Department of Homeland Security

	




OIG-12-103

Efficiency and Effectiveness of TSA's Visible 

Intermodel Prevention and Response Program Within 

Rail and Mass Transit Systems 

(Redacted)

August 2012
August 15, 2012
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Department of Homeland Security

 Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

Should you have any questions, please call me, or your staff may contact 

Carlton I. Mann, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, at (202) 254-4100, or 

Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector, at (202) 254-4202. 

Enclosure 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

TableofContents

ExecutiveSummary.............................................................................................................1

Background.........................................................................................................................2

ResultsofReview..............................................................................................................12

VIPRProgramImprovementsHaveEnhancedItsEffectiveness..........................12

Recommendations................................................................................................16

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis..........................................................16

CentralizedOperationalGuidanceIsNeededToClarifyLawEnforcement

ActivitiesonVIPROperations...............................................................................18

Recommendation..................................................................................................28

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis..........................................................28

TSAHasaMethodologyToSelectVIPRDeployments,ButAdditional

EnhancementsAreNeeded..................................................................................28

Recommendation..................................................................................................35

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis..........................................................35

OrganizationalPlacementWithinTSAHindersVIPRProgramEffectiveness.......35

Recommendations................................................................................................40

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis..........................................................40

VIPRTeamResourceAllocationIsDisproportionate............................................42

Recommendations................................................................................................50

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis..........................................................50

LengthofVIPRTeamMemberAssignmentsHindersProgramEffectiveness......51

Recommendation..................................................................................................54

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis..........................................................54 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

TransportationSecurityInspectorRolesandResponsibilitiesArePerformed

Inconsistently........................................................................................................55

Recommendation..................................................................................................57

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis..........................................................58

CanineTeamsAddValuetoVIPROperations.......................................................58

Recommendation..................................................................................................60

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis..........................................................60

StandardizedVIPRTrainingandTeamParticipationinJointExercisesIs

Needed..................................................................................................................61

Recommendations................................................................................................64

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis..........................................................64

EquipmentMaintenanceEnhancesEffectiveness,andOSOSafetyGearMayBe

Necessary..............................................................................................................65

Recommendations................................................................................................67

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis..........................................................67

Conclusion.............................................................................................................68

Appendixes

AppendixA:Purpose,Scope,andMethodology.................................................69

AppendixB:Recommendations...........................................................................72

AppendixC:ManagementCommentstotheDraftReport.................................74

AppendixD:DistributionofPriorityTransportationVenuesandEntitiesby

VIPRTeamAreasofResponsibility.................................................83

AppendixE:MajorContributorstoThisReport..................................................84

AppendixF:ReportDistribution..........................................................................85

Abbreviations

AFSDLEAssistantFederalSecurityDirectorLawEnforcement

BDOBehavioralDetectionOfficer

DNDODomesticNuclearDetectionOffice

DHSDepartmentofHomelandSecurity

DOPDeploymentOperationsPlan OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

FAMSFederalAirMarshalService

FSDFederalSecurityDirector

FYfiscalyear

JCCJointCoordinationCenter

OIGOfficeofInspectorGeneral

OLEOfficeofLawEnforcement

OSOOfficeofSecurityOperations

PRNDPreventativeRadiological/NuclearDetection

SACSupervisoryFederalAirMarshalinCharge

SFAMSupervisoryFederalAirMarshal

TSATransportationSecurityAdministration

TSITransportationSecurityInspector

TSNMTransportationSectorNetworkManagement

TSOTransportationSecurityOfficer

TSSETransportationSecuritySpecialist–Explosives

VIPRVisibleIntermodalPreventionandResponse
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 1 OIG-12-103

ExecutiveSummary

TheAviationandTransportationSecurityAct,asamended, establishedthe

TransportationSecurityAdministration(TSA)andtaskeditwithsecuringallmodesof

transportation.TSA’sauthoritytoimplementtheVisibleIntermodalPreventionand

Response(VIPR)ProgramwascodifiedintheImplementingRecommendationsofthe9/11

CommissionActof2007,asamended,whichauthorizedTSAtouseanyDepartmentof

HomelandSecurity(DHS)assetforVIPRteams.

TSAdeploysVIPRteamstoaugmentlocal,State,andFederalentities’effortstoenhance

securityonU.S.criticaltransportationinfrastructure.VIPRteamsscreenpassengers,

lookforsuspiciousbehavior,andactasavisibledeterrentforpotentialterroristacts.

VIPRteamsoftenincludeFederalAirMarshals,TransportationSecurityOfficers,Surface

TransportationSecurityInspectors,caninedetectionteams,explosivesdetection

specialists,BehaviorDetectionOfficers,andFederal,State,andlocallawenforcement

officers.

WeassessedTSAeffortstodeployVIPRteamstoaugmentsecurityinrailandmass

transitsystemsaspartofourFiscalYear2011AnnualPerformancePlan.Specifically,we

reviewedwhetherTSAhasamethodologytoselectVIPRdeployments;whether

geographiclocationandcriticalinfrastructureaffecttheconductofVIPRteam

operations;andwhetherVIPRteamsareefficientandeffectiveinaugmentinglocal,

State,andFederaleffortstoenhancesecurityonrailandmasstransitsystems.

TSAhasimprovedtheVIPRProgramsinceitsinception;however,organizational,

programmatic,andoperationalchallengesremain.Wearemaking16

recommendationstoimprovetheefficiencyandeffectivenessofTSA’sVIPRProgram.

TSAconcurredwith12recommendationsanddidnotconcurwith4recommendations.

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-12-103

Background

TSA’smissionistoprotect“theNation’stransportationsystemstoensurefreedomof

movementforpeopleandcommerce,”anditworkscloselywithtransportation,law

enforcement,andintelligencecommunitypartnersandstakeholderstoaccomplishthis

task.1

From1995to2005,morethan250terroristattacksoccurredworldwideagainst

passengerrailandbussysteminfrastructure,resultinginapproximately900deathsand

morethan6,000injuries.AftertheJuly2005terroristattacksonsubwayandbus

systemsinLondon,England,andtheJuly2006attacksontherailsysteminMumbai,

India,TSAfurtherrecognizedthevulnerabilitiesofmasstransitandenhanceditsefforts

toprotecttheNation’spublictransportationsystems.2

VIPRProgramAuthoritiesandIntent

TheAviationandTransportationSecurityAct,asamended,establishedandassignedTSA

theauthorityandresponsibilityforsecurityinallmodesoftransportation.3

Congress

furtherclarifiedTSA’sauthoritiesinaugmentingthesecurityofanymodeof

transportationintheUnitedStateswiththeImplementingRecommendationsofthe

ImplementingRecommendationsofthe9/11CommissionActof2007(9/11Act).4The

9/11ActauthorizedTSAtoformVIPRteams,whichcanincludeanyDHSasset,suchas

FederalAirMarshals(FAMs),SurfaceTransportationSecurityInspectors(TSIs),explosive

detectioncanineteams,andscreeningtechnologies.The9/11ActalsodirectedTSAto

collaboratewithlocalsecurityandlawenforcementofficialstodeployVIPRteams

appropriately.

TheVIPRProgramisonecomponentofTSA’smultilayereddefensiveapproachto

transportationsecurity,anditisintendedtoaugmentthesecurityofanymodeof

transportationatanylocationwithintheUnitedStates.VIPRoperationsaretargeted

andcustomizeddeploymentsofDepartmentpersonnelandassetswithvarying

capabilitiesto“provideavisiblepresencetodetect,deter,disrupt,anddefeat



1

TSA:Mission,Vision,andCoreValues.www.tsa.gov.2

OnJuly7,2005,terroristsdetonatedfourbombsinLondon,England’ssubwayandbussystemsthat

killed52andinjured700.OnJuly11,2006,sevenbombsweredetonatedthroughoutMumbai,India’s

suburbanrailwaysystem, killing209andinjuring700.3

PublicLaw10771,asamended(November19,2001).4

PublicLaw11053,asamended(August3,2007). OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 3 OIG-12-103

suspiciousactivitywhileinstillingconfidenceinthetravelingpublic.”5VIPR

deploymentsalsoenhanceTSA’sabilitytorespondquicklyandeffectivelytoincidents

withtransportationsecuritypartnersandstakeholders.AsVIPRteamsbecomemore

familiarwithtransportationvenuesandoperations,theteamsaugmenttransit

agencies’securityandresponseplansandcansupplementlocalandtransitlaw

enforcement’sresponseefforts.

VIPRProgramManagementStructure

TSA’sOfficeofLawEnforcement/FederalAirMarshalsService(OLE/FAMS)and

OfficeofSecurityOperations(OSO)jointlyimplementtheVIPRProgram.

AccordingtotheVIPRProgramConceptofOperations,OLE/FAMSistheleadTSA

officeresponsibleforcoordinatingtheoverallprogram,developingguidelines,

andreportingandcompilingVIPRstandardoperatingprocedures.OSOprovides

directiontofieldmanagementthatalignswithVIPRpoliciesandguidance.

InAugust2007,TSAestablishedtheJointCoordinationCenter(JCC)at

headquarterstomonitorlogistics,informationsharing,andVIPRProgram

activitiesnationwide.Asshowninfigure1,theJCCismanagedbyanOLE/FAMS

VIPRProgramManagerandisstaffedbyOLE/FAMSandOSOpersonnel,aswell

aspersonnelfromotherTSAsupportingoffices.TheJCCisresponsiblefor

reviewingandmanagingallVIPRdocumentationandreportingfromthefield,

establishingcoordinationanddeploymentguidelinesforoperations,and

ensuringthatallVIPRactivitiescomplywithguidance.TheJCCisalso

responsibleforensuringeffectiveinformationcoordinationamongdifferentTSA

officesinvolvedintheVIPRProgram.



5

DraftTemplateofVIPRMassTransit[AnnualOpenEnded]DeploymentOperationsPlan,April6,2010. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 4 OIG-12-103

Figure1:VIPRProgramOrganizationalChart6

Source:OIGanalysis.

Withinareasofresponsibility,theOLE/FAMSSupervisoryFederalAirMarshalin

Charge(SAC)andOSOFederalSecurityDirector(FSD)overseetheVIPRProgram

anddeterminewhetherOLE/FAMSorOSOwillmanagetheprograminthefield.

SACsandFSDsdelegateVIPRProgramimplementationtoAssistantSACsand

AssistantFSDs,andSupervisoryFAMs(SFAM)andSupervisoryTSIscanfunction

asprimaryVIPRteamleaders.

VIPRTeamCompositionandGeographicDistribution

VIPRteamoperationsusedifferentTSAdisciplines,includinglawenforcement,

surfacetransportationinspection,passengerscreening,behaviordetection,and

explosivesdetectionandappraisal.Throughcoordinationwithlocal



6

TheOfficeofTransportationSectorNetworkManagementidentifieshighrisktransportation

infrastructureandprovidesthisinformationtotheVIPRProgram. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 5 OIG-12-103

transportationsecurityandlawenforcement,VIPRteamcompositioncanbe

tailoredtopartnerandstakeholderoperationalneeds.

FAMsareTSA’slawenforcementofficers,authorizedtoenforceFederallawsin

supportoftransportationsecurity.TSIsinspecttransportationvenuesfor

compliancewithexistingsecuritystandardsanddirectives.SurfaceTSIs

specializeinmasstransit,passenger,andfreightrailsystems.Behavior

DetectionOfficers(BDOs)aretrainedtouseTSA’sScreeningPassengersby

ObservationTechniquestoidentifysuspiciousbehaviorsintransportation

venuesandrefersuspiciousindividualstolawenforcement.7

Transportation

SecurityOfficers(TSOs)aretrainedandcertifiedtoperformphysicalscreening

andinspectionofaccessiblepropertywithinspecifiedTSAprotocols.

TransportationSecuritySpecialistsExplosives(TSSEs)aresubjectmatterexperts

inexplosives,includingimprovisedexplosivedevicesandchemical,biological,

radiological,andnuclearthreats.8

Althoughmostofthesedisciplineshavebeenappliedprimarilywithinthe

aviationenvironment,theycanbeusedinanytransportationmode,including

masstransitandpassengerrail.Inaddition,otherDHScomponents,suchasU.S.

CoastGuard,U.S.SecretService,andtheNationalProtectionandPrograms

Directorate,mayparticipateinVIPRoperations.Figure2showsamultidiscipline

VIPRteamdeployingforanoperation.



7

ScreeningPassengersbyObservationTechniquesisamethodofidentifyingpersonswhomayposea

potentialsecurityriskbyassigningnumericalvaluestobehavioralandappearanceindicators.8

Duringourfieldwork,TSA’sorganizationalrealignmentcreatedanewSecurityCapabilitiesOfficethat

incorporatesexistingScreeningPassengersbyObservationTechniquesandTSSEheadquartersprogram

managementfunctions.However,BDOsandTSSEswillcontinuetoreporttoFSDs. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 6 OIG-12-103

Figure2:VIPRTeamDeployingforanOperation

Source:Stakeholdermonthlynewsletter.

Infiscalyear(FY)2008,TSAreceived$20milliontoestablishandoperate10

multimodalVIPRteams.TheseteamsareauthorizedtoperformVIPRoperations

inallmodesoftransportationandwereassignedtocitieswherebothOLE/FAMS

andOSOFSDofficesarelocated.In2010,Congressprovided$25millionforTSA

toexpandtheprogrambyestablishing15additionalVIPRteamstowork

primarilywithinsurfacetransportation.Theseteamswereassignedtocities

wheretheremainingOLE/FAMSfieldofficeswerelocated.AccordingtoTSA

officials,in2012,TSAreceivedapproximately$12millioninlapsedfundingfor12

additionalmultimodalVIPRteams.Theseteamsareassignedtoexisting

OLE/FAMSfieldofficeswithhigherVIPRworkloads.AsofDecember2011,TSA

officialsweredeterminingtheappropriatestaffingfortheseadditionalteams,

butanticipatethateachwillbeoperationalbySeptember2012.Asaresult,TSA

willhave37operationalVIPRteamsacrosstheNation,asshowninfigure3. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 7 OIG-12-103

Figure3:VIPRTeamGeographicDistribution

Source:OIGanalysis.

VIPRProgramSupport

WithinTSA,theOfficeofTransportationSectorNetworkManagement(TSNM)

identifieshighrisktransportationinfrastructureandprovidesthisinformationto

theVIPRProgram.9

TheVIPRProgramusesthisinformationtoprovidefield

operationswithguidanceforprioritizingandschedulingdeployments.TSNM

alsoengagesstakeholders,andassessesandassistsinmitigatingvulnerabilities,

coordinatingsecurityplans,conductingregulatoryevaluations,andpromoting

riskreductiontotheNation’stransportationsystems.



9

Duringourfieldwork,TSA’sheadquartersrealignmenttransitionedTSNMtotheOfficeofSecurityPolicy

andIndustryEngagement. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 8 OIG-12-103

TSA’sOfficeofChiefCounselprovideslegalservicestoTSAofficesand

personnel,andassistswithdevelopingpolicyandimplementingTSA’sauthorities

andresponsibilities.OfficeofChiefCounselfieldattorneysworkwithVIPRstaff

innegotiatinganddraftingagreementswithpartnersandstakeholders;

reviewingoperationaldocuments,plans,procedures,andpoliciestoensure

compliancewithlegalauthorities;providinglegaladviceandguidanceonsearch

relatedandcivilrights/civillibertiesissues;andinterpretingregulatoryand

statutoryauthorities.

TSA’sOfficeofIntelligenceandAnalysisprovidesintelligencebasedriskanalyses

toTSAofficesandpersonnelregardingtransportationthreatsandvulnerabilities.

SituationalorcurrentintelligenceismadeavailabletoVIPRteammembersfor

operations.TheOfficeofIntelligenceandAnalysisroutinelyforwardsmass

transitandpassengerrailalertstotheVIPRProgram.

TheNationalExplosivesDetectionCanineTeamProgramtrainsandcertifies

caninesandhandlerstodetectexplosiveandchemicalsubstancesinallmodesof

transportation.ThisprogramprovidescaninesforTSA’ssecurityinspection

functionsandalsoprovidescaninestolocalandtransportationlawenforcement

agencies.AsofDecember2011,900TSAauthorizedcanineteamswere

deployedacrossthecountrytosupporttransportationsecurity.Somecanine

teamsparticipatinginVIPRoperationsareprovidedbystakeholdersupon

requestbyOLE/FAMSfieldoffices,andotherteamsareemployedatairports

underanFSD’soperationalcontrol.

TheDomesticNuclearDetectionOffice(DNDO)wasestablishedtoimprovethe

Nation’scapabilitytodetectandreportunauthorizedattemptstoimport,

possess,store,develop,ortransportnuclearorradiologicalmaterials.Toassist

incarryingoutitsmission,DNDOpartnerswithTSAtoprovideFAMledVIPR

teamswithPreventativeRadiological/NuclearDetection(PRND)equipment.

VIPRteamsusePRNDequipmenttoscreenforradiologicalandnuclearmaterials

whenperformingoperations.

VIPRPlanningandReporting

VIPRteamssubmitalloperationalplanningandreportingdocumentstotheJCC

throughWebEOC.WebEOCisawebbasedincident/eventinformation OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 9 OIG-12-103

managementsystemcapableofmanagingmultipleincidentsanddailyevents,

assigningandtrackingmissionsandtasks,providingsituationalalerts,

coordinatingresources,andgeneratingreports.

