J-S08012-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: J.M., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.M., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1293 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 10, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Orphans' Court 

at No(s): Adoptee # 48-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 27, 2022

J.M. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered on August 10, 2021, 

which terminated his parental rights to his daughter, J.C.M., born in June 

2016.

1

 We affirm.

Northumberland County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) was 

already involved with Father in an unrelated matter with another child when 

Mother, J.C.M., and J.M.R. moved in with Father. CYS expanded its 

involvement at that time to include them. In January 2019, CYS visited their 

____________________________________________

1 The orphans’ court entered a separate decree terminating the rights of 

J.C.M.’s mother, J.R. (“Mother”). Mother has filed appeals at 1292 MDA 2021

and 1294 MDA 2021, regarding the termination of her parental rights as to 

J.C.M. and her half-sister, J.M.R., born in January 2014, respectively. As a 

note, we have added middle initials for clarity within this memorandum for 

J.C.M. and J.M.R. because the children’s first and last initials, as used in the 

captions, are identical to those of either Mother or Father. Additionally, while 

Father assumed a parental role for J.M.R., he is not her biological father. The 

orphans’ court entered a separate decree terminating the rights of J.M.R.’s

father, who is unknown and has not filed an appeal. 
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home and attempted to administer drug tests to Father and Mother. Father 

refused; Mother tested positive for a controlled substance. Ultimately, CYS 

took J.C.M. and J.M.R. into custody and placed them in kinship care. 

J.C.M. and J.M.R. were adjudicated dependent based upon concerns 

with substance abuse, inadequate housing, lack of parenting abilities, and lack 

of employment. As it pertains to Father, he was ordered to undergo a drug 

and alcohol evaluation, comply with treatment recommendations, obtain 

stable housing and employment, visit with J.C.M., and complete parenting 

classes.2 Orphans’ Court Opinion in Support of Final Decrees, 8/10/21, at 

unnumbered 1. Due to a lack of engagement with services and contact with 

J.C.M., aggravated circumstances were found to exist against Father in August 

2019.3 

In February 2020, J.C.M. and J.M.R. changed kinship care and were 

placed with P.L. (“Maternal Grandmother”),4 who lives in the state of Georgia. 

In June 2020, Father and Mother moved into a residence owned by Mother’s 

father (“Maternal Grandfather”) in Georgia. At that time, Father and Mother 

____________________________________________

2 Since the certified record does not include the child permanency plan for 

J.C.M., we glean the concerns at adjudication and the goals for reunification 

from the testimony presented at the termination hearings and opinion of the 

orphans’ court in support of the final decrees.

3 The same concerns and orders applied to Mother with respect to J.C.M. and 

J.M.R., and the court likewise found aggravating circumstances against Mother 

for the same reasons.

4 The children have remained in Maternal Grandmother’s home since that 

time. Maternal Grandmother is a pre-adoptive resource for J.C.M. and J.M.R.
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began calling the children daily, though the calls were mainly between Father 

and J.C.M. 

In September 2020, CYS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights 

of Father as to J.C.M. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2311(a)(1), (2), and (5), based 

on his failure to complete the child permanency plan.5 Shortly before the 

petition was filed, Father completed a drug and alcohol evaluation through 

Georgia Hope and began the recommended treatment.6

A permanency review hearing was held in November 2020. Father 

secured employment prior to the hearing, but subsequently quit that same 

week. Following the hearing, the court found compelling circumstances 

existed not to terminate because Father lived close enough to J.C.M. to 

establish a relationship and perform parental duties, CYS withdrew the petition 

to terminate Father’s parental rights, and Father began attending weekly inperson visits with J.C.M. Maternal Grandmother supervised the visits, which 

were also attended by Mother and J.M.R.

Meanwhile, as part of the treatment program at Georgia Hope, Father 

was required to call in daily to determine whether it was his turn for a random 

drug test based upon a color-wheel system. However, he failed to make the 

____________________________________________

5 CYS also filed petitions to terminate against Mother as to J.C.M. and J.M.R., 

as well as against J.M.R.’s unknown father. 

