependent 

on foreign space infrastructure for strategic or commercial applications.5 This followed from the belief that space was an essen36

GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

37

tial national infrastructure and that it would be foolish to depend 

on foreign sources of supply in this vital sector. French president 

Jacques Chirac even went so far as to state that if Europe did 

not fund Galileo, Europe would become an “American vassal.”6

US Reaction

An early US concern was that in moving forward with the Galileo program, Europe was spending funds on “a military service 

that was already provided by the US, funds that could be better 

spent addressing more pressing shortfalls in European military 

capabilities.”7 In relation to the United States, defense spending 

among US allies has been declining for the past several years. 

The NATO-member defense budgets have fallen from 2.49 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1993 to 1.8 percent 

of the GDP in 2005––compared to the 3.7 percent of GDP spent 

annually by the United States.8 In fact, according to US Army 

general Bantz “John” Craddock, Supreme Allied Commander 

Europe, only six of NATO’s 26 member nations meet the organization’s goal of spending a minimum of 2 percent of their GDP 

on defense.9 The United States, understandably, would have 

preferred that the EU spend its limited funds on programs that 

yielded a greater return in military capabilities—especially those 

capabilities that would enable Europe to participate more evenly 

in joint operations—rather than divert its funds to provide duplicate satellite navigation capabilities.10

However, it quickly became clear that the EU rationale for Galileo had important economic, commercial, and strategic aspects 

that would outweigh any US protests in European decision making. Thereafter, faced with the EU’s concrete support of the program, US interests turned to ensuring the compatibility of GPS 

and Galileo and the capability of each to serve as a back up for the 

other in case of a malfunction.11 User benefits from receiving signals from both satellite navigation constellations will include 

improved precision, reliability, and availability. Currently, GPS 

users may find their signal path to the satellite constellation significantly reduced by buildings, trees, bridges, or other obstructions. With twice as many satellites visible in the sky, the probability will be much lower that signal blockage will interfere with 

the delivery of the GPS and Galileo navigation solution. Applica-
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

38

tions that are currently marginal, or impossible, will become more 

viable and cost effective for users. Using interoperable frequencies 

will enable simplified receiver design (e.g., same antenna and circuitry), leading to lower costs for consumers.12

As warfare in the electronic arena continues to advance and 

the doctrine of “network-centric warfare” moves toward center 

stage, the use of satellite-based navigation and positioning systems has become essential for armed forces. As such, the 

United States would oppose anything that would diminish the 

ability to deny access to positioning signals to adversaries during a crisis, and how the United States would act to prevent the 

hostile misuse of Galileo has been considered by senior US government officials for the past several years.13 A glimpse of a 

possible course of action was provided in October 2004, when 

US representatives at a space conference in London warned 

that the Pentagon could attack Galileo’s satellites if the system 

were hijacked by a hostile power such as China.14

Following a Trend:

Airbus and Ariane Programs

According to Braunschvig, Garwin, and Marwell, “This is not 

the first time that US technological superiority has prompted 

innovation in Europe.”15 The EU and the ESA, together with 

other major interested parties, view the Galileo project as 

equivalent in potential to other successful large-scale European 

efforts such as Airbus and Arianespace, both of which were 

developed when the United States’ lead in airplane production 

and rocket launch sectors seemed out of reach.16

Airbus Industrie was set up by France, Germany, and England to offset US supremacy in the civilian airplane manufacturing industry; it now threatens Boeing for world dominance 

in the aircraft industry. The EU’s decision to start building its 

own rocket launchers in the early 1970s, when the United 

States was aggressively lobbying the non-Soviet world to use 

its cheaper space shuttle for satellite launches, produced Ariane, which successfully seized a significant share of the satellite launch business when the United States terminated commercial satellite launchings by the space shuttle following the 
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

39

Challenger disaster in 1986. Virtually all space launch business previously had been performed in the United States, but 

now Ariane has become the most widely used commercial 

launch system in the world.17 As with the Airbus and the Ariane rocket programs, the expectation is that Galileo will follow 

suit and enable Europe to acquire some technological independence in the satellite navigation sector.