AllVIPRfieldactivitybeginswithanannualDeploymentOperationsPlan(DOP)

thatissubmitted,reviewed,andcommentedon,orconcurredtobytheJCC.A

DOPincludesadescriptionofplanneddeploymentsinatransportationsystem

andmode,addressesVIPRteamcompositionandteammemberactivitiesduring

deployments,deploymenttimeandlocation,reasonforvenueselection,and

howVIPRdeploymentswillaugmentexistingvenuesecurity.ADOPalso

identifiesparticipatingagencypointsofcontactandoperationspecificdetails

suchasfirearmsrestrictions,arrestauthorities,screeningprotocols,explosives

disposal,andcommunications.AseparateDOPispreparedforeachpartnerand

stakeholderthatworkswithVIPRteams,andlargervenuesservingmultiple

partnersandstakeholdersmayhaveaseparateDOP.

AsofDecember2011,theDOPwastransitioningtoaNationalDeployment

OperationsPlan,whichwilldescribenationallyapprovedVIPRactivitiesin

surfacetransportation.Withthistransition,theVIPRProgramalsoanticipates

replacingWebEOCwiththeVIPRInformationManagementSystem,whichis

expectedtoreduceadministrativerequirementsandsupportanalysismore

effectively.

InadditiontotheannualDOP,whenaVIPRdeploymentisscheduled,an

OperationsTrackingReportissubmittedtotheJCC.Thismorespecificreport

identifiesthedate,time,mode(s),andlocation(s)fortheoperations.AnActivity

SummaryReportidentifyingpersonnelassignedtothedeployment,aswellas

theproposedVIPRteamandpartneragencyactivities,isprocessedbytheJCC

andpostedinWebEOC2to3daysbeforeaVIPRteamisdeployed.Afteran

operation,significantchangestostaffing,timing,oranysignificanteventssuch

asarrests,aresubmittedtotheJCCinanAfterActionReport.Thisreport

providesVIPRProgrammanagementwithanopportunitytoanalyzefield

activities,lessonslearned,andbestpractices. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 10 OIG-12-103

Partners,Stakeholders,andVenues

TheNation’spublictransportationsystemsarebuilt,owned,maintained,

operated,andfundedthroughFederal,State,andlocalgovernmentandprivate

sectorpartnerships.VIPRoperationsareconductedwithvariouspartners,

stakeholders,andvenues.VIPRteamsdeploytocommuter,light,andheavyrail

andtobus,airport,highway,bridge,ferry,andpipelinesystems.Asfigure4

shows,staffingandfundingenhancementshaveincreasedVIPRoperationsin

bothaviationandsurfacevenues.AsofDecember2011,VIPRteamswere

conducting75percentofoperationsinsurfacetransportationand25percentin

aviation. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 11 OIG-12-103

Figure4:VIPRFundingandOperations

Source:OIGanalysis.

WeassessedTSAeffortstodeployVIPRteamstoaugmentsecurityinrailand

masstransitsystemsaspartofourFiscalYear2011AnnualPerformancePlan.

Specifically,wereviewedwhetherTSAhasamethodologytoselectVIPR

deployments;geographiclocationandcriticalinfrastructureaffecttheconduct

ofVIPRteamoperations;andVIPRteamsareefficientandeffectivein

augmentinglocal,State,andFederaleffortstoenhancesecurityonrailandmass

transitsystems.ThisreviewisafollowuptoourreportTSA’sAdministration

andCoordinationofMassTransitSecurityPrograms(OIG0866),issuedinJune

2008. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 12 OIG-12-103

ResultsofReview

TheVIPRProgramhasimproveditsabilitytoestablisheffectivepartnerandstakeholder

relationships.However,organizational,programmatic,andoperationalchallenges

remain.Forexample,theVIPRProgram’splacementwithinTSAhindersitsabilityto

ensurecoordinatedfieldactivities.Guidanceisneededtoclarifylawenforcement

activities,teammemberrolesandresponsibilities,andequipmentuseduringVIPR

operations.Additionally,theVIPRdeploymentmethodologyneedsrefinement,and

resourcesarenotallocatedproportionatelytoteamworkloadsacrosstheNation.

Teamsdonotreceivestandardizedtraining,andthelengthofVIPRteammember

assignmentsaffectsprogrameffectiveness.TSAcanenhanceprogramefficiencyand

effectivenessbyaddressingthesechallenges.

VIPRProgramImprovementsHaveEnhancedItsEffectiveness

TSAcontinuestoimprovetheVIPRProgramthroughenhancedpartnerand

stakeholderoutreachandinteraction,andtheintegrationofOSOandOLE/FAMS

assetsonVIPRteams.However,greaterpublicawarenessandoutreachare

neededtoenhanceknowledgeandacceptanceoftheprogram.Inaddition,

capturingprogramdatamoreaccuratelywouldreflecttheVIPRProgram’svalue

toDHS,partners,andstakeholdersbetter.

EnhancedInteractionHasImprovedPerceptionandEngagement

TransitagenciesarenotrequiredtoparticipateinVIPRoperations.When

partnersandstakeholdersarenotreceptivetoparticipatinginandinteracting

withtheprogram,teamsareunabletofulfilltheirmissiontoenhancethe

securityoftheNation’stransportationinfrastructure.Asaresult,developinga

workingandmutuallybeneficialrelationshipwithpartnersandstakeholdersis

essential.

SeveralpartnersandstakeholderssaidthatinitialVIPRProgramexposurewas

unsatisfactory.Teamshadnotintroducedandcommunicatedtheprogram’s

intentorestablishedcredibilityortheprogram’susefulnesstotransitagencies.

Forexample,onemasstransitstakeholderdescribedinitialexposuretoVIPR

operationsasuniformedteamsappearingunannouncedattrainstations,which OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 13 OIG-12-103

createdconfusionastowhotheteamswereandwhatwastheirintended

purpose.

Afterinitialdeployments,partnersandstakeholdersdescribeVIPRProgram

engagementasregroupingandcommunicatingbetterthroughmoremeaningful

outreachtopolicedepartments,transitagencies,governingboards,andother

entities.Astakeholderdescribedthenewoutreachasthoughtfullydone,as

stakeholdersarenowengagedandincludedindiscussionsofpotential

operationswithintheirsystems.Asaresult,mostpartnersandstakeholderssaid

theyvaluetheprogramasaforcemultiplierandanextensionoftheirsecurity

assets,anddescribetheteamsasprofessional,willingtoworkandtakeadvice,

flexible,andresponsivetopartnerandstakeholderneeds.However,some

partnersandstakeholdersremainhesitanttoreengagewiththeprogramafter

theirinitialexperiences.

PartnersandstakeholderssaidVIPRProgramscheduling,planning,andthesite

selectionprocessarecontinuouslyimproving,especiallywhenteammembers

remaininassignmentsforextendedperiods.Onsometeams,onememberis

assignedtocoordinatewithspecifictransitagenciesandanotherconducts

scheduling,whichprovidesagencieswithadirectconnectiontotheVIPR

Program.

MoreEffectivePublicEngagementIsNecessary

AlthoughtheVIPRProgramhasimproveditsengagementwithpartnersand

stakeholders,itcanfurtherenhanceknowledgeandacceptanceoftheprogram

throughpublicoutreachefforts.MoreeffectiveVIPRProgrampromotionwould

raiseawarenessofTSA’smissioninallmodesoftransportationandconveyTSA

executivesupportfortheprogram.

InJuly2010,DHSannouncedtheIfYouSeeSomething,SaySomethingTM

campaigntoencouragethepublictoreportsuspiciousactivity.10The

campaign’spurposeistoraisepublicsituationalawareness,supportingDHS

SecretaryNapolitano’sstatementthat“homelandsecuritybeginswith

hometownsecurity.”InFebruary2011,SecretaryNapolitanomentionedthe



10ThissloganistrademarkedbyNewYork’sMetropolitanTransportationAuthority. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIG-12-103

VIPRProgramwhendiscussingIfYouSeeSomething,SaySomethingTMandthe

NationalSuspiciousActivityReportingInitiative,asanextrameasuretohelp

deterterroristactivityinthepublictransitenvironment.11

AsaresultoftheIfYouSeeSomething,SaySomethingTMcampaign,DHShas

developedpartnershipswithtransitagenciesandStateandlocallaw

enforcementagencies,andthecampaignhasbeenpromotedatlargesporting

events,suchasthe2012SuperBowl.Partnersandstakeholdersmentioned

promotingthecampaignbyhandingoutIfYouSeeSomething,SaySomethingTM

informationtopassengersduringVIPRoperations.Increasingpublicawareness

andparticipationinidentifyingsuspiciousbehaviorenablesthepublictoserveas

aforcemultipliertolawenforcementofficers.

IntroducingasimilarcampaigntopromotetheVIPRProgramcouldenhanceits

missionto“instillconfidenceinthetravelingpublic”whilebeingvisibleduring

operations.12Inadditiontoassistingwithstakeholderrelations,public

promotioncouldfurtherthetravelingpublic’sawareness.SeeingVIPRteams,

particularlyFAMsintacticalgear,cancausesomepassengerstoexpress

emotionsofanxietyandfearorsecurity.Withoutpriorknowledgeaboutthe

teamoritspurpose,stakeholdersinitiallyreceivednegativereactionsand

opinionsfrompassengersencounteringVIPRteams.Oncepassengerswere

moreknowledgeableabouttheprogramanditsintent,theytypicallyviewedthe

teamsfavorably.Forexample,passengershaveapproachedVIPRteam

memberswithquestionsregardingwhethertherewasanimmediatethreator

securityrisk.Oncetheteamexplaineditspurposeofincreasingsecurityat

transportationvenues,passengersoftenrespondedpositivelytotheteam.



11TheNationwideSuspiciousActivityReportingInitiativeisanefforttoinvolveState,local,andFederal

partnersinidentifying,reporting,andanalyzingsuspiciousactivityreports.

12VIPRNationalDOP–SurfaceSection1.1. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-12-103

TheVIPRProgramMayNotMeasureItsValueAccurately

TheVIPRProgramusesthefollowingcriteriatomeasureandtrackits

performance:

NumberofVIPRteamoperations,includingthenumberofoperationsinaviation

andsurface

PercentageofNationalSpecialSecurityEventsandSpecialEventAssessmentRating

EventsatwhichVIPRteamsaredeployed13

CompletionofVIPRoperationsatsitesthatTSAhasdeterminedtobehighrisk

basedonriskassessments,analyses,andstudiesconductedineachmodeof

transportation

PercentageofrepeatVIPRdeploymentswithprimarystakeholders,capturing

continuedworkingrelationshipswithprimarytransportationstakeholders

Althoughthesecriteriacanmeasurethequantityandqualityofservices

providedtotransitpartnersandstakeholders,theusefulnessofthe

measurementdependsondataintegrity.FieldofficescountandreportVIPR

operationsdifferentlydependingonthenumberofVIPRteams,stakeholders,

andvenues.Forexample,whenoneteamworkswithastakeholderatmultiple

venues,somefieldofficesreportdailyactivitiesasoneVIPRoperationbecause

theteamworkedwithonlyonestakeholder.However,anotherfieldofficemay

reportthesameactivitiesasmultipleVIPRoperations,sincevisibilitywas

providedatmultiplevenues.

AlthoughthenumberofvenuesandstakeholdersaffecthowVIPRteamscount,

report,andrecordoperations,thefollowingfactorsalsoinfluenceprogramdata

consistencyandaccuracy:

HowVIPRteamsdivideduringanoperation;

Whetheranoperationincorporatesbothstationaryscreeningandaroving

uniformedpresence;and



13NationalSpecialSecurityEventsareeventsDHSidentifiesasnationallyorinternationallysignificant

basedonpotentialriskforaterroristattack.SpecialEventAssessmentRatingEventsdonothavethe

samelevelofriskasNationalSpecialSecurityEvents. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIG-12-103

Thenumberofplanningdocumentssubmittedforeachdeployment.

VIPRProgramofficialssaidthatJCCanalystsensurethatWebEOCdataare

reconciledwhensubmitted.However,withoutdefininghowtocountVIPR

operations,fieldpersonnelwillcontinuetoreportandcountVIPRoperations

differently,whichcreatesunnecessaryworkattheJCC.Inaddition,withouta

workingdefinitionforaVIPRoperation,JCCanalystsmaynotbeabletocount

operationsconsistentlyandaccurately.Definedcriteriaforcountingand

reportingVIPRoperationsandamethodforconfirmingoperation

documentationwillensurethatVIPRProgramperformancemetricsreflecteach

VIPRoperationaccurately.

Recommendations

WerecommendthattheAdministratorfortheTransportationSecurity

Administration:

Recommendation#1:Developandimplementapublicawarenessinitiativeto

conveytheVIPRProgram’sintent.

Recommendation#2:ClarifythedefinitionsofVIPRoperationsandprovide

guidancetoheadquartersandthefieldabouthowtocompleteoperational

documentationtocorrectlyreportoperations.

Recommendation#3:Establishandimplementadatareportingprocedurethat

ensuresinformationsubmittedtotheJointCoordinationCenterisupdatedand

reflectseachVIPRoperationaccurately.

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis

WeevaluatedTSA’swrittencommentsandhavemadechangestothereport

wherewedeemedappropriate.AsummaryofTSA’swrittenresponsetothe

reportrecommendationsandouranalysisoftheresponsefollowseach

recommendation.AcopyofTSA’sresponse,initsentirety,isincludedas

appendixC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIG-12-103

Inaddition,wereceivedtechnicalcommentsfromTSAandincorporatedthese

commentsintothereportwhereappropriate.TSAconcurredwith12

recommendationsanddidnotconcurwith4recommendationsinthereport.

WeappreciateTSA’scommentsandcontributions.

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#1:TSAofficialsconcurredwith

Recommendation1.Initsresponse,TSAsaidthattheVIPRProgramisworking

withTSA’sOfficeofStrategicCommunicationsandPublicAffairstodevelopa

publicaffairsguidancedocumentanddefineTSA’sparticipationinmedia

exchanges.TheOfficeofStrategicCommunicationsandPublicAffairswillalso

workwiththeOfficeofSecurityPolicyandIndustryEngagementtocreatea

proactiveinitiativewithstakeholdersasasecondpartofthepublicawareness

strategy.Thethirdpartofthestrategywillincludeoutreachandeducation

initiativeswithexternalstakeholderstoensurethatpersonnelparticipatingin

VIPRoperationshaveaccurateandtimelymessaging.

OIGAnalysis:WeconsiderTSA’sactionsresponsivetoRecommendation1,

whichisresolvedandopen.TSAdescribesplannedpublicoutreacheffortswith

stakeholdersandpartners.However,theintentofthisrecommendationisalso

toensureuniformmessagingtothepublicabouttheVIPRProgramandteam

presenceinvarioustransportationvenues.Thisrecommendationwillremain

openpendingourreceiptofdocumentationthatTSAhasdevelopedVIPR

Programplansanddisseminatedmaterialsforgeneralpublicengagementand

awareness.

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#2:TSAofficialsconcurredwith

Recommendation2.Initsresponse,TSAsaidthatJCCpersonnelareresponsible

forconsistentlyandaccuratelyhandlingoperationsdata.TSAagreedthatan

understooddefinitionforwhatconstitutesaVIPRoperationamongallfield

personnelcouldenhanceaccountingforoperationsdata.

Further,formetricpurposestheVIPRProgramconsidersanoperationtobe“the

deploymentofVIPRpersonnel(TSAandnonTSA)atavenueinaspecificmode

foradefinedperiodoftime.”RecognizingvariationsinVIPRoperationsatthe

locallevel,theprogramdoesnotmandateaminimumormaximumrequirement

forpersonnelorduration.Fieldpersonnel,workingwithstakeholders,

determinewhetheravenuethatcontainsmultipletransportationmodesand OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 18 OIG-12-103

includesothertransitstationsisconsideredasingleVIPRactivity,ormultiple

VIPRactivitiesrequiringmultipleActivitySummaryReports.

TheJCCrecentlyupdatedandcommunicatedguidancetoVIPRfieldpersonnel

aboutconsistentlyandaccuratelycompletingActivitySummaryReports.In

addition,theJCCwillcommunicatetheVIPRoperationdefinitiontofield

personnel.

OIGAnalysis:WeconsiderTSA’sactionsresponsivetoRecommendation2,

whichisresolvedandopen.Thisrecommendationwillremainopenpendingour

receiptofdocumentation,fromheadquarterstofieldoffices,thatclearlydefines

aVIPRoperationandguidancetocompleteVIPRoperationdocumentation

accurately.

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#3:TSAofficialsconcurredwith

Recommendation3.Initsresponse,TSAsaidtheVIPRInformationManagement

Systemdesignanddevelopmentteamcodedthesystemtoensureconsistent

fieldreportingandVIPRprogramdataanalysis.TheVIPRInformation

ManagementSystemiscurrentlyscheduledtobeimplementedinthefirst

quarterofFY2013.

OIGAnalysis:WeconsiderTSA’sactionsresponsivetoRecommendation3,

whichisresolvedandopen.Thisrecommendationwillremainopenpendingour

receiptofdocumentationthatensuresconsistentfieldreportingandinformation

submittedtotheJCCisupdatedandreflectsVIPRoperationsaccurately.

