Department of Homeland Security
 

��������������������������
 

Adequacy of USSS Efforts to Identify, 


Mitigate, and Address Instances of Misconduct and 


Inappropriate Behavior 


(Redacted)
 

OIG-14-20 December 2013
 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 I www.oig.dhs.gov 

December 19, 2013
 

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Julia Pierson 

Director 

nited States Secret Service 

OQ~'- FROM: a~nn 

Chief Operating Officer 

SUBJECT: USSS' Efforts To Identify, Mitigate, and Address Instances of 

Misconduct and Inappropriate Behavior- Redacted 

Attached for your action is our final report, USSS' Efforts To Identify, Mitigate, and Address 

Instances of Misconduct and Inappropriate Behavior - Redacted. We incorporated the 

formal comments from the United States Secret Service in the final report. 

The report contains 14 recommendations aimed at improving processes for identifying, 

mitigating, and addressing instances of misconduct and inappropriate behavior. Your office 

concurred with all recommendations. Based on information provided in your response to 

the draft report and supporting documentation, we consider recommendations #1 through 

#10, and #13 closed. We consider recommendation #12 resolved and open. Once your 

office has fully implemented this recommendation, please submit a formal closeout letter 

to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendation. The memorandum should 

be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions. Please email 

a signed PDF copy of all responses and closeout requests to 

OIG I nspectionsFollowup@oig.d hs.gov. 

We consider recommendations #11 and #14 open and unresolved. As prescribed by the 

Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-01, Follow-Up and Resolutions for Office of 

Inspector General Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the date of this 

memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that includes your 

corrective action plan and target completion date for recommendations #11 and #14. Also, 

please include responsible parties with any supporting documentation necessary to inform 

us about the current status of the recommendations. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide copies of 

our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and appropriation 

responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post a redacted version 

of the report on our website. 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Deborah Outten-Mills, Acting 

Assistant Inspector General, Office of Inspections, at (202) 254-4015. 

Attachment 

2 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 1 


Background ........................................................................................................................ 2 


Results of Review ................................................................................................................ 8 


We Did Not Discover Evidence that Misconduct or Inappropriate Behavior is 


Widespread in USSS ........................................................................................... 10 


Survey Respondents Have Varying Perceptions of Whether Management 


Tolerates Misconduct and Holds Employees Accountable................................ 31 


Survey Results for Reporting Inappropriate Behaviors Related to Conduct 


Standards and Adjudicative Guidelines ............................................................. 36 


USSS Needs To Clarify When Misconduct Cases Should Be Handled by Managers 

and Supervisors.................................................................................................. 43 


Recommendations ................................................................................................ 44 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ......................................................... 44 


USSS Did Not Fully Investigate Allegations that an Employee Engaged in 

Misconduct While on Official Travel in a Foreign Country ................................ 45
 

Recommendations ................................................................................................ 49 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...............................................................50 

Policies and Procedures for Proposing and Issuing Discipline are Insufficient .... 50 


Recommendations ................................................................................................ 59 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis .......................................................... 59 


USSS is Not Always in Compliance with Federal Disciplinary Regulations ........... 60
 

Recommendations ................................................................................................ 62 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis .......................................................... 63 


Internal Controls are Insufficient to Ensure Discipline is Aligned with Agency 

Principles ............................................................................................................ 63 


Recommendations ................................................................................................ 68 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis .......................................................... 68 


 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table of Contents 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Adjudication of Discipline and Security Concerns Following the Cartagena 

Incident .............................................................................................................. 70 

Security Appeals Board Appointments and Composition Need Attention .......... 74 


Recommendations ................................................................................................ 75 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis .......................................................... 75 


Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ............................................ 77 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ............................... 83 

Appendix C: About Survey Items........................................................................ 90 

Appendix D: Results of Electronic Surveys ......................................................... 91 

Appendix E: Results of In-person Surveys ....................................................... 104 

Appendix F: Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to 

Classified Information ................................................................. 117 

Appendix G: Disposition Summaries for 13 Employees Investigated in 

Connection with Events in Cartagena ......................................... 122 

Appendix H: Contributors to This Report ......................................................... 136 

Appendix I: Report Distribution ...................................................................... 137 

Abbreviations 

ATSAIC Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

CSO Chief Security Officer 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

ERB Employee Relations Branch 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FFN female foreign national 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

ISP Inspection Division (USSS) 

MSPB Merit Systems Protection Board 

NCCA National Center for Credibility and Assessment 

OCC Office of Chief Counsel (USSS) 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

PRWG Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group 

RES Office of Professional Responsibility 

The Board Security Appeals Board 

SAIC Special Agent in Charge 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

SCD Security Clearance Division 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

USSS United States Secret Service 

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Executive Summary 

In April 2012, United States Secret Service (USSS) employees were preparing for a 

Presidential visit to the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia. While off duty, 

several employees were suspected of soliciting prostitutes and consuming excessive 

amounts of alcohol. We assessed the adequacy of the agency’s efforts to identify, 

mitigate, and address instances of misconduct and inappropriate behavior. To satisfy 

our review objectives, we (1) interviewed more than 200 USSS supervisors, managers, 

and senior officials; (2) administered an electronic and in-person survey with a 

combined response rate of 41 percent; (3) reviewed USSS internal affairs cases; 

(4) analyzed discipline records; and (5) analyzed personnel security records. 

Although individual employees have engaged in misconduct or inappropriate behavior, 

we did not find evidence that misconduct is widespread in USSS. Furthermore, we did 

not find any evidence that USSS leadership has fostered an environment that tolerates 

inappropriate behavior. Of the 2,575 employees who responded to our electronic 

survey, 2,144 (83 percent) indicated they were not aware of USSS employees engaging 

in any of six behaviors that were displayed in Cartagena. Additionally, 61 percent of 

survey respondents believed management does not tolerate misconduct. 

Some of the employees involved in the Cartagena incident claimed that the Secret 

Service did not afford them due process, mistreated those involved in the incident, and 

did not adjudicate their case consistent with comparable prior incidents. Of the 13 

employees suspected of soliciting prostitutes, 3 employees returned to duty, 6 either 

resigned or retired, and 4 had their clearances revoked and were removed. We 

determined that Secret Service’s security clearance actions were consistent and based 

on facts from internal inquiries. 

We are making 14 recommendations to improve the Secret Service’s processes for 

identifying, mitigating, and addressing instances of misconduct and inappropriate 

behavior. Specifically, it needs to (1) enhance policies related to reporting and 

investigating employee misconduct and security concerns; (2) strengthen procedures for 

proposing and issuing discipline; (3) ensure compliance with Federal disciplinary 

regulations; (4) ensure discipline is aligned with agency disciplinary principles; and (5) 

ensure appointments to the Security Appeals Board are made according to policy. Prior 

to the initiation of our field work, USSS began implementing and taking action on the 

recommendations from an outside group of experts assembled by the former Director. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 1 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

The USSS is a Federal law enforcement agency within the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), with headquarters in Washington, DC, and more than 150 offices 

throughout the United States and abroad. It has a dual mission: (1) to safeguard the 

Nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems, and (2) to protect national 

leaders, visiting heads of state and government, designated sites, and high-profile 

events.1

 At the time of our field work, USSS employed approximately 3,200 Special 

Agents, 1,300 Uniformed Division officers, and more than 2,000 technical, professional, 

and administrative support personnel. 

USSS appoints Special Agents, Uniformed Division officers, Special Officers, Protective 

Support Technicians, and Physical Security Specialists in the excepted service under 

Schedule B.2

 Executive Order 11203 allows USSS to convert employees appointed under 

Schedule B to career status after completing at least 3 years of continuous service if 

they are in positions concerned with the protection of the life and safety of the 

President, members of his immediate family, or other persons for whom similar 

protective services are required. If the appointments made under Schedule B are not 

converted to career status 120 days after meeting 3 years of continuous service, the 

appointment will expire. The expiration of that appointment is not an adverse action 

that is subject to appeal.3

 Most other administrative, professional, and technical 

employees are hired as career status employees. 

Addressing Misconduct 

All USSS employees must maintain a Top Secret security clearance,4

 which grants 

the employee access to information which reasonably could be expected to 

cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security if disclosed without 

authorization.5 When employees who possess a Top Secret security clearance 

engage in misconduct, agencies may address their misconduct in two ways. First, 

the behavior may violate agency standards of conduct and warrant disciplinary 

action. Second, the behavior may cause a security concern, and an agency can 

review the employees’ access to classified information in light of their 

1

 18 U.S.C. § 3056.


2

 The excepted service consists of those civil service positions which are not in the competitive service or the Senior 


Executive Service (See 5 U.S.C. § 2103). Excepted positions under Schedule B are those other than a confidential or
 

policy-determining character for which it is not practicable to hold a competitive examination (See 5 CFR § 6.2). 


3

 5 CFR § 752.401(b)(11) 


4

 USSS designated full-time employees at least Critical Sensitive, requiring that they hold at least a Top Secret security 


clearance per DHS Instruction, 121-01-007, Personnel Suitability and Security Program (Revision 00). See SCD-02(01): 


Special Security Clearances Requirements and Reporting.
 

5

 Executive Order 13292 Sec. 1.2(1) 


www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

misconduct. 

A disciplinary action seeks to correct employee conduct and improve the 

efficiency of the agency. The goal of a security clearance evaluation is to 

determine whether a person’s access to classified information is clearly 

consistent with the interests of the national security. A security clearance 

evaluation is not a disciplinary action. Disciplinary actions and security clearance 

adjudications are separate processes. 

However, because USSS employees must maintain a Top Secret security 

clearance, USSS prefers to resolve security concerns before considering 

disciplinary action. USSS may still discipline an employee even after a security 

clearance concern is resolved in the employee’s favor. Employees have different 

appellate rights under each process. 

Disciplinary Actions 

Federal agencies take disciplinary actions to correct employee misconduct that 

adversely affects the efficiency of the service and to encourage employee 

conduct in compliance with standards of conduct, policies, goals, work 

procedures, and practices of the agency. USSS employees may be disciplined for 

a wide range of policy violations including time and attendance, misuse of 

government property or vehicles, sexual misconduct, or alcohol and drug-related 

incidents. Managers are responsible for administering matters and rendering 

decisions resulting in disciplinary or adverse action. 

The USSS Employee Relations Branch (ERB) is responsible for advising on matters 

including, but not limited to: 

•	 the advisability of taking an action; 

•	 the basis for taking an action; 

•	 the appropriate action to be taken; 

•	 the ensuring of adherence to all procedural requirements; and 

•	 the preparation of all documentation necessary to effect an action so as 

to ensure conformance to prescribed regulations and procedures.6 

Any official contemplating an action against an employee must contact the ERB 

for guidance before initiating that action. Additionally, ERB prepares letters of 

reprimand and notices of proposal and decision. Managers then issue the letters, 

6 USSS Human Resources and Training Manual PER-11 (01) 

www.oig.dhs.gov 3 	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

proposals, or notices to employees. 

According to USSS Human Resources and Training Manual section PER-11(01), 

the intent of discipline is to correct unacceptable behavior and should only be as 

severe as is necessary to bring about the desired change. However, the discipline 

should also be consistent with past administered discipline for the same offense. 

There are three levels of disciplinary actions: informal, formal, and adverse. 

Informal actions, such as oral counseling or a memorandum of counseling are 

the least severe forms of discipline at USSS. There are no Federal or USSS policies 

guiding the use of informal discipline. Employees can grieve a memorandum of 

counseling. 

A formal action at USSS is a letter of reprimand. There are no Federal policies 

guiding the use of letters of reprimand. However, USSS policy requires that they 

be maintained in the employee’s official personnel folder for a minimum of 1 

year and a maximum of 3 years. Managers must consult ERB officials before 

issuing a letter of reprimand. ERB officials prepare the letter for the manager’s 

signature. The letter notifies the employee of his or her right to challenge the 

action by filing a grievance. Employees can also request all materials relied upon 

as a basis for the letter of reprimand. 

Adverse actions are suspensions without pay, reductions in pay or grade, and 

removals. Before management can impose an adverse action on an employee, 

the employee has a right to due process under procedures set forth in Federal 

law and regulations.7

 These provisions do not apply to excepted or competitive 

service employees serving a probationary or trial period.8

 An employee against 

whom a suspension for 14 days or less is proposed is entitled to: 

•	 a notice of proposed action that states specific reason(s) for the 

proposed action, and informs the employee of his or her right to review 

the material which is relied on to support the reasons for action given in 

the notice; 

•	 a reasonable time, but not less than 24 hours, to answer orally and in 

writing, and to furnish affidavits and other documentary evidence in 

support of the answer; 

•	 be represented by an attorney or other representative; 

•	 the consideration by the agency of only the reasons specified in the 

7

 5 U.S.C. Chapter 75 and 5 CFR Part 752 

8

 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C) and 5 U.S.C. 7501(1) 

www.oig.dhs.gov 4 	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

notice of proposed action and any answer of the employee or his or her 

representative, or both, made to a designated official; and 

•	 a written notice specifying the reason(s) for the decision and an 

advisement of any grievance rights.9 

Similar procedures exist for employees to whom a suspension of more than 14 

days, a reduction in grade or pay, or removal is proposed.10 Additionally, certain 

employees are entitled to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board 

(MSPB). 11 MSPB is an independent, quasi-judicial agency in the Executive branch 

that hears appeals of adverse actions, among other agency actions. USSS policies 

provide additional guidance for administering adverse actions. 

Security Clearance Evaluations 

Security clearance adjudications evaluate employees’ reliability, trustworthiness, 

and ability to protect classified information. An agency’s decision to evaluate 

whether an employee should retain a security clearance and access to classified 

information is triggered by employee behavior that causes a security concern 

under one or more of 13 Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for 

Access to Classified Information (Adjudicative Guidelines): 12 

•	 Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States 

•	 Guideline B: Foreign Influence 

•	 Guideline C: Foreign Preference 

•	 Guideline D: Sexual Behavior 

•	 Guideline E: Personal Conduct 

•	 Guideline F: Financial Consideration 

•	 Guideline G: Alcohol Consumption 

•	 Guideline H: Drug Involvement 

•	 Guideline I: Psychological Conditions 

•	 Guideline J: Criminal Conduct 

•	 Guideline K: Handling Protected Information 

•	 Guideline L: Outside Activities 

•	 Guideline M: Use of Information Technology Systems 

9

 5 CFR §752.203 

10 5 U.S.C. § 7511 

11 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) 

12 Memo from Stephen Hadley on December 29, 2005, Attachment A: “Revised Adjudicative Guidelines for 

Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information”. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 5 	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

For more information on behaviors that cause a security concern under these 

guidelines, see appendix F. 

During the adjudication process, the agency considers a number of variables 

known as the “whole person” concept. This concept requires that the agency 

must evaluate the behavior that could cause a security concern because of both 

favorable and unfavorable information about a person’s past and present.13 

USSS’ Security Clearance Division (SCD) initiates, coordinates, monitors, and 

adjudicates all security clearance evaluations. SCD is also responsible for policies 

and procedures relating to the suspension, denial, and revocation of access to 

classified information. Federal, DHS, and USSS policies guide the process for the 

revocation of security clearances.14 After conducting an initial evaluation, the 

Chief of SCD either warns the employee that future incidents of a similar nature 

may result in revocation of access, or issues a Notice of Determination to the 

employee stating that his or her access to classified information has been 

revoked. 

The employee may appeal a security clearance revocation to USSS’ Chief Security 

Officer (CSO). If there is an appeal, the CSO reviews case documentation, 

considers the employee’s reply, and informs the employee of the decision to 

reverse or uphold the revocation in a Notice of Review. If the revocation is 

reversed, the Notice of Review states the basis for the action. If the revocation is 

upheld, the Notice of Review describes the process for filing an appeal with the 

DHS Security Appeals Board (the Board). The Board consists of three senior-level 

USSS officials. The Board makes decisions by majority vote, and its decisions are 

final. The Board considers each case on its own merits using the Adjudicative 

Guidelines. 

USSS’ Internal Investigation of Misconduct in Cartagena 

In April 2012, USSS employees were in Cartagena, Colombia, preparing for a 

Presidential visit to the Summit of the Americas. While off duty, several USSS 

employees solicited prostitutes. We analyzed the adequacy of USSS’ internal 

investigation of misconduct in Cartagena in our report, Adequacy of USSS’ 

Internal Investigation of Alleged Misconduct in Cartagena, Colombia (OIG-13-24), 

January 2013. We determined that USSS responded expeditiously and 

13 Memo from Stephen Hadley on December 29, 2005, Attachment A: “Revised Adjudicative Guidelines for 

Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information,” Section 2. 14 Memo from Stephen Hadley on December 29, 2005, Attachment A: “Revised Adjudicative Guidelines for 

Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information”; DHS Instruction, 121-01-007, Personnel Suitability and 

Security Program (Revision 00); and USSS Human Resources and Training Manual RPS- 02(02) 

www.oig.dhs.gov 6 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

thoroughly to the allegations. We did not address the disposition of individual 

employee administrative proceedings related to their conduct in Cartagena. 

Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group Report 

In May 2012, in response to the Cartagena incident, the former USSS Director 

established the Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group (PRWG). The 

group was co-chaired by the Directors of the Office of Personnel Management 

and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and had senior 

representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of 

Defense, and USSS. The former Director tasked the PRWG with reviewing USSS’ 

internal controls on professional conduct; benchmarking the agency against the 

best practices of peer organizations; and identifying areas in which the USSS is 

best in class and areas that require improvement. 

The peer organizations that the USSS was benchmarked against include the FBI, 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Joint Special Operations 

Command, a component of the U.S. Special Operations Command, and the 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the Department of State. The PRWG made 17 

recommendations, including recommendations to improve USSS’ disciplinary 

system. USSS accepted these recommendations and created an action plan for 

their implementation. We reviewed the PRWG Report and the associated USSS 

action plan created to meet the working group’s recommendations. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 7 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Results of Review 

We found no evidence that USSS employees frequently engage in behaviors contrary to 

conduct standards or that could cause a security concern. Although some employees 

engaged in certain misconduct during a foreign assignment in Cartagena, we did not 

discover evidence that similar misconduct is widespread throughout the Secret Service. 

Disciplinary and security clearance cases show that, while not widespread, USSS should 

continue to monitor and address excessive alcohol consumption and personal conduct 

within its workforce. USSS is planning to identify and address trends in misconduct 

through the new position of Chief Integrity Officer. 

We conducted a survey of the USSS workforce to obtain employees’ views on 

misconduct and security clearance concerns.15 We also sought to determine the 

adequacy of management controls in place to report misconduct or behaviors that could 

cause a security concern, whether management’s efforts and perceived attitudes 

encourage the reporting of misconduct and behaviors that could cause a security 

concern, and the adequacy of USSS’ process for adjudicating and administering 

discipline and security clearances. We invited 6,447 employees to complete the survey 

electronically; 2,575 employees (39.9 percent) did so. 

Our survey asked USSS employees the extent to which they agreed that violations of any 

law, rule, regulation, or standard of conduct were not tolerated within USSS. While 61 

percent of survey respondents believed management does not tolerate misconduct, 18 

percent of respondents disagreed. 

We also surveyed the USSS workforce to determine whether employees perceive that 

the six behaviors displayed by some employees in Cartagena are prevalent in USSS. Of 

the 2,575 employees who responded to our electronic survey, 2,144 (83 percent) 

indicated they were not aware of USSS employees engaging in 

• Solicitation of prostitutes; 

• Criminal sexual behavior; 

• Other sexual behavior that can cause a security concern; 

• Excessive alcohol consumption that can cause a security concern; 

• Contact with foreign nationals that causes a security concern; and 

• Personal conduct that can cause a security concern. 

USSS policy requires employees to report any behaviors that (1) violate the standards of 

conduct or (2) cause a security concern under the Adjudicative Guidelines. Survey 

15 The survey results in our report are unweighted and represent only USSS employees who completed surveys. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 8 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

responses indicate that employees are knowledgeable of their responsibility to report 

such violations. The majority of electronic survey respondents (84 percent) indicated 

that they would report individuals whom they suspected of violating conduct standards. 

However, of those employees who indicated that they personally observed any of 

several behaviors that could cause a security concern, a small percentage of the 

respondents indicated that they reported the incident. USSS conduct policy requires 

that employees promptly and directly report to USSS’ Office of Professional 

Responsibility (RES), Inspection Division (ISP) or Office of Inspector General (OIG). In 

contrast to policy, 85 percent of electronic survey respondents believe the correct 

process is to report misconduct through their chain of command. 

USSS policy does not define which infractions would, at a minimum, require formal 

discipline. Because a manager’s obligation to contact ERB is based on the manager’s 

intention to administer formal discipline or adverse action, this obligation can be 

interpreted differently, leading to different approaches to misconduct across the 

agency. In addition, it is unclear whether ERB’s current tools are sufficient for 

recommending reasonable and consistent discipline. 

We determined that USSS complied with Federal requirements for an advance written 

notice and a reasonable timeframe for the employee to reply. However, summaries of 

employee oral replies to proposed actions were missing from more than 76 percent of 

the case files reviewed despite Federal law requiring agencies maintain such 

documentation.16 Additionally, written replies were missing from 10 percent of these 

files. 

Although USSS policy states managers must give due consideration to applicable 

mitigating and aggravating circumstances, it does not provide managers guidance on 

how to consider these factors in the majority of cases. USSS policy also states that 

formal disciplinary and adverse actions should be consistent with other such actions 

taken by USSS for similar infractions. ERB maintains historical records of disciplinary and 

adverse actions. Therefore, for a manager to comply with USSS’ principle of consistency, 

the manager should propose and decide discipline in line with what ERB advises is 

consistent with the agency’s past disciplinary actions. In 28 percent of cases reviewed, 

the amount of discipline was outside the range of what ERB had recommended. 

Furthermore, USSS policy does not require managers document their consideration of 

the factors they use in determining the reasonableness of non-appealable disciplinary 

actions. 

16 5 U.S.C. § 7513(e) 

www.oig.dhs.gov 9 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

According to USSS policy, a more severe disciplinary action than would otherwise be 

taken may be imposed upon an employee whenever that employee has previously 

received a written reprimand or a suspension. All prior discipline may be considered 

regardless of when it was administered. However, 55 percent of cases reviewed, the 

employees received a harsher discipline for their subsequent offense. 

USSS often administers penalties that are less severe than the range of recommended 

penalties at other DHS law enforcement components. The PRWG recommended that 

USSS consider establishing a table of penalties. USSS is currently reviewing its discipline 

data to identify common infractions and penalties, as well as other Federal law 

enforcement entities’ tables of penalties. 

We determined that security clearance actions for employees implicated in the 

Cartagena incident were based on facts gathered during the management inquiry in 

Cartagena and the ISP investigation. There was no evidence of bias during the security 

clearance revocation process. 

The Board is the third-level deciding authority for all DHS employees or applicants who 

are determined not to meet the standards for access to classified information. The 

Board is comprised of three USSS officials. Appointments to the Board and the 

composition of the Board have not been made in accordance with current policy. 

We Did Not Discover Evidence that Misconduct or Inappropriate Behavior Is 

Widespread in USSS 

The USSS expects its employees to comply with rules and standards of ethical 

conduct when on or off duty. Employees should also avoid any behavior that 

could cause a security concern under one of the adjudicative guidelines. We 

found no evidence that USSS employees frequently engage in behaviors contrary 

to conduct standards or that could cause a security concern. Although some 

employees engaged in certain misconduct during a foreign assignment in 

Cartagena, we did not find evidence that similar misconduct is widespread 

throughout the Secret Service. We based our conclusions on (1) interviews with 

more than 200 USSS supervisors, managers, and senior officials; (2) an electronic 

survey completed by 2,575 USSS employees, and an in-person survey 

administered to 161 USSS employees; (3) reviews of USSS internal affairs cases; 

(4) analysis of discipline records; and (5) analysis of personnel security records. 

Disciplinary and security clearance cases show that, while not widespread, USSS 

should continue to monitor and address excessive alcohol consumption and 

personal conduct within its workforce. USSS is planning to identify and address 

www.oig.dhs.gov 10 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

trends in misconduct proactively through the new position of Chief Integrity 

Officer. 

Case Data Indicates that USSS Employees Do Not Frequently Engage in 

Behavior that Violates Conduct Standards 

Standards of conduct are documented in various manuals maintained within the 

USSS Directives System and cover areas such as general employee 

responsibilities and ethics; use of government systems and information 

technology; use of social media; use of government vehicles; firearms policies; 

and specific Uniformed Division officer requirements. The policies also include 

post-Cartagena reinforcements of conduct standards and specific guidance 

regarding off duty conduct on foreign assignments. USSS policy dictates that the 

absence of a specific published standard does not mean that such an act is 

condoned, permissible, or would not result in corrective or disciplinary action. 

From January 2004, to February 2013, USSS ERB tracked 824 incidents of 

employee misconduct. Excluding partial-year data from 2013, pending cases and 

cases with incomplete date information, there were 791 misconduct cases 

between 2004 and 2012 (see figure 1). During this period, USSS’ workforce has 

averaged 6,600 employees. 

Figure 1: USSS Misconduct from 2004-2012 

Year USSS Misconduct Cases 

2004 74 

2005 105 

2006 58 

2007 96 

2008 93 

2009 102 

2010 100 

2011 76 

2012 87 

Source: USSS ERB 

www.oig.dhs.gov 11 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

In these 824 cases, ERB specialists identified 963 offenses (some employees 

were charged with more than one offense). However, since ERB specialists do 

not categorize offenses consistently, we grouped the 963 offenses by 14 general 

misconduct categories in tables of penalties used by U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), ICE, and the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) (see figure 

2). 

Figure 2: 963 Offenses by Category 

Attendance and Leave 

Discriminatory/ Disruptive Behavior 

Drugs and Alcohol 

Failure/ Refusal to Follow Orders 

Falsification/Dishonesty/Misstatement 

Inquiries and Investigations 

Integrity and Ethics 

Neglect of Duty 

Personal Appearance and Hygiene/Uniform 

Property Misuse/Loss/Damage 

Reporting Responsibilities 

Safety/Security/Health 

Unauthorized Takings or Possession 

Weapons 74 

4 

24 

10 

165 

1 

68 

23 

39 

91 

37 

113 

57 

Source: USSS ERB provided offense data which OIG grouped into the categories shown. 

In the past nine years, USSS has characterized offenses as Neglect of Duty (257 

offenses) more often than other categories. Specific offenses under Neglect of 

Duty can include: 

•	 delay in carrying out orders; 

•	 failure to follow applicable laws, rules or regulations; 

•	 sleeping on the job; 

•	 inattention to duty; 

•	 negligent or careless performance of assigned duties; and 

•	 intentional or reckless disregard of rules governing arrests, searches, or 

seizures. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 12	 OIG-14-20 

257 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Security Clearance Data Indicates USSS Employees Do Not Frequently Engage in 

Behavior that Causes a Security Concern 

From January 2004 to February 2013, SCD suspended security clearances 195 

times as a result of derogatory information received about employee behavior 

related to an adjudicative guideline. Excluding partial-year data from 2013, this is 

an average of 21 suspensions per year. After SCD evaluated the information, it 

reinstated 64 security clearances, revoked 67 security clearances, and sustained 

64 suspended clearances. A security clearance can remain suspended if an 

employee’s access to classified information is under review, or if the employee 

leaves USSS while his or her clearance was suspended. During the same period, 

SCD also issued 67 security clearance warning letters to employees. These letters 

explain that future incidents of a similar nature may result in a security clearance 

revocation. 

Our conclusion that USSS employees do not frequently engage in behavior that 

causes a security concern is based on suspension data provided by SCD. The 

information in figure 3 does not reflect those instances when SCD was informed 

by someone who believed they had derogatory information about an employee, 

and SCD determined that the information was not a potential security concern. 

SCD does not track that information. 

Figure 3: USSS Security Clearance Actions from 2004-2012 

Year USSS Security Clearance USSS Security Clearance 

Suspensions Warnings 

2004 4 0 

2005 18 0 

2006 14 0 

2007 13 5 

2008 13 5 

2009 19 6 

2010 22 9 

2011 37 11 

2012 45 28 

Source: USSS SCD 

Note: We excluded SCD actions from 2013. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 13 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figures 4 and 5 show how often reported employee behaviors caused a security 

concern under the 13 adjudicative guidelines. 