International Cooperation

Foreign participation has provided a significant portion of 

the funds (on the order of hundreds of millions of euros) required 

for Galileo’s development and deployment. The involvement of 

foreign participants is a means to demonstrate European political leadership in space activities. Furthermore, as a global 

system, Galileo needs global partners to develop its full potential, so cooperating with countries beyond the EU’s borders is 

essential. The ESA has thus been interested in involving international partners to the Galileo project.

In October 2003 China became the first country to sign an 

agreement with the EU when the National Remote Sensing 

Center of China entered in the GJU with an investment of €200 

million.18 However, “the agreement remains a shell and the ultimate role China will play in Galileo is unclear.”19 In July 2004, 

Israel’s Matimop, the Israeli Industry Center for Research and 

Development—coordinator of industrial research and development cooperation between Israel and the international hightechnology community—signed a membership agreement with 

the GJU and contributed €18 million. The agreement with 

Israel provided for joint work on research, satellite manufacturing, follow-up services, and marketing.20 India agreed to 

participate in Galileo in September 2005 but withdrew over 

concerns of China’s involvement and instead partnered with 

Russia on GLONASS. Similar agreements were contracted with 

Ukraine in June 2005, with Morocco in November 2005, and 

with South Korea in January 2006. Steps also have been taken 

to involve several other countries, notably Norway, Argentina, 

Switzerland, Brazil, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. The next step for the GJU is to determine the scope and the 

arrangements for cooperation with these third countries in 
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

40

future phases of the Galileo program.21 “Third countries are 

more enthusiastic than certain European countries about Galileo,” EU transport commissioner, Loyola de Palacio, said in 

2003, referring ironically to wrangling in the (then) 15-member 

bloc about funding for the project.22

However, the primary reason underlying international cooperation is not the need to meet the demands of individual countries 

but the need to ensure interoperability with existing systems to 

promote European industrial and political know-how, stimulate 

the creation of system applications, penetrate the markets of these 

third countries, and install components of the terrestrial segment 

in certain parts of the globe. That numerous third countries are 

associated with the program and share the European Union’s 

interests in promoting Galileo has helped to reduce the technical 

and political risks involved. These worldwide links with future 

users make it possible to define more precisely user requirements. 

Lastly, international cooperation has provided considerable funding to support the Galileo project. 

Security Implications of

China’s Compass System 

The heavy involvement of China in the Galileo program is 

troubling for the United States. A principal US concern with 

China’s participation in the Galileo program is that it will allow 

China to transfer not only Galileo’s advanced technology and 

knowledge to significantly enhance its Compass system but 

also the advanced technology of the United States. Recently, 

Lockheed Martin––a principal US defense contractor in the 

development of GPS III satellites, and Astrium, one of Europe’s 

leading satellite systems specialists and a subsidiary of the 

European Aeronautic Space and Defence Company (EADS)—

announced that a cooperative agreement had been signed to 

ensure the “interoperability, integrity, and optimization” of GPS 

III with the Galileo program. “This opens a new dimension of 

cooperation between two of the world’s leading technology companies in systems that will benefit consumers for decades as 

the Galileo and GPS III come on line,” noted Reinhold Lutz, 

EADS senior vice president for Earth Observation, Navigation, 
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

41

and Science.23 However, because of China’s significant involvement in Galileo, this agreement could benefit China by providing indirect access to advance US technologies.

A recent RAND Corporation commentary stated the following:

China has a history of using foreign technology and assistance to improve its military. This has increased its ability to copy weapon systems, to quickly integrate advanced technology into Chinese production 

lines, and to raise the technical expertise of their defense production 

sector. Chinese participation in Galileo is part of a gradual trend in economic and defense cooperation with Europe that in recent years has 

seen European governments and businesses sell to China technology 

that could be used for military purposes. This includes British microand nano-satellite technology that can be used in anti-satellite weapon 

systems, British airborne early warning radar that can be used in military aircraft, German engines that can be used in conventional submarines, and French and Italian technology that can be used in attack 

helicopters.24

In contrast to US concerns, senior EU officials have played down 

concerns about China’s involvement in Galileo. Hans Peter 

Marchlewski, general counselor of the GJU, said the agreement 

with Beijing ensures that it is “explicitly excluded” from confidential signals affecting Western security. EU officials say the 

aim is to provide Beijing with a more sophisticated satellite system limited to civilian use.25 However, European officials admit 

