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87–281 2014

BARRIERS TO OPPORTUNITY: DO OCCUPATIONAL 

LICENSING LAWS UNFAIRLY LIMIT 

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND JOBS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING AND 

WORKFORCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS 

UNITED STATES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 26, 2014 

Small Business Committee Document Number 113–063 

Available via the GPO Website: www.fdsys.gov 

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Congress.#13
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

BLAINE LUETKEMER, Missouri 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

SCOTT TIPTON, Colorado 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

RICHARD HANNA, New York 

TIM HUELSKAMP, Kansas 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

KERRY BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

CHRIS COLLINS, New York 

TOM RICE, South Carolina 

NYDIA VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York, Ranking Member 

KURT SCHRADER, Oregon 

YVETTE CLARKE, New York 

JUDY CHU, California 

JANICE HAHN, California 

DONALD PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

GRACE MENG, New York 

BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANN McLANE KUSTER, New Hampshire 

PATRICK MURPHY, Florida 

LORI SALLEY, Staff Director 

PAUL SASS, Deputy Staff Director 

BARRY PINELES, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL DAY, Minority Staff Director 

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(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Page 

Hon. Richard Hanna ................................................................................................ 1 

Hon. Grace Meng ..................................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Ms. Melony Armstrong, Owner, Naturally Speaking, Tupelo, MS ...................... 4 

Mr. Timothy Sandefur, Principal Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, CA .......................................................................................................... 6 

Ms. Patti Morrow, President, Interior Design Protection Consulting, Greer, 

SC .......................................................................................................................... 7 

Ms. Rebecca Haw, Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School, Nashville, TN ................................................................................................................ 9 

APPENDIX 

Prepared Statements: 

Ms. Melony Armstrong, Owner, Naturally Speaking, Tupelo, MS ............... 24 

Mr. Timothy Sandefur, Principal Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, CA .................................................................................................. 28 

Ms. Patti Morrow, President, Interior Design Protection Consulting, 

Greer, SC ....................................................................................................... 159 

Ms. Rebecca Haw, Assistant Professor of Law, Vamderbilt Law School, 

Nashville, TN ................................................................................................ 164 

Questions for the Record: 

None. 

Answers for the Record: 

None. 

Additional Material for the Record: 

None. 

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(1) 

BARRIERS TO OPPORTUNITY: DO OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LAWS UNFAIRLY LIMIT 

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND JOBS? 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 26, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONTRACTING AND WORKFORCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 

2360, Rayburn House Office Building. Hon. Richard Hanna [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Hanna, Meng, and Nunnelee. 

Chairman HANNA. The hearing is called to order. 

First, I want to thank the witnesses for being with us today as 

we discuss an issue that relates to economic opportunity for our 

citizens: the proliferation of state occupational licensing laws and 

the effects these have on entrepreneurship and job creation. 

As the private economy continues to struggle to create a sufficient number of jobs to replace those lost in the recession, many 

unemployed and underemployed Americans are taking it up on 

themselves to use whatever skills or talents they have to start 

their own business and earn income. 

Unfortunately, for many of these would-be entrepreneurs, they 

may need some sort of government approval in order to do so. One 

of the most difficult forms of that approval is an occupational license. While the intent of occupational licenses are to protect public health and safety or to protect consumers from bad actors, the 

scope and complexity of occupational licensing has grown considerably in recent years. 

Yet, as these trends develop, there is mounting evidence that 

many of the public benefits arguments used to justify occupational 

licenses are tenuous at best. Instead, some licensing laws appear 

to be designed not to protect life, safety, or property, but to protect 

existing businesses from competition. For example, while many 

Americans would not be surprised to know that doctors and lawyers need a state-issued license to practice their trade, they may 

be surprised to learn that it is illegal for a person to braid hair, 

work as an interior decorator or operate an obedience school for 

dogs without a state-issued license, and they may be more shocked 

to learn what obtaining such a license entails. 

In a recent report, the Institute for Justice found that the education and training requirements for many of these professions to 

obtain a license exceed those needed to become an emergency medSBREP-219 with DISTILLER

2 

ical technician, an occupation where lives are at risk. The cost of 

such excessive licensing requirements can be measured in reduction in new business startups, job loss, higher prices for consumers 

or increased income inequality. 

According to another study, job creation in certain professions is 

20 percent lower in a licensed state versus unlicensed state. Many 

of the entrepreneurial opportunities lost to excessive occupational 

licensing are in jobs most likely to be pursued by the economically 

disadvantaged. The issue of state and local occupational licensing 

raises several questions for Congress. While the federal policymakers have an interest in promoting the principles of economic 

liberty and preventing discriminatory practices that limit opportunity, especially for the disadvantaged, we must also respect the 

principle of federalism, which gives states the right to regulate activities that take place within their borders. 

Our purpose today is not to answer the question of whether 

states should or should not regulate; it is to examine how certain 

occupational licensing laws have become excessive and discuss options for reform to enhance economic opportunity and help our 

economy and its people grow jobs and prosper. 

I now yield to the ranking member for her comments. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Licensing is a process by which the state makes it illegal to do 

a certain job unless one completes a series of mandatory requirements. The requirements are usually set by a licensing board made 

up of members of the profession or by legislatures with significant 

input from current professionals. The origin of these limits have 

promising goals and was intended to protect the safety and wellbeing of residents, but since the 1950s, the number of licensed 

workers has jumped from just 5 percent of the workforce to nearly 

30 percent today. In total, roughly 1,100 occupations now require 

some sort of license by at least one state. Much of the time these 

licenses require fees to be paid, training of some sort, and written 

examinations. While the requirements serve a functional purpose, 

they are also a barrier for entrepreneurs to enter an occupation. 

Today’s hearing will give us the opportunity to learn more about 

the genesis of professional licensing and its evolution. Though this 

issue is one for the states to take up, it is nevertheless important 

for us to bring it to the forefront. Licensing requirements have exploded to new fields, some that merit regulations and others that 

raise the question of whether there is too much licensing. States 

have broad powers to regulate their workers and have a duty to 

protect their residents. Requiring certain professions to meet strict 

licensing rules only makes sense in that regard. 

However, we must look at the implications licensing has on entrepreneurs. They are the backbone of our economy and we rely on 

them for innovation and growth. Requirements for training fees 

and examinations can keep qualified individuals from starting a 

busy profession, and a lack of uniformity among the states and 

their licensing rules impact many entrepreneurs attempting to 

move to another market where they see an opportunity for business 

growth. States should not be hindering growth in these viable markets for business expansion or creation. They should be fostering 

these self-starters. 

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3 

Encouraging competition for small firms is critical to job creation 

and economic growth. The Sherman Antitrust Act was created to 

do just that—protect consumers and business owners from anticompetitive behavior. We will hear from witnesses about how antitrust law applies to cases involving licensing boards and what approach is best for ensuring qualified individuals can enter an occupation without fear of excessive costs. 

Despite the fact that this topic belongs on the state level, the 

well-being of American entrepreneurs is a concern to the nation as 

a whole. That is why I am glad we are holding this hearing. It will 

give us a chance to hear some personal experiences of those who 

have successfully navigated state regulations and what insights 

they can provide to reform the system. As more Americans begin 

to take risks and start their own businesses, it is vital to bring licensing requirements to their attention. Balancing the need for 

market competition with the need for consumer protections will 

give small firms the certainty they require. 

We are here today to learn more about licensing rules and how 

to address the possibility of over-licensing. In order to ensure the 

success of our self-employed, we must understand the challenges 

and benefits these laws hold for entrepreneurs. 

I thank all the witnesses for being here today, and I look forward 

to your comments. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Chairman HANNA. Thank you. 

If Committee members have an opening statement, I ask that 

they submit them for the record. 

I will just take a minute to explain to you the lights. It is a little 

bit like your stewardess explaining the seatbelt. You have five minutes. We will be lenient. You will see the yellow light go on. That 

is a minute left. 

And with that I will yield to Mr. Nunnelee from Mississippi who 

will introduce our first witness. Go ahead. You may begin. 

Mr. NUNNELEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is my privilege to be before this Committee, even though I am 

not on the Committee. I thank you for allowing me to be here with 

my constituent and friend, Melony Armstrong. 

I met Melony five years ago when she was a small business operator, and I was serving in the state Senate. I was her senator. And 

Melony was attempting to grow a business helping to teach other 

people how to be small business operators, and she was restrained 

by the process of state regulation. And she came to me as her legislator. Before she came to see me, she had attempted to get relief 

through the administration, the regulatory process, and had not 

been successful. She then went into the courts and that process 

was dragging on too long. And I think if I would ask this Committee to take anything away from my part of this hearing, it is 

when Melony Armstrong came to the state legislature, she found 

a willing ear to listen and we responded, and within 90 days we 

fixed the problem, we put legislation on Governor Haley Barbour’s 

desk that he signed into law. And I would ask the Committee to 

reflect if she had come to the Congress asking for similar relief, 

how long would it have taken and would we still be debating the 

issue that we solved in 90 days at the state level. I think there is 

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4 

a real reason the states are known as the great laboratories of democracy. 

So with that, Melony Armstrong from Tupelo, Mississippi, we are 

glad to have you here today to testify before this Committee. 

Chairman HANNA. Ms. Armstrong, you may begin. 

STATEMENTS OF MELONY ARMSTRONG, OWNER, NATURALLY 

SPEAKING; TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, PRINCIPAL ATTORNEY, PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION; PATTI MORROW, PRESIDENT, INTERIOR DESIGN PROTECTION CONSULTING; REBECCA HAW, 

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW, VANDERBILT LAW SCHOOL 

STATEMENT OF MELONY ARMSTRONG 

Ms. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of 

this Committee. My name is Melony Armstrong. 

Every day, hundreds of low-income families are housed because 

of my work, but I do not run a shelter. They are clothed through 

what I have done but I do not run a second-hand clothing store. 

They are fed because of what I achieve, but I do not run a soup 

kitchen. I have transformed the lives of hundreds of poor women 

in my state of Mississippi, not because I sought out government assistance; rather, because I asked the government to get out of my 

way. 

I demanded that the government get out of my way so that I 

could provide for myself and for my family and so other women 

around me could do likewise in peace, dignity, and prosperity. And 

if a lone braider in Tupelo, Mississippi could have such a transformative impact helping to change the law to free so many around 

to earn an honest living, imagine what could happen across our nation if state and local governments followed that example. 

Not every entrepreneur is a Bill Gates or Henry Ford. Some are 

and will remain more humble in the scope of their impact, but each 

day we all demonstrate the power of one entrepreneur. 

African hair braiding is a skill that has been passed from one 

generation of women to another for the past 3,000 years of recorded 

history. For the vast majority of human history, women like me 

have practiced this craft with no government oversight, with no 

government-issued license, and with no government-imposed demands. We learned from the previous generations by doing, and in 

so doing we were free to earn a living for our families. 

But even with that history to open my hair-braiding salon, Naturally Speaking in Tupelo, Mississippi in 1999, I had to file a lawsuit and lobby the state to change the hair-braiding law in my 

state so I could get to work. To get paid to braid hair, many states 

demand braiders to obtain a cosmetology license or other similar license, typically requiring up to 2,100 hours of coursework. That is 

more than a year’s worth of work study, 40 hours a week taking 

classes that do not teach braiding. Let me say that again. The government in many states requires would-be braiders to take thousands of hours of classes that have literally nothing to do with the 

trade they want to practice. To teach others to braid hair in Mississippi required me to take more than 3,000 hours of classes and 

apply for a school license, hours I could use more productively running my own business. And the 3,200 classroom hours it would 

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5 

have taken for me to earn a license to teach hair braiding, I could 

have instead become licensed in all of the following occupations in 

Mississippi—emergency medical technician, emergency medical 

technician as a paramedic, ambulance driver, law enforcement officer, firefighter, real estate appraiser, a hunting education instructor, and that would have all taken more than 600 hours less than 

obtaining a license to teach hair braiding. 

