alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Part 10
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 10 appear by T.D. 9359, 72 FR 54544, Sept. 26, 2007.

§ 10.64 Answer; default. ( a ) *Filing.* The respondent's answer must be filed with the Administrative Law Judge, and served on the Internal Revenue Service, within the time specified in the complaint unless, on request or application of the respondent, the time is extended by the Administrative Law Judge.
( b ) *Contents.* The answer must be written and contain a statement of facts that constitute the respondent's grounds of defense. General denials are not permitted. The respondent must specifically admit or deny each allegation set forth in the complaint, except that the respondent may state that the respondent is without sufficient information to admit or deny a specific allegation. The respondent, nevertheless, may not deny a material allegation in the complaint that the respondent knows to be true, or state that the respondent is without sufficient information to form a belief, when the respondent possesses the required information. The respondent also must state affirmatively any special matters of defense on which he or she relies.
( c ) *Failure to deny or answer allegations in the complaint.* Every allegation in the complaint that is not denied in the answer is deemed admitted and will be considered proved; no further evidence in respect of such allegation need be adduced at a hearing.
( d ) *Default.* Failure to file an answer within the time prescribed (or within the time for answer as extended by the Administrative Law Judge), constitutes an admission of the allegations of the complaint and a waiver of hearing, and the Administrative Law Judge may make the decision by default without a hearing or further procedure. A decision by default constitutes a decision under § 10.76.
( e ) *Signature.* The answer must be signed by the respondent or the respondent's authorized representative under § 10.69(a)(2) and must include a statement directly above the signature acknowledging that the statements made in the answer are true and correct and that knowing and willful false statements may be punishable under 18 U.S.C. 1001.
( f ) *Effective/applicability date.* This section is applicable beginning August 2, 2011.
[T.D. 9011, 67 FR 48774, July 26, 2002, as amended by T.D. 9527, 76 FR 32309, June 3, 2011]
#### § 1026.200 General.

Futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities are subject to the program requirements set forth and cross referenced in this subpart. Futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities should also refer to subpart B of part 1010 of this chapter for program requirements contained in that subpart which apply to futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities.
39980.

#### SIMMONS v. AMERICAN SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY.

Russell, Judge.

Where by the terms of a contract of motor vehicle insurance the loss is payable to the named insured and a named mortgagee loan company “as interest may appear,” the insured may not, over timely special demurrer, sue in his own name to recover the loss to the exclusion of the *365mortgagee. He may in the first instance join the mortgagee as party, *Georgia Cas. &c. Co. v. Pincus,*89 Ga. App. 836 (81 SE2d 527), or he may maintain the action for his own use and the use of the mortgagee. *Johnson v. General Exchange Ins. Corp.,*49 Ga. App. 780 (176 SE 840). But an amendment merely calling upon the mortgagee, who is not a party, to intervene in the pending suit is not a compliance with either method.

Decided February 18, 1963.

*Lucian J. Endicott,*for plaintiff in error.

*Powell, Goldstein, Frazer \& Murphy, Robert R. Harlin, James K. Rankin,*contra.

A timely special demurrer having been filed raising the issue of nonjoinder of necessary parties, and the plaintiff having failed to amend to cure the defect, it was not error thereafter to dismiss the petition.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Felton, C. J., and Eberhardt, J., concur.*
### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 22

- 0284

_________________ IN RE THE ESTATE OF ELDA MARBLE , JERRY MARBLE, Personal Representative for the Estate of Elda Marble,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. DOREEN KING and JAMES D. KING, a/k/a JIM KING,

Defendants and Appellants. O R D E R

_________________ Pursuant to co unsel fo r Appell ee Estate of Marble’s motion for extension to of time to file the response brief and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appell ee ha s until February 24 , 202 3 , to file the response brief.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

January 27 2023

01/27/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0284
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#### Long *v.*Woollenweber.

[No. 20,007.

Filed April 20, 1964.]

*70*Allen E. Goltra*and *Goltra & Kershaw,*of Columbus, for appellant.

*Charlton J. Walker*and *Walker & Conner,*of Columbus, for appellee.

Pfaff, J.

This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Bartholomew Circuit Court in which the court found for the appellant and entered judgment for the appellant in the sum of One Hundred Five Dollars ($105.00) on appellant’s complaint. The complaint was to recover back support money from her former husband who is the appellee herein.

