Filed 9/17/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

GLORIA GUZMAN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

NBA AUTOMOTIVE, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B303655

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC675851)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Los Angeles County 

Superior Court, Michael P. Linfield, Judge. Affirmed.

McCreary and Duncan J. McCreary for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Lyon Law, Geoffrey C. Lyon; and Henry Harmeling IV for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Gloria Guzman timely filed an administrative complaint 

with the Department of Fair Housing and Employment (DFEH) 

after her employer, NBA Automotive, Inc. dba Hooman Chevrolet 

of Culver City (NBA Automotive),1 terminated her employment. 

DFEH issued Guzman a right-to-sue letter, and Guzman filed 

this action against NBA Automotive, alleging wrongful 

termination and various causes of action under the Fair 

Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) 

(FEHA).2 A jury found in favor of Guzman and awarded her 

monetary damages, and the trial court entered judgment in her 

favor. 

NBA Automotive appeals from the judgment, challenging 

the trial court’s orders denying its motions for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. NBA 

Automotive argues Guzman failed to exhaust her administrative 

remedies under FEHA because her administrative complaint, 

though it named something very close (“Hooman Chevrolet”) to 

NBA Automotive’s correct fictitious business name (“Hooman 

Chevrolet of Culver City”), it incorrectly identified “Hooman 

Enterprises, Inc.,” rather than “NBA Automotive, Inc.,” as the 

corporation doing business as Hooman Chevrolet of Culver City. 

Because Guzman’s administrative complaint sufficiently 

identified her employer, she exhausted her administrative 

1 NBA is an initialism for Nissani Brothers Automotive. 

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government 

Code.
3

remedies within the statutory limitations period. Therefore, we 

affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Guzman Files an Administrative Complaint

On September 8, 2017 Guzman filed an administrative 

complaint with DFEH asserting various employment claims, 

including discrimination, harassment, retaliation, failure to 

engage in the interactive process, denial of family or medical 

leave, and denial of reasonable accommodations. The caption of 

the complaint named “Hooman Enterprises, Inc.” as the 

respondent, and in the first sentence, under the heading 

“Additional Complaint Details,” Guzman alleged she “was 

employed by Defendant Hooman Enterprises Inc. DBA Hooman 

Chevrolet (Employer)” from February 2002 to May 2017 in, 

among several locations, Culver City. Guzman also named her 

supervisors, including “owner Hooman Nissani.” Guzman 

requested, and DFEH issued the same day, a right-to-sue letter.

3

DFEH sent Hooman Enterprises, Inc. a copy of Guzman’s 

administrative complaint and the right-to-sue letter. 

3 See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 10005, subd. (a) (“Any person 

claiming to be aggrieved by an employment practice made 

unlawful by the FEHA may forgo having the department 

investigate a complaint and instead obtain an immediate rightto-sue notice. A right-to-sue notice issued by the department 

shall state that the aggrieved party may bring a civil action 

against the person or entity named in the complaint within one 

year from the date of the notice.”).
4

B. Guzman Files This Action

On September 14, 2017 Guzman filed this action, naming 

as defendants “Hooman Enterprises Inc. DBA Hooman Chevrolet; 

and DOES 1 to 10.” The operative first amended complaint 

alleged 12 causes of action, including for wrongful termination, 

retaliation (§ 12940, subd. (h)), disability discrimination (§ 12940, 

subd. (a)), age discrimination (§ 12940, subd. (a)), failure to make 

reasonable accommodations (§ 12940, subd. (m)), and failure to 

engage in the interactive process (§ 12940, subd. (n)). On 

January 23, 2018 NBA Automotive, using the name “Hooman 

Chevrolet of Culver City,” filed an answer to Guzman’s first 

amended complaint.