The cosmetology establishment benefitted most from Mississippi’s regulations. Practicing cosmetologists made up the State 

Board of Cosmetology and they did their best to keep competition 

to a minimum and to ensure cosmetology schools enjoy captive customers in the form of students. 

It was in August 2004 I joined two aspiring hair braiders and the 

Institute for Justice, a public interest law firm that represented us 

for free. We filed a lawsuit to break down the regulatory walls barring potential entrepreneurs from entering the field. In the months 

that followed, I took weekly trips to the state capital of Jackson. 

It was a seven-hour roundtrip trip from Tupelo, working to convince legislators to change the law. We did not go to the government seeking a handout; instead, we asked the government to get 

out of our way. 

In 2005, our efforts paid off. Mississippi’s governor signed legislation enabling hair braiders to practice without the burdensome government-mandated classes. The only requirements now are that 

hair braiders must pay a $25 fee to register with the state and 

abide by all relevant health and hygiene codes. Since the restrictions were lifted, more than 800 women provide for themselves as 

hair braiders taking once underground businesses legit and opening new enterprises in a place where customer demand was once 

unmet. And because of the change in Mississippi’s laws, aspiring 

hair braiders are moving here from nearby states, including Tennessee, Alabama, and Arkansas. 

Free from the needless government-created barriers, I have gone 

on to teach more than 125 individuals how to braid hair. No longer 

blocked from putting industrious individuals to work, I have employed 25 women, enabling them to provide for themselves and 

their families. For many of these women, the money they earn from 

braiding represents the first steady paycheck they have earned in 

their entire lives. 

Thank you for holding this hearing to alert the public to this 

problem. I hope lawmakers in every state across this country are 

paying attention and will heed our calls to remove the laws that 

do nothing to prevent honest competition in trades from coast to 

coast. 

Thank you. 

Chairman HANNA. Thank you, Ms. Armstrong. Eloquently said. 

Our next witness is Tim Sandefur, principal attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation. Mr. Sandefur has successfully challenged 

various state laws that unfairly inhibit entrepreneurship in California, Oregon, and Missouri. In addition to his work with the Pacific Legal Foundation, he is author of three books that examine 

how government regulation inhibit economic liberty. 

Mr. Sandefur, thank you for being here. You may begin. 

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STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY SANDEFUR 

Mr. SANDEFUR. Thank you very much. 

You know, we are here discussing the right to earn a living without unreasonable government interference which is the most neglected civil right in America. The right to earn a living without 

unreasonable interference from the government was protected by 

English and American courts as far back as William Shakespeare’s 

day, but unfortunately, today, lawmakers and judges typically turn 

a blind eye to this right and it gets sacrificed by agencies that are 

acting often in the best interest of established firms. Today, onethird of all occupations requires government permission in order to 

go into a business. Even a business like being a florist in Louisiana, you have to get government approval before you can do this. 

Now, licensing laws were originally invented to protect consumers 

against shoddy or incompetent or dishonest practices, and research 

shows that they are not really that effective at doing that, but even 

so, that is at least legitimate. Unfortunately, these laws are frequently abused by established insiders to prevent competition by 

raising educational requirements, raising the costs of examinations, 

increasing continuing education requirements, forcing people to get 

college degrees before they are allowed to take the application examination, and other kinds of requirements that lower access to 

services to consumers, raise prices to consumers, and what is most 

important to me, restrict economic opportunity typically to those 

who need it the most. 

For example, you have to have a college degree to be an interior 

designer in Florida. Well, 47 percent of blacks and Hispanics have 

college degrees in Florida, and 66 percent of whites do. So not surprisingly, a restriction like that tends to have a racially disproportionate impact and a class disproportionate impact, restricting economic opportunity for precisely those people who most need entrylevel employment and what we used to call the American dream. 

Even more absurdly, people do not really rely on occupational licenses that much to protect themselves as consumers. More often 

they rely on reviewing websites, like Yelp or Angie’s List or word 

of mouth from friends who have gone to a business and been treated well or badly there. So they are not really very effective in the 

first place at protecting the public. But these restrictions limit people from entering into trades unless they receive high education requirements. Or I mentioned testing costs. A lot of the times these 

examinations to get a license are held in inconvenient or distant 

places. The examination to get a license as a florist in Louisiana, 

for example, is offered only once quarterly in Baton Rouge. So if 

you live somewhere else in Louisiana and you want to be a florist, 

you have to pay for travel and lodging expenses in addition to the 

cost of taking the examination just because you want to arrange 

flowers. 

Another kind of licensing restriction that does not get enough attention is the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity law. 

This is a licensing law that on its own terms is not intended to protect consumers against dangerous or dishonest business practices 

but exists explicitly for the purpose of protecting established firms 

against legitimate competition. 

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Just last month, I won a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality 

of Kentucky’s licensing law for moving companies. That state, like 

22 other states, says if you want to go into the business of being 

a mover you first have to get permission from all of the existing 

moving companies in the state. You file your application to run a 

moving company. All the existing movers are notified and allowed 

to file objections against you getting a license. And guess what? 

They typically do. The government then, once an objection is filed, 

decides whether there is a ‘‘public need’’ for a new moving company. How do you determine this? Nobody really knows. The statute does not explain. No regulation or case law defines the terms. 

It turned out that between 2007 and 2012, 39 people had applied 

for licenses to run companies; 19 of those had received objections 

and every single objected application had been denied by the state, 

including license applications from fully qualified movers. One guy 

who had worked as a mover for 35 years before seeking his own 

license to start his own company was denied in a written opinion 

that said you are fully qualified but you would compete against existing movers; therefore, denied. 

And we were very fortunate that Pacific Legal Foundation was 

able to secure a court decision declaring that unconstitutional, but 

that is certainly not the final word. Other courts have upheld these 

kinds of restrictions and there is no Supreme Court precedent on 

it since the 1930s. 

These restrictions are costly. In fact, to prove that there needs 

to be a new moving company you were required to hire an attorney 

to attend this hearing. You are not allowed to represent your own 

company. There are restrictions on economic freedom that do not 

protect the public, often on their own terms and are unnecessary. 

In my written testimony, I explain some routes of what the Federal government could do to protect economic liberty more than a 

new federal civil rights legislation which is badly needed to protect 

the right to earn a living; using Congress’s spending power to require states to respect the constitutional right to earn a living, a 

right Supreme Court Justice Douglas once called ‘‘the most precious liberty that man possesses.’’ 

Thank you very much for this opportunity. 

Chairman HANNA. Thank you. 

Our next witness is Patti Morrow. She is president of Interior 

Design Protection Consulting, a public affairs firm that assists 

small businesses in fighting state occupational licensing laws for 

interior designers. Prior to starting her firm, she owned and operated her own interior design business in New Hampshire before 

moving with her family to Greer, South Carolina. 

Thank you for being here, Ms. Morrow. You may begin. 

STATEMENT OF PATTI MORROW 

Ms. MORROW. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of 

the Committee. Thank you so much for allowing me to speak here 

today. 

Like many other interior designers, I entered the field as a second career. In 2004, when my children were 10 and 13, I enrolled 

in a two-year program at the New Hampshire Institute of Art. It 

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was an interior design program. There were about 25 women in the 

class and we were all second career changers. 

As I was nearing the end of the interior design program, a licensure bill was introduced in the New Hampshire legislature. If enacted, this bill would have destroyed my dream of having my own 

interior design business. In order to legally practice, I would have 

had to go back to school, earn another four-year bachelor’s degree 

in interior design from an expensive, privately accredited college. 

Well, number one, there were no such schools in New Hampshire. 

And then not only that, but since I was going part-time it would 

have taken me about eight years before I could have completed 

that program. Also, I would have had to pass the burdensome 

NCIDQ (National Council for Interior Design Qualification) exam. 

This exam has historically had a less than 40 percent passage rate 

for all three sections taken at the same time, and it can cost over 

$2,000 to take once you consider the cost of the exam, the cost to 

travel to take the exam, and the cost of study materials. I would 

have also had to complete a lengthy internship under one of these 

NCIDQ-certified designers. Well, there were only 25 in the whole 

state and there was really no guarantee that even these 25 wanted 

to or were financially able to hire an intern. This bill would have 

put not only me but most of all of the other interior designers out 

of business in that state. 

And why? Well, the bill claimed it was to protect the public, but 

I was not buying that. So I did my own research. And do you know 

what I found? There is not a shred of evidence to warrant a conclusion that the unregulated practice of interior design places the public in any form of jeopardy. In fact, 13 state agencies have already 

looked at this issue, they issued reports, and without exception, 

every single one concluded that interior design regulation would 

not add anything to protect the public beyond measures that were 

already in place. 

Since 1907, only 52 lawsuits have been filed against interior designers in the entire country. That is over 100 years, and nearly 

every single one of those involved contract disputes, not safety 

issues. That New Hampshire bill had nothing to do with the public 

good but had come about solely through the efforts of industry insiders who were asking the legislature to eliminate their competition and grant them a monopoly. 

I was not going to just sit back and let this small interest group 

dictate who could and who could not practice interior design. So I 

organized a grassroots group of interior designers. We attended the 

hearing. We testified against the bill and we soundly defeated it in 

March of 2007. 

Then two years ago I moved to South Carolina, and it was de ́ja ́vu 

all over again. In the last two years, I have had to travel to the 

state capital multiple times to meet with legislators, to testify at 

hearings, all this time taking time away from my business. As of 

right now that bill has been tabled, but for how long? 

Licensing interior designers is a job killer. For the last eight 

years, because I am passionate about this, I have been helping interior designers all over the country protect their right to practice. 

Eighty percent of interior designers are small business owners. 

Forty percent are sole practitioners. Eighty-four percent of interior 

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designers who are practicing do not have a degree in interior design, and licensing disproportionately excludes minorities and second career switchers. 

If there is a happy ending to this story it is this—since 2007, 

over 150 state bills which would have expanded or enacted new interior design regulations have been defeated. But like zombies they 

just will not stay dead. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, let me 

just say that when Barack Obama was elected president, he did 

what many other presidents did before him—he redesigned the living quarters of the White House. Now, the District of Columbia 

does have full-blown licensing laws for interior designers. But who 

did he hire? He hired Michael Smith, an unlicensed designer from 

California to do this work. 

Now, I submit to you if the most protected person in the entire 

world can hire an unlicensed interior designer, should not everybody else be able to? 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman HANNA. Thank you. You are welcome to move to New 

York anytime you like. 

For the next witness I yield to Ranking Member Meng. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you. Actually, New York, the state laws for 

interior designing are more lax, so I welcome you, too. 

It is my pleasure to introduce Professor Rebecca Haw, a law professor at Vanderbilt Law School. She is a specialist in antitrust law 

and is focused on changes in professional licensing. She has recently released an article focused on licensing and the Sherman 

Antitrust Act. She was previously a fellow at Harvard Law School 

and also clerked for Judge Richard Posner on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. She has degrees from Yale, Cambridge University, and Harvard Law School. Welcome, Professor 

Haw. 

STATEMENT OF REBECCA HAW 

Ms. HAW. Thank you, Chairman Hanna, Ranking Member 

Meng, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting 

me here today. 

To someone who studies antitrust, the state of professional licensing in this country is shocking. Licensing requirements are created mostly by boards that are dominated with competitors. They 

get together and agree on how many competitors they will face; 

they agree on who those competitors will be. Essentially, these 

boards are cartels with one important and dangerous exception— 

they are much more powerful. They do not have to worry, as most 

cartels do, about entry from competitors; they control that entry. 

They do not have to worry about cheating on the cartel since their 

rules are backed by the police power of the states. 

