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AFGHANISTAN: HONORING THE HEROES OF 

EXTORTION 17 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 27, 2014 

Serial No. 113–98 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOC HASTINGS, Washington 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

TONY CARDENAS, California 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

Vacancy 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

STEPHEN CASTOR, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on February 27, 2014 ....................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Garry Reid, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special 

Operations & Low Intensity Conflict, U.S. Department of Defense 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 6 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8 

Ms. Deborah Skillman, Director, Casualty & Mortuary Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 20 

Colonel John Devillier, USAF, Commander, Air Force Mortuary Affairs Operations, U.S. Department of Defense 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 21 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 23 

Colonel Kerk Brown, USA, Director, Army Casualty & Mortuary Affairs, 

U.S. Department of Defense 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 29 

Commander Aaron Brodsky, USN, Director, Navy Casualty Services, U.S. 

Department of Defense 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 29 

APPENDIX 

Joint Statement for OSD, Army & Navy Casualty & Mortuary Affairs ............. 52 

Statements of Mary Strange, Terry Pittman, Ida Pittman, Charlie Strange 

and Doug Hamburger, submitted by Rep. Chaffetz .......................................... 64 

DD Form 93 submitted by Rep. Chaffetz .............................................................. 79 

News Release Aug. 11, 2011: DOD Identifies Service members killed in CH– 

47 crash ................................................................................................................. 83 

(1) 

AFGHANISTAN: HONORING THE HEROES OF 

EXTORTION 17 

Thursday, February 27, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Lummis, Mica, Duncan, 

Amash, Woodall, Tierney, Maloney, Lynch, Speier, Kelly, Welch, 

and Grisham. 

Also Present: Representatives Rigell and Fortenberry. 

Staff Present: Brien A. Beattie, Professional Staff Member; Adam 

P. Fromm, Director of Member Services and Committee Operations; 

Linda Good, Chief Clerk; Frederick Hill, Director of Communications and Senior Policy Advisor; Mitchell S. Kominsky, Counsel; 

Jim Lewis, Senior Policy Advisor; John Ohly, Professional Staff 

Member; Laura Rush, Deputy Chief Clerk; Sarah Vance, Assistant 

Clerk; Sang H. Yi, Professional Staff Member; Jaron Bourke, Minority Director of Administration; Devon Hill, Minority Research 

Assistant; Jennifer Hoffman, Minority Press Secretary; Peter 

Kenny, Minority Counsel; Chris Knauer, Minority Senior Investigator; Julia Krieger, Minority New Media Press Secretary; Elisa 

LaNier, Minority Deputy Clerk; Juan McCullum, Minority Clerk; 

and Dave Rapallo, Minority Staff Director. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Committee will come to order. Thank you all for 

being here. I—this hearing, Afghanistan, Honoring the Heroes of 

Extortion 17, has been extraordinarily difficult to organize this 

hearing, because it’s proved nearly impossible to effectively solicit 

and subsequently meet the needs and wishes of every family member and loved one that was onboard Extortion 17. 

I want to assure the families that this committee has questioned 

the Department of Defense officials on the full spectrum of the mission, to include extremely sensitive and highly classified information, in an effort to fully understand the events pertaining to the 

tragedy that unfolded that day. We have tried our best to treat all 

the families’ interests equally, knowing that there’s a wide range 

of spectrum and perspectives, given the sheer number of people 

and families that are engaged in this. 

Two of these—two of our—America’s best happen to be from my 

congressional district in Utah. And a number of members obviously 

care deeply about this issue. You’re going to see members coming 

2 

and going in this hearing. We have lots of different things happening here in Congress at the same time. 

Some families may claim we have not done enough by not allowing classified or highly graphic information to be discussed today 

and others may claim that any discussion about Extortion 17 is 

counterproductive and opens old wounds. If I did not believe that 

the majority of the families wanted a forum like this to exist, we 

would not be conducting this hearing. It is extremely sensitive. 

There are things that we cannot and will not be discussing in this 

hearing, given the classified nature. I hope people will understand 

that. That’s the way the United States of America operates. And 

our first and foremost concern is to make sure that we protect the 

ongoing lives and operations of the United States military. But I 

will say that the United States is different than the rest of the 

world. We are open, we are transparent, we are self-critical, and 

we do so in the spirit of making things better. 

I’d also—so today as we start this, I’d like to welcome Ranking 

Member Tierney of the subcommittee, particularly Congressman 

Lynch, who’s shown a great deal of interest in this. I want to welcome Mr. Rigell, who’s spent a lot of time on this. Although not a 

member of this committee, I appreciate his presence here today. 

On August 6th of 2011, Taliban insurgents killed 30 American 

servicemen, including 17 Navy SEALs, making it the largest single 

day loss of life in naval special warfare history and the largest single day loss of life during the war in Afghanistan. The events that 

unfolded that night are commonly referred to as Extortion 17, 

which is the call sign for the helicopter transporting the special operations personnel. 

We are here today at the request of many of the families of the 

fallen heroes aboard Extortion 17 to obtain answers to their questions where answers can be found. This hearing also serves to 

honor the 30 American servicemen aboard Extortion 17 and their 

families. I’ve traveled to Afghanistan numerous times, visited with 

the servicemen and women there, and have nothing but the greatest respect and admiration that are serving our country. 

Over the course of many months, the committee has had an open 

and ongoing dialogue with many of the families and servicemen, 

families of the servicemen aboard Extortion 17. In an effort to find 

answers to many of the outstanding questions regarding Extortion 

17, some concerning the operation, others regarding postmortem 

events, we have welcomed the families to communicate their 

thoughts and concerns with the committee. 

In addition to attending a funeral of one of the servicemen 

aboard Extortion 17, I personally met with some of the families of 

the 30 servicemen to hear their concerns and listen carefully to 

what questions they had about the tragic event. 

I offer my deepest condolences to all the families who’ve lost a 

loved one as a result of this incredibly tragic event. My heart also 

goes out to the bigger, broader military family and community, because I know how much they care about their colleagues and 

friends and people that they serve with. 

It is important as a Nation we not forget the service of all the 

men and women who serve this country. They’ve served us in the 

past, they’re serving us now, and they will serve us in the future. 

3 

In advance of this hearing, the committee staff has invited and 

encouraged families to submit written testimony for the record and 

to pass on some of their questions that may be directed to the Department of Defense by Members of Congress. There is an order 

and a process to this, which I’m proud to help facilitate. 

Because the committee takes the concerns of families with great 

sincerity, for more than 8 months we have been reviewing the facts 

surrounding Extortion 17. The committee has performed an extensive review of almost 2,000 pages of unclassified material related 

to Extortion 17, the committee has also met with independent 

sources with direct and indirect knowledge of the facts surrounding 

Extortion 17. 

To address some of the unanswered questions, the committee received briefings, classified and unclassified, on the operational component leading up to the loss of the 30 servicemen and eight Afghan nationals, and on the postmortem handling of the 30 American servicemen on Extortion 17. 

I’d like to take a moment to thank the Department of Defense 

for their cooperation with the subcommittee in providing answers 

to many of the questions I have asked and others have asked of 

the Department. The facts surrounding Extortion 17 are terribly 

heartbreaking, and we appreciate the candor and willingness to answer difficult questions from both sides of the aisle. The committee 

has reviewed these facts in a bipartisan way, we have had open, 

transparent dialogue with our colleagues on both sides of the aisle. 

Today the committee will be specifically looking into whether the 

remains of U.S. personnel were treated with the proper respect 

they deserve, and whether Department of Defense procedures were 

followed and sufficient. I strongly believe that every fallen hero deserves to be treated with the proper amount of dignity and respect. 

If there are concerns calling into question the Department policies, 

we are here today to have productive discussion on how we can ensure the proper treatment of the remains of servicemen. 

I’d like to emphasize, it is the intent of the subcommittee to obtain all the available information about the events following the 

crash of Extortion 17, dispel potential myths, and to learn from the 

event so we can assure that proper reforms are implemented. 

I want to take a moment to recognize the dedication of our loyal 

servicemen to this country in maintaining the security and bedrock 

of our principles. In this vein, I’m greatly saddened that 1,795 U.S. 

military personnel have given their lives to serve in Afghanistan 

since September 11th, 2001, and 19,665 have been wounded in action during that same time frame. We must pay respect to those 

men and women and their families and thank them for their service. I personally believe as a community, as a Nation, we can do 

more to help and support and recognize and honor them. 

At that same time, I want to commend the witnesses, three of 

which are dressed in uniform and two retired officers for their service to this country and thank them for appearing before this subcommittee on a very difficult topic. Their heart’s in the right place, 

having met with them and chatted with them. They serve our Nation. We honor them and we thank you for what it—in attending 

what is obviously a very difficult topic, but we appreciate your 

service and we thank you for being here today. 

4 

With that, I’d now like to recognize the distinguished Ranking 

Member, the gentlemen from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney, for his 

opening statement. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before we begin today, 

I think it’s extremely important that we honor the lives of all of 

our fallen heroes for the untold contributions that they’ve made to 

the service of this country and to the families who mourn their 

losses. We need to remember that not only did we lose 30 great 

warriors that night in the Afghan battlefield, but the burden is 

now carried by the families who lost sons and fathers, brothers and 

husbands. 

I’d also like to acknowledge that some of the families are here 

with us today. For you and the other families who couldn’t attend 

today’s proceedings, I want to express my profound gratitude for 

your sons’ service and also express my condolences for your loss. 

Mr. Chairman, I understand that there are some out there who 

strongly believe this hearing is necessary, and there are other families and their representatives who have contacted the subcommittee and expressed great concern about today’s hearing. 

They’ve asked for privacy and they seek closure. So I realize that 

some have more questions about what happened; we should acknowledge that not all of the families affected with this tragedy 

support these proceedings. And I have confidence, Mr. Chairman, 

that you will make all efforts to conduct today’s discussion with 

both dignity and fairness. 

I think it’s also important to acknowledge that earlier this week, 

senior officials from the Pentagon provided an extensive briefing to 

members and staff, where many questions were asked and answered about the topics that we may not be able to discuss at today’s hearing. We also received an unclassified briefing last week 

on some of the post operations concerns that you do intend to discuss today. Pentagon officials provided answers to many questions, 

and I look forward to their testimony today, which I hope may provide some answers to those that are still seeking them. 

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to acknowledge the distinguished men and women on today’s panel. These officials also serve 

their country. Some have even served in harm’s way and others 

served as one of the final caretakers of our fallen heroes. During 

the briefings last week, we heard from these officials just how 

humbling their work truly is, and it is not made it any easier by 

the fact that the fallen heroes are also their comrades. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by noting that to date, 

we have lost 2,175 great Americans during the war in Afghanistan 

and tens of thousands and others who have been wounded and severely debilitated. 

While we are here today to discuss the events surrounding the 

tragic deaths of 30 brave Americans, let’s also take the opportunity 

to acknowledge the thousands of men and women who have sacrificed and paid the ultimate price in their service to this country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I have a unanimous consent request. 

I would request, Mr. Chairman, that after your remarks and the 

remarks of the ranking member, that we insert in the record of this 

hearing at this point the names of those individuals, servicemen 

5 

who lost their life in the C–47 Chinook helicopter disaster. And I 

would ask that that be printed immediately after your remarks. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

I’d like to also thank again the members of our—of our subcommittee for attending today. I’d also like to recognize Mr. 

Fortenberry from Nebraska, who’s been very active and involved 

and engaged in this issue, and I appreciate his presence here 

today. 

I would also remind members that they may have 7 days to submit opening statements for the record. That would be all members, 

even those that do not serve here on our committee. 

It’s now, at this point, I’d like to recognize our panel. And we 

have members representing the Pentagon, and we have Mr. Garry 

P. Reid, who’s the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Defense For Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict at the 

United States Department of Defense; Ms. Deborah Skillman, is 

the director of Casualty and Mortuary Affairs at the United States 

Department of Defense; we have Colonel John Devillier. Devillier? 

Devillier—my apologies—is the Commander of Air Force Mortuary 

Affairs Operations at the United States Department of Defense; 

Colonel Kerk Brown is the director of Army Casualty and Mortuary 

Affairs—Mortuary Affairs Operations Center at the United States 

Department of Defense. And we have Commander Aaron Brodsky 

who is the director of Navy Casualty Services at the United States 

Department of Defense. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn before 

they testify. If you’d please rise and raise your right hands. Do you 

solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you’re about to give 

will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? 

Thank you. You may be seated. Let the record reflect that the witnesses all answered in the affirmative. 

As we have discussed with the Department of Defense, I want 

our audience, and particularly the families, to know that there are 

some limitations in things that we can discuss. As I’ve mentioned, 

there are certain classified information, certain things about the 

actual operation itself that we cannot and will not in a non-classified setting discuss. This is for the safety and security of the ongoing operations of our U.S. military. It is imperative that we do this 

so that we do not allow insurgents and other enemies of the United 

States of America to gain an operational advantage. We will adhere 

to that. 

I will assure you that as representatives, we have had classified 

briefings, and if we have to have additional classified briefings, we 

will, so members can ask their questions. The Department of Defense and the witnesses here today understand this. 

We are—while we have five witnesses here today, I believe we’re 

going to have three opening statements, so we’re going to give 

great liberty to the fact that some of these have been combined. 

And I believe we’re going to start first with Mr. Reid. Please go 

ahead. Proceed. 

6 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF GARRY REID 

Mr. REID. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member 

Tierney and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I’m here in the 

capacity as a senior defense official with oversight of our special operations, but I’m also here, and I bring to that job my background 

of 28 years of service in the U.S. Army in the Special Operations 

Forces working very closely with the organizations that we’ll be 

talking about today. I’m joined by a team of civilian and military 

subject matter experts to honor the fallen of Extortion 17 and to 

answer your questions. 

The downing of Extortion 17 was a catastrophic and unprecedented tragedy for our Nation. As you indicated, Chairman, sadly 

since 2001, there have been 1,795 U.S. military personnel killed in 

action in Afghanistan. Any loss of our warriors is a grim reminder 

of the tragedies of war, the violence of combat action, and the perilous lives our forces live each day in defense of our Nation and our 

values. 

Our sadness for their loss, however, cannot be compared to the 

pain and anguish of our Gold Star families, some of whom are here 

today. Their sacrifices cannot be measured and their losses can 

never be replaced. We are deeply humbled to be in their presence, 

and hope our testimony can answer their questions, and in some 

small measure, hope to bring them an additional amount of comfort. 

Above all, we are here to pay respect to our fallen heroes and pay 

tribute to their ultimate sacrifice and honor their service. 

Again, chairman, as you indicated, on August 5th, 2011, the 

brave men of Extortion 17 embarked on an important mission, as 

they had done so many times before. They were part of a highly 

capable task force that had conducted more than 2,800 operations 

in Afghanistan in the previous 12 months using tactics and methods proven in over 10 years of combat against the Taliban and Al 

Qaeda in Afghanistan. 

Tragically, as Extortion 17 was nearing its landing zone, Taliban 

fighters, hidden in a building, fired two or three rocket-propelled 

grenades at close range, leaving the pilot no chance to perform evasive maneuvers. One rocket struck a rotor blade, causing the aircraft to crash almost instantly. 

The recovery operation commenced immediately and lasted 4 

days. All of the fallen were recovered within hours, and ultimately 

nearly all of the wreckage was recovered. Contrary to some unofficial statements, there was no flight data recorder, no so-called 

black box. This equipment is not standard on this aircraft. 

All of the fallen were taken to Bagram Air Base. A solemn memorial service marked the beginning of a dignified and respectful 

journey home for the brave men of Extortion 17. A U.S. military 

chaplain paid tribute to the fallen, as did both the commander of 

the U.S. task force and the Afghan special operations unit involved 

in the crash. 

An investigation was launched immediately, completed within 30 

days, and I’d just like to highlight some of the results and concluVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:06 Apr 24, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\87499.TXT APRIL
7 

sions of that investigation. We believe our forces employed sound 

tactics in planning and executing their fateful mission. Their high 

tempo operations paced over the previous months was essential to 

maintaining pressure on the enemy, and their success in past operations validated the effectiveness of their tactics. 

We believe the attachment of the Afghan soldiers enhances the 

potential for mission success. This specially selected group attached 

to our task force make invaluable additions to their capabilities, 

having superior knowledge of the operating environment, the cultural differences, and of course, the native language capability. 

We do not believe the special operations variant of the Chinook 

and air crew would have fared any differently than Extortion 17 on 

that night. There is no technology advantage inherent in the special operations model that would have protected it from the rocket 

that downed the aircraft. 

We recognize, however, that these helicopters are vulnerable to 

rocket-propelled grenades. Although there is currently no proven 

system to counter that particular weapon and that particular 

enemy tactic, in the 21⁄2 years since this tragic loss, we have fielded 

24 different survivability and safety equipment upgrades on over 

2,000 of our military aircraft, with the Chinook CH–47 receiving as 

many as four of these individual upgrades, and we continue our efforts with the support of Congress to fund the research and development to develop the countermeasures that we would need to protect against the RPG. But I have to say no advances in technology, 

or any change in the way we operate will bring back our fallen heroes or ease the pain of their loved ones. We honor their sacrifices 

by continuing to dedicate ourselves to defending the nation from attack, upholding our values as Americans and remembering the 

families left behind. Through our enduring commitment to these 

Gold Star families, we will cherish the sacrifices of the fallen and 

keep them forever in our hearts. 

Chairman, Ranking Member, I stand ready to address your questions. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Reid follows:] 

8 


Insert offset folio 1 here 87499.001

Statement By 

Garry Reid, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, United States Department of Defense 

Submitted to 

The United States House of Representatives 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Hearing on 

Afghanistan: Honoring the Heroes of Extortion 17, 

The U.S. CH-47D Aircraft Shot Down in Wardak Province, Afghanistan on August 6, 2011, 

Resulting in the deaths of 30 U.S. and Eight Afghan Military Personnel 

February 271\ 2014 
9 


Insert offset folio 2 here 87499.002

Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to examine the events 

following the loss of 30 U.S. Service Members, eight Afghans, and a U.S. military working dog 

aboard a U.S. military CH-47D Chinook helicopter, call sign "Extortion 17" that was shot down 

by a rocket propelled grenade while conducting combat operations in Wardak Province, 

Afghanistan on August 6'h, 2011. 

As a senior U.S. government official, I share in the sacred trust placed upon the 

Department of Defense by the families and loved ones of our brave servicemen and women to 

ensure they have the resources, policies, and oversight they need to protect our country from 

terrorist attacks like those of September 11,2001 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 

As a former Special Operations soldier, I understand the risks we ask our service members to 

take. Since 9111, there have been 1,795 U.S. military personnel killed and 19,665 wounded in 

action in Afghanistan. I The loss of our comrades in arms is a grim reminder of the tragedies of 

war, the violence of combat action, and the perilous lives they live each day in defense of our 

nation and our values. 

My sadness, however, cannot be compared to the pain and anguish of our Gold Star 

families, some of whom are here today. Their sacrifices cannot be measured, their grief cannot 

be washed away, and their loss can never be replaced. I am deeply humbled to be in their 

presence, and I hope my testimony today can help answer their questions and in some small 

measure help bring them comfort. Above all, I am here to respect our fallen heroes, pay tribute 

to their ultimate sacrifice, and honor their service. 

I Source: Source: U.S. Department of Defense, 26 February 2014, < http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf> 

2 
10 


Insert offset folio 3 here 87499.003

Eleven U.S. servicemen aboard Extortion 17 entered the military after the 9/11 attacks, 

answering the call to arms as so many brave Americans have done throughout the history of our 

great republic. Navy Petty Officer Nicholas Spehar, age 24, of St. Paul, Minnesota, the youngest 

SEAL in the group, was only 14 when the U.S. was attacked by al-Qa'ida. At just 21 years old, 

Army Specialist Spencer Duncan of Olathe, Kansas, a crewman on the Chinook helicopter, was 

the youngest on board. At 47, Army Chief Warrant Officer David Carter, of Centennial, 

Colorado, was the oldest. Many on board Extortion 17 had completed numerous deployments to 

Iraq and Afghanistan, taking the fight to a vicious and determined enemy, and denying that 

enemy the chance to achieve its goal of attacking us again at home. The U.S. did not ask for this 

war - and although the horrific imagery of 911 I may have faded from our memories, we cannot 

forget why we are fighting in Afghanistan. The Taliban hosted al-Qa'ida, allowed Usama Bin 

Laden to build his organization, and use Afghanistan as a launching pad to destroy the World 

Trade Center, attack the Pentagon, attempt to destroy the Capitol or the White House and kill 

2,996 innocent people, mostly Americans.2 If given the opportunity, they and those who follow 

them would try - and have tried - to attack us again. 

Qari Tahir, the man our forces were attempting to capture or kill on August 5t

h, 2011, is 

one of many Taliban leaders who dedicate their lives to a corrupt agenda that seeks to eliminate 

freedom, equality, and prosperity in exchange for a medieval society built on violent extremism 

and wanton destruction. In mid-20 11, he took command of the Tangi Valley, sitting at the top of 

a syndicate of sub-commanders to plan, organize, and conduct attacks on U.S. and Coalition 

2 "We Have Some Planes." 911 I Commission Report. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States. 2004. Retrieved October 1,2013. 

3 
11 


Insert offset folio 4 here 87499.004

forces. His area of operations in Wardak Province is just 50 miles from Kabul, the capital of 

Afghanistan. The Taliban place a premium on conducting spectacular attacks in Kabul to 

terrorize Afghans that support the government, and to kill U.S. and coalition forces. Capturing 

Qari Tahir would have given us valuable intelligence on plans for these attacks, and enabled 

more operations to dismantle the Taliban. 

