Filed 9/23/20 P. v. Maldonado CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JUAN MALDONADO,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B301054

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. YA069639)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Hector M. Guzman, Judge. Affirmed.

Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Daniel C. Chang and Nancy Lii 

Ladner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Juan Maldonado appeals from the 

trial court’s order denying his Penal Code section 1170.951

petition for resentencing on two voluntary manslaughter 

convictions. We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

In October 2007, defendant was charged with several 

offenses including two counts of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) arising 

from a robbery during which two people were killed.2 Pursuant 

to a plea agreement, the murder charges were dismissed and 

defendant pleaded guilty to, among other charges, two counts of 

voluntary manslaughter. (§ 192, subd. (a).) In June 2014, the 

trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years, eight months in state 

prison.

In February 2019, defendant filed his section 1170.95 

petition seeking resentencing on his voluntary manslaughter 

convictions. Among other things, defendant contended that he 

was entitled to relief because: “I took a plea deal (in lieu of going 

to trial at which I could have be[en] convicted of 1st or 2nd degree 

murder at trial) of voluntary manslaughter.” The trial court 

denied the petition, apparently without appointing counsel to 

1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

2 We granted defendant’s motion for judicial notice of the 

April 18, 2014, unpublished opinion in People v. Julius Laulu

(Apr. 18, 2014, B245988 [nonpub. opn.])—the appeal of one of 

defendant’s codefendants.
3

represent defendant,

3 finding that defendant was a major 

participant in the charged crimes and acted with reckless 

indifference to human life.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1170.95 Does Not Apply to Voluntary Manslaughter

Convictions

Defendant contends he demonstrated a prima facie case of 

eligibility for resentencing on his voluntary manslaughter 

convictions under section 1170.95 and the trial court erred when 

it failed to appoint counsel to represent him, allow briefing, and 

hold a hearing. We disagree.

Section 1170.95 provides, in relevant part:

“(a) A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a 

natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with 

the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s 

3 The parties assert the trial court did not appoint counsel to 

represent defendant. The record is unclear. Defendant 

acknowledges that the court’s order denying the petition states, 

“‘The clerk to give notice to petitioner and his attorney . . . ’”, but 

notes the record does not indicate the trial court appointed 

counsel and the minute order for the trial court’s order denying 

the petition states, “Defendant is not present in court, and not 

represented by counsel.” That minute order also reflects, 

however, that the clerk served a copy of the minute order on two 

private attorneys. A prior minute order also reflects that the 

clerk served a copy of defendant’s petition on a third private 

attorney.
4

murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any 

remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply:

“(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed 

against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed 

under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine.

“(2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second 

degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of 

a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree 

or second degree murder.

“(3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second 

degree murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made 

effective January 1, 2019.” (Italics added.)

Section 1170.95, by its plain terms, applies only to murder 

convictions and not to voluntary manslaughter convictions. 

(People v. Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194, 201 (Paige); People v. 

Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914, 917 (Sanchez); People v. 

Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 432; People v. Flores (2020) 44 

Cal.App.5th 985, 993; People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 

884, 887 (Cervantes).) Defendant was not eligible for 

resentencing on his voluntary manslaughter convictions under 

section 1170.95 and the trial court therefore did not err in 

denying the petition without appointing counsel. (People v. 

Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320, 330, review granted, 

Mar. 18, 2020, S260493.)

B. Defendant’s Constitutional Arguments Are Unavailing

Defendant argues that an interpretation of section 1170.95 

that restricts its application to murder convictions and does not 
5

include voluntary manslaughter convictions violates equal 

protection and substantive due process under the United States 

and California Constitutions. In Cervantes, supra, 44 

Cal.App.5th 824, the court rejected similar arguments. We agree 

with the analysis in Cervantes and adopt it here:

“The first step in an equal protection analysis is to 

determine whether the defendant is similarly situated with those 

who are entitled to the statutory benefit. [Citation.] Cervantes 

was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a different crime from 

murder, which carries a different punishment. Normally 

‘offenders who commit different crimes are not similarly situated’

for equal protection purposes. [Citation.] ‘[O]nly those persons 

who are similarly situated are protected from invidiously 

disparate treatment.’ [Citation.]

“[¶] . . . [¶]

“When the Legislature reforms one area of the law, it is not 

required to reform other areas of the law. [Citation.] It may elect 

to make reforms ‘“‘one step at a time, addressing itself to the 

phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative 

mind.’”’ [Citation.] Here the legislative focus was centered on 

the unfairness of the felony murder rule. The Legislature could 

rationally decide to change the law in this area and not be 

currently concerned with crimes not involved with that rule. 

[Citation.] It also could reasonably decide that the punishment 

for voluntary manslaughter was appropriate, but the punishment 

for murder based on the felony murder rule could be excessive 

and reform was needed only there. [Citation.] Legislators in 

making this choice could also consider a variety of other factors 

including the number of prisoners subject to the change and its 

impact on the ‘administration of justice.’ [Citation.]
6

“The decision not to include manslaughter in section 

1170.95 falls within the Legislature’s ‘line-drawing’ authority as 

a rational choice that is not constitutionally prohibited.

[Citation.] ‘[T]he Legislature is afforded considerable latitude in 

defining and setting the consequences of criminal offenses.’ 

[Citation.] A classification is not arbitrary or irrational simply 

because it is ‘underinclusive.’ [Citation.] ‘A criminal defendant 

has no vested interest “‘in a specific term of imprisonment or in 

the designation [of] a particular crime [he or she] receives.’”’ 

[Citation.] ‘Courts routinely decline to intrude upon the “broad 

discretion” such policy judgments entail.’ [Citation.]

“We also reject Cervantes’s claim that he was denied 

substantive due process. ‘[S]ubstantive due process requires a 

rational relationship between the objectives of a legislative 

enactment and the methods chosen to achieve those objectives.’ 

[Citation.] Here there was such a relationship. The legislative 

goal was to eliminate the sentencing disparity caused by the 

felony murder rule. That goal was properly achieved by the 

section 1170.95 petition procedure to vacate those murder 

convictions.” (Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 888–889, 

fn. omitted]; see also, Paige, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 205–206 

[rejecting equal protection argument]; Sanchez, supra, 48 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 920–921 [rejecting equal protection 

argument].)

Accordingly, defendant’s equal protection and substantive 

due process arguments fail.
7

IV. DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

KIM, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

MOOR, J.