Burma

Brief

Policy

August 2013

THE U.S. 

COMMISSION ON 

INTERNATIONAL 

RELIGIOUS 

FREEDOM

was created by the 

International 

Religious Freedom Act 

of 1998 to monitor the 

status of freedom of 

thought, conscience, 

and religion or belief 

abroad, as defined in 

the Universal 

Declaration of Human 

Rights and related 

international 

instruments, and to 

give independent policy 

recommendations to 

the President, 

Secretary of State, 

and Congress. 

732 N. Capitol St. N.W. ,

Suite A714

Washington, D.C. 20401

Phone: (202) 786-0613

Communications@uscirf.gov

www.uscirf.gov

August 2013

Burma: Implications 

of Religious and 

Ethnic Violence

Findings from a Visit of the 

U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom 

(USCIRF) 
August 2013

Brief

Policy

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
August 2013

Brief

Policy

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

USCIRF Deputy Director for Policy and Research Scott Flipse visited Burma in May 2013 to 

assess whether current political reforms have improved religious freedom conditions. He met 

with religious leaders, elected government officials, representatives of civil society, international 

humanitarian organizations, political party leaders, and U.S. government officials. He visited the 

city of Meikhtila, the site of March 2013 sectarian violence between Buddhists and Muslims, and 

Chin State, an ethnic minority area where there have been numerous reports of serious religious 

freedom violations targeting the mostly Christian Chin peoples. Though unable to travel to 

either Rakhine (Arakan) or Kachin States, Dr. Flipse was able to meet with representatives from 

the Rohingya and Kachin ethnic minority groups along with USAID and UN officials and NGOs 

working on both humanitarian assistance and peace process initiatives. 

Religion & Burma’s Democratic Trajectory

Burma’s transformation is the most significant political event in Southeast Asia in the past 

decade, but both Burmese and ethno-religious nationalities remain pessimistic that political 

reform will last. There has been an obvious opening to democracy since 2011, and notable 

advances in many civil and political rights. Individuals can meet openly with former political 

prisoners, visit with nascent political parties and civil society organizations illegal two years ago, 

travel to places formerly under military control, and express dissenting views openly in a 

growing free press. Internet use and penetration remains sparse and expensive and governed by 

a government monopoly. In the past year, restrictions on some internet content have been lifted, 

some citizens imprisoned for their online activities have been released, and opposition political 

parties have been able to use online tools to mobilize supporters. However, laws that censor web 

content remain in place and bloggers remain in prison. In addition, during the past year, 

Buddhist monks and anti-Muslim activists used the web to spread hate, incite violence, and 

organize economic boycotts of Muslim-owned businesses (the “969” campaign). 

Bottom Line Assessment: Issues of religion and ethnicity will shape the trajectory of 

Burma’s political reform before the planned 2015 elections. Burma is currently

designated by the State Department as a “country of particular concern” for 

particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as ongoing political reforms have 

yet to dramatically improve the situation for freedom of religion and belief. Sectarian

and societal violence, anti-Muslim exclusionary campaigns, and military incursions 

have caused egregious religious freedom violations against Muslims and some ethnic 

minority Christians. Nonetheless, in areas where the military has retreated from daily 

governance, the worst human rights abuses have receded in the past year (including 

many that affected religious communities). Legal restrictions on some religious 

activities remain in place, but are enforced sporadically, if at all, depending on region, 

ethnicity, and religious group. The situation of the ethnic minority Rohingya, which 

intertwines issues of religious freedom and ethnic discrimination, remains a profound 

humanitarian and political crisis. It threatens to inflame anti-Muslim prejudices in 

other parts of the country, create large refugee flows in the region, instigate additional 

sectarian violence and discrimination, and potentially undermine the political reform 

process. 

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Brief

Policy

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

Burmese citizens and ethno-religious nationalities are quick to express their fears, hatreds, 

pessimism, and hope for their country’s future. Many Muslims live in fear and have organized 

armed neighborhood watch groups in some cities to repel potential attacks. Ethnic Rohingya 

Muslims live in fear that their ethnic Rakhine Buddhist neighbors (with the assistance of border 

police and blessed by radical Buddhist monks) will resume attacks or forcibly seek to starve or 

deport them. Many ethnic Burmese look at Muslims with loathing, seeing sectarian violence and 

discrimination as necessary defenses against the illusion of high Muslim birthrates, concentrated 

economic power, and “extremism.” Some prominent Buddhist monks lend their voices, and 

religious legitimacy, to anti-Muslim hatred, racism, and violence. 

