Filed 9/17/21 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

GLORIA GUZMAN

,
Plaintiff and Respondent

,

v.

NBA AUTOMOTIVE , INC.

,

Defendant and Appellant

. B303655

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC675851 )

APPEAL from a j udgment of the Los Angeles County
Su peri or Court, Michael P. Linfield

, Judge . Affirmed

. McCreary and Duncan J. McCreary for Defendant and Appellant. Lyon Law, Geoffrey C. Lyon ; and Henry Harmeling IV for Plaintiff and Respondent

.2 INTRODUCTION

Gloria Guzman timely filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Fair Housing and Employment (DFEH) after her employer, NBA Automotive, Inc. dba Hooman Chevrolet of Culver City (NBA Automotive), 1 terminated her employment. DFEH issued Guzman a right

- to

- sue letter, and Guzman filed this action against NBA Automotive, alleging wrongful
termination and various causes of action under the Fair Employmen t and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) (FEHA). 2 A jury found in favor of Guzman and awarded her monetary damages, and the trial court entered judgment in her
favor

. NBA Automotive appeals from the judgment, challenging
the trial court’ s orders denying its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. NBA Automotive argues Guzman failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under FEHA because her administrative complaint, though it named something very close (“H ooman Chevrolet”) to NBA Automotive’s correct fictitious business name (“Hooman
Chevrolet of Culver City”), it incorrectly identified “Hooman Enterprises, Inc.,” rather than “NBA Automotive, Inc.,” as the corporation doing business as Hooman Chevrolet of C ulver City. Because Guzman’s administrative complaint sufficiently identified her employer, she exhausted her administrative

1 NBA is an initialism for Nissani Brothers Automotive.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.3

remedies within the statutory limitations period. Therefore, we
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Guzman Files a n Administrative C omplaint
On September 8, 2017 Guzman filed an administrative complaint w ith DFEH asserting various employment claims, including discrimination , harassment, retaliation, failure to engage in the interactive process, denial of family or medi cal leave, and denial of reasonable accommodations. The caption of the complaint named “Hooman Enterprises, Inc.” as the respondent, and in the first sentence

, under the heading “Additional Complaint Details

, ” Guzman alleg ed she “was employed by Defendant Hooman Enterprises Inc. DBA Hooman Chevrolet (Employer)” from February 2002 to May 2017 in

, among several locations

, Culver City

. Guzman also named her supervisors, including “owner Hooman Nissani.” Guzman requested, and D FEH issued the same day , a right

- to

- sue letter

. 3
DFEH sent Hooman Enterprises, Inc. a copy of Guzman’s
administrative complaint and the right

- to

- sue letter.

3 See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 10005, subd. (a) ( “Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an employment practice made unlawful by the FEHA may forgo having the department investigate a complaint and instead obtain an immediate right

to

- s ue notice. A right

- to

- sue notice issued by the department shall state that the aggrieved party may bring a civil action against the person or entity named in the complaint within one year from the date of the notice.” ).4 B. Guzman Files This Action On September 14, 2017 Guzman filed this action , naming
as defe ndants “Hoom an Enterprises Inc. DBA Hooman Chevrolet;
and DOES 1 to 10

. ” The operative first amended complaint alleged 12 causes of action, including for wrongful termination,
retaliation (§ 12940, subd. (h)) , disability discrimination ( § 12940,
subd. (a))

, age discrimination (§ 12940, subd. (a))

, failure to make
reasonable accommodation s ( § 12940, subd. (m))

, and failure to engage in the interactive process ( § 12940, subd. (n)). On January 23, 2018 NBA Automotive , using the name “ Hooman Chevrolet of Culver City ,” filed an answer to Guzman’s first amended complaint.

