U.S. Department of 

Transportation

Federal Railroad 

Administration

Proposed Key Elements of a Critical Incident 

Intervention Program for Reducing the Effects of 

Potentially Traumatic Exposure on Train Crews to 

Grade Crossing and Trespasser Incidents 

Office of Research

and Development

Washington, DC 20590

DOT/FRA/ORD-14/06 Final Report

April 2014
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Proposed Key Elements of a Critical Incident Intervention Program for Reducing the Effects 

of Potentially Traumatic Exposure on Train Crews to Grade Crossing and Trespasser 

Incidents 

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)

Richard Gist, Ph.D.

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National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF)

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Emmitsburg, MD 21727

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U.S. Department of Transportation 

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Office of Research and Development

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COTR: Michael Coplen, FRA; TM: Scott Gabree, Volpe

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

This document is available to the public through the FRA Web site at http://www.fra.dot.gov.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. This independent report presents work conducted regarding project FR-RDD-0024-11-01 to advise and support the formulation of 

regulations and supporting materials concerning “critical incident” response plans for rail carriers covered by the Rail Safety Improvement Act 

of 2008, Sec. 410. This report addresses the following topics:

(a) Review of literature on established and emerging research findings with respect to occupational exposure to potentially traumatic 

events (PTEs); 

(b) Review of literature on current best practices with respect to prevention, mitigation, early intervention, and evidence-based treatment 

of established sequelae from such exposures; 

(c) Review of current practices by key rail carriers as reported through the Association of American Railroads (AAR) to determine level 

of consensus reflected in existing programs respecting critical requirements of the authorizing act (e.g., definition of “critical incident,”

release from duty of impacted employees, intervention design, and evaluation of outcomes); 

(d) Preparation of a general guidance template outlining key features that might be expected in model programs, reflecting current best 

practices and existing consensus; and

(e) Comparison of reported features within existing carrier programs with critical elements of current best practices. 

14. SUBJECT TERMS

Critical incident, trauma, trespassing, grade crossing, train crews, critical incident stress plan

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46

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ii

METRIC/ENGLISH CONVERSION FACTORS

ENGLISH TO METRIC METRIC TO ENGLISH

LENGTH (APPROXIMATE) LENGTH (APPROXIMATE)

1 inch (in) = 2.5 centimeters (cm) 1 millimeter (mm) = 0.04 inch (in)

1 foot (ft) = 30 centimeters (cm) 1 centimeter (cm) = 0.4 inch (in)

1 yard (yd) = 0.9 meter (m) 1 meter (m) = 3.3 feet (ft)

1 mile (mi) = 1.6 kilometers (km) 1 meter (m) = 1.1 yards (yd)

1 kilometer (km) = 0.6 mile (mi)

AREA (APPROXIMATE) AREA (APPROXIMATE)

1 square inch (sq in, in2) = 6.5 square centimeters (cm2) 1 square centimeter (cm2) = 0.16 square inch (sq in, in2)

1 square foot (sq ft, ft2) = 0.09 square meter (m2) 1 square meter (m2) = 1.2 square yards (sq yd, yd2)

1 square yard (sq yd, yd2) = 0.8 square meter (m2) 1 square kilometer (km2) = 0.4 square mile (sq mi, mi2)

1 square mile (sq mi, mi2) = 2.6 square kilometers (km2) 10,000 square meters (m2) = 1 hectare (ha) = 2.5 acres

1 acre = 0.4 hectare (he) = 4,000 square meters (m2)

MASS - WEIGHT (APPROXIMATE) MASS - WEIGHT (APPROXIMATE)

1 ounce (oz) = 28 grams (gm) 1 gram (gm) = 0.036 ounce (oz)

1 pound (lb) = 0.45 kilogram (kg) 1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2 pounds (lb)

1 short ton = 2,000 pounds 

(lb)

= 0.9 tonne (t) 1 tonne (t) =

=

1,000 kilograms (kg)

1.1 short tons

VOLUME (APPROXIMATE) VOLUME (APPROXIMATE)

1 teaspoon (tsp) = 5 milliliters (ml) 1 milliliter (ml) = 0.03 fluid ounce (fl oz)

1 tablespoon (tbsp) = 15 milliliters (ml) 1 liter (l) = 2.1 pints (pt)

1 fluid ounce (fl oz) = 30 milliliters (ml) 1 liter (l) = 1.06 quarts (qt)

1 cup (c) = 0.24 liter (l) 1 liter (l) = 0.26 gallon (gal)

1 pint (pt) = 0.47 liter (l)

1 quart (qt) = 0.96 liter (l)

1 gallon (gal) = 3.8 liters (l)

1 cubic foot (cu ft, ft3) = 0.03 cubic meter (m3) 1 cubic meter (m3) = 36 cubic feet (cu ft, ft3)

1 cubic yard (cu yd, yd3) = 0.76 cubic meter (m3) 1 cubic meter (m3) = 1.3 cubic yards (cu yd, yd3)

TEMPERATURE (EXACT) TEMPERATURE (EXACT)

[(x-32)(5/9)] °F = y °C [(9/5) y + 32] °C = x °F

QUICK INCH - CENTIMETER LENGTH CONVERSION

0 1 2 3 4 5

Inches

Centimeters 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

QUICK FAHRENHEIT - CELSIUS TEMPERATURE CONVERSION

 -40° -22° -4° 14° 32° 50° 68° 86° 104° 122° 140° 158° 176° 194° 212°

 

°F

 °C -40° -30° -20° -10° 0° 10° 20° 30° 40° 50° 60° 70° 80° 90° 100°

For more exact and or other conversion factors, see NIST Miscellaneous Publication 286, Units of Weights and 

Measures. Price $2.50 SD Catalog No. C13 10286 Updated 6/17/98
iii

Acknowledgements

Significant results for any project do not typically arise from the efforts of one single individual, 

nor do they tend to emerge quickly, smoothly, or seamlessly. The conclusion is often all that is 

long remembered and the final architect or author commonly receives far more credit than he or 

she truly deserves. The history of this project includes several quiet but perseverant contributors 

who should not pass unnoted.

This effort was inspired by the passion of labor organizations to ensure that members could 

expect consistent standards of compassionate care when confronted by what has become, 

unfortunately, a recurrent occupational nightmare. John Tolman of the Brotherhood of 

Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, among others, has worked tirelessly for years to see that 

vision through to completion. FRA’s Critical Incident Working Group invested several months, 

multiple meetings, and much active discussion facilitating final consensus.

Staff in the FRA’s Office of Research and Development saw the significance of this effort many 

years ago and helped to emphasize the urgency of the project. Immediate intervention following 

on-the-job exposure to potentially traumatic events had become a prime example of the chasm 

between science and practice. Indeed, the gulf between common practice and empirical 

outcomes had become so pronounced that workable solutions were needed. Staff at the Volpe 

Center also made key contributions to the project, including ensuring that each draft considered 

all elements of stakeholder interest and input. 

The Association of American Railroads (AAR) and its member carriers provided crucial input 

throughout the process. The matrix of current services created and supplied by AAR was the 

foundation for much of this work and indispensable to building a template by which to put the 

Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 into practical, efficient, and cost-effective application. Dr. 

Malva Reid, Maia Dalton-Theodore, and Steve Graham of Amtrak’s Employee Assistance 

Program, along with representatives of their carrier’s labor organizations, also provided gracious 

and superbly helpful feedback to help reconcile the salient findings of the research with the 

practicalities of serving employees in a rail carrier environment.

Chief Ron Siarnicki and the staff of the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation supplied critical 

support in managing the logistics of travel, reporting, document development, editing, and the 

other basic but essential procedural pieces required to bring the project to completion. Dr. 