Beijing has shown interest at the top end of Galileo, including its 

encrypted and jam-resistant PRS. To remove any gray zones 

about its use, EU ministers confirmed in December 2004 that 

the PRS would be available only for such military uses as pinpointing locations, not for missile technology. Heinz Hilbrecht, a 

director at the European Commission, insists that the PRS “will 

not be offered outside the EU. It is very clear that certain confidential things, for example those linked to intellectual property 

rights, will not be opened to the Chinese. . . . The Chinese will 

use Galileo for specific applications and we have no indication 

that they would use it for military operations.”26

Meanwhile, China is doing little to mollify US concerns regarding its peaceful intentions. For example, a targeted attack in 

September 2006 on orbiting US intelligence satellites by a 

ground-based laser was confirmed by sensors on Kwajalein Atoll 

to have originated in mainland China.27 Then, on 11 January 

2007, China destroyed a defunct Chinese weather satellite by 

hitting it with a warhead launched on board a ballistic missile, 
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

42

making China only the third country after Russia and the United 

States to shoot down anything in space. The message China has 

sent through these hostile actions is quite clear, “despite the 

opacity of China’s space and military programs and deepening 

suspicion over its stated commitment to the purely peaceful use 

of space.”28 As Vice President Dick Cheney stated in February 

2007, “Last month’s anti-satellite test and China’s continued 

fast-paced military buildup are less constructive and are not 

consistent with China’s stated goal of a peaceful rise.”29

Notes

1. Cheli and Darnis, “Towards a European Space Strategy?” 109. 

2. European Commission (EC), COM 29. 

3. Gleason, “European Union Space Initiatives,” 19.

4. EC, “Report of the Panel of Experts on Space and Security,” 37–38.

5. Bildt, Peyrelevade, and Späth, “Towards a Space Agency.” 

6. Kettmann, “Europe Gives Go-ahead to Galileo.” 

7. Lewis, “Galileo and GPS,” 7.

8. Hackett, “Military Balance 2007,” 24.

9. McMichael, “US Troops in Europe Would Need Backups,” 27. 

10. Lewis, “Galileo and GPS,” 7.

11. Cheli and Darnis, “Towards a European Space Strategy?” 110. 

12. US Department of State and US Department of Commerce, “GPSGalileo Negotiations,” 10.

13. Ibid., 8.

14. “Insider Notes,” United Press International.

15. Braunschvig, Garwin, and Marwell, “Space Diplomacy,” 158.

16. ESA, “Galileo, the European Program,” 10.

17. Morton, “Europe’s New Air War,” 8.

18. ESA, “Galileo, the European Program,” 11.

19. Johnson, “China’s Space Program.”

20. “Israel Signs up to European Satellite Project,”Agence France Press.

21. EC, “Taking Stock of the GALILEO Programme,” 9.

22. AFX European Focus. “India to Invest 300 Million Euros.”

23. Stakelbeck, “Red Skies.”

24. Jones and Larrabee, “Let’s Avoid Another Trans-Atlantic Feud.”

25. Minder, “China’s Focus on Galileo,” 20.

26. Ibid. 

27. Stakelbeck, “Red Skies.”

28. Bodeen, “China’s Space Effort Seen in New Light.”

29. “Cheney: China Actions Worrisome,” USA Today, 5.
43

Chapter 5

Five Steps the US Government

Should Undertake

The United States must undertake the following five distinct 

actions to protect and promote its industrial, military, and 

national security interests: (1) acknowledge the existing situation; (2) ensure fair competition and protect satellite navigation 

hardware manufacturers; (3) compel allied militaries to adopt 

GPS now; (4) drive home the fact that, counter to European 

claims, the availability and precision of GPS will be on par with 

or better than Galileo; and (5) secure China’s cooperation in 

satellite navigation. The following paragraphs detail the rationale for this imperative.

Through its provision of GPS free of user fees, the United 

States has been able to promote its national interests by maintaining the system as an international public good. The benefits 

of providing such a system include international prestige, technological leadership, economic competitiveness, and the security that comes with having political control of a global resource. 

