Brig Gen Kenneth Newton Walker

Kenneth Walker enlisted at Denver, Colorado, 

on 15 December 1917. He took flying training 

at Mather Field, California, getting his commission and wings in November 1918.

After a tour in the Philippines, he returned 

to Langley Field, Virginia, in February 1925 

with a subsequent assignment in December 

1928 to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. 

Retained on the faculty as a bombardment instructor, Walker became the epitome of the 

strategic thinkers at the school and coined the 

revolutionary airpower “creed of the bomber”: 

“A well-planned, well-organized and well-flown 

air force attack will constitute an offensive that 

cannot be stopped.”

Following attendance at the Command and General Staff School at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1933 and promotion to major, he served for three 

years at Hamilton Field, California, and another three years at Luke Field, 

Ford Island, and Wheeler Field, Hawaii. Walker returned to the United States 

in January 1941 as assistant chief of the Plans Division for the chief of the 

Air Corps in Washington, DC.

He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1941 and colonel in March 

1942. During this time, when he worked in the Operations Division of the 

War Department General Staff, he coauthored the air-campaign strategy 

known as Air War Plans Division—Plan 1, the plan for organizing, equipping, 

deploying, and employing the Army Air Forces to defeat Germany and Japan 

should the United States become embroiled in war. The authors completed 

this monumental undertaking in less than one month, just before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor—and the United States was, in fact, at war.

In June 1942, he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned by Gen 

George Kenney as commander of Fifth Air Force’s Bomber Command. In this 

capacity, he repeatedly accompanied his B-24 and B-17 units on bombing 

missions deep into enemy-held territory. Learning firsthand about combat 

conditions, he developed a highly efficient technique for bombing when aircraft faced opposition by enemy fighter planes and antiaircraft fire.

General Walker was killed in action on 5 January 1943 while leading a 

bombing mission over Rabaul, New Britain—the hottest target in the theater. 

He was awarded the Medal of Honor. Its citation, in part, reads, “In the face 

of extremely heavy anti aircraft fire and determined opposition by enemy 

fighters, General Walker led an effective daylight bombing attack against 

shipping in the harbor at Rabaul, which resulted in direct hits on nine enemy 

vessels. During this action, his airplane was disabled and forced down by the 

attack of an overwhelming number of enemy fighters. He displayed conspicuous leadership above and beyond the call of duty involving personal valor and 

intrepidity at an extreme hazard to life.” Walker is credited with being one of 

the men who built an organization that became the US Air Force.
A US Strategy for Iran Douglass and Hays

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

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After you have read this research report, please give us your 

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Mail them to AFOPEC/FO, 325 Chennault Circle,

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AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE OFFICER professional

EDUCATION CENTER

 AIR FORCE Fellows

A US Strategy for Iran

Charles A. Douglass

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Michael D. Hays

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Walker Paper No. 11

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5962

April 2008
ii

Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data

Douglass, Charles A.

A US strategy for Iran / Charles A. Douglass. Michael D. Hays.

 p. : cm. – (Walker paper, 1555-7871 ; no. 11)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-1-58566-200-5

1. United States—Foreign relations—Iran. 2. Iran—Foreign relations—United 

States. 3. Iran—Foreign relations—History. 4. Iran—Strategic aspects. I. Title. 

II. Hays, Michael D., 1965- III. Series.

327.73055—dc22

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, 

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: 

distribution unlimited.

This Walker Paper and others in the series are available 

electronically at the Air University Research Web site 

http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web 

site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
iii

Since 1958 the Air Force has assigned a small number of 

carefully chosen, experienced officers to serve one-year tours 

at distinguished civilian institutions studying national security 

policy and strategy. Beginning with the 1994 academic year, 

these programs were accorded in-residence credit as part of 

professional military education at senior service schools. In 

2003 these fellowships assumed senior developmental education (SDE) force-development credit for eligible officers.

The SDE-level Air Force Fellows serve as visiting military ambassadors to their centers, devoting effort to expanding their 

colleagues’ understanding of defense matters. As such, candidates for SDE-level fellowships have a broad knowledge of key 

Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force issues. SDE-level 

fellows perform outreach by their presence and voice in sponsoring institutions. They are expected to provide advice as well 

as promote and explain Air Force and DOD policies, programs, 

and military-doctrine strategy to nationally recognized scholars, 

foreign dignitaries, and leading policy analysts. The Air Force 

Fellows also gain valuable perspectives from the exchange of 

ideas with these civilian leaders. SDE-level fellows are expected 

to apprise appropriate Air Force agencies of significant developments and emerging views on defense as well as economic and 

foreign policy issues within their centers. Each fellow is expected to use the unique access she or he has as grounds for 

research and writing on important national security issues. 

The SDE Air Force Fellows include the National Defense Fellows, 

the RAND Fellows, the National Security Fellows, and the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows. In addition, the Air Force 

Fellows program supports a post-SDE military fellow at the 

Council on Foreign Relations.

On the level of intermediate developmental education, the 

chief of staff approved several Air Force Fellowships focused on 

career broadening for Air Force majors. The Air Force LegislaAir Force Fellows
iv

tive Fellows program was established in April 1995, with the 

Foreign Policy Fellowship and Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency Fellowship coming under the Air Force Fellows 

program in 2003. In 2004 the Air Force Fellows also assumed 

responsibility for the National Laboratories Technologies Fellows.

AIR FORCE FELLOWS
v

Contents

Chapter	 Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

1 SOLVING IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2 IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS:

HISTORIC ROOTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Ancient Persian Greatness and

 Cultural Pride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Resentment of Foreign Interference . . . . . . . . 7

Persian-Shiite Strategic Loneliness . . . . . . . . 10

Pragmatic National Interest Replaces

 Revolutionary Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3 ANALYSIS OF IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Demographics, Politics, and Economics . . . . . 24

Internal Dynamics, Personalities, Power

 Centers, and Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Nuclear Desire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

4 US PERCEPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

US Perceptions of Iran Internally . . . . . . . . . . 49

US Perceptions of Iran Externally . . . . . . . . . 51

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

5 REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Dual Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Post­–9/11 Openings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Public Diplomacy and Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . 60

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
vi

Chapter	 Page

6 STRATEGY GROUNDWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Key Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

US Goal Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Centers of Gravity Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Planning Mechanics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

7 A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Short-Term Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Long-Term Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

8 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Illustrations

Figure	

1 Persia’s Achaemenid Empire as of 500 BC . . . . 6

2 Iran’s formal power centers and

constitutional structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

3 Current members of the Gulf 

Cooperation Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

4 Southern tier of the former Soviet Republics . . . 63

5 World oil reserves as of 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

CONTENTS
vii

Foreword

 Arguably a top tier concern for American foreign policy for 

more than a few years, Iran gets the meticulous attention of two 

distinguished Air Force scholars. Lt Cols Charles A. Douglass 

and Michael D. Hays are critical of the current American policy 

toward Iran and tell us why. More importantly, they point to 

elements necessary for an effective Iranian strategy. Their aim: 

“to change the fundamental calculus of the Iranian problem” to 

one beneficial for both Americans and Iranians. 

Their calculation is based on the need to solve long-standing 

problems and recognition that a solution involves more than 

just a prescriptive mixing of incentives, coercion, and the threat 

of military attack. A long view must recognize the historical pride 

of the Persian people, their resentment of foreign meddling (especially by the United States), and the vigor of their Shiite religion, but also the endemic pragmatism of their nationalism. In 

two insightful chapters, the authors review Persian heritage and 

analyze current Iranian demographics, politics, and economy. 

Colonels Douglass and Hays examine current US policies 

and the changing range of recent policies, from containment, 

to direct dialogue following 9/11, to the current practice of a 

very public diplomacy with the threat of punitive sanctions. 

They point out that the United States has not been successful 

in stopping Iran’s nuclear program, its export of terrorism, nor 

the general Iranian practice of destabilizing the Middle East. 

They discuss the mechanics of strategic formulation that takes 

into account American concerns and the important “centers of 

gravity” pertinent to Iran.

Douglass and Hays conclude their study by introducing innovative short-term and long-term strategic frameworks based 

on the assumption that pressure is building for all parties to 

“do something.” Interestingly, they place employment of American military power low on the list of short-term options. Persuasion through increased diplomatic and cultural engagement 

along with economic incentives, they conclude, should move 

relations in a positive manner. The long-term military goal is 

development of an alliance between the United States and Iran, 

perhaps problematic at the current time, but workable in the 

long term. 
Colonels Douglass and Hays have provided a solid, timely, 

and attractive investigation with attendant methodology, one 

designed to help diplomatic and military analysts address the 

worrisome problems posed by Iran. 

DANIEL R. MORTENSEN, PhD

Chief of Research

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

viii

FOREWORD
ix

Lt Col Charles A. Douglass is director of force protection for the 

US Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF). He was awarded the 

bachelor’s degree in public administration from Samford University, 

Birmingham, Alabama, and received his commission through the 

Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1987. Following tours 

as a security police shift commander at Whiteman AFB, Missouri, 

and Hahn AB, Germany, he was assigned as operations officer and 

later executive officer of the 78th Air Base Wing, Robins AFB, Georgia. He served as a flight commander at Squadron Officer School, 

Maxwell AFB, Alabama, before assignment as commander, 82nd 

Security Forces Squadron, Sheppard AFB, Texas.

As deputy division chief, Requirements Management Division on the Air Staff, Colonel Douglass oversaw the approval 

of urgent requirements in the post–9/11 environment. He then 

completed tours as political military planner and executive officer for the Western Hemisphere deputy directorate (J-5) on 

the Joint Staff, Washington, DC. He served as commander of 

the 407th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron, Ali Base, 

Iraq, and the 509th Security Forces Squadron, Whiteman AFB, 

prior to selection as National Defense Fellow, Ridgway Center, 

University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Colonel Douglass is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff 

College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and holds a master’s degree 

in public administration from Troy University. He is married 

to the former Annette Grote of Bowling Green, Missouri. His 

personal awards include the Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with four oak 

leaf clusters, and Air Force Commendation Medal with one oak 

leaf cluster.

About the 

Authors

Lt Col Charles A. Douglass
Lt Col Michael D. Hays is chief of the 

Strategy Division, 607th Air Operations 

Center, Osan AB, Korea. Born in Cleveland, Ohio, he graduated from Penn 

State University in 1988 with a bachelor 

of science degree in aerospace engineering and earned his commission through 

Officer Training School (OTS) that same 

year. He became a distinguished graduate of Specialized Undergraduate Navigator Training, Mather AFB, California, 

in September 1989, and was assigned as an EC-130H Compass 

Call navigator in the 43rd Electronic Combat Squadron, Sembach 

AB, Germany, deploying to Incirlik AB, Turkey, in support of Operation Desert Storm. He also served in the 37th Airlift Squadron, 

Rhein Main AB, Germany, as a C-130H air-drop navigator. 

In December 1993, Colonel Hays became a distinguished 

graduate of Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training at Vance 

AFB, Oklahoma. Following additional flight training at Columbus AFB, Mississippi, and Luke AFB, Arizona, he was assigned 

to the 34th Fighter Squadron, Hill AFB, Utah, as an F-16C pilot, 

deploying to Dhahran AB, Saudi Arabia, in support of Operation 

Southern Watch. 

In July 1997, he reported to the 63rd Fighter Squadron, Luke 

AFB, Arizona, as instructor and evaluator pilot. Colonel Hays 

served two years on the Headquarters US Air Forces Europe 

(USAFE) staff, Ramstein AB, Germany, as chief of strategy in the 

Plans and Programs (XP) Directorate, deploying to Prince Sultan 

AB, Saudi Arabia, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He returned to flying duty in July 2004 as chief of safety, 8th Fighter 

Wing, Kunsan AB, Korea, until June of 2005, when he assumed 

command of the 35th Fighter Squadron at Kunsan.

Following his command tour, Colonel Hays attended Harvard 

University as a National Defense Fellow in the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. He was awarded master’s degrees 

as a distinguished graduate of Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) and a graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower 

Studies (SAAS), both at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Colonel Hays’ personal decorations include the Bronze Star, 

Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, Air Medal, 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

x

Lt Col Michael D. Hays
xi

Aerial Achievement Medal with one oak leaf cluster, and Air 

Force Commendation Medal. He is a senior pilot with more than 

2,500 hours in the T-43, C-130H (navigator), T-37, T-38, and 

F-16 aircraft and over 100 hours of combat and combat support 

time. He is married to the former Susanne Theis of Gruenstadt, 

Germany. They are the proud parents of Clayton, age 12.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

xiii

Abstract

This study uses the lens of history to elucidate barriers that 

have confounded a successful US strategy for Iran. This strategy 

blends pressure and engagement to overcome these barriers.

Iran’s perceptions and patterns have historical roots in a sense 

of Persian greatness, resentment of foreign influence, strategic 

Persian-Shiite loneliness, and the emergence of pragmatic national interest replacing revolutionary ideology. Analysis further 

demonstrates how Iran’s unique characteristics, such as the 

populace and nature of the government, portend strategic vulnerabilities which can be used by US strategic planners.

Recent US policies for Iran are evaluated to understand US 

perceptions and how these have contributed to an inability to 

deter Iran from developing nuclear weapons, proliferating terrorism, and destabilizing the region. A proposed strategy framework expounds upon key assumptions and identification of 

Iranian centers of gravity. A novel planning construct is created to develop the short- and long-term strategy for US relations with Iran. 

This study outlines a strategy based on potential vulnerabilities of Iran created by its history and the nature of the country 

itself. The short-term recommended strategy consists of a prioritized list of six components for creating pressure on Iran. 

The result of this pressure portends changes in Iran’s behavior. 

Public diplomacy and a strategic communications effort are 

cross-cutting elements that tie together the components of the 

short-term strategy. Despite the proposed use of pressure, 

there are engagement aspects that allow exploitation of positive 

opportunities created by changes in Iran’s behavior. The longterm strategy is comprised of a blend of changed assumptions 

and tailored goals implemented at a rate tied to improvements 

in US and Iranian relations. The strategy proposal outlined in 

this study should be implemented immediately to take advantage of current opportunities.

xv

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Dr. Kenneth Pollack of the 

Brookings Institution and Dr. Judith Yaphe of the National Defense University’s Institute for Strategic Studies for their interviews on this subject, which provided a great starting point for 

our research. Also, thanks are in order to the “anonymous” people 

in the Pentagon whose interviews proved very helpful in understanding the issues relating to Iran and the greater Middle East. 

We are grateful as well to Dr. Donald “Goldy” Goldstein at the 

University of Pittsburgh for his guidance and inspiration, Dr. 

Jan Nolan of Pitt and Georgetown University for her support and 

insight, and chief editor Jerry Gantt for coordinating the publishing process “long-distance” while we were scattered to the far 

corners of the globe. We especially thank our wives for their 

patience throughout this project.



Chapter 1

Solving Iran

Crafting an effective response to the Iranian threat is 

as important as any challenge America faces in the 

world today. It is critical that we succeed.

—R. Nicholas Burns

Clearly the world changed on 11 September 2001 (9/11), as 

did the US perception of the world. One thing, however, did not 

change—the challenge the United States has faced historically 

and faces today in its relations with Iran. What does 9/11 have 

to do with Iran? The answer: everything. To be clear, Iran had 

no direct connection with 9/11, but for the United States and 

the West to succeed in the war on terror, we must “solve” Iran. 

Since 1979, and now perhaps more so than ever, US relations with and concerns about Iran dominate the American 

media and policy-making discussions. Myriad pundits and 

articles propose that America must “do something” about Iran. 

Almost every thoughtful piece on Iran describes this as a “tough 

problem,” and some even call it “unsolvable.” This study’s 

underlying premise is that Iran is “solvable.”

Solving Iran will require some innovative thinking and flexibility on some very significant and emotional national-level 

points. Yet, solving Iran is a problem whose time has come. The 

pressure created by the current crisis can be used by the United 

States, if it is done carefully. It is analogous to steam. Steam 

results from pressure. If one can channel it correctly, it can 

produce positive results. So it is with the current crisis for Iran. 

Of course, just like steam, if the situation is handled incorrectly, the United States can get seriously burned.

This is not a study of military strategy, nor is it focused solely 

on either the nuclear problem or terrorism. If the reader is looking for military discussion on how to attack Iran, read no further. This is a strategic study in every sense of the word and 

focuses on the broader considerations tied to security planning 

for Iran. The aim is to change the fundamental calculus of the 
Iranian problem and to find a way forward that is the most 

beneficial for both the United States and Iran.

In creating this study, the authors found several trends in 

the policy world regarding how to solve Iran. At their core, the 

strategies are: unconditional engagement (incentives); unconditional pressure (coercion); or, assuming the United States 

has already failed at its goals, a Cold War–type containment 

plan. The one option with the least support is a military attack 

on Iran. The authors did not want to simply add to the volume 

of existing strategies, and as the reader will see, this study 

recommends a hybrid of sorts that will work. 

This study prescribes grand expenditures of US intellectual, 

economic, and political capital to resolve enduring policy standoffs between Iran and the West. Why is solving these issues so 

important? As Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns points 

out above, it is critical that the United States succeed where it 

has not in the past. However, the need is not just to deal with 

the “current” crisis with Iran, but rather to solve some longstanding problems which, if satisfactorily addressed, will transform Iranian relations from adversarial to amicable. Therefore, 

this study proposes a hybrid strategy based on research into 

the historic trends and perceptions that have soured relations 

between Iran and the United States in the past and proposes 

specific actions as a beginning for further development.

The good news is that the population of Iran, by and large, 

wants to embrace the United States. There are pragmatic actors 

in Iran; despite their rhetoric, even the most hardened revolutionaries have shown strong pragmatism in their actions. More 

good news: many US policy experts share a common perspective that a successful policy can be crafted, albeit with a little 

patience. 

Make no mistake; this is a dangerous time for the United 

States, Iran, and the world. Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and the 

entire Middle East could evolve into a “nightmare scenario” if 

continued regional strife should depress economic markets for 

a generation and spur a conflict that could spill to every corner 

of the globe.1

This study begins by looking at what makes the Iranians feel 

and act as they do. It then explores the US perspective and how 

well Washington has met its regional goals in recent years. The 

SOLVING IRAN
SOLVING IRAN



historic backdrop identifies key barriers and opportunities to 

create a successful US strategy for Iran.

Note

1. Neil King Jr. and Greg Jaffe, “If Iraq Worsens, Allies See ‘Nightmare’ 

Case,” Wall Street Journal, 9 January 2007.



Chapter 2

Iran’s Perceptions

and Patterns—Historic Roots

I am Darius the Great King, King of Kings, King of countries containing all kinds of men, King in this great earth 

far and wide, son of Hystaspes, an Achaemenian, a Persian, son of a Persian, an Aryan, having Aryan lineage.

—Darius the Great

Iranians have a visceral connection to their national history.1 An 

understanding of how that history shapes Iran’s view of its place in 

the world must underpin any effective US policy. A full account of 

Iran’s 4,000-year history plainly exceeds the scope of this study; 

however, by drawing on existing literature and commentary, policyrelevant answers can be posited for two very important questions. 

First, what are the dominant historic and cultural sources of Iran’s 

geopolitical perceptions and orientation? Second, what patterns 

are evident in Iran’s postrevolutionary strategic behavior?

To answer the first, an evaluation of formative historic events 

and crises will reveal the origins of Iran’s unique perception of 

its place in the world. This perception is best understood through 

the framework of three central themes: a sense of greatness and 

cultural pride, resentment of foreign interference, and PersianShiite strategic loneliness.2 To answer the second question, evidence supports the argument that pragmatic national interest 

has replaced revolutionary ideology as the driving force behind 

Iran’s post-Khomeini strategic behavior.

Ancient Persian Greatness and Cultural Pride 

A consciousness of ancient Persian greatness and refinement 

imbue Iranians with a deep sense of cultural pride and a corresponding belief that Iran should naturally be the region’s dominant 

actor.3 This conception of itself as geopolitical epicenter derives in 

part from the fact that at its peak, 2,500 years ago, Persia’s Achaemenid Empire (fig. 1) ruled with an advanced administrative infrastructure all the way from Greece and Libya to India.4
IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­While Iran today appears to harbor no irredentist claims, a 

certain awareness of past glory and sophistication shapes its 

worldview and diplomatic posture. Significantly, even at its 

present size, Iran’s landmass exceeds that of Iraq, Kuwait, 

Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Syria, and Jordan combined.5 Coupled with its strategic position and resources, this confers natural geopolitical clout and contributes to Iran’s lofty self-esteem. 

Quoting current supreme leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, “no policy can be implemented in the region without taking 

account of Iran’s views.”6

Also distinguishing Iran from many of its Middle Eastern 

neighbors, whose more arbitrary borders and status as nationstates originate in the twentieth century, is its sense of enduring national identity.7 Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi frequently 

drew on Iranian greatness and continuity themes, referring to 

“the glorious pages of her history for the last twenty-five centuries.”8 This characteristic Persian pride does not always sit well 

with other regional ethnic groups. Many early Iranian texts 

portray Turks, for example, as unrefined and Arabs as uncivilized “eaters of lizards.”9 A tenth-century Persian epic poem 

describes Persia’s seventh-century Muslim conquerors as “barbarian, savage, coarse Bedouin Arabs.”10 In perhaps a more 

modern version of the Iranian self-perception, one of Iran’s 

Figure 1. Persia’s Achaemenid Empire as of 500 BC

Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.
IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­leading political scientists called it “a pride that we allocate to 

ourselves in terms of what the proper status of Iran is and 

ought to be . . . a sense of preeminence.”11

This national belief manifested its durability despite centuries 

of foreign occupations—Greek, Arab, Mongol, and Turk, to name 

a few. While these peoples altered and added to the Iranian cultural mosaic, Iran’s basic integrity remained intact. In fact, 

occupying forces often found that their own imported traditions 

had become “Persianized,” giving truth to the saying that “Iran is 

easier to swallow than digest.”12 In his insightful analysis of 

Iran’s political culture, Graham E. Fuller describes Iranian skill 

in “living by one’s wits” in the face of absolute power and how 

“artifice, dissembling, flattery, pandering, deceit, and treachery 

become preeminent arts of survival in the Persian court.”13 Many 

saw elements of these traits in Shah Pahlavi’s “cultivating an 

ambiguity in political life” and “refusing to crystallize issues to 

the point where definite choices are made.”14 Confounding to 

many Western negotiators, hidden agendas and an assumption 

of conspiratorial behavior also inform Iran’s political culture.

Current US policy makers would do well to take Iran’s 

national pride into account. Two other core issues underpin 

Iran’s geopolitical perceptions and orientation.

Resentment of Foreign Interference

Persian survival skills notwithstanding, the foreign subjugations mentioned above left a heavy residue of suspicion. In the 

modern era, Iran’s consciousness of past material and cultural 

greatness made the humiliation of its vulnerability and achievement deficit particularly acute.15 Though never formally colonized, 

Iran essentially became a pawn during the nineteenth century 

“Great Game” between Britain and Russia.16 In the twentieth century, oil exploitation by foreign powers became an emotionally 

charged issue. A few salient examples from this modern period 

reveal how Iran’s resentment of foreign interference came to be 

such a dominant theme in its geopolitical perceptions. 