Christian and animist ethnic minorities have similar fears. Ethnic Kachin fear renewed military 

assaults and accompanying brutal human rights abuses as they negotiate a political truce to over 

five decades of fighting. Ethnic Chin are happy that the military has removed itself from day-today governance in Chin State, but do not believe there will be any justice for the egregious 

abuses they experienced for three decades, often at the hands of former military officials now 

governing as civilians. Ethno-religious nationalities strongly desire a new constitution that 

creates a federal system with ethnic regions and states as equal partners in a “new Myanmar.” 

Without such a system, renewed fighting is possible, providing the military with an excuse to 

stall or influence upcoming 2015 elections. 

Among the fear and loathing there is also hope, but that hope hangs mostly on the outcome of the 

2015 elections, which could bring the National League for Democracy (NLD) to power in the 

Parliament and Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) to the Presidency. However, there are many obstacles 

to such an optimistic future, including constitutional and electoral reforms that would have to 

happen prior to 2015 (including removal of a ban on ASSK running for the Presidency). There 

are also many “spoilers” at large who want to create a different future, including the military, 

former military, some ethnic nationality militias, and those who seek to deport or deny 

citizenship to Rohingya. In addition, it is still unclear whether Beijing will allow for a fully 

democratic (and Western looking) Burma, given its large strategic and economic interests there. 

Nevertheless, issues of religion and ethnicity—and the political coalitions that will emerge 

around those identities—will play a major part in determining Burma’s democratic trajectory. 

Religious Freedom Conditions 

Religious freedom conditions remain problematic, and in some areas of the country acute, as 

sectarian and military violence, societal discrimination, and impunity increased in the past year 

for Muslims (including Rohingya) and Kachin Christians. In addition, legal restrictions that 

were used in the past to curtail independent religious activities remain in place. In some parts of 

the country, religious communities continue to have difficulties getting permissions to build, 

renovate, and conduct activities, particularly in Chin and Rakhine (Arakan) States. Given the 

new political space, ethnic minority political leaders are intervening with provincial and national 

government officials to change laws and lift restrictions. Strong ethno-religious minority 

political parties are needed to engage in a dialogue about Burma’s political future, address the 

decades of human rights abuses and discrimination under military rule, and improve the longneglected economic, health, and educational infrastructure. 

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U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

Visit to Chin State 

In Chin State, the military’s withdrawal from daily governance ended the most egregious human 

rights abuses, such as rapes, forced labor, coerced conversions, and beatings against the mostly 

Christian Chin, though some restrictions and discrimination remain. The military and the Chin 

National Army (CNA) signed a ceasefire in 2012. Nevertheless, some serious religious freedom 

violations continue. In the past two years, religious sites have been torn down, religious services 

have been disrupted, and permissions to build or restore religious venues have been denied 

repeatedly. 

During the visit, USCIRF heard how the Chin peoples continue to deeply distrust both the 

military and former military officials now in civilian government positions, and say they face 

continued discrimination in the allocation of aid resources which they believe go 

disproportionately to Buddhists. Provincial government officials offered assurances that they 

would speed permissions to allow building of Protestant venues and engage Chin political 

leaders on discrimination in the distribution of economic assistance. Chin State officials also 

made a point of demonstrating that forced conversions no longer occur at the Border Areas 

Training Schools (NaTaLa), where ethno-religious minority children (mostly orphans or those 

from single parent homes) are housed while attending the public schools. This has been a major 

issue in the past, including in the UN Special Rapporteur on Burma’s reports. Given 

international criticism of government practices at the NaTaLa schools, the assurances of local 

officials was encouraging, even though as yet unverified. 

Chin State officials also stated that they would be willing to entertain proposals to build a private 

Christian primary school system, as a parallel to private Buddhist monastic schools. The 

Buddhist schools give parents the option to have their children taught both a public school 

curriculum and religious studies. Officials in southern Chin state also are seeking additional 

assistance from faith-based NGOs to improve a very basic health system in Burma’s poorest 

province. 

Rohingya Muslims: Living in Fear 

While in Yangon, USCIRF heard how there is a dire need to find a citizenship solution for 

Rohingya, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, and address the looming humanitarian crisis they 

face during the current monsoon season. It is unclear whether popular or political will exists to 

integrate Rohingya into Burma’s future. Most Burmese would like to see many Rohingya leave 

Burma—whether by deportation or by making life so difficult for them that they leave on their 

own. 

