1996 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-9-1996

United States v. Anderskow

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 95-5093,95-5094

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Recommended Citation

"United States v. Anderskow" (1996). 1996 Decisions. Paper 95.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/95
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 ______________ 

 No. 95-5093 

 ______________ 

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 v. 

 RALPH A. ANDERSKOW, 

 Appellant 

 ______________ 

 No. 95-5094 

 ______________ 

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 v. 

 DONALD ANCHORS, 

 Appellant 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the District of New Jersey 

 (D.C. Criminal Nos. 93-cr-00300-02 &

 93-cr-00300-03) 

 _______________ 

 Argued January 25, 1996 

 Before: COWEN and SAROKIN, Circuit Judges, and 

POLLAK, District Judge 

 (Filed July 9, l996) 

 _______________ 

Richard F. X. Regan, Esq. (ARGUED) 

Hayden, Perle and Silber 

1500 Harbor Boulevard 

Weehawken, New Jersey 07087 

 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT ANDERSKOW 

Michael M. Mustokoff, Esq. (ARGUED) 
Teresa N, Cavenagh, Esq. 

Judith E. Baylinson, Esq. 

Duane, Morris & Heckscher 

One Liberty Place 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT ANCHORS 

Allan Tananbaum (ARGUED) 

Faith Hochberg 

United States Attorney 

970 Broad Street 

Newark, New Jersey 07102 

 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE 

 _______________ 

 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 _______________ 

COWEN, Circuit Judge. 

 Ralph Anderskow and Donald Anchors appeal from judgments 

of conviction and sentence entered by the District Court for the 

District of New Jersey. The convictions arise out of their 

participation, along with several other coconspirators, in the 

Euro-American Money Fund Trust (the "Trust"), an entity that was 

used to perpetrate a pernicious advance-fee scheme. Over a threeyear period, the Trust bilked unsuspecting loan applicants and 

investors out of over eighteen million dollars. Both defendants 

raise evidentiary and legal sufficiency challenges. We will affirm 

the judgments of conviction. 

 I. 

 John Voigt was the mastermind of a scheme to obtain fees 

from loan applicants and potential investors for nonexistent loans 

and investments. At the heart of this scheme was the Trust. Voigt 

fabricated a fictitious genealogy for the Trust, claiming that it 

was a long-established European financial institution affiliated 

with the Catholic Church and the Knights of Malta, and that it had 

access to billions of dollars. For two and one-half years brokers 

for the Trust would recount this false genealogy to unsuspecting 

loan applicants and investors, who would part with substantial fees 

in return for "self-liquidating" loans (loans that repaid 

themselves) and "Master Collateral Commitments" ("MCCs"), allegedly 

a special form of commercial paper available only to banks. 

 Voigt benefitted from the cooperation of several 

coconspirators, including Anderskow, a partner at a Chicago law 

firm who also was a certified public accountant. He was hired as 

the Trust's lawyer in the Chicago area, and his credentials helped 

provide the Trust with an appearance of legitimacy, which 

facilitated its attempts to lure loan applicants and potential 

investors. Anderskow's primary responsibility was providing 
guarantees to borrowers on behalf of the Trust and maintaining a 

client escrow account into which advance fees were deposited. 

Anderskow would immediately distribute fees that had been deposited 

into his escrow account according to Voigt's instructions, which 

violated the terms of contracts entered into with the loan 

applicants and investors. For his role in the Trust Anderskow 

received $995,000 in compensation. 

 In January of 1991 appellant Anchors was hired for the 

position of "loan oversight officer." Somewhat akin to a customer 

relations manager, Anchors was primarily responsible for responding 

to questions and complaints from customers of the Trust. Over 

time, Anchors devoted much of his time to placating loan applicants 

who had paid advance fees and were calling with increasing 

frequency to inquire as to the status of their loans. Anchors 

eventually responded to several hundred calls each month, assuring 

disgruntled borrowers that their loans were about to be funded. 

Eventually, Anchors began to tell some applicants that other loans 

had been funded, which he knew was untrue. Anchors received 

$325,000 for his participation in the Trust. 