Viewing Russia as the Great Game’s bigger threat in 1891, 

Iran’s weak, cash-starved Qajar Dynasty sold Iran’s entire 

tobacco industry to Britain. This lopsided deal required all Iranian tobacco farmers to sell their crop to the British Imperial 
IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­Tobacco Company, which would also control all sales and 

exports.17 The deal sparked a popular backlash known as the 

“Tobacco Revolt,” with Iran’s leading cleric issuing a religious 

decree that forbade all tobacco smoking until the foreign monopoly was abolished.18 Iran’s large population of smokers, already 

harboring anti-imperialist sentiments, obeyed en masse. The 

resulting economic and political pressure quickly forced the corrupt Nasir al-Din Shah to cancel the deal, though Iran still paid 

Britain a large punitive indemnity. A similar but more momentous crisis involving oil would play itself out 60 years later, indirectly ushering in the turbulent era of US-Iranian relations.

That crisis had its roots in a 1901 concessions agreement, by 

which Iran’s Muzaffar al-Din Shah, in return for a 16 percent 

share of any future proceeds, granted a private British interest 

exclusive rights to prospect for oil in Iran.19 With a major find 

seven years later, the British government formed a new corporation, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), which took full 

control of oil operations in Iran. Production and profits grew 

rapidly as the firm built wells, pipelines, and the world’s largest 

refinery on the Persian Gulf island of Abadan. APOC oil fueled 

the British navy for decades, met domestic consumption needs, 

and still generated enormous global export revenues, 16 percent of which went to Iran.20

This arrangement came under increasingly hostile scrutiny 

in the 1930s and 1940s as Iranians questioned APOC’s (later 

named AIOC, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) bookkeeping, contested the legitimacy of the original contract, and resented the 

workers’ squalid living conditions at Abadan. Britain argued 

for its rights under the contract, but reluctantly agreed to make 

minor adjustments. The issue smoldered and then reignited in 

1946 when the Abadan workers went on strike. While AIOC 

dug in its heels, the oil controversy garnered international 

attention and galvanized the Iranian public under the charismatic leadership of Mohammad Mossadeq, a towering democratic figure in twentieth-century Iranian history.21

As a popularly elected leader in Iran’s parliament and later 

prime minister, Mossadeq led a campaign that shocked the 

world in 1951 by nationalizing Iran’s entire oil industry, renaming it National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).22 During the takeover, Iranian officials found AIOC documents that showed a 
IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­widespread network of British influence in Iran’s political 

affairs. Arguing his nation’s case in two speeches to the United 

Nations (UN), Mossadeq made effective rhetorical use of these 

documents.23 His popularity soared at home and abroad. Britain, refusing to concede such a strategic loss, embargoed Iranian oil exports. When threats and economic coercion failed, 

however, Britain sought to install a more cooperative Iranian 

prime minister by covert means.24

Enter the United States. The Truman administration had 

actually discouraged British military action and tried to mediate the crisis, even hosting Mossadeq in Washington in 1952. 

But in 1953, urging from Churchill and concern about Iran 

falling into the Soviet orbit led the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) under President Eisenhower to execute a covert plan to 

topple Mossadeq. With British assistance and a nod from the 

shah, CIA operatives used an extensive payoff network to 

foment Iranian political turmoil and capitalize on the growing 

public discontent created by reduced oil exports.25 The coup 

succeeded on 19 August 1953. Mossadeq landed in prison, the 

United States and Britain installed their puppet prime minister, the shah returned from exile, and the West regained control 

of Iran’s oil industry. British Anglo-Iranian conceded to a 40 

percent share of NIOC, five US companies split another 40 percent, and the remainder went to Dutch and French firms.26 The 

Western companies kept the books, but agreed to split profits 

with Iran 50–50.

Iranians harbor deep resentments over the 1953 coup. Many 

view it as a particularly cynical betrayal by the United States—

one that destroyed a democratic awakening in Iran and ushered in the shah’s repressive era.27 The role played by Iranians 

themselves in the coup seems to get less attention. In the Iranian consciousness, the event came to symbolize all of the previous century’s foreign interference, exploitation, and paternalism.28 The 1979 constitution would leave no room for debate on 

the issue of foreign meddling: “Any form of agreement resulting 

in foreign control over the natural resources, economy, army, 

or culture of the country, as well as other aspects of the national 

life, is forbidden.”29

In the years following the coup, as the shah rapidly Westernized Iran, America’s growing economic presence and military 
IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­10

ties to the country bred further resentments. A 1964 Majles 

(parliament) bill granting diplomatic immunity to US military 

personnel and their families angered many Iranians. Though 

the bill resembled status-of-forces agreements covering US 

officials in other countries, firebrand Ayatollah Khomeini made 

a famously enraged protest speech in Qom, which struck several familiar chords:

I cannot express the sorrow I feel in my heart . . . our dignity has been 

trampled underfoot . . . all American military advisors, together with 

their families, technical and administrative officials, and servants—in 

short, anyone in any way connected to them—are to enjoy legal immunity with respect to any crime they may commit in Iran. If some American’s servant, some American’s cook, assassinates your marja in the 

middle of the bazaar, or runs over him, the Iranian police do not have 

the right to apprehend him! Iranian courts do not have the right to 

judge him! The dossier must be sent to America, so that our masters 

there can decide what is to be done! . . . They have reduced the Iranian 

people to a level lower than an American dog.30

The shah forced Khomeini out of the country not long after this 

speech. But the ayatollah’s diatribes continued from exile—his 

themes of resistance and martyrdom resonated with the Shiite 

audience in Iran.

Persian-Shiite Strategic Loneliness

Iran’s unique self-perception and ethnic-religious mix leave 

it with few natural friends. Unlike “pan-Arabism,” which denotes 

an ethnic solidarity that transcends state borders, “pan-Persian” 

has no similar reach. While the Sunni-Shi’a rift is often overstated, the fact remains that Iran is 90 percent Shiite in a Muslim world made up of roughly 90 percent Sunnis.31 Khomeini’s 

“pan-Islamic” rhetoric could ultimately not overcome these 

basic divides, leaving no real export market for his revolution. 

The ethnic-religious sources of Iran’s geopolitical “loneliness” 

go back at least five centuries to the Safavid Dynasty, when 

Shiism was made Iran’s state religion. But today in Iran, one 

historic event overrides all others in shaping the current generation’s perception of being alone in a Hobbesian world.

The Iran-Iraq War—in Iran’s lexicon, the “Imposed War”—left 

a deep imprint on the Iranian psyche.32 The war’s financial cost 

exceeded the total of Iran’s twentieth-century oil revenues, and 
11

IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­low estimates put Iran’s war dead at 262,000.33 Khomeini, proclaiming that victory could “only be achieved by blood,” cast 

the war in religious terms as “fighting to protect Islam” against 

the secular Ba’athist barbarian.34 The regime also sent “human 

waves” of Iranian youth volunteers (Basij) through Iraqi minefields, many wearing headbands honoring the famous seventhcentury Shiite martyr, Husayn.35 As he did with the US Embassy 

hostage crisis, Khomeini used the war to solidify the Islamic 

revolution, brutally crushing internal dissent.36 But bleak prospects after eight years of war caused an isolated, exhausted 

Iran to agree to an internationally brokered armistice. Khomeini called his acceptance of UN Resolution 598—essentially 

a return to the status quo ante, which left a threatening Saddam in place—“more deadly than drinking hemlock.” 

Despite the war’s catastrophic scale, it was soon historically 

eclipsed—at least outside Iran—by the Cold War’s end and 

Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Inside Iran, however, memories 

and grievances remain very much alive. Iraq enjoyed money 

and material throughout the war from a long list of rich, powerful backers, while Iran could count only Syria and Libya as 

friends.37 Saddam’s broad international support, despite his 

atrocities, solidified Iran’s view of the external world as fundamentally cynical and hostile.38 Many in Iran believe, for example, that the 1987 downing of an Iranian commercial jetliner by 

the guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes, killing all 290 passengers, was a deliberate act.39 The regime generally directs its 

resentment at the West and the UN, charging them with injustice, hypocrisy, and “double standards.”40

One Iranian grievance has to do with the international community’s response to Iraq’s blatant aggression in starting the 

war. Unilaterally abrogating the 1975 Algiers Accords, which 

had governed both countries’ joint use of the Shatt al Arab waterway, Saddam invaded Iran on 22 September 1980. Yet UN resolutions during the war referred only to “the situation between 

Iran and Iraq,” making no mention of responsibility for the war 

or the violation of Iran’s territorial integrity.41 Furthermore, UN 

calls for an “immediate cease-fire” did not address the fact that 

this would have left Iraqi forces on Iranian territory. Iranians 

bitterly contrast this with the response to Iraq’s 1990 invasion of 

Kuwait. In that case, the UN produced a unanimous resolution 
IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­12

within hours, condemning “the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,” and 

demanding “that Iraq withdraw immediately.”42

Also not forgotten in Iran is the international community’s 

tepid response to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons beginning in 

1983, which caused an estimated 50,000 Iranian casualties 

during the war.43 One Iraqi general infamously stated, “if you 

gave me a pesticide to throw at these swarms of insects . . . then 

I’d use it.”44 Iraq claimed their use of choking and nerve agents 

was retaliatory, but eight UN investigations found no evidence of 

Iran having used chemical weapons during the war.45

Iranian leaders frequently point to their own restraint as evidence of moral superiority: “the Iraqis violated every accepted 

principle of warfare including using chemical weapons, but Iran 

staved off the aggression without compromising Islamic principles,” stated soon-to-be-president Rafsanjani on Tehran radio 

following the cease-fire.46 The current ruling generation in Iran 

points to the international community’s hypocrisy as evidence 

that Iran can rely only on itself to safeguard its sovereignty.

Even most of Saddam’s marginalized Arab-Shiite population 

in the south, through some mix of national loyalty and fear of 

their Sunni-Ba’athist officers, fought against their Iranian coreligionists.47 The tension between ethnic-nationalist and sectarian loyalties persists in the current Iraq conflict. Only with the 

earlier war as a backdrop can one fully appreciate the significance of the choreographed apology rendered by Iraq’s postSaddam defense minister in Tehran—asking “forgiveness for 

what Saddam Hussein has done.”48

Today in Iraq, the earlier war’s toxic legacy and the highstakes uncertainty surrounding Iraq’s post-Saddam future 

dominate threat perceptions in Tehran, where veterans of the 

Iran-Iraq War wield significant policy-making influence. Saddam’s overthrow provided Iran an opportunity to finally “finish 

the war” by turning what was the perennial threat to its west 

into a weaker, Shiite-led state where Tehran will have significant influence.

Clouding this picture for Tehran, however, are the US forces 

in Iraq and elsewhere in the region that present the regime with 

a looming threat to its survival. Tehran’s aggressive rhetoric 

and efforts to solidify political and economic influence in Iraq 

and impose greater costs on the US occupation indicate how 
13

IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­important Iraq is in Iran’s strategic calculus. The religious ties 

are deep, and two post-Saddam political parties, Supreme 

Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and al-Dawa, 

have roots in Iran. SCIRI’s Badr Brigade is a product of the 

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Patterns in Iran’s 

strategic behavior suggest that it will seek to avoid open hostilities with the United States in Iraq but continue to actively 

support proxies opposed to the US presence.

Overall, the Iran-Iraq War solidified the Islamic revolution, 

which had largely spent its ideological fervor. Yet for many of 

Iran’s current leaders who fought in the war, such as Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad and IRGC commander Yahya Rahim Safavi, the 

war remains their primary formative geopolitical experience. It 

shaped the “self-help” approach to Iran’s national security and 

solidified its sense of being strategically alone in a dangerous 

world. The war will continue to dominate the strategic perceptions of the Iranian leaders who experienced it directly. 

Pragmatic National Interest Replaces 

Revolutionary Ideology

In the wake of the war and Khomeini’s death, Iran’s isolation 

and economic predicament necessitated a more realistic foreign policy. Its actions, if not always its rhetoric, indicate a 

clear shift from Khomeini-style revolutionary dogma to pragmatic national interests.49 Far from catalyzing a pan-Islamic 

revolution of the masses, Khomeini’s religious radicalism 

turned Iran into a pariah state. It also unsettled the Arab sheikdoms, many sitting atop their own restive populations. The 

Gulf Arab leaders formed the Gulf Cooperation Council largely 

to thwart Iranian influence.50 Khomeini’s successors saw the 

need to adopt a more pragmatic approach in order to secure 

Iran’s national interests.

Of course, Iran’s national interests are not uniformly defined 

among its various political factions, but these generally include 

ensuring regime survival, strengthening the economy, stabilizing the Persian Gulf, eroding US-Israeli influence, and establishing Iran’s rightful place as the region’s preeminent power.51 Iran’s 

pragmatic pursuit of these interests is not necessarily inconsis-
IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­14

tent with its simultaneous demonizing of Israel and the United 

States, support to various nonstate proxies, and use of the “Shiite card” when deemed advantageous to do so.52 Geographic 

proximity also plays into Iran’s postwar pragmatism—greater 

distance, as with Egypt and Israel for example, permits a more 

ideological antagonism. Iran seeks to use its extreme anti-Zionism 

and support to Hezbollah and Hamas to bolster its standing in 

the Islamic world and expand its regional influence.53

Closer to home, however, the regime soberly reestablished 

bilateral ties with its Gulf neighbors, despite these Arab regimes’ 

recognition of Israel, close ties to the United States, and support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. In that war’s aftermath, 

Iran’s top leaders realistically stated that their “neighborhood 

is unchangeable” and “if Iran had demonstrated a little more 

tactfulness,” Saudi Arabia and Kuwait “would not have supported Iraq.”54 As a result, high-level diplomatic engagement 

between Tehran and the Gulf sheikdoms increased during the 

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–97) and Seyyed Mohammad

Khatami (1997–2005) presidencies. 

More recently—despite events in Iraq, the nuclear standoff, 

and the rise of an ideologue president in Tehran—the regime 

has tried to keep relations with its immediate neighbors on an 

even keel. Ahmadinejad himself and other top officials have 

hosted emissaries and traveled to various Gulf capitals, suggesting that enduring national interests, more than ideological 

or religious agendas, will continue to drive Iran’s behavior in 

the region.55

Iran’s policies vis-à-vis the new Central Asian republics also 

reveal a clear pattern of interest trumping ideology.56 Tehran’s 

desire to avoid refugee crises, stabilize its own minorities, build 

beneficial economic ties, contain Wahabbi radicalism, and 

maintain good relations with Russia have all contributed to 

Iran’s moderate policies in the Caucasus and Central Asia.57

For example, Iran has deep historic, ethnic, and religious affinities with Azerbaijan. But in Shiite Azerbaijan’s war with Christian Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, Iran did not side with its 

coreligionists. Instead, the regime tried to balance multiple 

interests—preventing indigenous ethnic unrest and refugee 

problems and managing relations with Russia and tensions 

with Turkey, for example—to mediate a peace agreement.58
15

IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­Similarly, during Tajikistan’s civil war in the mid-1990s, Iran 

maintained a strictly hands-off policy, despite domestic pressure to side with the Islamists and Persian-speaking Tajik groups 

opposing the Soviet-era leadership.59 This neutrality contributed 

to Iran’s playing a central role in ending the civil war (Tajik president, Imamali Rahmanov, and the Islamist leader, Abdullah 

Nouri, signed a peace agreement in Tehran in 1995).60 With 

respect to events in Chechnya, Iran remained conspicuously 

quiet during Russia’s crackdown on Islamic insurgents, calling 

it an “internal issue.”61 The regime played realpolitik, giving priority to its nuclear and military deals with Russia over any kind 

of ideological support to its Islamic brethren. 

As militant Wahabbi movements grew in Central Asia, emanating predominantly from Saudi-funded extremist madrassas 

in Pakistan, Iran’s rational behavior began to look more appealing to states like Uzbekistan. Throughout the 1990s, the large 

Shiite communities in Pakistan and Afghanistan increasingly 

became targets of violent Sunni extremists. The Taliban, for 

example, views Shiites as deviants and massacred over 2,000 

of them in 1997 and 1998 at Mazar-i Sharif and Bamiyan.62

Containing violent Sunni movements on its eastern borders 

became and remains a national security priority in Tehran. 

The regime, of course, supported and benefited from the 

2001 US toppling of the Taliban. Tehran now seeks a stable, 

deradicalized Afghanistan with Western forces entirely out of 

the country. Drug smuggling, refugees, and a loosely controlled 

frontier will continue to be concerns to the regime along its 

eastern border with Afghanistan. 

With regard to Pakistan, Iran has maintained generally stable relations with the Musharraf government. But the regime 

looks warily at Pakistan’s combination of nuclear weapons, violent Sunni extremism, and a population growth rate more than 

double its own. Also unsettling to Tehran are the documented 

links between the Taliban and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and security forces.63

In the changed geopolitical landscape of the broader Middle 

East, Iran’s more pragmatic policies have not allayed Arab fears 

of growing Iranian power. Some, like Jordan’s King Abdullah, 

talk of a “Shiite Crescent” stretching from Iran and Bahrain on 

the Gulf across Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.64 The king added 
IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­16

that this new bloc would “alter the balance of power between 

the two main Islamic sects and pose new challenges to US 

interests and allies.”65 Egypt’s President Mubarak claimed that 

most “Shiites are loyal to Iran, and not the countries they are 

living in.”66 This construct conjures a purposefully unified 

agenda being centrally controlled by the sinister theocracy in 

Iran. The facts, however, do not support such a construct—they 

instead paint a more complex picture.67

Lebanon’s Shiite community, for example, has deep indigenous roots and unique social issues that exist with or without 

Tehran. That community’s champion in the 1960s and 1970s, 

Imam Musa al-Sadr, led a political and social movement that 

united Lebanon’s historically downtrodden Shi’a. While traditional clerical ties then existed between Iran and Lebanon, Iran 

in no way directed al-Sadr’s movement. The shah was allied 

with Israel at the time, and Israel was not then a galvanizing 

issue among Lebanese Shi’a. Today the Islamic Republic provides significant support to Hezbollah through money, training, and weapons. But if Tehran turned off the spigot tomorrow, Hezbollah would continue fighting its own political and 

social battles in Lebanon. As one noted scholar put it, Iran will 

be more “an influential big brother, but not a ‘heavy father,’ 

much less a master.”68

Syria, by anyone’s measure, does not fit neatly into a Shiite 

construct. Intensely secular and Alawite—a sect not even recognized by most Shiite clerics—the Syrian government rules 

over a 70 percent Sunni population. Perceived common interests have kept Damascus and Tehran allied. Should those 

interests diverge, through future Syria-Israel peace talks, for 

example, Syria would likely chart its own course. 

Even in the new Iraq, where Iran’s ties and influence are and will 

continue to be strongest, there seems to be little interest in replicating Iran’s theocratic governing model or taking direct orders from 

Tehran. While Iraq’s leading Shiite cleric in Najaf, Grand Ayatollah 

Ali al-Sistani, is Iranian by birth, his traditional quietism is philosophically incompatible with Khomeini’s revolutionary doctrine of 

velayat-e-faqih (guardianship or rule of the jurist).69

Iran’s regional position has no doubt strengthened in recent 

years. It will continue to support popular Shiite movements—in 

Bahrain, for example—when its national interests are served 
17

IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­by doing so. But Tehran rarely emphasizes its “Shiite-ness,” 

preferring pan-Islamic, anti-imperialist rhetoric that appeals to 

a broader audience. Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah became popular figures on the Sunni-Arab street, 

certainly not for their sectarian affiliation, but for confronting 

the United States and Israel. Conservative Arab regimes, some 

with no significant Shi’a constituencies, are concerned about 

growing Iranian power and possible spillover effects on their 

own Sunni populations from these popular Shiite movements. 

Creating an image of Iran as theocratic puppet master might 

serve some interests in the region, but the facts suggest a more 

nuanced picture.70 While religion and ideology still factor into 

Iran’s geopolitical calculations, pragmatic national interest 

remains the dominant variable. 

This chapter began by explaining the historic and cultural 

sources of Iran’s geopolitical perceptions and behavior. Historic 

examples painted a clear picture of Iran through three broad 

themes: Persian greatness, resentment of foreign exploitation, 

and a sense of strategic loneliness. The final question of the 

chapter was answered by demonstrating the historic underpinnings of Iran’s predilection for pragmatic behavior rather than 

revolutionary overreaction. This key component will play an 

important role in the policies yet to come. The next chapter 

expands on these concepts and delves more specifically into 

the nuances of Iranian political, governmental, economic, 

nuclear, and cultural characteristics and what they portend for 

developing a successful US policy toward Iran.

Notes

1. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle (New York: Random House, 

2004), xx–xxii.

2. The authors developed these themes based on their recurrence in one 

form or another across a wide range of sources and interviews. The term 

“strategic loneliness” appears in Takeyh’s Hidden Iran (referenced below). 

3. Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic

(New York: Times Books, 2006), 61; American Foreign Policy Council panel 

remarks by Patrick Clawson, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 15

November 2006; and Roger M. Savory, “Religious Dogma and the Economic 

and Political Imperatives of Iranian Foreign Policy,” in Iran at the Crossroads, 

Miron Rezun, ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1990), 35–65.
IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­18

4. Massoume Price, Iran’s Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook (Santa 

Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 7.

5. 2006 World Population Data and Fact Sheet, http://www.prb.org.

6. “Khamenei Tells Commanders No Policy Made in Region without Iran,” 

Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network (Tehran), vol. 1, 13 October 

2004, in BBC Monitoring.

7. Graham Fuller, The Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 16–18.

8. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, speech to the National Press Club, 14 December 1954, New York Times electronic archive, http://www.nytimes.com.

9. Fuller, Center of the Universe, 17.

10. Hakim Abū-l-Qāsem Ferdowsi, “Shahnameh,” in Stephen Kinzer, All 

the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 21.

11. Dr. Hadi Semati, Tehran University, panel remarks at Saban Center 

Symposium, Washington, DC, 23 November 2004, www.brookings.org.

12. Price, Iran’s Diverse Peoples, 345–47; and Fuller, Center of the Universe, 28.

13. Fuller, Center of the Universe, 23.

14. George B. Baldwin, “The Foreign-educated Iranian,” Middle East Journal, 17:3, quoted in Fuller, Center of the Universe, 27.

15. Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy 

and the Next Great Crisis in the Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 

7–27.

16. Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran (Cambridge, MA: Yale University Press, 

2003), 22–72; Pollack, Persian Puzzle, 14–22; and Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 

28–35. 

17. Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 32; and Keddie, Modern Iran, 61.

18. Ansari, Confronting Iran, 14–15.

19. Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 48.

