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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15-3067

U NI T E D S TAT E SOF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

S T E V E N S YM S

, Defen dant-Appellant.

Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

So uthern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s. No. 3: 13 -cr- 30 12 5- DRH-5 — David R. He rndon , Judg e.

A RGU E D S E PT E MB E R 27, 2016

— D E C I D E D J ANU AR Y 17, 2017

Before B AU E R

, R OVN E R

, and H AMI L TO N

, Ci rcui t Judges. B A U ER , Cir cui t Judge. Thi s case inv olv es a conspi racy to di strib ute c ocai ne i n St. Lo ui s, Mi ssouri, and the s urro unding
area. One of the conspi rat or s, S tev e n Sy ms, pleaded gui lty to conspi r a cy t o di strib ute and possess wi th intent to di strib ute cocaine, i n violati on of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)( 1), (b) (1)( A)(i i ), and 846. The di stric t court sentenced Sy ms to 15 1 months’ i m-2 No. 15-3067
p r isonment. On appeal, Sy ms arg ues that the mandatory minim um sentence contai ned in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1)( A)(i i ) violates the separation-of- pow ers doctrine. He also arg ues that the di stric t co ur t i mproper ly based i ts drug-quanti ty calc ulation and sentencing enhanc ement on specu lativ e and unre li

able evidenc e, and further contends that he quali fi ed for a safety v alv e reducti on in hi s sentencing, an d that hi s sentence violates the Ei ghth Amendment. For the reasons th at follow , w e affi rm Sy ms’ s entence.

I. BACKGRO UND Beginning i n April 2011, multi ple law enforcement agenci es, i nclu ding the Drug Enforcement Admini strat i on, Inter nal Rev enue Se r v ice , and Uni ted St ates Mar shals Ser vic e, began i nv esti gating a drug-tr affi cking oper ation based on info rmation that T

yr one Carr aw ay of St

. Loui s, Mis souri, w as supp lyi ng cocaine to brot hers Cor tez and Ri chard Y arbough of East St

. L ou i s, Illi noi s. During the course of the inv esti gation, agents ga the re d in formation and col l e c te d e vi d e n c e thro u gh c onfi d e n tial i nformants, contro lled buys of cocaine, wi tness interv i ews,
surv ei llance, and searches. The inv esti gation r e vealed that Carr aw ay and coconspi rat or Ri chard Graham di strib uted
co ca i ne to the Y

arbough brot hers, and other defendants a nd uni denti fi ed i ndi vidu als. The ulti mate source of Carr aw ay and Graham’s supp ly w as Huey Jones of Houston, T ex a s. The intermediari es betw een Jones, Carr aw ay

, and Graham w ere Sy ms and cocons p irato r Antoine Meek s. Sy ms, Meek s, and an unindi cted coconspi rat or

, tr av eled to Houston to obtain cocaine from Jones. Sy ms also recruited Keith H a rr i s to tr ansport drugs and moneyNo. 15-3067 3
betw een Houston and St

. Loui s; Harris tr ansported the cocaine and money i n the gas tank of the v ehi cles he drove to retr i ev e the drugs. On Ap r il 27, 2012, Harris’ v ehi cle w as searched duri ng a tr affi c stop. The search rev ealed 40 packages that each co ntain ed a r o un d

. 5 kilograms of cocaine, for a tot al of 19.91 kilograms. A fingerpr int analysi s of the packages showed latent pr ints belongi ng to Sy ms, Meeks, Jones, and others. O n O ctober 14, 2012, agents conduc ted surv ei llance o n Sy ms, Meek s, and another indi vidu al. Sy ms drove to a resi dence i n St