The United States currently plays the role of political and technological leader and as such may see Europe as beginning to 

challenge this status through the Galileo system. 

However, the United States should not have been surprised 

by EU concerns over GPS in the mid-1990s; several of the EU 

remarks corresponded with the findings of its own review of 

GPS and its planned evolution. The 1994 National Defense 

Authorization Act called for a study to provide recommendations on the GPS program’s way ahead and to ensure it continued to meet military and civilian needs, and the Global Positioning System: Charting the Future commission was convened 

and was led by former US Secretary of Defense James 

Schlesinger. The Schlesinger commission’s May 1995 summary 

report highlighted international acceptance of GPS as central 

in dissuading the development of multiple competing satellite 

navigation systems, thereby enabling the United States to 

retain its leadership position in this sector. The report cautioned that the United States’ approach to GPS must not appear 
“chauvinistic or mercantilistic” by international parties, but 

rather the United States should foster increasing international 

interest in GPS by providing other nations with a voice in the 

system’s future.1 The EU would do well to heed these same warnings in regard to Galileo and dispel the program’s air of arrogance 

exhibited toward GPS.

The EU highlighted Galileo as more modern than GPS and 

emphasized Galileo’s focus on meeting civilian and commercial, rather than GPS’s military, demands. While one US argument against the Galileo program held that scheduled improvements to GPS would offset Galileo’s purported technical 

superiority, the GPS program’s susceptibility to budget-induced 

schedule slips made this claim implausible. The Schlesinger 

commission suggested that international involvement in the 

control of GPS and discontinuing SA might help to avoid a situation of multiple competing global navigation satellite systems. 

However, “US reluctance to internationalize GPS governance 

was matched by the EU’s desire to develop and maintain an 

independent space capability rather than continue its dependence on the United States for access to space and space services.”2 US and EU interests, together with the realization that 

Europe desires autonomy in areas it considers vital to its interests, it should not be a surprise that the EU decided to proceed 

with its Galileo project. In the interest of promoting an improved 

trans-Atlantic relationship, “the US must take European initiatives in space seriously, identify the key actors, seek to understand the rationales and processes behind them, and find ways 

the United States can benefit from European investment.”3

Even though Europe and the United States share numerous 

common values, both sides of the Atlantic have experienced 

strong dissonance recently; and disputes over Iraq are a symptom of larger tensions. Neither side has done a good job of managing relations, thus political relations remain strained.4 The 

heavy US emphasis on homeland security has complicated 

matters, making it more difficult for foreign scientists to get 

visas. Progress requires recognition of the whole situation, 

including a strong acknowledgement by both sides of their real 

differences in interest as well as the value of their partnership, 

coupled with the political will in Brussels and Washington to 

pursue it.5

44

FIVE STEPS
FIVE STEPS

45

Protect GNSS Receiver Manufacturers 

As the global economy continues to grow increasingly dependent on satellite-based positioning, navigation, and timing services, so grows the market for GNSS end-user products, and US 

producers of GPS products stand to lose significant market share 

and/or gross revenue with Galileo’s implementation. The US 

government must prevent unfair treatment of these US producers by ensuring that a fully open and competitive market remains 

in place for all manufacturers of GNSS receivers and by steering 

the EU away from implementing mandatory use requirements 

and market access restrictions of GNSS receivers.

If Galileo’s Phase 3 operating costs prove to be too high, or its 

revenue streams do not produce as expected, the Galileo concessionaire will not be able to cover its costs and will likely turn 

to the EU for assistance. The EU could respond with additional 

taxpayer financing, or it could elect to subsidize the Galileo 

revenue stream through mandatory regulations and standards 

that mandate the purchase of Galileo’s services. For example, 

the EU may assert that since Galileo is more accurate than the 

current GPS civil signal, aircraft entering its airspace must use 

Galileo-based navigation systems to ensure flight safety. The 

United States must work to ensure that any new usage standards are technologically neutral, allowing civil users to choose 

to use GPS, Galileo, or a combination based on their needs.

