I n or der t o di s t i ng ui s h t he pet i t i oner i n t hi s ca s e f r om hi s un cl e, Rear no V aug hn , wh o was al s o convi ct ed 1 of t hes e c r i mes and wh o i s t he pet i t i oner i n a not her ca s e c ur r ent l y before t hi s Co ur t , we wi l l r ef er t o t hi s pet i t i oner as “J . V a u g h n ” a n d to his u n c le a s “R . V a u g h n .” 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE J a nua r y 25, 2005 S e s s i on

J A M ES A

. VA U G H N v . STA TE OF TEN N ESSEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Sum ner County Case No. C R64-1999 Jane Wheatc raft, Judge

No. M2004- 00458-CCA -R3-P C - F iled April 22, 2005

The Peti t i o n er, J ames A. V aug hn, was c onvicted of one count of fir st deg ree murder, thr ee counts of attempted f

irst deg ree murder, and o n e count of re ckless endang erme nt, and the trial
co u r t s e n te n c e d h im

to a n e f f e c ti v e s e n te n c e o f

li f e p lu s tw e n ty

- tw o y e ar s

. T h is Co u r t a f f irme d the Petition er ’s co n v i ctions and sentenc es on appe al. The Petitioner subseque ntly filed a pe tition fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f, wh ic h th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt dismi ss ed a ft e r a

he ari ng . O n a

pp e a l, the Petitioner contends that the post-c onviction court er red be cause he wa s denied the e ffe ctive assistance o f

c o u n s e l. F in d in g n o r e v e r s ib le e rr o r , w e a f f irm th e ju d g me n t o f

th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti on c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., d el i v er ed the opinion of the c ourt, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.
Cy nthia Hall Templeton, Ga llatin, Tennessee , for the A ppellant, J ames A. V aug hn.

P au l G. S ummers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; David H. F indley , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; L awr ence Ray

Whit ley , District At torney Gene ral; and Sallie Wade B rown, Assistant District Attorney

Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION I. F acts

On May 31, 1996, a jury convicted J

. Vaug hn of the first deg ree m u rd er o f T yrone 1 Smit h, the attempted f

irst deg ree murder of

Arde ll W illiams , t he attempted f irst deg ree murder of Chris Wi lli a ms, t he attemp te d f ir st d e g re e mur de r o f T a lli s B on ds , a ndon e c ou nt o f r e c kle ss e nd a ng e rm e nt. Th is C ou rt su mma ri zedthe fa c ts o n d ir e c t app e a l a s f oll ow s:− 2

−

Appellant [ J ames A. V aug hn] was indicted for the f irst deg ree murder of

Ty rone Smith, th e attemp te d f

ir st d e g re e mur de r o f C hris Wi lli a ms, the a tte mpt e d f ir st de g re e mur de r of Tal lis B on ds , th e a tte mpt e d f ir st d e g re e mur de r o f A rd e ll Willi a ms, a ndon e c ou nt o f f e lon y re c kle ss e nd a ng e rment as a re su lt o f e ve nts
occur ring on J uly

2, 1995. Around 2:00 a.m. that morning , a g roup of friends had g a the re d at “ Wing I ts, ” a loc a l r e staur a nt i n G a llatin . A s many a s tw e nty

pe op le
we re pr e se nt, inc lud ing Ty ro ne S mi th , Ta lli s B on ds , A rd e ll Wil lia ms, Chris W i l l i a m s , L e m ar c u s R i c k m a n , K e i t h G o o d r i c h , A l o n z o R o g a n , A n t o n i o B on ds , Germaine Mason, Joseph L y les, and Ernest Redding . Severa l of those pre sent
we re drin ki ng bee r andsmo kin g mari juana . It w a s u nd isp ute d at tria l th a t a number of those y oung men belong ed to the “Z one 8” g ang . [FN1]

FN1. T estimony

re fl ected that Z one 8 wa s a g ang of y ouths from the bla c k c ommun ity

that had b een in e xiste nc e sin c e the la te 1980’s. Ty

rone Smith and hi s twin brother, Ge rome, we re two of the fo un din g me mbe rs

. The c ro wd was g ather ed outside the re staurant a nd many wer e sitting on picnic tables w aiting f

or their f ood to b e s er v ed

. Parked in a g rave l lot across the street wa s the trailer

portion of a tra ct o r t ra i ler. Some of the y oung men at the picnic table notice d two pair of f eet visible under

t h e t ra i l er, a s if two people we re sta n d in g b e h in d it

. Su d d e n ly , tw o me n c a me ar o u n d th e s id e o f th e trailer a nd one said “ What’s up now, mother______? ” B oth men b ra n d i s hed g uns and a fl ur ry of g un fi re fo llo we d. Th e c ro wdsc a tte re d, wi th s e ve ra l pe op le fl e e ing int o the re staur a nt andoth e rs ru nn ing do wn the str e e t.

F ou r o f tho se pr e se nt w e re inj ur e d b y the g un sh ots . A rd e ll Wil lia ms su ff e re d f ive g un sh ot w ou nd s to his le ft thi g h a nde ntry

a nde xit wo un ds on his le ft a nk le . Ch ri s Wil lia ms s uffered on e g un sh ot w ou ndto the bu tto c ks . T a lli s Bonds wa s shot in the back of his rig ht th i g h and the bullet exited just above the knee. He was also shot in the foot. Ty rone Smit h was shot onc e in the left upper abd ome n a ndthe bu lle t e xi ted his ri g ht c he st a re a . Sm ith a lso ha d e ntry a nde xit g un sh ot w ou nd s o n his le ft thi g h. Al tho ug h M r. Smith r e c e ive d tw o s ur g e ri e s to
re pa ir his wo un ds , h e die d f

ro m c omp lic a tio ns fo ur

day s a ft e r the inc ide nt.
At trial, four e y ewitnesses to th e s h o o t ing, T allis Bonds, Ke ith Goodrich, J oseph Ly le s , a n d L e ma

r c u s Ri c k man , id e n ti f

ie d ap p e ll a n t a s o n e o f

th e g u n me n. [F N2 ] Altho ug h h e la te r d e nie d d oing so , A lon zo Ro g a n w a s th e fi rs t pe rs on to ide nti fy app e lla nt a s a

sh oo te r i mme diate ly

a ft e r the inc ide nt.− 3

− FN2. A ppare ntly , the sec ond s h o o t er was Rearno Vaug hn, A p p e ll a n t’ s u n c le

. H o w e v e r , h e a n d ap p e ll a n t w e r e in d ic ted and tr i e d s e p ar a t e l y.

Ba sed on ea

rlier incide nts, police believe d appellant ha d motive for sh oo tin g Ty

ro ne Smith. I n Fe br

ua ry of 19 95 , th e Ap pe lla nt’ s u nc le , Ro nn ie Vaug hn, was killed by

Ger ome Smith. Gerome Smith i s t h e t wi n brother of Ty ro ne Smith, the mur der v ictim in this c a se . L a w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic ia ls
su sp e c te d, a ndthe Sta te the orize d at tr ial, that A pp e lla nt s ho t T yro ne Smith in reta liation f

or the murder of his unc le. Police office rs testified t h at b etwee n Fe bruary and Jul y of 1995, the atmosphere on the “n o rt h side” of G allatin had be e n e xtre me ly

te ns e a nda ll p oli c e of

fi c e rs we re on a le rt

. A l arg e sc a le se arc h f

or the app e lla nt w a s c on du c te d a ft e r the sh oo tin g s. Following unsucce ssful attempts to locate appe llant in Gallatin, authorities
rec eived information that he could be lo ca t ed at a private re sidence in Sheffield, Alabama . On J u l y 2 5 , 1995, detec tives from Sumner County observe d Appellant at the re sidence , but were unable to ar rest him at that time. [ FN 3 ] Ap p ell ant was finally appre hended o n S eptember 14, 1995 outside Cincinnati, Ohio as a re sult of a routine tra ffic stop.

FN3. Re arno V aug hn was a pprehe nded a short dista n ce from the Alabama residenc e and indicated that appe llant was in the house. Howe v e r , p o li c e w e r e u n ab le to lo c a te h im a n d d e te r mi n e d tha t he fled out the ba ck door of

the home.

Two we apons we re f

ound in the attic of the A labama residenc e: a Smith and Wess on .3 57 Ma g nu m a nda .3 8 c a lib e r s nu b- no se d p ist ol. Us ing e xpe nd e d s he ll casing s from t h e cr ime scene , [FN4] ballis tics testing disclosed that the seized

. 3 5 7 M agn u mh ad b ee n u s ed i n t h e s h o o t i n g s

. Fo u r o t h erfi re d ca rt ri d ge c as i n gs rec overe d at the sce ne we re a ll fired fr om the same .45 c aliber w eapon, but no
we ap o n o f t hat ca liber wa s submitt ed for comparison purposes. [FN5] Testing perf ormed on Ar dell Wil liams’ clothes r ev ea l ed that two of his gunshot wounds resulted f rom cont ac t s hots, meaning the muzz le was e ither touching the g arme nt
o r l e s s t h a n t h r e e i n c h e s a w a y.
FN4. T hat evidenc e consisted of five Win ch es t er br and .357
cartridg e ca ses found ne ar the scene , four nicke l-pl ated .357 metal bullet j ac k et s , and one hollow point .357 nickel- plated metal jac ket bu lle t r e mov e d f

ro m Ch ri s Wil lia ms.− 4

− FN5. In addition, thr ee

. 4 5 caliber full metal ca se bullets and one bu lle t f ra g me nt s ub mit te d for testing c ou ld n ot b e ide nti fi e d to determine whether

they wer e fire d throug h same we apon. Appellant submitted alibi pro o f from his girlfriend’s sister. Monica Eason state d th at s h e s a w ap p e ll a n t a t “ Cl u b M a li b u ” in N a s h v il le o n Ju ly 2, 1995 betwee n 1:00 and 1:30 a. m

. Appellant also int roduce d proof that it would take approximately

thirty -six minu t es to drive f rom Club Malibu in Nashville to W ing I ts in Gallatin. I n addition, [ A]ppellant presente d p ro o f t o contradict a State’s wi tne ss w ho te sti fi e d to sp e akin g wi th a pp e lla nt andRearno Vaug hn imm e diate ly afte r the shooting . I n rebuttal, the S t ate introduced testimony that Monica Ea son had ea rlier told a police detec tive that she saw a ppellant a t C l ub Malibu around 12:00 a.m. on J uly

2, 1995.

B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g ev ide nc e , th e jury c on vic te d a

pp e lla nt o f f

ir st deg ree preme ditated murder of Ty rone Smith, attempt ed first deg ree murder of Arde ll W illiams, attempted seco n d deg ree murder of Tallis Bonds, attempted
se c on d d e g re e mur de r o f C hris Wi lli a ms, a ndfel ony re c kle ss e nd a ng e rm e nt. Appellant automat i ca l l y

rec eived a

life sentenc e for

the first deg ree murder conviction. At a su b s equent se ntencing hearing, [A]ppellant rec eived twe nty -two y ear s for the attempted first deg ree murder, tw elve y ear s on eac h count of attempted sec ond deg ree murder, an d t wo y ear s for the r eckle ss endang erme nt conviction. Those se ntence s were order ed to be se rved concurrently to one another , but consec utive to the life sentenc e.
State v. J ames Alfonso V aug hn a/k/a F uzz , No. 01C01-9612-CR-00523, 1998 WL 255438, at *1-3 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 21, 1998), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. Jan. 25, 1999).