Figure 4: Use of Adjudicative Guidelines for 195 Security Clearance Suspensions 

Allegiance to the United States 

Foreign Influence 

Foreign Preference 

Sexual Behavior 

Personal Conduct 

Financial Considerations 

Alcohol Consumption 

Drug Involvement 

Psychological Conditions 

Criminal Conduct 

Handling Protected Information 

Outside Activities 

Use of Information Technology Systems 

Source: USSS SCD 

Note: Total Adjudicative Guidelines used exceeded 195 because a suspension can be based on more than 

one Adjudicative Guideline. 

15 

0 

8 

79 

47 

5 

26 

25 

122 

21 

2 

17 

0 

www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 5: Use of Adjudicative Guidelines for 67 Security Clearance Warnings 

Allegiance to the United States 

Foreign Influence 

Foreign Preference 

Sexual Behavior 

Personal Conduct 

Financial Considerations 

Alcohol Consumption 

Drug Involvement 

Psychological Conditions 

Criminal Conduct 

Handling Protected Information 

Outside Activities 

Use of Information Technology Systems 15 

0 

13 

17 

1 

0 

21 

6 

3 

0 

3 

0 

25 

Source: USSS SCD 

Note: Total Adjudicative Guidelines used exceeded 67 because a warning can be based on more than one 

Adjudicative Guideline. 

In April 2012, USSS employees were in Cartagena, Colombia, preparing for a 

Presidential visit to the Summit of the Americas. While off duty, several USSS 

employees drank heavily and solicited female foreign national prostitutes. After 

(1) reviewing ISP records and other allegations; (2) reviewing security clearance 

data; (3) surveying USSS employees; and (4) interviewing USSS employees, we 

did not find evidence that the behavior exhibited in Cartagena is widespread in 

USSS. 

We reviewed ISP’s records and other allegations to determine whether other 

employees have engaged in solicitation of prostitutes. ISP’s records did identify 

instances of related behaviors. Because of how matters are reported to ISP (we 

discuss this further on page 45), we were unable to confirm that these instances 

represent a comprehensive account of all alleged or confirmed activities related 

to sexual contact in exchange for money. 

We also analyzed security clearance data to determine the extent to which USSS 

employees have engaged in behavior that can cause a concern under the 

www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Adjudicative Guidelines. Based on derogatory information obtained during USSS’ 

preliminary fact-finder and investigation of the Cartagena incident, USSS 

considered the following four Adjudicative Guidelines to evaluate the security 

clearances of employees implicated in the Cartagena incident: 

• Guideline B: Foreign Influence; 

• Guideline D: Sexual Behavior; 

• Guideline E: Personal Conduct; and 

• Guideline G: Alcohol Consumption. 

Because the USSS may have disciplined employees in the past for behaviors 

similar to those exhibited in Cartagena, we examined ERB disciplinary records 

and misconduct cases to identify prior instances of misconduct that involved 

alcohol or sex. 

We also surveyed the USSS workforce to determine whether employees perceive 

that the following specific behaviors that are contained within the four 

Adjudicative Guidelines listed above are prevalent in USSS: 

• Solicitation of prostitutes; 

• Criminal sexual behavior; 

• Other sexual behavior that can cause a security concern; 

• Excessive alcohol consumption that can cause a security concern; 

• Contact with foreign nationals that causes a security concern; and 

• Personal conduct that can cause a security concern. 

Respondents answered a minimum of 34 questions regarding their awareness of 

these behaviors. Of the 2,575 employees who responded to our electronic 

survey, 2,144 (83 percent) indicated they were not aware of USSS employees 

engaging in these behaviors. For the in-person survey, 95 out of 161 respondents 

(59 percent) indicated they were not aware of these behaviors. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 6: Electronic Survey Results - USSS Employees’ Awareness of Behaviors 

[Respondents indicating awareness of any behavior could select more than one] 

Solicitation of Prostitution 

Criminal Sexual Behavior Other than Solicitation 

Other Sexual Behavior 

Excessive Alcohol Consumption 

Contact with Foreign Nationals 

Personal Conduct 

No Awareness of These Behaviors 

247 

116 

269 

153 

50 

207 

2,144 

Source: OIG electronic survey results for Question 28 

In addition, we interviewed more than 200 USSS supervisors, managers, and 

senior officials. The results of our fieldwork as they relate to each of the six 

behaviors we measured are discussed below. 

Solicitation of Prostitutes 

According to the Adjudicative Desk Reference, solicitation of prostitutes involves 

offering or agreeing to pay for a sex act.17 Our review of internal affairs records 

and the electronic and in-person survey indicated solicitation of prostitutes is 

isolated in USSS. 

Review of Internal Affairs Records and Allegations 

We verified 14 instances where USSS employees engaged in sexual activity in 

exchange for money. 

•	 Based on evidence from ISP’s investigation into the Cartagena incident, 

10 employees had sexual contact with a foreign national in exchange for 

money (see appendix G for additional details).18 

•	 A special agent, who solicited a prostitute in Cartagena, 

admitted to OIG investigators that he solicited prostitutes
 

17 The Adjudicative Desk Reference for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information is a job aid created 

by the Department of Defense to assist in identifying and evaluating behaviors and circumstances that are relevant to 

security decisions. 

18 In addition, one employee retracted an admission made to polygraph examiners that he vaguely remembered 

discussing payment for sex with the prostitute. He 

www.oig.dhs.gov 17	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

• A Uniformed Division officer attempted to solicit an 

in 2008 in Washington, DC. The officer resigned from the agency 

in 

•	 A Uniformed Division officer solicited a prostitute in 2013 while 

 USSS revoked the officer’s security clearance. 

In addition, we learned of four cases of alleged misconduct related to 

prostitution. Three cases were not substantiated and USSS did not adequately 

investigate the fourth. 

•	 The media reported an allegation involving the solicitation of prostitutes 

by USSS employees in El Salvador in 2011. A 2012 USSS investigation 

concluded that the allegation was unfounded. 

•	 ISP investigated an allegation that an
 

harassed 
 and attempted to coerce 

. 

•	 During OIG’s investigation of misconduct in Cartagena, employees alleged 

that a senior official had sexual contact with a female foreign national 

(FFN) while in Colombia for the 2012 Summit of the Americas. The senior 

official denied these allegations when questioned by OIG investigators. 

•	 An employee while on a protective-duty 

assignment in in 2010. We heard allegations that he may have 

engaged in solicitation while We did not find evidence that 

prostitutes were involved; however, USSS did not fully investigate this 

matter. We discuss this case in more detail on page 45. 

Electronic Survey Results 

Electronic and in-person survey respondents do not believe the solicitation of 

prostitutes is widespread in USSS. Out of 2,575 electronic survey respondents, 

207 respondents (8 percent) indicated they were aware of USSS employees 

engaging in solicitation of prostitutes. Of the 207 respondents, 19 indicated they 

personally observed this behavior.19 Figure 7 shows how respondents became 

aware of this behavior. 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

19 We referred information about these survey responses to OIG’s Office of Investigations. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 18	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 7: Survey respondent indications of how they became aware of solicitation of prostitutes in USSS 

[More than one could be selected] 

Electronic In Person 

I have personally observed this behavior 

I learned about this behavior from 

the person who engaged in it 

I learned about this behavior from 

a person who observed it 

I learned about this behavior from 

someone who reported it to me 

I learned about this behavior 

as part of my official duties 

I learned about this behavior 

through official USSS communication 

I learned about this behavior from 

the media or another public source 

I learned about this behavior 

through a casual conversation that I considered gossip 

Other 2 

20 

42 

19 

5 

3 

3 

7 

86 

55 

47 

19 

47 

24 

19 

0 

0 

Source: OIG electronic and in-person survey results for Question 28a (solicitation of prostitutes) 

Of the 19 respondents who personally observed solicitation of prostitutes, 14 

(74 percent) indicated the behavior occurred during a protective assignment. 

When asked to describe their perception of USSS employees engaging in the 

solicitation of prostitutes, 112 of the 207 respondents (54 percent) indicated the 

behavior was isolated (see figure 8). 

www.oig.dhs.gov 19 OIG-14-20 

159 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 8: Electronic Survey - USSS Employees’ Perception of Behaviors 

Solicitation of Prostitution 

Criminal Sexual Behavior Other 

than Solicitation 

Other Sexual Behavior 

Contact w/Foreign Nationals 

Excessive Alcohol Consumption 

Personal Conduct 

102 

103 

66 

59 

32 

108 

38 

64 

12 

74 

37 

54 

12 

30 

6 

21 

112 

Number of Respondents 

who Believe the Behavior 

is Systemic 

Number of Respondents 

who Believe the Behavior 

is More than Isolated but 

Less than Systemic 

Number of Respondents 

who Believe the Behavior 

112 is Isolated 

Source: OIG electronic survey results for Question 28e (all behaviors) 

In-Person Survey Results 

Of 161 in-person respondents, 44 (27 percent) indicated that they were aware of 

USSS employees engaging in solicitation of prostitutes. Of these 44 respondents, 

42 (95 percent), learned about USSS employees engaging in solicitation through 

the news, media, or another public source. None of the in-person respondents 

personally observed the solicitation of prostitutes. 

In-person survey respondents who indicated an awareness of solicitation of 

prostitutes were asked to describe their perception of the behavior in the USSS. 

Forty-two of the 44 respondents (95 percent) believe solicitation is isolated. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 20 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Criminal Sexual Behavior Other than Solicitation 

According to the Adjudicative Desk Reference, criminal sexual behavior can 

include rape; incest; sexual relations with children; possession of child 

pornography; voyeurism; exhibitionism; obscene phone calls; and sexual 

harassment. Few survey respondents were aware of criminal sexual behavior 

other than solicitation. 

Review of Internal Affairs Records and Allegations 

USSS provided a list of all special investigations, fact finders and complaints 

between January 2004 and February 2013. We were unable to identify the 

prevalence of investigations of criminal sexual behavior in USSS from this data 

alone. 

Electronic Survey Results 

The results of our electronic survey showed that of all behaviors listed, 

respondents were least aware of criminal sexual behavior other than solicitation 

(see figure 6). Fifty of 2,575 respondents (2 percent) were aware of USSS 

employees engaging in criminal sexual behavior other than solicitation. Of the 50 

respondents, 4 indicated they personally observed this behavior.20 Figure 9 

shows how respondents became aware of this behavior. 

20 We referred information about these survey responses to OIG’s Office of Investigations. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 21 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 9: Survey respondent indications of how they became aware of criminal sexual behavior other 


than solicitation
 

[More than one could be selected]
 

Electronic In Person 

I have personally observed this behavior 

I learned about this behavior from 

the person who engaged in it 

I learned about this behavior from 

a person who observed it 

I learned about this behavior from 

someone who reported it to me 

I learned about this behavior 

as part of my official duties 

I learned about this behavior 

through official USSS communication 

I learned about this behavior from 

the media or another public source 

I learned about this behavior 

through a casual conversation that I considered gossip 

Other 

7 

8 

1 

1 

1 

1 

3 

21 

6 

18 

3 

10 

5 

4 

0 

0 

0 

23 

Source: OIG electronic and in-person survey results for Question 28a (criminal sexual behavior other than 

solicitation) 

Of the four respondents who personally observed criminal sexual behavior other 

than solicitation, three indicated the behavior occurred during a protective 

assignment. When asked their perception of USSS employees engaging in 

criminal sexual behavior, 32 out of the 50 electronic survey respondents (64 

percent) believed this behavior is isolated within USSS (see figure 8). 

www.oig.dhs.gov 22 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

In-Person Survey Results 

Of 161 in-person survey respondents, 12 (8 percent) indicated they were aware 

of USSS employees engaging in criminal sexual behavior other than prostitution. 

No respondents indicated they personally observed criminal sexual behavior 

other than solicitation. All 12 respondents perceived the behavior as isolated 

within the USSS. 

Other Sexual Behavior that Causes a Security Concern 

According to the Adjudicative Desk Reference, sexual behavior is a security 

concern when the behavior reflects lack of judgment or discretion, or subjects 

the individual to undue influence or coercion, exploitation or duress. Security 

clearance files and electronic and in-person survey results indicate that this 

category of sexual behavior occurs very infrequently within USSS. 

Security Clearance File Review 

Of the 195 instances where SCD suspended an employee’s security clearance, 

21 (11 percent) involved sexual behavior that could cause a security concern. 

Of these 21 cases, 15 (71 percent) either led to a revocation or continued 

suspension. Of the 67 instances where SCD issued a warning to an employee, 

3 (4 percent) involved sexual behavior that could cause security concerns. 

Discipline Data Review 

Misconduct cases in the ERB database involving sex were a small percentage of 

total misconduct from 2004 through 2013. Of the 751 ERB misconduct cases 

where there was enough information to determine whether sexual misconduct 

was involved, 53 cases (7 percent) involved sexual misconduct. 

Electronic Survey Results 

Survey results showed that 153 respondents out of 2,575 (6 percent) were aware 

of USSS employees engaging in other sexual behavior that causes security 

concerns. Of the 153 respondents, 38 (25 percent) indicated they personally 

observed the behavior. Figure 10 shows how respondents became aware of this 

behavior. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 23 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 10: Survey respondent indications of how they became aware of other sexual behavior that can 


cause a security concern
 

[More than one could be selected]
 

Electronic In Person 

I have personally observed this behavior 

I learned about this behavior from 

the person who engaged in it 

I learned about this behavior from 

a person who observed it 

I learned about this behavior from 

someone who reported it to me 

I learned about this behavior 

as part of my official duties 

I learned about this behavior 

through official USSS communication 

I learned about this behavior from 

the media or another public source 

I learned about this behavior 

through a casual conversation that I considered gossip 

Other 1 

7 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

9 

47 

19 

34 

20 

60 

41 

38 

0 

0 

Source: OIG electronic and in-person survey results for Question 28a (other sexual behavior that causes a 

security concern) 

Of the 38 respondents who personally observed other sexual behavior that could 

cause a security concern, 29 (76 percent) indicated the behavior occurred during 

a protective assignment. Of the 153 respondents, 59 (39 percent) believed the 

behavior is isolated within USSS, and 30 (20 percent) respondents believed the 

behavior is systemic (see figure 8). 

In-Person Survey Results 

In-person survey respondents were least aware of other sexual behavior that 

causes security concerns. Nine respondents (6 percent) indicated an awareness 

of the behavior. Of these, one respondent personally observed the behavior. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 24 OIG-14-20 

79 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Excessive Alcohol Consumption 

According to the Adjudicative Desk Reference, excessive alcohol consumption is 

a security concern when it leads to impaired judgment or the failure to control 

impulses, and can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and 

trustworthiness. Security clearance data and electronic and in-person survey 

results indicate excessive alcohol consumption is not widespread in USSS. 

However, USSS survey respondents expressed a greater awareness of excessive 

alcohol consumption in comparison to the other five categories of behavior that 

we measured. Of the 269 survey respondents who indicated awareness of 

excessive alcohol consumption, 138 personally observed it. 

USSS officials told us that excessive alcohol consumption by employees often 

leads to questionable judgment and misconduct. For example, USSS’ 

investigation into the activities of 13 employees in Cartagena revealed they 

consumed between 2 to 13 alcoholic beverages before engaging in questionable 

behavior. After the Cartagena incident, USSS officials took steps to address onand off-duty alcohol consumption by enhancing USSS’ policy. USSS policy now 

states that while on a temporary duty assignment, alcohol may only be 

consumed in moderate amounts while off duty. Also, USSS extended the period 

before duty that employees must abstain from alcohol from 6 to 10 hours. 

Furthermore, alcohol cannot be consumed at the protectee’s hotel once the 

protective visit has begun. 

Security Case File Review 

Of the 195 instances where SCD suspended an employee’s security clearance, 

26 (13 percent) involved excessive alcohol consumption. Of these, 15 cases 

(58 percent) resulted in a revocation or continued suspension. Of the 67 

instances where SCD issued a warning, 21 (31 percent) involved alcohol 

consumption. 

Discipline Data Review 

Misconduct cases in the ERB database involving alcohol were a small percentage 

of total misconduct from 2004 through 2013. Of the 751 ERB misconduct cases 

where there was enough information to determine whether alcohol was 

involved, 62 (8 percent) involved alcohol. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 25 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Electronic Survey Results 

Excessive alcohol consumption was the most identified behavior in the electronic 

survey (see figure 6). Of the 2,575 respondents, 269 (10 percent) indicated they 

were aware of USSS employees engaging in excessive alcohol consumption. Of 

the 269 respondents, 138 (51 percent) indicated they personally observed 

excessive alcohol consumption. Figure 11 shows how respondents became 

aware of this behavior. 

Figure 11: Survey respondent indications of how they became aware of alcohol consumption that can 


cause a security concern
 

[More than one could be selected]
 

Electronic In Person 

I have personally observed this behavior 

I learned about this behavior from 

the person who engaged in it 

I learned about this behavior from 

a person who observed it 

I learned about this behavior from 

someone who reported it to me 

I learned about this behavior 

as part of my official duties 

I learned about this behavior 

through official USSS communication 

I learned about this behavior from 

the media or another public source 

I learned about this behavior 

through a casual conversation that I considered gossip 

Other 

23 

23 

9 

3 

2 

18 

8 

15 

8 

120 

110 

34 

48 

39 

129 

73 

0 

Source: OIG electronic and in-person survey results for Question 28a (excessive alcohol consumption that 

causes a security concern) 

www.oig.dhs.gov 26 OIG-14-20 

138 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Of the 138 respondents who personally observed excessive alcohol 

consumption, 100 (73 percent) indicated the behavior occurred during a 

protective assignment. Of the 269 respondents who were aware of excessive 

alcohol consumption, 103 (38 percent) believe the behavior is isolated; 112 (42 

percent) believe the behavior is more than isolated but less than systemic; and 

54 respondents (20 percent) believe the behavior is systemic (see figure 8). 

In-Person Survey Results 

Of the 161 in-person respondents, 40 (25 percent) indicated they were aware of 

excessive alcohol consumption. Of these, 15 (38 percent) personally observed 

this behavior. 

Contact with Foreign Nationals 

According to the Adjudicative Desk Reference, contact with foreign nationals is a 

security concern when the contact creates a heightened risk of foreign 

exploitation, manipulation, pressure, or coercion. Security clearance data and 

electronic and in-person survey results do not indicate this behavior is 

widespread. 

Security Clearance File Review 

Of the 195 instances where SCD suspended an employee’s security clearance, 

17 cases (9 percent) involved foreign influence. Of the 17 cases, 13 cases (76 

percent) resulted in the revocation or continued suspension of an employee’s 

security clearance. Furthermore, of the 67 instances where SCD issued a warning 

to an employee, 3 instances (4 percent) involved foreign influence. 

Electronic Survey Results 

Respondents to our electronic survey indicated that 116 respondents out of 

2,575 (5 percent) were aware of USSS employees engaging in contact with 

foreign nationals that cause security concerns (see figure 6). Of the 116 

respondents, 17 (15 percent) personally observed the behavior. Figure 12 shows 

how respondents became aware of this behavior. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 27 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

Figure 12: Survey respondent indications of how they became aware of contact with foreign nationals 


that can cause a security concern
 

[More than one could be selected]
 

Electronic In Person 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

I have personally observed this behavior 

I learned about this behavior from 

the person who engaged in it 

I learned about this behavior from 

a person who observed it 

I learned about this behavior from 

someone who reported it to me 

I learned about this behavior 

as part of my official duties 

I learned about this behavior 

through official USSS communication 

I learned about this behavior from 

the media or another public source 

I learned about this behavior 

through a casual conversation that I considered gossip 

Other 2 

11 

10 

7 

1 

1 

1 

1 

6 

49 

16 

32 

11 

27 

25 

17 

0 

Source: OIG electronic and in-person survey results for Question 28a (contact with foreign nationals that 

causes a security concern) 

Of the 17 respondents who personally observed contact with foreign nationals 

that caused a security concern, 15 (88 percent) indicated the behavior occurred 

during a protective assignment. When asked their perception of USSS employees 

engaging in contact with foreign nationals that cause security concerns, 66 out of 

the 116 electronically surveyed (57 percent) believe this behavior is isolated 

within USSS (see figure 8). 

www.oig.dhs.gov 28 OIG-14-20 

51 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

In-Person Survey Results 

Eighteen of 161 in-person respondents (11 percent) said they were aware of the 

behavior. All 18 respondents believe contact with foreign nationals that causes a 

security concern is isolated within the USSS. 

Personal Conduct 

According to the Adjudicative Desk Reference, personal conduct is a security 

concern when it involves questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or 

unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, including standards of 

conduct. Security clearance data, as well as electronic and in-person survey 

results, indicate that personal conduct that can cause a security concern has 

occurred infrequently in USSS. 

Security Clearance File Review 

Personal conduct was the adjudicative guideline SCD cited most frequently when 

suspending employees’ clearances or providing written warnings about their 

behavior. Of the 195 instances where SCD suspended an employee’s Top Secret 

security clearance to review his or her access to classified information, 122 (63 

percent) described personal conduct that could cause security concerns. Of 

these, 95 cases (78 percent) resulted in a revocation or continued suspension. 

Of the 67 instances where SCD issued a warning to an employee, 25 (37 percent) 

described personal conduct that could cause security concerns. 

Electronic Survey Results 

Although the electronic and in-person surveys indicate personal conduct that 

causes a security concern as one of the most identified behaviors, employees 

who responded to our survey do not feel that this behavior is common. Of the 

2,575 respondents, 247 (10 percent) were aware of USSS engaging in personal 

conduct that could cause a security concern (see figure 6). When asked how they 

became aware of the personal conduct that caused a security concern, 102 of 

247 respondents (41 percent) personally observed this behavior. Figure 13 

shows how the respondents became aware of this behavior. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 29 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 13: Survey respondent indications of how they became aware of personal conduct that can cause 


a security concern
 

[More than one could be selected]
 

Electronic In Person 

I have personally observed this behavior 

I learned about this behavior from 

the person who engaged in it 

I learned about this behavior from 

a person who observed it 

I learned about this behavior from 

someone who reported it to me 

I learned about this behavior 

as part of my official duties 

I learned about this behavior 

through official USSS communication 

I learned about this behavior from 

the media or another public source 

I learned about this behavior 

through a casual conversation that I considered gossip 

Other 1 

9 

2 

2 

1 

3 

5 

2 

6 

26 

67 

33 

62 

42 

108 

67 

102 

Source: OIG electronic and in-person survey results for Question 28a (personal conduct that causes a 

security concern) 

Of the 102 respondents who personally observed this behavior, 56 respondents 

(55 percent) indicated the behavior did not occur during a protective 

assignment, while 46 respondents (45 percent) indicated that it did. Of the 247 

respondents, 102 respondents (41 percent) believe the behavior is isolated 

within USSS (see figure 8). 

In-Person Survey Results 

Twelve of 161 in-person respondents (7 percent) indicated awareness of 

personal conduct which could cause a security concern. Six said they personally 

observed personal conduct that can cause a security concern. Nine (75 percent) 

www.oig.dhs.gov 30 OIG-14-20 

117 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

believe the behavior is isolated within USSS. 

USSS Is Planning To Identify and Address Trends in Misconduct 

More Aggressively 

The PRWG recommended that USSS establish a separate office reporting to the 

Director on issues of integrity and professional standards. The PRWG envisioned 

this office assessing risk to professional standards and developing plans to 

mitigate this risk. For example, the PRWG suggested that USSS evaluate how 

team formation, operation, and leadership provide opportunities for misconduct 

on protective assignments. 

In response, USSS assigned a Chief Integrity Officer to lead the new Office of 

Integrity. Although USSS has not formalized its roles and responsibilities, USSS 

management expects the Chief Integrity Officer will conduct risk assessments to 

identify emerging trends or unique disciplinary cases that USSS management 

feels must be addressed. The Chief Integrity Officer would create education 

campaigns to address those conduct issues. The Chief Integrity Officer may have 

difficulty conducting risks assessments because information about misconduct 

resides in several offices throughout USSS. 

Survey Respondents Have Varying Perceptions of Whether Management 

Tolerates Misconduct and Holds Employees Accountable 

Our survey asked USSS employees the extent to which they agreed that 

violations of any law, rule, regulation, or standard of conduct were not tolerated 

within USSS. While a majority of survey respondents believed management does 

not tolerate misconduct, a noteworthy number of employees disagreed. 

Of the 2,575 electronic survey respondents, 1,575 (61 percent) indicated that 

such violations are not tolerated. Of the 161 in-person respondents, 126 (78 

percent) said they do not believe they are tolerated. Conversely, 463 electronic 

survey respondents (18 percent), and 15 in-person respondents (9 percent) 

believe management tolerates violations of misconduct. Of the 463 respondents, 

89 were supervisors. 

Our survey also asked USSS employees the extent to which they agreed that 

employees in various occupational specialties are held accountable if they 

engage in misconduct or illegal activities. Similar numbers of electronic survey 

respondents believe that special agents (1,599 or 62 percent), Uniformed 

Division officers (1,587 or 62 percent), and administrative, professional, and 

www.oig.dhs.gov 31 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

technical support employees (1,565 or 61 percent) are held accountable. Fewer 

respondents believe that senior managers (1,285 or 50 percent) and supervisors 

(1,410 or 55 percent) are held accountable. 

High percentages of in-person survey respondents perceive that most employees 

are held accountable if they engage in misconduct or illegal activity. Fewer inperson respondents felt that administrative, professional, and technical support 

employees are held accountable: 

•	 103 of 161 respondents (64 percent) believe senior managers are held 

accountable; 

•	 124 (77 percent) believe supervisors are held accountable; 

•	 110 (68 percent) believe special agents are held accountable; 

•	 131 (81 percent) believe Uniformed Division officers are held 


accountable; and 


•	 93 (58 percent) believe administrative, professional, and technical
 

support employees are held accountable. 


Using demographic data from our survey, we separated supervisors’ responses 

from non-supervisors’. Figure 14 illustrates the percentage of electronic survey 

respondents’ (supervisors and non-supervisors) who perceive individuals in each 

occupational series are not held accountable when they engage in misconduct or 

illegal activity. A low percentage of both supervisors and non-supervisors felt 

that administrative, professional, and technical support employees and 

Uniformed Division officers are not held accountable when they engage in 

misconduct or illegal activity. However, higher percentages of both supervisors 

and non-supervisors believe that supervisors and senior managers are not held 

accountable. For example, one in every five non-supervisor respondents believes 

that supervisors are not held accountable. Almost one in every five respondents 

who is a supervisor believes that senior managers are not held accountable. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 32	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

Figure 14: Percentage of respondents who believe the following occupational specialties and managerial levels are 

not held accountable when they engage in misconduct or illegal activity, by response of supervisors and nonsupervisors. 

Supervisory Respondents Non-Supervisory Respondents 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Administrative, Professional & Technical Support 

Uniformed Division Officers 

Special Agents 

Supervisors 

Senior Managers 24% 

22% 

13% 

3% 

6% 

19% 

14% 

9% 

3% 

4% 

Source: OIG electronic survey results for Questions 6-10 

Survey results show a noteworthy number of respondents who perceive that (1) 

management tolerates misconduct (463), and (2) senior managers in the 

organization are not held accountable (587). Individual interviewees gave 

insights into this segment of the workforce’s perceptions that management 

fosters an environment that tolerates misconduct. For example, a supervisory 

special Agent stated that he was aware of instances of underreporting 

misconduct and misconduct that was not addressed adequately by the agency. 

Another employee told us that “disciplinary cases are always handled differently, 

and that the manner in which a misconduct case is managed depends on who 

you are and who you know.” 

Survey results suggest that the majority of employees trust their supervisor to 

respond appropriately to reported misconduct. Asked whether they trust their 

immediate supervisor to respond appropriately to reported misconduct, 1,967 

electronic survey respondents (76 percent) and 138 in-person respondents (86 

percent) indicated that they do trust their immediate supervisor. Supervisors, 

managers, and senior leaders we interviewed at USSS headquarters and in field 

offices described how they have responded, or would respond, if alleged 

misconduct was brought to their attention. However, they pointed out that 

www.oig.dhs.gov 33 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

there are valid reasons why the disciplinary process may not seem transparent 

to those not involved in it. The challenge for supervisors in demonstrating 

accountability to those employees who do not trust them—269 electronic survey 

respondents (10 percent) and 8 in-person respondents (5 percent) indicated they 

do not trust their immediate supervisor to respond to reported misconduct—is 

that they may not openly discuss how they respond to instances of misconduct. 

The PRWG recommended USSS take every opportunity to reinforce the core 

values of the agency to promote an atmosphere where misconduct is not 

tolerated. In response to this recommendation, USSS implemented an annual 

Director’s Award recognizing employees who represent agency values. The 

agency is also developing a messaging campaign that draws upon USSS history to 

reinforce core values. 

