COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00074-CV

DENNIS L. MIGA APPELLANT

V.

RONALD L. JENSEN APPELLEE

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FROM THE 352ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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AND

NO. 02-11-00167-CV

IN RE DENNIS L. MIGA RELATOR

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ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

The dispute between these parties has spanned more than sixteen years.2 

The current appeal and petition for mandamus result from the trial court‘s 2011 

postjudgment injunction enjoining Appellant/Relator Dennis L. Miga and his wife

from spending, depleting, secreting, or transferring $21,560,150.67, plus 

prejudgment interest—except in the ordinary course of business or for 

reasonable and necessary household and living expenses or reasonable and 

necessary attorney‘s fees—until that amount is finally paid to Appellee/Real Party 

in Interest Ronald L. Jensen.

In his petition for writ of mandamus and appeal, which we consolidated, 

Miga complains that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the postjudgment 

injunction and, alternatively, that the trial court abused its discretion by doing so. 

Because we hold that the injunction is not appealable, we dismiss Miga‘s appeal. 

Because we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction and 

did not abuse its discretion by doing so, we deny Miga‘s petition for writ of 

mandamus.

I. Facts and Procedural History

A. Miga’s Suit

In January 1998, Miga obtained a trial court judgment against his former 

employer, Jensen, for about $18.8 million plus approximately $4.5 million in 

 

2See Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207, 209 (Tex. 2002) (Miga I).
3

prejudgment interest.

3

 Jensen appealed.

4

To end the accrual of postjudgment 

interest, the parties entered into an agreed order, signed by the trial court, under 

which Jensen tendered $23,439,532.78 to Miga toward satisfaction of the 

judgment.5 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Texas reduced Miga‘s judgment to 

$1,034,400; reinstated prejudgment interest at a rate of 10%; and also awarded 

postjudgment interest at a rate of 10% from the date of the trial court‘s judgment 

to the date the agreed order terminated the accrual of postjudgment interest.

6

 

On remand, the trial court rendered a modified judgment for Miga of 

$1,879,382.11.7

B. Jensen’s Suit

Jensen then sought restitution of the difference between the modified 

judgment and the amount he had already paid to Miga.8 Miga refused to repay 

Jensen the $21,560,150.67, so Jensen filed suit against Miga for restitution 

(Jensen‘s lawsuit).9

 

3

Id. at 210.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id. at 217.

7Miga v. Jensen, 299 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. 2009) (Miga II).

8

Id.

9

Id.
4

In February 2004, while Jensen‘s lawsuit was pending, the trial court 

entered a temporary injunction (the 2004 temporary injunction) prohibiting Miga 

and his wife from spending, dissipating, or otherwise moving $21,560,150.67, 

except in the ordinary course of business and reasonable and necessary living 

expenses. The trial court found in the 2004 temporary injunction that injunctive 

relief was necessary to preserve the status quo and that Miga had admitted that 

he no longer had the whole amount Jensen had paid him. The 2004 temporary 

injunction stated that it was effective ―until judgment in this cause is rendered by 

this Court.‖ On March 3, 2005, the trial court entered an order extending the 

2004 temporary injunction, stating that it ―shall survive the entry of final judgment 

by this Court and shall remain in effect until a final, non-appealable judgment is 

entered in this cause and all rights to appeal in this cause have been exhausted 

or expired.‖

The next day, the trial court signed an order granting summary judgment 

for Jensen. The trial court signed a final judgment in the cause on April 19, 2005, 

ordering that Jensen recover $21,560,150.67 plus prejudgment and 

postjudgment interest.10 The judgment states that the March 3, 2005 order 

extending the 2004 temporary injunction ―shall remain in force following the entry 

of this judgment in accordance with its terms.‖

 

10Miga v. Jensen, 214 S.W.3d 81, 84–85 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006), 

aff’d, Miga II at 105.
5

On May 7, 2005, the trial court modified its judgment to dismiss without 

prejudice all claims asserted against Miga‘s wife pursuant to the parties‘

stipulation. Like the previous judgment, the modified judgment provides that the 

March 3, 2005 order extending the 2004 temporary injunction ―shall remain in 

force following the entry of this [j]udgment in accordance with its terms.‖

This court affirmed the trial court‘s judgment, and the Supreme Court of 

Texas affirmed this court‘s judgment on October 23, 2009.

11

 Miga filed a motion 

for rehearing in that court.

C. Jensen’s Recent Attempts to Enforce Judgment Against Miga

While Miga‘s motion for rehearing was pending, the parties‘ attorneys filed 

with the trial court a Rule 11 agreement (dated December 7, 2009) in which they 

agreed to extend the 2004 temporary injunction ―for two weeks beyond the date 

on which that Order would otherwise expire by its terms,‖ that is, two weeks 

beyond the date on which all rights to appeal had been exhausted or expired.

Then, on January 15, 2010, the Supreme Court of Texas issued mandate. 

Ten days later, Jensen filed with the trial court an application for a temporary 

restraining order, injunction, and expedited discovery. On January 27, 2010, 

after a hearing on Jensen‘s application, the parties filed with the trial court 

another Rule 11 agreement, this time agreeing to extend the 2004 temporary 

 

11Miga II at 101, 105.
6

injunction ―until the time the Court enters a replacement temporary restraining 

order or temporary injunction.‖ In March 2010, Jensen deposed Miga.