JoEllen Kelly and Vickie Taylor of NFFF’s Behavioral Health Initiative Team, Dr. Patricia 

Watson of the National Center for PTSD, Dr. Ken Ruggiero of the National Crime Victims 

Research and Treatment Center, and Dr. Chip Benight of University of Colorado-Colorado 

Springs Trauma Studies and Resource Center also contributed insight and feedback to the final 

report.
iv

Contents

Executive Summary........................................................................................................................ 1

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 2

2. Literature Review ........................................................................................................ 3

3. Applicability to Railway Environment........................................................................ 5

3.1 Existing Carrier Programs........................................................................................... 5

4. Defining a “Critical Incident” ..................................................................................... 7

5. Relief from Duty.......................................................................................................... 9

6. CIWG Definition and Proposed Rule........................................................................ 10

7. Proposed Model for Rail Industry Critical Incident Intervention Program............... 11

8. Development, Evaluation, and Approval of Plans .................................................... 14

9. Articulation with Current Programs and Practices.................................................... 16

9.1 Compatibility with Established Carrier Programs..................................................... 16

10. Conclusions............................................................................................................... 19

11. References ................................................................................................................. 20

Appendix A. Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Sec. 410.................................................... 25

Appendix B. American Railroad Critical Incident Matrix........................................................... 26

Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................................................................... 39
v

Illustrations

Figure 1. Proposed Model for Railway Industry Critical Incident Stress Program...................... 11
1

Executive Summary

Over the past decade, there has been substantial refinement in scientific and professional 

understanding of occupational traumatic exposure and reactivity. This refinement has led to a 

modification of objectives and methods for implementing and evaluating pilot intervention 

efforts and programs. Ideally, the results of such efforts will be used consistently by railroad 

carriers to mitigate potential negative effects on train crews of traumatic exposure to incidents on 

the tracks. Section 410 of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 mandated that the Federal 

Railroad Administration (FRA) define the term “critical incident” to clarify the situations in 

which such services would be needed and that all Class 1, intercity passenger, and commuter 

railroads develop plans to offer services to train crews following critical incidents. FRA issued a 

final rule on Critical Incident Stress Plans on March 25, 2014.

This report describes the critical incident plans that are currently in place with railroad carriers 

and proposes a model by which carriers may modify and strengthen their existing plans. Carrier 

programs summarized in the matrix provided by the Association of American Railroads (AAR)

reflect a general consensus on key definitions and prescriptions sought by the Rail Safety 

Improvement Act of 2008. Programs in place typically contain most of the essential elements 

needed to devise a suitable plan for approval by FRA and mount a successful program of 

intervention and assistance. 

Accordingly, a template for a model program is presented to help guide efforts to implement the 

requirements of the Rail Safety Improvement Act and the proposed rule by railroads, rail labor 

organizations, and other stakeholders. The template is grounded in practices currently in place, as 

indicated in the matrix provided by AAR (Appendix B). Specific recommendations are made to 

help incorporate current evidence-supported best practices with the specific intent of (a) ensuring 

all required elements of the Act are accommodated, (b) providing a soundly structured approach 

that can be efficiently and effectively executed, and (c) allowing carriers to build upon their 

current programs without undue cost or disruption. 

Initial review of the proposed template with a major carrier helped refine process elements and 

identify additional inputs needed. Overall, the model was seen as an enhancement that could be 

accommodated without substantial difficulty and which would likely benefit both efficiency and 

effectiveness of the program. Of specific note were elements of interaction between operating 

elements and Employee Assistance Program (EAP)/Occupational medicine components that 

could help mitigate immediate impact and ensure ease, fidelity, and consistency of 

implementation in the field.

Next steps include support for pilot testing the model at a proposed railroad site, identification of

implementation issues or challenges that may need to be overcome, and documentation of the 

model’s effectiveness and impacts for lessons learned. 
2

1. Introduction

This report presents work conducted under an FRA grant (FR-RDD-0024-11-01) to advise and 

support the formulation of regulations and supporting materials respecting “critical incident” 

response plans for rail carriers covered by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Sec. 410. 

In accordance with the Statement of Work for that project, the following elements are addressed:

(a) Review of literature on established and emerging research findings with respect to 

occupational exposure to potentially traumatic events (PTEs); 

(b) Review of literature on current best practices with respect to prevention, mitigation, early 

intervention, and evidence-based treatment of established sequelae from such exposures; 

(c) Review of current practices by key rail carriers as reported through the Association of 

American Railroads (AAR) to determine level of consensus reflected in existing 

programs respecting critical requirements of the authorizing act (e.g., definition of 

“critical incident,” release from duty of impacted employees, intervention design, and

evaluation of outcomes); 

(d) Preparation of a general guidance template outlining key features that might be expected 

in model programs, reflecting current best practices and existing consensus;

(e) Comparison of reported features within existing carrier programs with critical elements 

of current best practices. 

This final report reflects discussions and inputs from Critical Incident Working Group (CIWG) 

meetings. Each session included presentation of both draft and modified text and a full 

presentation of revisions and additions to date; in addition, the working draft was circulated for 

comment and input prior to its final revision and presentation at the December CIWG meeting.
3

2. Literature Review

The origins of most industry programs focused on occupational exposure to PTEs can be traced 

back to the rapid growth of “critical incident stress” interventions from the mid-1980s through 

the 1990s (Mitchell, 1983). The impetus for these programs was generated outside the world of 

refereed scientific and medical literature, and, hence, outside the more conservative restraints 

demanded in those venues with respect to documented safety, efficacy, and impact (Gist & 

Woodall, 2000; Gist, Woodall, & Magenheimer, 1999). It was not until the end of the 1990s that 

controlled empirical studies had been conducted and reported in sufficient numbers to allow 

clear findings to be articulated (see, for example, Bisson et al., 1997; Carlier et al., 1998; Deahl 

et al., 1994; Gist, Lubin, & Redburn, 1999; Griffith & Watts, 1992; Hobbs et al., 1996; Kenardy 

et al.; 1996; Lee, Slade, & Lygo, 1996; Mayou, Ehlers, & Hobbs, 2000). Meta-analyses of 

randomized controlled trials—the “gold standard” for determination of treatment efficacy—were 

first published in the early 2000s (Rose, Wessely, & Bisson, 2007; van Emmerik et al.2002). 

Psychological debriefing, the central intervention of most critical incident programs, showed no 

preventive efficacy, and well-controlled studies suggested risk of impaired recovery for some 

participants, especially the most severely symptomatic (McNally, Bryant, & Ehlers, 2003). 

Other frequently prescribed elements (e.g., peer support, psychoeducation) lack direct empirical 

demonstrations of efficacy and, in some settings, have also raised concern (Lohr et al., 2003).

Such findings from independent empirical study contradicted beliefs of low risk and strong 

efficacy that had become ingrained among practitioners of these interventions (Mitchell & 

Everly, 1997). The consistency of these findings, however, led to growing consensus in the 

scientific and medical communities that these practices should be curtailed and more effective 

alternatives advanced (Brewin et al., 2002; Gray & Litz, 2005; NIMH, 2002). Principal 

constructs in debriefing programs became subject to reexamination (Devilly & Cotton, 2003, 

2004; Devilly, Gist & Cotton, 2006). 

One such construct was a general assumption that a pathologic reaction was a common 

consequence of exposure to PTEs. Focused epidemiologic study of those exposed to natural 

disaster, occupational events, and similar impingements suggested that generalization from study 

of populations experiencing intense and/or protracted exposure to highly threatening events (e.g., 

military combat, rape, violent crime) severely overestimated decompensation and underestimated 

spontaneous recovery and resilience (Bonanno, 2004). Well-designed population studies of the 

impact of the 9/11 attacks on residents of Manhattan provided strong evidence for both the 

dominance of resiliency as a trajectory following exposure and the prevalence of spontaneous 

remediation of initial symptom presentations (Galea et al., 2003; Galea et al., 2004). The 

demonstrated paradoxical impact of debriefing on spontaneous recovery provided further 

impetus for its contraindication, and focus turned to less intrusive techniques with an emphasis 

on maintaining resiliency and supporting spontaneous resolution.