6 Mother began treatment at Georgia Hope at the same time. There is some 

discrepancy as to the number of treatment sessions Father attended. Father 

claimed he attended seven sessions, see N.T., 5/5/21, at 89-91, whereas 

Cheryl Weigand, a certified alcohol and drug counselor at Georgia Hope, 

testified that Father attended four sessions, see N.T., 4/8/21, at 5. 
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daily calls and was not administered a single drug test between September 

2020 and January 2021. According to Father, he stopped attending the 

sessions in the middle of December 2020 because he was overwhelmed with 

preparations for the Christmas holiday and depressed. As a result of his nonattendance, Father was discharged from Georgia Hope in January 2021. 

In January 2021, CYS sought and was granted the right to reinstate the 

petitions to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. The orphans’ 

court held hearings on the petitions to terminate on April 8, 2021, and May 5, 

2021.7 CYS presented the testimony of several individuals from CYS, as well 

as a counselor from Georgia Hope and Maternal Grandmother. Maternal 

Grandmother testified that Father and Mother visited the children weekly and 

called on the phone daily. While the visits had gone well and the children 

were happy to see their parents, she did not believe Father and Mother were 

ready to parent J.C.M. and J.M.R. as they did not have jobs or a car and had 

not been drug tested. She testified that if the parents’ rights were terminated, 

she would permit them to remain part of the children’s lives via visits, calls, 

and holiday celebrations.

Father testified on his own behalf, as did Mother. At the time of the 

hearing, Father was living in a hotel and seeking new housing because

____________________________________________

7 The court appointed Cindy Kerstetter, Esquire, as the guardian ad litem

during the dependency proceedings. Attorney Kerstetter was appointed as 

legal counsel during the termination proceedings “after certifying on the 

record that there was no conflict between what was best for the girls and the 

girls’ desired outcome.” Orphans’ Court Opinion in Support of Final Decrees, 

8/10/21, at unnumbered 2 n.2.
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Maternal Grandfather had asked him to vacate the residence when Mother 

became incarcerated.

8

 Regarding Father’s substance abuse issues, the 

counselor from Georgia Hope testified that Father’s case was reopened on 

March 8, 2021. According to Father, he underwent a new evaluation and had 

one treatment session since his case reopened, but still had not been drug 

tested. Finally, Attorney Kerstetter stated that the children loved their parents 

and, if allowed, would live with them.

Following the hearings, the orphans’ court issued a decree terminating 

Father’s parental rights as to J.C.M. pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and 

(b). Father filed a timely notice of appeal and concise statement pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). The orphans’ court did not file a Rule 1925(a) opinion 

or statement in lieu of opinion with this Court. Father presents the following 

issues for our consideration:

I. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in its 

determination that Northumberland County Children and Youth 

Services presented clear and convincing evidence to terminate 

Father’s rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5), and 

2511(a)(8)[.]

II. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in 

finding the termination of his parental rights would best serve the 

development, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the 

children.

____________________________________________

8 Mother was incarcerated on pending criminal charges. At the termination 

hearing, the court tried to avoid any testimony about the underlying conduct 

for the charges. Nonetheless, it appears the charges related to when Mother, 

without permission, removed the children from their initial kinship foster home 

based upon alleged abuse. See N.T., 5/5/21, at 10, 19, 57, 65, 74.
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Father’s brief at 10 (cleaned up).

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized [the appellate court’s] deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up). “The trial court is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free 

to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the 

evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will 

affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re 

Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption 

Act and requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination followed 

by the needs and welfare of the child:

Our case law has made clear that under [§] 2511, the court must 

engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
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that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs 

and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the 

child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have 

defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (cleaned up).

Termination is proper when the moving party proves grounds for 

termination under any subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). T.B.B.,

supra at 395. Father asserts that CYS failed to establish by clear and 

convincing evidence the statutory grounds for termination of his parental 

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). To affirm the

termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the orphans’ court as 

to any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). We focus our analysis 

on § 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . . . 
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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b). 