On January 14, 2011, Miga filed a motion to declare the 2004 temporary 

injunction dissolved, asserting that (1) although the parties had filed the 

December 2009 and January 2010 Rule 11 agreements with the trial court, that 

court had never issued an order on the agreements and (2) he was withdrawing 

his consent to the entry of any agreed order by the trial court based upon the 

Rule 11 agreements. Miga asked the trial court to declare that the temporary 

injunction had dissolved by its own terms. Miga argued in his motion that the 

extension had been issued under civil practice and remedies code section 

52.006 and rule of appellate procedure 24.2,12 that the trial court‘s authority 

expired under those rules when the appeals were exhausted, that ―[t]he attempt 

by the parties to confer on the Court by agreement additional authority after the 

determination of the appeal [was] improper and ineffective,‖ and that ―[t]he 

Court‘s authority under the statutes and rules during the pendency of the appeal 

[was] no longer applicable . . . .‖ He further argued that the trial court had no 

authority under section 31.002 of the civil practice and remedies code (the 

turnover statute) to enter an injunction prohibiting him from making 

expenditures.13

 

12See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 52.006 (West 2008); Tex. R. 

App. P. 24.2.

13See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002 (West 2008).
7

On January 26, 2011, Jensen filed a combined emergency motion to 

enforce the Rule 11 agreement and application for temporary restraining order 

and injunction. Jensen argued that the Rule 11 agreement was valid and 

enforceable because it was in writing, signed by the parties, and filed with the 

trial court. He asserted that the trial court had jurisdiction ―over this postjudgment collection action,‖ including authority under sections 31.002 and 

52.006(e) of the civil practice and remedies code.

The trial court held a hearing on February 14, 2011. The trial court 

concluded that a valid and enforceable Rule 11 agreement existed and that Miga 

had violated the agreement by secreting assets and concealing the existence 

and location of the assets. The trial court further concluded that it had the 

authority to enjoin Miga from secreting or further dissipating assets under the 

turnover statute. The trial court entered a turnover order, ordering Miga to turn

over all assets in various accounts and to disclose to Jensen the location and 

account numbers of any other bank or account over which Miga or his wife had 

signature authority. Miga did not appeal or otherwise challenge the turnover 

order.

The trial court also entered a ―temporary‖ injunction ordering Miga to 

―cease, desist and refrain from spending, dissipating, depleting, secreting, or 

otherwise moving, transferring, or burdening, other than in the ordinary course of 

business and/or for reasonable and necessary household and living expenses 

and/or reasonable and necessary legal fees‖ the amount of $21,560,150.67, plus 
8

prejudgment and postjudgment interest. It is from this new injunction that Miga 

both appeals and seeks mandamus relief.

D. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The new injunction signed by the trial court contains the following findings 

and conclusions of law:

1. The mandate issued by the Texas Supreme Court on 

January 15, 2010 made this Court‘s Judgment final and nonappealable. The Judgment is now final, fully enforceable, and due 

to Jensen in full as follows:

(a) The principal amount of $21,560,150.67 together with 

pre-judgment interest thereon in the amount of 

$1,465,204.21, calculated at the rate of 5.50% simple 

interest from December 12, 2003, through March 8, 

2005, plus $3,248.79 per day from March 8, 2005 until 

the day preceding the date of this judgment; plus

(b) Post-judgment interest, calculated at the judgment 

interest rate of 5.50% compounded annually on the 

unpaid balance from the date of judgment until Jensen 

is paid.

2. Miga has to date refused to pay the amount due on the 

Judgment in whole or in part, and testified that he has no intention of 

paying the Judgment.

3. In May 2004, in conjunction with Jensen‘s suit before 

this Court to recover the $21.5 million Miga owed him at that time, 

this Court entered a temporary injunction barring the Migas from 

―spending, dissipating, depleting, secreting, or otherwise moving, 

transferring, or burdening, other than in the ordinary course of 

business and/or for reasonable and necessary household and living 

expense, funds and assets in the amount of $21.560,150.67 . . . .‖

4. In March 2005, the Court signed an order extending the 

temporary injunction, pursuant to the parties‘ agreement in return for 

Jensen‘s agreement to waive the requirement of a supersedeas 

bond, while Miga appealed this Court‘s grant of summary judgment 
9

(the ―Injunction‖). The Injunction provided that it would automatically 

dissolve ―upon entry of a final, non-appealable judgment in this 

cause and the exhaustion or expiration of all rights of appeal.‖

5. On December 7, 2009, after the Texas Supreme Court‘s 

decision denying Miga‘s appeal, but before the Court‘s denial of 

Miga‘s Motion for Rehearing and issuance of the Mandate, the 

parties filed a Rule 11 Agreement with the Court in which they 

agreed to extend the Injunction an additional two weeks beyond 

when it would otherwise expire.

6. The Texas Supreme Court denied Miga‘s Motion for 

Rehearing and issued its Mandate on January 15, 2010, thus 

making this Court‘s 2005 judgment (the ―Judgment‖) final and nonappealable, and triggering the final two weeks of the Injunction.

7. Miga refused to extend the Injunction pending postjudgment collection proceedings, and Jensen filed an Application for 

Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction and Expedited 

Discovery with this Court on January 25, 2010.

