alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 48.6416(b)(1)-1 Price readjustments causing overpayments of manufacturers tax.

In the case of any payment of tax under chapter 32 that is determined to be an overpayment by reason of a price readjustment within the meaning of section 6416(b)(1) and § 48.6416(b)(1)-2 or § 48.6416(b)(1)-3, the person who paid the tax may file a claim for refund of the overpayment or may claim credit for the overpayment on any return of tax under this subpart which the person subsequently files. Price readjustments may not be anticipated. However, if the readjustment has actually been made before the return is filed for the period in which the sale was made, the tax to be reported in respect of the sale may, at the election of the taxpayer, be based either (a) on the price as so readjusted or (b) on the original sale price and a credit or refund claimed in respect of the price readjustment. A price readjustment will be deemed to have been made at the time when the amount of the readjustment has been refunded to the vendor or the vendor has been informed that the vendor's account has been credited with the amount. No interest shall be paid on any credit or refund allowed under this section. For provisions relating to the evidence required in support of a claim for credit or refund, see § 301.6402-2 of this chapter (Regulations on Procedure and Administration), § 48.6416(a)-3(a)(2), and § 48.6416(b)(1)-4. For provisions authorizing the taking of a credit in lieu of filing a claim for refund, see section 6416(d) and § 48.6416(f)-1.

[T.D. 8043, 50 FR 32024, Aug. 8, 1985]
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

September 26, 2018

No. 04

- 17

- 00465

- CV

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF ALICE

,

Appellant

v.

TEXAS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE SELF

- INSURANCE FUND aka Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool, Appellees

From the 79th Judicial District Court, Jim Wells County, Texas

Trial Court No. 15

- 03

- 54404

- CV Honorable Oscar (O.J.) Hale, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The appellant ’ s unopposed motion to extend time to file motion for rehearing and motion for en banc reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Time is extended to October 24, 2018. Further requests for extension of time in which to file appellant’s motion for rehearing will be disfavored.

_________________________________ Irene Rios , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 26th day of S eptember, 2018

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE

, Clerk of Court
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT

SERGEI KOVALEV,
Petitioner

v.

BOARD OF REVISION OF TAXES CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Respondent : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 3 E AL 2020

Petition for Allowance of A ppeal from t he Unpublished Order o f the Superior Court at No

. 2898 E DA 2019 e ntered o n De cembe r 3 , 2019, quashing the O rder o f the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas at No. 190801135 entered on September 23, 2019

ORDER

PER CURIAM
AND NOW , this 8 th day of July, 2020, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, and the order of the Superior Court is VACATED. See Grant v. Blaine , 868 A.2d 400, 402 (Pa. 2005) (holding that “an order denying in forma pauperis status is a final, appealable order”) . The matter is REMANDED to the Superior Court for consideration of the propriety and advisability of a transfer of the appeal to the Commonwealth Court, see 42 Pa.C.S. §704(a), as well as further proceedings, in one of those courts, on the underlying app eal. The Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is GRANTED, limited to the filing of the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

.
#### Esther Person *vs.*John R. Lilliendahl.

Mambís, C. J., Haines, Hinman, Banks and Avery, Js.

Argued March 7th

decided April 3d, 1934.

*Dominic A. Roina,*with whom, on the brief, was *Robert R. Rosan,*for the appellant (plaintiff).

*694
      *Cyril Coleman,*with whom, on the brief, were *Lawrence A. Howard*and *Olcott D. Smith,*for the appellee (defendant).

Per Curiam.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages because of injuries due to alleged malpractice on the part of the defendant, a dentist, and she has appealed from a judgment upon a verdict directed for the defendant. In her complaint she alleged that, in extracting an impacted tooth, the defendant fractured her jaw and that thereafter he failed to tell her this, although he knew or should have known it, failed to set the jaw, to remove broken pieces of bone and to give her proper after-treatment. The plaintiff concedes that no evidence was offered sufficient to show that the jaw was broken in extracting the tooth, but that the fracture must be regarded as pathological, that is, resulting from a diseased condition of the bone. The tooth was extracted, as the plaintiff testified, on February 1st, 1932. The fracture did not appear until an X-ray picture was taken on February 21st. This picture also disclosed a fragment of tooth remaining in the jaw. The plaintiff testified that the defendant advised her to return to have this extracted, but did not tell her of the fracture. She did return and the defendant attempted to extract the fragment of tooth remaining in the jaw, but was not successful. He then advised her to return the next day, but the next morning the plaintiff was informed that he had sprained his ankle. She was then taken by an attendant in his office to another dentist who treated her, and extracted the fragment of tooth. Later she went to a dentist in New York. The jaw in finally healing developed a lump or lack of proper alinement.

