Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Porter, 2014 IL App (3d) 120338

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

OMAR PORTER, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-12-0338

Filed

Modified upon

denial of rehearing

January 13, 2014

February 28, 2014

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

Defendant’s conviction for armed violence was reversed and his 

20-year sentence was vacated on the ground that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress the firearm that 

fell from his belt during a struggle with an officer, notwithstanding the 

testimony that police officers, responding to a report of a home 

invasion in the early morning, saw defendant walking in the area, he 

matched the description given by the victim of the home invasion, and 

when defendant was later encountered at a nearby convenience store, 

he initially followed directions to go outside, but when an officer 

grabbed his wrist and conducted a patdown search for weapons, 

defendant attempted to run and a firearm fell out of his belt, since 

defendant was not given a chance to answer any questions, the officer 

who conducted the patdown offered no reasons that would lead a 

reasonable person to believe that his safety was in danger, the victim 

did not mention any weapon, and defendant did not try to flee until he 

was grabbed and the patdown started, and without the evidence that 

should have been suppressed, defendant’s guilt could not be proved.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 10-CF-1024; the 

Hon. Timothy M. Lucas, Judge, presiding.
- 2 -

Judgment Reversed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Mario Kladis (argued), of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of 

Ottawa, for appellant.

Jerry Brady, State’s Attorney, of Peoria (Nadia L. Chaudhry and 

Thomas D. Arado (argued), both of State’s Attorneys Appellate 

Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Carter and Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 The defendant, Omar Porter, was convicted of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) 

(West 2010)) after a stipulated bench trial, following the denial of his motion to quash his 

arrest and suppress evidence. The defendant appealed.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 The defendant was arrested on October 2, 2010, and found in possession of a loaded 

handgun and approximately five grams of cocaine. He was later indicted for armed violence 

(720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2010)), unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 

5/24-1.1(a) (West 2010)), two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 

5/24-1.6(a)(1) (West 2010)), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 

570/402(c) (West 2010)). The defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress 

evidence, arguing that the evidence was discovered during an unlawful arrest and seizure. The 

trial court held a hearing on the motion.

¶ 4 Peoria police officer Denise White testified that she arrived at a home on Northeast 

Monroe Street in Peoria at 3:56 am on October 2, 2010, in response to a possible home 

invasion. The victim told White that she had been sleeping on the couch and woke up to find a 

man standing over her shining his cell phone light at her. The man went into another room, and 

the victim never saw him again. The victim described the man as a black male with a dark 

complexion and braids, wearing a dark hat and dark clothing.

¶ 5 Peoria police officer Jacob Beck testified that he was alone in his squad car when he 

responded to a call about a home invasion in the early morning hours of October 2. When the 
- 3 -

description went out, and another officer stated the he saw a man walking that could have been 

the male involved, Beck traveled in the same direction and saw a man matching that 

description in the Super Pantry. Beck saw a black male, with small braids, wearing a black 

shirt and black hat. He had a red T-shirt on under the black button-up shirt. As Beck walked up 

to the front door, the defendant looked and saw Beck and took a couple of steps backwards, 

looked at the rear exit door, and saw another officer at the back door. The defendant did not 

make any quick movements, nor did he reach into his coat or his pockets. Beck motioned for 

the defendant to come out of the store, which he did. The report from dispatch did not indicate 

that the victim of the home invasion saw a weapon, and Beck had no other notice that the 

suspect was known to have a weapon on him. As the defendant exited the store, Beck, who 

held the door open, grabbed the defendant by the left wrist to conduct a patdown for officer 

safety reasons. Beck did not remember what he said to the defendant. The defendant tried to 

pull away, and he tried to take off running.

¶ 6 Sergeant Paul Segroves, also with the Peoria police department, testified that he responded 

to a call regarding a possible home invasion on the morning of October 2. On his way to the 

scene, a few blocks from the home, he observed a black male walking southbound, on the river 

side of the street. Segroves thought it was odd because it was raining out and there were no 

homes of the river side of the street. He reported that he just passed a male, and gave his 

description, and then went to the scene. When the victim’s description fit the description of the 

man he saw, Segroves got back in his car to go look for him. Segroves knew that the Super 

Pantry, about eight blocks away, was the only open business in the area, so he went there, and 

Beck followed. Segroves went around back, and he saw the defendant walking toward the back 

of the store until the defendant saw Segroves’ car. Segroves testified that Beck motioned the 

defendant to come out the front door, and Beck grabbed the defendant’s arm when he did. The 

defendant immediately started to twist and attempted to run. They struggled for about 10 feet 

and fell into the gas pumps. During the struggle, a pistol fell out of the defendant’s belt.

¶ 7 The defendant testified that he was walking from his sister’s house to the Super Pantry 

around 4 a.m. on the morning of October 2 to buy something to drink. He was walking 

southbound, and he remembered seeing the police officer drive past him going north. He 

testified that he was wearing a black T-shirt with a long-sleeve red shirt underneath, with a 

black hat with a red Dodgers logo, and he had braids. He continued into the Super Pantry. He 

noticed about four other people in the Super Pantry; none were dressed like the defendant and 

none had braids. While in line to check out, he noticed both officers pull up to the Super 

Pantry. The defendant denied walking toward the back door. He followed Beck out of the 

store, and he testified that Beck immediately grabbed his right arm and tripped him to the 

ground. The defendant testified that, after asking him to step outside, Beck did not say 

anything else to the defendant.