In addition, based on a PRWG recommendation, USSS was considering whether 

to publish disciplinary outcomes, and if so, how. USSS senior leadership stated 

that USSS has the challenge of balancing the workforce’s apparent need to know 

disciplinary outcomes with privacy concerns, especially given the small size of 

the agency relative to other law enforcement agencies such as FBI. Our survey 

showed that some employees perceive that USSS tolerates misconduct, does not 

hold employees accountable, and does not take appropriate action against 

supervisors and senior managers. These announcements would aid USSS’ 

credibility in responding to reported misconduct and remind the workforce of 

the consequences of engaging in misconduct. 

Survey Respondents Believe that Supervisors Respond Appropriately to 

Behavior that Causes a Security Concern 

Our survey also included questions related to USSS’ response to reports of 

misconduct or behaviors that cause a security concern, and the consequences of 

those behaviors. Of the 2,575 electronic survey respondents, 2,094 (81 percent) 

indicated they trust their immediate supervisor to respond appropriately to 

security concerns. Similarly, of the 161 in-person survey respondents, 139 (86 

percent) indicated they trust their immediate supervisor to respond 

appropriately to security concerns regarding a USSS employee. 

Electronic survey results indicate that respondents believe USSS takes 

appropriate action if individuals in various occupational specialties engage in 

behavior that causes a security concern. For example, 1,542 out of 2,575 

respondents (60 percent) believe that USSS takes appropriate action if a special 

agent engages in behavior that causes a security concern. Electronic survey 

www.oig.dhs.gov 34 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

respondents provided similar responses for USSS’ managerial levels. For 

example, 1,381 out of 2,575 respondents (54 percent) believe that USSS takes 

appropriate action if a supervisor engages in behavior that causes a security 

concern. Figure 15 further illustrates whether survey respondents believed that 

individuals in various occupational specialties were held accountable for 

behavior that causes a security concern. 

Figure 15: Percent of electronic survey respondents who believe USSS takes appropriate action if employees in 

specific occupational specialties and managerial levels engage in behavior that causes a security concern. 

Positive Neutral Negative Do Not Know 

Admnistrative, Professional 

& Technical Support 

Uniformed Division Officers 

Special Agents 

Supervisors 

Senior Managers 49% 18% 13% 20% 

54% 

60% 15% 9% 

57% 13% 3% 27% 

57% 15% 4% 24% 

17% 12% 

16% 

Source: OIG survey results for Questions 21-25 

In-person survey responses were similar: 

•	 96 of 161 respondents (60 percent) believe senior managers are held 

accountable; 

•	 119 respondents (74 percent) believe supervisors are held accountable; 

•	 100 respondents (62 percent) believe special agents are held
 

accountable;
 

•	 121 respondents (75 percent) believe Uniformed Division officers are 

held accountable; and 

•	 82 respondents (51 percent) believe administrative, professional, and 

technical support employees are held accountable. 

Also of note, is the percentage of respondents who are supervisors who believe 

that supervisors and senior managers are not held accountable if they engage in 

behavior that causes a security concern (9 and 11 percent, respectively). Figure 

16 illustrates the perceptions of supervisors and non-supervisors as to whether 

USSS takes appropriate action when employees in specific occupational 

www.oig.dhs.gov 35	 OIG-14-20 

17% 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

specialties engage in behavior that causes a security concern. 

Figure 16: Percent of electronic survey respondents who believe USSS does not take appropriate action when 

employees in specific occupational specialties and managerial levels engage in behavior that causes a security 

concern, by response of supervisors and non-supervisors. 

Supervisory Respondents Non-Supervisory Respondents 

Administrative, Professional & Technical Support 

Uniformed Division Officer 

Special Agents 

Supervisors 

Senior Managers 

Source: OIG survey results for Questions 21-25 

Survey Results for Reporting Inappropriate Behaviors Related to Conduct 

Standards and Adjudicative Guidelines 

14% 

13% 

9% 

3% 

4% 

11% 

9% 

6% 

3% 

3% 

All DHS employees, including those in USSS, are required to report suspicions of 

violations of law or regulation to the DHS Office of Inspector General or the 

appropriate offices in their agency. 21 In USSS, the appropriate office is RES ISP. 

Further, USSS policy requires its employees to report any behaviors that could 

cause a security concern under the Adjudicative Guidelines to SCD. Survey 

responses indicate that employees are knowledgeable of their responsibility to 

report such violations. The majority of all electronic and in-person survey 

respondents (87 and 94 percent, respectively) confirmed their knowledge of how 

to report misconduct. The majority of survey respondents indicated that they 

would report individuals whom they suspected of violating conduct standards. 

However, respondents indicated that they did not report personally observed 

behaviors that could cause a security concern 80 percent of the time. USSS must 

ensure that employees understand the importance of reporting misconduct and 

21 Management Directive 0810.1 Section V(B)

www.oig.dhs.gov 36 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

behaviors that cause a security concern, and are able to do so without fear of 

reprisal. 

Our survey results showed that 2,316 of 2,736 total survey respondents (85 

percent) indicated they would report coworkers or managers whom they suspect 

of violating conduct standards. In addition, 2,485 of 2,736 total survey 

respondents (91 percent) indicated they would report coworkers or managers 

whom they suspected were engaged in behaviors that could cause a security 

concern. 

As discussed on page 16, USSS’ Security Clearance Division used 4 of the 13 

Adjudicative Guidelines to evaluate the security clearances for those employees 

involved in the Cartagena incident. Our survey asked employees about their 

awareness of six specific behaviors contained under the four guidelines: 

solicitation of prostitutes; criminal sexual behavior other than solicitation; other 

sexual behavior; personal conduct; contact with foreign nationals; and excessive 

alcohol consumption. Our survey asked employees how they became aware of 

the behaviors. Those respondents who indicated that they personally observed 

the behaviors that could cause a security concern were also asked whether they 

reported the behavior. These respondents indicated they reported 69 of 341 

such behaviors, or 20 percent of the time (see figure 17). 

Figure 17: Reporting of Personally Observed Behaviors that Caused a Security Concern 

Electronic Survey Respondents In-Person Survey Respondents 

Behavior that caused a security Personally Personally 

concern Observed the Reported the Observed the Reported the 

Behavior Behavior Behavior Behavior 

Solicitation of Prostitutes 19 0 0 N/A 

Criminal Sexual Behavior Other 

than Solicitation 4 1 0 N/A 

Other Sexual Behavior 38 6 1 1 

Excessive Alcohol Consumption 138 20 15 1 

Contact with Foreign Nationals 17 3 1 0 

Personal Conduct 102 34 6 3 

Total 318 64 23 5 

Source: OIG electronic and in-person survey results for Questions 28a and b (all behaviors) 

www.oig.dhs.gov 37 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

If respondents indicated they did not report the behavior, our survey asked the 

respondents to select the reason(s) why they did not report it. The reasons 

respondents cited most frequently for not reporting the behaviors were (1) they 

did not believe management was supportive of employees reporting these types 

of behaviors; (2) the behavior occurred off duty; and (3) they feared reprisal and 

retaliation. Respondents also perceived that employees who were reported 

would not be investigated. The reasons respondents gave for not reporting each 

behavior are summarized in the following sections. 

Solicitation of Prostitutes 

Of the 19 electronic survey respondents who indicated they observed solicitation 

of prostitutes, none of them reported the behavior. Each respondent could 

select multiple reasons for not reporting the behavior. Some frequently cited 

reasons include: 

•	 12 respondents (63 percent) did not believe that management is 


supportive of employees reporting the behavior;
 

•	 11 respondents (58 percent) indicated that the employee engaged in the 

behavior while off-duty; 

•	 9 respondents (47 percent) indicated they were afraid of reprisal or 

retaliation for reporting the behavior; 

•	 9 respondents (47 percent) indicated that they did not believe that 

employee would be investigated even if reported; 

•	 7 respondents (37 percent) indicated that management was already 

aware of this behavior; and 

•	 5 respondents or (26 percent) indicated that someone else reported the 

behavior. 

None of the in-person survey respondents indicated that they personally 

observed solicitation of prostitutes, and therefore, none of the respondents 

were asked whether they reported the behavior. 

Criminal Sexual Behavior Other than Solicitation 

Four electronic survey respondents observed criminal sexual behavior other than 

solicitation. Three respondents (75 percent) indicated that they did not report 

the behavior. Each respondent could select multiple reasons for not reporting 

the behavior. Some frequently cited reasons include: 

www.oig.dhs.gov 38	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

•	 2 respondents did not believe that management is supportive of
 

employees reporting the behavior;
 

•	 2 respondents were afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the 

behavior; 

•	 2 respondents did not believe the employee would be investigated even 

if reported; and 

•	 1 respondent indicated that management was already aware of this 

behavior. 

No in-person survey respondents indicated that they personally observed 

criminal sexual behavior other than solicitation. 

Other Sexual Behavior 

Of the 38 electronic survey respondents who indicated they observed other 

sexual behavior that caused a security concern, 32 (84 percent) indicated they 

did not report the behavior. Each respondent could select multiple reasons for 

not reporting the behavior. Some frequently cited reasons include: 

•	 18 respondents (56 percent) did not believe that management is 


supportive of employees reporting the behavior;
 

•	 16 respondents (50 percent) indicated that the employee engaged in the 

behavior while off-duty; 

•	 14 respondents (44 percent) indicated that they did not believe the 

employee would be investigated even if reported; 

•	 10 respondents (31 percent) indicated that management was already 

aware of this behavior; and 

•	 4 respondents (13 percent) indicated that someone else reported the 

behavior. 

One in-person survey respondent indicated that they personally observed other 

sexual behavior and did report it. 

Excessive Alcohol Consumption 

Of the 138 electronic survey respondents who personally observed excessive 

alcohol consumption, 118 (86 percent) indicated they did not report the 

behavior. Each respondent could select multiple reasons for not reporting the 

behavior. Some frequently cited reasons include: 

www.oig.dhs.gov 39	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

•	 66 respondents (56 percent) indicated the employee engaged in the 

behavior while off-duty; 

•	 55 respondents (47 percent) did not believe that management is 


supportive of employees reporting the behavior;
 

•	 47 respondents (40 percent) were afraid of reprisal or retaliation; 

•	 40 respondents (34 percent) indicated that management was already 

aware of this behavior; and 

•	 20 respondents (17 percent) indicated that someone else reported it. 

Furthermore, 15 in-person survey respondents indicated personally observing 

excessive alcohol consumption; 14 (93 percent) did not report it. Each 

respondent could select multiple reasons for not reporting the behavior. Some 

frequently cited reasons include: 

•	 10 respondents (71 percent) indicated the employee engaged in the 

behavior while off-duty; 

•	 7 respondents (50 percent) indicated the behavior was not serious 

enough to report; 

•	 4 respondents (29 percent) indicated that management was already 

aware of this behavior; and 

•	 2 respondents (14 percent) indicated that someone else reported it. 

Contact with Foreign Nationals 

Seventeen electronic survey respondents observed contact with foreign 

nationals that caused a security concern, and 14 (82 percent) did not report the 

behavior. Each respondent could select multiple reasons for not reporting the 

behavior. Some frequently cited reasons include: 

•	 7 respondents (50 percent) did not believe that management is 


supportive of employees reporting the behavior;
 

•	 7 respondents (50 percent) believed that management was already 

aware of the behavior; 

•	 6 respondents (43 percent) feared reprisal or retaliation; and 

•	 2 respondents (14 percent) indicated that someone else reported it. 

One in-person survey respondent indicated that they personally observed 

contact with foreign nationals that caused a security concern and did not report 

it because someone else did. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 40	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Personal Conduct 

Of the 102 electronic survey respondents who indicated they observed personal 

conduct that caused a security concern, 68 (67 percent) did not report the 

behavior. Each respondent could select multiple reasons for not reporting the 

behavior. Some frequently cited reasons include: 

•	 45 respondents (66 percent) indicated that they did not believe 


management is supportive of employees reporting the behavior; 


•	 35 respondents (51 percent) were afraid of reprisal or retaliation for 

reporting the behavior; 

•	 34 respondents (50 percent) did not believe that the employee would be 

investigated even if reported; 

•	 29 respondents (43 percent) indicated that management was already 

aware of this behavior; and 

•	 10 respondents (15 percent) indicated that someone else reported the 

behavior. 

Six in-person survey respondents personally observed the behavior. Three 

respondents did not report the behavior. Each respondent could select multiple 

reasons for not reporting the behavior. Some frequently cited reasons include: 

•	 3 respondents indicated that management was already aware of this 

behavior; 

•	 2 respondents indicated that someone else reported the behavior; 

•	 2 respondents were afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the 

behavior; and 

•	 2 respondents indicated that the employee engaged in the behavior 

while off-duty. 

Some Employees Are Hesitant To Report Off-Duty Behavior 

More than half of survey respondents who observed excessive alcohol 

consumption, solicitation of prostitution, or other sexual behaviors that may 

cause a security concern did not report the behaviors because the employee 

engaged in the behavior while off-duty. Agency officials stated that certain 

behaviors that employees may consider as a personal matter, such as alcohol 

consumption or sexual behavior, becomes an agency’s concern if it can cause a 

security clearance holder to be coerced, exploited, or otherwise manipulated. 

This concern is heightened in the USSS because of its protective mission. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 41	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Some of the supervisors that we interviewed said that they explain to employees 

their responsibilities while on and off duty to maintain the reputation of the 

agency. Another supervisor told his employees that the consequences for 

misconduct are the same while on or off duty, and the rule they should follow is 

“if it does not look good, it’s not good.” 

The USSS has taken several steps to increase employees’ awareness of the codes 

of conduct that apply both on and off duty including reiterating employees’ 

responsibilities to conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the highest 

standards; issuing a plain-language ethics desk guide; providing enhanced 

agency-wide ethics training; providing in-person ethics training; and providing 

“Professional Conduct” briefings to personnel prior to all protective assignments. 

Some Employees Fear Reprisal and Retaliation 

Employees consistently cited fear of reprisal or retaliation as a reason for not 

reporting solicitation of prostitution, criminal sexual behavior other than 

solicitation, excessive alcohol consumption, foreign contacts, or personal 

conduct. While 1,438 of 2,575 electronic survey respondents and 105 of 161 inperson respondents (56 and 65 percent respectively) indicated that they could 

report misconduct without fear of retaliation, a greater proportion of 

respondents indicated they could report suspected security concerns without 

fear of retaliation: 1,768 of 2,575 electronic survey respondents (69 percent) and 

124 of 161 in-person respondents (77 percent). 

During interviews, supervisors and employees described the USSS as a small and 

competitive agency, which can make fear of retaliation or alienation an issue. 

One supervisor explained that fear of retaliation and alienation applies even 

when trying to take measures to prevent a colleague from initially engaging in 

misconduct, which leads to the concept of “big boy/big girl rules.” A supervisor 

described this concept as personal accountability where everyone knows the 

rules and his or her responsibilities. 

The PRWG recommended USSS reinforce that a safe environment exists for 

employees to report misconduct. In response, USSS added prominent links to the 

ISP hotline on the USSS Intranet site, where employees can report misconduct. 

At the end of our fieldwork, ISP had not received any hotline reports from 

employees. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 42 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

USSS Needs To Clarify When Misconduct Cases Should Be Handled by 

Managers and Supervisors 

USSS conduct policy requires that employees promptly and directly report to RES 

ISP or OIG any violations of the codes of conduct or any other misconduct not 

ordinarily addressed by management.22 However, because USSS policy does not 

clearly define misconduct issues not ordinarily addressed by management, each 

manager uses his or her own discretion either to handle misconduct issues or 

elevate them in the chain of command. 

In contrast to policy, employees appear to believe the correct process is to 

report misconduct through their chain of command. During in-person interviews, 

73 of 112 supervisors said that the process for reporting misconduct was 

through the chain of command. Furthermore, our survey results showed: 

•	 Of 2,575 electronic survey respondents, 2,177 respondents (85 percent) 

said they would report misconduct or illegal activities to their direct 

supervisor, as would 152 of 161 (94 percent) of all in-person survey 

respondents. 

•	 In contrast, 577 of 2,575 electronic survey respondents (22 percent) and 

31 in-person respondents (19 percent) indicated they would report 

misconduct to the RES ISP. 

A RES senior official said guidance on referring misconduct through the chain of 

command, and eventually to RES, is at the discretion of each directorate. This 

discretion minimizes the level of consistency among managers for reporting 

misconduct. For example, 51 of 101 supervisors we interviewed said they would 

report all instances of misconduct through the chain of command. Eighteen of 

these supervisors were either an ATSAIC or Sergeant, which is the first level of 

supervisor within USSS. In contrast, a higher-level supervisor provided examples 

of minor misconduct, such as tardiness or equipment issues, that subordinate 

supervisors should handle without elevating through the chain of command. 

When an allegation is elevated through the chain of command, directorate 

leadership can decide whether to refer it to RES or conduct its own fact-finder. If 

the directorate conducts its own fact-finder, it is likely the information will not 

be provided to RES. The former Director told the directorates that their factfinder reports must be provided to RES. However, this requirement is not in any 

written policy, and the extent to which the directorates provide those reports is 

22 USSS PER-05(11) Investigations of Alleged Employee Misconduct, p. 1. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 43	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

unclear. RES has only received five fact-finders from the directorates since 2010. 

Given the chain-of-command culture of the Secret Service, employees may be 

more apt to report misconduct to their supervisor. Many supervisors explained 

that USSS leadership would not want to be caught off guard by receiving 

allegations of misconduct from headquarters offices such as RES, but would 

rather be notified initially by their subordinates. 

From first-line supervisors to the organization’s executives, individuals make 

decisions regarding whether an incident (1) can be handled at their level; 

(2) must be referred through the chain of command; or (3) should be referred 

back down to a subordinate supervisor. In the absence of sufficient guidance, 

misconduct is addressed based on managerial style, the experience level of the 

supervisor, and individual interpretations of what constitutes serious 

misconduct. USSS guidance should provide sufficient direction to staff and 

managers to ensure greater consistency in decision making. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, USSS: 

Recommendation #1: Clarify USSS’ conduct policy for reporting allegations of 

misconduct. At a minimum, the policy should define misconduct issues that are 

not ordinarily addressed by management, and clarify reporting procedures for 

referring misconduct issues through the chain of command, RES ISP, and OIG. 

Recommendation #2: Establish a written policy requiring directorate offices to 

report the results of fact-finders to RES. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Management Response to Recommendation #1: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said it has created a 

new policy, PER-05(13), which identified a specific table of offenses and states: 

“Employees are encouraged and expected to report through their chain of 

command, or Inspection Division Hotline, or DHS office of Inspector General 

Hotline, information that indicates another employee may have engaged in 

misconduct descried in the table of penalties.” In addition, USSS said PER-05(13) 

also requires supervisors to report through their chain of command any 

misconduct committed by their subordinates included in the table of penalties 

and identifies examples of items that warrant informal discipline. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 44 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

OIG Analysis: We reviewed USSS’ new policy, PER-05(13). The new policy is 

responsive to the recommendation. It clarifies reporting allegations of 

misconduct and requires supervisors to report through their chain of command 

any misconduct omitted by their subordinates included in the table of penalties. 

This recommendation is Resolved – Closed. 

Management Response to Recommendation #2: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said a new policy, 

RES-02, requires that fact-finding results be forwarded to the Office of 

Professional Responsibility via a standard form within ten days of the completion 

of investigation. 

OIG Analysis: USSS’ new policy, RES-02, is responsive to the recommendation. 

RES-02 outlines the circumstances under which directorates must forward factfinding results to the Office of Professional Responsibility and instructs them to 

use the Fact Finding Form 4093, which is attached to the policy. This 

recommendation is Resolved – Closed. 

USSS Did Not Fully Investigate Allegations that an Employee Engaged in 

Misconduct While on Official Travel in a Foreign Country 

Officials stated that the process of referring allegations is sufficient, and they 

normally do not have difficulty getting necessary information or access to 

personnel. However, we identified one case that highlights how the combination 

of managerial discretion and weak internal controls affected multiple areas of 

the misconduct adjudication process. In this case, USSS did not adequately 

investigate an allegation of employee misconduct, despite the incident raising 

security concerns under the adjudicative guidelines. 

In 2010, an employee traveling in in support of a Presidential visit went 

into the local town with other employees during a stop. The employee failed to 

 The 

resource intensive response by USSS personnel, 

military, and American civilian personnel 

. The employee 

arrived at the airport 

The employee was observed arriving at the 

airport with unknown local residents and smelled of alcohol. 


When the ATSAIC questioned the employee about the incident,
 

. The ATSAIC told the employee to
 

www.oig.dhs.gov 45 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

provide a written statement
 Upon returning 

to the United States, the employee provided a written statement to his Special 


Agent in Charge (SAIC), 

In his statement to the SAIC, the employee explained that 

. 

Directorate Leadership Did Not Refer the Incident to RES for Investigation 

When an allegation of misconduct is reported, a directorate may choose to 

initiate its own fact-finder or refer the case to RES. RES’ ISP is responsible for 

investigating violations of any provision of the agency’s minimum standards of 

conduct, and incidents which cast doubt upon the integrity of an employee. In 

this case, the employee’s Deputy Assistant Director, who would be responsible 

for referring alleged employee misconduct to internal investigations and security 

clearance officials, was advised of the incident but did not refer it to RES. RES 

and ISP officials said that they were unaware of this incident. The employee’s 

field office conducted its own fact-finder. 

This fact-finder was not thorough. The supervisor assigned to conduct the factfinder did not collect a statement from the ATSAIC who remained in
 

Consequently, the supervisor did not gather pertinent information about the 

employee’s ability and willingness to account for the events. What the ATSAIC 

learned was never part of the record and potentially important information was 

not included for SCD’s consideration. In addition, the supervisor conducting the 

fact-finder collected statements from five witnesses. However, (1) one of the five 

individuals who was interviewed did not witness the employee’s behavior and 

provided no relevant information, and (2) there were potentially more than five 

witnesses who could have been interviewed. 

The incident was similar to Cartagena but was not thoroughly 

investigated. Both incidents occurred while employees were off duty supporting 

a Presidential protective visit in a foreign country. Individuals consumed alcohol; 

interacted with FFNs; and were untruthful when initially questioned by 

managers. Both incidents required managers to divert their attention to address 

potential misconduct. 

SAIC Did Not Charge the Employee with Lack of Candor 

The employee’s supervisor sent ERB and SCD a memorandum from the SAIC 

summarizing the incident and requesting a recommendation for disciplinary 

action. ERB and SCD requested the employee’s statement as well as any witness 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 46 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

statements collected during the field office’s inquiry. The field office provided
 

these documents. After comparing the incident to similar cases and reviewing 


the employee’s discipline history, ERB identified and 

recommended that the SAIC The SAIC 

initially proposed based on the following charges: 

• failure to report to duty as scheduled; 

• being less than candid with a USSS supervisor; and 

• conduct unbecoming a USSS special agent. 

The employee retained legal counsel and
 

A lack of candor charge can lead to Giglio impairment, which affects the 

employee’s future ability to testify as a witness in criminal cases.23 

. 

Before issuance of the new suspension proposal, an ERB specialist asked the SAIC 

whether he thought the charge was not supported by the preponderance of 

evidence. The SAIC advised the ERB specialist that he did not want to affect the 

employee’s future ability to testify in criminal cases, and explained that once the 

employee cleared his head and had time to reflect fully on the events, the 

employee acted in good faith. ERB specialists informed their manager about 

their concern about changing the proposal. After a discussion with the 

employee’s Deputy Assistant Director, the manager told the ERB specialists to 

remove the charge. The ERB specialists noted in their files that the employee’s 

Deputy Assistant Director mandated that they remove the charge. 

It is unclear whether a supervisor is permitted to change the basis of a proposed 

penalty once it has been issued to the employee. During the appeal process, the 

proposed discipline is issued, and the employee may respond. If the employee 

successfully argues to have a charge removed, this would be removed in the 

23 Ultimately, a “Giglio-impaired” law enforcement officer could be deemed unable to testify as a witness in a criminal 

case and thus unable to perform a critical element of his or her job. Pursuant to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 

(1972) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the defense in a Federal criminal case is entitled to any information 

or evidence that tends to undermine the credibility or truthfulness of a witness. When the United States Attorney’s 

Office makes a Giglio request, a Federal agency has an affirmative duty to conduct a pretrial examination of each 

testifying law enforcement officer’s personnel file for any such derogatory information, United States v. Henthorn, 

931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991). Because a lack of candor charge against a Federal law enforcement officer relates to his or 

her propensity for truthfulness, this material would have to be provided to the United States Attorney’s Office and 

could potentially undermine the Government’s case. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 47 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

decision letter, which would state that the charge is not supported by the 

evidence. In this case, the SAIC did not justify removal of a charge due to a lack 

of evidence. 

SCD Could Not Inquire About Security Clearance Concerns 

The thoroughness of a fact-finder directly affects the adjudicative process. SCD 

depends on the thorough development of facts when addressing instances of 

misconduct. When SCD does not have sufficient information to identify and 

resolve security concerns, the office may request further information from RES 

ISP or the directorate. However, there is no policy requiring that either office 

provide additional information to SCD or make the employee available to SCD for 

additional questioning. 

SCD has minimal investigative capabilities, and it cannot request that RES ISP 

conduct an investigation without approval of the directorate where the 

employee is assigned. If SCD and the directorate disagree whether further 

investigation is needed or whether the case should be referred to RES, it is 

unclear what recourse SCD has to resolve outstanding security concerns. 

These issues were apparent in this case. Using the information in the fact-finder, 

the SCD Counterintelligence Branch conducted a counterintelligence review on 

the employee to assess possible security concerns related to foreign intelligence. 

The Counterintelligence Branch produced a report identifying several security 

concerns and developed a 56-question template to ascertain additional 

information from the employee. The counterintelligence report identified 

several security concerns including that the employee was possibly (1) 

concealing damaging information; (2) drugged by locals; (3) concealing damaging 

information to avoid taking a drug test; and (4) omitting other pertinent 

information. However, the employees’ Deputy Assistant Director would not 

authorize SCD to question the employee even after the CSO explained the 

security concerns to this official. 

SCD maintains the authority to suspend an employee’s security clearance while it 

reviews derogatory information affecting an employee’s ability to maintain a Top 

Secret clearance. However, in this instance, SCD was not able to suspend the 

employee’s security clearance because it did not have sufficient credible 

evidence and was not allowed to seek this evidence. 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 48 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

In this case, managerial discretion interfered with the agency’s ability to resolve 

potential security concerns. Because SCD did not vet counterintelligence 

concerns related to the employee’s conduct, counterintelligence vulnerabilities 

may exist. A senior USSS official familiar with the incident acknowledged that 

when it occurred in 2010, the employee’s directorate typically performed its own 

fact-finding investigations. The official explained that prior to the Cartagena 

incident USSS had less reason to be concerned about employee misconduct 

during foreign travel. 

USSS suspended clearances of those employees implicated in the Cartagena 

incident, and in some cases, revoked employees’ clearances or terminated them 

in part due to a lack of candor. Truthfulness when questioned about events, 

regardless of how embarrassing or personal, is a concern of the agency’s when 

the security clearance holders and the security of the President are involved. 

 

Other senior officials familiar with the case said that in light of the Cartagena 

incident, USSS would handle this incident differently now and it would likely be 

referred to RES. USSS should take steps to ensure that allegations of misconduct 

are consistently identified, thoroughly investigated, and fully reviewed for 

security concerns. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, USSS: 

Recommendation #3: Establish a written policy granting the Chief Security 

Officer unfettered access to employees to obtain information relating to 

potential security concerns. 

Recommendation #4: Establish a written policy identifying the circumstances 

under which managers may conduct their own fact-finders. 

Recommendation #5: Create and document procedures for collecting and 

recording facts by managers who conduct fact-finders. 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 49 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Management Response to Recommendation #3: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said it revised policy 

SCD-02(01) to clarify that the Chief Security Officer has direct access to 

employees in order to obtain information relating to potential security concerns. 

OIG Analysis: We reviewed SCD-02(01). USSS’ revision of its policy to specifically 

state that the Chief Security Officer has direct access to employees in order to 

obtain information relating to potential security concerns is responsive to this 

recommendation. This recommendation is Resolved – Closed. 

Management Response to Recommendation #4: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said it established a 

policy, RES-02, to provide additional clarity for managers. 

OIG Analysis: We reviewed RES-02. USSS’ new policy clarifies for managers 

actions that are not considered fact-finding investigations, as well as 

circumstances under which directorates are authorized to conduct a fact-finding. 