Prior to the above action and the divorce proceeding the parties entered into a separation agreement which was incorporated into and made a part of the divorce decree. This agreement and decree established the support money to be allotted the wife and constituted the basis for the action to recover back support, which judgment is now being appealed. The appellant, however, has failed to set out in her brief the divorce decree, which we consider to be a vital part of her case. Appellant relies heavily on certain sections of the decree and makes reference to said sections, but nowhere in her brief is the decree set out in full. There is a long line of authority in Indiana to the effect that briefs must be so presented that all questions on as*71signed errors can be determined from the briefs without looking to the record. *Wilt*v. *Board, etc.*(1913), 54 Ind. App. 240, 102 N. E. 878; *Hauser*v. *Markwell*(1942), 111 Ind. App. 420, 41 N. E. 2d 652. It is also clear that an omission of evidence, such as the divorce decree herein, from the appellant’s brief waives questions of sufficiency of evidence and being contrary to law. *Johnson*v. *Johnson*(1946), 117 Ind. App. 117, 69 N. E. 2d 606; *Witte*v. *Witte et al.*(1953), 123 Ind. App. 644, 113 N. E. 2d *166; Mendenhall, Extr., etc.*v. *Lay*(1953), 123 Ind. App. 486, 111 N. E. 2d 662.

In the recent Indiana case of *Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.*v. *Lilly Paint Products*(1963), 135 Ind. App. 46, 188 N. E. 2d 278, 281, where a similar question arose before this court, wherein the appellant failed to set out certain documents in his brief which were necessary to appellant’s case on appeal, this court stated:

> “ ... In the absence of said documents in the condensed recital of the evidence in appellant’s brief or any showing that no part or provisions of the same had or could have had any bearing or decisive influence upon the decision as made by the trial court, we must assume, in support of the court’s decision, without search of the record, that the documents contained sufficient to warrant the court’s interpretation and construction thereof under all the facts and circumstances made apparent by the evidence.”

In view of the authority in this state that such evidence relied upon by the appellant is a necessary part of her brief, this court is duty-bound to affirm the lower court’s judgment even though we prefer to decide the cases on the merits.

Judgment affirmed.

*72Hunter, P. J., Kelley and Mote, JJ., concur.

Note.—Reported in 197 N. E. 2d 652.
EX-10.39



 





EXHIBIT 10.39




HEALTH CARE REIT, INC.




Summary of Director Compensation




     For each calendar year, each non-employee member of the Board of Directors of Health Care
REIT, Inc. (the “Company”) will receive an annual retainer of $45,000, payable in equal quarterly
installments. Additionally, each of the chairs of the Audit Committee and the Compensation
Committee will receive an additional retainer of $10,000 and the chair of the Nominating/Corporate
Governance Committee will receive an additional retainer of $7,500. If the Board of Directors holds
more than four meetings in a year, each non-employee member of the Board will receive $1,500 for
each meeting attended in excess of four meetings. With respect to the Audit, Compensation,
Executive and Nominating/Corporate Governance Committees, if any of these committees holds more
than four meetings in a year, each non-employee member of these committees will receive $1,000 for
each meeting attended in excess of four meetings.



     In each calendar year and until otherwise determined by the Compensation Committee of the
Board of Directors, each of the non-employee directors will receive a grant of deferred stock units
with a value of $70,000, pursuant to the Company’s 2005 Long-Term Incentive Plan. The deferred
stock units will be convertible into shares of common stock of the Company in three equal
installments on the first three anniversaries of the date of the grant. Recipients of the deferred
stock units also will be entitled to dividend equivalent rights.
§ 132.7 Regulatory enforcement. The requirements under this part are subject to the exclusive regulatory enforcement of— ( a ) The Federal functional regulators, with respect to the designated payment systems and participants therein that are subject to the respective jurisdiction of such regulators under section 505(a) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. 6805(a)) and section 5g of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 7b-2); and
( b ) The Federal Trade Commission, with respect to designated payment systems and participants therein not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of any Federal functional regulators (including the Commission) as described in paragraph (a) of this section.
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 152 (Monday, August 10, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Pages 39918-39919]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-19093]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration


National Renewable Energy Laboratory, et al.; Notice of Decision 
on Applications for Duty-Free Entry of Scientific Instruments