 In June of 1993, a federal grand jury issued a twentysix-count indictment against Anderskow, Anchors, and their three 

coconspirators--Voigt, Mercedes Travis, and Solis Alevy. Alevy 

entered a plea of guilty and became a government witness. 

Subsequently, the grand jury issued a twenty-eight-count 

superseding indictment against the remaining four defendants, 

charging Anderskow and Anchors with conspiracy to commit wire 

fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering, and bringing criminal 

money laundering forfeiture allegations against them. 

 After a three-month trial, a jury convicted Anderskow on 

all charges except two counts of wire fraud. Anchors was convicted 

of conspiracy and seven counts of wire fraud, but was acquitted of 

seven other counts of wire fraud and two counts of money 

laundering. Anderskow and Anchors were sentenced, respectively, 

to terms of imprisonment of seventy-eight and thirty-two months. 

This appeal followed. 

 II. 

 The district court had original jurisdiction over these 

criminal actions pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  3231. We exercise 

appellate jurisdiction to review final judgments of conviction 

under 28 U.S.C.  1291. 

 III. 

 Both Anderskow and Anchors contest the district court's 

decision to allow coconspirator Alevy, who pled guilty prior to 

trial and testified for the government, to give lay opinion 

testimony under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Alevy's 

testimony tended to show that Anderskow and Anchors had knowledge 

of the Trust's fraudulent scheme. Contending that Alevy's 

allegedly improper testimony provided the government with its only 

evidence concerning their knowledge that the Trust was a fraud, 

both defendants claim that this alleged error was so prejudicial as 

to warrant a new trial. We disagree. 

 A. Anderskow 

 1. 

 During its case in chief, the government called Alevy to 
testify about the workings of the Trust and its various components. 

Specifically, Alevy was asked to explain why in late 1991 he had 

drafted letters containing false information for Anderskow to sign 

and send to a victim of the Trust who had paid a substantial 

advance fee for an MCC, and was becoming angry at not having 

received it. Anderskow assigns error to the following exchanges 

between the government and Alevy: 

 Q. How is it that you, on the one hand, passed false 

 information to Mr. Anderskow but did not intend to 

 deceive him? 

 A. Mr. Anderskow was a daily participant in the same 

 fraud that I was. I can't get into his mind, I 

 have no way of knowing what he knew inside his 

 mind, but it was obvious to me and told to me by 

 Mr. Voigt that [Anderskow] will do anything we ask 

 him to. 

 . . . 

 Q. When you passed on that false information to Mr. 

 Anderskow, did you do it to deceive him? 

 A. No, sir. 

 Q. Why then did you pass on information if it wasn't 

 true? 

 A. It was part of the job I was doing, and he was 

 doing the part of the job that he was doing, and 

 some information was necessary for his part. 

 . . . 

 Q. Did you ever directly or specifically discuss this 

 fraud with Mr. Anderskow? 

 A. No, sir. 

 Q. Why not? 

 A. There was no reason to. We were both doing the 

 same thing for the same ends every day. 

App. at 1786, 1799. 

 2. 

 Anderskow's complaint is twofold. First, he claims that 

Alevy lacked sufficient personal knowledge to form an opinion as to 

whether Anderskow knew the Trust was a fraud and, therefore, that 

Alevy's testimony failed to meet Rule 701(a)'s "rational basis" 

requirement as a matter of law. Second, Anderskow appears to argue 

that even if Alevy's opinion was rationally based on his 
perceptions, to the extent it suggested that Anderskow had guilty 

knowledge it was tantamount to an opinion on the ultimate issue of 

Anderskow's guilt. Alevy's opinion testimony, according to 

Anderskow, failed to meet Rule 701(b)'s "helpfulness" requirement 

as a matter of law. 

 We normally review alleged evidentiary errors for abuse 

of discretion. Government of Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 

619, 629 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 556 (1993); Eisenberg 

v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 780 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946, 

106 S. Ct. 346 (1985). Anderskow, however, failed to object 

contemporaneously to any of the testimony about which he now 

complains. As a result, we review his contention for "'plain 

error,' that is, 'egregious error or a manifest miscarriage of 

justice.'" United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526, 530 (3d Cir. 1996) 

(quoting United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 488 U.S. 928, 109 S. Ct. 314 (1988)). See Fed. R. Crim. P.52(b). 

 We find no plain error because none of the disputed 

testimony actually contains a "lay opinion" by Alevy as to 

Anderskow's knowledge. Although it is readily apparent that in 

questioning why Anderskow would know that the information in the 

letters was false the government was attempting to elicit an 

opinion from Alevy, he never explicitly opined on direct 

examination that Anderskow possessed guilty knowledge. Instead, 

Alevy provided several reasons to support the unstated conclusion 

that Anderskow had guilty knowledge. For instance, Alevy testified 

that he did not believe that Anderskow would be deceived since 

Anderskow and Alevy were part of the same organization working 

toward a common goal, and because Voigt had told him that Anderskow 

would do anything they asked. This simply furnished the basis for 

an inference, based on circumstantial evidence, that Anderskow had 

guilty knowledge which the government was free to suggest during 

its closing argument and which the jury was free to accept or 

reject. Accordingly, since Alevy's testimony did not implicate 

Rule 701, there clearly was no plain error in its admission. 

 B. Anchors 

 Anchors advances a similar claim with respect to Alevy's 

testimony. Because Anchors preserved this claim for appellate 

review by raising a contemporaneous objection, we review the 

admission of Alevy's opinion testimony under Rule 701 for abuse of 

discretion. Knight, 989 F.2d at 629; Eisenberg, 766 F.2d at 780. 

 1. 

 During its case in chief, the government questioned Alevy 

about certain documents he had sent to Anchors to be passed along 

to borrowers who had paid advance fees and were becoming angry at 

not having seen any results. Anchors assigns error to the 

following exchanges between the government and Alevy: 

 Q. Now, when you were providing this information 

 concerning schedules and projects to Mr. Anchors, 

 did you intend to deceive him by that information? 

 A. No, sir. 

 Q. How so? 
 A. I was doing my job, he was doing his job. 

 Q. Did you believe that Donald Anchors would be 

 deceived by the information that you were sending 

 him? 

 . . . 

 A. Personally, I did not believe that. 

 Q. Why not? 

 A. Donald Anchors had probably 20 or 30 borrowers, 

 maybe more for all I know, who had been promised 

 millions of dollars for a long time, some as long 

 as a year. He had never seen one dime funded or 

 loaned, and he kept on with the business at hand. 

 I had no reason to believe that he wasn't fully 

 aware of what was occurring, as long as he was 

 getting paid. 

 Q. Did you ever specifically discuss fraud, the fraud 

 in which you believed you were involved with Donald 

 Anchors? 

 A. No, sir. 

 Q. Why not? 

 A. There was no reason to discuss this, we were doing 

 it. 

App. at 503-04. 

 2. 

 Anchors first complains that he had insufficient contact 

with Alevy for his opinion to be "rationally based" on his 

perceptions. We disagree. We have held that lay opinion testimony 

can be based upon a witness' "knowledge and participation in the 

day-to-day affairs of his business," Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco 

Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1175 (3d Cir. 1993), and upon a witness' review 

of written documents. United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 193 (3d 

Cir. 1991); Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 

403-04 (3d Cir. 1980). Alevy's testimony revealed that he had 

contact with Anchors by telephone and via facsimile on a weekly 

basis in the fall of 1991. Most of this correspondence concerned 

loan schedules that had been promised to borrowers. In explaining 

the workings of the Trust and the roles of its various members, 

Alevy testified that he would provide schedules containing false 

information to Anchors so that he could pass them along to the 

borrowers. We think that in light of the weekly correspondence by 

telephone and facsimile between Alevy and Anchors, Alevy had 

sufficient first-hand knowledge such that his opinion was 
"rationally based" on his perceptions. Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 

F.3d at 1175; Leo, 941 F.2d at 193; Teen-Ed, Inc., 620 F.2d at 403- 

04. 

