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44–063 PDF 2008

THE CYBER INITIATIVE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FEBRUARY 28, 2008 

Serial No. 110–98 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

TODD GEE, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

(II) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .. 1 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 2 

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

WITNESSES

Ms. Karen Evans, Administrator, Electronic Government and Information 

Technology, Office of Management and Budget: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. Robert D. Jamison, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs 

Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, Accompanied by Mr. Scott 

Charbo, Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

APPENDIX

Questions From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke ........................................................ 35 

(1) 

THE CYBER INITIATIVE 

Thursday, February 28, 2008 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson 

[Chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Thompson, Harman, Christensen, 

Etheridge, Langevin, Green, McCaul, Dent, and Brown. 

Chairman THOMPSON [presiding]. The committee will come to 

order. 

The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on the 

Cyber Initiative. The infiltration and exploitation of Federal Government networks and critical infrastructure networks is one of the 

most critical national security issues confronting our country today. 

Public reports suggest that Federal networks have been under 

attack for years. These attacks have resulted in the loss of indeterminate amounts of information. The purpose of today’s hearing is 

to discuss the administration’s proposed Cyber Initiative, a proposal that attempts to reduce the vulnerability of our Federal computer networks and critical infrastructure and the consequences of 

attacks against these networks. 

We aim to discuss several things today, including the consolidation of trusted internet centers, known as TICs, which would reduce the number of Federal connections to the internet and allow 

for easier monitoring of incoming and outgoing traffic, the implementation of the Department of Homeland Security’s cyber monitoring capabilities throughout Federal agencies, known as Einstein, 

the privacy implications of electronic data collection, efforts underway to conduct damage assessment of Federal systems, and efforts 

to secure our federally and privately owned critical infrastructure 

from cyber attack. 

Thus far, I have been extremely disappointed in this administration’s efforts in cybersecurity. The administration drafted a highlevel national strategy for a secure cyberspace in 2002 that presented problems and possible solutions to high-level cybersecurity 

issues but never mandated any changes required to improve security. 

In 2003, the administration eliminated its top advisor on 

cybersecurity, Richard Clarke, who was a key advisor to the president. Then, after Congress pushed for the creation of an assistant 

secretary for cybersecurity, DHS waited over a year to fill the position and buried it four levels down in the bureaucracy. 
2 

Despite the creation of a cross-agency intelligence director, the 

administration failed to educate Federal agency officials on the 

cyber threat. For instance, in a 2007 hearing before this committee, 

the chief information officer at DHS, Scott Charbo, who is with us 

today, told us that he had never received any intelligence reports 

about nation state hacking and that he was unfamiliar with this 

activity. To me, this suggests a failure on the part of the director 

of national intelligence who is charged with connecting dots that 

would prevent cross-agency intelligence failures from occurring. 

This administration regularly requested inadequate budgets for 

DHS cybersecurity activities, both for the National Cyber Security 

Division, the US–CERT and the CIO security budget and the R&D 

activities undertaken at the Science and Technology Directorate. 

This administration has vested responsibility for securing these 

networks in folks who don’t understand the threat or the technical 

methods to deal with the threat. Secretary Chertoff’s decision to 

promote Mr. Charbo to the position of deputy under secretary for 

National Protection and Programs places him in charge of DHS’ efforts in the Cyber Initiative. This decision was made in spite of the 

committee’s investigation into how he and his staff failed both to 

protect the Department’s computers from intrusion and properly 

manage the contractor in charge of security. 

In light of these and other issues, it is hard to believe that this 

administration now believes it has the answers to secure our Federal networks and critical infrastructure. 

I want to be clear: I believe that cybersecurity is a serious problem, maybe the most complicated national security issue in terms 

of threat and jurisdiction. This problem will be with us for decades 

to come. 

I am pleased that this administration recognizes the challenges 

we face in securing this area. 

As Chairman of this committee, I continue to have numerous 

practical and theoretical questions about the initiative and the possibilities of its success: Who is in charge, what are the matrix for 

success, who is accountable, how are privacy concerns being addressed, how will future technologies be incorporated, how will future threats be addressed, what legal frameworks must be amended, how will the administration work with the private sector, and 

what will be done with critical infrastructure? 

I am committed to charting a course toward freedom from fear, 

and I look forward to working through these difficult questions in 

the weeks, months and years to come. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the subcommittee and who is standing in for the Ranking Member of the 

full committee, the gentleman, Mr. McCaul, for an opening statement. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Today’s hearing is on the administration Cyber Security Initiative, which is a sweeping effort to better secure the computer networks owned and operated by the Federal Government. 

In my judgment, since 9/11, we have been very focused on the 

threats in the physical world, and yet not enough attention, in my 

view, has been paid on threats in the virtual world. 
3 

I am glad to see that the administration has come forward with 

an initiative, a plan. Congressman Langevin and I have launched 

a nonpartisan commission to study the threat of cybersecurity to 

this Nation and to provide recommendations to the next President 

of the United States, and I look forward to seeing their recommendations as well. 

As this committee learned last year, the Government’s computer 

networks are under constant attack from hackers and criminals, 

many of whom are sponsored by foreign nations. Just last year, the 

country of Estonia was temporarily taken off the internet by organized hackers. While the chances that a similar attack could 

achieve similar results in this country are small, the threat remains very real. 

The Department of Homeland Security will play a prominent role 

in developing and implementing the administration’s initiative. In 

fact, the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request includes close 

to $200 million more for DHS than was requested last year for 

cybersecurity, and I am pleased to see that. 

In addition, media reports indicates the administration plans to 

ask for up to $30 billion over the next 5 years. If this figure is accurate, Congress needs to know how that money will be spent. This 

project is still in the formative stages; therefore, I understand a 

number of details cannot be shared at this time or possibly in an 

open forum. But it is important, however, that the administration 

keep Congress informed so as to avoid any misunderstanding about 

what this initiative is designed to do. 

With such a large project that cuts across the Government, efficient congressional oversight may be difficult to achieve because so 

many different committees claim jurisdiction over DHS. It is times 

like this that highlight the fact that despite promises to fulfill all 

the remaining 9/11 commission’s recommendations, the Congress 

still has not consolidated oversight of DHS, and, unfortunately, it 

now has oversight by 86 committees and subcommittees. 

I understand that the administration doesn’t believe that further 

authorities are necessary for this initiative, but this area potentially could be added to our annual DHS authorization bill, which 

I urge the Chairman and this committee to take up prior to congressional action on DHS’ appropriations bill later this spring. I 

raised this issue during our full committee this past Tuesday and 

was pleased to hear an optimistic response from Chairwoman 

Sanchez. 

We on the Republican side look forward to working with our majority counterparts and colleagues on another bipartisan DHS authorization bill. 

I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Other Members of the committee reminded that under committee 

rules opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Hon. Langevin follows:] 
4 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN

FEBRUARY 28, 2008 

THE CYBER INITIATIVE

For years, Federal networks have been under attack. I believe that the infiltration 

and exploitation of these networks is one of the most critical issues confronting our 

Nation. The acquisition of our Government’s information by outsiders undermines 

our strength as a Nation. If sensitive information is stolen and absorbed by our adversaries, we are strategically harmed. 

Last year, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, 

Science and Technology, I held a series of hearings on the cyber threats to our Federal networks and critical infrastructure. It is clear that our failure to secure Government networks has more to do with mismanagement, and less to do with inadequate technology. This administration simply has not made cybersecurity a priority. They have not comprehensively identified or mitigated vulnerabilities on our 

networks; they have not held anybody accountable for breaches; and they have not 

invested adequate resources to solve the problems. Unfortunately, we are paying the 

price today. 

I remain deeply concerned about the growing threat to our national critical infrastructure. The effective functioning of many infrastructures is highly dependent on 

control systems. which are computer-based systems used to monitor and control sensitive processes and physical functions. Cyber attacks against these pieces of infrastructure have the potential to cause serious—if not catastrophic—damage to the 

economy and our way of life. The administration’s Cyber Initiative does not adequately prioritize this issue. 

With the right vision and leadership, we can improve security on our Federal networks and critical infrastructure. There are some promising elements of the Cyber 

Initiative, but there are also some gaping holes. I assure the American people that 

we will continue to perform robust oversight on this issue. 

RECAP OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE’S PREVIOUS HEARINGS

Last year, as Chairman of the subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, 

Science and Technology, I held a series of hearings on the cyber threats to our Federal networks and critical infrastructure. We began in April 2007, with a hearing 

on cyber attacks against the Departments of State and Commerce. At that time, it 

was clear to me that the Federal Government did not understand the severity of 

the threat. Officials did not know the scope or topology of networks; who infiltrated 

our networks in the past; who was inside of our networks at the present; and how 

much information had been stolen. At that hearing, I promised to begin an investigation to assess the cybersecurity posture at the Department of Homeland Security. Chairman Thompson and I began requesting documents from the Department’s 

Chief Information Officer the following week. 

Our second hearing in April focused on the need to reduce critical infrastructure 

vulnerabilities through investment in research and development. In the last 7 years, 

more than 20 reports from such entities as the INFOSEC Research Council, the National Science Foundation, the National Institute of Justice, the National Security 

Telecommunications Advisory Committee, the National Research Council and the 

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection have all urged the 

Government to do more to drive, discover and deliver new solutions to address cyber 

vulnerabilities. Yet the administration routinely proposed reductions or flat funding 

for research and development efforts at the Department of Homeland Security. Our 

witnesses described the necessity to dramatically reduce the vulnerability of the national information infrastructure to attack, and make major, strategic investments 

that can significantly reduce infrastructure vulnerabilities over a 5- to 10-year period. 

During a June 2007 subcommittee hearing, we discussed the preliminary results 

of our investigation into the security of the Department’s networks. Due to poor security practices on its networks, the Department of Homeland Security suffered numerous significant security incidents. Routine security reviews—like rogue tunnel 

audits, ingress/egress filtering, widespread internal and external penetration tests, 

and contractor audits—were not performed. Multi-factor authentication was not 

fully implemented And in spite of nearly 900 cybersecurity incidents between fiscal 

year 2005 and fiscal year 2006, the Department continued to under-invest in IT security. 

The testimony of the Department’s Chief Information Officer, Scott Charbo, was 

disturbing to the committee. Although the Chief Information Officer is ultimately 
5 

responsible for the security of the Department’s numerous information networks, 

Mr. Charbo seemed unaware and unconcerned about any serious malicious activity 

on the networks he was charged with securing. For example, when asked if he or 

his security team had requested or received intelligence briefings about Chinese 

hackers penetrating Federal networks, or if Department computers ever exfiltrated 

information to Chinese servers, Mr. Charbo responded ‘‘you don’t know what you 

don’t know.’’ This answer was typical of the laissez-faire attitude that he exhibited 

throughout the investigation, and suggested that neither he nor the rest of the Department was taking the issue of cybersecurity seriously. Chairman Thompson and 

I sought additional information to determine whether these incidents could be tied 

to the same attacks that occurred on the networks at State and Commerce. 

In September 2007, Chairman Thompson and I concluded that the Department 

was itself a victim not only of cyber attacks initiated by foreign entities, but of incompetent and possibly illegal activity by the contractor charged with maintaining 

security on its networks. The Department’s intrusion detection systems—designed 

to monitor networks and issue alerts when outsiders attempted to gain access—were 

not properly installed and monitored. This resulted in dozens of computers becoming 

compromised by hackers, who sent an unknown quantity of information to a Chinese-language Web site. We asked the Department’s Inspector General to begin an 

inquiry into these matters and refer the case for criminal investigation. 