The policy is responsive to this recommendation. This recommendation is 

Resolved – Closed. 

Management Response to Recommendation #5: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said its policy, RES02, now outlines the procedures for collecting and recording facts by managers 

who conduct fact-findings. 

OIG Analysis: USSS’ new policy, RES-02, outlines procedures for collecting and 

recording facts by managers who conduct fact-findings, and is responsive to the 

intent of this recommendation. This recommendation is Resolved – Closed. 

Policies and Procedures for Proposing and Issuing Discipline are Insufficient 

USSS policy does not define which infractions would, at a minimum, require 

formal discipline. Because a managers’ obligation to contact ERB is based on the 

manager’s intention to administer formal discipline or adverse action, this 

obligation can be interpreted differently, leading to different approaches to 

misconduct across the agency. In addition, it is unclear whether ERB’s current 

tools are sufficient for recommending reasonable and consistent discipline. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 50 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Managers Interpret Their Obligation To Contact ERB Differently 

Any official contemplating a penalty against an employee must contact ERB for 

guidance prior to initiating any formal disciplinary or adverse actions. However, 

USSS does not have a policy that states what behaviors require formal 

disciplinary or adverse actions and appropriate penalties. Therefore, unless a 

manager calls ERB when the misconduct occurs to determine whether it would, 

at a minimum, require formal discipline, the agency cannot ensure managers are 

addressing similar misconduct consistently across the agency. 

In our interviews, managers said they considered ERB part of the formal 

discipline and adverse action process and that they call ERB before administering 

these penalties as required by policy. Several considered ERB the best source for 

information regarding discipline and relied on these recommendations to ensure 

consistency with the rest of the agency. For example, one manager explained 

that an employee may commit an offense and the manager might be very upset 

and want to take severe action. However, when they call ERB they are advised as 

to what action would be appropriate and consistent with the agency’s approach 

to that offense. 

However, managers differed as to when they contact ERB. While some managers 

call ERB to determine whether an offense meets the threshold for formal 

discipline or adverse action, others determine on their own whether the offense 

meets that threshold and call ERB only if they are considering formal discipline or 

adverse action. These different approaches jeopardize consistency and 

reasonableness of discipline across the agency. 

Managers, based on their experience and managerial style, may inadvertently 

apply informal discipline when formal discipline is more appropriate, making the 

discipline unreasonably lenient. Furthermore, if one manager administers formal 

discipline for an offense that another manager addresses with informal 

discipline, this creates inconsistency across the agency. 

Another reason USSS requires managers to contact ERB is because USSS uses a 

progressive disciplinary system that accounts for past disciplinary and adverse 

actions when determining discipline. Therefore, a more severe disciplinary action 

than would otherwise be taken may be imposed upon an employee whenever 

that employee has previously been formally disciplined. In USSS, all prior formal 

discipline may be considered regardless of when it was administered. 

A supervisor needs to know whether misconduct by an employee is a repeat 

offense before administering discipline. USSS employees transfer frequently and 

www.oig.dhs.gov 51 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

a manager may not know about an employee’s formal disciplinary history unless 

he or she contacts ERB. A manager may consider informal discipline appropriate 

because, in his or her estimation, the offense is minor or occurred for the first 

time. Therefore, having determined to administer informal discipline, the 

manager may not consult ERB. However, if the manager consulted ERB upon 

initially learning of the misconduct, the manager may learn the employee had 

been disciplined for this behavior in the past and may choose to administer 

formal discipline instead. 

The current policies and process provide little opportunity to define or adjust 

managers’ thresholds for applying formal discipline. If a manager addresses an 

offense with informal discipline, such as a memorandum of counseling, the 

manager would not be required to call ERB. Therefore, ERB would not have an 

opportunity to educate the manager on the appropriate discipline for the 

offense. Since the Cartagena incident, USSS has provided training to encourage 

supervisors to bring potential issues to ERB regardless of how small the issues 

may seem. 

ERB Needs Data Integrity Controls 

ERB maintains a database of formal disciplinary and adverse actions initiated by 

managers and tracks the disposition of these actions. However, ERB specialists 

maintain the database for their use and do not always enter information 

accurately and consistently. For example, we identified employee names 

misspelled; misconduct charges not standardized; and inaccurate entries for ISP 

involvement in misconduct cases. These data quality issues make it difficult to 

identify serial offenders easily and conduct historical analyses across the agency 

when researching new cases. Furthermore, the section of the database where 

specialists may make notes about the case is used differently. For example, some 

specialists use this space to provide additional information about when the case 

was referred to other offices while other specialists use the field infrequently, if 

at all. 

ERB’s database also may not include all instances of misconduct that warrants 

formal discipline. For example, an employee may have been under ISP 

investigation or the employee’s security clearance may have been under review. 

However, the employee may resign or retire before any disciplinary action is 

taken, and ERB may not be made aware of the misconduct. 

As discussed previously, USSS has assigned a Chief Integrity Officer and expects 

this individual to conduct risk assessments to identify emerging misconduct 

trends. While ISP’s database tracks the most serious misconduct cases, and SCD’s 

www.oig.dhs.gov 52 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

database captures security concerns, ERB’s database potentially represents the 

most complete historical record of misconduct across the agency. The Chief 

Integrity Officer may rely on this data to conduct analyses. Enhanced data quality 

would not only allow ERB specialists to perform their role more effectively, but 

would provide the agency valuable information to analyze misconduct trends. 

ERB Comp Sheets Are Inconsistent and Incomplete 

ERB’s main tool for recommending discipline is the comparable discipline sheet, 

or “comp sheet.” A comp sheet is a summary of all past disciplinary adjudications 

for a category of misconduct. ERB uses the sheets to compare incoming cases to 

the historical record to provide recommendations to managers about penalties 

that are consistent with past recommendations. ERB has 56 comp sheets listing 

various offenses. However, comp sheets contain broad, incomplete, or 

inconsistently defined and updated categories. The more inaccurate its comp 

sheets are the less consistent ERB’s recommendations for disciplinary action will 

be. 

Complete comp sheets allow an ERB specialist to compare a new incident with all 

the prior incidents that may have occurred in USSS. However, the comp sheets 

do not include all instances of formal discipline or adverse action from the 

historical record. Of 247 cases reviewed, 145 (59 percent) were documented on 

the comp sheets; 97 (39 percent) were not documented on any comp sheet; and 

5 (2 percent) were documented on the wrong comp sheet. 

Many instances of formal discipline or adverse action include more than one 

category of misconduct, but are not always listed on all applicable comp sheets. 

For example, an employee was disciplined for Absence Without Leave, Failure to 

Follow Guidelines Outlined in Leave Memorandum, and Failure to Follow 

Supervisory Instructions. Although ERB has comp sheets for the two latter 

categories, this instance of formal discipline was only included in the Absence 

Without Leave comp sheet. 

ERB specialists said they review the past 3 years of similar misconduct across the 

agency to recommend discipline to managers which is consistent with the 

agency’s historical record. However, ERB is not updating comp sheets 

consistently to include recent misconduct cases. Of the 97 cases that were not 

documented in any of the comp sheets, 27 of those cases (28 percent) involved 

allegations of misconduct that occurred between 2010 and 2013. Also, 14 comp 

sheets did not have any entries within the last 3 years. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 53 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

We also reviewed six comp sheets that did not have any dates, information, or 

another case for comparison to an incoming disciplinary action. Five comp sheets 

had entries that were dissimilar in incidents, prior offenses, or discipline. 

Broad Misconduct Charges May Lead to Inconsistent Disciplinary Actions 

Determining the charges that apply to an act of misconduct is the first step for 

an ERB specialist recommending discipline to a manager. Some of these charges 

are defined better than others. Managers can implement more consistent 

disciplinary action when a charge is defined clearly. 

For example, USSS uses Discourteous Conduct to charge employees for being 

rude to fellow employees and supervisors, external DHS components, state and 

local law enforcement entities, and the general public. In contrast, USSS uses 

Conduct Unbecoming for several different types of misconduct including driving 

under the influence, sexual harassment, criminal behavior, and other types of 

criminal and non-criminal misbehavior. Conduct Unbecoming has also been used 

to categorize instances of misconduct that have their own charges. For example, 

an employee was discourteous to a White House press photographer. Although 

this would be considered Discourteous Conduct, the employee was charged with 

Conduct Unbecoming. 

As figures 18 and 19 show, outcomes of disciplinary actions for Discourteous 

Conduct were more consistent than those for Conduct Unbecoming for all 

disciplinary and adverse actions. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 54 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 18: Frequency of outcomes and number of days suspended for offenses that ERB categorized as 


Discourteous Conduct
 

25 

20 

15 

10 

5 

0 

Counsel/ LOR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15-29 30+ 

0 days day days days days days days days days days days days days days days days days 

Source: ERB 

Note: LOR is Letter of Reprimand 

Figure 19: Frequency of outcomes and number of days suspended for offenses that ERB categorized as 


Conduct Unbecoming
 

Counsel/ LOR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15-29 30+ 

0 days day days days days days days days days days days days days days days days days 

Source: ERB 

Note: LOR is Letter of Reprimand 

0 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

www.oig.dhs.gov 55 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

USSS officials explained that, in cases where the employee is facing a penalty of 

more than a 14-day suspension and can appeal before the MSPB, the agency 

uses Conduct Unbecoming as a general charge for various types of misconduct. 

By using a general charge but being specific about the conduct leading to the 

charge, the agency is more likely to substantiate the charges before the MSPB. 

However, as figure 19 shows, most USSS Conduct Unbecoming cases result in 

penalties less severe than a 14-day suspension and are therefore not subject to 

the MSPB appeal process. Therefore, this legal strategy does not fully explain the 

inconsistency in disciplinary outcomes for Conduct Unbecoming charges. It is 

more likely that, given the wide range of misconduct categorized as Conduct 

Unbecoming, it is difficult to apply consistent disciplinary penalties for this 

charge. It would also be difficult for an ERB specialist to find all relevant prior 

cases to compare and provide disciplinary recommendations to managers. 

In another example, categories of misconduct describing lost or misplaced 

weapons are also specific to that conduct. The discipline across the agency over 

its history has also been fairly consistent, as shown in figure 20. 

Figure 20: Frequency of outcomes and number of days suspended for offenses that ERB placed in a Lost 

and Misplaced Weapons category

25 

20 

15 

10 

5 

0 

Counsel/ LOR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15-29 30+ 

0 days day days days days days days days days days days days days days days days days 

 Source: ERB 

Note: LOR is Letter of Reprimand 

www.oig.dhs.gov 56 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Survey Results Regarding Discipline Policies, Fairness, Consistency, and 

Appropriateness 

The final portion of our survey addressed the adequacy of USSS’ process for 

adjudicating and administering disciplinary actions. The vast majority of survey 

respondents believe appropriate discipline policies and procedures are in place. 

Additionally, while a plurality of respondents believe the disciplinary process is 

fair and at the appropriate level; a noteworthy minority have negative 

perceptions in these areas. Feelings regarding the consistency of discipline are 

mixed; with noteworthy percentages of respondents with either positive or 

negative perceptions. 

Our survey asked whether employees felt appropriate policies and procedures 

exist to address employee violations of any law, rule, regulation, or standards of 

conduct. Of the 2,575 electronic survey respondents, 2,081 (81 percent) believe 

USSS has appropriate policies and procedures in place. Of the 161 in-person 

survey respondents, 147 (91 percent) believe USSS has appropriate policies and 

procedures in place. 

When questioned about whether the disciplinary process is fair, respondents 

were mostly positive, but others were negative or neutral. 

•	 Of the 2,575 electronic survey respondents, 1,037 (40 percent) believe 

USSS’ disciplinary process is fair, and 75 of 161 (47 percent) of in-person 

respondents believe the process is fair. 

•	 Of the 2,575 electronic survey respondents, 589 (23 percent) do not 

believe the process is fair. Similarly, 39 of the 161 in-person respondents 

(24 percent) do not believe the process is fair. 

•	 Of the 2,575 electronic survey respondents, 626 (24 percent) and 34 of 

the 161 in-person respondents (21 percent) indicated that they neither 

agree nor disagree that the process is fair. 

A similar percentage of respondents had both positive and negative perceptions 

regarding the consistency of penalties for similar offenses. 

•	 Of the 2,575 electronic survey respondents, 763 (30 percent) and 52 of 

the 161 in-person respondents (32 percent) indicated they do not believe 

USSS applies discipline consistently for similar offenses. 

•	 Of the 2,575 electronic survey participants, 773 (30 percent) and 59 of 

the 161 in-person respondents (37 percent) believe discipline is 

consistent. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 57	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

•	 Of the 2,575 electronic survey respondents, 452 (18 percent) and 24 of 

the 161 in-person respondents (15 percent) told us they do not know 

how consistent disciplinary actions are. 

Finally, a plurality of respondents believes that penalties are at the appropriate 

level. 

•	 Of the 2,575 electronic survey respondents, 941 (37 percent) and 85 of 

the 161 in-person respondents (53 percent) said they believe disciplinary 

actions within the USSS are at the appropriate level of severity given the 

offense. 

•	 Of the 2,575 electronic survey respondents, 457 (18 percent) of 

electronic and 29 (18 percent) of the 161 in-person survey respondents 

do not believe the actions are at the appropriate level. 

USSS Is Considering Making Disciplinary Actions More Transparent 

In its report, the PRWG noted that the FBI publishes a newsletter displaying 

anonymously a sample of violations and incidents and the resulting disciplinary 

actions. This newsletter communicates to employees the consequences for 

violations and allows employees to assess the fairness of the disciplinary system. 

The PRWG recommended that USSS provide similar information to its workforce 

to the extent consistent with law while protecting the identity of the affected 

employees. USSS is considering how to implement this recommendation. Senior 

management expressed concerns about privacy, especially given that the small 

size of the agency will make it more difficult to protect an employee’s identity 

even if the information is sanitized. 

The PRWG also recommended USSS consider establishing a cross-agency 

disciplinary review panel to increase transparency and remove the responsibility 

for disciplinary decisions from the employee’s direct supervisor. USSS’ Office of 

Chief Counsel (OCC) is currently working with the Assistant Directors of Human 

Resources and Training and RES to design and implement a disciplinary review 

panel. USSS expects to implement the panel by the end of 2013. 

Several senior managers we interviewed support the concept. Of the 19 senior 

managers we spoke with, 10 supported the idea of a panel while 1 was not 

supportive. Eight senior managers did not provide an opinion or said they had no 

basis to judge. 

Supervisors we interviewed had mixed opinions as to whether USSS should 

www.oig.dhs.gov 58	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

establish a disciplinary panel. Several supervisors believed the panel would be a 

good idea because it would introduce transparency and fairness and reduce the 

likelihood that a manager would retaliate against or favor an employee. Other 

supervisors did not support the concept, believing that the SAIC knows the 

employee best and is in the best position to consider mitigating and aggravating 

circumstances. Furthermore, enforcing discipline is part of the SAIC’s authority 

as a manager. Some supervisors see the ERB as an independent disciplinary 

panel. 

If USSS does implement the panel, it should ensure that it establishes procedures 

for board members to recuse themselves when there is a conflict of interest or 

the board member is in the employee’s chain of command. USSS could also allow 

the SAIC to submit a statement regarding the employee’s service or the 

misconduct’s affect on USSS’ mission. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, USSS: 

Recommendation #6: Define and document specific offense categories, as well 

as subcategories of broader categories, such as Conduct Unbecoming, to ensure 

ERB specialists consistently categorize misconduct. 

Recommendation #7: Establish and document a quality control process to 

ensure comparable offense sheets reflect specific offense categories, are up-todate, and complete. 

Recommendation #8: Establish and document a quality control process to 

ensure ERB specialists enter and update misconduct case information in their 

database accurately and consistently. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Management Response to Recommendation #6: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said its policy PER05(13) now includes a detailed table of specific offense categories and 

accompanying penalties to ensure consistency and transparency in the discipline 

process. 

OIG Analysis: We reviewed PER-05(13). The new policy includes a detailed table 

of specific offense categories and accompanying penalties. The policy is 

www.oig.dhs.gov 59 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

responsive to the intent of this recommendation. This recommendation is 

Resolved – Closed. 

Management Response to Recommendation #7: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said it has eliminated 

the need for comparable offense sheets in its new discipline process but they 

agree that a quality control process is important for maintaining an equitable 

discipline process. 

OIG Analysis: USSS has eliminated comparable offense sheets. Therefore, this 

recommendation is Resolved – Closed. 

Management Response to Recommendation #8: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said it has updated 

its standard operating procedures to ensure that the database is updated 

accurately and consistently. 

OIG Analysis: USSS’ has established two quality control procedures to ensure 

that the database is updated accurately and consistently. USSS provided an 

excerpt from the procedures titled “Discipline Log.” First, the ERB Branch Chief 

must review the log for each action when it is received. Second, on a monthly 

basis, the ERB Branch Chief will verify the accuracy of all information related to 

pending disciplinary cases in the database. This recommendation is Resolved – 

Closed. 

USSS Is Not Always in Compliance with Federal Disciplinary Regulations 

We reviewed 122 proposed adverse actions for 120 non-probationary 

employees. We determined that USSS complied with Federal requirements for 

an advance written notice and a reasonable timeframe for the employee to 

reply. However, summaries of employee oral replies to proposed actions were 

missing from more than 76 percent of the case files despite Federal regulations 

requiring agencies maintain such documentation. Additionally, written replies 

were missing from 10 percent of files. 

Administrative Requirements for Adverse Action 

Federal law and regulations govern adverse actions, which include suspensions; 

reductions in pay or grade; and removals.24 The regulations apply to non24 5 U.S.C. Chapter 75 and 5 CFR Part 752 

www.oig.dhs.gov 60 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

probationary employees, including, but not limited to, those who occupy a 

Schedule B appointment. An employee facing an adverse action is entitled to an 

advance written notice stating the specific reasons for the proposed action; a 

reasonable time to answer orally and in writing and to furnish affidavits or other 

documentary evidence in support of the answer; and a written decision with the 

specific reasons for it at the earliest practicable date. Employees facing more 

than a 14-day suspension are allowed (unless there is reasonable cause to 

believe they have committed a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment may 

be imposed) at least 30 days’ advance written notice and not less than 7 days to 

respond. 

In the written decision, the USSS must advise affected employees of their appeal 

or grievance rights. Employees receiving an adverse action more severe than a 

14-day suspension may appeal the decision either to the MSPB. If the adverse 

action is a suspension for 14 days or less, the affected employee may only file a 

grievance. In all cases, as part of the appeal or grievance, the affected employee 

has a right to file directly with the agency's Equal Employment Office or Office of 

Special Counsel any allegations of discrimination, reprisal for whistle blowing, 

and other prohibited personnel practices. 

For all adverse actions, the USSS is responsible for maintaining copies of the 

notice of proposed action; the employee’s answer if written or a summary 

thereof if made orally; the notice of decision and reasons therefore; and any 

order affecting the suspension, together with any supporting material. Upon 

request, the USSS must furnish these documents to the MSPB or affected 

employee. 

Incomplete Case Files 

We reviewed ERB’s case files for 122 proposed adverse actions ranging from 1­

day suspensions to removals. These actions involved 120 non-probationary 

employees from 42 divisions or offices. 

We verified that all 122 case files complied with Federal requirements for an 

advance written notice and a reasonable timeframe for the employee to reply. 

The case files included copies of the proposed action. These notices included 

detailed descriptions of the offense and incident triggering the proposed adverse 

action. They also identified the affected employee’s right to reply orally and in 

writing within 15 calendar days of receiving the notice; provide documentation 

supporting the reply; have representation; have a reasonable amount of official 

duty time to prepare and present a reply; and review the documentation 

www.oig.dhs.gov 61 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

supporting the proposed adverse action. 

Due to the severity of the proposed adverse action in 12 of the 122 cases, the 

USSS had to provide the employees with at least 30 days’ advance written notice 

and not less than 7 days to respond with supporting documentation. We 

determined that USSS met this requirement in all 12 cases. 

Employees provided an oral response to the proposed adverse action in 46 of 

the 122 cases. USSS officials summarized or had transcripts of the oral replies in 

11 instances. There was no such documentation or reference made to such 

documentation in 35 of the 46 case files provided to the OIG. Although USSS 

guidance does not require such documentation for suspensions for 14 or fewer 

days, Federal law and regulations require that agencies maintain summaries of 

the affected employee’s oral reply, if any, for all adverse actions. 

In 51 of the 122 cases, the affected employee replied in writing to the proposed 

adverse action. During our file review, we located copies of the employee’s 

written reply in 46 of the 51 case files. Upon notification, USSS officials located 

their record of one additional employee’s written reply. In total, 4 of the 113 

case files did not include a copy of the employee’s written reply. According to 

Federal law and regulations, agencies shall maintain an employee’s written reply 

to a proposed adverse action. USSS guidance does not specifically address the 

Federal requirement. 

Of the 122 proposed adverse actions, 113 required a notice of decision.25 During 

our file review, we located notices of decision in 106 case files. Upon 

notification, USSS officials located notices of decision for two additional case 

files. In total, 5 of the 113 case files did not include notices of decision. According 

to Federal law and regulations, agencies shall maintain notices of decision. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, USSS: 

Recommendation #9: Ensure summaries of oral appeals to adverse actions are 

retained in case files. 

Recommendation #10: Ensure that notices of decision are retained in case files. 

25 In two cases, the employee resigned before discipline was administered, and in seven others the employee waived 

the right to receive a written decision. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 62 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Management Response to Recommendation #9: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said a checklist has 

been developed to ensure that oral summaries are properly retained. 

Additionally, standard operating procedures have been updated and Employee 

Relations Branch specialists have been trained on the new process. 

OIG Analysis: We subsequently reviewed the checklist, the notification to ERB 

Specialists concerning use of the checklist, and USSS’ description of an 

interactive training session it conducted for Employee Relations Branch staff. 

The creation of a checklist to ensure oral summaries are properly retained is 

responsive to this recommendation. This recommendation is Resolved – Closed. 

Management Response to Recommendation #10: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said the checklist 

described in the its response to Recommendation #9 will ensure that all relevant 

information, including notices of decisions, will be maintained in case files. 

OIG Analysis: USSS provided a copy of the case file checklist. It includes notices 

of decisions, and is responsive to the recommendation. This recommendation is 

Resolved – Closed. 

Internal Controls Are Insufficient To Ensure Discipline Is Aligned with Agency 

Principles 

USSS policy provides seven principles to guide disciplinary actions. Overall, 

disciplinary actions must be taken for good cause, and giving due consideration 

to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.26 Mitigating circumstances may 

lessen the gravity of the employee’s offense, while aggravating circumstances 

may increase the gravity of the employee’s offense. Specifically, all disciplinary 

actions should be corrective; consistent; non-discriminatory; timely; progressive; 

constructive; and to promote the efficiency of the agency. 

Although USSS policy states managers must give due consideration to applicable 

mitigating and aggravating circumstances, it does not provide managers 

guidance on how to consider these factors in the majority of cases. The MSPB 

expects agencies to have considered Douglas Factors when administering 

discipline more severe than a 14-day suspension to ensure the discipline is 

26 USSS PER-11(01) Disciplinary and Adverse Actions - General 

www.oig.dhs.gov 63 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

reasonable. The Douglas Factors list specific criteria to ensure a manager is 

evaluating relevant employee circumstances and coming to a fair and reasonable 

disciplinary penalty. USSS managers use this list when considering penalties of 

15-day suspensions or greater, which are appealable to MSPB. However, USSS 

does not require managers to consider the Douglas Factors for misconduct cases 

resulting in penalties of 14 days or less and has no alternate guidance for these 

cases. According to ERB’s database, 89 percent of USSS’ misconduct cases 

between January 2004 and February 2013 resulted in a proposed disciplinary 

action of less than a 15-day suspension, and therefore not appealable to MSPB. 

Furthermore, USSS policy does not require managers to document their 

consideration of the factors they use in determining the reasonableness of nonappealable actions. 

As discussed previously, USSS policy also states that formal disciplinary and 

adverse actions should be consistent with other such actions taken by USSS for 

similar infractions. ERB maintains historical records of disciplinary and adverse 

actions. Therefore, for a manager to comply with USSS’ principle of consistency, 

the manager should be administering discipline in line with what ERB advises is 

consistent with the agency’s past disciplinary actions. 

USSS managers generally propose discipline within ERB’s recommended range, 

but less frequently make final discipline decisions that are within ERB’s 

recommended range. We reviewed 85 cases where ERB’s recommendation to 

the manager was documented in the file. In 9 of the 85 cases (11 percent), 

managers proposed discipline outside ERB’s recommended range. However, in 

24 of the 85 cases (28 percent), the discipline managers administered following a 

discipline proposal was outside the range of what ERB had recommended. 

Specifically, 22 instances were less than the range recommended, and 2 were 

more than the range recommended. 

Although consistency is an important factor in discipline, agency managers have 

discretion to decide an appropriate penalty as long as it promotes the efficiency 

of the service.27 However, without guidance on evaluating an employee’s 

individual circumstances regarding non-appealable actions similar to the Douglas 

Factors, and no requirement to document this consideration, USSS will not be 

able to ensure managers are giving due consideration to appropriate factors, and 

disciplinary actions are reasonable. For example, when a manager proposes 

discipline according to what ERB advises is consistent with the historical record, 

the manager may ultimately decide to mitigate the proposed discipline. 

27 E.g., 5 U.S.C. 7513(a)(adverse actions appealable to the MSPB). 

www.oig.dhs.gov 64 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

However, USSS managers rarely explain what factors led to their decision to 

mitigate proposed discipline. Of the 122 proposed adverse actions we reviewed, 

the manager reduced the penalty in 44 cases (36 percent) in response to oral 

responses, written responses, or both. In four instances, the deciding official 

reduced the penalty without any response from the employee. As shown in 

figure 21, the deciding officials provided a justification for the reduced penalty in 

2 of the 44 cases (5 percent). As discussed previously, employee responses that 

resulted in these mitigations are also not always documented. 

Figure 21: Mitigated discipline after different employee responses and associated documentation 

Discipline mitigated Employee response in file Manager's justification provided 

18 

13 

9 

4 

1 

8 

7 

0 0

1 1 

0 

Oral reply Written reply Both oral and written No response 

Source: USSS ERB 

Another USSS guiding principle is that disciplinary actions must be progressive. 

USSS policy states that, in progressive discipline, a more severe disciplinary 

action than would otherwise be taken may be imposed upon whenever an 

employee has previously received a written reprimand or a suspension. All prior 

discipline may be considered regardless of when it was administered. Based on 

our analysis of ERB’s records, we determined that 107 employees committed 

more than one offense from 2004 to 2013. However, 59 of these employees 

received a harsher discipline for the subsequent offense. In 12 cases, the 

discipline was actually less severe than for the previous offense. Again, without 

documentation of a manager’s consideration of factors that led to his or her 

decision, USSS cannot demonstrate that these decisions are reasonable even if 

www.oig.dhs.gov 65 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

they are not aligned with one of USSS’ disciplinary principles. Ensuring that 

managers document their disciplinary decisions would decrease the agency’s 

exposure to allegations of disparate treatment and enhance supervisor 

credibility. 

USSS Penalties Are Often Less Severe than Other DHS Law Enforcement 

Agencies 

USSS often administers penalties that are less severe than the range of 

recommended penalties at other DHS law enforcement components. We 

compared USSS’ disciplinary response for specific infractions to discipline ICE, 

TSA, and CBP would recommend for similar infractions. We reviewed tables of 

penalties of each of these DHS components. We limited our analysis to informal, 

formal, or adverse actions USSS administered for a single offense to individuals 

with no prior discipline. Further, we limited our analysis to cases where we had 

sufficient information to compare the offense to TSA, ICE, and CBP offense 

categories. Between 2004 and 2013, USSS administered discipline for a single 

offense to one-time offenders 341 times. We determined that: 

•	 In 265 of the 341 instances (78 percent), USSS administered less severe 

discipline than one or more of TSA, ICE, and CBP’s tables of penalties 

suggest those agencies would have administered. 

•	 In 141 of these 265 instances (53 percent), USSS administered less severe 

discipline compared to all three of the comparison agencies’ tables of 

penalties. 

•	 For the remaining 76 of the 341 instances (22 percent), USSS 

administered discipline within or above the range of what TSA, ICE, and 

CBP’s tables of penalties suggest those agencies would have 

administered. 