¶ 8 The trial court denied the motion, finding that there were articulable facts that justified the 

stop and temporary detention. It found that the defendant was walking in a generally 

nonpedestrian area away from where a home invasion was reported, the defendant matched the 

description of the home invader, the defendant made furtive movements inside the store, and 
- 4 -

the defendant attempted to flee. Under those facts, the trial court found that the police officers 

were acting reasonably when they stopped the defendant and a patdown was justified.

¶ 9 The defendant waived his right to a jury trial and consented to a stipulated bench trial, 

preserving the issue of the search and seizure for appeal. The defendant was convicted of 

armed violence and sentenced to 20 years in prison. The defendant appealed.

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 The defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to quash and 

suppress because the police did not reasonably suspect that the defendant had committed a 

crime. Even if the police had reasonable suspicion, the defendant argues that they exceeded the 

scope of the investigatory stop when they seized him and began searching him for weapons 

when they did not have a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. The State 

argues that the police officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant.

¶ 12 The United States and Illinois Constitutions protect people from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. Generally, reasonableness 

requires a warrant supported by probable cause. People v. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d 257 (1997). 

Police officers can, however, briefly stop and question an individual without a warrant if they 

suspect that the individual committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). When conducting a Terry stop for such an investigatory purpose, 

police officers, when necessary for safety, may conduct a limited protective search for 

weapons. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 262. In determining whether a police officer’s suspicion was 

reasonable, courts consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the stop. People v. Smith, 

331 Ill. App. 3d 1049 (2002). When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress 

evidence, we will uphold factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, but we review de novo the ultimate legal question of whether suppression was 

warranted. People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77 (2011).

¶ 13 In denying the defendant’s motion, the trial court found that the area that the defendant was 

walking was suspicious because it was a generally nonpedestrian area near the scene of a 

reported home invasion. It found that the defendant, with his black shirt and hat and braids, 

matched the description of the invader. It also found that the defendant’s steps toward the back 

of the store, after seeing the police officer arrive in the front, were furtive movements. Based 

upon the testimony of the witnesses, those factual findings were not unreasonable or arbitrary, 

or not based upon the evidence. See People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322 (2008) (a finding is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident, 

or if the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence). In light of those 

factual findings, an investigatory stop of the defendant, based upon the reasonable suspicion 

that the defendant committed a crime, was justified.

¶ 14 The defendant argues that even if the stop was justified, the officers exceeded the scope of 

the Terry stop by grabbing him to conduct a patdown search for weapons when they did not 

have a reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. Although there are 

circumstances when a police officer physically grabbing a suspect to effectuate a stop is 

warranted, those circumstances were not present in this case. See United States v. Sokolow, 
- 5 -

490 U.S. 1 (1989) (grabbing a suspect and moving him to a sidewalk to prevent him from 

departing an airport in a taxicab was reasonable under the circumstances to effectuate a stop). 

Officer Beck waved the defendant toward himself at the front door of the Super Pantry, and the 

defendant complied. Beck even held the door open for the defendant to exit. Beck did not give 

the defendant an opportunity to answer any questions, but immediately grabbed the defendant 

and put him in a lock to conduct a patdown.

¶ 15 During a Terry stop, a limited search for weapons, or a “frisk,” is warranted only if a police 

officer has reason to believe that the defendant is armed and dangerous. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 

262; 725 ILCS 5/108-1.01 (West 2010). The reasonableness of a police officer’s belief is 

measured by an objective standard, whether a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances 

would be warranted in believing that his safety or that of others was in danger. Flowers, 179 Ill. 

2d at 264. If a protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if a suspect is 

armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and any fruits of the search will be suppressed. People 

v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425 (2001).

¶ 16 Although Beck testified that he grabbed the defendant to conduct a patdown for officer 

safety reasons, he did not articulate any reasons that would lead a reasonably prudent person to 

believe his safety was in danger. The victim of the home invasion reported that the suspect had 

a cell phone, but did not report any weapon. The officers both testified that the defendant made 

furtive movements toward the back door, but Beck testified that the defendant only took a 

couple of slow steps toward the back of the store, and the defendant never made any move to 

reach inside his coat or pockets. The defendant did not attempt to flee until after Beck grabbed 

him to conduct the patdown. While a police officer can physically restrain someone when he 

attempts to flee, the physical contact in this case came before the defendant made any attempt 

to flee. Measured by an objective standard, Beck had no reason to believe that the defendant

was armed and dangerous. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the 

defendant’s motion to quash and suppress. Without the evidence that should have been 

suppressed, the State cannot prove the defendant’s guilt. Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s 

conviction and vacate his sentence. See People v. Kipfer, 356 Ill. App. 3d 132 (2005).

¶ 17 CONCLUSION

¶ 18 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is reversed.

¶ 19 Reversed.