 Although we conclude that Alevy's testimony was 

"rationally based" on his perception of Anchors, we conclude that 

Alevy's subjective belief that Anchors "must have known" fails to 

meet Rule 701(b)'s "helpfulness" requirement. Anchors' principal 

contention is that the reasons supporting Alevy's opinion as to why 

Anchors would not be deceived were already before the jury. Since 

it was for the jury to determine whether he "must have known" that 

the Trust was engaged in a large-scale fraud, Alevy's opinion on 

the subject, according to Anchors, essentially turned him into a 

thirteenth juror. We agree. 

 In United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1992), 

the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that where the 

jury has before it the same circumstantial evidence of a 

defendant's criminal knowledge on which a witness bases an opinion 

concerning a defendant's knowledge, testimony from a witness 

concluding that the defendant "had to know" usually will not meet 

Rule 701(b)'s helpfulness requirement: 

 [W]hen a witness has fully described what a 

 defendant was in a position to observe, what 

 the defendant was told, and what the defendant 

 said or did, the witness's opinion as to the 

 defendant's knowledge will often not be 

 "helpful" within the meaning of Rule 701 

 because the jury will be in as good a position 

 as the witness to draw the inference as to

 whether or not the defendant knew. 

Id. at 1216 (internal citations omitted). The Rea court found that 

testimony by a witness that the defendant "had to know" failed to 

meet Rule 701's helpfulness requirement, but went on to conclude 

that the error was harmless. 

 In this case, Alevy testified about the number of 

complaints Anchors was receiving from customers; Anchors' response 

to those complaints; and the sheer passage of time during which 

Anchors saw no loans funded. That Alevy "had no reason to believe 

that [Anchors] wasn't fully aware of what was occurring, as long as 

he was getting paid," App. at 504, simply was not helpful to the 

jury's determination of Anchors' criminal knowledge. The 

government suggests that because a coconspirator's subjective 

belief that a defendant "must have known" simply provides 

additional circumstantial evidence as to the defendant's objective 

mental state, it is helpful to the jury. We are not persuaded. We 

do not understand how a witness' subjective belief that a defendant 

"must have known" is helpful to a factfinder that has before it the 

very circumstantial evidence upon which the subjective opinion is 

based. Furthermore, during its closing argument the government is 

free to ask the jury to draw the inference suggested by the 

circumstantial evidence: that the defendant must have known. 

Accordingly, our holding does nothing to hamper the government's 

ability to establish a defendant's criminal knowledge, even where 

members of a conspiracy never openly discuss their criminal 
activity. 

 Although we conclude that Alevy's opinion testimony fails 

to meet Rule 701(b)'s helpfulness requirement, its admission was 

harmless error. As our opinion will demonstrate, see infra IV.B., 

the circumstantial evidence of Anchors' knowledge was overwhelming. 

Furthermore, the government did not rely on Alevy's testimony in 

its summation, stressing instead the mountain of circumstantial 

evidence supporting the inference that Anchors "must have known." 

Accordingly, there is no possibility that Alevy's opinion testimony 

to the same effect contributed to the verdict. 

 IV. 

 At trial the government had no direct proof of a tacit 

agreement among Voigt, Alevy, Anderskow and Anchors to engage in an 

advance-fee scheme. Accordingly, both defendants filed posttrial 

motions for judgments of acquittal contending that the government 

had failed to adduce sufficient evidence that they were knowing 

participants in a scheme to defraud potential borrowers and/or 

investors. They appeal the district court's denial of those 

motions. 

 Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is 

"governed by strict principles of deference to a jury's findings," 

United States v. Ashfield, 735 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 469 U.S. 858, 105 S. Ct. 189 (1984), such that we draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict. Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct 2781, 2789 (1979). We will 

overturn a verdict only "if no reasonable juror could accept 

evidence as sufficient to support the conclusion of the defendant's 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Coleman, 811 

F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Campbell, 

702 F.2d 262, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Consequently, a "claim of 

insufficiency places a very heavy burden on an appellant." United 

States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting 

United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 

457 U.S. 1125, 102 S. Ct. 2945 (1982)), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982, 

111 S. Ct. 1637 (1991). 

 A. Anderskow 

 Anderskow was convicted on ten counts of money laundering 

arising out of various transfers of funds from his attorney escrow 

account to Trust members, pursuant to Voigt's instructions, between 

July and October of 1991. He also was convicted on numerous counts 

of wire fraud relating to his actions during the same period. 