CentralizedOperationalGuidanceIsNeededToClarifyLawEnforcement

ActivitiesonVIPROperations

FAMshavespecificauthoritiesasFederallawenforcementofficersinallmodes

oftransportation.AlthoughVIPRteamsarevisibledeterrentstoterrorism,in

manycasesFAMsarevaluedasforcemultipliersbylocallawenforcement

agenciesinmasstransitenvironments.However,becauseofdifferences

betweentheaviationandmasstransitoperatingenvironments,impliedand

actualoperatingguidanceineachenvironment,andperceivedneedformore

guidanceandsupportfrommanagement,FAMsonVIPRteamsexpressedhaving

ahigherconfidencelevelworkinginaviationthaninmasstransit.Theseissues OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 19 OIG-12-103

reduceVIPRProgrameffectivenessincertainlocations.Strongercentralized

guidancespecifyingtheextenttowhichFAMscansupportlocallaw

enforcement,whichreflectstherealitiesofVIPRoperationsinmasstransit

environments,isneeded.

FAMsHaveFederalLawEnforcementAuthorityinAllTransportationModes,

ButAuthoritiesVarybyState

AccordingtotheAviationandTransportationSecurityAct,TSAisresponsiblefor

securityinallmodesoftransportation.14AsTSA’slawenforcementofficers,to

theextentthattheyareactinginsupportoftransportationsecurity,FAMsare

authorizedtocarryafirearmandmakeawarrantlessarrestforanyFederal

offensecommittedintheirpresence,orforanyFederalfelonyiftheFAMhas

probablecausetobelievethatthepersontobearrestedhascommittedoris

committingthefelony.Inaddition,FAMsmayseekandexecuteFederal

warrantsforarrestorseizureofevidencebasedonprobablecausethata

violationhasbeencommitted.TheAviationandTransportationSecurityActalso

statesthatTSAmustprovideguidancetoFAMsinexercisingtheseauthorities,in

consultationwiththeU.S.AttorneyGeneral.15

Furthermore,asFederallawenforcementofficers,FAMSareconsideredtobe

withinthescopeoftheiremploymentwhentakingreasonableaction,including

theuseofforce,toprotectsomeoneintheirpresencefromacrimeofviolence;

helpsomeonesufferingfromorbeingthreatenedwithbodilyharm;orprevent

theescapeofsomeonewhomFAMSbelievescommittedacrimeofviolencein

theFAMS’presence.16

FAMsroutinelyexercisetheirlawenforcementauthorityintheaviationand

masstransitenvironments,aswellasothertransportationmodeswhen

conductingVIPRoperations.Asapolicymatter,VIPRteamsfocuson

transportationsecuritymatters;however,asamatteroflaw,undercertain

circumstances,FAMsarepermittedtoengagewhentheyencountercriminal

conduct.Specifically,FAMsmaymakeawarrantlessarrestforanyFederal



1449USC114(d).

1549USC114(p).

16Thisauthorityderivesfromthesocalled“FederalGoodSamaritanLaw.”28USC2671note. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 20 OIG-12-103

felonycommittedintheirpresence,orforanyFederalfelonyiftheFAMhas

probablecause.17

FederalPeaceOfficerStatusVariesbyState

AlthoughFAMshaveauthoritytoactonFederaloffenses,theirabilitytosupport

localpartnersandstakeholdersfullyinalawenforcementcapacitydependson

whetherFAMshave“peaceofficer”statusinaState.EachStatedefinespeace

officerstatusdifferently,butthestatusgenerallyreferstotheauthorityto

performStateandlocallawenforcementfunctionsinaspecificjurisdiction.

FederallawenforcementofficershavepeaceofficerstatusinsomeStates.For

example,inColorado,Federallawenforcementofficersauthorizedtousedeadly

forceinperformingtheirdutiesaregrantedpeaceofficerstatus.18InIllinois,

FederalemployeesauthorizedbystatutetoarrestindividualsforFederalcrimes

areconsideredpeaceofficers.Amongotherpowers,FAMscanassistanother

IllinoispeaceofficerinanarrestoractuponanoffenseunderIllinoislawbeing

committedintheirpresence.19

InotherStates,Federallawenforcementofficersfromspecificagenciesare

grantedpeaceofficerstatus.ThisdefinitionmayormaynotincludeallDHS

agencies,andFederallawenforcementofficers’peaceofficerpowersmaybe

limitedtospecificactions.Forexample,inNewYork,FAMsmayusephysicaland

deadlyforceinmakinganarrestortopreventescape,andmayseizeweapons.20

However,eventhoughtheycanperformwarrantlessarrests,theycannotdoso

solelybasedonprobablecausethattheindividualhascommittedafelony

outsideoftheofficer’spresence,astheycanundertheirFederalauthorities.21

InotherStates,suchasCalifornia,Massachusetts,andOhio,FAMsdonothave

peaceofficerstatusandmaynotarrestorremovesomeonefromthetransit

systemforcommittinganonFederalcrime.



17FederalAirMarshalServiceOfficeofTrainingandWorkforcePrograms:VIPRLegalLessonPlan,

October2009.

18ColoradoRevisedStatutes§163110(b)(2012):Peaceofficers–duties.19720ILCS5/213(2012).

20N.Y.C.P.L.Law§2.20(2012):Powersofpeaceofficers.21N.Y.C.P.L.Law§2.20and§140.25(2012):Arrestwithoutawarrant;bypeaceofficer. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 21 OIG-12-103

FieldCounselandLocalLawEnforcementProvideSomeOperationalGuidance

Aseachoperatingareapresentsuniquechallenges,theOfficeofChiefCounselat

TSAheadquartersaswellasfieldcounsel,reviewDOPstoensurethatteamsare

operatingwithintheirpowersandlocallegalconstraints,andthatVIPRteams

aresupportingtheStateorcity’srole,authorities,andresponsibilities.

Fieldcounselmayprovideopinionsbeforeoperationsorprovideclarification

whenheadquartersissuesnewguidance.Fieldcounselmayalsovisitmajor

deploymentlocationsandobserveaVIPRoperationtoprovideguidanceon

potentiallegalissues.Inaddition,fieldcounseldescribedtalkingtostakeholders

involvedintheVIPRoperationstoexplainFAMauthorities,andtoexplainthat

workingwiththeVIPRteamdoesnotprovideFAMsanyspeciallawenforcement

powers.

RegardlessofFAMauthorities,partnersandstakeholdersprovideadditional

informationregardingtheactivitiestheyarecomfortablewithVIPRteams

performingintheirsystemsandthelegaltrainingtheyconsiderimportantfora

successfulpartnership.Onestakeholderwhoconductsvehiclesearchesduring

VIPRoperationsdescribedconcernsregardingevidencerecoveredduring

searches,whichmaybeinadmissibleasevidenceintheStatepenalsystemwhen

discoveredbyaFAM.Asaresult,thisstakeholderconsidereditimperativethat

VIPRteamsunderstandStateandFederalsearchandseizurelaws.Another

stakeholdersaidthathisagencywouldnotallowVIPRteamstopatroltrainsin

motion.Therefore,whenconductingamultistationoperationwiththis

stakeholder,theVIPRteamtravelsbetweenstationsbycarwhilethe

stakeholder’slawenforcementteampatrolstrainsinmotion.

Partners,Stakeholders,andthePublicExpectLawEnforcementSupportFrom

FAMs

FAMsarelawenforcementofficersandpartners,stakeholders,andthepublic

expectthattheywillknowhowtorespond,andwilldosowhenfacedwith

potentialcriminalactivity.Teamsdeployinmasstransitenvironmentswhere

encounteringcriminalactivityiscommon,andstakeholdersexpressedthatVIPR

teamsareconsideredanaugmentandsupporttotheirsecurityteamsanda

forcemultiplier.In2007,TSAandrepresentativesoftheTransitPolicingand OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 22 OIG-12-103

SecurityPeerAdvisoryGroupcreatedmutuallyagreeduponoperatingguidelines

forVIPRteamsinmasstransitandpassengerrail.Accordingtotheseguidelines,

FAMsshoulddefertothetransitagencyorlocaljurisdiction’spoliceforce,but

areexpected“toactasnecessaryintheinterestofpublicsafetyorother

exigencyrequiringpromptintervention.”22

FieldcounseldescribedFAMsasbeinginadelicatesituationaslawenforcement

officerswhoareperceivedasforcemultipliers,butwhomaynotbeableto

intervenedependingonStateandlocallaws,aswellasdirectionfromTSA

leadership.Forexample,aFAMwhodoesnothavepeaceofficerstatuscannot

legallyintervenetoremovepubliclyintoxicatedindividualsfromatransitvenue,

eventhoughtheindividualsmaybeathreattootherpassengersoradangerto

themselves,unlesstheycommittedanoffenseagainsttheUnitedStatesinthe

FAM’spresence,ortheFAMhasprobablecausetobelievethatafelonyisorhas

beencommitted.EvenwhereFAMshavepeaceofficerstatus,theyare

encouragedtonotgetinvolvedinStateorlocaloffenses,andtoreferoffenders

tolocallawenforcement.Shouldanincidentoccur,thepublicwouldperceive

theFAMsaslawenforcementofficerswhodidnotacttopreventormitigatethe

incident.

HeadquartersprogramofficialsstressedthattheVIPRProgramisabout

counterterrorism,notaboutcriminalbehavior,andthatVIPRFAMsare

encouragedtofocusonthecounterterrorismmissionandletpartnersand

stakeholdersfocusoncriminalaspects.However,aFAMVIPRteammember

expressedconcernthattheteamalreadydeferstolocallawenforcementfor

manyincidents.Whencalledupontoassistastakeholderwithcriminal

incidents,ifFAMscontinuallycannotprovideassistance,thestakeholdermayno

longerconsiderFAMsalawenforcementasset.

FAMsExpressDiscomfortWithAuthoritiesintheMassTransitOperating

Environments

AlthoughFAMauthoritiesasTSAlawenforcementofficersinaviationaswellas

masstransitstemfromthesamestatutes,FAMsexpressedhavingagreater



22TSAandtheTransitPolicingandSecurityPeerAdvisoryGroup,EffectiveEmploymentofVisible

IntermodalPreventionandResponse(VIPR)TeamsinMassTransitandPassengerRail,October30,2007. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 23 OIG-12-103

comfortlevelandunderstandingoftheirauthoritiesinaviation.Thiscanbe

attributedtothedifferencesbetweentheaviationandmasstransitoperating

environments;thedifferencesinimpliedandactualguidancetooperateinthe

aviationandmasstransitmodes;andconflictsbetweenguidanceandVIPR

operationalrealities.

AviationandMassTransitAreDifferentOperatingEnvironments

Theauthoritywithinthecontainedenvironmentofanaircraftisclear.ThePilot

inCommandisincharge,andFAMsonboardworkwiththeflightcrewtoensure

thesafetyoftheaircraft.Whenthereareotherlawenforcementofficerson

board,theydefertoFAMlawenforcementauthorityandsupportasneeded.In

addition,althoughanairportisnotascontainedasanaircraft,themajorityof

individualsenterairportsforspecificpurposesandexhibitpredictablebehaviors.

Asaresult,itmaybeeasiertospotinconsistenciesinbehaviorthatwarrant

furtherscrutiny.Also,passengersenteringanairportterminaltotravelmust

submittophysicalscreeningtoaccessaircraft.Whencalleduponbythelocal

lawenforcementorasecurityteamresponsibleforairportsecurity,FAMswould

beperceivedasactingwithintheirauthoritytoprotectaviationsecurity.

Bycontrast,masstransitsystemsareexpansiveandporous,withstationsthat

havemultipleentrancesandexits.Someworkonthehonorsystemanddonot

haveturnstilesoranyotherfarecollectionchokepoint.Thepublicentersthese

venuesforavarietyofpurposes,includingtravel.Individualsenteringmass

transitvenuesarenotscreened,andthelayoutofmanymasstransitvenues,as

wellastheirpassengervolume,makesphysicalscreeningachallenge.In

addition,dependingontheStateandstakeholders,FAMsmayormaynothave

theauthorityorpermissiontotakecertainlawenforcementactionswithinmass

transitvenues.

FAMTrainingandLawEnforcementBackgroundAreInsufficientGuidancefor

FAMsintheMassTransitEnvironment

OLE/FAMSheadquartersofficialssaidthatindecidingwhethertointerveneand

exercisetheirlawenforcementauthorities,FAMscanrelyontheirexperienceas

seasonedlawenforcementofficers.However,notallVIPRFAMshavea

traditionallawenforcementbackground,andmanycomefromhighereducation OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 24 OIG-12-103

ormilitarybackgrounds.ManyFAMsseekVIPRexperiencebecauseofthe

opportunitytogaintraditionallawenforcementexperienceandexposure.Field

leadershipsuggestedthattheOLE/FAMSofficialsassumethatFAMsarearmed

lawenforcementandwillknowhowtorespondtoamasstransitsituation;

however,fieldofficialssaid,therealissuesarenotonlywhetherFAMsknow

howtorespondoutsideofaviation,butwhethertheyarecomfortabledoingso.

AllFAMacademycandidatesreceiveextensivetraininginpreparationfortheir

missionasTSAlawenforcementofficers.Inadditiontotheiracademytraining,

FAMsarerequiredtocomplete160traininghoursperyear.OLE/FAMSofficials

saidthatthistrainingisconsideredguidanceonhowFAMswillexercisetheirlaw

enforcementauthoritiesintheaviationandmasstransitenvironments.

However,eventhoughsometrainingmaterialsareapplicabletobothflyingand

VIPRmissions,theymaynotbesufficienttoaffordFAMstheskillsand

informationtoperformsuccessfullyinthemasstransitenvironment.

SomeFAMtrainingwascreatedspecificallyfortheVIPRmission,suchasVIPR

Legal,whichcoversFAMs’broadauthoritiesaslawenforcementin

transportationmodes,includingthemasstransitenvironment.SomeFAMshave

expressedinterestintrainingthatwouldexplorethenuancesofpeaceofficer

statusandspecificlawenforcementauthorities.However,TSAheadquarters

officialssaidthatitisimpossibletocreatetrainingthatwouldcoverallthe

specificoperatingenvironmentswithinmasstransit.Asaresult,fieldofficesare

expectedtodeveloptheirownunderstandingofsafetyandproceduralissuesin

theirvenues.

Delegatingthisguidancetothefieldcreatesaperceptionthatpossibleblamefor

misstepswillfallonfieldleadership,causingsomeofficestodeployVIPRteams

lessaggressivelythanothers.SomefieldleadershipdeploytheirVIPRteamsin

masstransitvenueswheretherearelowcrimeratesandFAMsarelesslikelyto

makedecisionsaboutexercisingtheirlawenforcementauthorities.Field

leadershipmaydeployteamsmoreofteninaviationenvironments,wherethey

perceiveFAMauthoritiesasbetterdefined.Inaddition,someseniorFAMsare

hesitanttojoinVIPRteamsbecausetheyconsiderguidancelimited,andare

unconvincedofheadquarterssupportregardinglawenforcementactivities. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 25 OIG-12-103

ThemajorityofOLE/FAMStraining,suchasBasicHandcuffingandArrest

Procedures,isgearedtowardtheaviationenvironmentandassumesthataFAM

hasarrestauthorityandwilluseit.OthertrainingaddressesInterview

Techniques,whichcontainelementsusefultoVIPRFAMswhentheyhavethe

authoritytointerviewmasstransitpassengerstheydeemsuspicious.However,

outsidetheaviationenvironment,FAMsareunclearwhethertheyhavethe

authoritytodetainapassengerforinterviewbasedonbehavior.Inaddition,

shouldapassengerrefuseaninterview,FAMsareunclearhowtheyshould

respond.

GuidanceDoesNotReflectVIPRProgramOperationalRealities

TheNationalDeploymentOperationsPlanforSurfacedescribesFAMsas

“trainedtooperateovertlyandcovertlywithinapublicenvironmentto

investigate,detect,andrespondtocriminalbehaviorindicators.”InAugust

2010,TSAissuedanoperationsdirectivedescribingVIPRProgramdeployments

asmeanttovisiblydeterpotentialcriminaland/orterroristplanningand

activity.23ThemostcurrentConceptofOperations,updatedinJanuary2008,

included“conductinginvestigatorydetentionsbasedonreasonablesuspicion”

and“makingarrestswithoutwarrants”intheFAMs’roleduringVIPRoperations.

AlthoughFAMsareconsideredlawenforcementbythepublicandseveral

partnersandstakeholders,andinmanylocationshavepeaceofficerstatusand

mayrespondtocriminalsituations,programleadershiphasrecentlydiscouraged

FAMsfromexercisingthisauthority.Inaddition,programleadershipreminds

FAMsthattheVIPRmissionisconsistentwithTSA’soverarchingmission,which

iscounterterrorismandtransportationsecurity.Forexample,inMarch2011,

TSAleadershipreleasedamemorandumtoFSDsandSACs,whichinstructsthat

alldeploymentsbe“focusedonprevention,deterrenceanddetectionof

terrorismrelatedactivities,notbasedonlocalanticrimeinitiatives.”In

addition,adraftupdatetotheAugust2010operationsdirectiveremoves

languageaboutdeploymentsdeterringanddisruptingcriminalplanningand

activities,andaddsthat“allVIPRoperationsmusthaveanexustotransportation



23OD40050113A,“VIPRPlanningGuidanceforFederalSecurityDirectorsandOfficeofLaw

Enforcement/FederalAirMarshalServiceSpecialAgentsinCharge,”August6,2010. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 26 OIG-12-103

security”andthat“operationsmustbedesignedtodeter,detect,andprevent

actsofterrorism.”