On Fe bruary

1, 1999, J . Vaug hn filed a pr o se petition for post-c onviction relief, w hich
wa s late r ame nd e d mu lti ple tim e s b y app oin te d c ou ns e l. Th e a me nd e d p e tit ion a lle g e d, in pe rti n e n t p ar t, th a t J. V a u g h n ’ s tria l c o u n s e l w a s in e f f e c ti v e b y : ( 1 ) f

a il in g to o b

je c t t o th e tr ial court’s instruc tion to the jury that deliberation was an e l em en t o f first deg ree murder; ( 2) fa iling to o bje c t to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s instr uc tio n o n th e de fi nit ion of “ kn ow ing ly ” ; ( 3) faili ng to o bje c t to
or ap p e a l th e tria l c o u r t’ s in s tr u c ti o n to th e ju r y ab o u t th e mi n imu m r e le a s e e li g ib il it y date f or the first deg ree murder of fense ; and (4) f

ailing to a dequately

prepa re f or trial by

failing to view the ar ea of

the hou s e wh er e t h e g un was found by police and by

failing to interview witnesse s re g ard ing thi s e vid e nc e

. F urthe r, J. Vaug hn a sse rt e d that his tr ia l c ou ns e l’ s i neff ect ive ne ss prejudice d him.T h e p o st-co n v ic tio n c o u rt h e ld o n e he a rin g o n b o th J . V a u g h n ’s an d R . V a u g h n ’s p e tit io n e r fo r p o st- 2

co nvi ct i o n rel i ef

. R. V aughn has al so ap p eal ed t he p o st

- co nvi ct i o n co urt ’ s d eni al o f hi s p et i t i o n t o t hi s C o urt

. W e are issu ing se p a ra te o p in io n s i n e a c h o f t h e a p p e a ls, b u t m a n y o f t h e fac ts a n d w itne sse s tha t we re p re se n te d a t t h e p o stcon v i ct i on h ea r i n g a r e t h e s ame i n bot h appe al s

. Acc or di n g l y , we r ef er t o t h e par t i es i n v ol v ed i n a ma n n er t h at w i l l be cl ear i n bo t h op i ni o ns .

− 5

− The following evidenc e re levant to J . Vaug hn’s claims wa s prese n t ed at the hea ring on his petition for post-conviction relief : Walter S t u b b s (“Counsel S tubbs”) testified that he was 2 appointed to re prese nt J . Vaug hn in h i s d ef en s e ag ainst multi ple cha rg es, the most serious of which wa s a first deg ree m u rd er char g e. He said that his theory of the c ase w as that J. Vaughn didno t c omm it a ny

of the se c ri me s, a ndhe a tte mpt e d to pr ov e that J. V aug hn wa s n e ve r i n Al aba ma , w he re the mur de r w e apo n was fo un d, a ft e r the mur de rs oc c ur re d. Cou ns e l Stu bb s said that identification wa s one of the big g est issues, an d h e at t ac k ed the State’ s witnesses who te sti fi e d th a t J. V a ug hn wa s a t th e sc e ne wh e n th e sec ri me s o c c ur re d. Cou ns e l Stu bbs said that, based on w hat J . Vaug hn told h i m , J . Vaug hn was not in Alaba ma at the time that the g un was found , and he mounted his de fense upon that fac t. Counsel St ubbs said that he did not file a motion to s upp re s s t h e gu n found in Alaba ma bec ause, a g ain, J . Vaug hn said that he wa s not there . Counsel Stubb s said that he discussed w ith J . Vaug hn the fa ct that he c ould not file a motion t o s u ppress the g un if J . Vaug hn was ne ver in Ala bama be cause he would not have sta ndin g to do so . Co un se l Stu bb s said that he tol d J. V a ug hn wh a t th e po te nti a l de fe ns e s c ou ld be if he either w as, o r wa s n o t , i n Alabama wher e the g un was found, and J . Vaug hn maintained that he wa s not in Alabama. Counsel Stubbs ex plained that the “ linchpin” of t h e d efe nse wa s that J

. Vaug hn wa s n ot i n A la ba ma , a ndhe wa s n ot c on ne c te d to the g un . Co un se l Stu bb s said t h a t , i n h i s c l o s i n g ar g u m e n t s , h e a s s e r t e d t o t h e j u r y t h a tt h e r e w a s r e a s o n ab l e d o u b tt h a tJ. Vaug hn wa s e ve r i n A la ba ma . Co un se l Stu bb s st a ted th at he ne ve r w e nt t o th e ho us e in Al abama wher e the g un was found. Counsel Stubbs testified that the police w ere unable to link one of the two g uns fou n d i n Al ab ama to the c rimes in Tenne ssee, a nd, there fore , it could have possiblybeen e x clud ed on rele vancy g rounds, but Counsel Stubbs did not feel that this was particula rly signific ant considering his theory of the c ase.
Cou ns e l S tu bb s tes tif

ie d th a t he wa s a wa

re that th e re we re tw o w itn e sse s w ho wo uld te sti fy that J. V a ug hn wa s in Al aba ma . He was als o aware that th e tr ia l c ou rt ha d r ule d th a t R. Vaug hn’s stat em en t s to police that J . Vaug hn was in the house in Ala bama we re a dmissibl e. Cou ns e l Stu bb s said that he sp eci fi cal ly told J. V a ug hn that th e re we re thr e e pe op le that w ou ld link J . Vaug hn to Alabama, but J. Vaug hn maintained that he w as neve r in Alaba ma.
Counsel Stubbs said that he tried to inter view ea ch and e very wi tness listed on the i n d i c t m e nt, b u tt h e r e w a s a tl e a s to n e w i t n e s s t h a th e d i dn o tg e tt o t a l k t o u n t i l t h e d a y

o f J. Vaug hn’s trial. Counsel Stubbs asked J

. Vaug hn if any of his r elatives in A lab am a w o u l d testify that he wa s not there at the t i m e that the weapon wa s discovere d, and J. Vaug hn told Counsel Stu bb s th a t he wo uldc a ll the m to se e if the y wo uldbe wi lli ng to t e sti fy

. Cou ns e l Stu bb s said− 6

−

that, as the t

ri a l g ot c los e r, J. Vaug hn tol d Co un se l Stu bb s th a t he didno t w a nt any of his Alabama relatives involved in this case, and h e d i d not want Counsel Stubbs t o contac t them
abo ut t e sti fying . Co un se l Stu bb s te sti fi e d th a t he a tt emp ted to conta c t a ll the wi tne sse s in thi s case , and he a sked J. Vaughn if there we re any

witnesses who would testify on J . Vaug hn’s behalf . Counsel Stubbs said that he spent ove r 200 hours on this case

. Counsel Stubbs t es t i fi ed that he talked w ith SammyAlexander, whom Counsel Stubbs
wa s g oin g to u se to i mpe a c h KeithGo od ri c h, on e of the Sta te ’s wi tne sse s w ho ide nti fi e d R. Va u gh as b ei n g at t h e s ce n e o f t h e m u rd er

. Go o d ri ch t es t i fi ed t h at , o n t h e n i gh to f t h e s h o o t i n g, R. V a ug hn po int e d a

g un a t hi m a nda tte mpt e d to sh oo t hi m, b ut the g un did no t f ir e be c aus e it
was e mpty . Alexander would ha ve testified that Goodr i ch t o l d h i m that the man who attempted to shoot Goodrich had a mask on, and Goo d ri ch could not see his fa ce. A lexander had previously

been c onvicted of voluntary manslaug hter, a nd Counsel Stubb s at tempted to have the trial judg e rule that this pr i o r co n v i ction could not be used to impea ch Alexander . Counsel Stubbs said that he thought that ther e wa s some questi o n i n t h e j u d ge’s r uling a bout whether

he would allow the State to ask que stions abou t t h i s p ri o r conviction. Therefor e, he ma de an of fer of proof with Alexander’s testimony , but he did not call Alexander to testify befor e the jury

. Cou ns e l Stu bb s te sti fi e d th at th e se arc h w arr a nt that th e po lic e ob ta ine d, a nde xec ute d, to
sear ch the Ala

bama house stated that the house w as t o be sea rche d for the “ body

of James Vaug hn.” Counsel Stubbs testified that, at J . Vaug hn’s trial, the State off ered t es t i m o ny

of a police off icer that he h ea rd an unidentified man say “F uzz ,” which is J. Vaug hn’s alias. Counsel St u bbs objected to this testimonyon hear say g rounds, the trial c ourt overr uled the objec tion, and
on app e a l th is C ou rt

he ld t hat th e tr ial c ou rt c omm itt e d e rr or , b ut t

he e rr or wa s h arm le ss. Counsel Stub b s t est ified that he ne ver w ent to Alabama to view the location where police hea rd the statement to ensur e that the police office r’s testimony was a ccur ate.

Counsel Stubbs said that he re viewed the jury ins t ru ct i o n s prior to trial, and, at that time, the instructions appea

red to c omport with the law. The jurywas instructe d that, if the jury found J . Vaug hn g uiltyof first deg ree murder, the trial court would impose a sent en ce o f life in prison, which ca rried a m i n i m u m of twenty -five c alenda r y ear s. Counsel St ubbs said that he
su bs e qu e ntl y

le arn ed th at Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -5 01 c ha ng e d th e re le a se e lig ibi lit y date fo r p e rs ons con vi c te d o f c omm itt ing fi rs t de g re e mur de r andse nte nc e d to lif e in prison w ith th e p o s s ib il it y o f p ar o le f r o m tw e n ty

- f

iv e y e ar s to f

if ty

- o n e y e ar s

. H e s a id that the chang e wa s not made cle ar until the re lease of an opi n i o n fr o m t he Attorne y Gene ral’s O ffice sometime af

t er J

. Vaug hn’s trial. Counsel Stubbs said that neither he, the judg e, nor the prosec utor knew that this st atute chang ed the r elea se elig ibilit y date.