Another presumption inherent in interventions based on debriefing was that of strong preventive 

benefit from early ventilation. Derived from Freudian notions regarding psychic catharsis and 

well engrained in popularized notions of therapy, the idea that “what goes in must come out” led 

to an argument that compelling those exposed to confront their experience and express their 

reactions would yield preventive benefit. This, too, was contradicted in findings of controlled 
4

studies, most especially with respect to those whose standard coping mechanisms centered on 

distancing or repression (Frasure-Smith et al., 2002; Ginzburg, Solomon, & Bleich, 2002). 

Systematic review of work with disaster victims resulted in published consensus surrounding 

five basic principles that held demonstrated positive impact on resiliency and resolution 

(Hobfoll, et al., 2007):

1. restoring a sense of safety;

2. calming anxiety and agitation;

3. enhancing self-efficacy;

4. building connectedness; and

5. facilitating hope.

These principles provided the foundation for an evidence-informed approach to early assistance 

designed to facilitate resiliency and establish a basis for subsequent intervention based on 

systematic screening and stepped care, employing evidence based treatment as indicated. A 

series of well researched, public domain components is now available to support each step of 

early intervention and stepped care, including:

(a) Psychological First Aid, a manualized approach to early assistance developed by the 

National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (NCPTSD) and the Substance 

Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) (Brymer et al., 2006);

(b) Trauma Screening Questionnaire, a 10 item quick screen with documented 

sensitivity, specificity, and efficiency to identify those for whom further assessment 

and treatment may be indicated (Brewin et al., 2002);

(c) Web based approaches to clinician training to enable journeyman providers open 

access at little or no cost to training and consultation in evidence-based treatments for 

PTSD, anxiety, and depression (NCVC, 2005, 2009).

Used together, these approaches enable existing carrier programs to meet current standards of 

care. As a consequence, programs for fire and emergency medical services personnel have been 

substantially redesigned along parameters more consistent with empirical evidence respecting 

variability in individual reactivity and resilience; organizational roles in preparation, response, 

and recovery; and implementation of standards respecting screening, assessment, and specialty 

care (Gist & Taylor, 2008, 2009). Similar adaptations are underway in other workplace settings 

(van de Pol, Labardee, & Gist, 2006; van de Pol et al., 2007).
5

3. Applicability to Railway Environment

Exposure of railway employees, particularly locomotive operators and conductors, to 

prototypical PTEs is well established (see Schartung et al., 2011, for a recent analysis). 

Paramount among these are incursion events involving vehicular accidents at grade crossings and 

pedestrian incursions onto railroad right of way (sometimes as a method of suicide). Regulatory 

efforts and other safety measures have effected a significant decrease in the frequency of 

accidents (despite a sizable increase in the number of open crossings), but there has been an 

increase in both injury and fatality rates (Schartung et al., 2011). Injuries sustained are often 

gruesome. Operators and conductors must often tend to the injured and secure the scene, which 

compounds proximity and duration of exposure to the traumatic event. 

Systematic empirical study of the impact of this exposure on these personnel is limited. The best 

designed studies have been European (e.g., Cothereau et al., 2004; Cox, Griffiths, & Houdmont, 

2003; Farmer, O’Donnell, & Tranah, 1991; Farmer et al., 1992; Karlehagen et al., 1993; Lunt & 

Hartley, 2004; Malt et al., 1993; Trannah & Farmer, 1994; Vatshelle & Moen, 2004; Webb, 

2005) and show clinically diagnosed PTSD in 7–14 percent of those exposed; PTSD detected has 

been reported to be time limited in at least two recent studies (Cothereau et al., 2004; Tranah & 

Farmer, 1994). Detailed empirical study of treatment efficacy and impact within this population 

is not easily found, presumably due to the relatively small population annually treated and the 

diversity of locations and systems involved in their identification and care.

3.1 Existing Carrier Programs

Most major American carriers have endeavored to provide their employees with assistance and 

intervention following these events. The AAR provided a matrix of existing programs 

(Appendix B) highlighting key elements of current endeavors. Most of these programs have 

been in existence for a number of years and most appear to operate under the aegis and direction 

of the carrier’s Employee Assistance Program (EAP).

The descriptions of interventions, timing, delivery, and the like appear to reflect efforts to 

transplant design and key features found in “critical incident stress” programs created in fire, 

rescue, and emergency services venues in the 1980s and 1990s. These approaches, and 

especially elements built around “critical incident stress debriefing” and related interventions, 

have come under increased scrutiny as independent research has consistently reported core 

interventions to be inert with respect to preventive goals and to potentially evoke paradoxical 

inhibition of natural recovery for certain vulnerable participants (see McNally, Bryant, & Ehlers, 

2003, or Devilly, Gist, & Cotton, 2006 for detailed review and discussion). Accordingly, most 

authoritative guidelines now caution against the routine application of these approaches and a 

number now lists them as directly contraindicated (Australian Centre for Posttraumatic Mental 

Health, 2007; National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2005; Gray & Litz, 2005; Rose, 

Wessely, & Bisson, 2007; World Health Organization, 2013.) While several railroad EAP 

providers note that they have modified their programs in light of these data, a clear set of 

guidelines for appropriate, evidence-informed response has not been available to benchmark 

their efforts.
6

While there exist noteworthy variations between the programs outlined in the AAR matrix 

(Appendix B), there is also substantial consensus reflected with respect to the key elements 

sought in the authorizing act. Elements of particular importance treated in the following sections 

include:

1. Definition of “critical incident”;

2. Relief for balance of duty tour

a. Employees directly involved

b. Employees witnessing the incident or its sequelae; and

3. Leave from normal duties to receive services.
7

4. Defining a “Critical Incident”

“Critical incident” and “critical incident stress” are not terms that have clinical significance or 

standard definitions in the scientific or medical literature. The term was coined by Flanagan 

(1954) in the early literature of industrial and organizational psychology to describe a specific 

method of job analysis. 

Critical incidents, in the original formulation, were defining moments with respect to issues such 

as job performance, where the capacity to handle such an event was diagnostic of success or 

failure in the overall execution of a job’s inherent responsibilities. Critical incident methodology 

enjoyed a strong following in areas such as industrial psychology, organizational development, 

and military science as a useful way to focus attention on those things that separate success from 

mediocrity or failure and to identify variables and test manipulations that might enhance 

successful performance. While this remains the understood meaning of the term in technical 

circles, the paltry 104 Google hits for “critical incident technique” or “critical incident method” 

are astronomically dwarfed by the more than 41,000 hits for its malapropos offshoot, “critical 

incident stress.”

The definitions offered in trade literature promoting critical incident stress interventions are 

amorphous and essentially circular. A “critical incident,” according to these formulations, is any 

event that provokes “critical incident stress.” “Critical incident stress” is defined as the 

individual’s reaction to exposure to a critical incident. Lists of presumed events that would 

qualify are often provided but there is no evidence of any empirical substantiation of an 

operational definition that would break this tautological circle.

The dominant allusion appears to be to Criterion A of the diagnostic rubric for PTSD but here, 

too, definitions are subjective rather than systematic or operational. For purposes of the Rail 

Safety Improvement Act of 2008, what is required is an operational definition that will establish 

for carriers when their required plan must be implemented. Since the clinical definitions of 

actual relevance depend on reactions of those exposed rather than the nature of the event itself, 

the prudent course appears to be establishment of an agreed operational minimum—a set of 

events for which the elements of the plan must be mobilized and made available to employees. 

Current definitions reflected in the AAR matrix suggest that all carriers consider an incursion 

incident resulting in death or substantial injury to fall within the domain of their programs. 

Several also include major derailments resulting in death or injury; passenger carriers reasonably 

include death or injury to passengers as well. Where an affected employee is defined or a 

definition implied, those who witness or are charged to intervene are generally considered to be 

the employees of focus. A reasonable starting point toward consensus was therefore proffered to 

be: 

Critical incidents are defined as incursions or other right of way events in which 

railroad operations result in death or significant injury and in which railroad 

employees witness or are charged to directly intervene. 

