NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AJEENAH CRITTENDON; EZ E-FILE 

TAX PREPARERS, INC., a California 

corporation, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

ANGELICA MULDROW, AKA Angelica 

Ivana, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 23-16205 

D.C. No. 3:22-cv-09153-RS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Richard Seeborg, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 20, 2024

San Francisco, California

Before: BRESS and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,** District Judge.

EZ E-File Tax Preparers, Inc. (EZ), and its CEO, Ajeenah Crittendon

(collectively, “Crittendon”), appeal the district court’s dismissal of their claims

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

FILED

AUG 29 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

against Crittendon’s niece, Angelica Muldrow, for defamation and the filing of false 

police reports. The district court concluded that this lawsuit was barred by res 

judicata on account of a prior lawsuit filed by Muldrow in Georgia alleging that 

Crittendon and EZ had issued Muldrow certain fraudulent tax forms. See 

Muldrow v. EZ E-File Tax Preparers, Inc., 2022 WL 2349204 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 

2022). In the district court’s view, Crittendon either could have raised or did raise 

her current claims as compulsory counterclaims in the Georgia case.

We review the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) de novo. Pardini v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 65 F.4th 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 

2023). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the district court’s 

decision dismissing Crittendon’s claims, except as to Muldrow’s acts that occurred 

after the Georgia court issued its judgment. As to the latter, we reverse.

1. We agree with the district court that the Georgia lawsuit precludes 

Crittendon’s defamation and false reporting claims premised on conduct that 

occurred before the Georgia court issued its judgment, because these claims were 

compulsory counterclaims in the prior lawsuit. Under Georgia law, “there are three 

requirements which must be satisfied in order for res judicata to apply: there must 

be identity of the cause of action, identity of the parties or their privies, and previous 

adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Bostick v. CMM 

Props., Inc., 772 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 2015); see also Daewoo Elecs. Am. Inc. v. 
3 

Opta Corp., 875 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that a federal court 

assessing the preclusive effect of a judgment rendered by another federal court 

sitting in diversity “must apply preclusion principles according to the law of the 

initial court’s state”). 

Crittendon does not dispute that the two lawsuits involve the same parties. 

We further agree with the district court that the “same claim” requirement is satisfied

(except insofar as the claims are premised on Muldrow’s conduct occurring after the 

Georgia decision, which we discuss below). Although the Georgia lawsuit related 

to Muldrow’s tax fraud claim, the “same claim” requirement is met if Crittendon

either (1) actually raised her defamation and false reporting claims in the Georgia 

lawsuit, or (2) should have raised them then as compulsory counterclaims. See, e.g., 

Setlock v. Setlock, 688 S.E.2d 346, 385–86 (Ga. 2010). 

Here, Crittendon did raise, and should have raised, her then-existing claims 

against Muldrow in the prior Georgia lawsuit. Crittendon’s answer in the Georgia 

case generally alleged that Muldrow committed the same acts for which she now 

seeks relief in this case. Further, based on the answer, Crittendon herself understood 

the tax returns as inherently related to her allegations that Muldrow had previously 

made false statements about her. Indeed, and among other things, in the Georgia 

answer Crittendon requested a “Motion to Demand – Plaintiff Muldrow to remove 

the Harassing, Malicious, Defaming Facebook & Google Posts against Defendants.” 
4 

In substance, these are the same claims she advances here. 

Crittendon’s answer thus itself demonstrates “a logical 

relationship . . . between the respective claims asserted by the opposing parties.” 

Metro Brokers, Inc. v. Sams & Cole, LLC, 729 S.E.2d 540, 543 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)

(quoting Steve A. Martin Agency, Inc. v. PlantersFIRST Corp., 678 S.E.2d 186, 188 

(Ga. Ct. App. 2009)). Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court 

that even if the Georgia answer did not sufficiently raise the defamation and false 

reporting claims as counterclaims, they were compulsory counterclaims that are now 

precluded. See OCGA § 9-11-13(a) (indicating that a counterclaim is compulsory if 

it “arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 

opposing party’s claim”). 

The third requirement for res judicata under Georgia law is likewise met 

because the Georgia decision operated as an “adjudication on the merits” for all 

claims that were actually at issue or that “‘might have been put in issue,’” including 

the counterclaims as discussed above. See Starship Enters. of Atlanta, Inc. v. 

Gwinnett County, 903 S.E.2d 55, 62–63 (Ga. 2024) (quoting OCGA § 9-12-40). 

Crittendon has waived any argument that the Georgia court was not competent to 

adjudicate these claims by failing to raise this issue below. See United States v. 

Anekwu, 695 F.3d 967, 985 (9th Cir. 2012) (issues not raised below are waived). 

Finally, we reject Crittendon’s arguments that any policy-based concerns justify not 
5 

applying res judicata here. 

2. We disagree with the district court that the same reasoning applies to 

Crittendon’s claims premised on Muldrow’s conduct that occurred on or after April 

2022, which was after the district court in Georgia issued its decision. Under 

Georgia law, res judicata does not apply to a claim “where the merits were not and 

could not have been determined under a proper presentation and management of the 

case . . .” Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Woelper, 498 S.E.2d 255, 256 (Ga. 1998); 

see also Bigley v. Mosser, 509 S.E.2d 406, 408 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that 

libel claims were not precluded by a prior libel lawsuit where the subsequent claims 

were “based upon a different statement, made at a different time and in a different 

publication”). Muldrow offers no substantive response to this point, nor does she

identify any authority that required Crittendon to seek further relief from the Georgia 

court after March 2022. We therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of 

Crittendon’s claims to the extent they are premised on Muldrow’s April 2022 actions

or any other actions after March 2022.

3. We reject Crittendon’s argument that Muldrow’s motion to dismiss was 

untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. That Muldrow had previously 

moved to strike a prior version of the complaint does not render untimely her 

subsequent Rule 12 motion with respect to a new complaint.

4. The lawsuits between these parties appear to be part of a broader familial 
6 

dispute over the care of a relative. At oral argument, counsel indicated that the 

parties’ animosity toward each other may impede the resolution of this case. The 

parties are cautioned that the federal courts are not the forum for litigating personal 

grievances that do not involve meritorious claims for legal relief. Unending 

litigation for litigation’s sake is not a proper use of judicial resources. The district 

court has ample discretion to ensure that the parties abide by court rules and to 

encourage the prompt resolution of the remaining claims.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.1

1 The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.