An EU decision to restrict access to, or knowledge of, Galileo’s 

signals could exclude US firms from the market for Galileo satellite navigation services and equipment, and the United States 

must ensure that all information needed for Galileo receiver 

production must be made equally available to all manufacturers. Specifically, the United States should work to ensure that 

the EU publishes all documentation for access to Galileo’s open 

service, just as it is done for the GPS SPS. The EU must provide 

equal access to the specifications for Galileo’s controlled access 

services to include openly publishing the encryption algorithms, 

ensuring the cryptographic key system does not exclude nonEuropeans, and ensuring that any licensing arrangements and 

fees do not discriminate against non-European firms. The ESA 

did release the “Galileo Open Service Signal in Space Interface 

Control Document” in May 2006,6 a positive step toward pro-
FIVE STEPS

46

viding access to Galileo’s technical information, but the United 

States must remain vigilant and ensure that this vital information continues to flow freely, equitably, and timely to US manufacturers.

The June 2004 EU-US cooperation agreement on the use of 

Galileo and GPS established a forum to address these two issues. 

The agreement states that the United States and the EU will 

communicate before establishing any measures that will have 

the effect of mandating the use of a particular system within its 

territory and that measures should not be used as a disguised 

restriction on or as an unnecessary obstacle to international 

trade.7 To ensure that these critical aspects are upheld, the 2004 

agreement established the trade and civil applications working 

group to address nondiscrimination and other trade-related 

issues; this group met for the first time in January 2007.8 The 

United States must capitalize on this working group’s operational oversight to ensure that a fair and level playing field exists 

for all manufacturers of civil satellite-based navigation and timing end-user equipment, regardless of nationality.

Compel Allied Militaries to Adopt GPS Now 

Even though civilian GPS users today outnumber their military counterparts by at least 100 to one,9 GPS is at its core a 

military system, providing a capability that has proven increasingly vital to US national security over the past three decades. 

GPS’s encrypted precise positioning service (PPS) is designed to 

provide continuous positioning and navigation signals to the 

military community, even during periods of regional jamming 

of GPS’s civilian signal due to national security crises. This 

way, GPS service will only be continuously available to users 

with military GPS receivers. To preserve this military competitive advantage and the force enhancement capabilities derived 

from direct access to the GPS encrypted military signal, the fiscal year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act prohibited 

procurement or modification of any DOD aircraft, ship, armored 

vehicle, or indirect-fire weapon system not equipped with a 

GPS receiver after 30 September 2000 (later slipped to 30 September 2005).10 This measure equipped US forces with GPS 
FIVE STEPS

47

capability and ensured that they would remain so equipped for 

the foreseeable future.

The United States does not typically train or fight alone but 

rather in a coalition of allied forces. To ensure that all US allies 

enjoy continued access to critical positioning and navigation 

services, the United States should compel these allied militaries to formally adopt the GPS PPS signal as their standard 

satellite-based positioning and timing service and then encourage them to fully and rapidly equip their military forces with 

GPS PPS-capable receivers. NATO recognized satellite navigation as a huge capability multiplier and has been heavily 

invested in GPS for several years.11

The addition of Galileo signals will provide greater precision 

in their military receivers; access to several positioning signals 

will benefit allied forces in future missions, especially those 

that take place in urban areas or under heavy foliage. Failure 

to adopt and equip with GPS now could lead some allied militaries to choose to adopt Galileo user equipment when it 

becomes available, introducing risk into any operations conducted in an area where the United States has jammed Galileo 

to prevent hostile misuse of its signals; Galileo will be available 

to neither ally nor foe.

Coupled with military exercises that clearly demonstrate the 

survivability of PPS over SPS, presentations to explain the theory 

of the advantages of the PPS signal will go a long way to compel 

allied militaries to adopt GPS. It is not necessary to disclose any 

specific US tactics or techniques; rather, the demonstration 

should focus simply on what is possible. For example, constellations of unmanned aerial vehicles over a battle space using special antennas and signal processors to acquire the GPS signal 

from satellites in spite of heavy GPS jamming and then rebroadcasting a more powerful and much closer GPS PPS signal to 

allied forces and weapons is one such possibility; this concept 

was validated by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

in April 2000.12 To further drive home the point, invite the US Air 

Force’s 26th Space Aggressor Squadron from Schriever AFB, 

whose mission is “to show how a space-savvy adversary could 

severely hinder the air and ground campaign,”13 to participate in 

the multinational military exercises; the participants will quickly 

appreciate the value of GPS’s uninterrupted PPS signal.
FIVE STEPS

48

As more and more US allies adopt the GPS PPS signal and integrate it throughout their military forces, operational and interoperability challenges introduced by Galileo’s arrival will be minimized. 