The three most common categories where USSS has administered less severe 

discipline than TSA, ICE, or CBP are Neglect of Duty (60 percent); Integrity and 

Ethics (16 percent); and Property Misuse, Loss or Damage (7 percent). Figure 22 

provides examples of Neglect of Duty offenses where USSS administered less 

severe discipline than other agencies. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 66	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 22: Examples of Neglect of Duty Offenses Where USSS Issued Less Severe Discipline than 

other DHS Law Enforcement Agencies 

USSS Other DHS Law Enforcement Agencies 

Examples of USSS 

Employee 

Misconduct 

USSS’ Range of 

Decided Action 

CBP 

Recommended 

Penalty Range 

ICE 

Recommended 

Penalty Range 

TSA 

Recommended 

Penalty Range 

Failure to Report for 

Duty as Scheduled 

Memo of 

counsel 

5- to 14-day 

suspension 

5- to 14-day 

suspension 

5- to 14-day 

suspension 

Leaving Post 

Without Proper 

Authorization 

No action to 3­

weekday 

suspension 

5- to 14-day 

suspension 

5- to 14-day 

suspension 

5- to 14-day 

suspension 

Failure to Observe 

Established 

Apprehension or 

Detention Policies 

and Procedures 

Reprimand 7- to 14-day 

suspension 

5- to 14-day 

suspension 

No Penalty 

Range Listed 

Sources: USSS ERB Database, CBP, ICE, and TSA Tables of Penalties 

USSS Is Considering Establishing a Table of Penalties 

The PRWG recommended that USSS consider establishing a table of penalties. 

USSS is currently reviewing their discipline data to identify common infractions 

and penalties, as well as other Federal law enforcement entities’ tables of 

penalties. USSS managers involved with implementing the table of penalties 

explained that the table of penalties will still allow for consideration of relevant 

mitigating and aggravating factors. One USSS official responsible for 

implementing the recommendation explained the table of penalties has to be 

appropriate for USSS job functions and mission. A few USSS officials 

acknowledged that initial reviews of other agencies’ tables of penalties revealed 

that USSS’ takes less severe disciplinary actions compared to other agencies. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 67 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, USSS: 

Recommendation #11: Ensure manger consideration of mitigating and 

aggravating factors is documented in notices of proposed action and decisions 

for non-appealable disciplinary actions. 

Recommendation #12: Develop and implement a process to ensure that 

disciplinary actions are progressive. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Management Response to Recommendation #11: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said its newly 

designed file checklist will ensure that documentation regarding managers’ 

consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors is retained in case files. 

OIG Analysis: USSS’ creation of a checklist to ensure that documentation 

regarding managers’ consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors is 

retained in case files does not meet the intent of this recommendation. Our 

intent is to ensure that a manager’s consideration of mitigation and aggravating 

factors is included in the notices of proposed action and decisions, and not as a 

separate document in the case file. This recommendation is Unresolved – Open. 

Management Response to Recommendation #12: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said it has further 

clarified that disciplinary actions are to be progressive in its enhanced discipline 

process. 

OIG Analysis: We reviewed PER-05(13), USSS Table of Penalties and section 

titled, “Purpose and Progressive Nature of Discipline.” The policy states that 

discipline is progressive in nature, meaning that subsequent acts of misconduct 

are treated with increasing severity, especially but not exclusively, when the acts 

are of similar nature.” We acknowledge that it is a new policy and progressive 

discipline is defined. The checklist suggests officials must sign off on Douglas 

Factors, which include consideration of prior offenses. In its corrective action 

plan, USSS should demonstrate how progressive discipline will be administered. 

This recommendation is Resolved – Open. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 68 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Adjudication of Discipline and Security Concerns Following the Cartagena 

Incident 

To help assess how USSS identifies, mitigates, and addresses instances of 

misconduct and inappropriate behavior, we reviewed USSS’ handling of the 

employees implicated in potential misconduct in Cartagena. We examined 

personnel and security clearance files for implicated employees and interviewed 

USSS officials involved in management actions following the Cartagena incident. 

We interviewed deciding officials for discipline, security clearance adjudicators, 

members of the Security Appeals Board (the Board), OCC employees, and Human 

Capital Division employees. We also attempted to interview all 13 individuals 

implicated in the Cartagena investigation. However, only five individuals agreed 

to be interviewed, three of whom are no longer employed by USSS. 

Security Clearance Actions for Employees Implicated in the Cartagena Incident 

Were Based on Facts from Internal Inquiries 

We determined that security clearance actions for employees implicated in the 

Cartagena incident were based on facts gathered during the management 

inquiry in Cartagena and ISP’s investigation. There was no evidence of bias 

during the security clearance revocation process. We based our conclusion on a 

review of employee security clearance evaluation files, ISP’s investigation report, 

and interviews with both implicated employees and officials involved in the 

security clearance adjudication process. 

SCD initially suspended all 13 employees’ security clearances due to possible 

inappropriate involvement with a foreign national while on a protective 

assignment in a foreign country. At the conclusion of ISP’s investigation, SCD 

reinstated the security clearance of three employees who were sufficiently 

cleared of serious misconduct. SCD revoked the security clearance of five 

employees because they either knowingly solicited prostitutes, demonstrated 

lack of candor during the investigation, or both. Five employees resigned or 

retired prior to the adjudication of their security clearance. 

SCD Suspended the 13 Employees’ Security Clearances Pending an Internal 

Investigation 

SCD suspended the Top Secret security clearances of the 13 employees 

implicated in during the Cartagena investigation due to their possible 

inappropriate involvement with FFNs while on a protective assignment in a 

foreign country. They did so pursuant to provisions of Executive Orders 10450 

www.oig.dhs.gov 69 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

and 12968 and, and USSS’ Interim Procedures Concerning, Suspension, Denial, or 

Revocation of Access to Classified Information. 

Federal, DHS, and USSS regulations permit the suspension of a security clearance 

when there is reason to believe that an individual's continued access to classified 

information is not in the interest of national security. USSS may suspend a 

clearance immediately and notify the employee afterward, though attempts 

should be made to resolve the matter as expeditiously as circumstances permit. 

Five Employees Resigned with a Suspended Security Clearance 

Five employees agreed to resign or retire after their Top Secret security 

clearance was suspended, but prior to the adjudication of their security 

clearance. USSS employees do not retain their security clearance after separating 

from an agency. However, if an employee resigns or retires while the employee’s 

security clearance is suspended, SCD records indicate the employee is separated 

from the agency with a suspended, rather than active, security clearance. A 

central Office of the Director for National Intelligence database, which maintains 

U.S. security clearance holder information, will reflect a suspended security 

clearance for these individuals. Should an employee who separates from USSS 

seek a security clearance at another Federal agency, SCD makes internal security 

investigation reports and personnel security clearance files available to that 

agency’s background investigators. 

SCD Reinstated the Security Clearances of Three Employees 

SCD reinstated the security clearance of three employees who were cleared of 

serious misconduct (figure 23). Two of the employees had consensual sex with 

FFNs in their hotel room, and 

. The third employee took an FFN prostitute to his hotel room 

 The employee

 The 

employee then asked that she leave his hotel room. 

Witness statements and polygraph examinations corroborated the three 

employees’ statements to ISP. SCD did not charge the three employees with lack 

of candor and reinstated their security clearance. SCD issued a warning letter to 

each employee. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 70 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 23: Reinstated Security Clearances 

Employee 

Employee 1 

Employee 2 

Employee 3 

Sexual 

Encounter 

(Employee 

Account) 

Sexual 

Encounter 

(FFN 

Account) 

Payment 

National 

Security 

Polygraph28 

Specific 

Issue 

Polygraph29 

SCD Lack 

of Candor 

Charge 

No 

No 

No 

Alcohol 

Consumed 

Source: USSS ISP and SCD case files 

Employees 1, 2, and 3 returned to duty after SCD reinstated their Top Secret 

clearance. ERB recommended discipline for these employees ranging from 

. However, management instead 

 All three employees received the same type of 

informal discipline,

 Under USSS’ 

progressive discipline system, prior discipline may be considered when 

administering disciplinary action. 

SCD Revoked the Security Clearances of Five Employees 

SCD revoked the Top Secret security clearance of five employees implicated 

during the Cartagena investigation (figure 24). These employees either paid for 

sexual services, demonstrated a lack of candor during the investigation, or both. 

We determined that deciding officials had sufficient evidence to justify the 

Adjudicative Guideline security concerns used to revoke the employees’ security 

clearance. 

Three of the five employees alleged that their sexual conduct in Cartagena was 

permissible because SCD briefed Washington Field Office personnel that onenight stands were allowed. The official who provided the briefing remembered 

providing guidance to employees that they do not have to report one-night 

28 A national security polygraph examination addresses counterintelligence topics including unauthorized foreign 


contacts, mishandling classified information, and terrorism. 


29 A specific issue polygraph examination is an examination conducted to resolve a specific issue, e.g., criminal 


activity, espionage, or sabotage.
 

www.oig.dhs.gov 71 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

stands unless there was a high risk circumstance surrounding the incident. The 

employees’ allegation is not credible because (1) SCD did not base any of their 

revocations on employees’ failure to report their contact with foreign nationals, 

and (2) nothing in this guidance suggested it was permissible to have sexual 

contact with prostitutes. 

On , one employee whose security clearance was revoked alleged 

that USSS was denying him due process 

 Two employees we interviewed whose 

security clearance was revoked agreed with this allegation. The Chair of the 


Board explained that 

 In our report, Adequacy of USSS’ Internal Investigation of 

Alleged Misconduct in Cartagena, Colombia (OIG-13-24), January 2013, we 

validated the management inquiry and internal investigation USSS relied upon to 

revoke the employees’ security clearances. 

Figure 24: Security Clearance Revocations after Cartagena 

Employee 

Employee 

4 

Employee 

5 

Employee 

6 

Employee 

7 

Employee 

8 

Sexual 

Encounter 

(Employee 

Account) 

Sexual 

Encounter 

(FFN 

Account) 

Payment 

National 

Security 

Polygraph 

Specific 

Issue 

Polygraph 

SCD Lack 

of 

Candor 

Charge 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Alcohol 

Consumed 

Source: USSS ISP and SCD case files 

www.oig.dhs.gov 72 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

USSS Provided Employees with Options that Were Consistent with Procedures 

Of the 13 employees who were subjects of the Cartagena investigation, 

employees resigned, and allowed to retire. Employees 

submitted letters of resignation, but later rescinded their resignations; USSS then 

revoked their security clearances. Some of the implicated employees said they 

felt pressured to resign or that USSS supervisors threatened the revocation of 

their security clearance if they did not resign. 

USSS PER-16(02), Resignations, March 2001, states resignations may be 

processed only in response to an employee’s request and may not be demanded 

as an alternative to removal, termination, discharge, or other adverse action. 

However, according to the directive, an employee may elect to resign rather 

than face removal procedures. MSPB has ruled that Federal agencies are not 

permitted to use threats, coercion, or any deliberate misrepresentation to force 

an employee to enter into an employee agreement, including resignation.30 For 

example, if a resignation is induced based on information that the agency knows 

could not be substantiated and serves no legitimate purpose, the employee’s 

decision would be considered coerced. However, when an agency warns an 

employee of its intent to take legitimate disciplinary action, and there is no 

evidence that the employee was not able to exercise a free choice; the 

employee’s decision to resign is not considered coerced.31 

While the Cartagena investigation was ongoing, senior USSS officials advised the 

implicated employees of their option to resign in lieu of SCD’s issuance of a 

Notice of Determination to revoke Top Secret clearance. OCC provided talking 

points to the senior officials in the Office of Protective Operations, the Office of 

Investigations, and the Uniformed Division on the procedures. Officials were to 

advise employees that a Notice of Determination that cites specific security 

concerns used to make the decision had been prepared, and that a proposal for 

indefinite suspension without pay would be issued shortly after issuance of the 

Notice of Determination. The document informed employees of their right to 

appeal the impending security clearance revocation and advised that they may 

want to consider resigning prior to issuance of the Notice of Determination. The 

talking points explicitly stated that supervisors shall not force or require an 

individual to resign. 

30 Staats v. U.S. Postal Service, 99 F.3d 1120, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
 31 Braun v. Department of Veterans’ Affairs, 50 F.3d 1005, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 


www.oig.dhs.gov 73 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Security Appeals Board Appointments and Composition Need Attention
 

While assessing USSS’ adjudication of security concerns stemming from the 

Cartagena incident, we identified several matters not within the scope of our 

review concerning the organization and placement of DHS’ Security Appeals 

Board (the Board) that warrant management’s attention. Specifically, 

appointments to the Board and the composition of the Board have not been 

made in accordance with current policy. 

Security Appeals Board Members Are Not Appointed according to Policy 

Executive Order 12968 requires that employees who are determined not to meet 

the standards for access to classified information be provided an opportunity to 

appeal in writing to a high level panel appointed by the agency head. The Board 

is the third-level deciding authority for adjudicating appeals from all DHS 

employees or applicants. 

DHS Instruction 121-01-007 Revision # 00, issued in June 2009, requires that the 

Board be appointed by the Secretary or a designee. However, current members 

of the Board were selected by the Director. USSS claims that the Director has this 

authority according to DHS Delegation 12000, Delegation for Security Operations 

Within the Department of Homeland Security, which gives the Director authority 

to make appointments to implement and administer USSS’ personnel security 

program. However, since the Board is a Department-level body and not part of 

USSS’ personnel security program, Delegation 12000 does not apply to Board 

appointments. 

DHS Management Directive 11048 required Board members to be USSS officials. 

However, in June 2009, the Management Directive was cancelled and 

superseded by DHS Instruction 121-01-007. This Instruction does not require 

that the Board be composed solely of USSS officials. However, the current Board 

is composed of all USSS senior officials, including a Deputy Assistant Director 

serving as the Chair, along with an Assistant Chief and another Deputy Assistant 

Director. 

USSS officials have expressed an interest in relocating the Board to the 

Department-level and including members who are not from USSS. One senior 

official said moving the Board out of USSS would increase the appearance of 

fairness and due process when considering an appeal of a USSS employee. As 

such, consideration should be given to ensuring appropriate appointments and 

placing the Board within a structure most beneficial to the Department. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 74 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The Assistant Chief Should Not Serve on the Security Appeals Board for 

Uniformed Division Employees 

The Assistant Chief of the Uniformed Division serves on the Board even when an 

employee in his chain of command is the appellant. The Chair of the Board does 

not see this as a conflict of interest. However, Instruction 121-01-007 states that 

members of the Board selected to review a matter cannot have a current 

supervisory relationship with the employee. Additionally, USSS policy states that 

no supervisor of an employee who would be involved in either proposing or 

effecting any disciplinary action will be designated as a member of the Board.32 

The Assistant Chief is responsible for ensuring fairness in the administration of 

procedures with regard to discipline. As part of his duties, he sees every 

discipline case and engages in discussions with his subordinates and ERB about 

what discipline should be proposed. Therefore, he would clearly be “involved” in 

the process of posing discipline for any Uniformed Division employee. Because of 

these factors, the Assistant Chief should not sit on the Board when reviewing 

Uniformed Division employee appeals. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director, USSS: 

Recommendation #13: Inform the Secretary, or the Secretary’s designee, when 

vacancies on the Board occur so that either an appointment is made to fill the 

vacancy or other action is taken, as deemed appropriate by the Secretary, or the 

Secretary’s designee. 

Recommendation #14: Ensure that the Uniformed Division Assistant Chief, or 

other officials in their chain of command, does not rule on appeals by Uniformed 

Division employees to the Security Appeals Board. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

Management Response to Recommendation #13: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said it will notify the 

Secretary, or the Secretary’s designee, when a vacancy occurs so that an 

appointment can be made to fill a vacancy on the Security Appeals Board or 

other action as appropriate. 

32 Human Resources and Training Manual, Section RPS-02(02) 

www.oig.dhs.gov 75 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

OIG Analysis: USSS provided a copy of a November 25, 2013 memo from USSS 

Director to USSS’ Chair that (1) referenced DHS Instruction 121-01-007 requiring 

members be appointed by the Secretary, and (2) requesting to be notified when 

there is a vacancy on the board so that the Director may notify the Secretary. 

This recommendation is Resolved – Closed. 

Management Response to Recommendation #14: The Director of USSS 

concurred with this recommendation. In its response, USSS said vacancies to the 

Security Appeals Board will be filled at the Secretary’s or Secretary’s designee’s 

direction and notes that its policy, RPS-02(02), states that no supervisor of an 

employee who would be involved in the discipline process for that employee will 

be a member of the Security Appeals Board reviewing that employee’s 

revocation decision. 

OIG Analysis: USSS noted that RPS-02(02) states that no supervisor of an 

employee who would be involved in the discipline process for that employee will 

be a member of the Security Appeals Board reviewing that employee’s 

revocation decision. However, USSS was not following this policy at the time of 

our review. In its corrective action plan, USSS should describe how it would 

replace a sitting board member, such as the Uniformed Division Assistant Chief, 

when a Uniformed Division Employee is appealing a revocation decision before 

the Security Appeals Board. This recommendation is Unresolved – Open. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 76 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department. 

In April 2012, USSS employees were in Cartagena, Colombia, preparing for a Presidential 

visit to the Summit of the Americas. While off duty, several USSS employees solicited 

prostitutes, consumed excessive amounts of alcohol, and patronized questionable local 

establishments. Off duty behaviors such as these could compromise USSS’ missions or 

jeopardize an employee’s suitability for employment. 

On May 23, 2012, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs held a hearing held to obtain facts regarding the Cartagena incident. Committee 

members expressed particular interest in whether these activities were an isolated 

event or indicative of a pattern of misconduct by USSS employees. In subsequent 

discussions, members and staff expressed a concern that systemic issues may exist 

within USSS that create a tolerance for the types of inappropriate behavior exhibited in 

Cartagena. We initiated this review based on this Congressional concern. 

Our objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which USSS employees engage in 

behavior contrary to conduct standards; (2) whether USSS management has fostered an 

environment that tolerates or condones inappropriate behavior; (3) the adequacy of 

management controls in place to report misconduct or inappropriate behavior; (4) 

whether management’s efforts and perceived attitudes encourage the reporting of 

misconduct and inappropriate behavior; and (5) the adequacy of USSS’ process for 

adjudicating and administering disciplinary actions. 

Our field work encompassed various analytical and evidentiary techniques reflecting the 

multifaceted nature of identifying, addressing, and mitigating employee misconduct. 

We designed our methodology to collect enough information to complete our 

objectives. Our methodology included an electronic and in-person survey; a review of 

disciplinary and security clearance data and case files; site visits to field offices; and 

interviews with leadership. These aspects of our fieldwork are discussed in further detail 

in the following paragraphs. We conducted our fieldwork between March 2013 and July 

2013. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 77 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Electronic and In-Person Survey 

We conducted a survey of the USSS workforce to obtain employees’ views on 

misconduct and security clearance concerns. We also sought to determine the adequacy 

of management controls to report misconduct or behaviors that could cause a security 

concern, whether management’s efforts and perceived attitudes encourage the 

reporting of misconduct and behaviors that could cause a security concern, and the 

adequacy of USSS’ process for adjudicating and administering discipline and security 

clearances. 

We worked with USSS’ Human Resources, Research and Assessment Division to ensure 

that the survey questions were designed specifically for USSS survey participants. In its 

formal comments, USSS expressed that the survey design, methodology, and 

construction could potentially result in unreliable survey results and inaccurate data. 

We worked with USSS to address their concerns while designing our survey. For 

example, we added options for survey participants to choose from so that we could 

better understand how employees became aware of behaviors that could cause a 

security concern. Options added include, “I learned about this behavior from the press, 

media, or another public source” and “I learned about this behavior through a casual 

conversation that I considered gossip.” USSS requested several other changes to the 

survey which we did not make because these changes would have negatively affected 

our ability to achieve our objectives. 

In addition, we consulted research psychologists with the U.S. Office of Personnel 

Management, Organizational Assessment Section. The lead research psychologist 

informed us that our survey was appropriately constructed and directly measured the 

areas we intended. While the research psychologists offered minor revisions, they 

informed us there was nothing wrong with the survey that required fixing. Therefore, 

we maintain that our survey results are an accurate reflection of respondents’ 

perceptions, and provide USSS with useful and actionable information. 

We administered the survey both electronically and in-person. The survey was not 

hosted on USSS servers nor did USSS collect any survey data on our behalf. We invited 

6,447 employees to complete the survey electronically; 2,575 employees (39.9 percent) 

completed the survey. We administered the electronic survey from May 13, 2013, to 

June 9, 2013. 

We invited a judgmental sample of 200 USSS employees from the Presidential 

Protective Division, Vice Presidential Protective Division, Special Operations Division, 

and Uniformed Division to complete the survey in-person. Due to scheduling conflicts, 

we were unable to schedule 30 of the 200 employees. We invited 24 of the 30 

www.oig.dhs.gov 78 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

employees to complete the survey electronically. The remaining six employees were not 

provided the electronic survey or in-person survey. 

Of the 170 employees scheduled to complete the survey in-person, 2 employees did not 

appear for the survey.33 The remaining 168 USSS employees were advised during the 

introduction of the survey that their participation was voluntary. After this advisement, 

seven employees declined to participate. Therefore, 161 out of 170 employees 

scheduled for the in-person survey (95 percent) completed it. We administered the inperson survey from May 13, 2013, to June 11, 2013. 

The survey results in our report are unweighted and represent only USSS employees 

who completed surveys. With few exceptions, we did not combine the electronic and inperson results because of inherent differences between in-person and electronic survey 

administration, as well as differences between the groups of employees who took the 

survey in each format. 

Figure 25: USSS Population at time of Survey Compared to Survey Population, by Occupational Specialty 

USSS Population 

Electronic 

Survey 

Population 

In-Person Survey 

Population 

Special Agents 3,383 (51%) 1,262 (49%) 54 (34%) 

Uniformed Division Officers 1,356 (20%) 431 (17%) 98 (61%) 

Administrative, Professional, 

Technical Support Personnel or 

Other 

1,884 (29%) 882 (34%) 9 (5%) 

All Employees 6,623 2,575 161 

Electronic Biases 

As shown in figure 25, all occupational specialties in the electronic survey closely match 

their representation in the general population, which increases our confidence that the 

variety of employees’ opinions were captured in the survey. Uniformed Division officers 

were most underrepresented—by three percent—from the general population. In 

addition, because the survey was voluntary, it is possible Uniform Division officers were 

underrepresented because many officers do not have desks and may have been on 

33 We did not ask USSS to require the two employees to appear before OIG because the survey was voluntary. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 79 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

mission-related travel. Special agents were underrepresented by two percent. While 

many have desks, many also have hectic mission-related travel schedules. The 

administrative, professional, and technical support personnel or other occupations are 

overrepresented in the electronic survey by six percent. This could be attributed to 

having greater access to work stations, as well as less work-related travel than other 

occupational specialties. Surveys were sent to employees’ USSS email accounts; 

therefore, employees who are skeptical of the confidentiality of their responses may 

have chosen to not participate in the survey. 

In-Person Biases 

Individuals selected to take the survey in-person represent divisions most closely 

involved in traveling with or closely guarding the President. Therefore, they are not a 

representative sample of USSS employees. Compared to the electronic survey, the inperson survey population differs more from the general population. There is a higher 

percentage of Uniformed Division officers in the divisions we selected for our in-person 

survey than in the agency as a whole. As a result, Uniformed Division officers ended up 

being overrepresented and special agents underrepresented in our in-person survey. 

Further, while we used a standard template to administer the in-person survey 

instrument, employees taking the survey in-person would have a different experience 

from those taking the survey electronically. For example, the survey covered sensitive 

topics which employees may be more comfortable answering anonymously at a 

computer. 

Interviews 

We interviewed 204 current and former USSS employees, including program and office 

managers as well as directorate and agency leadership. 

We interviewed officials from the following offices, divisions and branches: 

•	 Office of the Director 

•	 Office of Chief Counsel 

•	 Office of Human Resources and Training, including officials from the Human 

Capital Division, the Employee Relations Branch, and the Security Clearance 

Division 

•	 Office of Professional Responsibility, including officials from the Inspection 

Division 

•	 Office of Investigations 

www.oig.dhs.gov 80	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

•	 Office of Protective Operations, including the Presidential Protective Division, 

the Vice Presidential Protective Division, Special Operations Division, Special 

Services Division, and the Uniformed Division 

•	 Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information 

•	 Office of Technical Development and Mission Support 

•	 Office of Government and Public Affairs 

Across these offices, we interviewed 46 Assistants to the Special Agent in Charge; 

20 Assistant Special Agents in Charge; 5 Deputy Special Agents in Charge; and 

15 Special Agents in Charge. We interviewed 21 Sergeant/Sergeant-Techs; 7 Captains; 

4 Inspectors; 2 Deputy Chiefs; the Assistant Chief, and the Chief of the Uniformed 

Division. We also interviewed 13 Deputy Assistant Directors; 6 Assistant Directors; the 

Deputy Director; and the Director. 

We visited four field offices, including Houston, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Chicago, IL; and 

Minneapolis, MN. We interviewed supervisors telephonically in the San Antonio, TX; 

Seattle, WA; and Rome, Italy, field offices. These locations were selected to provide a 

variety of office size, geographic location, and experience with discipline. 

Cartagena Follow-up Interviews 

We were able to interview 5 of the 13 employees implicated in the solicitation of 

prostitutes in Cartagena. Four employees declined to be interviewed or did not provide 

a response once contacted. Two employees were scheduled to be interviewed and later 

declined. One employee was scheduled to be interviewed and did not appear for the 

interview. We were unable to contact one employee. 

Disciplinary Data and Files 

In response to our request, USSS’ ERB provided us a list of 1,006 formal disciplinary and 

adverse actions taken between January 2004 and February 2013. From this data set, we 

selected a judgmental sample of 251 cases for review. ERB determined that one case 

was performance-related, thereby reducing our sample to 250 cases. We further 

selected 71 cases based on testimonial evidence. In all, we reviewed case files related to 

321 disciplinary and adverse actions. 

USSS’ database of 1,006 cases had several data integrity issues, such as inconsistent, 

incomplete or incorrect data entries, and inclusion of performance-related actions. To 

the extent possible, we extracted information from this data set that was usable. 

Throughout the report, when we use this universe of disciplinary and adverse actions, 

we explain which entries we used and which ones we did not. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 81	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

We reviewed the ERB files for the judgmental sample of 250 formal disciplinary and 

adverse actions, as well as the additional 71 actions. When presenting any analysis, we 

specify whether the analysis was based upon the judgmentally selected files, the files 

selected because of testimonial evidence, or both. Further, because the documentation 

in these files was not standardized, our analyses based on the judgmental sample may 

not include all 250 files. For example, not all of the files included information about 

ERB’s recommendation to a manager. Therefore, our analysis comparing ERB 

recommendations to decided disciplinary action would be based on files that contained 

ERB recommendations. Throughout the report, we specify how many of these randomly 

selected files had documentation to support each analysis. 

We reviewed ERB internal operating policies. We also reviewed 56 comparable 

discipline sheets (or comp sheets) which ERB specialists use to research historical data 

for specific offenses and recommend ranges of disciplinary or adverse action to 

managers. 

Security Clearance Data and Files 

In response to our request, USSS provided and we reviewed a list of all 195 security 

clearance suspensions; their adjudicative guidelines base; and their dispositions from 

January 2004 through February 2013. Similarly, we requested and USSS provided a list 

of all 67 security clearance warnings and their adjudicative guideline bases issued by 

USSS during the same period. We judgmentally selected 50 SCD files from these lists, as 

well as testimony, to review. 

RES Inspection Division Data and Reports 

In response to our request, USSS provided and we reviewed a list of all ISP special 

investigations, fact finders and complaints between January 2004 and February 2013. 

We also reviewed reports encountered during our review of ERB files, as well as 

additional fact-finder and special investigation reports. We reviewed Monthly Director 

Reports for May 2012 and June 2013, as well as relevant ISP records and templates. 

We conducted this review under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the Council 

of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 82 OIG-14-20 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

* U.S. Dep<ll'l nwnl of omcl~n d Seeurity 

UNITED S'J'A'l'l:t.;S SECRET SERVICE 

Washington, D.C. 20723 

DIRECTOR 

November 22. 20 13 

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorab le Ch:Jrles K. Edward ~ 

Depmy Inspector General 

Office of the Inspector General 

Department of Homeland SecuLrity 

FROM: Julia A. Pierson \ 

Director ·~ United States Se~ t Ser vice 

SUBJECT: "USSS Efforts to Identify, Mitigate, and Address Instances of 

Misconduct and Inappropriate Behavior,'' OIG Project No. 13- 13 1-

ISP-USSS 

The United States Secre t Service (Secret Service) has had an opportunity to review and comment on 

the Ofnce of Inspector General (OIG) draft repon concerni ng "USSS Efforts to Identify, Mitigate, 

and Address ln ces o f Misconduct and Inappropriate Behavior." OIG Projec t No. 13- 13 1-ISPUSSS. While we agree with your rccunnnt nd<ttiuus and have taken <tel ions to implement them. we 

are concerned with aspects of the survey used in this project. 