8. After the hearing on Jensen‘s motion on Jan. 27, 2010, 

the parties filed a Rule 11 agreement (the ―Agreement‖) with the 

Court extending the term of the Injunction ―until the time the Court 

enters a replacement temporary restraining order or temporary 

injunction, whichever comes first.‖

9. The Agreement is in writing, signed by the attorneys for 

Jensen and for Mr. and Mrs. Miga, and was filed with the Court on 

Jan. 27, 2010. The Injunction states that ―Either Party may seek 

modification or amendment of this Order at any time for good cause 

shown.‖

10. In March 2010, Miga testified that he had only about 

$340,000 in collectible assets left from Jensen‘s $23.4 million 

Payment and had no intention to pay the Judgment.

11. In an informal accounting in June 2003 captioned ―Use 

of Rule 11 Agreement Funds,‖ Miga represented to Jensen that he 

had $9.74 million remaining in ―Cash and securities on hand,‖ after 

paying $4.838 million in taxes, paying $1.49 million in attorney‘s 

fees, spending $2 million cash on a new house, incurring $2.5 

million in losses on various investments, repaying a $1.8 million 
10

business loan to a partner to his company Interfax, contributing 

$220,000 to section 529 educational plans for his sons, contributing 

$325,000 into an ―Irrevocable Trust‖ for his sons, and incurring 

$550,000 in losses on municipal bonds.

12. In his deposition in this proceeding in August 2004, 

Miga discussed the expenditures listed above in his schedule of the 

―Use of Rule 11 Agreement Funds,‖ but refused to answer any 

questions about the location of the $9.74 million in ―Cash and 

securities on hand‖ on the grounds that those questions invaded his 

constitutional right to privacy. When Jensen moved to compel 

further disclosures, Miga also refused, on the same grounds.

13. In Miga‘s March 2010 deposition, he testified that 

between March 13 and 19, 2003, within weeks after the Miga I

mandate, he transferred $9.47 million in cash and securities to ―RCR 

Foundation,‖ a private ―foundation‖ in Vaduz, Liechtenstein, under 

the administration of the Allgemeines Treuunternehmen (―ATU‖) and 

associated with VP Bank. Specifically, Miga testified that:

a. The assets were located in Liechtenstein.

b. Miga had handwritten ―RCR Foundation‖ on the JP 

Morgan Chase account statement next to the bank‘s 

reference to the transfers to ―VP Bank.‖

c. Miga funded RCR Foundation to benefit his children 

after his death, and that he understood it was akin to an 

irrevocable trust in the United States.

d. Miga had no power to access the assets, to control what 

VP Bank did with the assets, or even to see a balance 

statement on value of the assets held by the Foundation 

other than on annual visits by a representative of ATU 

which ceased after 2008.

e. Miga had never received any disbursement of funds 

from the Foundation.

f. Because Miga had no control over the Foundation, he 

could not repatriate the assets for payment of the 

Judgment.
11

g. Miga had no other bank, investment or other accounts 

outside the United States and had produced all records 

relating to such accounts.

14. After his March 2010 deposition, Miga produced what 

purported to be an amendment to the by-laws of the RCR 

Foundation, signed by Dr. Guido Meier, and a ―Letter of Wishes‖ 

expressing his desire that the assets of the Foundation be 

distributed to his two sons at the discretion of the directors after the 

deaths of Miga and his wife.

15. The deposition of Miga‘s personal accountant 

established that Miga had not reported or paid taxes on what he 

claimed to have been a complete and final gift of almost $10 million 

to the RCR Foundation, nor had he filed the reports required for 

offshore trusts and bank accounts.

16. After the March deposition, Miga also produced bank 

records that showed, among other things, transfers into his JP 

Morgan Chase bank account from various overseas banks, including 

VP Bank BVI, as well as transfers from an entity identified on the

bank statements as ―Bridgeport Group‖ to meet capital calls from JP 

Morgan.

17. A search of public records in the British Virgin Islands 

disclosed that the Bridgeport Group, Inc. had been incorporated by 

ATU (BVI) Limited, the British Virgin Islands subsidiary of the 

Liechtenstein trust company affiliated with VP Bank, that ATU (BVI) 

remained the general agent of Bridgeport and that Bridgeport 

maintained its office at the same address as ATU [(]BVI). Bridgeport 

Group was incorporated on March 6, 2003, three days after the 

Mandate in Miga I.

18. At a continuation of his deposition in August 2010, after 

he produced additional documents, Miga refused to answer any 

questions on these subjects on the advice of his counsel, on the 

grounds that his answers would tend to incriminate him.

19. On the morning of the August deposition, Miga 

disclosed for the first time the existence of a former account at First 

Curacao International Bank and produced for the first time a 

statement from that account showing transactions from July 1, 2005 

through October 23, 2006.
12

20. Miga testified that the First Curacao account was in his 

name individually, but that he used it exclusively to receive 

payments from customers of his business, Interfax, who were 

located in Syria, Iraq, and Iran and therefore were not able to send 

money directly into the United States because of restrictions on 

currency transfers following the September 11, 2001 attacks.

21. Miga testified that although the funds received into the 

First Curacao account represented payments due to Interfax, Miga 

used them for personal purposes. Those purposes included making 

capital contributions for his account and those of a family trust to 

Interfax itself. Miga testified that he also accessed the funds directly 

through an ATM card that he could use in the United States.