First, we address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2). Termination 

under this subsection requires that the moving party prove the following 

elements: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” 

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted). 

Termination is not limited to affirmative misconduct but may be based upon 

parental capacity that cannot be remedied. Id. (citation omitted). Finally, 
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“[p]arents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt 

assumption of full parental duties.” Id. (citation omitted).

Father argues that he “had done everything he could do” by securing 

stable housing and participating in treatment at Georgia Hope. Father’s brief 

at 15.

9

 According to Father, he had previously completed and was successfully 

discharged from a drug and alcohol treatment program as a condition of a 

sentence he received in New York. Id. at 16. He maintains that he is not 

addicted to a controlled substance and is willing to be drug tested. Id. 

The orphans’ court, on the other hand, concluded that Father has “failed 

to remedy the circumstances which led to placement.” Orphans’ Court Opinion

in Support of Final Decrees, 8/10/21, at unnumbered 4. Specifically, Father 

has “avoided services meant to better [his] parenting and functioning[,]” his 

“substance abuse concerns remain[,]” he has not “maintained employment[,]” 

and he has “not taken advantage of the services offered by” CYS. Id. 

The assessment of the orphans’ court is supported by the certified 

record. At the time of the termination hearings, J.C.M. had been in care for 

over two years based upon substance abuse concerns and a lack of adequate 

housing, parenting abilities, and employment. Father was aware of the child 

permanency plan and, more specifically, his need to address his substance 

____________________________________________

9 We note with displeasure that Father’s counsel has apparently re-used 

portions of other briefs herein. See Father’s brief at 1 (basing this Court’s 

jurisdiction on the imposition of a judgment of sentence); id. at 11 (using 

female pronouns for Father); id. at 13, 17 (describing termination as to “the 

children” instead of the lone subject child, J.C.M.).
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abuse issues. N.T., 4/8/21, at 26-28, 31, 33 (ordered to complete drug 

testing, drug and alcohol counseling, and parenting); N.T., 5/5/21, at 61. 

However, during that period, Father failed to remedy the underlying concerns. 

With respect to the primary concern, Father’s substance abuse, Father 

claimed that he had previously completed six weeks of intensive outpatient 

drug and alcohol treatment at a Merakey facility in January or February of 

2019, as part of a plea agreement in New York to drug possession charges, 

and he notified CYS of same. N.T., 4/8/21, at 28; N.T., 5/5/21, at 38-40, 48-

49. CYS submitted a request for those records and Father signed a release, 

but CYS never received any records from Merakey. N.T., 4/8/21, at 28, 35; 

N.T., 5/5/21, at 40. CYS casework supervisor Diana Stine testified it is 

historically difficult to get records from Merakey. N.T., 4/8/21, at 35. 

However, regardless of whether Father completed any treatment at Merakey,

Ms. Stine testified that “he was advised that he was still expected to do drug 

and alcohol treatment” because he continued to test positive for controlled 

substances following J.C.M.’s dependency adjudication. Id. at 28, 36, 38; 

see also Exhibit A4 (positive lab test results for 2/7/19 urinalysis); Exhibit A5 

(positive cup results for 6/13/19 urinalysis); Exhibit A6 (positive lab test 

results for 8/16/19 urinalysis). 

Despite being advised that he still needed to complete drug and alcohol 

treatment as part of the child permanency plan, Father did not pursue 

treatment until he completed an evaluation at Georgia Hope in September 

2020, approximately nineteen months after J.C.M. was placed in kinship care. 
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N.T., 4/8/21, at 5, 50-51. While Father initially attended the recommended 