Since states have basically given professionals the reigns to their 

own competition, one should not be surprised that self-dealing results. Yet, some of the licensing restrictions are shocking as my fellow panelists have illustrated. 

I want to speak a little bit about what the economists have said 

about licensing because that is just as shocking as some of the restrictions we have heard about today so far. Economists say that 

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licensing is huge and it is getting bigger. It used to be in the ’50s 

that one in 20 people needed a license to legally perform their profession; now that number is more like one in three. And licensing 

tends to raise prices to consumers. So, for example, in some states, 

dentists must hire a maximum of two hygienists. This is at the 

peril of losing their license. In states where the number of hygienists that may work with a dentist are restricted, dental exams are 

7 percent more expensive. Economists have estimated that this results in hundreds of millions of dollars that every year could be in 

consumers’ pockets. 

Consumers, of course, are not the only ones who lose out. Licensing makes it impossible for many would-be practitioners to enter 

the market, effectively reducing their wages and deterring entrepreneurship. 

But is licensing a bad thing? Certainly, not all licensing rules are 

harmful. Some improve service quality and public safety enough to 

justify the costs. These are the licensing restrictions that tend to 

solve the information issues and other problems that make a totally free market for professional services dysfunctional. 

But there is a lot of economic evidence that many licensing restrictions have no effect on service quality. And the way that professional licensing is currently done through practitioner-dominated boards with the fox guarding the henhouse, no one has the 

tools or incentives to balance licensing’s economic costs against its 

benefits. 

Here is where I see a role for federal law. Federal antitrust law 

as it exists now is designed to balance these economic considerations, and there are many antitrust precedents striking down 

similar restrictions when they are passed not by a board in a licensing context but by purely private cartels. Antitrust law could 

be a powerful tool against the excessive of state-level licensing. But 

most jurisdictions have interpreted the antitrust statutes to shield 

licensing boards from antitrust liability. The law here is complex, 

and I would be happy to go into it in the questions, but suffice it 

to say that most courts have allowed licensing boards to operate 

immune from antitrust liability and that has meant carte blanche 

to regulate to their own benefit at the expense of the consumer and 

the excluded professionals. 

But last year, the Fourth Circuit became the first appellate court 

to deny a licensing board immunity and to declare that one of its 

licensing restrictions violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. That created a circuit split, and the Supreme Court will review the case 

next term. It has granted cert in that case. I feel strongly that the 

court should affirm the Fourth Circuit’s opinion and make it clear 

that because of the self-dealing that inevitably happens when you 

give competitors the reigns to their own competition, practitionerdominated licensing boards should have to answer to the Sherman 

Antitrust Act, and that is because I think antitrust is not only an 

appropriate but the best way to balance the economic costs and 

benefits of licensing restrictions. 

Thank you. 

Chairman HANNA. Thank you. 

Mr. Sandefur, part of what has not been talked about today is 

the effect this has on the growth of government. I am assuming 

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that for every license there is someone behind a desk someplace 

that is managing the testing, the whole process through that. Can 

you, anyone, give me an idea of how you feel that affects the overall growth and scope and cost of government? 

Mr. SANDEFUR. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The public choice economics predicts that when existing firms 

have the opportunity to inflict burdens on entry and impose costs 

on their potential competitors, they are going to exploit that opportunity whenever it is worth it financially for them to do so. And 

so what you find is not only do licensing agencies employ a lot of 

people—inspectors and so forth to make sure that people are complying with these laws and running sting operations and things 

like this, but you find that existing firms will also waste their 

money in policing their rivals. They will watch what the other 

firms are doing or potential competitors are doing with money that 

could be spent on helping consumers and producing a better product. 

As I mentioned sting operations, we see police departments setting up sting operations for unlicensed movers in order to arrest 

people for running a moving company without a license when these 

police officers could be out there actually solving real crimes. And 

these kinds of costs, if you put them together and consider what 

they are nationwide, they must be tremendous. But I do not know 

of any actual numbers that have ever been done on that. 

Chairman HANNA. Ms. Haw? 

Ms. HAW. Yeah, I have something to add to that. I absolutely 

agree with everything that Mr. Sandefur has said, but also I think 

the real question is how does this affect the scope of regulation, not 

so much the scope of government, because to me these boards are 

not government; what they are is a bunch of private competitors 

getting together to agree on entry and agree on rules. So what I 

am worried more about than the expansion of government is the 

expansion of regulation in this area. 

Chairman HANNA. Thank you very much. 

Let me ask you a bit—or anyone who wants to answer this—but 

implicit in all of this is that somehow there is some public good attained. And we have something called ‘‘free enterprise’’ that clears 

cut its own market. Bad actors get in, people find out about their 

reputations, good or bad, they grow or leave the market. So the assumption under all this to me is that somehow government intervention improves that process, keeps people out who otherwise 

should not be in and helps people enter the system who are somehow better or likely better at whatever it is they want to do. I do 

not buy that personally, but I am interested in how you feel about 

it, Ms. Haw. How you feel about letting the market be the market 

versus—things like Angie’s List, et cetera—versus government trying to figure out that market in advance of free enterprise doing 

it on its own. 

Ms. HAW. So economists tell us that there are two possible reasons why a free market for professional services will not work, and 

that is information asymmetries, which means that I as a consumer have less information than I really ought to have in purchasing a service. And then something called externalities, which 

means that when I purchase this service and it turns out badly for 

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me, I am not the only one who suffers. So this is why we license 

engineers. So if I purchase engineering services to build a bridge 

and that bridge collapses, well, maybe I got a cheap engineer, 

maybe I got low quality service, but the real problem is that I do 

not internalize the cost when it collapses. 

So what this suggests is that a licensing restriction needs to address only serious problems of externalities and information 

asymmetries. When we think about professions like interior design 

or hair braiding, we have a lot of information about these services 

with the advent of things like Angie’s List and other services on 

the Internet, and it is hard to imagine a really terrible externality 

story where if you did not like the decorating that you had done 

to your house or you were not happy with that particular hair service, it somehow proves to be a disaster for society. So certainly, I 

think there are some professions that ought not to be licensed, and 

even within the professions that ought to be licensed for the reasons that I said, sometimes they go too far. 

Chairman HANNA. Mr. Sandefur, that is an interesting outline 

of where the limits begin I guess for you. And what would you say 

to that? 

Mr. SANDEFUR. First, the problem with the information asymmetry argument in favor of government regulation is that it presumes that the government has more information, which it generally does not. Government officials do not know how to run a 

moving business, for example. So what the government agencies 

then do is they then recruit existing firms to give them that information in theory, and that is just what leads to the antitrust problems that Professor Haw was talking about, is that then these entities get taken over by the industry in the name of getting the kind 

of information to protect the consumer. And, in fact, information 

asymmetry problems can be solved better by private certification 

routes and private review alternatives, like Yelp or Angie’s List 

and so forth. 

As for externalities, externalities are taken care of by health and 

safety regulations that are routine already that say anybody doing 

this business, whether you have a license or not, if you hurt somebody you are liable for that. Plus, the information asymmetry and 

externalities, those are not the only two considerations. The more 

important and usually ignored consideration is rent seeking, that 

is the exploitation of government power by established firms to exclude their competition. And this all sounds all very technical and 

economic and modern but it is actually very old, and it goes back 

to one of my favorite cases in the law, a case called ‘‘The Case of 

the Upholsterers.’’ Now, Ms. Morrow was talking about licensing of 

interior decorators. There was a case about licensing of interior 

decorators, in I think it was 1615, called ‘‘The Case of the Upholsterers’’ where there was a law that said you could not practice upholstery without permission of the Upholstery Guild. And it was 

challenged in court, and one of my great heroes, the Judge Sir Edward Coke, declared it unconstitutional under the British Constitution. He said, ‘‘No skill there is in this for a man might learn it 

in six hours.’’ And people said, ‘‘Well, but it protects the consumers.’’ And he said, ‘‘Unskillfulness is sufficient punishment.’’ 

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fulness is sufficient punishment.’’ If you are bad at your job, people 

will not hire you. They will not shop from you. That is a far better 

protection of the consumer than creating a government apparatus 

that gets taken over by established firms who use it to exclude 

competition, hurt consumers, and bar entrepreneurs who need economic opportunity. 

Chairman HANNA. Although government may be the one place 

where you are protected when you are not good at your job. 

Mr. SANDEFUR. Or with government power. That is right. 

Chairman HANNA. Thank you. 

Ms. Armstrong, you mentioned that there are hundreds of people 

who become independent, become entrepreneurs, have that sense of 

pride. Maybe give us a couple cases, because at the end of the day, 

that is what this is all about, unleashing the energy, the enthusiasm, the entrepreneurial nature of human beings to become selfreliant, to be able to engage their own juices and their own success. 

And government is holding that back. Your own story is remarkable. I give you a lot of credit, but other people who you know, 

maybe one or two examples for the Committee. 

Ms. ARMSTRONG. Sure there is Nina Lyons. And Nina Lyons, 

when she graduated from high school wanted to be a professional 

hair braider but learned quickly that without the cosmetology license she was going to not be able to do that. And so she chose 

instead to go work in a factory. I happened to meet Nina Lyons 

around about the time this was all taking place, and after the law 

was passed, she then came out of the factory, not wanting to be 

there anyway, and came and worked in my salon. And she is a very 

talented, gifted hair braider. And so she was able to pursue what 

she had wanted to pursue 20 years prior. 

There is also Loveeta Warren. She is down on the coast of Mississippi, and she owns a braiding salon called Braid Baby. As a 

matter of fact, she had opened a second location and this is something that as a result of the law being passed enabled her to be 

able to do this. 

Chairman HANNA. These are taxpayers. I mean, these are the 

people we need. 

Ms. Morrow, do you want to add anything to that? I wonder, implicit in all this regulation is somehow somebody is being protected. 

Maybe you would like to push back on that, if you want to. Because 

the suggestion is somehow there is bad interior designers out there 

creating ugly homes or something; I do not even know. But is there 

any reality in any of that? 

Ms. MORROW. Well, to paraphrase Oscar Wilde, ‘‘No one ever 

died over the wallpaper.’’ And there is no evidence whatsoever that 

unregulated interior designers are harming the public. There are 

three states that actually have full-blown licensing laws, and this 

is after more than 30 years of the proponents trying to get licensing laws. And after all that time there is only three states. There 

was a fourth one. Alabama’s was struck down, declared unconstitutional. If interior designers were being harmed or killed, certainly, 

we would have laws in far more than three states. The 47 states 

that do not have licensing would at least have some. And the licensing laws, the bills that are introduced, you would not believe 

how far-reaching they are. 

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I will just read you a couple of things that if you do not have 

the right credentials, you cannot do designs, drawings, diagrams, 

studies. You cannot consult with clients. You cannot offer space 

planning. You cannot recommend furnishings. You cannot draft 

contract documents. You cannot research or analyze a client’s requirements. How do you do interior design without those things? 

You could not even give customers a recommendation as an employee of Home Depot if some of these laws were to pass. 

Chairman HANNA. Ms. Haw? 

Mr. SANDEFUR. And for me, add to that, Mr. Chairman, that 

a lot of these laws are backed up by criminal penalties. Is that the 

case in your situation? 

Chairman HANNA. You can be jailed for bad floor design or 

something like that? 

Ms. Haw, so to get this straight, more harm is done with these 

laws than without them. Can we say that in certain cases? And I 

am interested. You seem to have a pretty clear idea of where you 

would draw the line in terms of who should be licensed and who 

should not. I think all of you probably do to some degree. Could you 

generalize that? I mean, at what point would you would say, or 

maybe there are a couple of industries that are examples, but—go 

ahead. What do you think? 

