NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 21a0369n.06

Case No. 20-5813

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DANNY COLLINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

KENTUCKY

OPINION

BEFORE: BATCHELDER, WHITE, and DONALD; Circuit Judges.

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Danny Collins 

appeals after a jury found him guilty of various drug and felon-in-possession charges. Specifically, 

Collins claims that the district court’s prohibition on recross examination without leave of court is 

structural error mandating reversal. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM Collins’ 

conviction. 

I.

In June of 2019, Collins was indicted on three counts. Count One charged Collins with 

conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Count Two charged Collins with possession of a firearm in furtherance of 
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a drug-trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Finally, Count Four1charged 

Collins with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). An 

investigation conducted by federal, local, and state police purported to show that Collins and four 

others (Samantha Collins, Kevin Quillen, Michael Slone, and Sabrina Chaffins) were involved in 

a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and that Collins “supervised” and led the conspiracy. 

At his initial appearance and arraignment, Collins pleaded not guilty. The district court then 

conducted a two-day jury trial on March 12 and 13, 2020. The government called seven witnesses.

Michael Slone. The government’s first witness, Michael Slone, was an acquaintance of 

Collins who testified on direct examination that he went with Collins to Louisville, Kentucky to 

introduce Collins to methamphetamine suppliers. Slone also testified that Collins would bring a 

pistol with him each time the two traveled to Louisville. Slone, charged in the same indictment as 

Collins, also testified as to his own guilty plea. On cross examination, Collins’ counsel asked 

Slone if he expected anything in return for his testimony. Slone responded that he was expecting 

nothing and that nothing was “built into [his] plea agreement” in exchange for his testimony. On 

redirect, Slone testified that at the time he made his initial statement to law enforcement (in which 

Slone provided a list of individuals involved in the sale of methamphetamine), he had no plea 

agreement, nor had anyone made any promises to him. He did concede that in his plea agreement, 

he agreed to continue to cooperate and would “lose everything” (i.e., cooperation credit) if he 

perjured himself in his testimony. Collins’ counsel did not request any recross, instead telling the 

trial court that he had no further questions. 

1 Count Three charged only Samantha Collins, Collins’ daughter, with possession of a firearm in 

furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense. 
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Omar Sandlin. As its second witness, the government called Oman Sandlin, a Kentucky 

State Police detective involved in the investigation of Collins. On direct, Sandlin testified that a 

confidential informant named Scotty Couch contacted Sandlin, as a result of which law 

enforcement used Couch in eight separate controlled buys. In performing those controlled buys, 

Couch had with him a recording device that captured the buys; when the government moved to 

introduce those videos into the record, Collins’ counsel stated that he had viewed the eight videos 

and had no objection. Sandlin also testified that the packages obtained from the controlled buys 

tested positive for methamphetamine. 

On cross, Collins’ counsel questioned Sandlin about Couch’s motivation in acting as a 

confidential informant, i.e., that Couch was under indictment at the time and would have expected 

to receive some leniency for his cooperation. At a sidebar conference, defense counsel pointed 

out to the district court that one of the videos appeared to not record a “very important part of the 

video.” Counsel “want[ed] to know why [Couch] misses trying to photograph something that 

would be that important.” Back in front of the jury, Sandlin agreed with counsel that it would be 

“odd” if a confidential informant failed to record something important if the informant 

intentionally hid the camera. Defense counsel also asked Sandlin about the lack of fingerprints 

taken from the baggies of drugs obtained from the controlled buys; Sandlin testified that the 

Kentucky State Police practice is to not take fingerprints from the bags, given the potential harm 

of coming into direct contact with the substance. Finally, defense counsel asked how much money 

Couch might have received from law enforcement. Specifically, Collins’ counsel stated: 

Q: And if I told you that the information supplied from the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office involving [Couch] was, there was $800 on this, and then another 

$1,200, and then another $2,700, unless the 800 is included somewhere in 

there. So that comes to almost $4,000. $3,900 altogether. Would that 

surprise you? 

A: No. 
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On redirect, the government asked Sandlin whether “the Kentucky State Police paid for, 

the totality of all of those buys, approximately $800,” to which Sandlin responded affirmatively. 