. Loui s, at whi ch tim e agents se a r ched the

v ehi cle, r e si dence, and gar age and recov ered tw o packages that contai ned 982 gr ams of cocaine. At a post-arr est interv i ew , Meek s rev ealed that he and Syms had tr av eled to Ho uston to obtain the drugs. On June 18, 2013, a gr and jury charged Sy ms wi th conspi r acy to distribute, and po sses si on wi th intent t o dis tr ibute fi v e kilo g r ams or more of cocaine in violati on of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)( 1), 841(b) (1)( A)(i i ), and 846. On June 27, 2013, Sy ms
w as arr ested and released on a $10,000 uns ecured appearance bond. In a Sept ember 6, 2013, interv i ew , Jones i mpli cated Sy ms in sev eral addi tional tr i ps to Houston thro ughout 201 1 obtaining a tot al of 41 kilograms of cocaine. Jones advis ed that the final shi pment of coca ine w as 19.91 kilograms that w as sei zed by law enforcement, a shipm e nt that Sy ms helped to deli v er
. Jones also stated that Sy ms sought to increase hi s ro le i n the conspi racy and the amount of cocaine that w as being tr ansported so t hat he could selli t inSt . Loui s.4 No. 15-3067 Agent s i nterv i ew ed Harris on Sept ember 10, 20 1 3 , who described how Sy ms recruited hi m to be a couri er for the drugtr affi cki ng oper ation, and of Sy ms’ inv olv ement in the tr i ps to Houston to obtain c ocaine. Sy ms pleaded gui lty to the one - c oun t ch arg e again st hi m on August 28, 2014. The Uni ted St ates Probation Offi ce prepar ed Sy ms’ Presentence Inv esti gation Repor t. I t detailed the i nterv i ew notes from Jones and Harris. Sy ms’ PSR deter mined that he w as responsible for conspi ring wi th multi ple defendants and other s to possess and/or di strib ute 61.8 kilograms of cocaine. Although the amount contai ned in the indi ctment w as 5 kilograms or more, the PSR, rely ing in part o n st a t ements from c oconspi rat or s, deter mined that Syms’ relev ant c onduct

w as 61.8 ki logr ams of c ocaine. Using the 2013 Gui delines Manual, the PSR recommended

a base offense lev el of 36. The PS R appli ed a three -lev el enhanc ement, pursuant to U.S.S .G. § 3B1.1(b) , for being a manager or supe r vis or of a cri minal acti vity inv olving fi v e
or more partici pants. Sy ms w as cr edi ted for acceptanc e of responsibi li ty

, pursuant to U.S.S .G. §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b)

. Accordi ngly

, hi s total o ffens e lev el w as 36. Sy ms fi led a wri tte n ob j ecti on to the PSR, challen gin g the i nclu si on of the uncharged drug amounts and the manager /supervis or enhanc eme nt

. He complained that the statements take n from coconspi rat or s us e d t o increase the drug amount and apply the manager/supervisor enhanc ement w ere self- serving and unreli able. The government fi led i ts response
o ut l ining the basi s for the information used in the PSR, and S yms wi thdrew hi s objections. Sy ms then fi led a sentencingNo. 15-3067 5
memorandum whi ch did no t rais e any of the consti tutional clai ms h e rais es before us but requested that the di stric t c ourt i mpose the statuto ry mini mumsentence of ten y ears. At sentencing, the d i s tr i ct court accepted the PSR. The court calc ulated Sy ms’ base offense lev el at 34 using the 2014 Gui deline s, whi ch contai ned a change from the 2013 Gui delines that decreased Sy ms ’ base offense lev el by tw o. After applyi ng the manager/supervisor enhanc ement and credi tin g Sy ms with acceptanc e of responsibi li ty , the di stric t court
ca l cu l a ted Sy ms’ tot al offense lev el to be 34. The court found that the statuto ry mini mum sentence w as ten y ears, and the maxi mum w as a li fe sentence. The court de t e r min ed the Sente ncing Gui delines range to be fr o m 1 5 1 to 188 months. Before sentencing Sy ms, the court sp e cifi cally asked Sy ms’
couns el i f there were any other arg uments made in mi tigati on that he had no t fu l l y addressed, to whi ch couns el replied, “No.” The court then or dered S yms to pay a $500 fine and
se ntenced hi m to 151 months in pris on wi th fi v e y ea r s o f supervis ed release. Thi s appeal f ollow ed.