On cr oss-exami n at i o n , Counsel Stubbs said that he filed a motion in oppos ition to t he consolidation of J . Vaug hn’s trial with R. Vaug hn’s trial, and he was succ essful on this motion. He sa id that he a lso fi le d a mot ion to e xclu de a n e xcit e d u tte ranc e a nda dy ing de c laratio n, bo th− 7

−

of which w ere g rante d by the trial court. Counsel St ubbs said that he fi l ed a n u m b er o f other motions, som e of w hich wer e gra n t ed

. Counsel Stubbs said that he re viewed the entire police file, and he interviewe d most of the police off icer s involved. I n addition, he interview ed all of the Sta te ’s wi tne sse s, e xce pt o ne . Co un se l Stu bb s said that J. V a ug hn sp ecif ic a lly ins truc te d h im that J. V a ug hn didno t w a nt any of his re la tiv e s to be c a lle d a s w itn e sse s.
Counsel Stubbs testified that he r equeste d some j u ry i n s tructions, and he r eviewe d the ins truc tio ns that the ju dg e sa id h e wa s g oin g to g ive to the jury . Co un se l Stu bb s said that he did not focus on the mens r ea instr u ct i o n b ecause his theory of the c ase w as that J. Vaughn w as abs e nt f ro m th e sc e ne of

the c ri me , n ot that he didno t ha ve the re qu isi te ment a l st a te . With reg ard to the sentencing instruction, Counsel St ubbs said that he re viewed the proposed instruction and the statute, a nd he dete rmined t h at they “appe are d to be consistent with eac h other.” He sa id that the issue about the re lease el igibility date wa s not broug ht to light until the Attorney Ge n e r a l i s s u e d a n a d v is o r y o p in io n o n Ju ly

1 , 1 9 9 7 , w h ic h w a s a lm o s t a y e ar a f te r he filed the a ppeal in this case

. Roge r A. Sindle (“Counsel Sindle”) testified that he r epre sented R. Vaug hn . Counsel Sindle said that he discussed R. Vaug hn’s ca se with Counsel Stubbs. He said that he and Cou ns e l Stu bb s d isc us se d th a t bo th o f the ir c lie nts had ins truc te d th e m no t to inv olv e the ir Alabama relatives in th e d ef

en s e of the se ca ses. Counsel Sindle said that he and Counsel Stubbs had numer ous conver sations about how Counsel S t u b b s was going to approa ch his ca se, and the mot io ns that he wa s g oin g to f ile . H e sa id that he a ndCou ns e l Stu bb s d isc us se d o the r s us pe c ts in the crime.

Stev en Ke i t h Be arde n, an Alabama State Troope r, said that he te stified in the trials of both R. Vaug hn and J. Vaug hn, an d also in the motion to suppress hearing . Trooper Be arde n sa id that h e wa s in vo lve d in the se arc h o f the Al aba ma ho us e wh e re the we apo ns in this c a se wer e found on July25, 1995. He sa id that, during the sea rch, he was looking fo r J

. Va u gh n , and he sea rche d the attic for

him. The trooper

testified t h at t h e en t ra nce to the attic was inside a closet, and he climbed into the hole with another detec tive’s assistance

. T h e troope r said that he enter ed the attic, which was a relatively

lo w at t i c wi th a cr awl spac e, and he immediately saw tw o h a nd g un s. Th e tr oo pe r h a nd e d th e tw o g un s to theoth e r o ff icers, and he the n c on tin ue d to
sear ch the attic using a

flashlig ht. The trooper

identified photog raphs of the entrance to the attic.

On cr oss-examination, the trooper said that the se arc h of the Ala bama house beg an shortly afte r 9:00 p.m. He said that th er e we re multipl e off icer s prese nt, and ea ch off icer was assig ned a spe cific ar ea o f the house to sea rch. The trooper te stified that he could not stand inside the attic, but t h er e wa s enoug h room for a person to be hiding . Trooper Be arde n said that he did not sear ch any

draw ers, a nd he d i d n o t o v er t u rn a mattress during the sea rch. The trooper didno t ha ve a ny

inf orma tio n a

bo ut w he the r J. V a ug hn li ve d in Al aba ma , a ndthe on ly information he ha d was that ther e we re m u rd er suspects that wer e believe d to be in Sheffield,− 8

−

Alabama and that a se arc h war

rant h ad b ee n o b t ained. The trooper said that he is 6' 1" and weig hs 170 pounds.
Sammy Alexander testified that he enc ountere d Keith Goodric h in the hospital imm e diate ly

a ft e r the sh oo tin g . A le xan de r s a id that G oo dric h a pp ro a c he d h im a nd aske d h im i f he had a g un for sa le. Alexander told Goodric h t h at he did not have a g un for sa le, and then he asked G oodrich why

Goodrich wanted a

g un, and Goodrich re sponded “I don’t know . . . they ha d a sk i ma sk

on .” Al e xan de r sa id th a t he te sti fi e d at J. V aug hn ’s tr ia l, and , at tria l, h is te sti mon y wa s t hat Go od ri c h s a id “ I do n’ t kn ow ma n. Th e m ni g ** ** ha d s ki m a sk s o n th e m, but it had to be Fuzz and the m

. ” Al ex an d er said that he told Counsel Stubbs about his prior
rec ord. On c ross-examination, Alexander testified that, a s a juvenile, he was co n v i ct ed of voluntary manslaug hter.

B re nda Fay Vau ghn Fre e ma n te sti fi e d th a t sh e wa s r e nti ng the ho us e that w a s se arc he d in Sheffield, Ala

bama at t h e ti me that the sea rch w arr ant in this case wa s executed, and she had liv e d th e re fo r f

ou r o r f ive y e ars . Sh e sa id that R. Vaug hn is h e r b ro ther, and he had com e to visit her ten day s prior to the sea rch. She sa id that R. Vaug hn’s mother k n ew t h at h e was vis iti ng he r, a ndheha d h is o wn ro om i n th e ho us e th at he wo uldstay . Fre e man te sti fi e d th a t R. Vaug hn and J. Vaug hn share d a key to the home, and th ey b o t h h ad t h eir own beds in the home. S h e s a i d t h a tJ. V a u g hn ha d pre vio u s l y s p e n tt h e s u m m e r

a th e r h o u s e

. F r e e m a n s a i d t h a tJ. Vaug hn was not at he r house on the day that it was sear ched.

Fr e e ma n te sti fi e d that the ho us e wa s a sin g le sto ry ho us e

. She sa id that the re wa s a c l o s e ti n t h e h o u s e t h a th a da s m a l l o p e n i n g t o t h e a t t i c , w h i c h h a d p r e v i o u s l y b e e n us e d as a chimney with an exhaust stack that went up throug h the a ttic. At the time of the sea rch, she stored tool s , an ax , a s l i ng blade, a nd a wa g on in the closet. Free man said that, the nig ht of the
se arc h, R. V a ug hn ha d b e e n at Fre e ma n’ s d aug hte r’ s hou se a ndto the g ro c e ry sto re . Sh e sa id that, when R. Vaug hn and Free m an ’s d au gh t er br oug ht the g roce ries to the house at around 5:00 p.m., the police pulled up and told R. Vaug hn to s top. The police a rre sted R. Vaug hn, and then returne d around 9:00 p.m. with a sea rch w arr ant for the home. Fr eema n s ai d t h e search la sted appro xima te ly

fo rt y -f ive min ute s, a ndhe r h ou se loo ke d “ [l]ike a torna do ” ha d g on e thr ou g h it when the police wer e done. She sa id that all of the mattres s es we re o ff of the be ds, and all of contents of the dr awe rs wer e ly ing on the floor. Free man said that all of t h e i t ems in the closet with the chimney

hole to the attic we re undisturbe d.

F re e ma n te sti fi ed th a t Co un se l Stu bb s n e ve r c on ta c te d h e r. F re e ma n s a id that sh e wo uld ha ve be e n w ill ing to t a lk t o h im, a ndsh e woul d hav e testif ie d at J. V a ug hn ’s tr ia l. Fre e ma n s a id that sh e ha d n e ve r seen e ith e r o f the g un s th a t w e re c on fi sc a te d b y po lic e in h e r h ome . Sh e sa id that she neve r told either R. Vaug hn or J. Vaughn that she did not want to talk to their lawy ers.− 9

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On c ro ss- e xami natio n, F re e ma n s a id that R. Vaug hn a ndJ. Vaug hn cam e do wn to v isi t her tog ether . Sh e said that J. Vaug hn was staying w ith her whe n the sea rch w arr ant was
exec u te d , b u t h e h a d g o n e to v is it a f r ie n d w h e n th e s e ar c h w arr a n t w a s e xe c u te d

. She said that J . Vaug hn was living at her house on Jul y

25, 1995, as wa s her son, Ge org e Simpson. Free man testified that neither

J . Vaug hn nor R. Vaughn went into her attic and neither could fit in the attic. Fr eema n said that she re turned to Tenn es s ee at least five times during the time from the V a u g h n s ’ arr e s tu n t i l t h e i r tr ia ls. O n t h o s e o c c a s i o n s , s h e n e v e r a t t e m p t e d t o s e e e i t h e r J. Vaug hn or R. Vaug hn, and she ne ver c ontacted e ither of their attorney s.
Geor g e E. Simpson, J r., testified that Free man is his mother, and, o n J u l y25, 1995, he was twe nty -two and w as living w ith his m other in Shef field, Alabama. Simpson t estified that the h o u s e w a s ap p r o xim a te ly 1 0 0 0 s q u ar e f e e t a n d th a t it h a d f

o u r b e d r o o ms , a k it c h e n , a living
ro om, a nda

bathr oo m. S imp so n id e nti fi e d p ic tur e s o f t he ho le in the c los e t c e ili ng that g oe s to the att ic. He sai d th at th e ho le us e d to be a c him ne y , a ndthat, t o g e t to the ho le , y ou ha d to
remove g arde n tools, sli ng blades, a wag on and bikes. S i m p s o n t es t ified that the hole me asure d thirteen inche s by

fiftee n inches. He said that approximately six office rs searc h ed t h e h o me, and the sea rch la sted betwe en forty -five minutes a nd one hour. Simpson said t h at he wa s never contac ted by

Counsel Stubbs , and he said that, had he be en conta cted, he would hav e testified on J. Vaug hn ’s be ha lf . O n c ro ss- e xami natio n, Simp so n s a id that R. Vaug hn a ndJ. Vaug hn c a me toge ther to visit Si mpson and his mother. He sa id that, wh en R

. Va u ghn was a rre sted, J . Vaug hn
was at a diffe rent house in the a rea . He sa id that he neve r saw th e g uns that the offic ers f ound, and he w as unaw are that there wer e any g uns in the house.
R. Vaug hn testified that he was ar rested in Ala bama on July25, 1995, and he ha d been there for e ight to ten d ay s

. He s ai d that J . Vaug hn came with him to Alabama and that they wer e stay ing toge ther at the Fr eema n’s house. R. V aug hn said that he did not know w h er e J

. Vaug hn
wa s w he n R. Vaug hn wa s a rr e ste d, bu t, at th a t ti me , they were st il l sta y ing a t Fre e ma n’ s h ou se toge ther. He also testified that he ha d nev er b ee n i n the attic of Free man’s house, and he did not know anything a

bout the g u n s

. R

. Vaughn sa id that he did not know whether J . Vaug hn put anything in the attic.