20. Mary Ann Heiss, “The International Boycott of Iranian Oil and the 

Anti-Mossadeq Coup of 1953,” in Mohammad Mossadeq, eds. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 

178–200.

21. Homa Katouzian, “Mossadeq’s Government in Iranian History,” in 

Gasiorowski and Byrne, Mohammad Mossadeq, 1–15.

22. Dilip Hiro, Iranian Labyrinth: Journeys through Theocratic Iran and Its 

Furies (New York: Nation Books, 2005), 64–84.

23. Pollack, Persian Puzzle, 57–62.

24. Stephen Kinzer’s bestselling All The Shah’s Men thoroughly explains 

US and British cooperation in orchestrating the Mossadeq coup. 

25. For an analysis of why and how the coup succeeded, see Mark J. 

Gasiorowski, “Why Did Mossadeq Fall?” in Gasiorowski and Byrne, Mohammad Mossadeq, 261–77.

26. Ibid., 195–96.
19

IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­27. Keddie, Modern Iran, 123–31; Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men, 212–15; and 

Robin Wright, The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran

(New York: First Vintage Books, 2001), 246.

28. Ansari, Confronting Iran, 36–38.

29. Constitution of the Islamic Republic, Article 153, www.oefre.unibe

.ch/law/icl/ir.

30. Ansari, Confronting Iran, 53.

31. Vali Nasr, The Shi’a Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the 

Future (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006), 34; and CIA, World Factbook, 

http://www.cia.gov.

32. Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, DC: Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 18; and Farhang Rajaee, “Views 

from Within,” in Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War, ed. Farhang Rajaee 

(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997), 1–8.

33. Kamran Mofid, The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War (London, 

UK: Routledge, 1990); and Dilip Hiro, “The Iran-Iraq War,” in Iran and the 

Arab World, eds. Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (New York: St. 

Martin’s Press, 1993), 65.

34. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (Boulder, 

CO: Westview Press, 1991), 53–68; and Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 

10 November 1987, in Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 170–71.

35. Shirin Ebadi, Iran Awakening: A Memoir of Revolution and Hope (New 

York: Random House, 2006), 61; and Patrick Clawson and Michael Rubin, 

Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos (The Middle East in Focus) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 108.

36. Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran: The Structure of Power in the Islamic 

Republic (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), 

111–16.

37. Saideh Lotfian, “Taking Sides: Regional Powers and the War,” in Iranian Perspectives, 22. Countries supporting Iraq included the United States, 

the Soviet Union, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 

Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 

38. Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, 18.

39. Dilip Hiro, The Longest War (London, UK: Routledge, 1991), 211; and 

Pollack, Persian Puzzle, 232.

40. For a summary of Iran’s grievances against the UN from an Iranian 

perspective, see Bahram Mostaghimi and Masoud Taromsari, “Double Standard: The Security Council and the Two Wars,” in Iranian Perspectives, 62–

72. 

41. See texts of UN Resolutions 514 and 598 at http://www.un.org.

42. UN Security Council Resolution 660, 2 August 1990, http://www

.un.org.

43. CIA declassified document, “Iran-Iraq: Chemical Warfare Continues, November 1986,” http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/muhammadiyat_ii/muhammadiyat_ii

_refs/n71en018/970409_cia_95224_95224_01.html.

44. Hiro, Longest War, 109.
IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­20

45. Joost Hiltermann, “Outsiders as Enablers: Consequences and Lessons from International Silence on Iraq’s Use of Chemical Weapons during 

the Iran-Iraq War,” in Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War, eds. Lawrence Potter 

and Gary Sick (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2004), 151–67.

46. In Hiro, Longest War, 249.

47. Fuller, Center of the Universe, 39–42.

48. Al-Jazeera, 7 July 2005, cited by Council on Foreign Relations Senior 

Fellow, Ray Takeyh, in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, 31 January 2007.

49. Houchang Hassan-Yari, “Iranian Foreign Policy in the Postwar Era,” in 

Iranian Perspectives, 133–50. See also, Adam Tarock, Iran’s Foreign Policy 

since 1990: Pragmatism Supersedes Islamic Ideology (Hauppauge, NY: Nova 

Science Publishers, 1999), 1–8.

50. Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 65.

51. Fuller, Center of the Universe, 270.

52. Moshe Ma’oz (professor emeritus of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem), interview by author, 20 February 2007. 

See also, Graham E. Fuller, “The Hizballah-Iran Connection: Model for Sunni 

Resistance,” Washington Quarterly 30, no. 1 (Winter 2006–2007), 139–50.

53. David Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, 

and Power (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 281–87; and Takeyh, 

Hidden Iran, 70–71.

54. President Rafsanjani and deputy foreign minister Besharati, IRNA, 19 

November 1988, in Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran, 240.

55. Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 70; and “Iran Chief to Visit Saudi Arabia,” Boston Globe, 2 March 2007.

56. Shireen Hunter, director of the Islam program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Iran’s Pragmatic Regional Policy,” Journal of 

International Affairs 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), 133–48.

57. W. Nathaniel Howell, “Iran’s Policy in NorthWest Asia: Opportunities, 

Challenges, and Implications,” in Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability, 

Jamal S. Al-Suwaidi, ed. (Abu Dhabi, UAE: Emirates Center for Strategic 

Studies and Research, 1996), 175–91. See also Daniel Byman et al., Iran’s 

Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 

2004), 77–81.

58. Tarock, Iran’s Foreign Policy Since 1990, 135–39. 

59. Hunter, Iran’s Pragmatic Regional Policy, 136–41.

60. Tarock, Iran’s Foreign Policy Since 1990, 130.

61. Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics, 236. See also Bynum et al., 

Iran’s Security Policy, 179.

62. Nasr, Shi’a Revival, 156–62.

63. Byman et al., Iran’s Security Policy, 72–75.

64. Ibid., 109, 184.

65. Robin Wright and Peter Baker, “Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election 

from Iran,” Washington Post, op-ed, 8 December 2004.
21

IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS­66. Nicholas Blanford, “Shiite-Sunni ‘Rift’ a Worry Across Region,” USA 

Today, 13 April 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006

-04-13-iraq-rift, quoted in Fuller, “The Hizballah-Iran Connection,” 145.

67. Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam (New York: Random House, 2003), 

23–24; Nasr, Shi’a Revival; Fuller, Center of the Universe and “Hizbullah-Iran 

Connection;” David Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics, 246–49; and Moshe 

Ma’oz, interview.

68. Nasr, Shi’a Revival, 184.

69. Ibid., 125.

70. See Sherifa D. Zuhur, Iran, Iraq, and the United States: The New Triangle’s 

Impact on Sectarianism and the Nuclear Threat (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, November 2006), 17–23, http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army

.mil/newsletter/.

23

Chapter 3

Analysis of Iran

This chapter examines sociopolitical trends and internal 

power dynamics in Iran in order to reduce uncertainty about 

future Iranian behavior and inform an effective US strategy. 

More specifically, three broad policy-relevant areas are 

explored: current demographic, political, and economic 

trends in Iran; the regime’s internal decision-making dynamics, power centers, and the personal characteristics of influential leaders; and, finally, Iran’s attitude toward the nuclear 

program.

As this chapter observes, political decision making in Iran is 

often an opaque process that proceeds along both formal and 

informal lines. For clarity, we begin by identifying and defining 

the constitutional functions of three key bodies in Iran’s multipolar government: 

Assembly of Experts—86 clerical members, elected by popular vote for eight-year terms; responsible for electing and 

supervising Iran’s supreme leader.

Council of Guardians—12-member body made up of six clerics (appointed by the supreme leader) and six jurists (nominated by head of the judiciary, approved by Iran’s parliament); reviews and holds veto power over all laws passed by 

parliament to insure compliance with Islam and the constitution; also supervises all elections and vets candidates for 

public office.

Expediency Council—38-member body appointed by supreme 

leader for five-year terms; resolves disputes between Iran’s 

parliament and the Council of Guardians; also serves as 

supreme leader’s consultative council to determine general 

regime policies.1

Figure 2 shows how members of various power centers are 

constitutionally elected or appointed.
ANALYSIS OF IRAN

Demographics, Politics, and Economics

Iran’s diverse population of 70 million—51 percent Persian, 

24 percent Azeri, 8 percent Gilaki and Mazandarani, 7 percent 

Kurd, and smaller percentages of Arabs, Lurs, Baluchis, and 

Turkmen—has doubled since 1979.2 These ethnic percentages 

have not changed appreciably over the last two decades. Iran’s 

youth comprise a majority, with two-thirds under 30 years old 

and an overall median age of 24.8.3 A government-promoted 

baby boom in the 1980s created a demographic bubble that 

will continue to have political, economic, and social effects. 

Iran has since reduced its birth rate to one of Asia’s lowest, but 

with “boomers” entering child-bearing years, population is still 

projected to reach 90 million by 2025.4

Ethnic minorities, who make up nearly half of this population, have not historically fared well under the governing regime 

24

Figure 2. Iran’s formal power centers and constitutional structure (Reproduced from Mehran Kamrava and Hassan-Yari Houchang, “Suspended 

Equilibrium in Iran’s Political System,” The Muslim World 94, no. 4 [October 

2004]: 495–524.)

The Electorate

Assembly

of Experts

Leader

Expediency Council Guardian Council Head

of Judiciary

Security Forces

Commanders

Islamic Consultative

Assembly (Majles)

President

Elects

Elects Elects

Elects

Approves

Approves

Appoints

Appoints Appoints

Appoints

Appoints

Mediates Conflict

Approves all Candidates and Bills

Approves Candidates

Approves 6 Non-clerical Nominees

Appoints

6 Clerical

Members

Nominates 6

Non-clerical

Members

Cabinet

Head of Supreme Court

Police (Nirouha-ye

Entezami)

Army IRGC
25

ANALYSIS OF IRAN

in Tehran.5 Complaints of Persian chauvinism and economic 

neglect are common. As potential sources of instability, most of 

these minority groups live on Iran’s periphery and share cultural and linguistic bonds with coethnics in adjacent countries. 

Sunnis in Baluchistan, for example, mix freely with their kin 

across the border in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iranian Baluch 

rebels have sustained a periodically violent resistance against 

Tehran—blaming the regime for political and religious oppression and a near-50 percent unemployment rate in their region.6

Kurds are another group in Iran with a strong ethnic identity 

that transcends state borders.

Discontent among many of these groups, however, does not 

necessarily equate to an organized separatist movement.7 The 

regime is concerned about ethnic unrest and works to defuse 

tensions, generally blaming outside meddling for problems that 

do flare up. Improving the plight of minorities has also become 

a more common theme in national political campaigns.8 Notably, current supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei and many 

other officials in Tehran are ethnic Azeris.9 Wise US policy makers would not treat Iranian nationalism as a strictly Persian 

phenomenon and respect the difficulty in gauging—much less 

manipulating—ethnic versus national allegiances. In other 

words, minority discontent in Iran should be monitored closely 

but not made a linchpin of US policy.

Political and economic frustration extends beyond Iran’s minorities. Outside of a hard core of “true believers” and conservative 

supporters, Iranians are generally disgusted with their government.10 Significantly, the highly literate, Web-savvy boomer generation has no recollection of the shah and no experiential connection to the revolution or Iran-Iraq War.11 Fully one-half of 

eligible voters in Iran today—voting eligibility for men and women 

begins at age 15—are under 30 years of age.12 This young, educated demographic bloc desires greater political freedom, government accountability, and economic opportunity. 

Still proudly Iranian, they are also, at least by Middle-Eastern 

standards, pro-Western. Many speak English well and seem 

able to simultaneously like American people and things, yet 

dislike and resent US government policies.13 Following the 9/11 

attacks, in a stark contrast with popular reactions elsewhere in 
ANALYSIS OF IRAN

26

the region, thousands of Iranians spontaneously held candlelight vigils in Tehran to honor the victims.14

Iran’s young population in general and women in particular 

voted in droves for Khatami in the 1997 and 2001 presidential 

elections.15 In a cruel irony, however, Khatami’s popular but 

ultimately failed reform movement left in its wake a more disillusioned populace and an Iran that increasingly resembles a 

traditional authoritarian state.16 Current hard-liners lack political legitimacy, but their near- to mid-term hold on power 

seems quite secure.17

Iran’s unique government—a theocracy-democracy hybrid 

with multiple formal and informal power centers—defies historic analogy. Regular elections occur with wide voter turnout, 

but real power rests with the unelected supreme leader and the 

various networks and institutions he controls. The regime has 

many constitutional mechanisms at its disposal to limit the 

parameters of democratic expression, such as vetting candidates through the unelected Council of Guardians.18 The brutal 

crackdown of countrywide 1999 student demonstrations—in 

which students called for greater freedoms and government 

accountability—showed that it also will not hesitate to use 

extralegal intimidation tactics when deemed necessary.19

Khatami had no control over the club-wielding paramilitary 

group—Ansar-e Hezbollah (distinct from Hezbollah in Lebanon)—that led the violent crackdown on the students.20 Their 

murky chain of command bypasses the president or any other 

elected body. The regime also uses these shock troops to terrorize intellectuals who too publicly threaten core revolutionary 

principles such as Khomeini’s doctrine of velayat-e faqih. Khatami’s inability to put an end to such practices exposed his basic 

lack of political power and dispirited many of his constituents. 

Out of apathy or protest, many pro-reform voters stayed away 

from the polls in the 2005 election that brought Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad to power. A brief look at Ahmadinejad’s electoral 

victory and early tenure as president highlights several policyrelevant facts about the current political mood in Iran. 

Ahmadinejad benefited from a disorganized and divided 

reform movement and won primarily for what he is not. As a 

noncleric with a simple lifestyle, he capitalized on the growing 

resentment Iranians have for a corrupt, wealthy class of cleri-
27

ANALYSIS OF IRAN

cal elites who have failed to deliver on the revolution’s promises.21 His most prominent rival in the race, former president 

Hashemi Rafsanjani, paid a political price for simultaneously 

holding the titles of ayatollah and richest man in Iran. Ahmadinejad ran on domestic issues, making populist pledges to 

share Iran’s wealth more broadly and wipe out corruption. 

His cultural conservatism and nationalist credentials as a 

war veteran and former IRGC general also gave him a loyal, 

aggressive base that mobilized votes. His electoral victory, however, in no way indicates popular support for the hate speech, 

millenarian ramblings, or belligerent foreign policy statements 

that have characterized his early tenure. 

In fact, recent official “reigning-in” actions and results from 

the December 2006 elections indicate a clear rejection of Ahmadinejad’s amateur diplomacy and economic performance.22 The 

international condemnation brought about by his Holocaust 

denials embarrassed many Iranians, who would prefer he paid 

more attention to Iran’s domestic dilemmas. On the nuclear 

issue, the unanimous Security Council adoption of sanctions 

under United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 

1737 and 1747 displeased senior Iranian officials seeking to 

prevent further economic isolation. A popular newspaper associated with supreme leader Khamenei recently editorialized 

that “just when the nuclear issue was about to move away from 

the UN . . . the president’s fiery speeches have resulted in the 

adoption of two resolutions.”23

Reasserting a degree of control over his trouble-making president, Khamenei issued two decrees apparently designed to put 

a limit on how much damage Ahmadinejad could do in the foreign policy arena. One tasked the Expediency Council, a powerful 38-member body led by the pragmatic Rafsanjani, to more 

closely oversee and report on the executive branch. The other 

established a “Strategic Council for Foreign Relations” made up 

of more moderate foreign policy veterans to develop and implement policy.24 The leader could also potentially use this group 

for less formal diplomatic talks with the West. Indirect rebukes 

such as these are the norm in high Iranian politics, where the 

leader generally tries to avoid an open breach.

On the economic front, 150 members of parliament recently 

signed a public letter criticizing Ahmadinejad for Iran’s double-
ANALYSIS OF IRAN

28

digit inflation and unemployment. And another newspaper with 

ties to the supreme leader pilloried Ahmadinejad for attempting 

to use the nuclear confrontation to distract public attention 

away from his failed domestic policies.25 The December 2006 

City Council and Assembly of Experts elections—in which 

nearly all of Ahmadinejad’s handpicked candidates lost—also 

reflected his waning popularity.

US policy makers should view these official and popular 

reactions against Ahmadinejad more as political correctives 

than harbingers of sweeping reforms. In other areas, such as 

the parliament, government ministries, and Supreme National 

Security Council, conservatives have consolidated their control 

of key power centers. But politics in Iran rarely remains static, 

and fissures exist within the conservative bloc between hardliners and more pragmatic forces. Some kind of tactical 

reformist-pragmatist coalition could plausibly emerge in 2009 

to make Ahmadinejad a one-term president. This outcome will 

be even more likely if economic prospects do not improve for 

Iran’s young generation. Roughly 1.8 million members of that 

generation will turn 20 this year, far exceeding the job-producing 

capacity of Iran’s economy.26

 Unemployment officially sits at 11 percent, but most analysts put the number closer to 15–20 percent and higher still 

among young Iranians.27 Iran’s economy has seen positive 

growth in recent years, but income disparities have widened 

and job creation remains insufficient. Educated youth in Iran 

readily tell foreign journalists about their lack of opportunity 

and disdain for corrupt “millionaire mullahs.” One female economics student stressed the need for free-market reforms, 

actually citing works by Milton Friedman.28

By regional standards, Iran has a strong economy. Some Iranian officials hope for a “China model” for Iran—meaning a 

rapidly expanding economy without any corresponding political liberalization. However, in order to achieve such a vision 

and improve economic prospects for its young population, the 

regime would need to address several deeply rooted structural 

problems. To name a few: widespread corruption and weak rule 

of law, a negative investment climate, vast unaccountable 

patronage networks, heavy state subsidies, and overreliance 

on aging oil infrastructure to generate over 80 percent of Iran’s 
29

ANALYSIS OF IRAN

foreign revenues and fund nearly 50 percent of its welfare-state 

budget.29 Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad’s populist promise to “put 

oil wealth on people’s tables” would require an already bloated 

state sector to grow even further.30

Gasoline is the most consequential of Iran’s many subsidized 

commodities, eating up approximately 10 percent of the gross 

domestic product.31 Iranians pay about a dime for a liter of 

gasoline, roughly 35 cents per gallon. Not surprisingly, while 

population doubled since the revolution, domestic gasoline 

consumption increased more than fivefold.32 To date, government attempts to reduce consumption or raise fuel prices have 

not met with success.33 Of its four million barrels per day (bpd) 

of crude oil production, Iran now consumes 41 percent internally, up from 29 percent in 1990.34 Compounding the issue, 

Iran’s outdated refineries meet less than 60 percent of domestic demand. The artificially low gasoline prices make investment in new refineries unprofitable. Thus, while second only to 

Saudi Arabia in proven oil reserves, Iran imports at market 

price over 40 percent of its refined petroleum.35

As a further problematic sign, Iran has also failed to meet its 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) production quotas in recent years and today extracts 30 percent less 

crude oil than it did under the shah in the 1970s.36 Over the 

same time period, however, the number of people working in the 

oil sector, where nepotism and graft are rampant, has ballooned 

from 54,000 to 180,000.37 The entire state-run oil industry suffers from aging and neglected infrastructure, foreign investment apprehension, and bureaucratic incompetence.38 “Rentseeking,” or using oil revenues to subsidize various oil and 

nonoil commodities, also continues to do long-term damage.39

Oil revenue provides the regime the financial levers it needs 

to control the economy and maintain its patronage networks. 

Several leading mullahs and opaque quasi-state entities rely on 

this steady flow of oil and cash. But to reverse an annual 8–10 

percent production decline in roughly 60 mature fields, the Iranian oil industry will need investment on the order of several 

billion dollars per year.40

On a different but interesting note, there is a similar story 

with respect to natural gas. Second only to Russia in proven 

natural gas reserves, Iran has yet to bring this tremendous 
ANALYSIS OF IRAN

30

resource to economic fruition.41 By comparison, tiny Qatar, 

capitalizing on an attractive foreign investment climate, exports 

six times more natural gas than Iran does from their shared 

South Pars gas field.42

Anomalously high oil prices in recent years have hidden some 

of this decay in Iran’s energy sector. One frequently cited US oil 

analyst, Roger Stern of Johns Hopkins University, predicts 

that, if current trends and practices continue, Iran will export 

no oil within a decade. Furthermore, the current flight of capital and talent out of Iran suggests that needed Western investment will be difficult to obtain, at least in the near term. 

Since oil revenues buttress the regime, threats by Iran to use 

the “oil weapon” against outsiders are hollow. In fact and very 

importantly, as will be demonstrated later, the regime’s dependence on a fundamentally weak industry represents a key strategic vulnerability. Apparently, at least some Iranian oil industry and government officials are aware and concerned about 

the issue.43 In response to its energy and geopolitical problems, 

the regime has adopted a “look East” strategy designed to minimize the effects of Western sanctions and establish long-term 

energy partnerships with rising economic giants in Asia. 

China is the more-than-willing centerpiece of this new look 

East strategy.44 The crux of the relationship is that China needs 

oil, natural gas, minerals, and markets; Iran needs weapons 

technology, cheap Chinese manufactured goods, a reliable 

long-term energy buyer, and a sponsor at the UN. The two 

appear ready to finalize a large, 25–30 year oil and natural gas 

deal which Iran’s deputy minister of petroleum calls “a marriage” worth between 100 and 200 billion dollars.45 The IranChina relationship resembles the petrodollar recycling arrangement the United States enjoyed in the 1970s under the shah, 

when US products accounted for 21 percent of Iran’s imports; 

of course that number is zero today.

Chinese companies in Iran routinely underbid their Western 

European competition by large margins. Sinopec, China’s second largest oil company, transferred to Iran a complete set of 

its oil exploration equipment in an effort to show that it had 

narrowed the technological gap with the West.46 Over 40 Chinese firms keep permanent offices in Iran, and roughly 2,000 

Chinese businessmen can be found on any given day in Teh-
31

ANALYSIS OF IRAN

ran. Chinese appliances are ubiquitous, and Chinese companies presently have large-scale dam, subway, and pipeline 

projects under way.47

Beijing disregards provisions of the US Iran-Libya Sanctions 

Act (ILSA), which threaten sanctions against any company 

investing more than $20 million in Iran’s oil sector. The Chinese commercial attaché in Tehran stated that “We don’t care 

about the sanctions. . . . Why should we ask America’s permission to do business? We are a sovereign country. . . . We don’t 

believe politics should be part of business.”48

Booming global energy demand and its strategic partnership 

with China and other Asian powers have helped Iran lessen the 

impact of Western sanctions. But looking East will not cure Iran’s 

chronic economic ills; only significant internal reforms can.

Inhibiting such reforms, however, are the vested interests 

deeply entrenched in Iran’s untaxed, largely unaccountable 

foundations, or bonyads. These paragovernmental entities control 30–40 percent of business in Iran and constitute a vast 

shadow economy through which the supreme leader and other 

rich mullahs exercise political power via patronage.49 With origins as religious charitable institutions, bonyads in postrevolutionary Iran have become multibillion-dollar corporate conglomerates.50 Having expropriated all of the former shah’s 

assets and property, these entities rapidly expanded into big 

business, such as banking, construction, real estate, agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and petrochemicals.