There is a loud historical dispute over whether Rohingya Muslims were present in Burma before 

1826 and whether Rohingya is a fabricated ethnic marker to garner international sympathy. AntiRohingya animus is particularly strong among the ethnic Rakhine, whose once glorious history 

has been reduced to sharing a small province with Rohingya, who they consider “former slaves,”

“Bengali migrant workers,” and “Muslim extremists.” The military stripped Rohingya of 

citizenship in 1982 and, as a result, they have experienced discrimination, human right 

violations, and religious freedom restrictions for decades. 

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U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

Violence in Rakhine State that began in June 2012 (and flared up again in October 2012) 

between ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and ethnic Rohingya Muslims left 1,000 Rohingya dead and 

created 140,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in what one UN official called “the 

worst camps in the world.” The violence also created new refugee flows to other Southeast 

Asian countries, where asylum seekers face deportation, slavery, and squalid conditions in 

camps. Over the past three months, there continue to be reports of Rohingya murdered for 

seeking food and other resources outside their villages and/or IDP camps. Rohingya camps also 

continue to be denied humanitarian aid, often by ethnic Rakhine mobs and the notorious (and 

now disbanded) NaSaKa border security forces. Clashes (with some deaths reported) have 

erupted recently as police and local officials have started a census campaign to “register”

Rohingya as “Bengalis.” Rohingya believe that this effort will lead to their deportation, as the 

term Bengali is often used as a synonym for “illegal alien.” 

To prevent further violence, the Burmese government recommends doubling the number of 

security personnel present in Rakhine State. On the eve of President Thein Sein’s visit to 

Europe, he abruptly disbanded NaSaKa forces without providing for an alternative force. The 

international community and some Rohingya leaders welcomed this step, though it remains

unclear if and how the border security forces will be re-constituted. Rohingya Muslims will 

continue to distrust any security force staffed mostly by ethnic Rakhine or Buddhists. Members 

of the security services actively participated in attacks on the Rohingya during the June and 

October violence and others stood by and took no action to protect them. Increasing the presence 

of these sectors of the security services increases the vulnerability of the Rohingya population. 

The government must clarify the command and control structure of the new force that will 

replace the NaSaKa and investigate and arrest any members who have committed abuses. 

The most important element in addressing the Rohingya Muslim issue is finding a path to 

citizenship. The Burmese government states that it wants to apply the 1982 Citizenship Act to 

the Rohingya. Many in the international community assume this means that Rohingya Muslims 

who have lived in the country for at least three generations (which would include a large 

percentage of the Rohingya population) would be granted naturalized citizenship. However, 

many Rohingya do not have the documents necessary to prove their ancestry (such as birth and 

death certificates, or deeds to property), nor is it certain that the government will interpret the 

Act as permitting even naturalized citizenship for the Rohingya. 

Naturalized citizenship is supported by the United States, the UN, and many major donors as a 

first step towards full nationality rights. However, Rohingya Muslims reject this status, stating 

that they would only accept full citizenship and recognition of their Rohingya Muslim identity. It 

should be noted that in Burma a naturalized citizen does not have the same rights as full citizen 

and can be deported for minor and vague offenses. 

The situation of the Rohingya represents a profound humanitarian and political crisis, and 

religious freedom challenge, for the Burmese government. Ongoing discrimination and violence 

could ignite sectarian conflict in other parts of the country, force refugee flows into neighboring 

countries, and undermine the nascent democratic reforms. 

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August 2013

Brief

Policy

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

Visit to Meikhtila: Continuation of Anti-Muslim Violence 

On March 20, 2013, an organized and coordinated wave of anti-Muslim violence erupted in 

Meikhtila and swept through Mandalay and Bago Divisions, sporadically affecting Sagaing, 

Rangoon, and Magway Divisions as well as Mon and Kachin States. Largely Buddhist mobs 

devastated numerous Muslim quarters, resulting in the partial or full destruction of an estimated 

1,600 houses, 77 shops, and 37 mosques. Burmese authorities claim that the violence displaced 

12,846 people, of whom 8,441 remained in seven temporary camps in Meikhtila. The UN has 

received reports that at least 3,000 more displaced people await assessment in affected areas 

within Meikhtila Township and in 20 other communities affected by sectarian violence. 