J

. Vaug hn testified that he is c urre ntly serving a life sentenc e, and C o u n s el S t ubbs
re pr e sen ted h im i n h is c a se . H e sa id that he didno t te ll Co un se l Stu bb s th a t he wa s n ot i n Alabama , rathe r he told him that he wa s not at the hou s e whe n it was sear ched. H e said that he g ave Counsel Stubbs t h e t elephone number of his Ala bama r elatives, including Fr eema n, beca use he w anted C o u n s el Stubbs t o contac t them. He denie d that he eve r told Counsel St ubbs not to contact his Alaba ma re latives. J . Vaug hn testified t hat Counsel Stubbs t old him that the State was g oing to of

fer the testimony o f t wo detec tives who would testify that, when R. Vaug hn
wa s a rr e s t e d , R

. V a u g h n s a i d t h a t J. V a u g h n w a s i n t h e A l ab a m a h o u s e

. C o u n s e l S t u b bs a lso tol d h im that th e re was a .3 57 g un c on fi sc a te d in the She ff ie ld, Al aba ma

ho us e that w a s g oin g to− 10

−

be us e d a s e vid e nc e again st J. Vaug hn . J. V a ug hn sa id that he wa s n ot i n th e Al aba ma ho us e when it was se arc hed bec ause he had lef t ear lier that day

.
J. V a u g h n te s ti f

ie d th a t Co u n s e l Stu b b s to ld h im th a t h e w a s f a c in g a li fe se ntence and t h a ta l i f e s e n t e n c e w a s t w e n t y- f

i v e ye ar s

. J

. V a u g h n s a i d t h a th e w a n t e d A l e x a n d e r t o t e s t i f y, and th e jury

ne ve r h e ardAl e xan de r’ s te sti mon y be c a us e Cou ns e l Stu bb s o nly pr e se nte d th is te sti mon y in an o ff e r o f pro of. J

. Vaug hn sa id that he ne ve r w e nt o ve r the jury ins truc tio ns wi th Counsel Stubbs . He sa id that he is 6' 2" ta ll and weig hs 215 p o u n d s

. J

. Va u gh n said that he g ave Cou ns e l Stu bb s th e na me s o f thr e e or fo ur a lib i w itn e sse s.
On cr oss-examination, J . Vaug hn said t h at he wa s in Sheffield, Alabama on the day that R. V a ug hn wa s a

rr e ste d, a nd , at th e ti me of th e arr e st, he wa s v isi tin g a fe ma le frie nd . H e sa id that he spent the nig ht at the fe male friend’s house, and he lef t Alabama the next day . J . Vaug hn said t h at he knew that R. Vaug hn had bee n arr ested, but he did not know that ther e wa s a wa rra nt
ou t f or his ow n a

rr e st. He sa id that he ne ve r t oldthe po lic e or Cou ns e l Stu bb s th a t he wa s n ot i n Alabama on the day

of the a rre st. J . Vaug h n s ai d t h at , t h e day afte r R. Vaug hn was a

rre sted, he
rea d ab o u t th e ar

r e s t i n th e n e w s p ap e r

. H e c o u ldn o t r e c a ll w h e th e r th e n e w s p ap e r

s a idth a t th ere was a w arr a n t o u t f

o r h is arr e s t. H e s a id th a t h e th e n le f t A la b a ma a n d d r o v e to T ennesse e. He didno t r e c a ll w he n h e le ft Te nn e sse e to go to O hio , w he re he wa s e ve ntu a lly arr e ste d. He sa id that he we nt to Ohio to vis it another f em al e fr i en d , and he stay ed with her in Cincinnati for approximately

one mont h

. J . Vaug hn testified that he did not speak with the detec tives on the
way fro m Cinc inn a ti t o T e nn e sse e . H e sa id that he ne ve r e nte re d th e c ra wl sp a c e in the Al aba ma home.

Sus an Mor

ro w, a de te c tiv e wi th the Ga llatin Pol ic e De pa rt me nt, te sti fi e d th a t, i n Se pte mbe r of 19 95 , ov e r tw o mon ths a ft e r the sh oo tin g in thi s c a se , sh e went t o C in cin nati , Ohio, to bring J . Vaug hn back to Te nnessee . The de tective said that she transporte d J . Vaug hn in an unmarke d police ca r, and, w hile driving , he told her that he was ne ver in S heff ield, Alabama . On cr oss-examination, the detective te st ified that the c asing s from the .45 ha ndg un found in the Sheff

ield, Alabama

house did not match t h e ca s i ng s from the .45 used in the shooting.

Ba sed upon this evidence , the post-conviction court dismi ssed J . Vaug hn’s p et i t ion for po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f, a ndJ. Vaug hn no w a pp e a ls.
II. Ana lys is

On app e a l, J. V a ug hn c on te nd s th a t th e po st- c onvi cti on c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

dis mis se d h is petition because Counsel Stubbs fa i l ed to: (1) objec t to the trial court’s instruction to the jury that deliberation was an e lement of fir st deg ree murder; ( 2) o b j ec t to the trial court’ s jury instruction reg arding the mens re a of “ knowing ly ”; (3 ) objec t to or appea l the trial court’ s instruction to the jury

about the minimum release elig ibilit y date f or first deg ree murder; a nd (4)− 11

−

adequately

prepa re f or trial by failing to vie w the ar ea of the house whe re the g un was found by police and by

failing to interview wit nesses re g arding this evidence . Further, J. Vaug hn asserted that hi s tria l c ou ns e l’ s in e ff e c tiv e ne ss p re

jud ic e d h im.

I n order to obtain post-conviction relief , a petitioner must show that his or her conviction or sentenc e is void or voidable be cause of th e ab ri dg ment of a c onstitut ional rig ht. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103 ( 2003). The pe titioner bear s the burden of proving fac tual alleg ati o n s i n the petition for post-conviction re lief by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40 -3 0- 11 0( f) . A po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt ’s fa c tua l f ind ing s a re su bje c t to a

de novo revi e w b y

thi s Cou rt ; ho we ve r, we mus t a c c ord th e se fa c tua l f ind ing s a pr e su mpt ionof

c or re c tne ss, wh ic h is
overc ome only

when a prepon d era nce of

the evidenc e is contra

ry to the post-conviction court’s fac tual finding s. Fields v. State, 40 S .W.3d 450, 456 (Tenn. 2 0 01). A post-c onviction court’s conclusions of l aw ar e subj ect to a pur ely de novo re view by

this Court, wit h no presumption of
corr ectne ss. I d. at 457.

T h e r i g h to f

a c r i m i n a l l y

a c c u s e d t o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s g u ar a n t e e d b y b o t h t h e S i xth Amendment to the United States Constit u t ion and Article I , section 9, of the T ennesse e Constit ution. St ate v. White, 114 S.W .3d 469, 475 (Te n n

. 2003); State v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Te nn . 1 99 9) ; B a xter v. Ros e , 5 23 S.W. 2d93 0, 93 6 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) . T his ri g ht t o repr esentation includes t h e ri ght to “rea sonably eff ective” assistance . Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 461. Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha s h e ld that th e iss ue of ine ffecti ve a ssi stanc e of c ou ns e l is a mix ed question of law and fa ct and, a s such, is subject to a de novo r eview. I d.

I n revie wing a cla im of ineffe ctive assi s tance of counse l, this C ourt must determine whether the advice g iv en o r s er v i ces render ed by the attorne y

are within the rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in criminal ca s es

. Ba x t er, 523 S.W.2d at 936. To prevail on a claim of ineffe ctive assistanc e of co u n sel, a pe titioner must show that “counsel’s r epre sentation fell below an objec tive standard of

reas o n ab leness,” Strickla nd v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984),
a nd th at th is pe rf

orma nc e pr e

jud ic e d th e de fe ns e , r e su lti ng in a failu re to p ro du c e a

re lia ble result. I d. at 687 ; C o o p er v

. State, 849 S.W .2d 744, 747 (Tenn. 1993) . To satisfy the require ment of prejudice , a petitioner must show a rea sonable probability that, but f or counse l’s
unrea sonable e rror , the fa ct finder would have ha d rea sonable doub t re gar d ing the petitioner’s g uilt. S trickland, 466 U.S. at 695. This rea sonable proba bilitymust be “suffic ient to undermine confide nce in the outc ome.” I d. at 694; see a lso Harris v. St ate, 8 7 5 S .W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994).

Whe n e va luatin g a n in e ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l c la im, the r e vie wi ng c ou rt sh ou ld judge the attorne y ’s per formanc e within t he conte x t of the ca se as a whole, taking into account al l re l ev ant circ umstances. Strickland, 466 U .S. at 690; St ate v. Mitche ll, 753 S.W .2d 148, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The re viewing court must evaluate the questionable conduct f rom the attorne y ’s perspective at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; Cooper, 849 S.W .2d at 746;− 12

−

He lla rdv. Sta te , 6 29 S.W. 2d4, 9 ( Te nn . 1 98 2). I n do in g s o, the re vie wi ng c ou rt mus t be hig hly defe rential a nd “should indulge a strong presumptio n that counsel’s c onduct fa lls withi n the wide rang e of r easona

ble profe ssional ass i s t an ce

. ” Burns, 6 S.W .3d at 462. Counsel should not be deeme d to have be en inef fec tive mere ly

beca use a diff

ere nt proce dure or

strateg y might have produce d a diffe rent re sult. W illiams v. S tate, 599 S.W.2d 276 , 2 7 9 -8 0 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). The fa ct that a pa rticular strateg y

or tac tic failed or

hurt the def

ense doe s n o t, standing alone, e stablish unreasona ble re prese ntation. House v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) ( c it a ti o n o mi tt e d ) ; T h o ma s B r a n d o n Boo k e r v

. St a te , N o

. W2 0 0 3

- 0 0 9 6 1

- CC A

- R3

- PC , 2 0 0 4 WL 5 8 7 6 4 4 , a t * 4 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. , a t Ja c k s o n , M ar

. 2 4, 2004), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. June 21, 2004). Howe ver, de fer ence to matters of strateg y and tac tical choice s appl i es o n l y if the choic es are informed one s based upon a dequate prepa ration. House, 44 S.W.3d at 515.

A. F ail ing to Obj e c t t o J ur y I nst r uc ti ons 1. De libe r at ion Ins tr uc ti on The Petitioner alleg es that Counsel Stubbs was ineffe ctive by failing to ob

j ect to the tria l court’s instruc tion to the jury that deliberation was an e lement o f fi rs t d egre e murde r. The trial
c ou rt ins truc te d th e jury

a s f oll ow s:
Firs t -deg ree murder. A ny person who c ommits the offe nse of f irst-deg ree murder is guilty of a c rime.

For y ou t o fi n d t h e def

endant g uiltyof this offense the State must have proven bey ond a re asonable doubt the exis tence of the following essential
e le me nts : (1) That the defe ndant unlawf ully killed the alleg ed victim; and, (2 ) Th a t the de fe nd a nt a c te d int e nti on a lly

. A perso n acts int ent iona lly

wi th r e sp e c t to the natur e of the c on du c t or

to a re su lt of the conduct when it is the person’ s conscious objective or desire to eng ag e in the conduc t or cause the re sult; and, (3) That the killing was de liberate . A d el iberate ac t is one perf ormed with a c ool purpose; and, (4) That the killing was pr emeditated.
A pre meditated ac t is one d o n e af ter the e x erc ise of re flec tion and judgme nt. Premeditation means that t h e intent to kill must have bee n formed prior to the ac t its el f. I t is not necessa ry that the purpose to kill pree x ists in t he min d o f the a c c us e d f

or a ny de fi nit e peri od of tim e . It is su ff ic ie nt that it prec eded the act, howe ver short the interval, a s long a s it was the re sul t of
re fl e c tio n a ndjud g me nt.− 13

−

W h e n d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r C o u n s e l S t u b b s f a i l u r e t o o b

j e c tt o t h i s j u r y

i n s tru c t i o n e n t i t l e d J. Vaug hn to post-conviction relief , the post-conviction court found:
This shooting occ urre d on J uly 2, 1995. The law chang ed on Jul y 1, 1995 . . . . T. C

. A. 39-13-202, F irst Deg ree Murder was a mended by

the leg islature and the element of

deliberation was remove d. Firs t d egree murde r wa s now define d as

“ T h e p r e me d it a te d a n d in te n ti o n a l k il li n g o f a n o th e r

. [” ] T h e o th e r p ar ts of the stat u te ar e ir

r e le v a n t f o r th e p u rp o s e o f th is d is c u s s io n

. Prio r to Ju ly 1 , 1995, the definition of Fir st Deg ree Murder was “ the intentional, preme ditated and de l i b e r a t e k i l l i n g o f

a n o t h e r

. ” T h e C o u r t , i n i t s j u r y i n s tru c t i o n u s e d t h e p re -Jul y 1, 1995 definition and instructed the jury on deliberation as well as in t en t i onal and pre meditated.