Anderskow claims that the evidence is legally insufficient to 

sustain those convictions because the government failed to prove 

that he knew the funds being transferred represented the proceeds 

of unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C.  1956(a)(1), or that the transfers 

were intended to promote "the carrying on of specified unlawful 

activity." Id.  1956(a)(1)(A)(i). He likewise contends that the 

evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that he was a knowing and 

willful participant in a scheme to defraud. Id.  1343. Simply 

stated, Anderskow argues that the government failed to prove that 

he was a member of the conspiracy. We disagree. 

 The crucial period with respect to Anderskow's legal 

sufficiency challenges is July of 1991, the start of his money 

laundering activity. Anderskow's position on appeal is that he 
joined the Trust believing it to be a bona fide provider of funding 

services and that Voigt was a "legitimate, honest international 

financier." Anderskow's Br. at 32. He also points to Alevy's 

testimony that they never openly discussed the fraudulent nature of 

the Trust and the "steady stream of false and deceptive 

information" Alevy provided him to be passed on to the Trust's 

customers. Id. at 34. Anderskow argues that absent Alevy's 

improper opinion testimony as to his knowledge, the government 

produced insufficient evidence that he was a knowing and willful 

participant in an illegal venture between July and September of 

1991. 

 In rejecting Anderskow's argument, we begin our analysis 

by observing that at trial Anderskow asserted a good-faith defense 

to the fraud charges. The government, therefore, sought and 

obtained from the district court a "willful blindness" instruction. 

The district court charged the jury that "[t]he element of 

knowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof that a 

defendant may have deliberately closed his or her eyes to what 

otherwise had been obvious to him or her." App. at 4287-88. We 

think that even if Anderskow were correct that the government 

failed to establish that he was aware of the Trust's fraudulent 

nature when he first joined in March of 1990, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the government, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 

319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789, the evidence more than adequately supports 

the jury's finding that he knew of the Trust's illegal activities 

by July of 1990 and, instead of withdrawing, continued as a willing 

participant in return for substantial remuneration.

 As the government points out, the Trust Anderskow joined 

in March of 1990 had a "strong aura of unreality." Government's 

Br. at 77. It purported to sell "self-liquidating" loans; i.e., 

loans that did not have to be repaid. It also claimed to be a 

long-established European financial institution affiliated with the 

Catholic Church and the Knights of Malta, and that it had access to 

billions of dollars. Furthermore, loan applicants were required to 

sign bizarre confidentiality agreements that purported to bar 

customers from disclosing information about the Trust in this life 

and the hereafter. Loan applicants also were required to fill out 

peculiar personal questionnaires that asked if they could hold 

their breath under water or were flat footed, and they were asked 

to provide hair samples and blood tests. Given Anderskow's status 

as a partner in a Chicago law firm and a certified public 

accountant, and in light of his initial questioning of Trust 

brokers as to whether the money was "clean," a rational jury was 

entitled to find that Anderskow was suspicious from the outset. 

Furthermore, a rational jury could have accepted the government's 

argument that Anderskow's credentials provided the Trust with an 

appearance of legitimacy. 

 More significant, however, is that during 1990 no less 

than seventeen advance fees, which totaled $1.5 million, were 

deposited into Anderskow's escrow account. Despite the fact that 

not one loan was funded during that time, Anderskow immediately 

would parcel out the money to the various coconspirators. By July 

of 1991, moreover, seventeen additional borrowers and investors had 

paid Anderskow advance fees totaling $6.5 million dollars, which 
Anderskow disbursed to his confederates. Anderskow himself 

testified that during 1991 he received approximately twelve 

complaints per day from anxious loan applicants and investors 

inquiring about their money. Although he knew that not one loan or 

MCC had been funded, Anderskow continued to provide a plethora of 

false excuses intended to lull customers into believing that their 

money was forthcoming. 