The U.S. Navy SEAL task force assigned to conduct operations in Tangi Valley was well 

conditioned to the dangerous operating environment. In mid-2011, combined with a U.S. Army 

aviation battalion, they had spent weeks conducting operations nearly every other night in 

Wardak and surrounding provinces south of Kabul to capture or kill Taliban forces, disrupt 

attack plots, and deny them sanctuary on this strategic approach to Kabul City. 

Intelligence on August 5th indicated Qari Tahir was in Tangi Valley, just a short 

helicopter flight from the SEAL base camp. The Tangi Valley is strategic terrain that connects 

the two primary highways that lead to Kabul. The Kabul-Gazni highway defines the north end 

ofthe valley, and the Kabul-Gardez highway defines the southern end. The north end of the 

valley is only a couple of hundred meters wide, closely surrounded by mountain peaks on each 

side. The Tangi River winds through the valley southeast for about 10 miles, on the southern 

end the valley widens to more than four miles across. Melting snow from the high mountains to 

the north and west in central Afghanistan, and the occasion mountain rain shower, create a fertile 

valley floor that supports farming of apples and pomegranates. 

4 
12 


Insert offset folio 5 here 87499.005

Upon learning of Tahir's possible location, a team of U.S. Army Rangers and Afghan 

Special Forces was deployed into the valley from the south. At 10:58 p.m., they were inserted 

by the same CH-47D helicopters that would later conduct the mission to insert the SEAL team. 

As the operation got underway, our airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

(ISR) platforms, including an MQ-9 Predator, detected a group evading the Rangers, moving 

towards the north. AC-130 gunships orbiting overhead directed two AH-64 Apache attack 

helicopters to fire on and kill five enemy fighters. After some time another group of about 10 

Taliban fighters was spotted that we suspected could be Qari Tahir himself fleeing the scene. 

The SEAL task force was monitoring this activity, and they were soon called upon to deploy 

quickly into the northern end of the valley to intercept Tahir and capture him and those moving 

with him. The SEAL commander assembled his force: 17 Navy SEALs, five Navy combat 

support specialists, three U.S. Air Force Special Tactics Airmen, seven Afghan Special Forces 

operators, an Afghan interpreter, and a military working dog. The Afghan soldiers were an 

essential part ofthe package; they are trained to move with our forces to the target, and when 

tactical conditions allow initiate operations by calling out enemy forces. This tactic was highly 

successful; over a period of years hundreds of operations were conducted without firing a shot. 

After completing mission planning, and conducting coordination with the aviation unit, 

the SEAL Task Force moved to the CH-47s to commence the operation. At 2:22 a.m., on 

August 6th, Extortion 16 and Extortion 17 took off for the short flight to the selected landing 

zone, circling around the north side of the mountains to enter Tangi valley from the opposite 

direction used by thc Rangers, with intent to surprise the evading enemy element. To expedite 

unloading at their intended landing zone, all of the SEALs and Afghans boarded Extortion 17, 

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Insert offset folio 6 here 87499.006

with a crew of five U.S. Army aviators. Extortion 16 accompanied them part of the way to the 

target, and orbited a few miles away waiting for Extortion 17 to insert the assault force. As they 

advanced, the AC-130 and a suite of airborne intelligence platforms scanned the valley to 

overwatch the Rangers, who were still conducting their operation. The Apaches, flying in 

"detached escort" mode, approached from the south to check the landing zone for enemy 

presence, and scan the ingress route to detect any threats. They saw none. 

At 2:38 a.m., Extortion 17 indicated they were one minute from the landing zone. As 

they slowed to land, Taliban fighters hidden on top ofa building on the west side of the valley 

fired two or three rocket propelled grenades at the helicopter. The attackers, who had not been 

detected by the two Apaches, the Predator or the AC-130, were well positioned at the most 

narrow area of the valley, only 200 meters wide and serving to funnel a low flying, incoming 

helicopter right past the building they occupied. Although there was no moonlight and little 

illumination from the nearby village, they were able to hear and see the Chinook as it entered the 

valley, shooting at it from nearly head-on at a distance of less than 250 yards, leaving the pilot no 

chance to perform evasive maneuvers. Traveling at 120 yards per second as it leaves the 

launcher, the velocity of the RPG round, combined with the airspeed of the oncoming Chinook, 

left the pilot with less than one second to identify the threat, react and maneuver the 40,000 

pound loaded helicopter. Evasive action was not possible. One rocket struck a rotor blade, 

causing the aircraft to spin violently, and crash almost instantly into a dry creek bed. The main 

fuselage was immediately engulfed in flames. Extortion 17 was down, and there were no signs 

of survivors. Apaches scanned the area for enemy, and fired its cannon along a tree line to 

prevent anyone access to the burning CH-47. The Ranger element was quickly alerted to 

6 
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Insert offset folio 7 here 87499.007

converge on the crash site. A 20 man Pathfinder unit was alerted and deployed to secure the site. 

As daybreak reached the valley, the solemn task of recovering our fallen heroes began. All 30 

Americans and 8 Afghans on Extortion 17 had perished. 

The recovery operation in a hostile operating environment lasted four days. All of the 

fallen were recovered within hours, but the wreckage was spread over a large area when the 

shattered rotor blades broke from their pylons upon impact by the RPG. The main fuselage was 

situated in a creek bed, and parts of the wreckage were swept a hundred meters down stream by a 

flash flood on the evening of August 6'h• Ultimately nearly all of the wreckage was recovered. 

There was no flight recorder - this equipment is not standard on the CH-47D. 

The fallen U.S. service members were taken to Bagram Air Base. Joined by their Afghan 

comrades, these brave warriors were paid honors by their fellow unit members, commanders, and 

coalition partners. A solemn memorial service marked the beginning ofa dignified and 

respectful journey home for the brave men of Extortion 17. Consistent with our warrior ethos 

that no man will be left behind, all of the fallen; Navy SEALs and Combat Support specialists, 

Army aviators, Air Force Air Commandos, and Afghan soldiers all were equally memorialized in 

a combined service. All paid the ultimate price for freedom, and all deserved to be honored and 

respected. The commander of the U.S. Special Operations task force and a U.S. military 

chaplain paid tribute to the fallen, as did the Commander of the Afghan Special Forces. 

As soon as this tragic incident occurred, our military leaders, planners, and operators 

began asking the question - "How did this happen?" General James Mattis, Commander of the 

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U.S. Central Command, immediately tasked an experienced General Officer to conduct a full 

investigation to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash, the cause of the 

crash, any recommendations concerning improvements to tactics, techniques, and procedures to 

improve our operations, and any other matters pertaining to the incident the investigating officer 

deemed relevant. The investigating officer rendered his report a month later, complete with 86 

exhibits full of supporting technical data, transcribed interviews with those involved in the 

planning of the mission and execution of the recovery operation, historical records of aircraft 

maintenance, crew qualifications, and other pertinent information. 

What have we learned from this tragedy, and how does the Department of Defense 

assessment differ from some views expressed in the public domain? 

We believe the SEAL task force employed sound tactics in planning and executing their 

fateful mission, including the decision to load the entire element on a single aircraft. Their hightempo operations pace over the previous months was essential to maintaining pressure on the 

Taliban, and their success in past operations validated the effectiveness of their tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. Employing the SEALs, Rangers, Army aviation, and Afghan 

soldiers into a combined team reflects the best practices of our "combined joint task force" 

approach that has served as the model of success for more than 12 years of war since 2001. 

We believe the attachment of Afghan soldiers to the SEAL task force, and the process for 

coordinating our operations with the Afghan military leadership, enhances the potential for 

mission success. The Afghan teams are invaluable additions to our force - having superior 

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knowledge of the operating environment, cultural nuances, and native language capability. The 

force attached to the SEALs is specially trained for these operations, and they have been 

partnered with U.S. Special Operations assault elements for the past several years. When the 

U.S. military mission in Afghanistan is over the Afghan forces will continue to provide security 

and conduct operations to counter the Taliban insurgency. The U.S. cannot stay in Afghanistan 

indefinitely providing security; we will cease combat operations at the end of2014. To ensure 

long term stability in Afghanistan we must train and mentor Afghan forces now, so they can 

develop the capability to operate without us later. 

We believe the Army CH-47D aircraft and crews were suitable and proper for this 

mission. Our Chinook pilots and crew carefully planned their route consistent with proven 

tactics, deliberately altering their route to enter the valley from a different direction than had 

been used earlier that night. They masked their approach by circling around the valley to the 

northeast, and dropped down to a low altitude on final ingress to the selected landing zone. 

We do not believe a Special Operations Chinook and aircrew (MH-47) would have fared 

differently than the CH-47D flown by the Extortion 17 crew. As noted by the investigating 

officer, the Extortion 17 crew was experienced flying in the Tangi Valley - and inserted the 

Ranger unit earlier in the evening. The short flight route was over familiar terrain, with no air 

defense radar threat, obviating the need for the high-tech avionics package that distinguishes the 

MH-47 from the CH-47. The two models share identical Threat Countermeasures and Aircraft 

Survivability Equipment - meaning there is no technology advantage inherent in the MH-47 that 

would have protected it from the rocket that downed Extortion J 7. 

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We do not believe Extortion 17 was the victim ofa pre-planned enemy ambush, nor do 

we believe the enemy had advance knowledge of our flight route and landing zone location. 

This information was not provided to anyone outside the SEAL and Army aviation task force 

commands. Because the mission was developed and approved after the Ranger assault had 

begun, there was no coordination with Afghan officials. Although the presence of helicopters in 

the valley likely put the enemy forces on a heightened state of alert, the element that fired the 

rockets remained undetected by our airborne sensors until unleashing its fatal volley as Extortion 

17 was nearing the designated landing zone. 

We do not believe the rules of engagement restricted our forces from engaging the enemy 

during this operation. The AH-64 Apache helicopters that comprised the Air Weapons Team 

performed their escort duties consistent with proven tactics, demonstrating sound judgment at 

each stage of the operation from the time the Ranger element entered the Tangi Valley until all 

U.S. forces were extracted following recovery operations at the crash site. 

We recognize our helicopters are vulnerable to direct fire from Rocket Propelled Grenade 

(RPG) and other shoulder fired ballistic rockets. Tragically Extortion 17 is not the first Chinook 

helicopter lost to RPG fire in Afghanistan. Sixteen Special Operators, including eight SEALs, 

perished in a similar incident involving an MH-47 in Kunar Province in June 2005, and in March 

2002 an MH-47 was shot with an RPG, resulting in the first SEAL fatality of the war in 

Afghanistan. 

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Immediately after the loss of Extortion 17, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research 

and Engineering directed the Helicopter Survivability Task Force CHSTF), established in August 

2009, to examine in detail potential countermeasures to rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks. 

A surge effort involving more than 80 government personnel, including 23 nationally-recognized 

subject matter experts assessed technological solutions to this threat, including concepts of 

varying maturity from 17 industry teams. Unfortunately, the findings of this assessment were 

that technologies to enable the development of Active Protection Systems CAPS) for helicopters 

are immature and unproven. 

Subsequent to this effort, the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation delivered a report 

to Congress in February 2012 regarding the maturity of Active Protection Systems (APS) for 

Ground Vehicles. The findings of that report were that none of the seven tested systems were 

mature enough for fielding; further development, test, and evaluation was required for ALL of 

the systems. Given the severity of the RPG threat to rotorcraft, DOD has continued to actively 

research RPG Active Protection Systems for aircraft. 

We recognize more needs to be done to help protect our forces - especially when they are so 

vulnerable in the air. In the two and half years since this tragic loss, HSTF efforts, supported by 

three reprogramming actions worth over $182 million approved by Congress, have resulted in 

the fielding of 24 different survivability and safety equipment upgrades on over 2,000 aircraft, 

with CH-47s receiving as many as four of these individual upgradesY Every rotorcraft 

operating in Afghanistan has received at least two of these upgrades, and some have received as 

3 Over 3000 individual aircraft equipment upgrades were perfonned as a result of the HSTF efforts. 

4 Source: PA 10-3, March 2010; PA 10-24, Oct 2010; PA 11-25, Oct 2011 

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many as five. The Department continues to actively pursue the accelerated fielding of RPG 

Active Protection Systems on rotary wing aircraft. 

Although we will continue to develop the best equipment to protect our brave service men 

and women, sadly there is no technological solution that will guarantee the safety of those thrust 

into battle, particularly when helicopters are involved. Afghanistan is especially dangerous 

given the high elevations and mountainous terrain. Our aviators have responded and performed 

brilliantly during this war, but the fact remains we will always have to balance the tactical 

requirement to move troops quickly across the battlefield with the dangers of incurring lethal 

enemy fire and flying in extreme terrain. 

No advances in technology, or changes in the way we operate, will bring back our fallen 

heroes or ease the pain of their loved ones. We honor their sacrifices by rededicating ourselves 

to defending the nation from attack, upholding our values as Americans, and never forgetting 

those they left behind. Through our enduring commitment to our Gold Star families; the 

mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers, extended families, wives and children of the 30 Fallen 

Eagles aboard Extortion 17, we will cherish their memories, keep them forever in our hearts, and 

never forget them. 

I stand ready to address your questions. 

12 
20 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Ms. Skillman. 

STATEMENT OF DEBORAH SKILLMAN 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, 

and distinguished members of the committee, I want to thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today to answer your questions regarding our assistance to surviving family members of 

these 30 brave heroes who were killed in action on August 6th, 

2011. 

I am the program manager for Casualty and Mortuary Affairs 

within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In this capacity, I am 

responsible for providing uniform policies and procedures to the 

military departments for notifying and assisting the next of kin of 

service members who have become a casualty. My office is also the 

focal point for the coordination of all matters related to our Mortuary Affairs programs. 

As a little background on myself, I am a retired army colonel 

with over 12 years experience working in this particular program. 

The Department holds casualty and Mortuary Affairs program 

among our most solemn responsibilities to our service members, 

our surviving family members, and to our Nation. A fundamental 

element of military culture and tradition is that we hold our fallen 

in the highest esteem, treat their remains with highest reverence 

and provide their surviving family members the highest level of 

care and continued support. My office is responsible for promulgating casualty and Mortuary Affairs policies that reflect these core 

values, and we work in coordination with the service members and 

the colleagues, my colleagues that you see at the table here today, 

to ensure that the intent of our policies is reflected throughout all 

casualty and mortuary tasks and processes. 

If I could just take a moment about some of the testimony you 

will hear today and some common terminology that my colleagues 

will be using. We will be discussing the DD Form 93. This is the 

record of emergency data. And I want to note that the DD Form 

93 is the voice of the service member upon his or her death. This 

form is completed by all service members at regular intervals during their military service, and informs the casualty offices of whom 

the service member wishes to be notified in the event he or she becomes a casualty. 

The form also indicates whom the service member wishes to receive certain death benefits, and it allows the service member to 

designate the Person Authorized to Direct Disposition, or the 

PADD. It’s worth noting that the service member can select anyone 

as the PADD, not necessarily a family member. And the PADD is 

the single person that the casualty office may take direction from 

regarding the disposition of the service member’s remains. 

Before I pass it over to my colleague, Colonel Devillier, sir, my 

colleagues in the Army and the Navy Casualty Office have also 

prepared a statement, and I request that they be allowed to provide that for the record. 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Again, I want to thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you today, and it’s my honor and my privilege to 

21 

serve in this capacity, and I hope today we’ll be able to address 

your concerns. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. And thank you for your service and 

your caring. And, of course, we will enter that into the record. Colonel? 

STATEMENT OF COLONEL JOHN DEVILLIER 

Colonel DEVILLIER. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the 

opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the process of 

disposition of our fallen heroes from Extortion 17. 

Since March 2012, I have had the honor and privilege to serve 

with some of the finest soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and civilians who work behind the scenes providing dignity, honor and respect to our Nation’s combat fallen as well as care, service and support to their families. 

While the port mortuary has been associated with Dover Air 

Force Base, Delaware, since the 1950s, the organization I command 

was activated in early 2009 in response to Department of Defense 

directed changes surrounding authorized family travel to Dover Air 

Force Base and media access to dignified transfer. My organization 

has both Air Force specific rules, along with being the lead service 

component for dignified transfers and effecting final disposition of 

our fallen as directed by the Person Authorized to Direct Disposition, the PADD. 

Since the implementation of policy changes in April 2009, team 

Dover has welcomed home over 1,800 of our Nation’s fallen and 

supported over 8,700 of their families. 

The events surrounding the return of the fallen from Extortion 

17 are seen as a watershed for our operation at Dover in terms of 

mass fatalities. Team Dover has supported well over 800 family, 

friends and unit members, as well as more than 40 distinguished 

visitors desiring to pay their respects to these brave heroes. 

While I was not present for this event, it was a monumental undertaking for the entire team in terms of support. As with every 

fallen service member who arrives at Dover, the fallen from this 

event were taken into the medical-legal custody of the Armed 

Forces medical examiner system for scientific identification, which 

may include fingerprinting, dental and/or DNA testing followed by 

a medical autopsy. Upon the scientific identification, the chain of 

custody for the fallen is then passed to my organization to effect 

final disposition, as directed by the PADD. 

For this incident as a whole, my organization effected these disposition instructions for our 30 heroes, eight of which included 

written requests for cremation from the PADD. For those eight 

cases, four were cremated at the port mortuary, and four were cremated at their final resting place. 

Again, we consider this incident a watershed moment and we 

have made a number of changes in terms of our in place support 

mechanisms. In January 2013, we opened a new command and control facility to enhance communication between the branches of 

service and my organization. Additionally in February 2013, a new 

chapel was opened on Dover with one-third of the space dedicated 

to our operation in terms of facilities to further support families. 

22 

In my nearly 21 years of active military service, I have never 

served in a more honorable or humbling mission. The men and 

women who work tirelessly behind the scenes under my command 

see the worst results of conflict. Not only do they honor the fallen, 

they serve the families, who are often experiencing the worst moments of their life, and these quiet professionals ask for nothing in 

return. I’m proud to serve as their commander. 

Thank you for your time this morning and your strong support 

for the men and women of the Department of the Air Force. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Colonel. 

[The statement of Colonel Devillier follows:] 

23 


Insert offset folio 13 here 87499.013

United States Air Force 

Presentation 

Before the House Oversight and 

Government Reform Committee 

Disposition of Remains - Extortion 17 

Witness Statement of Colonel John M. 

Devillier, Commander, Air Force 

Mortuary Affairs Operations 

February 27, 

2014 

Not for publication until released by the House OverSight and Government 

Reform Committee, Subcommittee on National Security 
24 


Insert offset folio 14 here 87499.014

Disposition of Remains - Extortion 17 

February 27, 2014 

Chairman Chaffetz, Representative Tierney, and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the 

process of disposition of remains from Extortion 17. Since March 2012 I have had the 

honor and privilege to serve with some of the finest Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, 

and Civilians who work behind the scenes as quiet professionals to provide dignity, 

honor, and respect to our nation's combat fallen as well as care, service, and support to 

their families. 

While the Port Mortuary has been associated with Dover Air Force Base, 

Delaware since the 1950s, the organization I command, Air Force Mortuary Affairs 

Operations, was activated in early 2009 in response to Department of Defense directed 

changes surrounding authorized family travel to Dover Air Force Base and media access 

to Dignified Transfers. My organization has both Air Force specific roles along with being 

the lead service component for Dignified Transfers, Media Policy, and effecting final 

disposition of our fallen as directed by the Person Authorized to Direct Disposition. While 

we are an Air Force organization, our sister services provide liaison teams who work in 

our facility to support their individual service fallen and the families of these fallen. 

Currently our team consists of just over 100 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and 

Civilians serving within the Charles C. Carson Center for Mortuary Affairs at Dover Air 

Force Base. 

For our Air Force specific role, we provide subject matter expertise to the entire Air 

Force in the areas of mortuary entitlements as outlined in statute, general honor guard 

policy, and we also serve as a direct link to families of airmen still unaccounted for from 

Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold War. Furthermore, we serve as mortuary officers for 

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Disposition of Remains - Extortion 17 

February 27, 2014 

airmen who are killed in overseas operations, providing direct assistance to their families 

in terms of travel to Dover for Dignified Transfers and assisting these families with 

mortuary entitlements and associated disposition instructions. In our lead service 

component role, my team executes all Dignified Transfers as well as implements media 

policy for those Dignified Transfers. Additionally, we serve as the only continental United 

States Port Mortuary and in conjunction with our sister services we prepare and ship all 

of our nation's fallen to their final destination, regardless of branch of service. Lastly, 

given the size of the mortuary and our co-location with the Armed Forces Medical 

Examiner System, we are tasked with supporting mass fatalities as directed by the 

leadership of the Department of Defense. 

Since the implementation of policy changes in April 2009, Team Dover has 

welcomed home 1,820 of our nation's fallen (military, civilian, and contractors) and 

supported 8,706 of their families at Dover. Families travel to Dover to welcome home 

their loved one for 83 percent of our Dignified Transfers, and families elect some level of 

media coverage in 90 percent of these Dignified Transfers. Since April 2009, we have 

supported 52 mass fatality events, defined as a single event with 5 or more casualties. 