II. DISCUSSION Sy ms fi rst arg ues that mandatory mini mum sentences violate the separation-of- pow ers doc tr in e b y gr a n tin g prosecutor s sole di screti on i n deci ding whether to pursue charges that carry m a n d a to ry m in i mu m s e n tenc es and stripping the judi ci al branch of di screti on i n sentencing. W e flatly rej ected a si mi la r arg ument in United States v
. Nigg, 667 F .3d 929, 934 (7th Ci r
. 2012). W e held that mandatory mini mum sentences di d not violate the separation-of- pow ers doctrine, recog ni zi ng that “deter minate sentences w ere found6 No. 15-3067
i n thi s country’ s penal codes from i ts incepti on[.]” Id

. (internal alter ation omi tte d) (quoti ng Chapman v
. United States , 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)) ; see also United States v. Brucker, 646 F .3d 1012, 1 0 1 9 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (“W e hav e rej ected separation of pow er s ch allenges to mandatory mini mum sentences, and w e see no reason to rev i si t that holdi ng here.”). W e decline Sy ms’ i nvitati on to upend well-settled precedent inthi s cas e. W e also note that the di stric t court w ent abov e the mandat o r y mini mum sentence of ten y ears, sentencing Sy ms t o tw elv e y ears and sev en months. The di stric t court deter mined the Gui delines r a ng e and t hen used the factors set fort h in 18 U.S.C

. § 3 5 53(a) i n fash i oni ng Sy ms’ sentence. Contr ary to Sy ms’ contention, the di stric t court d id us e i ts di screti on in sentencing hi m. Sy ms’ sentence di d not violate the separationof-pow ers doctr i ne. Next, Sy ms contends that the di stric t court violated hi s rights under the Fifth and Six t h Amendments when i t sent e nced hi m based upon uncharged conduc t contai ned in t he PSR. Speci fi cally

, Sy ms arg ues that the di stric t court ’s concl usi on that he w as i nv olv ed in di strib uti ng 61.8 kilog rams of cocaine in t he oper ation w as based upon unreli able information prov i ded by hi s coconspi rat or s. He further arg ues that the Probation Department’s recommendati on that Sy ms receive a leadershi p ro le enhanc ement w as si mi larly based upon unreli able information from coconspi rat or s. The government counters that Sy ms w ai v ed thi s arg ument by wi thdrawi ng hi s objections to the PSR, and w e agr ee. Pri or to sentencing, Sy ms objecte d to the PSR, challen gin g the drug quanti ty c a l cu l a ti on a n d the m a n a ger/supervis or enhanc ementNo. 15-3067 7
on the basi s that they w ere based on un reliab le coconspi rat or st a tements. He later wi thdrew these objections and di d not
renew them a t sentencing. W e hav e repeat edly found that a wi thdraw al of an objection gener ally results in a w ai v er of that arg ument on appeal, see, e.g. , United S ta tes v
. V enturella , 585 F .3d 1013, 1019 (7th Ci r
. 2009) (collecting cases ), and Sy ms has not put fort h any arg ument w arr anting a deviati on from that holdi ng. In addi tion, the di s tr i ct court judge speci fi cally asked Sy ms’
couns e l wh e the r he had consi dered all arg uments in mi tigati on of the sentence, t o which she replied in the affi rmativ e. The judge too k thi s step i n or der to ensure that any counterv ai ling factors had been appropr i ately consi dered , a practic e that in
our view i s to be commended. In United States v
. Garcia-Segura , w e admoni shed defendan t s that i f defense couns el answered thi s questi on i n the affi rmativ e during sentencing, sub sequent challen ges to the defendant’s sentence for fai lure to address a prin ci pal mi tigati on arg ument w ould be w ai v ed. 717 F .3d 566, 569 (7th Ci r
. 2013). Accordingly , w e find that Sy ms has w ai v ed hi s challen ges to the di stric t court’s fact-finding at sentencing. Sy ms also arg ues tha t t he di stric t court err ed by not applyi ng the “safety v alv e” prov i si on in U.S.S .G. § 5 C 1 .2 of the Sente ncing Gui d e l ines in or der to reduce hi s sentence. The gove r nment arg ues that Sy ms fai led to quali fy for the safety v alv e according to the pl ain language of the G ui delines. The M andator y Min i mum Sente ncing Refor m A ct of 1994 i nclu des a safety v alv e prov i si on that created more flexibi l it y i n sentencing by permi tting courts to sentence below the8 No. 15-3067
mini mum sente nc e s fi xed by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f ). The Sente ncing Commi ssi on added an analogo us prov i si on to the Gui delines. S e e U.S.S .G. § 5C1.2. The safety v alv e i s i ntended to benefi t “fi rst-time, n on- vi ol e n t d ru g offenders who