Whenpotentialcriminalsituationsoccur,VIPRProgramleadershipencourages

FAMstonotifylocallawenforcement,whichimpliesthatFAMsarealwayswith

orincloseproximitytolocallawenforcement.Onsomeoperations,locallaw

enforcementofficersorsecurityteammembersaccompanyeachVIPRgroup.

However,otherpartnersandstakeholdershavelimitedpersonnelavailableto

deploywithVIPRteams,andpositiontheirofficersatstrategiclocationswithina

venue.Inlargervenues,therecanbeagreatdistancebetweenaFAMandthe

closestlocallawenforcementofficerortransitsecurityofficer.Inaddition,

communicationequipmentisnotalwaysreliableorinteroperable.Onother

operations,VIPRteamsdeploywithpartnerandstakeholderpermission,but

withoutlocallawenforcementorsecurityteammembers.

Asaresult,FAMsonVIPRoperationsneedmorespecificguidanceon

engagementprotocolsandlegalauthoritieswhentheyencounterpotential

criminalsituations.ThiscanbeachievedbyleveragingexistingguidancetoVIPR

teamneeds.Forexample,the2005CommonStrategyDetailedGuidance

(Strategy)describestherolesofflightandcabincrewswithrespecttoFAMsand

otherlawenforcementonboardanaircraft.TheStrategyhasThreatLevelsthat

includepassengers’behaviorandappropriateflightandcabincrewactionsfor

eachThreatLevel,asshowninfigure5. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 27 OIG-12-103

Figure5:BehaviorThreatLevelsonanAircraft

Threat Level Examples

Level 1: Disruptive, 

suspicious or threatening 

situation or behavior

Alcohol or drug-induced disorderly 

behavior or verbally abusive language; 

non-violent threatening behavior.

Level 2: Physically abusive 

behavior

Physically abusive behavior towards 

another person or threats of such 

behavior,

Level 3: Life threatening 

behavior

Imminent threat of death or serious 

bodily injury, 

Level 4: Attempted or actual 

breach of the flight deck

 

.

Source:OIGanalysisofFederalAviationAdministrationandTSA,CommonStrategyDetailed

Guidance,2005.

TSAofficialssaidthatthereisnocomparabledocumentforthemasstransit

environment.However,someStrategyelementscouldbeleveragedtodraw

parallelguidanceforVIPRteams.Forexample,TSAcouldestablishsimilarthreat

levelsformasstransitenvironmentsandidentifywhenaFAMmaydetainor

interviewapassenger,shortofarrest.Onceidentified,TSAcanestablish

engagementprotocolsandlegalauthoritiesforFAMsandotherVIPRteam

members.Inaddition,transitagencyrepresentativessaidthattheindustry

continuallydevelopssecurityplans,sharesbestpracticesandtraining,and

providespeerreviewsandadvice.TSAcouldusethetransitindustryasa

resourcewhendevelopingmasstransitguidance. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 28 OIG-12-103

Recommendation

WerecommendthattheAdministratorfortheTransportationSecurity

Administration:

Recommendation#4:DevelopandcommunicateguidanceforFAMengagement

protocolsandlegalauthoritieswhenVIPRteamsencounterpotentialoractual

criminalactivityinmasstransitenvironments.

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#4:TSAofficialsconcurredwith

Recommendation4.Initsresponse,TSAsaidtheVIPRProgram’sobjectiveisto

deterandpreventterroristactivitiesinanymodeoftransportation.TSA

understandsthatVIPRpersonnelmayencountercriminalactivitywhile

conductingoperations;however,locallawenforcementpartnersareresponsible

foraddressingcriminalactivity,whileVIPRteams’focusremainson

counterterrorismactivities.TSAwillincreasecommunicationwithfield

personnelregardingexistingguidancetoenhanceunderstandingandapplication

oftheprotocolsandauthorities.TSAalsoanticipatesaddressingthistopicinthe

trainingprogramscurrentlybeingdeveloped.

OIGAnalysis:WeconsiderTSA’sactionsresponsivetoRecommendation4,

whichisresolvedandopen.Thisrecommendationwillremainopenpendingour

receiptofacommunicationplanandguidanceforfieldpersonnelregardingFAM

authoritiesduringVIPRoperations.

TSAHasaMethodologyToSelectVIPRDeployments,ButAdditional

EnhancementsAreNeeded

VIPRteamsdeployintotransportationvenuesbasedonnationalprogram

guidanceandlocalpartnerandstakeholderneedsandconcerns.TheJCC

provideslistsofcriticalinfrastructure,andVIPRteamsworkwithStateandlocal

transportationentitiestoscheduledeploymentsthatalignwiththesepriorities.

Whenthereisnospecificintelligenceregardingcrediblethreatsagainstthe

Nation’ssurfacetransportationinfrastructure,teamsandstakeholdersusetheir

expertisetomakedeploymentdecisions.However,thereisnodocumented OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 29 OIG-12-103

methodologythatcanbeappliedatthelocallevel,andguidanceregarding

deploymentfocusandteamactivitiesisevolving.

TheJointCoordinationCenterProvidesOverarchingGuidanceRegardingVIPR

Deployments

VIPRdeploymentsarebasedonacombinationofnationalandlocal

considerations.Atthenationallevel,theJCCprovidesteamswithguidance

regardingcriticallyimportantvenuesintheirareasofresponsibility.These

include40FocusAirports,60HighThreatUrbanAreas,20HighThreatMaritime

Locations,23CriticalFreightLocations,8CriticalBridgesandTunnels,theTop

100MassTransitAgencies,22CriticalPipelineLocations,andManPortableAir

DefenseSystemMitigationPlanSupport.Figure6describesthesecategoriesin

moredetail.

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 30 OIG-12-103

Figure6:JCCDeploymentVenuePrioritization

Source:OIGanalysisofTSAdocuments.

TSAleadershipcanalsodeployteamsbasedoncredibleintelligenceor

heightenedsecurityenvironments,aswellasinresponsetoeventstoenhance

publicandinfrastructuresecurity.TheFSDandSACineachareaofresponsibility

areexpectedtocoordinateandscheduleVIPRoperationsatallNationalSpecial

SecurityEvents,andSpecialEventAssessmentRatinglevelIandIIevents.24

OthereventsaresupportedwhenrequestedbyStateandlocaltransportation



24 TheSpecialEventAssessmentRatingincorporatesariskmethodologythatprioritizesspecialeventsfor

Federalsupportbasedongeneralanddignitaryattendance,significance,siteprotectioncomplexity,

duration,location,andlocalcapabilities.Therearefivelevels,withthehighestbeingI,whichcommands

fullU.S.Governmentsupport. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 31 OIG-12-103

entitiesifateamisavailable.TSA’sOfficeofIntelligenceandAnalysismayalso

providethreatanalysestoinformaVIPRteamdeploymentincertain

transportationsystems.Inaddition,VIPRteamsmaypartnerwithDHS

componentsalreadyperforminguniformedoperations.

VIPRprogramguidanceencouragesrandomnessandunpredictabilityinthe

timingofoperations,includingoperationsoutsidenormalbusinesshours,on

holidays,andonweekends.25

VIPRTeamsWorkWithPartnersandStakeholdersToPrioritizeandSchedule

LocallyGeneratedDeployments

Toaugmentpartnerandstakeholdersecurityposture,VIPRteamsworkwith

Stateandlocaltransportationsecurityentitiestoschedulelocallygenerated

deploymentsthatalignwithJCCvenuedeploymentpriorities.Bydeveloping

annualandmonthlyoperationalplansandDOPswithpriorityvenueandsystem

entities,teamscreatealocalstrategy.Forexample,onestakeholderdescribed

howitworkswiththeVIPRteamtoconcentrateonhighdensity,hightraffic

stationsofmutualinterestwheremultipletransitmodesconverge.Other

stakeholdersfocusoperationsontheirmajorstationsandlocalvenuesbasedon

vulnerabilitystudies.PartnersandstakeholderscreditVIPRteamswithbeing

flexibleandadaptingtheirdeploymentvenueprioritiestoaccommodatelocal

needsandconcerns.

VIPRteamsandstakeholdersplandeploymentsjointly,providemutualsupport,

anddescribevariousengagementlevelstoinitiatedeployments.Forexample,

someVIPRteamsareincorporatedintotransitstakeholderuniformed

operations.Thisrelationshiprequireslimitedformalinitiationfromeitherparty,

astheVIPRteamisconsideredanextensionofthestakeholder’ssecurityteam.

AnothertransitagencystakeholdersaiditinitiatesengagementwiththeVIPR

teambecauseitspecifiesthatsystemoperationsaretobebasedonintelligence

andhomelandsecurityissues.Anotherstakeholdersaidengagementwas

mutual,withtheVIPRteamofferingavailabilityoncertaindates,aswellasthe



25OD40050113A,“VIPRPlanningGuidanceforFederalSecurityDirectorsandOfficeofLaw

Enforcement/FederalAirMarshalServiceSpecialAgentsinCharge,”August6,2010.Also,DraftOD400

50113B(unsigned). OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 32 OIG-12-103

transitentityspecificallyrequestingsupportforroutinepatrolsandoperationsat

highprofileevents.

SomestakeholdersexplainedthattheyworkwiththeSFAMtodeterminewhich

locationsandtimingwouldbemosteffectiveforoperations,aswellashowto

implementrandomness.Insomecases,wherethetransitsystemhasitsown

deterrenceprogram,theVIPRteammayaugmentstakeholderdeploymentsas

wellasrequestnewoperations.Althoughteamsmayworkwitheach

stakeholderfourorfivetimespermonth,therandomnesscreatesan

appearanceofgreatercoverage.

Mostteamsengagestakeholdersandcandeploytopriorityvenuesandsystems.

However,factorssuchasteamavailabilityandpartnerandstakeholder

willingnesstosupporttheVIPRProgramaffectdeploymenttocertainvenues.

Forexample,someVIPRteamssaidthateventhoughtheyhavealarge

geographicareaofresponsibility,teamsizerequiresthattheyfocusoperations

onhighconsequenceinfrastructureinurbancenters,andengageotherlocal

transportationentitiesinfrequently.Onestakeholderdescribedtheprogram

favorably,butimpliedalimitedengagementbecauseofitssmallstaffsize.

Anothertransportationagencydidnotwanttheteamoperatingonitstrains

becauseVIPRoperationsareunpopularwithpassengers.

RiskBasedMethodologyIsNeededToPrioritizeDeploymentsWith

Stakeholders

SomeTSAofficialsexpressedconcernthatVIPRoperationlocationsandtiming

arenotbasedonariskbasedmethodologyorcredibleintelligence.Adraft

updatetotheAugust2010VIPRoperationaldirectivestatesthat“ariskbased

methodologyshouldbeappliedwhenidentifyingpotentiallocationsforVIPR

deploymentinalltransportationmodes”inanareaofresponsibilityandthat

“modalrepresentativesfromTSNMcanprovidesubjectmatterexpertisetothis

portionoftheprocess.”26Theguidance,however,doesnotexplainwhat

methodologytouse,whichcanresultintheuseofdifferentmethodologiesfor

eachVIPRteamfieldlocation.Forexample,oneVIPRteammembersaidthereis



26DraftOD40050113B,“VIPRPlanningGuidanceforFederalSecurityDirectorsandOfficeofLaw

Enforcement/FederalAirMarshalServiceSpecialAgentsinCharge”(unsigned). OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 33 OIG-12-103

noadditionaldirectionfromtheJCConhowtoprioritizevenuesinhisareaof

responsibility,otherthantheoverarchingJCCvenueprioritylist.Asaresult,he

identifieslocationsandvenueswheretheteamcouldhavethemosteffect,but

themethodologyisspecifictohisteamandnotreviewedbyTSAheadquarters.

FormostU.S.surfacetransportationinfrastructure,therehasnotbeenspecific

intelligenceofcrediblethreats.FieldintelligencecoordinatorsatFAMfield

officesdescribedU.S.masstransit–relatedintelligenceaslimited,butsaidthat

credibleintelligenceonthetacticsusedabroadissharedwithVIPRteamsfor

situationalawareness.Eventhoughcrediblethreatinformationislimited,there

areperiodsofheightenedawarenesswhenVIPRteams,partners,and

stakeholdersworktoreduceriskstomasstransitsystems.Forexample,during

the10thanniversaryoftheSeptember11,2001,attacks,VIPRteamsacrossthe

Nationincreasedtheiroperationalfrequency.TwoVIPRteamsalmostdoubled

theirdailyoperations.Inanothercity,leadinguptotheanniversarytheVIPR

teamincreaseddailyoperationstofour,workingwithasmanyasfour

stakeholdersateachoperation.OnSeptember11,2011,thisteamconducted

sevenoperations.PartnersandstakeholdersalsoengagedVIPRteamstoplan

operationsduringthisperiod.

Somestakeholdershavethreatandvulnerabilityassessmentsfortheir

transportationsystemsandinformationaboutsuspiciousactivity,whichthey

sharewithVIPRteamstoinformoperationalplanning.Teamsalsousetheir

expertiseaboutasystemtodeterminethemosteffectivelocationsandtimesfor

deployment.AlthoughlocallevelVIPRdeploymentmethodologyisnot

documented,teamsuseavarietyofmethods,inconcertwithstakeholders,to

determineappropriatetransitsystemcoverage.

VIPRTeamsNeedAdditionalGuidanceonDeployments

DeploymentguidancefocusesmoreontheVIPRProgram’sintentthanonwhat

constitutesanappropriatedeployment.Forexample,theConceptofOperations

describesthepurposeofVIPRdeploymentsassupplementingexistingsecurity

resourcesandprovidingadeterrentpresence.Deploymentsaremeantto

providedetectionandresponsecapabilitiesandexpandtheunpredictabilityof

securitymeasuresagainstterroristoperations.Inaddition,anAugust2010TSA

operationsdirectivedescribesVIPRProgramdeploymentmethodologyas OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 34 OIG-12-103

consistentlyexercisingtodetercriminalorterroristactivitiesandenhanceTSA’s

abilitytodeployseamlesslytotransportationvenuesinemergencies.

InMarch2011,theAssistantAdministratorsofOSOandOLE/FAMSissueda

memorandumtoallfieldFSDsandSACstoprovidemorespecificguidance

regardingdeploymentsthatarenotconsideredwithinthescopeoftheVIPR

Program.Thesetypesofdeploymentsincludethefollowing:

Fareticketchecksinmasstransitvenues

PrimaryenforcementofTransportationWorkerIdentificationCardstatus

Deploymentonlocalandinterurbanbuses

Operationsfocusedspecificallyonthedetectionofgeneralcriminalactivity

Screeningofindividualswhenleavingatransportationvenue

ThemajorityoffieldleadershipsaiditappearsthatTSAheadquartersishesitant

toprovidespecificguidanceonwhatconstitutesanappropriateVIPRoperation.

Asaresult,fieldmanagementusesitsdiscretiontoimplementtheprogram,and

additionaloperationalprohibitionsareinstitutedbyTSAheadquarters.For

example,becauseoftrainstationvandalism,astakeholderrequestedaVIPR

teamtoaccompanyitssecurityteaminastationlateatnight.Althoughthis

typeofoperationwasinitiallyallowed,theVIPRteamwastoldthatsimilar

operationsareprohibited.VIPRteammembersdescribedbeingunsureofthe

localDOP’spurpose,andpreferringtousenationalguidancethatspecifieswhat

teamsmayandmaynotdoinbusandrailstationsandothersurface

transportationvenuessuchashighways,bridges,andtunnels.Morespecific

guidancewouldensurethatVIPRteamsknowwhatconstitutesanappropriate

deploymentandwhatTSAleadershipenvisionsfortheprogram. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 35 OIG-12-103

Recommendation

WerecommendthattheAdministratorfortheTransportationSecurity

Administration:

Recommendation#5:Provideenhancedguidanceregardingriskbased

deploymentplanningandincreaseaccesstoriskassessmentinformationthat

VIPRteamscanusetoprioritizedeploymentswithpartnersandstakeholders.

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#5:TSAofficialsconcurredwith

Recommendation5.Initsresponse,TSAsaidthattheOfficeofSecurityPolicy

andIndustryEngagementissuedalistthatidentifieshighrisktransportation

infrastructuretowhichfieldpersonnelcouldreferasbasicguidancewhen

planningVIPRoperations.Inaddition,VIPRfieldpersonnelworkwith

stakeholderstoassessthepotentialconsequencesandvulnerabilitiesfor

terroristactionsatstakeholdervenues.VIPRteams,inconjunctionwith

stakeholders,alsodeterminewhichVIPRcapabilitiescanmitigatethose

vulnerabilities.

Further,theVIPRProgramisworkingwiththeOfficeofSecurityPolicyand

IndustryEngagementtocommunicatetheuseofriskbasedtools,techniques,

andinformationtosupportplanningandschedulingofVIPRoperationswith

stakeholders.

OIGAnalysis:WeconsiderTSA’sactionsresponsivetoRecommendation5,

whichisresolvedandopen.Thisrecommendationwillremainopenpendingour

receiptofguidancethatdocumentsariskbasedmethodologyforfieldoffices

andpersonneltousewhenselectingvenuesandplanningVIPRoperations.

OrganizationalPlacementWithinTSAHindersVIPRProgramEffectiveness

TheVIPRProgramismanagedbyOLE/FAMSFieldOperationsonbehalfofTSA.