In October 2007, my subcommittee again revisited the issue of cybersecurity and 

critical infrastructure, specifically with regard to the electric grid. The effective 

functioning of the bulk power system is highly dependent on control systems, which 

are computer-based systems used to monitor and control sensitive processes and 

physical functions. Once largely proprietary, closed-systems, control systems are becoming increasingly connected to open networks, such as corporate intranets and 

the Internet. As such, the cyber risk to these systems is increasing. Intentional and 

unintentional control system failures on the bulk power system can have a significant and potentially devastating impact on the economy, public health, and national 

security of the United States. 

The subcommittee learned about an experimental cyber attack led by DHS researchers at Idaho National Laboratory. This experiment—code-named Aurora— 

could inflict significant damage upon the electric sector, and several Members joined 

me in calling upon the Federal Electric Regulatory Commission (FERC) to investigate whether the owners and operators were implementing mitigations to prevent 

this attack from occurring. In light of these issues, I joined Chairman Thompson, 

Chairwoman Jackson Lee, and Ranking Member McCaul in submitting comments 

to the FERC rulemaking, arguing that their proposed standards do not sufficiently 

ensure the production or delivery of power in the event of intentional or unintentional cyber incidents involving critical infrastructures. We suggested adopting 

standards for control systems proposed by the National Institute of Science and 

Technology. 

Our final hearing focused on the implementation of the cyber aspects of the Sector 

Specific Plans. These 17 plans—one for each critical infrastructure sector in the 

United States—are supposed to describe how each sector will identify, prioritize, 

and protect their physical and cyber assets. However, an investigation performed for 

the committee by the GAO suggests that many of the 17 plans are incomplete when 

it comes to cybersecurity. The GAO analyzed the 17 plans under three categories: 

fully addressed, partially addressed, or not addressed, and found that none of the 

plans fully addressed all 30 cybersecurity criteria. Even more distressing was the 

absence of an implementation plan. Because Sector Specific Plans remain a voluntary exercise for all sectors, the Federal Government is unable to assess the effectiveness of the private sector’s cybersecurity controls. 

Each of these hearings suggests that the Federal Government is vulnerable to a 

cyber attack against Federal networks or critical infrastructure. We must continue 

to identify vulnerabilities in our systems. We must continue to reduce those 

vulnerabilities. We must continue to engage the private sector. We must make 

cybersecurity a priority. 

Chairman THOMPSON. I now welcome our witnesses to this hearing. 

Our first witness, Karen Evans, is the administrator of the Office 

of Electronic Government and Information Technology at the Office 

of Management and Budget. In this role, she oversees implementation of IT throughout the Federal Government, including advising 

the director on the performance of IT investments, overseeing the 
6 

development of enterprise architecture within the agencies, directing activities of the Chief Information Officer Council and overseeing the usage of the e-government funds to support interagency 

partnership and innovation. 

Our second witness is Robert Jamison, the under secretary for 

the National Protection and Program Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security. He was confirmed in December 2007. 

Under Secretary Jamison leads the Department’s integrated effort 

to analyze, manage and reduce risk. Mr. Jamison oversees the Department’s efforts in the Cyber Initiative. 

He will be joined in questioning period by Deputy Under Secretary for National Protection and Programs Directorate Scott 

Charbo. Mr. Charbo was named to this position earlier this month 

after previously serving as the Department’s chief information officer. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be read into 

the record. I ask each witness to summarize their statements, beginning with Ms. Evans for 5 minutes. 

Ms. Evans. 

STATEMENT OF KAREN EVANS, ADMINISTRATOR, ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, 

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 

Ms. EVANS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

committee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss the administration’s comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative. Our work 

on the Cyber Initiative is focused on building upon our existing effort to continue to close the gap in areas of continued weakness, 

implementing existing security policies and managing our risk associated in particular with non-secure external connections, including internet points of presence. 

Please note, our work is happening concurrently on all of the programs described in my written statement. 

Agencies connect to the internet to deliver timely information 

and services to the public, but each new connection multiplies 

threats and vulnerabilities. Agencies can consolidate or reduce unnecessary connections while still accomplishing program goals. 

OMB has set a target date of completion for the reduction and optimization of agencies’ external connections, including those to the 

internet, by June 2008. 

Agencies reduce the number of internet connections, as they also 

will be determining transitions and, if so, their transition strategy 

to the network’s contract managed by the General Services Administration. This transition provides an opportunity for agencies to 

consolidate and optimize their external access points and to obtain 

secure telecommunications technologies and services. 

In connection with the network’s transition, Einstein will be deployed at the appropriate external connection. Currently, 14 departments and agencies have deployed Einstein. Einstein will be 

discussed more in depth by my colleague, Under Secretary 

Jamison, during his statement. 

Agencies are also taking advantage of products and services offered by the Information Systems Security Line of Business. This 

initiative, led by the Department of Homeland Security and OMB, 
7 

was introduced in the spring of 2005 and identified common solutions for four areas to be shared by the government: Security training; Federal Information Security Management Act, FISMA, reporting; situational awareness and incident response; and the selection, 

evaluation and implementation of security solutions. 

As of November 2007, 12 agencies had implemented security 

awareness training services provided by three approved shared 

service centers, and 13 agencies have begun using FISMA reporting services provided by two approved shared service centers. As a 

result, agencies are beginning to reduce duplicative investment and 

common security tools, ensuring a baseline level of training and reporting performance and are better able to refocus their efforts to 

other complex and critical security issues at their agency. 

With the understanding that vulnerabilities result from weaknesses in technology, as well as improper implementation and oversight of technological products, we have collaborated with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, and Microsoft to 

develop a set of information security controls to be implemented on 

all Federal desktops, which are running Microsoft Windows XP or 

Vista. 

This set of controls, known as the Federal Desktop Core Configuration, is currently being implemented across the Federal enterprise. By implementing a common configuration, we are gaining 

better control of our Federal systems and are allowing for closer 

monitoring and correction of potential vulnerabilities, while limiting the download of internet applications to only authorized professionals. 

In addition to the desktop configuration, we are also working 

with the vendor community to make our application safer. As part 

of this program, NIST has developed testing tools for use by both 

the Federal agencies and the vendors. NIST awarded Security Content Automation Protocol, or SCAP, validation to three products as 

of February 4, 2008. 

Three independent laboratories have been accredited by NIST 

National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for the 

SCAP product validation. 

To help agency procurement officers ensure that new acquisitions 

include the common security configurations, we have also provided 

agencies with recommended procurement language. The Federal 

Acquisition Council has approved the language and is completing 

the process of adding this language to the Federal acquisition regulations. 

While notable progress in resolving IT security weaknesses has 

been made, and I have included more examples in my written 

statements, problems remain in agencies’ implementation, and new 

threats and vulnerabilities continue to materialize. Work remains 

to continue to improve the security of information and systems supporting the Federal Government’s missions and manage the risk 

associated with these systems. 

To address these challenges, OMB looks forward to continuing to 

work with the agencies, GAO and Congress to promote the appropriate risk-based and cost-effective IT security programs, policies 

and procedures. 
8 

I will be happy to answer any questions at the appropriate time. 

[The statement of Ms. Evans follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KAREN EVANS

FEBRUARY 28, 2008 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss the administration’s Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative. My remarks today will focus on the progress we have made in improving 

the security of the Government’s information and information technology (IT) systems as well as our strategy for managing the risk associated with our Government 

services in this ever-changing IT environment. In our increasingly interconnected 

and interdependent environment, security risks left unaddressed by one agency can 

exponentially compound security risks faced by all of us. These weaknesses prevent 

agencies from achieving program goals and erode the public’s trust in us. 

Information security and privacy are extremely important issues for the administration. On March 1, 2008, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will provide our fifth annual report to the Congress on implementation of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA). This report will go into detail on our 

improvements and remaining weaknesses for both security and privacy. 

OMB policies and subsequent National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(NIST) guidance focus on a risk-based, cost-effective approach and reflect the balance between strong security and mission needs. Agencies are responsible for implementing the policies and guidance for their unique mission requirements within 

their capital planning and investment control processes. Agency officials who own 

and operate the agency business programs are ultimately responsible and accountable for ensuring security is integrated into those program operations. Our oversight 

is achieved in two primary ways—via the budget and capital planning process, and 

through independent program reviews. 

Our work on the cyber initiative is focused on closing gaps in areas of continued 

weakness—implementing existing security policy, and managing non-secure external connection, including Internet points of presence. Please note our work is happening concurrently on all of the programs described. 

EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTING EXISTING SECURITY POLICIES

Securing cyberspace is an ongoing process, so as new technologies appear and new 

vulnerabilities are identified, NIST provides guidance to Federal agencies on securing networks, systems, and applications. Recommendations include user awareness 

briefings as well as training for technical staff on security standards, procedures, 

and sound security practices. As required by 44 U.S.C. § 3543, Federal agencies 

must adopt and comply with standards promulgated by NIST, and identify information security protections consistent with these standards. 

For example, agencies must complete certification and accreditation (C&A)—a 

fundamental security procedure required by law and policy. As of first quarter fiscal 

year 2008, 985 systems (9.5% percent of all systems) operate without a complete 

C&A. Based on our annual reports to Congress, the percentage of systems C&A’d 

rise each year we need to be at 100%. When performed correctly, C&As identify the 

risks when operating an information system, tests controls necessary to mitigate 

them, and provides program managers a level of assurance the systems supporting 

their programs operate at an acceptable level of risk. 

In addition to following existing policy, agencies are continuing to take advantage 

of GSA’s SmartBUY program when acquiring security products and services. 

SmartBUY is a Federal Government procurement vehicle designed to promote effective enterprise level software management. By leveraging the Government’s immense buying power, SmartBUY has saved taxpayers millions of dollars through 

Government-wide aggregate buying of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) software 

products. Agencies are utilizing new SmartBUY agreements to acquire quality security products at lower costs. 

In one recent example, GSA and DoD established a SmartBUY agreement for 

products certified through the NIST FIPS 140–2 Cryptomodule Validation Program. 

These certified products will be used to encrypt data at rest. This benefit is not confined solely to Federal agencies, since the Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) was 

written so that States and local governments can also take advantage of this opportunity. 

In addition to the encryption BPA, GSA worked to complete two BPA’s for credit 

monitoring services deemed necessary by an agency in the event of a breach of per-
9 

sonally identifiable information (PII), as well as risk assessment services for when 

a breach occurs. More information about the BPA related to credit monitoring services can be found in our OMB Memorandum M–07–04, ‘‘Use of Commercial Credit 

Monitoring Services Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA),’’ at http:// 

www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-04.pdf. More information about 

the BPA to assist agencies to assess risk associated with data loss can be found in 

our OMB Memorandum M–08–10, ‘‘Use of Commercial Independent Risk Analysis 

Services Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA),’’ at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 

omb/memoranda/fy2008/m08-10.pdf. 

Currently, the Information System Security Line of Business (ISSLOB) is working 

across Federal agencies and with GSA to assess the feasibility of additional security 

related SmartBUY and BPA opportunities for situational awareness and discovery 

tool sets. 

MANAGING MULTIPLE NON-SECURE EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS

Agencies connect to the Internet to deliver timely information and services to the 

public, but each new connection multiplies threats and vulnerabilities. Agencies can 

consolidate or reduce unnecessary connections while still accomplishing program 

goals. Per OMB guidance, agencies must reduce and/or consolidate their external 

connections including those to the internet by June 2008 with a target of no more 

than 50 access points in total for the civilian agencies. 

As agencies reduce the number of internet connections, they are also determining 

whether to transition, and if so, their transition strategy, to Networx. As you know, 

FTS2001/Crossover Bridge contracts, which provide services for telecommunications 

and networking services, for current customers will expire in May and June 2010. 

The Networx program is the primary replacement vehicle for these expiring contracts. We believe that this transition will provide an opportunity for agencies to 

consolidate and optimize their external access points including internet connections 

and obtain secure telecommunications technologies and services. Networx Universal 

and Enterprise Service contracts were awarded in March and May 2007, respectively. 