The proud legacy of the Secre t Service is based on the accomplishments and selfless dedication of 

t\1e many men and women who have joined our agency since it ~ founding in 1865. Nearl y 150 

years of excellence stems from the overwhelming maj ority of our employee' holdi ng themselves to 

the hi ghest standards of personal and professional conduct. Although this rcpon uocLHnents that 

misconduct is not widespread in the Secret Service. we will not tolerate it at any level. I :nn 

commillcd to swiftl y and vigorously investigati ng any in st an ce~ of misconduct that are brought to 

my allcntion. 

Our ovcrarching goal is to support our workforce to ensu re mission success. inc.:I uding our e l'l'on s 

for thorough oversight and strong human capita l polic ies and procedures. Your recommendations. 

along with our own efforts to identify and implement enhancements, comribute to that effort. 

Immediate ly following the incidents of misconduct that occurred in Colombia, the Secret Service 

initiated an interna l review of our humnn capita l pnlicics and procedures to identify areas ror 

enhancement. As part o f th.is effort, we collaboruted with the Office of r~ nn l Management and 

the Federal Law Enl'orcemeni Traini ng C:enter lo develop a Professionalism Re inforcement 

Working Group (PRWG) to examine Secret Service human capital li c~ and rocedure~. The 

PRWG was specifically ehargecl with: I) re viewing the Secret Service's int.:rn•tl comrols on 

profc;sional conduct; 2) bt:nchmarking the agency against best practices of peer organization': and 

3) identifying areas in which the Secret Se rvice i. e~! in c lass and any areas in need of 

www.oig.dhs.gov 83 OIG-14-20 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

- 2 -

improvement. The group assembled included senior executives with various areas of expertise 

across government. 

In February 2013, the PRWG provided the Secret Service with its report and recommendations. 

The PRWG made recommendations in the areas of: Recruitment and Hiring; Discipline and 

Rewards; Diversity and Inclusion; Performance Management; Values and Mission: Leadership; 

Reporting Misconduct; Availability of Support Services for Employees; and Reinforcing 

Professionalism. Just I1S witb this OIG report, we accepted all of the PRWG's recommendations. 

We developed a Strategic Action Plan to Reinforce Professionalism to enhance our internal controls 

and ensure that our practices are consistent with best practices in government. To date, we have 

completed action on a majority of our plan's objectives and on all of the recommendations you 

identified in your report. 

Specifically, the actions we have taken include the following: 

• Appointed a Chief Integrity Officer to conduct risk assessments for professional standards 

and develop targeted training to support integrity in the workforce 

• Established a highly visible link to our Inspection Hotline on our Intranet site to encourage 

all employees to report misconduct 

• Provided employees with an ethics desk reference guide containing the agency"s policies 

and made it available on our intranet site 

• Provided enhanced ethics and integrity training to 4.500 employees since April 2012 

• Developed policy to centralize our discipline process and enhance transparency and 

consistency when adjudicating misconduct 

• Developed a table of penalties that identified specific offenses and accompanying penalties 

• Publicly praised employees for modeling our core values in an awards ceremony 

• Reinforced the importance of leadership and ethical conduct with newly promoted 

supervisors 

Thus, both prior to and during your review, the Secret Service was working to institute significant 

changes in the way we reinforce professionalism in our workforce and how we respond to instances 

of misconduct. 

Secret Service Response to the OIG's Specific Recommendations 

Recommendation #1: Clarify USSS' conduct policy for reporting allegations of misconduct. At a 

minimum, the policy should define misconduct issues that are not ordinarily addressed by 

management, clarify reporting procedures for referring misconduct issues through the chain of 

command, ISP, and OlG. 

Secret Service Response: Concur 

Secret Service policy, PER-05( II), states that Secret Service employees are required to repon 

promptly and directly to the Office of Professional Responsibility {RES) any knowledge, 

information, or allegations that indicates any employee or former employee may have committed a 

criminal act, violated any provision of the Standards of Conduct or any rule of conduct, violated any 

provision of the merit system, or committed any other misconduct. We have further clarified this 

policy through the addition of PER-05{13), which identifies a specific table of offenses (and 

www.oig.dhs.gov 84 OIG-14-20 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

-3-

accompanying penalties) and states, "Employees are encouraged and expected to report through 

their chain of command, or the lnspection Division Hotline, or the DHS Office of the Inspector 

General hotline, information that indicates another employee may have engaged in misconduct 

described in the Table of Penalties." PER-OS( 13) also requires supervisors to report through their 

chain of command any misconduct committed by their subordinates included in the table of 

penalties and identifies examples of items that warrant infonnal discipline. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

Recommendation #2: Establish a written policy requiring directorate offices to report the results 

of fact-finders to RES. 

Secret Service Response: Concur 

As the new discipline policy, PER-OS( 13), significantly limits the actions that could warrant 

informal discipline, fact-finders will be limited to only minor issues of employee conduct. Outside 

of these instances, only the Office of Professional Responsibility or the Deputy Director of the 

Secret Service can authorize a directorate o[fice to conduct a fact-finder. In these latter authorized 

instances, a new Secret Service policy, RES-02, requires that fact finding results be forwarded to 

the Office of Professional Responsibility via a standard form within ten days of the completion of 

the investigation. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

Recommendation f-3: Establish a written policy granting the Chief Security Office.r unfeuered 

access to employees to obtain information relating to potential security concerns. 

Secret Service Response: Concur 

We agree that the Chief Security OHicer (CSO) must have appropriate access to all employees io 

provide oversight for security clearances. We have clarified our policy by revising SCD-02(01) to 

specifically state that the CSO has direct access to employees in order to obtain information relating 

to potential security concerns. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

Recommendation #4: Establish a written policy identifying the circumstances under which 

managers may conduct their own fact finders. 

Secret Service Response: Concur 

We have established RES-02 to provide additional clarity for managers. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 85 OIG-14-20 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

- 4-

Recommendation #5: Create and document procedures for collecting and recording facts by 

managers who conduct fact-finders. 

§ecret Service Rqponse: Concur 

Secret Service policy, RES-02, now outlines the procedures for collecting and recording facts by 

managers who conduct fact-findings. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

Recommendation #6: Define and document specific offense categories. as well as subcategories 

of broader categories, such as Conduct Unbecoming. to ensure ERB specialists consistently 

categorize misconduct. 

Secret Service Response: Concur 

As detailed above, PER-05(13) now includes a detailed table of specific offense categories and 

accompanying penalties to ensure consistency and transparency in our discipline process. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

Recommendation lrl: Establish and document a quality control process to ensure that comparable 

offense sheets reflect specific offense categories, are up-to-date, and complete. 

Secret Service Response: Concur 

While our new discipline process eliminaces the need for comparable offense sheets. we agree that a 

quality control proce.~s is important for maintaining an equitable discipline process. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

Recommendation #8: Establish and document a quality control process to ensure that ERB 

specialists enter and update misconduct case information in their database accurately and 

consistently. 

Secret Service Response: Concur 

We have updated our standard operating procedures to ensure that our database is updated 

accurately and consistentJy. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 86 OIG-14-20 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

- 5-

Recommendation #9: Ensure summaric.~ of oral appeals to adverse actions are retained in case 

files. 

Secret Service Response: Concur 

The Secret Service understands that summaries of oral appeals must be maintained in case fi les. As 

part of our quality control process, we have developed a file checklist to ensure that oral summaries 

along with all other required documentation are properly retained, updated our standard oper.tting 

procedures and trained our ERB specialists on the new process. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

Recommendation #10: Ensure that notices of decision arc retained in case files. 

Secret Service Response: Concur 

The Secret Service understands that of the 300 adverse action files provided to the OIG for review, 

a filing error had occurred in five cases. The checklist described in our response to the previous 

recommendation will ensure that all relevant infonnation, including notices of decisions, will be 

maintained in the case files. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

Recommendation #11: Ensure manager's consideration of mitigating and nggr.tvating factors is 

documented in notlces of proposed 11ction and decisions for non·;sppeaJable disciplinary actions. 

Sesret Service Resoonse; Concur 

As with the previous two recommendations, the newly designed file checklist will ensure that 

documentation regarding managers' consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors is retained 

in the case files. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

Recommendation #12: Develop and implement a process to ensure that disciplinary actions are 

progressive. 

Secret Service Response: Concur 

The Secret Service agrees with the principles of progressive discipline and has a policy m place to 

allow for its use in cases when an employee has previously received a written reprimand or 

suspension. As part of our enhunced discipline process. we have further clarified that disciplinary 

actions are to be progressive. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 87 OIG-14-20 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

. 6. 

Recommendation #13: Inform the Secretary, or the Secretary's designee, when vacancies on the 

Board occur so that either an appointment is made to fill the vacancy or other action is taken, as 

deemed appropriate by the Secretary, or the Secretary's designee. 

Secret Service Response: Concur 

We will notify the Secretary, or the Secretary's designee, when a vacancy occurs so that an 

appointment can be made to fill a vacancy on the Security Appeals Board or other action as 

appropriate. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

Recommendation #14: Ensure that the Uniformed Division Assistant Chief, or other officials in 

their chain of command. does not rule on appeals by Uniformed Division employees to the Security 

Appeals Board. 

Secret Service Resoonse: Concur 

Consistent with the previous recommendation, we will fill vacancies at the Secretary's or 

Secretary's designee's direction. Our policy, RPS-02(02), states that no supervisor of an employee 

who would be involved in the discipline process for that employee will be a member of the Security 

Appeals Board reviewing that employee's revocation decision. 

Estimated date of completion: Completed. 

Comments Concerning Survey Responses and the Use of those Responses 

While the Secret Service concurs with all of the recommendations contained in the report, we are 

concerned with the survey used during the course of the project and some of the narration presented 

in the report in regard to the survey results. During the initial phases of the audit, we notified your 

staff that we believed that the survey design, methodology. and construction could potentially result 

in unreliable survey results and inaccurate data. For example, the survey asked Secret Service 

employees to speculate about the personal, sexual, and potential criminal activities of co-workers, 

and to respond with what they believed to be true through rumor and gossip. This posed a serious 

concern about the survey content and the value of coUecting such speculation, 

The survey design also contributes to potential confusion regarding the number of instances of 

misconduct that have occurred. For example, we pointed out that it would be impossible to tell 

whether the respondents were all referring to a single incident about which they had beard, or 

whether multiple incidents had occurred. Further, allowing respondents to identify multiple ways in 

which they became aware of misconduct suggests that the number of occurrences is greater than 

what your results found and leads to percentages higher than 100% for the number of the 

individuals aware or the misconduct. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 88 OIG-14-20 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

-7 -

Conclusion 

We support and appreciate the OIG's efforts to provide clear, constructive recommendations 

concerning our human resource processes and remain committed to continuing our ongoing efrorts 

in the areas of employee conduct and professionalism. The criticality of the Secret Service's 

mission demands that we maintain the highest levels of integrity in our workforce. I remain 

committed to investigating and adjudicating all instances of misconduct that are brought to my 

attention. 

Again, we thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Technical 

comments and a sensitivity review were previously provided under separnte cover. Please feel free 

to contact me if you have any questions. We look forward to work1ng with you in the future. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 89 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

About Survey Items 

Survey respondents considered a minimum of 34 items. Respondents could have 

answered 30 additional survey items based on their response to section 3, item 28, 

which asked respondents to select behaviors by USSS employees of which they are 

aware. Subsequent questions in section 3 asked employees further details regarding the 

behavior(s) that they identified. Respondents considered a maximum of 64 items. 

Twenty-five survey items used a Likert scale format, which measures individual’s 

agreement or disagreement with a statement. The table below describes how responses 

to Likert items are interpreted. 

Positive Response Neutral Response Negative Response Agnostic 

Strongly 

Agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree 

Do not 

know 

(If Applicable) 

Fifteen of the survey items allowed respondents to select “Yes” or “No.” Fifteen 

questions allowed respondents to select more than one response. Finally, the survey 

included six demographic items asking respondents their length of service, occupational 

specialty, current grade, supervisory status, and their involvement in a disciplinary 

matter or the security clearance adjudication process. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 90 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

For all scale questions, responses of “strongly 

agree” and “agree” are positive, “neither agree 

nor disagree” is neutral, and “strongly disagree” 

or “disagree” are negative. 

Percent 

Positive 

Strongly 

Agree Agree 

Neither 

Agree 

Nor 

Disagree 

Disagree Strongly 

Disagree 

Do Not 

Know 

Reporting and Addressing Misconduct 

80.8% 

86.7% 

55.8% 

76.4% 

84.2% 

she is held accountable. 

[A senior manager supervises 

several supervisors and their staff.] 

49.9% 

608 677 427 301 286 276 

7. If a supervisor engages in 

misconduct or illegal activity, he or 

she is held accountable. 

[A supervisor is the first-line 

manager who monitors and 

regulates employees in their 

performance of assigned or 

delegated tasks.] 

54.8% 

24.0% 30.8% 16.4% 12.0% 7.8% 9.0% 

617 793 423 310 200 232 

Appendix D 

Results of Electronic Surveys 

1.	 Appropriate policies and 

procedures are in place to address 

employee violations of any law, 

rule, regulation, or standards of 

conduct. 

2.	 I am aware of avenues available to 

Secret Service employees to report 

misconduct. 

3.	 I can report a suspected violation 

of any law, rule, regulation, or 

standards of conduct without fear 

of retaliation. 

4.	 I trust my immediate supervisor to 

respond appropriately to reported 

misconduct. 

5.	 If I suspected that my co-workers
 

or managers were engaged in
 

misconduct or illegal activity, I 


would report it to the appropriate 


Secret Service officials.
 

6.	 If a senior manager engages in 

misconduct or illegal activity, he or 

31.7% 49.1% 9.1% 5.7% 2.4% 

817 1,264 234 146 61 


35.2% 51.5% 7.2% 5.1% 0.9%
 

907 1,327 186 131 24 


23.5% 32.3% 21.7% 13.8% 8.6%
 

605 833 559 356 222 


37.6% 38.8% 13.2% 6.0% 4.5%
 

969 998 339 154 115 


44.4% 39.8% 11.8% 2.6% 1.4%
 

1,143 1,024 305 67 36 


23.6% 26.3% 16.6% 11.7% 11.1% 

2.1% 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

10.7% 

www.oig.dhs.gov 91	 OIG-14-20 

53 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Agree 

62.1% 

27.3% 10.1% 

704 259 

61.6% 

29.1% 23.5% 

749 606 

60.8% 

27.5% 19.0% 

707 490 

61.1% 

24.2% 2.1% 

40.3% 

30.0% 

36.6% 

15. If you were to report misconduct by a Secret Service employee, to whom would you report it? [More than one could 

be selected] 

Reporting and Addressing Misconduct 

(cont.) 

8.	 If a Special Agent engages in 

misconduct or illegal activity, he or 

she is held accountable. 

9.	 If a Uniformed Division Police 

Officer engages in misconduct or 

illegal activity, he or she is held 

accountable. 

10. If an Administrative, Professional, 

or Technical Support employee 

engages in misconduct or illegal 

activity, he or she is held 

accountable. 

11. Violations of any law, rule, 

regulation, or standards of conduct 

are not tolerated within the Secret 

Percent 


Positive
 

Strongly Agree 

34.8%

895 

32.5%

838 

33.3%

858 

36.9%

Neither 


Agree
 

Nor 


Disagree
 

15.6% 

401 

11.9% 

307 

14.4% 

371 

18.8%

Strongly Disagree Disagree 

7.3% 5.0% 

187 129 

2.0% 0.9% 

52 23 

3.8% 2.0% 

98 51 

12.7% 5.3% 

Do Not 

Know 

Service. 

12. The Secret Service’s disciplinary 

process is fair. 

13. Disciplinary actions within the 

Secret Service are applied 

consistently for similar offenses. 

14. Disciplinary actions within the 

Secret Service are at the 

appropriate level of severity given 

the offense. 

624 

13.7%

352 

10.6% 

274 

11.4%

293 

951 

26.6% 

685 

19.4%

499 

25.2% 

648 

483 

24.3% 

626 

22.8% 

587 

27.8% 

715 

327 

13.6% 

349 

17.6%

452 

10.8% 

278 

136 

9.3% 

240 

12.1% 

311 

7.0% 

179 

54 

12.5% 

323 

17.6% 

452 

17.9% 

462 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

My direct supervisor 84.5% 2,177 

Another supervisor other than my direct supervisor 20.6% 530 

DHS Office of Inspector General 11.4% 293 

USSS Equal Employment Opportunity Office 8.6% 221 

USSS Inspection Division 22.4% 577 

USSS Ombudsman 13.1% 338 

Do not know 4.5% 115 

Other 3.8% 97 

www.oig.dhs.gov 92	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

Reporting and Addressing Security 

Concerns 

16. Appropriate policies and 

procedures are in place to address 

security concerns regarding a 

Secret Service employee. 

Percent 

Positive 

83.8% 

Strongly 

Agree 

31.1%

800 

Agree 

 52.7% 

1,357 

Neither 


Agree
 

Nor 


Disagree 

8.5% 

218 

Disagree 

3.1% 

80 

Strongly 

Disagree 

1.3% 

33 

Do Not 


Know
 

3.4% 

87 

17. I am aware of avenues available to 

Secret Service employees to report 

security concerns regarding a 

Secret Service employee. 

86.0% 

30.5%

785 

55.5% 

1,428 

9.4% 

243 

4.1% 

105 

0.5% 

14 

NA 

18. I can report a suspected security 

concern regarding a Secret Service 

employee without fear of 

retaliation. 

68.7% 

28.1%

723 

40.6% 

1,045 

19.2% 

495 

8.4% 

217 

3.7%

95 

NA 

19. I trust my immediate supervisor to 

respond appropriately to security 

concerns regarding a Secret 

Service employee. 

81.3% 

37.8%

973 

43.5% 

1,121 

12.2% 

313 

3.9% 

100 

2.6% 

68 

NA 

20. If I suspected that my co-workers 

or managers engaged in behavior 

that caused a security concern, I 

would report it to the appropriate 

Secret Service officials. 

Reporting and Addressing Security 

90.5% 

Percent 

45.0%

1,158 

Strongly 

45.5% 

1,171 

Agree 

7.2% 

186 

Neither 

Agree 

Nor 

1.5% 

39 

Disagree 

0.8% 

21 

Strongly 

NA 

Do Not 

Concerns (cont.) 

21. The Secret Service takes 

appropriate action if a senior 

manager engages in behavior that 

causes a security concern. [A 

senior manager supervises several 

supervisors and their staff.] 

Positive 

49.2% 

Agree 

20.3%

524 

 28.9% 

743 

Disagree 

17.9% 

462 

7.7% 

199 

Disagree 

5.6% 

144 

Know 

19.5% 

503 

22. The Secret Service takes 

appropriate action if a supervisor 

engages in behavior that causes a 

security concern. [A supervisor is 

the first-line manager who 

monitors and regulates employees 

in their performance of assigned or 

delegated tasks.] 

53.6% 

21.2%

546 

 32.4% 

835 

17.5% 

450 

7.4% 

190 

4.4% 

113 

17.1% 

441 

www.oig.dhs.gov 93 OIG-14-20 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

59.9% 

57.2% 

Administrative, Professional, or 

Technical employee engages in 

behavior that causes a security 

concern. 

56.7% 

629 833 389 64 30 630 

26. The Secret Service has a fair 

process for reviewing an 

employee’s eligibility for continued 

access to classified information as 

a result of behavior that causes a 

security concern. 

53.6% 

19.8% 33.8% 17.7% 4.2% 2.8% 21.7% 

511 870 456 108 72 558 

23. The Secret Service takes 

appropriate action if a Special 

Agent engages in behavior that 

causes a security concern. 

24. The Secret Service takes 

appropriate action if a Uniformed 

Division Police Officer engages in 

behavior that causes a security 

concern. 

25. The Secret Service takes 

appropriate action if an 

24.2% 35.7% 15.5% 5.7% 2.8% 16.1% 

624 918 399 146 73 415 

25.0% 32.2% 13.0% 1.9% 0.8% 27.1% 

643 829 334 50 21 698 

24.4% 32.3% 15.1% 2.5% 1.2% 24.5% 

27. If you were to report behavior that causes a security concern, to whom would you report it? [More than one could be 

selected] 

My direct supervisor 86.9% 2,237 

Another supervisor other than my direct supervisor 22.6% 583 

DHS Office of Inspector General 26.8% 689 

USSS Security Clearance Division 9.9% 255 

USSS Inspection Division 20.3% 523 

USSS Ombudsman 8.0% 207 

Do not know 3.8% 98 

Other 3.2% 83 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 94 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Existence of Certain Behaviors within Secret Service 

28. Using the list below, please select any behaviors by Secret Service employees of which you are aware. [More than one 

could be selected] 

Excessive alcohol consumption that causes a security concern 10.4% 269 

Solicitation of prostitute(s) 8.0% 207 

Criminal sexual behavior other than solicitation 1.9% 50 

Other sexual behavior that causes a security concern 5.9% 153 

Contact with foreign nationals that causes a security concern 4.5% 116 

Personal conduct that causes a security concern 9.6% 247 

I am not aware of any Secret Service employees engaging in these 

behaviors 83.3% 2,144 

If the respondent selected: Excessive alcohol consumption that causes a security concern 

a. How did you become aware of the excessive alcohol consumption? [More than one could be selected] 

I have personally observed this behavior. 51.3% 138 

I learned about this behavior from the person who engaged in it. 27.1% 73 

I learned about this behavior from a person who observed it. 48.0% 129 

I learned about this behavior from someone who reported it to me. 14.5% 39 

I learned about this behavior as part of my official duties. 17.8% 48 

I learned about this behavior through official Secret Service 12.6% 34 communication. 

I learned about this behavior from the press, media, or another public 40.9% 110 

source. 

I learned about this behavior through a casual conversation that I 44.6% 120 considered gossip. 

Other 3.0% 8 

If the respondent answered “I have personally observed this behavior,” he/she proceeded to “b.” If not, he/she 

proceeded to “d.” 

b. Did you report the behavior? 

Yes 14.5% 20 

No 85.5% 118 

If the respondent answered “Yes,” he/she proceeded to “d.” If the respondent answered “No,” he/she proceeded to “c.” 

c. If no, why did you not report this behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

Someone else reported the behavior. 16.9% 20 

I was afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the behavior. 39.8% 47 

I do not believe management is supportive of employees reporting the 46.6% 55 behavior. 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

The employee engaged in the behavior while off-duty. 55.9% 66 

www.oig.dhs.gov 95 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I did not feel the behavior was serious enough to warrant reporting. 29.7% 35 

I was unfamiliar with the process for reporting the behavior. 4.2% 5 

I did not believe the employee would be investigated even if reported. 37.3% 44 

I did not want to cause an adverse action against a co-worker. 20.3% 24 

I did not want to get involved. 19.5% 23 

Management was already aware of this behavior. 33.9% 40 

Other 5.9% 7 

d. Did the excessive alcohol consumption occur during a protective assignment? 

Yes 65.1% 175 

No 34.9% 94 

e. Which of the following most accurately describes your perception of excessive alcohol consumption in the Secret 

Service? 

This behavior is isolated within the Secret Service.34 38.3% 103 

This behavior is systemic throughout the Secret Service.35 20.1% 54 

This behavior is more than isolated but less than systemic. 41.6% 112 

If the respondent selected: Solicitation of Prostitutes 

a. How did you become aware of the solicitation of prostitute(s)? [More than one could be selected] 

I have personally observed this behavior. 9.2% 19 

I learned about this behavior from the person who engaged in it. 11.6% 24 

I learned about this behavior from a person who observed it. 22.7% 47 

I learned about this behavior from someone who reported it to me. 9.2% 19 

I learned about this behavior as part of my official duties. 22.7% 47 

I learned about this behavior through official Secret Service 26.6% 55 communication. 

I learned about this behavior from the press, media, or another public 76.8% 159 

source. 

I learned about this behavior through a casual conversation that I 41.5% 86 considered gossip. 

Other 3.4% 7 

If the respondent answered “I have personally observed this behavior,” he/she proceeded to “b.” If not, he/she 

proceeded to “d.” 

b. Did you report the behavior? 

Yes 0.0% 0 

No 100.0% 19 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

34 Isolated means that the behavior occurs infrequently, among a small percentage of employees who act alone. 35 Systemic means that the behavior occurs frequently, among a large percentage of employees who act together. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 96 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

If the respondent answered “Yes,” he/she proceeded to “d.” If the respondent answered “No,” he/she proceeded to “c.” 

c. If no, why did you not report this behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

Someone else reported the behavior. 26.3% 5 

I was afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the behavior. 47.4% 9 

I do not believe management is supportive of employees reporting the 63.2% 12 behavior. 

The employee engaged in the behavior while off-duty. 57.9% 11 

I did not feel the behavior was serious enough to warrant reporting. 5.3% 1 

I was unfamiliar with the process for reporting the behavior. 10.5% 2 

I did not believe the employee would be investigated even if reported. 47.4% 9 

I did not want to cause an adverse action against a co-worker. 31.6% 6 

I did not want to get involved. 15.8% 3 

Management was already aware of this behavior. 36.8% 7 

Other 21.1% 4 

d. Did the solicitation of prostitute(s) occur during a protective assignment? 

Yes 82.1% 170 

No 17.9% 37 

e. Which of the following most accurately describes your perception of solicitation of prostitute(s) in the Secret Service? 

This behavior is isolated within the Secret Service. 54.1% 112 

This behavior is systemic throughout the Secret Service. 10.1% 21 

This behavior is more than isolated but less than systemic. 35.7% 74 

If the respondent selected: Criminal sexual behavior other than solicitation 

a. How did you become aware of the criminal sexual behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

I have personally observed this behavior. 8.0% 4 

I learned about this behavior from the person who engaged in it. 10.0% 5 

I learned about this behavior from a person who observed it. 20.0% 10 

I learned about this behavior from someone who reported it to me. 6.0% 3 

I learned about this behavior as part of my official duties. 36.0% 18 

I learned about this behavior through official Secret Service 12.0% 6 communication. 

I learned about this behavior from the press, media, or another public 46.0% 23 

source. 

I learned about this behavior through a casual conversation that I 42.0% 21 considered gossip. 

Other 6.0% 3 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 97 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If the respondent answered “I have personally observed this behavior,” he/she proceeded to “b.” If not, he/she 

proceeded to “d.” 

b. Did you report the behavior? 

Yes 25.0% 1 

No 75.0% 3 

If the respondent answered “Yes,” he/she proceeded to “d.” If the respondent answered “No,” he/she proceeded to “c.” 

c. If no, why did you not report this behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

Someone else reported the behavior. 0.0% 0 

I was afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the behavior. 66.7% 2 

I do not believe management is supportive of employees reporting the 66.7% 2 behavior. 

The employee engaged in the behavior while off-duty. 0.0% 0 

I did not feel the behavior was serious enough to warrant reporting. 0.0% 0 

I was unfamiliar with the process for reporting the behavior. 0.0% 0 

I did not believe the employee would be investigated even if reported. 66.7% 2 

I did not want to cause an adverse action against a co-worker. 33.3% 1 

I did not want to get involved. 0.0% 0 

Management was already aware of this behavior. 33.3% 1 

Other 0.0% 0 

d. Did the criminal sexual behavior occur during a protective assignment? 

Yes 32.0% 16 

No 68.0% 34 

e. Which of the following most accurately describes your perception of criminal sexual behavior in the Secret Service? 

This behavior is isolated within the Secret Service. 64.0% 32 

This behavior is systemic throughout the Secret Service. 12.0% 6 

This behavior is more than isolated but less than systemic. 24.0% 12 

If the respondent selected: Other sexual behavior that causes a security concern 

a. How did you become aware of the sexual behavior that caused a security concern? [More than one could be selected] 

I have personally observed this behavior. 24.8% 38 

I learned about this behavior from the person who engaged in it. 26.8% 41 

I learned about this behavior from a person who observed it. 39.2% 60 

I learned about this behavior from someone who reported it to me. 13.1% 20 

I learned about this behavior as part of my official duties. 22.2% 34 

I learned about this behavior through official Secret Service 12.4% 19 communication. 