These events will require initiation of the required plan with respect to those employees directly 

impacted. This should not preclude initiation of plans for other events (e.g., “close calls” with 

clear and/or declared impact on specific employees), or their extension beyond directly impacted 

employees, but these would be determined by the carrier and/or the carriers’ negotiated 
8

agreements with their employees. It is recommended, however, that guidance regarding 

implementation of these plans emphasize that access to the plan’s components should be made 

available and specific outreach considered for any event in which (a) the nature of the event or 

observed reactions to it suggest that intervention would prove of value to the employee and/or 

promote safe return to duty, or (b) specific employees request assistance following such 

exposure.
9

5. Relief from Duty

The majority of existing plans call for immediate relief from duty upon request for the remainder 

of a shift or tour of duty and for transportation to the home terminal for employees directly 

involved in a covered event. The conventional pattern at present is to grant 3 days additional 

leave upon request, generally requiring contact with occupational medicine or EAP to ensure that 

any needed services have been offered. Additional leave is typically predicated on evaluation by 

the appropriate occupational medical authority and treated in conformance with other 

occupational injury protocols, as is consistent with existing clinical literature.

Substantial discussion at CIWG sessions centered on whether immediate relief should be 

mandatory. There is no compelling scientific evidence at present to suggest that all persons 

exposed to a potentially traumatic event require or benefit from such mandated removal from 

duty; there is, however, substantive anecdotal evidence to suggest that many persons prefer and 

may benefit from continuing their duties if they choose to do so. Feedback provided by carriers 

during CIWG deliberations suggest that 35–50 percent of crews currently elect to continue, 

although the option for relief and transportation to home terminal is typically offered. 

There is some empirical evidence that certain individuals—particularly those whose dominant 

coping style is repressive in nature—fare as well or better than those who employ more 

expressive coping styles, unless their coping style is challenged by efforts to provide assistance 

incompatible with their typical strategies (Frasure-Smith et al., (2002); Ginzburg, Solomon, & 

Bleich, 2002). As many as a quarter of the individuals in these studies were classified as 

repressive copers, suggesting that provision of an option is a reasonable solution. It may be 

useful to ensure that personnel are advised of their option at the time of the event and that they 

are allowed to change that decision should they later determine that relief is in their best interest. 

Safety considerations must also be taken into account to ensure that employees are indeed 

capable of operating the train safely if allowed to continue.

Similarly, relief following an event should be considered an option at the individual’s discretion. 

Where addressed in existing plans, the more common period cited has been up to 3 days relief. 

There is at present no clinical evidence to suggest this or any other specific interval is optimal or 

necessary, but the 3-day period is (a) consistent with common industry practice as reported in the 

AAR matrix (Appendix B) and (b) presents a reasonable window in which employees can 

evaluate their response and reconciliation of the event. Therefore, it is suggested that this be 

considered a guideline index, subject to employee election, but that additional time requests 

beyond those 3 days involve occupational medicine (as specified in carrier protocol).
10

6. CIWG Definition and Proposed Rule

The CIWG achieved consensus on the following definitions:

Critical incident means an event that results in a fatality, loss of limb, or a similarly 

serious bodily injury; or a catastrophic accident which could be reasonably expected to 

impair a directly involved employee’s ability to safely perform his or her job duties.

Directly involved employee means a railroad employee whose actions are closely 

connected to the critical incident, who witnessed the critical incident, or who was charged 

to directly intervene/respond to the critical incident.

The proposed rule submitted to the CIWG, directly mirroring the Act, provides that:

(a) Each railroad to which this part applies is required to develop and submit to the Federal 

Railroad Administration, Office of Railroad Safety, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E., 

Washington DC 20590, for approval, a Critical Incident Plan. Each covered railroad 

must submit its Critical Incident Plan to FRA for approval within 12 months of the 

effective date of this regulation.

(b) A Critical Incident Plan is considered approved if FRA notifies the railroad in writing 

that the Critical Incident Plan is approved, or 90 days after FRA received the Critical 

Incident Plan. After initial approval by FRA, if there is a material change in a railroad’s 

Critical Incident Plan, the revised Critical Incident Plan shall be submitted to FRA within 

30 days of the change.

(c) Each Critical Incident Plan shall include, at a minimum, provisions for:

1) Immediate response, counseling, guidance, and other appropriate support services;

2) Relief from the balance of duty-tour for employees directly involved in a critical 

incident, following any actions necessary for the safety of persons and 

contemporaneous documentation of the incident;

3) The railroad’s response personnel must inform the employee(s) directly involved in a 

critical incident that they may request relief; and

4) Permitting such additional leave from normal duty as may be necessary and 

reasonable to receive preventive services and/or treatment related to the incident.

(d) A copy of the Critical Incident Plan must be made available to employees covered by the 

regulation and/or holding responsibilities related to execution of the plan.

These provisions are combined with current evidence supported best practices to propose a 

recommended model template, designed to be compatible with current best practices in the

railroad environment and consistent with the Act and the proposed rule. The model has also 

been compared with an existing program to determine goodness of fit and acceptability for 

implementation without undue cost or administrative burden.
11

7. Proposed Model for Rail Industry Critical Incident Intervention 

Program

The proposed model template is treated as a process design. The focus of the process is 

generated from the perspective of the impacted employee and tracks his or her progress through 

the event and its sequelae. The recommended general design is illustrated in the flow chart below 

(black lines are the progress of the event from the employee perspective; the red line indicates 

exposure recommendation for contact of the employee as an outreach step; solid green lines 

indicate pathways toward terminus of process; dashed green lines prescribe recommendations 

that the employee contact EAP or Occupational Medicine designated resource prior to 

termination of process).

The chart begins with a potentially traumatic exposure (PTE, a.k.a. “critical incident”) as defined 

under the Act (or, if indicated based upon protocol or agreement, an event falling outside that 

strict definition but recognized as a pertinent trigger).

Figure 1. Proposed Model for Railway Industry Critical Incident Stress Program
12

(1) The employee is expected to perform those duties assigned by protocol to secure the train 

and the scene, notify appropriate personnel, render aid to injured persons, and provide 

information needed for contemporaneous documentation of the incident. This implies that 

each employee involved has clear and prescribed protocols to follow with respect to tasks 

and responsibilities, and that each employee involved has access to all equipment required to 

perform those tasks and has received adequate training to execute those tasks effectively. 

Check lists and/or process charts should be provided for each position; it is advisable that 

these be accessible in the event of emergency.

(2) Involved employees should be presented the option of immediate relief from duty and timely 

transport to their home terminal. Regardless of their decision, they should also be informed 

of their option to request recovery leave at a later time (see below). It is suggested that an 

occupational medicine representative or EAP make contact and offer services according to 

the carrier’s approved plan. 

(3) If further recovery leave is requested or required, the case should be handled in accordance 

with the carrier’s occupational medicine protocols. This option should remain available even 

if the employee opts to complete the immediate tour of duty (above). If no additional time is 

requested or required, the process terminates, but can be reopened by the employee. Medical 

clearance should not be required to return to duty if no additional leave is involved.

(4) Screening for adverse clinical reactions, to specifically include PTSD and depression, should 

be conducted prior to return to duty in any case where additional time has been granted. 

Evidence-based screening should be utilized (e.g., Brewin, et. al., 2002). In the absence of a 

positive screen, it is suggested that an exit interview through occupational medicine or EAP 

be recommended to ensure that any necessary assistance is offered. If no other services are 

indicated, the process terminates.

(5) Positive screening should result in complete assessment for PTSD and/or depression. This 

assessment should be conducted by appropriately trained, certified, and prepared 

practitioners; if none are available through the carrier’s occupational medicine or EAP 

resources, the employee should be referred for specialist evaluation. If no clinical diagnosis 

is indicated, it is suggested that an exit interview with occupational medicine or EAP be 

recommended to determine need or desire for other assistance or support. If no other 

services are indicated, the process terminates.

(6) Where a clinical diagnosis is entered, the employee should be referred for appropriate 

specialist care. Specialists should be prepared to provide treatment according to current 

standards for evidence-based practice (e.g., cognitive behavioral therapy). Following 

completion of specialist care, a final occupational medicine or EAP contact should be 

recommended to determine need or desire for other assistance or support. If no other 

services are indicated, the process terminates.