Ms. HAW. So this is why I think antitrust is such a great tool 

for this particular question because to me it really is an economic 

argument that the markets fail. And if the markets fail, then 

maybe we need regulation and maybe we need licensing. So if we 

back it up and we ask the question to begin with, is a free market 

in this area filing, I think you will find that for a lot of the currently regulated professions that is not true. I think you will find 

for the professions in which a truly free market may fail, a lot of 

the restrictions go too far and they address market failures that 

are not there. 

So the question that I would ask is, is this the kind of industry 

in which we are likely to see a lot of information asymmetries? Is 

this the kind of industry in which we have a big problem with 

externalities? Then the second question would be, does the restriction that we are considering, not just licensing generally but this 

particular licensing restriction. So let us say you want to license 

dentists. Well, how many hours of schooling are you going to require? What level of education are you going to require? What is 

the exam going to look like? Every one of these questions should 

be answered with the market failure in mind, and it should be allowed only if that particular regulation addresses that market failure. 

Ms. MORROW. Mr. Chairman, the free market works very, very 

well in the interior design industry. Consumer are very savvy these 

days. They have many means to investigate the qualifications of interior designers, and not only that but there are many private organizations that do different credentialing. And if an interior designer wants to be distinguished from his or her peers, they can 

certainly take one of the exams and after it is passed they can market those credentials, and if they get the job based on that, then 

they have put that work into their own career. 

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Chairman HANNA. People build a body of work, they build a 

reputation in the community they live in, and people can decide to 

hire them or not. 

Ms. MORROW. Exactly. 

Chairman HANNA. So the fundamental piece of this is, is government better at deciding who you want to have as an interior designer or are you in your own market? And clearly, failure clears 

out the market that the government is assuming it is doing by not 

licensing certain people but may in fact be limiting competition in 

a way that could actually encourage less qualified people who are 

able to get over those hurdles to have access where people that are 

equal might not. Is that fair, Mr. Sandefur? 

Mr. SANDEFUR. Yes, Mr. Hanna. I almost called you, Your 

Honor. 

Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is exactly right. And the Supreme Court 

has made clear in every decision on this issue that restrictions on 

entry into a trade must be related to a person’s fitness and capacity 

to practice the trade of profession. The first Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of occupational licensing laws was 

Dent v. West Virginia in 1883. I think it was about medical doctors. And that was written by Justice Steven Field, who declared 

that licensing laws on the entry into a profession are constitutional 

if they are related to the trade and they are attainable by reasonable study and practice. But otherwise, they would violate a person’s constitutional right to earn a living. 

The most recent decision on the question, Schware v. Board of 

Examiners in 1957, struck down the effort of New Mexico to bar 

members of the Communist Party from practicing law. And the Supreme Court again said licensing laws can be used to protect consumers but they must rationally relate to a person’s fitness and capacity to practice the profession. Unfortunately, I mentioned the 

Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity laws for the moving laws have no relationship whatsoever, even on their own terms, 

to a person’s capacity to practice the business of moving. They are 

written in such a way as to deny qualified movers the opportunity 

to enter simply because there are already enough movers in the 

minds of bureaucrats. Now, how do bureaucrats determine how 

many movers there ought to be in a market? They do not even do 

consumer assessments or research or surveys or anything. The entrepreneurs often do but that is not enough to persuade the bureaucracy. And a lot of these laws are written in very vague terms. 

Nevada, their licensing law for movers is the most anticompetitive licensing law in the country. It says you can only practice the 

trade of moving if it would ‘‘foster sound economic conditions.’’ 

What does that mean? Well, last year I was at a hearing in front 

of the Nevada State Senate Transportation Committee. The head 

of the Department of Transportation was asked, ‘‘What does that 

mean?’’ And he said, and I quote, ‘‘You know it when you see it.’’ 

Now, that kind of discretion in the hands of bureaucrats means 

it is going to restrict opportunities, it is going to raise prices, it is 

going to availability of services, all solely for private interest of 

those politically powerful movers who do not want competition. It 

is unconstitutional and it is unfair. 

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Chairman HANNA. Thank you. I appreciate your indulgence in 

me, Ranking Member Meng. Thank you. 

Ms. MENG. No problem. 

Piggybacking off that question, and anyone is free to answer, 

much of the application of antitrust law and licensing cases falls 

on whether the licensing board is an entity of a state. Can you 

please explain how the makeup and structure of various licensing 

boards could be changed so that antitrust law would apply to 

them? And how could simply reforming the structure of a board 

help entrepreneurs gain access to more occupations? 

Ms. HAW. Well, I actually think that the way that boards are 

currently comprised as they are right now, in most cases they are 

subject to antitrust law. So this is where we get into the controversy that is at play in the Supreme Court case, the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners. 

So most boards—we did some research into boards in Tennessee 

and Florida—are dominated, which means there is a majority of 

members holding seats on the board, are of the profession, licensed 

people of the profession. I think it is 93 percent in Tennessee and 

in Florida it is 90 percent of boards are this way. Under a correct 

interpretation of the state action immunity that I referred to, those 

boards should be subject to antitrust law. This is what I believe 

from my research. It is what the FTC believes, and now a circuit 

court has decided that. What we need is a Supreme Court case to 

come in and say these boards, as they are currently comprised, are 

subject to antitrust liability. So you would not need to change the 

way the boards are organized in order to get that antitrust liability. 

Now, likely, if the boards as they are comprised now start seeing 

more antitrust suits when these floodgates open, as they would in 

the case of we got a favorable decision from the Supreme Court, it 

may be true that the states will alter how they do their regulation. 

They may actually change the composition of those boards, and to 

my mind that is a good thing because what they would have to do 

is they would have to remove—at the very least they would have 

to remove that majority on each board of the practitioners. 

Ms. MENG. Besides the legal and health fields, what are some 

of the most common licensed professions that you have seen around 

the country that are overregulated? Where can states ease regulations in some of these fields? 

Mr. SANDEFUR. It is hard to answer what trades are the most 

commonly regulated because you find that typically all the states 

impose regulations and then there are some that are contentious, 

like florist is only in Louisiana, and then there are varieties of licensing requirements, like with interior designers. It is only a violation of your First Amendment rights and not of your Fourteenth 

Amendment rights. That is, it only says you are not allowed to call 

yourself what you are but you are still allowed to do that practice, 

for example. 

So it is hard to answer that question, but industries like, in my 

business running the Economic Liberty Project at Pacific Legal 

Foundation, we have focused a lot on the moving industry because 

this is an entry-level industry that has low startup costs, it is a 

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ence or education, and yet they are licensed in the same way that 

natural gas pipelines and railroads are licensed, which is absurd. 

And that is in, as I said, 22 states in this country regulate the moving industry in that way. And then there are lots of cities and 

counties that impose similar kinds of regulations. 

I think the way I would answer your question is that the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity law for ordinary competitive markets should be abolished entirely. There is no rational justification for allowing existing firms to veto their own competition 

in a perfectly normal competitive market like moving or taxicab operations. Or these laws even apply to hospitals. If you want to start 

a hospital, you cannot start a hospital if the existing hospitals do 

not want you to. Or buy medical equipment. We are talking about 

people’s lives now. 

The island of Maui a few years ago, it only had one hospital operating on the island run by the state, which meant if you were injured far away from that hospital, you would have to endure a long 

ambulance ride to the hospital. So some people got together and 

said let us start a second hospital. The state denied them a certificate of need to open a new hospital for several years. It has since 

been granted. But when you consider the fact that in an emergency 

every second counts, that means that it is very likely that there is 

somebody who is dead today who would not be dead if the state of 

Hawaii had not decided that it was more important for them to 

prevent economic competition against their state-run hospital. 

So my answer to you would be that the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity law should be radically scaled back or abolished entirely, and the Federal government can do that either as 

a condition of spending costs budgetary matters or through federal 

civil rights legislation, which as I said, is sorely needed in this 

area. The first federal civil rights law in 1866 was primarily focused on protecting the right to contract and the right to private 

property, and we have lost sight of the importance of those rights 

in just the past few decades. And I think it is really important for 

Congress to consider that that hurts precisely those minorities who 

most need that civil rights protection. 

Ms. HAW. So Mr. Sandefur provides some shocking testimony 

there, and I can shock it maybe in a different way. 

So there are 1,100 different professions that are licensed in at 

least one state, and I could be here for the rest of this hearing listing these but I will just give you a few. 

Locksmiths. This means it is illegal to do this unless you have 

a government-issued license. Locksmiths, beekeepers, fortune tellers, tour guides, shampooers. This list goes on and on. 

Mr. SANDEFUR. Fortune tellers. Even though it is literally impossible to be a competent fortune teller. 

Ms. MENG. I think we need to have another hearing to determine if that is true. 

Just to play devil’s advocate, in New York City, many areas, for 

example, you talk about moving companies. We have heard lots of 

stories where moving companies will sort of prey on people within 

certain communities. They will come and move and steal people’s 

furniture so people never see them again. They will park, taking 

up parking spaces, and there is no way to contact them or to hold 

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them accountable, parking illegally. And so how do you balance the 

interest of consumer protection overregulating moving companies, 

for example? 

Mr. SANDEFUR. The reason I am smiling is not because that is 

a bad question but because I am actually in a dispute with my 

moving company which just started yesterday, and it is quite tense 

for me and stressful, and I am having to deal with this exact problem myself. And there are perfectly normal remedies. I could have 

hired a different company. I can review them badly on Yelp. I can 

sue them if they break or steal my things. We can call the police 

department if they steal my things, and so forth and so on. There 

are plentiful regulations. You are never going to have a regulatory 

system that will stop all harm. And these Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity laws have no connection to that. 

It is true. You have to satisfy the bureaucracy that you would 

comply with the law in order to get a license, but that does not prevent you from breaking the law if you choose to. So these kinds of 

laws are not effective at protecting the public, and protecting the 

public is more effectively, although not perfectly, done through 

other avenues of the law. 

Now, as far as New York City is concerned, you are almost certainly aware that in the 1930s the city of New York capped the 

number of taxicab licenses at I think it is something like 30,000, 

13,000. I do not remember the number. Anyway, capped the number of available taxicab medallions so that today there are many 

cabs or fewer almost in New York City than there were in the 

1930s so that today a medallion to operate a single taxicab in New 

York City costs a million dollars. Now, it is not rich white guys 

driving taxis; right? So if you want to run a taxi company, what 

you have to do is lease your license from the few wealthy people 

who are able to afford them. And that means that you are working 

from Monday until Thursday or so to pay off the hundreds of dollars a week that you have to pay for the lease of the license on your 

taxicab and then you get to keep the money that you earn otherwise. 

Is it any wonder that these licensing laws, not only do they harm 

the poor and entrepreneurs, but they push people into the underground economy or even deter them from getting a job in the first 

place because it is just too hard and they cannot imagine themselves getting that. 

Ms. MENG. Several states have begun to offer better reciprocity 

between their licensing regulations to enable workers to start 

working immediately following moving to a new state. This is especially beneficial for military families. Besides offering portability to 

increase worker mobility across state lines, what else can be done 

to reign in licensing laws? 

Mr. SANDEFUR. Well, I would say that legislation that makes 

clear—I would suggest something modeled on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act that would say that restrictions on the right to 

earn a living must satisfy a high threshold for constitutionality. 

Another one would be what is being called sunrise legislation. It is 

similar to sunset legislation. Sunset legislation says a bill will expire unless it is renewed. Sunrise legislation says to the legislature 

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you have to satisfy these standards in order to impose a new licensing restriction. 

There is a bill like this in Missouri right now. I just testified in 

a committee there just a couple weeks ago. And they are not binding. They do not actually prohibit the legislature from restricting 

or imposing a new licensing restriction, but they include certain 

factors that have to be proved before the legislature will impose 

these restrictions. And there are significant ones. They say prove 

that there is no free market alternative available, and so forth and 

so on. I think those are good ideas for reform. 