Estimates indicate that as many as 148 persons may have been killed between March 20 and 24. 

Radical monks were preaching in the towns of Meikhtila, Bago, and Laisho a week prior to 

violence breaking out in those areas. 

Issues of impunity continue to erode trust in the Burmese government. While the Burmese 

central government denounced sectarian violence, declared a state of emergency, and sent 

military units to restore calm, the response was slow and initial arrests were all of Muslims. The 

police repeatedly demonstrated that they are not capable or, in some cases, not willing to 

maintain order. Police did little to stop a mob killing frenzy in Meikhtila or rampages by mobs 

in Bago, Laisho, and Okkhan. 

Anti-Muslim violence is not a new feature of Burmese social life. Over the past decade, there 

have been repeated incidents of violence against Muslims in the areas surrounding Meikhtila. In 

2006, Buddhist mobs attacked homes, businesses, and mosques in the town of Magway, resulting 

in three deaths. In 2003, large riots erupted in Mandalay and a nearby town, Kyaukse, resulting 

in more than 100 deaths and the destruction of mosques, businesses, and homes. 

During USCIRF’s visit to the province, three common theories of what drives sectarian violence 

and anti-Muslim attitudes were heard. 

1. Burmese nationalism & Buddhism: Through religious and nationalist appeals, young

monks and Buddhist laypeople are being incited to violence and hatred of the Muslim

community in order to protect Buddhism’s favored place in society. Prominent monks

posit a Muslim conspiracy against Burma through speeches, videos, rallies, and social

media.

2. “Spoilers” Seeking to Maintain Power: High-level economic and political figures are

using existing prejudices to generate chaos in an attempt to derail reforms, to maintain

their own political/economic power, and/or to provide an opportunity for the army to

maintain its position in society.

3. Economic Grievances/Boycotts: Ethnic Burmese Buddhists, hurt by decades of

sanctions, are attacking Muslims (whose ties to trade, capital and banking in the Gulf and

South Asia were able to skirt Western sanctions) to displace them from their economic

position in the community. This argument is used as a basis for the “969” exclusionary

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U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

campaign to boycott Muslims shops, businesses, and organizations. The 966 campaigns 

are the organization foundation for all anti-Muslim activities. 

The question of whether Muslim residents of Meikhtila will be able to return to normal life 

remains unanswered. The Burmese government has promised to quell future violence and help 

residents return to their homes and livelihoods. An uneasy calm continues, though Muslims 

around Yangon have formed neighborhood protection units, only a few Buddhists have been held 

accountable for inciting or participating in violence, and squalid IDP camps remain in operation. 

Kachin State 

Reports of the military’s abuses of civilians in Kachin State, many who are Christian, were worse 

than expected. In June 2011, the Burmese military broke a 17-year truce with the Kachin 

Independence Army (KIA). In January 2013, the military started a concerted campaign against 

the KIA that created 100,000 IDPs and unknown numbers of deaths and property destruction. 

The campaign included the destruction of churches, reprisal attacks on clergy and congregations, 

the shooting of worshippers on the way to Sunday services, and the rape and disappearance of 

young Kachin woman, dragged from a church in February 2012. Military units raided churches 

for food and money and forcibly abducted church members for labor. An estimated 66 churches 

were destroyed since January in aerial bombing campaigns. Kachin religious leaders reported 

that women face sexual violence, men and boys are arbitrarily detained and tortured, and IDPs 

continue to live in precarious situations, denied assistance by the military because they live in 

KIA controlled territory or “unofficial” camps. 

Kachin political leaders told USCIRF that the June 2013 ceasefire will not address the distrust 

created by past and present military abuses. The stability of the June ceasefire agreement will 

depend on the government’s will to implement the ceasefire faithfully, government reformers’

ability to manage “hardliners” who want to see the ceasefire and dialogue on national 

reconciliation fail, and the ethnic minorities’ ability to agree on a unified agenda for a national 

political dialogue. At the moment, fighting continues in Shan State threatening the ceasefire. 

Also, there are reports that ethnic nationalities groups are balking at starting a national political 

dialogue as the Burmese government refuses to announce an agenda for the talks. 