ProgramleadershipincludesrepresentationfromOLE/FAMS,OSO,andthe

OfficeofSecurityPolicyandIndustryEngagement.Programleadershipdevelops

administrativeandoperationalguidancefortheprogramincollaborationwith OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 36 OIG-12-103

headquartersandfieldoperationsleadership.TheVIPRProgramdirectly

managestheJCCandOSOandOLE/FAMSfieldleadershipimplementprogram

activitiesinthefield.TheJCCdoesnothavetheauthoritytomakeandenforce

independentexecutiveleveldecisionsregardingtheprogram’sdirectionorto

ensurecoordinatedVIPRProgramfieldpersonnelandassetsupport.Ineffective

coordinationhindersTSA’sabilitytoleverageoperationalcapabilities,potentially

diminishingitstransportationsecurityposture.

VIPRManagementIsNotEmpoweredToMakeExecutiveLevelProgram

Decisions

FortheVIPRProgram,theAssistantAdministratorforOSOandtheAssistant

AdministratorforOLE/FAMSprovidejointimplementationguidancetoFSDsand

SACsviaoperationalmemorandaanddirectives.

AttheJCC,theVIPRProgramManagercoordinatesandprovidespoliciesand

guidanceregardingVIPRProgramimplementationandoverseesVIPRoperations.

However,asfigure7shows,theVIPRProgramManagerisfourlevelsbelowthe

AssistantAdministratorswhoprovidedirectguidancetofieldleadership.Asa

result,theextenttowhichJCCVIPRProgrammanagementcanprovideand

implementfieldguidanceisnotclear. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 37 OIG-12-103

Figure7:OrganizationalPositioningoftheVIPRProgram

Source:OIGanalysisofTSAorganizationcharts.

AlthoughoverallVIPRProgrammanagementresideswithOLE/FAMS,the

operationalcontroloffieldpersonnelandassetsresponsibleforimplementation

isbifurcated.Forexample,accordingtoVIPRProgramguidance,SACsandFSDs

withinthesameareaofresponsibilitydecidewholeadstheprogramlocally.In

manylocations,OSOleadsscreeningoperations,whileOLE/FAMSteamslead

lawenforcementor“patrolling”operations. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 38 OIG-12-103

Bothprogramandfieldofficialsexplainedthatbecausethereisnocentral

authorityatTSAheadquartersdirectingSACsandFSDs,leadershipofpersonnel

andassetsperformingVIPRoperationsisbifurcated.Asaresult,program

effectivenessisheavilydependentontheabilityofSACsandFSDstowork

togetherandcoordinateoperations.Inaddition,nomethodologyisprovidedto

thefieldtodeterminewhetherOSOorOLE/FAMswouldbethemost

appropriatelead.

CoordinationBetweenOSOandOLE/FAMSNeedsImprovement

Insomelocations,thereareeffectivepartnershipsandcoordinationbetween

OSOandOLE/FAMS,andthisrelationshipisoftenfacilitatedthroughthe

AssistantFederalSecurityDirectorLawEnforcement(AFSDLE).FSDsandSACs

empowertheVIPRSFAMandtheAFSDLEsfromairportsinanareaof

responsibilitytoplanoperations,deployteams,andensurethatpartnersand

stakeholdersareprovidedpersonnelandassetsforalldeployments.For

example,inonelocationtheSFAMandAFSDLEmeetquarterlywiththeirFSD

andSACtodiscusspastdeployments,currentevents,andothertopicsthatmay

affectVIPRoperations.

AnotherFSDdescribedtheSFAMasthepointpersonforVIPRplanning.The

SFAMworkswithOSOpersonnelandassetsprovidedbytheFSDtothe

OLE/FAMSfieldofficetoconductplanningandcoordinateresourcesforVIPR

operations.Inanotherexample,anSFAMcommunicateswiththeAFSDLEsin

hisareaofresponsibilityatmonthlyplanningmeetingstojointlydeterminewho

willperformwhichtypesofoperationsandwhere.Insomeareasof

responsibility,FSDsandSACscreateseparateVIPRoperationswithinaviation

andsurfacemodes,andcoordinationislimited.

VIPROperationsintheAviationMode

BothVIPRProgramofficialsandairportpartnersandstakeholdersclaimthatthe

insiderthreatisoneoftheirgreatestconcernsatairports.TheVIPRProgram

encouragesteamstoperformoperationsonthesecuresideofanairportto

mitigatetheinsiderthreat,althoughnotallfieldleadershipagreesthatthese

operationsarevaluable. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 39 OIG-12-103

WeobservedthatwhenanFSDisdisengagedfromlawenforcementledVIPR

operations,orwhereFSDsandSACscreateseparateVIPRoperationsinaviation

andsurfacetransportation,FAMVIPRteammembersrarelyperformoperations

insideanairport.Wheretherearemultipletypesofoperationsandlimited

communicationbetweenFSDandSACoffices,FAMledVIPRteamsoftenpatrol

thepublicsideofairports.Asaresult,someFSDsdonotunderstandwhythe

VIPRteamisintheairport,becauseTSApersonnelandassets,aswellaslocal

lawenforcement,arealreadypatrollingthispublicenvironment.SomeOSOand

OLE/FAMSVIPRteammembersalsoconsideroperationsonanairport’spublic

sideawasteoftimebecauseofthemultiplesecuritylayers,whilemasstransit

remainslessprotected.

EffectiveVIPRandSecurityPlaybookProgramCoordinationCanEnhanceTSA’s

AviationSecurityPosture

DependingonthelevelofVIPRProgramcoordinationandjointactivityinanarea

ofresponsibility,TSA’seffortstoincreasesecurityatairportsareinconsistent.

Similarlytohowteamsworkwithhighvisibilitysecurityteamsinmasstransit

systems,VIPRteamscanaugmentTSA’sothernationaloperations,suchasthe

SecurityPlaybookProgram.

TheSecurityPlaybookProgramisriskbasedandintelligencedriven,andis

intendedtoincreaseairportsecuritybyincreasingunpredictabilityandproviding

additionallayersofsecurityintheairport’spublicandsecureareas.27The

PlaybookManagerusesarandomizerprogramtogeneratesecuritymaneuvers,

orplays,basedonspecificinformation.Forexample,therandomizerprogram

mayinstructateamtoperformenhancedpropertyandpersonalscreeningof

airportpersonnel,includingexplosivetracedetection,atsecurityidentification

displayareadoors,checkpoints,andotherlimitedaccessdoors.Therandomizer

programmayalsogeneratehighvisibilityplaysinthepublicareassuchas

baggageclaim,theterminal,andvehicleareas.Locallawenforcement,FAMs,

theAFSDLE,BDOs,canineteams,TSOs,andTSIscanbeinvolvedinthe

operations.



27StatementofChristopherMcLaughlin,AssistantAdministrator,OSOandGeorgeNaccara,FSD,Logan

InternationalAirport,beforetheUnitedStatesHouseofRepresentativesCommitteeonHomeland

SecuritySubcommitteeonOversight,Investigations,andManagement,September16,2011. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 40 OIG-12-103

APlaybookManagerdeterminesplaysfarenoughinadvancetofacilitateVIPR

teamsupport.Whenthethreatlevelisraisedenoughtowarrantplaysinpublic

transitairportaccesspoints,thePlaybookManagermayrequestaVIPRteamto

coverthesepoints.VIPRteamscanprovidehighvisibilitypresenceoradditional

covertsupportasrequested.Also,whennotneededinanairport,VIPRteams

workinginmasstransitsystemsorotherairportaccesspointsthatobserve

potentiallysuspiciousindividualscanalertthePlaybookManager.Thislevelof

coordination,however,wasdescribedasunusual.Forroutineplays,FAMs

involvedarenormallythosestationedatanairportandnotVIPRteamFAMs.

WorkingwithaPlaybookManagerwouldensurethatVIPRoperationsin

aviation,regardlessofwholeadstheprogramlocally,arecoordinatedwithan

FSD’sstaff.Asaresult,VIPRteamswouldbeusedmoreeffectively,understand

theirroleinairportsecuritybetter,andenhanceaPlaybookManager’s

capabilities.

Recommendations

WerecommendthattheAdministratorfortheTransportationSecurity

Administration:

Recommendation#6:DesignateVIPRProgramdecisionmakingauthoritytoone

TSAheadquartersofficetoensurethatoverallfieldoperations,programactivity

andengagement,andoversightarecoordinatedeffectively.

Recommendation#7:EnsurecoordinationandengagementbetweenlocalVIPR

teamleadersandthePlaybookManager,andensurethatairportlaw

enforcementVIPRoperationsareintegratedwithSecurityPlaybookoperations.

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#6:TSAofficialsdidnotconcur

withRecommendation6.Initsresponse,TSAsaidithasdesignatedtheField

OperationsorganizationwithinOLE/FAMStomanagetheVIPRprogram.

Recognizingthechallengesofamultifunctionalprogram,theVIPRProgram

structureincludessectionchiefsfromOSOandtheOfficeofSecurityPolicyand

IndustryEngagement,whoareresponsibleforcommunicatingwiththeir OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 41 OIG-12-103

organizationalleadershipandperformingpolicydevelopmentandanalysis.As

such,OLE/FAMScollaborativelymanagestheVIPRProgramwithotherTSA

leadershipwhenprogramdecisionmakingcrossesorganizationallines.

HavingdesignatedmanagementresponsibilitytoOLE/FAMSanditscollaborative

programmanagementstructure,TSAbelievesthisorganizationbestservesthe

interestsofinternalandexternalstakeholdersanddoesnotintendtomake

additionalorganizationalchange.

OIGAnalysis:AlthoughTSAdidnotconcur,weconsiderTSA’sactions

responsivetotheintentofRecommendation6,whichisresolvedandopen.

TSA’scurrentVIPRProgramorganizationalstructure,however,hasnotbeen

effective,andoperationalcontroloffieldpersonnelandassetsresponsiblefor

implementationremainsbifurcated.Asaresult,withoutadditionalmodification,

theVIPRProgramwillcontinuetooperateinefficiently.Assigningdecision

makingauthoritytooneTSAheadquartersofficetoensurethatoverallfield

operations,programactivityandengagement,andoversightarecoordinated

effectivelyisprudent.

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#7:TSAofficialsdidnotconcur

withRecommendation7.Initsresponse,TSAsaidtherecommendation’s

wordingdoesnoteasilytranslateintoatangibleresult.VIPRoperationsalways

requireadvancecoordinationandnotificationtostakeholders,aswellasthe

FSD’sapprovalpriortodeployment.Playbook’smissionandauthorityallowsfor

lastminuteexecutionofsecurityactivities.FSDsareresponsibleforplanning

andexecutingriskmitigationstrategiesandactivitiesintheirairports,andfor

coordinatingVIPRoperationswiththeappropriateOLE/FAMSSAC.Assuch,the

FSDandSACareresponsiblefordeterminingthebeststrategiestouseassets,

capabilities,andprograms.TSAwillencourageregularcommunicationamong

VIPRandPlaybookleadershiptodevelopguidanceregardingleveragingthe

capabilitiesofbothprogramstomitigateriskmoreeffectively.

OIGAnalysis:AlthoughTSAdidnotconcur,weconsiderTSA’sactions

responsivetoRecommendation7,whichisresolvedandopen.Aligningand

leveragingexistingprogramcapabilitiescanenhancetheefficientuseofTSA

resources,whilealsoenhancingtheeffectivenessofbothprograms.This

recommendationwillremainopenpendingourreceiptofguidancethat OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 42 OIG-12-103

leveragesandcoordinatesPlaybookandVIPRprogramcapabilitiestomitigate

riskmoreeffectively.

VIPRTeamResourceAllocationIsDisproportionate

EachVIPRteamisallocated

AlthoughVIPRassetdistributionacrosstheNationappearsequitable,the

sizeofeachareaofresponsibilityanddensityofcriticalinfrastructurevary,

whichcancreatedisproportionateworkloads.Inaddition,theVIPRProgram’s

masstransitprioritizationlistfromtheOfficeofSecurityPolicyandIndustry

Engagementmayexacerbatetheuseoflimitedresources,andnotallteams

haveequalaccesstoOSOassets.

GeographicAreaandCriticalInfrastructureCreateDisproportionateWorkloads

forVIPRTeams

Initially,VIPRteamallocationwas

Programandfieldleadershipsaidinitialallocationswerebasedon

fairdistributiontheoretically,butinpracticearedisproportionate.Table1

showshowtheHighThreatUrbanAreasandtransportationrelated

infrastructureprioritizedbytheJCCaredistributedamongtheVIPRteamsasof

December2011. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 43 OIG-12-103

Table1:VIPRTeamAreasofResponsibilityandCriticalInfrastructurePriorities

Source:OIGanalysisofVIPRProgramdocuments.

Forexample,theLosAngelesVIPRteam’sareaofresponsibilityincludes10of

thetop100masstransitagencies,3HighThreatUrbanAreas,and6other

transportationrelatedpriorityinfrastructure.AlthougheachVIPRteamisthe

samesize,thenumberoftransportationvenuesprioritizedbyTSAvariesgreatly

amongareasofresponsibility.Somelocationshavemultiplemasstransitand OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 44 OIG-12-103

otherprioritytransportationsystems,requiringteamstointeractwithmultiple

partnersandlawenforcementstakeholders,whileotherlocationshavelimited

railinfrastructure.AppendixDshowsthedistributionofprioritytransportation

venuesandentitiesacrosseachVIPRteamareaofresponsibility.

FAMTeamsAreOverextendedinSomeLocations

SomeOLE/FAMSteammemberssaidthattheywereunabletocovervenuesin

theirareaofresponsibilityadequatelybecauseofthearea’ssizeorthesizeof

thetransportationinfrastructure.Oneteamdescribedneedingatleasttwiceas

manyFAMstomeetdemand,andsupplementingtheteamwithflyingFAMson

nonmissionstatus.28AnotherteamoccasionallysupplementsitsVIPR

operationswithflyingFAMswhohavepreviouslybeenontheVIPRteam.

Partnersandstakeholdersintheseareasalsoexpressedadesiretoworkwith

VIPRteamsmore,butrecognizedthatsometeamsareoverwhelmed.For

example,onestakeholderwantedmoreFAMsavailabletokeepasteady

deploymenttempo.Anotherstakeholdersaidthatitslargecityandsurrounding

areasarefullofimportantinfrastructure,andtheVIPRteamisalready

overworked.ThisstakeholderwantstheprogramtoconsiderincreasingVIPR

FAMcadresizebecauseitissupportinglawenforcementstakeholders

effectively.

OLE/FAMSandOSOHaveRequestedIncreasedAllocationsforVIPRTeams

InFY2012,theVIPRProgramreceivedanallocationincrease,whichincludes12

additionalVIPRteamstobedistributedbasedonriskandworkload.AfteraVIPR

ProgramofficialperformedananalysisofVIPRhigherriskpartners,stakeholders,

andvenues,twoteamswillbeallocatedtoNewYorkandWashington,DC.One

teameachwillbeallocatedtoBaltimore,Boston,Chicago,Houston,LosAngeles,

Newark,Seattle,andSanFrancisco.AppendixDshowsthecurrentfieldoffice

areasofoperation,teamdistribution,andcriticalinfrastructure.



28NonmissionstatusreferstoscheduledworkdayswhenFAMsreporttotheirassignedfieldofficeto

performadministrativetaskssuchascompletingtravelvouchersandsubmittingtimeandattendance. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 45 OIG-12-103

AlthoughtheFY2012allocationanddistributiondemonstratesthatprogram

leadershipisconsideringriskandworkloadinfutureallocations,theprogram

shouldevaluateexistingVIPRFAMteamallocationsandredistributeasneeded.

MassTransitVenuePrioritizationGuidanceShouldBeMoreFocused

TheJCCmasstransitprioritylistislong,maynotrepresentlocationswhere

deployedteamsarebestused,andmayexacerbateuseoflimitedresources.

VIPRProgramofficialsshouldprioritizemasstransitentitiesonthelisttoreflect

thepurposeoftheVIPRProgramandlocalriskbasedmethodologiesbetter.

TheVIPRProgramuseshighvisibilitypatrolstodeterpotentialterroristplanning

andattacks,aswellastopromoteconfidenceinthesecurityandsafetyof

transportationsystems.TheJCCmasstransitprioritylistincludesthetop100

masstransitentitiesbasedonpassengervolume.However,astable2shows,

thetop25entitiesbasedonpassengervolumerepresentapproximately73

percentoftheNation’smasstransitpassengertravel.

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 46 OIG-12-103

Table2:Top25MassTransitAgenciesbyPassengerVolume

Source:OIGanalysisofdatafromAmericanPublicTransportationAssociationPublic

TransportationFactBook,Washington,DC,April2011.

The75additionalentitiesonthemasstransitprioritizationlistrepresentthe

remainingmasstransitvolume.Althoughthereisvalueinensuringthatteams

areawareofalltransitsystemsintheirareaofresponsibility,orderingthelistby OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 47 OIG-12-103

passengervolumedoesnotincorporateallaspectsofriskbasedmasstransit

securitypriorities.