OMB anticipates agencies choosing to use the Networx contract can leverage the 

transition process and service offerings to meet the goal of reducing the number of 

external connections including Internet points of presence. OMB has asked the Federal Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council to prepare a cost-benefit analysis regarding the use of the Networx contract. 

The Interagency Management Council’s Transition Working Group (TWG) has 

asked agencies seeking to qualify for transition cost reimbursement to complete Fair 

Opportunity decisions by September 2008. GSA recommends agencies target the 

completion of Fair Opportunity decisions by March 2008 to ensure sufficient time 

to complete transition of services prior to the expiration of FTS2001/Crossover 

Bridge contracts. 

Currently, one major agency has completed a Fair Opportunity Analysis and selected a service provider (Treasury). As of February 2008, GSA has received 21 

Statements of Work (SOWs), and anticipates at least 58 more SOWs from major 

agencies by September 2008. 

The TWG deadline for agencies to submit all transition orders is April 2010. GSA 

recommends agencies target the submission of all transition orders to the extent 

possible for January 2009 to allow sufficient time for service providers to complete 

the processing of all orders and establish service on the new contracts before the 

expiration of FTS2001/Crossover Bridge contracts. 

In concert with Networx transition, Einstein will be deployed at the appropriate 

external connections, including Internet points of presence; 14 departments and/or 

agencies have currently deployed Einstein. Einstein is an intrusion detection system 

managed by DHS to collect, analyze, and share aggregated network computer security information across the Federal Government. As a result of these deployments, 

agencies maintain an awareness of their network while DHS maintains awareness 

of Government-wide information security threats and vulnerabilities. With this information, agencies will be able to quickly take corrective action and reduce their 

risk to a manageable level. 

Agencies are also taking advantage of products and services offered by the Information System Security Line of Business (ISSLOB). This initiative, led by DHS and 

OMB was introduced in the Spring of 2005. An inter-agency Task Force identified 

common solutions to be shared across Government. The Task Force identified common solutions in four areas: security training; FISMA reporting; situational awareness/incident response; and selection, evaluation and implementation of security solutions. 
10 

All agencies were asked to submit proposals to either become a Shared Service 

Center (SSC) for other agencies, or migrate to another agency from which they 

would acquire expert security awareness training services and FISMA reporting 

services. DHS helped coordinate the selection of SSCs, and agency implementation 

of these services. 

As of November 2007, 12 agencies had implemented security awareness training 

services provided by three approved SSC, and 13 agencies had begun using FISMA 

reporting services provided by two approved SSC. As a result, agencies are beginning to reduce duplicative investment in common security tools, ensuring a baseline 

level of training and reporting performance, and are able to refocus their efforts to 

other complex and critical security issues at their agency. OMB expects agencies 

will fully report the number of employees trained via the ISSLOB in their fiscal 

year 2008 annual FISMA report. 

Finally, vulnerabilities result from weaknesses in technology as well as improper 

implementation and oversight of technological products. Over the past year, in collaboration with NIST, the Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, 

and Microsoft, we have developed a set of information security controls to be implemented on all Federal desktops which are running Microsoft Windows XP or VISTA. 

This set of controls, known as the Federal Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC) is 

currently being implemented across the Federal enterprise. By implementing a common configuration, we are gaining better control of our Federal systems, and allowing for closer monitoring and correction of potential vulnerabilities. Security configurations provide a baseline level of security, reduce risk from security threats and 

vulnerabilities, and save time and resources. In particular, security configurations 

help protect connections to the Internet and limit the download of Internet applications to only authorized professionals. 

In addition to the desktop configuration, we are also working with the vendor 

community to make their applications safer. As part of this program, NIST has developed testing tools for use by both Federal agencies and vendors. NIST awarded 

Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) Validation to three products as of 

February 4, 2008. These products and their associated validation information can 

be found at http://nvd.nist.gov/scapproducts.cfm. Three independent laboratories 

have been accredited by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) for SCAP Product Validation testing. The list of accredited labs is 

available at the same URL. We are very optimistic this program will greatly enhance the security of our Federal desktops, and, of our Federal enterprise as a 

whole. To help agency procurement officers ensure that new acquisitions include 

common security configurations, we have provided agencies with recommended procurement language. This language can be found in our Memorandum M–07–18, ‘‘Ensuring New Acquisitions Include Common Security Configurations,’’ at http:// 

www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-18.pdf. Currently, the Federal 

Acquisition Council is in the process of adding similar language to the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 

These initiatives described in my testimony today in combination with other administration initiatives (including: IPv6, HSPD–12, minimum communications capabilities for continuity of Government and continuity of operation plans, and IT Infrastructure Line of Business) address our potential security gaps, help agencies optimize their information infrastructure, and facilitate appropriate network consolidation and configuration. In turn, agencies will be able to better manage their information infrastructure, allowing them to reduce risks to an acceptable level. 

In closing, OMB is committed to a Federal Government with resilient information 

systems. The dangers posed by the internet must not be allowed to significantly affect agency business processes or disrupt services to the citizen. I would like to acknowledge the significant work of agencies and IGs in conducting the annual reviews and evaluations. This effort gives OMB and the Congress much greater visibility into agency security status and progress. 

While notable progress in resolving IT security weaknesses has been made, problems remain in agency implementation and new threats and vulnerabilities continue 

to materialize. Work remains to continue to improve the security of the information 

and systems supporting the Federal Government’s missions and manage the risk associated with these systems. To address these challenges, OMB will continue to 

work with agencies, GAO, and Congress to promote appropriate risk-based and costeffective IT security programs, policies, and procedures to adequately secure our operations and assets. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Jamison for 5 minutes. 
11 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. JAMISON, UNDER SECRETARY, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ACCOMPANIED BY 

SCOTT CHARBO, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY, NATIONAL 

PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. JAMISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Congressman McCaul and Members of the 

committee, I appreciate the opportunity to update you on the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to improve America’s 

cybersecurity posture. 

I also appreciate the committee’s interest in the Cyber Initiative. 

The Department and our interagency partners are committed to an 

ongoing engagement with Congress in an appropriate setting on 

the classified aspects of our activities. 

In my role as under secretary for the National Protection and 

Programs Directorate, one of my most important programmatic activities has been cybersecurity, and I have served as the lead DHS 

official for the Cyber Initiative since last summer. 

I am pleased this morning to be joined on this panel by my esteemed colleagues from OMB, Karen Evans, and the former DHS 

chief information officer and just recently appointed deputy under 

secretary, Scott Charbo. 

Secretary Chertoff identified cybersecurity as one of the Department’s top priorities for 2008, and the President’s 2008 and 2009 

budgets reflect this priority. We are aware of, and have defended 

against, malicious cyber activity directed at the U.S. Government. 

We take these threats seriously and remain really concerned that 

this activity is growing more sophisticated, more targeted and more 

prevalent. 

The nature of the threat is diverse, ranging from unsophisticated 

hackers to very technically competent adversaries using state-ofthe-art intrusion techniques. Many of these malicious attacks are 

designed to steal information and disrupt, deny access to, degrade 

or destroy critical Federal information systems. 

Over the past 4 months, the Department has provided this committee with several classified briefings on a number of different 

cyber-related topics, including threats. The Department and our 

interagency partners remain committed to an ongoing dialog with 

Congress in an appropriate setting on these classified topics. 

DHS has the lead responsibility for assuring the security resiliency and reliability of the Nation’s information technology and 

communications infrastructure. Since 2003, the Department has 

been investing in the development of a nimble, effective cyber 

emergency response capability and a culture of preparedness. 

These activities have positioned DHS to play a key role in this important initiative we will discuss today. 

We have established the National Cyber Security Division to 

focus on securing cyberspace. In NCSD, we have built a 24×7 

watch, warning and response operation centers to defend against 

and respond to cyber attack, the US–CERT. US–CERT has developed and deployed an Einstein program, which provides Government officials with situational awareness about malicious activity 
12 

across the Federal civilian network so we can protect against and 

respond to cyber threats more effectively. 

Under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan framework, 

we have also worked closely with our private sector partners to develop 17 sector-specific plans, which all include a cybersecurity 

component. 

We are here today because we must do more. The Federal Government has a vast information interstate system with thousands 

of points of access. At last count, the Federal network had at least 

4,000 access points. Defending the Federal system in its current 

configuration is a significant challenge. Implementing effective defensive strategies requires a manageable number of access points. 

Therefore, we are working with OMB to reduce the number of access points. 

As we reduce the number of access points, we plan to employ an 

enhanced intrusion detection capability, enhanced Einstein. While 

valuable, currently our Einstein capability is limited. We do not 

have comprehensive coverage, and it is a delayed flow analysis tool. 

We need to enhance the capability through comprehensive coverage 

across our Federal system external access points and upgrade Einstein to detect malicious activity in real time. 

Our goal is a comprehensive, consistent intrusion detection capability that is informed by our full understanding of the threat. 

Mr. Chairman, the threat is real. To defend our networks, a comprehensive situational awareness capability must augment the 

foundation already in place at the Department. We will achieve 

this improved situational awareness by consolidating our Federal 

connections, enhancing our intrusion detection capabilities, improving our threat assessment and information-sharing capabilities and 

building a stronger watch and warning system. 

These changes, coupled with an investment in our people, processes and systems, will enable the Federal Government to apply 

the full capabilities to the defense of our networks. 

Thank you for the opportunity to update you today on DHS’ efforts to improve America’s cybersecurity posture, and I welcome the 

questions. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Jamison follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. JAMISON

FEBRUARY 28, 2008 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Thompson, Congressman King, and Members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to speak about the Department of Homeland Security’s ongoing efforts to improve cybersecurity. I also appreciate the committee’s continued 

interest in the Department’s cybersecurity activities and in particular the Department’s role in Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative. As we have done 

since last year, the Department and our interagency partners will continue to engage with the committee and Congress in an appropriate setting on the classified 

portions of our activities. 

As our economy, critical infrastructure, and national security become more reliant 

on technology, it is essential that we take proactive measures to enhance the security and resiliency of the information technology (IT) systems and networks on 

which we rely. We face increasing global threats to our cyber infrastructure, and 

the exploitation of vulnerabilities is facilitated by the widespread availability of 

tools, techniques, and information. The Department has made progress in enhancing 
13 

the cybersecurity of the Nation; however, we recognize the need to take deliberate 

action to reinforce and build on those efforts as the threat grows. To underscore the 

Department’s efforts in this area, Secretary Chertoff has identified cybersecurity as 

one of the top priorities for the Department for 2008. The enacted fiscal year 2008 

and the President’s proposed fiscal year 2009 budget reflect the necessary investment for this priority. 

The Department has outlined four areas of focus within cybersecurity to guide our 

efforts over the coming year. First, we are enhancing Federal cyber situational 

awareness, intrusion detection, information sharing, and response capabilities. Second, we are expanding the Department’s cadre of cybersecurity personnel, its capabilities, and its services to our public and private sector partners. Third, we are 

strengthening our efforts to integrate cybersecurity into Federal, State, private sector, and international preparedness, response, and resilience efforts. Finally, we are 

developing and promoting the adoption of proven cybersecurity practices with Government, private sector, the general public, and the international community. 

Today, I will provide an overview of the Department’s efforts to improve 

cybersecurity across Federal departments and agencies will focus on our first priority. Specifically, I will address two programs focused on cyber risk reduction 

across the Federal enterprise: the Trusted Internet Connections initiative (TIC) and 

the EINSTEIN program. 