    This is a decision pursuant to Section 6(c) of the Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Materials Importation Act of 1966 (Pub. L. 89-
651, as amended by Pub. L. 106-36; 80 Stat. 897; 15 CFR part 301). 
Related records can be viewed between 8:30 a.m. and 5 p.m. in Room 
3705, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th and Constitution Ave., NW., 
Washington, DC.
    Comments: None received. Decision: Approved. We know of no 
instruments of equivalent scientific value to the foreign instruments 
described below, for such purposes as these are intended to be used, 
that were being manufactured in the United States at the time of its 
order.
    Docket Number: 09-032. Applicant: National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory, Golden, CO 80401. Instrument: MicroTime 200 Single Molecule 
Fluorescence Lifetime Imaging System. Manufacturer: PicoQuant GmBH, 
Germany. Intended Use: See notice at 74 FR 33207, July 10, 2009. 
Reasons: This instrument will be used in biomass characterization. The 
instrument will be capable of doing Fluorescence Lifetime Imaging, 
measuring Fluorescence Resonance Energy Transfer and Fluorescence 
Correlation Spectroscopy for single fluorescent molecules. No domestic 
sources make devices with similar capabilities.
    Docket Number: 09-034. Applicant: University of Georgia, Athens, GA 
30605. Instrument: Gasification Unit. Manufacturer: Termoquip Energia 
Alternative LTDA, Brazil. Intended Use: See notice at 74 FR 32207, July 
10, 2009. Reasons: This instrument will be used to turn biomass into 
syngas, which is composed of hydrogen and carbon monoxide that can be 
catalytically upgraded to liquid fuel, chemicals and energy. No 
domestic sources make devices with similar capabilities.


[[Page 39919]]


    Dated: August 4, 2009.
Gregory Campbell,
Acting Director, Subsidies Enforcement Office, Import Administration.
[FR Doc. E9-19093 Filed 8-7-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
EXTENT OF JURISDICTION UNDER. CHANGE OF VENUE.

Circuit Court of Cuyahoga County.

#### Floy Mills v. Robert Mills.

Decided, November 10, 1902.

*Jurisdiction*— Effect *of Change of Tenue on Jurisdiction as to Existing Orders.*

By the transfer of a case from the court of common pleas of one county to the court of common pleas of another county, the court in the county to which the case is transferred acquires exclusive jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the case, including ,the enforcement of the orders already made in the case, as well as the granting of new orders and final judgment.

*Walter C.*Ong, for plaintiff in error.

*L. Z. Tanney,*contra.

Hale, J.; Caldwell, J., and Marvin, J., concur.

An action ivas pending in the court of common pleas of this county by plaintiff against defendant for a divorce. Alimony *pendente lite*had been allowed and the defendant ordered to pay a certain amount to the plaintiff during the pendency of the action. After this order Avas made, the ease was transferred by order of the court, under statute, to Medina county for trial and determination. Up to the time that the order was made transferring the case to Medina county, all instalments of alimony falling due had been paid; there was no default on the part of the defendant in payment of alimony at the time of the transfer. After the transfer, proceedings in contempt against the defendant AA-ere commenced in the court of common pleas of this county. The question is, AA'hether actions for contempt can be maintained in this county after the transfer, for a violation of an order on the part of the defendant in the payment of alimony.

Very little light or aid can be gathered from any decisions that Ave have been able to find, or which have been cited to us. But, after consideration such as we have been able to give in *134the case, we hold that, after the transfer by the court of common pleas of this county to the Court of Common Pleas of Medina County, exclusive jurisdiction of'all matters pertaining to the case, as well the enforcement of the orders made as the granting of new orders and judgment, was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Medina County. That court had jurisdiction to modify, abrogate, or enforce the order for alimony *pendente lite*then' existing. Disobedience of the order which existed at the time of the transfer, after the transfer was made, was a contempt of the court having the jurisdiction to enforce the order, that order virtually becomes the order of the court to which the case is transferred and that court has full jurisdiction over existing orders and over the case, to make further orders.

This, of course, does not deal with the phase of the case as if there had been a default to obey the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County prior to the transfer. Nor do we undertake to controvert the proposition argued by counsel that proceedings in contempt are *quasi*criminal and, to an extent at least, independent of the case in which the order was made for the disobedience of which the party is in contempt.

This was the holding of the court of common pleas, and the result is the affirmance of that judgment.
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter II

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to subchapter A appear at 78 FR 60697, Oct. 2, 2013.

