As the parties are well aware of the facts, we merely 

summarize them here. LVLP owned five blocks of land in downtown Las 

Vegas that it wished to develop. It hired Nype to help find an investor 

that would fund the project. Through one of Nype's contacts, LVLP was 

introduced to Forest City. LVLP appears to have worked with Nype in 

brokering a deal with Forest City, and may have promised him 

compensation for this work although it does not appear they formally 

contracted with him concerning the Forest City deal. 

LVLP and Forest City negotiated a partnership, but Forest 

City initially backed out. Nype worked with Forest City to get them to 

reconsider, and Forest City entered into a letter of intent to form a 

limited-liability company (LLC) with LVLP. However, Forest City let that 

agreement lapse, and the partnership fell through. A few months later, 

however, Forest City contacted LVLP and indicated it would be interested 

in restructuring the transaction as a land sale contract. The parties 

thereafter contracted to sell a tenancy-in-common interest in the land to 

Forest City. Nype may not have been aware of the sale contract, as it 

appears LVLP began excluding Nype from its correspondences with Forest 

City during this time. 

LVLP, Nype, and other interested parties litigated the case in 

New York and Nevada. When discovery in the Nevada case moved 

forward, LVLP petitioned for summary judgment. The district court 

granted the motion because the final agreement was a land sale contract, 

and it found NRS 642.270 bars unlicensed person from collecting 

compensation for work done in the capacity of a real estate broker. The 

order relied on Islandia, Inc. v. Marechek, 82 Nev. 424, 427-28, 420 P.2d 5, 

6 (1966), and Loomis v. Lange Financial Corp., 109 Nev. 1121, 1127-28, 

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865 P.2d 1161, 1165 (1993), in finding that Nype acted as a broker by 

bringing the parties together and later claiming a commission on the 

resulting land sale. The district court did not explain which of Nype's acts 

met the statutory definition of real estate broker, assuming that Nype was 

necessarily covered by the statute because the ultimate transaction was a 

land sale contract. 

This court reviews questions of statutory construction and the 

district court's legal conclusions de novo. Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las 

Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008); California Commercial 

v. Amedeo Vegas I, 119 Nev. 143, 145, 67 P.3d 328, 330 (2003). In 

interpreting any statute, this court looks first to the plain language of the 

statute and construes the statute so as not to produce unreasonable 

results. Harris Assocs. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 119 Nev. 638, 641-42, 

81 P.3d 532, 534 (2003). Likewise, this court reviews a grant of summary 

judgment de novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 

1026, 1029 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate only where the 

evidence reflects no genuine issue of material fact and, as a matter of law, 

the moving party is entitled to judgment. Id. 

On appeal, LVLP makes the same argument it did before the 

district court: if a party's efforts culminate in the sale of an interest in 

land, and that party does not hold a Nevada realtor license, that party is 

precluded from collecting any fee pursuant to NRS 645.270, regardless of 

the party's intent in undertaking or furthering the transaction. 

We disagree. NRS 645.230 requires a real estate broker or 

salesperson to be licensed to conduct real estate transactions. NRS 

645.270 bars a person not licensed as a real estate broker from collecting 

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•-••• 
compensation "for the performance of any of the acts mentioned in NRS 

645.030.. . ." NRS 645.030 defines a real estate broker, in part, as 

a person who, for another and for compensation or 

with the intention or expectation of receiving 

compensation: (a) [s]ells, exchanges, options, 

purchases, rents or leases, or negotiates or offers, 

attempts or agrees to negotiate the sale, exchange, 

option, purchase, rental or lease of, or lists or 

solicits prospective purchasers, lessees or renters 

of, any real estate. . . . 

NRS 645.030(1)(a). This definition focuses on the nature of the action, not 

the nature of the ultimate outcome. Moreover, the statute later exempts 

certain persons who do "not perform any tasks related to the sale or other 

transfer of an interest in real estate," further supporting that if the action 

was not intended to effect the transfer of real property, the actor may not 

fall within the definition of a real estate broker. NRS 645.030(3). Thus, 

only persons who act for the purpose of furthering a sale, lease, or rent 

contract for real property fall within the definition of real estate broker 

and are subject to NRS 645.270. 