Forexample,systemsandpassengersarenottheonlyprogrampriority,asthese

systemscanbeusedtoparalyzeurbanareasanddestroyothercritical

infrastructurenearmasstransitvenues.Asaresult,VIPRteamsdescribedurban

centersandcriticalinfrastructureneartransitvenueswhenprioritizing

deploymentsincertainlocations.Inaddition,recenttestimonyonmasstransit

securityaddressedstakeholders’concernsabouttheconnectionofmajorcities

totheirneighboringcommunitiesbymasstransit,andtheimportanceof

ensuringthatresourcescanbeusedtosecurevenuesinthesecommunities.29

Thecurrentmasstransitvenueprioritizationlistisnotfocusedtoreflectthese

concerns,andcouldbeenhancedbyprioritizingmasstransitentitiesbasedon

highthreaturbanareasandtheircriticalinfrastructureandmasstransit

networks.Forexample,NewYorkCityisahighthreaturbanarea,andtheNew

YorkTransitAuthorityranksfirstintheNationinpassengervolume.Astable3

shows,5ofthetop25transitentitiesontheJCCprioritizationlist(basedon

passengervolume)serveNewYorkCity.30Theseentitiescouldbeusedinan

attackortocreatedisruptionandpanic,butarerankedloweronthe

prioritizationlistbecauseofpassengervolume.Asaresult,itmaybeprudentto

groupthesemasstransitentitiesasonenetworkwhendeterminingVIPR

deployments.



29CommissionerPeterBoynton,ConnecticutDepartmentofEmergencyManagementandHomeland

Security.TestimonybeforetheU.S.SenateHomelandSecurityandGovernmentalAffairsCommittee,

“SeeSomething,SaySomething,DoSomething:NextStepsforSecuringRailandTransit,”June22,2011.30ThislistdoesnotincludeAmtrak,whichisconsideredtobeintercityrailandnotmasstransit. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 48 OIG-12-103

Table3:TransitEntitiesintheJCCVenueDeploymentPrioritization

(Top25)ThatServeNewYorkCity

Source:OIGanalysisofJCCvenuedeploymentprioritization.

Inanotherexample,Chicagoisahighthreaturbanarea,andtheChicagoTransit

Authorityrankssecondinpassengervolume.However,Chicago’sMetrais

ranked22ndontheprioritizationlist,althoughitservesthecity’smajor

transportationcenters,suchasUnionStationandOgilvieTransportationCenter,

bytransitingpassengerstoandfromChicagosuburbanareas.31Itmaybe

prudentforTSAtoconsidertheChicagoTransitAuthorityandMetraasonemass

transitnetworkwhendeterminingVIPRdeployments.

TSAshouldalsoprovideteams,usingexistingresources,withoptionsand

encourageteamstoplandeploymentsthataddressplausibleriskstopriority

infrastructure.Forexample,tomeetdemand,teamscurrentlydividetocover

moreareaandworkwithmultiplepartnersandstakeholders.However,teams

couldbeguidedtowardusingexistingresourcestofocusonacriticalassetand

deploytochokepointsintransportationsystemnetworks.Forexample,inareas

wheremasstransitsystemsconveypassengersdirectlytoairports,VIPRteams

couldsplitupanddeploytokeylocationsservingtransitlinesenteringthe

airport.

ProgramleadershipsaidthattheyareworkingtodeveloptoolsforFSDsand

SACstouseindeterminingriskandareasofpotentialvulnerabilities,and

aligningcapabilitiesandassetsbasedonrisk.AsaplannedmilestoneforFY

2012,theJCCintendstoworkwithTSNMtocompleteariskbaseddeployment

approachusingtheTransportationSectorSecurityRiskAssessment



31MetraisoperatedbytheNortheastIllinoisRegionalCommuterRailCorporation. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 49 OIG-12-103

methodology,andtocontinuetoenhanceitsresourcealignmentwithpartner

andstakeholderriskbasedneeds.TheTransportationSectorSecurityRisk

Assessmentevaluatesthreat,vulnerability,andpotentialconsequenceofmore

than200terroristattackscenariosformasstransitandpassengerrailroad,

includingfactorssuchasthreatcapabilities,transitsystemsvulnerabilities,and

thelikelihoodofexecution.32

Intheabsenceofguidance,VIPRteamsuseexistingresourcestodetermine

prioritiesandmeetatleastpartoftheirmandate.Developingmorefocusedand

conciseprioritylistsandprovidingoptionsforhowprioritiescouldbemetwith

currentresourceswillbetterpositionteamstocarryoutTSA’svisionfortheVIPR

Program.

OSOPersonnelandAssetsDedicatedtoOLE/FAMSLedVIPRTeamsNeedMore

Consistency

OSOfieldleadershipisdirectedbyTSAheadquarterstodedicate

toVIPRteams.However,OSOassetsvarydependingonFSD

resourcelimitationsandsupportforhowtheprogramisimplementedinanarea

ofresponsibility.AsthereisnoprocesstoensurethatOSOpersonnelandassets

assignedtoVIPRteamsareactuallydedicatedandparticipating,teamsmaynot

havefulluseofOSOassets.

AllFSDsreceivedirectionfromTSAheadquartersregardingFAMledVIPRteam

resourceallocation,butFSDsappeartohavediscretionwhetherornotto

dedicateanOSOasset.Forexample,anFSDmaynotapprovealldeploymentsor

maynotconsiderthedeploymentagooduseoftheOSOasset.Asaresult,the

FSDmayrecalltheemployee,directtheassetnottoparticipate,ornotassign

theasset.Inothercases,however,FSDshavelimitedOSOpersonnel,asituation

thatappearsmorecommonfortheTSIandsomeBDOpositions.Atthese

locations,OSOteammembersalreadydividetheirtimebetweensupporting

VIPRdeploymentsandtheirregularairportduties.



32JohnPistole,Administrator,TSA.TestimonybeforetheU.S.SenateHomelandSecurityand

GovernmentalAffairsCommittee,“SeeSomething,SaySomething,DoSomething:NextStepsfor

SecuringRailandTransit,”June22,2011. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 50 OIG-12-103

Recommendations

WerecommendthattheAdministratorfortheTransportationSecurity

Administration:

Recommendation#8:RedistributeexistingVIPRFAMpositionallocations

amongfieldofficesaccordingtohighthreaturbanareas,criticalinfrastructure,

andmasstransitnetworksusingariskbasedmethodology.

Recommendation#9:Developaprocessto increaseoversightregardingthe

availabilityandinvolvementofOSOpersonnelandassetstoOLE/FAMledVIPR

teams.

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#8: TSAofficialsdidnotconcur

withRecommendation8.Initsresponse,TSAsaidthatthefirstFAMVIPRteams

wereassignedbasedonwhichlocationshadthemostsignificantsurface

transportationinfrastructureinallmodesoftransportation.Afterreceiving

additionalVIPRteamsinFY2010,TSAallocatedteamstoareaswiththesecond

highestamountofsurfacetransportationinfrastructure.FortheproposedFY

2012FAMteams,theVIPRProgramassessedthestatusofallexistingVIPRassets

andallocatednewteamsusingariskbaseddecisionmakingprocess,which

consideredthreats,vulnerabilities,andconsequences.TheVIPRProgramisalso

consideringapplyingthisapproachtoOSOassetlocationfundedbytheFY2012

enhancement.

TheVIPRProgramregularlyassessesthedeploymentpatternsofeachteamand

comparesthattotheavailablehighriskinfrastructureineachteam’sareaof

responsibility.Todate,theanalyseshavenotrevealedoperationalproblems

thatrequireredistributionofexistingallocations,ratherthansurgingassetsas

necessary.Inaddition,allVIPRFAMsareavailabletorespondifcredible

intelligenceisreceivedregardingthreatstoaparticulargeographicarea.

GivenTSA’sconsiderationforriskbasedfactorsinallthreeVIPRFAMSteam

allocations,theresponsivenessofVIPRFAMSpersonnel,andananalysisofthe

deploymenthistoryforallareasofresponsibility,TSAdoesnotconcurthat OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 51 OIG-12-103

significantvaluewouldbeachievedfromredistributingtheVIPRFAMSposition

allocationsatthistime.TSAwillcontinuetomonitordeploymentpatternsand

updateriskinformationtodeterminewhetherrealignmentsshouldbepursued

inthefuture.

OIGAnalysis:AlthoughTSAdidnotconcur,weconsiderTSA’sactions

responsivetoRecommendation8,whichisresolvedandopen.Wewillclosethis

recommendationuponreceiptofdocumentationthatexplainstheriskbased

methodologyconsideredwhenassigningVIPRFAMassetstofieldoffices.

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#9:TSAofficialsconcurredwith

Recommendation9.Initsresponse,TSAsaidthatapproximately60percentof

VIPRoperationsincludebothOSOandOLE/FAMSpersonnel.Fieldguidance

requirestheFSDandFAMSACtodesignateoperationalteamleadersandensure

thatnecessarypersonnelandcapabilitiesareavailableforeachoperation.TSA

saiditwouldassessthestaffingprocessforanyTSAresourceonVIPRoperations

andupdatetheguidanceasnecessary.Inaddition,OSOwilldevelopaprocess

toensurethataffectedFSDsareincompliancewiththedirectivetoassign

toeachVIPRteam.

OIGAnalysis:WeconsiderTSA’sactionresponsivetoRecommendation9,which

isresolvedandopen.Thisrecommendationwillremainopenpendingour

receiptofdocumentationofaprocessthatensuresthatOSOpersonnelare

availabletodeploywithVIPRteamsandincompliance.

LengthofVIPRTeamMemberAssignmentsHindersProgramEffectiveness

TheOSOandOLE/FAMSofficeswevisitedhaveprocessestoselectVIPRteam

members,butthemethodsusedtomakeassignmentsdiffer.OLE/FAMShas

extendedthelengthofVIPRassignments.However,partners,stakeholders,and

TSAofficialssaidthatrotationsandteamassignmentsshouldbefurther

extendedtoallowtimefortrainingandtomaintaineffectivestakeholderand

teammemberrelationships. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 52 OIG-12-103

VIPRTeamMemberSelectionandLengthofAssignmentDifferbyField

Location

OSOandOLE/FAMShavedifferentprocessesforselectingVIPRteammembers.

TheOSOselectionprocessincludesaskingstafftovolunteer,usingan

alphabeticallistofeligiblestaff,andhavingmanagementdirectindividuals.

Whendecidingwhoiseligibletoparticipate,managementconsidersthe

employee’sexperience,lengthoftimeinposition,andanydisciplinaryor

correctiveactionsagainsttheemployee.OLE/FAMSusesajobannouncement

andapplicationprocess,whichcouldincludeaninterview.Afterselectingteam

members,OSOandOLE/FAMsmanagementassignstafftoVIPRteamsfor

varyingperiods.OLE/FAMShasguidancedefiningVIPRteamassignments,but

OSOdoesnot.FSDsusetheirdiscretiontomakeassignments.

InApril2011,OLE/FAMSextendedVIPRassignmentsfrom6monthstoa

maximumof1yearattheSAC’sdiscretion.FAMSfieldofficesimplementthis

extensiondifferently.Forexample,onefieldofficeassignsFAMstotwo6month

terms,1yeartotal,with6monthsofflyingdutiesbetweenVIPRteam

deployments.Anotherofficekeepstheteamleaderforonlyayearandrotates

othermembersevery6to8months.FSDstaffmayassignOSOpersonneltoa

singleoperationortotheVIPRteamforasettime.Eventhoughstaffcouldbe

assignedonanoperationbyoperationbasis,OSOrotationalassignments

typicallyrangedfrom60to90days.

TeamTrainingandRotationsShouldBeCoordinatedMoreEffectively

SometeammembersmustcompleterequiredTSAandstakeholderspecific

trainingtoparticipateonVIPRoperations.However,frequentrotationscreate

gapsinVIPRteamcapabilities,andeachteammusttrainnewmembers

continuously,whichcanresultininefficiencies.Forexample,onestakeholder

saidthattimeandmoneyspentontrainingandequipmentiswastedbecauseof

therotationlength,asnewerteammembershavelimitedabilitiestocontribute

immediately.

Inaddition,BDOsworkingatairportsaretrainedtoestablishabaselinefor

typicalbehaviorsthatpassengersexhibitintheaviationenvironment.When

participatingonVIPRoperationsinmasstransitvenues,BDOsmustestablisha OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 53 OIG-12-103

passengerbaselineforthisenvironment.ThefrequentrotationsrequireBDOsto

reacclimatebetweentheseenvironments.Also,requiredtrainingforspecialized

capabilities,suchasPRNDequipmentforFAMledVIPRteams,isoffered

infrequently.Asaresult,TSAofficialssaidthatsometeamshavegonefor

extendedperiodswithoutPRNDcapabilitybecausecertifiedFAMsrotatedoff

teamsandnewlyassignedFAMshavenotcompletedtherequiredtraining.

TomaintainteamcapabilitiesandincreaseVIPRassignmentefficiency,onefield

officetrainsitsFAMsonrailsafetyandPRNDequipmentbeforetheyparticipate

ontheteam.AllfieldofficeswevisitedstaggerFAMrotations,whichallows

experiencedteammemberstoprovidenewVIPRFAMswithonthejobtraining

andensurecontinuityofoperationsandcapabilities.

SomeFAMofficialscompareVIPRassignmentswithothergroundbased

assignments,suchasservingasamemberoftheFederalBureauof

Investigation’sJointTerrorismTaskForce.TheseofficialssaidthatVIPR

assignmentlengthshouldbecomparabletoothergroundbasedassignments,

whichcanrangefrom3to5years.Inaddition,anOSOofficialsaidthatshort

rotationperiodsgivetheimpressionthatTSAdoesnotfullysupporttheVIPR

Program.Tosupporttheprogrammoreeffectivelyandimproveitsefficiency,

TSAshouldmirrorothergroundbasedassignmentsbylengtheningstaff

rotationsonVIPRteams.

FrequentVIPRTeamMemberRotationsHinderEffectiveStakeholder

Relationships

EstablishingandmaintainingeffectiverelationshipsisintegraltotheVIPR

Program’ssuccess.InanOctober2007documenttitled“EffectiveEmployment

ofVisibleIntermodalPreventionandResponse(VIPR)TeamsinMassTransitand

PassengerRail,”TSA,partners,andstakeholdersrecognizedthatVIPRteam

memberconsistencyenhancesjointsecurityoperationsandtheirdeterrent

effect.Thedocumentalsostatesthat“coordinationbuildsthetrustandmutual

understandingofcapabilities,operatingenvironmentandcircumstances,and

securityaugmentationneedsthatareessentialelementsofeffectivejoint

securityenhancementactivities.” OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 54 OIG-12-103

FAMsrotateoffVIPRteamsafterdevelopingrelationshipswithpartnersand

stakeholders.Asaresult,theseentitieshavetoreestablishrelationshipswith

newFAMs.Asbuildingeffectiverelationshipstakestime,somepartnersand

stakeholdersrelyonformerVIPRteammembersratherthancreating

relationshipswithnewmembers.MostVIPRteammembers,partners,and

stakeholdersinterviewedwantassignmentslengthenedtomaintaineffective

relationships.

Recommendation

WerecommendthattheAdministratorfortheTransportationSecurity

Administration:

Recommendation#10:ExtendOLE/FAMSandOSOVIPRassignmentsformore

than1year.

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#10:TSAofficialsdidnotconcur

withRecommendation10.Initsresponse,TSAsaid thatitacknowledgesthe

benefitsofhavingVIPRpersonnelinplaceforthelongestperiodspossibleto

establish,maintain,andenhancestakeholderrelationshipsanddeployment

capabilities.TheVIPRProgramhasaddressedthisconcernbyhaving18month

to3yearassignmentdurationsforSFAMs.Inaddition,VIPRteamrotationsare

staggeredtoreducetheeffectonstakeholderrelationships.

OLE/FAMSpersonnelassignmentstoVIPRteamsare6months,andcanbe

extendedto1year.AsaVIPRteammember,FAMscanengageintheirroleas

lawenforcementofficersandobtainexperienceinmoretransportation

environments.TSAsaidthathavingalargenumberofFAMswithVIPRskills,

experiences,andequipmentisvaluableforsurgecapacityinsupportofcredible

threats,highpriorityevents,orterroristincident. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 55 OIG-12-103

OSOwillassessVIPRrotationlengthforitspersonneland,iftheassessment

supportsachangeinassignmentdurations,willextendassignmentsfortheVIPR

teamTSSE,TSI,andBDO.

OIGAnalysis:AlthoughTSAdidnotconcur,weconsiderTSA’sactionresponsive

toRecommendation10,whichisresolvedandopen.SFAMsareresponsiblefor

supervisingtheVIPRProgramanditsoperations,andFAMsandOSOpersonnel

havemoredirectinteractionwithstakeholdersandpartners.Akeycomponent

oftheVIPRProgram’seffectivenessisestablishing,maintaining,andenhancing

stakeholderandpartnerrelationshipsandcapabilities.Asaresult,additional

considerationforextendingFAMandOSOpersonnelassignmentsonVIPRteams

isprudent.Thisrecommendationwillremainopenpendingourreceiptof

documentationthatOSOhasassessedVIPRrotationlengthsanddetermined

appropriateduration.

TransportationSecurityInspectorRolesandResponsibilitiesArePerformed

Inconsistently

The9/11ActandTSAguidanceallocateFAMs,TSIs,TSOs,BDOs,TSSEs,and

explosivedetectioncanineteamstosupportVIPRoperations.Partnersand

stakeholdersselectfromthesecapabilitiesandassetstoaugmenttheirsecurity

operations.However,theTSI’sroleonVIPRteamsisinconsistent,asdefined

positiondutiesandrequirementsarenotalwaysperformedorleveraged.