Conclusion 

The issues of religion, ethnicity, and the protection of religious freedom are critical factors that 

will shape Burma’s democratic trajectory, its movement toward political reform, and its 

economic development. Further anti-Muslim violence and military incursions against ethnic 

(mostly Christian or animist) ethno-religious nationalities will cause deep societal divisions that 

could intensify as 2015 elections approach and bolster those who would spoil Burma’s 

democratic evolution. Continued sectarian violence also threatens to undermine investment and 

economic development in Burma and create additional dissatisfaction among ethnic minorities. 

President Thein Sein has said publicly that sectarian violence will undermine Burma’s 

development of democracy. Aung San Suu Kyi has not been as vocal about sectarian violence 

but has stated that Burma will only succeed as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious democracy, though 

she left out Muslims in her list of the country’s religious groups. 

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U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

Consequently, the government of Burma needs to tackle four interconnected and difficult issues 

for Burma to move forward and address the fears of ethnic and religious minorities: 1) Find a 

citizenship solution for Rohingya Muslims; 2) End impunity that erodes trust in the Burmese 

government by bringing to justice those who commit and incite sectarian violence and those who 

perpetrated the worst human rights abuses in the past against ethnic nationalities; 3) Build 

capacity and a better command structure for police to prevent violence against Muslims; and 4) 

Re-envision Burma as a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-religious society, with a place for 

minorities in the political structure and in Burma’s potential prosperity. 

Burmese government reforms remain fragile and reversible, and their long-term success will 

depend on building capacity for democratic governance, the rule of law, and protecting the rights 

of ethnic and religious minorities. The U.S. government should maintain the “country of 

particular concern” (CPC) designation for particularly severe religious freedom violations. In 

addition, it should retain the ability to use targeted political and economic sanctions (including 

visa and investment restrictions and vetoes of some World Bank funded projects) if the Burmese 

government refuses to release all religious and political prisoners, fails to respect a nationwide 

ceasefire and conduct a credible political dialogue with ethnic minorities, does not find a 

citizenship solution for Rohingya that respects international standards, fails to reform laws 

limiting religious freedom and other human rights, and fails to conduct free and fair elections in 

2015. 

The United States and other donor nations should use targeted technical assistance to empower 

civil society actors, parliamentarians, nascent political parties, and religious groups to promote 

the rule of law, interfaith cooperation, peace-building, economic development, human rights 

documentation, education, democratic leadership, and legal, political, and human rights training, 

particularly for the police and any new force ensuring border security. 

In conversations with Burmese, Chin, Rohingya, Kachin, and other ethnic and religious 

minorities about ways to improve the freedom of religion and belief and address sectarian and 

ethnic conflict, they recommended the following priorities for the U.S. government, the U.N., 

and other donor nations: 

 Pressing the government of Burma to take immediate actions to address religious hatred

and violence, bring to justice perpetrators of sectarian violence and those complicit in

spreading it, undermine support for anti-Muslim exclusionary campaigns, and promote

inter-religious dialogue, cooperation, and reconciliation;

 Mediating a national political dialogue between the government of Burma and ethnic

nationality groups with the primary goal of building a successful federal system in a

multi-ethnic and multi-religious Burma;

 Creating assistance and training programs to build the capacity and expertise of political

parties among ethnic nationalities, allowing them to engage credibly in a national

dialogue about Burma’s political future, train and run candidates in provincial elections,

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and provide constitute services to address past human rights abuses, including the 

freedom of religion, discrimination, and equitable allocation of economic assistance; 

 Urging the government of Burma to allow unhindered and regular access for international 

and national humanitarian organizations to provide assistance to internally displaced 

persons (IDPs) in both Kachin and Rakhine (Arakan) States and facilitate the work of 

additional NGOs to work in these areas; 

 Urging the review, amendment and/or repeal of the 1982 Citizenship Law, in accordance 

with international norms; 

 Establishing independent inquiries into the status of the Rohingya, to evaluate their 

historical claims to citizenship and assess the root causes of ethnic and sectarian violence 

in Rakhine (Arakan) State; 

 Creating programs to counter anti-Muslim sentiment in the Burmese population, 

specifically focusing on undermining fears of “religious extremism” and high Muslim 

birthrates, which drive popular support for a Muslim exclusion campaign; 

 Placing those who instigate, carry out, or publicly support anti-Muslim violence and 

discrimination on the U.S. Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) 

list, including Buddhist monks, organizers of the “969” anti-Muslim exclusion campaign, 

and government or other officials; and 

 Pressing the government of Burma to repealing and/or amend remaining laws that restrict 

the freedom of religion and belief. 

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