 Even more damning was Anderskow's admission under crossexamination that by dividing up advance fees among the 

coconspirators, instead of retaining them in his escrow account, he 

knew in June of 1991 that he was violating his contractual and 

ethical duty to hold customers' funds until they had received their 

loans. The evidence showed that Anderskow also lied to one 

borrower in the latter part of 1991, claiming that the Trust had 

funded loans in the past when, in fact, Anderskow knew that no such 

funding had occurred. Finally, the evidence of Anderskow's 

financial motive and willingness to cooperate is not seriously 

debatable. In 1990 Anderskow earned $100,000 from the Trust, and 

in 1991 he received $437,000, which was more than ten times greater 

than his 1989 income. Anderskow mechanically complied with Voigt's 

directions as to how to disburse the advance fees in his escrow 

account among the various coconspirators. 

 The government presented an overwhelming circumstantial 

case that by July of 1991 Anderskow had willfully blinded himself 

to the Trust's fraudulent activities. We have held that there must 

be evidence establishing a "'unity of purpose,' the intent to 

achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work together toward 

that goal." United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 

1988). See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 321 (3d Cir. 

1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 962, 113 S. Ct. 1388 (1993). We have 

further held that "all of the elements of the government's case, 

including the existence of the agreement, may be proven entirely 

through circumstantial evidence." United States v. Schramm, 75 

F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Kapp, 781 

F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1024, 106 S. Ct. 

1220 (1986)). Given Anderskow's lulling of disgruntled customers, 

his admitted knowledge that disbursing advance fees among the 

coconspirators violated both the Trust's contractual obligations 

and his ethical duties, and his financial motive, a rational jury 

could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderskow was 

a knowing and willing participant in a scheme to defraud by July of 

1991. 

 B. Anchors 

 Anchors likewise contends that there is insufficient 

evidence of his knowing and willful participation in a scheme to 

defraud loan applicants. The jury acquitted Anchors of counts 

three through six, but found him guilty of counts seven through ten 

and twelve through fourteen. Accordingly, the jury found that 

Anchors had the requisite knowledge as of October 31, 1991, the 

date on which he faxed a letter on behalf of Anderskow. Again, 

while the government's evidence of Anchors' knowledge was entirely 

circumstantial, we think it provides overwhelming proof that 

Anchors had willfully blinded himself to the fact that he was 

participating in a fraudulent scheme. 
 Anchors joined the Trust as a "loan officer" in January 

of 1991, with thirty years of experience in business, the last 

seven of which were as a loan officer. From the moment he joined 

the Trust, Anchors was aware that there were loan applicants who 

had paid advance fees but had not received their loans. According 

to his own testimony, Anchors fielded "between 70 and 80" calls in 

January of 1991 alone from concerned customers. App. at 1203. By 

February, merely one month into his employment, Anchors informed 

Voigt that he was using "every excuse in the world," id. at 1205, 

and he raised the possibility of liabilities flowing from the 

Trust's failure to fund the loans. All the while, Anchors 

continued to provide excuses to angry customers, knowing that not 

a single loan had been funded. Anchors testified that by May of 

1991 he was fielding approximately 250 calls per week. 

 Despite the fact that not one loan was funded, Anchors 

continued to assuage disgruntled applicants with excuse after 

excuse, responding to twenty calls per day from mid-July on. 

Furthermore, notwithstanding his attempts to downplay his 

significance to the Trust, Anchors clearly understood the 

importance of his role. For instance, he wrote Voigt that 

"sometimes I amaze myself with [the customers'] resultant 

patience," and that "I feel as though I am the [T]rust to those 

borrowers under my care." Id. at 181. More significantly, by 

September and October of 1991, Anchors had affirmatively lied to 

one customer, falsely telling him that eight other loans had been 

funded, which provided strong circumstantial evidence of knowledge 

and intent. At the same time, however, Anchors wrote to Alevy 

about the rising tide of customer complaints and asked for 

additional "creative" excuses that he could put in writing. 