Some of the largest bonyads—the Foundation for the Disabled 

and Oppressed, the Martyr’s Foundation, and the Imam Reza 

Foundation—control tens of billions of dollars and dispense largesse to millions of Iranian families and war veterans. They 

derive income from their various private commercial ventures as 

well as directly from “the official budget of the supreme leader.”51

The head of the Imam Reza Foundation, Ayatollah Abbas VaezTabasi, provides an example of the intertwined nature of political and economic power in Iran. In charge of the bonyads’ auto 

plants and multiple other businesses worth $15 billion, Tabasi 

also sits on the Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts.52

Most analysts estimate that roughly half of Iran’s national 

budget flows into bonyads, with little legal oversight. Notoriously corrupt and inefficient, their opaque accounting methods 
ANALYSIS OF IRAN

32

also facilitate “no-fingerprint” funding for various weapons 

deals, covert operations, and foreign proxies.53

Former President Khatami’s past attempts to instill more 

transparency and accountability into these institutions met 

with little success. Iran’s elected parliament, the Majles, actually passed a motion to remove the bonyads’ tax-exempt status, 

but the Council of Guardians, beholden to the supreme leader, 

exercised their constitutional power and vetoed the measure, 

arguing that the bonyads’ charitable functions justified their 

privileged status.54 By controlling and protecting bonyad leaders, Khamenei ensures continued loyalty.

Internal Dynamics, Personalities,

Power Centers, and Factions

Multiple power centers exist in Iran, where informal networks 

have as much or more influence on decision making as traditional bureaucratic institutions do.55 Networks generally form 

around commonalities: kinship, generational bonds, revolutionary credentials, wealth, political allegiance, clerical status, 

or wartime military service.56 While penetrating the fog surrounding these networks is difficult, a cultural desire for consensus in Iran suggests that on major policy decisions, the top 

power brokers have at least given tacit approval.57 Some analysts have described the regime’s decision-making methodology 

as “chaotic but not anarchic.”58

With respect to the nuclear portfolio, influential elder statesman Rafsanjani recently assured an audience that important 

decisions were reached collectively, not via a renegade actor or 

institution.59 The regime also sought to create an image of unity 

and policy continuity during the 2005 presidential transition, 

holding a public meeting that included Khamenei, Rafsanjani, 

Khatami, and the newly elected Ahmadinejad.

Regarding official decision-making authority, it nearly all 

rests with the supreme leader. The constitution gives the 

supreme leader vast power, including command of the armed 

forces, authority over foreign policy, power to declare war, control of the media, and pardoning power. He has appointment 

and dismissal authority over military and IRGC commanders, 
33

ANALYSIS OF IRAN

supreme judicial authorities, and clerical members of the 

Guardian Council.60 The leader can also dismiss the president 

if it is deemed to be in the national interest to do so and exerts 

further influence by appointing “representatives” to all of Iran’s 

important institutions.

Iran’s current supreme leader, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, 

emerged largely by default in the succession crisis that followed 

Khomeini’s death in 1989. Khomeini’s original heir apparent, 

Grand Ayatollah Hosein Ali Montazeri, ran afoul of the imam 

when he criticized the regime’s 1988 execution of roughly 3,000 

political prisoners.61 The succession crisis that developed had its 

roots in Khomeini’s 1979 constitutional dictate that the supreme 

leader—the fusion of political and religious authority in Iran—be 

a “source of emulation,” or “Grand Ayatollah.” But none of Iran’s 

other highest ranking clerics, most of whom never fully subscribed to Khomeini’s doctrines, were sufficiently politicized. So 

on his deathbed, Khomeini amended the constitution, eliminating the requirement for the supreme leader to have attained 

Shiism’s highest clerical rank.62

When Khomeini died, the Assembly of Experts convened and 

chose the loyal Khamenei to be the next supreme leader. At 

that time, Khamenei served as Iran’s figurehead president (the 

president’s office has since been constitutionally strengthened) 

and held only the midlevel clerical rank of hojjatoleslam. In a 

political move still not recognized by Iran’s top Shiite scholars, 

the regime granted Khamenei the title of Ayatollah. Khamenei 

plainly lacked his predecessor’s charisma and clerical credentials. Thus, he has had to deal with legitimacy and respect 

issues since taking office. His official 15-page biography goes to 

great lengths to demonstrate his humble, devout origins; revolutionary credentials; and wide-ranging religious studies.63

Born in 1939, Khamenei belongs to the Islamic Republic’s 

founding generation. Like other regime leaders of this era, 

Khamenei remained loyal to Khomeini through the 1960s and 

’70s and suffered imprisonment and torture by the shah’s 

hated domestic intelligence service, SAVAK, for his political 

activities. Unlike Khomeini, who as supreme leader used his 

dominant stature to remain above political faction, Khamenei 

has generally aligned himself with his base of ideological and 

clerical conservatives.64
ANALYSIS OF IRAN

34

He does not appear, however, to drive a specific agenda or 

strongly dictate foreign policy. As long as the regime and its 

ideological pillars remain unthreatened, Khamenei seems content to let other power centers operate and even exercise a 

degree of autonomy.65 For example, he presided over and largely 

tolerated reformist Khatami’s “dialogue of civilizations” overtures to the West, as well as hard-liner Ahmadinejad’s calls for 

a “world without the United States and Zionism.”66 These 

extreme, nearly antithetical policy positions do not suggest a 

heavy hand or guiding policy vision from Khamenei. With 

respect to rival political factions, Khamenei leans well right but 

generally seeks to build at least some consensus, keep a lid on 

public anger, and prevent any one faction or institution from 

dominating Iranian politics.

Political parties in the Western mold do not exist in Iran, but 

we can discern three rough ideological factions that define the 

political spectrum: from right to left, the hard-line Khomeini-ist 

ideologues, the pragmatists, and the reformers.67 As explained 

above, Khamenei hovers near the right end of the spectrum, 

but does not have a dominant persona. Also, clerics should not 

be treated as any kind of ideological bloc—one finds them scattered along the entire political spectrum. A brief sketch of influential personalities within each of the three factions reveals the 

breadth of opinion in Iran and sheds light on existing rivalries, 

networks, and formal and informal sources of power.

The Hard-Liners

We start with Iran’s hard-line, 50-year-old president. Too 

young to be among the founding generation, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad nonetheless has solid revolutionary credentials. Speculation persists about his direct involvement in the 1979 US 

Embassy takeover, but his political activism as a student in the 

1970s and later service in the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War 

are well documented. It appears likely that in the revolution’s 

early years, he performed covert internal intelligence functions 

and interrogated political prisoners. He reportedly became a 

senior commander of the IRGC’s elite “Qods Force” in western 

Iran during the latter part of the war, responsible for special 

foreign military operations.68
35

ANALYSIS OF IRAN

His official biography has conspicuous gaps in the 1980s. It 

lists various provincial governorships with no corresponding 

dates and states that “during the war imposed on Iran, Dr. 

Ahmadinejad [he holds a PhD from Tehran University in civil 

and transportation engineering] was . . . a member of the volunteer forces (Basij) in different parts and divisions of the battlefronts.” He was governor-general of a northern province from 

1993 to 1997, but his 2003–05 term as Tehran’s mayor marked 

his first appearance on the national scene.69

By most accounts, Ahmadinejad from a young age has been 

devoutly religious and socially conservative. While he came 

from a family with sufficient means to send him to private 

schools, they kept a simple household and honored Shiite traditions. Ahmadinejad and his family continue to live a simple 

lifestyle—a well-publicized feature of his presidential campaign. 

During the campaign, he also had strong support from many of 

Iran’s most politicized, hard-line clerics in Qom, who advocate 

a return to the revolution’s roots.

Said to be Ahmadinejad’s spiritual advisor, 72-year-old seminary scholar Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi heads 

the Imam Khomeini Institute and the influential “Haqqani circle” in Qom. A sampling of his political statements put him at 

the extreme end of the spectrum: “If someone tells you he has 

a new interpretation of Islam, hit him in the mouth,” “The people are ignorant sheep,” and “Killing hypocrites does not require 

a court order. . . . Throw them down from a high mountain.”70

Contesting Mesbah-Yazdi’s ideological influence on Iran’s 

president, a Tehran University political scientist and childhood 

friend of Ahmadinejad downplays the extreme cleric’s role, calling the relationship one of political convenience. He instead 

claims that Ahmadinejad’s political ideas, such as they are—

radical egalitarianism and militant anti-imperialism—come 

primarily from Ali Shariati, the influential twentieth-century 

Islamic theorist.71 Ahmadinejad’s economic ideas by most 

accounts reprise Khomeini’s statement that the revolution was 

not about “the price of melons.”

Ahmadinejad’s formal powers as president are primarily 

domestic; he directs budgetary and economic policy and has 

appointment power for various ministerial positions. In the foreign policy realm, the president chairs the Supreme National 
ANALYSIS OF IRAN

36

Security Council (SNSC), which also includes the commanders 

of the regular armed forces and IRGC, two supreme leader representatives, and the heads of the foreign, interior, and intelligence ministries. This body—generally given some latitude by 

Khamenei—performs its constitutional function of crafting 

defense and security policy under the general guidance of the 

supreme leader. The SNSC’s current secretary, former IRGC 

brigadier general Ali Larijani, also leads Iran’s international 

nuclear negotiations.

Larijani, a Khamenei protégé, has had to moderate some of 

Ahmadinejad’s most bellicose public statements on the nuclear 

issue, but the SNSC has clearly tacked to the right under 

Ahmadinejad. This is also reflected in the increased militarization of Iran’s foreign and nuclear policy. As president, Ahmadinejad replaced scores of professional diplomats and government officials with cronies from the Revolutionary Guard and 

security and intelligence communities.72 Ahmadinejad does not 

possess a power network based on family, wealth, or clerical 

status, but instead he exerts informal influence mainly through 

shared wartime experience and close ties to the IRGC and intelligence communities.

The 120,000-man IRGC has emerged as a powerful policy 

player in its own right. It exploits its direct access to the supreme 

leader and, along with the intelligence services, its control over 

information. Its close ties to extreme elements of the clerical 

community in Qom also extend its influence to the judiciary 

and Expediency Council. Unlike Iran’s 450,000-man regular 

military, with its traditional responsibilities to defend Iran’s 

borders, the more ideological IRGC protects the revolution and 

its achievements.73

And along with its paramilitary basij force, the IRGC performs various internal functions for the regime, gets favorable 

budgetary treatment, and maintains operational ties with foreign proxies. Most current and former IRGC commanders are 

culturally conservative nonclerics that fought in the Iran-Iraq 

War, have technical or engineering backgrounds, and toe a 

hard nationalist line; Ahmadinejad exemplifies the mold.

The Guard has expanding financial and institutional interests in ensuring regime survival and preventing political 

reforms. It owns large corporate enterprises in telecommunica-
37

ANALYSIS OF IRAN

tions and other industries and increasingly exercises contracting independence for new weapons programs.74 Significantly, 

the IRGC also runs firms responsible for procuring hardware 

for Iran’s Shahab missile program and nuclear industries.75

The Guard’s growing assertiveness became more evident in 

its poor relations with former president Khatami. Viewing his 

reform agenda as a danger to revolutionary pillars, IRGC commander Safavi made thinly veiled threats: “I have made the 

supreme leader Khamenei aware that there is a new form of 

hypocrisy disguised by the clergy. . . . Some of them should be 

beheaded or have their tongues torn out,” and “When I see 

conspirator cultural currents, I give myself the right to defend 

the revolution and my commander, the esteemed Leader, has 

not prevented me.”76

It seems plausible that the IRGC kept Khatami in the dark 

on some of its weapons programs and foreign ventures. Khatami clearly had no awareness of or control over its internal 

activities. It seems less plausible, however, that Ahmadinejad 

would be ignorant of IRGC activities, given his ideological affinities and network of connections in defense and intelligence 

circles. Dependency between the IRGC and supreme leader 

seems increasingly a two-way street. Some analysts speculate 

that the Guard may become a “king maker” when the time 

comes to name Khamenei’s successor.77

The Pragmatists

Between Ahmadinejad and Khatami on the political spectrum sit the pragmatists. This faction’s leader, 72-year-old 

Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, has been at or near 

the top of Iranian politics and society since the revolution. Like 

Khamenei, Rafsanjani aligned politically with Khomeini in the 

1960s and ’70s and suffered multiple imprisonments and torture under the shah. Rafsanjani held positions as Iran’s Majles

speaker, 1980–89, and president, 1989–97. Though defeated in 

2005 in his bid for a third presidential term, he still wields 

official power today through his seats on the Assembly of 

Experts and Expediency Council, which he chairs. These two 

bodies have constitutional authority to oversee and arbitrate 
ANALYSIS OF IRAN

38

disputes between Iran’s governing institutions and select the 

next supreme leader.

Arguably Iran’s richest man, Rafsanjani’s vast informal networks extend into nearly every facet of Iranian politics and 

society. He exerts influence in several ways: as family patriarch 

through his siblings, children, and extended clan who are active 

in various political and large business enterprises; through 

connections to bonyads; through his revolutionary and generational commonalities with Khamenei and other senior Iranian 

figures; through clerical ties; and simply through his wealth 

and stature as Iran’s senior statesman. His tactical maneuvering and willingness to form ad hoc alliances also keep him at 

the center of Iran’s political dynamic. Finally, his direct access 

to and long relationship with Khamenei give him a prominent, 

though informal place in major foreign policy decisions.

Neither a revolutionary ideologue nor democratic reformer, Rafsanjani seems more the practical politician and businessman.78 If 

the system allowed him sole control, one could see something like 

a “China model” for Iran as a real possibility. Rafsanjani desires 

stable geopolitical and domestic conditions so that Iran can repair 

and strengthen its economy and achieve its rightful place on the 

world stage. He recently stated “domestic and foreign conflicts . . . 

will lead to the flight of capital from this country.”79 Seeing Iran’s 

restive, underemployed youth as potentially destabilizing, pragmatists shun strict Islamic social mores and instead call for 

greater cultural tolerance and job growth. 

Rafsanjani views Ahmadinejad’s populist economic policies 

as the wrong prescription for Iran. He sees private ownership, 

competition, foreign investment, and technocratic competence 

as the keys to Iran’s economic and national future. His comments indicate a desire not to reject the revolution but to reconcile it with global economic realities. He can still make fiery 

speeches denouncing the United States and Israel, but his 

rhetoric focuses on specific policies, leaving the door at least 

partially open for future cooperation. Rafsanjani’s politics are 

not always easy to pin down, but “economic nationalist” would 

seem a more apt label than “liberal democrat.”

From a US policy standpoint, Rafsanjani should be viewed as 

a crafty but rational man with whom one should look to do business. In his 2005 presidential campaign, he called for “positive 
39

ANALYSIS OF IRAN

and constructive interaction with the international arena: renewing bonds and links with the rest of the world in order to remedy 

the country’s vulnerabilities on the international stage and 

speeding up the process of foreign investment in Iran.”80 Populist hard-liners attack this as corrupt mullahs trying to protect 

their investments at the expense of the nation’s honor. 

Though Rafsanjani lost the 2005 election, he successfully 

formed a tactical alliance with reformist leader and former 

president Mohammad Khatami in the December 2006 City 

Council elections, which contributed to the defeat of most hardline candidates.81 Rafsanjani himself won nearly twice as many 

votes as previously mentioned hard-line cleric Mesbah-Yazdi in 

the same election for Assembly of Experts.

The Reformers

The reformers are the most popular but least powerful faction in Iran. With conservatives consolidating institutional 

power and driving up the price of political activism, Khatami’s 

agenda has been relegated to the political margins—at least for 

now. Unlike the pragmatists, the reformers’ ideas confront 

directly the ideological foundations and legitimacy of the revolution. The movement does not, however, call for a complete 

overthrow of the current government; hence, it remains legitimate within the democratic system. But Khatami’s attempts to 

make changes within the existing system proved to be simultaneously too threatening to hard-liners and too slow and ineffectual to his constituents.

Women make up a large percentage of the pragmatic constituency. Iran’s most famous woman, human rights lawyer 

Shirin Ebadi, winner of the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize, recently 

published her memoir illuminating some social impulses brewing in Iran today—a resource that provides helpful insights for 

US policy makers.

The near-universal education of postrevolutionary Iranian 

women, remarkable by regional standards, has produced what 

Ebadi calls “a visceral consciousness of their oppression.”82

Women outnumber men at universities but, with triple the rate 

of unemployment, face even bleaker prospects upon graduation. Many of those with means seek opportunity in Western 
ANALYSIS OF IRAN

40

countries, adding to Iran’s “brain drain.” Ebadi also described 

the social effects of rapidly expanding Internet usage in Iran, 

especially among educated, reform-minded youth and women, 

and the regime’s inability to fully censor or control information 

flow. Along with previously mentioned social factors, Iran’s 

educated women portend inevitable political change.

The work of one of Iran’s most prominent intellectuals provides a philosophical foundation for such a change. Professor 

Abdul-Karim Soroush argues that there is no “official” or “final” 

interpretation of Islam and that a state’s “ideologization [sic] of 

religion” leads to its vulgarization.83 His writings, which attempt 

to reconcile Islam with modernity and plainly challenge velayate faqih, have gained a wide, enthusiastic audience in Iran and 

elsewhere. But concepts such as “an ideal religious society 

can’t have anything but a democratic government” and “in an 

ideal religious society, no personality or fatwa [religious decree] 

should be above criticism . . . clerics must be accountable as 

everyone else” were not received well in Tehran.84

The regime’s basij henchmen physically attacked Soroush at 

Tehran University and made death threats to his family. Under 

increasing danger, he eventually left the country to speak and 

teach abroad. Not lost on Iranians who lived through the revolution, the regime’s use of the MOIS and secret police to repress 

political dissent resembles the shah’s use of SAVAK and the rot 

it exposed. The current price of dissent is high in Iran, but 

demographic realities keep the clock of political reform ticking. 

Virtually every day, international policy makers are dealing 

with another ticking in Tehran: the nuclear clock.

Nuclear Desire

Nuclear power is very important to Iran. US policy makers 

must understand the degree to which Iranians, across the 

political spectrum, support their nation’s nuclear energy program. Recent, widely respected polling done in Iran found that 

an overwhelming majority (84 percent) said it was “very important” for Iran to have a full-fuel-cycle program.85 Respondents 

cited several “key reasons” to have such a capability, in priority 

order: “securing Iran’s energy needs, enhancing Iran’s national 

technical competence, enhancing Iran’s great power status, 
41

ANALYSIS OF IRAN

preserving Iran’s rights to nuclear technology under the NPT 

[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty], and preventing other countries from trying to economically and politically dominate Iran.” 

The NPT is, of course, the 1968 international treaty designed to 

stop proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarm nuclear states to 

the extent possible, and allow peaceful nuclear power technology as verified through its watchdog organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this regard, Iranian 

perceptions of nuclear power are dismissive of Western talk of 

a “Libya model” for Iran, viewing any such comparison as an 

insult to their national pride because Iran would never “give in” 

to “international bullying.”

Respondents were not asked specific questions about weaponization or sanctions cost-tolerance, but most analysts agree 

that the majority of Iranians presently do not want nuclear 

weapons at the price of further economic and political isolation. The current hard-line regime and its media organs deny 

any intent to develop nuclear weapons and frame the domestic 

debate in terms of national pride, double standards, and US 

bullying—themes that resonate well in Iran. With failed economic policies and weak domestic support, hard-liners hope to 

stoke nationalist flames around the nuclear issue to legitimize 

their hold on power and marginalize moderates.86

The internal political debate appears to have coalesced 

around two positions. Hard-liners, like Ahmadinejad (backed 

by the IRGC command), push for a costs-be-damned overt 

weapons capability, while pragmatists, like Rafsanjani, give 

Iran’s economic health top priority and prefer sanctions avoidance and continued technical advances within prescriptions 

under the NPT.87 The latter position leaves room for a more 

ambiguous “nuclear hedging” strategy in which Iran could 

achieve greater status and move closer to a weapons capability 

while avoiding the high political and economic costs that an 

overt breakout would precipitate.

With respect to the regime’s threat perceptions, the US military presence in the region continues to dominate. Other 

regional nuclear actors such as Israel and Pakistan, for example, undoubtedly also affect Tehran’s strategic calculus. The 

United States, however, remains the overriding external perceived threat to the regime and its regional hegemonic ambi-
ANALYSIS OF IRAN

42

tions. While IRGC commanders publicly trumpet Iran’s growing 

sea-denial capabilities and the painful costs the United States 

would suffer for military action, they see nuclear weapons as 

the only real national deterrent for Iran, and their best response 

to US conventional superiority. 

This nuclear posturing is consistent with comments made by 

Iran-Iraq War veterans within the regime’s increasingly militarized leadership. Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator and former 

IRGC general, Ali Larijani, said to an audience of IRGC commanders that to counter US pressure, “you have to find a way 

to be able to take the country’s level and status to a point so as 

to automatically solve your national security problem, otherwise this pressure factor will always weigh upon you.” He continued to say that “if Iran becomes [a nuclear power], no longer 

will anyone dare challenge it, because they would have to pay 

too high a price.”88 The IRGC and many in Iran’s scientific community have increasing institutional interests in the nuclear 

program. Decades of investments also give the program a 

momentum of its own.

Khamenei remains the central hinge in Iran’s internal nuclear 

debate and future nuclear course. His traditional desire for 

consensus suggests that Iran will likely continue down an 

ambiguous, dissembling path. He also does not appear to have 

sufficient legitimacy, clout, or will to stake out a bold diplomatic course for Iran by clearly and divisively aligning himself 

with either the hard-liners or pragmatists.89 A late-life, Sadator Rabin-like move does not appear to be in his repertoire. The 

possibility of a total alienation of his hard-line clerical and military base seems equally remote. Given economic and demographic trend lines in Iran, the luxury of a noncommittal course 

may not remain viable beyond the near term.

An important note of caution should be injected when analyzing the possibility of preemptive military strikes against Iranian nuclear assets. This approach would mobilize Iranian 

nationalism and bankrupt moderate political voices in Tehran. 

It would also give credence to current hard-line arguments, 

increase Iranians’ cost-tolerance for the nuclear program, and 

force Khamenei to align with Iran’s most extreme political 

forces.90 This approach would also reduce the economic pressure that is currently opening fissures between hard-liners and 
43

ANALYSIS OF IRAN

more traditional conservatives. As odd as it sounds, preemptive 

military action could effectively reward hard-liners for their 

international intransigence and allow them, at least in the near 

term, to strengthen their grip on policy-making institutions.91

This chapter offers a better understanding of Iran’s internal 

dynamics, describing structural weaknesses in Iran’s economy, 

the regime’s dependence on a fundamentally weak oil industry, 

the intertwined nature of political and economic power in Iran, 

and several policy-relevant demographic and social trends. It 

also more systematically peered inside key institutions, networks, and influential personalities within the regime to reduce 

uncertainty about future behavior, better comprehend Iran’s 

nuclear motives, and inform a coherent US policy. To further 

chart a course for a successful strategy, analysis of the US 

position and perception is needed.