The objective should be to allow each carrier to utilize its existing model as a base, making 

modifications as necessary to ensure compliance with minimum standards proposed for 
13

applicability and to enhance conformity of its screening and intervention components to current 

best practices and standards for evidence-based care. The plan to be presented for review should 

document that the carrier has taken sufficient steps to establish capacity and capability to 

satisfactorily execute each element in the proposed process model and describe how those 

elements are to be executed in covered events.
14

8. Development, Evaluation, and Approval of Plans

Collaboration between labor and management in the development of the critical incident 

response plan is strongly recommended prior to submission. It is recommended that review of 

plans examine, at a minimum, these essential features:

(1) Clearly specified protocols should be provided for railroad personnel in the event of a 

covered incident, to include:

i. Actions to be taken by specific employees (e.g., contacts to be made, treatment of 

injured, securing scene, documenting circumstances and events).

ii. Training and equipment needed to ensure capacity and capability to execute required 

functions.

iii. To whom responsibility will be relinquished as event unfolds.

iv. Timeframe (with specified minimum standards) in which relief will be provided when 

indicated.

v. Checklist and/or process chart to be followed to ensure that responsibilities have been 

met.

(2) Responsibility for first contact with impacted employees and initiation of required plan 

should be specifically assigned, to include:

i. Assumption of responsibility for scene and injured parties.

ii. Gathering of preliminary information for legal and investigative purposes.

iii. Establishment of first contact elements of carrier’s approved plan.

iv. Relief from duty and return to home terminal if requested.

v. Initiation of contact/outreach components as indicated.

vi. Training and equipment needed to ensure capacity and capability to execute required 

functions.

vii. Checklist to be followed to ensure that responsibilities have been met.

(3) Responsibility of occupational medicine or EAP (internal or contracted) should be outlined, 

to include:

i. Timing and responsibility for outreach contact.

ii. Standards of care regarding basic services to be provided.

iii. Processes and standards for screening, assessment, and immediate care.

iv. Standards and methods for specialty referral.

v. Evaluation protocols for return to duty.

vi. Relationship to occupational medicine functions.
15

(4) Peer support programs, if utilized, should follow specific protocols:

i. Not a required component though recommended where feasible.

ii. Where utilized, should complement but not supplant professional roles outlined above.

iii. Definition of roles and boundaries should be emphasized.

iv. Relationship to occupational medicine and/or EAP, including selection, supervision, and 

case evaluation, should be specified.

(5) Resources to Support Implementation:

i. Training protocols should be developed for covered employees, responsible parties, 

supervisors, managers, and providers.

ii. Plans should provide for adaptation or development of resources not currently available.
16

9. Articulation with Current Programs and Practices

A central objective in the development of a model template has been to create a flexible 

approach that can be both compatible with existing practices and reflective of current evidenceinformed best practices. Specifically, the model is intended to:

(a) Be compatible with the needs, practices, and personalities of the workers who will be

using it for help;

(b) Provide for implementation by the carrier and their designated providers without undue 

burden or extraordinary expense;

(c) Contain elements that have been demonstrated to help mitigate, attenuate, and limit 

stressful impacts, as well as provide intervention and treatment after the fact;

(d) Establish clear pathways for action and intervention as seen from employee, organization, 

and provider viewpoints;

(e) Strengthen established and effective programs where present; and

(f) Ensure both employees and providers that their needs have been recognized, understood,

and appropriately addressed.

9.1 Compatibility with Established Carrier Programs

The model as proposed and presented at the September Working Group meeting was discussed 

in detail with representatives of a major carrier EAP noted for its effectiveness; members of 

United Transportation Union and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen involved 

in that program were specifically included in those discussions. The purpose of these 

discussions was to 

(a) Explain the proposed model and how it would be expected to work;

(b) Hear concerns, comments, suggestions, and recommendations;

(c) Compare key elements prescribed with existing processes and practice;

(d) Explore “goodness of fit” for the railroad environment; 

(e) Determine perceptions of providers and consumers regarding benefits and/or liabilities; 

and

(f) Identify any specific changes, enhancements, or additions the model would require to be 

fully implemented.

The program queried was chosen as the first site visit because (a) it was identified by several 

contributors as one of the longer established and more developed programs in the industry, (b) its 

experience and utilization rates were sufficient to ensure representative information, and (c) it is 

a national operation that represents many parts of the country and a range of geographic, 

population, and resource distribution configurations. 
17

Key findings from those discussions included:

(1) Though a very well developed and operated program, there did not appear to be a clear 

written protocol or checklist for required actions. There are indeed various procedures that 

are understood; some of these exist in various policies and operating procedures. These did 

not appear at present to have been brought together in a clear process, resulting in procedures

that detailed specific responsibilities and expectations in the event of accident or emergency.

(2) Specificity of responsibility and expectation is a critical feature in ensuring that immediate 

impact is mitigated. This can typically be done without great cost, effort, or expense. 

Beyond its moderating effect with respect to individual impacts, it contributes to reliable and 

consistent action by those first on scene and hence benefits all aspects of the evolving 

incident. Participants felt it could and should be done but, since it is an operational feature, 

input outside the EAP function is required.

(3) Specific training for responsibilities and tasks in accidents is another area of development 

that lies outside the EAP domain. Operating employees such as train crews, trainmasters, 

and road foremen, have important first contact assignments and need preparation to do them 

reliably and well. These first contacts can be critical to moderating impact. Some training in 

critical areas is recognized as a part of other training activities, but specific training involving 

accidents and other critical incidents should be provided. 

(4) Employees and providers recognized situations in which immediate relief expectations might 

be difficult to meet. All agreed that exceptions should be possible but that any exceptions 

should require specific authorization at a managerial level and should be accompanied by 

appropriate documentation and review.

(5) Development of protocol, process charts, and the like for those assigned to relieve impacted 

personnel also requires operational input from outside the EAP. As with the elements 

addressed above, clear procedures and regular training ensure consistent and reliable 

execution in relatively infrequent but high impact situations. 

(6) Consistency throughout the system was a major concern of all discussants because different 

regions have different operating cultures. Again, clear and specific protocols backed by 

consistent, reinforced training must be in place and performance monitored at a system level 

if consistency is to be achieved and maintained.

(7) Some “retraining” of providers was recommended to ensure that skills and formulations 

represent expectations of the model and current best practices. The provider involved has 

internal trainers who can accomplish this but indicated that additional assistance would be 

welcome.

(8) Relationship to occupational medicine protocols and regulations were understood but could 

benefit from clarification and documentation of policy and process elements specific to the 

PTE response. Of particular consequence are approval of additional time, handling of 

“reportable injury,” return to duty, and the like. A clear process outlined would help 

document the expected structure for these interactions, which would in turn help facilitate 
18

employee transition and utilization.

(9) Peer programs were noted to be effective bridge mechanisms. This carrier program, like 

many such programs, utilized labor representatives whose duties make them natural 

resources for benefits, assistance, and the like. Additional guidance and structure may be 

beneficial to help guide decisions to develop or utilize peer contact mechanisms, especially 

where programs are weakly established or underutilized. A current international project to 

develop best practice standards (Australian Centre for Posttraumatic Mental Health, 2009) 

may provide a resource for carriers wishing to consider this option.

Overall, discussants reported good fit between the proposed model template and their existing 

model. Few discussants perceived obstacles to meeting any requirements the proposed model 

template would present and anticipated that added features would enhance an already successful 

program without undue burden or additional major expense. The final model, as presented in 

this report, reflects modifications made based on these discussions and comparisons, as well as 

further refinements derived from discussion within the CIWG.
19

10. Conclusions

The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 mandates that each Class I railroad carrier, intercity 

passenger railroad carrier, and commuter railroad carrier develop and submit for approval a 

critical incident stress plan that makes available appropriate support services to employees

affected by a critical incident. This report reviewed existing critical incident stress plans in place 

at various railroads around the United States. Based on current best practices and relevant 

findings from the scientific literature, a model plan was proposed for the railroads to consider 

when adapting their plans to conform to the forthcoming FRA rule on this matter.