22. Miga testified that he never disclosed the First Curacao 

account or the income received into the account to his accountant 

who prepared his tax returns, or his Interfax business partner.

23. Following the August deposition, Miga represented, 

through his litigation counsel . . . , that he might be willing to sign a 

letter requesting or instructing VP Bank, RCR Foundation or ATU to 

return the assets and all associated proceeds to enable Miga to pay 

a part of his debt to Jensen. However, on November 1, 2010, Miga‘s 

counsel communicated Miga‘s refusal to request repatriation of the 

assets on the grounds that it would jeopardize his negotiations with 

the IRS for tax amnesty. Miga refused to consent to allowing the 

IRS to discuss resolution of their potentially conflicting . . . claims to 

the assets in the Foundation.

24. On November 15, 2010, [Miga‘s litigation counsel] 

informed [Jensen‘s litigation counsel] via email that Miga had sent a 

letter to ATU requesting that RCR Foundation provide Miga with 

copies of all documents referring or relating to the RCR Foundation 

and/or to the Miga family‘s participation therein. To date, Miga has 

represented through [his litigation counsel] that he has received no 

responsive documents.

25. Based on Miga‘s testimony and other representations 

about RCR Foundation, Jensen retained counsel in Liechtenstein to 

obtain an injunction freezing the assets of the Foundation. The 

District Court of the Principality of Liechtenstein granted an 

injunction against Miga and the RCR Foundation c/o Allgemeines 

Treuuternehmen (General Trust Company) on December 7, 2010. 
13

However, by letter dated December 14, 2010, Dr. Guido Meier, on 

behalf of the Foundation Council for the RCR Foundation, informed 

the Liechtenstein court that there are not now nor have there ever 

been any assets in the RCR Foundation.

26. On December 27, 2010, Miga produced a copy of a 

letter that had been sent by counsel representing Mr. and Mrs. Miga 

to the IRS in September in relation to a request for tax amnesty. In 

that letter, the Migas state that:

a. In 2003 they ―transferred approximately $8.5 million in 

liquid assets and/or negotiable securities to VP Bank‖;

b. The assets they transferred came from Jensen‘s 

Payment;

c. The ―primary account‖ disclosed ―is located at VP Bank, 

which has headquarters in Liechtenstein. The (Migas‘) 

account is located at VP Bank in the British Virgin 

Islands (―BVI‖), located at 3076 Sir Francis Drake‘s 

Highway, PO Box 3463 Road Town, Tortola, British 

Virgin Islands‖;

d. ―The Taxpayers‘ (Migas‘) VP Bank account is held in the 

name of Bridgeport Group Inc.‖;

e. William Green, who is ―believed to be a businessman 

and resident of BVI‖ is the sole director and officer of 

Bridgeport Group;

f. Bridgeport Group was formed by RCR Foundation, a 

foundation established by the Migas and domiciled in 

Vaduz, Liechtenstein;

g. The Migas estimate their total unreported income 

stemming from the account(s) to be between $0 and 

$100,000 for the years 2003 through 2008; and 

h. During 2005 and 2006, the Migas []also had an account 

with First Curacao International Bank ―in order to have a 

debit card.‖
14

27. Miga has not produced any account statements or other 

documents relating to the account of Bridgeport Group, Inc. with VP 

Bank (BVI) or any other foreign bank other than First Curacao 

International Bank.

28. This Court has authority to enjoin Miga from secreting or 

further dissipating assets pursuant to the Turnover Statute, Civil 

Practice and Remedies Code § 31.002. In the Guardianship of De 

Villarreal, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 2249, at *14 [2009 WL 888467, at 

*4] (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, pet. [denied]) . . . .

29. To obtain injunctive relief in the pre-trial context, the 

applicant must plead and prove: (1) a cause of action against the 

defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a 

probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru v. 

Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); Emeritus Corp. v. 

Ofczarazak, 198 S.W.3d 222, 226–27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

2006, no pet.). However, ―the first two elements that must be 

established to obtain a pre-trial temporary injunction are necessarily 

met when a judgment has been rendered against a defendant.[‖] 

Emeritus Corp., 198 S.W.3d at 227.

30. The standard for injunctive relief to preserve assets 

after judgment is different than the ―more general  ̳probable, 

imminent and irreparable injury‘ that is applicable in a variety of pretrial contexts.‖ Emeritus Corp., 198 S.W.3d at 227. In the postjudgment context, the question is only ―whether the judgment debtor 

is likely to dissipate or transfer its assets to avoid satisfaction of the 

judgment.‖ Id. Evidence of the actual dissipation or transfer of 

assets is not necessary to meet this standard. Id. at 228.

31. In this case, the evidence is undisputed that Miga has 

transferred millions of dollars of money he received from Jensen to a 

secret offshore account and taken extensive actions to prevent its 

discovery, including falsely marking documents and deliberately and 

repeatedly giving false testimony under oath.

32. The record therefore establishes that in the absence of 

injunctive relief, Miga is likely to dissipate or transfer his assets to 

avoid satisfaction of the judgment.