Notes

1. Constitution of the Islamic Republic, http://www.iranonline.com/iran/

iran-info/Government/constitution.html. 

2. CIA, World Factbook 2006, http://www.cia.gov; and Population Reference Bureau (PRB), 2006 World Population Datasheet, http://www.prb.org. 

3. Ibid.

4. PRB, Demographic Data and Estimates for Countries and Regions of the 

World, http://www.prb.org.

5. Keddie, Modern Iran, 313–14; and John R. Bradley, “Iran’s Ethnic Tinderbox,” Washington Quarterly 30, no. 1 (Winter 2006–07): 181–90.

6. “Iran: Assassination, Confusion, or Disinformation,” Stratfor Intelligence Briefing, 20 December 2005, http://www.stratfor.com. 

7. Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran, 113–14.

8. Both Khatami and Ahmadinejad, for example, made addressing ethnic 

issues a part of their presidential campaigns.

9. Official Khamenei biography, http://www.leader.ir/langs/EN/index

.php?p=bio; and Price, Iran’s Diverse Peoples, 329.

10. Laura Secor, “Whose Iran?” New York Times Magazine, 28 January 

2007, 48–53.

11. Ibid., 258–59.

12. Buchta, Taking Stock, 44.

13. For anecdotal evidence based on street interviews, see Hiro, Iranian 

Labyrinth, and Wright, Last Great Revolution.

14. Nasr, Shia Revival, 251.

15. Buchta, Taking Stock, 46.

16. Elliot Hen-Tov, “Understanding Iran’s new Authoritarianism,” Washington Quarterly 30, no. 1 (Winter 2006–07): 163–79. See also, Ali Gheissari 
ANALYSIS OF IRAN

44

and Vali Nasr, “The Conservative Consolidation in Iran,” Survival, 47, no. 2 

(Summer 2005), 175–90.

17. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, co-chairs, Iran: Time for a 

New Approach (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations Task Force 

Report, 2004), 12–17; Frederic Tellier, The Iranian Moment, Policy Focus no. 

52 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006), 2–4; 

and Buchta, Taking Stock, 45.

18. See Buchta, Who Rules Iran, for a comprehensive, single-source 

description of Iran’s formal and informal power centers.

19. Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran, 143–51.

20. Ibid. See also, Shirin Ebadi, Iran Awakening, 158–59; and Buchta, 

Who Rules Iran, 33.

21. Keddie, Modern Iran, 328.

22. Secor, “Whose Iran?” See also, “A President under Fire at Home,” 

Economist, 18 January 2007, 57.

23. Ibid.

24. Niusha Boghrati, “President Ahmadinejad’s First Year,” Worldpress, 

18 July 2006, http://www.worldpress.org.

25. Secor, “Whose Iran?” 50.

26. Vivienne Walt, “Iran Looks East,” Fortune 151, no. 4 (21 February 

2005): 88–95.

27. Parvin Alizadeh, “Iran’s Quandary: Economic Reforms and the ‘Structural Trap’,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 9, no. 2 (Winter/Spring 2003); 

Roger Stern, “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security,” PNAS 104, no.1 (2 January 2007): 377–82; Lisa Margonelli, Oil on the 

Brain (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 211; and “Iran: Time for a New Approach,” 

CFR Task Force Report, 2004, 14. 

28. Walt, “Iran Looks East,” Fortune, 88–95.

29. See Hen-Tov, “Understanding Iran’s New Authoritarianism,” 169–70; 

Buchta, Who Rules Iran, 170–73; and Byman et al., “Iran’s Security Policy,” 

16–19.

30. Dr. Gil Feiler, Iran and the West: Who Needs Whom? A Look at the 

Consequences of Ahmadinejad’s Economic and Foreign Policies, Perspective 

Paper 14 (Ramat Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 7 

March 2006), http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/perspectives14.html.

31. Margonelli, Oil on the Brain, 212.

32. Wright, Last Great Revolution, 278–85.

33. Paul Simons, deputy assistant secretary for Economic and Business 

Affairs, State Department, Testimony to Joint Economic Committee of Congress, 25 July 2006.

34. David Wood and Michael J. Economides, “Iran Stuck in Neutral: 

Energy Geopolitics Hinder Iran’s Oil and Gas Industry’s Development,” 

Energy Tribune, 11 December 2006.

35. Stern, “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis,” 379–81.

36. Ibid.

37. Reza Bayegan, “Iran’s New Oil Disorder—An Interview with Dr. Parviz 

Mina,” Ektaban Ovserver, 4 August 2005.
45

ANALYSIS OF IRAN

38. Stern, “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis,” 377–82.

39. Kjetil Bjorvatn and Kjetil Selvik, “Destructive Competition: Factionalism and Rent-Seeking in Iran,” Research Paper, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Oslo, 14 February 2007, 

http://www.nhh.no/sam/cv/paper/iranmodel8february2007.pdf.

40. Stern, “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis,” 377–82.

41. Wood and Economides, “Iran Stuck in Neutral.” 

42. Walt, “Iran Looks East,” 88–95.

43. Bayegan, “Iran’s New Oil Disorder”; Stern, “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis,” 380; and Margonelli, Oil on the Brain, 214.

44. John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial 

World (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006).

45. Garver, China and Iran, 270; Walt, “Iran Looks East,” 88–95; and Margonelli, Oil on the Brain, 232.

46. Garver, China and Iran, 246–69.

47. Walt, “Iran Looks East.”

48. Ibid.

49. Jahangir Amuzegar, “Iran’s Underground Economy,” Middle East Economic Survey, 8 September 2003; Wright, Last Great Revolution, 278; Buchta, 

Who Rules Iran, 73–77; and Keddie, Modern Iran, 342.

50. Ali A. Saeidi, “The Accountability of Para-governmental Organizations 

(Bonyads): The Case of Iranian Foundations,” Iranian Studies 37, no. 3 (September 2004): 479–98.

51. Buchta, Taking Stock, 75.

52. Abbas William Samii, “The Iranian Nuclear Issue and Informal Networks,” Naval War College Review 59, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 68.

53. Shaul Bakhash, a 2004 visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution 

who has written widely on Iran, quoted in Kambiz Foroohar, “Iran’s Power 

Brokers,” The Iranian.Com, 21 April 2004, http://www.theiranian.com.

54. Saeidi, “Accountability of Para-governmental Organizations,” 497; and 

Samii, “The Iranian Nuclear Issue,” 67–68.

55. Byman et al., “Iran’s Security Policy,” 21–29.

56. Samii, “The Iranian Nuclear Issue,” 64.

57. Byman et al., “Iran’s Security Policy,” 22.

58. Ibid., 100.

59. Abbas William Samii, “Iran: New Foreign Policy Council Could Curtail 

Ahmadinejad’s Power,” Radio Free Europe, 29 June 2006, http://www.rferl

.org/featuresarticleprint/2006/06.

60. Constitution of the Islamic Republic, Article 110, http://www.iranon 

line.com/iran/iran-info/Government/constitution-8.html.

61. Buchta, Taking Stock, 14–23.

62. Ibid.

63. Khamenei official biography, Office of the Supreme Leader, http://

www.leader.ir/langs/EN.

64. Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 33–34; and Buchta, Who Rules Iran, 55.

65. Gheissari and Nasr, “The Conservative Consolidation in Iran,” 176–77.
ANALYSIS OF IRAN

46

66. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, speech, 26 October 2005, http://sharifnews

.com/?10484.

67. Not all Iranian politicians fall neatly into one of these factions. Buchta, 

in Who Rules Iran, adds more groupings. Takeyh, in Hidden Iran, uses hardliners, pragmatists, and reformers.

68. See Ahmadinejad’s official biography at http://www.president.ir/eng/

ahmadinejad/bio, as well as his Global Security.org profile. See also, Alireza 

Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear 

Crisis (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2007), 3–25; and Ilan Berman, Understanding Ahmadinejad, American Foreign Policy Council Strategy Brief, June 

2006.

69. Islamic Republic of Iran’s official Web site, “Biography of H. E. Dr. 

Ahmadi Nejad, Honourable President of Islamic Republic of Iran,” http://

www.president.ir/eng/ahmadinejad/bio/ (accessed 23 March 2007),

70. Secor, “Whose Iran?”

71. Comments from Tehran University political scientist Nasser Hadian, 

cited in Secor, “Whose Iran?”

72. Jafarzadeh, Iran Threat, 331; and Secor, “Whose Iran?” 50.

73. Constitution of the Islamic Republic, Articles 143 and 150, http://

www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/Government/constitution-8.html.

74. Gheissari and Nasr, “The Conservative Consolidation in Iran,” 181; 

and Buchta, Who Rules Iran, 67–68. 

75. Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 38; and Gheissari and Nasr, “The Conservative 

Consolidation in Iran,” 188.

76. Buchta, Who Rules Iran, 143; and Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 52.

77. Gheissari and Nasr, “The Conservative Consolidation in Iran,” 184.

78. For insights into Rafsanjani’s politics and personality, see Pollack, The 

Persian Puzzle; Manashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran; Hiro, Iranian 

Labyrinth; Clawson and Rubin, Eternal Iran; and Takeyh, Hidden Iran.

79. Ken Pollack, “What Iran Really Wants,” Current History, November 

2006, 368.

80. “Iran Press: Rafsanjani Outlines Five Post-Election Pledges to Nation,” 

Iran (Tehran), 31 May 2005, in BBC Monitoring, 2 June 2005.

81. Kamal Nazer Yasin, “Resurgent Pragmatists Work to Push Iran in a Different Direction,” Eurasia Insight, 9 January 2007, http://www.eurasianet

.org.

82. Ebadi, Iran Awakening, 108.

83. For summaries of Soroush’s ideas, see Menashri, Post-Revolutionary 

Politics in Iran, 32–35; and Wright, Last Great Revolution.

84. Wright, Last Great Revolution, 55.

85. See poll results in “Public Opinion in Iran and America on Key International Issues,” conducted by The Program for International Policy Attitudes 

and Search for Common Ground (SFCG), report dated 24 January 2007, 

http://worldpublicopinion.org.

86. Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, 28.

87. See Ken Pollack, “Iran: Three Alternative Futures,” The Middle East 

Review of International Affairs, June 2006.
47

ANALYSIS OF IRAN

88. Ali Larijani, Remarks to IRGC commanders, November 2005, quoted 

in “Larijani—Now is the Time for Resistance,” Farhang-e Ashti, BBC Monitoring, 12 December 2005.

89. Pollack, “Iran: Three Alternative Futures.”

90. Barry R. Posen, “A Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult but Not Impossible 

Problem,” Century Foundation Report, 2006, http://www.tcf.org.

91. Pollack, “Iran: Three Alternative Futures.”

49

Chapter 4

US Perceptions

There are things known and there are things unknown, 

and in between are the doors of perception.

—Aldous Huxley

This is the first of two chapters to set the stage for our policy 

proposal. Specifically, for our purpose here, how does the 

United States perceive recent developments in Iran? Also, how 

does it perceive Iran’s external behavior? This chapter should 

not to be considered a comprehensive introduction and review 

of documents that shape US perceptions of Iran internally or 

externally. Instead, the intent is to provide an overview and 

framework for future chapters.

As described above, it is absolutely critical for any future US 

policy maker dealing with Iran to understand how Iranians 

resent foreign domination, feel isolated, and fully expect themselves to assume their rightful role as a regional leader. As a 

summary statement, since 1953 Iran has perceived the United 

States as a “foreign dominator” that created or exacerbated Iran’s 

feeling of isolation and obstructed its destiny to be a dominant 

force in the Middle East and leader in the Islamic world. 

How does the United States perceive Iran internally? How 

does it view Iran’s regional aspirations politically, economically, 

religiously, and even militarily? How does the United States 

perceive Iran’s nuclear ambitions? These questions are very 

difficult to answer because they are by their very nature subjective. A summary of US perceptions is needed before moving 

on. For brevity, we limit the discussion to the last five years.

Of all the questions above, perhaps the easiest to answer is 

how the United States perceives Iran both internally and externally, because of very straightforward policy statements made 

by the US government. 

US Perceptions of Iran Internally

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 

(NSS) states: “Tyrannical regimes such as Iran . . . that oppress 
US PERCEPTIONS

at home and sponsor terrorism abroad know we will continue to 

stand with their people against their misrule.”1 The president, in 

a speech on 16 June 2005, clearly summarizes the administration’s perception of Iran internally and sets the stage for our 

next question on how the US perceives Iran within the region:

The Iranian people are heirs to a great civilization—and they deserve a 

government that honors their ideals and unleashes their talent and 

creativity. Today, Iran is ruled by men who suppress liberty at home 

and spread terror across the world. Power is in the hands of an unelected few who have retained power through an electoral process that 

ignores the basic requirements of democracy.

Today, the Iranian regime denies all these rights. It shuts down independent newspapers and websites and jails those who dare to challenge the 

corrupt system. It brutalizes its people and denies them their liberty.2

Rarely in the US political realm has there been as much unanimity as there is on US perceptions of Iran internally. Congressional statements abound confirming this point: “Iran’s 

internal politics are dominated by a clerical clique that holds 

power by force.”3 Military planners and scholars on Iran share 

this perception, but it is in these spheres, away from the political realm, that one hears caveats. The two most common are 

that the government of Iran is extremely complex and that “Iran 

today is a nation in search of an identity, a state that oscillates 

between promises of democratic modernity and retrogressive 

tradition.”4 As previous chapters demonstrate, US security 

planners and scholars are very cognizant of the complex situation within Iran.5

Beyond the presidential and NSS statements, there seems to 

be consensus within the US government and academia that Iran 

has a youthful population, untapped economic potential, vast 

natural resources, and cultural dynamism yearning to be set 

free. Within government and academia, a vocal minority views 

Iran in much less hopeful terms and lumps the entirety of Iran 

into the same category as its leaders without any distinction.6 

The perception by the US populace of Iran generally differs 

from those more familiar with the subject. Polling routinely 

finds that the American public views Iran in a negative light. 

Interestingly, when studying the US populace and its perception of Iran, there are few polls which differentiate between 

Americans’ perception of Iran’s leadership and its population. 

50
51

US PERCEPTIONS

In general, US polling focuses on Iran’s interference in Iraq and 

its nuclear aspirations. To summarize, based on these polls, 

most people view “Iran” as a “growing threat.”7 Perhaps the 

most illuminating poll, because of questioning ambiguity, is 

one conducted in December of 2006 by the Opinion Research 

Corporation for CNN. It polled 1,119 American adults nationwide and asked that for Iran “please say whether you consider 

it an ally of the United States, friendly but not an ally, unfriendly, 

or an enemy of the United States.” With an estimated margin of 

error at ±3 percent, the answers were: 4 percent ally, 14 percent friendly, 29 percent unfriendly, 48 percent enemy, and 5 

percent unsure.8 The poll did not distinguish between the leaders in Iran and the people. One poll that did distinguish between 

the leadership of Iran and its people points to similar conclusions by the US population. This poll concluded that 59 percent of polled Americans view the Iranian people unfavorably 

and only 29 percent view them favorably.9 The United States, in 

general, views Iran as a threat. 

US Perceptions of Iran Externally

The United States sees Iran as seeking to become a regional 

power, create a nuclear weapons capability, destabilize the 

Middle East, export terrorists throughout the world, and act as 

a spoiler for the United States in Iraq.10 Nicholas R. Burns, 

undersecretary of state for political affairs (a key spokesperson 

for the administration on Iran) summarizes the US government’s perception of Iran in Iraq: 

I would say that next to the challenge we have in front of us in Iraq, nothing is more important to the United States in the years ahead than to deal 

with this challenge which is multifaceted from the Iranian government. 

That challenge is an Iran that most of the world believes is trying to 

achieve a nuclear weapons capability, an Iran that continues to be in 

many respects the central banker of most of the Middle East terrorist 

groups of Hezbollah and Hamas, of Palestinian and Islamic Jihad, of the 

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command, just to 

name four terrorist groups. And an Iran, because of its policy in recent 

years, particularly through the statements and actions of President Ahmadinejad, that has caused instability in its relations with most of the 

Arab world and the countries of the greater Middle East.11
US PERCEPTIONS

52

The US government contends that there is abundant proof 

that Iran is trying to spoil US efforts in Iraq. The US administration’s position is that “Iran has been cultivating influence in 

Iraq through all means at its disposal. Iran’s threat involves 

both lethal action and the burrowing of Iranian actors into Iraqi 

institutions.”12

Regionally, the United States believes there is a level of 

unease among most countries of the Middle East in regard to 

Iran. “The Sunni-dominated monarchies are increasingly concerned that Shi’a-dominated Iran will try to dominate the region 

by appealing to Shiites in such places as Bahrain, Lebanon 

and Saudi Arabia.”13 These growing regional concerns are not 

just among countries with large Shiite populations but extend 

to Egypt and Jordan as well. Some of this concern stems from 

the purely Shi’a and Sunni divide, but there is also a less tangible issue on the minds of many in the Middle East discussed 

in earlier chapters—Iran is Persian and not Arab.14

Traditionally, some of the Arab sheikdoms have relied on the 

United States to come to their rescue if a country within the 

region or from the outside oversteps, much as the United States 

did in 1991 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Now the equation for 

this relationship is changing because of the growing regional 

fear of Iran. The clearest demonstration of this is the January 

2007 International Defence Equipment Exhibition (IDEX 2007) 

in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE). If the deals which 

were announced are completed, “then the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia will spend nearly $60 

billion this year” on military inventory, a nearly fivefold increase 

from last year.15 This reaction is not due to terrorism in the 

region nor the problems in Iraq; it is because of Iran.

Iran’s nuclear weapons program is a regional and international concern and the crux of the current crisis for the United 

States and the West. The specter of a nuclear-armed Iran dominates discussions in the region, and there are virtually no diplomatic, economic, or military forums internationally that do 

not treat this issue as a top priority.

Interestingly, many may forget that the origins of Iran’s 

nuclear program are American. As early as 1957, the United 

States began working with the shah to develop a civilian nuclear 

capability. The remnants of this program made it through the 
53

US PERCEPTIONS

1979 revolution and remain the foundation of Iran’s current 

program. Since Iran is a signatory of the 1968 NPT, why is this 

issue such a concern for the United States and the world?16

The answer is found in the nature of how the United States 

views Iran today. The United States and the world view Iran as 

going well beyond the NPT provisions for peaceful production of 

nuclear power. Increasingly, the United States and the international community characterize Iran’s nuclear program as a 

threat. Iran has been warned, repeatedly, by the United States 

and the international community since 2002, when a much 

more robust nuclear program than anyone had considered 

came to light. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (a dissident group) brought to light numerous facilities that are likely 

the “tip of the iceberg” of the Iranian nuclear program.17 These 

ongoing warnings are intended to bring Iran back into compliance with NPT protocols. 

Throughout the 2002–06 time frame, warnings to Iran culminated in sanctions by UNSCR 1737. This resolution asked 

Iran to be more transparent in its program and to stop nuclearrelated activities within 60 days.18 Tehran rejected this and 

missed the deadline of 23 February 2007.19 In the month just 

after the deadline, top officials from the United States, Britain, 

China, Russia, Germany, and France hammered out a new 

resolution (UNSCR 1747, 24 March 2004). This resolution further targets the Iranian nuclear program. UNSCR 1747, passed 

unanimously by the 15-member Security Council, places an 

embargo on Iranian weapons exports, bars nations and international banks from making new loans to Iran, freezes assets 

of 28 additional Iranian individuals and organizations involved 

in the nuclear and missile program, and calls for a voluntary 

travel embargo on Iranian officials and IRGC commanders. Iran 

immediately rejected the measure.20 Behind the scenes, the 

United States and the West continue to view the Iranian program as a façade for a weapons program, despite constant 

proclamations to the contrary from President Ahmadinejad. 

From the US perspective, Iran remains defiant and is working 

as rapidly as possible to develop nuclear technology.21

The United States perceives Iran as a dangerous destabilizing force in the region, an exporter of terrorism, a spoiler of US 

goals in Iraq, and as a country bent on gaining a nuclear 
US PERCEPTIONS

54

weapon. When juxtaposing chapters 2 and 3 with this chapter, 

one can see the significant hurdles facing policy makers in 

devising a cogent strategy for dealing with Iran. What are the 

recent US policies for Iran and have they been effective?

Notes

1. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of 

America, March 2006.

2. George W. Bush, “Statement of the President of the United States, 16 

June 2005,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/200506 

16.html. 

3. Henry J. Hyde, “United States Policy toward Iran—Next Steps,” Opening Remarks, House Committee on International Relations, 8 March 2006, 

http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/hyde030806

.pdf.

4. Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 3–4.

5. This is an amalgam of interviews conducted by the authors with Kenneth M. Pollack, Judith S. Yaphe, John Limbert, Barbara Slavin, and military 

planners at the Pentagon, 13–16 November 2006.

6. Rick Santorum, “The Gathering Storm,” National Review Online, 26 

October 2006, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MzZmYWUyNWYzNThlM 

2UwZGY0ZmUxYmI5NTIyMTJjYWU.

7. PollingReport.Com, compendium of US polls on Iran, http://www.polling 

report.com/iran.htm.

8. Ibid.

9. Public Diplomacy Online, “Polls in Iran and US Show Shared Concerns 

and Differences,” http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/75.htm. 

10. This is an amalgam of virtually every article published by the US government in regard to Iran over the last couple of years. This information has now 

become “common knowledge” for those most familiar with world current 

events.

11. Nicholas R. Burns, “A Conversation on Iran and US National Security,” remarks to Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 14 February 2007, 

http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/80562.htm. 

12. The White House, “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review,” January 

2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/iraq-strategy011007.pdf.

13. Greg Jaffe and Neil King Jr., “US Courts Allies’ Support on Iran,” Wall 

Street Journal, 16 January 2007.

14. Andrew Higgins, “As US Puts Pressure on Iran, Gulf’s Religious Rift 

Spreads,” Wall Street Journal, 26 February 2007.

15. Hassan M. Fattah, “Arab States, Wary of Iran, Add to their Arsenals 

but Still Lean on the US,” New York Times, 23 February 2007.

16. David Albright, “Appendix A: Timeline of Iran’s Path to Nuclear Weapons,” cited by Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes, Reassessing the Implica-
55

US PERCEPTIONS

tions of a Nuclear-Armed Iran, McNair Paper 69, Institute for Strategic Studies (Washington, DC: National Defense University, August 2005). 

17. Ilan Berman, Tehran Rising: Iran’s Challenge to the United States (Lanham, 

MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 37–41.

18. UN Security Council Resolution 1737, 23 December 2006, http://

daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/681/42/PDF/N0668142.pdf

?Open Element.

19. Helene Cooper, “Diplomats to Begin Drafting New U.N. Sanctions on 

Iran,” New York Times, 27 February 2007.

20. Cable News Network (CNN), “Security Council Approves New Sanctions on Iran,” 26 March 2007, http://us.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/ 

03/24/iran.nuclear/index.html.

21. Mark Heinrich, “Iran Vows to Pursue Atomic Project Despite Deadline,” Reuters, 21 February 2007, http://today.reuters.com/news/article 

news.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2007-02-21T180020Z_01_HAF126411R 

TRUKOC_0_US-IRAN-NUCLEAR1.xml. This study in later chapters demonstrates that these sanctions are directed at precisely the right targets, or 

centers of gravity, within Iran.

57

Chapter 5

Review of Recent US Policy

Our policy toward Iran is aimed at changing the behavior 

of the Iranian government in several key areas, including 

its efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction and 

long-range missiles, its support for terrorism and groups 

that violently oppose the peace process, its attempts to 

undermine friendly governments in the region, and its 

development of offensive military capabilities that threaten our GCC partners and the flow of oil.

—1998 National Security Strategy

Recent US policies toward Iran have been mixed. In a relatively short time, policy approaches included a hands-off 

attempt at containment, direct dialogue with Iran immediately 

following 9/11, and now an increasingly aggressive mixture of 

public diplomacy with punitive sanctions. This is an overview 

of US policies focusing on trends to be used in the subsequent 

strategy proposal. 

Dual Containment

Why begin with Dual Containment Policy (DCP) rather than 

the Reagan or Carter administration? Since 1979 most US policies were slightly different versions of a similar theme. These 

themes are to keep oil flowing, maintain a strategic political 

balance, and try to modify the behavior of the Iranians through 

incentives or disincentives.

When President Clinton took over in 1993, Iran had not only 

rebuked US attempts to reach out, but “had stepped up its animosity toward the United States.”1 While DCP has at its beginning the word “dual,” meaning both Iraq and Iran, in reality the 

United States was really only bottling up Iraq militarily and 

squeezing them economically. The real purpose then of DCP was 

containing Iran. It was clearly the stronger country and capable 

of doing more damage to US vital interests in the long term. A 
REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY

former CIA Iran specialist recalled, “The DCP, more accurately 

described as the Iran Containment Policy, calls for collective economic action against the Islamic Republic of Iran. It represents 

a determined effort to embargo Iran into ever-worsening poverty 

unless it alters its destabilizing, often terrorist, foreign policies.”2

DCP, most experts on Iran policy would agree today, represented 

the “most coherent attempt to establish a blueprint at that time 

for coping with Iranian Islamic militancy.”3

This policy took many forms, but two of the three most tangible ones are President Clinton’s Executive Order 12957 (15 

March 1995), banning US investment in Iran’s energy sector, 

and Executive Order 12959 (6 May 1995), which banned US 

trade with and investment in Iran.4 The last of the three tangible efforts was the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which Congress 

passed and President Clinton signed in 1996. The ILSA aimed 

to cut off financial loans and credit for Iran and to stop their 

export of military technology. The “teeth” of the ILSA was its 

ability to financially cut off any firm found violating these sanctions from US government procurement. It also restricted 

imports to the United States by foreign companies dealing with 

Iran. However, a waiver provision in the ILSA was used immediately after the act was passed to avoid a crisis with Europe. 

This provision has since been used to avoid economic crises 

with the European Union (EU) and Russia.5 In summary, 

despite the original design of the ILSA, by 1998 it had ceased to 

have any real effect on Iran.6

Iran’s role in the bombing of the Khobar Towers further demonstrated the failure of DCP. On 25 June 1996, “acting under 

direct orders from senior Iranian government leaders, the Saudi 

Hezbollah detonated a 25,000-pound TNT bomb that killed 19 

US airmen in their dormitory at Khobar Towers in Dhahran, 

Saudi Arabia.”7 A June 2001 investigation into this bombing 

produced astounding proof, netting 14 indictments by the US 

District Court in Virginia. This indictment stated that, among 

other things, “[Saudi Arabian] Hezbollah organizations were 

inspired, supported, and directed by elements of the Iranian 

government.”8

Another important event for US-Iranian relations occurred 

during the 1990s when the Clinton administration attempted 

to change the nature of the relationship. Many US experts on 

58
59

REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY 

Iran had advocated establishing a dialogue with Tehran since 

the 1979 revolution. One of the first components of such a 

dialogue would be admitting US complicity in the 1953 coup. 

US advocates argued that this would clear the air in the relationship and be a first step in US-Iranian rapprochement. In March 

2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright delivered a speech 

in which she admitted that the United States orchestrated the 

overthrow of then Iranian prime minister Mossadeq. Tehran 

responded with a resounding “we told you so” for the now 

“admitted” action and went further in blaming the United States 

in the Iran-Iraq war. This effort marked “the end of the Clinton 

administration’s bid for reconciliation with Iran.”9

By 2001, when Pres. George W. Bush took office, the only 

country really being effectively contained by the United States 

was Iraq. Iran was largely unabashedly pursuing nuclear weapons, exporting terror, and disrupting the region. The US strategic security assumptions were about to change dramatically.

Post-9/11 Openings

It is almost cliché, but everything changed after the terrorist 

attacks in New York; Washington, DC; and in the skies over 

Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001. US policy toward Iran, if 

only for a short time, also changed. 

There were conflicting messages from Iran after 9/11; most 

notably for the purposes of this study, Iran’s people and some 

of their leaders showed unprecedented support for America.10

After 9/11, the United States focused on the Taliban and alQaeda. Iran gladly helped in this effort because both of these 

organizations were their enemies as well. This created an opening for discussions and diplomacy between the United States 

and Iran. The “six-plus-two” talks and later the “Geneva Contact Group” regarding Afghanistan represented the United 

States’ and Iran’s highest level of diplomacy since the 1979 

revolution. Discussions encompassed a variety of issues 

expanding from the basic theme of an Afghanistan free of alQaeda and the Taliban.11 US policy in regard to Iran had shifted, 

if ever so slightly, and then came the Karine A.

On 3 January 2003, Israel intercepted the ship Karine A, a 

freighter destined for the Palestinians with 50 tons of weapons 
REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY

60

cargo directly from Iran.12 Whether the shipment was part of a 

long-lasting relationship, a one-time shipment, or an act directed 

solely by Iranian intelligence or the Revolutionary Guard Corps 

is unknown. Nonetheless, this event had drastic strategic effects 

that closed the door to US and Iranian diplomacy. “Revelations of 

Iranian-Palestinian collusion to smuggle fifty tons of weapons 

into the hands of Yasir Arafat’s Palestinian Authority (PA) 

through the offices of Hizballah [sic] had profound strategic 

implications for the Middle East.”13

This event meant one thing to the National Security Council 

and the speechwriters working on the Bush administration’s 

State of the Union address in January of 2002. They added 

Iran as one of the countries in an “axis of evil” threatening “the 

United States and free peoples everywhere.”14 To say that the 

president’s characterization disappointed the Iranian leadership would be a gross understatement. The response was 

immediate as the Iranians ceased attending the Geneva Contact Group, thereby ending negotiations at this level and closing many of the diplomatic doors which had opened. The only 

contact between the United States and Iran after this point was 

through informal means or third parties; the diplomatic opening which was created by 9/11 was closed.15 This “refrigeration” of diplomacy between the United States and Iran would 

grow colder as the decade progressed.

Public Diplomacy and Sanctions 

US policy since 2002 focused on addressing three major 

issues and one minor one. The major issues have been the 

growing threat from Iran’s nuclear ambitions and lack of compliance with NPT protocols, exporting terror, and destabilizing 

the Middle East. The minor issue, which has remained a component of US policy for Iran, is a concern over the lack of “true 

democracy” and infringement of human rights. By 2007 two 

more issues had developed to further sour US-Iranian relations. These issues were the specter of overt Iranian military 

posturing in and near the Persian Gulf and US policy as it officially and unofficially relates to the inflammatory rhetoric 

between Iran and Israel.16
61

REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY 

US policy since 2002 has relied on a “variety of tools, including sanctions, interdiction, law enforcement, diplomacy, and 

international public opinion.”17 In essence, US policy toward 

Iran over the last several years has shifted focus based upon 

US perceptions of the Iranian domestic situation, regional 

developments, and the international diplomatic and economic 

environment. A recent example of this shift can be found in the 

president’s reaction to the passing of the Iran Freedom Support 

Act (IFSA) in September 2006:

My Administration is working on many fronts to address the challenges 

posed by the Iranian regime’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, 

support for terrorism, efforts to destabilize the Middle East, and repression of the fundamental human rights of the citizens of Iran. 

I applaud Congress for . . . passing the Iran Freedom Support Act. This 

legislation will codify US sanctions on Iran while providing my Administration with flexibility to tailor those sanctions in appropriate circumstances and impose sanctions upon entities that aid the Iranian regime’s development of nuclear weapons.18

The president’s statement above highlights the issues and 

the policy for dealing with them. The IFSA, signed into law on 

30 September 2006, seeks to strengthen the sanctions regime. 

The IFSA revises the terminology of the ILSA by removing Libya 

because of its positive renunciation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The IFSA also has new provisions for action by the 

United States against companies supporting Iran’s WMD program and also for companies that help Iran obtain “destabilizing” amounts of conventional weapons.19

Public diplomacy and sanctions have become areas of particular emphasis in the last few years, as Iran has accelerated 

its nuclear program. The most recent sanctions have had some 

success at exerting pressure on Iranian leadership.

UNSCRs 1737 and 1747 reflect many components of US policy. 

The United States has also worked diligently outside of the UN 

structure to build economic, diplomatic, and even military coalitions which could counter Iran through pressure. Examples can 

be seen both in and outside the region.

Within the region, the United States is working aggressively 

to build coalitions to counter Iran’s growing power. Diplomatically, the United States is working to stabilize Iraq, which is 

critical. Iran is making the most of the ongoing turmoil created 
REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY

62

by US setbacks in Iraq.20 Further, the United States and several 

Persian Gulf states are working collectively to counter the growing specter of Iranian nuclear ambitions and Shi’a influence in 

their countries. The United States is doing this multilaterally 

with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and bilaterally with a 

number of countries in the Gulf (fig. 3).21 The GCC sees Iran’s 

nuclear activity as a threat to the security of both the Persian 

Gulf region and the entire Middle East. The GCC is willing to 

work diplomatically and economically, and to prepare militarily 

to counter this threat.22

4BVEJ"SBCJB

,VXBJU

2BUBS

#BISBJO

6"&

0NBO

Figure 3. Current members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Adapted 

from map in the public domain.)
63

REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY 

Economically, the easiest way to affect Iran is through the oil 

barrel. It is here that the United States and its allies in the 

Persian Gulf are working to depress the price of oil.23 As seen in 

chapter 3, the Iranian economy desperately needs reforms. 

Beset by rampant corruption, the regime’s economic policies 

have “reduced liquidity, frightened off investment, boosted 

inflation, spurred widespread unemployment, diminished nonoil exports, impoverished the middle class, and created a very 

serious gap between rich and poor.”24

Many regional governments are preparing militarily, as demonstrated by their military procurements and exercises with 

each other and the United States.25 This is not new for the 

GCC, whose stated purpose at its founding was a unified 

response to the Iranian revolution of 1979. 

Part of the American regional strategy to deal with Iran should 

include the former Soviet southern tier countries (fig. 4). Good 

US relations with these countries is a by-product of the US war 

Figure 4. Southern tier of the former Soviet Republics

Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, the University of Texas at Austin, 2003.
REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY

64

in Afghanistan and can be used by the United States as the 

threat from Iran grows. In a recent book by Ilan Berman, entitled 

Tehran Rising, he devotes an entire chapter to “The Northern 

Front,” as he describes it.26 The United States must use caution 

in this area. If not handled deftly, a false step could create collateral political damage in two particularly sensitive areas. The 

United States must be careful because it is dealing with Russia’s 

former components, and Russia has an interest in maintaining 

a safety sphere on its southern tier against Muslim extremism. 

The United States must also be careful not to restoke fears 

within Iran of the historic threat on its northern border previously supplied by the Mongols, Russians, and Soviet Union. 

Despite the risks, the United States must include the former 

Soviet Union’s southern tier countries into any strategy.

Beyond the regional policy, the United States is consistent 

internationally with regard to Iran. It continues to mount international pressure on Iran through multilateral means and 

bilaterally with discussions ongoing in multiple venues. At least 

for the time being, it is important to note that the US policy 

beyond the region focuses almost completely on diplomacy and 

economic instruments of national power. The United States 

uses the following multilateral vehicles to apply pressure on 

Iran outside of the region:

1. The United Nations

2. The European Union

3. The World Trade Organization

4. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund27

The United States also uses the following key bilateral relations to apply pressure on Iran outside of the region:

1. Russia

2. China

3. France

4. Germany

5. United Kingdom

6. India28
65

REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY 

These are not comprehensive lists but are useful in analyzing 

current US thinking in its policies and how they are being 

applied. 

The United States has failed thus far to bring Iran’s nuclear 

program into NPT compliance, stop Iran’s export of terrorism, or 

stop its destabilization of the Middle East. There have been some 

encouraging developments as different variables have come 

together with US policies since the 1979 revolution, but they 

could at best be described as sporadic. The few modest successes, such as the post-9/11 diplomacy and Iranian reaction to 

UNSCR 1737 and 1747, may foreshadow a novel strategy combining diplomacy and pressure.

Notes

1. Pollack, Persian Puzzle, 259.

2. Edward G. Shirley (pseudonym of a former CIA Iran specialist), Foreign 

Policy 96 (Autumn 1994): 75.

3. Ibid.

4. Kenneth Katzman, “The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA),” Congressional 

Research Service Report for Congress, 31 July 2003.

5. Ibid.

6. The two best summary documents of the ILSA chronology and its effects 

are Katzman, “The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)” in its entirety, and Pollack, Persian Puzzle, 286–89. The later work draws on multiple sources but 

is good to read as a single source. The authors’ interview with Kenneth Pollack on 16 November 2006 reinforced this point.

7. Louis J. Freeh, “Khobar Towers: The Clinton Administration Left Many 

Stones Unturned,” Wall Street Journal, editorial page, 25 June 2006. 

8. United States of America v. Ahmed al-Mughassil, Abdel Karim Al-Nasser 

et al. in FindLaw.com, http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/.

9. Pollack, Persian Puzzle, xxv–xxvi.

10. There are conflicting reports on the exact quotations and reactions of 

both the people and the leadership in Iran after 9/11, although the consensus 

is that Iranians generally sympathized with the United States’ plight. Pollack, 

Persian Puzzle, 346, and Ansari, Confronting Iran, 181, are examples of positive 

response such as the “spontaneous candlelight vigil” in Tehran. The Iranian 

leadership’s response was definitely a positive contrast to Iraq’s Sadaam Hussein, who openly welcomed the attacks. There were still many in the leadership 

of Iran at the time who could not bring themselves to condemn the attacks, 

including the supreme leader Ali Khamenei, as noted in several articles found at 

the Middle East Media Research Institute’s (MEMRI) Web site, which reported 

extensively on post-9/11 Muslim response. It must also be noted, the authors 

found questions about MEMRI’s accuracy in reporting as well as allegations of 
REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY

66

bias toward Israel. For more information, see http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi

?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=SP28601.

11. Barbara Slavin, “Iran, US Holding Talks in Geneva,” USA Today, 11 May 

2003; and Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: Current Developments and US Policy,” 

Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress, 26 June 2003, 7.

12. Alan Sipress, “Bush’s Speech Shuts Door on Tenuous Opening to 

Iran,” Washington Post, 4 February 2002.

13. Robert Satloff, Karine-A: The Strategic Implications of Iranian-Palestinian 

Collusion, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch #593, 15 

January 2002, Columbia University’s International Affairs Online (CIAO), http://

www.ciaonet.org/pbei/winep/policy_2002/2002_593.html.

14. Pollack, Persian Puzzle, 352. 

15. Ibid, 352–54. Pollack’s viewpoint was clarified in the authors’ interview on 16 November 2006. The impact on US-Iranian relations by the State 

of the Union address in 2002 cannot be overstated. This was reinforced by 

several discussions the author (Douglass) had with two Iranian students at 

the University of Pittsburgh on diverse occasions.

16. This is a summary of press briefings, statements, and speeches by the 

White House and State Department. Two of the clearest vestiges of this policy 

“era” are testimony delivered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

by Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage on 28 December 2003 and 

comments by Undersecretary of State R. Nicholas Burns at the Michael Stein 

address on US Middle East policy at the Washington Institute’s Soref Symposium in Washington, DC, on 11 May 2006. The authors accessed all of these 

releases through the National Defense University’s Military Education 

Research Library Network (MERLN) at http://merln.ndu.edu/index.cfm?sec

ID=143&pageID=3&type=section.

17. Richard L. Armitage, US Policy and Iran, Opening Remarks before the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 28 October 2003, http://www.state

.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/25682.htm.

18. George W. Bush, Statement of the president of the United States, 30 

September 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/200

60930-4.html.

19. “US Trade Sanctions Expanded For Parties Dealing With Iran: Iran Freedom Support Act Signed Into Law,” Release posted by the Baker Botts law firm, 

Houston, TX, http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/IranFreedomSupportAct 

SignedIntoLaw.htm.

20. Anthony Shadid, “With Iran Ascendant, US Is Seen at Fault: Arab Allies 

in Region Feeling Pressure,” Washington Post (Foreign Service), 30 January 

2007.

21. Glenn Kessler, “A New Tool for Middle East Diplomacy,” Washington 

Post, 17 January 2007.

22. Robert Lowe and Claire Spencer, ed., Iran, Its Neighbours and the 

Regional Crisis: A Middle East Programme Report (London, UK: Chatham 

House, 2006), 36.

23. Anatole Kaletsky, “How the Saudis Plan to Put Oil Squeeze on Iran,” The 

Australian, 29 January 2007, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/ 
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REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY 

0,20867,21131719-601,00.html; and Jad Mouawad, “Saudis Hint at $50-abarrel oil; Iran may be one reason,” Seattle Times, 28 January 2007, http://

seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003544842_oilprices280

.html.

24. Pollack, “Three Alternative Futures.”

25. Fattah, “Arab States, Wary of Iran”; and Farah Stockman, “US Unit 

Works Quietly to Counter Iran’s Sway,” Boston Globe, 2 January 2007, http:// 

www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2007/01/02/us_unit

_works_quietly_to_counter_irans_sway/.

26. Berman, Tehran Rising, 81–99. In the authors’ opinion this chapter is a 

superb overview of the complexity of Iran–US–former Soviet Republic dynamics.

27. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is not 

included because most of its members are regional.

28. Pakistan is not listed because it is regional.

69

Chapter 6

Strategy Groundwork

What do you want to achieve or avoid? The answers to 

this question are objectives. How will you go about 

achieving your desired results? The answer to this you 

can call “strategy.”

—William E. Rothschild

There are volumes of material on the mechanics of strategy 

formulation. The US strategy groundwork for Iran needs to 

consist of assumptions, reevaluated US goals for Iran, centers 

of gravity, and some basic planning mechanics.

Key Assumptions

Assumptions are important to any type of short- or long-term 

planning and allow one to move forward with a “most logical” 

course of events. The following assumptions are very strategic in 

nature. Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces 

of the United States, defines assumptions as “intrinsically important factors on which the conduct of the contemplated action is 

based.”1 The assumptions for this study are the most logical scenarios for some overarching questions based on trends from past 

chapters. Assumptions are required for a study of this length. 

Without them, there are numerous courses of action impacted by 

variables which make any strategy proposal too vague. This study 

presents a strategy overview. Further development and a more 

in-depth analysis of the assumptions presented here are required 

to create a policy and to implement it. An example of the process 

that might be used to analyze and further develop our key assumptions could be the RAND Corporation’s “Assumption-Based Planning” tool, which was reviewed for this work.2

Applicable assumptions are as follows:

1. Iran and the United States act in a pragmatic manner in 

their relations.

2. Neither Iran nor the United States desires a military 

engagement with each other.
STRATEGY GROUNDWORK

3. Iran has a unique, multipolar political structure.

4. Iran’s economy is failing.3

5. Iraq and Afghanistan can be stabilized.4

6. Iran’s populace is educated and desires good relations 

with the international community, including the United 

States.

7. Iran has a goal of producing a nuclear weapon but will not 

produce one for at least five years.5

8. Israel and/or the United States will not conduct a preemptive military strike on Iran’s nuclear program within 

the near term (three years).

9. The international community does not want Iran to have 

a nuclear weapon.

10. The United States can produce a cogent short-term (one to 

three years), and long-term (beyond three years) strategy 

for Iran that can be effective.6

In light of these assumptions, are US goals in relation to Iran 

reasonable?

US Goal Assessment

The United States is working to have Iran bring its nuclear 

program into NPT compliance and stop its export of terrorism 

and its destabilization of the Middle East. US goals are reasonable for strategy development.

The United States is presently not close to reaching its goals. 

Some qualification of these goals is needed because intransigent 

interpretation of the goals has been a barrier to moving forward 

in the relationship. For instance, the goal to stop Iran from 

exporting terror is likely too broad. If the United States interprets this as meaning any terrorist attacks that can be remotely 

linked to Iran, then this may prove unachievable. Strict interpretation is equally difficult for the goal of halting Iran’s destabilization of the Middle East. Less liberal interpretation is needed for 

the nuclear goal, but there may well be difficulty in determining 

when the United States has achieved it. In other words, does this 

70
71

STRATEGY GROUNDWORK 

goal mean no nuclear reactors or enrichment, or does it mean 

that as long as Iran has a verifiably transparent program subject 

to IAEA and NPT protocols then the goal is met? How these goals 

are interpreted through a strategy into policy is very important 

and relies on targeting the effort. 

Centers of Gravity Overview

Targets, or centers of gravity, need to be identified clearly for 

strategy formulation. Centers of gravity are those strategic 

instruments of power––both in and outside Iran––which can 

and should be the target of a US strategy to achieve the goals 

stated previously. This must not be confused with a military 

target, because this is not the intent. “Target” and “center of 

gravity” in this study are strategic terms. A center of gravity 

could be “the people of Iran” and would not mean a military 

attack on them but rather the strategic goal of affecting the 

people to achieve a positive outcome. To target the center of 

gravity of the populace of Iran, the United States could use 

information, public diplomacy, or economic efforts. What are 

the centers of gravity for a US strategy for Iran?

Centers of gravity in Iran are the leadership, the political 

structure itself, the people (including culture), and the Iranian 

economy. Another center of gravity, more nebulous but equally 

important, would be the way the Iranian leadership and people 

view themselves. Yet another center of gravity for a successful 

strategy on Iran is the international community, including 

international organizations. A closer examination of a few of 

these centers contributes to further strategy formulation.