C. Guzman Learns the Legal Name of Her Employer and
Amends Her Complaint in This Action and Her Administrative Complaint
Guzman state d (and NBA Automotive did not dispute) that
i n October 2018 she le arned the legal name of NBA Automotive
and asked the court t o amend the complaint in this action to substitute the “true name” of the defendant, “ NBA Automotive

, Inc. dba Hooman Chevrolet of Culver City

, ” in place o f the “incorrect name” of “Hooman Enterprises, Inc. dba Hooman
Chevrolet.” On January 3, 2019 t he trial court signed the order amending the complaint. On April 25, 2019 Guzman filed an amended administrative complaint with DFEH naming

“ NBA Automotive

, In c.” as the respondent and stating in the body of the complaint that her employer was “ NBA Automotive

, Inc., DBA Hooman Chevrolet .” DFEH accepted the amended complaint and deemed it “to have the same filing date of the original complaint.”5 D

. A Jury Retur ns a Split Verdict in Favor of Guzman,
and NBA Automotive Files Motion s for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for a New Trial
After a four

- day trial, t he jury found in favor of Guzman on her causes of action for wrongful termination and retaliation

, awarded her $245,892 in damages, and found in favor of NBA
Automotive on her causes of action for disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage i n the interactive process, and age discrimination. 4 NBA
Automotive moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that “there was an error in law and insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict” because t he “ evidence set forth
dur ing trial did not establish that all of the necessary elements of the causes of action were present. ” Specifically, NBA Automotive

argu ed Guzman did not comply w ith section 12960,
subdivisions (b) and (d) , because she did not file her administrative compl aint “within one year of the last alleg edly illegal act identifying her employer.” NBA Automotive moved for
a new trial on the same grounds , arguing Guzman’s “failure [to ]
file a DFEH Complaint against NBA [Automotive] should have resulted in [Guzman] not prevailing on the causes of action for wrongful termination and retaliation because [she] failed to
exhaust her admi nistrative remedies under .

. . § 12960(b) [and] (d).”

4 On August 12, 2019, the first da y of trial, NBA Automotive filed a m otion for j udgment on the p le adings, arguing Guzman failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under FEHA . On August 15, 2019 the trial court denied the motion.6 The trial court denied both motions. The court ruled
Guzman exhausted her administrative remedies because DFEH
“confirmed t hat the amendment to the DFEH complaint naming the proper defendant applied retroactively to the initial September 8, 2017 filing date.” T he court also ruled NBA
Automotive “was described as a perpetrator of discriminatory acts, [it] would have been put on notice of the charges, and [it] would have had an opportunity to participate, had DFEH investigated.” NBA Automotive timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

NBA Automotive contends the trial court “ erred in law” in denying its motion s for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and for a new trial because Guzman failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies

, as required by section 12960,
subdivision s (b) and (d)

. 5 NBA Automot ive argues Guzman did

not exhaust her administrative remedies because her administrative complaint “identified Hooman Enterprises, Inc.,”

5 In the “Statement of the Case” section of its brie f, NBA Automotive asserts the trial court erred in denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the same exhaustion argument. NBA Automotive , however, does not in its brief provide any argument relating to that motion. Therefore, we do not address it . (See Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 377, fn. 3 [“‘we do not consider .

. . the loose and disparate arguments that are not clearly set out in a heading and supported by reasoned legal argumen t’”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [a brief must “[s] tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority ].)7

rather than “NBA Automotive, Inc. dba Hooman Chevrolet of Culver City,” as her employer. Because NBA Automotive ’s

exp ansive view of the exhaustion requirement under FEHA is
incorrect

, t he t rial c ourt d id n ot e rr in d enying the m otion s for j udgment n otwithstanding the v erdict and for a new trial

.

A. Standard s of Review
“‘A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence in support . [Citation.] [¶] .

. . As in the trial court, the standard of review [on appeal] is whether any
substanti al evidence

— contradicted or uncontradicted

— supports the jury’s conclusion

. ’” ( Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co . (2011)

51 Cal.4th 764, 770; see Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc . (2016)

63 Cal. 4th 167 , 192; Morgan v. J

- M Mfg. Co.

, Inc. , (2021 )

60 Cal.App. 5th 1078, 1085 .) But w here t he “sole question before

us

. . . is one of law” and t he “jury

. . . was not asked to resolve any factual questions bearing on the question,” we “address the
issue under a de novo standard of review. ” ( Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 62, 68 ; see Brown v. City of Sacramento (2019) 37 Cal.App. 5th 587, 598 [“to the extent a motion for judgment notwith standing the verdict raises legal issues such as the application of law to undisputed
facts .