w ere not or gani zers of cri minal acti vity and who hav e made a goo d-fai th effort to co o p e r ate wi th the government.” United States v
. Arrington , 73 F .3d 144, 147 (7th Ci r
. 1996); see also United States v
. Thompson , 76 F .3d 166, 171 (7th Ci r
. 1996) (di scu ssing legis lativ e hi stor y of t he statute and guid eline). In or der to apply the safety v alv e, the court mus t find that: (1) the defendant does not hav e more than 1 cri minal hi stor y poin t, as deter mined under the sentencing gui delines; (2) the defendant di d not
use violence or credible threat s of violence or pos se ss a fi rear m or other dangero us w eapon (o r i nduc e another partici pant to do so) in co nnecti on wi th the offense; (3) the offense di d not result i n death or seri ous bodi ly injur y t o any person; (4) the defendant w as not an or gani zer , leader , manager

, or superv iso r of other s in the offense, as deter mined under the sent encing gui delines and w as not engaged in a conti nuing cri minal ent erpr i se, as defined in secti on 408 of the Contr olled Substances Act; and (5) not later t han the tim e of the sentencing hearin g, t he defendant has tr uthfull y prov i de d to the Government all i nformation and evidenc e the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that

w ere part o f the same course of conduc t or of a common sc he me or plan, but the fact that theNo. 15-3067 9
defendant has no relev ant or usef ul other infor

ma t ion to prov i de or that the Gov ernment i s already aw are of the information shall no t preclud e a deter minati on by the court that the defendant has compli ed wi th this requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f ); see also U.S.S .G. § 5C1.2. Th e defendant bears the burden of prov ing by a preponder

ance of the evidenc e hi s eli gib i li ty for safety v alv e relief. United States v
. Ramirez , 783 F .3d 687, 692 (7th Ci r
. 2015). Ge ne r ally , w e r e view the di stric t court’s factual findings concerning a defendant’s eli gib i l i ty for the safety v alv e for clear err or
. United States v
. R e bo l l e do-Delgadillo , 820 F .3d 870, 879 (7th Ci r
. 2016). How ev er

, Sy ms rais es thi s i ssu e for th e first tim e on appeal, whi ch i mpacts the standard of rev i ew
. Consequently

, he has ei ther forfeited or w ai v ed the arg um ent. W e wi ll gener ously
assu me that Sy ms’ si lence on thi s i ssu e unti l t his p oin t i s the result of a “fai lure to make a tim ely asserti on of a right” rat her t ha n an “i ntentional relinqu i shm ent[.]” Ramirez , 783 F .3d at 693 (quoti ng U n i te d States v
. Olano , 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993))

. Accordi ngly

, w e assu me Sy ms merely forfeited hi s safety v alv e request, whi ch per mit s p lain err or rev i ew
. See id

. at 694 n.5 (notin g that, i n addi tion to o ur cir cui t, other ci rcui ts hav e applied plain err or rev i ew where the defendant fai led to request safety v alv e consi derat i on before t he di stric t court ). In any case, i t i s clear that Sy ms i s not entitled to relief. The di stric t court deter mined that Sy ms w as a manager/supervisor of the oper ation, whi ch precludes hi s quali fyi ng for the safety

v a l v e. Indeed, prov i ding Sy ms wi th relief under the safe t y
v alv e w ould run counter to th e p ur p o se o f t he statute, whi ch10 No. 15-3067
i s to rew ard those who hav e cooper ated wi th the government and di d not or gani ze the cri minal acti vity