VIPRProgramTeamCompositionVariesbyStakeholder

TransitagenciesparticipatinginVIPRoperationsworkwithTSAfieldleadership

torequestacombinationofavailableTSApersonnelandassetstoaugment

securityattheirvenues.Asaresult,VIPRoperationsmaynotincludeallTSA

capabilities.Table4showsTSAVIPRparticipationondeploymentsweobserved.

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 56 OIG-12-103

Table4:TSAAssetParticipationonVIPROperations

FAMSFAMBDOTSITSOTSSECanine

Operation1

Operation2

Operation3

Operation4

Operation5

Operation6

Operation7

Operation8

Operation9

Operation10

Operation11

Source:OIGanalysis.

TheTransportationSecurityInspector’sVIPRRoleIsNotConsistent

AccordingtotheVIPRConceptofOperations,TSIsareTSA’srailandmasstransit

safetyandsecuritysubjectmatterexperts.TheVIPRStandardOperating

ProceduresstatethatTSIsshouldbea“visualdeterrent,providemodalspecific

expertise,andrespondtosecurityrelatedincidents,”andrequireTSIstoinspect

railcarswhilethecarsarestationaryatVIPRvenues.AsidefromVIPR

operations,TSIsperformvulnerabilityassessmentsandserveinaregulatory

capacityinthemasstransitenvironment.

Inthe11operationsweobserved,TSIsperformedsomedutiesdescribedin

theseVIPRdocuments.Forexample,TSIsconductedpreVIPRoperation

briefingsatfourvenues.ThesebriefingsprovidedVIPRparticipantswith

informationaboutthevenues,includingsafetyfeaturesandemergencyescape

routes,orintroducedteammembersandtheirroles.TSIswereteamleadersfor

twooperations.Atallvenues,TSIsworejacketswith“TSAInspector”printedon

thebacktoconveyavisibleasset.

TSIsserveasavisiblepresenceduringoperations.Ofthe26partnersor

stakeholdersweinterviewed,only3saidthatTSIsarecontributingassubject OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 57 OIG-12-103

matterexpertsduringVIPRoperations.Severalpartners,stakeholders,andTSA

officials,includingtwoTSIs,wereunsurewhatroleTSIsareexpectedtoperform.

ThetwoTSIsattributedtheconfusiontoinsufficientguidance.Additionally,TSIs

serveinaregulatorycapacityinthemasstransitenvironmentandcanimpose

finesonstakeholders,whichfurtherconfusestheirroleinavoluntarysecurity

enhancementprogramsuchasVIPR.

RefiningTSIrolesandresponsibilitiesduringVIPRoperationscouldenhanceuse

ofthisasset.Forexample,intheirregulatorycapacity,TSIsarerequiredto

conductstationprofilesandanalyzeandreportonexistingsecuritypractices,as

wellasonareasneedingimprovement.Transitagenciesusethesereportsto

applyforvariousFederalgrantstoimprovepracticesandrectifyanydeficient

areasidentifiedbyTSIs.AsTSIshaveknowledgeofsecuritypracticesandgrants

availabletotransitagencies,theyareinauniquepositiontoassisttransit

agencies.

Inaddition,the9/11Actpermitstransitagenciesreceivinggrantstousefundsto

acquiresecurityresponsetrainingandexercises.WorkingwithTSNM’sMass

TransitDivision,TSIscouldhelptransitagenciestakeadvantageoftraining

opportunitiesandplanningexercises.VIPRteamscouldalsouseTSIstoidentify

stationvulnerabilitiesandassistinplanningVIPRoperations.Usingthe

resourcesandinformationavailable,TSIscanassiststakeholders,whilebeinga

valuableassettoVIPRteams.RedefiningTSIrolesandresponsibilitieswill

enhanceteamandstakeholderrelationships,leveragetheircapabilitiesbetter,

andimproveVIPRProgramefficiencyandeffectiveness.

Recommendation

WerecommendthattheAdministratorfortheTransportationSecurity

Administration:

Recommendation#11:RefineStandardOperatingProcedurestoreflect

appropriaterolesandresponsibilitiesforTSIsduringVIPRoperations. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 58 OIG-12-103

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#11:TSAofficialsconcurredwith

Recommendation11.Initsresponse,TSAsaidthattheVIPRProgramhasstarted

reviewingtheVIPRStandardOperatingProcedures,andwillupdatetheTSIrole

duringoperationsandleverageTSIsubjectmatterexpertise.TheCompliance

SectionofOSOwasinvolvedinthepolicyupdateandwillbeintegralto

implementingthisrecommendation.ThepolicyupdateiscurrentlyinTSA’s

approvalprocess.

OIGAnalysis:WeconsiderTSA’sactionsresponsivetoRecommendation11,

whichisresolvedandopen.Thisrecommendationwillremainopenpendingour

receiptoftheupdatedVIPRStandardOperatingProcedures,whichclearly

definestheTSIroleonVIPRteams.

CanineTeamsAddValuetoVIPROperations

TheNationalExplosivesDetectionCanineTeamProgramtrainsandcertifies

caninesandhandlerstodetectexplosiveandchemicalsubstancesinallmodesof

transportation.ThisprogramprovidesTSAwith45multimodal/masstransit

canineteams.Theseteamsarehighlyvisible,enhancescreeningcapabilities,

andhelpbuildstakeholderrelationships.UntilNovember2011,TSAcanine

teamshadbeenallocatedbetweenOSOandOLE/FAMS—23and22teams

respectively—tosupporttransportationsecurityoperations.

TSACanineTeamRealignmentEffects

InNovember2011,TSAannouncedthatitwasrealigningthe22VIPRFAM

canineteamswithOSOcanineteamstomitigatechallengesassociatedwith

paralleloperationalstructures.Intherealignment,FAMscouldtransferwith

theircaninetoOSOandremainhandlers,butwererequiredtosurrendertheir

lawenforcementauthorityandretirementbenefits.OnlytwoFAMcanineteams

transferredtoOSO.

TheremainingOLE/FAMhandlersreturnedtoflyingdutiesorotherground

basedassignments,andthecanineswerereturnedtotheNationalExplosives

DetectionCanineTeamProgram.Asaresult,only25OSOcanineteams OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 59 OIG-12-103

remainedtoassistwithVIPRProgramoperations.Inaddition,OSOcanineteams

arestationedatairportsandareavailabletoassistVIPRProgramoperationsonly

atanFSD’sdiscretion.Allcanineteamscompleteexplosiveandchemical

detectiontraining,butnotallhandlershavelawenforcementauthority.

Althoughallcaninehandlerscompletethesametraining,theirauthorityto

operatewithinthetransitenvironmentvariesandaffectsacanineteam’sability

tosecuretransportationinfrastructure.Forexample,alawenforcementcanine

handlerisauthorizedtostop,search,andquestionapersonwhenthecanine

detectsexplosivematerial.ATSIcaninehandler,however,doesnothavelaw

enforcementauthority,maynotstopanindividual,andmustrequestassistance

fromalawenforcementofficer.

LawenforcementauthorityallowsFAMsandstakeholderofficerstorespond

immediatelytoasituation.PairingthiscapabilitywithTSA’sprimarymissionto

protectallmodesoftransportationagainstaterroristattackmakeslaw

enforcementcaninehandlersmorevaluable.Recognizingtheneedforcanine

teamstohavelawenforcementpresentataVIPRoperation,onestakeholder

saidthatitwouldprefertouseitslawenforcementofficertohandleanOSO

canineratherthanuseanOSOhandlerandcanine.AnOSOofficialsaidthat

VIPRteamsreliedmoreonstakeholdercanineteamsaftertheprogram

realignedtoallOSOhandlers.

CostsandBenefitsofCanineTeams

Beforetherealignment,eachFAMcanineteamcostapproximately$220,000

annually;thesecostsincludethehandler’ssalaryandcaninemaintenanceand

veterinarycare.Aftertherealignment,TSAprovidescaninesonlytoTSIsand

Stateandlocallawenforcemententities.EachTSIcanineteamcost

approximately$170,000annually,andfutureyearcostsbecomelowerasinitial

startupandtrainingcostsdonotrecur.ForparticipatingState,local,andtransit

agencylawenforcemententities,TSAprovidesanannualstipendofupto

$50,000forcanines.Thestipendhelpstooffsetcaninemaintenanceand

veterinarycosts.

Inexchangeforthecanineandfunding,stakeholdersarerequiredtomaintain

TSAcaninecertificationandmustsupportTSAmissionsinaviation,masstransit,

orcargoenvironments80percentofthetime.Stateandlocallawenforcement OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 60 OIG-12-103

canineteamscanassistotheragenciesatdifferentvenuesfortheremaining20

percentofthetime.Table5comparesthecostsandbenefitsassociatedwith

thethreecanineteamprogramoptions:TSI,FAM,andStateandlocallaw

enforcement.

Table5:CostsandBenefitsofCanineHandlerOptions

OLE/FAM 

Canine Handler

OSO Canine 

Handler

Transit/Local 

Police Officer 

Canine Handler

DHS' Annual 

Cost per Team $220,000 $170,000 $50,000 

Immediate 

Response Time



Law Enforcement 

Intervention 

Capability



Immediate TSA 

"command and 

control"



Source:OIGanalysis.

Recommendation

WerecommendthattheAdministratorfortheTransportationSecurity

Administration:

Recommendation#12:Evaluatetherealignmenttodetermineanypotential

adverseeffectsonTSA’sabilitytoensurethatVIPRteamshavesufficientaccess

tolawenforcementcanineteams.

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#12:TSAofficialsconcurredwith

Recommendation12.Initsresponse,TSAsaiditassessedprogramdatafor

ExplosivesDetectionCanineTeamssincetheDecember2011realignment.The

numberofnonFAMSExplosiveDetectionCanineTeamsparticipatinginVIPR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 61 OIG-12-103

operationseachmonthhasremainedconstantsincetherealignment,indicating

nodeclineinavailabilityofExplosiveDetectionCanineTeams.TSAsaidthe

combinationofnonFAMSExplosiveDetectionCanineTeamswiththe

requirementforlawenforcementpresenceatalloperations,indicatesthatthere

havebeennoadverseeffects.TSArespectfullyrequeststoclosethis

recommendationbasedonthisevaluation.

OIGAnalysis:WeconsiderTSA’sactionsresponsivetoRecommendation12,

whichisresolvedandopen.Protectingtransportationmodesfromdangerousor

terroristactivityrequiresimmediatelawenforcementofficerresponsetovarious

situations.Asaresult,additionalconsiderationisnecessarytoensurethatnon

FAMSExplosiveDetectionCanineTeamsmaintaintheabilitytorespond.This

recommendationwillremainopenpendingourreceiptofthedocumented

assessmentthatverifieslawenforcementcapabilitiesandeffectivenessare

maintainedduringVIPRoperationswithnonFAMSExplosiveDetectionCanine

Teams.

StandardizedVIPRTrainingandTeamParticipationinJointExercisesIsNeeded

OSOandOLE/FAMShavedevelopedanddeployedseparateVIPRtraining

courses,butthereisnoestablishedanduniformtrainingprogramforallVIPR

participants.Standardizedtrainingimprovesoperationalefficiencyandensures

thatteammembersareinformedofappropriateprocedures.Inaddition,joint

exercisesallowVIPRparticipantstoworkwithpartnersandstakeholdersand

learnhoweachrespondstoincidents.Incorporatingexistingcoursesfromboth

OSOandOLE/FAMSwouldestablishamoreuniformtrainingbaselineand

understandingofallVIPRProgramrolesandcapabilities.

VIPRTrainingOpportunitiesExist

AsofDecember2011,OLE/FAMShaddevelopedanddeployedVIPRspecific

courses,butanoverallVIPRtrainingcurriculumhadnotbeenapproved.Existing

coursesincludeBasicHandcuffingTechniques(whichemphasizesgroundbased

deployments),FieldInterviewing,ArrestProcedures,VIPRLegal,VIPROverview,

andGroundBasedIncidentResponse(whichincludesactiveshooterscenarios).

TheVIPRCrowdControlOverviewcoursewasdevelopedandawaiting OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 62 OIG-12-103

deploymentapproval.OLE/FAMSmayalsocompleteDNDOtrainingonPRND

equipment.

OSOhasaVIPRtrainingcurriculum;however,thistrainingisrequiredonlyfor

TSIs.CoursesincludeRailroad101,TransitRailSecurity,andTransitRailIncident

Investigation.TSIsmustcompleteRailroad101beforeaccessingrailyards.In

contrast,BDOs,TSOs,TSSEs,andadditionalOSOassetsarerequiredto

completeonlypartnerandstakeholderrailsafetytrainingbeforeaccessing

transitvenues.

SomeVIPRteammembersalsocompletetheDepartmentofTransportation’s

FederalMotorCarrierSafetyAdministrationcourse“TrucksandTerrorism–

RapidRiskRecognition,Assessment,andResponse.”Thiscourseteaches

criminalbehaviorindicators,interviewtechniques,andconcealmenttechniques

inthemotorcarrierenvironment.

Inaddition,partnersandstakeholdersoftenrequireVIPRteammembersto

completetrainingbeforepermittingoperationsintheirsystems,sothatteams

haveacommonunderstandingofspecificvenuesandinfrastructure.Ofthe26

partnersandstakeholdersweinterviewed,18hadVIPRteammembertraining

courses.

AdditionalVIPRTrainingOpportunitiesAreBeingDeveloped

BothOLE/FAMSandOSOofficialsacknowledgetheneedtoimproveVIPR

training.Forexample,inaJune2011memorandum,OLE/FAMSofficials

proposedaFAMVIPRcurriculumtoincludeexistingcourses,aswellasupdating

orcreatingnewcourses.ThememorandumproposesupdatingtheVIPR

Overviewcoursetoemphasizetheterroristplanningcycle,andcreating

EncounteringandDisarminganArmedSubjectandVIPREquipment

Familiarizationcourses.Also,theFederalLawEnforcementTrainingCenterbuilt

anonsiteIntermodalTrainingFacilityinAugust2011,andOLE/FAMShasthree

instructorsembeddedinitsCounterterrorismTrainingDivision.33These



33TheFederalLawEnforcementTrainingCenterisaninteragencylawenforcementtrainingorganization

forFederal,State,local,tribal,andinternationallawenforcementagencies. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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instructorsreviewexistingandplannedtrainingmaterialstoenhancethe

OLE/FAMSVIPRcurriculum.

OSOisdevelopingaVIPR101course,whichinstructsteammembersonVIPR

policy,legalauthority,planning,andoperations.Inaddition,OSOisdevelopinga

Railroad101forLawEnforcementOfficerscourse,whichintroduceslaw

enforcementofficerstobasicrailroadinformationandsafetyandaddresses

situationalawareness,presence,andinvolvement.Althoughthiscourseis

appropriateforFAMs,othercourses,suchasTransitRailSecurityandTransitRail

IncidentInvestigation,arealsorelevant.

In2011,TSAcentralizedalltrainingresponsibilitieswithinitsOfficeofTraining

andWorkforceEngagement.Thisofficeistaskedwithcombiningallexisting

technical,leadership,andworkforcetraining.ByleveragingOLE/FAMSandOSO

existingandplannedVIPRspecificcourses,theOfficeofTrainingandWorkforce

EngagementcouldassistthemwithdevelopingastandardizedVIPRProgram

curriculum.

VIPRTeamsParticipateinJointExercisesWithPartnersandStakeholders

Inadditiontotrainingcourses,someVIPRteamsparticipateinpartnerand

stakeholderexercises.Asaresultofjointexercises,theseentitiesandVIPR

teamsdevelopbetterrelationshipsandlearnappropriateteammemberroles

andsituationalresponses.Althoughpartnersandstakeholdersinitiatemost

jointexercises,TSNMalsocanfacilitateexerciseswithtransitagenciesbyusing

theIntermodalSecurityTrainingExerciseProgram.Thisprogramprovides

surfacetransportationcommunitieswithmeaningfulevaluationsoftheir

preparednessforandabilitytorespondtoterroristrelatedincidents.It

exercisespotentialtransportationsecurityscenarioswithvariousFederal,State,

andlocalentities,includinglawenforcementandfirstresponders.In

conjunctionwiththeIntermodalSecurityTrainingExerciseProgram,TSAuses

theExerciseInformationSystemtoplanandimplementexercises,andthe

ExerciseEvaluationSystemtorecordactivityandevaluatedecisionsmadeduring

exercises. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 64 OIG-12-103

Recommendations

WerecommendthattheAdministratorfortheTransportationSecurity

Administration:

Recommendation#13:DevelopandimplementaTSAwideVIPRtraining

program,toincluderailsafetyandgroundbasedincidentresponsetraining

scenarios.

Recommendation#14:EvaluateexercisesthatcouldincorporateVIPRteams,

lawenforcementpartnersandstakeholders,anddeterminethefeasibilityof

conductingjointexercisesinallVIPRProgramfieldofficesandareasof

responsibility.