I learned about this behavior from the press, media, or another public 30.7% 47 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

source. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 98 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

I learned about this behavior through a casual conversation that I 51.6% 79 considered gossip. 

Other 	 5.9% 9 

If the respondent answered “I have personally observed this behavior,” he/she proceeded to “b.” If not, he/she 

proceeded to “d.” 

b. Did you report the behavior? 

Yes	 15.8% 6 

No 	 84.2% 32 

If the respondent answered “Yes,” he/she proceeded to “d.” If the respondent answered “No,” he/she proceeded to “c.” 

c.	 If no, why did you not report this behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

Someone else reported the behavior.	 12.5% 4 

I was afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the behavior. 37.5% 12 

I do not believe management is supportive of employees reporting the 56.3% 18 behavior. 

The employee engaged in the behavior while off-duty.	 50.0% 16 

I did not feel the behavior was serious enough to warrant reporting. 12.5%	 4 

I was unfamiliar with the process for reporting the behavior. 9.4% 	 3 

I did not believe the employee would be investigated even if reported. 43.8% 14 

I did not want to cause an adverse action against a co-worker. 18.8% 	 6 

I did not want to get involved.	 21.9% 7 

Management was already aware of this behavior. 	 31.3% 10 

Other 	 28.1% 9 

d.	 Did the sexual behavior, other than prostitution or criminal sexual behavior, which caused a security concern, occur 

during a protective assignment? 

Yes	 53.6% 82 

No 	 46.4% 71 

e. Which of the following most accurately describes your perception of Secret Service employees’ engaging in sexual 

behavior, other than prostitution or criminal sexual behavior, which causes a security concern? 

This behavior is isolated within the Secret Service.	 38.6% 59 

This behavior is systemic throughout the Secret Service. 	 19.6% 30 

This behavior is more than isolated but less than systemic. 41.8% 64 

If the respondent selected: Contact with foreign nationals that causes a security concern 

a. How did you become aware of the contact with foreign nationals that caused a security concern? [More than one 

could be selected] 

I have personally observed this behavior.	 14.7% 17 

I learned about this behavior from the person who engaged in it. 21.6% 25 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 99	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

I learned about this behavior from a person who observed it. 23.3% 27 

I learned about this behavior from someone who reported it to me. 9.5% 11 

I learned about this behavior as part of my official duties. 27.6% 32 

I learned about this behavior through official Secret Service 13.8% 16 communication. 

I learned about this behavior from the press, media, or another public 42.2% 49 

source. 

I learned about this behavior through a casual conversation that I 44.0% 51 considered gossip. 

Other 5.2% 6 

If the respondent answered “I have personally observed this behavior,” he/she proceeded to “b.” If not, he/she 

proceeded to “d.” 

b. Did you report the behavior? 

Yes 17.6% 3 

No 82.4% 14 

If the respondent answered “Yes,” he/she proceeded to “d.” If the respondent answered “No,” he/she proceeded to “c.” 

c. If no, why did you not report this behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

Someone else reported the behavior. 14.3% 2 

I was afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the behavior. 42.9% 6 

I do not believe management is supportive of employees reporting the 50.0% 7 behavior. 

The employee engaged in the behavior while off-duty. 21.4% 3 

I did not feel the behavior was serious enough to warrant reporting. 7.1% 1 

I was unfamiliar with the process for reporting the behavior. 14.3% 2 

I did not believe the employee would be investigated even if reported. 21.4% 3 

I did not want to cause an adverse action against a co-worker. 35.7% 5 

I did not want to get involved. 28.6% 4 

Management was already aware of this behavior. 50.0% 7 

Other 7.1% 1 

d. Did the contact with foreign nationals that caused a security concern occur during a protective assignment? 

Yes 56.9% 66 

No 43.1% 50 

e. Which of the following most accurately describes your perception of Secret Service employee’s contact with foreign 

nationals, which causes a security concern? 

This behavior is isolated within the Secret Service. 56.9% 66 

This behavior is systemic throughout the Secret Service. 10.3% 12 

This behavior is more than isolated but less than systemic. 32.8% 38 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 100 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If the respondent selected: Personal conduct that causes a security concern 

a. How did you become aware of the personal conduct that caused a security concern? [More than one could be 

selected] 

I have personally observed this behavior. 41.3% 102 

I learned about this behavior from the person who engaged in it. 27.1% 67 

I learned about this behavior from a person who observed it. 43.7% 108 

I learned about this behavior from someone who reported it to me. 17.0% 42 

I learned about this behavior as part of my official duties. 25.1% 62 

I learned about this behavior through official Secret Service 13.4% 33 communication. 

I learned about this behavior from the press, media, or another public 27.1% 67 

source. 

I learned about this behavior through a casual conversation that I 47.4% 117 considered gossip. 

Other 10.5% 26 

If the respondent answered “I have personally observed this behavior,” he/she proceeded to “b.” If not, he/she 

proceeded to “d.” 

b. Did you report the behavior? 

Yes 33.3% 34 

No 66.7% 68 

If the respondent answered “Yes,” he/she proceeded to “d.” If the respondent answered “No,” he/she proceeded to “c.” 

c. If no, why did you not report this behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

Someone else reported the behavior. 14.7% 10 

I was afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the behavior. 51.5% 35 

I do not believe management is supportive of employees reporting the 66.2% 45 behavior. 

The employee engaged in the behavior while off-duty. 30.9% 21 

I did not feel the behavior was serious enough to warrant reporting. 17.6% 12 

I was unfamiliar with the process for reporting the behavior. 10.3% 7 

I did not believe the employee would be investigated even if reported. 50.0% 34 

I did not want to cause an adverse action against a co-worker. 11.8% 8 

I did not want to get involved. 23.5% 16 

Management was already aware of this behavior. 42.6% 29 

Other 16.2% 11 

d. Did the personal conduct that caused a security concern occur during a protective assignment? 

Yes 40.5% 100 

No 59.5% 147 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 101 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

e. Which of the following most accurately describes your perception of Secret Service employees’ personal conduct 

which causes a security concern? 

This behavior is isolated within the Secret Service. 41.3% 102 

This behavior is systemic throughout the Secret Service. 15.0% 37 

This behavior is more than isolated but less than systemic. 43.7% 108 

About the Interviewee 

29. How long have you been employed with the Secret Service? 

Less than 1 year 0.7% 19 

1-3 years 13.7% 352 

4-6 years 14.3% 367 

7-9 years 12.1% 311 

10 or more years 59.3% 1,526 

30. What is your current occupational specialty? 

Special Agent 49.0% 1,262 

Uniformed Division Police 16.7% 431 

Administrative, Professional, and Technical Support Personnel 33.1% 853 

Other 1.1% 29 

31. What is your current grade (GS or LE)? 

1 7.7% 197 

2 0.5% 12 

3 1.1% 29 

4 2.5% 65 

5 1.6% 41 

6 0.7% 18 

7 1.6% 41 

8 4.2% 109 

9 4.5% 116 

10 0.5% 14 

11 5.1% 131 

12 6.4% 165 

13 41.6% 1,070

14 13.4% 344 

15 5.4% 139 

Senior Executive Service 1.2% 32 

Other 2.0% 52 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 102 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

32. Do you supervise staff? 

Yes 26.0% 669 

No 74.0% 1,906 

33. I have been directly involved in a disciplinary matter. 

Yes 17.8% 458 

No 82.2% 2,117 

34. I have been directly involved in the security clearance adjudication process. 

Yes 8.5% 220 

No 91.5% 2,355 

www.oig.dhs.gov 103 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

For all scale questions, responses of “strongly 

agree” and “agree” are positive, “neither agree 

nor disagree” is neutral, and “strongly disagree” 

or “disagree” are negative. 

Percent 

Positive 

Strongly 

Agree Agree 

Neither 

Agree 

Nor 

Disagree 

Disagree Strongly 

Disagree 

Do Not 

Know 

Reporting and Addressing Misconduct 

91.3% 

94.4% 

65.3% 

85.7% 

92.6% 

she is held accountable. 

[A senior manager supervises 

several supervisors and their staff.] 

63.9% 

40 63 19 23 4 12 

7. If a supervisor engages in 

misconduct or illegal activity, he or 

she is held accountable. 

[A supervisor is the first-line 

manager who monitors and 

regulates employees in their 

performance of assigned or 

delegated tasks.] 

77.0% 

26.7% 50.3% 10.6% 8.7% 1.9% 1.9%

43 81 17 14 3 3 

1.	 Appropriate policies and 

procedures are in place to address 

employee violations of any law, 

rule, regulation, or standards of 

conduct. 

2.	 I am aware of avenues available to 

Secret Service employees to report 

misconduct. 

3.	 I can report a suspected violation 

of any law, rule, regulation, or 

standards of conduct without fear 

of retaliation. 

4.	 I trust my immediate supervisor to 

respond appropriately to reported 

misconduct. 

5.	 If I suspected that my co-workers
 

or managers were engaged in
 

misconduct or illegal activity, I 


would report it to the appropriate 


Secret Service officials.
 

6.	 If a senior manager engages in 

misconduct or illegal activity, he or 

31.7% 59.6% 3.7% 1.9% 0.6%
 

51 96 6 3 1 


37.3% 57.1% 4.3% 1.2% 0.0%
 

60 92 7 2 0 


22.4% 42.9% 26.7% 6.8% 1.2%
 

36 69 43 11 2 


36.0% 49.7% 9.3% 3.7% 1.2%
 

58 80 15 6 2 


52.8 % 39.8% 7.5% 0.0% 0.0% 

85 64 12 0 0 


24.8% 39.1% 11.8% 14.3% 2.5%
 

2.5% 

NA 

NA 

NA 

NA 

7.5% 

4 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix E 

Results of In-Person Surveys 

www.oig.dhs.gov 104	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reporting and Addressing Misconduct 

(cont.) 

8.	 If a Special Agent engages in 

misconduct or illegal activity, he or 

she is held accountable. 

9.	 If a Uniformed Division Police 

Officer engages in misconduct or 

illegal activity, he or she is held 

accountable. 

10. If an Administrative, Professional, 

or Technical Support employee 

engages in misconduct or illegal 

activity, he or she is held 

accountable. 

11. Violations of any law, rule, 

regulation, or standards of conduct 

are not tolerated within the Secret 

Service. 

12. The Secret Service’s disciplinary 

process is fair. 

13. Disciplinary actions within the 

Secret Service are applied 

consistently for similar offenses. 

14. Disciplinary actions within the 

Secret Service are at the 

appropriate level of severity given 

the offense. 

Percent 


Positive
 

Strongly Agree 

41.6%

67 

44.7% 

72 

33.5% 

54 

47.2%

76 

33.5%

 54 

28.6%

 46 

39.1%

63 

Neither 


Agree
 

Nor 

Strongly Disagree Disagree 

4.3% 1.2% 

7 2 

1.9% 0.6% 

3 1 

1.2% 0.6% 

2 1 

8.7% 0.6% 

14 1 

18.0% 6.2% 

29 10 

24.2% 8.1% 

39 13 

15.5% 2.5% 

25 4 

Do Not 

Agree Know 

Disagree 

68.3% 

26.7% 11.2% 14.9%

43 18 24 

81.3% 

36.6% 5.0% 11.2% 

59 8 18 

57.7% 

24.2% 8.1% 32.3% 

39 13 52 

78.3% 

31.1% 11.8% 0.6%

50 19 1 

46.5% 

13.0% 21.2% 8.1%

21 34 13

36.7% 

8.1% 16.1% 14.9%

13 26 24

52.8% 

13.7% 16.1% 13.0%

22 26 21 

15. If you were to report misconduct by a Secret Service employee, to whom would you report it? [More than one could 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

be selected] 

My direct supervisor 94.4% 152 

Another supervisor other than my direct supervisor 32.9% 53 

DHS Office of Inspector General 6.8% 11 

USSS Equal Employment Opportunity Office 11.2% 18 

USSS Inspection Division 19.3% 31 

USSS Ombudsman 21.7% 35 

Do not know 0.6% 1 

Other 3.7% 6 

Declined to answer 0.6% 1 

www.oig.dhs.gov 105	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Percent 

Positive 

Strongly 

Agree Agree 

Disagree 

Reporting and Addressing Security 

Concerns 

91.3% 

91.9% 

77.0% 

86.4% 

that caused a security concern, I 

would report it to the appropriate 

Secret Service officials. 

96.9% NA 

88 68 4 1 0 

21. The Secret Service takes 

appropriate action if a senior 

59.6% 

21.1% 38.5% 12.4% 8.7% 1.9% 17.4%

73.9% 

62.1% 

16. Appropriate policies and 

procedures are in place to address 

security concerns regarding a 

Secret Service employee. 

17. I am aware of avenues available to 

Secret Service employees to report 

security concerns regarding a 

Secret Service employee. 

18. I can report a suspected security 

concern regarding a Secret Service 

employee without fear of 

retaliation. 

19. I trust my immediate supervisor to 

respond appropriately to security 

concerns regarding a Secret 

Service employee. 

20. If I suspected that my co-workers 

or managers engaged in behavior 

34.2%

55 

32.9%

53 

26.7%

43 

39.8%

64 

54.7%

 57.1% 

92 

59.0% 

95 

50.3%

81 

46.6%

75 

42.2% 

Neither 


Agree
 

Nor 


5.6% 

9 

5.0 % 

8 

16.8% 

27 

10.6% 

17 

2.5% 

Strongly Disagree Disagree 

1.2% 0.0% 

2 0 

3.1% 0.0% 

5 0 

6.2% 0.0%

10 0 

3.1% 0.0% 

5 0 

0.6% 0.0% 

Do Not 


Know
 

1.9% 

NA 

NA 

NA 

manager engages in behavior that 

causes a security concern. [A 

senior manager supervises several 

supervisors and their staff.] 

22. The Secret Service takes 

appropriate action if a supervisor 

engages in behavior that causes a 

security concern. [A supervisor is 

the first-line manager who 

monitors and regulates employees 

in their performance of assigned or 

delegated tasks.] 

23. The Secret Service takes 

appropriate action if a Special 

Agent engages in behavior that 

causes a security concern. 

34 62 20 14 3 28 

25.5% 48.4% 9.3% 6.2% 0.6% 9.9% 

41 78 15 10 1 16 

25.5% 36.6% 9.9% 3.1% 1.2% 23.6%

41 59 16 5 2 38 

3 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 106 OIG-14-20 
 

 

Reporting and Addressing Security 

Concerns 

24. The Secret Service takes 

appropriate action if a Uniformed 

Division Police Officer engages in 

behavior that causes a security 

concern. 

75.2% 

 

Percent Strongly 

Positive Agree 

28.6%

46 

Agree 

 46.6% 

75 

Neither 

Agree 

Nor 

Disagree 

8.7% 

14 

Disagree 

2.5% 

4 

Strongly 

Disagree 

0.0% 

0 

Do Not 

Know 

13.7%

22 

25. The Secret Service takes 

appropriate action if an 

Administrative, Professional, or 

Technical employee engages in 

behavior that causes a security 

concern. 

51.0% 

21.2%

34 

 29.8% 

48 

8.7% 

14 

1.2 % 

2 

0.0% 

0 

39.1%

63 

26. The Secret Service has a fair 

process for reviewing an 

employee’s eligibility for continued 

access to classified information as 

a result of behavior that causes a 

security concern. 

56.6% 

22.4%

36 

 34.2% 

55 

9.3% 

15 

3.1% 

5 

1.2% 

2 

29.8%

48 

27. If you were to report behavior that causes a security concern, to whom would you report it? [More than one could be 

selected] 

My direct supervisor 94.4% 152 

Another supervisor other than my direct supervisor 39.1% 63 

DHS Office of Inspector General 5.6% 9 

USSS Security Clearance Division 29.2% 47 

USSS Inspection Division 20.5% 33 

USSS Ombudsman 9.9% 16 

Do not know 0.6% 1 

Other 3.7% 6 

Declined to answer 0.6% 1 

Existence of Certain Behaviors within Secret Service 

28. Using the list below, please select any behaviors by Secret Service employees of which you are aware. [More than one 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

could be selected] 

Excessive alcohol consumption that causes a security concern 24.8% 40 

Solicitation of prostitute(s) 27.3% 44 

Criminal sexual behavior other than solicitation 7.5% 12 

www.oig.dhs.gov 107 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

If the respondent selected: Excessive alcohol consumption that causes a security concern 

a. How did you become aware of the excessive alcohol consumption? [More than one could be selected] 

I have personally observed this behavior. 37.5% 15 

I learned about this behavior from the person who engaged in it. 20.0% 8 

I learned about this behavior from a person who observed it. 45.0% 18 

I learned about this behavior from someone who reported it to me. 5.0% 2 

I learned about this behavior as part of my official duties. 7.5% 3 

I learned about this behavior through official Secret Service 22.5% 9 communication. 

I learned about this behavior from the press, media, or another public 57.5% 23 

source. 

I learned about this behavior through a casual conversation that I 57.5% 23 considered gossip. 

Other 0.0% 0 

If the respondent answered “I have personally observed this behavior,” he/she proceeded to “b.” If not, he/she 

proceeded to “d.” 

b. Did you report the behavior? 

Yes 6.7% 1 

No 93.3% 14 

If the respondent answered “Yes,” he/she proceeded to “d.” If the respondent answered “No,” he/she proceeded to “c.” 

c. If no, why did you not report this behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

Someone else reported the behavior. 14.3% 2 

I was afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the behavior. 14.3% 2 

I do not believe management is supportive of employees reporting the 21.4% 3 behavior. 

The employee engaged in the behavior while off-duty. 71.4% 10 

I did not feel the behavior was serious enough to warrant reporting. 50.0% 7 

I was unfamiliar with the process for reporting the behavior. 0.0% 0 

I did not believe the employee would be investigated even if reported. 14.3% 2 

I did not want to cause an adverse action against a co-worker. 14.3% 2 

I did not want to get involved. 21.4% 3 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Other sexual behavior that causes a security concern 5.6% 9 

Contact with foreign nationals that causes a security concern 11.2% 18 

Personal conduct that causes a security concern 7.5% 12 

I am not aware of any Secret Service employees engaging in these 

behaviors 59.0% 95 

Declined to answer 1.2% 2 

www.oig.dhs.gov 108 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Management was already aware of this behavior. 28.6% 4 

Other 7.1% 1 

d. Did the excessive alcohol consumption occur during a protective assignment? 

Yes 55.0% 22 

No 42.5% 17 

Declined to answer 2.5% 1 

e. Which of the following most accurately describes your perception of excessive alcohol consumption in the Secret 

Service? 

This behavior is isolated within the Secret Service.36 70.0% 28 

This behavior is systemic throughout the Secret Service.37 5.0% 2 

This behavior is more than isolated but less than systemic. 25.0% 10 

If the respondent selected: Solicitation of Prostitutes 

a. How did you become aware of the solicitation of prostitute(s)? [More than one could be selected] 

I have personally observed this behavior. 0.0% 0 

I learned about this behavior from the person who engaged in it. 0.0% 0 

I learned about this behavior from a person who observed it. 6.8% 3 

I learned about this behavior from someone who reported it to me. 6.8% 3 

I learned about this behavior as part of my official duties. 11.4% 5 

I learned about this behavior through official Secret Service 43.2% 19 communication. 

I learned about this behavior from the press, media, or another public 95.5% 42 

source. 

I learned about this behavior through a casual conversation that I 45.5% 20 considered gossip. 

Other 4.5% 2 

If the respondent answered “I have personally observed this behavior,” he/she proceeded to “b.” If not, he/she 

proceeded to “d.” 

b. Did you report the behavior? 

Yes 0.0 % 0 

No 0.0% 0 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

36 Isolated means that the behavior occurs infrequently, among a small percentage of employees who act alone. 37 Systemic means that the behavior occurs frequently, among a large percentage of employees who act together. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 109 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

If the respondent answered “Yes,” he/she proceeded to “d.” If the respondent answered “No,” he/she proceeded to “c.” 

c. If no, why did you not report this behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

Someone else reported the behavior. 0.0% 0 

I was afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the behavior. 0.0% 0 

I do not believe management is supportive of employees reporting the 0.0% 0 behavior. 

The employee engaged in the behavior while off-duty. 0.0% 0 

I did not feel the behavior was serious enough to warrant reporting. 0.0% 0 

I was unfamiliar with the process for reporting the behavior. 0.0% 0 

I did not believe the employee would be investigated even if reported. 0.0% 0 

I did not want to cause an adverse action against a co-worker. 0.0% 0 

I did not want to get involved. 0.0% 0 

Management was already aware of this behavior. 0.0% 0 

Other 0.0% 0 

d. Did the solicitation of prostitute(s) occur during a protective assignment? 

Yes 84.1% 37 

No 13.6% 6 

Declined to answer 2.3% 1 

e. Which of the following most accurately describes your perception of solicitation of prostitute(s) in the Secret Service? 

This behavior is isolated within the Secret Service. 95.5% 42 

This behavior is systemic throughout the Secret Service. 0.0% 0 

This behavior is more than isolated but less than systemic. 4.5% 2 

If the respondent selected: Criminal sexual behavior other than solicitation 

a. How did you become aware of the criminal sexual behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

I have personally observed this behavior. 0.0% 0 

I learned about this behavior from the person who engaged in it. 8.3% 1 

I learned about this behavior from a person who observed it. 0.0% 0 

I learned about this behavior from someone who reported it to me. 8.3% 1 

I learned about this behavior as part of my official duties. 8.3% 1 

I learned about this behavior through official Secret Service 8.3% 1 communication.

I learned about this behavior from the press, media, or another public 66.7% 8 

source. 

I learned about this behavior through a casual conversation that I 58.3% 7 considered gossip. 

Other 0.0% 0 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 110 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If the respondent answered “I have personally observed this behavior,” he/she proceeded to “b.” If not, he/she 

proceeded to “d.” 

b. Did you report the behavior? 

Yes 0.0% 0 

No 0.0% 0 

If the respondent answered “Yes,” he/she proceeded to “d.” If the respondent answered “No,” he/she proceeded to “c.” 

c. If no, why did you not report this behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

Someone else reported the behavior. 0.0% 0 

I was afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the behavior. 0.0% 0 

I do not believe management is supportive of employees reporting the 0.0% 0 behavior. 

The employee engaged in the behavior while off-duty. 0.0% 0 

I did not feel the behavior was serious enough to warrant reporting. 0.0% 0 

I was unfamiliar with the process for reporting the behavior. 0.0% 0 

I did not believe the employee would be investigated even if reported. 0.0% 0 

I did not want to cause an adverse action against a co-worker. 0.0% 0 

I did not want to get involved. 0.0% 0 

Management was already aware of this behavior. 0.0% 0 

Other 0.0% 0 

d. Did the criminal sexual behavior occur during a protective assignment? 

Yes 0.0% 0 

No 100.0% 12 

e. Which of the following most accurately describes your perception of criminal sexual behavior in the Secret Service? 

This behavior is isolated within the Secret Service. 100.0% 12 

This behavior is systemic throughout the Secret Service. 0.0% 0 

This behavior is more than isolated but less than systemic. 0.0% 0 

If the respondent selected: Other sexual behavior that causes a security concern 

a. How did you become aware of the sexual behavior that caused a security concern? [More than one could be selected] 

I have personally observed this behavior. 11.1% 1 

I learned about this behavior from the person who engaged in it. 11.1% 1 

I learned about this behavior from a person who observed it. 22.2% 2 

I learned about this behavior from someone who reported it to me. 0.0% 0 

I learned about this behavior as part of my official duties. 0.0% 0 

I learned about this behavior through official Secret Service 11.1% 1 communication. 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 111 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

I learned about this behavior from the press, media, or another public 11.1% 1 

source. 

I learned about this behavior through a casual conversation that I 77.8% 7 considered gossip. 

Other 	 11.1% 1 

If the respondent answered “I have personally observed this behavior,” he/she proceeded to “b.” If not, he/she 

proceeded to “d.” 

b. Did you report the behavior? 

Yes	 100.0% 1 

No 	 0.0% 0 

If the respondent answered “Yes,” he/she proceeded to “d.” If the respondent answered “No,” he/she proceeded to “c.” 

c.	 If no, why did you not report this behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

Someone else reported the behavior.	 0.0% 0 

I was afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the behavior. 0.0% 	 0 

I do not believe management is supportive of employees reporting the 0.0% 	 0 behavior. 

The employee engaged in the behavior while off-duty. 	 0.0% 0 

I did not feel the behavior was serious enough to warrant reporting. 0.0%	 0 

I was unfamiliar with the process for reporting the behavior. 0.0% 	 0 

I did not believe the employee would be investigated even if reported. 0.0% 	 0 

I did not want to cause an adverse action against a co-worker. 0.0% 	 0 

I did not want to get involved.	 0.0% 0 

Management was already aware of this behavior. 	 0.0% 0 

Other 	 0.0% 0 

d.	 Did the sexual behavior, other than prostitution or criminal sexual behavior, which caused a security concern, occur 

during a protective assignment? 

Yes	 55.6% 5 

No 	 44.4% 4 

e. Which of the following most accurately describes your perception of Secret Service employees’ engaging in sexual 

behavior, other than prostitution or criminal sexual behavior, which causes a security concern? 

This behavior is isolated within the Secret Service. 	 88.9% 8 

This behavior is systemic throughout the Secret Service.	 11.1% 1 

This behavior is more than isolated but less than systemic. 0.0% 0 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 112	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

If the respondent selected: Contact with foreign nationals that causes a security concern 

a. How did you become aware of the contact with foreign nationals that caused a security concern? [More than one 

could be selected] 

I have personally observed this behavior. 5.6% 1 

I learned about this behavior from the person who engaged in it. 0.0% 0 

I learned about this behavior from a person who observed it. 5.6% 1 

I learned about this behavior from someone who reported it to me. 5.6% 1 

I learned about this behavior as part of my official duties. 5.6% 1 

I learned about this behavior through official Secret Service 38.9% 7 communication. 

I learned about this behavior from the press, media, or another public 55.6% 10 

source. 

I learned about this behavior through a casual conversation that I 61.1% 11 considered gossip. 

Other 11.1% 2 

If the respondent answered “I have personally observed this behavior,” he/she proceeded to “b.” If not, he/she 

proceeded to “d.” 

b. Did you report the behavior? 

Yes 0.0% 0 

No 100.0% 1 

If the respondent answered “Yes,” he/she proceeded to “d.” If the respondent answered “No,” he/she proceeded to “c.” 

c. If no, why did you not report this behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

Someone else reported the behavior. 100.0% 1 

I was afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the behavior. 0.0% 0 

I do not believe management is supportive of employees reporting the 0.0% 0 behavior. 

The employee engaged in the behavior while off-duty. 0.0% 0 

I did not feel the behavior was serious enough to warrant reporting. 0.0% 0 

I was unfamiliar with the process for reporting the behavior. 0.0% 0 

I did not believe the employee would be investigated even if reported. 0.0% 0 

I did not want to cause an adverse action against a co-worker. 0.0% 0 

I did not want to get involved. 0.0% 0 

Management was already aware of this behavior. 0.0% 0 

Other 0.0% 0 

d. Did the contact with foreign nationals that caused a security concern occur during a protective assignment? 

Yes 50.0% 9 

No 38.9% 7 

www.oig.dhs.gov 113 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Declined to answer 11.1% 2 

e. Which of the following most accurately describes your perception of Secret Service employee’s contact with foreign 

nationals, which causes a security concern? 

This behavior is isolated within the Secret Service. 100.0% 18 

This behavior is systemic throughout the Secret Service. 0.0% 0 

This behavior is more than isolated but less than systemic. 0.0% 0 

If the respondent selected: Personal conduct that causes a security concern 

a. How did you become aware of the personal conduct that caused a security concern? [More than one could be 

selected] 

I have personally observed this behavior. 50.0% 6 

I learned about this behavior from the person who engaged in it. 16.7% 2 

I learned about this behavior from a person who observed it. 41.7% 5 

I learned about this behavior from someone who reported it to me. 25.0% 3 

I learned about this behavior as part of my official duties. 8.3% 1 

I learned about this behavior through official Secret Service 16.7% 2 communication. 

I learned about this behavior from the press, media, or another public 16.7% 2 

source. 

I learned about this behavior through a casual conversation that I 75.0% 9 considered gossip. 