33. The record further establishes that Jensen is in 

imminent and probable danger of being irreparably harmed if Miga is 
15

not enjoined from spending, dissipating, depleting, secreting, or 

otherwise moving, transferring, or burdening the assets that remain 

available to satisfy the Judgment. The record establishes that 

Jensen is faced with the threat of imminent and irreparable harm in 

that any further depletion of Miga‘s assets could further reduce 

Jensen‘s recovery, with Miga claiming to be unable to make up such 

loss. Each day of delay increases the risk of additional irreparable 

harm to Jensen‘s entitlement to payment of the Judgment. 

Temporary relief is accordingly necessary to preserve the status 

quo. If the Court does not issue a temporary restraining order to 

preserve the status quo, the Judgment entered by the Court will be 

rendered ineffectual in that the Funds will no longer be available, in 

whole or in part, for collection.

34. Jensen has no adequate remedy at law for the 

threatened injury, because Miga has admitted that he no longer 

retains the full amount of the Judgment even now. Any further 

expenditure, loss, concealment, dissipation, burdening or other 

disposition of remaining funds would only further reduce Miga‘s 

capacity to make restitution and Jensen‘s ability to recover what is 

due to him. Given the magnitude of Miga‘s obligation, the total 

losses to Jensen from Miga‘s conduct could easily exceed Miga‘s 

financial worth so as to prevent adequate compensation to Jensen.

35. It clearly appears from these facts that unless Miga is 

immediately restrained from spending, dissipating, depleting, 

secreting, or otherwise moving, transferring, or burdening, other than 

in the ordinary course of business and/or for reasonable and 

necessary household and living expenses, funds and assets in the 

amount of $21,560,150.67, together with pre-judgment interest 

thereon in the amount of $1,465,204.21, calculated at the rate of 

5.50% simple interest from December 12, 2003, through March 8, 

2005; plus pre-judgment interest in the amount of $194,927.40 for 

the dates March 8, 2005 until May 6, 2005, the day preceding the 

date of judgment, calculated at the rate of $3,248.79 per day; plus 

post-judgment interest thereon calculated at the judgment interest 

rate of 5.50% compounded annually on the unpaid balance from 

May 7, 2005, the date of judgment, until Jensen is paid, representing 

the amount of Jensen‘s Payment less that amount awarded to Mr. 

Miga under the Second Modified Judgment on Remand in Cause 

No. 048-161505-95, he will commit the foregoing acts before Jensen 

has opportunity to collect the Judgment; and that, if commission of 

these acts is not restrained immediately, Jensen will suffer 
16

irreparable injury because his ability to recover the Judgment will be 

compromised.

II. Our Jurisdiction

Miga asks us to treat his original petition for writ of mandamus and his 

subsequent brief on appeal and petition for writ of mandamus as one 

consolidated brief. His issues can be divided into two main categories—those 

complaining that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the postjudgment 

injunction and those complaining that even if the trial court had jurisdiction, the 

trial court nevertheless abused its discretion by entering the injunction.

As Miga‘s decision to seek both appellate and mandamus relief shows,

determining whether mandamus or appeal is the proper procedural vehicle for his 

complaints is tricky. Caselaw provides that orders under the turnover statute are 

appealable because of their mandatory nature,14 but this injunction is prohibitory 

in nature, not mandatory.15 Temporary injunctions are appealable interlocutory 

orders under section 51.014 of the civil practice and remedies code,16 but this 

 

14Schultz v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Appeals of Dallas, 810 S.W.2d 738, 

740 (Tex. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by In re Sheshtawy, 154 S.W.3d 

114, 124–25 (Tex. 2004).

15See Lifeguard Benefit Servs., Inc. v. Direct Med. Network Solutions, Inc., 

308 S.W.3d 102, 112 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (explaining that a 

prohibitive injunction forbids conduct but a mandatory injunction requires it).

16Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4) (West 2008).
17

injunction, despite its label, is permanent, not temporary, in character.

17

 And 

while permanent injunctions issued with a final judgment are appealable,18 an 

order enforcing a previously signed judgment generally is not a final judgment or 

decree and cannot be appealed as such.19 Because we believe that the 

challenged order is a permanent, prohibitory injunction designed to enforce the 

money judgment previously awarded Jensen, we hold that it is not an appealable 

order.20 We therefore dismiss Miga‘s appeal and address his issues brought via 

his petition for writ of mandamus and subsequent brief.

III. The Trial Court’s Jurisdiction

Miga contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction under the turnover 

statute or other law to enter the injunction. But a trial court has the inherent 

power to enforce its judgments.21 ―That power is part of the court‘s jurisdiction, 

 

17See Del Valle Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lopez, 845 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex.

1992); cf. Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 335–38 (Tex. 

2000) (treating order as temporary injunction rather than permanent injunction 

because it restrained Qwest immediately and while suit was pending).

18See, e.g., Operation Rescue-Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and 

Se. Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546, 567–70 (Tex. 1998) (affirming judgment and 

permanent injunction as modified).

19Schultz, 810 S.W.2d at 740.

20To foster judicial economy, we note that should the Supreme Court of 

Texas ultimately determine that Miga‘s issues are in fact appealable, we would 

alternatively overrule his appellate issues for the reasons provided herein and 

dismiss his petition for mandamus relief.