The e lements wer e def

ined and in no part of the ju ry i n s t ruction does it state that

“ int e nt o r d e sig n to kil l may be c on c e ive d a nd del iber a te ly fo rm e d in a n in stant” which ins t ru ct ion was abolished in St. of Tn. v. B rown, 836 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1992). T h e ju r y in s tr

u c ti o n g iv e n in th is c a s e p r o p e r ly d e f in e d th e e le me nts of “intenti o n al and premeditated” and this Court finds that the inclusion of the definition of “de l i b er ate” is harmless under the circ umstances of

this case. Further, the c ase w as appe aled to th e T en n es s ee Court of Criminal Appeals on a
su ff icie nc y of e vid e nc e c la im a ndthe Cou rt of Ap pe a ls h e ld that th e re c or d a mpl y e sta bli sh e d th e e le me nts of

pr eme dit a tio n a ndint e nt. Th e Cou rt of [Cri min a l] Appea ls stated,

“Evidenc e that the a

ppellan t was armed with a g un and hid ing be hin d a

tr a ile r t o w a tc h a

g ro up kn ow n to be his e ne mie s, support the jury ’s finding of pre meditation. When viewed tog ether with th e additional proof that the victim’s brother ha d murdere d appellant’ s uncle five m o ths earlier , we c onclude that the e vidence supports a finding of both preme ditation and intent.”

This Court does not fin d t h at co u nsel was inef fec tive for f

ailing to r aise the “deliber ation” issue.
On appe al, J . Vaug hn contends that the post-c onviction court er red w hen it found that he was not entitled to relief

on this iss ue bec ause the addition of “de libe ra t i o n ” co uld have c onfused the jury . We have pr eviously held that the inclusi on of the wor d “deliber ately ” in the conte x t of an ind i ct m en t wo u ld not have lower ed the State’ s burden of proof, but would have in fac t i n cr ea s ed t h e S t at e’ s b u rd en , s t at i n g:− 14

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[C ]om mon sense belies the appellant’ s arg ument that the g rand j u ry would have indicted the appe llant for a pr emeditated, intentional a nd deliberate k i l ling, but
wo u l d n o th av e i n d i ct ed h i mfo r ap re m ed i t a t e d a n d i n t en t i o n al o n e. I f a n y t h i n g, th e a d d i t i o n a l e l e m e n t o f “ d e l i b e r a t e l y ” c r e a t e d a h i g h e r b u r d e n f o r t h e s t a te to
overc ome in order

to secure an indictment ag ainst the ap p el l an t for f irst deg ree murder. A ccording ly , any err or in the g rand jury

proce ss cause d by

the addition of “ de lib e rate ly ” in theind ic tme nt ran to the app e lla nt’ s b e ne fi t, n ot h is de tr ime nt. State v. Stacy

Allen B ullard, No. E1999-00796-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 277314, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. Ap p

. , at Knox ville, Mar. 15, 2000), perm. app. de nied ( T e n n

. S e p t

. 1 1 , 2 0 0 0 )

. In
acc ordanc e with this analy sis, we conc lude that, whil e it may have be en def

icient for Counsel Stubbs to be unawa

re of this chang e in the law, J. Vaug hn has not shown that this deficienc y prejudice d him because any instructional err or incre ased the State’s burde n of proof . Be cause he has n o t shown prejudice , J . Vaug hn is not entitl ed to post-conviction re lief. Ther efor e, this issue is w ith ou t me ri t.

2. Knowin gly Instruction

J . V a u g h n a ls o c o n te n d s th a t C o u n s e l S tu b b s w a s in e f f e c ti v e b y f a il in g to o b

je c t t o the trial co u rt ’s instruction on the mens re a of “ knowing ly ” with re spect to the sec ond deg ree murder cha r g e , c it in g St a te v

. Pa g e , 8 1 S. W. 3 d 7 8 1 ( 2 0 0 2 )

. Wi th r e g ar d to s e c o n d d e g r e e murder, the tr i a l c o u r ti n s tru c t e d t h e j u r y:
Se c on d- de g re e mur de r. An y pers on who c omm its se c on d d e g re e mur de r i s g uil ty of a c rime.

For y ou to find the Defendant g uiltyof this offense , the State must have proven be y ond a re asonable doubt the exis tence of the following essent i al
e le me nts :
1. That the De fenda nt unlawfully killed the alleg ed victim; and 2. Th a t th e De fe nd a nt acted kn owing ly . Kno wi ng ly me a ns that a

pe rs on a c ts knowing ly

with respec t to the conduct or the circ umstances sur ro u n ding the conduct whe n the per son is awa re of the nature of the conduct or that the circ umsta n c e s e xis t. A p e r s o n a c ts kn o w in g ly w ith r e s p e c t t o a

r e s u lt o f the pe rs on ’s c on du c t w he n th e pe rs on is a wa re that th e c ondu ct is reas on ably c e rt a in to cause the re sult.
The post-c onviction court found “ Pag e

. . . was de cided six y ear s after the ca se at ba

r. The Court fi nd s c ou ns e l w a s n ot i ne ff e c tiv e be c a us e he didno t r a ise Pa g e iss ues

. I t is unfatho ma ble to− 15

−

think that all cases a

re to be retr i ed i f j u ry i n structions do not comport with Page . The instructions give n ref

lected the law and pattern instructions in effe ct in 1996.”

We a g r e e w i t h t h e p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n c o u r t

. I n P a g e , t h i s C o u r tc h a n g e d t h e l a w w i th respe ct to the def

inition of “knowing ly ,” the r equire d mens rea f or sec ond deg ree murder, holding t h at sec ond deg ree murder is strictly a “r esult of conduc t offense ” and a jury instruction allowing a j u ry t o convict on sec ond deg ree murder ba sed only “upon aw are ness of the nature of the conduc t or circ umstances surr ounding the conduct” improperly lessened th e State’s burde n of proof . I d. at 788. Afte r this d ec i s i o n , there wer e multiple post-conviction petitions filed by petitioners alleg ing that t h ei r t rial attorne y s were ineffe ctive for failing to appea l the issue d ecide d in Pag e, even though their appea ls w ere filed and decide d prior to the rele ase of th e P age decision. I n the fa ce of

this iss ue, in Corwyn E. Winfield v. St ate, No. W2003-00889-CCA-R3- PC, 2003 W L

22922272 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ac k s o n , Dec . 10, 2003), perm. app. de nied (T e nn . M a y

10 , 2 00 4) , th is C ou rt

no ted th at, wh ile it w a s a rg ua ble that app e llate c ou ns e l c ou ld ha ve a nti c ipate d th e Pa g e ho ldi ng , c ou ns e l’ s p e rf orma nc e was no t de fi c ie nt f or faili ng to anticipate a

chang e in the law w ith reg ard to the jury char g e on the mens r ea of “k n o wi n gl y

. ” I d. at *10. Simil arly , i n E rn es t B. Ea dy v. State, No. E2002-03111- CCA-R3-PC, 2004 W L 587639 (T enn. C rim. App., at Knoxvil le, Mar. 25, 2004) , perm. app. de nied ( T e n n

. O c t. 1 1 , 2 0 0 4), the Cour t co n cl uded that the pe titioner’s trial counse l was not ineff ective f or fa iling to ra ise the “knowing ly ” issue on appe al bec ause the fi rst appellate decision re versing a convic tion based upon an incor

rec t “knowing ly ” instruction was r elea sed shortl y befor e this Court relea sed the decision in Eady ’s direc t appea l. I d. at *8. The Ea dy Court cited the Wisconsin Court of Ap pe a ls f or the pr op os iti on th at “‘ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of

c ou ns e l c a se s sh ou ld b e lim ite d to situatio ns wh e re the la w o r d uty is c le ar s uc h th a t r e a so na ble c ou ns e l sh ould kn ow eno ug h to
raise the iss ue .’ ” I d. a t *8 (c iti ng Sta te v. Mc Maho n, 18 6 Wis.2 d 68, 51 9 N .W. 2d62 1, 62 8 ( Wis. Ct

. A p p

. 1 9 9 4 ) )

. T h e Pa g e d e c is ion w a s r e le a s e da lm o s t s ix y e ar s a f te r J. V a u g h n ’ s tria l. We f i n d o u r r e a s o n i n g a n d a n a l y s i s i n W i n f i e l d a n d E a d y

to be pe rs ua s i v e , a n d w e c o n c l u d e t h a tJ. Vaug hn has not met his burden of show ing that Counsel’s performance was de fi ci en t

. This issue is w ith ou t me ri t.

3. Re le as e Elig ibil it y I nst r uc ti on

J . Vaug hn next allege s that Counsel St ubbs was inef fect i v e fo r failing to object to the trial court’ s instruction to the jury reg arding the re lease elig ibilit y date f or a life sent ence . The tr ia l c ou rt ins truc te d th e jury , “ Th e pu nis hme nt f or the of fe nse of mu rder in the fi rs t de g re e is life imprisonment. There for e, s h o u l d y ou return a verdic t of g uilty , the court will im pose a life senten c e w h ic h c arr ie s a mi n imu m o f

2 5 c a le n d ar

y e ar s

. ” Wh e n d e c id in g w h e th e r Counsel Stu bb s w a s in e ff

e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ng to r e qu e st a

dif fe re nt j ury

ins truc tio n, or

faili ng to a

pp e a l th is instruction, the post-conviction court found:− 16

−

The sec ond chang e in the law e ffe ctive Jul y 1, 1995 was in re lease elig ibilit y afte r conviction of F irst Deg ree Murder . On J u n e 12, 1995, the L eg islature passe d Pub lic Cha

pte r 4 92 wh ic h a me nd e d T .C. A. 40 -3 5- 501 by add ing su bs e c tio n ( i) wh ic h s ta te s in pe rt ine nt p art that,
“[T] here shall be no re lease elig ibilit y for a person c ommitt ing an offe nse on or a fter July1, 1995, that i s en u m er ated in subpart (2) of this subsection. Such person sh al l serve 100% of the se ntence imposed by

the Court less sentenc e cr edits ea rned and reta ined. Provided, howeve r, no sentenc e re duction cre dits authorized by T. C.A . 4 1- 21 -2 38 or

a ny oth e r pro vi sio n o f the la w s ha ll o pe rate to reduc e the se ntence imposed by the Court of more tha n 15%.
Prior to the passag e of Public Chapter 492, rele ase eligibility

of a de fendant sent en ced to life was g overne d by T.C.A. 40-35-501( h)(1) . This section requir ed that,
“[R] elea se eligibilityfor e ach de fendant rec eiving a sente nce of impris o n me n t f

o r li f e f o r F ir s t D e g r e e mu r d e r s h a ll o c c u r afte r service o f 60% of 60 y ear s less sentence cre dits earne d and reta ined by

the def endant, but in no eve nt shall a defen d ant sentenc ed to imprisonment for life be elig ible for pa role until the defe ndant has served a

minimum of twenty -five ( 25) full ca lendar y e ars of su c h s e nte nc e , n otw ith stand ing the g ov e rn or ’s po we r t o reduc e prison over crow ding pur s uant to title 41, chapter 1, part 5, or any sentenc e re duction cre dits authorized by § 41-21-236, or any other provision of law relating to sente nce cre dits. A de f e n d a n t r e c e i v i n g a s e n t e n c e o f i m p r i s o n m e n t f o r l i f e f o r f ir st deg r e e mu r d e r

s h a ll b e e n ti tl e d to e ar n a n d r e tains u c h s entenc e cre dits, but su ch credits shall not operate to make such de fendant
e lig ibl e f o r r e l e a s e p r i o r

t o t h e s e r v i c e o f

t w e n t y

- f i v e ( 2 5 ) f

ull cale ndar y ear s.”

