*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under

the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 6/10/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

ROBERT LEE BOWMAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 95-5204

(D.C. No. 95-CR-19-C)

(W.D. Okl.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

Robert Bowman appeals his convictions on multiple counts of wire fraud and

aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2. The sole issue raised on appeal

is whether the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the convictions. We affirm.

Bowman and his wife Susan Bowman were charged with nine counts of wire fraud

and aiding and abetting. Specifically, the indictment charged Bowman with forming

Insurance Dynamics of America (IDA) and recruiting persons to provide money to

capitalize IDA in exchange for debentures purporting to guarantee returns varying from
2

11 to 12.5 percent; however, the indictment charged that the Bowmans used most of the

investors' money to cover personal and other unrelated expenses.

A person commits wire fraud if, "having devised or intending to devise any

scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or

fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, [he] transmits or causes to be

transmitted by means of wire [or] radio . . . communication in interstate . . . commerce,

any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme

or artifice." 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Thus, the essential elements of wire fraud are a scheme to

defraud and use of interstate wire communications to facilitate the scheme. United States

v. Galbraith, 20 F.3d 1054, 1056 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 233 (1994). "[A]

scheme to defraud is conduct intended or reasonably calculated to deceive persons of

ordinary prudence or comprehension." United States v. Hanson, 41 F.3d 580, 583 (10th

Cir. 1994).

On the other hand, to be liable as an aider and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2, the

evidence must establish defendant associated himself with a criminal venture, defendant

participated in the venture as something he wished to bring about, defendant sought by his

actions to make the venture succeed, and proof established commission of the offense by

someone and aiding and abetting by defendant. Hanson, 41 F.3d at 582.

Bowman generally contends the evidence presented was insufficient to support his

convictions. Specifically, he argues the evidence does not establish he acted with
3

fraudulent intent but that he acted in good faith. The standard of review applicable to a

sufficiency of evidence challenge is highly deferential to the prosecution; indeed, we have

stated that an appellant challenging his conviction due to insufficiency of the evidence

must overcome a "difficult standard" of review. United States v. Hoenscheidt, 7 F.3d

1528, 1530 (10th Cir. 1993). We recently explained the standard:

In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "we review the record

de novo, and ask only whether, taking the evidence--both direct and circumstantial,

together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom--in the light most

favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to conclude the evidence was insufficient, as

a matter of law, to support a conviction, we must find that no reasonable juror

could have reached the disputed verdict." [Citation omitted.] 

United States v. Hicks, 1996 WL 268047, *7 (10th Cir. May 20, 1996) (quoting United

States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1126 (10th Cir. 1995)).

Bowman argues he ran an honest business that failed, and that the government

failed to establish he had the intent to defraud. We have carefully reviewed the entire

record in this case and we conclude a reasonable jury could have found that Bowman

intended to defraud his investors. It is clear from the transcript that Bowman was the

person primarily responsible for inducing the investors to part with their money; he

contacted them, visited them, and encouraged them to purchase debentures to capitalize

IDA. He represented to the investors that their money would be used to establish IDA,

that he guaranteed a certain rate of return on their investments, and that IDA was a safe

investment. Bowman told the investors their money was safer with him than in banks
4

because it would be invested in the assets of "other going corporations." The transcript

also supports reasonable inferences that Bowman diverted a substantial amount of IDA's

capital to personal use and that he misrepresented IDA's business pursuits to the investors,

including misrepresentations that their monies were being invested and were growing. 

Some investors made additional investments following their receipt of an Investors

Quarterly Newsletter which Bowman sent to them. The Newsletter misrepresented to

investors that IDA was going forward and producing well. FBI Agent Dan Risner

testified in some detail about the manner in which the investors' money was spent. He

opined the Bowmans used up to 54 percent of IDA's capital for personal and other

expenditures unrelated to IDA. Additionally, the transcript clearly indicates Bowman

falsely represented IDA's financial stake in and ownership of various health care

companies. Although the extent of these misrepresentations is unclear, Risner's testimony

supports a reasonable inference that Bowman used most of the investors' money for

purposes other than to capitalize IDA.

Bowman unpersuasively attempts to transmute the investors' understanding of risk

into an insurmountable showing of his own good faith; his disclosure of general risk does

not necessarily indicate he lacked fraudulent intent. The indictment charged him with

diverting the investors' money to unrelated uses and Risner's testimony supported that

charge. With respect to whether he diverted the investors' money, Bowman disputes

Risner's testimony, as he did at trial through cross-examination and his own testimony,
5

and generally contests the government's interpretation of the evidence. In essence,

Bowman simply urges us to favor his interpretation of the record.

The question is not whether Bowman's interpretation of the evidence is tenable but

whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, "any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United

States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 864 (10th Cir. 1995). We must "accept the jury's resolution

of conflicting evidence and its assessment of the credibility of witnesses." Hicks, 1996

WL 268047, *7 (quoting Owens, 70 F.3d at 1126). We believe a rational trier of fact

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Bowman committed wire fraud. 

Accordingly, we find the evidence presented was sufficient to support Bowman's

convictions.

For the foregoing reasons, Bowman's convictions are AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe

Circuit Judge