CYBERSECURITY: A DEPARTMENTAL PRIORITY

As Under Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate 

(NPPD), I oversee the Directorate’s efforts to advance the Department’s mission of 

risk reduction, which encompasses identifying threats, determining vulnerabilities, 

and targeting resources where risk is greatest, including to our critical information 

systems. A key area within this mission includes the Office of Cybersecurity and 

Communications’ (CS&C) efforts to improve cybersecurity by reducing risk to the 

Nation’s cyber infrastructure and maintaining the resilience of our communications 

systems. The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security articulated the importance of this mission by recognizing that many of our essential and emergency services, including our critical infrastructure, ‘‘rely on the uninterrupted use of the 

Internet and the communications systems, data, monitoring, and control systems 

that comprise our cyber infrastructure. A cyber attack could be debilitating to our 

highly interdependent [Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources] and ultimately to 

our economy and national security.’’ 

Global threats to our cyber infrastructure and to the services, systems, and assets 

that depend on them continue to increase. The nature of the threat is large and diverse and ranges from unsophisticated hackers to very sophisticated adversaries. 

We are seeing more state-of-the-art intrusion techniques designed to disrupt, deny 

access to, degrade, or destroy critical information systems and steal our intellectual 

capital and proprietary information. 

The Department is positioned to address these threats through our watch, warning, and response capabilities; our information sharing and coordination efforts with 

the public and private sectors; and our programs and initiatives through the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) and United States Computer Emergency 

Readiness Team (US–CERT). These programs and initiatives are designed to carry 

out our mission of preparing for and responding to incidents that could degrade or 

overwhelm the operation of our Federal IT and communications infrastructure. 

SECURING FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

Since its inception, the Department of Homeland Security has been working to 

strengthen Federal and critical infrastructure systems and enhance our cyber operational response capabilities. The Department established a number of programs 

and initiatives to coordinate efforts with Federal departments and agencies to improve cybersecurity. These programs focus on enhancing situational awareness, increasing collaboration across Federal operational security teams, preventing cyber 

incidents, and providing inter-agency coordination during a cyber event. 

The Department conducts outreach to Federal departments and agencies to raise 

cybersecurity awareness with operational security teams and senior official through 

channels such as the Government Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams 

(GFIRST). GFIRST is a community of more than 50 incident response teams from 

various Federal agencies working together to improve Federal Government security. 

The Department sponsors the annual GFIRST Conference, which fosters greater information sharing among IT security professionals from various departments and 

agencies. The 2007 conference garnered unprecedented attendance, including more 

than 550 IT professionals, representing numerous Federal departments and agen-
14 

cies, including more than 100 attorneys from the Department of Justice. We expect 

similar success at the upcoming GFIRST Conference in June 2008. 

To enhance collaboration on control systems security across the Federal Government, NCSD established and facilitates the Federal Control Systems Security Working Group, consisting of over 30 Government organizations. Since late 2006, this 

group has been developing a Federal Coordinating Strategy to Secure Control Systems, which seeks to place related Federal control systems activities into a unified 

framework, assess opportunities for sharing and leveraging information and resources, and identify possible gaps in Federal efforts. In addition, NCSD is working 

with other Federal organizations, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to provide control systems specific tools in their 

areas of responsibility. 

NCSD co-chairs the National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG) with 

the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Defense (DoD) to coordinate response to a cyber incident across the Federal Government. The NCRCG 

serves as the principal interagency mechanism for providing subject matter expertise, recommendations, and strategic policy support to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security during and in anticipation of a cyber incident. The NCRCG comprises senior representatives from Federal agencies that have roles and responsibilities related to preventing, investigating, defending against, responding to, mitigating, and 

assisting in the recovery from cyber incidents. The senior-level membership of the 

NCRCG helps ensure that during a significant national incident, appropriate Federal capabilities will be deployed in a coordinated and effective fashion. 

To ensure processes and procedures involved with response to cyber incidents are 

up-to-date and comprehensive, the Department sponsors exercises to allow participants in the public and private sector to examine their cyber response capabilities. 

In February 2006, the Department held the first National Cyber Exercise—Cyber 

Storm—to examine various aspects of our operational mission, including collaboration with Federal departments and agencies. The Department and other participants continues to address lessons learned and after-action items from the exercise. 

Progress made to improve response processes and procedures will be measured in 

Cyber Storm II, which is scheduled for March 2008. Cyber Storm II will simulate 

a coordinated, large-scale cyber attack on four of the Nation’s critical infrastructure 

sectors. The exercise will include participants from 18 Federal departments and 

agencies, 9 States, over 40 private sector companies, and 4 international partners. 

For the Federal Government Cyber Storm II will exercise strategic incident response 

decisionmaking and interagency coordination in accordance with national-level policies and procedures. The exercise will strengthen the ability of participating organizations to prepare for, protect against, and respond to the effects of cyber attacks. 

US–CERT is the Department’s watch and warning mechanism for the Federal 

Government’s internet infrastructure. It provides around-the-clock monitoring of 

Federal network infrastructure and coordinates the dissemination of information to 

key constituencies including all levels of Government and industry. In addition, US– 

CERT serves as the main component for helping Government, industry, and the 

public work together to respond to cyber threats and vulnerabilities. A main area 

of focus for US–CERT is our work with Federal departments and agencies. US– 

CERT provides Government partners with actionable information needed to protect 

information systems and infrastructures. In addition, US–CERT leverages its technical expertise to further efforts to secure Federal networks and systems through 

targeted programs, such as the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative and 

EINSTEIN. 

Trusted Internet Connections Initiative 

The Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative is a multifaceted plan to improve the Federal Government’s security posture by significantly reducing the number of Federal external connections. External connections include, but are not limited to, any connection outside a department or agency, such as government-to-government connections and Internet access points. Currently, there are several thousand Federal external connections. The existence of such a large number inhibits 

the Federal Government’s ability to implement standardized security measures effectively. The TIC initiative aims to reduce and consolidate the number of external 

connections to create a more clearly defined ‘‘cyber border.’’ Fewer external connections will enable more efficient management and implementation of security measures and reduce avenues for malicious attacks. Once fully implemented, the TIC initiative will facilitate security standardization for access points across the Federal 

Government. 

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) maintains oversight of the TIC initiative, and implementation relies on the technical expertise of US–CERT, all par-
15 

1The TIC was announced in OMB Memorandum 08–05. 

ticipating Federal departments and agencies, and the Information Systems Security 

Line of Business (ISS LOB). The ISS LOB is part of the President’s Management 

Agenda to expand Electronic Government. The goal of the ISS LOB is to address 

those areas of information security which are common to all agencies and are not 

specific to the mission of any individual agency, ultimately resulting in improved 

information systems security. OMB has selected DHS as the managing agency for 

the ISS LOB, and DHS, through the NCSD, is leveraging its role in the ISS LOB 

to enhance the TIC initiative. 

OMB announced 1 the TIC initiative to the heads of Federal Government departments and agencies in November 2007, subsequently outlining the specific steps departments and agencies should take as part of the initiative, including compiling a 

comprehensive inventory of each department and agencies’ existing network infrastructure. Each department and agency is required to develop a Plan of Actions and 

Milestones (POA&M) to reduce and consolidate the number of external connections 

with a target completion date of June 2008. NCSD is in the process of reviewing 

initial POA&M submitted to NCSD, via the ISS LOB, for review to ensure completeness and alignment with the goals and objectives of the TIC initiative. In addition, 

US–CERT and the ISS LOB created an interagency technical working group to establish, for OMB’s approval, a list of requirements and standards for the implementation of each TIC. Once approved, these requirements will be passed to the department and as for implementation. 

The reduction of external connections will have a number of benefits for the Federal Government, particularly when coupled with other security measures. First, 

fewer external connections will provide the ability to establish a central oversight 

and compliance function. This central function will benefit Federal systems by facilitating the implementation of standardized information security policies. In addition, 

the TIC will enable the implementation of 24-hour watch and warning capabilities 

across the Federal Government and enable faster and more effective response to 

cyber incidents. The TIC will also enable the rollout of an intrusion detection system 

across Federal networks to provide better situational awareness, earlier identification of malicious activity, and overall, a more comprehensive network defense. 

The EINSTEIN Program 

The EINSTEIN program is another critical element of our efforts to increase 

cybersecurity across Federal departments and agencies. EINSTEIN is a collaborative information-sharing program that was developed in response to increasingly 

common network attacks on and disruptions to Federal systems. The program was 

initially established to help departments and agencies more effectively protect their 

systems and networks and to generate and report necessary IT-related information 

to US–CERT. EINSTEIN enhances situational awareness of the Federal Government’s portion of cyberspace, allowing US–CERT and cybersecurity personnel to 

identify anomalies and respond to potential problems quickly. EINSTEIN is presently deployed at 15 Federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, and US–CERT is in the process of deploying EINSTEIN across all Federal departments and agencies. With the TIC initiative providing a reduced number of external connections, EINSTEIN will be able to more effectively monitor activity 

across Federal Government networks. 

The EINSTEIN program supplements departments’ and agencies’ intrusion detection systems by monitoring their networks from outside their firewalls, 24 hours a 

day, 7 days a week. EINSTEIN utilizes an automated process for rapidly collecting, 

correlating, analyzing, and sharing government computer security information with 

US–CERT and department and agency system administrators. EINSTEIN utilizes 

a specific tool set to analyze network flow, which is comprised of a brief summary 

of a network connection, including source, destination, time, bytes, and packets 

transferred. 

US–CERT deploys EINSTEIN to Federal departments and agencies, along with 

all necessary hardware, software, support services, and staff training. Once implemented within a Federal department or agency, EINSTEIN identifies and establishes a baseline for normal network operational activity. From this baseline, security personnel are able to identify unusual network traffic patterns and trends, such 

as configuration problems, unauthorized network traffic, network backdoors, routing 

anomalies, and unusual network scanning activities. With this information, security 

personnel can quickly identify, prevent, and respond to potential problems. 

EINSTEIN analyzes the information collected and posts it to a secure internet 

portal, which only approved personnel can access. System administrators from participating departments and agencies review their data and determine if any mitiga-
16 

tion activities are necessary, often in collaboration with US–CERT. Simultaneously, 

US–CERT personnel analyze the data from participating department and agency 

networks to determine if any recurring patterns and trends exist, potentially indicating the presence of malicious cyber activity targeting the Government as a whole. 

If US–CERT finds such patterns of unusual activity across multiple agencies, US– 

CERT notifies appropriate stakeholders and coordinates mitigation and response actions as necessary. 

EINSTEIN already has proven successful in enhancing security within the Federal Government. For example, through the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) 

participation in the EINSTEIN program, we were able to quickly detect malicious 

activity and prevent it from infecting other government computers. In this case, a 

computer worm had infected an unsecured government computer in a U.S. Government agency. When the worm, in its attempts to increase its network of infected 

computers, tried to attack DOT’s network, EINSTEIN detected the unusual traffic. 

After further investigation, US–CERT discovered the worm and worked with the affected departments and agencies to prevent its spread. 

EINSTEIN reduces the time it takes to gather and share critical data on computer security risks from an average of 4 to 5 days to an average of 4 to 5 hours. 

Quick notification results in the Federal Government being able to respond to incidents and mitigate potential problems more efficiently and effectively. Governmentwide deployment of EINSTEIN will further enhance the ability of US–CERT to gain 

a more comprehensive view of Federal systems, increasing US–CERT’s analytic capabilities and augmenting the extent and quality of US–CERT’s information sharing 

activities. Together with the TIC, broad deployment of EINSTEIN will increase our 

ability to address potential threats in an expedited and efficient manner. 

CONCLUSION

Securing the Nation’s IT systems and networks in an environment of increasing 

global threats by agile and sophisticated adversaries is a difficult challenge that requires a coordinated and focused effort. Secretary Chertoff’s prioritization of 

cybersecurity for the year ahead underscores the importance of this challenge. Accordingly, the Department is working with its Federal partners to develop and implement a holistic strategy for securing our Federal networks and systems. 