Ms. HAW. What I would like to see is the correct interpretation 

of the State Action Doctrine prevail in the Supreme Court. And 

what that would mean for probably around 90 percent of boards in 

the U.S. is that they would be subject to the antitrust laws and 

would have to balance the anticompetitive effects against the procompetitive effects. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman HANNA. A couple of quick questions. 

What do you think this costs the economy in terms of job creation? We have an example. A relatively small community of hundreds, right, and in general, job creation—anybody? You have 

talked to economists, Ms. Haw, maybe—— 

Ms. HAW. Yeah, you know, I know that—so some of the figures that float around are licensing costs $100 billion to consumers. 

That does not directly address the question of job creation but it 

is going to be related to that; right? So another statistic that I 

think is relevant here is licensing tends to raise wages for the incumbent professionals. The figure used to be 10 to 12 percent. Modern day to now says more like 18 percent. So if we want to think 

about that as how it would affect job creation, you can think about 

that as raising the minimum wage or something. There are only so 

many places these dollars can go. So that is going to constrict the 

labor supply as well. 

Mr. SANDEFUR. It is really impossible to answer that question 

any more clearly than that because of what economists call the 

‘‘broken window fallacy.’’ The kind of costs that are being imposed 

by licensing restrictions are in the form of jobs that just never appear. So how do you measure that? How do you measure the number of people who say, oh, I would like to start a moving company 

but it is impossible to get permission so I am not going to. And it 

is impossible to measure that. 

The reason it is called the ‘‘broken window fallacy’’ is it comes 

from an old story about a baker who arrives at his work one day 

to see that somebody has shattered his window in the middle of the 

night. And as he is sweeping up the glass, a friend says to him, 

‘‘Well, do not worry. It is good for the economy because now you 

will buy a new window to replace the broken window.’’ Well, that 

is nonsense because he was going to spend that money on a new 

coat, and then he would have had both a window and a coat. But 

now he only has a window. What you never see is the unseen cost 

of this vandalism is the coat that is never made and never appears. 

And so what we have with economic restrictions like licensing 

laws is how do you measure jobs that are never created, or the innovation that might have occurred. The hair braiding is a great exSBREP-219 with DISTILLER

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ample of this because licensing boards define the scope of their 

practice as broadly as possible to protect themselves from competition. Well, an entrepreneur comes along and says, well, you know, 

I am not going to be a barber. I have got an idea. I am going to 

just braid hair. Well, then the barber and cosmetology board says, 

‘‘No, no. You have to have one of our licenses.’’ Now, this is an innovative new business model. This is a new idea for a business 

that has never been around before but is being forced into this category of barbering that it really was not designed for it and was 

imposed decades ago. 

Well, we do not know the kinds of costs in terms of innovation 

and creativity that these licensing restrictions impose. It is literally 

incalculable. 

Chairman HANNA. Well, what we do know from Ms. Morrow 

and Ms. Armstrong is that there are literally thousands of people 

who are held back from doing what they want to do because of restrictions, barriers to entry that are so burdensome, either do not 

try it or they try and they quit. We know that within that, that 

lack of competition by its nature is a cost push. Clearly no one 

would be interested in limiting the number of moving companies if 

it were not something they thought moved to their own bottomline. 

Mr. SANDEFUR. That is right. And you could try to measure the 

costs of these licensing restrictions by measuring how much time 

and energy the existing firms put in to restricting their possible 

competition. In the interior design field, they put in millions and 

millions of dollars to try and obtain licensing laws that will restrict 

entrepreneurs from competing against them. In the moving industry the existing firms would hire lawyers and spend hours in the 

process of the hearing and filing objections and these sorts of 

things in order to block competition. So you could measure those 

kinds of costs and say that that is more or less the cost of the license. 

Chairman HANNA. If someone is going to tens of thousands of 

dollars to keep someone out of their business, you can be darn sure 

that it is for a reason. 

Mr. SANDEFUR. That is right. 

Chairman HANNA. And it is profit. 

Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. MORROW. Mr. Chairman, in the interior design business, it 

is one national trade association that has spent allegedly $8 million 

trying to get every state regulated. And not only that but this same 

trade association, they created the exam that you have to take and 

then spun it off and they created the accreditation for the colleges 

that you would need to take, spun that organization off. So there 

are these three organizations that have been working together for 

over 40 years to regulate the whole industry. We call that a cartel. 

Chairman HANNA. Sure. Sure. 

Ms. HAW. We do, too. 

Chairman HANNA. So these manufactured requirements by people who are already in the industry are designed to keep other people out of whatever that is, raise prices, limit competition, limit job 

creation. 

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What about innovation? I mean, what do you think of that? I 

mean, that is just a though. 

Ms. HAW. So Mr. Sandefur brought this up a minute ago, and 

I think that is absolutely right. So you are seeing a lot of this activity on the part of established boards of broadening the definition 

of what their practice is. And this, of course, is going to stifle innovation because any time you come up with a new business model 

that is to the side of a profession, suddenly you might find yourself 

receiving a cease and desist letter that says, ‘‘Oh, no, no. That is 

in our profession.’’ 

So we are seeing this with teeth floaters. I guess horses teeth do 

not naturally wear down and so you have to file them. And it has 

traditionally been done by, you know, relatively low level of education, just sort of you learn how to do it from your family business-type thing. Well, suddenly, veterinarians have decided that 

this is part of veterinary practice and cannot be done unless you 

have a veterinary license which, of course, as we know, is many, 

many years of education and passing an exam. And guess what? 

They do not teach horse teeth floating in vet school. 

So the case that is actually before the Supreme Court is about 

teeth whitening. So it was the Dental Board of North Carolina saying, ‘‘Oh, teeth whitening in all its forms is part of dental practice.’’ 

So as you see, the definition, not just more and more professions 

coming under licensing, but the established licensed professions becoming bigger and bigger, you are going to be able to see less innovation on the margins of those professions. 

Chairman HANNA. My sister was a farrier and did that often, 

filed teeth. And you are right. They just grow forever. They are like 

rats. 

So free markets work best. Consequences of what we are describing here today are good and bad. There are good and bad outcomes. 

But markets have a way of dealing with that. People do not need 

the government to tell them every little thing they need to know 

about who they are hiring. And like you said, in terms of moving 

vans in New York City, just because you have a license does not 

mean you are not a thief, no more than it means you are not good 

at what your job is. So with that, unless—we have a little time if 

anyone would like to—— 

Mr. SANDEFUR. I do have one other point I would make in 

terms of economic costs, and that is what economists call the ‘‘Cadillac effect.’’ The ‘‘Cadillac effect’’ is when government regulation 

makes it such that you can buy a Cadillac or nothing at all. Right? 

A restriction that says if you want a car it must be a Cadillac. And 

that is often what happens in terms of regulation of professions 

that say if you want to hire a lawyer, it has to be a lawyer who 

has gone through this many hours of continuing legal education. Or 

if you want to hire a hair braider, actually, you have to hire a barber. And this prices people out of the market and that is what 

causes a lot of black market problems. 

Chairman HANNA. Would you like to comment on Tesla? 

Mr. SANDEFUR. Or UBER are other examples of the recent 

headlines in which new and innovative business models have been 

excluded from the market by really obsolete licensing restrictions 

for taxicabs or car dealers. 

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Ms. HAW. Yeah. And can I just say a lot of the stuff we talked 

about today is kind of shocking but it is also completely mundane. 

If you asked competitors, ‘‘Who do you want to compete with?’’ they 

are going to say as few people as possible. If you are going to ask 

dealers, you know, do you want Tesla to direct market their cars, 

they are going to say no. So on the one hand this is all surprising; 

on the other hand to me it seems really unsurprising. 

Mr. SANDEFUR. And it is not new. I mean, I mentioned the 

17th century cases. Lord Coke, when talking about licensing laws, 

said that the people who advocate for licensing laws are like a man 

rowing a boat. They look one way but they row the other. They pretend public benefit but intend private. 

Chairman HANNA. You are a man without lack of anecdotes. 

I want to hit one other theme because I think it is very important. And that is that minorities and women who—I have friends 

who sell Mary Kay. You have friends who do braiding and other 

things. These are cottage industries that can be done within the 

confines of someone’s existing lifestyle if they can find the time. If 

they have children, stay-at-home mother. So, I mean, I find it compelling that in your case, Ms. Armstrong, that people are able to 

become independent through being entrepreneurs and able to probably stay home with their children while they do this. The same 

with you, Ms. Morrow. So we are really hurting a class of people, 

women and minorities—and I will just throw this out there, if you 

can confirm it or not—it disproportionately affects people trying to 

manage in let us say marginal circumstances, that we have an opportunity to help them be transcendent and through these licensing 

laws we are actually hurting the people we are pretending to help 

in some cases with these laws. 

Any comment about that? 

Ms. MORROW. Yes. And you really hit on something because 

that is one of the main complaints that the cartel uses. They say 

anyone can hang out a shingle and be an interior designer. And 

yes, in 47 states that is true. But, you know, as I said before, consumers are very savvy and the needs of the person who is practicing are different, too. And you have the person who wants to do 

a lower level of design and you have the person who wants to do 

a hospital. And the thing is the person who is responsible, the administrator of the hospital is not going to hire the person who hung 

out their shingle yesterday. They are going to very vigorously vet 

the interior designer who is going to design. 

So there are different levels. And there are consumers for all levels. And if only the wealthy or only the big businesses could hire 

an interior designer, I do not think that is right. I think everyone 

should have good interior design. And it is such a diverse field that 

anyone can come into it. They can create their own little niche for 

customers that like what they are selling and, you know, for as 

many hours as they want to work and support their family. 

Chairman HANNA. So free enterprise works best, government 

interference is often the law of unintended consequences which creates more dislocation and damage economically than it intends, 

and people use government to protect their own self-interests in a 

way that keeps others out, and in particular, in Ms. Armstrong’s 

case and yours, stay-at-home moms and minorities and a whole 

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class of people that really are not in a position to climb over those 

hurdles that the government has thrown at their feet. 

I want to thank you all for being here today. You have provided 

great input and done a wonderful job, all of you. 

If there are on further questions, I ask unanimous consent that 

members have five legislative days to submit statements and supporting materials. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

That is it. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

Testimony of Melony Armstrong 

African Hairbraider 

Owner of ‘‘Naturally Speaking’’ Salon, Tupelo, Miss. 

Before the U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Small Business 

Subcommittee on Contracting and Workforce Hearing 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee. 

My name is Melony Armstrong. 

It may surprise members of this committee to learn that, not too 

many years ago, the State of Mississippi demanded that I register 

my hands with the government. 

No, I’m not a secret agent. 

But my work has had a powerful impact in the fight for freedom. 

Every day across Mississippi, hundreds of low-income families 

are housed because of my advocacy and hard work. But I don’t run 

a shelter. 

They are clothed through what I’ve done. But I don’t run a second-hand clothing store. 

They are fed as a direct result of what I have achieved and continue to achieve. But I don’t run a soup kitchen. 

I have transformed the lives of literally hundreds of poor women 

in my state of Mississippi not because I sought out government assistance for them; rather, because I demanded that the government 

get out of my way so I could provide for myself and for my family, 

and so other women around me could do likewise in peace, dignity 

and prosperity. 

What I achieved and what each of these women is now achieving 

across the American Southeast is happening because of one simple 

fact: We demanded the government respect our economic liberty— 

the right to earn an honest living in the occupation of our choice 

free from unnecessary government regulation. 

I am an African hairbraider. 

And if a lone braider in Tupelo, Miss., could have such a transformative impact helping to change the law to free so many around 

me to earn an honest living, imagine what could happen across our 

nation if state and local governments followed that example. 