. . , we review the trial court’s ruling on the motion de novo”] ; Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008)

162 Ca l

. App. 4th 1107, 1138 [same] .) We generally review orders granting or denying a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co . (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 859 ; Denton v. City and County of San Francisco (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 779, 794 .) But8

“any determination underlying an y order is scrutinized under the test appropriate to such determination.” ( Aguila r , at p. 859; accord, Tun v. Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc. (2016)
5 Cal.App .5th 309, 323.) Here, because whether Guzman
exhausted her administrative remedies is a question of law (see
Foster v. Sexton (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1023), we review the
trial court’s ruling de novo. (See Aguilar , at p. 860 [superior court’s order gr anting a new trial “was predicated, specifically, on
its determination that .

. . it made an error in law,” which “is itself scrutinized de novo”]; Estill v. County of Shasta (2018)
25 Cal.App.5th 702, 708 [“[b]ecause the trial court granted [the plaintiff ] a new trial based on a question of law, we review the order de novo”].)

B. T he Exhaustion Requirement U nder FEHA “In enacting the FEHA, California’s Legislature sought to safeguard the rights of all perso n s to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination on account of various characteristics, including race, national origin, physical disability, and medical condition.” ( Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co

. (2014) 59 Cal. 4th 407, 420; see § 12920; Pollock v. Tri

- Modal
Distribution Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal. 5th 918, 934 ( Pollock ) ; Saavedra v. Orange County Consolidated Transportation etc. Agen c y (1992) 11 Cal.App. 4th 824, 82 8 ( Saavedra ) .) “ Section

12960 delineates the procedures by which aggrie ve d employees
are to state their co mplaints.” ( Saavedra , at p. 826. ) Section 12960, former subdivision (b), 6 stated: “Any person claiming to

6 “Effective January 1 , 2020, fo rmer section 12960, subdivision (b) was redesignated without material chang e as9

be aggrieved by an alleged unlawful practice may file with [DFEH] a verified complaint, in writing, that shall state the name and address of the person, employer, labor organization, or employment agency alleged to have committed the unlawful practice complained of, and that shall set forth the particulars
thereof and c ontain other information as may be required by the
d epartment.” (See Clark v. Superior Court (2021) 62 Cal.App. 5th 289, 299 ( Clark ).) “[ S ] ection 12960, former subdivision (d) require s litigants seeking relief under the FEHA to file a n administrative comp laint with the DFEH within one year ‘from the date upon which the alleged unlawful practice .

. . occurred.’” ( Pollock

, at p. 929; see Alexander v. Community Hospital of Long
Beach (2020) 46 Cal.App. 5th 238, 250 ( Alexander ).) 7
“Once the DFEH receives an aggrieved person ’ s complaint, it must investigate the alleged unlawful practice and determine
whether it can resolve the matter ‘ by conference, conciliation, and persuasion. ’ [Citation.] If such measures fail, the department may issue an accu sation to be heard by the Fair Employment and Housing Commission. [Citations.] If that council finds a violation, it may issue a cease and desist order and grant other appropriate relief. [Citation.] If the department issues no accusation, it must give the aggrieved person notice and a right

to

- sue letter. [Citation.] The aggrieved person may, within one

section 12960, subdivision (c).” ( Clark v. Superior Court (2021) 62 Cal.App. 5th 289, 299, fn. 11.)

7 Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature amended section 12960 to “enlarge [ ] the time for filing a [DFEH] claim to three years from the date of the challenged conduct.” ( Brome v. California Highway Patrol (2020) 44 Cal.App. 5th 7 86, 793, fn. 2 ;

see § 12960, subd. (e).)10

year after receiving notice, bring a civil action against the

‘ person, employer, labor organization, or employment agency ’ named in the charge. ” ( Al exander

, supra , 46 Cal.App. 5th at

p. 250.) “An employee who wishes to file suit under the FEHA ‘must exhaust the administrative remedy provided by the statute by filing a complaint with the’ DFEH , ‘and must obtain from the [ DFEH ] a notice of right to sue.’ [Citation.] ‘The timely filing of an administrative complaint’ before the DFEH ‘is a prerequisite to the bringing of a civil action for damages.’” ( Pollock

, supra , 11 Cal. 5th at p. 931 ; accord, Clark

, supra , 62 Cal.App. 5th at

p. 301 .) “The administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied
if FEHA claims in a judicial complaint are ‘“like and reasonably
related to”’ those in the DFEH complaint [citation] or ‘likely to be
uncovered in the course of a DFEH investigation.’” ( Clark

, at

p

. 301 .)