. See Arrington , 73 F

. 3 d at 147; see also United States v
. Marin , 144 F .3d 1085, 10 9 5 (7th Ci r . 1998). There w as no plain err or by the dis tr i ct court. Fin ally , Sy ms arg ues that hi s 151-month sent e nce i s so gr ossly di spropor tionate to hi s cri me t ha t i t consti tutes cruel

a nd unus ual puni shm ent under the Ei ghth Amendment. Th e
crux of Sy ms’ arg ument i s that hi s sentence i s di spropor tionate becau se i t i s the same as that of coconspi rat or Meek s, who has
a more ex tensi v e cri minal hi stor y than S yms. The Supreme C ourt has recog ni zed that “[t]he Ei ghth Amendment, whi ch forbid s cruel and unus ual puni shments, contai ns a narro w propo rt i onali ty prin ci ple that appli es to noncapi tal sentences .” Ewing v
. California , 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (ci tation and quotat i on marks omi tte d). But “narro w” does not equate to stric t propo rt i onali ty

. Id

. at 23. Only ext reme sentences that are “gr ossly di spropor tionate” to the cri me wi ll be deemed cruel and unus ual. Id

. (ci tation omi tte d). Addi tionally , “eig ht h amendmen t challen ges to sentences that are both prescribed by the gui deline s, and wi thin the statuto ry maxi

mum s establi shed by Congr ess, are looked on wi th d i sfav or .” U nited States v
. Saunde rs , 973 F .2d 1354, 1365 (7th Ci r
. 19 9 2 ) (ci tation omi tte d). In deter mining whether a se nte n c e i s gr os s ly d i s p ro p or ti onate, the Supreme Court has outlin ed a three -fac tor test, whi ch consi ders: “(i ) the gr avity of the offense and the ha r sh ne ss of the penalty; (i i ) the sentences i mposed on other cri minals in the
same jurisdi cti on; and (i i i ) the sentences i mposed for commi ssi on of the same cri me in other jurisdi cti ons.” Solem v
. He l m ,No. 15-3067 11
463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983). The fi rst factor i s a threshold factor; i f

an i nference of gr oss di spropor tionali ty i s not establi shed, w e need no t conduc t any comparativ e analysi s wi thin and bet w een jurisdi cti ons. United States v
. Gross , 437 F .3d 6 9 1 , 692–93 (7th Ci r . 2006). In exami ning the fi rst factor , the Supreme Court has found that “[p]oss essi on, use, and di strib uti on of i llegal drugs repr esent ‘one of the gr eatest problems a ff e ct ing the health and w elfare of our populati on.’” Harmelin v
. Michigan , 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (qu o t ing Nat’l T reasury Emps. Union v
. V on Raab , 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989))

. The Co urt furt her detailed the violence, cri me, and so ci al di splac ement that i s atte ndant to the p o ss e ssi on and di strib uti on of drugs in thi s country

. Id

. a t 1 002–04. Thus, w e recog ni ze the seri ous nat ure of the offense that S yms comm i tte d. Regar ding the harshness of Sy ms’ sentence, w e note that he

w as sent e nc e d wi thi n the statuto ry range, and at the low est
e nd of the Gui delines r ange. “W e hav e not in t he past look e d

v ery fav or ably upon Ei g ht h Amendment challen ges to sentences that are prescribed under the gui delines and are wi thi n the statuto ry maxi mum s establi shed by Congr e ss.” United S tat es v . Jones , 950 F .2d 1309, 1317 (7th Ci r . 1991). W e hav e also permi tte d le ng thi er sentences for si mi lar
cr imes. See Saunde rs , 973 F .2d at 1365–66 (defendan t’s 2 6 2

- month sentence for conspi ring to di strib ute and intent to di strib ute 13 ounces of cocaine w as not gr ossly di spropor tionate); United States v
. W ashington , 109 F

. 3 d 335, 338 (7th Ci r
. 1997) (“The cruel and unus ual puni shm ents claus e of the ei ghth amendmen t permi ts li fe i mpri sonment for a single drug12 No. 15-3067
cri me.” (ci tation omi tte d)). Therefore , we conclu de that Sy ms’ sentence does not giv e rise to an inference of gr oss di sproport i onali ty

. As a result, we need not conduc t any comparativ e analysi s wi th Meek s’ sentence, or wi thi n and betw een jurisdi ctions

. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated abov e, w e AFF IRM Sy ms’ sentence.