We have established a strong foundation of programs and activities to address the 

dynamic threat, and we continue to expand and improve upon those programs 

through new and enhanced efforts. The TIC’s reduction of Internet access points and 

EINSTEIN’s situational awareness capabilities are examples of initiatives designed 

to prevent the disruption of Federal critical infrastructure from unauthorized users 

that penetrate Federal systems and steal or compromise vital or sensitive information. 

Government-wide deployment of TIC and EINSTEIN enables strategic, crossagency assessments of irregular or abnormal Internet activity that could indicate a 

vulnerability or problem in the system. These programs enhance Federal Government cybersecurity by providing more robust security monitoring capabilities to facilitate the identification and response to cyber threats and attacks. They contribute 

to the improvement of network security, increasing the resilience of critical electronically delivered government services, and enhancing the survivability of the 

internet. 

The Federal Government is committed to increasing its capabilities to address 

cyber risks associated with our critical networks and systems. Every Federal department and agency plays a role in and adds to the protection of our Nation and its 

citizens from cyber threats. 

Thank you for your time today, and I am happy to answer any questions from 

the committee. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

I thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

I now remind each member that he or she will have 5 minutes 

to question the panel. 

I now recognize myself for the first set of questions. 

Mr. Charbo, we had a hearing in June of last year where Mr. 

Langevin chaired the subcommittee, and it was quite revealing 

that a number of attacks had occurred on our system, and perhaps 

we were not as notified, or you and your Department, of many of 

those attacks until a contractor informed you of that. The infa-
17 

mous, ‘‘You don’t know what you don’t know,’’ comment was in response. 

Now, to the extent possible, since that hearing, can you give this 

committee the follow-up as to what you have instituted in your previous position and this present position to prevent such attacks? 

Mr. CHARBO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

At that hearing, we were asked about some of the security notifications that we have had on our networks through our intrusion 

detection systems. In 2005, we looked at the current contract that 

we had on those local networks. We identified gaps, and we put 

dollars in place to fill a lot of those gaps, including putting contract 

support in place for that. We also identified a need to recompete 

that contract, which we have done. 

It is true that at the time of that hearing, I had not been read 

into any of the specific threat vectors that are in place and that we 

are now aware of. The first briefing that we did have was with 

OMB—that was to the general CIO Council, and since that, we 

have had follow-up briefings. This initiative has caused a number 

of briefings, and my staff and I have also gone out and pretty aggressively looked toward any sources we can to identify briefings 

that get beyond a sensitive but unclassified or even a secret level. 

At the time, we said, ‘‘We are only focused on the data. That is 

all we can look at in terms of data of intrusion sets, et cetera, to 

identify anything back to whether it is a nation state attack or 

what is the nature of the vulnerability.’’ We are still in that phase. 

There’s a handful of issues that we are continuing to look at. Those 

in a classified state. We take every security incident very seriously 

at the operation. 

At the Department of Homeland Security, we have instituted 

several issues since I have started at that Department. The one we 

have spoke about many times is OneNet. We have said very publicly, ‘‘That is the most important IT project that we can put in 

place at the Department.’’ That is a consolidation of a wide area 

of points of access. It mirrors very closely to what the TIC effort 

is about. 

We want to put state-of-the-art intrusion detection at those access points that includes Einstein and other services. We have put 

that in place. We have put a security operations center in place 

that is 24×7. 

We are beginning to peer to those from our different components 

at the Department. We have raised the classifications of the CIOs, 

of our security, administrators, of our network administrators, of 

our deputy CIOs so that no longer are they just getting an unclassified brief. Quite honestly, what you get in that state is just a 

piece of information that is very difficult to interpret back to any 

attribution at all or to identify what the gaps are. 

What makes it even more difficult at the Department of Homeland Security is we are an immigration agency, which we have clients from outside of this country who are trying to receive information on our public points of access, as well as law enforcement 

points, as well as border and port agencies. So we have done a 

number of things before the hearing, since the hearing in order to 

shore up our security operations at the Department, including 

doing a number of recompetitions and rebuilds of certain applica-
18 

tions, moving it to our points of access, which were part of the 

OneNet project. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. We will come back to some 

other questions. 

I yield to the Ranking Member for questions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to follow up on the Chairman’s line of questioning, 

because at the last hearing, when you testified, it did raise some 

serious concerns. You are the chief information officer for the Department of Homeland Security. There is a major threat of intrusion into our Federal networks, and yet you are not read into, as 

you said, read into the threat factors at the time. I understand you 

didn’t know what you didn’t know, but who was responsible for ensuring that you had that information, that didn’t get you that information that you should have had? 

We talk a lot after 9/11 about silos and not connecting the dots, 

not sharing information, and yet we have what I consider to be a 

major breach at the Federal level of not sharing information that 

should have been shared with you. I mean, you are the CIO of 

Homeland Security, and you didn’t have this threat factor information. 

Can you tell me what happened? Then I think you explained 

what you have done to correct that; that is the good news. You had 

a clearance, I assume, at the time. But you said you have upgraded 

now all the CIOs, they have the clearance to share that information. 

What happened back then? 

Mr. CHARBO. It is difficult to tell what happened, sir. The briefings that we get are on a compartmentalized basis. They are tear 

lines between information moving down from classifications level. 

Most of the information that we got prior was at an unclassified 

level. At that point, it is very difficult to interpret that. 

If I can bring this back to the hearing point, in terms of the enterprise network, I think this is an issue that is going to have to 

be addressed across a lot of the components—raising classification 

levels, moving information onto secure networks and not trying to 

do this on our unclassed networks—and that is going to be a training, a clearance issue, a network issue. We have addressed that. 

Once we do have the information at Homeland, I think we have 

moved very aggressively in terms of raising the visibility with our 

key points. We have taken that to mean our CIOs within the Department, our security officers within the Department, our network 

administrators. We can bring together in classified settings, action 

those and then task those on in an unclassified point of presence. 

All I can say is, prior to that there were gaps in that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. You suffered from that gap, obviously, and I think 

as we move forward with this initiative and as Congress provides 

its oversight in how best to implement this initiative, that has got 

to be one of the key factors to make sure the CIOs for each of the 

major Federal agencies involved with this initiative are certainly 

read into the classification level to share that kind of threat information. I mean, we have gotten the reports that the Federal Government has had massive intrusions into its Federal networks, and 
19 

it seems to me the CIOs of these agencies should be aware of that 

fact to better protect itself. 

I know this is part of the initiative, but I would encourage you 

to make this a priority in this initiative, and we will be looking at 

that issue. 

Mr. Jamison, did you have a comment? 

Mr. JAMISON. Yes, sir. Congressman, you are exactly on point: 

This is one of the fundamental challenges that we are facing, and 

a lot of the threat information was extremely classified. What we 

are talking about trying to do is get comprehensive situational 

awareness. 

So as we improve our Einstein deployment, improve intrusion detection, we are also coordinating with our intelligence components 

and all of the Federal Government agencies that have threat information so we can get more real-time information to the CIOs and 

to the network operation centers and security operation centers so 

that they can take defensive action. That is the top priority. 

Mr. MCCAUL. My second question is, under this initiative—I am 

a believer in clear lines of authority. When you have these mergers 

and partnerships and sharing agreements and what not, you need 

to know who is in charge and who is in charge of the budget. 

Under this initiative, can you tell me—maybe Mr. Jamison—who 

is in charge here? 

Mr. JAMISON. Sure. First, let me caveat this statement by, I 

would be happy to give you a detailed briefing on the full budget, 

including the classified parts in a close session. 

For what we are talking about today, for the TIC consolidation, 

we share the lead with OMB on helping them consolidate internet 

access points, but we have the lead to deploy the intrusion detection, to own, operate and manage the intrusion detection and come 

up with that comprehensive situational awareness picture. 

There are many more parts to this initiative that I can’t discuss 

openly in this forum and would be happy to give you a classified 

briefing on that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I understand that. I think at one of the hearings 

that the Chairman of the subcommittee, Langevin, and I had, we 

had testimony that the DHS was not really coordinating, certainly 

as well as we would hope, with the Department of Defense, and I 

know that may be getting into a classified area. I hope that is an 

area that will be focused on as well. They certainly have great expertise in this area that I think the DHS could be of great value 

to you in terms of the coordination. So I certainly hope that takes 

place. 

Then, last, we heard about the declassified operation, Aurora, 

where the Idaho National Labs found a vulnerability where a 

power grid could be shut down, exploited, with the click of a mouse. 

That causes, obviously, shockwaves, I think, through not only in 

the Federal Government but also the administration and the Congress, in terms of the vulnerability. 

That is great work, though, in terms of detecting that vulnerability and fixing it. 

Can I hear from you maybe some of the lessons learned from this 

project and what you are doing to protect the United States? 
20 

Mr. JAMISON. Sure. I think it was a success story. I think, as always, when you look back there is always room for improvement. 

But what happened with the Aurora vulnerability is research that 

was funded by the Department of Homeland Security through our 

lab networks identified the vulnerability. Once we identified the 

vulnerability, we worked through the national security infrastructure protection process and our interagency partners to validate 

that there was a vulnerability and actually develop mitigation 

plans. 

We developed those mitigation plans and tested those mitigation 

plans and actually came up with a dissemination plan within that 

NIPP framework, leveraging both our interagency partners and the 

Federal Government and our private sector partners and drove 

those implementation plans. 

We continue to monitor the implementation plans. We are 

pleased with the results. What we must continue to do is make 

sure that we are able to validate that those measures are still 

being taken in the field and we continue to pursue enhanced 

cybersecurity. 

But I do think it was a success story, especially given the fact 

of the sensitivity of the information and the challenges with trying 

to get implementation measures down the field while you don’t 

highlight a vulnerability, and I think the system worked. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I agree with that and look forward to hearing more 

about it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island and Chairman 

of the subcommittee for 5 minutes, Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you yielding, and I appreciate the witnesses for their testimony. I have deep 

appreciation for the Chairman’s line of questions, as well as the 

Ranking Member, about who knew what when and this issue of 

silos. 

Obviously, the Department of Homeland Security being the lead 

agency for security needs to know what threats we are facing and 

making sure that the dots are connected, and I haven’t been satisfied previously that that had been happening. I hope that this is 

changing, and we heard some of that in your testimony today. 

I am not going to go on about that, but I will say, obviously, for 

years now, our Federal networks have been under attack, and I believe that the infiltration and exploitation of these networks is one 

of the most critical issues confronting our Nation. The acquisition 

of our Government’s information by outsiders undermines our 

strength as a Nation, and if sensitive information clearly is stolen 

and absorbed, our systems are hacked by our adversaries, clearly, 

we are strategically harmed. 

I don’t believe that this administration, at least up until now, 

has made cybersecurity the priority that it should be. I believe that 

is starting to change, and with the right vision and leadership, I 

believe we can improve security of our Federal networks and our 

critical infrastructure. 

There are some promising elements of the Cyber Security Initiative, but there are still some gaping holes, and I just want to as-
21 

sure the American people that under Chairman Thompson’s leadership and the work that we are doing on our subcommittee that we 

are going to continue to perform robust oversight of this issue. 

In terms of questions, in terms of what I see as gaps, what I 

want to know is, how many and what kinds of connections does the 

trusted internet connection cover? For instance, does the TIC cover 

government-to-contractor network connections? Because we know 

that it is not only about the security on networks but authorized 

intrusions. We need to be secure about that. 

We had problems right at the Department of Homeland Security 

where we had contractors plugging unauthorized laptops into our 

own network, which you have viruses on there that infiltrate our 

networks. So you could be securing your networks but if you have 

unauthorized access, that is a problem. 

Also does it cover Federal-to-State and local connections? What 

about public service e-gov Web sites, such as student loans at the 

Department of Education or Social Security or the IRS e-file site? 

How about law enforcement internet connections used for investigative purposes? 