The government then asked Sandlin about the video recordings of the controlled buys; Sandlin 

testified that Couch created a “good quality video” from the controlled buys and that he did not 

see any evidence Couch was attempting to hide anything from the camera. Next, the government 

asked Sandlin about law enforcement’s attempts to surveil Collins’ trailer and the difficulties in 

doing so given the tint of the windows. The government asked Sandlin to describe “the area [i.e., 

the trailer] and, more importantly, the tint of the windows.” Sandlin responded that law 

enforcement did have several vehicles surveilling the trailer but that they could not see inside the 

trailer. The district court then interrupted, advising the government to “watch the scope of your 

redirect. I’m not sure that’s responsive to the cross.” The government returned to asking about 

the allegedly missing part of the video, asking Sandlin whether the tint (and the resulting darkness 

inside) could have caused the video to go “black” at certain times; Sandlin responded affirmatively, 

agreeing that there was little natural light inside the trailer. 

At this point, Collins’ counsel requested recross. The following took place at a sidebar 

conference: 

District Court: I only allow recross with leave. So what do you want to 

recross on?

Defense Counsel: Well, I was going to ask [Sandlin] about the number of 

investigations that this young man [i.e., Couch] has done, 

how many trips, to try to equate the money to it. It’s hard. 

District Court: I think it is covered.

Defense Counsel: All right. Thank you. 

Scotty Couch. The government then called its third witness, Scotty Couch, who testified 

on direct to the eight controlled buys he conducted on behalf of law enforcement in their 

investigation of Collins and others. The government introduced the video recordings of those 
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controlled buys. On cross, Collins’ counsel asked Couch how many “trips” he made for the Collins 

investigation and how much he made for each; Couch responded that he performed eight buys and 

received approximately $100 per trip. Couch also noted that at the time of the Collins investigation 

he was involved in other law enforcement investigations. On redirect, the government asked about 

the source of the $3,900 that Couch purportedly received from the totality of his cooperation (given 

his testimony that he made only $800 for the Collins investigation); this testimony clarified that 

Couch made money from other Kentucky State Police and ATF investigations rather than $3,900 

from the Collins investigation alone. At the conclusion of redirect, the district court excused the 

witness. Collins’ defense counsel did not request any recross. 

Barry Engle. The government’s fourth witness was Barry Engle, a retired Kentucky 

sergeant. On direct, Engle testified to the execution of the search warrant on Collins’ residence on 

March 12, 2018. He testified that law enforcement found Collins unconscious in his pickup truck, 

where police found over 26 grams of methamphetamine. Engle also testified that when law 

enforcement searched the residence, they found a safe; Collins opted to open that safe so that law 

enforcement would not have to destroy it. Collins then led officers to the safe where he entered 

the correct combination; inside that safe was over 500 grams of methamphetamine. On cross, 

Engle clarified that there were two safes found inside; he accompanied Collins to the gun safe (as 

described on direct) but does not know what was found in a separate, smaller safe. He also clarified 

that Collins and his daughter, Samantha, were not placed together in the same police vehicle before 

Collins went in and opened the gun safe. On redirect, the government asked Engle why they would 

have kept Samantha and Collins separate; Engle responded that they did so to ensure the two did 

not “coincide their stories together.” Engle also reiterated that Collins opened the larger gun safe 

but that he believed Samantha opened the separate smaller safe. Engle also testified that no one 
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had the chance to give Collins the gun safe’s combination, i.e., that Collins knew the combination 

himself. At the conclusion of redirect, Collins’ counsel made no request for recross, and the district 

court excused the witness. 

Alisha Congleton. The government’s next witness, Alisha Congleton, was a Letcher 

County officer at the time and, like Engle, she testified to the details of the search warrant 

execution. On direct, she confirmed much of Engle’s previous testimony. She found Collins 

passed out in what she believed was a black Mazda pickup truck. She also testified to the search 

of two separate safes; officers found one small safe in Samantha’s room, which Samantha herself 

opened. The other safe was located in Collins’ bedroom, and Collins entered the house with 

officers to open that safe. Congleton explained that officers first asked Samantha if she knew the 

code to the safe in Collins’ bedroom, but that she did not, so officers asked Collins to open that 

larger safe. On cross examination, Collins’ counsel asked Congleton only about the pickup truck 

and whether she knew if it was a Mazda or a Ford. On a brief redirect, the government asked 

Congleton to clarify whether she thought Collins was found in a Mazda or Ford. Collins’ counsel 

did not thereafter request any recross, and the court excused the witness. 