21Arndt v. Farris, 633 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1982); see Tex. Gov‘t Code 

Ann. § 21.001(a) (West 2004); Tex. R. Civ. P. 308.
18

and the court may employ suitable methods to enforce its jurisdiction.‖

22

 ―This 

authority to enforce is not extinguished by the mere passage of time or the finality

of a judgment.‖23 The only limitations on a trial court‘s power to enforce its own 

judgments is that any enforcement order must be consistent with the original 

judgment and must not materially change the judgment.24 An order that does 

materially change the judgment is void.25

The rules of procedure do not dilute the trial court‘s inherent power. Rule 

308 of the civil rules of procedure provides that a trial court shall cause its 

judgments to be executed.26 Rule 621 provides that they shall be enforced by

execution or other appropriate process.27

 

22Arndt, 633 S.W.2d at 499.

23In re Tarrant Cnty., No. 02-05-00274-CV, 2005 WL 3436582, at *4 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth Dec. 12, 2005, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (Livingston, J., 

dissenting) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b; Wall Street Deli, Inc. v. Boston Old 

Colony Ins. Co., 110 S.W.3d 67, 69 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, no pet.); and 

Reynolds v. Harrison, 635 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1982, writ ref‘d 

n.r.e.)).

24Id. at *2, *5 (majority and dissenting ops.); Matz v. Bennion, 961 S.W.2d 

445, 452 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied).

25In re Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 252 S.W.3d 480, 493 n.20 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding) (citing Harris Cnty.

Appraisal Dist. v. West, 708 S.W.2d 893, 896–97 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1986, no writ) (holding that trial court‘s enforcement order was void 

because it attempted to materially change the relief awarded in the trial court‘s 

judgment)).

26Tex. R. Civ. P. 308.

27Tex. R. Civ. P. 621.
19

The legislature has also not attempted to reduce the judicial branch‘s 

inherent power to enforce its own judgments. Section 31.002(a), the turnover 

statute, specifically provides that injunction is a tool for achieving such 

enforcement:

(a) A judgment creditor is entitled to aid from a court of appropriate 

jurisdiction through injunction or other means in order to reach 

property to obtain satisfaction on the judgment if the judgment 

debtor owns property, including present or future rights to property, 

that:

(1) cannot readily be attached or levied on by ordinary legal 

process; and

(2) is not exempt from attachment, execution, or seizure for 

the satisfaction of liabilities.

(b) The court may:

(1) order the judgment debtor to turn over nonexempt property 

that is in the debtor‘s possession or is subject to the debtor‘s 

control, together with all documents or records related to the 

property, to a designated sheriff or constable for execution;

(2) otherwise apply the property to the satisfaction of the 

judgment; or

(3) appoint a receiver with the authority to take possession of 

the nonexempt property, sell it, and pay the proceeds to the 

judgment creditor to the extent required to satisfy the 

judgment.

(c) The court may enforce the order by contempt proceedings or by 

other appropriate means in the event of refusal or disobedience.

(d) The judgment creditor may move for the court‘s assistance under 

this section in the same proceeding in which the judgment is 

rendered or in an independent proceeding.
20

(e) The judgment creditor is entitled to recover reasonable costs, 

including attorney‘s fees.

(f) A court may not enter or enforce an order under this section that 

requires the turnover of the proceeds of, or the disbursement of, 

property exempt under any statute, including Section 42.0021, 

Property Code. This subsection does not apply to the enforcement 

of a child support obligation or a judgment for past due child support.

. . . .

(h) A court may enter or enforce an order under this section that 

requires the turnover of nonexempt property without identifying in 

the order the specific property subject to turnover.28

Nowhere in the language of that statute does the legislature indicate an 

intent to eradicate the trial court‘s authority to enforce its judgments by 

restraining behavior rather than commanding other acts; we therefore reject 

Miga‘s argument that ―[t]he turnover statute does not provide authority for the 

court to enter a purely prohibitive injunction against a Defendant to aid the 

judgment creditor in the collection of his judgment.‖

Miga also argues that the injunction impermissibly modifies the judgment 

by granting Jensen a security interest in all of Miga‘s assets, current or future, 

exempt or not. Miga cites with no discussion two El Paso cases for this 

proposition,

29 but we can see no correspondence between those cases and this 

 

28Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002 (emphasis added).

29Moseley v. EMCO Mach. Works Co., 890 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 1994, no writ); Seibert v. Seibert, 759 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. App.—El 

Paso 1988, writ denied).
21

issue, and we decline to develop Miga‘s argument for him.

30

 Further, our review 

of the injunction here does not reveal any inconsistency between the judgment 

and the injunction, and the injunction does not change the judgment but is merely 

a vehicle for its enforcement.

Because we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the 

postjudgment injunction and that the injunction does not exceed that jurisdiction, 

we overrule all portions of Miga‘s issues contending otherwise. Also, because 

the trial court did not rely on the existence of the prior written rule 11 agreement 

to acquire its jurisdiction to enforce its judgment, we overrule Miga‘s issues

concerning that agreement as moot.