By compelling and enabling allied militaries to adopt, equip, train, 

and operate with the GPS PPS signal now, the United States will 

protect the future of the GPS PPS signal as the gold standard in 

positioning and navigation for combined military operations, maximizing the abilities of US and allied forces to conduct seamless 

operations with optimal effects during all phases of warfare.

Advertise GPS Availability and

Precision on Par with Galileo 

Since the inception of the Galileo project, the EU and the ESA 

have published numerous multi-page publicity brochures touting the Galileo system and all the valuable services it will provide. Key to their brochures’ argument in justifying the Galileo 

program is Galileo’s superior availability and precision in relation to GPS. In turn, to the extent that it seems almost common 

knowledge in the GNSS community, newspaper and magazine 

articles discussing Galileo and GPS frequently mention Galileo’s 

advantages in these two areas. However, as discussed earlier, 

Galileo will not be more available than GPS, and the precision of 

the two satellite systems will likely be a lot closer than the EU 

and the ESA would have the readers of their brochures believe. 

The EU’s claims of Galileo’s superiority over GPS in terms of 

availability and precision are somewhat understandable, as 

these claims are undoubtedly a significant component of the 

EU’s ongoing campaign to attract large amounts of foreign 

investment. However, it is important for the US government to 

set the record straight by countering these claims to the international audience whenever possible and promoting the perception that GPS will continue to serve as the most trustworthy 

and reliable resource for the global community.

Secure China’s GNSS Cooperation 

The involvement of China in the Galileo program is particularly troubling for the United States. As part of a larger program 
FIVE STEPS

49

of military modernization, China has sought satellite navigation services for its armed forces. While technology transfer 

from Europe to China and input from China into Galileo’s 

design and operation will be limited, this cooperation will allow 

the Chinese to develop a more sophisticated understanding of 

navigational satellites. Also, China’s Compass navigation satellite system, which is expected to become operational over much 

of China in 2008, could use the same radio frequency as Galileo and GPS, making US attempts to jam an adversary’s positioning and navigational signals much more difficult during 

crises. Ultimately, the Compass navigation satellite system 

could be used worldwide to provide precise positioning data for 

the Chinese military similar to information already produced 

by GPS to support military field commanders. Thus, China’s 

deepening space partnership with the EU could present an 

immediate national security dilemma for the United States, 

since advanced technologies shared by cooperative EU nations 

would almost certainly enhance China’s military modernization and intelligence programs.

To mitigate this situation, the United States and the EU 

should enter into multilateral discussions with China to determine how best to proceed cooperatively with GPS, Galileo, and 

Compass, just as the United States did with the EU in 2000. 

The United States should discuss China’s current and future 

participation in Galileo, starting with such questions as “What 

is China’s role in Galileo?” “What kind of access will it have to 

sensitive technology?” and “What firewalls are in place to make 

it more difficult for China to acquire sensitive technologies 

through Galileo?”14 Concurrently, the United States and the EU 

should capitalize on the recently formed United Nations International Committee on GNSS to address compatibility and 

interoperability issues among the three systems. How amenable China will be to constructive and productive discussions to 

achieve cooperation and avoid competition between GPS, Galileo, and Compass has yet to be seen. The US and the EU agreement took almost four years to conclude and that was between 

two largely cooperative entities. To sweeten the deal and entice 

China to the discussion table, the United States and the EU 

could offer such incentives as a collection of GPS and Galileo 
FIVE STEPS

50

lessons learned coupled with technical assistance in developing the Compass system.

Notes

1. Schlesinger and Adams, “Global Positioning System,” 7.

2. Lewis, “Galileo and GPS,” 2.

3. Gleason, “European Union Space Initiatives,” 37.

4. Lewis, “Galileo and GPS,” 10.

5. Ibid., 11.

6. ESA/Galileo Joint Undertaking, “Galileo Open Service Signal in Space 

Interface Control Document.” 