#### § 208.6 Availability of Treasury-sponsored accounts.

An individual who receives a Federal payment shall be eligible to open a Treasury-sponsored account under terms and conditions established by Treasury.
39967.

#### MAULDIN v. PATTEN.

Eberhardt, Judge.

G. A. Mauldin brought suit for damages against Bob Patten, doing business as Bob Patten Construction Company, alleging the destruction of a bridge on the Old Federal Road crossing the Etowah River when Patten’s heavy road machinery crossed it, that the bridge has not been replaced and that access to his 300 acre farm by way of the Old Federal Road has been destroyed resulting in several items of damage including, inter alia, a diminution in value of $30 per acre of his farm. To the sustaining of a general demurrer he excepts. *Held:*

One whose means of egress from and ingress to his property abutting on a public highway is illegally and unnecessarily interfered with by the placing of obstructions therein and who suffers a special injury different in kind from that suffered by the public at large has a cause of action therefor, and this is true although the obstruction of the road and interference with the use thereof may constitute a public nuisance. *Barham v. Grant,*185 Ga. 601 (7) (196 SE 43). That some others may sustain like damage is not controlling, for to varying degree it must be obvious that others who may own lands abutting the highway in the vicinity of the obstruction may also suffer a special damage not shared by the general public who merely travel the highway.

Depreciation in the market value of land which results from the obstruction is a special damage. *Atkinson v. Kreis,*140 Ga. 52 (2) (78 SE 465). Interference with ingress and egress to one’s property because of an obstruction may depreciate its value, *Coker v. Atlanta, K.*&c. *R. Co.,*123 Ga. 483 (3) (51 SE 481), and the possibility of other or more circuitous access, while not preventing a recovery, may be considered in determining whether the value has been diminished. *Louis**550*ville &c. R. Co. v. West End &c. Co.,*135 Ga. 419 (5) (69 SE 564). Other items of special damage may appear. *Brunswick &c. R. Co. v. Hardey*& *Co.,*112 Ga. 604 (37 SE 888, 52 LRA 396).

Decided March 6, 1963

Rehearing denied March 29, 1963.

*Lewis, Lems, Whaley A Cagle, T. J. Lewis, Jr.,*for plaintiff in error.

*Greene, Neely, Buckley A DeBieux, John D. Jones, Homer A. Houchins, Jr.,*contra.

Destruction of a bridge or making it impassable constitutes an obstruction of the road. Bembe v. Anne Arundel County, 94 Md. 321 (51 A 179). And see *Code*§§ 72-104, 105-1401, 105-1410.1

Whether any of the other items of damage sought to be recovered are of a special nature, and if so, whether they be remote or speculative is not now before us. The petition was sufficient as against a general demurrer.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Felton, C. J., and Bussell, J., concur.*

1

*Code*§ 95-601 provides: “If any person shall alter, or cut any ditch across, any public road *or alter the location of any bridge, or make any new bridge necessary by his act,*without first obtaining an order therefor, he shall be liable for all damages any person may sustain thereby.” (Emphasis supplied.) However, this probably refers to an intentional rather than a negligent act.
#### § 1024.312 Identification required.

Refer to § 1010.312 of this chapter for identification requirements for reports of transactions in currency filed by mutual funds.
40054.

#### VAN NORDEN et al. v. AUTO CREDIT COMPANY, INC.

Eberhardt, Judge.

The overruling of plea of material alteration to a suit on a conditional-sale contract and note is not a final judgment to which a writ of error will lie. If the plea had been sustained, as contended for by the plaintiff in error (defendant below), it would still have been necessary to have judgment entered for the defendant in order to terminate the case; and in order to review a sustaining or overruling of the plea there must be an assignment of error upon the final judgment in the case. See, as to a plea in bar, *Medernach v. Bazemore,*100 Ga. App. 721 (112 SE2d 272) (accord and satisfaction); *Besco Corp. v. Buice,*99 Ga. App. 528 (109 *677SE2d 88); *Turner v. Walters,*105 Ga. App. 852 (125 SE2d 703) (workmen’s compensation coverage in personal injury-action); *Levy v. Logan,*98 Ga. App. 584 (2) (106 SE2d 185) (estoppel by contract). This court is without jurisdiction and the bill of exceptions must be

Decided April 24, 1963.

*Scott Walters, Jr.,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Ronald J. Armstrong,*contra.

*Dismissed.*

*Felton, C. J., and Russell, J., concur.*