Other 8.3% 1 

If the respondent answered “I have personally observed this behavior,” he/she proceeded to “b.” If not, he/she 

proceeded to “d.” 

b. Did you report the behavior? 

Yes 50.0% 3 

No 50.0% 3 

If the respondent answered “Yes,” he/she proceeded to “d.” If the respondent answered “No,” he/she proceeded to “c.” 

c. If no, why did you not report this behavior? [More than one could be selected] 

Someone else reported the behavior. 66.7% 2 

I was afraid of reprisal or retaliation for reporting the behavior. 66.7% 2 

I do not believe management is supportive of employees reporting the 33.3% 1 behavior. 

The employee engaged in the behavior while off-duty. 66.7% 2 

I did not feel the behavior was serious enough to warrant reporting. 33.3% 1 

I was unfamiliar with the process for reporting the behavior. 0.0% 0 

I did not believe the employee would be investigated even if reported. 0.0% 0 

I did not want to cause an adverse action against a co-worker. 33.3% 1 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 114 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

I did not want to get involved. 33.3% 1 

Management was already aware of this behavior. 100.0% 3 

Other 0.0% 0 

d. Did the personal conduct that caused a security concern occur during a protective assignment? 

Yes 41.7% 5 

No 50.0% 6 

Declined to answer 8.3% 1 

e. Which of the following most accurately describes your perception of Secret Service employees’ personal conduct 

which causes a security concern? 

This behavior is isolated within the Secret Service. 75.0% 9 

This behavior is systemic throughout the Secret Service. 8.3% 1 

This behavior is more than isolated but less than systemic. 16.7% 2 

About the Interviewee 

35. How long have you been employed with the Secret Service? 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Less than 1 year 0.0% 0 

1-3 years 16.8% 27 

4-6 years 16.1% 26 

7-9 years 14.3% 23 

10 or more years 52.8% 85 

36. What is your current occupational specialty? 

Special Agent 33.5% 54 

Uniformed Division Police 60.9% 98 

Administrative, Professional, and Technical Support Personnel 5.0% 8 

Other 0.6% 1 

37. What is your current grade (GS or LE)? 

1 23.0% 37 

2 1.2% 2 

3 3.1% 5 

4 5.0% 8 

5 3.1% 5 

6 1.9% 3 

7 3.1% 5 

8 1.2% 2 

9 1.9% 3 

10 0.6% 1 

www.oig.dhs.gov 115 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

11 3.7% 6 

12 2.5% 4 

13 29.2% 47 

14 4.3% 7 

15 1.9% 3 

Senior Executive Service 0.6% 1 

Other 12.4% 20 

Declined to answer 0.6% 1 

38. Do you supervise staff? 

Yes 24.8% 40 

No 75.2% 121 

39. I have been directly involved in a disciplinary matter. 

Yes 19.3% 31 

No 80.7% 130 

40. I have been directly involved in the security clearance adjudication process. 

Yes 8.1% 13 

No 91.9% 148 

www.oig.dhs.gov 116 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix F 

Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to 

Classified Information 

Adjudicative Guidelines identify 13 criteria for consideration when determining 

eligibility for initial or continued access to classified information. They are: 

Adjudicative 

Guidelines Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 

(a) involvement in, support of, training to commit, or advocacy of any act of sabotage, 

espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition against the United States of America; (b) 

association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are 

committing, any of the above acts; (c) association or sympathy with persons or 

Guideline A: organizations that advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or use any other 

Allegiance to the illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort to: (1) overthrow or influence the 

United States government of the United States or any state or local government;(2) prevent 

Federal, state, or local government personnel from performing their official duties; 

(3) gain retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the Federal, state, or local 

government; (4) prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or 

laws of the United States or of any state. 

(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, 

or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact 

creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, 

or coercion; (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 

create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect 

sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign 

person, group, or country by providing that information; (c) counterintelligence 

information, that may be classified, indicates that the individual's access to protected 

information may involve unacceptable risk to national security; (d) sharing living 

Guideline B: 

Foreign Influence 

quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship 

creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; 

(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any 

foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to 

heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation; (f) failure to report, when 

required, association with a foreign national; (g) unauthorized association with a 

suspected or known agent, associate, or employee of a foreign intelligence service; 

(h) indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to 

increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, 

inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; (i) conduct, especially while 

traveling outside the U.S., which may make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, 

pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 117 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Guideline C: 

Foreign Preference 

(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a 

U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This includes but is 

not limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign passport; (2) military service or a 

willingness to bear arms for a foreign country; (3) accepting educational, medical, 

retirement, social welfare, or other such benefits from a foreign country; (4) 

residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements; (5) using foreign 

citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country; (6) seeking or 

holding political office in a foreign country; (7) voting in a foreign election; (b) action 

to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an American citizen; (c) 

performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the 

interests of a foreign person, group, organization, or government in conflict with the 

national security interest; (d) any statement or action that shows allegiance to a 

country other than the United States: for example, declaration of intent to renounce 

United States citizenship; renunciation of United States citizenship. 

Guideline D: 

Sexual Behavior 

(a) sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been 

prosecuted; (b) a pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high-risk sexual behavior 

that the person is unable to stop or that may be symptomatic of a personality 

disorder; (c) sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, 

exploitation, or duress; (d) sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that which 

reflects lack of discretion or judgment. 

Guideline E: 

Personal Conduct 

(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any 

personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to 

conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or 

status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary 

responsibilities; (b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning 

relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical 

authority, or other official government representative; (c) credible adverse 

information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an adverse 

determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a 

whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, 

untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules 

and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly 

safeguard protected information; (d) credible adverse information that is not 

explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an 

adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information 

supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, 

unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or 

other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard protected 

information. This includes but is not limited to consideration of: (1) untrustworthy or 

unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release of proprietary 

information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or other government 

protected information; (2) disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the 

workplace; (3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations; (4) evidence of significant 

misuse of Government or other employer's time or resources; (e) personal conduct or 

concealment of information about one's conduct, that creates a vulnerability to 

exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such as (1) engaging in activities which, if 

www.oig.dhs.gov 118 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

known, may affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing, or (2) 

while in another country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that 

is legal in that country but illegal in the United States and may serve as a basis for 

exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or intelligence service or other group; 

(f) violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the individual to the 

employer as a condition of employment; (g) association with persons involved in 

criminal activity. 

Guideline F: 

Financial 

Considerations 

(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts; (b) indebtedness caused by frivolous or 

irresponsible spending and the absence of any evidence of willingness or intent to pay 

the debt or establish a realistic plan to pay the debt. (c) a history of not meeting 

financial obligations; (d) deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, 

employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing 

deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches of trust; (e) 

consistent spending beyond one's means, which may be indicated by excessive 

indebtedness, significant negative cash flow, high debt-to-income ratio, and/or other 

financial analysis; (f) financial problems that are linked to drug abuse, alcoholism, 

gambling problems, or other issues of security concern; (g) failure to file annual 

Federal, state, or local income tax returns as required or the fraudulent filing of the 

same; (h) unexplained affluence, as shown by a lifestyle or standard of living, increase 

in net worth, or money transfers that cannot be explained by subject's known legal 

sources of income; (i) compulsive or addictive gambling as indicated by an 

unsuccessful attempt to stop gambling, "chasing losses" (i.e., increasing the bets or 

returning another day in an effort to get even), concealment of gambling losses, 

borrowing money to fund gambling or pay gambling debts, family conflict or other 

problems caused by gambling. 

Guideline G: 

Alcohol 

Consumption 

(a) alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the 

influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the peace, or other incidents of 

concern, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or 

alcohol dependent; (b) alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work 

or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job, regardless of 

whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent; (c) 

habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment, 

regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol 

dependent; (d) diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician, 

clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence; (e) 

evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed clinical social worker 

who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program; (f) relapse after 

diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence and completion of an alcohol rehabilitation 

program; (g) failure to follow any court order regarding alcohol education, evaluation, 

treatment, or abstinence. 

Guideline H: Drug 

Involvement 

(a) Any drug abuse (see above definition); (b) testing positive for illegal drug use; (c) 

illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, 

or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia; (d) diagnosis by a duly qualified 

medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug 

abuse or drug dependence; (e) evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a 

licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment 

www.oig.dhs.gov 119 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

program; (f) failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by 

a duly qualified medical professional; (g) any illegal drug use after being granted a 

security clearance; (h) expressed intent to continue illegal drug use, or failure to 

clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue drug use. 

Guideline I: 

Psychological 

Conditions 

(a) behavior that casts doubt on an individual's judgment, reliability, or 

trustworthiness that is not covered under any other guideline, including but not 

limited to emotionally unstable, irresponsible, dysfunctional, violent, paranoid, or 

bizarre behavior; (b) an opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional that 

the individual has a condition not covered under any other guideline that may impair 

judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness; (c) the individual has failed to follow 

treatment advice related to a diagnosed emotional, mental, or personality condition, 

e.g. failure to take prescribed medication. 

Guideline J: 

Criminal Conduct 

(a) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses; (b) discharge or dismissal from 

the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; (c) allegation or admission of 

criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged, formally 

prosecuted or convicted; (d) individual is currently on parole or probation; (e) 

violation of parole or probation, or failure to complete a court-mandated 

rehabilitation program. 

Guideline K: 

Handling Protected 

Information 

(a) deliberate or negligent disclosure of classified or other protected information to 

unauthorized persons, including but not limited to personal or business contacts, to 

the media, or to persons present at seminars, meetings, or conferences; (b) collecting 

or storing classified or other protected information in any unauthorized location; (c) 

loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, transmitting, or otherwise handling 

classified reports, data, or other information on any unapproved equipment including 

but not limited to any typewriter, word processor, or computer hardware, software, 

drive, system, gameboard, handheld, "palm" or pocket device or other adjunct 

equipment; (d) inappropriate efforts to obtain or view classified or other protected 

information outside one's need to know; (e) copying classified or other protected 

information in a manner designed to conceal or remove classification or other 

document control markings; (f) viewing or downloading information from a secure 

system when the information is beyond the individual's need to know; (g) any failure 

to comply with rules for the protection of classified or other sensitive information; (h) 

negligence or lax security habits that persist despite counseling by management; (i) 

failure to comply with rules or regulations that results in damage to the National 

Security, regardless of whether it was deliberate or negligent. 

Guideline L: 

Outside Activities 

(a) any employment or service, whether compensated or volunteer, with: (1) the 

government of a foreign country; (2) any foreign national, organization, or other 

entity; (3) a representative of any foreign interest; (4) any foreign, domestic, or 

international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of 

material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology; (b) failure 

to report or fully disclose an outside activity when this is required. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 120 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Guideline M: Use 

of Information 

Technology 

Systems 

(a) illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system or 

component thereof; (b) illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, 

manipulation or denial of access to information, software, firmware, or hardware in 

an information technology system; (c) use of any information technology system to 

gain unauthorized access to another system or to a compartmented area within the 

same system; (d) downloading, storing, or transmitting classified information on or to 

any unauthorized software, hardware, or information technology system; (e) 

unauthorized use of a government or other information technology system; (f) 

introduction, removal, or duplication of hardware, firmware, software, or media to or 

from any information technology system without authorization, when prohibited by 

rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations. (g) negligence or lax security habits in 

handling information technology that persist despite counseling by management; (h) 

any misuse of information technology, whether deliberate or negligent, that results in 

damage to the national security. 

Source: Memo from Stephen Hadley on December 29, 2005, Attachment A: “Revised 


Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information”.
 

www.oig.dhs.gov 121 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix G 

Disposition Summaries for 13 Employees Investigated in 

Connection with Events in Cartagena 

Employee 1 

Employee 1 told inspectors he the FFN, and that the FFN

 The FFN confirmed Employee 

1’s description of events. On the night of the incident, he consumed drinks. 

Employee 1 was evaluated as “ indicated” on a national security polygraph 

examination. On , SCD suspended Employee 1’s Top Secret security 

clearance. 

 SCD reinstated Employee 1’s security 

clearance, with a warning, on . The security clearance reinstatement letter, 

which warns that any future incident involving conduct which raises a security concern 

may result in the immediate suspension and revocation of Top Secret clearance, cites 

concerns related to the following adjudicative guidelines as conduct calling into 

question suitability for a security clearance: 

• Adjudicative Guideline B (foreign influence); 

• Adjudicative Guideline E (personal conduct); and 

• Adjudicative Guideline G (alcohol consumption). 

On Employee 1 was issued a Memorandum of Counseling as a result of
 

this incident.

Employee 2
 

Employee 2 told inspectors he and the FFN , and that the FFN 

. Inspectors could not locate the FFN. 

However, the FFN who was with Employee 12 told inspectors the woman 

. On the night of the incident, Employee 2 consumed 

. Employee 2 was evaluated as “ indicated” on a national 

security polygraph examination, and was evaluated as “

 On , SCD suspended Employee 2’s 

Top Secret security clearance. SCD reinstated Employee 2’s security clearance, with a 


warning, on The security clearance reinstatement letter, which warns that 

any future incident involving conduct which raises a security concern may result in the 


immediate suspension and revocation of Top Secret clearance, cites concerns related to 


www.oig.dhs.gov 122 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

the following adjudicative guidelines as conduct calling into question suitability for a 

security clearance: 

• Adjudicative Guideline B (foreign influence); 

• Adjudicative Guideline D (sexual behavior); 

• Adjudicative Guideline E (personal conduct); and 

• Adjudicative Guideline G (alcohol consumption). 

On Employee 2 was issued a Memorandum of Counseling as a result of
 

this incident. 

Employee 3
 

Employee 3 told inspectors he the FFN, but that while 

 The employee said he 

. 

On the night of the incident, Employee 3 consumed The FFN 

confirmed that Employee 3 

 The FFN told inspectors the employee paid 

take her back to his hotel. On SCD suspended Employee 3’s Top Secret 

security clearance. 

Employee 3 was evaluated as “ indicated” on a national security polygraph 

examination and was evaluated as “ 

SCD reinstated Employee 3’s security clearance, with a warning, 

on The security clearance reinstatement letter, which warns that any 

future incident involving conduct which raises a security concern may result in the 

immediate suspension and revocation of Top Secret clearance, cites concerns related to 

the following adjudicative guidelines as conduct calling into question suitability for a 

security clearance: 

• Adjudicative Guideline B (foreign influence); 

• Adjudicative Guideline E (personal conduct); and 

• Adjudicative Guideline G (alcohol consumption). 

On Employee 3 was issued a Memorandum of Counseling as a result of
 

this incident.
 

www.oig.dhs.gov 123 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Employee 4 


Employee 4 voluntarily informed inspectors that on he 

with an FFN Employee 4 said 

. On the night of the incident, he consumed 

SCD suspended Employee 4’s Top Secret security clearance. Employee 4 was evaluated
 

as “ indicated” on a national security polygraph examination, and was 

evaluated as “ . The FFN involved 

could not be located. , SCD issued to Employee 4 a Notice of 

Determination revoking his security clearance. The Notice of Determination cites 

security concerns related to the following guidelines as reasons for the revocation of his 

security clearance: 

• Adjudicative Guideline B (foreign influence); 

• Adjudicative Guideline D (sexual behavior); and 

• Adjudicative Guideline E (personal conduct). 

Employee 

revocation of Employee 4’s security clearance. The CSO said

 The CSO concluded the employee’s conduct showed poor judgment, a failure 

to exercise self control, and a disregard for security rules and regulation, and that the 

employee’s

 Employee 4 resigned from the 

agency 

Employee 5 

USSS’ interviews with Employee 5 and the FFN confirmed that the subject paid for 

sexual services and was the supervisor who conducted the 

management inquiry in Colombia. Employee 5 wrote in a sworn statement that 

www.oig.dhs.gov 124 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 On the night of the incident, he consumed

 On , SCD suspended Employee 5’s Top Secret security 

clearance. 


 USSS proposed the removal of Employee 5. The proposed removal 

was based on Conduct Unbecoming a Secret Service 

. The Notice of Proposed Removal letter states the employee paid a prostitute for 

sexual services and cites the following violations as reasons for proposed removal: 

•	 USSS standards of conduct (USSS PER-05(1)); 

•	 notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other conduct that is prejudicial to the 

Government (USSS PER-05(2)); and 

•	 negligence in the performance of official duties, conduct which brings disrepute 

to the agency (USSS PER-05(5)). 

With regard to security concerns, the Notice of Proposed Removal for Employee 5 states 

the employee’s actions could provide a foreign intelligence service, security service, or 

other criminal element the means to exert coercion or blackmail. However, USSS made 

the determination to initiate the security clearance revocations process following a 

recommendation by the DHS Office of Chief Human Capital Officer to revoke the 

employee’s security clearance . 

, SCD revoked Employee 5’s security clearance, and USSS subsequently 

. The Notice of Determination for security clearance 

revocation cites security concerns related to the following guidelines as reasons for the 

revocation of his security clearance: 

• Adjudicative Guideline B (foreign influence); 

• Adjudicative Guideline D (sexual behavior); and 

• Adjudicative Guideline E (personal conduct, including lack of candor and 


dishonesty).
 

. 

Employee 5 believed the agency

 Furthermore, Employee 5 

www.oig.dhs.gov 125	 OIG-14-20
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 Employee 5 said he 

. 

In our previous report, we credited the initial management inquiry conducted by the 

Miami SAIC immediately following the incident with helping USSS respond to the 

incident. Regarding

 This employee’s security clearance 

was revoked. 

an 

employee and arrived at the airport 

accompanied by unknown females (see page 45). 

the revocation of Employee 5’s security clearance. 

. Employee 5 was 

removed from the USSS effective 

. 

, Employee 5 alleged was denying him due 

process 

The Chair of 

the Board explained that 

 

www.oig.dhs.gov 126 OIG-14-20
 

 

 

Employee 6
 

Employee 6 told USSS Inspectors he engaged with an FFN in his hotel room. 

He said the FFN The FFN stated Employee 6 

paid for sexual services. On the night of the incident, Employee 6 consumed 

On , SCD suspended Employee 6’s Top Secret security clearance. 

. 

Employee 6 was evaluated as indicated” on a national security polygraph 

examination. 

”

 SCD issued to Employee 6 a Notice of Determination revoking his 


security clearance. The Notice of Determination cites security concerns related to the 

following guidelines as reasons for the revocation of his security clearance: 

• Adjudicative Guideline B (foreign influence); 

• Adjudicative Guideline D (sexual behavior); and 

• Adjudicative Guideline E (personal conduct, including lack of candor and 


dishonesty).


 USSS proposed 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 127 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 Furthermore, Employee 6 

argued that he was denied due process

 allegations and 

concerns outlined in the Notice of Determination to revoke his security clearance. 


the revocation of Employee 6’s security clearance. 

. 

decision to revoke Employee 6’s security 

clearance 

 Furthermore, the letter cites 

lack of discretion and poor judgment related to his decision to 

bring an FFN prostitute to his hotel room, as actions calling into question Employee 6’s 

ability to protect classified information. 

, subsequent to the revocation of Employee 6’s security clearance by 


the Board, USSS issued to the employee a notice proposing removal from the agency. 


Employee 6 was removed from the USSS effective 


.
 

Employee 7
 

Employee 7 

told 

inspectors he engaged in with the FFN,

 The FFN told inspectors that 

Employee 7 to take her to his hotel. On the night of the incident, 

www.oig.dhs.gov 128 OIG-14-20
 

 

 

Employee 7 consumed . 

. After the examination, 

Employee 7 admitted to unreported contact with a foreign national. Furthermore,
 

.” On SCD suspended Employee 7’s Top Secret 

security clearance. 


 Employee 7 resigned effective 

. Employee 7 

engaged in 

after the incident. 

 

SCD revoked his security 


clearance. The Notice of Determination cites security concerns related to the following 

guidelines as reasons for the revocation of his security clearance: 

•	 Adjudicative Guideline B (foreign influence); 

•	 Adjudicative Guideline D (sexual behavior); and 

•	 Adjudicative Guideline E (personal conduct, including lack of candor and 

dishonesty).

 USSS proposed for Employee 7 based 

on his failure to maintain Top Secret clearance. 

. 

the revocation of Employee 7’s security 

clearance. 

the employee’s behavior in Cartagena placed him 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 129	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

in a position where he was vulnerable to the threat of personal harm, coercion, or
 

blackmail. 

. 

 

, 

USSS issued to the employee a notice proposing removal from the agency. Employee 7 

was removed from the USSS effective 

Employee 7 told OIG investigators that 

. The employee 

confirmed traveling to the country and having sexual relations with a foreign national, 


and did not initially report the international travel to SCD.

 Upon returning to the United States, the 

employee reported the foreign national contacts from his Colombia trip to SCD. 

Employee 8
 

Employee 8, 

 arrived in Cartagena on April , 2012. He brought FFNs back to his 

hotel room. Employee 8 told inspectors 

the FFNs asked that he pay for sexual services. FFNs told 

inspectors that 

FFNs told inspectors engaged in sexual services with the employee. 

On
 

the night of the incident, Employee 8 consumed Employee 8 was 

evaluated as “ ” indicated on a national security polygraph examination, 

www.oig.dhs.gov 130 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

and was evaluated as “


 SCD suspended Employee 8’s Top Secret security clearance. 

 

SCD revoked his security 

clearance. The Notice of Determination cites security concerns related to the following 

guidelines as reasons for the revocation of his security clearance: 

•	 Adjudicative Guideline B (foreign influence); 

•	 Adjudicative Guideline D (sexual behavior); 

•	 Adjudicative Guideline G (alcohol consumption); and 

•	 Adjudicative Guideline E (personal conduct, including lack of candor and 

dishonesty). 

The following day, USSS proposed Employee 8’s failure 

to maintain Top Secret clearance. 

. Further, he argued that 

that an SCD 

representative communicated to USSS employees during a briefing that a one-night 

stand would not need to be reported as a foreign contact. 

the revocation of Employee 8’s security 

clearance. 

the seriousness of roles and responsibilities of USSS. The CSO concluded that Employee
 

8’s decision to bring back to the hotel 

showed questionable judgment raising concerns about his lack of discretion, 

trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information. In addition, with regard to 


Employee 8’s 


www.oig.dhs.gov 131	 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

Employee 8 was advised that the proposal 

the revocation of Employee 8’s 

security clearance, citing lack of discretion and poor judgment in bringing 

back to his hotel room the President was scheduled to arrive 

in Cartagena, 

, as raising concerns about the employee’s ability to protect classified 


information. 

Employee 9
 

Employee 9 arrived in Cartagena April , 2012. That night, he solicited an FFN 

prostitute and engaged in with her in his hotel room. Interviews with 

Employee 9 and the FFN confirmed that the he paid for sexual services. On the night of
 

the incident, he consumed . On SCD suspended Employee 

9’s Top Secret security clearance. 

 SCD suspended Employee 9’s security clearance on . The 

Notice of Suspension of Top Secret Clearance letter cites “possible inappropriate 


involvement with a foreign national while on a protective assignment in a foreign 


country” as the reason for security clearance suspension. 

 

Employee 9 alleged that he felt coerced 

Employee 9 faced removal . 

However, as previously discussed, when an agency warns an employee of its intent to 

take legitimate disciplinary action and there is no evidence that the employee was not 

able to exercise a free choice, the employee’s decision to resign is not considered 

coerced.38 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

38 Braun v. Department of Veterans’ Affairs, 50 F.3d 1005, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 

www.oig.dhs.gov 132 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

Employee 10
 

Employee 10,

 arrived in Cartagena on April 2012. On the night of April 2012, 

Employee 10 brought an FFN to his hotel room. 

FFN told inspectors that she 

and Employee 10 engaged in . The FFN said payment for sexual 

services was both requested and received, though the FFN told inspectors that payment 


was not discussed prior to sex. On the night of the incident, he consumed

 SCD suspended Employee 10’s security clearance on

 The Notice of Suspension of Top Secret Clearance letter cites possible 

inappropriate involvement with a foreign national while on a protective assignment in a 

foreign country as the reason for security clearance suspension.
 

 USSS provided Employee 10 with 


 

The letter states that due to the employee’s security clearance suspension, it was 

determined that 

, Employee 10 submitted a letter of 

resignation The employee states in resignation documents that 

his decision was made under limited time and therefore under duress. 

Employee 11
 

Employee 11 arrived in Cartagena April 2012. On the night April 2012, he 

brought an FFN to his hotel room. Employee 11 

the FFN said she and Employee 11 engaged 

in , and that the USSS employee paid for sex . On 

the night of the incident he consumed . Employee 11 was evaluated 

as “ indicated” on a national security polygraph examination, and was 

evaluated as “ 

SCD suspended Employee 11’s security clearance on citing possible 

inappropriate involvement with a foreign national while on a protective assignment in a 

foreign country as the reason for security clearance suspension.
 

Employee 11 resigned, effective . 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 133 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

Employee 11 alleged during an interview with OIG investigators that

 Employee 11 said 

Employee 11’s assertion that 

Employee 12
 

Employee 12 arrived in Cartagena on April 2012. , he brought an FFN back 

to his hotel room. Employee 12 told inspectors he engaged in with 

the FFN, and that payment was requested . He said 

. The FFN told inspectors that 

payment for sexual services was discussed prior to engaging in sexual intercourse, 


 On the night of the incident, he consumed 

Employee 12 was evaluated as “ indicated” on a national security 

polygraph examination, and was evaluated as “ 

During the course of the investigation, 

. 

SCD suspended Employee 12’s security clearance on citing possible 

inappropriate involvement with a foreign national while on a protective assignment in a 


foreign country as the reason for security clearance suspension. 

Employee 12 resigned effective 

Employee 12 alleged that 

. However, we 

determined 

. USSS determined 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 134 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

. 

Employee 13 

Employee 13 arrived in Cartagena April , 2012. April 

2012, he brought an FFN back to his hotel room. Employee 13 told inspectors he and the 

FFN engaged in Furthermore, the employee said he gave the FFN 

money, but that payment had not been discussed prior to sex. Employee 13 was 


evaluated as indicated” on a national security polygraph. 

 On the night of the incident, he consumed 

 

SCD suspended Employee 13’s Top Security clearance on April , 2012, due to an 

investigation into his possible inappropriate involvement with a foreign national while 

on a protective assignment in a foreign country. , Employee 13 agreed 

to resign, effective 

. 

 

www.oig.dhs.gov 135 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix H 

Contributors to This Report 

Major Contributors 

William McCarron, Chief Inspector 

Paul H. Bergstrand, Lead Inspector 

Kimberley Lake de Pulla, Senior Inspector 

John Woo, Senior Auditor 

LaDana Crowell, Inspector 

Nicholas Ketter, Inspector 

Matthew Salaga, Inspector 

Ja’nelle Taylor, Inspector 

Other Contributors 

Jacqueline Simms, Lead Inspector 

Bette Jo Walker, Investigator 

Anna Hamlin, Senior Program Analyst 

James Miller, Senior Auditor 

E. Kristine Odiña, Senior Program Analyst 

Roger Thoet, Senior Auditor 

Matthew Worner, Senior Auditor 

Katherine Yutzey, Senior Inspector 

Carlos Aviles, Auditor 

David Bunning, IT Specialist 

Ryan Cassidy, Inspector 

Thea Calder, Program Analyst 

Kimberley Crabbe, Inspector 

Ebenezer Jackson, Program Analyst 

John Jadick, Program Analyst 

Nicole Nasiatka, Investigator 

Tanya Suggs, Inspector 

www.oig.dhs.gov 136 OIG-14-20 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix I 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Acting Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Respective Component Head, if not the Addressee 

DHS Component Liaison 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Homeland Security 

www.oig.dhs.gov 137 OIG-14-20 
 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this document, please call us at (202) 254-4100, fax your 

request to (202) 254-4305, or e-mail your request to our Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) Office of Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

For additional information, visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov, or follow us on Twitter 

at: @dhsoig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To expedite the reporting of alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any 

other kinds of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) programs and operations, please visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov 

and click on the red tab titled "Hotline" to report. You will be directed to complete and 

submit an automated DHS OIG Investigative Referral Submission Form. Submission 

through our website ensures that your complaint will be promptly received and 

reviewed by DHS OIG. 

Should you be unable to access our website, you may submit your complaint in writing 

to: 

Department of Homeland Security 


Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 


Attention: Office of Investigations Hotline 


245 Murray Drive, SW 


Washington, DC 20528-0305 


You may also call 1(800) 323-8603 or fax the complaint directly to us at 

(202) 254-4297. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.