IV. No Abuse of Discretion by the Trial Court

In the remaining portions of his issues, Miga contends that the trial court 

abused its discretion by issuing the injunction because (A) it is not based on the 

evidentiary showing required by the turnover statute, (B) its use of terms 

―ordinary,‖ ―reasonable,‖ and ―necessary‖ makes it impermissibly vague, and 

(C) what a judgment debtor does with his property after the judgment is final and 

nonappealable ―should not . . . be considered conduct that significantly interferes 

with the administration of a trial court‘s core functions,‖ and holding otherwise 

 

30See Tello v. Bank One, N.A., 218 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (stating that ―we know of no authority obligating us to 

become advocates for a particular litigant through performing [his] research and 

developing [his] argument for [him]‖).
22

would ―open the flood gates for post-judgment actions by eager judgment 

creditors . . . .‖

A. Evidentiary Showing Under Turnover Statute

Miga argues that it is impossible for the evidence to make the requisite 

―showing that all of this unknown [future acquired] property cannot readily be 

attached or levied on by ordinary legal process and/or it is not exempt from 

attachment, execution[,] or seizure for the satisfaction of liabilities.‖ But that 

statutory showing required for a turnover order is not required for a postjudgment 

injunction. As the trial court explained in its findings of fact and conclusions of 

law within the injunction, to obtain pretrial injunctive relief, an ―applicant must 

plead and prove: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right 

to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the 

interim.‖

31

 But those first two elements are necessarily established when 

judgment has already been rendered against a defendant.32 The requisites for 

obtaining postjudgment injunctive relief to preserve assets are different than the 

―more general  ̳probable, imminent and irreparable injury‘ that is applicable‖

pretrial.33 To justify a postjudgment injunction, an applicant must prove only that 

―the judgment debtor is likely to dissipate or transfer its assets to avoid 

 

31Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Emeritus Corp., 198 S.W.3d at 226–27.

32Emeritus Corp., 198 S.W.3d at 227.

33Id.
23

satisfaction of the judgment.‖34 Evidence of the actual dissipation or transfer of 

assets is not necessary to meet this standard.35 ―The trial court abuses its 

discretion in ordering a post-judgment injunction if the only reasonable decision 

that could be drawn from the evidence is that the judgment debtor would not 

dissipate or transfer its assets.‖36

The trial court‘s unchallenged findings provide that

Miga has refused to pay any part of the judgment and has testified that 

he has no intention of paying it;

Miga has testified that he has only about $340,000 left from Jensen‘s 

$23.4 million payment;

In an informal accounting in June 2003, Miga represented to Jensen 

that he had $9.74 million remaining in ―Cash and securities on hand,‖ 

after paying $4.838 million in taxes, paying $1.49 million in attorney‘s 

fees, spending $2 million cash on a new house, incurring $2.5 million in 

losses on various investments, repaying a $1.8 million business loan, 

contributing $220,000 to college funds for his sons, contributing 

$325,000 into an ―Irrevocable Trust‖ for his sons, and incurring 

$550,000 in losses on municipal bonds;

In an August 2004 deposition, Miga refused to answer any questions 

about the location of the $9.74 million in ―Cash and securities on hand‖;

In Miga‘s March 2010 deposition, he testified that within weeks after the

Miga I mandate, he transferred $9.47 million in cash and securities to 

―RCR Foundation,‖ a private ―foundation‖ in Liechtenstein. Miga 

testified that he understood that the RCR Foundation was like an 

irrevocable trust in the United States; that he had no power to access 

the assets, to control what the bank did with the assets, or even to see 

 

34Id.

35Id. at 228.

36Id. at 227.
24

a financial statement of the assets‘ value after 2008; and that he had 

never received any disbursement of funds from the Foundation;

Miga testified that he had no other financial accounts outside the United 

States and had produced all records relating to such accounts;

Later, Miga produced a document purporting to be an amendment to 

the Foundation‘s bylaws and a letter indicating his desire that the 

assets be distributed to his sons after he and his wife died, subject to 

the discretion of the Foundation directors;

Miga‘s accountant‘s deposition established that Miga had neither 

reported nor paid gift taxes on the purported gift of almost $10 million to 

the Foundation, nor had he filed required reports for offshore trusts and 

bank accounts;

After the March deposition, Miga also produced bank records that 

showed transfers into his JP Morgan Chase bank account from various 

overseas banks, including VP Bank BVI, as well as transfers from an 

entity identified on the bank statements as ―Bridgeport Group‖ to meet 

capital calls from JP Morgan;

A public record search revealed that on March 6, 2003, three days after 

the mandate in Miga I, the Bridgeport Group was incorporated by a 

subsidiary of the Liechtenstein trust company administering the RCR 

Foundation;

In the continuation of his deposition in August 2010, Miga refused to 

answer any questions on these subjects on the advice of his counsel, 

on the grounds that his answers would tend to incriminate him;

In August 2010, Miga admitted that he had also had an account at First 

Curacao International Bank, and he produced a statement from that 

account showing transactions from July 1, 2005, through October 23, 

2006;

Miga testified that the account was his individual account but that he 

used it exclusively to receive payments from customers of his business

who were located in Syria, Iraq, and Iran and therefore prohibited from 

sending money directly into the United States because of restrictions on 

currency transfers following the September 11, 2001 attacks;
25

Miga admitted that he used funds received into the account for personal 

purposes and that he accessed the funds directly in the United States 

through an ATM card;

Miga testified that he never told his accountant or business partner 

about the account or the income received via the account;