The events surrounding the return of the fallen from the CH-47 incident in August 

2011 are seen as a watershed for our operation at Dover in terms of mass fatalities. In 

this incident, we received 38 fallen of which 22 were Sailors, 5 were Soldiers, 3 were 

Airmen, and 8 were Afghan nationals. Team Dover supported well over 800 family, 

friends, and unit members as well as more than 40 distinguished visitors, to include the 

President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, and others 

desiring to pay their respects to these brave individuals. While I was not present for this 

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Disposition of Remains - Extortion 17 

February 27, 2014 

event in 2011, it was a monumental undertaking for the entire team in terms of support. 

As with every fallen service member who arrives at Dover, the fallen from this 

event were taken into the medical-legal custody of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner 

System for scientific identification, which may include finger printing, dental, and/or DNA 

testing followed by a medical autopsy. Upon the scientific identification, the chain of 

custody for the fallen is then passed to my organization to effect final disposition. For 

each case, the branch of service of the fallen, interacting with the Person Authorized to 

Direct Disposition, provides written instructions for final disposition, which my 

organization then executes. 

For the three airmen involved in the incident, the Person Authorized to Direct 

Disposition (PADD) were initially briefed at the Center for the Families of the Fallen at 

Dover AFB prior to the dignified transfer. The briefing included the dignified transfer 

process, an entitlements briefing, and a review/completion of the AF Form 970, 

Statement of Disposition of Remains. Through this form, the PADD provided written 

instructions for disposition of their loved one to the Air Force, regardless of the condition 

of the remains. Upon receipt of the remains from the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, 

the licensed funeral directors who performed the embalming process made a 

recommendation of viewability via DD Form 2063. In all three cases, the funeral director 

responsible for the embalming recommended the remains be considered non-viewable. 

Given the fragmented condition of the remains, an additional form was required from the 

PADD of these three airmen, the Central Joint Mortuary Affairs Board Form One in which 

the PADD provided specific instructions regarding any additional remains found of their 

loved one. This form is required when the Armed Forces Medical Examiner determines 

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Disposition of Remains - Extortion 17 

February 27,2014 

the remains are considered non-intact. These written instructions were then executed by 

the Port Mortuary to return the fallen as expeditiously as possible to their final 

destination. 

For the Extortion 17 incident as a whole, my organization effected these 

disposition instructions for our 30 heroes, 8 of which included requests for cremation 

from the PADD. For those 8 cases, 4 were cremated at the Port Mortuary, and 4 were 

cremated at their final resting place. Regardless of the size of the incident in question, 

the internal process for receiving and then executing disposition instructions has 

remained unaltered since this event with the exception of a change implemented in 2012 

where we no longer perform full body cremations at Dover. Cremations now occur only 

at the final destination through a funeral home directed by the PADD. 

Again, we consider this incident a watershed moment because of the size and 

scope of the event, particularly in terms of family support. Prior to 2009, families could 

travel to Dover but it was at their own expense, thus, in past cases, while families 

traveled to Dover, the numbers were relatively small. Based upon this inCident, we have 

made a number of changes in terms of our in place support mechanisms. In January 

2013 we opened a new command and control facility to enhance communication 

between the branches of service and my organization for mass fatality situations. This 

command and control cell is staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. 

Additionally, in February 2013, a new chapel was opened on Dover, with one-third of the 

space dedicated to our operation in terms of facilities to further support families during a 

mass fatality event. 

In my nearly 21 years of active military service, I have never served in a more 

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Disposition of Remains - Extortion 17 

February 27, 2014 

honorable or humbling mission. The men and women who work tirelessly behind the 

scenes at the Charles C. Carson Center for Mortuary Affairs at Dover Air Force Base see 

the worst side of conflict. Not only do they honor the fallen, they serve the families who 

are often experiencing the worst moments of their life. These silent professionals ask for 

nothing in return and I'm proud to serve as their commander. Thank you for your strong 

support of the men and women of the Department of the Air Force. 

Page 8 
29 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Colonel Brown. 

STATEMENT OF COLONEL KERK BROWN 

Colonel BROWN. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney 

and other distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to represent the United States Army, and I am 

humbled to provide testimony in honor of the service members of 

Extortion 17. 

I have served as the director of the Army Casualty & Mortuary 

Affairs Operations Center since July 2012. The mission of the Casualty & Mortuary Affairs Operations Center is to execute the full 

spectrum of Army Casualty & Mortuary Affairs for present and 

past conflicts. In this role, the Casualty & Mortuary Affairs Operations Center provides policy and direction to 33 casualty assistance centers around the world, develops standardized casualty assistance and casualty notification training, provides notification, 

casualty assistance and casualty management for injured, ill, missing and deceased personnel, and operates the joint personal effects 

depot at Dover Air Force Base for all of the services. 

On August 6th, 2011, five soldiers were killed in action in support of the Extortion 17 mission. The notification and assistance 

provided to the soldiers’ next of kin were completed in accordance 

with policy. The Army recognizes that people are the Army, and 

our dedicated and talented force is the reason the United States 

Army is second to none. The Army remains committed to honor our 

Nation’s commitment to its soldiers and the family of deceased, injured, ill and unaccounted for through compassionate and responsive support. 

Thank you for your continued support to the United States 

Army, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Colonel. 

STATEMENT OF COMMANDER AARON BRODSKY 

Commander BRODSKY. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member 

Tierney, other distinguished members, good morning. I’m Director 

of Navy Casualty & Mortuary Affairs at the Navy Personnel Command in Millington, Tennessee. Thank you also for this opportunity. 

I’ve been director of Navy Casualty since August 2013. My office 

is lead for the Navy Casualty’s assistance program, which includes 

next of kin verification, execution of proper and timely notifications, and benefits and entitlements authorizations. We do this 

across three command tiers: Navy Personnel Command, consisting 

of program management, entitlements execution and casualty 

aftercare; Commander Naval Installations Command, which is 24/ 

7 operations through regional operations centers; and the Casualty 

Assistance Calls Officer, or CACO, training and assignment, and, 

of course, our network of more than 6,000 trained CACOs worldwide. 

I’m here today to discuss navy protocol and procedures with regards to casualty assistance, and I will also discuss the manner in 

which casualty assistance was rendered to the families of the 22 

Navy personnel who perished on Extortion 17. 

30 

When the Navy first learned of the Extortion 17 incident on August 6th, 2011, all established protocols and procedures were initiated, next of kin were verified, and regional CACOs were assigned. 

Within a few hours, the extent of this casualty became fully known. 

At this point, Naval Special Warfare Development Group and Special Operations Command teamed with Navy Casualty, and together trained CACOs and command representatives notified each 

next of kin and provided follow-on assistance to all the families and 

their authorized beneficiaries. 

The special warfare community is unfortunately well versed in 

casualty assistance, and within the first 24 hours, they established 

a casualty assistance and call center and created casualty teams 

for each family. This command and control structure complemented 

our own and provided not only an increase in capability and capacity, but also lent their expertise and professional insight. 

To echo my colleagues, at the end of the day, we all want the 

same thing: timely and compassionate care for our grieving Gold 

Star families. The assistance rendered to Navy families is professionally and compassionately conducted, always prioritizing their 

needs for the acute sensitivity for the profound grief they experience. 

On behalf of Navy leadership and the men and women in the 

United States Navy and their families, I thank you as well for your 

commitment to these heroes of Extortion 17, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, Commander. Appreciate it. 

I now recognize—I have actually some unanimous consent requests. The first request I have is to place into the record the statements of Mary Strange, Terry Pittman, Ida Pittman, Charlie 

Strange and Doug Hamburger. 

Mr. TIERNEY. No objection. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. I also ask unanimous consent to enter into the record DD Form 33, that was mentioned in part of the testimony. Or 93, sorry. Without—without objection? 

Mr. TIERNEY. No objection. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So ordered. I’ll now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Reid, without touching into the—into the classified information, what can you tell us about why this mission was happening 

and what they were trying to do, why they were engaged in this? 

And, again, I recognize the limitations you have no classified setting, but if you could set the context, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. REID. Thank you, chairman. The objective on this night was 

to capture a senior Taliban commander operating in a valley that 

cuts between two main highways south of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. The strategic relevance of this valley is it provides the 

Taliban with a sanctuary and a jumping-off point. Their goal is to 

conduct spectacular attacks in Kabul, to terrorize Afghans that 

support the government and support the coalition, and to attack 

our—our bases there. That’s the strategic context of this particular 

mission, as a part of a broader campaign, as you know, chairman, 

to dismantle and defeat these Taliban organizations throughout Afghanistan, to allow the government forces to establish a security 

31 

foothold and transition out of U.S. combat actions, as we will at the 

end of this year, into Afghans providing security. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Now, one of the more troubling and sensational 

stories that we have seen along the way is the idea that upon 

this—the crash of the helicopter after it was shot is that the black 

box was supposedly washed away in a flash flood, which defies— 

I mean, it’s really hard to believe. We have talked about this, but 

could you please respond to that story, because it has been out 

there fairly—fairly pervasively. 

Mr. REID. Yes, Chairman. Thank you. This valley, as I said, in— 

situated in between these mountains is part of a drainage system 

that feeds over into the central highlands of Afghanistan over the 

Uruzgan Province. The elevation in this particular valley is around 

7,000 feet, but it is a drainage area for high mountain showers and 

snow melt. It’s actually a very fertile valley with a large amount 

of agriculture. 

On the night of August 6th, as we were one day into the recovery 

effort, a flash flood swept through the valley. The aircraft, upon 

crashing, landed in a dry creek bed. That creek bed filled with up 

to 4 feet of water very quickly during the recovery effort, and some 

of the material from the crash was washed about 100 yards downstream. 

We—we have a photograph board. If we could light like up—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. If you can like that up. Sure. 

Mr. REID. —to enter that, sir, we can show the before and after. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I think we’re just going to show the flash flood. 

Mr. REID. Yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We’re not going to show the actual wreckage 

itself. 

The idea that the black box washed away, was there a black box? 

Mr. REID. No, sir, not—as I indicated, there is a device attached 

to the engines that records engine performance. It’s—the engines 

are new, in fact, the same engines that are on the other Chinooks, 

the modern engines, but the airframe itself is an analog aircraft. 

There is no source of digital data. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. There is no traditional so-called black box? 

Mr. REID. That’s correct, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Even though there was a flash flood, and there 

are other photos as well that—— 

Mr. REID. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Publicly, this is not something we’re revealing 

and showing for the very first time. This is something that has 

been—is out there and widely available. 

Can I—Ms. Skillman, I want to talk about the ramp ceremony, 

because the other point—one of the other major points of contention as I’ve talked to a lot of families is that there is a video of the 

service that was done in Afghanistan. My understanding is—I have 

two questions about this, two concerns. One is why it was 

videotaped. My understanding is that is not what current DOD policy is. My question is, why did that happen? Did it happen? Why 

did it happen? And who was the person who was making the—who 

participated in that—in that service, because there were some very 

concerning comments that were made by the person who was representing the Afghans who were killed that night. 

32 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Sir, thank you for the question. I—I cannot address who was speaking at—at the memorial service at that particular ceremony in Bagram. 

As we understand, the commanders conducted a memorial service, which is within policy. We expect our commanders to do that. 

And their interpretation of our policy was that the videotape was— 

was allowed. However, we have just learned that they recently republished their policy to reflect our considerations for the next of 

kin and wanting them to consent to any videotaping of their next 

of kin. So their regulation was revised in February of 2013, which 

we have just recently learned, to reflect that current policy. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I have more questions. My time is expired. I’ll 

now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you for that. 

Mr. Reid, in your written remarks, you provide a significant 

amount of detail about the operation of Extortion 17 and, for instance, you mention the Navy SEAL task force and the U.S. Army 

aviation group, and I quote, ‘‘spent weeks conducting operations 

nearly every other night.’’ 

You stated the Afghan soldiers deployed with the American Special Forces, and I quote again, ‘‘were an essential part of the package. They are trained to move with our forces to the target, and 

when tactical conditions allow, initiate operations by calling out 

enemy forces. This tactic was highly successful over a period of 

years. Hundreds of operations were conducted without firing a 

shot.’’ 

You then say the rocket-propelled grenade that brought down 

Extortion 17, ‘‘left the pilot with less than one second to identify 

the threat, react and maneuver the 40,000-pound loaded helicopter. 

Evasive action was not possible.’’ 

And regarding the flight route and the landing zone for Extortion 

17, you wrote, ‘‘This information was not provided to anyone outside the SEAL and Army aviation task force commands. Because 

the mission was developed and approved after the ranger assault 

had begun, there was no coordination with Afghan officials.’’ 

And finally you state you believe, ‘‘the SEAL task force employed 

sound tactics in planning and executing their fateful mission, and 

that you do not believe the rules of engagement restricted our 

forces from engaging the enemy.’’ 

So, Mr. Reid, with all—we all believe that the downing of Extortion 17 was a tragic loss of life, there’s no doubt about that, but 

how would you characterize the operation that day? Was it hastily 

or poorly planned as a mission? Were the appropriate teams and 

equipment used? Was the mission compromised? 

Mr. REID. Thank you, Congressman. The mission was planned. 

This particular—the SEAL mission was planned in the course of 

the ranger mission, and that planning process is deliberate. And 

what I mean is their role in this operation was a standby force 

should there be a necessity to deploy a second force. 

The way this worked at that time, they have two forces. They 

have the SEALs and the rangers. And typically, every other night, 

every third night, we do an operation, one would be the lead, one 

would be the standby, and that was the conditions this night. So 

33 

there was always the condition and the intent to deploy this force 

based on the tactical circumstance. 

And as I indicated, sir, the circumstances were such that the 

enemy appeared to evade the initial attack and seek sanctuary in 

the valley in another location. The SEAL mission was constituted 

to come in from the other direction and intercept that Taliban leader. 

We do not believe the mission was compromised. There is a coordination process with Afghan leaders for these missions that was 

put in place years prior to mitigate against claims of civilian casualties in special operations that were not coordinated. But on this 

particular event, understanding the SEAL piece was—was done 

during the operation, there was no external coordination, so there 

was no possibility of information going up the chain and somehow 

coming back out to the Taliban. 

We believe the enemy positioned himself in that building. Whether or not he knew anyone was coming in, he was in a very advantageous place tactically to strike the aircraft as it approached. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Reid. 

So we just talked a little bit about the concern we had for the 

treatment of the—of our fallen heroes. Before the bodies were even 

to reach Dover, they had a transfer ceremony at the Bagram Airfield. That ramp ceremony was conducted to honor those dead servicemen. 

Ms. Skillman, it’s my understanding that the ramp ceremonies 

are customary, and that they’re solemn and respectful events. Can 

you explain why the ramp ceremony—or what it is and why it occurred? 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Thank you, sir. I—I can’t address what happened 

in theater, however, that we do—commanders routinely conduct 

what we would consider a memorial service for their fallen, which 

is exactly what happened on that day. 

Mr. TIERNEY. And that’s, as I say, customary? 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. TIERNEY. And it’s not customary generally to videotape, as 

you mentioned to Mr. Chaffetz’s question? 

Ms. SKILLMAN. No, sir, it is not. It was our intent that next of 

kin consent to any still photography or videography of their loved 

ones. Primarily the PNOK is responsible for making that consent, 

the Primary Next of Kin; however, there’s a misinterpretation of 

our policy, and we have clarified that, and CENTCOM has recently 

revised their policies, as I stated earlier. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Good. Thank you. Yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I now recognize the gentlewoman 

from Wyoming, the vice-chair of our subcommittee, Ms. Lummis, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to extend my 

appreciation to the next of kin here present of our deceased members of the military who participated in the mission that brought 

down Extortion 17. We are grateful for your family’s service, for 

your sacrifice, and they will not be forgotten. 

I—I also want to comment, Mr. Chairman, on an old 2009 HBO 

movie called ‘‘Taking Chance’’ that was a documentary about a fallen Iraq Veteran, a Marine by the name of Chance Phelps, and it 

34 

illustrated the treatment that the military provides to our servicemen and women once they have been killed in action, and they 

are—their remains are being returned to their homes. Chance 

Phelps, who was the soldier who was killed and whose return to 

my home State of Wyoming is illustrated in that film, is someone 

whose parents I knew. My husband and Chance Phelps’ father 

were high school friends and I know his mother very well, and how 

proud we are that the manner in which he was treated was so well 

illustrated by the film and how it accurately, we believe, depicted 

the manner in which and the respect with which his remains were 

treated by the military. So I want to commend the work of our 

military services with regard to their very dignified and appropriately respectful treatment of those who gave their last measure 

of human devotion. 

I also would like to follow that up with a question. This is for 

all witnesses. Did the Department follow protocol and directions 

from the servicemen’s Person Authorized to Direct Disposition of 

human remains in the case of Extortion 17? Colonel Devillier. 

Colonel DEVILLIER. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for that question. In 

all 30 cases, the direction provided by the—the written direction 

provided by the PADD was followed appropriately. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. And are these records available to reflect that for 

anyone who might wish to use the Freedom of Information Act to 

obtain that information? 

Colonel DEVILLIER. Ma’am, family members can certainly request 

that through FOIA, and they would be redacted according to the 

FOIA rules. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. Would anyone else care to offer perspective 

on that question? Thank you. 

What are some of the guidelines for reporting, recording, notifying and assisting the next of kin whenever DOD casualties are 

sustained? Once again, I would direct that question to whoever 

wishes to answer. Ms. Skillman? 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Ma’am, thank you for that question. The services 

are directed to provide standardized training for their notification 

officers, their casualty assistance officers, and to provide proactive 

support to family members. They get—they will have a dialogue 

with the family members that they are assisting and they will 

proactively provide them with information regarding the circumstances surrounding the death as soon as it becomes available 

and provide them regular updates. They will also assist them with 

the benefits request and reports of investigations and then continued follow on care. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Did the Department follow its policies in the case 

of the families of Extortion 17? 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Ma’am, from our records, there’s all indication 

that each of the services followed the policies and procedures as 

prescribed by DOD. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. Also for you, Ms. Skillman, how can we improve the policies to ensure that families receive all the casualty 

information to which they are legally entitled? 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Ma’am, thank you for that—that question. We are 

constantly improving our program, and it’s through forums such as 

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35 

tions, our partner agencies, such as the Department of Veterans 

Affairs that we make continued improvements. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentlewoman. Now recognize the gentlewoman from New York, Ms. Maloney, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking 

Member, and thank you to all the panelists. And before I ask my 

question, I want to join with all of my colleagues and all the members on this panel to acknowledge the sacrifice made by the fallen 

heroes as well as the families, some of whom are here today. 

And I would like to go back, if I could, to the questioning on the 

flight recorder, or the so-called black box, and I’d like to ask Mr. 

Reid, and thank you for your public service. My brother also served 

in the Special Forces with the Army, and we’re very proud of the 

work of that division for our country. Did you—I believe you answered the question from the chairman that there was no black 

box. That’s correct, that there was no black box? 

Mr. REID. Yes, ma’am, that’s correct. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, I want to ask to clarify that. Do other CH– 

47D’s have a black box? 

Mr. REID. No, ma’am. The aircraft is not a digital—does not have 

a suite of digital electronics. It has gauges, analog gauges. Those 

gauges do not provide you with the ability to withdraw, extract digital data that you could record. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Now, today there was a photograph of a flash 

flood that we saw earlier, but I’ve received some correspondence to 

my office that suggested that there was not a flash flood, so I’d like 

to clarify that a little more. I understand that—that the—that the 

plane, Extortion 17, crashed into a creek bed. Is that correct? 

Mr. REID. Yes, ma’am, that’s correct. 

Mrs. MALONEY. A dry creek bed. So can you explain for us 

whether a flash flood occurred in that creek bed? Some people allege that it did not occur, so could you clarify if that—— 

Mr. REID. Ma’am, I can clarify, having read the report and spoken to individuals involved and seeing the photographs and studied 

the climate data, from my own assessment, I believe it’s perfectly 

logical and credible that a flood occurred. We had up to 140 people 

at that site over the period of 4 days, about 45 or 50 within an 

hour. We never left that site until everything was recovered. Multiple accounts and, again, photographs show the water in the creek 

that was not there on the first day. It happened on the night of 

the 6th of August, ma’am. 

Mrs. MALONEY. So did the flash flood complicate the recovery? 

Mr. REID. It halted the efforts temporarily, because we had to 

move people to higher ground. But as these occur, even in our own 

desert southwest area, they—they come very quickly without warning and they recede often just as quickly. As you saw in the photo, 

though, there was still some residual water, but the majority of the 

wreckage had been recovered at that time. 

Mrs. MALONEY. So it did complicate it. Do you think that going 

forward, we should have black boxes on CH–47D’s? It’s an older 

plane, I understand, but should we get a black box on them in the 

future? 

36 

Mr. REID. I’m aware that the newer—I’m not an aviator, but I’m 

aware of the newer platforms, as the digital platforms are fielded, 

that that is a standard configuration. I’ve also told that it’s not 

technically possible for the analog aircraft to replicate that. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I’ll now recognize the gentleman from 

Florida, Mr. Mica, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Reid, this is one of the greatest losses of life that we have 

had in any single incident. I guess that’s correct? 

Mr. REID. This is the largest loss in Afghanistan, sir, that’s correct. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. What was used? Was it an MH–47, or is there 

a difference between a CH–47D or Chinook helicopter? What was 

used? 

Mr. REID. The aircraft, Extortion 17, was a model of Chinook, the 

D model, the delta model, CH–47. 

Mr. MICA. And this was a high risk mission? 

Mr. REID. The risk assessment for the mission profile overall as 

a commander’s risk assessment was a high risk mission, yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. And we put our—our men in equipment that couldn’t 

be protected. I chaired aviation. We developed—we have equipment 

for commercial airliners that’s available. We have—I’ve been in Afghanistan. They only put me on certain types of flight equipment 

that would protect me, particularly from RPG’s. 

Why would we risk our—a high risk mission on—putting our 

men on this kind of equipment? See, first I want to—I’m already 

concerned you put our people at risk on equipment, and we know 

we have equipment for a high risk mission where they wouldn’t be 

put at risk or killed. We do have that equipment, don’t we, sir? 

Mr. REID. Sir, specific to this, no. 

Mr. MICA. We do not have equipment in Afghanistan that would 

have allowed some protection against RPG fire, you’re telling me 

and this committee? 

Mr. REID. For this particular, yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. And this was a high risk mission. Now, you also 

testified that those guys, or whoever fired this, were in some building. I’m very concerned about the people that were in that building. 

Don’t we assess the risk, and you just said it was a high risk mission, that these guys are there? 

I don’t know if we can discuss the investigation, the post investigation about the Afghans and how much information they had 

about the mission, and if that mission placed those people in a position where they can use those RPG’s to take down a piece of 

equipment that couldn’t protect our people. Now, was there a thorough investigation, in your opinion? In August 6th, 2011, were you 

there, were you in charge of this mission? 

Mr. REID. No, sir. I am a civilian—— 

Mr. MICA. Okay. Who was in charge of the mission? 

Mr. REID. U.S. Central Command, sir. 

Mr. MICA. But who was the individual in charge? I think we 

need to be hearing from that individual. I’d like to also find out 

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37 

tion and who was investigation—what Afghans had information as 

to this mission. 

Mr. REID. Sir, no Afghans were provided information on the mission. The eight Afghans onboard were part of our team. 

Mr. MICA. And none of the Afghans were briefed in advance as 

to where they were going? 

Mr. REID. Not outside that team, sir, no. 

Mr. MICA. Again, I would like to see further reports and I’d like 

it made part of a reference to—and if it is classified information. 

But I’m very concerned, one, the right equipment wasn’t used, we 

put our people at risk, and also we pass—I just do not trust the 

Afghanis. When I was there, I’m telling you, they—they’re— 

they’re—everything they do I would question, right from the president, who I think is corrupt, and the money that we’re pouring 

down that rat hole and then losing lives on top of this is sinful. 

But, Mr. Brown, Army Mortuary, is the mess at Arlington 

cleaned up in the way we treat our—the remains of our fallen? Are 

you satisfied with what has been done there? I’ve never seen anything so disgusting as the mess, the misplacement, the mistreatment, the use of human remains of our servicemen and women as 

what I’ve learned took place at Arlington. Is that mess cleaned up? 

Have you followed that? 

Colonel BROWN. Sir, that is outside my purview. 

Mr. MICA. How long have you been there, and how long have you 

been in this particular position? 

Colonel BROWN. Sir, I have served as a director of Army Casualty 

since July of 2012. 

Mr. MICA. Well, again, you are aware of the mess I am talking 

about? 

Colonel BROWN. Yes, sir, I am. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. And can you provide me the names of the individuals and put it in the record of who was in charge of the remains at that particular time. And then I would like a statement 

from you or from someone in your office that you believe that the 

situation has been cleared up, that the remains that were misplaced or abused, that we have also taken care of that situation. 

Can you provide that to the committee? 

Colonel BROWN. Sir, I will provide that for the record. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Along with the other members, I want to offer my condolences 

to all the families of our fallen heros. We are deeply appreciative 

of all of their family service and sacrifice. 

I do, as a threshold matter, I want to acknowledge Mr. Chairman 

and our ranking member, Mr. Tierney, the work that you have 

done on this and both staffs, Democrat and Republican, working together, the energy and thoroughness with which the committee has 

taken great pains and sensitivity regarding the families involved 

and the issues involved. This is the way government is supposed 

to work, side by side. 

38 

Mr. Reid, I want to ask you about this CH–47D Chinook. You 

know, I have been to Afghanistan nine times. I spent a lot of time, 

you know, in contrast to the earlier gentleman’s comments that we 

never put, you know, people that we value on a CH–47, I have 

spent a lot of time on that aircraft. So maybe they just don’t value 

me so much. I don’t know, but I have spent a fair amount of time. 

And I have also talked to the pilots and crew, mechanics about— 

and they love this aircraft, the CH–47D. They say they can perform 

simple maintenance. It is a very reliable aircraft, but there have 

been a lot of questions in the general press about the appropriateness of using the CH–47D, the Chinook, in this instance, knowing 

the topography of the Tangi Valley, very tight, mountains on the 

northern end there. It widens out in the south. 

But given the aggregate circumstances here, was this an appropriate aircraft to use, or was this something that was thrown together at the last minute, because that allegation has been out 

there as well? 

Mr. REID. Thank you, sir. This was the appropriate aircraft for 

this mission. The choice of this aircraft was tactically sound. Other 

aircraft may have been used, but what could not have been used 

and has been questioned was the Black Hawk. One of the issues 

with the war in Afghanistan is the elevation in the mountains, and 

the Chinook helicopter, which, frankly, in my career, we did not 

use extensively in other conflicts, and even in Iraq, the first time 

or the second time, you see mostly Black Hawks. That is a function 

of the elevation. 

The Chinook—D Model Chinook is the same engines as the Special Operations model. The distinction of the Special Operations 

models is the high technology, terrain-following navigation system, 

and the in-flight refueling capability and the larger fuel tanks. Beyond that, they are essentially the same aircraft. What that means 

is, for certain mission profiles, you must use the MH47. This particular tactical mission was about a 15-mile flight on known terrain 

in clear weather. The avionics capabilities of the MH47 were not 

necessary to conduct this mission. 

Both aircraft have the identical survivability. And if I may clarify, sir, there is no active technology countermeasure to defeat the 

RPG. The RPG is a rocket-propelled grenade. I believe what the 

gentleman was referring to were for surface-to-air missiles that 

have a radar signature or an active seeker. We have countermeasures for those. We do not have countermeasures for a ballistic 

rocket-propelled grenade right now active. We are researching and 

trying to do that, and none currently exists. 

Mr. LYNCH. I appreciate that. Let me ask you, the other criticism 

that has been out there in the press is that the way this went 

down, that there was a several-hour fire fight, that there were a 

number of helos in the area, Apaches and also the Ranger team 

that went in first. And then, when the Chinook came in with 30 

personnel on board, that it was, you know, tactically inadvisable to 

have a long-term fire fight making the insurgents in that area 

aware of a major operation and then having the Chinook come in, 

you know, a relatively slower aircraft and then being exposed to insurgent fire. Can you address those allegations? 

39 

Mr. REID. Yes, sir. Thank you. The investigating officer did conclude that the presence of our activity in that valley likely put the 

enemy on a heightened state of alert. That is true. The tactical 

planning and the commanders’ decisions to mitigate against that 

were to approach from the opposite direction at a low altitude. 

The area was scanned by our overhead platforms. The C130 had 

overview of the whole battlefield, the Apaches air weapons team 

scanned the LZ 1 minute prior, confirmed no enemy presence on 

the LZ. The enemy that fired at Extortion 17 remained undetected 

through those scans. We did not detect that enemy, and we did not 

achieve, frankly, the element of surprise into the Valley that was 

planned and anticipated. 

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. I believe my time is expired. 

I thank the Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentlewoman from California, 

Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you to all of 

the members of the panel. And let me first say to the families who 

are here, we know how broken your hearts are. And we share, albeit at some distance, the same sense of loss that you do. And there 

is no way that we can make you whole again, and that is very difficult, I think, for all of us. And hopefully, through this hearing and 

others, we will at least have solace in knowing that we will take 

steps to make sure that those who are serving our country in war 

zones have absolutely the best protection available. 

We can’t foresee everything. That is why we have lost the men 

and women in battle that we have, but that doesn’t mean we 

shouldn’t redouble our efforts to try and protect them, so thank 

you. 

Let me ask, there have been concerns raised about the way those 

fallen service members from Extortion 17 were transported and 

whether they were accorded the appropriate respect. For instance, 

some have raised concerns about which flags were used to drape 

over the caskets of some of the fallen heros during a ceremony at 

Bagram Airfield and again at the Dignified Transfer Ceremony at 

Dover. 

Colonel, could you provide for us an understanding about the catastrophic nature of this crash that, from what I understand, made 

it impossible in some respects to distinguish Americans from Afghan dead. The identities of the remains of Extortion 17 service 

members were not known until after they were examined, my understanding is, by the medical examiner in Dover following the 

transfer ceremony. Is that right? 

Colonel DEVILLIER. Thank you, ma’am, for your question. That is 

correct. Given the trauma associated with this incident, all of the 

remains were brought to Dover as believed to be unknown, and 

until scientifically identified by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, there was no way to positively identify these individuals. 

Ms. SPEIER. Is that the protocol that is always used and has always been used historically? 

Colonel DEVILLIER. Yes, ma’am, until they are scientifically identified by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, every remain that 

comes to Dover is believed to be—they can be visually recognized 

40 

in certain instances, so every situation is different. This particular 

situation was an aircraft accident. It was very traumatic. 

Ms. SPEIER. In hindsight, would you have handled it any differently? 

Colonel DEVILLIER. Well, ma’am, you know, the decisions were 

made at the time based upon the information they had available. 

And the scientific identification process has to occur at Dover Air 

Force. 

Ms. SPEIER. I understand that. I am just trying to put myself in 

the shoes of family members who were at the ceremony watching 

these caskets come off without an American flag draped over them. 

And, I mean, arguably maybe you would have the Afghan flag and 

the American flag. I don’t know what the right answer is, but having a coffin come off that has no flag draped on it, I am sure gave 

the family members a sense of pain that was magnified by everything else that they had endured. 

Colonel DEVILLIER. Ma’am, while I was not there at the time of 

the event, I can tell you that there was a lot of debate that occurred about this on how to properly provide dignity, honor and respect to all of the members of Extortion 17. And there were different courses of action that were discussed with the leadership 

within the Office of Secretary of Defense. And their final determination was to flag drape 30 of the transfer cases with American 

flags and 8 with the Afghan flags. 

Ms. SPEIER. And that decision was based on what? 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Ma’am, if I may respond to that question, again, 

as Colonel Devillier had stated our leadership was presented with 

several courses of action after we had discussed with our colleagues 

within the Service Casualty Department of how to best honor our 

military service members, the U.S. fallen, and also our coalition 

forces, understanding that remains were en route to the United 

States, we had to make a decision rather quickly. Again, it was a 

catastrophic event, largest incident of—number of fallen in one single incident in Afghanistan. So, based off the courses of action consult with our military departments, OSD leadership decided that to 

best honor, we would be able to display the 30 transfer cases as 

best we could identify were carrying our U.S. service members and 

8, our coalition forces. 

I would also emphasize that in transport to the United States, 

all remains were under U.S. flag cover, as per our policy if we cannot make the distinction. So, en route on the aircraft, all 38 transfer cases were under U.S. flag cover. 

Ms. SPEIER. I realize my time is expired, Mr. Chairman, if you 

would just indulge me for one moment. I think it would just be 

helpful to all of us if you queried the family members as to how 

they perceived the return and if they had any, would have any suggestions, just for future reference. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I will new recognize the gentlewoman 

from Illinois, Ms. Kelly, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here, and thank you for 

your service to our country and to all the Service folks in the audience, whether retired or not, and my condolences to the family. 

41 

Ms. Skillman, you spoke about the person authorized to direct 

disposition. And I was just curious, is there special resources or 

tools that are given to the families or there for the families to help 

them through this time or whoever the person is that has been appointed the PADD? Do you help them with their decision or—— 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Ma’am, a casualty assistance officer—and each of 

the service departments call their assistance officers different 

names, but we will refer to them as assistance officers—are assigned to the designated person, the PADD. And they are provided 

information. We do not persuade. We don’t make recommendations. 

We merely try to make sure that they have all the information 

available to them to help them in making a decision. They are provided with the options that are available to them and the amounts 

that are allowable under law to pay for any funeral expenses and 

what the government can provide for them. 

Ms. KELLY. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Pursuant to committee rules, members of the committee—my 

apologies. I now recognize the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. 

Welch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much. 

I thank Mr. Chaffetz and Mr. Tierney for the hearing, and I 

want to thank very much Mr. Rigell for being here, since he represents so many of the soldiers who died in service to their country. 

Thank you very much. And I want to thank the families, and I 

want to thank you. 

How can any of us deal with the loss of a loved one? We are all 

proud obviously of those who die in service of our country. Our responsibility is to recognize that we have these Americans who sign 

up and volunteer, no matter what the mission may be. And they 

will report for duty when the commander in chief says, We need 

you. This democracy would never work if we didn’t have citizens 

who were willing to put aside their own judgment when it comes 

to what America’s engagement should be and defer to civilian leadership. And our responsibility here more than anything else is to 

make certain that the missions that we set America on are worthy 

of the willingness of our civilians who become military people to 

make the ultimate sacrifice. So I say that really out of respect to 

the families. 

And I am going to ask one question that I know the answer to. 

These families have all been affected in the same way. They have 

lost a loved one, but they have all been affected in different ways 

because how one deals with loss is very personal. And some people 

need more information; some people need more privacy. And the 

question I have of you is will you be available to each of the families to give them every bit of information that you can about every 

detail that they seek to try to respect the needs and desires and 

the emotions of each of the families? And they have different ways 

of trying to work through this enormous loss. Thank you. 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Yes, sir. I think I can speak on behalf of all of 

my colleagues here. We welcome the opportunity to assist every 

family member with their individual needs, and we will be more 

than happy to speak to the family members when they are ready. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentlemen. 

42 

Pursuant to committee rules, we do have some flexibility in allowing colleagues who do not serve on this committee to join us and 

ask questions. I would ask my colleagues for unanimous consent to 

allow Mr. Rigell of Virginia and Mr. Fortenberry to ask—each be 

granted 5 minutes to ask questions. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Without objection. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Without objection, so ordered. 

They care deeply about this issue. I appreciate their participation 

and serve on committees that are also very relevant to this issue, 

so I appreciate their presence. 

I now recognize Mr. Rigell for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RIGELL. Well, given that I do not serve on this committee, 

I am especially grateful to the chairman and to all members for the 

unanimous consent that was required. 

And the title of the hearing is, ‘‘Honoring the Heros of Extortion 

17,’’ and my comments are provided here today in that spirit, and 

I hope it honors the good men that we lost. 

Even within a community that accepts the great risk that comes 

with our mission, the loss of Extortion 17 was truly tragic and profound. And so to the families that are here today, from one American to another, I offer you my deepest condolences. 

Now, the tragedy merits and should receive, and I believe has received, rigorous examination, unflinching examination, looking at 

each and every measure to see if, indeed, we could have done something different, because we owe that to the men who we lost that 

day to honor their memory. And also we owe it to the commanders 

and the warfighters that will follow them to provide that with any 

lessons that could be learned to give our warfighter every advantage in equipment, tactical procedures, and doctrine to allow them 

to come home safe. 

You know, each member of this body has standing here, whether 

a member lost someone in their district or not, that, as my friend 

and colleague, Mr. Welch, I think gracefully offered, our district 

has had a disproportionate loss. And it is both humbling and honoring to me and sobering really to represent so many of our 

warfighters and their families. 

It is well known, I think, that there is at least some degree of 

controversy associated with the hearing itself. There is not unanimity among the family members, and I have a duty and the 

privilege of representing the Second District in Virginia, and the 

families who are there overwhelmingly have made clear that their 

desire would be that we did not hold the hearing. But I am especially grateful to the chairman and to all who have offered their remarks today that there is a deep level of respect, and our heartfelt 

condolences extend, of course, to each and every family. 

I have listened carefully to the testimony that has been offered 

here today. It is under oath. Each one of you, I believe, meets the 

highest standard of an American patriot, and it is not a term that 

I offer casually. I deeply respect your service to our country. 

Mr. Reid, I think your own experience in particular and your intense investigation here is noteworthy. Do you have any question 

whatsoever, Mr. Reid, that there was no communication at all between Americans and Afghans that would have in any way jeopardized or compromised that mission? 

43 

Mr. REID. No, sir, I do not have any questions that that information was provided. I know from those involved that this particular 

17 mission was not coordinated externally. 

Mr. RIGELL. Is it your testimony here today that the aircraft that 

was selected for this operation was appropriate to the mission? 

Mr. REID. Yes sir. 

Mr. RIGELL. The testimony that I have heard, not only today but 

the classified material itself, which of course we cannot go into, I 

do, and this is with deep respect for those who actually hold a different view, I find compelling. And I would hope that in this hearing, the fact that it was held, that it can bring just perhaps a measure of closure on some of the technical issues that need to have 

been worked through and I think, indeed, have. 

It is certainly to my satisfaction, so I thank all who are here 

today. I certainly thank all who have testified. I thank the chairman and all the members of the committee for the opportunity to 

speak. 

And I yield back the remainder of my time. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Chairman Chaffetz, for extending 

me the courtesy of being able to speak here and members of the 

committee as well. I am grateful for the opportunity to participate 

in this difficult moment for many of the families here but those of 

you as well who attend to these families. This is difficult for all of 

us. 

And first, let me extend my heartfelt sympathies to all who have 

lost loved ones through this tragic incident and also commend Mr. 

Rigell for something that I think he put very well. I hope that the 

outcome of this committee provides some measure of closure for all 

of those who have suffered so grievously. 

In late summer of 2011, my office, I was notified that a young 

man from South Sioux City, Nebraska, had been killed. His name 

was John Douangdara. John was a first generation American. His 

parents had fled Communism in Laos and come to the United 

States in 1975 to rebuild their lives. They are good Americans. And 

their son, after high school, like so many other Americans, right 

after 9/11, joined the Navy. This was his fifth tour your of duty, 

and John had a specialty. He had an assault dog, a specialty with 

an assault dog, whose name was Bart, who happened to be on this 

helicopter as well and was also killed. 

The family was kind enough to ask me to speak at the memorial 

service there in South Sioux City and then kind enough again, 

even though this is no longer in my congressional district because 

the lines have changed, to invite me back on Memorial Day last 

year for the unveiling of a statute of John and his dog Bart at the 

park there in South Sioux City. 

Now, those of you who are in the military and those of you who 

have lost a loved one, to know that all of your loved ones are honored in a particular special way but to know John’s story as well 

and to have seen what I saw, the outpouring of support from that 

little, small community there along the Missouri River, called 

South Sioux City, should be uplifting to all of us as Americans. 

44 

I did only have one brief question, and it is a sensitive issue, but 

I would like to get a little bit more clarity on it. You mentioned 

the memorial service that took place immediately after the incident. Were there insulting remarks made by an Afghan cleric 

there? 

Mr. REID. Thank you, Congressman. 

Three people spoke at the ceremony that you are asking about. 

It is a memorial service; the troops call it a ramp ceremony. We 

make a distinction in policy between ceremonies and services, but 

they call it a ramp ceremony. And they have been doing them the 

whole war. And it is an important—and if I may, I will get to that. 

The question was asked earlier about why we do that. The troops 

are in the battlefield, and they are continuing the fight. They don’t 

come back to see their loved comrades off, so that is their farewell. 

They are filmed, and they are filmed for the purpose of providing 

those to the families. They are filmed by that organization at the 

commander’s discretion at that time within policy. As you heard 

the policy has been changed by CENTCOM in 2013. But they are 

done so for the families, and they provide that to them as a memento of what they did down range. 

Three people spoke, the commander of our Special Operations 

Task Force, a U.S. military chaplain, and the third gentleman, to 

get to your question, is an Afghan. He is a colonel. He is a commander of the Afghan unit that we work with. He has been working with us in a very trusted, close and cooperative way for several 

years. I believe now—he is still there; started, I believe, in 2009. 

He accounts for those special troops that are assigned to our task 

force. And as I mentioned, they come out of the other forces. We 

run a special selection and a vetting and a training program for 

them. He is the one that spoke. There is no other one that spoke. 

I don’t speak Arabic. I am not a religious scholar. We have had 

people in our government listen to what he was saying. I am told— 

again, not my authority—that there are verses that he is citing. He 

is commemorating the fallen, all of the fallen. There are some interpretations I have seen on the internet that he is condemning the 

Americans, the infidels. Again, it is not my expertise, but what we 

have been told on good authority is he is commemorating all of our 

fallen and condemning the enemy. But I understand things are 

subject to interpretation, sir. That is who was speaking. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. And that was one of the points that I think 

was particularly sensitive that was under public scrutiny about the 

entire incident. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the privilege of being with you during this particularly difficult hearing. 

Let me just conclude that I am not here on behalf of the 

Douangdara family. I just got to know them, and I wanted in some 

small measure to honor John’s life. He was dedicated to his community. He was a warrior. John was an American. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank the gentleman. 

I thank both of you for your participation and your heart and 

caring. 

We will now recognize the gentlewoman from New Mexico, Ms. 

Lujan Grisham, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

45 

And I, too, very much appreciate your participation in today’s 

hearing and to work diligently to assure that we have the right 

protocols and procedures to support the men and women who give 

their lives and their families in the most appropriate, meaningful 

way that we possibly can. I cannot imagine the pain of losing a 

family member or a loved one in this kind of an incident. And I 

offer and share with my colleagues in giving my deepest condolences and sympathies for the family members who are here today 

and all those family members who have suffered these kinds of 

losses on behalf of this country. 

And I also agree that the Department of Defense has an obligation to do absolutely everything that it possibly can do to be open, 

transparent, comforting, supportive, and to do that at the highest 

possible level to the family members and every family member who 

has suffered through the loss of a loved one. So I know that you 

have been doing this, and I want you to keep doing it. 