Not every entrepreneur is a Bill Gates or a Henry Ford. Some 

are and will remain more humble in the scope of their impact. But 

that doesn’t mean the impact is not significant in the lives of those 

around them. 

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Imagine the creative forces that would be unleashed if government respected the rights of other would-be entrepreneurs who 

want to braid hair, or drive cabs, or sell flowers by the roadside, 

or pursue any of a hundred or more occupations that would otherwise be easy to pursue if only the government didn’t needlessly 

stop entrepreneurs from doing so for no better reason than to protect the politically powerful from competition. 

Each day, I work to demonstrate the power of one entrepreneur. 

As my story demonstrates, the power of one entrepreneur can 

transform not only a life, or an industry or a community; the power 

of America’s entrepreneurs can transform our nation. 

African hairbraiding is a skill that has been passed from one 

generation of women to another for the past 3,000 years of recorded 

history. For the vast majority of those 100-plus generations, women 

like me have practiced this craft with no government oversight, 

with no government-issued license, with no government-imposed 

demands. We learned from the previous generations by doing, and 

in so doing, we were free to earn a living for our families. 

But even with that history, to open my hairbraiding salon—Naturally Speaking—in Tupelo in 1999, was no easy task; it took not 

only persistence and hard work, it also took a lawsuit and lobbying. 

It took all this even though I wanted to practice an occupation that 

is perfectly legal and perfectly safe. 

To get paid to braid hair, many states demand hairbraiders obtain a cosmetology license or other similar license—typically requiring up to 2,100 hours of coursework. 

That is more than a year’s worth of study, 40 hours a week taking classes from educational institutions that more often than not 

don’t teach braiding in their curriculum. 

Let me say that again: the government in many states requires 

would-be braiders to take thousands of hours of classes that have 

literally nothing to do with the trade they want to practice. 

When I first opened my doors as a hairbraider, I had to earn a 

‘‘wigology’’ license (yes, there is such a thing), which required 300 

hours of coursework, none of which covered hairbraiding. 

To teach others how to braid hair, however, which was my ultimate goal, the state of Mississippi required me to obtain a cosmetology license (another 1,200 hours of classes in addition to the 300 

I completed for wigology), then a cosmetology instructor’s license 

(another 2,000 hours of classes) and then apply for a school license—hours I could use more productively running my business, 

teaching others about braiding, volunteering in my community or 

nurturing my family. Again, none of the required instruction actually spent any time teaching the student how to braid hair. 

In the 3,200 classroom hours it would have taken for me to earn 

a license to teach hairbraiding, I could instead have become licensed in all of the following occupations in Mississippi: 

• Emergency medical technician-basic (122 hours plus five 

emergency runs), 

• Emergency medical technician-paramedic (1,638 hours), 

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• Ambulance driver (8 hours), • Law enforcement officer (400 hours), • Firefighter (240 hours), • Real estate appraiser (75 hours) and • Hunting education instructor (17 hours). 

And that would all take more than 600 hours less than obtaining 

a license to teach braiding. 

The group that benefited most from Mississippi’s regulatory regime was the cosmetology establishment. Practicing cosmetologists 

made up the State Board of Cosmetology and could set the bar for 

entry to their occupation high (and thereby keep competition to a 

minimum), and cosmetology schools enjoyed captive customers. 

I was not about to submit to such naked economic protectionism. 

Instead, I decided to take on both the political establishment and 

the cosmetology regime, which had convinced lawmakers to limit 

entry into the trade. 

In August 2004, I joined with two aspiring hairbraiders, who 

wanted to learn the business from me, and with the Institute for 

Justice—a public interest law firm that represented us for free— 

to file a lawsuit against the state to break down the regulatory 

walls barring potential entrepreneurs from entering the field. 

In the months that followed, I took weekly trips to the state capital of Jackson (a seven-hour round-trip from Tupelo) working to 

convince legislators to change the law. 

We didn’t go to the government seeking a handout. Across the 

board, braiders are independent individuals who take great pride 

in providing for themselves and their families through their own 

handiwork. 

In 2005, all of our efforts paid off: Mississippi’s governor signed 

legislation enabling hairbraiders to practice their occupation without the burdensome government-mandated classes. The only requirement now are that hairbraiders must pay a $25 fee to register 

with the state and abide by all relevant health and hygiene codes. 

It is rewarding to know that the influence of my work is felt beyond the Tupelo area. Since the restrictions were lifted, more than 

800 women provide for themselves as hairbraiders, taking once-underground businesses ‘‘legit’’ and opening new enterprises in places 

where customer demand was once unmet. And because of the 

change in Mississippi’s laws, aspiring braiders are moving here 

from nearby states, including Tennessee, Alabama and Arkansas. 

One of the greatest benefits of our success is that it moves aspiring entrepreneurs from the ‘‘underground economy’’ into the ‘‘formal economy.’’ In the underground economy, braiders are forced to 

operate off the books and out of sight of intimidating and sometimes ruthless regulators who are often out to shut them down to 

protect the status quo. 

Regulators often don’t care about people’s dreams; they only care 

about enforcing codes, laws and regulations that justify their existence. And as they drive around, looking for the next ‘‘scofflaw’’ to 

shut down, those lawbreakers (who are nothing more than people 

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trying to work hard to support themselves and provide an otherwise perfectly legal service) must fear that next knock on the door, 

which could mean losing what they’ve worked for, paying steep 

fines and, in some cases, even going to jail for practicing their 

trade. 

Freed from needless government-created barriers, I have now 

gone on to teach more than 125 individuals how to braid hair. No 

longer blocked from putting industrious individuals to work, I have 

employed 25 women, enabling them to provide for themselves and 

their families. For many of these women, the money they earn from 

braiding represents the first steady paycheck they have earned in 

their lives. 

For years, the government tried to stop me from doing all this 

good—stop me from reaching my full potential and from helping 

others to do likewise through the dignity of honest enterprise. In 

too many states and in too many occupations across the country, 

these kinds of government-imposed barriers to earn an honest living still exist. 

Thank you for holding this hearing to alert the public to this 

problem. I hope lawmakers in every state across the country are 

paying attention and will heed our calls to remove those laws that 

do nothing but prevent honest competition in trades from coast to 

coast. 

Thank you. 

—————————— 

Melony Armstrong is the owner of Naturally Speaking, a 

hairbraiding salon in Tupelo, Miss. For more information on economic liberty, visit: www.ij.org/PowerOfOneEntrepreneur. 

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U.S. House Committee on Small Business 

Subcommittee Hearing on Contracting and Workforce 

Testimony of Patti Morrow 

March 26, 2014 

My name is Patti Morrow; I live in Greer, SC: 

• Interior Designer/President - Juxtapose Interior Design 

• Certified in Residential Design (RIDE) 

• Certified Aging in Place Specialist (CAPS) 

• Board of Directors, Design Society of America (DSA) 

• Founder of Interior Design Protection Consulting (IDPC) 

Like many other interior designers, I entered the field as a second career. When my children were 10 and 13, I enrolled in a 2- 

year interior design program at the New Hampshire Institute of 

Art (I was living in New Hampshire at the time). There were about 

25 women in the class, all second-career changers. 

As I was nearing the end of the interior design program, HB–881 

was introduced in the New Hampshire legislature. If enacted, this 

bill would have become the most restrictive interior design law in 

the country and would have prohibited me from my dream of having my own interior design business. 

In order to legally practice, an interior designer would need to 

have the ‘‘proper’’ credentials, aka ‘‘Three E’s:’’ 

1. Education. Graduate with a 4-year Bachelor Degree in Interior Design from an expensive, exclusive, privately accredited 

college. There are no such schools in the entire state. 

2. Exam. Pass the National Council for Interior Design Qualification (NCIDQ) exam, an extremely burdensome private 

exam, which 

a. Historically has had a less than a 40% passage rate 

for all three sections taken at the same time; 

b. Can cost well over $2,000 to take 

• $1,200 just to apply for the test 

• Add in the cost of study guides and prep classes 

• Travel and accommodations to take the 2-day 

exam. 

• Each time a part of the test is failed, there’s another fee to be paid 

c. Is not under the purview of the state legislature, so 

anytime the exam is changed, it would result in defacto 

legislation, changing New Hampshire law without the 

knowledge or consent of the state legislature. 

3. Experience. Complete an internship under one of the proposed licensed (NCIDQ-certified) designers which could take 

anywhere from 2 to 15 years. There were only 25 NCIDQ-cerSBREP-219 with DISTILLER

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1Designing Cartels, Dick Carpenter II, Ph.D., http://www.ij.org/designing-cartels-economic-liberty 

tified in the entire state, and there was no guarantee that 

they: 

a. Supported the licensing scheme 

b. Were in a financial position or had enough work to 

hire an apprentice 

c. Would be willing to pay vs. just offering a free internship 

d. Would want to train a new designer who would eventually become a competitor 

This bill was well in excess of what is needed to practice interior 

design, and would have put not only me, but the overwhelming majority of interior designers in New Hampshire out of business. 

But why? What logical reason could there be for putting so many 

small business entrepreneurs out of business and creating a barrier 

to entry for anyone wishing to enter the field? 

The bill asserted that interior design licensing was necessary to 

protect the health and safety of the public. But after doing my own 

extensive research, I found some very important facts: 

• There’s not a shred of evidence which would warrant a 

conclusion that the unregulated practice of interior design 

places the public in any form of jeopardy. 

• 13 state agencies have studied the need for interior design 

regulation (sunrise and sunset reviews, Federal Trade Commission investigations, etc.) and without exception, all recommended against any type of regulation on the basis that it 

would add absolutely nothing to protect the public beyond that 

which is already in place (building inspectors, Certificate of Occupancy requirements, architects/engineers, fire marshals, construction code enforcement officials, consumer affairs actions, 

etc.). 

• According to the Better Business Bureau and other data, 

since 1907, only 52 lawsuits have been filed against interior 

designers in the entire country. And nearly every single one of 

those involved contract disputes, not safety issues.1

It seemed to me that monopoly and the denial of free enterprise 

was the true objective of HB–881. This bill had come about not 

through public outcry or legislative determinations that regulation 

was necessary for the public good, but solely through the efforts of 

industry insiders who were asking the legislature to eliminate their 

competition for their own personal monetary gain. 

This is obviously not a legitimate goal of good government, and 

I was not going to just sit back and let this small special interest 

group dictate who could and who could not practice interior design! 

I contacted every interior designer and student I knew and organized a grassroots group to attend the hearing and testify against 

this bill. That bill was mercilessly defeated at that hearing in 

March of 2007 and has never reared its ugly head again. 

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2 Icon, American Society of Interior Designers, 3/2014 http://browndigital.bpc.com/publication/ 

?i=199326 3The Interior Design Profession: Facts and Figures, American Society of Interior Designers, 

2007. 4 Ibid 

5Designed to Exclude, Harrington & Treber, 2009 http://www.ij.org/images/pdf—folder/economic—liberty/designed-to-exclude.pdf 6The Myth of the ‘‘Three E’s,’’ Patti Morrow, 2010, http://www.idpcinfo.org/THREE—E—s.pdf 7 United States of America, Federal Trade Commission, Dallas, 1987 and 1989 

Two years ago, I moved to South Carolina, and it was de ́ja` vu, 

all over again. In 2012 and 2013, I had to take time away from my 

business to drive to Columbia multiple times to speak with legislators and testify at hearings. As of right now, the latest bill has 

been tabled. 

But for how long? 

Licensing this industry is nothing more than restraint of trade 

and is a JOB KILLER. 

Interior design is a dynamic profession that celebrates innovation, creativity and diversity. Imposing a one-size-fits-all licensing 

scheme on the profession could not be more contrary to those values. 

Because I am passionate about this topic, for the last eight years 

I have been networking and helping interior designers all across 

the country to help them protect their right to practice. 