C. Guzman Exhausted Her Administrative Remedies Guzman complied with the requirements of se ction 12960,
former subdivision (b)

. She filed a n administrative complaint stating “the name and address of the .

. . employer” (§ 12960,
former subd. (b )) who she alleged committed the unlawful employment practice s described in the complaint

. The
administrative complaint unmistakably identified NBA
Automotive as the respondent

. Although Guzman did not state
NBA Automotive ’s full correct legal name

, she stated that the fictitious business name of her employer was “ Hooman Chevrolet,” a name virtually identical to “ Hooman Chevrolet of Culver City, ” NBA Automotive’s actual fictitious business name. In addition, Guzman’s administrative complaint listed t he11

address of Hooman Chevrolet in Culver City and named the owner (Hooman Nissani)

. (See Clark

, supra , 62 Cal.App.5th at

pp. 305

- 306 [plaintiff sufficiently identified her employer where the caption of the administrative complaint had names that were “very similar” to the employer’s “actual fictitious business name,” and “any administrative investigation into [ her ] DFEH Complaint would have certainly identified [the employer] as an intended respondent”]; Saavedra

, supra , 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 827 [plaintiff could maintain a cause of action against her supervisor, even though she had not named him in her administrative complaint (and named only the agency that employed her), because he “was the only person with whom [the plaintiff] dealt” and “[h]is actio ns were those of [the employer] ”]; see also Myers v. Checksmart Financial, LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 701 Fed.Appx. 588, 590 [plaintiff sufficiently identified her employer by stating the
fictitious business name and address of the store where sh e worked]; Thompson v. George De L allo Co., Inc. (E.D.Cal. Jan. 16, 2013, No. Civ . S

- 12

- 1058 LKK/CMK ) 2013 WL 211204, p. 9 [plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies under FEHA
where , even though the administrative complaint did not name the proper de fendant, “the charge properly identifie[d] the fictitious business name of his employer and was mailed to the facility at which he was employed”]; see generally Hawkins v. Pacific Coast Bldg. Products, Inc. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1504 [plaintiff was entitled to amend his complaint to state the true name of his employer because “courts have long allowed a plaintiff to correct the name of a defendant who conducts
business under a fictitious name after the statute of limitations has run”].)12 Guzman also provided a detailed description of her employer, the names of the individuals who engaged in the alleged ly discriminatory practices, and a narrative of multiple instances of wrongful conduct spanning 15 years. She also named the supervisors an d managers employed by NBA Automotive who took the adverse employment actions against
her

. Any reasonable investigation would have revealed that NBA Automotive was Guzman’s employer. (See Martin v. Fisher (1992) 11 Cal.App. 4th 118, 122 [“[t]he function of an administrative complaint is to provide the basis for an investigation into an employees’ claim of discrimination against an employer, and not to limit access to the courts”] ; Valdez v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Ca l.App .3d 1043, 1060 [same ].) 8 To
allow NBA A utomotive to escape liability for discriminatory
conduct merely because Guzman identified her employer administratively with a name that was nearly the same as , but not quite identical to, her employer’s actual fict itious business name would be contrary to the purpose s of FEHA. (See § 12993,
subd. (a) [“[t]he provisions [of FEHA] shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes of ” FEHA ]; Poll o ck

, supra , 11 Cal.5th at pp. 934

- 935 [“‘section 12960 should not be

8 The r egulations governing DFEH require it to “liberally construe all complaints to effectuate the purpose of the laws the department enforces to safeguard the civil right of all persons to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimin ation.” (Cal. Code Re gs., tit. 2, § 10003; see Clark

, supra , 62 Cal.App.5th at

p. 306; see also Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 268 [“what is submitted to the DFEH must not only be construed liberally in favor of plaintiff, it must be construed in light of what might be uncovered by a reasonable investigation”].)13

interpreted to impose serious practical difficulties on an employee’s ability to vindicate’ the right to hold employment without experiencing discrimination or harassment”]; Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 493

- 49 4 [“ the limitations period set out in the FEHA should be interpreted so as to promote the resolution of potentially meritorious claims on
the merits ”].)
T he information in Guzman’s administrative complaint
also gave NBA Automotive sufficient notice that s he was naming
it in her administrative complaint and would name it in her subsequent civil action , both of which, as well as the right