Iranian leadership refers to the supreme leader, the president, the Parliament, the Council of Guardians, the Assembly 

of Experts, the Expediency Council, the leaders of the judiciary, 

leaders of the regular army, leaders of the IRGC, leaders of the 

Basij, and the leaders of the bonyads. Iranian political structure refers to the nature of the political system itself and specifically its multipolar nature. For use as a center of gravity, the 

political structure more strictly defined is any part of the governing structure that can be pressured (or enticed) to attain a 

positive result in achieving US goals. This last point is important because many in the larger US policy community overlook 
STRATEGY GROUNDWORK

72

the importance of this vulnerability. For instance, if Supreme 

Leader Khamenei feels too much pressure from the international community and the people of Iran, he may take action 

against President Ahmadinejad. 

Planning Mechanics

The United States historically has done a poor job of planning security strategies. It would seem logical to think that 

placing the National Security Council in charge of this process 

and the heads of the US security policy apparatus at the same 

table with the president would lend itself to successful completion of this important task. Results do not bear this out. “There 

is still no systematic effort at strategic planning for national 

security that is inclusive, deliberative, and integrative.”7 The 

history of US strategy and the policies that have come out of it 

in regard to Iran further prove this point. As noted above, there 

has been no long-term, consistent policy on Iran. In broader 

terms, some critics argue that the US multipolar political system of checks and balances prevents consistent strategy formulation. Having strategy formulation powers in multiple 

branches (at least the executive and legislative) of government, 

coupled with the large, often stove-piped bureaucracies within 

the executive branch, as a minimum inhibits coherent and 

consistent strategic security decision making.

Interestingly, despite the shortcomings of our system and 

the lack of strategic-level planning, the policies it has produced 

have remained relatively close in scope due to the commonality 

of US perceptions in all branches of government relative to Iran 

since the 1979 revolution. As further testament to this point, 

both political parties have occupied the White House and controlled Congress at different times during this period. Based on 

this commonality of broad goals, it is logical that strategists 

and policy makers of different political persuasions can come 

to a common agreement on a US strategy. This study does not 

go deeper on the US political system because that is not its 

purpose. It is sufficient to state that with a common set of goals, 

a short- and long-term strategy for Iran is achievable if the 

right apparatus is in place to facilitate its development. 
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STRATEGY GROUNDWORK 

A successful short- and long-term strategy for Iran requires 

a novel approach and should be a component of a larger strategic US security process. The term “a new Goldwater-Nichols 

Act” is bandied about often in senior military and policy circles, 

and a sustainable security-strategy planning process may well 

require this type of grandiose effort, but in regard to Iran there 

is not time for this.

The United States should immediately form an Iran policy 

planning committee (IPPC). This committee should use the 

concepts broadly outlined in this and the next chapter as a 

basis for more detailed future planning. This body would exist 

at no lower than the deputy committee level and would have 

representation from all executive departments and agencies. 

Further, the IPPC should be “interbranch” and include selected 

senior-level staff from the House and Senate. To add greater 

expertise, the IPPC should have access to a pool of functional 

experts. This pool should represent backgrounds in multiple 

executive departments and agencies along with legislative and 

academic backgrounds. The IPPC could be a valuable test case 

for other interagency reform proposals for the broader national 

security planning apparatus.8 The IPPC, using reasonable 

assumptions and focusing on the correct centers of gravity, can 

produce a successful short- and long-term strategy for Iran.

Notes

1. Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United 

States, 14 November 2000, A-2.

2. James A. Dewar et al., Assumption-Based Planning: A Planning Tool for 

Very Uncertain Times, RAND Report for the US Army (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corp., 1993).

3. Kenneth Pollack, “Three Alternative Futures.” This is a simplistic assumption, and there are clearly many other stresses that contribute to Iran’s economy 

failing such as rampant corruption, poor infrastructure, lack of investment or 

reinvestment, rapidly expanding unemployment, and others.

4. The importance of this assumption is discussed in the next chapter. 

This study is not a thorough plan on how to solve the incredibly difficult 

problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. The importance of this assumption was 

confirmed at the very outset of the authors’ study at the 60th Annual Middle 

East Institute’s Conference in Washington, DC, on 13–14 November 2006 

and again in interviews with Kenneth Pollack and Judith Yaphe.

5. This estimate is based on numerous articles with very conflicting 

reports that are often driven by politics. Some articles indicate Iran could 
STRATEGY GROUNDWORK

74

have a nuclear weapon in less than a year and some estimated more than 

fifteen years. Two of the most salient articles are “US Military Sees Iran’s 

Nuke Bomb 5 Years Away,” Washington Times, 31 August 2006; and Sharon 

Squassoni, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments,” Congressional 

Research Service Report for Congress, 22 February 2007, http://fpc.state

.gov/documents/organization/81349.pdf.

6. The assumptions made by the authors are general amalgams based on 

nearly six months of research on these topics. Any particularly poignant 

source for an assumption made is annotated as such.

7. Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn W. Brimley, “Strategic Planning for 

National Security: A New Project Solarium,” Joint Forces Quarterly, issue 41 

(2nd quarter 2006): 80.

8. Ibid., 80–86. There are numerous articles and studies on this subject. 

The Joint Forces Quarterly article is of particular note in the authors’ opinion 

because of the recommendation for sweeping changes tying threat assessment to a strategic-level security planning review and planning process.
75

Chapter 7

A US Strategy for Iran

A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity; an 

optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty.

—Winston Churchill

Iran is at the very least a “difficulty” for the United States. As 

the great crisis leader Winston Churchill eloquently points out, 

there is an “opportunity” here. The current nuclear crisis with 

Iran seems to be deteriorating rapidly. As it does so, pressure 

is building on the United States, Iran, and even the international community to “do something.” There is an opportunity, 

because even though it seems there is a momentum that cannot be stopped, the pressure generated will create the environment needed for a successful strategy. The United States should 

seize this opportunity to develop and implement a successful 

strategy that will achieve the goals of bringing Iran’s nuclear 

program into NPT requirements and stopping Iran’s export of 

terrorism and its destabilizing effect in the Middle East.

This study’s proposed strategy for Iran should be implemented through parallel policy initiatives across the entire 

range of US national instruments of power. This proposal is a 

broad overview and is the starting point for further and urgent 

development by the IPPC.

First, there is a centrally unifying theme; namely, implementing an aggressive strategic communications or public diplomacy effort to demonstrate to the world that the United States 

wants to peacefully resolve its differences with Iran and that 

the leadership of Iran is the party resisting peaceful progress. 

Underlying America’s strategy should be a sincere message 

that it wants to recognize Iran as the great country it is and 

embrace it as a friend and ally.

This approach has a number of subtle differences from previous US policies for Iran. The differences are fourfold. First, all 

components found in this strategy must be seamlessly woven 

together in both the short and long term. This is not to say 
A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN

there is no coordination between the elements of policy now, 

but, as indicated above, the United States can improve in this 

regard. Second, some of the proposed elements differ significantly from current policies. Third, many parts of this strategy 

are on a concertedly larger scale than current initiatives. Last, 

the United States, by implementing these proposals, must use 

flexibility in dealing with Iran. As an example, there will be 

efforts by the United States that could be harshly rebuked by 

Iran, as with Secretary Albright’s 2000 reconciliation speech. 

The United States should be prepared for this and not allow 

such a setback to completely derail the strategy.

The United States has made progress in the arena of public 

opinion in recent months by working closely with the United 

Nations on resolutions and meeting with Iraq’s neighbors (including Iran) to resolve the violence in Iraq. The Iranian leadership 

has further hurt its international standing through Holocaust 

denials, nuclear saber-rattling, the unlawful incarceration of 

British sailors, and near-overt intervention in Iraq. The United 

States can build upon these recent public opinion “victories.” 

Short-Term Strategy

The US short-term strategy for Iran consists of the following 

parts, in order of their importance: (1) coercive economic and 

political policies targeting the Iranian economy; (2) coercive 

graduated sanctions;1 (3) strategy enabling through the stabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan; (4) bilateral and multilateral 

diplomacy with Iran; (5) cultural engagement with the Iranian 

people; and (6) coercive military pressure.

A short-term strategy (three years) should begin as soon as 

feasible. This three-year window allows enough time for positive changes in the relationship, but remains well within the 

five-year assumption for Iranian nuclear weapons completion. 

This window also provides sufficient time to create a changed 

environment for the long-term strategy. Further, to be successful, a short-term strategy must focus beyond Iran. The centerof-gravity discussion earlier made the case for the international 

community as an important target. 

As a preamble note, it is important to address one issue: 

regime change. This strategy does not have as one of its goals 

76
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regime change within Iran. This strategy proposal seeks a 

behavior change by the Iranian leadership. The pressures 

placed on Iran in this strategy may in fact create regime change, 

but that is not the specific intent. It would be up to the Iranian 

people to make the determination if a change of leadership is 

needed. As we have seen in the history of US-Iranian relations, 

it is very important that this be an Iranian decision.

One other note for the short-term strategy involves incentives planning. While implementing the short-term strategy, 

the IPPC should be preparing, in parallel with the steps below, 

contingency branches for success. The short-term strategy will 

not cover these in-depth because the short-term prospects are 

low for significant headway. The long-term strategy assumes 

some positive changes in behavior and therefore covers some 

incentives that could be used for Iran, many of which are intuitive after reading the short-term elements. Should significant 

progress be made in the short-term, incentive contingencies 

should be ready for implementation.

Economic and Political Coercion 

Proposal: The United States should accelerate current efforts 

to weaken the Iranian economy, thereby placing pressure on 

both the people of Iran and the leadership in order to stimulate 

the reform movement. 

Purpose: To further drive a wedge between the people of Iran 

and the leadership and to force a change in behavior. This pressure on different poles of the multipolar Iranian government 

will create fractures within the system. 

Method: Increase pressure on corporations and countries 

doing business with Iran to stifle foreign investment. Work to 

increase global oil supplies, driving down world oil prices 

through international negotiation. Increase US domestic oil 

production and aggressively work to curtail US domestic oil 

consumption. 

Caution: This component must be executed carefully and in 

close coordination with the other elements of the strategy. 

Implementation must avoid having the Iranian people focus on 

the United States as the source of their economic woes rather 

than the Iranian leadership’s unwillingness to purge the cor-
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78

rupt system in favor of Iran’s best interests. Experts on Iran see 

a great deal of value in this: “tightening the economic noose 

around Tehran is one of the best policy options.”2

The people of Iran feel the pain of a broken economy every 

day and have voted to elect officials who pledge to fix the problem, such as President Ahmadinejad. “What is the center of 

gravity for Iran which we must hope to affect in order to change 

Iran’s behavior? Oil.”3 The Iranian economy is broken, and the 

only thing keeping it afloat is oil revenue. Even record-high oil 

prices have not changed the economic dynamic significantly in 

Iran, and the economy continues to deteriorate. This presents 

an opportunity for the United States. If the relationship with 

Iran changes in the short term, then the United States, with its 

technological capacity to quickly fix Iran’s oil infrastructure, 

can be seen as an ally of Iran.4 This coercive approach is directed 

at several centers of gravity. For example, if Supreme Leader 

Khamenei and the legislature see the economy continuing its 

downward spiral and are under significant pressure from the 

people, then they may change behavior regardless of the IRGC 

or President Ahmadinejad’s objections. Iranian pragmatism 

will win out over rhetoric in the end.

Since the short-term strategy relies heavily on oil and economic coercion, implementation will require aggressive diplomacy and leveraging of the Arab Gulf states’ fear of Iran in 

order to rapidly increase the world oil supply and lower global 

prices (see fig. 5). 

This short-term strategy would focus on the countries with 

the immediate capacity and motivation to increase production. 

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar are four GCC members with combined proven oil reserves of 478.8 billion barrels.5

These countries fear Shi’a uprisings and growing Iranian power. 

If the defense expenditures mentioned earlier are any indication, then increasing oil production could be much more profitable in both the short and long run than posturing for military 

containment of Iran. 

Other countries with perhaps less motivation to contribute 

in this effort but who could possibly be counted on (with total 

oil reserves of 435.29 billion barrels) are Canada, Iraq, Russia, 

Libya, Mexico, and Kazakhstan. Diplomatic motivation would 

vary from country to country but could be tailored for the need. 
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Libya could be motivated because of newly found diplomatic 

and economic progress established after it renounced WMD 

and was subsequently removed from ILSA. Kazakhstan could 

be pressured into reducing or ceasing business with the “outcast” Iranian regime. Kazakhstan can continue their aggressive 

oil production goals by trading with other countries such as 

China or India.6 These are just two examples; the IPPC would 

need to develop these concepts further. Representatives of the 

Departments of State, Energy, and Commerce likely would take 

the lead role for this economic and diplomatic effort in the IPPC. 

Increasing US production while reducing US consumption 

would also help in this effort.

Figure 5. World oil reserves as of 2004 (Adapted from “How Much Oil and 

Gas is Left?” Oil and Gas Journal, 22 December 2003, http://www.spe.org/

specma/binary/images/2919953WORLDOILRESERVES.gif.)
A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN

80

 In the short-term strategy, increasing US production and 

reducing US consumption can only be started and will not 

mature until a longer-term time frame. However minor the 

near-term gains in this area, immediate efforts will set the 

stage for the long-term strategy. With its oil drilling technology, 

the United States could, in just three years, generate a significant production increase. The United States currently produces 

more oil than Iran despite having much smaller reserves. This 

ability is due to US technology in oil recovery and production. 

Nevertheless, only half of the United States’ proven recoverable 

oil reserves are open to drilling. Over 10 billion barrels are 

onshore beneath the Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) 

1002 area, which is within miles of Prudhoe Bay (a major oil 

transshipment point) but remains off-limits to drilling.7 This oil 

could be exploited but is not the only option available for nearterm US production. Chevron Corporation recently made a 

huge find in the deep Gulf of Mexico called the “Jack No. 2 

well.” This find could, on the upper end of estimates, equal the 

amount of oil in ANWR. This well in the Gulf of Mexico can and 

should be immediately developed.8

The United States should also immediately reduce domestic 

consumption of oil to affect international opinion and set the 

stage for a change in the long-term equation. The United States 

has the largest gross domestic product in the world but consumes by far the largest amount of oil at 20.7 million barrels a 

day. The nearest “competitor,” China, consumed 6.9 million 

barrels a day in 2005.9 By addressing its domestic oil consumption, the United States would also help with other strategic 

security issues that might arise from instability in the Middle 

East. The United States should address its consumption 

through a combination of methods, including new technology, 

cost savings to existing technologies, and incentives to develop 

oil-saving strategies.10

The objective is to coerce the leadership and the people of 

Iran by further exacerbating the poor economic conditions 

there. Iranian systemic economic corruption will likely prevent 

the current regime from countering this strategic move by the 

United States and world markets. “Already there are signs of 

domestic discontent within Iran, and targeted financial measures can produce further political pressure [on] Iran.”11 This 
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element will undoubtedly garner some criticism. One could be 

that there are no reformers in power who can benefit from this 

strategy and therefore cannot exert enough influence to change 

Iran’s political equation. Although the “reformers are in decline, 

reform in the larger society is alive and well.”12 The people still 

desire change, whether or not reformers are in power. In interviews, the people of Iran desperately seek reform. This sentiment is picking up steam as the current dynamic of a failing 

economy and the nuclear standoff continue.13 The mounting 

criticism of the current leadership goes so far that some see 

President Ahmadinejad as a virtual lame duck.14 Keeping in 

mind that the people are a key center of gravity is important for 

economic coercion to succeed.

Coercive Targeted and Graduated Sanctions

Proposal: The United States and its Western allies should 

continue coercive pressure on Iran’s leadership through gradually stronger sanctions focused on Iran’s economy, nuclear 

program, leadership, and weapons proliferation. 

Purpose: When used in concert with other components of 

the short-term strategy, this will exert pressure on multiple 

poles of Iran’s leadership. By using sanctions, the United States 

demonstrates to the world community its sincerity in solving 

the Iranian problem through diplomatic means. This also shows 

the people of Iran that the world is united against the policies 

of their leadership. 

Method: The authors envision little change to the current 

method being employed by the United States and the international community. 

Caution: Due to the urgency of the situation, sanctions on 

Iran should continue to be gradually strengthened. The 60-day 

suspense window created by UNSCR 1737 and 1747 had the 

desired effect and was not perceived as overly aggressive by the 

people of Iran or the international community.

Sanctions are essential but must be used in unison with other 

components of the strategy and be sustainable over the long term.15

As noted expert, Dr. Mathew Levitt, stated recently: “Graduated 

sanctions, including multilateral UN sanctions and unilateral measures to protect the US financial system are critical and effective 
A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN

82

tools. Employing these in a graduated manner demonstrates that 

the purpose of such measures is not simply to punish Iran but to 

encourage a change in the regime’s behavior.”16

When developing sanction specifics, the centers of gravity 

must be targeted to achieve the desired effect. “To be sure, the 

IRGC is precisely the element within Iran that should be targeted. . . . Applying targeted measures against the IRGC represents the kind of regime-hostile, people-friendly sanctions that 

punishes those engaged in offensive behavior without harming 

the average Iranian citizen.”17 The people of Iran are educated 

and in touch with world events through the Internet. This connectivity allows them to make the distinction between sanctions directed at the leadership of Iran or its nuclear program 

rather than at them. This type of strategy would not be as effective against North Korea, for example, where the people are less 

educated and far more isolated.

This strategy is feared by many Iranian leaders and therefore 

can be effective. “Top leaders of the Islamic Republic, from Ayatollah Khamenei to Mr. Rafsanjani, have made it clear that they 

consider sanctions a serious threat—more serious, according 

to Mr. Rafsanjani, than the possibility of invasion.”18

Sanctions are an offensive strategy, and with the Iranian 

leadership on the defensive economically and diplomatically, 

both at home and abroad, the effect could be pronounced. To 

be effective, the United States needs to take other steps to curtail Iran’s growing regional power.

Strategy Enabling through Stabilization of Iraq and 

Afghanistan

Proposal: The United States and its allies must stabilize Iraq 

and Afghanistan. “Stabilization” is defined as installing reasonably peaceful, centrally controlled governments allied with the 

world’s free states. 

Purpose: To reduce Iranian ascendancy in the region and 

the perception by the international community (including Iran’s 

neighbors) that Iran may well be the only country able to produce stability in the region, thereby creating a de facto regional 

hegemony. 
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Iraq and Afghanistan can and must be stabilized to produce 

an effective strategy in dealing with Iran.19 The current and 

growing instability in these two countries nullifies American 

efforts in the region. There are multiple “nightmare scenarios” 

if either Iraq or Afghanistan become failed states. Almost all 

such scenarios envision Iran as ascendant, thereby eroding the 

United States’ ability to negotiate from a position of power or 

even relevance.20

Creating stability in the two largest conflicts in the Middle 

East will likely stabilize world oil markets, and oil prices will fall 

even more precipitously. This stability would facilitate US diplomatic efforts to further increase the production of oil around the 

world and have a greater effect on Iranian leadership. The United 

States should also be prepared to negotiate with Iran on another 

issue involving Iraq. The Mujahideen e Khalq, or MEK, is a terrorist group residing around the world but mostly in Iraq. This 

is a bargaining chip the United States could use to help Iran 

settle the problems in Iraq vis-à-vis Iran.21

Stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan enables a successful strategy 

for Iran. A stabilized Iraq and Afghanistan will build diplomatic 

momentum. This momentum will allow the United States to further exploit weaknesses in Iran.22

Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomatic Negotiations 

Proposal: This is an incentive-based enabling component of 

the strategy. The United States should immediately establish 

bilateral and multilateral negotiations with Iran.

Purposes: The two principal purposes are to build positive 

opinion of the United States and to open formal lines of communication. 

Method: At key levels of the US government (except in the 

near-term at the head-of-state level), begin overt and wellpublicized efforts to establish diplomacy in both bilateral and 

multilateral formats.

This component of the strategy puts the United States on the 

offensive diplomatically. Currently, by not engaging Iran, it 

remains on the diplomatic defensive in the court of world opinion. The United States negotiates with many countries on a 

containment and isolation strategy for Iran; however, this is 
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84

defensive in nature. The targets of this change in US strategy 

are the international community, the people of Iran, and the 

multipolar leadership of Iran. The United States must prove to 

all of these audiences that it is serious about achieving a negotiated settlement without using force. Every contact should be 

advertised for effect.

There should be no illusions that this element will yield significant diplomatic fruits immediately, but the positive public 

appeal of the effort outweighs the dangers of offering a discourse. Daniel Byman of the Brookings Institution points out 

that “We can and should talk to Iran: we just should not expect 

talks alone to accomplish US objectives.”23 It is naïve to think 

that the United States by simply talking to Iran will fix the 

years of bad relations. Without the pressure from other components of this strategy, there is simply no motivation for the 

leadership of Iran to change behavior.

This study does not propose immediate reestablishment of 

ambassadorial relations. A gradual approach will allow exploitation of any gains from the diplomacy itself or from positive 

international reaction to US initiatives. Government officials 

and academicians agree conceptually. The Bush administration’s policy has modified recently in this regard. Robert Gates, 

prior to becoming secretary of defense, coauthored a Council 

on Foreign Relations study with Zbigniew Brzezinski in 2004 

entitled Iran: Time for a New Approach. This report realistically 

assessed US policy options. It recommends that a “political dialogue with Iran should not be deferred until such a time as the 

deep differences over Iranian nuclear ambitions and its invidious involvement with regional conflicts have been resolved.”24

Realists also recognize that the situation has changed since 

2004, as Secretary Gates himself recently acknowledged.25 The 

primary change is the increasing pressure existing today. Gates 

currently believes there is still a need to have “higher-level (diplomatic) exchanges” with Iran. The United States should have 

modest expectations for these exchanges, but they are needed 

for a number of reasons.26

By creating a diplomatic channel to the Iranians, the United 

States will have greater flexibility to affect other components of 

the short-term strategy. There are indications that some leaders within Iran’s multipolar government would welcome dia-
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logue. “There are long-term reasons to seek talks as well. Much 

of the Iranian public, and even many senior leaders, seeks an 

improved relationship with the United States.”27 Also, if a crisis 

arises, diplomatic channels would provide a conduit for peaceful resolution.

Establishing diplomatic relations with Iran would represent a 

significant shift in US policy, but when combined with other 

parts of the short-term strategy, will maintain pressure on the 

Iranian leadership. This pressure has the potential to further 

drive a wedge between the divergent poles of leadership in Iran 

or between the leadership and the people.28 The world community and the people of Iran will see this as a positive effort by the 

United States. The current Iranian leadership will be faced with 

two losing scenarios. If it puts aside its acerbic rhetoric and talks 

to the United States, then the United States is seen in a better 

light by building a bridge with Iran peacefully. If it does not talk 

with the United States, then the regime further isolates itself in 

world opinion and in the eyes of the Iranian public.