C. Guzman Learns the Legal Name of Her Employer and

Amends Her Complaint in This Action and Her 

Administrative Complaint

Guzman stated (and NBA Automotive did not dispute) that 

in October 2018 she learned the legal name of NBA Automotive 

and asked the court to amend the complaint in this action to 

substitute the “true name” of the defendant, “NBA Automotive, 

Inc. dba Hooman Chevrolet of Culver City,” in place of the 

“incorrect name” of “Hooman Enterprises, Inc. dba Hooman 

Chevrolet.” On January 3, 2019 the trial court signed the order 

amending the complaint. On April 25, 2019 Guzman filed an 

amended administrative complaint with DFEH naming 

“NBA Automotive, Inc.” as the respondent and stating in the 

body of the complaint that her employer was “NBA Automotive, 

Inc., DBA Hooman Chevrolet.” DFEH accepted the amended 

complaint and deemed it “to have the same filing date of the 

original complaint.” 
5

D. A Jury Returns a Split Verdict in Favor of Guzman, 

and NBA Automotive Files Motions for Judgment 

Notwithstanding the Verdict and for a New Trial 

After a four-day trial, the jury found in favor of Guzman on 

her causes of action for wrongful termination and retaliation, 

awarded her $245,892 in damages, and found in favor of NBA

Automotive on her causes of action for disability discrimination, 

failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in 

the interactive process, and age discrimination.4 NBA

Automotive moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on 

the grounds that “there was an error in law and insufficiency of 

the evidence to justify the verdict” because the “evidence set forth 

during trial did not establish that all of the necessary elements of 

the causes of action were present.” Specifically, NBA Automotive 

argued Guzman did not comply with section 12960, 

subdivisions (b) and (d), because she did not file her

administrative complaint “within one year of the last allegedly 

illegal act identifying her employer.” NBA Automotive moved for

a new trial on the same grounds, arguing Guzman’s “failure [to] 

file a DFEH Complaint against NBA [Automotive] should have 

resulted in [Guzman] not prevailing on the causes of action for 

wrongful termination and retaliation because [she] failed to 

exhaust her administrative remedies under . . . § 12960(b) 

[and] (d).” 

4 On August 12, 2019, the first day of trial, NBA Automotive 

filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Guzman 

failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under FEHA. On 

August 15, 2019 the trial court denied the motion. 
6

The trial court denied both motions. The court ruled

Guzman exhausted her administrative remedies because DFEH

“confirmed that the amendment to the DFEH complaint naming 

the proper defendant applied retroactively to the initial 

September 8, 2017 filing date.” The court also ruled NBA

Automotive “was described as a perpetrator of discriminatory 

acts, [it] would have been put on notice of the charges, and [it] 

would have had an opportunity to participate, had DFEH

investigated.” NBA Automotive timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

NBA Automotive contends the trial court “erred in law” in 

denying its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 

and for a new trial because Guzman failed to exhaust her 

administrative remedies, as required by section 12960, 

subdivisions (b) and (d).

5 NBA Automotive argues Guzman did 

not exhaust her administrative remedies because her 

administrative complaint “identified Hooman Enterprises, Inc.,” 

5 In the “Statement of the Case” section of its brief, NBA 

Automotive asserts the trial court erred in denying a motion for 

judgment on the pleadings based on the same exhaustion 

argument. NBA Automotive, however, does not in its brief 

provide any argument relating to that motion. Therefore, we do 

not address it. (See Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco

(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 377, fn. 3 [“‘we do not consider . . . the 

loose and disparate arguments that are not clearly set out in a 

heading and supported by reasoned legal argument’”]; Cal. Rules 

of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [a brief must “[s]tate each point 

under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, 

and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation 

of authority].) 
7

rather than “NBA Automotive, Inc. dba Hooman Chevrolet of 

Culver City,” as her employer. Because NBA Automotive’s 

expansive view of the exhaustion requirement under FEHA is 

incorrect, the trial court did not err in denying the motions for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.

A. Standards of Review

“‘A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may 

be granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the 

light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there 

is no substantial evidence in support. [Citation.] [¶] . . . As in 

the trial court, the standard of review [on appeal] is whether any 

substantial evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—supports 

the jury’s conclusion.’” (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 

51 Cal.4th 764, 770; see Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 

63 Cal.4th 167, 192; Morgan v. J-M Mfg. Co., Inc., (2021) 

60 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1085.) But where the “sole question before 

us . . . is one of law” and the “jury . . . was not asked to resolve 

any factual questions bearing on the question,” we “address the 

issue under a de novo standard of review.” (Sweatman v. 

Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68; see

Brown v. City of Sacramento (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 587, 598 [“to

the extent a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 

raises legal issues such as the application of law to undisputed 

facts . . . , we review the trial court’s ruling on the motion de 

novo”]; Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 

162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1138 [same].)