So I would like you to answer that, as well as what will the 

Cyber Initiative do to secure federally owned or privately owned 

critical infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants and the electric grid from cyber attacks? As part of the TIC consolidation, will 

you consolidate connections between federally owned critical infrastructure and the internet? In other words, will dams operated by 

the Bureau of Reclamation or power plants operated by the TVA 

consolidate their connections, and will you install Einstein on these 

connections? 

Ms. EVANS. I would be happy to answer the first part of the 

question, which is, what types of connections, and the way that we 

are approaching it is, it is all external connections. 

As you clearly outlined, any external connection to an entity 

causes or poses a risk. So all agencies were required to report back 

to DHS by the guidance of OMB to tell how many external connections, and that is all of them, whether it is going to a Federal contractor, whether it is your internet point of presence, whether it is 

a direct connect between you and another. If it is external to your 

operation, it counts and it is being looked at as part of this effort. 

Because we need to manage the risk associated with those, because this is a shared responsibility of managing the risk by department, by department. They all have to look at what type of information they have, what type of services they are providing and 

then manage the risk accordingly to that. 

So they have all reported in. We gave them a reporting template. 

We have the number baseline of connections that they have right 

now so that we can then move to optimize those going forward. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And the second part of the question? 

Mr. JAMISON. I will just follow up on the critical infrastructure. 

As Karen mentioned, we are focused on all external connections 

and getting those external points solidified. The initial focus of the 

effort is to get the dot-gov networks under stronger intrusion detection management and situational awareness. 

We are continuing our dialog through the NIPP process on critical infrastructure and how we better manage cybersecurity in 
22 

those areas. We will continue to engage them and develop a stronger plan, and some of those initiatives we will be happy to talk in 

more detail about in a classified session. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That is promising. We are going to continue to 

follow up on that. 

Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I do have one last question. 

Have we ever done a full damage assessment of Federal agency 

networks or DHS networks? If not, why not, and will this be covered under the Cyber Initiative? 

Mr. JAMISON. Not to my knowledge that a full damage assessment has been done, but I will say that we investigate known intrusions and make sure that each agency follows up and has that 

responsibility, and Karen may want to go into more detail about 

that. 

US–CERT has played a support role in investigating intrusion 

activity and making sure that we follow up with damage assessments from known intrusions. 

There is a broader effort to do a more detailed risk assessment, 

as we move forward with this initiative on the total risk picture for 

the Federal Government, as we address those risks. 

Karen, you may want to follow up on that. 

Ms. EVANS. I would like to clarify a couple of pieces here. One, 

under the FISMA, Federal Information Security Management Act, 

agencies do need to do an assessment right off the bat on all their 

systems, and the guidance has been given out to the agencies, and 

we report on this on an annual basis. So all systems are categorized by high-, medium- and low-risk, and we report on that. 

Then they all have to do testing, have security controls in place 

and then also then evaluate what that is. So we report on that on 

an annual basis. That report is due March 1 every year. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. If I could just stop you there, because that is a 

risk assessment. That is different than a damage assessment. 

Ms. EVANS. I am going to get there. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

Ms. EVANS. So the second part of that is, as a result of the loss 

of data that happened at the VA situation with the personal identifiable information, we put additional procedures in place so that as 

agencies have things happen—we also now have a BPA available 

for all agencies so that they can then do an assessment after the 

fact so that they can then go in and see how much damage has actually occurred, what they are supposed to do. 

The policy is in place, they have teams that are in place at the 

highest levels of each department so that as they lose data, they 

are supposed to assess it, what is the risk associated with that, and 

then take proper precautions and proper notification associated 

with it. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay, but that is prospectively. You are saying 

that we have not and we are not going to do a damage assessment—— 

Ms. EVANS. No, sir. They need to do a damage assessment each 

time things—that is how the policy is set up now. So they do an 

assessment as each incident occurs and as they report the incidents 

in. So they report incidents into US–CERT. They have to make an 

assessment at that point depending on the type of incident, by the 
23 

categories we have, and then they have to continue on doing the 

assessment. You are calling it a damage assessment; we call it a 

risk, data breach type of assessment so that they can then take the 

appropriate actions. 

That is whether you turn it over to law enforcement, whether 

you have to notify individuals for the services that you have done 

if their information may have been compromised or notify your 

partners so that they are aware of what has happened within your 

entity to be able to share for more awareness across the board. 

So we have enhanced our procedures to make sure that that is 

being done on a consistent basis. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, 

Mr. Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My question is to Mr. Jamison. 

Mr. Jamison, I guess my first question is, who is in charge of the 

Cyber Initiative and who is going to hold the budget authority for 

it? 

Mr. JAMISON. Congressman, for the portions that we are talking 

about today, with the TIC consolidation, we share the lead with 

OMB, but the $115 million budget supplemental that addresses 

this issue of deploying Einstein and dramatically ramping up our 

comprehensive situational awareness, DHS has the budget authority for that and are owning, operating and managing that equipment. 

I would be happy to go into more details in follow-up briefings 

on the rest of the classified budget and who has the leads for the 

other pieces. 

Mr. DENT. I guess in a follow-up to that question, if the initiative 

is spread across the entire Government, who is going to have the 

ultimate control over how everybody is working together? Obviously, Mr. McCaul pointed out some gaps and people not knowing 

things that they needed to know, apparently, so who is going to 

have that ultimate control to make sure that people are actually 

working together on this? 

Mr. JAMISON. Let me answer the question in a couple of ways. 

The director of national intelligence has a coordination role for all 

aspects of the initiative to help coordinate the project management 

of those initiatives. Each individual agency that has authorities 

and responsibilities under the initiative have that responsibility. 

We would be happy to come back in a classified session and give 

you a lot more details on that aspect. 

The Department of Homeland Security plays a key role in the 

protection of the dot-gov and Federal networks from an Einstein 

perspective and has a lead role in that. We also have a coordination role across the cybersecurity domain, and we would be happy, 

as that develops, the plan for that develops, to come back up in a 

classified session and lay out in detail how that coordination role 

is going to be played out to coordinate all of the activities across 

the Federal Government. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you for that answer. 
24 

* Copies of the charts have been retained in committee files. 

It is also my understanding that US–CERT is going to be able 

to view the content of communications over government networks. 

I guess the question is, why is this important, and what information will they be collecting, and what will they do with it? 

Mr. JAMISON. First of all, if I may, I brought a couple of props 

with me, if I can ask one of—— 

Mr. DENT. Please. 

Mr. JAMISON [continuing]. My employees to come up. I would like 

to, kind of, explain to you what the differences are. 

So if you get the other two first, I want to show this. 

Mr. DENT. We can’t see that, by the way. Well, maybe some of 

you can but not me. 

Mr. JAMISON. Can you take it up to the Congressman? 

Our current Einstein capability is a flow analysis tool, so if you 

look at the current Einstein flow records, this is the basic information that Einstein captures: IP addresses, the size of data packets 

and where is information is flowing from network to network. We 

capture that and then once day, or routinely, we download it. The 

other chart shows you the types of analysis that we do on that information.* 

So we are trying to detect patterns, we are trying to detect malicious IP addresses and to do analysis on activity that would look 

suspicious or have malicious intent. It is delayed and our effectiveness—and we have got good analysts—but our effectiveness is limited to how good our analysts are. 

Where we want to go is we want to be able to detect the malicious code that we know about. When an adversary or an intrusion 

has a signature of malicious code, we want the sensors to be able 

to scan for that malicious code and alert us when we know that we 

have malicious activity. 

Let me point out that this is no different than intrusion detection 

capabilities that are on Federal systems today. They all have commercial capability to do intrusion detection. What is different is 

that we are going to have comprehensive coverage of our external 

points to make sure that we have got intrusion detection at all 

those points. 

We are also going to make sure it is consistent so the same intrusion detection is consistent, and it is going to be informed by the 

knowledge of the Federal Government of what we know about the 

threat, so we will have the latest signature information on the 

threat comprehensively across the Federal Government. 

So it addresses some of the concerns that I have heard from the 

committee today about not knowing all the threat avenues and one 

agency knowing more threat information than another. This is the 

intent, to get to comprehensive situational awareness. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

Real quickly, the specific role of US–CERT, the administration is 

requesting, I guess, about $100 million more than was enacted last 

year, and so I guess the question is, how are you going to spend 

this US–CERT money? 

Mr. JAMISON. It really breaks down into a couple of different 

components. The majority of it is in deploying the equipment, so 
25 

the intrusion detection equipment to the sites. We also have a large 

chunk of money, about $43 million, for the 2008 budget in facilities 

as we ramp up our capabilities to add more people. 

We have to build the backend analytical capabilities. So just as 

I have shown you, some of the analysis has to be done on flow 

records. We need to build our capability to do analysis on that, to 

handle a much larger percentage of the traffic. Currently, our Einstein capability handles a very, very, very small percentage of the 

Federal Government traffic. We want to expand that to 100 percent 

through this initiative, so we have to back up our analytical capability. 

It also will allow us to build our malicious malware analysis labs 

and those things and expand them to handle the additional volume. 

Those are the major components. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now recognize the gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman, 

for 5 minutes. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. 

As I think the witnesses know, Members of this committee have 

received a number of classified briefings on the threat. Obviously, 

we are not discussing the threat here, but since my focus over all 

my years in Congress, all 100 years that I have served in Congress, 

has been on security threats, I take that kind of information very 

seriously, and I think the threats are substantial, starting with 

hackers but going on to much bigger threats. 

I have been sitting here with my mouth open. I think that this 

hearing reminds me of FEMA trailers, the Government doing something and 2 years later deciding that it is toxic and taking it away. 

I think while all of you are well meaning and working hard at your 

jobs, the fact that you don’t have the threat information and that 

you are working on projects that will take years to complete is absolutely shocking. Let me repeat that: I think it is shocking. 

If we are serious about these threats—and I am serious about 

these threats—we are not being serious about our response to the 

threats. It is not timely, I don’t get any sense of urgency, I don’t 

think much of it will work. 

As an example, as we all know, most of the cyber network is in 

the private sector. I think, absolutely, everybody knows that. You 

have been talking about private sector collaboration and cooperation. My understanding is the private sector considers Einstein too 

passive, and it doesn’t deliver information in real time. 

So how is it that we are going, in real time, have a response to 

a very significant threat? I just don’t see it happening. I don’t see 

DHS being able to do it within DHS, let alone coordinate a response across our Government. So I am sitting here really concerned about that. 

Second, I hear from constituents all the time in my district. They 

are really aware of programs that involve having access to personal 

information of American citizens. Obviously, for this program to 

work, as you have been discussing, there has to be some collaboration with some of our security agencies, like NSA and DOD. 
26 

I have no doubt that you are working on, and that we have been 

briefed on, some legal protocols about all that and that there is an 

effort to protect privacy. However, I assure you that constituents 

of mine listening to this hearing—and I am sure they are all tune 

in, even though it is pretty early in California—are thinking about 

this as, ‘‘Government sets up new spy network.’’ That is how they 

are going to receive this information. 

So let me ask you to respond—all of you—to what I have just 

said, two parts. No. 1, is this in real time and fast enough to mount 

a serious response to a serious threat? No. 2, what would you advise me to tell my constituents who are going to call me this afternoon and ask me how I am going to stop this latest government 

spy network into their personal privacy? 

Mr. JAMISON. Thank you, Congressman, I will address those. The 

previous charts I put up were trying to get exactly to that point. 

Obviously, I could do a better job of explaining it. But I would say 

that right now our Einstein capability is passive. We are looking 

at flow records, we are not looking for malicious activity, we are 

doing it after the fact, and we want to move that to real-time intrusion detection capabilities. So we want to make sure we lock down 

our nodes of access to the Federal Government and give ourselves 

real-time malicious activity intrusion detection. 

So that is exactly the intent of this. We are aggressive about it. 