Walk me through the process and the protocol that the DOD has 

in place now to ensure that there is direct and a sustained line of 

communication between the Department of Defense Family Liaison 

Offices and the family members of Americans serving in harm’s 

way, and what services and supports specifically are you providing? 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Ma’am, thank you for your question. If I understand your question, the level of support that we are providing, the 

continued support that we provide to our surviving family members? 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Correct. 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Our current policy requires, of course, that an assistance officer, whether it is a casualty assistance representative 

from the Air Force or a casualty assistance officer from the Army 

or a casualty assistance calls officer from Navy or Marine Corps, 

assist the family members through the initial phase of the loss. We 

are also required to provide long-term support for those family 

members for as long as they want to be part of the military community. Again, we want that family member to feel that they can 

be part of the military community for as long as they need us. 

Each Service has their own long-term care program. Army, for 

example, can expound upon that. They have a Survivor OutReach 

Services Program, and I will allow each of the Services just to talk 

about their program, but that program is in place where there are 

people that are available for the family members to contact to provide that long-term care support. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Thank you. Can you give me some specifics. 

So that is going to be counseling? Are there therapeutic services, 

an opportunity for suggestions about how to improve those processes, involvement in the services to the highest degree possible? 

Can you give me some level of specificity about the kinds of services that you are providing to family members and loved ones? 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Yes, ma’am. Each of those long-term programs, 

they want to keep them involved, especially around their community. Some family members are not close to a military installation, 

so we want to reach out to them, make sure that they are part of 

the community. TAPS is an integral part of that. We constantly 

work with our other agencies that provide support to our family 

members, so the Marine Corps may invite family members to TAPS 

46 

events. The Army Survivor Outreach Services may bring in—provide a session that provides some counseling for family members; 

make sure that if they need bereavement counseling, they can 

reach out to the Department of Veterans Affairs or other agencies 

who may be providing that level of support. But again, it is a case 

manager that is assigned to that family member that knows what 

their specific needs are. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. And given that each one of these tragedies 

is very difficult to accept, we want to absolutely evaluate it in the 

context of mitigating for the future but also supporting men and 

women and, again, the family members who suffer these kinds of 

tragedies, is there a process also for being clear about things that 

the families want you to do to improve and how that communication occurs? And what can Congress be doing to ensure that all of 

these protocols and all of these processes continue to sort of amend 

and grow and really meet the needs of both the current situations 

and the potential for future issues that should be supported in the 

context of these families? 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Thank you, ma’am. 

Our current program requires that we proactively provide family 

members and inform them of specific Federal entitlements. That 

long-term program, of course, is dependent upon the family’s needs. 

We have two governing bodies, the Casualty Advisory Board and 

the Central Joint Mortuary Affairs Board that meets quarterly. 

Those two boards that these members represent, they are voting 

members on both of those boards, as I know OSD chairs both of 

them. They are the governing bodies that we ensure that we are 

doing things right by the family members. At those times, we review specific cases. We may review our policies, make recommendations where we think legislation needs to be corrected. Where a 

survivor’s needs are not being met, there may be a gap in law or 

policy. And those boards, we make those recommendations at that 

time. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. And, Mr. Chairman, with your diligence, I 

have one small follow up. 

And how often are those reports or suggestions, is that annually? 

Do you do it quarterly, and I would suggest that we have more access to that kind of information in this committee, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Ma’am, we meet quarterly. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. But that information is available quarterly, 

or do you do kind of an annual report? 

Ms. SKILLMAN. There is no reporting requirement to Congress at 

this time, ma’am. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. In consultation with the Ranking Member 

Tierney, I have a series of questions. We tried to get as many different questions from the families as possible, so I am going to go 

through a series of questions here. Again, it won’t answer every 

question that every family member has, but I think it is a good 

representation of some of their specific concerns. 

First of all, I can tell you that having reviewed the records, the 

pilots that were operating this aircraft are of exceptional quality, 

skill and high rating, but there were some questions about why 

47 

was there no pre-assault fire laid down before, as this helicopter 

was coming in. Could you help clarify that, Mr. Reid? 

Mr. REID. Yes, sir. Thank you. The use of pre-assault fire is a 

tactical decision based on conditions on the ground. The objective 

of Extortion 17 was to get into the LZ and drop off the assault force 

and depart the area without alerting the enemy overtly. I think as 

we explained to you the other day, the force was going to then walk 

closer to the target. So you are trying to achieve surprise. Firing 

in advance of that in a suppressive fire mode would be highly alerting to the enemy, and, secondly, there was no enemy detected on 

the landing zone. But let me just clarify, this is a tactical decision. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Can you give us a general sense of the time of 

day that this is happening? 

Mr. REID. 2:39 in the morning on the morning of August 6, 2011. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. One of the concerns and the questions about the 

Afghans that were on this helicopter, there were some allegations 

that there were Afghans on the helicopter, I should say, and then 

got off, and a different group got on, which begs an awful lot of 

questions. Can you help clarify that, please? 

Mr. REID. Yes, sir. Thank you. There are two groups of Afghans 

assigned to this task force. One group went on the first Target with 

the Rangers. The second group was on Extortion 17. There was a 

mistake made after the crash to retrieve the list of Afghans that 

were aboard 17. The list that was provided was for the other squad 

that was with the Rangers. This created this confusion and led to 

some speculation that there was a switching out of the actual 

forces. That is not the case, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Why were there Afghans on the plane, and what 

kind of experience did we have with these people—I keep saying 

plane. On the helicopter. What kind of experience did we have? 

How many times, missions, had they done in the past? Was this 

a new group. Can you provide some context there, please? 

Mr. REID. Yes, sir. This group of Afghans we referred to as our 

partnered unit, and they have been aligned with our assault forces 

going back to 2009. The purpose of these forces is to facilitate actions on the objective, primarily by speaking with and dealing with 

the enemy and the civilians on the target because they speak the 

language and they know the culture. 

As was mentioned earlier, the majority of these missions since 

we started doing this result in what we call a tactical callout, saying we are out here, come out. And 80 percent of the missions, 

therefore, because of this capability are accomplished without any 

shots being fired. So it greatly enhances our safety. That is why 

they were there. How they got there is through a very long and extensive training cycle that lasts about 7 months. They are hand selected out of the Afghan Army and Afghan police and their other 

security services. They are vetted, trained and selected, and then 

aligned with our units. They are paired with our forces. They go 

on a rotation cycle, just like our forces did. Our assault forces come 

in for about 90 days in cycles, and we rotate them back out. We 

align the Afghans in a similar cycle, and they repeat that. These 

folks, again, for the previous 2 years prior to this, every mission 

we are taking them on the objective with us. This was not a new 

construct. 

48 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. My understanding is that General Colt conducted 

part of this review, and one of the questions is why it appears 

there were no Afghans that were interviewed. Why not? 

Mr. REID. Sir, I don’t know specifically why no Afghans were 

interviewed. The focus of his investigation and the list of questions 

that the commander of CENTCOM charged him to answer did not 

require him to interview others outside our decision chain and our 

training and equipment chain. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Perhaps you can provide some additional clarification for the committee. That would be appreciated. I want to go 

back to the ramp ceremony itself. Having been through a number 

of meetings, classified, unclassified discussions, not to belabor the 

point, but to my colleagues here, I think one of the—and this is 

just Jason Chaffetz, just me personally, my personal take on it. 

You all are the experts. You have been doing this for years, but my 

sense of it is that if you do have a situation where there are deceased Americans and whatever country, in this case Afghanistan, 

my sense of it is that there probably should be two different ceremonies. 

I think if—I mean, I can’t even imagine having my son or daughter go through this, but I don’t want some Afghan saying something about my son. I don’t want that. So I hope—we are supposed 

to be the Oversight and Government Reform. I would hope the Pentagon would seriously consider—honoring those Americans is our 

number one priority, and of course, we are going to honor those 

that also lost their lives, but do it separately. And let’s not have 

this mistake and this heartache that these families feel. That is my 

suggestion. 

And, Ms. Skillman, I need you or one of the others to help explain, clarify, just how is it we can lay a tombstone and then have 

to go back and change it. And in some cases, I think it happened 

three times. Can you shed some light on this? You are a very committed, patriotic person. It is not all on her shoulders. 

To the families and members here, she is the brave one who is 

sitting here helping us. 

But this is very hard for a family to go through. Can you please 

shed some light on this? 

Ms. SKILLMAN. Yes, sir. The group internment, I believe, is what 

you are referring to here, is that group headstone that is at Arlington National Cemetery. Per our current policy, we may decide if 

there are remains that cannot be identified to a single individual, 

that we may have a group internment of those at a specific place. 

Arlington is picked pretty regularly, and then a headstone is placed 

on that location. 

Normally we list the names of the deceased. There are some 

challenges in this particular case because of our coalition forces, 

and we struggled with how we would appropriately label that headstone. And in deference to the family members, we should have 

given them the opportunity to review our suggestions. And I think 

that is something that we can look at before we ever put another 

headstone on a group internment, conferring with the family members of how they would like that to be done. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I appreciate that, and I have one more topic and 

then if any members have additional questions. 

49 

You know, the people out there who are paying attention and 

care about Extortion 17, they didn’t just make this thing up about 

a black box being washed away. That wasn’t just something that 

somebody made up out of the blue. There is some reason to believe 

that the, I am not sure what his rank is, but the commander essentially on the ground, made note of the fact that they were looking 

for in black box and they couldn’t find the black box. 

Again, you are telling us, Mr. Reid, that these helicopters aren’t 

even equipped with them, but how is it the commander wouldn’t 

know that. 

Mr. REID. Sir, I can’t speak exactly for what the commander 

thought. I have seen the transcript of where he talked about looking for it. I would say, though, that this crash environment is a 

hostile environment. We did not have complete freedom of action, 

freedom of thought of what we were doing, what we were coordinating and what we were looking for. That team went in there in 

the immediate moments after the crash to recover the fallen, as I 

indicated, over a period of 4 days going through the wreckage. I 

don’t know why they thought they would be looking for one either, 

but I have spoken to our aviation community. And they have assured me that those helicopters are not equipped with such a device. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you, and for those on the committee, I just 

want people to know that many of our men and women who are 

intimately involved in this are also continuing to serve and serve 

abroad. 

Anyway, I appreciate it. Does any other member have additional 

question or comment? 

Gentlewoman from Wyoming. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Mr. Chairman, I simply want to comment that I 

am proud of the work you have done as chairman, on this. It is apparent that you went through this record exhaustively and that 

you took to heart the concerns that certain family members have. 

I recognize that there are other families who may have felt differently about the appropriateness of this hearing, but I just want 

to commend you and thank you for your diligent regard for the 

families who did have concerns so they would have an opportunity 

today to hear you ask the questions that they have had on their 

minds and hearts. 

And I just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you have 

done a very commendable thing. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

We recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney. 

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. 

Well, I just want to add my comments that I hope the families 

that have had concerns and questions have now felt that they have 

had an opportunity to hear fairly broadly answers to those concerns and that they are going to be heard going forward and attention will be paid to their continuing concerns and questions. 

But I want to address our panelists here today. I think nothing 

that I have read or heard would indicate that any of you proceeded 

or any of those under your commands have proceeded with anything but the best of intentions and caring and concern for their 

colleagues with whom they either work directly or indirectly or at 

50 

least emphasize with because of their shared commitment to this 

country and to each other. And I commend all of you also for diligently going about your investigations and your review in the same 

manner and also the willingness to learn where learning is appropriate on that. 

And thank you for your service and for the way that you have 

represented your country well. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

As we conclude here, I want to first thank the five people that 

are sitting here before us. You have a tough assignment but probably one of the most important assignments. It is a great opportunity, and I know you all feel that. I have chatted with you previously. I can tell that in your demeanor and your approach. We 

thank you for your service and your dedication. 

Most importantly, we obviously unanimously, regardless of party 

or politics or anything else, we cannot thank the men and women 

enough who serve this Nation and those that have given their lives 

for this Nation. 

There is a different group of people in our country, and these are 

the men and women who run to action. They run to the fire fight. 

That is the American way. There is a certain group of people who 

just do that. They just do it instinctively, and those Americans who 

do that are my heroes. I thank the families for their sacrifice. That 

is quite a thing that this is the largest loss of life, but it has happened unfortunately thousands of times. And I just hope they feel 

the love of this Nation, and so I appreciate the hearing. We stand 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(51) 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

52 


Insert offset folio 19 here 87499.019

Joint Statement For 

OSD, Army & Navy 

Casualty & Mortuary Affairs 

BEFORE THE 

NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE 

HOUSE OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE 

SECOND SESSION, 113TH CONGRESS 

EXTORTION 17 

FEBRUARY 27, 2014 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE 

HOUSE OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE 
53 


Insert offset folio 20 here 87499.020

The Department holds casualty and mortuary affairs among its most solemn 

responsibilities to our Service members, surviving family members, and the nation. A 

fundamental element of military culture and tradition is that we hold our fallen in highest 

esteem, treat their remains with highest reverence, and provide their surviving family 

members the highest level of care and continued support. The Office of Casualty and 

Mortuary Affairs promulgates policies that reflect these core values, and works in 

coordination with the Military Departments and the Services to ensure that the intent of 

the policies is reflected throughout all casualty and mortuary tasks and processes. 

Casualty Assistance: 

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for establishing uniform personnel 

policies and procedures for reporting, recording, notifying, and assisting the next of kin 

of Service members who are deceased, duty status - whereabouts unknown 

(DUSTWUN), excused absence - whereabouts unknown (EAWUN), missing, ill, or 

injured. The Office of the secretary of Defense (OSD) also establishes uniform policy 

and procedures for reporting, recording, notifying, and assisting the next of kin of 000 

civilian personnel, eligible contractors, and other designated or covered personnel. 

These policies apply to the Military Departments, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, 

Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, Defense Agencies, 000 

Field Activities, and all other organizational entities in the Department of Defense. To 

carry out this mission, 000 has established procedures for completing and updating the 

Record of Emergency Data or DO Form 93. The DO Form 93 is an official record for 

military personnel that provides the names and addresses of the persons the Service 

member desires to be notified in case of injury or death, designates certain benefits in 

2 
54 


Insert offset folio 21 here 87499.021

the event of a Service members' death, and designates the person authorized to direct 

disposition of his or her remains. The DD Form 93 also serves as a guide for the 

disposition of pay and allowances if captured, missing, or deceased. This form is also 

used for civilian personnel as emergency notification in the event the civilian member 

becomes a casualty. 

Mortuary Affairs: 

In addition to providing policy oversight for casualty assistance, the Office of 

Casualty and Mortuary Affairs provides overarching policy guidance and serves as the 

Department's focal point for coordination of all matters related to the DoD Mortuary 

Affairs Program. This includes policy oversight for the handling and transportation of 

human remains; group interments, disinterments, memorial ceremonies, and cremation 

of remains. 

Program Governance and Oversight: 

DoD has codified the Departments' policies in Department of Defense Directive 

1300.22E, Mortuary Affairs Policy, and Department of Defense Instruction 1300.18, 

Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures which are further augmented by 

Service specific instructions, regulations or directives. DoD meets the statutory 

requirement as described in Section 562 of Public Law 109-163, to provide a uniformed 

casualty assistance program by defining the core training requirements for all casualty 

assistance personnel regardless of Service. The Services then establish additional 

requirements to address the Service-unique circumstances of their members, families, 

organizational structure and traditions. To ensure DoD is meeting the needs of our 

Service members and their families, and to ensure uniformity with DoD casualty and 

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mortuary affairs polices, the Department established the Central Joint Mortuary Affairs 

Board and the Casualty Advisory Board as governing bodies for all matters relating to 

mortuary affairs and casualty assistance policies respectively. These Boards meet 

quarterly with representatives from all Services, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the 

Armed Forces Medical Examiner, and other agencies to discuss casualty and mortuary 

policies and procedures. In addition to these boards, OSD conducts a monthly survey 

of DoD survivors, and the Director, Casualty and Mortuary Affairs serves as a co-chair 

on the DoD and Department of Veterans Affairs Survivors' Forum. The Service specific 

operations and procedures are provided in more detail throughout the remainder of this 

written statement. 

Army Casualty Overview 

The Army has been in a state of continuous war for over twelve years - the 

longest in our Nation's history. More than 4,900 Soldiers have given their lives on 

behalf of this Nation. Behind each and every one of these Soldiers is a Survivor or 

Survivors, and it is the Army's charter to provide the best support possible to ease their 

transitions. The mission of the Casualty and Mortuary Affairs Operations Center is to 

execute the full-spectrum of Army Casualty and Mortuary Affairs for present and past 

conflicts. In this role, the Casualty and Mortuary Affairs Operations Center provides 

policy and direction to 33 Casualty Assistance Centers, develops standardized Casualty 

Assistance and Casualty Notification Officer training, operates the Joint Personal 

Effects Depot where Personal Effects for deceased personnel for all Service members 

who die in the combat theater of operations are processed/cleaned and returned to 

family or loved ones and provides notification, casualty assistance, and case 

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management for injured, ill, missing and deceased personnel. Casualty notification and 

initial support are completed through Casualty Notification Officers and Casualty 

Assistance Officers. 

Army Casualty Notification Officer 

The Casualty Notification Officer (CNO) represents the Secretary of the Army. 

The notification officer is courteous, helpful and compassionate toward the Next of Kin 

and reflects the Army's concern for its personnel and their families while performing this 

sensitive and honorable mission. Trained active duty officers in the rank of captain and 

higher, warrant officers in the rank of chief warrant officer two and higher, and senior 

noncommissioned officers in the rank of sergeant first class and higher, are charged 

with personally notifying the Next of Kin. Notifications generally occur between the 

hours of 0500 and 2400 with the goal to conduct notification within the first 24-hour 

period following the incident; notification will be made as a matter of highest priority, 

taking precedence over all other responsibilities the notification officer may have. The 

Primary Next of Kin is notified first followed by Secondary Next of Kin. 

Army Casualty Assistance Officer 

Selection of Casualty Assistance Officers is made by a Soldier's chain of 

command. The Casualty Assistance Center which has responsibility for the 

geographical area in which the Primary Next of Kin or Person Authorized to Direct 

Disposition resides will appoint a Casualty Assistance Officer from trained and certified 

active duty personnel. The Casualty Assistance Officers will be knowledgeable, 

competent, dependable, sympathetic, and, if possible, able to communicate in the same 

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language as the Primary Next of Kin or Person Authorized to Direct Disposition. 

Casualty Assistance Officers should meet the following qualifications: 

(1) Mature Soldiers with six or more years of service. 

(2) Officers in the rank of captain or higher, chief warrant officers in the rank of chief 

warrant officer two or higher, and noncommissioned officers in the rank of sergeant first 

class or higher. 

(3) The grade of the Casualty Assistance Officer will, whenever possible, be equal to or 

higher than the grade of the casualty and equal to or higher than the grade of the Next 

of Kin when applicable. 

Army Role of the Casualty Assistance Officer 

Upon official notification of the Next of Kin, the Casualty Assistance Officer, as a 

minimum, will-

(1) Communicate directly with the person making the personal notification to help 

ensure the first and subsequent contacts with the Next of Kin are productive. 

(2) Call the Next of Kin within four hours following initial notification to schedule an 

appointment to visit the Next of Kin. The Casualty Assistance Officer will determine the 

immediate needs or problems facing the Next of Kin and render prompt, courteous, and 

sympathetic assistance. The Casualty Assistance Officer, with the assistance of the 

supporting Casualty Assistance Center's Mortuary Affairs Specialist, will obtain the 

Person Authorized to Direct Disposition's decision on disposition of remains. 

(3) Assist the Next of Kin in applying for all entitled benefits. 

(4) Continue to support the Next of Kin until assistance is no longer required or the 

case is ready to transition to a case manager for long term management. 

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Army Extortion 17 Casualty Case Notes 

On August 6, 2011, five Soldiers were Killed in Action in support of the Extortion 

17 mission. Notification and assistance provided to the Soldiers' Next of Kin were 

completed in accordance with policy with two items of note: 

(1) In one case, Secondary Next of Kin (parents) were notified prior to the Primary Next 

of Kin (spouse). Standard procedures for notification were followed, however the 

notification team was unable to establish contact with the Primary Next of Kin. As such, 

the team made contact with the Secondary Next of Kin for notification and followed up 

with the Primary Next of Kin with condolences and standard casualty support. 

(2) In another case, it was identified that one of the Casualty Assistance Officers, who 

was properly trained on notification procedures, did not perform specific duties to the 

expected high level of standards when delivering such sensitive information to a 

Secondary Next of Kin (parent) under difficult circumstances. When this issue was 

identified, the Casualty Assistance Officer was relieved and immediately replaced to 

ensure the Next of Kin were as comfortable as possible throughout the assistance 

process. These notifications are difficult under the best of circumstances and even with 

training and guidance the task remains one that demands the highest emotional control 

and performance from the notifying officer. 

Army Conclusion: 

The circumstances surrounding the events of Extortion 17 are tragiC. To lose 

even one precious life is one too many, and the United States Army lost five Soldiers 

that day. The Army recognizes that people are the Army, and our dedicated and 

talented force is the reason the United States Army is second to none. The Army 

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remains committed to honor our Nation's commitment to the Soldiers and Families of 

deceased, injured, ill, and unaccounted-for through compassionate and responsive 

support. 

Navy Casualty Overview 

Navy families are, without doubt, an essential pillar of support to our operational 

readiness. When our uniformed men and women go in harm's way, they have 

leadership's unwavering commitment that the needs of their loved ones at home will be 

taken care of, particularly in a circumstance as tragic as a casualty. When a service 

member dies, is reported missing, captured, or is ill or injured, compassionate and 

timely care from our casualty assistance network is paramount in helping our families 

navigate the difficult road ahead. 

Navy Casualty Assistance Process 

The first priority of the casualty assistance program is to ensure the service 

member's immediate family is notified of the incident. This is followed by continuous 

information flow, as well as sustained assistance for as long as needed. To accomplish 

this, our three-tiered program consists of: 

1) Casualty assistance staff at the Navy Personnel Command (NPC) in 

Millington, TN (herein referred to as "Navy Casualty") 

2) Regional coordinators assigned to Commander, Navy Installations Command 

(CNIC) throughout the world 

3) Approximately 6000 trained Casualty Assistance Calls Officers (CACOs) who 

personally assist the families. 

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Additionally, when a major crisis occurs the casualty enterprise is augmented by 

activation of NPC's Emergency Coordination Center, designed to respond to the 

significant volume of incoming phone calls that inevitably result from a casualty or 

disaster. The center is staffed by active duty personnel, 24n, during an emergency to 

fill this vital requirement. Navy Casualty also has a reserve unit which specifically 

mobilizes to provide support during around-the-clock operations. 

Casualty reporting, notification, and assistance requirements are outlined in 

Department of Defense Instruction (DODINST) 1300.18. Navy provides additional 

guidance in Commander, Navy Installations Command Instruction (CNICINST) 1770.2 

and various Navy Military Personnel Manual (MILPERSMAN) articles. When a 

personnel casualty occurs, the member's commanding officer is required to submit a 

Personnel Casualty Report (PCR). This PCR is transmitted to all Casualty Assistance 

units: Navy Casualty (at Navy Personnel Command, in Millington, Tennessee) and each 

of the 24-hour Regional Operations Centers (ROCs). Navy Casualty verifies the 

information in the PCR against the Sailor's Official Military Personnel File, and the 

Regional coordinator assigns officer or senior enlisted CACOs to notify the next of kin. 

During notification, these CACOs may be accompanied by a Navy chaplain, if available. 

Next of kin notifications routinely occur within 6-8 hours of receipt of the PCR; 

Primary NOK (PNOK) notification is considered the most urgent. Stipulations are in 

place stating timeliness may take precedence over procedure which enables someone 

from the command or the command's reporting senior to make initial notification. 

During this initial visit, the CACO, or notifying official, provides available releasable 

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details concerning the death and renders immediate assistance to the family as the 

situation dictates. 

Within one to two days of the casualty, the CACO arranges a second visit with 

the NOK to identify any immediate needs, arrange timely payment of the Death Gratuity 

(DG), and to discuss arrangements and entitlements associated with funeral or 

memorial services. At this visit, the CACO also discusses the options for interment (as 

outlined on the Statement of Disposition) with the Person Authorized to Direct 

Disposition (PADD) as designated on the Sailor's Record of Emergency Data (DD93). 

In accordance with DoD policy, if a fatality occurs in a combat theater of 

operations, the deceased service member's remains are recovered and returned to the 

continental United States without delay. A Dignified Transfer of Remains (DTR) 

ceremony is performed upon arrival at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware. The PNOK, 

plus two additional family members, may travel at government expense to attend the 

DTR and the Secretary of the Navy may authorize additional family members to travel 

on a case-by-case basis. 

The U.S. Navy has two active duty licensed morticians permanently assigned at 

Dover Air Force Base. During the DTR, these morticians meet with the PADD, the 

family, and if present, the CACO, to discuss mortuary affairs, options for funeral 

arrangements, and the DTR process. If the CACO and/or PADD do not accompany the 

PNOK to Dover, the Navy Mortician will brief the CACO, PADD, and funeral home via 

telephone after meeting with the family to discuss family concerns and other procedural 

issues. Once the DTR is complete and the family has departed Dover, the Navy and 

Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) morticians begin the process of preparing and 

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transporting the fallen Hero to his or her final resting place. This includes an AFME 

identification routine and autopsy, and a preparation of the Sailor's uniform by Navy 

morticians. AFME officials also provide a letter to the PADD and funeral home with 

specific details concerning the condition of the remains. 

Approximately 10 working days after the member's death, the family receives a 

package from Navy Casualty discussing all remaining benefits and entitlements. The 

CACO will then schedule a third visit to assist the NOK in completing the remaining 

claims forms. The CACOs continue to assist all NOK as needed, until all benefits are 

paid or the family expressly states they no longer require further assistance. Upon 

completion of these duties, the CACO completes and submits to Navy Casualty a report 

indicating they have completed all duties and that all benefits have either been applied 

for or received. 

Navy Actions for EXTORTION 17 

Shortly after midnight on the morning of August 6, 2011, Navy Casualty began 

receiving phone calls concerning the possibility of a mass casualty - a CH-47 mishap in 

the Wardak Province of Afghanistan. Once the magnitude of the casualty became 

apparent - 22 Navy service members reported dead - standard protocol was initiated. 

Upon receipt of Personnel Casualty Reports indicating the deceased were assigned to 

Navy Special Warfare Development Group (NSWDG), NSWDG assigned CACO-trained 

personnel from their command to accomplish PNOK notifications and all follow-on 

casualty assistance. In accordance with the Navy's policy and procedures and based 

on records of the casualty teams, every family had a trained CACO, a notification 

official, a senior enlisted member, a cadre of administrative support provided by 

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NSWDG's Casualty Assistance and Calls Center (CAAC) , and standardized regional 

and program manager level support. 

In conjunction with Navy Casualty program managers and Regional CACOs, 

NSWDG representatives worked together consulting with the families on their remaining 

issues concerning benefits, entitlements, and travel pay as the cases progressed. 

In closing, the Navy would like to emphasize the serious and sensitive approach 

we take towards our casualty assistance responsibilities. The Navy Casualty enterprise 

- from the Regions to the Program managers - is a community of professionals 

dedicated to the full spectrum of compassionate care for each and every family 

member. The Navy will continue to evaluate our programs to identify areas upon which 

we can improve - our Sailors and their families deserve nothing less. 

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Statement of 

Mary Strange 

Dear Senators, Congress and Members of The Armed Services Committee, 

August 6,2011 was the most DEVASTING day in our lives. Every parent's WORST nightmare, your child has been killed, along with 30 

of his comrades in a foreign country. Imagine ... 30 Families, who on 08/05/2011 were strangers, 24 hours later...bonded forever. My 

stepson, Michael Strange was on board the Chinook, call sign "EXTORTION 17", and in our home, the loud laughter isn't as loud and 

holidays, family get-togethers, celebrations and just any "ordinary" day, there is that silent void that NEVER goes away. I have had to watch 

my husband cry every single day because his heart aches and he misses his Son so much. Do you know what it's like, to watch the one person 

you love with ALL your heart, hurt sooo bad and know there's NOT A DAMN THING you can do?! I do, and it's a HORRIBLE feeling! 

We have waited 30 months to be able to sit here today in the hope that this Committee would help us find out what REALLY happened that 

fateful night. Personally, I feel as if salt has been added to the wound by NOT ALLOWING any parents to speak here today. My husband & I 

have spent many sleepless nights, shed many tears and spent thousands of hours reading, researching, making calls and doing a whole lot of 

good or fashioned foot work knocking on doors trying to get some answers. In response we have been lied to, treated disrespectfully and 

talked to as if we were morons, it's disgracefull I can't believe this is what Gold Star Parents have to tolerate! 

There have been sooo many inconsistencies in the reports and stories for this to be "a lucky shot", so PLEASE DO NOT insult us with an 

OUTRAGEOUS AND OFFENSIVE excuse as that!! 

Let's begin with Colt's statement in his "Summary" of what happened. He states that the "CH-47D Air Mission Commander and his task 

force commander DETERMINED this mission to be BE A"HIGH-RISK MISSION" due to the experience level of one nonpilot crew chief and because of this HIGH-RISK, the mission had to be approved by The Higher Headquarters Commander for 

Special Operations Task Force and the Supporting Aviation Brigadier Commander". WHO ARE THESE 

INCOMPETENT INDIVIDUALS? WHY 

WOULD THEY OK ALL 31 MEN ON 1 CH-47, IF BEFQRE LEAVING THE FOB, IT WAS DETERMINED TO ALREADY BE A 

"HIGH RISK MISSION"? Then .... 

They Gave N 0 ESCORTS FOR "EXTORTION 1'7" ON an already "HIGH RISK MISSION" into a Hot Landing Zone (HLZ)? 

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Were Not Followed b/c they Should have had an escort (AC-130 Gunship OR an AH-64 Apache) upon 

leaving the FOB! OUR MEN HAD NONE! 

Gen. Colt. states, "THE RANGER-led assault force was SUPPORTED by 2 CH-47D CHINOOK Helos and 2 AH-64 APACHE 

attack helicopters, along with an AC-130 Gunship, and a RELATIVELY ROBUST TEAM OF lNTELLIGENCE. 

SURVEILLANCE AN-D RECONNAISSANCE (ISRl AIRCRAFT", 

THEN to add insult to injury the next line is as follows "THE 2 CH-47Ds woq.LI! AIRLIFr the Assault Force. totaling 47 

~9nnel. into a LZ annrox .. 1200 meters from the suspected ]ocatlQII ..... of the TANG1 VALLEYTALIBAN LEADER, OARI 

TAH!R.A,K.A- "OBJEcnyE LEFIY GROVE", 

So there were 47 Rangers and 31 Americans aboard Extortion 17, that equa1s 78 of our Special Operators to CAPTURE 1 

Taliban Leader??!! W H Y?? 

THEN ... when the RANGERS arrived at their target compound, "Overhead Manned and Unmanned Aircraft" observed several personnel 

departing the target area. The AH-64 Apache attack helicopters detected and Positively and Identified suspected TALIBAN 

FIGHTERS AR..1VtED with AK-47 rifles and "RPG" lAUNCHERS. WALKING single file APPROX. 400 meters NORTHWEST of 

the target compound." Throughout the execution of the mission the Overhead ISR aircraft continued to track the movement of suspected 

T'ALIBAN FIGHTERS". "THIS GROUP formed around two personnel who WERE OBSERVED MOVING NORTHWEST from the 

immediate vicinity of the target area, BEFORE the Ranger-led assault force had arrived". Did they know the Rangers were coming? .. SURE 

SOUNDS LIKE THAT TO ME!! 

"There were Taliban in the trees, on motorcycles, in the building, approx. 2 kilometers from the original compound". THEY KNEW ALL 

this, BUT STILL ALLOWED OUR "BOYS" to go IN A "HlZ, ALL 31 A,lIIERlCANS, ON ONE HELO??? 

•• WE WERE TOLD THE RANGERS NEEDED HELP BECAUSE THEY WERE UNDER A'ITACK ...... •• 

"THEN .. ,WE COME TO FIND OlJT .. ,ARE YOU READY FOR THIS? .. ,THE RANGERS WERE NEVER IN DANGER!" 

*****OUR BOYS DID NOT HAVE TO BE DEPLOYED THAT NIGHT AS A IRF ... SO ... WHY WERE THEY???***** 

The 7 Afghan Commandos who originally on "EXTORTION 17" either got off and refused to get back on OR were switched out and 7 New 

Afghans GOT ON.* WHO were they? WHY were th...nlS,E.VER questioned? WHO made these decisions? HOW come General Colt 

NJiY.E...R asks these questions? Are the 7 that aborted "EXTORTION 17" still being allowed to fly with our Special Operators? If so WHY? 
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*In the "Investigation Paperwork" "Ex. 89" Colt asks the Air Force Commander (AFC) "VVhat is the assessment of the 

Tangi Valley?" AFC answers "over 100 Taliban plan to travel from the _ Province to the Tangi Valley to shoot down 

the Coalition Force Aircraft". They knew and did nothing to prevent this?! 

WHY when our Men Requested Pre-Assault Fire 2-3 TIMES, to CLEAR THE HLZ ... They were DENIED! WHO denied that 

request? 

The Occupational Coordination Group (OeG) has the FINAL say in EVERY mission our Special Ops does, whether it is a go OR if they don't 

like it they can call the "mission" off! 

HOW THE HELL CAl" WE EVER WIN A WAR, WHEN THE ENEMY KNOWS ALL OUR MOVES BEFORE WE DO THEM?! 

WHERE ARE THE "BLACK BOXES"? On Oct.12, 2011 General Colt, when my husband (Charles Strange) asks this 

question, Colt replies "A flash flood came and washed it away! We have looked into this and those Boxes DON"]' go away, 

in fact they have BEACONS on them and can be found 20,000 ft UNDER WATER! SO we ask again ... WHEREARE THE 

"BLACK BOXES"? WHAT DONTTHEY WANT US TO HEAR ON THOSE RECORDINGS? 

There were 3 "EYES IN THE SKY" ••. BUT NOT 1 ON "EXTORTION 17" ••. WHY? 

Gen. Colt asks about them and is told "We NEVER did a mission like this Sir (referring to Colt), it made us feel VERY 

Vulnerable. Our hands were tied from UP ABOVE"! 

How far up is "UP ABOVE?" WHO gave this command? 95 days prior ALL EYES were on SEAL Team 6 from the 

SITUATION ROOM! 

MYSTEPSON. CTR1 MICHAEL STRANGE. WAS CIU1l!MTED .. HE DID NOT NEED TO BE! 

WHY WERE WE TOLD" "THEY ARE ALL BURNED BEYOND RECOVNLTION~ "NO IDENTIFIABLE REMAINS" AND 

"ONLY 38 C,SPINES AND SKUlLS LEFT". LIES, LIES AND MORE LIES!!! WHY??? 

WE NEED HELP FINDING THE "TRUTH" 

Why are the Parents and Loved Ones of "EXTORTION 17" BEING ALLOWED TO BE TREATED THIS WAY? 

The Men of "EXTORTION 17" were Men of courage, integrity and honor, and not only did the Families lose their loved 

ones BUT this Country lost 30 Heroic Defenders of Freedom. PLEASE help the Families of Extortion 17 find some 

closure and that can only begin with the Truth. WE DESERVE THAT MUCH! 

THE ONLY TIME YOU HAVE TO LIE, .. IS IF YOU KNOW WHAT YOU'RE DOING ... IS WRONG!! 
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Statement of 

J. Terry Pittman Gold star father Of SOl (SEAL) Jesse D. Pittman 

GOD BLESS AMERICA 

Initially we were one of three families that were asked to appear and talk. After much stress 

preparing for this, we were called and told that we weren't going to testify after all. I believe it 

was because of the lack of decorum which some of the families have shown. We were told that 

the Military were to talk instead. Normally I wouldn't have a problem with this, but 

unfortunately the Military brass answer to Politicians, and may have Political aspirations at some 

point in time. 

I do feel some of the parents should be allowed to talk. Preferably in a closed hearing. I know a 

lot of conspiracy theories are running rampart, but I don't believe much of anything the most 

vocal are saying. 

In my limited time I did some research on many of you. It has come to my attention that the 

majority of you are not Veterans and those that are have my deepest respect. (My point is that 

politics and our Great Nations Military are not in our country's best interest) I'm not saying we 

shouldn't have checks and balances, but let the Military determine how to fight the wars. 

My family has the highest respect for our son, and the others aboard the helicopter. Our son and 

all the other men on the helicopter were very special people as all of you are aware. It is our 

hope that some good can come out of this and anything we can change to see that this doesn't 

happen again. 

As a Vietnam Veteran, I didn't want our son to join the Military, not that I'm not unpatriotic, but 

for the fact when it comes to our children it is a different situation. Especially with our current 

rules of engagement, but I also didn't discourage him. Fortunately we were able to see him just 

before he deployed. He had just returned from another deployment and was back for a little over 

a month. My last words to him, (besides that I loved him) were: The two things that really 

concern me are the helicopters, and the Afghanis turning on them. His last words to me is 

"Don't worry Dad, I'll be home for Christmas" 

This brings me to my questions: Why were the Afghanis switched out at the last minute? Who 

gave that order? It had to come from someone higher than the men in the field. Was Karzai in 

on the dispatch of our troops? Who from the State Department or CIA gave the go ahead for the 

mission? Where were the eyes in the sky? It is my understanding that DEVGRU only takes 

orders from someone in the administration. 

If one of you should be elected President, what would be your exit strategy? What would you do 

more to protect our troops? 

It is my hope we can win your hearts and minds. It is impossible to do this with our enemy. 

Since World War II, we haven't really won a war, North Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and now 

Afghanistan. Political correctness and our rules of engagement have to change. We are losing 
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the finest people in the world to these asinine rules! 

Mistakes were made and need to be corrected. Operation RED Wings rescue helicopter was also 

sent out without air support. We should have learned from that. 

Nothing is ever going to bring our sons back. This is the most heart wrenching feeling we have 

ever experienced. There is not a day goes by when we don't think about him. To all of the other 

families including ones not on the helicopter who have lost a child they have our prayers and 

greatest sympathy 

Let our Military win the wars. We have without a doubt the best Military in the world. Please 

quit tying their hands behind their backs. 

Our soldiers should not be used for political gain. The administration should have kept their 

mouths shut when it comes to our missions and not disclosed who got Bin Laden. Poor example 

of leadership!!! 

On closing, my wife brought up a good point. Counsel all the loved ones in a disaster like this. 

Parents, wives, and siblings. There were people left out. 

Thank you for hearing me out. 

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To: House Oversight Committee Congressional Hearing 

Thank you for your consideration 

February 27. 2014 @ 10 a.m. EST 

By Ida B. Pittman, Gold Star Mother 

Jesse D. Pittman SEAL 

FIRST THOUGHT 

God Bless America is a prayer of many. Our country has been blessed by the mighty men of 

history. Many people of faith, came here for religious freedom, fought a mighty country for 

freedom and established a government that has lasted this long. Most of them confessed God 

as their sovereign leader. Our country, as a result, was blessed for many years. We became a 

world power, able to influence much in the positive that has gone on in the world to date. The 

wars we fought were not because we wanted a country's land or to control the people. Our 

history after a war has been to help to re-establish those countries. 

In the last years the USA has turned away from the founding father's guidance. Religious 

guidance is synonymous with our moral integrity. Because of this lack of integrity, I believe God 

is taking His blessing away. As I understand, the chance of an RPG hitting the Chinook 

helicopter was a 1 in 500, this tells me God allowed this unfortunate tragedy. I know my son, 

who accepted Jesus Christ as his savior at age 13, is with the LORD. I know that several men on 

the helicopter were also saved. God took those Mighty Men home and left us to ponder the 

tragedy. I hope we grow from it personally and as a nation. 

FIRST POINT 

Our son was very concerned about his anonymity. We were asked not to use photos of him 

publicly. He did not have any social network accounts. We are certain he did other things to 

keep his security. We know the other team men did similar things. In fact, this attitude travels 

all the way down from WARCOM to the SEALs. So why are our people in public office not using 

the same degree of discretion? Why are our special operator's actions being announced to the 

public? Since this has become a common practice, what is being done to stop it? What 

discipline is being performed on those who do not use discretion? What is being done to edit 

our political representatives in the future? 

SECOND POINT 

After this tragedy we were overwhelmed and our heads were in a fog. Our family was 

devastated. As I have been connected with the other families, I know they were also. There 

were people like TAP.s reaching out to help us and we thank them immensely. We were given 

money to cover expenses and many useful things to read. Resources were many for us. 

There was one area that we feel was forgotten and needs were not met. 

Our other sons suffered as we, Jesse's parents did. As their mother, I grieved for them. I knew 

how hurt they were at the loss of their treasured brother. 

My hope is that in the future, siblings need to be covered in the grief recovery programs. Again, 

siblings need to be better covered. 
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We want to thank everyone for all the help. 

Everything in my mind has been turned upside down. 

You are not supposed to bury your children. People frequently say, "Oh, I so am 

sorry I bought it up, but your son is a Hero." Well, let me tell all of those people 

who never buried a son or daughter. It does not matter if someone brings 

Michael's name up. It is not like you forget. 

It comes whether you are driving, walking, in a store, or sleeping. It just comes. 

But, what we need to know is how to cope with this to go on for our other children 

or grandchildren. So, how do you do this when there is no closure? They tell us a 

"Lucky Shot"; they give us a book with no ink and no toner. I know the country is 

hurting, but come on! Then they have us come back 11 months later to bury the 

remains. All over again. 

To cremate my son and then to find out he did not have to be cremated. What? 

"'Who? "'WHY"'? 

I will try and keep this short. 

In the report, they saw the recording device [the Black Box] but there was a fire 

near the pilot. Then they say the flash flood washed the recording device away. 

They said a few times they thought they heard it? I would think they would know 

the different sounds. I am not military but I am pretty sure there is a unique sound. 

Who came up with this mission? Why not the 160th? They are trained with a great 

deal of money spent on training 16Oth. That is who flies DEVGRU. 

They did not have an alternate landing site? WHY NOT after the Rangers were 

there for 3 hours? 

They knew how hot the area was from the previous mission. The previous 

mission was hit with everything yet they were not in a 1960 Chinook refurbished 

in 1985.They were in Black Hawks. They were told to abort the mission, but not 

Extortion-17 was NOT? 

Where is SEAL Commander Van Hauser? We want him there. 

Colt has multiple reports on the National Guard Unit from the day they went in 

until August 6, 2011. In fact, it's TOO much, as if he's TRYING to convince 

someone of something! He does that on OUR men BUT NOT on the Afghan 

Army? Not ONE WORD about the Afghan National Army. WHY? We don't even 

know who they were BECAUSE their names are NOT on the manifest. WHY 

don't they know who is with our MOST ELITE UNIT? 

Colt says, and this is in the report too ... are you ready for this? ... "The 
70 


Insert offset folio 37 here 87499.037

DRONES had A GLITCH IN THE Camera AND WERE NOT WORKING AT THE 

EXACT TIME OUR MEN WERE COMING IN." ... REALLY? 

And yet up until this point, there were NO PROBLEMS WITH THE CAMERAS 

OR THE DRONES!!! Do they expect us to believe this? Do they really think we 

are that stupid? Obviously THEY DO!!! And when we question them, they are 

such EGOMANIACS, they get ENRAGED!!! Also attacked by the NSA. [Phone 

and Computer] 

They "piss in my face and tell me it is raining" ... Really now? 

Air force Commander tells Colt "we never did a mission like this, it made us feel 

very vulnerable" then he says "OUR HANDS WERE TIED FROM UP ABOVE". 

Who is the "up above"? HOW FAR "UP ABOVE" DOES THIS REACH? 

While coming in a 50' tower on abuilding with 2 men up there in zero darkness? 

They called in to no other but to the "Afghan Administration" ... of all people, and 

they told them "they were just hanging crops" ... at 2 am? Who was the Afghan 

Administrator that night? WHO called the "Afghan Administration" to ask such a 

RIDICULOUS question?? 

At that "50 TOWER" APPROX. 30-40 Taliban were seen removing equipment 

out of there ... what were they moving? Our Men found 6 IEDs placed around 

the "Tower"! 

On the other side under the tree line there was 18 to 25 Taliban with AK-47's, 

motorcycles, RPGS, Night Vision Goggles (that worked), various machine 

guns, handguns, and cell phones. 

After this "horse and pony show", General Colt received a promotion to Major 

General ... WHAT? Just like the "Pat Tillman" case! 

General Colt mentions the word "AMBUSH" a few times BUT DOES NOT follow 

up to investigate the answers he received ... WHY NOT??? 

Admiral McRaven, while at the "Aspen Security Forum" said in an interview with 

Wolf Blitzer "We rehearse every operation before we conduct it." If this is the 

case, then WHAT HAPPENED ON 8/6/11? 

On August 24,2012, McRaven also warned his troops both current and former 

"he would take LEGAL ACTION against ANYONE found to have exposed 

sensitive info that could cause fellow Forces harm". Associated PRESS 8-24-

2012. BUT DOES THAT INCLUDE JOE BIDEN & LEON PANETTA for 

releasing the name of SEAL TEAM VI?? IF NOT ... WHY???? 

Army Aviation Regulation 95-1 states CH 47's can have as many as 3 different 

kinds of recorders such as: 
71 


Insert offset folio 38 here 87499.038

a. (FOR) Flight Data Recorder 

b. (CVR) Cock Pit Recorder 

c. (DSC) Digital Source Collector 

Someone by the call name of "S-3" was quoted 'WE DID NOT have the full 

planning products". WHY NOT??? 

TV Sensor Operator-Two individuals are starting to brag over the internet and 

they actually said their names. They just killed SEAL Team 6. What are the 

names? How did they know who was in the Chinook? 

Quair Tahir {AKA} objective Lefty Grove. If they are after him instead of the 

rescue mission for the Rangers, how did he know to move to another village? He 

KNEW him and his scumbag buddies. They knew. They Knew. They moved. The 

story went from rescue mission to going after Quair Tahir. 

TF-Task Force is the first issue is to figure out what Helo went down. It took us 

10 minutes to figure out what Helo went down. Coincidence my son, Michael 

jumped out of the Helo and few other people? Michael was intact except for his 

ankle and his hand was formed as though he was holding a gun. They did not 

know if anyone was alive but they did see a body cool down. WHAT the hell is 

going on? They don't know what Helo went down and then they watch my son 

DIE ... 

TM-J2*** The squirts {Taliban} leaders are back in Pakistan. They know when we 

are tracking them. You have to be out of your mind. They killed our sons and you 

know where they go in Pakistan and have TEA. It is in the paper work. 

General Jeffery Colt asks what is the assessment of the Tangi Valley. AC says 

well sir on 

May 10, 2011***One hundred Taliban are coming from ------- Providence to the 

Tangi Valley to shoot down the Coalition Force. They KNEW or is this just 

another coincidence? 

General Colt asks what was the assessment for the rescue mission. After we 

found out what Helo went down which took them 10 minutes, we had 30 plans 

we had pathfinders, Black Hawks and 140 men. He said we waited for daylight 

because the area had so many Taliban. Who told them to wait? They could of 

saved my son, Michael. They said there was a big fireball, Michael was not burnt 

and some of the other men were not either. The clean up crew got there in a MH47 S.O. Aircraft. 

TF-CDR*** "SOP" They cannot go off, the FOB {Forward Operating Base} 

without an escort at night. {AWT} Who told them to go??? 
72 


Insert offset folio 39 here 87499.039

10? This guy said J3 answerer's "Yes sir, there was a manifest" - and am sure 

you are aware of the 7 Afghan personnel that were not on the LIST but were on 

EXTORTION 17. 

Colt asked "did we ever switch the sensor over the landing zone?" 1/B PL T 

CDR responds "Not to my knowledge." WHAT? Come on! ANOTHER 

Coincidence?? 

Aircraft Commander says really quickly an important point: We did pick up a few 

squirters and asked to fire and we were DENIED. {RULES OF ENGAGEMENT} 

And our sons get KILLED. {ROE} 

Who was the contract crew and whom are they contracted from? What part did 

they play in the INFIL of Extortion 17? Did the contractor have anything to do with 

using only one ship? 

Also what happened to Direct Support officer, a hobbit he has the capability to 

monitor push to talk?? We were not able to have DSO for that night? WHY 30 

MEN and lets not use hobbit that night. ANOTHER Coincidence?? 

Also they say they heard the 3 minute-in call and one man said we have not 

heard anything from the guys ... and then they heard the one minute call. 

THERE WAS A THIRTEEN-MINUTE LAPSE. Where is that TAPE????????? 

Coincidence? They lost that too. 

We need the Armed Service Committee to stand up. WE NEED SOMEONE TO 

STAND UP TO THIS ESTABLISHMENT. We need to find out what really 

happened to our sons. God Bless the one million people who have shown their 

support. 

I would personally like to thank Mr. Klayman & Ms. James for all their support. 

Gold Star father of Michael Strange CTR1 KIA 

8-6-2011 Extortion-17 DEVGRU 

Mary & Charles Strange 

215-983-4470 
73 


Insert offset folio 40 here 87499.040

INTRODUCTION 

I am Doug Hamburger. My wife, Shaune, and I are not confident that the official 

crash report - distributed to the families of Extortion 17 on October 12, 2011 - is 

complete and thus request answers to the inconsistencies contained in the redacted 

report. My son, SSG Patrick Douglas Hamburger was a full-time National Guard 

Army Aviation stationed out of Grand Island, Nebraska. Pat was the Flight Engineer 

and Gunner on the CH-47D Chinook that was shot down in what we feel may have 

been an ambush, on August 6th, 2011 with thirty (30) of America's finest troops. 

We are very concerned that Vice President Biden and President Obama had 

disclosed on May 4th, 2011 that Navy SEAL Team VI had carried out a successful raid 

on Osama Bin Laden's compound resulting in the terrorist's death. Never before had 

a President in office released the identity of any Special Forces Team involved in a 

covert operation. Until Bin Laden was taken out, no one had really heard of SEAL 

Team VI. Its name and missions were always kept quiet for protection for 

themselves and their families. 

Releasing their identity put a target on their backs, along with any support troops 

that went into battle with them, like the Army and Air Force Crew that were flying 

with them on the "Quick Reactionary Mission" when they were shot down. 

Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted that the SEAL Team that carried out the 

raid on Bin Laden now feared for their safety. Gates writes in his book, .lli!i;)::. " ... I 

had reminded everyone that the techniques, tactics, and procedures the SEALs had 

used in the Bin Laden operation were used every night in Afghanistan and 

elsewhere in hunting down terrorists and other enemies. It was therefore essential 

that we agree not to release any operational details of the raid. That we killed him, I 

said, is all we needed to say. That commitment lasted about five hours. The initial 

leaks came from the White House and CIA. They just couldn't wait to brag and to 

claim credit. The facts were often wrong, including details in the first press briefing. 

Nonetheless the information just kept pouring out. I was outraged and, at one point, 

told Donilson, 'Why doesn't everybody just shut the f*** up?' To no avail." Gates 

continues, "The SEALs shared with me their concerns about the leaks, particularly 

the fact that reporters were nosing around their communities trying to find them. 

They were worried about their families. I said we would do whatever was necessary 

to protect them ... " 

In a meeting with a group of Marines at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, Robert 

Gates said, "we are very concerned about the security of our families, of your 

families and our troops, and also these elite units that are engaged in things like 

that. And without getting into details ... I would tell you that when I met with the 

Team last Thursday, they expressed concern about that, and particularly with 

respect to their families." He then stated, "frankly, a week ago Sunday, in the 

Situation Room, we all agreed that we would not release any operational details 

from the effort to take out Bin Laden. That fell apart on Monday, the next day." 

1 
74 


Insert offset folio 41 here 87499.041

Gates said that the Department of Defense was looking into ways to "pump up the 

security" for the elite troops. 

With Bounties on their heads and a target on their back, fifteen (15) Navy SEALs, 

seven (7) Navy Support, five (5) Army Aviation and three (3) Air Force Special Ops 

were shot down by the Taliban who were positioned in a tower of a building in the 

perfect place at the exact time to launch an attack on the CH-47D when it was most 

vulnerable - at landing. 

How can anyone justify putting our troops at such risk? 

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS 

1. The investigation focused only on what happened but not why it happened. 

Who made the decision to not investigate those who were responsible for the 

loss of Extortion 17? 

2. General Colt told Commanders that the Army's investigation into the 

downing of Extortion 17 was not to find fault. Why would the military 

conduct an investigation if it's main focus was not to find out all the facts 

surrounding the deaths of our sons? 

3. Why were the seven (7) Afghans on the Chinook different than the ones 

listed on the manifest? Who was involved and who approved that decision? 

Did one of the Afghans compromise the mission? Was this another example 

of a green on blue attack? 

4. It was the rules of engagement that dictated there had to be Afghans on that 

flight that night. Supposedly, we did not know if the group of men on the far 

side of town at 2 :00 am were friendlies? Because there was a question if the 

"friendlies" were Taliban or not, Afghans had to be on the flight with our 

men. Common sense says that if they are moving away from the fighting to 

escape at that time of the night they were Taliban, not farmers who would 

have otherwise stayed in their homes. 

5. In over 1250 pages of the investigation into the crash, why was the Afghan 

military not involved or even mentioned in the investigation? They were 

involved in all aspects of every mission. They had eight (8) men on the 

Chinook that night, including a civilian interpreter. It is hard to understand 

the omission. General Colt, who coordinated the investigation, should be 

invest,igated and we should find out who ultimately made the decision not to 

include the Afghan Command or any information they may have surrounding 

the crash. The pilot we talked with was in the initial meeting after the crash 

and the Afghan Command had records on each of our soldiers from the first 

day they joined the armed forces, including but not limited to their training 

and assignments up until the crash. With that type of thoroughness, how did 

they not investigate the Afghans? 

6. Where is the black box? It must have a homing device. What was on it that 

the military said could not be found? Did something happen on the flight? It 

is highly unlikely that the black box was washed away in the flash flood if the 

2 
75 


Insert offset folio 42 here 87499.042

report is accurate regarding the recovering ofthe bodies. All bodies and body 

parts are said to have been found. The area had been "sanitized." Yet, with or 

without a homing device, the black box cannot be found? 

7. Why did over thirteen (13) minutes pass between the 6-minute call and the 

one-minute call to land? Again, was there a fight on the Helicopter? Is this 

another example of a green on blue attack? 

8. The request by the pilot for pre-assault fire was denied. The pre-assault fire 

would have been shot in a nearby area to draw the attention from the 

approach and landing site of the aircraft. No one likes to draw attention to 

where the aircraft is actually landing. (That may have been what the pilot 

was thinking that night knowing how narrow the valley was ... ) Why was it 

denied? 

9. Why was the usual air support not stacked above the CH-47D as was 

customary on this type of mission? The two (2) CH-47Ds were the only 

aircraft on the mission. The other one was for secondary support. Thus, the 

other aircraft should have been support stacked above Extortion 17. 

10. Why did the brigade not fully assess the dangers that Extortion 17 may 

encounter? My son Patrick told me for years that the #1 concern of any 

mission was to ensure the complete safety of the soldiers on that mission. All 

missions were well planned out with support stacked above the Chinooks to 

spot and attack the enemy and to ensure the safety of the crew on the 

Chinook. 

11. Commanders had told General Colt's team that the Taliban had put one 

hundred (100) fighters in the Tangi Valley for the express purpose of 

bringing down a U.S. aircraft. This needs to be addressed. 

12. How did the Taliban know to have men in a tower with RPGs in the landing 

zone where Extortion 17 would be flying? There had been no action any 

where near this spot all night. 

13. Why was the decision made not to have the support stack positioned above 

Extortion 17? Protocol is to have two (2) Apaches, a C-130 Gunship and a 

drone stacked above the Chinook. The Apaches were to fly in low enough 

with the Chinook to escort it to the landing spot. The Apaches were looking 

for squirters instead of searching for enemies that would attack Extortion 17. 

The C-130 had its eyes on the landing spot. Supposedly, the drone's eye in the 

sky was not working. No one was looking out for the safety of the crew on 

this Special Ops mission. Why was protocol not followed? Why was their 

safety compromised? Those aircrafts should have been ordered to follow 

protocol before Extortion 17 entered the valley. 

14. Why didn't the two (2) Apaches inspect the landing zone, as was protocol 

until three (3) minutes before Extortion 17 was to land? There were two (2) 

people in the landing zone. Protocol would have had the landing called off 

with two (2) people running around the landing zone. The Apaches did not 

arrive in time to call off the landing. 

15. Why did the Special Operations Commander at headquarters not order the 

two (2) Apaches to inspect the landing site? The last-second-order was given 

3 
76 


Insert offset folio 43 here 87499.043

by a Ranger Commander on the ground. Who was the SOC? Was he Afghan or 

NATO? 

16. Protocol on mission planning was to have a primary landing zone and an 

alternative landing zone. During the mission planning, an alternative-landing 

zone was not assigned. Why was that? 

17. Why were there at least five (5) heavily armed enemy 800 meters to the east 

ofthe landing zone? Did they know our sons would be landing there? How 

did they know to go there? Who tipped them off? Especially when - in the 

crash report - it mentions men on the ground with radios. 

18. Why were the approach and the landing zone not properly vetted or 

guarded? 

19. General Colt said the drone over the CH-47D had a glitch and the camera was 

off. We had two (2) soldiers report that they had watched Extortion 17 get 

shot down from two (2) separate FOBs. We request a copy ofthat shoot 

down, to have an expert look at it and tell us what he thinks may have 

happened. Why were we lied to about the camera being turned off? 

20. Why was a CH-47D used in this mission? The mission was in a valley at a hot 

landing zone, flying in through a narrow entrance with buildings on each 

side. Two previous missions with CH-47D's that tried to land in that valley 

had to abort because of enemy fire. With that previous history, why wasn't 

the MH-47 used? They were used immediately to pick up the Army Rangers 

and to bring troops to the crash site. 

21. Billy Vaughn and Charlie Strange both mentioned that Captain Van Houser, 

who was SEAL Team Commander at the time, is no longer in command and 

has not been heard from since. What happened to him? Why did he 

disappear? What does he know about that night? 

22. Why was there no mention of the other two (2) Apaches that crashed that 

night? One crashed trying to climb the valley walls instead of flying out of the 

valley, through the entrance where Extortion 17 was shot down. 

23. There were a large number ofincreased missions in the years leading up to 

Extortion 17. The 82nd Brigade was constantly bragging about how many 

more missions they were doing than the 10th Mountain that was pulled out 

earlier. Why was there so much focus on how many missions were being 

done? Did it compromise the safety of our troops? 

24. Who made the decision to send an IRF after a group of squirters? An ARF is 

sent in to rescue our men when they are in trouble. An IRF is a pre-planned 

base contingency developed during the initial briefing before a mission. It is 

planned to counteract an enemy's possible movement. Extortion 17 was sent 

in as an IRF. Using them in this manner was not protocol. How could a change 

like this come out of a 50-minute meeting, three (3) hours into a mission? 

Who suggested this change in protocol? Who influenced this change? Who 

approved it? 

25. Why was Extortion 17 sent on a mission at all? There was no significant 

intelligence. In Colt's report he asked, "how often did a mission like this take 

place?" Never! No one questioned, had any knowledge of a mission that was 

sent to catch squirters. Special Forces had never been sent on a mission like 

4 
77 


Insert offset folio 44 here 87499.044

this. Who came up with this mission? Was it the Afghan Command? 

26. How could Extortion 17's mission be off the ground before the Brigade's top 

Officer was made aware of the mission? How could this happen, especially 

when Special Ops were involved? 

27. Thirty (30) minutes after Extortion 17 was shot down, the Taliban bragged 

on the Internet that they had shot down SEAL Team VI in a helicopter. How 

did they know members of SEAL Team VI were on that Chinook unless they 

were tipped off? 

RAMP CEREMONY 

At the Ramp Ceremony in Kabul, a Muslim Imam was allowed to say a prayer over 

the caskets bearing the bodies of our sons. Apparently, no one vetted what he was 

going to say. In Arabic, he disparaged the memories of our sons, damning them as 

infidels to Allah. The Imam said they are burning in hell, while the Muslims who 

were with them are in heaven. Yet, our military prohibited any mention of a JudeoChristian God at the ceremony. Families are usually given a copy of the Ramp 

Ceremony honoring their loved one. None of the Families of Extortion 17 were given 

a copy. Someone made the decision to cover up how our son's were degraded and 

humiliated in a ceremony that was meant to honor them for the sacrifice they had 

made for our country. Who allowed the Imam to speak? Who decided to cover it up? 

Why has no one has ever apologized to the families for ever letting something so 

disrespectful to happen? 

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 

The United States has the greatest military in the world. Our troops have the best 

training, the best weaponry and the best military minds. 

When our military is training, one of its top concerns is safety - the safety of the men 

they are fighting with as well as their own safety. 

The Rules of Engagement in the Middle East limit our forces from fighting to the best 

of their abilities. They also expose our forces to unnecessary risks, compromising 

their safety. 

The Rules of Engagement should be created to protect our troops, not to protect a 

population that chooses to hide and protect our enemy. 

It was because of the Rules of Engagement that seven (7) Afghan commandoes were 

onboard Extortion 17. If it is not known for sure that the people we are after are the 

enemy, we need to bring Afghans and an interpreter. Because those seven (7) were 

switched with Afghans that were not properly vetted out less than thirty (30) 

minutes before the mission, they could have compromised the mission, as would be 

consistent with the increase of green on blue attacks. 

5 
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Insert offset folio 45 here 87499.045

We could not fire on the turret where the two (2) men who shot down Extortion 17 

were located, because of the Rules of Engagement. It was not known if any innocent 

people were inside the building. The Taliban can use a building to attack us, but we 

cannot shoot at them. 

Helicopters returning to base see the enemy setting up rockets aimed at the military 

base, but cannot fire at them unless they fire first. 

The requested pre-assault fire as the Chinook entered the valley was denied because 

the rules of engagement would not allow the fire unless we could be certain no one 

would be hurt. 

Our troops cannot fire at someone, unless they are shot at first. Even if they see a 

gun or a weapon, they cannot shoot. 

The Rules of Engagement require so many Afghans to be on certain missions. Some 

missions are canceled because not enough Afghans show up for the mission to take 

place. 

CONCLUSION 

From what we have learned thus far in our correspondence with congressional staff, 

the military seeks to explain in their way these unanswered questions by claiming" . 

. . this is just a series of unfortunate events." If it were only a question of one or two 

"events", then perhaps there would be some plausibility to this. But, when there are 

thirty and more unanswered questions, and when there is no concerted effort to get 

to the bottom of this by our Commander in Chief and his military brass, one can only 

conclude that the circumstances surrounding the death of my son and his colleagues 

are being covered up. This regrettable conclusion is heightened by the decision of 

this Sub-Committee and Committee to bar any of the family members to give Jive 

testimony at the hearing to be held on February 27, 2014. 

Never before in this history of our country have we seen such a callous disregard for 

the well-being of the nation's best and brightest fighting men who gave their lives 

without reservation in a poorly conceived war that the nation has essentially 

already lost. 

As a father, what am I to think and feel when those who have the capacity to expose 

what truly happened hide their heads in the sand for cover? For the rest of my life, 

my loss will only grow greater knowing that when I asked for help to those 

responsible in Government, little has been forthcoming. 

I thank the Committee for holding this hearing and I pray that it is able to shed light 

upon some of these questions. 

6 
79 


Insert offset folio 46 here 87499.046

RECORD OF EMERGENCY DATA 

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT 

AUTHORITY: 5 USC 552, 10 USC 655, 1475 to 1480 and 2771,38 USC 1970, 44 USC 3101, and EO 9397 (SSN). 