• 80% of interior designers are small business owners 2 and 

according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 40% are actually 

sole proprietors.3

• 84% of practicing interior designers do not have a degree 

in Interior Design 4

• According to a study done by Harrington and Treber 

(Kenyon College), interior design regulations disproportionately 

exclude Hispanics, African Americans and second careerswitchers.5

• Licensing prevents potential entrepreneurs of low income 

means from entering the work force, because they may not be 

able to afford the tuition of a four year college, the burdensome 

exam costs, or working for several years as an apprentice at 

little or no pay.6

Where do you draw the line? If you don’t have the ‘‘right’’ credentials, you would be restricted from offering the following: 

• Designs, drawings, diagrams, studies 

• Consultations with clients 

• Offering space planning services 

• Recommend furnishings 

• Drafting contract documents 

• Researching and analyzing a client’s requirements 

These licensing bills are incredibly far reaching. You could not 

even give customers a recommendation as an employee of Home 

Depot! 

And consumers lose, too. The Federal Trade Commission concluded that interior design regulations result in higher costs and 

fewer choices to consumers.7

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If there’s a happy ending to this story, it’s this.... Since 2007, 

over 150 state bills which would have expanded or enacted new interior design regulations have been defeated. 

But like zombies, they just won’t stay dead! 

Conclusion 

When Barack Obama was elected President, he did what many 

Presidents before him did—he redesigned the living quarters of the 

White House. Now, the District of Columbia is one of only four 

places in the United States that has full restrictions on practicing 

interior design without a license. So who did he hire? Michael 

Smith, an un-licensed interior designer from California. I’m sure he 

did not for one minute think he was placing the health and safety 

of his little girl in jeopardy. 

If it’s okay for the most protected person in the world to hire an 

unlicensed interior designer, shouldn’t it be okay for everyone? 

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1See Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. ECON. S173, S198 (2013). 2Morris M. Kleiner, et al., Relaxing Occupational Licensing Requirements: Analyzing Wages 

and Prices for a Medical Service, NBER Working Paper No. 19906 (February 2014). 

THE COST OF EXCESSIVE OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 

AND WHAT ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR LICENSING 

BOARDS CAN DO ABOUT IT 

By Rebecca Haw 

This testimony reflects only my views on the subject and not that 

of Vanderbilt Law School or Vanderbilt University. It draws from 

Aaron S. Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should 

Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, U. PA. L. REV. 

(forthcoming 2014), a draft of which is available at http://ssrn.com/ 

abstract=2384948. 

Introduction 

Although often overlooked, state licensing boards have become a 

significant exception to the Sherman Antitrust Act’s ban on cartels. 

Boards are largely dominated by active members of their respective 

industries who meet to agree on ways to limit the entry of new 

competitors. But professional boards, unlike cartels in commodities 

or consumer products, are sanctioned by the state—even considered 

part of the state—and so are often assumed to operate outside the 

reach of the Sherman Act under a doctrine known as state action 

immunity. 

The cost of the cartelization of the professions is on the rise. In 

the 1950s, only about five percent of American workers were subject to licensing requirements; now nearly a third of American 

workers need a state license to perform their job legally, and this 

trend is continuing.1 Some recent additi8ons to the list of professions requiring licenses include locksmiths, beekeepers, auctioneers, interior designers, fortune tellers, tour guides, and shampooers. And even the traditionally-licensed ‘‘learned professions’’ 

are seeing a proliferation of licensing restrictions and regulations. 

The excesses of professional licensing are easy to illustrate, Cosmetologists, for example, are required on average to have ten times 

as many days of training as Emergency Medical Technicians 

(EMT). In Alabama, unlicensed practice of interior design was a 

criminal offense until 2007. In Oklahoma, one must take a year of 

coursework on funeral service (including embalming and grief counseling) just to sell a casket, while burial without a casket at all is 

perfectly legal. And in some states, nurse practitioners must be supervised by a physician, even though studies show that nurse practitioners and physicians provide equivalent quality of care where 

their practices overlap.2

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3See CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, BUREAU OF ECON., FTC, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF

OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 21–27, 40 (1990). 4MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATION: ENSURING QUALITY OR RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 115 (2006). 5 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013). 

Labor economists have shown that the net effect of licensing on 

the quality of professional services is unclear.3 What is clear, according to their empirical studies, is the effect of licensing on consumer prices. Morris Kleiner, the leading economist studying the 

effects of licensing on price and quality of service, estimates that 

licensing costs consumers $116 to $139 billion every year.4 And 

consumers are not the only potential losers, since more licensing 

means fewer jobs. To be sure, not all licensing rules are harmful. 

Some improve service quality and public safety enough to justify 

the costs, but many do not. 

Despite wide recognition of the potential for economic harm associated with allowing professions to control their licensing rules and 

define the scope of their art, real reform is elusive. Part of the reason is that, in the professional licensing context, the most powerful 

legal tool against anticompetitive activity appears unavailable. 

Most jurisdictions interpret the Sherman Act to shield licensing 

boards from antitrust liability despite the fact that the boards often 

look and act like antitrust law’s principal target. Other avenues for 

reform, including constitutional suits asserting the rights of wouldbe professionals, have done little to slow or reverse the trend towards cartelized labor markets. 

Last year, in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. 

FTC,5 the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld 

an FTC decision finding a state licensing board liable for Sherman 

Act abuses, becoming the only appellate court to expose a licensing 

board to antitrust scrutiny and thereby creating a split between 

circuit courts. The Supreme Court has now granted certiorari, and 

one hopes the Court will take this opportunity to hold boards composed of competitors to the strictest version of its test for state action immunity. 

In this testimony, I will cover three topics. First, I will sketch the 

economics of licensing, and the forces that gave rise to our system 

of professional self-regulation. Then I will discuss antitrust law as 

what I consider the most effective federal intervention in this otherwise state-level issue. Finally, I will briefly explain the legal 

landscape that gave rise to the circuit split over state action immunity for licensing boards and explain what I consider the Court’s 

best course of action in next term’s North Carolina State Board of 

Dental Examiners. 

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6KLEINER, supra note 4, at 5. 7Meadows v. Odom, 360 F. Supp, 2d 811, 824 (M.D. La. 2005), vacated as moot, 198 F. App’x 

348 (5th Cir. 2006). 

I. Occupational Licensing Boards: The Road to Cartelization 

A. The Scope of Professional Licensing: Big and Getting Bigger 

Once limited to a few learned professions, licensing is now required for over 800 occupations.6 And once limited to minimum 

educational requirements and entry exams, licensing board restrictions are now a vast, complex web of anticompetitive rules and regulations. The explosion of licensing and the tangle of restrictions it 

has created should worry anyone who believes that fair competition 

is essential to national economic health. 

The expansion of occupational licensing has at least two causes. 

First, as the U.S. economy shifted away from manufacturing and 

towards service industries, the number of workers in licensed professions swelled, accounting for a greater proportion of the workforce. Second, the number of licensed professions has increased. 

Where licensing was once reserved for lawyers, doctors, and other 

‘‘learned professionals,’’ now floral designers, fortune tellers, and 

taxidermists are among the jobs that, at least in some states, require licensing. 

Since boards are typically dominated by active members of the 

very profession that they are tasked with regulating, this dramatic 

shift toward licensing has put roughly a third of American workers 

under a regime of self-regulation. A study I conducted with my coauthor Aaron Edlin revealed that license-holders active in the profession have a majority of 90% of boards in Florida and 93% of 

boards in Tennessee. Given this composition, it is not surprising 

that boards often succumb to the temptation of self-dealing, creating regulations to insulate incumbents rather than to ensure 

public welfare. 

B. The Anticompetitive Potential of Occupational Licensing 

The anticompetitive potential of licensing is best illustrated with 

actual regulations passed by practitioner-dominated boards. What 

follows is by no means a complete list of excessive regulations, but 

it serves as a sample. 

1. The New ‘‘Professions’’ 

In Louisiana, all flower arranging must be supervised by a licensed florist, a scheme successfully defended in court as preventing ‘‘the public from having any injury’’ from exposed picks, 

broken wires, or infected flowers.7 Minnesota (along with several 

other states) now defines the filing of horse teeth as the practice 

of veterinary medicine, a move that has redefined an old vocation 

as a regulated profession subject to restricted entry and practice 

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8 J. NELLIE LIANG & JONATHAN D. OGUR, BUREAU OF ECON. STAFF REP. TO THE F.T.C., RESTRICTIONS ON DENTAL AUXILIARIES: AN ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS 44–47 (1987). 9Morris M. Kleiner, Regulating Occupations: Quality or Monopoly?, EMP’T RESEARCH (W.E. 

Upjohn Inst., Kalamazoo, Mich.), Jan. 2006, at 2 tbl.1, available at http://research.upjohn.org/ 

empl—research/vol13/iss1/1. 

rules despite the fact that many consider the practice to be lowskill and low-risk. Similarly, state cosmetology boards have responded to competition from African-style hair braiders and eyebrow threaders by demanding that braiders and threaders obtain 

cosmetology licenses before they can lawfully practice their craft, 

even though practice requires no sharp instruments or chemicals, 

and involves no significant risk of infection. 

2. Old Professions, New Restrictions 

In many states, dental licensing boards restrict the number of 

hygienists a dentist can hire to two, a practice the FTC argues 

raises price but has no effect on quality of dental care.8 Similarly, 

the advent of nurse practitioners and physician assistants has ignited a turf war between these ‘‘physician extenders’’ and doctors, 

resulting in a national patchwork of regulation related to physician 

supervision despite the fact that outcome studies reveal that unsupervised extenders’ services are as safe and effective as that of supervised extenders. Lawyers, too, use licensing to limit competitions: advertising restrictions insulate lawyers from competition 

from other lawyers who can claim better average outcomes for clients. Moreover, each state has its own bar exam and licensing procedure, which reduces lawyer mobility across state lines. The justification for this is colorable—a different exam is necessary for 

each jurisdiction because of differing state laws—but it fails to account for practices such as California’s requirement that lawyers 

qualified in other states retake the multistate portion of the exam 

when sitting for the California bar. 

C. How We Got Here: Why License, and Why Self-Regulate? 

1. The Economics of Licensing 

The past twenty years have witnessed an explosion of empirical 

work on the effects of licensing restrictions on service quality and 

price. Economists agree that a licensing restriction can only be justified where it leads to better quality professional services—and 

that for many restrictions, proof of that enhanced quality is lacking. 

a. The Costs of Licensing: Higher Consumer Prices 

Studies that have the statistical power to identify a relationship 

between licensing and wages tend to suggest that licensing requirements raise wages by 10% to 18%, which has an obvious effect on 

consumer prices.9 Likewise, most studies examining practice restrictions show that when a licensing board is more heavy-handed 

in dictating hours, advertising, or levels of supervision within a 

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10LIANG & OGUR, supra note 8, at 40, 43. 11 John E. Kowka, Jr., Advertising and the Price and Quality of Optometric Services, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 211, 216 (1984). 12One study estimated that universal reciprocity between states for dentists would result in a geographical reallocation of dentists generating $52 million (in 1978 prices) in consumer surplus. Bryan L. Boulier, An Empirical Examination of the Influence of Licensure and Licensure 

Reform on the Geographical Distribution of Dentists, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULA- TION 73, 94–95 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980). 13For a comprehensive discussion of this research, see Aaron S. Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels 

by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), a draft of which is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2384948. 

profession, the consumer prices are higher. For example, restricting 

the number of hygienists a dentist may employ increases the cost 

of a dental visit by 7%,10 and in optometry, restrictions on advertising have been shown to inflate prices by at least 20%.11 Geographic restrictions—like nonreciprocity between states—also tend 

to increase consumer prices.12

But to get a complete picture of the economic harm from professional licensing, one needs a theory of how efficiently an unrestricted market would function. Advocates of licensing argue that 

the free market would do a poor job of efficiently allocating professional services to consumers because service quality would be too 

low without licensing. To the advocates of professional licensing, 

measuring the value of licensing by observing its effect on prices 

misses the point. 

