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DYSFUNCTION IN MANAGEMENT OF WEATHER 

AND CLIMATE SATELLITES 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 19, 2013 

Serial No. 113–49 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

CYNTHIA LUMMIS, Wyoming 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY WEBER, Texas 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JOSEPH KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC VEASEY, Texas 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

MARK TAKANO, California 

ROBIN KELLY, Illinois 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

HON. PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DAN MAFFEI, New York 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT

HON. CHRIS STEWART, Utah, Chair 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

RANDY WEBER, Texas 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARK TAKANO, California 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

September 19, 2013 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Paul C. Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 

Representatives .................................................................................................... 14 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 15 

Statement by Representative Dan Maffei, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17 

Statement by Representative Chris Stewart, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House 

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 18 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19 

Statement by Representative Suzanne Bonamici, Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................... 20 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 21 

Witnesses: 

Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 23 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 26 

Ms. Mary Kicza, Assistant Administrator, Satellite and Information Services, 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 48 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 50 

Mr. Marcus Watkins, Director, Joint Agency Satellite Division, National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 61 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 63 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 67 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Mr. David Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office .............................................................. 86 

Ms. Mary Kicza, Assistant Administrator, Satellite and Information Services, 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration .......................................... 90 

Mr. Marcus Watkins, Director, Joint Agency Satellite Division, National Aeronautics and Space Administration ...................................................................... 102 
Page

IV 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

GAO report to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House 

of Representatives, ‘‘Geostationary Weather Satellites: Progress Made, but 

Weakness in Scheduling, Contingency Planning, and Communicating with 

Users Need to Be Addressed’’ .............................................................................. 110 

GAO report to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House 

of Representatives, ‘‘Polar Weather Satellites: NOAA Identified Ways to 

Mitigate Data Gaps, but Contingency Plans and Schedules Require Further 

Attention ............................................................................................................... 172 
(1) 

DYSFUNCTION IN MANAGEMENT OF 

WEATHER AND CLIMATE SATELLITES 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

JOINT HEARING WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON

OVERSIGHT AND ENVIRONMENT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Broun 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight] presiding. 
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Chairman BROUN. This joint hearing of the Subcommittee on 

Oversight and the Subcommittee on Environment will come to 

order. 

Good morning and welcome to today’s joint hearing. In front of 

you are packets containing the written testimony, biographies, and 

truth-in-testimony disclosures for today’s witnesses. Before we get 

started, since this is a joint hearing involving two Subcommittees, 

I want to explain how we will operate procedurally so all Members 

understand how the question-and-answer period will be handled. 

We will recognize those Members present at the gavel in order of 

seniority on the full Committee and those coming in after the gavel 

will be recognized in their order of arrival. 

I now recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

Today’s hearing is titled ‘‘Dysfunction in Management of Weather and Climate Satellites. Let me begin by extending a warm welcome to our witnesses and thank you all for appearing here today.’’ 

The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology has held 

about a dozen hearings on weather satellites, under both Republican as well as Democratic leadership, all since 2003. Continued 

oversight is important because these programs are important. Data 

from these satellites not only help one decide whether or not to 

leave the house with an umbrella, they allow meteorologists to 

more accurately predict extreme weather, military planners to 

more intelligently deploy troops around the world, and emergency 

managers to better respond to wildfires and other natural disasters. 

Unfortunately, the programs have been plagued with problems. 

The Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General, the U.S. 

Government Accountability Office, and other independent reviewers have repeatedly assessed that the programs are at risk of exceeding cost and missing deadlines due to a myriad of issues. Citing ongoing concerns about potential data gaps for NOAA’s polarorbiting and geostationary satellite programs, including a potential 

polar-orbiting gap of 17 to 53 months, GAO added NOAA’s satellite 

programs to its High Risk List in a report issued earlier this year. 

On that note, I want to take a moment to thank the GAO staff 

for their diligent work on this issue over the years. You have been 

a valuable resource to this Committee’s oversight efforts, and I 

want our witness Mr. Powner to know that I personally, and we 

as a Committee, appreciate your work and your presence here 

today. Thank you, sir. 

As I have said before, it is frustrating to watch these important 

programs struggle. But it is even more frustrating to be told by 

NOAA and NASA that ‘‘all is well’’ when we all know that that is 

not the case. An IG report, GAO reports, and a 2012 independent 

report sponsored by NOAA all say otherwise, with the independent 

report going so far as to use the word ‘‘dysfunctional’’ in its analysis of the weather satellite programs. Another independent 

NOAA-commissioned report released this year described the possibility of the United States’ reliance on China for satellite data as 

a ‘‘silver bullet.’’ I have grave concerns about incorporating data 

into U.S. systems from a country well known for its persistent and 

malicious cyber attacks against our Nation. 
15 

The latest lifecycle cost estimate for JPSS is $11.3 billion, but it 

took some crafty accounting to arrive at that number. Along the 

way, the program went from six satellites operating in three separate orbits and carrying 11 unique sensors under NPOESS, the 

precursor to JPSS, to now two satellites, operating in one orbit, 

carrying only five sensors. Even with those downgrades, the first 

JPSS satellite isn’t scheduled to launch until March 2017. 

The GOES-R program is further along than JPSS, but it, too, is 

facing a potential data coverage gap. It is my understanding that 

NOAA expects to retire one of its operational satellites, GOES-13, 

and move the backup, GOES-14, into operation in April 2015. That 

means for at least six months, there will be no backup satellite, assuming GOES-R is launched in October of 2015. Recently, however, 

program officials acknowledged that the launch date will likely slip 

by one quarter, which could result in a delay of as much as six 

months. And the cause for the delay? A $54 million sequester cut, 

according to NOAA staff. 

If money is so tight and our weather satellite programs are so 

vulnerable, then perhaps the Administration needs to evaluate its 

priorities and determine which is more important: near-term 

weather monitoring, which can save lives and property today, or 

beefing up NOAA’s climate portfolio in an effort to guess what the 

weather might be decades from now. 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ testimonies and receiving some candid answers to our questions. Let me also make this 

general observation to you all: it is a lot easier for Congress to 

work collaboratively with the Administration on solving our satellite problems if there is transparency about potential concerns. As 

such, I will ask you to please answer our questions later in a concise, straightforward, expeditious, and accurate manner. It will defeat the purpose of this hearing if our questions are sidestepped 

through the use of bureaucratic doublespeak, as that will only try 

our patience and will waste our limited and valuable time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Broun follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PAUL C. BROUN, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

I want to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses and thank them for appearing 

today. 

The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology has held about a dozen hearings on weather satellites, under both Republican and Democratic leadership, since 

2003. Continued oversight is important because these programs are important. Data 

from these satellites not only help one decide whether or not to leave the house with 

an umbrella, they allow meteorologists to more accurately predict extreme weather, 

military planners to more intelligently deploy troops around the world, and emergency managers to better respond to wildfires and other natural disasters. 

Unfortunately, the programs have been plagued with problems. The Department 

of Commerce Office of Inspector General, the U.S. Government Accountability Office 

and other independent reviewers have repeatedly assessed that the programs are 

at risk of exceeding cost and missing deadlines due to a myriad of issues. Citing 

ongoing concerns about potential data gaps for NOAA’s polar-orbiting and geostationary satellite programs, including a potential polar-orbiting gap of 17 to 53 

months, GAO added NOAA’s satellite programs to its High Risk List in a report 

issued earlier this year. 

On that note, I want to take a moment to thank the GAO staff for their diligent 

work on this issue over the years. You have been a valuable resource to this Committee’s oversight efforts, and I want our witness Mr. Powner to know that we appreciate your work and your presence here today. 
16 

As I have said before, it is frustrating to watch these important programs struggle. But it is even more frustrating to be told by NOAA and NASA that ‘‘all is well’’ 

when we all know that is not the case. An IG report, GAO reports, and a 2012 independent report sponsored by NOAA all say otherwise, with the independent report 

going so far as to use the word ‘‘dysfunctional’’ in its analysis of the weather satellite programs. Another independent NOAA-commissioned report released this year 

described the possibility of the United States’ reliance on China for satellite data 

as a ‘‘silver bullet.’’ I have grave concerns about incorporating data into U.S. systems from a country well-known for its persistent and malicious cyber attacks 

against our nation. 

The latest lifecycle cost estimate for JPSS is $11.3 billion, but it took some crafty 

accounting to arrive at that number. Along the way, the program went from six satellites, operating in three separate orbits and carrying 11 unique sensors under 

NPOESS, the precursor to JPSS, to now two satellites, operating in one orbit, carrying only five sensors. Even with those downgrades, the first JPSS satellite isn’t 

scheduled to launch until March 2017. 

The GOES-R program is further along than JPSS, but it too is facing a potential 

data coverage gap. It is my understanding that NOAA expects to retire one of its 

operational satellites, GOES-13, and move the back-up, GOES-14, into operation in 

April 2015. That means for at least six months, there will be no backup satellite, 

assuming GOES-R is launched in October 2015. Recently, however, program officials 

acknowledged that the launch date will likely slip by one quarter, which could result 

in a delay of as much as six months. And the cause for the delay? A $54 million 

sequester cut, according to NOAA staff. 

If money is so tight and our weather satellite programs so vulnerable, then perhaps the Administration needs to evaluate its priorities and determine which is 

more important—near-term weather monitoring, which can save lives and property 

today, or beefing up NASA’s climate portfolio in an effort to guess what the weather 

might be decades from now. 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ testimonies and receiving some candid 

answers to our questions. Let me also make this general observation to you all: it 

is a lot easier for Congress to work collaboratively with the Administration on solving our satellite problems if there is transparency about potential concerns. As such, 

I will ask you to please answer our questions later in a concise, straightforward, 

and accurate manner. It will defeat the purpose of this hearing if our questions are 

sidestepped through the use of bureaucratic doublespeak, as that will only try our 

patience and waste our limited time. 

Chairman BROUN. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the 

gentleman from New York, my friend Mr. Maffei, for an opening 

statement. 

Mr. MAFFEI. I want to thank my friend, the Chairman, and I 

want to apologize for being just a couple minutes late today. We 

are going to be talking about how it is difficult to protect the 

weather. Apparently, it is difficult to predict the traffic in Washington as well. 

But, Mr. Chairman, the weather satellites we have flying over 

the poles and in geostationary orbits over the East and West Coast 

provide essential data for weather forecasting. And both the Joint 

Polar Satellite System and the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite are essential acquisition programs intended to put 

replacements on orbit for the current generation of operating satellites. Unfortunately, both of these acquisitions have been troubled, and that is why I am grateful to you for holding this hearing 

today, as well as Chairman Stewart. 