We generally review orders granting or denying a motion 

for a new trial for abuse of discretion. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic 

Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 859; Denton v. City and

County of San Francisco (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 779, 794.) But 
8

“any determination underlying any order is scrutinized under the 

test appropriate to such determination.” (Aguilar, at p. 859; 

accord, Tun v. Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc. (2016) 

5 Cal.App.5th 309, 323.) Here, because whether Guzman 

exhausted her administrative remedies is a question of law (see 

Foster v. Sexton (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1023), we review the 

trial court’s ruling de novo. (See Aguilar, at p. 860 [superior 

court’s order granting a new trial “was predicated, specifically, on 

its determination that . . . it made an error in law,” which “is 

itself scrutinized de novo”]; Estill v. County of Shasta (2018) 

25 Cal.App.5th 702, 708 [“[b]ecause the trial court granted [the 

plaintiff] a new trial based on a question of law, we review the 

order de novo”].) 

B. The Exhaustion Requirement Under FEHA

“In enacting the FEHA, California’s Legislature sought to 

safeguard the rights of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold 

employment without discrimination on account of various 

characteristics, including race, national origin, physical 

disability, and medical condition.” (Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co. 

(2014) 59 Cal.4th 407, 420; see § 12920; Pollock v. Tri-Modal

Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 918, 934 (Pollock); 

Saavedra v. Orange County Consolidated Transportation etc. 

Agency (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 824, 828 (Saavedra).) “Section 

12960 delineates the procedures by which aggrieved employees 

are to state their complaints.” (Saavedra, at p. 826.) Section 

12960, former subdivision (b),6 stated: “Any person claiming to 

6 “Effective January 1, 2020, former section 12960, 

subdivision (b) was redesignated without material change as 
9

be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful practice may file with 

[DFEH] a verified complaint, in writing, that shall state the 

name and address of the person, employer, labor organization, or 

employment agency alleged to have committed the unlawful 

practice complained of, and that shall set forth the particulars 

thereof and contain other information as may be required by the 

department.” (See Clark v. Superior Court (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th

289, 299 (Clark).) “[S]ection 12960, former subdivision (d)

requires litigants seeking relief under the FEHA to file an

administrative complaint with the DFEH within one year ‘from 

the date upon which the alleged unlawful practice . . . occurred.’” 

(Pollock, at p. 929; see Alexander v. Community Hospital of Long 

Beach (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 238, 250 (Alexander).)7

“Once the DFEH receives an aggrieved person’s complaint, 

it must investigate the alleged unlawful practice and determine 

whether it can resolve the matter ‘by conference, conciliation, and 

persuasion.’ [Citation.] If such measures fail, the department 

may issue an accusation to be heard by the Fair Employment and 

Housing Commission. [Citations.] If that council finds a 

violation, it may issue a cease and desist order and grant other 

appropriate relief. [Citation.] If the department issues no 

accusation, it must give the aggrieved person notice and a rightto-sue letter. [Citation.] The aggrieved person may, within one 

section 12960, subdivision (c).” (Clark v. Superior Court (2021) 

62 Cal.App.5th 289, 299, fn. 11.)

7 Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature amended section 

12960 to “enlarge[ ] the time for filing a [DFEH] claim to three 

years from the date of the challenged conduct.” (Brome v. 

California Highway Patrol (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 786, 793, fn. 2; 

see § 12960, subd. (e).) 
10

year after receiving notice, bring a civil action against the 

‘person, employer, labor organization, or employment agency’

named in the charge.” (Alexander, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 250.)

“An employee who wishes to file suit under the FEHA 

‘must exhaust the administrative remedy provided by the statute 

by filing a complaint with the’ DFEH, ‘and must obtain from the 

[DFEH] a notice of right to sue.’ [Citation.] ‘The timely filing of 

an administrative complaint’ before the DFEH ‘is a prerequisite 

to the bringing of a civil action for damages.’” (Pollock, supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 931; accord, Clark, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 301.) “The administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied 

if FEHA claims in a judicial complaint are ‘“like and reasonably 

related to”’ those in the DFEH complaint [citation] or ‘likely to be 

uncovered in the course of a DFEH investigation.’” (Clark, at 

p. 301.)