After the August 2010 deposition, Miga represented through his 

attorney that he might be willing to ask or instruct the Liechtenstein 

bank or trust company to return the Foundation assets and proceeds so 

that he could pay part of his debt to Jensen;

On November 1, 2010, Miga‘s counsel communicated Miga‘s refusal to 

request repatriation of the assets on the grounds that it would 

jeopardize his negotiations with the IRS for tax amnesty. Miga refused 

to consent to allowing the IRS to discuss resolution of Jensen‘s and the 

IRS‘s potentially conflicting claims to the Foundation assets;

On November 15, 2010, Miga‘s lawyer stated that Miga had sent a 

letter to the trust company asking that the foundation provide Miga with 

copies of all documents referring or relating to the RCR Foundation 

and/or to the Miga family‘s participation therein. As of the trial court‘s 

judgment, Miga claimed that he had received no documents;

On December 7, 2010, Jensen obtained from a Liechtenstein court an 

injunction freezing the assets;

A week later, Dr. Guido Meier, on behalf of the Foundation Council for 

the RCR Foundation, informed the Liechtenstein court in writing that 

there are not now nor have there ever been any assets in the RCR 

Foundation;

On December 27, 2010, Miga produced a September 2010 letter to the 

IRS in which he and his wife stated that in 2003, they transferred about 

$8.5 million liquid assets or negotiable securities to the Liechtenstein 

bank, that the assets came from Jensen‘s payment, that their account is 

located at the bank‘s subsidiary in the British Virgin Islands, that the 

account is held in the name of Bridgeport Group Inc., that Bridgeport 

Group was formed by RCR Foundation, a foundation established by the 

Migas and domiciled in Liechtenstein, that the Migas estimate their total 

unreported income stemming from the account(s) to be between $0 and 

$100,000 for the years 2003 through 2008, and that the Migas had the 
26

account with First Curacao International Bank ―in order to have a debit 

card‖;

The evidence is undisputed that Miga has transferred millions of dollars 

of money he received from Jensen to a secret offshore account and 

taken extensive actions to prevent its discovery, including falsely 

marking documents and deliberately and repeatedly giving false 

testimony under oath.

Accordingly, we reject Miga‘s argument and hold that Jensen has satisfied 

his evidentiary burden to obtain the injunction.

B. Injunction Is Not Impermissibly Vague

Miga also argues that the order is impermissibly vague because it uses the 

terms ―ordinary,‖ ―reasonable,‖ and ―necessary.‖ Miga cites no specific authority 

for his proposition that these three common terms in legal and legislative drafting 

are vague. Jensen, on the other hand, does cite specific Texas authority for the 

proposition that ―ordinary course of business‖ is sufficiently precise.37 Further, as 

our sister court in Dallas has pointed out, courts routinely enforce provisions 

requiring a party to pay reasonable and necessary expenses.38 We therefore 

reject Miga‘s argument that the injunction is vague and ambiguous because it 

uses the terms ―ordinary,‖ ―reasonable,‖ and ―necessary.‖

 

37See, e.g., Metra United Escalante, L.P. v. Lynd Co., 158 S.W.3d 535, 

545 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (citing Helpinstill v. Regions Bank, 

33 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied)).

38Zidell v. Zidell, No. 05-96-00052-CV, 1997 WL 424429, at *7 & n.13 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas July 30, 1997, no writ) (not designated for publication) (citing 

Robbins v. Robbins, 601 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no 

writ)).
27

C. Miga’s Policy Argument

Finally, Miga argues that what a judgment debtor does with his property 

after mandate has issued does not significantly interfere with the administration 

of a trial court‘s core functions and that upholding an injunction restricting the 

expenditures of the debtor until the judgment is paid would encourage hordes of 

creditors to seek postjudgment injunctive relief. Miga ignores the fact that 

injunctions are fact-specific and ignores the many unchallenged findings of fact 

included in the injunction itself.

Generally, a permanent injunction ―must not grant relief which is not 

prayed for nor be more comprehensive or restrictive than justified by the 

pleadings, the evidence, and the usages of equity.‖39 Here, Jensen requested 

the relief awarded. Further, the unchallenged findings of fact show that Miga has 

consistently flaunted the trial court‘s orders, wasting judicial resources at all 

levels. Finally, the permanent injunction allows Miga to continue to spend money 

in the ordinary course of business, for reasonable and necessary household and 

living expenses, and for reasonable and necessary attorney‘s fees; the injunction

is therefore not overly broad but equitably precise.40 We consequently reject 

Miga‘s remaining argument contending that the trial court abused its discretion,

 

39Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 39 (Tex. 2003) (citing 6 L. 

Hamilton Lowe, Texas Practice: Remedies § 244 at 237 (2d ed. 1973)).

40See Villalobos v. Holguin, 146 Tex. 474, 208 S.W.2d 871, 875 (1948);

Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 51 (5th Cir. 1992).
28

and we overrule all issues contending that the trial court abused its discretion by 

issuing the permanent injunction against him.

V. Conclusion

Having held that this injunction is not appealable, we dismiss Miga‘s 

appeal. Having held that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue this permanent 

injunction enjoining Miga from spending money except in the ordinary course of 

business, for reasonable and necessary household and living expenses, and for 

reasonable and necessary attorney‘s fees and that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by issuing the injunction, we deny all mandamus relief.

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.

DELIVERED: March 8, 2012