Of the two, JPSS is far and away in the most trouble. It will 

produce a definite gap in coverage due to the technical and cost 

challenges which have plagued the program. The Geostationary 

program is also worrisome with an ongoing possibility of a data gap 

emerging due to schedule slips. Obviously, none of us are happy 

about this. However, it has been suggested in some locations that 
17 

this might be something tied to the cost of doing climate science, 

and I don’t believe this is the case. 

When the Obama Administration took office, they inherited a 

crippled program already. It lacked planning and management 

guidance to move forward. It had experienced cost growth from 6.5 

billion to at least 12.5 billion. For almost 100 percent of the 

growth, we were getting two satellites instead of six, and we had 

jettisoned many sensors. This is what the Administration inherited 

and they had to make hard decisions about how to move the program forward, and that took almost two years to get the Defense 

Department out of the program and NOAA and NASA on a fresh 

path. 

Any observer, I think, would have to conclude that the restructured JPSS program is better managed and better structured now 

than it was in 2008, and that we should be proud of, but there are 

still gaps in the management tools needed in JPSS. Again, compared to where we were between 2005 and 2008, the bleeding has 

stopped and the slips seem relatively small. With that said, we are 

still facing an inevitable gap in coverage and what to do about that 

gap is going to be and should be explored today. 

The Geostationary Satellite program has always been a little 

healthier than JPSS. It has suffered from more technical issues 

and less relative cost growth and enjoyed more stable management 

than the polar program. That said, there is still a chance of a gap 

in coverage that would be tragic. NOAA has to keep the track— 

keep on track to get our satellites in orbit and working before the 

current geostationary satellites go dark. We need satellites ready 

for launch to avoid limit or gap in coverage. We need clear plans 

for alternative sources of data to protect accurate forecasting. And 

we need to make sure that we are not forced to depend on other 

countries such as the People’s Republic of China that the Chairman 

rightfully pointed out would have unacceptable downsides to that 

kind of relationship. We need to be confident that both of these programs are going to succeed even by the diminished expectations we 

now hold for them. 

And with that, I yield back to you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank 

you again for holding the hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Maffei follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE DAN MAFFEI, RANKING MINORITY

MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

Mr. Chairman, the weather satellites we fly over the poles and in geostationary 

orbits over the East and West coasts provide essential data for weather forecasting. 

Both the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and the Geostationary Operational 

Environmental Satellite (GOES-R) are essential acquisition programs intended to 

put replacements on-orbit for the current generation of operating satellites. Unfortunately, both these acquisitions have been troubled. 

Of the two, JPSS is far and away in the most trouble, and will produce a definite 

gap in coverage due to the technical and cost challenges which have plagued the 

program. GOES-R is also worrisome, with an ongoing possibility of a data gap 

emerging due to schedule slips. 

None of us are happy about this. However, it has been suggested that somehow 

the problems in these programs are tied to the costs of climate science. This is just 

not the case. 

When the Obama Administration took office, they inherited a crippled program 

that lacked all the planning and management guidance necessary to move forward. 

It had experienced cost growth from $6.5 billion to at least $12.5 billion. For almost 
18 

100 percent cost growth we were getting two satellites instead of six and we had 

jettisoned many sensors. The Administration inherited hard decisions about how to 

move the program forward and it took almost two years to get DOD out of the program and NOAA and NASA on a fresh path. 

Any objective observer would have to conclude that the restructured JPSS program is better managed and better structured now than it was in 2008. There are 

still gaps in the management tools need in JPSS, but compared to where we were 

in 2005 through 2008, the bleeding has stopped and the slips seem relatively small. 

That said, we are facing an inevitable gap in coverage. While that cannot be laid 

at the feet of this Administration, we can ask of the Administration whether they 

have put necessary resources into settling on a valid gap-filler strategy. Have they 

identified other sources of data? Do they have all agreements in place to insure they 

have unbroken access to that data? What steps have been taken to validate the effects of that data on our modeling to insure that we minimize impacts on forecast 

accuracy? These are crucial questions that I would like to see answered today. 

As to GOES-R, that program has always been a little healthier than JPSS. It has 

suffered from fewer technical issues and less relative cost growth, and enjoyed more 

stable management than the polar program. That said, there is still a chance that 

a gap in coverage could emerge and that would be tragic. NOAA has to keep on 

track to get us satellites on orbit and working before the current GOES satellites 

go dark. The recent slip narrows the margin for error and is a cause for concern 

among all of us. 

We need satellites ready for launch to avoid or limit coverage gaps. We need clear 

plans for alternative sources of data to protect forecasting accuracy. We need confidence that both these programs are going to succeed, even by the diminished expectations we now hold for them. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Maffei. 

I now recognize the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Environment, the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Stewart, for his opening statement. 

Mr. STEWART. Thank you, Dr. Broun, for holding this important 

hearing. I would like to thank the witnesses for being with us 

today. We look forward to hearing from you and for your expertise 

and for your service to our country. 

I think all of us agree this is an important issue. I think we all 

sense the clock is ticking and there is a sense of urgency of trying 

to move forward in a way that is, I think, beneficial. 

The Science Committee has a long history of overseeing the management of NOAA and NASA weather and climate satellite systems. Unfortunately, these programs have been rife with delays 

and other issues for more than a decade now, as has already been 

expressed by the two previous opening statements. Topics at issue 

today are also very timely in that they relate to legislation being 

considered by this Committee, the Weather Forecasting Improvement Act of 2013, which attempts to focus critical resources on developing a top-notch weather forecasting system based on streamlined research-to-operations and a more reasonable balance of resources toward weather research. 

All of our witnesses acknowledge the strong possibility of a data 

gap for one or both of our major weather satellite systems in a few 

short years. These satellites provide the majority of data for numerical weather predictions in this country, and a gap could be catastrophic for forecasting by the National Weather Service and our 

innovative weather enterprise. A potential gap in the polar-orbiting 

or geostationary satellite data, combined with continuing issues 

with how NOAA develops, analyzes, procures and integrates other 

satellite information, risks the permanent loss of U.S. leadership in 

weather forecasting. I believe the writing is on the wall, and our 

current trajectory is simply unacceptable. 
19 

As the Government Accountability Office will testify, our geostationary and polar-orbiting programs, known as GOES and JPSS, 

have been—again, indicated in previous testimony or opening 

statements, they have been plagued with cost overruns, with technical issues, and other delays. And we need to consider the right 

mix of satellite technology to make timely, accurate, and effective 

forecasts to protect American lives and property. 

For our polar-orbiting satellites, not only is there a potential gap 

in the 2016 to 2018 time frame, but there may also be issues between the first and second JPSS satellites in the early 2020s. 

While the GOES-R program has made progress in completing 

testing for several components, the program has still missed several key milestones for both flight and ground segments. This has 

caused the launch date for the GOES-R to slip from October 2015 

to perhaps March of 2016. There are also other technical problems 

on the horizon, including the Geostationary Lightning Mapper, an 

instrument that appears to duplicate some already-existing commercial capabilities. 

Robust contingency planning and implementation of these plans, 

as suggested by GAO, is essential. We have seen that it has taken 

several years for NOAA to validate key products on the SUOMI– 

NPP satellite. Just after the Oklahoma tornadoes this year, a 

micrometeoroid appears to have hit an existing GOES satellite, 

turning off all of its instruments. Murphy’s Law seems to be on full 

display when it comes to our weather satellites, and continued blue 

sky evaluations by NOAA could prevent us from dealing with these 

problems before they arise. 

It has taken the Administration several years and the prodding 

of this Committee as well as GAO to fully acknowledge the very 

real risk of a data gap, and we need to look at all options to mitigate potential breakdowns in our forecasting ability. While NOAA 

has paid for reports to examine gap mitigation options, I have fear 

that not enough has been done to pursue implementation of these 

backup plans. 

We need to look at American, as well as potentially commercial, 

sources for these critical data. It should be alarming that we may 

be in a position to have to rely on international partners for weather data and to protect lives and property, an outcome that could 

raise much greater quality and access concerns than some of our 

other potential commercial partners that have so far been rebuffed 

by NOAA. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I now yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stewart follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT CHAIRMAN CHRIS

STEWART

Thank you, Dr. Broun, for holding this important hearing. The Science Committee 

has a long history overseeing the management of NOAA and NASA weather and 

climate satellite systems. Unfortunately, these programs have been rife with issues 

for more than a decade. Topics at issue today are also very timely as they relate 

to legislation being considered by this Committee, ‘‘The Weather Forecasting Improvement Act of 2013,’’ which attempts to focus critical resources on developing a 

top notch weather forecasting system based on streamlined research-to-operations 

and a more reasonable balance of resources toward weather research. 
20 

All of our witnesses acknowledge the strong possibility of a data gap for one or 

both of our major weather satellite systems in a few short years. These satellites 

provide the majority of data for numerical weather prediction in this country, and 

a gap could be catastrophic for forecasting by the National Weather Service and our 

innovative weather enterprise. A potential gap in polar-orbiting or geostationary 

satellite data, combined with continuing issues with how NOAA develops, analyzes, 

procures and integrates other satellite and observational information, risks the permanent loss of U.S. leadership in weather forecasting. The writing is on the wall, 

and our current trajectory is unacceptable. 

As the Government Accountability Office will testify, our geostationary and polarorbiting programs, known as GOES and JPSS, have been plagued with cost overruns, technical issues, and delays. We need to consider the right mix of satellite 

technology to make timely, accurate, and effective forecasts to protect American 

lives and property. 

For our polar orbiting satellites, not only is there a potential gap in the 2016 to 

2018 timeframe, but there may also be issues between the first and second JPSS 

satellites in the early 2020s. 

While the GOES-R program has made progress in completing testing for several 

components, the program has still missed several key milestones for both flight and 

ground segments. This has caused the launch date for GOES-R to slip from October 

2015 to March 2016. There are also other technical problems on the horizon, including with the Geostationary Lightning Mapper, an instrument that also appears to 

duplicate some already-existing commercial capabilities. 

Robust contingency planning and implementation of those plans as suggested by 

GAO is essential. We have seen that it has taken several years for NOAA to validate key products on the SUOMI-NPP satellite. Just after the Oklahoma tornadoes 

this year, a micrometeoroid appears to have hit an existing GOES satellite, turning 

all of its instruments off. Murphy’s Law seems to be on full display when it comes 

to our weather satellites, and continued blue sky self-evaluations by NOAA could 

prevent us from dealing with these problems before they arise. 