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#13:TSAofficialsconcurredwith

Recommendation13.Initsresponse,TSAsaidthattheVIPRProgramis

coordinatingwithTSA’sOfficeofTrainingandWorkforceEngagementon

developinganoverarchingtrainingcapability.TheVIPRProgramandOfficeof

TrainingandWorkforceEngagementarediscussingwiththeFederalLaw

EnforcementTrainingCenteraboutholdinganinitialVIPRCurriculum

DevelopmentConference atitsfacilityinGlynco,GA.ThefirstVIPRCurriculum

DevelopmentConferencemaybeheldatthenewFederalLawEnforcement

TrainingCenterIntermodalTrainingFacility,whichcanfacilitatetrainingin

varioustransportationmodes.Itwillalsoprovideanopportunitytopartnerwith

theFederalLawEnforcementTrainingCentertoleveragerelevantitsexisting

counterterrorismrelatedcurriculumandcurriculumdevelopmentassets.

TheVIPRtrainingprogramwillneedtoconsidertheoutcomesandVIPR

operationalchangesbasedonrecommendationscontainedinthisreport.

Buildingintrainingflexibilitytoadapttoemergingoperationalpracticesand

emergingthreatswillalsobecritical.

OIGAnalysis:WeconsiderTSA’sactionsresponsivetoRecommendation13,

whichisresolvedandopen.Thisrecommendationwillremainopenpendingour

receiptoftheTSAwideVIPRProgramtrainingmaterials. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#14:TSAofficialsconcurredwith

Recommendation14.Initsresponse,TSAsaidthatjointexercisesbetweenTSA

anditspartnersandstakeholdersareinvaluabletoidentifyoperationalneeds

anddemonstratecapabilities.Inaddition,jointexercisescanidentify

operationalgapsthatcanberesolvedthrougheffectivetrainingsolutions.

TSAsaidthattheVIPRProgramwillworkwiththeOfficeofSecurityPolicyand

IndustryEngagementtodeterminehowtheIntermodalSecurityTrainingand

ExerciseProgramexercisesandotherjointexercisescouldbeintegrated

effectivelyintoexistingVIPRoperationalactivities.Thisinformationcanbe

incorporatedintostakeholderrelationshipactivitiestoincreasethelevelof

consistencywithwhichjointexercisesareconsidered,planned,andconducted.

OIGAnalysis:WeconsiderTSA’sactionresponsivetoRecommendation14,

whichisresolvedandopen.InadditiontoconsultingtheOfficeofSecurityPolicy

andIndustryEngagementProgram,TSAshouldconsultitsfieldofficesto

determinewhichjointtrainingandexerciseswithstakeholdersandpartnersare

currentlyconductedandcanbereplicatedatotherfieldoffices.This

recommendationwillremainopenpendingourreceiptofguidancetofield

officesonimplementingjointtrainingandexerciseswithstakeholdersand

partners.

EquipmentMaintenanceEnhancesEffectiveness,andOSOSafetyGearMayBe

Necessary

OnsomeVIPRoperations,TSOsuseexplosivetracedetectionscreening

machinesandFAMsoperatePRNDequipment.Thereareconcerns,however,

thatequipmentisinfrequentlymaintainedandnotcalibratedforthemass

transitenvironment.Whenconductingoperations,OSOassetscanwearTSA

uniformstobevisible;however,theymaynothaveenoughprotectioninmass

transportationenvironments.

EquipmentMaintenanceIsInfrequent

TSAofficialssaidthatexplosivetracedetectionmachinesandPRNDequipment

usedforVIPRoperationsarenotmaintainedorcalibratedregularly,whichcan OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 66 OIG-12-103

causeineffectiveandinefficientoperations.Anumberoftransitagenciesand

TSOsalsoexpressedconcernregardingscreeningmachineaccuracy.

Partnersand

stakeholdersstopscreeningoperationswhenexcessiveinnatepositivereadings

occur.VIPRProgramofficialsneedtoexploreoptionstorectifyexcessiveinnate

positivereadingsduringVIPRscreeningoperations.

InJune2008,DNDObeganworkingwiththeVIPRProgramtoprovideFAMled

VIPRteamswithPRNDequipment.Since2008,PRNDequipmenthasnot

receivedmaintenanceorcalibration,andseveralfieldofficessaidthatthe

equipmentisinoperable.Toresolvethisissue,DNDOandTSAofficialsare

draftinganagreementtoestablishaPRNDequipmentmaintenanceschedule.

OSOAssetsMayNeedSafetyGear

UniformsenhanceVIPRoperationvisibilityandcanbeadeterrenttoterroristor

criminalactivity.UniformedVIPRoperationsareoftenassociatedwithlocallaw

enforcementofficersandFAMs,butstakeholderscanalsorequestthatTSOs,

TSIs,orBDOswearuniforms.SomeTSAofficialsexpressedconcernthat

uniformedOSOassetscouldbetargetsforthosewithcriminalintent,astheyare

unarmedandnotissuedprotectivegear.InanefforttoprotectOSOassets,one

fieldofficeissuedsafetygear,suchasballisticvests.

Toaddresssafetyconcerns,someOSOVIPRteammembersprefernonuniform,

plainclothesoperations.Auniformedpresencecandeterterrorists,butplain

clothesoperationsarealsobeneficialbecauseassetscanperformcounter

surveillanceandwatchpassengerreactionstouniformedpersonnel,aswellas

blendwithpassengerstoobservesuspiciousactivity. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 67 OIG-12-103

Recommendations

WerecommendthattheAdministratorfortheTransportationSecurity

Administration:

Recommendation#15:EnsurethatscreeningequipmentusedforVIPR

operationsiscalibratedforthemasstransitenvironment.

Recommendation#16:Conductanevaluationtodeterminewhatsafetyand

protectivegearshouldbeprovidedtoOSOassetswhenparticipatingonVIPR

operations.

ManagementCommentsandOIGAnalysis

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#15:TSAofficialsconcurredwith

Recommendation15.Initsresponse,TSAsaidthatpriortoourreview,theVIPR

Programhadalreadystartedtoaddressthecalibrationandmaintenanceissue

forPRNDequipmentassignedtoallOLE/FAMSledVIPRteams.Maintenance

andwarrantycontractshavebeenestablishedforallPRNDequipment.VIPR

ProgrammanagementpersonnelareworkingwithDNDOtodevelopand

implementprotocolsforthesame.

TheVIPRProgramisworkingwithTSA’sOfficeofSecurityCapabilitiestodefine

requirementsandcalibrationprotocolsforexplosivestracedetection

technologiesusedduringsurfaceVIPRoperations.TSA’sOfficeofTrainingand

WorkforceEngagementisdevelopingspecifictrainingrequirementsforany

technologiesdeployedonVIPRoperations,specificallyTSOuseofMultiModal

TraceDetectiontechnology.

OIGAnalysis:WeconsiderTSA’sactionsresponsivetoRecommendation15,

whichisresolvedandopen.Thisrecommendationwillremainopenpendingour

receiptofguidanceregardingscreeningequipmentmaintenanceandcalibration

procedures.

ManagementResponsetoRecommendation#16:TSAofficialsconcurredwith

Recommendation16.Initsresponse,TSAsaidthatitiscurrentlyassessingthe

roleofOSOassetsinVIPRoperations.Theresultsofthatassessmentcanaffect OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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safetyandprotectiveequipmentrequirementsforOSOassets.Buildingfrom

thatassessment,theVIPRProgramcanassessboththesafetyandprotective

equipmentneedsforallVIPRpersonneltypeswhoparticipateinVIPR

operations.ThefindingsfromtheseevaluationswillalsoinformtheVIPR

trainingdevelopmentprocess.

OIGAnalysis:WeconsiderTSA’sactionsresponsivetoRecommendation16,

whichisresolvedandopen.Thisrecommendationwillremainopenpendingour

receiptofthefinalassessmentregardingissuingsafetyandprotective

equipmenttoOSOpersonnelforuseduringVIPRoperations.

Conclusion

The9/11Act authorizedTSAtoformVIPRteams,whichcanconsistofanyDHSasset,

includingFAMs,TSIs,explosivedetectioncanineteams,orscreeningtechnologies.

AdditionalstaffingandfundinghaveledtoincreasedVIPRoperations,andtheVIPR

Programhasimproveditsabilitytoestablisheffectivepartnerandstakeholder

relationships.However,organizational,programmatic,andoperationalchallenges

remain.Specifically,theVIPRProgram’splacementwithinTSAhindersitsabilityto

ensurecoordinatedVIPRfieldactivities.Guidanceisneededtoclarifylawenforcement

activities,teammemberrolesandresponsibilities,andequipmentuseduringVIPR

operations.Additionally,VIPRdeploymentmethodologyneedsrefinement,and

resourcesarenotallocatedproportionatelytoteamworkloadsacrosstheNation.

Teamsdonotreceivestandardizedtraining,andthelengthofVIPRteammember

assignmentsaffectsprogrameffectiveness.TSAcanenhanceprogramefficiencyand

effectivenessbyaddressingthesechallenges.

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 69 OIG-12-103

AppendixA

Objectives,Scope,andMethodology

TheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)OfficeofInspectorGeneral(OIG)was

establishedbytheHomelandSecurityActof2002(PublicLaw107296)byamendment

totheInspectorGeneralActof1978.Thisisoneofaseriesofaudit,inspection,and

specialreportspreparedaspartofouroversightresponsibilitiestopromoteeconomy,

efficiency,andeffectivenesswithintheDepartment.

WeassessedTSAeffortstodeployVIPRteamstoaugmentsecurityinrailandmass

transitsystemsaspartofourFiscalYear2011AnnualPerformancePlan.Ourreview

focusedonwhetherTSAhasintegratedFederalandlocalpartnersinplanningand

executingVIPRdeployments,andontheefficiencyandeffectivenessoftheVIPR

Programtoenhancesecurity,identifysuspiciousbehavior,anddeterpotentialterrorist

attacksonrailandmasstransitsystems.

OurobjectivesweretodeterminethemethodologyTSAusestoselectVIPR

deployments;whethergeographiclocationandcriticalinfrastructureaffecttheconduct

ofVIPRteamoperations;andwhetherVIPRteamsareefficientandeffectivein

augmentinglocal,State,andFederaleffortstoenhancesecurityonrailandmasstransit

systems.

Toaccomplishourobjectives,weinterviewedFederalofficialsandStateandlocallaw

enforcementpersonnel,andreviewedandanalyzedrelateddocumentsanddata.

Specifically,weinterviewedofficialsandstafffromTSA,U.S.CoastGuard,U.S.Customs

andBorderProtection,U.S.SecretService,OfficeofPolicy,OfficeofCivilRightsandCivil

Liberties,thePrivacyOffice,DNDO,andtheNationalProtectionandPrograms

Directorate.WealsometwithofficialsfromtheDepartmentofTransportation,

includingtheFederalRailroadAdministration,FederalTransitAdministration,and

FederalMotorCarrierSafetyAdministration,togaintheirperspectivesontheVIPR

Program.

ToassesstheefficiencyandeffectivenessofTSA’sVIPRProgramtoaugmentsecurityin

railandmasstransitsystems,weconductedsitevisitsandinterviewswiththefollowing

stakeholders:OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 70 OIG-12-103

AmtrakPoliceDepartment

BayAreaRegionalTransit

ChicagoPoliceDepartment

CSXRailroad

FoothillTransit

GreaterClevelandRegionalTransitAuthority

LongBeachTransit

LosAngelesSheriff’sOffice

MassachusettsBayTransitAuthority

MarylandTransitAdministration

MarylandTransportationAuthority

MetropolitanWashingtonAirportsAuthority

NewYorkMetropolitanTransitAuthority

NewYorkPoliceDepartment

NortheasternIllinoisRegionalCommuterRailroadCorporation(Metra)

PortAuthorityofNewYorkandNewJersey

SanFranciscoPoliceDepartment

SoutheasternPennsylvaniaTransitAuthority

VirginiaDepartmentofTransportation

VirginiaRailwayExpress

WashingtonMetropolitanAreaTransitAuthority

WehelddiscussionswithofficialsfromtheGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,the

MetropolitanAtlantaRapidTransitAuthorityPoliceDepartment,theNewJerseyTransit

PoliceDepartment,andtheAmericanPublicTransitAssociationtogaintheir

perspectivesonTSA’sVIPRProgram.

Inaddition,weexaminedVIPRProgramguidelinesandprocedures,includingapplicable

laws,regulations,andpolicies.WealsoassessedtheresourcesthatDHSandits

operationalcomponentsprovidetotheVIPRProgram.

OurfieldworkbeganinAugust2011andconcludedinDecember2011.Weinitiatedthis

reviewundertheauthorityoftheInspectorGeneralActof1978,asamended,and

accordingtotheQualityStandardsforInspections,issuedbythePresident’sCouncilon

IntegrityandEfficiency. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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WeconductedthisreviewundertheauthorityoftheInspectorGeneralActof1978,as

amended,andaccordingtotheQualityStandardsforInspectionsissuedbytheCouncil

oftheInspectorsGeneralonIntegrityandEfficiency. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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AppendixB

Recommendations

WerecommendthattheAdministratorfortheTransportationSecurityAdministration:

Recommendation#1:Developandimplementapublicawarenessinitiativetoconvey

theVIPRProgram’sintent.

Recommendation#2:ClarifythedefinitionsofVIPRoperationsandprovideguidanceto

headquartersandthefieldabouthowtocompleteoperationaldocumentationto

correctlyreportoperations.

Recommendation#3:Establishandimplementadatareportingprocedurethatensures

informationsubmittedtotheJointCoordinationCenterisupdatedandreflectseach

VIPRoperationaccurately.

Recommendation#4:DevelopandcommunicateguidanceforFAMengagement

protocolsandlegalauthoritieswhenVIPRteamsencounterpotentialoractualcriminal

activityinmasstransitenvironments.

Recommendation#5:Provideenhancedguidanceregardingriskbaseddeployment

planningandincreaseaccesstoriskassessmentinformationthatVIPRteamscanuseto

prioritizedeploymentswithpartnersandstakeholders.

Recommendation#6:DesignateVIPRProgramdecisionmakingauthoritytooneTSA

headquartersofficetoensurethatoverallfieldoperations,programactivityand

engagement,andoversightarecoordinatedeffectively.

Recommendation#7:EnsurecoordinationandengagementbetweenlocalVIPRteam

leadersandthePlaybookManager,andensurethatairportlawenforcementVIPR

operationsareintegratedwithSecurityPlaybookoperations.

Recommendation#8:RedistributeexistingVIPRFAMpositionallocationsamongfield

officesaccordingtohighthreaturbanareas,criticalinfrastructure,andmasstransit

networksusingariskbasedmethodology. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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Recommendation#9:Developaprocessto increaseoversightregardingtheavailability

andinvolvementofOSOpersonnelandassetstoOLE/FAMledVIPRteams.

Recommendation#10:ExtendOLE/FAMSandOSOVIPRassignmentsformorethan1

year.

Recommendation#11:RefineStandardOperatingProcedurestoreflectappropriate

rolesandresponsibilitiesforTSIsduringVIPRoperations.

Recommendation#12:Evaluatetherealignmenttodetermineanypotentialadverse

effectsonTSA’sabilitytoensurethatVIPRteamshavesufficientaccesstolaw

enforcementcanineteams.

Recommendation#13:DevelopandimplementaTSAwideVIPRtrainingprogram,to

includerailsafetyandgroundbasedincidentresponsetrainingscenarios.

Recommendation#14:EvaluateexercisesthatcouldincorporateVIPRteams,law

enforcementpartnersandstakeholders,anddeterminethefeasibilityofconducting

jointexercisesinallVIPRProgramfieldofficesandareasofresponsibility.

Recommendation#15:EnsurethatscreeningequipmentusedforVIPRoperationsis

calibratedforthemasstransitenvironment.

Recommendation#16:Conductanevaluationtodeterminewhatsafetyandprotective

gearshouldbeprovidedtoOSOassetswhenparticipatingonVIPRoperations. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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AppendixC

ManagementCommentstotheDraftReport OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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AppendixD

DistributionofPriorityTransportationVenuesandEntitiesby

VIPRTeamAreasofResponsibility
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 84 OIG-12-103

AppendixE

MajorContributorstoThisReport

MarciaMoxeyHodges,ChiefInspector

AngelaGarvin,TeamLeadInspector

KatherineRoberts,SeniorInspector

KimberleyLakedePulla,SeniorInspector

MorganFerguson,Inspector OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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www.oig.dhs.gov 85 OIG-12-103

AppendixF

ReportDistribution

DepartmentofHomelandSecurity

Secretary

DeputySecretary

ChiefofStaff

DeputyChiefofStaff

GeneralCounsel

ExecutiveSecretary

Director,GAO/OIGLiaisonOffice

AssistantSecretaryforOfficeofPolicy

AssistantSecretaryforOfficeofPublicAffairs

AssistantSecretaryforOfficeofLegislativeAffairs

UnderSecretary,NationalProtectionandProgramsDirectorate

Commandant,U.S.CoastGuard

Director,U.S.SecretService

DirectorofLocalAffairs,OfficeofIntergovernmentalAffairs

Director,DomesticNuclearDetectionOffice

TSAAuditLiaison

NPPDAuditLiaison

USCGAuditLiaison

U.S.SecretServiceAuditLiaison

DNDOAuditLiaison

U.S.DepartmentofTransportation

FederalRailroadAdministration

FederalTransitAdministration

FederalMotorCarrierSafetyAdministration

GAO/OIGLiaison OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 86 OIG-12-103

OfficeofManagementandBudget

Chief,HomelandSecurityBranch

DHSOIGBudgetExaminer

Congress

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For additional information, visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov, or follow us on Twitter 

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