The substantial claim of the plaintiff is that the *695defendant was guilty of malpractice in failing to inform her that her jaw was broken, in attempting to remove the fragment of tooth with the jaw in that condition and in failing to apply some kind of brace to keep the parts of the jaw in proper place while the fracture was healing. There was no evidence that in failing to inform the plaintiff of the fracture, the defendant was guilty of malpractice, or that it was not proper practice to attempt to remove the fragment of tooth from the fractured jaw or that, before it was removed or at any time before the defendant became incapacitated to treat her, proper dental practice required that a brace or other device should have been applied to the jaw. These were questions beyond the ordinary field of experience of laymen and the jury could not reasonably have reached a conclusion that the defendant was guilty of malpractice in the absence of expert opinion evidence to that effect. *Capolupo*v. *Wills,*116 Conn. 13, 17, 163 Atl. 454, and cases cited. The trial court did not err in directing a verdict for the defendant.

There is no error.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF WORLDPORT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED
JUNE 30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                           4,916
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,937
<ALLOWANCES>                                       763
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                22,029
<PP&E>                                         129,574
<DEPRECIATION>                                  13,843
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 216,922
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          188,123
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             3
<OTHER-SE>                                     (32,157)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   216,922
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                42,796
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   30,736
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                25,623
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    87
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              34,524
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (60,174)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (58,324)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (58,324)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (2.73)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (2.73)


</TABLE>
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Maritime Commission

          - 46 CFR Part 535
          - [Docket No. 09-02]
          - RIN 3072-AC35

# AGENCY:

Federal Maritime Commission.

# ACTION:

Notice of proposed rulemaking; extension of comment period.

# SUMMARY:

In a proposed rule published in the Federal Register on July 2, 2009, the Federal Maritime Commission proposed to repeal the exemption from the 45-day waiting period requirement applicable to certain Marine Terminal Agreements. The Commission also proposed to correct a typographical error in its regulations. This document extends the comment period.

# DATES:

Comments on the proposed rule published July 2, 2009 (74 FR 31666), are due by September 8, 2009.

# ADDRESSES:

                        Address all comments concerning this proposed rule to:  Karen V. Gregory, Secretary,  Federal Maritime Commission,  800 North Capitol Street, NW.,  Room 1046,  Washington, DC 20573-0001,                         *Secretary@fmc.gov*,  (202) 523-5725.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

                        Peter J. King, General Counsel,  Federal Maritime Commission,  800 North Capitol Street, NW.,  Room 1018,  Washington, DC 20573-0001,                         *generalcounsel@fmc.gov*,  (202) 523-5740.                    

Karen V. Gregory,

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. E9-19901 Filed 8-18-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE P
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-02-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-28-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-04-1998
<CASH>                                           1,310
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   43,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                     6,945
<INVENTORY>                                     74,305
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               131,639
<PP&E>                                          20,776
<DEPRECIATION>                                   6,321
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 200,330
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           95,550
<BONDS>                                        101,363
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            9,027
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             4
<OTHER-SE>                                       7,917
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   200,330
<SALES>                                        107,254
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               107,254
<CGS>                                           89,095
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   89,095
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                30,637
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   549
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,415
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (19,875)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (3,740)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (16,135)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    16,135
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (3.75)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (3.75)
        

</TABLE>
#### Madeline Burr, Appellant, v Town of Hempstead et al., Respondents.