treatment sessions at Georgia Hope, he missed three or four sessions 

beginning in December 2020 because he was preoccupied with the Christmas 

holiday and depressed, and failed to comply with the color-wheel system 

because he forgot to call in daily. Id. at 10, 70; N.T., 5/5/21, at 48, 54, 91-

92. As a result, he was discharged for non-attendance. N.T., 4/8/21, at 5, 7.

Coincidentally, it was not until after CYS requested reinstatement of the 

petition to terminate Father’s parental rights that he sought to reopen his 

treatment program with Georgia Hope. Id. at 69 (after being advised that 

CYS intended to seek reinstatement of the termination petition, Father and 

Mother told their current CYS caseworker, Kim Carpenter, that they “want[ed] 

to start services again to comply with the [c]ourt-ordered services and the 

child permanency plans”). As of the second termination hearing, Father had 

undergone a new evaluation and attended one session, but still had not been 

drug tested. Id. at 5-8; N.T., 5/5/21, at 56, 88-91. 

Rebecca Horst, one of the assigned CYS resource workers, testified that 

Father failed to complete the parenting, budgeting, and community resource 

services offered by CYS. N.T., 4/8/21, at 56, 62. Father was discharged from 

court-ordered parenting classes in June 2019 for non-attendance. N.T., 

4/8/21, at 71; N.T., 5/5/21, at 62 (Father testifying that he only attended one 

week of classes and decided after move to Georgia that he would not do 

parenting classes). 
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Father’s sole employment was for approximately one week around the 

November 2020 permanency review hearing, which he quit in anticipation of 

the weekly visits with J.C.M. N.T., 4/8/21, at 70, 77; N.T., 5/5/21, at 24. In 

January 2021, Father turned down a job because of a concern with the hours 

and being able to simultaneously comply with visitation, his treatment at 

Georgia Hope, and the color-wheel drug testing system. N.T., 4/8/21, at 70, 

75. During Father’s testimony, he indicated that he has not worked since 

moving to Georgia, save for approximately one week in November 2020,

because nothing was within walking distance, he needed time for visits with 

J.C.M., and he was receiving unemployment. N.T., 5/5/21, at 46-47. 

As to the stable housing concern, Father and Mother had been living in 

a residence provided by Maternal Grandfather in Georgia beginning in 2020. 

N.T., 4/8/21, at 76; N.T., 5/5/21, at 24. However, at the time of the second 

termination hearing, Father was living in a hotel while looking for an 

apartment because Maternal Grandfather asked him to vacate the residence

after Mother became incarcerated. N.T., 5/5/21, at 24, 45.

Stated simply, Father has failed to substantially comply with his courtordered goals or remedy the causes leading to his incapacity. While it is 

evident at the time of the hearings that Father was attempting to comply with 

portions of the child permanency plan by re-enrolling in drug and alcohol 

treatment and seeking stable housing, 

the statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held 

in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity 

necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot 
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and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence 

and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the 

future.

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006). Accordingly, 

the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in finding statutory support for 

termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(2).

We now turn to § 2511(b). This Court has explained the requisite 

analysis as follows:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we 

instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and 

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in 

cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa.Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent 

of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 63.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010).

Father assails the orphans’ court for failing to order a bonding 

assessment and maintains that he has had “consistent and appropriate 

visitation with his child.” Father’s brief at 18. Father further argues that he 

explained to CYS that he would be unable to maintain employment and comply 

with Georgia Hope’s color-wheel system simultaneously.10 Id. 

____________________________________________

10 We note that this argument pertains to § 2511(a), not § 2511(b).
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As a general matter, Pennsylvania does not require the orphans’ court 

to enlist a formal bonding evaluation or base its needs and welfare analysis

upon expert testimony. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2011). 

“Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also 

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they 

have a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M., supra, at 268. In 

weighing the bond considerations pursuant to § 2511(b), “courts must keep 

the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. “Children are young 

for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy 

development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is 

catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id. A court cannot “toll the well-being 

and permanency” of a child indefinitely in the hope that a parent “will summon 

the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 

999, 1007 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

In relation to § 2511(b), the orphans’ court provided as follows:

[The orphans’ c]ourt finds credible the testimony of the 

caseworkers, resource worker, and Maternal Grandmother that 

the children see maternal grandparents as their primary 

caretakers. The parents are not “parental” figures for the 

children. The children are both young and need permanence. 