In general, programs in place already contain most of the essential elements needed to devise a 

suitable plan and mount a successful program of assistance and intervention. Additional 

knowledge about current best practices may, however, help carriers make adjustments to their 

existing programs and refine their processes. Ideally, the model program included in this report 

will help guide carriers to effectively modify existing programs to meet the requirements of the 

Act. Included in this model program are elements which (a) ensure that all required elements of 

the Act are incorporated, (b) provide a soundly structured approach that can be efficiently and 

effectively executed, and (c) allow carriers to build upon current programs without undue cost of 

disruption.

Once the mandates of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 go into effect, this model 

program will help railroad carriers implement necessary changes in an efficient way. As these 

changes are implemented, FRA will continue to work closely with railroad carriers to better 

understand the challenges of implementing such programs and to better understand the various

impacts associated with mitigating potential stress reactions of train crews to potentially 

traumatic incidents.
20

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25

Appendix A. Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Sec. 410

Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-432, Division A

SEC. 410. CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS PLAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Transportation, in consultation

with the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Health and

Human Services, as appropriate, shall require each Class I railroad

carrier, each intercity passenger railroad carrier, and each commuter

railroad carrier to develop and submit for approval to the

Secretary a critical incident stress plan that provides for debriefing,

counseling, guidance, and other appropriate support services to

be offered to an employee affected by a critical incident.

(b) PLAN REQUIREMENTS.—Each such plan shall include provisions

for—

(1) relieving an employee who was involved in a critical

incident of his or her duties for the balance of the duty tour,

following any actions necessary for the safety of persons and

contemporaneous documentation of the incident;

(2) upon the employee’s request, relieving an employee

who witnessed a critical incident of his or her duties following

any actions necessary for the safety of persons and contemporaneous

documentation of the incident; and

(3) providing such leave from normal duties as may be

necessary and reasonable to receive preventive services, treatment,

or both, related to the incident.

(c) SECRETARY TO DEFINE WHAT CONSTITUTES A CRITICAL

INCIDENT.—Within 30 days after the date of enactment of this

Act, the Secretary shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding to define

the term ‘‘critical incident’’ for the purposes of this section.
26

Appendix B. American Railroad Critical Incident Matrix

Carriers 1 through 3

Carrier 1 Carrier 2 Carrier 3

Accountability Health Services and EAP are accountable for the 

delivery of the CIRP program and for 

coordinating appropriate action with employees 

and supervisors. Managers and supervisors are 

responsible for making the initial referral at the 

scene of any accident by providing employees 

with EAP contact information.

Employees are responsible for requesting leave 

following a critical incident when they feel that 

they will not be able to work safely. 

Medical and Environmental Health 

is responsible for managing the 

critical incident program in 

coordination with the EAP and field 

management. Employees are 

responsible for requesting leave 

whenever they believe they cannot 

work safely as a result of a critical 

incident.

Safety and Medical are responsible for overall 

management of the program. Field supervision 

is responsible for implementation and 

compliance with the program in field, with 

more senior field supervision involved in 

training and local management.

Scope/Applicability 

(Population)

All employees, and is especially significant for 

Hours of Service employees 

All Employees All Employees 

Process and 

Application 

(Management 

Training for 

Critical Incident 

Response Offered

Preventive 

Resiliency Training 

Offered

24/7 Hour Help 

Line Availability

Counseling 

Availability)

Employee wellbeing is essential to the 

productivity, safety, and health of employees, 

their families, and the general public. Carrier 1 

recognizes that employees exposed to workplace 

traumatic events may need special assistance in 

dealing with the event and/or its after-effects.

The Critical Incident Response Program (CIRP) 

is an integral component of the U.S. Employee 

Assistance Program (EAP) and is designed to 

provide timely assistance to individuals who 

have experienced traumatic events. The primary 

goal of this program is to support employees or, 

when appropriate, employee families or the 

general public, as they work through the normal 

reactions related to traumatic events.

24/7 immediate telephonic 

Psychological First Aid services 

available through EAPs

EAP counselors respond to site 

within 24 hours.

EAP trained peer responders 

available either telephonically or on 

site.

Identification of signs and symptoms of 

potential stress in an incident is fundamental. 

Individual employees can request assistance 

from supervision, request time off and/or elect 

to receive professional help (including 24/7 

immediate telephonic assessment and referral 

to the appropriate level of care). Field 

supervision can likewise initiate discussions 

with employees apparently affected by stress 

to identify any further assistance or action 

needed (but not counsel them, which would 

involve the professional assistance discussed 

above), grant leave, and involve the Medical 

Department. Most importantly, the program 

recognizes that adverse situations must be 

reacted to in accordance with the individual’s 

separate and distinct needs.
27

Carriers 1 through 3

Carrier 1 Carrier 2 Carrier 3

Critical Incident 

Definition

A critical incident is a catastrophic event the 

employee has witnessed or in which the 

employee was involved that is outside the range 

of usual workplace events. 

The following are examples of critical incidents;

however, the list is not exhaustive: 

1. Serious accidents, fatalities or dramatic events 

in the workplace (e.g. accidental death, 

explosion or suicide); 

2. Catastrophic injuries, crossing accidents, or 

major train derailments resulting in life 

threatening injuries;

3. Criminal incidents (e.g. hold-up; hostagetaking; terrorist acts).

The program does not contain a formal 

definition, but it is understood to include any 

fatality or major injury occurring in 

connection with rail operations in which a 

Carrier 3 employee is directly involved or 

observes the incident.

Time Away –

Immediate Relief 

From Duty 

(Compensated 

Time Off (number 

of days specified))

Upon request from an employee who believes he 

or she is unable to function safely following a 

critical incident, the manager on the scene may 

make the decision to relieve the employee for 

the remainder of his or her tour of duty. An 

employee granted such relief will be returned to 

his or her home terminal, if applicable, without 

loss of compensation for the tour of duty.

Employee may request relief from 

duty from his or her supervisor. 

Employee is returned to home 

terminal and paid for the balance of 

trip miles, or shift not completed, 

under applicable collective 

bargaining agreements.

The employee may request to be relieved from 

duty and transported to home terminal. 
28

Carriers 1 through 3

Carrier 1 Carrier 2 Carrier 3

Time Away –

Critical Incident 

Leave

Subsequent to a critical incident, there may be 

emotional reactions which may interfere with a 

person’s ability to function safely. These 

reactions may occur either at the time of the 

incident, or later. As a result, employees directly 

involved in a critical incident may request 

additional time off through their Manager. If 

this occurs:

• The employee must contact his or her

supervisor as soon as he or she feels unable to 

report for the next tour of duty;

• The supervisor will then make a referral to 

EAP with which the employee must comply;

• To receive compensation for time off, the 

employee must contact EAP and request and be 

approved for temporary leave based on the 

critical incident.

An employee may be allowed up to the 3 days 

(72 hours) with pay, with approval by EAP, in 

coordination with Health Services and the 

employee’s manager. All approved paid time 

off work will be paid at the basic daily rate of 

pay. 

Employees who believe that they 

are not safe to work should request 

time off from their supervisor. 

Time off is paid at the basic daily 

rate of pay, approved by the 

supervisor, and requires employee 

to work cooperatively with EAP.

Employees who believe they are not fit for 

service may request time off from their 

supervisor. If the request is for an extended 

period, or otherwise as medically dictated, the 

Medical Department will be involved. In the 

absence of a request for leave, supervisors 

who identify signs and symptoms of stress 

will alert Medical. 

Additional Leave Additional time off may be appropriate in some 

circumstances. This will be determined on a 

case-by-case basis by EAP in conjunction with 

appropriate medical/mental health professionals. 

Compensation for extended leave would be 

through Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) or 

complementary disability insurance.

Employee directly contacts his or 

her supervisor to request additional 

time off due to the incident. 

Same as immediately above. 