The notion that a free market would result in too-low quality 

service rests on two possible sources of failure in the market for 

professional services. First, absent licensing, the asymmetry of information between professional providers and consumers about the 

quality of service would create what economists call the ‘‘lemons 

problem.’’ Second, free markets for professional services would result in sub-optimal quality because the market participants (providers and consumers) do not internalize all the costs of bad service. In other words, a free market for professional services creates 

negative externalities. But if licensing has any effect on the market 

failures it is designed to address, then it should improve service 

quality. 

b. The Benefits of Licensing: Improved Quality? 

The economic research on quality of service as a function of licensing paints a murky picture. Some studies show modest increases in quality, at least for some kinds of consumers, but other 

studies do not find that same effect. A few studies even claim to 

show that licensing reduces quality.13

2. The Durability of Our System of Professional Self-Regulation 

If licensing can at least theoretically benefit consumers, why do 

we see so many obviously harmful licensing restrictions? The answer may lie with our current system of professional self-regulation, and its striking durability in the face of wide-spread criticism. 

When it comes to professional regulation, states have largely handed the reins of competition over to the competitors themselves. 

States justify this move by arguing that expertise is essential to 

creating efficient regulations, but it creates an obvious temptation 

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14 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 15 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 16See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 47 U.S. 34 (1985). 

of self-dealing. In any other context, antitrust law could be used to 

prevent combinations of competitors from maximizing their own 

welfare at the expense of consumers. But because the dominant interpretation of antitrust immunity holds boards immune from 

Sherman Act scrutiny, antitrust law has until now had little impact on professional regulation. That leaves only constitutional avenues of redress, which have proven to be weak against self-dealing 

boards. 

a. State Action Immunity Shields State Licensing Boards from 

Antitrust Liability 

The Supreme Court first created antitrust immunity for ‘‘state 

action’’ in Parker v. Brown,14 shielding state governments and bodies delegated a state’s authority from federal antitrust liability. In 

holding that the Sherman Act does not apply to state government 

action, the Court found the identity of the actor—the state or private citizens—essential but provided no guidance on how to draw 

the line. This created serious problems for lower courts trying to 

apply Parker because states rarely regulate economic activity directly through a legislative act. Rather, states delegate rulemaking 

and rate-setting to agencies, councils, or boards dominated by private citizens. 

The Court responded in 1982 with California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum,15 which provided a test to distinguish private action from state action. To enjoy state action immunity, the Court held, the challenged restraint must be ‘‘one clearly 

articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy to restrict 

competition,’’ and the policy must be ‘‘actively supervised by the 

State itself.’’ Since Midcal, however, the Court has created a category of entities not subject to the supervision requirement at all.16

These entities, which include municipalities, enjoy immunity if 

they can meet the clear articulation prong alone. The circuits are 

split on whether state licensing boards are like municipalities in 

this respect; in particular, whether licensing boards dominated by 

competitors—who regulate the way they compete and exclude 

would-be competitors—enjoy state action antitrust immunity without being supervised by the state. The Supreme Court is poised to 

resolve this split in next term’s North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners. The last section of this testimony will further explore the legal question in that case. 

b. The Common Route to Challenging State Licensing Restraints: 

Due Process and Equal Protection 

With powerful antitrust immunities in place, the only viable avenue for consumers or would-be professionals seeking to challenge 

the actions of state licensing boards is to make a constitutional 

claim. Like all state regulation, professional licensing restrictions 

must not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Due process prevents a state from denying someone has liberty interest in professional work if doing so 

has no rational relation to a legitimate state interest. Similarly, 

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17 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 18 353 U.S. 232 (1957). 19 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 

equal protection requires that states distinguish licensed professionals from those excluded from practice on some rational basis 

related to a legitimate state goal. The two analyses typically 

conflate into one question: did the licensing restriction serve, even 

indirectly or inefficiently, some legitimate state interest? 

That burden is easy to meet, as illustrated by Williamson v. Lee 

Optical,17 the leading Supreme Court case on the constitutionality 

of professional licensing schemes. Indeed, the Court has only once 

found an occupational licensing restriction to fail rationality review, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico,18 and 

then only because an otherwise valid licensing requirement was 

unlawfully applied to an individual. In applying Schware to the activity of state licensing boards, lower courts have found even extremely thin justifications for anticompetitive licensing restrictions 

to suffice for rationality review. One circuit has even held that insulating professionals from competition is itself a legitimate state 

interest, making matters even more difficult for plaintiffs alleging 

harm to competition. 

II. Why Sherman Act Liability for State Licensing Boards is 

a Good Idea 

A. Antitrust Liability for Professional Licensing: An Economic 

Standard for Economic Harm 

The Sherman Act—famously called ‘‘the Magna Carta of free enterprise’’ 19—protects competition as a way to maximize consumer 

welfare. According to courts and economists alike, competition is 

harmed when competitors restrict entry or adhere to agreements 

that suppress incentives to compete. The normative question in 

both traditional cartel cases and licensing contexts should be the 

same: Does the combination, on net, improve consumer welfare? To 

ensure that this important question is asked and answered in the 

licensing context, antitrust law and its tools for balancing pro- and 

anticompetitive effects should be brought to bear on licensing 

schemes. 

This close fit between the Sherman Act’s intended target and the 

economic harm of excessive licensing can be seen in the functional 

equivalence of the restrictions promulgated by occupational boards 

and the business practices held unlawful under § 1. The Ohio Rules 

of Professional Conduct prohibit attorneys from advertising their 

prices using words such as ‘‘cut rate,’’ ‘‘discount,’’ or ‘‘lowest.’’ But 

when similar restrictions on price advertising are imposed by private associations of competitors, rather than as a licensing requirement, it is per se illegal. Additionally, all lawyers must prove their 

‘‘good moral standing’’ to join a state bar. But when a multiple listing service (a private entity not created by the state) comprised of 

competing real estate agents tried to impose a ‘‘favorable business 

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20 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980). 

reputation’’ requirement on its members, a court found the requirement to violate the Sherman Act because the standard was vague 

and subjective. 

Thus, licensing schemes can be similar to cartel agreements in 

substance, which alone may justify antitrust liability. But making 

matters even worse for consumers, licensing schemes come in a 

particularly durable form. Licensing boards, by their very nature, 

face few of the cartel problems that naturally erode price and output agreements between competitors. By centralizing decision making in a board and endowing it with rulemaking authority through 

majority voting, professional competitors overcome the hurdle of 

agreement that ordinarily inhibits cartel formation. Cheating is 

prevented by imposing legal and often criminal sanctions—backed 

by the police power of the state—on professionals who break the 

rules. Finally, most cartels must fend off new market entrants from 

outside the cartel that hope to steal a portion of its monopoly rents. 

For licensed professionals, licensing deters entry and ensure that 

all professionals (at least those practicing legally) are held to its restrictions. 

B. Antitrust Federalism: Its Modern Justifications and 

Applicability to Antitrust Liability for Licensing Boards 

The most serious argument against Sherman Act liability for 

state licensing boards is that it would upset the balance between 

state and federal power struck in Parker and its progeny. But an 

examination of the normative commitments behind antitrust federalism, as revealed in scholarship and in the cases, reveals that 

boards—as currently comprised—should not enjoy immunity. All 

accounts of the purpose of antitrust federalism agree that self-dealing, unaccountable decision-makers should face antitrust liability. 

State licensing boards fall squarely in this category when a majority of members are competitors subject to or benefitting from the 

boards’ rules. 

For state licensing boards, the temptation of self-dealing is especially high and the potential for holding officials accountable especially low. First, those must hurt by excessive professional restrictions—consumers—are particularly ill-represented in the political 

process of licensure. Second, and most important, occupational licensing is currently left up to members of the profession themselves. When Parker is used to protect the efforts of incumbent professionals to restrict entry into their markets, it creates the very 

situation Midcal warned against—it casts a ‘‘gauzy cloak of state 

involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.’’ 20

Public participation in state board activity is very low because as 

our empirical study of boards in Florida and Tennessee confirms, 

the typical state board is comprised of appointed professionals, not 

consumers or other public members. On one hand, practitioner 

dominance is inevitable. Tailoring restrictions to benefit the public 

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21 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985). 22 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013). 

(namely, encouraging competent practice) usually requires experience in the profession. But the need for expertise creates a problem: those who have the most to gain from reduced consumer welfare in the form of higher prices are tasked with protecting consumer welfare in the form of health and safety—the fox guards the 

henhouse. 

II. North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners and the 

Future of Immunity for Licensing Boards 

Because any state mandate calling for the regulation of entry 

and good standing in a profession is likely to meet the Court’s low 

bar for clear articulation, a board’s status under Parker turns on 

whether it is subject to Midcal’s requirement of supervision at all. 

Next term, the Supreme Court will consider this question for the 

first time. The case, North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, is an appeal from a Fourth Circuit case that held a licensing 

board to both Midcal prongs, creating a circuit split and delivering 

a victory to consumers and unlicensed professionals harmed by 

anticompetitive regulation. The Supreme Court should affirm the 

Fourth Circuit’s decision, but also clarify, in contrast to the concurrence in the Fourth Circuit case below, that any board dominated 

by practitioners must pass Midcal’s supervision requirement, no 

matter how the board’s membership is elected. 

The legal question in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners has its roots in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,21

where the Court found a municipality immune under Parker because it acted pursuant to the state’s clearly articulated policy to 

displace competition, despite being unsupervised. The Court reasoned that, for municipalities, supervision is unnecessary because 

there is no ‘‘real danger that [it] is acting to further [its] own interests, rather than the governmental interests of the State.’’ Although Hallie did not provide a test for determining which entities, 

in addition to municipalities, are entitled to this fast track to immunity, a footnote provided a hint: ‘‘In cases in which the actor is 

a state agency, it is likely that active state supervision would also 

not be required, although we do not here decide that issue.’’ 

Many courts concluded that occupational boards are among the 

‘‘state agencies’’ to which the Hallie Court was referring, and thus 

exempted them from Midcal’s supervision prong. Other courts 

equivocated, implying the possibility of needing supervision without holding so squarely, at least until last year when the Fourth 

Circuit decided North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. 

FTC.22 This case is correctly decided because practitioner-dominated boards are very different from municipalities, which make 

decisions through elected officials and civil servants. In the case of 

incumbent-dominated boards, it cannot be said that ‘‘there is little 

or no danger’’ of self-dealing. For that reason, the Court should afSBREP-219 with DISTILLER

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firm the Fourth Circuit opinion holding licensing boards to the 

strongest test for antitrust immunity. 

Conclusion 

Licensed occupations have been free to act like cartels for too 

long without Sherman Act scrutiny. With nearly a third of workers 

subject to licensing and a continuing upward trend, it is time for 

a remedy. I do not propose an end to licensing or a return to a 

Dickensian world of charlatan healers and self-trained dentists. 

But the risks of unregulated professional practice cannot be used 

to rationalize unfettered self-regulation by the professionals themselves. The law needs to strike a balance. That balance is the same 

one sought in any modern antitrust case: a workable tradeoff between a restriction’s salutary effects on the market and its harm 

to competition. Immunity from the Sherman Act on state action 

grounds is not justified under antitrust federalism when those 

doing the regulation are the competitors themselves, where they 

are not accountable to the body politic, where they have too often 

abused the privilege, and where the anticompetitive dangers are so 

clear. The threat of Sherman Act liability can provide the necessary incentives to occupational regulators trading off competition 

for public safety and welfare. 

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