It has taken the Administration several years and the prodding of this Committee 

and GAO to fully acknowledge the very real risk of a data gap, and we need to look 

at all options to mitigate potential breakdowns in our forecasting ability. While 

NOAA has paid for reports to examine gap mitigation options I have fear that not 

enough has been done to pursue implementation of these backup plans. We need 

to look at American, and potentially commercial, sources for these critical data. It 

should be alarming that we may be in a position of having to rely on international 

partners for weather data to protect lives and property, an outcome that could raise 

much greater quality and access concerns than some of the potential commercial 

partners that have so far been rebuffed by NOAA. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Stewart. 

The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Bonamici, the Ranking Member of the Environment Subcommittee, for her statement. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you very much, Chairman Broun and 

Chairman Stewart, for holding this hearing today and thank you 

to all of our witnesses who are here today. We look forward to your 

testimony and answers. 

Our constituents may spend little time thinking about weather 

satellites managed by NOAA, but we have all at some point been 

transfixed by the images of hurricanes captured by NOAA’s Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites, and we all benefit 

from the forecasts, especially of severe storms that result from data 

collected in polar and geostationary satellite systems. 

As Mr. Stewart mentioned on the Environment Subcommittee, 

we have been working on how to improve weather forecasting and 

protect the American public and economy from severe weather. 

Losing coverage from either of the polar satellite or the geostationary satellites would seriously affect accurate weather forecasting. Because of a litany of troubles in the polar program, it now 

appears virtually certain that we will have a gap in satellite coverage perhaps for as long as three years, and there remains a 
21 

chance, not a probability but a possibility, that we may face a gap 

in the geostationary satellites as well. There was a time when we 

would all say that a gap in coverage is unacceptable, and now what 

would be unacceptable would be not having a viable plan to address such a gap. 

And with that in mind, the questions for our witnesses today 

have to be how do we minimize the scope and length of the expected gap in the polar program? How can we avoid a gap in the 

geostationary program? And are the plans to fill the gaps in coverage appropriately developed? 

On the Joint Polar Satellite System program, we have had eight 

years to determine how to handle a gap, and as early as 2005, we 

were getting warnings of slips in schedule and instrument issues 

and cost growth. Today, I am interested in hearing about NOAA’s 

definitive plan for how to deal with the gap they know they will 

face for polar satellite data. 

And on the GOES satellites, a potential for a gap has been slower in developing and still appears to be avoidable. However, even 

here I would expect and hope that NOAA has started to think 

about a contingency plan should the satellites suffer early failure 

and the replacement satellite suffer further delay. Of course we all 

hope everything performs optimally, but I would also hope that 

prudent managers would develop a plan for failure. 

I want to join Mr. Maffei in expressing my regret and frankly 

surprised that the majority charter for the hearing suggests that 

the problems in NOAA’s satellite program are somehow tied to climate science research. That simply is not accurate, and anyone 

who spends time looking at the history of these programs would be 

hard-pressed to identify climate research as even a factor in the 

technical problems, the schedule slips, or cost growth in the last 

eight years. Further, the majority charter seems to perpetuate 

what has become a common misconception in this Committee, that 

climate research is the same thing as climate change research. 

Colleagues, the issue before us today has been ongoing for years. 

My hope is that we can set aside partisanship and find solutions 

to what really is a slow-moving national tragedy. We should 

emerge from this hearing with a bipartisan commitment to work 

together and to help ensure that NOAA is doing all it can and 

should to manage these programs and plan for and cover any gaps. 

I also hope we can work together to support NOAA in getting any 

resources it needs to continue to protect the American public. I look 

forward to hearing from the witnesses from GAO, NOAA, and 

NASA, and to discuss the relevant agencies’ plan of action to address the looming satellite coverage gaps and to keep these programs on track. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and with that, I yield 

back. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bonamici follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT RANKING MEMBER

SUZANNE BONAMICI

Thank you, Chairman Stewart and Chairman Broun, for holding the hearing 

today. Our constituents may spend little time thinking about weather satellites 

managed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, but we have all 
22 

at some point been transfixed by the images of hurricanes captured by NOAA’s Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites. And we all benefit from the forecasts-especially of severe storms—that result from data collected in the polar and 

geostationary satellite systems. 

On this Committee, we have been working on how to improve forecasting and protect the American public and economy from severe weather. Losing coverage from 

either the polar satellites or the geostationary satellites would seriously affect accurate weather forecasting. 

Because of trouble and mismanagement in the polar program, it now appears virtually certain that we will have a gap in satellite coverage, perhaps for as long as 

three years. And there remains a chance, not a probability but a possibility, that 

we may face a gap in the geostationary satellites as well. 

There was a time when we would all say that a gap in coverage was unacceptable. 

Now what is unacceptable is not having a viable plan to address such a gap. 

With that in mind, the questions for our witnesses have to be: 

• How can we minimize the scope and length of the expected gap in the polar 

program, 

• How can we avoid a gap in the geostationary program, and 

• Are plans to fill gaps in coverage appropriately mature? 

On the Joint Polar Satellite System program we have had eight years to determine how to handle a gap. As early as 2005, we were getting warnings of slips in 

schedule and instrument issues and cost growth. 

Today I am interested in hearing about NOAA’s definitive plan for how to deal 

with a gap they know they will face for polar satellite data. On the GOES satellites, 

the potential for a gap has been slower in developing and still appears to be avoidable. However, even here, I would expect that NOAA has started to think about a 

contingency plan should the current satellites suffer early failure and the replacement satellite suffer further delay. Of course we all hope everything performs optimally, but also I would hope that prudent managers will develop a plan for failure. 

I want to join Mr. Maffei in expressing my regret, and frankly surprise, that the 

Majority charter for this hearing suggests the problems in NOAA’s satellite program 

are somehow tied to climate science. That simply is not true and anyone who wants 

to spend some time looking at the history of these programs would be hard pressed 

to identify climate as even a factor in the technical problems, schedule slips, or cost 

growth of the last eight years. Further, the majority charter seems to perpetuate 

what has become a common misconception on this committee: that climate research 

is the same thing as climate change research. 

Colleagues, this is an issue that has been ongoing for years. My hope today is that 

we can set aside partisanship and find solutions to what really is a slow-moving, 

national tragedy. We should emerge from this hearing with a bipartisan commitment to work together and help ensure that NOAA is doing all that it can and 

should to manage these programs and plan for gaps. I also hope we can work together to support NOAA in getting the resources they need to continue to protect 

the American public I look forward to hearing the witnesses from GAO, NOAA, and 

NASA discuss how the relevant agencies plan of action to address the looming satellite coverage gap and to keep these programs on track. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Ms. Bonamici. 

If there are Members who wish to submit additional opening 

statements, your statements will be added to the record at this 

point. 

At this time, I would like to introduce our panel of witnesses. 

Our first witness is Mr. David Powner, Director of Information 

Technology Management Issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Mr. Powner, welcome. 

Our second witness is Ms. Mary Kicza, Assistant Administrator 

for Satellite and Information Services at the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration. Welcome. 

And our third witness is Mr. Marcus Watkins, Director of the 

Joint Agency Satellite Division at the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration. Welcome, sir. 
23 

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to 

five minutes each, after which the Members of the Committee will 

have five minutes each to ask you all questions. 

It is the practice of this Subcommittee to receive testimony under 

oath. Now, if you would please stand and raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the whole truth and 

nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Thank you. You may be seated. 

Let the record reflect that all the witnesses participating have 

taken the oath. 

Now, before I recognize the first witness, let me just make a couple of points. I am very eager to hear your testimonies, but I would 

have appreciated the opportunity to read the NOAA and NASA testimonies 48 hours ago when they were due. I understand and I 

hope neither of you are directly responsible for the tardiness of 

submitting your testimony to this Committee, but I would like for 

you to pass the message along to the appropriate person or individuals that it is inconsiderate to provide testimony less than 48 hours 

before a hearing less than 24 hours before a hearing when the 

deadline is 48 hours. You were both given ample notice about this 

hearing, in fact, on August 14th, which was over a month ago, and 

yet you were unable to provide the testimonies as requested. 

I am further frustrated by NASA when I consider that the agency declined to send another witness requested by the Committee 

and it still submitted testimony late. 

When testimony is delivered this late, it does not provide Members of the Committee sufficient time to review and prepare to engage in an informative discussion with you about these programs. 

Your tardiness is intolerable and it reflects poorly on your respective agencies and the Administration by default as well. 

Further, will you please confirm that you will personally ensure 

that the Committee receives responses to our questions for the 

record following the hearing in a timely manner that is closer to 

two weeks than two months? 

Ms. Kicza nodded her head and you assure us that, Mr. Watkins? 

He nodded his head yes, too, so I am counting that as a commitment on both of your part. 

And I am looking specifically at you, Ms. Kicza, because as you 

well know, NOAA has yet to reply to questions from the Committee 

relative to a hearing on the National Weather Service held over a 

year ago. You are aware. That hearing in which your colleague, Dr. 

Sullivan, testified before us here, do you have an update on the status of those responses? Could you please give us an update from 

the agency as soon as possible? We are eagerly awaiting those responses and I think it is inappropriate and inconsiderate. Thank 

you. 

I thank you and I appreciate everyone’s indulgence. 

Now, I recognize Mr. Powner for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. DAVID POWNER, DIRECTOR, 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. POWNER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, and Members of 

the Subcommittee, earlier this year GAO added the potential gaps 
24 

in weather satellite coverage in consultation with this Committee 

as a high-risk area demanding immediate attention from NOAA 

management. Gaps in weather satellite coverage are likely and 

could have severe effects on lives and our economy. Therefore, our 

country needs the very best backup plans that budgets can afford. 

This morning, we are releasing two reports completed at your request, one on the GOES-R acquisition and the other on JPSS, 

which address the gap situation and contingency efforts. I would 

like to highlight our recommendations and findings on each, starting with GOES. 

There has been significant progress on the flight and ground 

components. The flight components are at various stages leading 

up to key systems integration and the spacecraft construction started earlier this year. Integration of ground components is slated to 

occur in early 2014, and the program is currently operating within 

its $10.5 billion lifecycle cost estimate. 

Turning to the launch date of October 2015, last year, we reported to this Committee that there was a 40 percent chance the 

GOES-R would meet its October launch date, and our report today 

highlights technical issues, delayed interim milestones, and scheduling weaknesses that call into question that launch date. 

Right after we received NOAA’s comments on our report, they 

did in fact slip the launch date to early 2016. Although this slip 

might not appear significant, it is since it extends the period of 

time where there will be no operational backup satellite for about 

a year-and-a-half from April 2015 until GOES-R launches and completes the 6-month check-out. Having this backup satellite in orbit 

at all times is an essential NOAA policy, as it has proved useful 

on multiple occasions over the past several years when one of the 

two operational GOES satellites has experienced issues and the 

backup had to be moved into position to provide weather observations. 

NOAA has fairly solid contingency plans to address the scenario, 

many consistent with best practices, but our report points out some 

areas where improvements are needed, primarily in areas focusing 

on preventing launch delays. We are also making recommendations 

on improving the spacecraft and ground schedules so that additional delays do not occur. 

Moving to JPSS, again, there is very solid progress to report. 

NPP transitioned from interim to routine operations in February of 

this year and key upgrades to the ground system have been made. 

Regarding JPSS-1, flight project is on track and instruments are 

between and 80 and 100 percent complete and the critical design 

review has been completed on the spacecraft. However, although 

the JPSS ground project has made progress, a major software release has been delayed. 

Also, major revisions to the programs scope are occurring to keep 

it within the $11.3 billion lifecycle cost estimate. Last year, when 

we testified, the program was going from $14.6 billion to $12.9 billion; now, it is at $11.3 billion. That is a $3.3 billion reduction in 

not a very long time. NOAA is reporting the bulk of the savings 

as coming from moving certain climate sensors outside of the JPSS 

program and also moving other sensors to NASA. There are many 

uncertainties associated with these moves, namely, what satellites 
25 

these sensors will fly on and whether these savings will truly allow 

the program to operate within the $11.3 billion cost estimate. 

We looked in depth at the schedules of VIIRS, the ground component in the spacecraft. We found issues with certain components’ 

schedules and the program overall did not have an integrated master schedule. All this is necessary to stay on track for the March 

2017 launch date. 

In addition, NOAA and NASA are reporting they have a 70 percent confidence in the JPSS-1 March 2017 launch date. Our confidence is much lower because the 70 percent assessment did not 

factor in the scheduling weaknesses we raised in our report. Hitting this March 2017 launch date is extremely important because 

any delays will extend the likely 17-month gap in the afternoon 

orbit. The gap will likely occur from late 2016 to early 2018. 

NOAA had an initial contingency plan to address the gap and recently contracted for technical assessment that identified additional 

alternatives. Options included using other government foreign and 

commercial satellite, using non-satellite sources such as aircraft observations and improving weather models. This list is quite extensive, but let’s be clear. None of the options can replace JPSS polar 

satellite observations. These options can minimize the gaps but do 

not eliminate the damage to forecasts from the gap. Because of 

this, the very best contingency options need to be selected. 

Therefore, we recommended that decisions need to be made on 

exactly what strategies to be pursued and the procedures need to 

be established to implement and adequately test them. We are also 

making recommendations on improving the spacecraft and ground 

schedules so that the March 2017 launch date does not slip. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Thank you for your 

leadership and oversight of these critical acquisitions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:] 
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Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Powner. 

Now, Ms. Kicza, you are recognized for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MS. MARY KICZA, 

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, 

SATELLITE AND INFORMATION SERVICES, 

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION 

Ms. KICZA. Good morning, Chairman Stewart and Broun, Ranking Members Bonamici and Maffei, and Members of the Subcommittees. I am pleased to join Mr. Watkins and Mr. Powner to 

provide an update on the JPSS and GOES-R series programs. 

I am proud to report that JPSS and GOES-R series continue to 

meet their key milestones. For the SUOMI–NPP mission, NOAA 

assumed operational control of the satellite in February 2013. 

Suomi has achieved over 99 percent data availability and its high 

resolution sounder data has been incorporated into weather service 

operational models. JPSS-1 remains on track for launch in second 

quarter Fiscal Year 2017. The instruments are built and now undergoing testing. The spacecraft is being built. Data products are 

being calibrated and validated and the ground systems are being 

upgraded. With a decision to focus JPSS on NOAA’s critical weather mission, we have reduced the JPSS lifecycle cost to $11.3 billion 

and accelerated the JPSS-2 to launch the first quarter of Fiscal 

Year 2022. JPSS-2 instruments and spacecraft acquisitions are now 

underway. 

For GOES-R, four of six instruments have completed environmental testing and the spacecraft bus has completed its critical design review. Significant progress has been made on the ground system with installation now complete for four of six antennas at Wallops Island, VA and West Virginia. GOES-R is on track for its second quarter Fiscal Year 2016 launch. 

While the title of this hearing would lead one to believe otherwise, management and oversight of these critical programs is functional. In response to recent review recommendations, the Department of Commerce, NOAA, and NASA have streamlined oversight 

and management decision-making processes, documented roles and 

responsibilities, and instituted a reporting process which has been 

well received. 

Within JPSS, the NOAA and NASA systems engineering personnel have been integrated into a single team, which is recognized 

as a cohesive high-performing unit. Within NOAA/NESDIS, we 

have added an enterprise-level systems engineering function and 

begun implementation of common ground services. Both efforts are 

already producing results which serve to reduce future costs. 

The NOAA/NASA partnership remains robust. The significant 

progress on JPSS and GOES-R reinforces the 2010 Administration 

decision to return to the partnership that has built and operated 

our Nation’s operational weather satellites for more than 40 years. 

This partnership capitalizes on the strengths of both organizations 

to develop and operate our weather satellites enabling delivery of 

products and services critical to our weather forecasts. 

Our NOAA/NASA team relies heavily on our industry partners. 

Contractors at locations across the Nation are working to bring 

JPSS and GOES-R to fruition. I congratulate them for their suc-
49 

cesses to date, particularly with SUOMI–NPP and thank them for 

their dedication to building next-generation systems on time and 

within budget. 

We remain closely connected to our user community and appreciate the GAO’s recommendation to strengthen these connections. 

Concerns about a possible observational gap has been a common 

theme among our users. I assure you, maintaining observational 

continuity remains our singular focus, and to that end, we remain 

intent on keeping our on-orbit assets operating safely, delivering 

next-generation capabilities on or ahead of schedule, and implementing approaches to mitigate the impact of the gap should one 

occur. 

Louie Uccellini, my counterpart at the National Weather Service, 

understands the importance of satellite data for the national 

weather forecasting enterprise. We both recognize, however, this 

enterprise includes contributions from academia, where much of 

the research and development occurs; the private weather forecasting sector, which provides avenues for dissemination of weather 

products; and federal, state, and local emergency managers who 

serve as first responders when severe weather strikes. 

NOAA also relies on our relationships with our international 

partners to meet our requirements. In this regard, we recently 

signed a long-term agreement with EUMETSAT, our European 

counterpart, to ensure continuity of our partnership to share spacebased observational data. 

Finally, I turn my attention to Congress. The ability of our teams 

to achieve sustained observations is only possible with your continued support. In addition to providing oversight, we depend on you 

to provide the budgets required to implement next-generation systems and to do so in a manner in which we can plan effectively. 

We are grateful for your support. 

We understand the difficult fiscal challenges our Nation faces 

and we have worked hard to minimize the impacts to our launch 

schedules in light of sequester reductions. We appreciate the recommendations offered by the GAO and by other external review 

bodies and we will respond to them. We recognize that collectively 

we all share the same objective, and that is mission success. 

Thank you and I am happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kicza follows:] 
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Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Ms. Kicza. 

Now, Mr. Watkins, you are recognized for five minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. MARCUS WATKINS, 

DIRECTOR, JOINT AGENCY SATELLITE DIVISION, 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear today to provide you information regarding the NASA role in, and commitment to, NOAA’s 

Joint Polar Satellite System, also referred to as JPSS, and the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R Series, or GOESR, programs. The JPSS and GOES-R programs are critical to the 

Nation’s weather forecasting system, environmental monitoring, 

and research activities. 

NASA and NOAA have been partners for more than 40 years in 

developing the Nation’s polar and geosynchronous weather satellites. With the President’s direction in 2010, NASA and NOAA returned to this successful partnership for JPSS. The NASA program 

office for JPSS has been established and is fully staffed. NOAA and 

NASA have established joint agency-level program management 

councils to oversee JPSS, and have integrated their decision-making processes to efficiently and effectively manage this cooperative 

activity. The NASA and NOAA teams have strengthened their 

working relationship over the last three years. One example of the 

JPSS organization success is the upcoming launch of the Total 

Solar Irradiance Calibration Transfer Experiment, TCTE, later this 

year on a United States Air Force mission to be launched November 4. 

The Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership, or SUOMI–NPP, 

was successfully launched almost two years ago and NOAA has 

operational control of this satellite. Meteorologists continue to use 

data products from instruments from SUOMI–NPP in their weather forecasts, and all of the data products have been publicly released. 

In addition to this success of SUOMI–NPP, the transition from 

the NPOESS program to the new JPSS program is now finished. 

The JPSS program successfully completed two critical milestones in 

2013, keeping the program on schedule and within budget. Now, 

both the JPSS-1 satellite mission and overall program have moved 

from the planning and formulation phase to implementation and 

execution. 

NASA, as NOAA’s acquisition agent, manages all of the JPSS instrument, spacecraft, and the majority of the ground system contracts. The first JPSS satellite, JPSS-1, will be a near clone of 

SUOMI–NPP with upgrades to meet the JPSS-1 level requirements. The instrument vendors continue to make progress in the 

manufacture of the flight units for the JPSS-1 and the spacecraft 

is currently being fabricated. Additionally, the Delta II rocket has 

been selected as the launch vehicle for the JPSS-1 mission. 

The GOES-R Series program of four geosynchronous satellites 

continues to make progress toward launching GOES-R, the first 

satellite of the series, in the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2016. 

Last fall, the GOES-R Series program successfully completed a 

Mission Critical Design Review. Since then, the GOES-R and 
62 

GOES-S spacecraft have made good progress in component manufacturing, and GOES-R is proceeding with spacecraft integration. 

Four of the six GOES-R instruments have completed environmental testing. 

The next major milestone for the GOES-R Series program is the 

Systems Integration Review, which is currently planned for the 

spring of 2014. Those performing the System Integration Review 

will evaluate the readiness of the program to start assembly, test, 

and launch operations. 

NASA and NOAA are committed to the JPSS and GOES-R program, and ensuring the success of these programs is essential to 

both the agencies and the Nation. The NASA and NOAA teams 

have established strong working relationships and are striving to 

ensure the weather and environmental requirements are met on 

the most efficient and predictable schedule without reducing system capabilities or further increasing risk. 

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I appreciate the support of this Committee and the Congress for these 

critical programs and would be pleased to answer any questions 

that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Watkins follows:] 
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Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Watkins. 

I want to thank all of you for your testimony. 

Now, reminding Members that Committee rules limit questioning 

to five minutes, the Chair at this time will open the first round of 

questions by recognizing myself for five minutes. 