Follow-Up EAP follow-up is initiated immediately or as 

soon as practical after each incident. If no other 

follow-up is needed, EAP will then close its 

files.

EAP continues services based on 

employee need. 

Medical continues involvement as needs 

dictate. 
29

Carriers 1 through 3

Carrier 1 Carrier 2 Carrier 3

Referral If an employee or employees indicate they need 

further attention, EAP will assist them in getting

a referral for services near their home.

Employees may request immediate 

referral for behavioral health 

services. EAP, whenever possible,

refers to trained critical incident 

specialists—Psychological First-Aid 

professionals. If employee's 

symptoms do not improve after 72 

hours, employees are referred to 

these professionals.

As discussed above, in addition to medical 

resources, there is the opportunity for first 

level supervisors to consult with senior 

supervisors, who have access to experts in the 

field of workplace stress management, for 

advice.

Administration 

(Peer Support 

Availability)

The administration and interpretation of this 

policy is the responsibility of Health Services.

EAP trained peer responders 

available either telephonically or on 

site.

Not provided by program 

Carriers 4 through 6

Carrier 4 Carrier 5 Carrier 6

Accountability At times there occurs at work a critical incident 

which exposes employees to actual or threatened 

death, serious injury, or other threats to the 

physical integrity of other employees or nonemployees. After such an incident, Carrier 4 

offers to those exposed employees a postincident debriefing. This confidential, 

structured, preventive interview is conducted by 

an EAP Counselor and is intended to aid in 

managing any discomfort experienced during or 

after the incident.

“Carrier 5 EAPs respond to critical 

incidents in the workplace to 

address employee’s needs for 

mental health assistance and 

support. The scope includes all 

Carrier 5 employees but specifically 

Train & Engine Service employees. 

The services include calls to 

employees, guidance to supervisors, 

defusing, debriefings, and follow up 

with employees.” 

Several departments collaborate to respond to 

employees impacted by critical incidents. The 

Risk Management Call Center notifies the 

EAP 24 Helpline. EAP regional managers are 

notified and the Peer Support manager begins 

the process of assessing crew needs under the 

supervision of the EAP director. Contact is 

made with local managers and Peer Support

volunteers to plan for responding to employee 

needs. For employee-related injuries and 

deaths, the Peer Support manager and EAP 

team are on-site within 12–24 hours. Services 

are coordinated with local management, 

Claims, and local resources. 

Scope/Applicability 

(Population)

All Employees All Employees All Employees
30

Carriers 4 through 6

Carrier 4 Carrier 5 Carrier 6

Process and 

Application 

(Management 

Training for 

Critical Incident 

Response Offered

Preventive 

Resiliency Training 

Offered

24/7 Hour Help 

Line Availability

Counseling 

Availability)

If a debriefing is appropriate, the supervisor will 

consult with EAP staff by calling Monday 

through Friday 8:30 AM to 5:00 PM, or by 

contacting the EAP Duty Counselor by beeper. 

The counselor will return the call promptly. The 

counselor will discuss the incident with the 

supervisor and, if necessary, with involved 

employees. If a debriefing is called for, it is 

scheduled as soon as practical, at EAP offices or 

another location, as directed by the counselor. 

After the debriefing has been conducted, the 

department is notified. EAP staff maintains 

contact with affected employees during their 

time out of service and coordinates any 

additional care, or, if necessary, additional rest 

time.

Once a critical incident takes place 

in the workplace, EAP staff is 

notified by various means. When a 

train incident is involved, the 

notification system operates through 

the National Operation Center. The 

EAP counselors are notified through 

an alert system on their 

Blackberries. They can also be 

notified through the local 

management (Road Foremen and 

Trainmasters), union 

representatives, or CARE Peer 

Counselors. The EAP staff will 

attempt to contact the employees 

involved in critical incidents up to 

three times within the first 24 hours. 

If the EAP is unable to contact the 

employee within the specified time 

frame, it is the employee’s 

responsibility to contact the regional 

EAP staff member if he/she is in 

need of services. The EAP staff will 

conduct an assessment to determine 

the wellbeing of the employee and 

the level of additional assistance 

necessary. The employee will be 

provided with basic stress 

management techniques to assist in 

coping. The employee is reassessed 

in 24 hour increments for up to but 

not limited to 3 days. In the three 

telephone sessions, the EAP will

assess the employee, providing 

psychological first aid, educating 

him or her on typical emotional 

reactions and evaluating the return 

to work readiness.

• Full time Peer Support (PS) Resource for 

Operating, Mechanical and Engineering 

• Trained Volunteer Peer Network (350 

volunteers) 

• All Employees involved in a critical incident 

are contacted 

• Per our critical incident policy employees

(when circumstances warrant) receive up to 3 

days off paid at a basic day rate. Local 

management authorizes the time off and pay. 

Extra time off, if needed, is approved by the 

superintendent in consultation with the EAP 

Director. 

• Onsite services provided by EAP for 

employee fatalities
31

Carriers 4 through 6

Carrier 4 Carrier 5 Carrier 6

Critical Incident 

Definition

• Serious injury or death of a fellow employee at 

work;

• Serious injury or death of a non-employee 

resulting from railroad operations;

• Requirement for employees to administer first 

aid for a serious illness or injury (e.g., CPR or 

traumatic amputation); 

• Requirement for employees to remove bodies 

or parts of bodies;

• Requirement for employees to wait with 

seriously ill or injured victims for the arrival of 

Emergency Medical Services;

• Workplace violence involving assaults or other 

violence directed at an employee that requires 

police notification.

A critical incident is defined as a 

traumatic event occurring in the 

workplace where there is serious 

bodily injury or death of employees, 

passengers, or trespassers. Also, 

traumatic events that do not result in 

bodily injury or death but are 

catastrophic in nature may be 

considered. A critical incident is 

defined in terms of its effects—that 

is, an event that may lead to a 

traumatizing reaction.

Defined as unforeseen disruption in standard 

work operations, typically outside the normal 

range of human experience, that adversely 

impacts the immediate safety and wellbeing of 

railroad employees. Disruptions to standard 

work operations include but are not limited to:

Employee involvement in or direct exposure 

to grade crossing accidents, pedestrian 

fatalities, serious injuries, and other 

catastrophic events outside the range of 

normal human experience.

Time Away –

Immediate Relief 

From Duty 

(Compensated 

Time Off (number 

of days specified))

Employees who attend a debriefing will be 

given an excused absence of 2 days with pay 

directly following the incident, if they want or 

need it.

First Three Days—If an employee 

involved in a critical incident 

believes that he or she has been 

traumatized by the event and cannot 

continue his or her work duties, he 

or she will be relieved from work 

assignments under the procedures of 

the CARE program. 

3 days off are provided based on employee 

request, manager assessment of need, and 

EAP/PS communication with the employee.
32

Carriers 4 through 6

Carrier 4 Carrier 5 Carrier 6

Time Away –

Critical Incident 

Leave

Once relieved, an EAP counselor 

will contact the employee, as 

specified by “EAP Primary Level of 

Intervention.” For up to 3

consecutive scheduled work days 

after the incident, the employee can 

be compensated for lost earnings by 

complying with the EAP 

counselor’s recommendations. EAP 

continues to assess and provide 

clinical support (rest days may 

intervene in consecutive scheduled 

work days when clinically 

appropriate).

During the 3-day time-off period, employees 

are assessed via telephone for disruptive signs 

and symptoms that may impact a safe return to 

work. Typically, at least two contacts are 

made with employees before their return. 

Employees may also be contacted after they 

have returned to work to monitor their 

adjustment. Electronic record EAP/PS profiles 

are created for each CI an employee is 

involved in so that the cumulative impact of 

CIs on an employee can be monitored.

Additional Leave If it is determined that the employee 

needs more than 3 consecutive 

scheduled workdays and needs to be 

treated for trauma, the employee can 

be compensated a maximum of 7

work days. 

Additional needed time off must be approved 

by management with EAP involvement.