Finally, Anchors' financial motive was beyond dispute. Although he 

earned $25,000 in the year prior to joining the Trust, he received 

$200,000 during 1991, his first year with the Trust. 

 We think that when viewed in the light most favorable to 

the government, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct at 

2789, the circumstantial evidence of Anchors' knowledge and willful 

participation was overwhelming. Pointing to Alevy's testimony that 

they never discussed the fraud in which they were engaged, Anchors' 

principal contention is that, absent Alevy's allegedly improper 

opinion testimony, the government failed to adduce any direct 

evidence of his knowledge of the conspiracy's illicit purpose. As 

we noted earlier, however, "all of the elements of the government's 

case," including knowledge of the conspiracy's illicit purpose, 

"may be proven entirely through circumstantial evidence." Schramm, 

75 F.3d at 156 (citing Kapp, 781 F.2d at 1010). If Anchors' 

argument were taken at face value, the government could never prove 

the existence of a conspiracy where, as here, the coconspirators do 

not discuss the fraudulent nature of their actions. United States 

v. Klein, 515 F.2d 751, 754 (3d Cir. 1975) ("Circumstantial 

evidence is clearly proper . . . especially in a conspiracy case 

where direct evidence is likely to be scant.") (footnote omitted). 

We refuse to so hold. Ten months passed during which no loan was 

ever funded. Given the mounting complaints and Anchors' willingness 

to provide both creative and false excuses for the Trust's 

nonperformance, which was motivated by the opportunity for 
substantial financial remuneration, the jury had ample evidence 

with which to conclude that, at a minimum, Anchors had willfully 

blinded himself to the fact that the Trust was a fraud and that his 

actions were aiding its fraudulent purpose. See United States v. 

Ruuska, 883 F.2d 262, 264 (3d Cir. 1989) (lulling defrauded victims 

with false excuses is circumstantial evidence of mens rea); United 

States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 958 (3d Cir. 1979) (anticipated 

remuneration circumstantial evidence of coconspirator's mens rea). 

 United States v. Klein, 515 F.2d at 751, cited by 

Anchors, is not to the contrary. In Klein we set aside a 

defendant's convictions for mail fraud and conspiracy to commit 

mail fraud, which arose out of a scheme by owners of a "debtridden" hotel to set their hotel afire and then collect the 

proceeds of several fire insurance policies. Id. at 752. Klein 

was hired to destroy the hotel for $60,000. After the hotel had 

been partially destroyed by fire, codefendant Luick was hired by 

another unindicted coconspirator to prepare and submit proofs of 

loss forms to the insurance companies. We overturned Luick's 

convictions because submission of the proofs of loss forms alone 

failed to prove that he knew of the conspiracy's unlawful purpose. 

Although Luick had paid Klein a referral fee, and had done so in 

the past, we found it significant, if not dispositive, that "[i]t 

was not shown that . . . Luick should have been put on notice of 

suspicious facts in this case because of his past dealings with 

Klein. In fact the nature of Klein's and Luick's past dealings was 

left wholly unexplained." Id. at 755 (footnote omitted). 

 Here, by contrast, the relationship among Voigt, Alevy, 

Anderskow and Anchors was fully explored at trial. It is true that 

Anchors joined a conspiracy that was already in progress. But 

unlike the defendant in Klein, Anchors engaged in numerous 

activities over a substantial period of time in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. While Klein stands for the unremarkable proposition 

that a latecomer to a conspiracy does not automatically acquire 

knowledge of the conspiracy's unlawful purpose simply by taking a 

one-time action ostensibly in furtherance of its purpose, surely 

Klein does not preclude a conviction where, as here, the defendant 

provides a steady stream of false excuses in the face of mounting 

complaints from disgruntled customers in return for substantial 

remuneration. Klein is inapposite. 

 V. 

 For the foregoing reasons the judgments of conviction and 

sentence will be affirmed in all respects.