[804 NYS2d 413]

*596In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Davis, J.), entered October 1, 2004, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that they neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of the defect in the roadway that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s injuries *(see Shvartsberg v City of New York,*19 AD3d 578 [2005]; *McDermott v South Farmingdale Water Dist.,*167 AD2d 517, 517-518 [1990]). Specifically, they demonstrated that they did not perform work where the plaintiff was injured and thus did not cause the defect *(id.).*

In response, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants caused the defect. The plaintiffs assertion that the workmen who were seen working in the street months before the plaintiffs accident were performing work on behalf of the defendant Town of Hempstead Water Department was based entirely on speculation and thus was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Regan v City of New York,*8 AD3d 462, 462-463 [2004]; *Skates v City of New York,*304 AD2d 820 [2003]). None of the other evidence submitted in opposition to the motion was sufficient to raise an inference that those workmen were performing work on behalf of the defendants. Moreover, there is no evidence that the defendants had notice of the defect that allegedly caused the injury. Consequently, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. H. Miller, J.P., Krausman, Rivera and Dillon, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the annual report of Newmark Group, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Company), on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2017 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, each of Howard W. Lutnick, Chairman, and Michael J. Rispoli, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

(1) The Form 10-K fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Form
10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



| |  |                       |  |                   |  |                        |  |                                  |  | 
| |  | --------------------- |  | ----------------- |  | ---------------------- |  | -------------------------------- |  | 
| |  | /s/ HOWARD W. LUTNICK |  |                   |  | /s/ MICHAEL J. RISPOLI
| |  | Name:                 |  | Howard W. Lutnick |  |                        |  | Name: Michael J. Rispoli        
| |  | Title:                |  | Chairman          |  |                        |  | Title:   Chief Financial Officer

Date: March 20, 2018
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                         542,476
<SECURITIES>                                   250,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                  673,484
<ALLOWANCES>                                    41,472
<INVENTORY>                                    343,704
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,907,779
<PP&E>                                         334,615
<DEPRECIATION>                                 288,141
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,821,889
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,639,667
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         11
<COMMON>                                         1,259
<OTHER-SE>                                 (1,882,778)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,821,889
<SALES>                                        839,698
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               839,698
<CGS>                                          410,510
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  832,899
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             (270,302)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             113,909
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (247,318)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (247,318)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (247,318)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.02)


</TABLE>
HomeWanted: Narcotics Rewards Program Targets...Alan Gabriel Nunez Herrera

# 									Alan Gabriel Nunez Herrera							

Narcotics Rewards Program: Wanted

April 14, 2023

U.S. Actions Targeting Transnational Criminals for Illicit Fentanyl Activity – United States Department of State

Alan Gabriel Nunez Herrera is another significant Mexican fentanyl trafficker working for the Chapitos.  In October and November 2022, Nunez Herrera supplied an associate and co-conspirator, Julio Marin Gonzalez, with approximately 20,000 fentanyl pills and approximately five kilograms of fentanyl powder that Marin Gonzalez sold to an undercover DEA agent at different locations in California.  Additionally, in March 2023, Nunez Herrera negotiated the delivery of additional multiple kilograms of fentanyl powder from Mexico to the U.S.  As part of those discussions, on approximately March 18, 2023, Nunez Herrera agreed to deliver fentanyl in Los Angeles through an associate.  In approximately2023, in the parking lot of a restaurant in Los Angeles, Nunez Herrera arranged for an associate to deliver to a buyer approximately nine kilograms of fentanyl powder.  The fentanyl deliveries were all subsequently seized by the DEA.

On April 4, 2023, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned an indictment against Alan Gabriel Nunez Herrera and others charging them with engaging in a Fentanyl Importation Conspiracy, Fentanyl Trafficking Conspiracy, Possession of Machineguns & Destructive Devices, Conspiracy to Possess Machineguns & Destructive Devices, and Money Laundering Conspiracy.

The U.S. Department of State is offering a **REWARD OF UP TO $1 MILLION** for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Alan Gabriel Nunez Herrera.

If you have information, please contact the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration via email at ChapitosTips@dea.gov.  If you are located outside of the U.S., you may also visit the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate.  If in the U.S., you can contact the local DEA office in your city.

**ALL IDENTITIES ARE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.**

Government officials and employees are not eligible for rewards.

Tags

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement AffairsDrug TraffickingMexico

Back to Top
#### § 16.36 Post-hearing briefs.

The ALJ may require the parties to file post-hearing briefs. The ALJ shall fix the time for filing such briefs, not to exceed 60 days from the date the parties receive the transcript of the hearing or, if applicable, the stipulated record. Such briefs may be accompanied by proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The ALJ may permit the parties to file reply briefs.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Be th Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 16, 2015

s0909 

# Order

Clerk September 16, 2015

150984

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 150984

COA: 325002

Kent CC: 14

- 008489

- FH

JUAN VALENTIN CUBUR

- TOCAY,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 10, 2014

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.