C. Guzman Exhausted Her Administrative Remedies

Guzman complied with the requirements of section 12960, 

former subdivision (b). She filed an administrative complaint 

stating “the name and address of the . . . employer” (§ 12960, 

former subd. (b)) who she alleged committed the unlawful 

employment practices described in the complaint. The

administrative complaint unmistakably identified NBA

Automotive as the respondent. Although Guzman did not state

NBA Automotive’s full correct legal name, she stated that the 

fictitious business name of her employer was “Hooman 

Chevrolet,” a name virtually identical to “Hooman Chevrolet of 

Culver City,” NBA Automotive’s actual fictitious business name. 

In addition, Guzman’s administrative complaint listed the
11

address of Hooman Chevrolet in Culver City and named the 

owner (Hooman Nissani). (See Clark, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 305-306 [plaintiff sufficiently identified her employer where 

the caption of the administrative complaint had names that were 

“very similar” to the employer’s “actual fictitious business name,” 

and “any administrative investigation into [her] DFEH 

Complaint would have certainly identified [the employer] as an 

intended respondent”]; Saavedra, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 827 

[plaintiff could maintain a cause of action against her supervisor, 

even though she had not named him in her administrative 

complaint (and named only the agency that employed her), 

because he “was the only person with whom [the plaintiff] dealt”

and “[h]is actions were those of [the employer]”]; see also Myers v. 

Checksmart Financial, LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 701 Fed.Appx. 588, 

590 [plaintiff sufficiently identified her employer by stating the 

fictitious business name and address of the store where she 

worked]; Thompson v. George DeLallo Co., Inc. (E.D.Cal. Jan. 16, 

2013, No. Civ. S-12-1058 LKK/CMK) 2013 WL 211204, p. 9

[plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies under FEHA 

where, even though the administrative complaint did not name 

the proper defendant, “the charge properly identifie[d] the 

fictitious business name of his employer and was mailed to the 

facility at which he was employed”]; see generally Hawkins v. 

Pacific Coast Bldg. Products, Inc. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1497, 

1504 [plaintiff was entitled to amend his complaint to state the 

true name of his employer because “courts have long allowed a 

plaintiff to correct the name of a defendant who conducts 

business under a fictitious name after the statute of limitations 

has run”].) 
12

Guzman also provided a detailed description of her 

employer, the names of the individuals who engaged in the 

allegedly discriminatory practices, and a narrative of multiple 

instances of wrongful conduct spanning 15 years. She also

named the supervisors and managers employed by NBA 

Automotive who took the adverse employment actions against 

her. Any reasonable investigation would have revealed that NBA 

Automotive was Guzman’s employer. (See Martin v. Fisher

(1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 118, 122 [“[t]he function of an 

administrative complaint is to provide the basis for an 

investigation into an employees’ claim of discrimination against 

an employer, and not to limit access to the courts”]; Valdez v. City 

of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1060 [same].)8 To 

allow NBA Automotive to escape liability for discriminatory 

conduct merely because Guzman identified her employer 

administratively with a name that was nearly the same as, but 

not quite identical to, her employer’s actual fictitious business 

name would be contrary to the purposes of FEHA. (See § 12993, 

subd. (a) [“[t]he provisions [of FEHA] shall be construed liberally 

for the accomplishment of the purposes of” FEHA]; Pollock, 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 934-935 [“‘section 12960 should not be 

8 The regulations governing DFEH require it to “liberally 

construe all complaints to effectuate the purpose of the laws the 

department enforces to safeguard the civil right of all persons to 

seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination.” (Cal. 

Code Regs., tit. 2, § 10003; see Clark, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 306; see also Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 

178 Cal.App.4th 243, 268 [“what is submitted to the DFEH must 

not only be construed liberally in favor of plaintiff, it must be 

construed in light of what might be uncovered by a reasonable 

investigation”].)
13

interpreted to impose serious practical difficulties on an 

employee’s ability to vindicate’ the right to hold employment 

without experiencing discrimination or harassment”]; Romano v.

Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 493-494 [“the 

limitations period set out in the FEHA should be interpreted so 

as to promote the resolution of potentially meritorious claims on 

the merits”].)

The information in Guzman’s administrative complaint 

also gave NBA Automotive sufficient notice that she was naming 

it in her administrative complaint and would name it in her 

subsequent civil action, both of which, as well as the right-to-sue 

letter, NBA Automotive does not dispute it received. NBA

Automotive had all the information it needed to participate in 

any administrative efforts to resolve the matter informally (had 

Guzman not requested a right-to-sue letter) and to engage in

settlement discussions once Guzman filed this action. (See Wills 

v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 156 [“The purpose 

of FEHA’s administrative exhaustion requirement is to ensure 

DFEH is provided the opportunity to resolve disputes and 

eliminate unlawful employment practices through conciliation.”]; 

Saavedra, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 827 [although the plaintiff

did not name her supervisor in the administrative complaint, he 

“was put on notice and had an opportunity to pursue a ‘voluntary 

settlement had he so desired’”].) 

Nor does NBA Automotive contend Guzman’s failure to 

state its correct legal name in her original administrative 

complaint prejudiced its defense in any way. NBA Automotive

filed an answer to Guzman’s complaint in this action under its 

fictitious business name, conducted discovery, and defended 

against Guzman’s causes of action at trial (even prevailing on 
14

some). Indeed, NBA Automotive refrained from using its true 

legal name until after Guzman learned it nine months later in 

discovery (apparently after filing a successful motion to compel 

on the issue). Such gamesmanship suggests that NBA 

Automotive knew Guzman intended to identify it in her 

administrative complaint and that NBA Automotive tried to 

deprive Guzman of her right to pursue her claims against the 

company for its unlawful employment conduct. (See Clark, 

supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 293 [“FEHA’s exhaustion 

requirement should not be interpreted as a ‘“procedural 

gotcha”’”].) And even if, as NBA Automotive suggests, it is

“wholly unrelated” to Hooman Enterprises, Inc., NBA Automotive 

was very much related to Hooman Chevrolet, the name that

appears in Guzman’s administrative complaint. Which the 

evidence at trial confirmed: NBA Automotive’s service manager 

testified the name “Hooman Chevrolet” was on the building 

where he and Guzman worked, and NBA Automotive’s general 

manager testified he was the general manager at “Hooman 

Chevrolet.”

9

Cole v. Antelope Valley Union High School Dist. (1996) 

47 Cal.App.5th 1505, on which NBA Automotive relies, is 

distinguishable. In that case the court held the plaintiff did not 

exhaust his administrative remedies before filing an action

against two of his supervisors because those supervisors “were 

not mentioned in the administrative charge at all.” (Id. at 

p. 1511.) The plaintiff named in the caption and body of the 

9 The general manger also testified his employer was 

“Nissani Brothers Automotive,” indicating he viewed the two 

entities as related, if not the same. 
15

complaint only the school district that employed him and a 

different supervisor. (Id. at p. 1509.) Unlike the plaintiff in Cole, 

who sought to sue individuals who were not identified in the 

administrative complaint, Guzman made clear she intended to 

sue her employer, whom she knew by the name Hooman 

Chevrolet; she did not seek to sue supervisors in their individual 

capacities or any entity other than her true employer. (Cf. 

Alexander, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 243, 251 [plaintiffs’ 

failure to mention anywhere in their administrative complaint a 

corporation that was separate from the named respondents 

precluded “their bringing a civil FEHA action against it”]; Valdez

v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1060-1061 

[plaintiff’s failure to name in his administrative complaint

certain supervisors and managers precluded him from bringing a 

civil action against them individually].)10

10 Because Guzman exhausted her administrative remedies 

by filing her original administrative complaint, we do not decide 

whether, as NBA Automotive contends, the trial court erred in 

ruling DFEH properly allowed Guzman to amend her 

administrative complaint. (See Clark, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 310, fn. 25 [because the plaintiff exhausted her administrative 

remedies when she filed her original complaint, “her failure to 

amend her DFEH Complaint to state [her employer’s] proper 

legal name prior to the trial court’s granting of summary 

adjudication is immaterial”].) In addition, the trial court did not 

err in denying NBA Automotive’s motion for a new trial for the 

same reasons it did not err in denying NBA Automotive’s motion 

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
16

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Guzman is to recover her costs 

on appeal.

SEGAL, J. 

We concur: 

PERLUSS, P. J.

FEUER, J.