Jeffrey Baker. Next, the government called Jeffrey Baker, a special agent with the ATF. 

Baker testified on direct to the procedures law enforcement used with the controlled buys and 

noted that he never had any issues using Couch as an informant. Baker also testified that law 

enforcement found over $10,000-worth of methamphetamine at Collins’ residence during the 

March 12 search. On cross, Collins’ counsel asked Baker whether law enforcement used any 

marked money; Baker responded that the money was prerecorded but that no investigation was 

conducted to determine if any marked money was recovered. Nor did law enforcement take any 

fingerprints from a weapon allegedly purchased during one of the drug transactions. Next, defense 
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counsel asked Baker specifically about the March 2 search (the search during which Collins 

appears to claim the informant Couch failed to record something on the video). On redirect, the 

government pulled back up the video from the March 2 search and asked Baker what he believed 

was covering the camera at one part of the video. Baker responded that he believed it was “his” 

hand (i.e., Collins’ hand). At a sidebar, defense counsel objected to Baker’s purported 

identification of the hand as Collins’ hand. Rather than sustain the objection, the district court 

offered defense counsel “limited recross on that basis[.]” After first agreeing to conduct that 

limited recross, defense counsel “changed [his] mind[,]” and Baker was excused. 

William Farley. Finally, the government called William Farley as its last witness; Farley 

is Collins’ brother-in-law. He testified on direct to living next door to Collins’ residence where he 

saw a significant volume of vehicle traffic that was indicative, to him, of drug trafficking. The 

government also asked Farley about a statement he allegedly made to law enforcement on March 

29, 2018; specifically, the government asked Farley whether he told ATF officers that Collins 

admitted to being a meth dealer. Farley responded with “if I said that, I probably said it . . . I’ll be 

honest, I suspected things, but it wasn’t something that I wanted to be associated with.” Farley 

also responded that he remembered telling officers that he knew Collins and Samantha were 

“heavily involved in the illegal drug trade.” On cross, defense counsel briefly asked Farley about 

Collins’ social security payments and Farley’s custody of Collins’ minor child. There was no 

redirect, and the government then rested. Collins rested without calling any witnesses.

The jury then returned a verdict of guilty on all three counts. On July 13, the district court 

entered final judgment and sentenced Collins to 251 months’ imprisonment, toward the lower end 

of the relevant Guidelines range as established in the PSR. Collins then timely appealed, claiming 

as error only the district court’s refusal to permit some recross-examination. 
Case No. 20-5813, United States v. Collins

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II.

Neither party clearly proffers the appropriate standard of review to apply here.2 On the 

one hand, when a party does not contemporaneously object to a purported error below (as Collins 

failed to do here), we generally review for plain error. United States v. Milan, 398 F.3d 445, 450-

51 (6th Cir. 2005). On the other hand, even when “plain-error review might have been available 

for this claim,” when neither party requests plain-error review—as is the case here where the 

government asks that we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard—we will typically not apply 

2 Collins asserts that the error was structural and mandates automatic reversal, but Collins does not 

clearly argue how or why the purported error here falls within the “very limited class of cases” that affect 

the “framework within which the trial proceeds[.]” See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997)

(quotation and citation omitted). That “very limited class of cases” includes, for example, the total 

deprivation of the right to counsel, the lack of an impartial trial judge, the right to self-representation at 

trial, and the right to a public trial. Id. at 468-69 (citing, in relevant part, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 

335 (1963); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984); Waller v. 

Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984)). 

In arguing that the error here was structural rather than subject to harmless error review, Collins 

says that the effects of being forced to seek leave to recross “are simply too hard to measure” because “[w]e 

cannot know what recross examination would yield,” parroting an example of structural error described by 

the Supreme Court. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017); [Appellant Br. at 24]. Yet, in 

his appellate briefing, Collins—presumably with the benefit of hindsight—sets forth for some of the 

witnesses precisely what he would have asked that witness on recross had he sought leave to recross and 

had the court granted it. And the questions that Collins says he would have asked on recross were already 

covered in previous testimony. These arguments belie the point Collins seeks to make: he has told us 

precisely what he wanted recross to yield and we can measure that harm by evaluating what was brought 

out in other testimony.

Moreover, in arguing in his reply brief that the government misunderstands his claim, Collins 

appears to assert that the specific “constitutional error” he complains of is a violation of the Confrontation 

Clause. [Reply Br. at 1-4]. And it is well established that Confrontation Clause errors are subject to 

harmless-error analysis and are not treated as structural errors. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 

(1986) (“improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness . . . like other Confrontation 

Clause errors, is subject to [] harmless error analysis”). 

Collins goes on to claim that the system used by the district court—requiring leave before any 

recross—improperly delegates to the district court the determination of whether recross is appropriate; 

instead, Collins claims, trial counsel should make that determination. He asserts that this “structure 

impinges upon and denies the right to counsel concerning the determination of whether or not to recross.” 

This assertion finds no support in our caselaw. Generally, trial courts have “broad discretion in the conduct 

of a trial[,]” Geisler v. Folsom, 735 F.2d 991, 997 (6th Cir. 1984), and that broad discretion includes the 

discretion to limit the extent or scope of the examination of a witness. Dorsey v. Parke, 872 F.2d 163, 167 

(6th Cir. 1989). 
Case No. 20-5813, United States v. Collins

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plain-error review. United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 763 (6th Cir. 2011); see also United 

States v. Blackie, 548 F.3d 395, 404 (6th Cir. 2008) (Sutton, J., concurring) (“The government 

never asked us to apply plain-error review to this claim, which by itself is reason enough not to 

apply this standard to the issue.”). 

Therefore, though Collins failed to object below, because the government does not ask us 

to apply plain-error review, we ask here whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing 

recross examination only with leave of court. 

III.

The Confrontation Clause grants defendants the right to confront witnesses against them. 

U.S. CONST amend. VI. At the same time, “the right to cross-examine is not absolute.” United 

States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 535 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920, 

929-30 (6th Cir. 1986)). The Federal Rules of Evidence afford broad discretion to trial courts to 

conduct proceedings before them. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) (directing trial courts to “exercise 

reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence” so 

as to, among other purposes, “avoid wasting time”); see also Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 

86 (recognizing the important role of trial judges and explaining that they “must meet situations 

as they arise and to do this must have broad power to cope with the complexities and contingencies 

inherent in the adversary process”). We have recognized the breadth of that discretion in two 

relevant ways. First, trial courts “have latitude to ‘impose reasonable limits on such crossexamination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, the witness’[s] safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.’” 

Beverly, 369 F.3d at 535 (quoting United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1022 (6th Cir. 1992)); 

see also Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (recognizing that “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as 
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the Confrontation Clause is concerned” to impose “reasonable limits” on the cross-examination of 

witnesses). Second, and more specifically relevant here, trial courts have discretion “to curtail or 

even to deny recross-examination if the government elicits no new matters on redirect 

examination.” United States v. Payne, 437 F.3d 540, 548 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. 

Odom, 13 F.3d 949, 957 (6th Cir. 1994) and United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1350 (6th Cir. 

1993)). In Payne, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the 

defendant’s request to recross a government witness based on allegedly “new topics” raised on 

redirect; we reached this conclusion by considering whether anything raised on redirect was 

actually new or was instead previously covered. Id. at 548-50. 

In this case, for six of the seven witnesses, Collins either failed to request recross (Slone, 

Couch, Engle, Congleton) or turned down the chance to recross when explicitly offered by the 

district court (Baker), or there was no redirect examination after which any recross examination 

could have followed (Farley). The record thus flatly contradicts Collins’ claim on appeal that the 

district court “did not allow recross” examination for these witnesses; in only one case (Sandlin) 

did the district court attempt to limit the scope of recross, and even then Collins failed to object. 

With every other witness, the district court took no action because Collins took no action. We 

cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to disallow Collins to do something 

that Collins did not even request to do. See United States v. Kone, 307 F.3d 430, 437 (6th Cir. 

2002) (“In order to preserve an issue for appeal . . . [the defendant’s] attorney was obligated to 

object each time the trial judge limited the attorney’s efforts to cross-examine a particular 

witness.”).

3

3

See also Jordan v. Warden, Lebanon Correctional Inst., 675 F.3d 586, 594 (6th Cir. 2012) (“There 

is no evidence in the record that defense counsel attempted to cross-examine C.A. about her sexual history, 
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In the case of Sandlin, there was no new topic covered on redirect that would have merited 

recross, and as such, the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of recross. 

As we did in Payne, we consider here the scope of testimony on redirect and ask whether any new 

topics were covered on redirect that would have merited recross. Payne, 437 F.3d at 549-50; see 

also Odom, 13 F.3d at 957. When Collins’ counsel asked to recross Sandlin, the district court set 

forth its policy of allowing recross only with leave and asked counsel what he wanted to recross 

on. Counsel answered that he wanted to ask “about the number of investigations that this young 

man [i.e., Couch] had done, how many trips, to try to equate the money to it.” As the district court 

explained at the time, those topics were already covered on cross.

4 On direct, Sandlin testified to 

the number of controlled buys that Couch participated in, and on cross, Collins’ counsel asked 

Sandlin about the compensation Couch might have received for each of those buys. Collins’ 

counsel on cross raised the specific amount of $3,900 and asked whether that total amount would 

surprise Sandlin. So, on redirect when the government asked Sandlin to clarify how much Couch 

would have received for each controlled buy, the government was not wading into previouslyunexplored topics that would have merited recross. Collins’ counsel raised the issue on cross, and 

the government responded on redirect. The district court did not abuse its discretion in explaining 

that the number of buys and Couch’s compensation were already covered such that any further 

recross would have been “repetitive or only marginally relevant.” See Payne, 437 F.3d at 548-50

(quoting Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 633 (6th Cir. 2003)); Odom, 13 F.3d at 957. And 

and Jordan admits as much. Jordan cannot now base a confrontation-clause error on his trial counsel’s 

strategies or shortcomings in not posing these questions to C.A.”). 

4 Additionally, to the extent Collins’ counsel was asking Sandlin questions about Couch, Couch 

was the next witness, and Collins’ counsel was able to directly ask Couch questions about the number of 

investigations and controlled buys that he participated in. For that reason, even if we were to find that the 

district court abused its discretion, any error here would be harmless because Collins had the chance to 

question Couch on the topics Collins’ counsel claims he wanted to ask Sandlin about Couch. 
Case No. 20-5813, United States v. Collins

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notably, after the district court denied recross on the issue of Couch’s compensation, Collins’ 

counsel responded “[a]ll right. Thank you,” and did not raise any objection nor request recross on 

any other topic. (R. 179, PageID #597). 

On appeal, Collins makes a markedly different argument with respect to Sandlin, now

claiming he actually would have asked about something entirely different. For the first time, he 

asserts that on recross he would have examined Sandlin as to his testimony on redirect regarding 

the poor quality of some of the video recordings that resulted from the heavy tint of Collins’ 

windows. Collins did not request the opportunity to recross Sandlin on this issue and for that 

reason the argument is forfeited. See United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Corp., 191 F.3d 

750, 758-59 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that where an argument was “never presented to the district 

court” it “cannot be considered by this court.”). But even if the argument were not forfeited, it 

would likely fail on the merits as well. Arguably, the tint of the window and the resulting quality 

of the video was not something raised anew on redirect because Collins’ counsel brought up, on 

cross, the allegedly missing or obscured portion of one of the video recordings. Therefore, when 

the government on redirect asked Sandlin to clarify what may have caused the video to be obscured 

(including the tint of the windows and the resulting lack of natural light in the residence), the 

government was probably not encroaching into new territory that would have mandated that 

Collins be given a chance to recross the witness. Collins’ counsel suggested Couch intentionally 

failed to record the scene; the government rebutted that suggestion on redirect. In any event, the 

district court clearly did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant recross on an issue where recross 

was not requested. For that reason alone, the claim fails.

5

5 We also note that it is clear the district court understood the propriety of allowing recross on any 

new topics raised in redirect. At one point, the district court cautioned the government to “watch the scope 

of your redirect” when the government asked Sandlin about the ability to see inside the residence from the 

outside, a topic not raised on cross. At another point, the district court offered Collins the chance to redirect 
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IV. 

For six of the seven witnesses, Collins either failed to ask for recross, disclaimed the chance 

to recross when offered by the district court, or had no opportunity to recross because there was 

no redirect. With the remaining witness, Sandlin, the government raised no new topics on redirect 

that would have merited recross. For those reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion,

and we therefore AFFIRM. 

when the district court believed Baker had spoken about something new on redirect (whether a hand in the 

video was Collins’). In that instance, the only apparent time the government expanded the scope of the 

witness’s testimony on redirect, Collins’ counsel chose not to ask anything on recross.