We are going to be employing—as we ramp down the number of locations, we are going to be deploying that equipment this year. As 

you can tell by our budget request, we have ramped up our capabilities to respond to that. 

Second, on the privacy issue, I can tell you one thing: First of all, 

privacy and civil rights has been a top priority for this. We have 

had our privacy folks and our civil rights folks involved in this 

from the very start. Current Einstein has a privacy impact assessment that is public. We are currently in the process of doing a privacy impact assessment for the new capability as we move it forward, as well as full legal review, and we take that matter very 

seriously. 

But I would like to add that the capability that we are talking 

about for detecting that malicious activity in real time is no different than a commercial intrusion detection capabilities at many 

agencies and every corporation in America has on their systems. 

The issue is, it is going to be comprehensive, it is going to be consistent, it is going to be informed by our threat information. 

Ms. HARMAN. It is going to be massive, and it is going to be 

across the Government and possibly across the private sector. So 

it is a little bigger than any of the other networks or tools that individual companies have, right? 

Mr. JAMISON. We are not talking about the private sector right 

now, we are talking about the Federal Government node and the 

traffic coming into the Federal Government. 

Ms. HARMAN. Got it. 

Other people have any answers to my two questions? 

Ms. EVANS. Yes, ma’am, I would like to answer those questions 

as well. 

In everything that we are talking about and even on the threat 

information and the vulnerabilities that we are all aware of, this 
27 

all starts with a defense in depth. There is no silver bullet, we all 

know that, and so there are several things that the agencies are 

doing that, first and foremost, most of these come from exploiting 

known vulnerabilities and through configuration management. 

There is a very extensive effort, and I mentioned this in my testimony and we did this jointly with the NSA, which is set up the 

way that FISMA was intended where they would do standards in 

an open setting, and then we would go through the process that the 

Commerce Department has. So we have set up 700 settings that 

then reduce the vulnerability and then make sure that what we are 

doing is building that in right up front. 

So some of these things that are common sense we are going 

ahead and trying to take care of that on a mass basis. That is also 

then going to be built into the computers that get delivered to the 

agencies. So in spite of themselves, they will be successful, because 

they will be coming configured securely. That is the first thing that 

we are doing, because those things we should take those right off 

the table, and that should not be an issue. 

The other thing that the agencies are doing are also encrypting 

all their data—data at rest, data that is mobile—so that should 

that happen, that then it becomes harder. So you are raising the 

threshold up. 

Then we are also using two-factor authentication, which then 

makes sure that people who are authorized, you know that those 

are the people who are supposed to be on your networks. 

So we have these in place. The agencies are rolling out, they 

have these measures, they are implementing these, and they are 

upgrading their security as they go forward. 

As part of privacy and security, that is an administration concern, has always been. It is a high priority, and we have been doing 

all of these activities in a very transparent way, so that everyone 

can comment on what we are doing. The privacy impact assessments are out there. We put it through the Federal Register notice 

process so that it is done in a very transparent way to make sure 

that the citizens know how we intend to protect that information. 

Ms. HARMAN. Did you want to comment? 

If he could just finish his response, I would appreciate that. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHARBO. I would just add that the Einstein program is only 

a part of the total cyber effort. We are really focused on also changing the way networks are operated. That is down at the operator 

level. In terms of just their situational awareness, their training 

and how they react and respond on a daily basis to operations, as 

well as to how we procure, how we also configure the different 

things, which Ms. Evans just went into. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Broun. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to just go a little further with a question that Mr. 

Dent asked you all. 

Secretary Jamison, it is my understanding that you all can view 

the content of all the dot-gov connections, and I am concerned 

about privacy too, as Congresswoman Harman is. We have had 

your folks from civil rights as well as the privacy protection of DHS 
28 

come testify before this committee, and the question I have or frustration I have is, I don’t really see beyond just DHS how folks in 

my district, privacy is really going to be protected. It looks almost 

like the fox guarding the henhouse, proverbially. 

As a United States Marine, I am very concerned about the security of this Nation, and as an original intent constitutionalist, I believe that national security and what you guys are doing is the 

prime purpose of the U.S. Government. But I am not convinced, as 

I think Ms. Harman is not convinced, that privacy is going to be 

protected in the process of developing these cyber protections within the government connections. 

I encourage you to try to find something beyond Einstein that is 

going to be focusing on the bad guys and not focusing just on the 

general public but finding some way to protect the privacy of American citizens, the good guys. As I see DHS developing these policies, when I go through security at airports or all these other 

things, it just looks to me as if we are focusing more of our resources, which are very limited, more of our personnel, greater and 

greater bureaucracy on focusing upon all us good guys and not on 

the bad guys. 

Can you assure me or tell me how you all maybe can go to Einstein 2.0, or whatever the system is, that is going to protect the 

privacy rights of American citizens, the good guys, and make sure 

that we don’t have these security threats within the cyberspace of 

the dot-gov connections? 

Mr. JAMISON. Thank you, Congressman. 

First of all, let me say that this is a comprehensive initiative, 

and there are a lot of agencies involved, and it has a comprehensive plan. We want to make sure that we have the opportunity to 

brief that to you in full in a classified session. 

From the standpoint of privacy, it is a top concern. We are currently not looking at content, as you put it. That is where we need 

to go. 

Mr. BROUN. Not looking at any content. 

Mr. JAMISON. Not currently. We are proposing that we are going 

to do that. 

Mr. BROUN. That is my concern, too. 

Mr. JAMISON. We are going through a privacy impact assessment 

to do that and make sure that we follow all the civil rights and 

civil liberties that are associated with that. 

Congressman, the threat is real. Our adversaries are very adept 

at hiding their attacks in normal traffic and the normal everyday 

traffic that comes across the network very well could be disguised, 

and it could be malicious. So the only true way to protect your networks is to have intrusion detections. It is what everybody has on 

all their networks now. It is not just consistent in the Federal Government, and it is not informed by our latest threat information of 

what we know. That is what we are talking about. 

There are a lot of other activities that we need to do to focus on 

improving cybersecurity beyond just this and the effort that we are 

talking about today, and we are working on that, and we would be 

happy to brief you on that in a detailed session. 

Mr. BROUN. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back. 
29 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina, 

Mr. Etheridge. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank you for being here. I must confess, I join Ms. Harman in listening to the testimony this morning. 

So, Mr. Jamison, given the hundreds of cyber incidents that have 

taken place over the last few years, how would you rate the Department’s response to cybersecurity, A through F? 

Mr. JAMISON. It’s been a while since I have been in school. I 

think currently we are—— 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Well, you find the number you want to, I will 

be happy. 

Mr. JAMISON. I think we are a solid C, and if you will allow me 

to expound on that from the standpoint of, as I mentioned before, 

our current capability from a US–CERT standpoint, and I am 

strictly talking about—— 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Let me just say something: If you say a solid C, 

you know, I was a State superintendent of schools for a few years, 

that is sort of average, at best. 

Mr. JAMISON. That is why we are here, Congressman. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. That isn’t even close to being good enough in 

what we are talking about for the American people. But I will let 

you continue, because I have another question following that. 

Mr. JAMISON. Congressman, that is why we are here. As I said 

in my opening statements, we need to do more. Currently, from a 

DHS and US–CERT perspective of having that responsibility across 

the Federal domain, we need to have more comprehensive—— 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. All right. Given that then, can you tell this committee what accountability has been put in place, because there are 

well-recorded numbers of breaches in the Government system? 

What accountability do we have in place when that happens? If it 

happens on my watch, what accountabilities am I accountable for? 

Mr. JAMISON. Well, I will defer to Karen to talk about the FISMA 

accountabilities and some of their requirements that each CIO has. 

Ms. EVANS. We hold the agencies accountable through a quarterly process. We manage, through the President’s management 

agenda, on the score card. However, when incidents occur, agencies 

are held accountable. We do work with them to ensure—because, 

first and foremost is when it does occur, that there is a proper response, because it is involving the citizens’ data, and, first and foremost, we have to make sure that the way that we handle that response is addressing their immediate needs and that we take the 

proper precautions in place to ensure that the citizen then knows 

that we are addressing that. 

Yes, sir. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Let me follow up on that, because I think that 

leads to a little broader question in that area, because every year 

OMB says that agencies are implementing more security controls 

on their computers, yet every year the number of successful penetrations in the Federal networks rise. This means that every year 

we lose more and more information to our adversaries. 

That being true, OMB measures success by the percentage of certified and accredited computer systems, but even the stamp of ap-
30 

proval that you are just talking about, sensitive data tends to seep 

out, okay? 

That being true, are we using the right metrics? The second part 

of that question, shouldn’t we be measuring our ability to stop attacks or at a minimum use our ability to detect and respond to attacks as the correct metric? Wouldn’t that seem to be a better metric to use in terms of where we are than just measuring the other 

pieces? I mean, that just seems common sense to me. 

Ms. EVANS. Okay. I would agree with you that initially when we 

first started this process, when FISMA’s predecessor was the Government Information Security Act, and many of the Members have 

brought this up: Initially, agencies didn’t know what they didn’t 

know. So metrics evolved, and these are the first sets of metrics 

that we use so that agencies could make sure that they knew what 

their inventory was. Because if you don’t know what you own, then 

you can’t manage it appropriately and know the risk associated 

with it. 

So the first set of metrics and the things that we have measured 

may need to improve, and we have talked to Congress about this 

and GAO, because we are now—and I would agree with you that 

the metrics that we look at are more output-oriented right now, 

and we are moving now to a level of more performance, such as the 

types of metrics that you are talking about, because—— 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Seems to me that is how you measure it. 

Ms. EVANS. Absolutely, and you know what the baseline is now. 

We know what these systems are, we know how the agencies are 

categorizing the systems, and there is consistency across the board. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. My time is running out. Let me touch one more 

point, if I may get it in, because I think this is critical. 

Because it seems to me there are flaws on the on-the-job training. I mean, we have already heard that. If we aren’t giving proper 

training and ongoing training, management practices within Federal agencies where workforces do not understand the effects of 

their actions on national security. I mean, what are we doing to 

train employees? That is the other side of it. We have got to measure both pieces, and that metric, it seems to me, has to change, if 

we are going to get—because if we do the same thing we have always done, we are going to get the same results we have always 

gotten. 

Ms. EVANS. May I answer? 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Please. 

Ms. EVANS. Thank you, sir. 

Okay, so we pick certification and accreditation because it is a 

soup-to-nuts process. If an agency approaches the process for compliance, checks the box, because I have to tell OMB and then it 

goes to Congress, we aren’t going to get the result that we intend. 

But if you look at the process associated with that, all the issues 

that you brought up, when you certify an accredited system, you 

have to know what it is, you have to analyze the risk, you have 

to put together rules of behavior so that each user, as they sign on, 

know what they are supposed to do and the consequences associated with not doing that. 

The last part of that also is residual risk, because the manager 

in charge needs to say, ‘‘That service is important. I will live with 
31 

this risk. Here is the compensating control and hold me accountable.’’ 

That is really how the process is supposed to work, and that is 

where we have to now move it to the next level so that we are actually achieving the result versus a paperwork exercise where we just 

get a bunch of paper and people are producing stuff and people 

don’t really know what their responsibility is and what they should 

be held accountable for. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. We are doing a lot of work. 

Ms. EVANS. We are improving it. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. But the results are meager for the investment, 

and we have got to do better to protect the American people. I really believe that. Thank you. 

Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you and the Ranking Member for holding this hearing, and because I know that time 

is of the essence, I will move as quickly as possible. 

I have a few questions, and thank you, witnesses, for appearing 

today. 

Is it true, Mr.—is it, Charbo, am I pronouncing it correctly?—Mr. 

Charbo, that you were the CIO of Homeland Security at a time 

when some intelligence reports about hacking were known to other 

agencies but not reported to you? Is this true? 