PRINCIPAL PURPOS~S: This form is used by military personnel and Department of Defense civilian and contractor personnel, co!le~!lve!y referred to 

as civilians, when applicable. For military personnel, it is used to designate beneficiaries for certain benefits in the event of the Serv«:e member's 

death. It is also a guide for disposition of that member's pay and allowances if captured, missing Of intemed It a~so shows names and addresses ,of the person(s) the Service member desires to be notified in case of emergency or death. For civilian personnel, It is used to expedite the notification 

process in the event of an emergency andror the death of the member. The purpose of soliciting the SSN is to provide positive Identification. AI! items 

may not be applicable. 

ROUTINE USES: None 

DISCLOSURE: Voluntary; however, failure to provide accurate personal identifier information and other solicited information will delay notification and 

the processing of benefits to designated beneficiaries if applicable. 

INSTRUCTIONS TO SERVICE MEMBER 

This extremely important form is to be used by you to show the names and 

addresses of your spouse, children, parents, and any other person(s) you 

would like notified if you become a casualty (other family members or fiance), 

and, to designate beneficiaries for certain benefits jf you die, IT IS YOUR 

RESPONSIBll1TY to keep your Record of Emergency Data up to date to show 

your desires as to beneficiaries to receive certain death payments, and to 

show changes in your family or other personnel listed, for example, as a result 

of marriage, civil court action, death, or address change. 

INSTRUCTIONS TO CIVILIANS 

This extremely important form is to be used by you to shOw the 

names and addresses of your spouse, children, parents, and any 

other person(s) you would ~ke notified if you become a casualty 

Not every item on this form is applicab!e to you_ This form is used 

by the Department of Defense (000) to expedite notification in 

the case of emergencies or death, It does not have a legal jmpact 

on other forms you may have completed with the DoD or your 

employer. 

IMPORTANT: This form is divided into two sections: Section 1 ~ Emergency Contact Information and Section 2 ~ Benefits Related 

Information. READ THE INSTRUCTIONS ON PAGES 3 AND 4 BEFORE COMPLETING THIS FORM. 

SECTION 1 - EMERGENCY CONTACT INFORMATION 

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) 2. SSN 

3a. SERVICEiCfVlLIANCATEGORY .1 b. REPORTING UNIT CODEfOUTY STATION 

OARMY ONAVY DMARINECORPS DAIRFORCE o DoD DCIVILIAN DCONTRACTORI. 

4a. SPOUSE NAME (If applicable) (Last, First, Middle Inilial) b. ADDRESS (Include ZIP Code) AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 

o SINGLE 0 DIVORCED 0 WIDOWED 

5. CHILDREN 

a. NAME (Last, Firs!, Middle Initial) b, RELATIONSHIP c. (~~n;..~t86jTH d. ADDRESS (Include ZIP Code) AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 

6a. FATHER NAME (Last, First. Middle/nltial) b. ADDRESS (Include ZIP Code) AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 

7a. MOTHER NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial) b. ADDRESS (Include ZIP Code) AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 

8a. DO NOT NOTIFY DUE TO ILL HEALTH b. NOTIFY INSTEAD 

9a. DESIGNATED PERSON(S) (Military only) b, ADDRESS (Include liP Code) AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 

10. CONTRACTING AGENCY AND TELEPHONE NUMBER (Contractors only) 

DO FORM 93, JAN 2008 PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE. 
80 


Insert offset folio 47 here 87499.047

SECTION 2 • BENEFITS RELATED INFORMATION 

11a. BENEFICIARY(IES) FOR DEATH GRATUITY b. RELATIONSHIP c. ADDRESS (Include ZtP Codej AND TELEPHONE NUMBER d. PERCENTAGE 

(Mi/itaryonly) 

12a. BENEFICIARY(lES) FOR UNPAID PAY/ALLOWANCES 

(Military only) NAME AND RELATIONSHIP 

13a. PERSON AUTHORIZED TO DIRECT DISPOSITION (PADD) 

(Mill(aryon/y) NAME AND RELATIONSHIP 

14. CONTINUATION/REMARKS 

b. ADDRESS (Include ZIP Code) AND TELEPHONE NUMBER c. PERCENTAGE 

b. ADDRESS (Include ZfP Code) AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 

15. SIGNATURE OF SERVICE MEMBER/CIVILIAN (Incll.1de rank, rate, 16. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS (Include rank. rate, orgrade 17. DATE SIGNED 

or grade if applicable) as appropriate) (YVYYMMDD) 

DO FORM 93 (BACK), JAN 2008 
81 


Insert offset folio 48 here 87499.048

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARING DO FORM 93 

(See appropnate Service Directives for supplemental instructions for completion of this form at other than MEPS) 

All entries explained below are for electronic or typewriter 

completion, except those specifically noted. If a computer 

or typewriter is not available, print in black or blue·black ink 

insuring a legible image on all copies. Include "Jr.," "Sr.," 

"HI" or similar designation for each name, if applicable, 

When an address is entered, include the appropriate ZIP 

Code. If the member cannot provide a current address, 

indicate "unknown" in the appropriate item. Addresses 

shown as P.O. Box Numbers or RFD numbers should 

indicate in Item 14, "Continuations/Remarks", a street 

address or general guidance to reach the place of 

residence. In addition, the notation "See Item 14" should be 

included in the item pertaining to the particular next of kin or 

when the space for a particular item is insuffic1ent If the 

address for the person in the item has been shown in a 

preceding item, it is unnecessary to repeat the address; 

however, the name must be entered. Those items that are 

considered not applicable to civHians will be left blank. 

ITEM 1. Enter full last name, first name, and middle initial. 

ITEM 2. Enter social security number (SSN). 

ITEM 3a. Service. Military: Mark X in appropriate block. 

Civilian: Mark two blocks as appropriate. Examples: an 

Army civilian would mark Army and either Civilian or 

Contractor; a DoD civilian, without affiliation to one of the 

Military Services, would mark 000 and then either Civilian or 

Contractor as appropriate. 

ITEM 3b. Reporting Unit Code/Duty Station. See Service 

Directives. 

ITEM 4a. Spouse Name. Enter last name (if different from 

Item 1), first name and middle initial on the Hne provided. If 

single, divorced, or widowed, mark appropriate block. 

ITEM 4b. Address and Telephone NUmber. Enterthe 

"actual" address and telephone number, not the mailing 

address. Include civilian title or military rank and service if 

applicable. If one of the blocks in 4a is marked, !eave blank. 

ITEM 5a-d. Children. Enter last name (only if different from 

Item 1) first name and middle initial, relationship, and date of 

birth of all children. If none, so state. Include illegitimate 

children jf acknowledged by member or paternity/maternity 

has been judicially decreed. Relationship examples: son. 

daughter, stepson or daughter, adopted son or daughter or 

ward. Date of birth example: 19950704. For children not 

living with the member's current spouse, include address 

and name and relationship of person with whom residing in 

item5d. 

ITEM 6a. Father Name. Last name, first name and middle 

initiaL 

ITEM 6b. Address and Telephone Number of Father. If 

unknown or deceased, so state. Include civilian title or 

military rank and service if applicable. If other than natural 

father is listed, indicate relationship. 

DO FORM 93 (INSTRUCTIONS). JAN 2008 

ITEM 7a. Mother Name. Last name, first name and middle 

initial. 

ITEM 7b. Address and Telephone Number of Mother. If 

unknown or deceased, so state. Include civilian title or 

military rank and service if applicable. If other than natural 

mother is listed, indicate relationship. 

ITEM 8. Persons Not to be Notified Due to III Health. 

a. List relationship, e.g., "Mother," of person(s) listed in 

Items 4, 5, 6, or 7 who are not to be notified of a casualty 

due to HI health. If more than one child, specify, e.g., 

"daughter Susan." OthelWise, enter "None". 

b. List relationship, e.g., "Father" or name and address of 

person(s) to be notified in lieu of person(s) listed in item 8a. 

If "None" is entered in Item 8a, leave blank. 

ITEM 9a. This item will be used to record the name of the 

person or persons, jf any, other than the member's primary 

next of kin or immediate family, to whom information on the 

whereabouts and status of the member shall be provided if 

the member is placed in a missing status. Reference 10 

USC, Section 655. NOT APPLICABLE to civilians. 

ITEM 9b. Address and telephone number of DeSignated 

Person(s). NOT APPLICABLE to civilians. 

ITEM 10. Contracting Agency and Telephone Number 

(Contractors only). NOT APPLICABLE to military 

personnel. Civilian contractors wi!! provide the name of 

their contracting agency and its telephone number. 

Example: XYZ Electric, (703) 555-5689. The telephone 

number should be to the company or corporation's 

personnel or human resources office, 

ITEM lla. Beneficiary(ies) for Death Gratuity (Military 

only). Enter first name(s), middle initial, and !ast name(s) 

of the person{s) to receive death gratuity pay. A member 

may designate one or more persons to receive aU or a 

portion of the death gratuity pay. The designation of a 

person to receive a portion of the amount shall indicate the 

percentage of the amount. to be specified only in 10 percent 

increments, that the person may receive. If the member 

does not wish to deSignate a beneficiary for the payment of 

death gratuity, enter "None," or if the full amount is not 

designated, the payment or balance will be paid as follows: 

(1) To the surviving spouse cfthe person, if any; 

(2) To any surviving chHdren of the person and the 

descendants of any deceased children by representation; 

(3) To the surviving parents or the survivor of them; 

(4) To the duly appointed executor or administrator of the 

estate of the person; 

(5) If there are none of the above, to other next of kin of the 

person entitled under the laws of domicile of the person at 

the time of the person's death. 

The member should make specific deSignations, as it 

expedites payment. 
82 


Insert offset folio 49 here 87499.049

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARING DO FORM 93 

(Continued) 

ITEM 11 a. (Continued) Seek legal advice if naming a minor 

child as a beneficiary. If a member has a spouse but 

designates a person other than the spouse to receive all or a 

portion of the death gratuity pay, the Service concerned is 

required to provide notice of the designation to the spouse. 

NOT APPLICABLE to civilians. 

Item 11 b. Relationship. NOT APPLICABLE to civilians. 

ITEM 11 c. Enter beneficiary(ies) full maillng address and 

telephone number to include the ZIP Code. NOT 

APPLICABLE to civilians. 

ITEM 11d. Show the percentage to be paid to each person. 

Enter 10%, 20%, 30%, up to 100% as appropriate. The sum 

shares must equal 100 percent. If no percent is indicated and 

more than one person is named, the money is paid in equal 

shares to the persons named, NOT APPLICABLE to 

civilians. 

ITEM 12a. Beneficiary(ies) for Unpaid PaylAliowance 

(Military only). Enter first name(s), middle initial, last 

name(s) and relationship of person to receive unpaid pay 

and allowances at the time of death, The member may 

indicate anyone to receive this payment. If the member 

designated two or more beneficiaries, state the percentage 

to be paid each in item 10c. If the member does not wish to 

designate a beneficiary, enter "By law." The member is 

urged to designate a beneficiary for unpaid pay and 

allowances as payment will be made to the person in order 

of precedence by law (10 USC 2771) in the absence of a 

designation. Seek legal advice if naming a minor child as 

beneficiary. NOT APPLICABLE to civilians. 

ITEM 12b. Enter beneficiary(ies) full mailing address and 

telephone number to include the ZIP Code. NOT 

APPLICABLE to civilians. 

ITEM 12c. If the member designated two or more 

beneficiaries, state the percentage to be paid each in this 

section. The sum shares must equal 100 percent. NOT 

APPLICABLE to civilians. 

ITEM 13a, Enter the name and relationship of the Person 

Authorized to Direct Disposition (PADD) of your remains 

should you become a casualty. Only the following persons 

may be named as a PADD: surviving spouse, blood relative 

of legal age, or adoptive relatives of the decedent. If neither 

of these three can be found, a person standing in loco 

parentis may be named, NOT APPLICABLE to civilians. 

DO FORM 93 (INSTRUCTIONS) (BACK), JAN 2008 

ITEM 13b. Address and telephone number of PADO. NOT 

APPLICABLE to civilians. 

ITEM 14. Continuations/Remarks, Use this item for remarks 

or continuation of other items, if necessary. Prefix entry with 

the number of the item being continued; for example, 5tJohn 

J.lson/19851220/321 Pecan Drive, Schertz TX 78151. Also 

use this item to list name, address, and relationship of other 

persons the member desires to be notified. Other 

dependents may also be listed. This block offers the 

greatest amount of flexibility for the member to record other 

important information not otherwise requested but 

considered extremely useful in the casualty notification and 

assistance process. Besides continuing information from 

other blocks on this fonn, the member may desire to include 

additional information such as: NOK language barriers, 

location or existence of a Will, additional private insurance 

information, other family member contact numbers, etc. If 

additional space is required, attach a supplemental sheet of 

standard bond paper with the information. 

ITEM 15. Signature of Service Member/Civilian. Check and 

verify all entries and sign all copies in ink as follows: First 

name, middle initial, last name. Include rank, rate, or grade 

if applicable. May be electronically signed (see DoD 

Instruction 1300.18 for guidelines). 

ITEM 16. Signature of Witness. Have a witness 

(disinterested person) sign all copies In ink as follows: First 

name, middle initial, last name, Include rank, rate, or grade 

as appropriate. A witness signature is not required for 

electronic versions of the DO form 93 (see 000 Instruction 

1300.18). 

ITEM 17. Date the member or civilian signs the form. This 

item is an ink entry and must be completed on all copies. 
83 


Insert offset folio 50 here 87499.050

4/412014 Defensa.gOtlNews Release: DOD ldootifles Seneca Mermers KIlled In CH-47 Crash 

u.s. DEPARTMENT OF J.J".rl"~"n 

HOMt~ TODAYlN DOD ADomDOD TOI'ISSUES I'HOTOS/VJDtX>S M1UTARYlDOD WenSrrES CQNTACTL'S 

~~~~~ ProssOperatloos ~ I Most Recent News Releases 

04102/2014 NEWS RaEASE E-1oWl A COPY I PRlIn12R FRIENDLY! lATEST NEWS Re~SAS!1S SlIltelMlltfrom 88111"111.:\11"" 0.1&"51 Hagel l1l'i ''''' .... 

Dt:IplJtySeGretaryof 

Defense 

Other 

IMMEDIATE REUASE 

Release No:705·11 

August 11,2011 

000 ldentifies Service Membere: KlIIed In CH-47 Crash 

The Department of Defense announood lUdaylhe deaths of 30 s9f\llcememoors who were 

suppcrling OperaUon EIldunng Freedom. Thoydlild ~g. 61n Wardak pro~nce, AfghanIstan, ofwoullds 

su1fered when their CH-47 Chinook helicopter crashed. 

The fo!iowmg sailors sssigned to an Easl Coast-basoo Naval Special Warfam unit were klUed: 

Lt. Cmdr. (SEAL) Jones B. Kelsall, 32, of Shreveport, La., 

Special Warfare Operalor Matltnr ChklfPaayOffioor (SEAL) Lou!s J. Langlais, 44. of Santa 

Barbara,Callf., 

Spacial Warfare Opamlor Seolor Chief PettyOfflcar (SE/IL) Thomas A RaMaIl, 34, ofGtean 

Forest.kk., 

Elrplosi'oO Ordnance Disposal Technician SeniorChlofPeItyO~r{Expsd!lIomHyWarfaro 

Specialhrt/Fraafan Pamchulllll) Kralg M Vickers. 36, of Kokomo, Hawaii, 

Spoola' Warfare Opora1or ChlefPe1tyOflk:er (SEM..) Brian R. BUI, 31, of Stamford, COI1O" 

Spoolal Warlare Oporxflor ChlafPettyOfficer (SEIoL) John W, Faes, 31, ofMlnnaapotis, Mnn., 

Special Warfare Opemtor Chief pattyomcor (8EAI.) Ke\oin A Houston, 35, OfW05t Hyannlspon, 

Spada! Warlara OporalorChlefPettyOffloer (SEAl) t..hlthaw O. Mason, 37, of Kansas City, 

Special Warfare Operalor ChfefPoItyOftloor(SEAI..) Stephen M Wilts, 35, of Fort Wor1h, Texas, 

El!plosl;oe Ordnance Disposal leohnlc!an Chief f'ettyOlicer (E~dltloruuyWarlar& 

SpeeialtsVFreefall ParachUllsb'Olver) Nicholas H. NuH, 30, ofWrulhlngton, w,va., 

Specla! Warfare OperatorChle1PeIlyOfiloor (SEN...) Robar! J. Rsews, 32, orShrevepori, La., 

Special warfare OpsmlQr Chlef~uyOflloor (SEM.) Heath M. Robinson, 34, ofOetroft, Mich., 

Spacial Warfare Oporator PoltyOllk:er 1s1 Cless (SEN...) Ol:m'k c. Benson, 28, of Jl.ngwln, Calif. 

Special warfare Operator PettyOfflcer 1s.t Class. (SEALfParac/lutist/ ChllstophGr G. Campbell, 

36,ofJackt\on"'Ue,N.C" 

Information Syatems Tadmlclan PettyOffloor 1st Class (Expeditionary Warfare $peclall~lIFretlfall ParamllUst) Jarod W. Day, 21.\. ofTa>foraville. Utah, 

Master--at .. Arms PoUyOffloor 1st Class (ExpedltlonaryWarfam Spoclalist} John Oouangdara, 

26, of South SIoux City, Nob., 

Crwtologlst Technician (Co!!octloo) Petty Officer 1st elMS (8rpedltkmaryWarfare Specialist) 

MchMJ J. Strange, 25,01 Phllooelptda, Pa" 

Special Warfare Operator POttyOfflCllf 1stCIass (SEA.LlEnllsleti Surface Warfare Specialist) 

Jon T. Tumilaon, 35, ofRoclOOrd. Iowa, 

Special Warfare Operator PettyOfficer 1 st Class (SEAl.) Aaron C. Vaughn, 30, of Stuar!, Fla., 

Speclal Warfare Operator PettyOlficor 1 51 Class (SEAl) Jason R. Wortonan, 32, of Blanding, 

Utah. 

Tha followfng sallorn assigned 10 II West Coast-based Naval Spaolal Warfare unit were kliled: 

SpaclalWsrtare OperatorPettyOfl!cer 111tC1M$ (SEAt)Jeslle D. PiUman.27,ofUkiah, Callt, 

SpiWIa! Wa>fara Operator PeflyOffloor2nd Class (SEAL) Nicholas P. Spehar, 24, afSa!nt Paul, 

Mnn. 

The $ol(tiers k111&d were; 

ChlafWarranl Officer Oa\oid R. Carter, 47, ofCantan!"\iat, Colo. He was assigned to thtI2nd 

Balfalkln, 1351h A\oiatlon Reglmenl (General SupportA'I!atlon Bettallon), hlrota, Colo.; 

ChlefW~mant Omcer Bryan J. NiChols, 31, of Hays, Kan. Ha was ass.lgned ID \he 7th Bal!.allon, 

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112 
84 

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Insert offset folio 51 here 87499.051

41412014 

flo"" 

Today In 000 

Toplsslll'lll 

PhotooNldeos 

Mtita,)/tDoOWeb$!Ies 

Defense,gOOl News-Release~DGD·ldentlf1es Ser-AooMerrbers KUloo In CH~47 Crash 

1~!h Mallon Regiment (General SUpportAviallon l3eUallon), New Cenlury, Ken.: 

Slaff Sgl PatrickO, Hamburger, 30, of Uncoln, Nab. He was assigned 10 \he 2nd BattalIon, 

13511\ A'.iatlon Regiment (General SUPJlQrtffllalioo Battalion), Grand Island, Neb.; 

SgL Nexander J. Benne1t, 24, ofTacoma, Wash, He was assigned fp the 7th l3altallon, 158th 

A'Ilatlon Regimen! (General SUpport AYlatkm Battalion), New Century, Kan.; and 

Spc. Spene&r 0, Duncan, 21. of Olathe, Kan. He wes esslgnod' to the 7l1) 8attalion, 158th 

ftMatlon Regiment (Geneml SUpport A~lItIon Bettallon), New Century, Kan.. 

The airman killed were: 

Tech, 8gl. John W, Brown, 33, ofTal!ahass6e, Fla.; 

Slatl Syl Mdrew W. Harvefl, 2:6, of Long Beach, Callf.;and 

Tech,S91. DanllJl L Zsrba, 28, of York, Pe. 

~! three aI!'I'tlen were assigned to the 24th Spedal Tactics Squadron, Pope Field. N.C. 

For mora Infonnatlon aboullhe sailors, media rnayconlactU hloPbrahamaOl'1 at 757~7e3-

2oo70r757-620·3109. 

For m01'e Infonnation on Carler, media maycontaellho Colorado National Guaro public affalt$ 

office: 81720-250-1053. 

For more: Information on Nichols. Bennett and Duncan, media mayoontacUha 11th A'oiatlon 

Command pubJIt: affairs offlce aI501-62{}-574a or 502-851-34-66. 

For more: Information on Hamburgor, mlJdla maycontaC4 the Nebraska Nationa! Gllard publIc 

affaIrs office at402..a09~7302 or 402-309·7303. 

For more information aboullha airman, media mayconlact lIle Alt FQf«l Specla! Operations 

Command pubUcaffalrs office at 550-884.5515, 

UPDATE: August 12, 2011 - S9t Hamburgerwas poslhumouslypromoled to atelt sergeant 

'rIspeclofGEmarel JoIn !he Wiltar)/ 

AivIlC)/&&\(lUrky 

Unkrl&elolmilr ~fbir:y 

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