Th[e orphans’ c]ourt is also mindful of the fact that because the 

[m]aternal [g]randparents are the adoptive resource, it is unlikely 

that the parents will ever be shut out of their children’s lives. It 

was testified to extensively that the parents visit “whenever they 

want” and they do have a bond with their children. Because 

legally terminating their parental rights will not change the actual 

relationship the parents have with their children, the effect of 

severing that bond in a termination is minimal.
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Orphans’ Court Opinion in Support of Final Decrees, 8/10/21, at unnumbered 

4-5.11

This assessment is supported by the certified record. At the termination 

hearing, it was evident that a bond exists between Father and J.C.M. and that 

she loves him. Father has had phone and video calls daily since June 2020 

and has had weekly in-person contact with J.C.M. since November 2020. N.T., 

5/5/21, at 5, 13, 22-24. However, we find the orphans’ court’s description of 

the visits as “akin to ‘playdates’ as opposed to parental interactions” accurate. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion in Support of Final Decrees, 8/10/21, at unnumbered 

4. For example, the visits only last approximately one and one half to two 

hours. N.T., 5/5/21, at 23. Maternal Grandmother generally chooses the 

locations for the visits and provides activities or crafts for the family. Id. at

5-7. Father and Mother usually provide food for the children during the weekly 

visits, but sometimes are not able to afford food and Maternal Grandmother 

will cover that expense when necessary. Id. at 5-6. 

Significantly, it is Maternal Grandmother who provides the parental care 

for J.C.M., as well as the intangibles such as “love, comfort, security, and 

stability[.]” J.M., supra at 324. Ms. Carpenter testified that since living with 

____________________________________________

11 We are cognizant that the orphans’ court considered J.C.M. and J.M.R. 

together in its opinion in support of the final decrees, likely because it issued 

the same opinion for Mother and Father. We focus our analysis herein on 

whether the record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion solely as to J.C.M. 

and Father.
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Maternal Grandmother, J.C.M. has been brought up to date on her

vaccinations and received significant dental work due to a lack of prior dental 

care. N.T., 4/8/21, at 78. Maternal Grandmother further testified that J.C.M. 

has been in therapy, participated in extracurricular activities, is excelling in 

school, and has been thriving in every way possible since living with her. N.T., 

5/5/21, at 4.

At the time of the hearings, J.C.M. expressed, through her counsel, that 

she loved Father and would live with him if possible. N.T., 5/5/21, at 96. 

While J.C.M. still expresses this abstract wish in her brief to this Court, she

acknowledges the reality that Father has not addressed the issues that led to 

placement in the first place. Moreover, she has settled into a regular routine 

with Maternal Grandmother over the past two years and has flourished at 

school. As such, she now desires to remain living with Maternal Grandmother. 

See J.C.M. and J.M.R.’s brief at 2-4.

Critically, Maternal Grandmother testified at the termination hearing 

that little would change in terms of Father’s contact with J.C.M. if his parental 

rights were terminated. Specifically, while acknowledging that daily phone 

calls might not continue, Maternal Grandmother envisioned that Father would 

still visit with J.C.M., call her, and partake in holiday celebrations. N.T., 

5/5/21, at 15-16. 

The certified record demonstrates that J.C.M. is best served by 

terminating Father’s parental rights in anticipation of an adoption by Maternal 
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Grandmother. Stated plainly, J.C.M. has thrived since being in Maternal 

Grandmother’s care, as she has provided a stable, loving environment that 

consistently satisfied J.C.M.’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs 

and welfare. Moreover, the record is clear that while a parental bond will 

legally be severed, Father will remain part of J.C.M.’s life even after 

termination. As such, the record supports the assessment of the orphans’ 

court that the effect of legally severing the parental bond between Father and 

J.C.M. will not be detrimental to J.C.M. 

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree of the orphans’ court 

terminating Father’s parental rights as to J.C.M. 

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/27/2022