Ms. Kicza, there seems to be a big disconnect between what you 

say and your testimony and what we hear from other folks, and 

hopefully, we can sort all that out. One thing we have just heard 

from you is that lifecycle cost of JPSS is now at $11.3 billion, but 

the responsibility for three climate sensors were transferred to 

NASA. NOAA has entered a new budget line item for a polar-free 

flyer program that had previously been included in the JPSS program an estimate. Please explain how these actions are not just 

budgeting tricks to make it appear that costs have gone down, 

when in reality they have been transferred to somewhere else and 

taxpayers are still on the hook for them. 

Ms. KICZA. Yes, sir. In response to both Congressional feedback 

and the President’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget, as well as an independent review, NOAA in concert with the Administration took the 

actions to focus the JPSS program on the critical weather mission. 

In doing so, there were several activities that took place. One was 

transferring capabilities outside of the scope of the JPSS program. 

While the JPSS program was reduced, those costs still remain 

should be Administration and the Congress choose to continue to 

fund those. 

Chairman BROUN. Well they are still there. Those costs are still 

there. 

Ms. KICZA. Yes. That is correct. 

Chairman BROUN. You can transfer the cost so it is not actually 

a reduction in the cost to the program, is that correct? 

Ms. KICZA. It is a reduction in the cost of the JPSS program, not 

a reduction of the total cost of the program. In addition to that, as 

part of the JPSS activities, we also reduced costs there as well. 

And if you would like a question for the record, we can enumerate 

those particular costs. Some of them were due to reducing reserves 

given the positive progress that the program has made, as well as 

the positive results of the SUOMI–NPP mission. Other areas include reducing areas of overlap between the NOAA and NASA activities particularly associated with the science. 

Chairman BROUN. Well, let me ask you this, Ms. Kicza. GAO reports that identify the lifecycle costs, that is the sum of all recurring and one-time costs from cradle to grave of the program at 

$11.34 billion JPSS and $10.9 billion for GOES-R. Can you break 

those numbers down for us further? 

Ms. KICZA. Yes, sir. 

Chairman BROUN. Let me ask, for example, how much is being 

spent on research and development for the ground components? 

How much is being spent on flight systems and sensors? How much 

will it cost to launch these satellites into orbit, and what are the 

estimated annual operating and maintenance costs? Can you give 

us those figures? 

Ms. KICZA. Sir, I would be happy to take a question for the 

record that enumerates all of those figures from both of those satellite systems. 
68 

Chairman BROUN. Okay. Well, I would appreciate it. We are 

going to give you some questions—— 

Ms. KICZA. Absolutely. 

Chairman BROUN. to answer for the record, and if you would, 

please breakdown the cost associated with each program in response to the Committee’s questions for the record. 

Ms. KICZA. Yes, sir. Those are available. 

Chairman BROUN. Okay. Mr. Powner, JPSS is reporting a 70 percent confidence in its planned launch date for JPSS-1. What concerns do you have that the JPSS-1 schedule will stay on track and 

what percentage would you give the program of meeting its March 

’17 launch date? 

Mr. POWNER. So, Mr. Chairman, what we did is we looked in detail at various schedules with JPSS program. One of the key sensors, VIIRS spacecraft in the ground system, because those scheduling practices give you confidence that ultimately you can hit a 

launch date. What we found were weaknesses in some of that 

scheduling. We actually found VIIRS to be stronger than the spacecraft in the ground component, which was encouraging. When you 

look at the 70 percent confidence analysis that was done, it did not 

factor in all the components of the program, so our confidence 

would be less than 70 percent. 

Chairman BROUN. Can you give us a number? 

Mr. POWNER. I don’t have an exact number. It is definitely less 

than 70 percent. 

Chairman BROUN. Is it less than 50? 

Mr. POWNER. That would be difficult to say. You know, we would 

have to look at those numbers with the models that they ran with 

that assessment, and that was our one recommendation is to rerun 

that with a more realistic confidence level factoring in all of these 

issues, ground and all the things we found with the flight segment 

also. 

The key, Mr. Chairman, is this: I think these scheduling practices, we are really focused on doing everything we can to tighten 

up those scheduling practices so that launch dates don’t slip anymore. We can’t have launch date slips because any further launch 

date slips like what happened on GOES, it appears insignificant, 

it is actually significant because it affects the backup situation. 

Chairman BROUN. Right. 

Mr. POWNER. That is really the focus that needs to occur. 

Chairman BROUN. Absolutely. And particularly when you get 

into a backup situation, you are talking about 17-month gap in 

there and this is intolerable just for good weather forecasting. 

My time is expired. Now, I recognize Mr. Maffei for five minutes. 

Mr. MAFFEI. I thank the Chairman. 

Mr. Powner, just following on that, were you surprised by the 

delay in the launch in the first GOES satellite? And what issues 

are in play that may lead to further delays with GOES? 

Mr. POWNER. The delay in the launch did not surprise us because 

last year we testified in front of this Committee that there was a 

48 percent confidence in the October 2015 launch date and we 

highlighted some scheduling weaknesses. In our report this year, 

we talk about some interim milestones that were missed, some 

technical issues, the Geostationary Lightning Mapper is one good 
69 

example, and then also further scheduling issues. So the delay did 

not surprise us. 

Mr. MAFFEI. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of 

weather prediction in my central New York State district. We get 

very bad weather, as people know. They are quite manageable because we can predict the weather, we can get our plows on the 

roads, et cetera. It doesn’t slow us down in contrast to this city 

which can’t seem to handle—the thought of a flake of snow, everybody closes. 

Chairman BROUN. One snowflake will close Atlanta. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Yeah—well, yeah. 

Chairman BROUN. Almost. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Yeah, exactly. Yes. But we will get that—we will 

enter that into the record. 

But in any event, it is extremely important, and it is obviously 

extremely important to the Nation’s economy. And as we do see 

more and more storms and things like that—Hurricane Sandy was 

devastating and it was just the latest one—it is just absolutely 

vital that we get this going. 

So pardon me for leaving the technical stuff behind but, you 

know, John F. Kennedy announced we were going to the moon in 

1962 and seven years later we were there. We have got 3–1/2 years 

to wait just for the JPSS to launch, and that might slip. GOES has 

already slipped. I mean I—and so I go to—I talk to the staff and 

I say, well, it must be money, right? There is not enough money 

here? But my understanding is money is really not the issue. If it 

is, you can correct me, but—so I will start with Mr. Powner, can 

you educate me? What—why does it take so darn long to put these 

things up when we are 2013? We have been doing these satellites— 

are we making the perfect the enemy of the good? Is that the problem? We want to have absolutely the latest technology on everything and so we, you know—I yield. 

Mr. POWNER. Well, I think we did. I mean these things were 

much more complex in the past and they are being whittled down 

to becoming simpler and simpler with less sensors, and that is 

probably a good thing. 

But the reality is there were a lot of problems over the years, 

probably more significant than what we currently have. I mean I 

used to testify in front of this Committee where we would talk 

about one and two year slips and billion-dollar overruns like clockwork. It was like clockwork year-to-year. And that put us in the 

situation we are in. 

So I know the GOES. It slipped one quarter. Historically, if you 

look at that, that looks actually pretty good but it is not. It is not 

because it is significant. But the problem is is we have built up to 

this point in time where all these sins of the past with NPOESS 

and the whole bit, it is catching up to everyone and that is why 

we have a gap. That is why we added it to our high-risk list so it 

gets the right attention with the appropriate contingency plans. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Ms. Kicza and then Mr. Watkins, is there anything 

you can enlighten me with? Why does it take so long to get a 

weather satellite up in the greatest country in history in 2013? 

Ms. KICZA. I would offer that it is a combination of issues that 

cause it to be difficult to build these more rapidly than we cur-
70 

rently are. First of all, these are complex systems for both GOESR and for the JPSS system. With SUOMI–NPP, there were new instruments, which oftentimes is more difficult when we start. 

However, I could contend that given the partnership that we 

have with NASA, our track record particularly on GOES-R has 

been very good. This is the first slip other than a protest we had 

with a contract early on that we have announced since 2007. And 

in fact the team itself continues to work to the earlier date. 

What we suggested is, given our reserve posture, we are committing to a date that is in the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2016. The 

team itself continues to work to the earlier date. We have had several reviews of the schedule of confidence, including the one that 

Mr. Powner refers to. In going through the analysis of the GOESR system, we all agree that the best thing to do is to continue to 

work to the earliest date possible, which is what this team is doing. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Thank you, Ms. Kicza. I want—it has improved that 

I do want to give Mr. Watkins a chance to explain. And are we 

making the perfect the enemy of the good? 

Mr. WATKINS. I don’t believe that we are making perfect the 

enemy of the good. Again, when you are looking at these weather 

satellites and the instrumentation that we are carrying, the instruments are advanced. With respect to the JPSS, again, initially 

SUOMI–NPP was to be a research and development satellite, a satellite that we would learn about the instruments. We now find ourselves in a position of utilizing that satellite operationally. Now, it 

is performing extremely well and the data products are already 

making their way into weather forecasting. 

The biggest challenge that we see is one of stability. What the 

programs, GOES as well as JPSS, need are stable funding so that 

we can plan accordingly, implement the programs. If you look at 

the track record associated with JPSS since the demise of 

NPOESS, we have been on schedule even with the challenges associated with in some cases delayed funding, in some cases—well, 

even with those challenges, we have been able to maintain the 

JPSS-1 launch date. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Mr. Watkins, thank you very much. Your point is 

good. I am already a minute over but I am sure we will continue 

to explore it. 

Mr. WATKINS. Okay. Thank you. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Maffei. By the way, for the 

record, I was being very facetious. Atlanta does a great job of taking care of snow when we get it down there. We don’t get as much 

as you all do in upstate New York, but I applaud what the Atlanta 

public works folks do in taking care of the snow. And—— 

Mr. MAFFEI. I am sure Representative Lewis will appreciate the 

correction. I will let him know. 

Chairman BROUN. It just reflects, though, how important it is for 

not only upstate New York but for Atlanta and for California and 

for the whole country for us to get these satellites flying and get 

them on board. So thank you, sir. 

Now, Mr. Stewart, you are recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. STEWART. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I have a facetious comment about Atlanta as well that I will forbear in order 

to be gracious. 
71 

I appreciate the testimony from the witnesses. I appreciate some 

of the questioning that has taken place. And it is interesting to me 

and honestly a little bit troubling to me some of the differences in 

opinions or perceptions based on some of the testimony and some 

of the answers to the questions. 

You don’t know so let me share with you. I was an Air Force 

pilot for 14 years. I flew one of the most sophisticated weapons systems ever built. And I honestly—maybe because of that culture, I 

can’t imagine going into a mission without a backup. It just didn’t 

happen. And it would have been completely unacceptable if we presented a proposal or a campaign where we didn’t have multiple 

backups. And yet that is exactly the situation we find ourselves in 

now. And I think we all agree that it is a mess. 

And now, I am convinced that this is a result of sequestration. 

Very clearly this goes back previous to the last year when sequestration actually was implemented. But I don’t think it is entirely 

the fault of this Administration. I think this has been perhaps in 

the making for a little bit longer than that. 

But rather than look back, I would like to look forward to concentrate on what we can do to mitigate some of these concerns that 

we have. And some of the options that we have that will maybe relieve some of the pressure, as I understand it, we are basically 

looking at generally two options. One of them is to rely on foreign 

sources of data, foreign government, particularly the Chinese, 

which is, I think, troubling for all of us. The second would be tapping into available commercial sources of some satellite or data capability. I would appreciate any of you have input to that, would 

commercial data purchases help NOAA avoid having to rely on foreign governments for much of this very critical data? Ms. Kicza, 

would you mind addressing that? 

Ms. KICZA. Yes, that is part of the contributions that we would 

take advantage of. In fact, if we are in a situation where we do 

have a gap, and I will say that our gap situation has improved 

since we last were before this Committee given the positive 

progress on SUOMI–NPP and the fact that we have remained on 

schedule for JPSS-1 and have accelerated JPSS-2. But in the event 

we do have a gap, NASA and NOAA are looking at several options 

and we are thankful for the funding in the Sandy Supplemental 

that is allowing us to move forward on that. 

That includes making better use of existing data, including 

microwave sensor data from the Defense Meteorological Satellite 

Program. Using our Cloud Impact Radiance data and using that 

more fully than we have been able to use it in the past, extending 

our current operational systems further into the future—NPOESS 

and the MetOp series—and making sure that we are sustaining 

that for as long as we are able to, and taking advantage of the new 

data sources that are planned for the future, including the potential of commercial data sources. Radio occultation in particular is 

one of interest. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. Let me pursue this a little bit if I could. I 

think most of us would be much more comfortable relying on U.S. 

sources, commercial sources than relying on foreign governments. 

Tell me the steps you are taking to prepare for that eventuality. 

Is the Administration moving forward to say, okay, when we reach 
72 

that point because many of us suspect that we will, this is what 

we are doing to prepare, and for example, are you working with 

any of these commercial providers right now to prepare so that we 

can move forward very quickly should we need to? 

Ms. KICZA. In response to the Sandy Supplemental funding that 

was provided in Fiscal Year 2013, NOAA is moving out on several 

fronts simultaneously to do the items that I just referred to. In addition to that, we are improving our computational capability and 

doing operational simulations that will allow us to determine which 

is the best source of data to procure, whether that be through commercial or through international partnerships. 

Mr. STEWART. So, as I understand it right now, you are still just 

evaluating? 

Ms. KICZA. No, we are in fact moving out on those activities. 

Those are underway. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. And a contracting process, is that underway? 

Ms. KICZA. That is beginning in some of the activities. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. 

Ms. KICZA. Yes, and if you would like a question for the record, 

I could— 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. 

Ms. KICZA. —enumerate that more for you. 

Mr. STEWART. Would either of the other witnesses have any perspective you could add to that? 

Mr. POWNER. I have a comment on the gap situation improving. 

I am not aware of the gap situation improving. NPP, if it lasts five 

years and maybe we are expecting it to last longer than five years, 

and hopefully it will so there is less of a gap, but that puts us in 

late 2016. We launch in March 2017. We have a year check-out. 

That gives us the 17-month gap we talk about. So our concern is 

we take the gap very serious so that we have the right plans in 

place and not downplay the likelihood of a gap. I think that is very 

important going forward so that we have the most robust plan in 

place. 

Mr. STEWART. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Powner, I do, and I 

share exactly your sentiment. And I don’t think it is helpful for us 

to, you know, as I said in my opening statement, blue sky the scenarios here. 

And, Ms. Kicza, I appreciate and I would encourage you and the 

Administration to continue to lean forward to looking at other options, particularly the commercial options. That may be something 

that could be very beneficial to us and we are far better to be doing 

it now that we are to be doing in 2016. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I apologize for taking a little extra 

time and I yield back. 

Chairman BROUN. Well, thank you, Mr. Stewart, and I think we 

all agree with that statement. We all on both sides are very eager 

to get these things flying and operational. It is absolutely critical 

for weather warnings for all of us, even upstate New York. 

Now, Ms. Bonamici, you are recognized for five minutes. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the discussion and want to follow up a bit and really get more 

focus on the expected gap. And I understand, Ms. Kicza, that the 
73 

current gap—and now we are talking about a range here—could be 

as low as we just heard, 17 months. I have heard it could be up 

to three years. So could you talk about what NOAA is—what steps 

NOAA is taking to make sure that the gap stays at the short end 

of that range? 

Ms. KICZA. First of all, refocusing the JPSS to a weather-focused 

mission improves our confidence in meeting both the JPSS-1 and 

JPSS-2 launch dates. As I said, JPSS-1 is on track; JPSS-2 has 

been accelerated. Close management of the Suomi operations will 

allow us to preserve that mission for as long as possible. And as 

I have mentioned, we now have two years of successful operations 

of Suomi on orbit. The issues that we would have expected to see 

that are referred to as ‘‘infant mortality issues,’’ early issues that 

will manifest themselves and present themselves as problems have 

not been seen on SUOMI–NPP. 

Both of these areas increase development schedule content—confidence. Keeping JPSS-1 on track and Suomi on orbit operation 

success gives us confidence that if SUOMI–NPP continues to perform as expected, that we can significantly reduce our projected 

risk of a gap in orbit. 

Lastly, I will note that the projections that we had had in the 

past also assumed the time associated with calibrating and validating the instruments on JPSS-1, our experience in SUOMI–NPP 

is also indicating that we may be able to reduce the time associated 

with the on-orbit check-out and calibration measurements on the 

JPSS-1. All of these contribute to reduced risk. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you. And I want to follow up on the 

SUOMI–NPP. Mr. Powner, in your testimony you say that the program estimates that there will be a gap of about a year-and-a-half 

from the time when the current SUOMI–NPP satellite reaches the 

end of its expected lifespan and when the JPSS-1 launch satellite 

will be in orbit and operational. So how do you calculate the expected lifespan, and obviously, it is an expected lifespan so it will 

be shorter or longer, and what are you doing to plan for the entire 

span? 

Mr. POWNER. So on NPP that was a demonstration satellite that 

was not built with the rigor that we will have on JPSS-1. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Right. 

Mr. POWNER. So the expected lifespan was three to five years. So 

the five-year mark, we use that as a—okay, that is—hopefully we 

get the full five years out of it and it could go longer, okay. We acknowledge that. But I think it is good to plan for five years. Five 

years puts you in late 2016. If you launch March 2017 and have 

a one-year check-out, which is typically how it goes—now, Mary, I 

am glad to hear that hopefully you can reduce that 12-month 

check-out. Those are the things that we want to see, but that is 

how we calculate the 17-month likely gap, and that is on the—that 

is best case scenario on our point because what happens is if NPP 

doesn’t last the full five years, it is longer. If JPSS-1 slips, it is 

longer. So all of those, that is how we get this range of likelihood 

of the gap. We think planning at least for a 17-gap is prudent. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you. And, Mr. Powner, I want to ask you 

another question, too. In your current report or past report—I 

know you have been working on this quite a long time—did you 
74 

ever identify the NASA Earth sciences budget allocation as a cause 

for delay in satellite procurement at NASA? 

Mr. POWNER. We have not. 

Ms. BONAMICI. And has trouble with climate sensors or a focus 

on the technology led to a delay in the satellite program or contributed at all to the data gaps? 

Mr. POWNER. Trouble with the climate sensors? Not particularly. 

The major issue was with the VIIRS. The major issue was with 

VIIRS if you go back historically and—— 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you. And did—have you identified steps 

that might be taken to prevent a data gap from developing in the 

GOES program? I know in your testimony you do note that you 

made multiple recommendations to NOAA and NOAA has taken 

steps to address the recommendations. Have you identified steps or 

made recommendations to prevent the data gap—a data gap from 

developing in the GOES program? 

Mr. POWNER. So on the GOES situation, it is a little different. 

It is a gap—it is not having an operational backup capability. That 

is very important because prior to Super Storm Sandy, we have 

repositioned the backup into operations. We did it again this year 

and 2012. So it is very important to have this operational backup. 

The issue there is with—when the current GOES launches, there 

is likely going to be about a year where we don’t have the operational backup, so this little slip of a quarter, which could be as 

long as six months, pushes that to about a year-and-a-half. So 

there are fairly good contingency plans associated with the GOES 

program because they actually use them when they actually move 

satellites into operations. Really what you need to do is minimize 

any further slips in the launch of GOES so that we don’t have a 

further issue with the backup. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you very much. I see my time is expired. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Ms. Bonamici. 

Now, the Chairman recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher for five minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to get to know more about this program 

and appreciate that some people who are out there putting an 

awful lot of work into making sure that the American people have 

the information they need and a weather satellite system that will 

serve its very needs and protect us against the maladies of weather 

that have plagued humankind. A reading of history is a reading of 

people whose lives were destroyed by maladies in the weather. 

And today, we have come a long way in that. And I would like 

to ask Ms. Kicza how many total satellites do you have in orbit 

that you are looking after or looking after us? 

Ms. KICZA. In the polar orbit right now we have NOAA–15 and 

NOAA–16 are older satellites that are secondary. We had NOAA– 

18 as a secondary. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Excuse me. So you have 15 satellites and 

then another 16? 

Ms. KICZA. No, I am sorry. In the polar orbit—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Ms. KICZA. —we have our primary operational satellite, which is 

NOAA–19. We have older satellites that remain in their orbits that 
75 

are still producing data although at degraded levels. So we have 

NOAA 15, NOAA–16, NOAA–18, NOAA–19, and SUOMI–NPP. In 

the geostationary orbit we have GOES 13, GOES 14, and GOES 15. 

So we have got one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight satellites 

that we are operating right now that are NOAA’s satellites. In addition to that, we also support the Defense Meteorological Satellite 

Program and their series of satellites. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you have eight satellites and right now, 

we are in discussion about replacing how many of them? 

Ms. KICZA. The JPSS will replace the SUOMI–NPP. SUOMI– 

NPP is currently operating, as is NOAA–19. JPSS-1will replace 

SUOMI–NPP in 2017. GOES-R will replace the on-orbit spare that 

by that time we likely will have positioned into a primary position. 

So it would replace GOES-14. 

Let me take this opportunity to let the Committee know that all 

of our older satellites we continue to operate for as long as possible. 

The geostationary satellites, for example, GOES 13, 14, 15, they 

are designed for ten-year lives. We typically operate them until we 

have no fuel left. So the depletion of fuel for GOES-13, for example, 

is in the 2021 time frame. For GOES-14 and GOES-15, it is in the 

2024 time frame. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we are here to discuss replacing two 

today? 

Ms. KICZA. We are replacing—the plans are to replace the primary spacecraft—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ms. KICZA. —when their primary missions are complete—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There are two? 

Ms. KICZA. —and most likely when they are degraded. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Two satellites? 

Ms. KICZA. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And you were just telling us now that there 

may be a need quickly when this fuel runs out to either replace or 

refuel these. 

Ms. KICZA. No, what I am suggesting is that we use our older 

satellites for as long as we can. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ms. KICZA. They are not our primary satellites. They become secondary. And that our current constellation that is in orbit, we will 

continue to fly those as long as we have fuel and the instruments 

are operating. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. But you expect that fuel to run out 

within a number of five, six years? 

Ms. KICZA. For the geostationary satellites, if the instruments to 

perform and the satellite continues to perform—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ms. KICZA. —the fuel will last long past when GOES-R would be 

launched. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. I have got to, I guess, get moving. 

Thank you for—— 

Ms. KICZA. Sure. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. —clarifying this for me. This is a very expensive program but a program that provides a very important and 

valuable service. 
76 

I would think that there have been other valuable services that 

government has provided in the past that has evolved into private 

sector services. And we want to especially, of course, encourage 

that at a time when the government has such a huge deficit that 

would help having the private sector put investment in where government was the sole provider before. We had a nice discussion in 

my office the other day, and it just seems to me in listening today 

and reading about this, that there is a hesitancy about purchasing 

commercial data and thus evolving into a situation where the commercial companies could actually play a much greater role. 

At the same time, it is important to note that a commissioned 

study by NOAA suggested that maybe this gap, for example, could 

be handled—you call it the ‘‘silver bullet’’ solution—is to rely on 

data from Chinese government satellites. It seems to me that it is 

a pretty misplaced set of values here when we are more interested 

in Chinese satellite data and we are hesitant to use commercial 

data from our own American companies. 

And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Now, Mr. Posey, your recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Kicza, I understand that the GOES-R ground system continues to make some very good progress toward the ground ratings, 

and I wondered if you could give me some examples of the 

progress, you know, how the installation of antennas in Wallops 

and Fairmont going? 

Ms. KICZA. Yes, sir. I am happy to do that. The GOES-R ground 

system has made excellent progress. The release of the mission 

management core ground element has been delivered to the NOAA 

Satellite Operations Facility in Suitland, Maryland. Four of the six 

new antenna structures have been completed. These are at the 

Wallops Flight Facility in Wallops Island, Virginia, and at our remote backup site and Fairmont, West Virginia. And the GOES-R 

ground system did complete its critical design review last July. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you. Also, what about the initial mission management software? Has that been installed at NOAA Satellite Operations Facility and has it passed acceptance test yet? 

Ms. KICZA. Yes, sir, it has been installed at the NOAA Satellite 

Operations Facility and it is undergoing tests now. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Mr. Watkins, I read recently that we missed 

on our orbit by two weeks gamma, ray bursts from the sun that 

would have knocked out quite a few of our satellites and perhaps 

taken down our grid. I am just wondering what your assessment 

of that is. If we had been on a two-week-later path, what damage 

do you think we would have sustained? 

Mr. WATKINS. Sir, I am going to have to take that question for 

the record. I really don’t have the expertise in that area to speak 

on that. 

Mr. POSEY. Do you realize there was any danger? I mean have 

you been advised? I mean you are the Joint Agency Satellite Division National Aeronautics Director. 

Mr. WATKINS. That is correct, and my primary role is implementation of NOAA’s portfolio of weather satellites. I am an engineer 

by training. I work to get them built. To talk about the science as-
77 

sociated with a gamma ray burst, clearly they offer risk to our 

planet and there are steps that we take and monitor these. But I 

am—in no way would I care to really speak in depth on the impact 

of a gamma ray burst. 

Mr. POSEY. Would you be kind enough to provide my office with 

that information? 

Mr. WATKINS. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Thank you. 

Back to Ms. Kicza, given that the GOES-R will provide about 40 

times more data to the weather expert community, it is important 

that the users are going to be ready to actually utilize the information, hopefully. And I assume that stations are going to need to be 

upgraded. I am just curious about what you are doing to prepare 

the weather prediction community for this extraordinary increase 

in information that they are going to have available. 

Ms. KICZA. Yes, sir. In fact, the GOES-R program has for some 

time now implemented what we call GOES-R proving grounds. And 

in doing so, we work hand-in-hand with our operational weather 

forecasters to prepare them for what they are likely to see in the 

GOES-R era so that they know what to expect and how to utilize 

it. 

Similarly, to be ready to accommodate this data on the ground 

is an effort in and of itself. I mentioned the progress on the GOESR ground system. We have about 150 racks of equipment coming 

in to the NOAA Satellite Operations Facility and the backup facility in Fairmont, West Virginia, in just a few months. So there is 

a tremendous amount of work going on. And being ready to receive 

that equipment requires facility upgrades that are underway and 

on track. It requires that we have our ability to distribute that 

data in place. That, too, is on track. And in the long-term that we 

have the ability to archive that data, and we are working through 

our CLASS archive capability to prepare for that as well. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you. And I guess I have about a half-a-minute 

left. I just wondered if you could briefly comment on the instruments in GOES-R that I understand are weather-focused instruments that can observe weather not just here on Earth but we can 

also get a better view of the space weather. 

Ms. KICZA. That is correct. There are six instruments on the 

GOES-R series system. The Advanced Baseline Imager is the primary weather imager, a critical instrument that has significant capability over our current GOES assets in orbit. There is the Geostationary Lightning Mapper, which is a new capability that will 

allow us to see much more closely the cloud-to-cloud lightning, 

which is a major indicator of pre-thunderstorm activity. And in addition to that, we have a suite of in-situ sensors that sense the 

space weather that are incoming to our planet. And all of those instruments are progressing very well. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you. That is good stuff. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Posey. 

And we will begin our second round of questions now. Hopefully, 

we will have at least five minutes for each Member. 

Ms. Kicza and Mr. Watkins, following up on questions from Mr. 

Stewart as well as Mr. Rohrabacher about this so-called ‘‘silver bul-
78 

let’’ that Riverside Technology and Integrity Applications stated 

utilizing Chinese data, as they say, is the ‘‘silver bullet.’’ This implies that this provides an immediate and a definitive solution to 

a complex problem. Are you looking for this so-called Chinese ‘‘silver bullet?’’ Mr. Stewart was asking about commercial utilization 

and so was Mr. Rohrabacher. Do you both agree with this characterization? Are you looking to the Chinese ‘‘silver bullet,’’ and what 

if any concerns that you would have about such collaboration? Ms. 

Kicza? 

Ms. KICZA. As you mentioned in your opening statement, security 

concerns exist with the use of Chinese data in the event of a gap. 

We are obviously very sensitive to that. NOAA believes that this 

would be a ‘‘whole-of-government’’ decision involving national security staff. 

Chairman BROUN. Are you counting upon that, Ms. Kicza, as far 

as Chinese data? 

Ms. KICZA. No, sir. As we have indicated already, we have a host 

of activities underway beyond use of other international assets that 

we are actively exploring. 

Chairman BROUN. Well, I certainly hope so. I hope that is not 

even a consideration. 

Mr. Watkins? 

Mr. WATKINS. I have nothing to add. 

Chairman BROUN. Mr. Powner, do you have anything to add to 

that? 

Mr. POWNER. Well, we would agree that the security concerns, 

also of availability concern I think are big issue going that route, 

too. There are security concerns, but the availability issue when it 

is in fact available if you went that route needs to be strongly considered. 

Chairman BROUN. I certainly hope so. We have seen a lot of 

cyber attacks from China and it is a very strong concern of mine 

personally as a Member of not only this Committee but Homeland 

Security Committee about what is going on with China and they 

are attacking us. And utilizing them as a ‘‘silver bullet’’ is absolutely not appropriate, and I hope that you all will look to other 

sources and put in policy that is going to look to the commercial 

sources, as well as backfilling all these gaps and problems that we 

see. 

And, Mr. Powner, have NOAA or NASA satisfied GAO’s inquiries 

concerning the new structure, budgets, and timeline for the JPSS 

and the GOES-R programs? 

Mr. POWNER. Yes, I think we are in alignment on what needs to 

be done—what the current budget is and the schedules and that 

type of thing. Our big push, Mr. Chairman, is that tightening up 

the management of those schedules, the integrated master schedule with JPSS and the components schedules. We are in the weeds 

with them on this, but it is important to be in the weeds so that 

they stay on that March 2017 launch date. 

Chairman BROUN. Well, this is a weedy problem and it is something that we need to fill because I am very concerned and I think 

all of us are concerned about these gaps. 

Mr. Watkins, does NASA have any concern about NOAA’s proposal to shift climate sensors to you? 
79 

Mr. WATKINS. Again, sir, my area of expertise is in managing 

weather satellites, reimbursable programs on behalf of NOAA. 

Chairman BROUN. Well, if you could answer that question for us 

in the questions for the record. 

Mr. WATKINS. Yes. 

Chairman BROUN. Can you answer this? Why would NOAA’s 

ownership of these instruments be better than under the current 

arrangement under NASA, which is building the instruments for 

NOAA? 

Mr. WATKINS. Again, that is a question that I will have to take 

for the record. 

Chairman BROUN. Okay. 

Mr. WATKINS. We have a science division that handles those 

areas. 

Chairman BROUN. And certainly if you would help us with that. 

Mr. WATKINS. I will. 

Chairman BROUN. Mr. Maffei, you are recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. MAFFEI. I thank the Chairman, and I echo his remarks 

about depending too much on China. There is no bipartisan divide 

whatsoever on this. We are very concerned about it. Hopefully, they 

would—we would never have to rely on them. And on the Armed 

Services Committee, we, too, are very, very concerned about the 

cyber security issues and it would put us in a very awkward position to have to depend on that particular country for this stuff. 

I do want to get back to Mr. Rohrabacher’s comments on having 

the private sector more involved. Mr. Powner, my—I actually would 

be open to that. I am a big advocate of private sector involvement 

and public-private partnerships in the space program. But my understanding is is that there are already private contractors that do 

most of the actual work that are hired to build the satellites and 

even launch the satellites into orbit. Is that true? 

Mr. POWNER. Yeah, that is true. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Can you—— 

Mr. POWNER. Private contractors, private companies, correct. 

Mr. MAFFEI. So there is not—so most of this is already private— 

well, public-private partnerships that really do it. 

Mr. POWNER. Yeah, I think the key question is with the Riverside analysis there was a suggestion that commercial providers 

could actually be used to help fill the gap. I think that is where 

the suggestion was. Both government for and commercial, all that 

was on the table with Riverside study. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Mr. Chairman, I might suggest that a study might 

be in order to have GAO take a closer look at whether there are 

any additional opportunities for public-private partnerships in the 

space program. I think it would be a bipartisan thing to—— 

Chairman BROUN. Well, certainly. I think all of us would be very 

eager to make sure that that happens. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Okay. Thank you. 

Ms. Kicza, I think you are the right person to ask this to, but 

according to the GAO, key satellite data users were not fully informed about the changes to GOES-R capabilities or alternative efforts to receive the data needed in the event of a system failure. 

Have there been any outreach efforts in place to ensure that GOES 
80 

data will continue to enable users that are outside of NOAA to 

complete their mission and—I mean are there any outreach efforts 

just to make sure that all of the various scientific users and private 

sector users are kept informed of these sort of issues when they 

arise? 

Ms. KICZA. Yes, there are avenues, and I think that what Mr. 

Powner encouraged is that we strengthen those. And so we do have 

regular conferences that we present at, where the users are largely 

present where we highlight the changes that are made. We have 

operational working groups that reach out to the users that inform 

them and help us make decisions on any trades that we have to 

make. 

In addition to that, in a response to the recommendations of the 

GAO, we are working with the Office of the Federal Coordinator of 

Meteorology to reinstitute a committee that had been in place prior 

to NPOESS as an additional method of reaching out to other agencies and their users to ensure that they are kept abreast of how 

our programs are progressing. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Mr. Watkins, how has the sequester affected your 

agency’s ability to implement these weather-related programs? 

Mr. WATKINS. So all of our funding is received via our partners, 

NOAA. And so clearly sequestration has had an impact on our ability associated with stable funding, which is what we need in order 

to adequately be able to build operational weather satellites. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Ms. Kicza, same question to you. And do you have 

enough flexibility in order to at least keep everything on track? 

How is that affecting you? 

Ms. KICZA. As I mentioned in my oral testimony, we have worked 

hard in the face of sequester reductions received in FY2013 to try 

to maintain the launch schedules. We were able to do that with the 

JPSS, keep JPSS-1 on track. To be honest with you, the way that 

we did that is we impacted the Polar Free Flyer, the part that was 

outside of the JPSS. 

With the GOES-R, as I had also indicated, the team is working 

to maintain the earlier launch date. However, given the low budget 

reserve posture we have in light of the reductions, the commitment 

we are making is to the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2016 for that 

launch. 

Mr. MAFFEI. All right. Mr. Powner, I appreciate it if you would 

follow up on it just in terms of your analysis, the impact of the sequester on these programs. 

Mr. POWNER. So sequestration $54 billion, it was clear that 

GOES-R on our—based on our analysis a year ago and currently 

was going to slip without sequestration. So now they are saying 

part of the slip was due to sequestration. Sequestration, we don’t 

know the details on what actually affect that the slip. I will say 

this: There were two prime contractors, one with the spacecraft, 

one with the ground. They continued to do work. So we did not 

have a situation where work was stopped. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Okay. So work continued. 

Mr. POWNER. I know there was arrangements cut with contractors which was appropriate to keep the work going. So those details 

on how 54 equated to a one quarter slip, we don’t have that, but 
81 

I do want to say that I think it was likely going to slip without sequestration. 

Mr. MAFFEI. I thank the Chairman. I have gone three seconds 

over. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Maffei. 

Mr. Stewart, you are recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. STEWART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, I won’t take 

that long. I have just a very quick question. 

And this is helpful to me; I think it is helpful for the record. But 

I was going to ask you as witnesses to give your best perception 

or opinion on a scale of one to ten, ten being severe, one being we 

are in great shape, what is your perception of the potential the 

gapping and satellite coverage of being a problem to the United 

States? How big of a problem is it to you, Mr. Powner? Could you 

give me a perception on your feeling on that? 

Mr. POWNER. I think for me it is a ten. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. 

Mr. POWNER. I think that we are predicting a 17-month gap. I 

think you are going to have a gap. 

Mr. STEWART. Yeah. 

Mr. POWNER. Having no gap at all I think is highly unlikely, so 

I would put it at ten. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. Thank you. 

Ms. Kicza? 

Ms. KICZA. The impact of a gap is severe. I would rate that as 

a 10. The probability of a gap I think is improving. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. Would you give me a rating on that, what 

you think the probability is? 

Ms. KICZA. I would say given the progress we have made and the 

operations on SUOMI–NPP I would rate it as a five. 

Mr. STEWART. Five? And, Mr. Powner, your rating was both on 

the severity and also the likelihood, is that true? 

Mr. POWNER. Correct. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. Mr. Watkins? 

Mr. WATKINS. I think for the JPSS program, given that SUOMI– 

NPP has been operating on orbit without any infant mortality 

issues, given the fact that I have confidence in the schedule associated with JPSS-1, I would probably give it a four or five. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. And that is on the likelihood? 

Mr. WATKINS. Yes. 

Mr. STEWART. Not on the severity should we encounter a gap? 

Mr. WATKINS. No. No. 

Mr. STEWART. Yeah. 

Mr. WATKINS. And that is on the likelihood. The severity—— 

Mr. STEWART. Yeah. 

Mr. WATKINS. —is huge. 

Mr. STEWART. Yeah. I hope that you who are more optimistic are 

right. I am afraid that you are not. I think it is in my opinion much 

more than a five. I think it is almost inevitable. 

Let me ask you one other question using the same kind of format. What do you think are the best options? Do you think that 

the commercially available data is the best option? That should be 

the direction we are leaning? Or should we be leaning towards foreign sources? Mr. Powner? 
82 

Mr. POWNER. Well, I think it is clearly a combination not only 

of using additional satellites, whether it is some foreign, some commercial, some other government. I think you need to look at all 

those, but also, it is important to look at other weather observations, observations from aircraft and also improving the weather 

modeling. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. 

Mr. POWNER. Weather modeling improvements could help, too. 

Mr. STEWART. Can help, too? 

Mr. POWNER. It is a combination of everything. 

Mr. STEWART. So you would rate them all as equally important, 

one not being much more than another? 

Mr. POWNER. Yes, I don’t know if I am in a position to say that 

it is better or not. I think that our recommendation is that we need 

to make the decisions on what the best options are given the current budget situation. 

Mr. STEWART. Which was part of my previous question. Let’s 

lean forward on that. 

Ms. Kicza, is one considered a strong preference in your opinion? 

Ms. KICZA. My strongest preference is to keep these programs 

funded, keep them stable so that these teams can execute. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. 

Ms. KICZA. I think that is our strongest weapon against running 

a gap. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. But if you had to choose right now, you 

know, as a relief as something that you could count on as backing 

up, would that be commercially available or foreign? 

Ms. KICZA. I would use a combination of the assets that are 

available to us. 

Mr. STEWART. Both of them being equal? 

Ms. KICZA. Yes. 

Mr. STEWART. Okay. 

Ms. KICZA. Yes. 

Mr. STEWART. Mr. Watkins? 

Mr. WATKINS. Again, I believe that we need to remain as focused 

as possible on trying to meet our overall schedules and deadlines 

associated—— 

Mr. STEWART. Understanding—— 

Mr. WATKINS. —and—— 

Mr. STEWART. —that, but if that weren’t to be the event, what 

would be your preference for the primary backup? 

Mr. WATKINS. I think we would be looking at everything and I 

would defer to the expertise of NOAA to meet those needs. 

Mr. STEWART. All right. Thank you. And I yield back. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Stewart. 

Ms. Bonamici, you are recognized for five minutes. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I don’t think I will take that long but I wanted to follow up on 

the question that Mr. Maffei asked about GOES-R. Ms. Kicza, the 

cost estimates on JPSS have gone up and down of course in recent 

years. At the high point, it was projected to be about $14.6 billion; 

now, it is down to $11.3 billion. Could you talk a little bit about 

how you have folded the key users and stakeholders in the process 
83 

to ensure that the essential functionality was not sacrificed in the 

search for savings? 

Ms. KICZA. Yes, ma’am. As we establish our requirements for the 

JPSS program, we worked very closely with all of the major line 

organizations within NOAA, the Weather Service being obviously 

the primary line organization, and assured that the requirements 

and trades that we are addressing are keeping their highest priority requirements intact. Those are referred to as the Key Performance Parameters. So we worked very closely with our NOAA 

counterparts who are taking this data and providing the products 

and services that the broader country takes advantage of. 

In addition to that, as we go through these trades, there are multiple opportunities to have dialogue with the broader community 

and we regularly engage in those forums. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you. And I want to follow up on what Mr. 

Stewart said earlier about looking forward. And obviously, there 

have been troubles in the past, and looking forward, I know that 

the Independent Review Team completed a report on the JPSS program last year. So what steps have you taken to follow the advice 

of the Independent Review Team? I think we all need some reassurance that things are getting better. 

Ms. KICZA. The Independent Review Team, which was led by 

Tom Young and host of other very senior acquisition experts, provided a report in July of last year, July of 2012. They had 23 recommendations. This past August we brought that entire team back 

and we reviewed with them our response to all of those recommendations. I think it is fair to say that they were pleased, 

quite pleased with the progress that has been made. They have 

identified a couple of areas that they want additional detail in, and 

we are scheduled to provide that information to them and they are 

projecting to have a report available in the November time frame. 

Ms. BONAMICI. Thank you very much. 

And I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Ms. Bonamici. 

I thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony today, and I 

thank the Members for their questions. Members of the Committee 

may have additional questions for you, and I ask that you respond 

to those questions in writing, and please do it as expeditiously as 

possible. 

Let me remind you that everyone’s responses to our questions 

are expected in a very timely manner. I am not unreasonable and 

I can permit a delay of a week or two, but delays that extend for 

over one year are totally inexcusable and intolerable. 

The record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments and written questions from Members. 

Thank you all so much. The witnesses are excused and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. David Powner 
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Responses by Ms. Mary Kicza 
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Responses by Mr. Marcus Watkins 
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