7. US Navy, “Agreement on the Promotion, Provision and Use,” articles 5 

and 6.

8. US Department of Commerce, “US-European Union GPS-Galileo Working Group.”

9. “GPS Overview, Fact Sheet,” Navstar Global Positioning System Joint 

Program Office.

10. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 6130.01B, “2000 CJCS 

Master Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Plan.”

11. Saulay, “Satellite Navigation as Seen By NATO,” 10.

12. Vizard, “Safeguarding GPS.”

13. Branum, “26th SAS Trains Airmen.”

14. Jones and Larrabee, “Let’s Avoid Another Trans-Atlantic Feud.”
51

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Once Galileo’s 30-satellite constellation and network of 

ground stations is operational, Europe will become the third 

owner of a satellite radio navigation system, after the United 

States and Russia. Motivated by anticipated long-term industrial and economic benefits, the desire for sovereignty and 

security in an area it considers vital to its interests, the rectification of perceived shortfalls in GPS availability and precision, 

and the opportunity to strengthen EU integration and exert 

political autonomy from the United States, the EU has been a 

staunch supporter of its Galileo program during the past 

decade. In spite of these perceived benefits, the Galileo program has been dogged by nearly four years of high-pressure 

negotiations with the United States over broadcast frequencies 

and on-going funding and deployment concerns. In fielding the 

Galileo satellite constellation, the EU expects to reap economic, 

technological, security, and political benefits when Galileo, as 

expected, will serve as the starting point for the development of 

many services and applications. 

Regarding the military and civilian communities’ everincreasing reliance on GPS signals, the United States has 

become heavily invested in its GPS program during the past 

three decades. Therefore, the challenges that Galileo poses to 

vital US industrial, military, and national security interests 

deserve serious attention. To protect the vast industry that has 

developed around GPS, the United States should ensure that 

the EU does not impose mandatory use requirements for Galileo and that access to the Galileo hardware market remains 

fair and does not discriminate against non-EU companies.

Compelling US allies to formally adopt the GPS military code 

and equip their militaries appropriately will ensure their ability 

to operate continuously with the United States during all levels 

of training and operations; this will not be the case if our allies 

are equipped with Galileo. The United States must set the 

record straight and counter EU claims to the international 

audience that Galileo will be available when the United States 
turns GPS off due to a national crisis. In all likelihood, the 

United States will cut off both GPS and Galileo during a national 

crisis to prevent hostile misuse of positioning signals, and only 

the encrypted GPS military code will be available. And finally, 

the United States must address China’s major involvement in 

Galileo and the development of China’s own satellite positioning and navigation system. The United States should partner 

with the EU, enter into negotiations with China similar to the 

successful US-EU discussions, and address concerns in all 

available multilateral venues.

Without question, the Galileo system has much to offer and 

will be a great benefit to the global community; yet, at the same 

time, it poses many and varied implications. Galileo will affect 

the transatlantic alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and US dominance in the defense and security of Europe; 

and, Galileo will present serious commercial and industrial 

concerns as well. While the United States must oppose anything that would degrade the GPS’s civil or military signals, 

diminish the ability to deny access to positioning signals to 

adversaries during crises, or undermine NATO cohesion, the 

United States must continue to seek to cooperate—and not 

compete—with the Galileo program.

52

CONCLUSION
53

Abbreviations

AFB Air Force base

CY calendar year

DGPS differential global positioning system

DOD Department of Defense

EADS European Aeronautic Space and Defense Company

EC European Commission

EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service

ESA European Space Agency

ESDP European Security and Defense Policy

EU European Union

GJU Galileo joint undertaking

GLONASS global navigation satellite system (Russian)

GNSS global navigation satellite system (Chinese)

GPS global positioning system

GPSOC Global Positioning System Operations Center

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVSTAR navigation satellite timing and ranging 

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PPS precise positioning service

PRS public regulated service

SA selective availability

SEP spherical error probable

SPS standard positioning service

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GPS and Galileo

Friendly Foes?

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