NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: SETH MICHAEL WINTERS; 

GENEVIEVE ALYCE WINTERS, 

Debtors, 

______________________________ 

METRIC ROOFING, INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

SETH MICHAEL WINTERS; GENEVIEVE 

ALYCE WINTERS, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-16266 

D.C. No. 4:21-cv-00515-JGZ 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 14, 2023**

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: GOULD, HURWITZ, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 18 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Metric Roofing, Inc. appeals a district court order reversing the bankruptcy 

court’s decision granting Metric relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

60(b)(6) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024. We review the district 

court’s decision on appeal from a bankruptcy court de novo. In re Saxman, 325 F.3d 

1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (simplified). We review district court decisions on Rule 

60(b) motions for abuse of discretion. Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 

1257 (9th Cir. 2004). We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

Settlement agreements, like the stipulation at issue in this case, are interpreted 

as contracts. Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1989). In interpreting 

such contracts, we look to state contract law. See Parsons v. Ryan, 912 F.3d 486, 

497 (9th Cir. 2018). Under Arizona law, which is controlling here, “[t]he 

construction of a contract is a question of law where the terms of the agreement are 

plain and unambiguous.” Smith v. Melson, Inc., 659 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Ariz. 1983) 

(citations omitted). If the parties’ intentions are clear by reading the plain language,

then the contract’s terms are not ambiguous. Id. “A contract must be construed so 

that every part is given effect.” Chandler Med. Bldg. Partners v. Chandler Dental 

Grp., 855 P.2d 787, 791 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted).

The relevant paragraph of the stipulation reads:

Plaintiff and Defendants will submit a Judgment to the Bankruptcy 

Court upon this Adversary, determining and declaring that the amount 

of $319,827.55 of the Superior Court Judgment is not dischargeable 

under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), and that the Defendants’ discharge is 
3 

excepted for that amount upon Plaintiff’s Superior Court Judgment; and 

that the other $211,422.45 of that Superior Court Judgment is eligible 

for discharge in this bankruptcy, and shall not be recoverable by 

Plaintiff in the event of entry of discharge.

Metric argues that, under the stipulation, $319,9827.55 of the judgment at 

issue is non-dischargeable in bankruptcy and, thus, the bankruptcy court was correct 

to hold the amount excepted from discharge notwithstanding the availability of the 

“super-discharge” under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). 

We disagree. The plain language of the stipulation shows that the parties 

agreed to except $319,9827.55 from discharge “under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).” 

Under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), debts excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) can

nonetheless be discharged after the completion of all payments required by the 

debtor’s Chapter 13 plan. See Goudelock v. Sixty-01 Ass’n of Apartment Owners, 

895 F.3d 633, 638–39, 639 n.4 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Subsections 1328(a)(1)–(4) 

enumerate the only exceptions to the broad discharge of debts under Section 

1328(a).”). Thus, under the plain language of the stipulation, Appellee-Defendants 

Seth and Genevieve Winters were entitled to discharge the $319,9827.55 after 

complying with their Chapter 13 plan.

Metric contests the plain language of the stipulation by relying on parol 

evidence. But “[i]t is universally held that, when the parties to a contract have 

reduced it to writing, one of them may not defeat it by showing by parol evidence 

that he did not understand what the contract meant[.]” Bradley v. Indus. Comm’n, 
4 

76 P.2d 745, 746 (Ariz. 1938). 

We thus agree with the district court that Metric was not entitled to Rule 60(b) 

relief. To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6)—which Metric sought here—the moving 

party must show “extraordinary circumstances.” In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 

889 F.2d 242, 250 (9th Cir. 1989). But a party “cannot be relieved” under Rule 

60(b)(6) “of [a calculated and deliberate] choice because hindsight seems to indicate 

. . . that [the] decision . . . was probably wrong.” Id. (quoting Ackermann v. United 

States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950)). Metric’s failure to fully appreciate the legal 

implications of the stipulation is not appropriately remedied through Rule 60(b)(6). 

AFFIRMED.