Public C h ap te r

4 9 2 c r e a te d o b v io u s c o n f u s io n a n d u n c e r tain ty

s in c e the L eg islature did not repe al T.C.A. 40-35-501(h )(1) , and the two se ctions of the sta tut e c o n f

l i c t e d

. T h e ap p l i c a t i o n o f P u b l i c C h ap t e r

4 9 2 r e m a i n e d u n c e r t a in until 1997 when the Attorney Gene ra l cl ea re d up the dilemma by stating that since th e ap p li c a ti o n o f

th e a me n d me n t w a s u n c le ar it w a s n e c e s s ary

to lo o k at leg islative intent. Specifically , the Attorney Gene ral’s O pinion said,− 17

− “Since the amendment’ s application is unc lear in this reg ard , t he leg islative intent is helpful in giving the intended e ffe ct to the law. Woodruff v. City o f Na s h ville, 183 Tenn. 483, 192 S.W.2d 1013, 10 15 (Tenn. 1946 ). Th e Ho us e Judic iary Com mit te e sp e c if

ic a lly state d th a t th e int ent of th e act , inso fa r a s a lif e se nte nc e fo r f

ir st deg ree murder is c oncerned, wa s to raise the a lrea dy -existi ng floor of tim e to be se rv e d a s p ro vid e d in § 4 0- 35 -5 01 (h )( 1) , f ro m 60 % t o 100% of the sixtyy ear s. Special Report to the House J udiciary Commi tte e, T ap e # 1 , May 3, 1995 at 672. I n addition § 40-35- 50 1( h) (1 ), re qu ir e s th a t a tw e nty -f ive y e ar m ini mu m “floo r” mus t be ser ved bef

ore a defe ndant sentenc ed to life for first deg ree mur de r b e c ome [s] e lig ibl e for a ny c on sid e ratio n o f r e le a se e lig ibi lity

. As th e fo re g oin g dis c us sio n p oin ts o ut, thi s c on fl ic ts with both the lang uag e and intent of sub-sec tion ( i ), whi ch wa s int e nd e d to raise the fl oo r f or re le a se e lig ibi lit y . W he n th e re is a conflict whic h canno t be re solved, long established rule s of statutory cons t ruction provide that the most rece ntly enac ted statute repe als by

implication an yirrec oncilable pr ovisions of the fo rmer act . T e nn e sse e -C aro lin a Tr a ns po rt a tio n, I nc . v . Pe nte c os t, 36 2 S. W.2 d 4 61 , 2 11 Te nn . 7 2 ( 19 62 ). Sin c e the re i s no way to
rec oncile the c onflict, it is the opinio n o f t h is Office that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 501(h)(1 ) h as been r epea led by implication by the e n actment of

Public Chapter 492, only to the extent that they
con f li c t. A me r ic a n Ci ty B a n k v

. We s te r n A u to [S u p p ly ], 632 S.W. 2d41 0, 42 8 ( Tenn. [Ct.] A pp . 1 98 1) . T he on ly re a so na ble
re su lti ng int e rp re ta tio n w ou ld b e that su bs e c tio n ( i) op e rate s, in s o fa r a s it c on fl ic ts w iththe pr ovis io ns of the e xistin g statut e g ov e rn ing re le a se e lig ibi lit y , to raiseth e floo r f ro m 60 % o f s ixty y ear s (the ar

bitrary n u m b er o f y ear s for the pur pose of c alculating rele ase e ligibility ), to 100% o f s ix ty y ear s, reduc ed by

not more than 15% of e ligible c redits.
At the trial in May

of 1996 the trial c ourt in s t ru ct ed on the law that was on the books at that time. The Court c annot find that counsel was ineffe ctive fo r not asking for a nother jury

instruction when the a

pplicabi l i ty

of the a mendment was so unclea r that two y ear s after

the ena ctment of Public Chapter 492 the Attorney Gene ral ha d to go be hind the wording of the statute itself a nd look to legislative intent. The Court is mindful of the unreported ca se of State v. Milam . . . . I n that
case there was a

question of whethe r the killing w as ac cidental or inte n tional, and the Court h el d t h at the jury verdic t might have been dif fer ent if 51 y ear s incar cer ation instead of 25 y ear s h ad been know n to the jury and it was re mandedW e n ot e t h at e f fec t i v e M ay 18, 1998, t h e Le g i s l at u r e ame n ded T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on 40- 35- 3 201, de l et i n g s u bs ec t i on (b) an d r epl ac i n g i t w i t h a n ew pr ov i s i on t h at pr ov i des t h at j u r i es i n n on ca pi t al c as es s h al l n ot be i n s t r u ct ed on t h e pos s i bl e pen al t i es for t h e of fen s e ch ar g ed or l es s er

- i n cl u ded of fen s es

. T h i s a men dmen t doe s n ot appl y t o c as es t r i ed bef or e t h e ef

fec t i v e dat e of

t h e ame n dmen t

. 1998 T en n

. Publ i c Act s c h

. 1041 § 2.

− 18

− for a new tria l. That was, howe ver, not a post-conviction ca se. The issue in the
case at bar

was o n e o f i dentity

and the pr oof on that issue wa s strong . Four ey ewitnesse s id e n ti f

ie d th e d e f

e n d a n t a s o n e o f th e s h o o te r s

. O n c e th e id e n ti ty of the defen d an t wa s established to the jury ’s satisfac tion, it i s without the realm of possibili ty

that if the Court had instructe d on the re lease eli gi b ilityof 51 y ear s inste a d o f

2 5 y e ar s th a t th e ju r y

w o u ldh a v e c o n v ic te d o f a le s s e r inc luded offe nse. As stat ed ab ove, the Court of [Criminal] Appea ls has alre ady determined that the proof in the r ecor d amply supports that this was a pre meditated and intentional killi ng

.
J . Vaug hn asserts that the post-conviction court e rre d wh en it found that he w as not
en ti tl e d to p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n r e li e f o n th is g r o u n d

. H e a s s e r ts th a t th is Co u r t h a s a c k n o wledg ed that his earliest re lea s e elig ibilit y date is fifty -one y ear s rather than twenty -five y ear s. As such, J. Vaughn asserts t

hat Co un se l Stu bb s’ failu re to r e qu e st s uc h a n in str uc tio n, or to a pp e a l th is iss ue , c on sti tut e s in e ff

e c tiv e a ss is ta nc e a ndthat he wa s p re jud ic e d b y

thi s d e fi c ie nc y . T he Sta te counter s tha t t h e l aw wi t h reg ard to re lease elig ibilit y dates for a first de g ree murder se ntence
wa s u nc le ar at th e tim e of J. Vaug hn ’s tr ia l a ndapp e a l, and , th erefo re, Co un sel Stub b’ s f a ilu re to reque st or appea l this i nstruction cannot be said to be def icient. We ag ree with the State.

J. Vaug hn re qu e ste d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt ins truc t th e jury

on the e a

rl ie st r e le a se e lig ibi lit y date pur suant to Tennesse e Code Annotated sect i o n 4 0 -3 5-201(b) , which provide s that “upon 3 the mot ion of e ith e r p art y , f ile d w ith the c ou rt

prior to the se le c tio n o f the jury , th e c ou rt sh a ll char g e the possible pena lties for the off ense c harg ed and a ll le s s er i n cl u d ed offenses.” When
su c h a c ha rg e is r e qu e ste d b y

e ith e r p arty , s e c tio n ( b) (2 )( A) (i ) p ro vid e s:
When a cha

rg e a s t o p o s sible penalties has be en re quested pursua nt to subdivi sion (b) ( 1 ) , th e ju d g e s h a ll a ls o in c lu d e in th e in s tr u c ti o n s f o r th e ju r y to weig h and consider the meaning of a se ntence of imprisonment for the of fense char g ed and
a ny le sse r i nc lud e d o ff

e nses. Suc h in str

uc tio n s ha ll i nc lud e a n a pp ro xima te
ca l cu lation of the minimum num ber of y ear s a per son sentence d to imprisonment for the of fense char g ed and le sser include d offe nses must serve be fore rea ching such per son’s ea

rliest rele ase e ligibility

date. Such c alcu l ati on shall include such fac tors as the re lease elig ibilit y perc entag e esta

blished by

§ 40-35-501, maximum and minimum sentenc e reduc tion c redits authorized by § 41-21-2 3 6 an d the− 19

−

g overnor ’s powe r t o reduc e prison over crow ding pur suant to titl e 41, cha pter 1, part 5, if a

pplicable.

At the time of the Petit i o n er’s trial, May of 1996, there wer e thre e statutes that mandated two dif fe re nt r e le a se e lig ibi lit y date s f or pe rs on s c on vic te d o f f ir st d e g re e mur de r. Th e fi rs t, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-501(g )(1) (Supp. 1993), stated:

Release elig ibilit y

for e ach defe ndant re ceiving a sente nce of imprisonment for lif e fo r F ir st D e gree mu rder sh a ll o c c ur a ft e r s e rv ic e of

60 % o f 6 0 y e ars le ss se nte nc e c re dit s e arn e d a ndre ta ine d b y the de fe nd a nt, bu t in no e ve nt s ha ll a defe ndant sente nced to imprisonment be e ligible f or par ole until defendant has
serve d a minimum of twenty -five ( 25) full ca lender y ear s of such sente n ce. . . . A defe ndant re ceiving a sente nce of imprisonment for l i fe for first deg ree murder sh a ll b e e n ti tl e d to e ar n a n d r e tain s u c h s e n te n c e c r e d it s , b u t s u c h c r e d it s s hall not
o p e r a t e t o m ak e s u c h d e f e n d a n te l i g i b l e f

o r r e l e a s e p r i o rt o t h e s e r v i c e o f t w e n t yfive (25) full cale ndar y ear s.”