This comports with established Nevada law. And contrary to 

the district court's analysis, Islandia compels this conclusion.' There, we 

held that the licensing requirement will not preclude payment of a 

commission unless the services rendered fall within acts outlined in NRS 

645.030, and that this determination rests on the individual 

'The district court also erroneously relied on Loomis, 109 Nev. 1121, 

865 P.2d 1161. That case dealt with a person who acted as a real estate 

agent in a real estate transaction while willfully evading the licensing 

scheme, and is therefore distinguished from the case at hand. Id. at 1127- 

28, 865 P.2d at 1165. 

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circumstances of the services. 82 Nev. at 427-28, 420 P.2d at 7. That case 

makes clear that a person who is not a licensed real estate broker may 

recover a commission where the work was not done to further or procure 

the sale of an interest in land but nevertheless resulted in a land sale 

contract. Moreover, this approach is consistent with other jurisdictions. 

See Greenlake Capital, LLC v. Bingo Inv., LLC, 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 85-86 

(Cal. Ct. App. 2010); Transaction Advisory Servs., LLC v. Silver Bar 

Holding, LLC, 831 N.Y.S.2d 159, 159 (App. Div. 2007); Roberts v. Gaskins, 

486 S.E.2d 771, 775 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Sheppard v. Bay Cnty. Realty, 

Inc., 465 A.2d 857, 861 (Md. 1983). 

Therefore, before refusing to enforce a commission, the court 

must first determine whether the person's actions brought him or her 

within the scope of NRS 645.030. Here, the district court determined 

there was no genuine issue of material fact because the final agreement 

between LVLP and Forest City was for the sale of an interest in land, 

Nype claimed a commission based on that sale, and Nype was not a 

licensed realtor. However, the district court focused on the final 

transaction and did not consider whether Nype's acts fell within the scope 

of activities limited to real estate brokers under NRS 645.030. 

Nype presented emails and affidavits suggesting that he had 

an agreement with LVLP to secure investors, that this agreement did not 

necessarily contemplate the sale of any interest in land, and that he acted 

to secure a contract between Forest City and LVLP for them to form a 

LLC. The evidence does not show whether Nype acted knowing Forest 

City and LVLP intended to enter into a land sale agreement or whether 

Nype's actions conflicted with the licensing requirement. LVLP's 

assertion that Nype clearly violated the statute by "'solicit[ing]' the 

5 
this order. 

J. 

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r 

prospective purchaser of the property, Forest City, [by] . . . pitch[ing] 

Forest City on the value of the property (i.e., 'selling' the property)" is not 

determinative. This is so because the evidence shows only that the final 

transaction was a land sale contract, but not that the initial work and 

agreements contemplated that result or that Nype engaged in specific 

actions reserved by NRS 645.030 to licensed real estate brokers. 

Thus, genuine issues of material fact remain concerning 

whether Nype is entitled to compensation. At a minimum, the district 

court must consider whether all of Nype's actions, for which he now claims 

compensation, were in the scope of NRS 645.030, or whether some or all of 

his actions fell outside the scope of that statute. And, if Nype performed 

work that is not restricted to licensed realtors under NRS 645.030, 

questions remain concerning the formation and scope of the agreement 

between Nype and LVLP, the effect the contract has on other agreements 

between the parties and third parties, and the amount of compensation 

due to Nype. Accordingly, summary judgment dismissing Nype's claims 

was inappropriate. We therefore 

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND 

REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with 
cc: Hon. Ronald J. Israel, District Judge 

Thomas J. Tanksley, Settlement Judge 

Lewis & Roca, LLP/Las Vegas 

Rice Silbey Reuther & Sullivan, LLP 

Reisman Sorokac 

Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP 

Sterling Law, LLC 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

7