Mr. CHARBO. Well, sir, I am not sure what was reported to other 

agencies. My assumption is, is that is probably correct. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. At a 2007 hearing, according to the intelligence that I have, the Department of Homeland Security CIO, 

Scott Charbo—that would be you—told the committee that he had 

never received any intelligence reports about nation states hacking 

and that he was unfamiliar with the activity. 

Mr. CHARBO. The response, I believe, was that we had had one. 

I had had one previous to that hearing, which was sponsored 

through the CIO Council—— 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHARBO [continuing]. And at that time, there was nothing 

that pointed back to DHS. 

Mr. GREEN. You were not familiar with it. There were others 

who knew but you did not know; is this true? 

Mr. CHARBO. Not by the name, I believe, that was being discussed at the hearing. I mean, obviously, we had heard about nation state hacking and different nations, but I had never had a 

briefing that pointed back to the Department. They were all, basically, in general at a lower classification level. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, did it happen? Maybe I should start there. Did 

this happen? Was there actually a hacking that took place? 

Mr. CHARBO. At the Department? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHARBO. We have lots of security events at the Department. 

Whether or not those are nation states—— 

Mr. GREEN. Whether they are nation states—all right, let’s talk 

about nation states. Was there a nation state hacking? 
32 

Mr. CHARBO. Yes, there are a few that we are looking at, and we 

would have to address that on a classified level. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Is it your opinion that we have not had any 

cross-agency intelligence failures? 

Mr. CHARBO. I certainly think it can be improved, and I think 

that is what this effort is about. 

Mr. GREEN. All right. Well, let me go to my next question. Is it 

true that we had a contractor charged with securing networks at 

the Department, and this contractor did not install intrusion detection systems? 

Mr. CHARBO. Those are gaps that we identified, and that we had 

them put in place. 

Mr. GREEN. Is that a true statement? 

Mr. CHARBO. That is a true statement. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. The question becomes then, what are the consequences when we have these kinds of occurrences? Have we ever 

had a contractor terminated for failure to perform to the level that 

this contractor failed to perform? Terminated. We are not talking 

about renewing a contract. But have we ever had one terminated? 

Mr. CHARBO. Well, I can only speak to this incident. I mean, 

from a broader contracting perspective, that would have to go to 

our contracts. We did recompete this contract. 

Mr. GREEN. Let me ask you about what you know? Do you know 

of any contractor ever having been terminated? 

Mr. CHARBO. I can’t speak to anything specific. 

Mr. GREEN. So you don’t know of one. 

Mr. CHARBO. To my knowledge, I don’t know of that. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Do you know of anyone who has ever been 

fired for failure to properly provide intelligence across agencies that 

should have been provided? 

Mr. CHARBO. I couldn’t put a name on it, but, certainly, we have 

had contractors removed. 

Mr. GREEN. Well, now I am talking about a person being fired 

as opposed to a contractor. We went through the contracting and 

you indicated that you didn’t know about the contractors. 

Mr. CHARBO. The question is? 

Mr. GREEN. The question is, have we had anybody fired? Has 

anybody ever been fired? 

Mr. CHARBO. To my knowledge, I have never fired a Federal employee. We certainly have responded to performance, but I have not 

fired a Federal employee. 

Mr. GREEN. Do you know of anyone that has ever been fired for 

failure to perform in this area of sensitive security information 

transmission? 

Mr. CHARBO. I can’t speak to anything specifically. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Will that gentleman yield? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman THOMPSON. In the interest of making sure we get the 

record straight, Mr. Charbo, that incident that was referred to by 

Mr. Green I think it was the committee staff that brought it to 

your attention of your shop that there had been some problems 

with a contractor that you all were not aware of. I think after that 

was brought to your attention, you all moved forward and looked 

at it. 
33 

Please. 

Mr. CHARBO. The one incident that I believe is being referred to 

was made aware of by our staff. What was incomplete was the closure of that because of the different opinions. I mean, much of this 

hearing is about the level of data that you receive on a particular 

event. One analyst can look at a piece of data and have one interpretation. Several others can look at it and have different interpretations. A lot of that is dependent on the situational awareness 

that an individual has. 

In this case, that is what was presented to me. That coincided 

with the hearing. We asked for that information. At that time, I 

turned that over to our security group and said, ‘‘I have conflicting 

information here. It is something for you to look at.’’ 

I believe that is currently still under investigation, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. All right, Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

We now have three votes on the floor, and we have concluded all 

of our witnesses and our questions for the witnesses. I would like 

to thank them for their valuable testimony. The Members of the 

committee may have additional questions for the witnesses, and we 

will ask that you would respond expeditiously in writing to those 

questions. 

Hearing no further business, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(35) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTION FROM HONORABLE YVETTE D. CLARKE FOR HONORABLE KAREN EVANS, 

ADMINISTRATOR FOR ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, 

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

Question. Ms. Evans, it is my understanding that you have worked with Director 

Will Pelgrin, head of NY State’s Cyber Security Office and the chair of the MultiState Information Sharing and Analysis Center, including coordination on the Dataat-Rest Smart Buy program. Can you describe your involvement with this effort 

with the State and local governments and what were the results? 

Answer. SmartBuy is a Government-wide initiative which leverages the Federal 

Government’s requirements and buying power. As a member of the governance 

board, we help determine the priorities and technical requirements to be included 

in SmartBuy efforts. A major effort of the SmartBuy program was the Data-At-Request (DAR) Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs) to provide encryption products 

to Federal agencies, NATO, and State and local governments to protect sensitive, 

unclassified data on mobile computing devices and removable media. 

Protecting DAR is increasingly critical in today’s information technology (IT) environment of highly mobile data and decreasing device size. Personal identity information or sensitive Government information stored on devices such as laptops, thumb 

drives and personal digital assistants (PDAs) can be unaccounted for and unprotected, and can pose a problem if these devices are compromised. In addition to saving taxpayer dollars, the DAR BPA enhances DAR information security and requires 

vendors to meet stringent technical and information assurance requirements. 

OMB Memorandum M–06–16, Protection of Sensitive Agency Information, issued 

in June 2006 was a key impetus for the actions resulting in these agreements. Two 

months after OMB issued this memo, the DoD Data-at-Rest Tiger Team (DARTT) 

was developed to address technical requirements. Eventually, the DARTT evolved 

into an interagency team comprised of 20 DoD components, 18 Federal agencies and 

NATO, with State and local governments joining in March 2007. These requirements were presented to the governance board and accepted. 

The State and local governments are participating under GSA’s Cooperative Purchasing Program, which allows them to purchase IT products and services from both 

GSA’s Multiple Award Schedule 70 and Consolidated Schedules that have IT special 

item numbers. 

To date 127,296 licenses have been issued across 15 States (including local governments). This has resulted in savings of $24.1 million on purchases of encryption 

software through use of these Federal DAR contracts and approximately $8 million 

using the special State and local government offers—for a total of more than $32 

million in savings/cost avoidance to date. 

QUESTION FROM HONORABLE YVETTE D. CLARKE FOR HONORABLE ROBERT D. 

JAMISON, UNDER SECRETARY, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Question 1. Secretary Jamison, how much of the Infrastructure Protection and Information Security (IPIS) account in the fiscal year 2009 budget request is intended 

to support State and local Government cybersecurity activities? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security collaborates with a broad range 

of security partners, including State, local, and international governments, privatesector owners and operators, and individuals, in its efforts to improve the Nation’s 

cybersecurity posture. Specifically, the Department’s United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US–CERT), the national focal point for coordinating the defense against and response to national cyber attacks, engages with State and local 

governments by sharing information with States and providing direct support to 

States requiring response and recovery assistance. Budgetary support for State and 
36 

local government cybersecurity efforts is embedded within the Department’s many 

programs and activities and does not maintain a specific line item; however, the Department does provide funding to the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis 

Center (MS–ISAC). Much of the increase in funding to cybersecurity will result in 

improved situational awareness of threats, intrusions, and response methods across 

the Federal domain. State and local governments will benefit from this enhanced 

focus. 

Through a contract with the Department, the MS–ISAC supports a number of 

operational and awareness activities. The current contract with the MS–ISAC, spanning from November 2007 through November 2008, totals $1,694,825, and a similar 

amount is estimated for fiscal year 2009. These activities include operating the MS– 

ISAC State and Local Operations Center for Cybersecurity, which collaborates with 

US–CERT and contributes to State and local cybersecurity by maintaining situational awareness of the State cyber landscape; by hosting bi-monthly webcasts with 

cybersecurity experts for the general public to raise awareness about emerging 

cybersecurity issues; and by developing cybersecurity educational materials offering 

best practices, tools, and tips as part of the Department’s national cybersecurity 

awareness efforts. 

In addition to the funding provided to the MS–ISAC for these efforts, the Department has dedicated staff to support ongoing MS–ISAC efforts. This includes more 

than two full-time equivalents who liaise with the MS–ISAC to ensure coordination 

with the Department on current State and local government efforts by engaging in 

MS–ISAC activities, including various working groups to help with the creation, 

production, and dissemination of education and awareness resources for use by the 

States; and by participating in regular meetings as well as the MS–ISAC annual 

meeting. In addition, Department staff members work to oversee the fulfillment of 

the statement of work. Staff support to and coordination with the MS–ISAC is estimated at $270,000 annually. 

An important component of the Department’s work is its support of efforts to advance State and local cybersecurity activities. In addition to funding provided to 

support the MS–ISAC, the Department has committed significant resources, 

through various programs and activities, to help State and local security partners 

address their cybersecurity preparedness and response needs and effectively manage 

cybersecurity issues. 

Question 2. Secretary Jamison, how much of the increased funding to DHS for 

cybersecurity initiatives to address improvements in the security posture of State 

and local governments is specifically set aside for programs to be coordinated or performed by the Multi-State ISAC? 

Answer. The Cyber Initiative is an interagency effort that aims to enhance the 

security of Federal Government networks. Increased funding has been primarily directed to enhancements for the Department of Homeland Security’s United States 

Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US–CERT), the Nation’s watch and warning 

mechanism. US–CERT provides around-the-clock monitoring of cyber infrastructure 

and coordinates the dissemination of information to key constituencies, including all 

levels of government and industry. It serves as the focal point for helping Federal, 

State, local, and international governments, industry, and the public work together 

to achieve the appropriate responses to cyber threats and vulnerabilities. The additional funding allocated to enhance US–CERT capabilities is primarily focused on 

improving Federal network security through programs such as the Trusted Internet 

Connections (TIC) initiative and the Einstein program. It will also result in increased level of service and information sharing with all cybersecurity partners, 

which includes all of the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); however, no additional funding has been allocated to the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS–ISAC) or any other ISAC under this initiative. 

Although the Cyber Initiative is focused on Federal networks, the enhanced products and services from US–CERT will provide specific additional benefits to State 

and local governments. States are dependent upon Federal network operations and 

information for a range of services and daily critical functions. Cyber threats to the 

Federal networks could have potentially devastating effects on State and local government networks given their interconnectedness. Improving US–CERT’s capabilities to monitor, detect, report, and mitigate malicious activity will enable the Department to identify threats to Federal networks more effectively and efficiently, 

thus protecting those networks upon which State and local governments rely. 

The Department recognizes the importance of State and local government 

cybersecurity in its efforts to better secure the Nation’s cyber assets. Under the 

Cyber Initiative, programs and activities to secure Federal networks will benefit 

State and local governments. Through US–CERT’s enhanced watch, warning, and 

response capabilities, State and local governments will benefit from improved infor-
37 

mation sharing of alerts, warnings, and mitigations plans. In addition, the Department has established and maintains strong cooperative relationships with State and 

local governments, and it has developed several programs directed at addressing 

State and local government cybersecurity issues. With existing and new programs, 

the Department remains committed to improving the cybersecurity posture of State 

and local governments. 

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