Simi larly , Tenne ssee C ode Annotate d section 39-13- 204 require d that the jury be instructed that a def endant r eceiving a

life sentenc e will not be elig ible for pa role c onsideration until the defe ndant has served “at least twenty -f i v e (2 5 ) fu ll calenda

r y ear s of such sente nce.” Tenn. Cod e A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 4 ( e ) ( 2 ) ( Su p p

. 1 9 9 3 )

. H o w e v e r , e f f e c ti v e Ju ly 1 , 1 9 9 5 , T e n n e s s ee Code An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -5 01 (i ), ma de app lic able to a pe rs on c on vic te d of com mi tting a fi rs t deg ree murder on or

afte r Jul y

1, 1995, stat ed that “[s]uch person shall serve 100% of the sentenc e imposed by

the Court less sentenc e c re d i t s ea rned and reta ined. Provided, howe ver, no sentenc e re duction cre dits authorized by T.C.A. 41 -21-238 or any other provision of the la w shall operate.” This statute did not repea l s ection 40-35- 501(g )(1) . I t was later interpre ted, howeve r, to mean that the earliest relea se elig ibilit y date f or a pe rso n convicted of first deg ree murde r w a s f

if ty

- o n e y e ar s , w h ic h is 8 5 % o f s ixty y e ar s

. Se e St a te v

. Ch ar le s Golden, No. 02C01-9709-CR-00362, 1998 WL 518071, at *7 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, A ug . 21, 1998), no perm. app. filed

(citing Attorney

Gen era l Opinion 97-098 (7-1-97) ); see a lso Drummer v. State, 6 S.W .3d 520, 522 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)

. The Te nnessee Supreme Court dea lt with the issue o f i m p roper jury instructions reg arding the ra n ge of punishment in S tate v. Cook, 816 S.W .2d 322 (Tenn. 1991) . I n Cook, the issue befor e the Court wa s whether a trial judg e committed pre judicial erro r b y i n s tructing the jury on the ra ng e of punishment for a Rang e I

offe nder, w here the sentenc e rang e under which the def endant must b e s en t en ce d is that of a Rang e I I offe nder. I d. at 324. The Court a ssumed that the trial court committed error when it instructed the jury and then turne d to decide w hether that err or wa s harmless. I d. at 325. It concluded that Tenn es s ee C ode Annotate d section 40-35-T h i s i s t h e s ame s t at u t e u s ed by J

. V au g h n i n t h i s c as e t o r equ es t t h at t h e j u r y be i n s t r u ct ed on t h e r an g e of 4
p u n ish m e n t.

− 20

− 201(b) g ave a defe ndant a claimable statutory rig ht to have the jury know t h e r an ge of

4 punishment. The Court went on to conc lude that the benefits that the L eg islature had in mind for the de fe nd a nt w he n it

pa sse d th is s ta tut e wo uldbe los t if the de fe ndant we re “ to b e se nte nc e d to punishments gr eate r than what the jury fi n d i n g gu i l t was instructe d would be imposed.” I d. at 327. Fur t h er , “t o deny

this defenda nt that statutory rig ht constitutes prejudice to the judicia l proce ss, rende ring the er

ror r ever sible . . . .” I d.

I n contra st, in 1995, thi s Court addresse d an issue s i m ilar to the issue addr essed by our S u p r e m e C o u r ti n C o o k

. S e e S t a t e v

. S m i t h , 9 2 6 S

. W

. 2 d 2 6 7 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. 1 9 9 5 )

. In S m i t h , t h e d ef

en d an tco m p l ai n ed t h at t h e t ri al co u rt i m p ro p er l y i n s tru ct ed t h e j u ryab o u ta R an ge I punishment when he w as subseque ntly sent ence d as a Rang e I I offe nder. This Court held, “Whether the defe ndant qualified a s a R an ge I or Rang e I I

offe nder de pended upon the proof offe red at any

subsequent sente ncing hearing. T hus, the jury was a war e of the pos s i b l e ra n g e of punishment that could have r esulted fr om thei r v er d i ct

. ” I d. at 271. The Court distinguishe d the
c a se be fo re it f

ro m Co ok

by statin g that in Coo k “ the on ly po ssi ble se nte nc e wa s a c tua lly wi thi n Rang e I I ” in Cook where as in Smit h the possi b l e s en t en ce inc luded a Rang e I sentenc e, depending on the proof at the sentenc ing he aring . I d.

I n Golden, the de fenda nt’s trial was he ld from May 1 7 t o M ay

19 of 1997. Golden, 1998 WL 5 1 8 0 7 1 , a t * 1

. T h e d e f e n d a n t w a s c h ar g e d a n d c o n v ic te d o f f ir s t d e g r e e murder. I d. The jury wa s to de te rm ine the de fe nd a nt’ s se nte nc e , a ndthe tr ia l c ou rt in stru c te d th e jury that if it sentenc ed the de fenda nt to life with the possibil ity of par ole, the def

endant would be elig ible for parole afte r ser ving a

minimum of twenty -f

i v e y ear s. I d. at *7. The jury sentenc ed the defe ndant to life without the possibili ty of par ole. I d. at *1. On appe al, we h el d t h at Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-501( i) mandate d that t h e d ef endant serve a

minimum sentenc e of f if ty

- o n e y e ar s , a n d , th e r e fore , th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d w h e n it in s tr u c te d th e ju r y

. I d

. a t * 7

- 8

. We stated:

I t immediate ly become s appar ent that the leg islature in 19 9 5 o v erlooked amending Tenne ssee Code A nnotat ed § 39-13-204 to coincide with the 1995
a me nd me nt t o Ten ne sse e Cod e An no ta te d § 40 -3 5- 50 1. Th e statut e s p re se ntl y are in conflict; howeve r, it is clear that the leg islature intended to c hang e the min imu m r e le a se e lig ibi lit y date fo r a

lif e sen ten ce fr om t we nty -f ive (2 5) y e ars to fifty -one ( 51) y ear s.

I d. at *8. The Court then h el d t h at , s i n ce the homicide at issue had oc curr ed af ter July1, 1995, “the tria l court er

red in informing the juryof the twe nty -five ( 25) y ear provision instead of theSi nce t hi s cr i me occur r ed pri or t o t he Jul y 1, 199 5, amendment t o t he s t at ut e, t he proper i ns t r uct i on was 5 tha t t h e d e fen d a n t wo u ld ha v e to se rv e a m inim u m o f t w e n ty-f ive ye a rs , no t f

ift y-o n e ye a rs .”

− 21

− fifty -one ( 51) y ear

provision.” I d

. The Court we nt on to conclude that the e rror was not harmless be y ond a re asonable doubt, and we r emande d the ca se for a new sentenc ing he aring

.
I n S t a t e v

. R e c o R

. D o u g l a s , N o

. 0 2 C 0 1

- 9 7 1 1

- C R

- 0 0 4 4 3 , 1 9 9 8 W L 8 0 3 4 1 0 ( T e n n

. Cr im. A p p

. , a t Ja c k s o n , N o v

. 2 0 , 1998), n o perm. app. filed , the Court ag ain addr essed whe ther a trial court e rre d when it instructed the jury on rel ea s e el i gibilit y

dates. The defe ndant was c harg ed and convic ted of fir st-deg ree felony murder on D ece mber 3, 1994. T h e trial court instructed the jur y tha t, if

i ts e n t e n c e d t h e d e f

e n d a n tt o l i f

e w i t h th e p o s s i b i l i t y

o f p ar o l e , t h e d e f

e n d a n tw o u ld be elig ible for pa

role in less than two y ear s, when, in fa ct, the def endant would h av e to serve a minimum of twenty -five y ear s. I d. at *2. The Do u gl as Court disti ng uished the ca se bef ore the 5 Court from Smith, s tating that, at the time of the S m i t h trial, the sentenc ing status of the defe ndant ha d “n o t b ee n established and the [S ]t ate’ s proof for a hig her r ang e may

fail. I n other words, in those ca ses, the instructed minimum sentence is stil l a possibil i t y

. ” I d. The Court then held that, in the ca se bef ore it, at the time of trialthe def endant wa s ineligible f

or par ole bef

ore serving twenty -five y ear s. I d. The Court cited Cook for th e pro posit ion that “ ‘[i ]t is w ide ly perc eived by t h o s e who observed the ope rations of our trial courts in pre vious tim es, whe n juries had the a dditi o n a l r e s p o n s ib il it y o f s e tt in g p u n is h me n t, th a t o f te n th e y s e e me d to f

in d g u il t o f a crime not ne cessa

ri l y m o s t s t rong ly

sug g ested by

the evidenc e, but one the punishment for which
su ite d th e ir

se ns e of jus tic e in t

hat c a se .’ ” I d. (c iti ng Coo k, 91 6 S .W .2d at 32 6) . T he Cou rt he ld that the instruction misled the jury , and it reve rsed and rema nded the c ase f or a ne w trial.

I n State v. Mey er, 994 S.W.2d 129 (Tenn. 1999), the Tenne ssee S u p reme Court rever sed and re manded a

case for a

new tria l where the def

endant wa s convi ct ed of two counts of r ape of
a chi ld afte r the jury

wa s e rr on e ou sly

ins truc te d th a t he wo uldha ve to s e rv e , if c on vic te d, a t le a st 5. 73 y e ars , rat he r tha n th e e nti re se nte nc e un dim ini sh e d. I d. a t 13 2. Th e Sup re me Cou rt he ld that the de fe nd a nt wa s pr e jud ic e d by the e rr on e ou s jury ins truc tio n a nd that it wa s conce iva ble that th e d ef

en d ant would have been c onvicted of a lesser of fense had the jury

known that he would not have be en elig ible for e arly rele ase. I d. at 131-32 (c iting Cook, 816 S.W .2d at 322).

Ou r C ou rt

de a lt w ith a

sim ila r iss ue in State v. B ry a n A . M ilam, N o. 01 C01 -9 71 2- CC00557, 1999 WL

701419 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashvill e, Sept. 10, 1999), no perm. app. filed

. I n that case , the def

end an t wa s co n v i cted of two counts of first de g ree murder f or a c rime he commit t ed on May

15, 1996, and he w as sentenc ed to life imprisonment for e ach c ount. I d. at *1. The trial court instructe d the jury that, if convicte d, the def endant would ha ve to serve twenty -five y ear s befor e his ea rliest rele ase e ligibility

date whe n, in fac t, he would have to serve fifty -one y ear s. I d. at *5. The Court c ited My er and Doug las, and it conc luded that “the defe ndant was pr ejudiced by the tri al co u rt’s er

roneous instruction.” I d. at *6. Further, the Court− 22

−

stated, “It is conceiva

ble that the def

endant would ha ve been convicte d of a le sser off ense ha d the jury kn ow n th a t he wo uldno t ha ve be e n e lig ibl e for re le a sefo r f

if ty -o ne y e ars a s o pp os e d to tw e nty -f ive y e ars .” I d. Th e Cou rt re ve rs e d th e c on vic tio n a ndre ma nd e d th e c a se fo r a ne w t ri a l.