Cultural Engagement with the Iranian People

Proposal: Increase cultural engagement with the Iranian 

people, inside and outside of Iran. This is another incentivebased enabling component of the short-term strategy. 

Purpose: To draw a significant contrast for Iranians between 

the United States as portrayed by their leadership and the 

United States they encounter, either physically or through public diplomacy.

Method: Significantly increase student and other visas for 

Iranians seeking to come to the United States. US public diplomacy efforts should be doubled both in and outside Iran. Additionally, the tenor of US public diplomacy should change from 

one of soft intervention in Iran to one of communicating US 

intentions to them. 

Cautions: There are two primary cautions on this point. First, 

cultural engagement, especially in the short term, must be managed closely so terrorists or members of the Iranian intelligence 

apparatus are not given free access to US interests. Second, the 

public diplomacy effort must be benign to the international community and the people of Iran. The leadership will label any step 
A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN

86

in this regard as “further proof of US intervention in Iranian 

affairs” no matter how it is handled, but it is critical that the 

international community and the majority of Iranians, either 

inside or outside Iran, do not perceive it as such.29

Regime change in Iran is not a goal of this strategy, and this 

needs to be reemphasized. The reaction within Iran immediately following the US military attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan 

was one of fear that the United States would try regime change 

in Iran next (as a nearby member of the so-called axis of evil). 

The United States must insure that the people of Iran do not 

believe this is the goal. The United States should consider making very public statements to this effect, if openings or changes 

in the regime’s policies begin to appear. Daniel Byman stated 

recently that “the United States should be prepared to disavow 

regime change if it is clear that Iran would make significant 

concessions in exchange.” Making clear that concessions are 

an option is critical for “allaying the fears of US allies that 

Washington is only interested in confrontation.”30 Remaining 

flexible as openings occur as a result of this changed strategy 

could determine success or failure for the United States.

Cultural engagement could take many forms, such as student visas, which focus on the large youth population. This is 

the exact group that has historically been at the core of all significant political change in Iran, including the revolution in 

1979. Extra effort should be made to include young females in 

all cultural exchanges. Unlike some Arab countries in the 

region, where women are less educated and politically engaged, 

within Iran this could be a very positive audience for US efforts. 

As a matter of logistics, this component of the strategy would 

require some form of visa office in Tehran—a job usually performed by an embassy or consulate. This office should be small 

and staffed by one or two US personnel to lessen the chance of 

a repeat of the 1979 hostage crisis. The bulk of the office staff 

could be Iranians who are locally hired after a background 

check. Also, to avoid Iranian sensitivities on this issue, the 

office should be located away from the former US Embassy.

Other forms of cultural engagement could be exchanges of social, 

academic, and professional groups. Athletic team visits should be 

encouraged. Frequent meetings in multiple forums should be conducted between US diplomats and policy makers with Iranians liv-
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A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN

ing abroad. Caution should be taken to be sure the United States 

is not meeting only with dissidents living abroad, so that it is not 

perceived as courting insurgents to be used in Iran.

Coercive Military Pressure

Proposal: Use military presence in the Persian Gulf to pressure Iranian leaders to modify their behavior. 

Purpose: More coercive pressure on the Iranian leadership 

center of gravity. By keeping a significant military presence in 

the Persian Gulf and in Afghanistan in the short term, the Iranian leadership knows the level of importance the United States 

prescribes to relations (negative or positive) with Iran. This 

keeps the military instrument of power close by in case Iran 

crosses any red lines.31 Keeping US military forces near Iran 

creates another opportunity. The Iranians view the US military 

proximity as a threat, and it can be a bargaining chip to be 

“removed” for positive changes in Iranian behavior. 

Method: In the near term, the United States should keep 

approximately the same amount of force as is currently deployed 

to the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility 

(AOR). However, the exact amount of US or coalition forces can 

be modified downward if Iraq stabilizes. The force construct 

should be at least three brigades of ground forces, two carrier 

groups, and a US Air Force expeditionary wing.

Caution: The amount of military force should not increase 

above what is in the Persian Gulf region now because the Iranians would view this as a prelude to attack. No matter how 

large or small the force, the current Iranian leadership will portray this presence as a threat for Iranian domestic consumption. The United States should be very clear in statements to 

the people of Iran and the international community that attack 

is not the intent. 

The placement of the military instrument of US national 

power relatively low on the list of components of the short-term 

strategy is indicative of the overall tone of the strategy. A key 

short-term objective of this strategy is to present the United 

States as the “good guys” and the current Iranian leadership as 

the “bad guys” in the court of public (Iranian, world, and US) 

opinion. By placing smaller emphasis on a large military pres-
A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN

88

ence in the CENTCOM region and downplaying this presence, 

the United States will be perceived as working peacefully to 

achieve its goals. By having a presence, pressure remains on 

the Iranian leadership. There are some cautions for this component of the strategy.

By having a significant military presence near Iran, there is 

a possibility that Iran may lash out militarily at US forces. If 

that attack is greeted by a US military response that is perceived by the Iranian people as US aggression, then Iranians 

will rally around whoever their leader is. In this case, many 

elements of this strategy proposal would be set back years or 

become impossible because the current regime would probably 

gain enough time to develop a nuclear weapon. 

Recently, the IRGC captured British sailors in the historically 

contested Shatt al-Arab delta of the Persian Gulf. Ironically, this 

is the same area where the Iran-Iraq War began. If Britain or the 

United States had attacked Iran militarily because of this event 

and it were seen by the Iranian people as “Western aggression,” 

then Britain or the United States would have created a public 

relations coup for the Iranian leadership.32 The West “won” this 

crisis by resolving it peacefully. For the purposes of this strategy, the West had a “restrained and measured” response to the 

“criminal” behavior of Iran. The people of Iran understand what 

occurred in this crisis. They also understand that their leadership further isolated Iran from the international community. 

Other crises will undoubtedly occur as pressure mounts on the 

regime. The United States and the West must deftly manage and 

exploit future crises to support this strategy. 

The short-term strategy uses economic and political coercion, sanctions, incentives, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, cultural engagement, and coercive military pressure. 

Iraq and Afghanistan must be stabilized as a basis to reduce 

Iranian influence in the region. The United States must weave 

the components of the short-term strategy together through 

public diplomacy. The purpose of this effort is to convince the 

Iranian people and the international community that the United 

States seeks peaceful solutions and better relations with Iran. 

The goals are to bring the Iranian nuclear program into NPT 

compliance, stop Iran from exporting terrorism, and halt Iranian destabilization of the region. Significant progress can be 
89

A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN

made by 2010. The short-term strategy enables and compliments the long-term strategy.

Long-Term Strategy

The long-term strategy consists of economic incentives, 

increasing diplomatic and cultural engagement, and a changed 

US military mission in the region. It addresses all of the major 

strategic goals, and will also address the minor issue that has 

not previously been addressed. This minor issue concerns lack 

of “true democracy” in Iran and infringements on human rights. 

The short-term strategy will create gains toward the goals, and 

as a by-product, it will increase democracy and human rights 

in Iran. In the long term, positive political changes in Iran can 

be institutionalized within the governmental apparatus to preserve positive momentum. As this occurs, the success could 

serve as a model for other countries in the region. 

This long-term strategy, by its nature, is more amorphous 

than the short-term strategy because of the time frame involved. 

As a result, it will be presented in a broader construct than the 

short-term strategy. The short-term strategy’s cross-cutting 

component of using positive public opinion will continue and 

gain momentum in the long term. The long-term effort to strategically communicate the United States’ message will be equally 

important. In the long-term strategy, this element will transition 

into one of “public opinion listening.” The United States has historically done this very poorly, and improvement is critical. 

Examples are plentiful. If the United States had listened better 

before 1979, the revolution might have been predicted, and significant policy adjustments could have possibly prevented it. 

The long term will have a changed strategic environment. 

The short-term strategy will create modified Iranian behavior 

through pressure from Iranians and through pressure on internal mechanisms within the multipolar government. The components of the government will ultimately act in a pragmatic 

manner and change Iran’s behavior. Because of this, new longterm US goals for Iran are needed. These goals will be outlined 

in each component of the long-term strategy. The long-term 

strategy is also based on evolving assumptions. Over both the 
A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN

90

short and long term, the IPPC should anticipate a fluid environment and be prepared to quickly adjust goals. 

Economic

The notional long-term economic goal should be to integrate 

Iran economically into closer relations with the United States 

as Iran modifies its behavior. As Iran does this, it would naturally be integrated into closer relations with the rest of the 

world, but because of the short-term strategy, the United States 

would be uniquely positioned to benefit from Iranian changes.

As change occurs, the IPPC would need to have ready a list 

of economic incentives and rewards that could be implemented 

for each step forward by Iran. The first of these steps should 

address the multiple sanctions the United States has in effect 

on Iran, such as the IFSA and any further unilateral US law or 

policies put into place in the short-term strategy to modify Iranian behavior. Other economic incentives would be multilateral, such as readdressing UNSCRs 1737 and 1747. Any other 

short-term coercive multilateral sanctions enacted by the world 

community should be incrementally readdressed as well. 

Another economic incentive would be for the United States to 

settle Iranian claims on the former shah’s assets.33

The next part of the economic component should be direct US 

investment in Iran and creating the framework for rapidly expanding trade. Iran has the potential to be a regional and international 

economic power. Only the United States has the ability to work 

rapidly with a stabilized Iran to rebuild its energy infrastructure, 

which would further cement close US-Iranian relations.

World economic markets would welcome stability in the 

region. The Middle East has been responsible for the greatest 

world economic fear since World War II as oil prices have vacillated based on each new crisis. A stabilized Iraq and Afghanistan would add to the region’s positive economic momentum. 

The next logical step in the Middle East would be to use this 

momentum to solve the Israeli-Palestinian issue.34

The United States in the long term would be reaping the benefits proposed in the short-term strategy of reducing oil consumption. As an added strategic-security measure, the United States 

should create significant oil reserves to be ready for future emer-
91

A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN

gencies. This reserve will result from drilling in ANWR and further 

use of Gulf of Mexico oil fields. If the short-term economic coercion on Iran has not achieved the desired results, then US conservation efforts and the oil reserve would allow the United States to 

exert even greater economic pressure beyond 2010.

Another economic incentive for the United States to use would 

be to push for Iranian acceptance into the World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO membership has historically been a sticking 

point for Iranian relations with both the United States and the 

Europeans. The United States can also sponsor Iranian debt 

relief with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.35

Each of these measures could be used independently or in unison should a rapid shift in Iranian behavior occur. 

Another advantage of having a complementary and deliberate short- and long-term strategy would be to use economics 

for expanding fissures created in Iran. For instance, if a Khatami-like reformer did emerge, as in the 1990s, then economic 

policies could be structured to make sure that reformer had 

relief from sanctions in the areas needed to aid in moving the 

country in the right direction and allowing the reforms to take 

root. The reform effort of the 1990s failed in large part due to 

the inability of the reformers to significantly change the economic equation of the country.

Diplomatic

The long-term goal is to normalize US diplomatic relations 

with Iran. This goal assumes positive movement in Iranian 

behavior.

Diplomacy, much like economics, should be a gradual process providing incentives for each measured improvement. 

Positive Iranian behavior metrics should be drawn up in the 

short term by the IPPC. Each metric should have an incentive 

package ready for rapid implementation. For example, if regime 

change occurs, the United States should be prepared to offer 

rapid incentives. Repealing international resolutions and unilateral laws, such as the IFSA, are further examples of incentives. Interestingly, IFSA, like ILSA before it, has a provision for 

“exigent circumstance” termination of the law. IFSA allows the 

president to cancel sanctions instantly and notify Congress 
A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN

92

within “3 business days.” This law anticipates the need to capitalize on rapid changes in diplomatic conditions.36

The United States should be prepared to quickly normalize 

diplomatic relations. This would enable further components of 

the long-term strategy by opening channels in economic and 

cultural instruments of power. This could be done by expanding the visa office of the short-term strategy or by reestablishing a US embassy in Iran and vice versa. 

There is also flexibility in the implementation of diplomacy 

over the long term. Using the example from economics, if a 

newly emboldened Khatami-like reformer emerged, then the 

United States could move diplomatically to support him. Creating meaningful diplomacy in coordination with the other elements of national power could give this emergent leader the 

legitimacy needed to complete reforms in Iran.

Cultural

In the long term, the US cultural goal is to dramatically draw 

the United States and Iranian people together. When the shortterm strategy for cultural engagement is successful, this goal 

will be well on its way. US policy should reunite families, allow 

Iranians to see America, and create an appreciation within the 

United States for Persian culture.

Like economics and diplomacy, this can be implemented 

gradually or rapidly. If the public diplomacy effort is working 

through television and not working through radio, then the 

effort can be shifted. If sports team exchanges are working but 

not as well as student exchanges, then efforts should be 

shifted.

Iranians in the United States before and even after 1979 have 

shown a real ability and desire to integrate into American society, which means it will be much easier to accomplish this task 

than some of the others.

Military

The long-term US military goal is to reduce tension and to 

eventually become allies. Achieving this goal would yield benefits for the United States in solving the Palestinian and Israeli 

conflict and other crises that may arise. 
93

A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN

This is an almost unimaginable goal currently, but it is 

achievable if a vastly changed environment occurs. Achieving 

this goal would allow the United States to significantly cut back 

its presence in the Middle East. This change would have longterm positive diplomatic and economic results well beyond this 

strategy for the larger “war on terror.” 

Components of this new relationship could be military-tomilitary exchanges and joint exercises between the two countries or in unison with other Middle Eastern countries. There 

will be an opportunity to create a new regional military cooperation organization to foster stability in the Middle East. Pundits of this strategy should remember that two of these components were present in the US-Iranian relationship before the 

1979 revolution.

There is a cautionary note. Because of Iranian nationalistic 

pride and a problem with the Status of Forces Agreement 

(SOFA) history, the United States should not seek permanently 

stationed forces in Iran. A SOFA should be drafted and prenegotiated before exercises commence.

This chapter creates a long-term strategy that, by its very 

nature, is hard to envision because of the huge obstacles in the 

short term which have to be overcome. This long-term strategy 

balances stepped “decontainment” with increased engagement 

through economics, diplomacy, culture, and the military.

Notes

1. The term graduated used with sanctions is not an original thought of 

the authors and can be found in multiple texts on UN sanctions in regard to 

North Korea, Iraq, and Iran over the past decades.

2. Daniel Byman (director, Center for Peace and Security Studies, Edmund 

A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University), Testimony before 

the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, 

Washington, DC, 15 March 2007, http://www.internationalrelations.house

.gov/110/bym031507.htm.

3. Judith Yaphe, interview by authors, 15 November 2006.

4. Pollack, “Iran: Three Alternative Futures.” This article points out there 

are only three capital markets in the world capable of the investment needed 

to fix Iran’s economy, with the United States being one. Dr. Matthew Levitt 

(director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. Washington 

Institute for Near East Policy), “Pulling Tehran’s Purse Strings: Leveraging 
A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN

94

Sanctions and Market Forces to Alter Iranian Behavior,” Testimony before the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, and Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, 

Washington, DC, 15 March 2007, http://www.internationalrelations.house

.gov/110/lev031507.htm.

5. Department of Energy (DOE), World Proved Reserves of Oil and Natural 

Gas, Most Recent Estimates, 9 January 2007, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/

international/reserves.html.

6. Berman, Tehran Rising, 91–92. This reference is only in regard to 

Kazakhstan.

7. DOE, Energy Information Administration, ANWR Oil Reserves Greater 

Than Any State, 12 March 2003, http://www.doi.gov/news/030312.htm.

8. Steven Mufson, “US Oil Reserves Get a Big Boost: Chevron-Led Team 

Discovers Billions of Barrels in Gulf of Mexico’s Deep Water,” Washington 

Post, 6 September 2006.

9. DOE, Energy Information Administration, Top World Oil Consumers, 

2005, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/topworldtables3.

10. Samuel W. Bodman (secretary of energy), opening address to Middle 

East Institute’s 60th Annual Conference, Washington, DC, 13 November 2006.

11. Levitt, testimony, 4.

12. Hooshang Amirahmadi, Rutgers University, remarks to Middle East 

Institute’s 60th Annual Conference, 13 November 2006.

13. Secor, “Whose Iran?”; Robert Tait, “President’s Future in Doubt as MPs 

Rebel and Economic Crisis Grows,” Guardian, 16 January 2007; Kim Murphy, 

“Iran Reformists Want US to Tone it Down,” Los Angeles Times, 11 February 

2007; Roya Hakakian, “Hungering for Reform in Iran: Akbar Ganji Puts His 

Life on the Line,” Washington Post, 21 August 2005, http://www.royahakakian 

.com/newsletter/washington _post_2005Aug21.html; Kim Murphy, “Dissent 

Grows in Iran,” Los Angeles Times, 8 February 2007; and Abbas Milani, “What 

Scares Iran’s Mullahs?” New York Times, 23 February 2007.

14. Tait, “President’s Future in Doubt.”

15. Byman, testimony.

16. Levitt, testimony.

17. Ibid.

18. Milani, “What Scares Iran’s Mullahs?”

19. Neither of the ongoing major conflicts in the region can be ignored in 

an Iran strategy because of the dramatic effect they are having on US-Iranian 

relations. As stated in the assumptions, Iraq and Afghanistan can and must 

be solved for any effective strategy on Iran to have a viable chance. The 

authors have reviewed studies on this subject to see their relation and importance for this work. Some of the most relevant opinions have been produced 

by the Iraq Study Group in late 2006 and another insightful study by Kenneth Pollack and Daniel Byman of the Brookings Institution entitled “Things 

Fall Apart: What do we do if Iraq Implodes?” Brookings Report, August 2006, 

http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/pollack/20060820.pdf.

20. Neil King Jr. and Greg Jaffe, “If Iraq Worsens, Allies See ‘Nightmare’ 

Case,” Wall Street Journal, 9 January 2007; Director of National Intelligence, 
95

A US STRATEGY FOR IRAN

National Intelligence Estimate—Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: A Challenging 

Road Ahead, January 2007, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070202

_release.pdf; and Anthony Shadid, “With Iran Ascendant, US Is Seen at Fault: 

Arab Allies in Region Feeling Pressure,” Washington Post, 30 January 2007.

21. Pollack, Persian Puzzle, 360–61, 388; and Pollack, interview by 

authors, 16 November 2006. Also important to note, the MEK (also known as 

the MKO) is regarded as a “valuable insurgent group” by some policy writers, 

such as Ilan Berman, who recommend evaluation of using it for destabilization of the regime in Tehran. See Berman, Tehran Rising, 140–41. Regardless 

of how one views the MEK, they can be a significant bargaining chip.

22. Pollack, interview by authors, 16 November 2006.

23. Byman, testimony.

24. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, Iran: Time for a New 

Approach, Report of Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on 

Foreign Relations, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004), 3.

25. Robert Gates, secretary of defense nominee, Testimony before Senate 

Armed Services Committee, 5 December 2006. 

26. Ann Scott Tyson, “US Is Open to a Deeper Iran Dialogue, Gates Says,” 

Washington Post, 28 March 2007.

27. Ibid.

28. The US position to negotiate only after nuclear concessions continues 

to be reiterated almost daily as does the position of Iranian experts who propose that US negotiations are the only option. The most recent examples of 

these position are: R. Nicholas Burns, undersecretary for political affairs, 

Minimizing Potential Threats from Iran: Assessing the Effectiveness of Current 

US Sanctions on Iran, Testimony before Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 21 March 2007, http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/ 

2007/82033.htm; and Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh, “The Iran Option That Isn’t 

on the Table,” Washington Post, 8 February 2007.

29. Lionel Beehner, “Backgrounder: US Soft Diplomacy in Iran,” Council 

on Foreign Relations, 14 February 2006, http://www.cfr.org/.

30. Byman, testimony.

31. The term red lines is a common one in policy circles. It is often used 

by Iran specialists referring to thresholds, which if the United States, Iran, or 

even Israel cross, then some much “greater” reaction would occur or “all bets 

are off then.” This term came up in multiple articles and the authors’ 15–16 

November 2006 interviews with Judith Yaphe and Kenneth Pollack.

32. Howard Chua-Eoan, “Why Iran Seized the British Marines,” Time 

Online, 23 March 2007, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/.

33. Byman, testimony.

34. The purpose of this study is not to solve all of the problems of the 

Middle East. It is important to note there are other tangible benefits to the 

momentum established by an increasingly stable Middle East.

35. Pollack, Persian Puzzle, 286–87, 378, 403, 406. 

36. Botts, “US Trade Sanctions Expanded.”

97

Chapter 8

Conclusions

The United States should immediately create an Iran policy 

planning committee to further refine and implement the strategy proposal presented in this study. For the greatest hope of 

success, the recommendations presented here should be implemented as soon as possible. This strategy proposal is based on 

sound analysis of historic trends.

Iran’s perceptions and patterns are based on historic roots of 

a sense of Persian greatness, resentment of foreign influence, 

strategic Persian-Shiite loneliness, and the emergence of pragmatic national interest replacing revolutionary ideology. Iran’s 

unique demographics, politics, personalities, power centers, 

and nuclear desire present key strategic considerations and 

frame the context for a US endgame with Iran.

Recent US policies have focused uniformly since the 1979 

Iranian revolution on stopping Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons, proliferation of terrorism, and destabilization of the region. 

The United States perceives Iran as one of the greatest exigent 

threats to its goals in the Middle East.

This study creates a framework expounding on key assumptions and identification of Iranian centers of gravity. Further, a 

novel planning construct was outlined, known as the Iran policy 

planning committee, which should be used as a template for 

further changes in interagency US strategic security planning.

A new US strategy for Iran is created using short- and longterm planning in parallel. An important cross-cutting thread flowing through both the short- and long-term strategy is a public 

diplomacy effort directed at multiple centers of gravity. The recommended short-term strategy uses both coercive and engagement efforts through six components to create pressure and offers 

a constructive way of relieving it. The proposed long-term strategy 

creates closer relations between the United States and Iran as the 

basic relationship and strategic environment change. 

There are two overarching cautions not previously covered. 

Contingency planning for crossing of red lines needs to be 

undertaken in the short term by the IPPC. Virtually all experts 
CONCLUSIONS

agree that red lines should be developed early on in the planning process. There should be contingency plans developed for 

all red lines. Examples of red lines could be a completed independent nuclear fuel cycle, a significant military attack by Iran 

on US forces in the region, continued or stepped-up terror tied 

to Iran, or an overt Iranian military attack on Israel.1

Despite the cautionary planning for red lines, the recommendations of this study do not change. The authors’ research proves 

this strategy is the most viable option for dealing with Iran. 

The time to solve Iran is now. As Winston Churchill stated, 

there are opportunities which need to be pursued, despite their 

difficulty.

Note

1. Byman, testimony.

98
99

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