- to

- sue letter, NBA Automotive does not dispute it received. NBA
Automotive had all the information it needed to particip ate in any administrative efforts to resolve the matter informally ( had Guzman not requested a right

- to

- sue letter ) and to engage in
settlement discussions once Guzman filed this action

. ( See Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 156 [“T he purpose of FEHA ’ s administrative exhaustion requirement is to ensure DFEH is provided the opportunity to resolve disputes and eliminate unlawful employment practices through conciliation. ”];
Saavedra

, supra , 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 827 [although the plaintiff
did not name her supervisor in the administrative complaint, h e

“ was put on notice and had an opportunity to pursue a ‘volunta ry settlement had he so desired ’”].)
Nor does NBA Automotive contend Guzman’s failure to

state its correct legal name in her ori ginal administrative complaint prejudiced its defense in any way. NBA Automotive
filed an answer to Guzman’s complaint in this action under its
fictitious business name , conducted discovery

, and defended against Guzman’s causes of action at trial (even prevailing on14

some)

. Indeed, NBA Automotive refrained from using its true legal name until after Guzman learned it nine months later in discovery (apparently after filing a successful motion to compel on the issue). Such gamesmanship suggests that NBA Automotive knew Guzman intended to identify it in her administrative complaint and that NBA Automotive tried to deprive Guzman of her right to pursue her claims against the

company for its unlawful employment conduct. (See C lark

, supra , 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 293 [“ FEHA ’ s exhaustion requirement should not be interpreted as a ‘“ procedural gotcha ” ’ ”].) And ev en if , as NBA Automotive suggests
, it is “wholly unrelated” to Hooman Enterprises , Inc.

, NBA Automotive was very much rela ted to Hooman Chevrolet, the name that appears in Guzman’s administrative complaint. Which the
evidence at trial confirmed: NBA Automotive’s service manager testified the name “Hooman Chevrolet” was on the building
where he and Guzman worke d , and N BA Automotive’s general manager testified he was the general manager at “ Hooman
Chevrolet. ” 9
Cole v. Antelope Valley Union High School Dist . (1996)

47 Cal.App. 5th 1 505

, on which NBA Automotive relies, is distinguishable

. In that case the court held th e plaintiff did not
exhaust his administrative remedies before filing an action against two of his supervisors because those supervisors “were not mentioned in the administrative charge at all.” ( Id. at

p. 1511.) The plaintiff named in the caption and bo dy of the

9 The general manger also testified his employer w as “Nissani Brothers Automotive,” indicating he viewed the two entities as related , if not the same

.15

complaint only the school district that employed him and a different supervisor. ( Id. at p. 1509.) Unlike the plaintiff in Cole

, who sought to sue individuals who were not identified i n the
administrative complaint

, Guzman made clear she intended to sue her employer, wh om she knew by the name Hooman
Chevrolet ; s he did not seek to sue supervisors in their individual capacities or any entity other than her true employer. (Cf.
Alexander

, supra , 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 243, 251 [plaintiffs’
fai lure to mention anywhere in their administrative complaint a corporation that was separate from the named respondents precluded “their bringing a civil FEHA action against it” ]; Valdez v. City of Los Angeles

, supra , 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1060

- 1061 [ plainti ff’s failure to name in his administrative complaint
certain supervisors and managers precluded him from bringing a civil action against them individually ] .) 10

10 Because Guzman exhausted her administrative remedies by filing her original administrative complaint, we do not decide whether, as NBA Automotive contends, the trial court erred in ruling DFEH properly allowed Guzman to amend her administrative complaint. (See Clark

, supra , 62 Cal.App.5th at

p. 310, fn. 25 [because the plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies when she filed her original complaint, “her failure to amend her DFEH Complaint to state [her employer’s] proper legal name prior to the trial court’s granting of sum mary adjudication is immaterial ”].) In addition, t he trial court did not err in denying NBA Automotive’s motion for a new trial for the

same reason s it did not err in denying NBA Automotive’s motion for judgment notwithstandin g the verdict

.16 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed

. Guzman is to recover her costs on appeal.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

FEUER

, J.