RENDERED: OCTOBER 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-1099-MR

CAREY KITTS APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 20-CI-00357

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 

AND JUSTICE AND PUBLIC 

SAFETY CABINET APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: COMBS, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Appellant, Carey Kitts (Kitts), alleges that he was wrongfully

terminated by his employer, the Department of Criminal Justice Training (DCJT). 

DCJT is a department within the Appellee, the Kentucky Justice and Public Safety 

Cabinet (Cabinet). Kitts filed a Complaint in Franklin Circuit Court pursuant to 
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the Kentucky Whistleblower Act (the KWA), codified in KRS1 Chapter 61. Kitts

alleged that he made two protected disclosures, one regarding DCJT Commissioner 

Alex Payne’s dismissal, and one regarding the appointment of the new 

Commissioner, Nicolai Jilek. The Cabinet filed a motion for summary judgment, 

which was granted. Kitts now appeals as a matter of right. For the following 

reasons, we affirm. 

“Because summary judgment involves only legal questions and the 

existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court need not defer 

to the trial court’s decision and will review the issue de novo.” Lewis v. B&R 

Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001) (citations omitted). 

In order to demonstrate a violation of KRS 61.102, 

an employee must establish the following four elements: 

(1) the employer is an officer of the state; (2) the 

employee is employed by the state; (3) the employee 

made or attempted to make a good faith report or 

disclosure of a suspected violation of state or local law to 

an appropriate body or authority; and (4) the employer 

took action or threatened to take action to discourage the 

employee from making such a disclosure or to punish the 

employee for making such a disclosure. The employee 

must show by a preponderance of evidence that the 

disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel 

action. 

1

 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 
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Davidson v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Mil. Affs., 152 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Ky. App. 

2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In its order granting 

summary judgment, the circuit court made the following findings:

[T]he parties agree that the first two (2) elements are 

satisfied. The parties contest the remaining two (2) 

elements. Defendant filed the underlying motion seeking 

summary judgment. Defendant contends that Plaintiff 

did not make a protected disclosure to an appropriate 

body and was not terminated as the result of his alleged 

disclosures. Plaintiff argues that he aided, supported, and 

substantiated Payne’s claim and thus he has established a 

viable claim under the KWA. Plaintiff’s response does 

not make any mention of his second alleged protected 

disclosure related to Jilek’s presence in the [DCJT]

building. The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff 

has failed to establish a prima facie case for a KWA 

violation.

Regarding the information that was the subject of the alleged protected disclosures, 

the court specifically determined:

the information was widely known and discussed, and 

corrective action was already underway.

. . . [Plaintiff] did not disclose information that the 

KWA was created to prevent such as mismanagement, 

fraud, waste, abuse of authority, or danger to the public.

In careful consideration of the foregoing, the circuit court ultimately held:

Because Plaintiff did not make an unknown good 

faith report or disclosure of a suspected violation of state 

or local law to an appropriate body or authority, he has 

failed to establish an essential element of a prima facie 

claim under the KWA. Because a viable claim under the 

KWA requires satisfying all four (4) elements, it is 
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impossible for Plaintiff to demonstrate that he was 

terminated because of his statements as they were not 

protected disclosures. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to 

establish a viable claim under the KWA and Defendant is 

entitled to summary judgment. 

Based upon our review of the record, we find no error in the trial 

court’s analysis. We agree that appellant did not make a protected disclosure that 

was covered by the KWA nor was appellant’s employment terminated for the 

purported disclosure. Accordingly, the circuit court’s conclusion that there was no 

genuine issue or dispute as to any material fact is supported by the record below. 

See CR2 56.03.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s September 1, 2022 

order granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment. 

ALL CONCUR. 

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Thomas E. Clay

Louisville, Kentucky 

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Leah Boggs

Erritt Griggs 

Robin Cornette

Frankfort, Kentucky 

2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.