Follow-Up If it is determined by the EAP staff 

that the employee needs more than 3

consecutive scheduled work days 

from active duty and needs to be 

treated for trauma, the employee 

will be referred to an external 

Qualified Health Care Professional 

(QHCP). 

In the unlikely event that the employee cannot 

return to service after 3 days off and any 

additional time off, the employee is placed on 

medical leave. Employee is required to work 

with a mental health provider during this time 

off.
33

Carriers 4 through 6

Carrier 4 Carrier 5 Carrier 6

Referral External Qualified Health Care 

Professional (QHCP) will be 

obtained through Amtrak’s provider 

network. As a requirement of the 

program, the QHCP will be sent an 

evaluation form to complete and 

return to the EAP staff. The EAP 

counselor must receive a diagnosis, 

prognosis, and treatment plan from 

the QHCP. As part of the program, 

the employee utilizes his or her

health care coverage and the CARE 

program pays the copays for up to 

10 sessions with the QHCP. 

Employees impacted by critical incident 

events are referred to a network of preferred 

providers for counseling. EAP managers 

collaborate with providers to ensure employee 

is receiving best practice care and is safe to 

work.
34

Carriers 4 through 6

Carrier 4 Carrier 5 Carrier 6

Administration 

(Peer Support 

Availability)

The Human Resources Department is 

responsible for the provision of counselors and 

the administration of this policy.

Peer—Primary level of Intervention

For train and engine employees, 

volunteer teams of engineers and 

conductors in each division will be 

notified of the train crew involved 

in the critical incident. These teams 

were developed from 1998 to the 

present. The CARE peers also are in 

contact with the regional EAP staff 

to enhance the response to 

employees. The EAP response to 

major train incidents is included in 

the overall Carrier 5’s Emergency 

Response Plan under the Go Team 

response. The function of the Go 

Team is to provide assistance to the 

injured passengers and families of 

injured or deceased passengers after 

a train accident involving injuries 

and fatalities. The response 

necessitates the activation of several 

departments and personnel across 

the country. The EAP response 

with the Go Team is to support the 

crew of the affected train and 

managers who are providing 

assistance to family members of 

passengers. Notification is made to 

the EAP national manager. The 

EAP manager and staff participate 

in a system-wide conference call. If 

a determination is made that EAP is 

necessary at the site, the appropriate 

number of EAP staff will be 

dispatched to the scene. 

Trained Volunteer Peer Network (350 

volunteers) 

PS volunteers are trained in PFA and are 

retrained every 2 years at a biannual 

conference.
35

Carriers 7 through 9

Carrier 7 Carrier 8 Carrier 9

Accountability On an as need basis Organizationally, EAP is located within Risk 

Management/Medical and is responsible for 

delivery of all critical incident services, 

volunteer training, training of field managers,

and the reporting of expenditures and 

outcomes to senior management. Supervisors 

are responsible for assessing the needs of the 

employees at the time of the accident.

Scope/Applicability 

(Population)

All Employees All Employees Emphasis is on Hours of Service but all 

employees are served.
36

Carriers 7 through 9

Carrier 7 Carrier 8 Carrier 9

Process and 

Application 

(Management 

Training for 

Critical Incident 

Response Offered

Preventive 

Resiliency Training 

Offered

24/7 Hour Help 

Line Availability

Counseling 

Availability)

EAP staff is immediately dispatched to the 

incident. As the first step, one of our EAP 

consultants conducts a crisis management 

consultation by phone with the manager 

reporting the incident. The specifics of the 

incident are discussed and the consultant works 

with the manager to determine an appropriate 

level of response. Recommendations can 

include some or all of the following critical 

incident stress management services:

1. Reminders of EAP availability to all 

employees at the location;

2. Referral of a particularly troubled employee 

to EAP services;

3. Distribution of educational recovery materials 

related to the incident;

4. Communication of online educational 

resources available through the EAP;

5. Telephonic meetings for managers and 

employees;

6. On-site wellness seminar related to the 

incident; and

7. On-site defusing or debriefing session.

On an as need basis Non-Employee Death:

a. Critical incident occurs.

b. Incident is reported to the 24/7 EAP 

Helpline (whether or not the crew has been 

relieved).

c. 24/7 Helpline counselor contacts employees 

immediately after the conclusion of their 

mandatory 10-hour rest period.

d. 24/7 Helpline counselor assesses the 

employees and from assessment information 

determines days off, interventions, and outside 

referrals (if any), as well as a follow-up 

schedule which can run from hours to weeks. 

e. Local EAP Counselor may also follow up 

with the employees in addition to the followup provided by the 24/7 Helpline counselor.

f. Local EAP Counselor will also follow up 

with the local manager and any other officer 

who worked the accident.

Process—Death of an Employee:

a. Local EAP Counselor will go on-site as 

soon as possible after the fatality to be 

supportive of employees, managers, etc.

b. Local EAP Counselor will meet with 

deceased coworkers whether or not they 

witnessed the accident.

c. Local EAP Counselor may accompany CSX 

officers as they make the death notification to 

family. 
37

Carriers 7 through 9

Carrier 7 Carrier 8 Carrier 9

Critical Incident 

Definition

A critical incident is any situation that causes a 

work group to experience strong reactions that 

have the potential to interfere with present or 

future productivity. A few examples are: 

Natural Disasters, Robberies, Employee 

Deaths/Serious Injuries, Assaults, Industrial 

Accidents, Other Traumatic Events 

A critical incident is an event experienced by 

an employee in the performance of his or her

duties that results in the death or injury of an 

employee or trespasser, or where the field 

supervisor determines the circumstances to be 

so uniquely traumatic as to constitute a critical 

incident.

Time Away –

Immediate Relief 

From Duty 

(Compensated 

Time Off (number 

of days specified))

As need basis Only a supervisor can remove an employee 

from service at the time of the CI. If the 

employee is relieved, he is returned to his 

home terminal and made whole for the 

remainder of that shift. 

Time Away –

Critical Incident 

Leave

As need basis An employee who experiences a critical 

incident must speak with the EAP counselor 

(local or 24/7 Helpline). EAP 

recommends/approves 0–3 days off after a 

telephone assessment with the individual crew 

members. EAP forwards that approval to 

payroll, which then pays the employee for the 

number of EAP-recommended days off at the 

basic rate using a special CI payment code. 

Additional Leave As need basis Additional leave under “critical incident” is 

possible in unusual circumstances; however, if 

significant additional time off is needed, the 

employee is transitioned to sickness status. 

Compensation would then be covered by RRB 

or personal disability insurance

Follow-Up As need basis EAP counselors monitor the employees for 

days to weeks. 
38

Carriers 7 through 9

Carrier 7 Carrier 8 Carrier 9

Referral Recommendations can include some or all of the 

following critical incident stress management 

services:

• Reminders of EAP availability to all 

employees at the location;

• Referral of a particularly troubled employee to 

EAP services;

• Distribution of educational recovery materials 

related to the incident;

• Communication of online educational 

resources available through the EAP;

• Telephone meetings for managers and 

employees;

• On-site wellness seminar related to the 

incident; and

• On-site defusing or debriefing session.

EAP Counselors refer employees for outside 

counseling services.

Administration 

(Peer Support 

Availability)

Carrier 9 has a Peer Support Program and 

training is provided by EAP counseling staff. 

We are transitioning to the Psychological First 

Aid curriculum and have appointed one EAP 

counselor to coordinate this company-wide 

program. 
39

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAR Association of American Railroads

BLET Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CI Critical Incident

CIRP Critical Incident Response Program

CISD

CISP

Critical Incident Stress Debriefing

Critical Incident Stress Plan

CIWG Critical Incident Working Group

EAP Employee Assistance Program

FRA Federal Railroad Administration

NCPTSD National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

NFFF National Fallen Firefighters Foundation

NIMH National Institute for Mental Health

QHCP Qualified Health Care Provider

PS Peer Support

PTE Potentially Traumatic Exposure

PTEs Potentially Traumatic Events

PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

RRB Railroad Retirement Board

SAMHSA Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration

UTU United Transportation Union