I n State v. Mitc h el l S h ephard, No. E2000-00628- CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL767010 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, J ul y3 , 2 0 0 1 ), perm. app. granted (Tenn. D ec. 2, 2002) , this Court addre ssed whethe r the trial c ourt committed reve rsible er ror by improperly

instructi n g t h e jury with reg ard to the de fenda nt’s punishment. By the ti m e o f t h e S h ephar d case , the L eg islature had ag ain cha ng ed the statute a n d h ad mandated that the jury not be instructed at all about punishment in first deg ree murder c ases whe re the State was not see king the d ea t h penalty . I d. at *11. The trial judg e, howe ver, ha d instructed the jury on punishment

. I d

. Fu rt h er, the trial judge instructed the jury

that the def

endant would be elig ible for pa role a fter se rving a minimum of twenty -five y ear s, rather than fifty -one y ear s. This court held that th e i n structional er ror wa s reve rsible. I d. I t stated, howeve r, “In fairne ss to the trial court, we ag ain re cogni z e t h at the trial court g ave the 25-y ear

ch ar ge as i t is stated in Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-13- 204(e) (2).” I d. at *12. The c ourt also said, “In sp i t e o f t h e obvious conflict be tween T enn. Code Ann. §§ 39- 13- 204(e) (2) a nd 40-35-501( i), the leg islature has still not amended Te nn. Co d e An n

. § 39-13- 204(e) (2) ( Supp. 2000).” I d. I t is hoped that such an a mendment wi l l b e m ad e t o avoid the i n co n s i s t en cy

. ” Id. T h e C o u rt re m an d ed t h e c as e f o r an ew s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g.
Con sid e ri ng the c on te nti on s o f the pa rt ie s, we thi nk

the iss ue be fo re us is t wo fo ld. F ir st, we must dec ide wheth er C o u n s el Stubbs was ineffe ctive for failing to reque st that the jury instruction with reg ard to re lease elig ibilit y dates be chang ed fr o m t we n ty -five y ear s to fifty -one y e ars . N e xt, w e mus t de c ide wh e the r C ou ns e l Stu bb s w a s in e ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ng to a

pp eal thi s issue. Acc ording ly , t h e t i m e line of the events of this ca se is rele vant. J . Vaug hn’s ca se wa s tried in May

of 1996, and the judgme nt was ente red May 31, 1996. The re cord i n this case wa s filed wi t h t h i s C o urt on Dec ember 19, 1996, and J. Vaug hn’s brief was filed on F ebrua

ry 19, 1997. O r a l ar g u me n ts w e r e h e ar d in D e c e mb e r o f 1 9 9 7

. T h is Co u r t e n te r e d it s judgme nt and opinion affirming J . Vaug hn’s conviction on May 21, 1998.
As previously

stated, the fir st issue we m u s t decide is whe ther Counsel Stubbs was ine ff e c ti ve for f

a ili ng to r e qu e st a

jury ins truc tio n th a t if

the jury c on vic te d J. V a ug hn of

fi rs t deg ree murder he would be inelig ible for pa role until he ser ved fifty -one y ears

. At the time of th e tr ial , th e L e g isl a tur e ha d c ha ng e d o ne of the re le va nt s ta tut e s, makin g the e arl ie st r e le a se elig ibilit y date f or those convic ted of fir st-deg ree mur d er fi fty -one y ear s rather than twenty -five y ear s. Since, howeve r, the ne wly enac ted statute did not repe al the twenty -five y ear statute the law wa s unclea

r as to the a

pplicable r elea se elig ibilit y date. At the time of

J

. Va u gh n ’s t ri al, t he only two case s that were decide d wer e Cook and Smith, and both o f t h o s e cases dea lt with jury instructi o n s about Rang e I and Rang e I I

sentenc es. F urthermor e, the Attorne y Gene ral’s statut ory int e rp re ta tio n o pin ion wa s n ot r e le a se d u nti l mo re than a y ear aft e r the tr ia l. Wh ile it i s arg uable that Counsel S tubbs could have anticipated the Attorne y Gene ral’s statutory− 23

−

interpre tation, or our subseque nt holdings af firming the Attorney

Gene ral’s opinion, we do not fi ndhis pe rf

orma nc e de fi c ie nt f

or faili ng to d o s o. As pr e vio usly st ate d, Co ok wa s n ot a

fi rs t deg r e e mu r d e r

c a s e , a n d , a s w e n o te d inman y o f o u r s u b s e q u e n t h o ld in g s , th e L e g is la ture’s failure to repe al the twenty -five y ear rele ase e ligibility

statute made this area of the law
c on fu sin g . G ive n th is c hr on olo g y of e ve nts , we cann ot c on c lud e that Co un se l Stu bb s’ failu re to reque st the jury

instruction at trial was inef fec tive. Furthermore , J

. Va u gh n cannot show prejudice in this reg ard. To sh o w p re j udice, he would have to pr ove that, had Counsel Stubbs reque sted the fifty -one y ear instruction, the trial court would ha ve instructed the jury
a c c or din g ly . Co ns ide ri ng the s tate o f the la w at th e tim e of thi s tria l, h ow e ve r, it i s si mpl y i m p o s s i b l e t o a s s u m e t h a tt h e tr i a l c o u r tw o u l d h a v e s o i n s tru c t e d t h e j u r y.
Converse ly , ina c c or da nc e wi th the a fo re me nti on e d c a se la w, J. Vaug hn c ou ld p os sib ly show prejudice w i t h respe ct to Counsel Stubbs ’ fa ilure to raise this iss ue on appe al. Howe ver, we c onclude that J. Vaug hn has n o t s h own that Counsel Stubbs’ failure to ra ise this issue on appea l was def

icient. We initiallynote that Counsel S t u b bs could only have br oug ht this i ssue befor e the Court u n d er the plain err or doctrine , as the instructional e rror would have be en wa iv ed for hi s failu re to o bje c t to it at tria l or in the mot ionfo r n e w t

ri a l. S e e Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 52(b). A g a in , w h il e it

is ar g u ab le th a t C o u n s e l S tu b b s c o u ldh a v e a n ti c ip a te d th is s ta tutory int e rp re ta tio n, and ou r su bseq ue nt h old ing s in Go lde n, Do ug la s, a ndMil a m, w e do no t f indhis perf ormanc e def

icient for f

ailing to do so. The re co rd o n J . Vaug hn’s direc t appea l was submitt ed on De cembe r 19, 1996, and J . Vaug hn’s brief was filed on F ebrua

ry 19, 1997. Both of these dates wer e prior to the A ttorney Gene ral’s opinion interpr eting the re levant statutes, and prior to all of our opinions conf irming that interpre t at i o n

. We simpl y cannot c onclude that Counsel Stubbs ’ re prese ntation fell below a n objective standa rd of r easona

b l en es s beca

use he did not anticipate this interpre tation of the statute.

As furthe r support for

our holding , we hig hlight ag ain, by wa y of ana logy , our pre vious
a na ly sis of

the Pa g e de c isi on a ndsu bs e qu e nt p os t- c on vic tio n d e cis io ns ho ldi ng that a petitioner’s trial c ounsel was not inef fec tive for fai l i n g t o raise the Pag e “know ingly ” issue on appea l when the law was unc lear . Ag ain, ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel ca ses should be l i m i ted to situations where the law or duty is clear such that re asonable counsel should know
e no ug h to raise the iss ue . E a dy , 2 00 4 WL 58 76 39 , at *8 . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t. C. Adequate Trial P reparation

L a stl y , J. Va

ug hn a sse rt s that Cou ns e l Stu bb s wa s ine ff e c tiv e by faili ng to adeq uate ly pr e pa re fo r t ri a l. H e c on te nd s th a t Co un se l Stu bb s f a ile d to vi e w the are a

of the Al aba ma

ho us e wh e re the g un wa s f

ou nda ndthat Co un se l Stu bb s f a ile d to sp e ak wi th J

. Vaug hn ’s re la tiv e s in Alabama . Further, J. Va u gh n contends that he told Counsel S tubbs that he was in Alabama at the time that the police f ound the wea

pon, bu t C o u nsel Stubbs did not pursue this information. The post-c onviction court found:− 24

−

When asked a

bout this allegation at the Post-Convi ction Relief hea ring , [C ounsel Stubbs] explained that from th e outset of his re prese ntation, [ J . Vaug hn]
c on sis te ntl y

a nda da ma ntl y st ate d th a t he didno t w a nt any of the famil y

in Al aba ma inv olv ed in the c a se . F urthe r, he ma int a ine d th a t he wa s n e ve r i n Sheff iel d, Al aba ma

a ndthe g un s w e re no t hi s. [Cou ns e l Stu bb s’ ] te sti mon y is
e xtre me ly c re dib le in this re g ardbecaus e he kn e w f ro m di sc ov e ry

a ndta lki ng to witnesses that two Ga llatin officer s were go i n g to testify to seeing [J . Vaug hn] at the Al aba ma

re sid e nc e a ndthat hi s u nc le , Re arn o V a ug hn , on ce he was in custody in the back of

the patrol c ar , b eg g ed the of fice rs not to shoot int o the Alabama residenc e and not to kill [ J . Vaug hn]. [ Counsel S t u bbs] s tated that he discussed this impending testimonywith [ J . Vaug hn]. [ J . Vaug hn] st ill maintained to [ Counsel Stu b bs] t hat he wa s never in Sheffield, Alabama. For those rea sons [C ounsel Stubbs] did not go to Alabama and did not talk to any one in Alaba ma.

W e conc lude that the evide nce doe s not preponder ate a g ainst the trial court’s finding s of fac t. Further, we conclude that J

. Vaug hn has not me t his burden of proving that C o u n s el Stu bb s’ repr ese ntatio n o f h im f e ll b e low a n o bje c tiv e stand ardof re a so na ble ne ss. Th e po stconviction court found that Counsel Stubbs’ testim ony was c redible, and Counsel Stubbs testif ie d th a t J. V a u g h n to ld h im , u n e q u iv o c a ll y , th a t h is A la b a ma r e lati v e s w e r e n o t to be involved in this case. F urther, J. Vaug hn told Counsel S tubbs that he was never in Ala bama. Co u n s e l S t u b b s c o n d u c t e d h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d f o r m u l a t e d J. V a u g h n ’ s d e f e n s e ar o u n d th e se state me nts . Si mpl y

be c a us e this d e fe ns e wa s u ns uc c e ssf ul, J. Vaug hn c a nn ot n ow su c c e ssf ull y c o m p l a i n t h a t C o u n s e l S t u b b s ’ p e r f o r m a n c e w a s d e f

i c i e n t

. A c c o r d i n g l y , w e c o n c l u d e t h a t J. Vaug hn has failed to me et his bur den of proving that Counsel Stubbs’ repr esentation fel l b elow an objec tive standard of

rea sonablene ss. Furthe rmore, J. Vaug hn h as not prese nted any evidenc e of how Counsel Stubbs’ alleg ed lac k of investig ation prejudice d him.

III. Conclusi on

I n acc ordanc e with the for eg oing reasoning a nd authorities, we a ffirm the post-c onviction court’s judg ment dismiss ing J. Vaug hn’s petition for post-convic tion relief.

___________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE