T EX . P E N A L C ODE § 1 9

. 0 3 (a)( 2 ). 1 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

A P - 74, 393

I R V I N G A LV I N D A V I S, A ppe l l ant

v . THE S TA TE OF TE X AS O N D I R E C T A P P E A L F R O M C A U SE N O . 20010D 06419

I N T HE 1 6 8 DI S TR I CT COURT

TH EL P ASO CO UNTY

J O H N S ON , J ., del i vere d t he opi ni on of t he C ourt i n w hi ch M E YE RS , P RI CE , W OMACK , H ERVEY , H OL C OM B , and C OCHR AN , J J ., jo in e d . K EASLE R , J ., c o n c u r r e d in th e r esu lt o f p o int o f er ro r th re e a n d o th er w ise join ed th e o p inion o f the C o u rt. K ELL ER , P .J ., c o n c u r r e d in th e r e su lt

. O P I N I O N I n J une 2002, appel l an t wa s convicted of murderingMelissa Medina in the c ourse of committing or attempting to commit ag g ravated sexual assault. Ba sed on the jury ’s answe rs to the 1 specia l issues set forth in T exas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, §§ 2( b) and 2( e), the2

U n le ss o the rw ise ind ic a te d , all re fer e n c e s to A rtic le s re fer to the T e x a s C o d e o f C rim ina l P ro c e d u re . 2 trial judge s e n te n c e d

a p p e ll an t t o d e a th

. A rt. 3 7

. 0 7 1 , § 2 ( g )

. I nJu n e 2 0 0 7 , w e a f f ir me d th e tr ial 2

c ourt ’s jud g me nt a s it re la te d to a pp e lla nt’ s c on vic tio n, re ve rs e d it a s it re la te d to his punis hme nt,

an d rema nded the c ase to the tria l court for a new punishment hearing

. D a v is v . S ta te, No . A P74,393 (Tex. Crim. App. J une 13, 2007)( not desig nated f or publication). In Fe bruar y 2008, the trial court he ld a new punishment he aringbefor e a ne w jury

. At the conclusion of that hear ing, the trial

co urt, a c ti n g in

a c c o r d an c e w it

h th e ju r y ’ s an s w e r s to th e tw o s p e c ia l i s s u e s , a g a in a s s essed appellant’ s punishment at death. Appellant now r aises nine issues on dire ct appe al from the se cond punis hme nt h e ari ng . A ft e r r e vie wi nga pp e lla nt’ s p oin ts o f er

ro r, we fi nd the m to be wi tho ut m e ri t

and a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

EV ID EN CE OF SAT AN ISM I n p oin t of er

ro r one , ap pe lla

nt ar g ue s tha t “th e tr ia l cou rt e rr e d whe n it a llo we d th e state to prese nt evidence t h at ap p ellant had be come a Satanist while imprisoned on death row .” He specific ally

complains that the trial cour t erre d by admitting state’ s Ex hibits 247, 248, and 285 throug h 301, permitting the tes t i m o n y of state’ s expert witness Donald Hale y , and re quiring

a pp e lla nt t o d isp lay

to t he jur y the ta tto o o f a

pe nta g ra m on his ches t. Ap pe lla

nt r a ise s b oth constitutional and statutory claims, arguing that the t rial court violated t he First Amendment to the Un ite d St a te s Co ns tit

uti on a nd Rul e s 401 and 40 3 o f t he Te xas R

ule s o f E vid e nc e . B e c a

us e

a pp e lla nt b a se s h is s ing le po int

of e rr or on mor e tha n o ne le g a l th e or

y , hi s ent ire po int

of e rr or is multifarious. T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1. We will, however, r eview his a rg uments in the interest of justice. We reviewa trial c ourt’s decision to a dmit evide nce under an abuse of discretion standa rd. W alters v. State, 247 S.W .3d 204, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The trial court a buses its discretion3

50 3 U

. S. 15 9 (19 9 2 ). 3 only when the de cision lies “outside the zone of re asonable disag ree ment.” Id. Prior to trial, anticipating that the state would “ attempt to offer into evidence expert testimony in d ic a ti n g Def endant’ s relig ious beliefs,” a ppellant filed a

motion in l imine asking the trial court to bar t estimony

on that subject. At the he aringon the motion in li mine, defe nse counse l argued t h at t h e s t at e should not be allowe d to ge t into “the issue of satanism” be cause it was not

re le van t, it wou ld v iol a te his ri g hts to f re e do m of

re lig ion and fr e e do m of

a sso c ia tio n, a nd

its probative va lue was outwe ighe d by any prejudicia l effe ct. Def

ense c ounsel furthe r stated, [I ]t ’s m y understanding that the t y pe of satanic belief

s that my client does prof

ess ar e, in f a c t, n on vio le nt a

nd do no t in vo lve any

vio le nc e a t a ll

. And that ’s jus t th e ir differ ent, I

g uess, chur ches or

way s to practice this satanism. And so unless they can tie my c lie nt i n to , y ou

kn ow , I g ue ss the se ba d a c ts that th e y ’r e g oin g to atte mpt to produce , Idon’t think there’ s any rele vance there

. . . . Ibelieve, ba sed on my

argument as to the v ar i o u s d i ffe rent, I g uess, sec tions of satanism that y ou might have , Ithink that’ s exactly the problem they ’re g oing to r un int o in thi s c a se , th a t th e y ’r e no t goingto– y ou kn ow , th e y ’r e g oin g to b a sic a lly try –they ’re g oing to be trying to sa y that the mere fac t that he ’s a satanist is a bad a ct in its own right, and that’s not appropriate pursuant to Dawson v. Delaware. [ ] 3 Th e pr os e c uto r r e sp on de d th a t th e state int e nd e d to int ro du c e a pp e lla nt’ s p ri so n r e c or ds , writing s, draw ings, and “a pentag ram that is e tched into his body that was e ither ca

rved or burned” to show that, in 2006, appellant had de clar ed that he ha d been a Satanist since 2005. The prosec utor added, “ W e have evidenc e that will come in throug h our expert witness that he will testify about satanists and i l l ega l activities and violent ac tiviti es that have been c ommitt ed on the pa rt of satanists.” The pr osecutor e x plained that “there is no need for the State to prove that the Def endant himself eng ag ed in all of those illega l violent acts, only that the g roup is known to do that, and that the De fe nd ant i s a memb e r of that gr ou p. ” Th e pr os e c uto r f

ur the r s ta te d th a t a

pp e lla nt’ s “ be lie f i n4

satanism is being offe red a s evidenc e of his cha rac ter, to show his belief s y s t em s” and howthey relate to future- dang erousne ss; the issues of char acte r and f uture da ng erousne ss “ar e at the hear t of the sentenc ing pha se in a c apital murder case .” F ollowing the pa rties’ a rg uments, the trial cour

t g rante d the motion in limine “until such t ime as [ the s tate’s] expert can e stablish outsi de the he aring of the Jury

that, in fac t, there is a pr opensity in this orga

nization or this faith or this relig ion . . . for illega l activities or an [sic] enga g ing in violent ac tiviti es.” The state’ s expert witness, Donald Vaug hn Haley , later te stified on voir dire e x amination outside the presence of t he jury that Satanism advocates violence, as evidenc ed by the di scussion of human sac rifice i n TheSa tan ic Bi bleand the “ rituals of destruc tion” contained in TheSa tan ic Rituals. Haley

also g ave se vera l examples of people who committed murder a nd mutilation “in the name of Satan.” Ove r def ense c ounsel’s objec tions on relevanc e and the First Amendme nt, the trial

c ourt ru le d th a t H a le y

wo uld be pe rm itt e d “ to te sti fy in the are a of the satanic re lig ion ” and

that “ a ll of that evide nce is re levant to the issue of future dang erousne ss a nd it is outside the prote ction of the First Amendme nt.” Appellant a lso filed written objec tions to t he cour t’s ruling , arguing that the evidenc e wa s “irre levant” a nd that its admissi on violated Rule 403 an d h i s ri gh t s of fre edom of relig ion and fre edom of a ssociation under the First Amendme nt of the United States Constitut ion. At tr ia l, t he state of

fe re d into e vid e nc e va

ri ou s ite ms obt a ine d fr om a pp e lla nt’ s p ri so n c e ll, including f

ive books (state’ s Ex hibits 285-289), three w riting ta blets (state’s Ex hibits 290, 291, and 29 3), seve n d

ra wi ng s ( state ’s Exhi bit s 2 94 -2 99 and 30 1) , a nd a ha nd wr itt e n n ote (s ta te ’s Exhi bit 300). The books w ere entitled Necronomicon , TheSe c re t Lif e of a Sa tan ist , Sa ta n S

pea k s! , The Sa tan ic Ri tua ls , and

The Satanic Bible. Ap pe lla nt’ s wr iti ng ta

ble ts and dr awi ng s c on ta ine d Satanic imag ery and ref

ere nces, including lists of “Satanic statements,” “Satanic rules,” and “Satanic sins.”5

One of appellant’ s drawing s depicts a naked woman who i s bound and gag g ed, and a nother dra wing depicts a w oman with a slashed thr oat. I n the handwr itten note, which appe llant describe d as “a

s u p l em en t[ s i c] t o m y

ap p l i ca t i o n t o t h e C h u rc h o f S at an , ” ap p el l an t ex p re s s ed h i s d es i re t o p l ed ge

a lle g ianc e to the Churc h of Sa tan. Th e state a lso of fe re d in to e vid e nc e a

pp e lla nt’ s g ri e va

nc e fo rm s (state’ s Ex hibit 247) and other r ecor ds (state’s Ex hibit 248) from the Texas D epar tment of Criminal J ustice (TD CJ ). In a g rieva nce form re ceive d by

TDCJ on J une 19, 2007, appe llant stated that he had bee n a Satanist since 2005, that he was a lso a “blood s orce rer ” who ha d taken up vampirism, and that he wa s wi tho ut the ma te ri a ls that he ne e de d to pr a c tic e his re lig ion . O the r r e c or ds sh ow e d th a t, in 2 00 6, a pp e lla nt a sk e d T DC J to c ha

ng e his re lig ion

on his tr a ve l c ard

fr om B ud dh ist

to S a tanis t

and that in 20 07 he re qu e ste d th a t “ Va mpi ri sm/ Th a

uma tur g y ” be e nter e d in

a dd iti on to S a tanis m. The state a lso demonstrated that a ppellant had a

n i n v er t ed p en tag ram on his che st by having appellant lift his shirt and stand bef ore the jury

. When Dr. Ha ley

testified bef

ore the jury , the s t at e as ked him about “the philosophy of

satanis ts r e g ard inghuman s a c ri fi c e .” Ha le y re sp on de d w ithpa ssa g e s f ro m TheSa tan ic Bi ble

. I t say s, “The only

time a satanist would per form a huma n sacr ifice would be if it were to serve a twofold purpose; that be ing to r elea se t he magicia n’s wrath in the throwing of a c urse, a

nd more important, to dispose of a totally obnox ious and deser

ving individual.” . . . I t states, “The question arises, ‘Who, then, would be consider ed a fit and proper hum an sacrifice , and how is one qualifie d to pass judgme nt on such a person? ’ The a

nswer is bruta lly

simple. Any one who has unjustly wrong ed y ou or wh o ha s g on e ou t of his wa y to hurt y ou

–to de lib e ra

te ly c a us e tr ou ble and ha rd sh ip for you or those dea

r to y ou.” . . . “When a

person, by

his reprehensible beha

vior, prac tically

crie s out to be destroy ed, it is truly y our m oral obli g ation to indulge, the n, their wish.” Haley exp l ai n ed that the “Nine Satanic Stateme nts” repr esent “ the ca non or standar d by which a satanist lives his l ife.” When asked a bout the “Ele ven Satanic Rules of the Ear th,” Hale y6

Appe l l an t a s s er t s t h at t h i s i s n ot a g an g c as e an d t h at h i s pr i mar y c on ce r n i s n ot on e of f r ee dom of 4 a sso c ia tio n b u t t h a t o f f re e d o m o f re ligio n . H e c o n te n d s tha t M as on is i n a p p o site b e c a u se it is a g a n g c a se . H o w e v e r, M as on ci t es and rel i es on D a w so n v . D e la w a re , whi ch i s t he seminal case wi t h regard t o Fir st A m end m ent f ree d o m s o f

reli gio n a nd asso ciati o n. 90 5 S .W .2d at 5 7 6

. A p p ell an t f ail s t o p ersu ad e u s t ha t t he rea so ning o f t he se c a se s sh o u ld no t ap p ly t o re ligio u s a ff ili a tio n s like the o n e a t i ssu e he re . replied, B a s e d

o nm y s tu dy, t h e o n e s t h a t

– i tw o u l d h a v e t o b e t h a ti f

ani n d i v i d

u a l an n o ys y ou , to tr e a t hi m c ru e lly . And the oth e r t hin g , if an in div idu a l bo the rs y ou , it say s in the re , to a sk

him to s top , a nd if the y do n’ t st op , it

say s– it u se d th e wo rd

de str oy the m. It s a ys d e s t r o y. Haley testified that to d es t roy

a per son means to ca

use their de ath. Def

ense e x pert John G o r d o n M e l t o n d i s a g r e e d w i t h H a l e y’ s d e f i n i t i o n . M e l t o nt e s t i f

i e d t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o A n t o nL a V e y, the author of TheSa tan ic Bi ble , to destroy a person means to “sy mbolically

curse them.” Melton, howeve r, ac knowledg ed on cr oss-examination that there ar e some S atanists who believe that Satan is a neg ative per sonal antideity , and that that par ticular ty pe of Sata nism has “ver

y neg ative socia l

and pe rs on a l e ff

e c ts, ” inc lud ingpe op le be ingkil le d in the name of

Sa tanis m. We first addre ss appellant’s c onstitut ional claim. The Fi rs t Am endment g uara ntees the fr ee doms of relig ion and association. See Casarez v . State, 91 3 S. W.2 d 4 68 , 4 76 -7 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); Mason v. State, 905 S.W .2d 570, 576 (Tex

. C ri m . App. 1995). I t protects an individu al ’s ri gh t t o join gr oups and to associate with others holding simil ar be liefs. Mason, 905 S.W .2d at 576 (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 161 (1992)). Howeve r, the Constituti on 4 does not ere ct a per se barr ier to the a dmission of evidence conce rning one’s be liefs and a ssociations

a t se nte nc ingme re ly

be c a us e tho se be lie fs and

a sso c ia tio ns are pr ote c te d by the F ir st A me ndme nt. Id. Such evidenc e may be admissi ble if it is shown to be releva nt to the issues involved in the case. Id. a t 57 6- 77 . F utu

re da ng e ro us ne ss i s an iss ue that is re le va nt t o th e se nte nc ingsta g e of a c a pit a lmurder tr ial. Id. at 577.7

I n order to prove the r eleva

nce of a def endant’ s membership in an org anization or g roup, the state must show: (1) proof of the g roup’s violent and illeg al ac tivit i es , an d (2 ) t he def endant’ s membership in the orga

nization. Mason, 905 S.W .2d at 577 (c iting Dawson, 503 U.S. at 163-67). The state introduc ed TDCJ records showing that appellant had identified himself as a Satanist since 20 05 . H a le y

te sti fi e d th at so me me mbe rs of the Satanic re lig ion

a dv oc a te vio le nc e , th a t Sa tanic relig ious publications like the ones fo u n d i n appellant’s cell discussed “ rituals of destruc tion” for perf orming “human sacrific e” on “ undesirable [and] obnox ious indivi dual[s] ,” and that various people ha d committed murder a nd mutilation “in the name of Satan.” Although Me lton disagr eed with Haley ’s def

inition of the term “destroy” an d his description of Satanic philosophy , Melton

a c kn ow le dg e d th a t in so me ins tanc e s pe op le ha d be e n kil le d in the name of

Sa tanis m. It w a s w ith in the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment for the trial court to decide that the evidenc e of Sata nism was

re le va nt t o th e iss ue of

futur e da ng e ro us ne ss a

nd ou tsi de the pr ote c tio n o f t he F ir st A me ndme nt. We next turn t o appellant’ s statutory claims. Relevant e vidence is that which has any tendenc y to make the e x istence of

any fac t of conseque nce mor e or less probable than i t would be without the evidence . T EX . R. E V ID . 4 0 1

. Ap p el l an t ’s S at an i c t at t o o , b o o k s , wr i t i n gs , an d dra wi n gs

are indicative of his cha

rac ter, a nd we have held that suc h evidenc e is re levant to the question of future da ng erousne ss at punishment. Conner v. State, 67 S.W .3d 192, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ; Corwi n v. State, 87 0 S. W.2 d 2 3, 25 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); see als o R o b l es v. S tate, No . A P74,726, 2006 WL 1096971 (Tex. Crim. App. April 26, 2006)(not desig nated f or publication). Rule 403 allows for the exclusion of otherwise rele vant evidenc e when its probative value is substantially

outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. T EX . R. E V ID . 403. Rule 403 favor s the adm i ssion of releva

nt evidence and ca

rries a presumption that rele vant evidenc e will be more8

probative than pre

judicial. W

ill iam s v . S

tat e , 958 S.W .2d 186, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). “The term ‘pr obative value ’ re fer s to the inherent pr obative for ce of an it em of evidence –that is, how strong ly it serves to make more or le ss probable the exis tence of a f act of co n s eq u en ce t o the litigation–coupled w ith the proponent’s ne ed for that item of evidenc e.” Casey v. State, 215 S.W .3d 8 7 0 , 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “‘Unf air pre judice’ r efe rs to a tende ncy to sugg est dec ision on an improper

basis, commonly , though not ne cessa rily , an emotional one.” Id. at 880. All testimony and phy sical evidenc e are likely be pre judicial to one par

ty or the other

. Jones v . State, 944 S.W .2d 642, 653 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). I t is only when ther e exists a clear disparity betwee n the deg ree of pre judice of the offe red e vidence and its probative va lue that Rule 403 is applicable. W ill iam s, 958 S.W .2d at 196. Th e pr ob a bil ity that a

pp e lla nt w ou ld c omm it c ri min a l a c ts o f v iol e nc e that w ou ld c on sti tut e a continuing threat to society was a “fa ct of conseque nce” in this punishment tria l. A rt. 37.071, § 2(b)( 1). In the instant case , appellant br utally rape d, beat, a

nd strang led a f

ifteen- y ear -old g irl and the n c ut o ff

he r f ing e rt ips to re mov e po te nti a l DN A e vid e nc e . T he state pr e se nte d e vid e nc e tha t, i n the past, appellant had display ed agg ressive behavior, had been in trouble at school, and ha d been p l ac ed on probation for

a thef t offense in North Carolina. De fense counsel a rg ued, “Ma

y be he

wa sn ’t a g oo d pe rs on ba c k the n, bu t he ’s a g oo d p e rs on

no w, ” po int ingou t th a t “ he ’s be e n tr y ingto do the rig ht things” since he was incar cer ated and that he had no documented inc idents of violence in pr iso n. Th e e vid e nc e that a pp e lla nt b e c a me a

Sa tanis t w hil e in p ri so n h e lpe d to re bu t th a t de fe ns e argument. As the pr os ecuto r s ta te d in c los ingargume nt, e vid e nc e of a pp e lla nt’ s a ff ili a tio n w ith Satanism was “a

nother piec e of the puzz le” f or t h e j u ry t o consider w hen answ eringthe spec ial9

issues. This e vidence was one of the fac tors that aff ecte d the probability that appellant would be a dang er in the f

utu re , j u s t l i k e the facts of the offe nse that he c ommitt ed and his prior history and violent a rtw o r k

. I t w a s n o t s o p r e

ju d ic ia l th a t th e r e w a s a c le ar d is p ar it y b e tw e e n th e d e g ree of pr e jud ic e and

its pr ob a tiv e va lue . T hu s, the tr ia l court did no t abu se its dis c re tio n in a dmi tti ngthi s evidenc e. Point of err or one is over ruled. CH AL LEN G ES F OR

CA USE I n point of err or two, appe llant alleg es that the trial c ourt improperly denied his challeng es for c ause a g ainst venire me mbers Sharon A nn Neumann, A lejandro Me lero, a nd L u is Romo. Appellant alleg es that these ve nire membe rs wer e cha lleng ea b l e fo r cause under A rticle 35.16 beca use they wer e biased either a g ainst appellant or a g ainst some part of the law upon which he was entitled to rely . Art. 35.16(a )(9) and (c )(2)

. To pr e se rv e e rr or

fo r a tr ia l court ’s e rr on e ou s den ia l of a ch a lle ng e fo r c a us e , a pp e lla nt m us t show that: (1) he asser

ted a c lear

an d s p ec i fic c halleng e for cause ; (2) he use d a per emptory challeng e on the c omplained-of ve nire membe r; (3) his per emptory challeng es we re e x hausted; (4) his request for

additional strikes was de nied; and (5) an objectionable juror sat on the jury

. Gree n v. State, 93 4 S. W.2 d 9 2, 10 5 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ). Ap pe lla nt ha s pro pe rl y

pr e se rv e d e rr or

wi th

re sp e c t to e a c h o f t

he c ha lle ng e d v e nir e me mbe rs . I f a tria l judge err s in overruling a cha lleng e for cause ag ainst a venire member , then a defe ndant is harmed if

he uses a

pere mptory

strike to remo v e t h e v enire member a nd there afte r suffe rs a detriment from the loss of the strike. Feldman v . State, 71 S.W. 3d 73 8, 74 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p . 2 0 0 2 )

. A p p e l l an t w a s d e n i e d an y a d d i t i o n a l p e r e mp t o r y s t r i k e s . T o d e m o n s t r a te ha rm , appellant must show that the trial cour t errone ously

denied one challeng e for cause . Chambers v.10

State, 866 S.W .2d 9, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). When review ing a

trial court’ s decision to de ny a challeng e for cause , we look at the e ntire

rec ord to determine if the re is suff icient evidenc e to support the ruling

. Feldman, 71 S.W .3d at 744. Th e te st i s w he the r a

bia s o r p re

jud ic e wo uld

su bs ta nti all y im pair th e ve nir e me mbe r’ s a bil ity to

car ry out the j uror’ s oath and judicial instructions in acc ordanc e with the law. Gardner v. State, 306 S.W .3d 274, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Be fore venire members may be excused for cause , the law mus t be e xpla ine d to the m, a nd the y mus t be a sk e d wh e the r the y c an f oll owthat la

w, re g a rd le ss of t heir pe rsonal views. Id. The propone nt of a c halleng e for cause has the burde n of establishing that the cha lleng e is proper

. Id. The proponent does not meet this burden until he ha s shown that the ven i re m em b er understood the r equire ments of the law a nd could not overc ome his or her prejudice well enoug h to follow the law. Id. We r e vie w a tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g on a c ha lle ng e fo r c a

us e wi th c on sid e ra

ble de fe re nc e be c a

us e the trial judg e is in the best position to evaluate a venire member’ s demea

nor and r esponses. Id. at 295-96 (c iting Colburn v. State, 966 S

. W

. 2 d 5 1 1 , 5 1 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). A trial judg e’s rul in g o n a c h a ll e n g e f

o r c a u s e ma y b e r e v e r s e d o n ly f

o r a c le ar a

b u s e o f d is c r e tion. Id. at 296. When a venire member’ s answer s are vacillating , unclea r, or c ontradictory , we a ccor d particula r defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s dec ision . Id. Sharon Ann Neumann Ap pe lla nt c l a i m s t h a t N e u m a nn w a s b i a s e d

a g a ins t hi m be c a

us e sh e “ wa s unc omf

or ta ble wi th Satanism” and she “ descr ibed t he religion as evil and contrary to ever y thing [she] believe[d] .” When de fe ns e c o u n s e l qu e s t i o n e d N e u m an n a b o u t h e r r e l i g i o u s a f

f i l i a t i o n s , s h e s t a t e d t h a t s h e w a s a prac ticing Christian. De fense counsel then c ontinued to question Neumann.11

Q. Now, what if I told y ou that in the last two y ear s, since 2005, I have c hang ed fr om a de vo ut C a tho lic to a

fe rv e nt s a tanis t? A

. O k ay. Q. Okay . I t’s a dra stic chang e. A. I t’s hug e. Q. Ok ay . A re y ou

sti ll o ka y wi th t hat? A. That make s me uncomfor table. Q

. W h y ? A. Be cause it’s contrar y to ever y thing I believe.

. . . Q. I ’m sure the re’ s some satanists that have c ommitt ed som e ver y , very violent a c ts. Do e s th a t ma

ke e ve ry bo dy wh o’ s a satanis t e vil ? A. Idon’t–Ithink they ’re evil beca use they ’re sat anist, not beca use they c omm itt e d th e vio le nt a c t. Q. So a

ny on e wh o’ s a

satanis t is e vil ? A. Ithink they

worship evil. To me, Satan is equiva lent to evil, being raised the way I ’ve be en ra ised.

. . . Q. So any one who’ s a satanist is evil, in y our opinion? A. Ithink they

worship evil. I think they could come a cross a s a ty pical citizen most ti mes . . ..

. . . Q. B ut w he n it

c ome s to satanis ts, the y

–y ou fe e l th a t th e y

wo rs hip e vil ? A. Ithi nk

if the y ’r e tr ue sat anis ts, the y

wo rs hip e vil . B ut I

do n’ t kn owthat it would come out all the time. At s o m e p o i n t i t would. But I don’t know much about that, so . . ..12

Neumann f

urther stated that her son had roomed with a sa tanist for a shor

t time when he wa s in colleg e, which ma de her “ver y unnerve d.” However , she stated that “ nothing ba d ever happene d,”

and he r s on “ wa s n ot h

ur t in any wa y .” Thus , she a g re e d th a t he r o nly on e -o n- on e e nc ounte r w ith a Satanist had be en peace ful. Finally , Neumann acknowle dg ed that even if she l ear ned that appellant

was a Satanist, she could still be fair a nd impartial and ba se her decision on the e vidence

. De fe ns e c ouns e l c ha lle ng e d N e uma nn fo r ca us e , ar guin g that she c ou ld n ot b e fa ir be c a us e sh e wa s “ sh oc ke d” a

bo ut the po ssi bil ity that a

pp e lla nt mig ht be a

Sa tanis t and

sh e sa id t hat Satanis m was “ ever y thing c ontrary

to her be lief sy stem.” The tr ial court de nied t he challeng e, and the rec ord

su pp or ts the tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g . N e uma nn ult imate ly

state d th a t sh e c ou ld f

oll owthe law, re g a rd le ss of her persona l views. Appellant ha s failed to mee t his burden to show that Neumann had a bias or pr e jud ic e tha t wo uld have su

bs tanti a lly imp a ir e d he r a

bil ity to c arr

y ou t he r o a th a

nd ins tr uc tio ns in

acc ordanc e with the law. See G ardner, 306 S.W .3d at 295. Al e jan dr o M e le ro Appellant complains that Mele ro wa s biased because he “w as lea ning towa rds death over life” a nd he “e x pecte d Appellant to prove that the death penalty was not appr opriate.” Any venire member w ho would automatically answe r t he future -dang erousne ss special issue in the a ffirmative

or wh o w o u l d

p l a c e t h e b u r d e no f

p r o o f o nt h e d e f

e n s e i s c h a l l e n g e a

b l e f o r c a u s e u n d e r Artic le 35 .1 6( c )( 2) fo r h a vin g a bia s or pr e jud ic e a g a ins t a law a

pp lic a ble to t he c a se up on

wh ic h th e de fe ns e is entitled to rely

. Feldman, 71 S.W .3d at 745. Ap p el l an ts p ec i fi ca l l y

co mp l ai n s ab o u tM el er o ’s re sponses to defe nse cou n s el ’s qu es t i o n i n g. Q

. In yo u r

qu e s t i o n n a i r e yo us t a t e d t h a tyo u ’ r e i nf

a v o r o f t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y, ri g ht? A. Ye s.13

Q. Whe n y ou

say y ou ’r e in f

a vo r o f i t, w hat do y ou

me an b y tha t? A. Ibelieve it’s a

n appropr iate punishment if some one is found g uilty of it and that’s the punishment g iven to them, it’s fair. Q. I s it

fa ir to s ay y ou ’r e le anin g tow ard s g ivi ngde a th o ve r g ivi nglif e , r ig ht? A. Ye s. Q. And, I

mean, you wer e asked about this statement. “Any person, man or woman, y oung or old, who commits capital murde r, should pay with his own lif e ,” ri g ht? A. Ye s. Q. Yo u p ut t

hat y ou a g re e wi th t

hat, r ig ht? A. Ye s. Q. Yo u f

e e l pr e tty str on g ly a bo ut t hat, r ig ht? A. Yes, sir.

. . . Q. Okay . Now, y ou wer e aske d , we l l , ca n y ou wait to hear all the evidenc e, o k ay? A. Ye s. Q. You wer e aske d that statement ea rlier. And you’re open to the possibility that we mi ght be abl e to pro vi de s om e reas on to no t gi ve the de a t h p e n a l t y , ri ght? A. Yes, sir. Q. Ok ay . B ut i n r e a lity , y ou ’r e g oin g to e xpe c t us to p ro ve to you that the de a th pe na lty is n ot t he a pp ro pr ia te wa

y to g o, ri g ht? A. Ye s. Q. I f we can’ t prove to y ou that the death penalty is not appropriate , then in y our op ini on it s ho uld be the de a th p e na lty , r ig ht?14

A. Ye s. Q. And y ou understand that that’s a little bit differe nt than the way [t he] law wo rk s, ri g ht? A. I n w hat a sp e c t? Q. Wel l, i n th e a sp e c t th a t th ey hav e to pr ov e to you that th e de a th p e na lty

is appropr iate. A. Okay . Yes, sir. Q. And in y our mind it should be the re verse , rig ht? I f y ou kill som eone, you’ve g ot t o p ro ve to m e that y ou sh ou ld l ive , r ig ht? A. Ye s.

. . . Q. Okay . And by

the same toke n, in this case y our i n i t i al , y ou know, y our inclination is to say

that death is ap p ro p ri ate unless the D efe nse ca n prove oth e rw ise , r ig ht? A. Yes, sir. Q. So y ou’re g oing to put the bur den on us to prove to y ou that he should live, ri g ht? A. Yes, sir. Q. An d y ou

fe e l pr e tty

str on g ly a bo ut t hat, r ig ht? A. Yes, sir. De fe ns e c ouns e l th e n e xpla ine d to Me le ro that “ [t]he fi rs t qu e sti on the State ha s to p ro ve to y ou be y on d a ll r e a so na

ble do ub t .

. . [is] th a t th e re is a pr ob a bil ity that th e De fe nd ant w ou ld c omm it criminal ac ts of violence that would constitute a co n t i n u i n g threat to society .” De fense counsel explained that “[i] f they

don’t prove that to y ou reg ardle ss of what we do, we present no evide nce at all, if they

don’t prove it, then the a nswer ha s to be no.” De fense further questioned Meler o.15

Q. I ’m

a sk ingy ou

a bo ut your o pin ion . D o y ou have an o pini on a lr e a dy

a s to wh a t th e ans we r t o q

ue sti on 1 is ? A. No . I

say Ihave to l ist e n to wh a t th e e vid e nc e is p re sen ted on it t o s e e if it was re asonable or if they

could prove it, that that was–that he would show a threat to that. I ’m open to the fact that if y ou’re g oing to prese nt the evidenc e to that, to show me otherwise, the n that’s, I think, a fair thingto do.

. . . Q. You see wher e we’ re at, rig ht? Imean, you’re telling me that on the one hand y ou expect us to convince you of something . On the other hand y ou’re saying Iwould wait to listen to the evidence and then make–ther e’s a–do y ou see the conflict ther e? A. Yes, sir. Q. So I g uess m y question, I ’ll just ask y ou. Which way is it? Do y ou expect us to unconvince you or . . .. A. Ba sed on what I ’m hea ring from them, I

would expect them to showme, y ou know, g iving me the burden of proof that they have that. They ’re supposed to s ho w m e on

that. Q

. T h a t ’ s t h e l aw , o k ay? A. Ye s. Q

. A n d

t h a t ’ s t h e l aw an d

e v e n tu a l l y, I m e an , I’ l l a s k yo ut h a tqu e s t i o n , o k ay? A

. O k ay. Q. That’s the l aw t h at y ou’re require d to follow. My question is, y ou know, based on the way y ou want to se e it ha ppen in your mind, oka

y , o r t h e w ay yo uf e e l i ts h o u l d

h a p p e n , t h a tw e s h o u l d

u n c o n v i n c e yo u , o k ay? A. I ’m not sure that’s fair to say . Ag ain, when Ianswe red the se questions, there wer e thing s -- y ou know, y ou’re asking my opinion– Q. Rig ht. A. –at the time. You’r e talking having sat in there for four hour s. I t’s kind of – a little hard to g et y our mind toge ther on a lot of t hings. Hea ring now what y ou’re telling me, the n that shows me that, y ou know, the way it’s supposed16 to go and how it’s supposed to be. B ased on he aringthat, I ’m willing to be open to see the burden of proof and follow the law like you said to see what it s ho ws . Whe n d e fe ns e c ouns e l f

ur the r q ue sti on e d M e le ro a ft e r thi s e xch ang e , Me le ro c on tin ue d to acknow ledg e that he w ould follow the law a nd hold the st at e t o i t s b u rd en of proof on the futur edang erousne ss special issue. Def ense counsel then challeng ed Melero for cause , arguing that he was biased in favor of the state, that he would e x pect the defe nse to “ unprove that [appellant] s hould be subject to the death penalty ,” and that “his opinions were ve ry strong in favor of

the death penalty .” The trial c ourt denied the challeng e for cause . Th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c retio n by den y inga pp e lla nt’ s c ha lle ng e fo r c a

us e to Me le ro . Wh e n d e fe ns e c ouns e l e xpla ine d th e law t o h im, Me le ro a g re e d th a t he c ou ld s e t a sid e his persona l opinions and follow the law re quiring the state to pr ove the future -dang erousne ss special issue bey ond a re asonable doubt. Appellant has not shown that Melero had a bias that would have substantially

impaired his ability

to car ry out his oath a

nd instructions in acc ordanc e with the law. See F eldman, 71 S.W .3d at 744. Luis Romo Appellant conte nds that Romo wa s biased ag ainst him be cause Romo “ had a ba d experience wi th a n unc le po sse sse d b y

the de vil ” and

“ [h]e a dm it ted th e inc ide nt w ou ld s wa y ho w h e wo uld view evide nce of

Satanism.” I n response to de fense counsel’s initial questioning, Romo stated that he did no t c on sid e r Sa tanis m a re lig ion , th a t a

pe rs on sh ou ld n ot b e a

ble to p ra c tic e Sa tanis m a s a

re lig ion , a

nd that it wo uld a ff e c t hi m a s a

jur or if he fo un d o ut t hat th e de fe nd ant w a s a Sa tanis t. Then the pr osecutor que stioned him further on this topic. Q. Sa tanis m. D o y ou kn owso me thi nga

bo ut t his ?17

A. Imean, what I ’ve se en and he ard. Q. Okay . Her e’s a

litt l e law in our c ourt. You shouldn’t prejudg e evide nce. Okay ? J ust like y ou shouldn’t prejudg e people. Remember we talked about a po lic e man c an c ome in h e re or a pr ie st o r wh a te ve r. We do n’ t wa nt y ou to judge th em b y wh o t hey say they are . We want y ou to wait, listen to the e vid e nc e , a

nd the n d e c ide . Re me mbe r t hat? A. Yes, sir.

. . . Q. Rig ht now

y ou have n’ t he ard

any e vid e nc e a

bo ut s a tanis m, w he the r i t’ s a re lig ion or no t. I s th a t c or

re c t? A. Yes, sir. I

mean, I have ba d persons, but y ou know, I ’m j u s t taking it from my persons it’s something bad. Q. Tell me about that. What’s the ba d? A. Something I ’d rather ke ep within my self. Q. No, y ou’ve g ot to tell us here

. Well, let me ask it thi s way . I s it something so bad -- here ’s going to be the ulti mate question. This satanism thing, y ou have n’ t he ard

any e vid e nc e of

it h e re in t

his c ourt ro om y e t. So h e re ’s the ru le of law. D on’t prejudg e it until y ou hear about whateve r the satanism is here, o k ay? A. Yes, sir. Q. No w, do y ou

thi nk y ou c an d o th a t? A. Ye s, sir

. I me an, if he ’s he re , h e ’s g ot t o p re se nt w hate ve r h e ’s g ot t o p re se nt. Yo u’ re jud g e d b y

wh a t th e y

pr e se nt. Q. You may

not hear any

thing about satanism. And if y ou don’t, g ood and fine

. I f y ou do, though, you’ve g ot t o ru l e or make y our judg ments about the evidenc e that y ou hear

in this courtroom about t hose t hings. Does that make sense to y ou? A. Yes, sir. Q. Ok ay . Ca

n y ou do that?18

A. Yes, sir. Q. Ok ay . So wh a te ve r h a s h a pp e ne d to y ou , w hate ve r t

he sto ry is w ithsatanis m, whateve r that is, this is what the law would require y ou to do, if y ou can. Put it aside, wait and he ar a

bout this satanism that happens he re, if you hear about it. Can y ou

do that? A. Yes, sir. Q. You sure? A. Imean, I

can he ar it, judg e by

what I hear

. Q. That’s what the l aw r equire s y ou to do, if y ou can do that. And y ou’re saying y ou c an d o th a t, i s th a t c or

re c t? A. Ye s, sir . I

fe e l c on fi de nt I

c an d o th a t. Q. Okay . All rig ht. What y ou can’ t have, a ccor ding to the law, is a bias or prejudice ag ainst somebody befor e y ou even hear the evidenc e, under stand? A. Yes, sir.

. . . Q. Right now y ou can be lieve any thing you want. W e’ re we lcoming your op ini on s. I f y ou ’r e a

jur or in t his c a se , th e re qu ir e me nt w ill be that y ou wa it. Fr om the evidenc e in thi s case, make your dec isions about satanism or whateve r else c omes in based upon the e vidence that comes i n in this case. An d c an y ou

do that? A. Yes, sir. Q. So ulti mately , the question bec omes this. Are y ou able t o s et aside y our whateve r biases or

prej u dices or f

eeling s or knowledg e y ou have a bout satanis m? W a it t o le arn a bo ut it fr om thi s c a se , if

y ou do , a nd the n a pp ly it in t hat c a se . Ca

n y ou do that? A. Yes, sir. Ye s, sir. Q. So let’s say y ou wer e to hear about sata nism in a case. T his is before you’ve he ard any e vid e nc e . Are y ou abl e to w e ig h a ll o f t he e vid e nc e in a

c a se to c ome to w hate ve r your c on c lus ion s a re to q ue sti on numbe r 2 , r e g ard le ss?19

A. Yes, sir. I

think I could. Q. Well, I need a

littl e more sure than think, if y ou can. A. Yes, sir. I

mean, I can. Def ense c ounsel then aske d Romo what experience s he had w ith Satanism. R omo stated that he “just had a

bad experienc e [on] one occ asion,” an d he re fused to discuss it. He a g ree d that Satanism was evil and that it should not be prac ticed in the United States. When def ense c ounsel asked if this would af

fec t him as a juror, Romo stated: “I mean, I can he ar the case and if it’s a case, it’s a ca se. And I

fee l Ican w ait till [ sic] they prove all the evidenc e and I can de cide what to do, I g uess, in that occa sion.” Def ense c ounsel then cha lleng ed Romo for cause due to his bias ag ainst Satanism. The trial court de nied the cha lleng e, but later g rante d defe nse counse l’s reque st to bring Ro mo back f or fu rt he r q ue sti on ingre g ard inghis “ ba d e xpe ri e nc e ” wi th S a tanis m. Wel l, I me an, Ijus t–I

wa s at my

ho us e and

we ha d v isit[ ors ] ov e r, and on e of my un c le s g ot i nto it w ithmy fa the r. An d w e ha d ju st a

lit tl e fam il y di sp ute and my un c le wa s r e a lly

int o s tuf f l ike that, you

kn ow , in to d oin g his , I

g ue ss w hat y ou

c a ll satanism or whatever

it is. And he went into so m e sort of la ng uag e that he spoke

. And when he walked out, when we t hrew him out of the house, he lef t. And when he lef t, may be two sec onds later, he returne d and he’ s g ot a m ar k on his back, like thr e e lit tle dr awi ng s. And he c ame in and, I

mean, i t ’s j u st the way

he ca me in and appr oache d us, y ou know. He sa id he was the devil, he wa s g oing to g et eve n , an d , y ou know, and t h e r e ’ s s t an d ar d

w ay s o f d o i n g t h i n g s . A n d

I m e an , j u s ta

v i e w o f h i s f a c e , r e a l l y, wasn’t wha

t we expected him to be, y ou know. And it’s well re corde d in my head wh a t he loo ke d li ke and

wh a t he did , y ou

kn ow . I me an, I ’v e a lw ay s hel d tha t I re a lly don’t want to re ally

discuss in real bigdetails on what–I mean, this was ba ck about may be–I was a bout 14, so y ou’re talking a bout 15, 16 y ear s ag o, may be a little more. And i t’s just very uncomforta ble for me t o discuss this beca use I mean, ba cktra cks me, y ou know, and it’s just very bothersome f or me a nd, Imean, this is something–I mean, I don’t know, it just makes me very , very uncomforta

ble. When d e f e n s e c ounsel continued to question Romo after this point , Romo ag ree d that his bias20

ag ainst Satanism would affe ct how he vie wed the evidence

. Upon further questioning by the state, howeve r, Romo ag ree d that he would listen to the evidenc e and ba se his decision on that alone

. Def ense counsel then pointed out, “ You say it won’ t a ffe ct y ou, but you said it would a ffe ct y ou.” Romo replied that he would listen to the evidenc e and that he would not make dec isions based on what had ha

ppened to him. Fina lly , the trial cour t questioned Romo. THE COURT: Under

the law the jur or is require d to rende r a ve rdict solely on the e vid e nc e tha

t th e y he ar. An d the y wi ll be sp e c if ic a lly ins tr

uc te d the y c ann ot re fe r t o any persona l e x perie nces, any expertise that they might have , things of that nature. I n other wor ds, y ou can’ t go to the jur y and say , oh, this happened to me. Y ou can’ t do that. That’s not the e vidence in this case. [R OMO]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Could y ou follow that instruction? [R OMO]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Could y ou set aside that prior ex perie nce that y ou had whe n y ou’re ana ly zingthe e vid e nc e , w hate ve r i t is ? [R OMO]: Yes, sir. F oll ow ingthi s e xch a

ng e , de fe ns e c ouns e l ag a in c ha lle ng e d Ro mo f or c a us e du e to h is b ia s a g a ins t Satanism. The trial cour

t ag ain denied the challeng e. The re cord s u p p orts the trial cour t’s ruling . We acc ord par ticular de fer ence to the trial court’s r uling whe n a venire member vacillates in his or he r answe rs. Gardner, 306 S.W .3d at 296. Although Romo vac illated i n h i s an s we rs, he ultimately stated to the trial cour

t that he could set aside his bias and f

ollow the law. Point of err or two is overr uled.

EXP ERT TE STIMONY In p o i n to f

e r r o r t h r e e , a p p e l l an tc o n t e n d s t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u rte r r e d i na l l o w i n g D o n a l d

H a l e y,21

the state’s e x pert on Satanism, to testify about the Satanic relig ion a nd the beliefs and pra ctices of its pr a c tit ion e rs . Ru le 70 2 o f t he Te xas Rul e s of

Ev ide nc e pr ov ide s th a t “ [i]f s c ie nti fi c , te c hn ic a l, or other specia liz ed knowledg e will assist the trier of f act to under stand the evide nce or to determine a fa ct in issue, [t hen] a witness qualified as an expert by knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining , or education may

testify there to in the form of a

n opi n i o n or otherw ise.” B efor e admitting e x pert testimony under R u l e 7 0 2, the trial cour t must be satisfied that three conditions are me t: (1) the witness qualifies as an ex pert by rea son of hi s knowledg e, ski ll, experience , training , or educ ation; (2) the subje ct matter of

the testimony

is an appropr iate one for ex pert testim ony ; and (3) a dmitti ng the expert testimony

will actually

assist the fac tfinder in deciding the ca se. Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W .2d 199, 215-16 (T ex . C ri m . App. 1995). The se conditions are commonly ref err ed to as (1) qualification, (2) r eliability , and (3) rele vance . Vela v. State, 209 S.W .3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 06 ). Ap pe lla

nt a rgue s th a t th e state fa ile d to de mon str a te that H a le y wa s q ua lif ie d o r t hat hi s expert testimony

was re liable. Qualification is a two-step inquiry

. Id. A witness must first have a sufficie nt backg round in a par ticular fie ld, and a tria l judge must then determine whe ther that ba ckg round g oes to the matter on which the witness is t o gi v e an opinion. Id. The propone nt must establish t hat the expert has knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, tr aining , or educ ation reg ardingthe spec ific issue bef ore the court that would qualify the ex pert to g ive an opinion on that particula r subject. Id. at 132. The f ocus is on the fit betwe en the subjec t matter at issue a nd the expert’s familiarity with it. Id. a t 13 3. B e c a us e the sp e c tr

um of edu c a tio n, sk ill , a nd tr a ini ngis s o w ide , a

tr ia l c ourt

ha s g re a t di sc re tio n in de te rm ini ng wh e the r a wi tne ss po sse sse s a pp ro pr ia te qu a lif

ic a tio ns a s an e xpe rt

on a sp e c if ic top ic in a par ticular c ase. Id. at 136.22

H al ey ex pl ai ned t hat “ adm i ni s t r at i on of j us t i ce . . . i s a s y nony mo us t er m wi t h a cr i mi nal j us t i ce 5 p ro g ra m .” Haley testified on voir dire e x amination that he had a ssociate’ s deg ree s in criminolog y and

a dmi nis tr a tio n o f j us tic e , a ba c he lor ’s de g re e in c ri min olo g y , a nd a ma ste r’ s d e g re e in p ub lic administration with a conce ntration in justice administration. H e was employ ed as the Direc tor of Administration of J ustice at Tidew ater Communi ty College in Virg inia Be ach, V irg inia, wher e he ha d ta ug ht mul tip le c ours e s tha t inc lud e d the su bje c t of Sat anis m. He ha d p re vio us ly wo rk e d at a 5 Virg inia state prison, the Virg inia Be ach Sheriff’s Office , the C hesape ake Police D epar tment, and the Virg inia Be ach Police Depa rtment. He ha d studied and re sear ched Sata nism since 1989, and he had taug ht and provided e x pert c onsultation on this subject t o police officer s and FBI ag ents. He ha d taug ht 78 people fr om various age ncies in a two-day course on “sata nism, the occult, and the bla ck arts” at r eg ional aca demy in E l Paso County , and had w ritten a manua l that he used whe n teac hing

c la sse s o n Sa tanis m to l aw- e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs and pe rs on ne l. H e ha d n e ve r b e fo re te sti fi e d a s a Satanism ex pert, but he w as consider ed an e x pert on the subjec t by the Virg inia GangAssociation and the c olleg e whe re he worke d. When asked if ther e we re “ any publications on satanism that have b ee np ar to f [ h i s ] s tu d i es , ” h e n am edn u m er o u s ar t i cl es an d b o o k s , i n cl u d i n g The Sa tan ic Bi ble , In the Name of Satan , Sa tan Sp e ak s! , The Book of Thelema , TheDe v il’ s D ic tio na ry , and the Di c tio na ry of S ata nis m , a

nd he e xpre sse d f

a mil iari ty wi th t he “ Ni ne Sa tanic Sin s” and the “ El e ve n Satanic Rules of the Ear

th.” He g ave spe cific c ases in which he had advised law-e nforc ement per sonnel on the s u bject of Sata

nism, and he name d other e x perts with whom he ha d confe rre d about ca ses involving Satanism. When asked if he had found doc umentation and evide nce “ that members of the satanic r elig i o n h av e a philosophy or belief sy stem advocating violenc e,” he testified about the23

dis c us sio n o f h

uma n s a c ri fi c e inThe Satan ic Bible and the r ituals of destruction in TheSa tan ic Ri tua ls

. When asked if he had r esea rche d any “sata nists that have committed illega l or violent acts,” he g ave the ex am p les of California serial- killer Richard Ramire z and the murder of a tee nag e g irl that was wr itten about in the book entitled In t he Name of Satan

. When a sked if he knew of case s “of e ither death or mutilation by satanists,” he r epeated t hese two ex amples and a dded seve ral more

. At the conc lusion of voir dire examination, the trial court ruled that Haley could “testify in the are a of the satanic re lig ion

and to its re lig iou s p hil os op hie s and to w hate ve r i t is that th e [Sat anic ] B ibl e permits or re commends or a ll of those things that y ou talked about.” Appellant conte nds that Haley was not qualified to testify as an e x pert be cause he “ha d never taken a ny classes on Sata

nism,” he “h ad ab solutely no theolog ical tra ining,” and he “ had neve r written any article s on the subject.” Haley acknow ledg ed that he ha d not taken any formal c ourses in Satanism while obtaining his deg ree s, but he testified that he had spent approximately 19 y ear s study ing that subject. Althoug h Haley confirme d that he had not wr itten any formally pub l i s hed article s about Satanism, he testified that he had authore d a 50-pag e manual that he us ed when teac hing classes on that topic. Given Haley ’s y ear s of resear ching , study ing, te aching , and advising

a bo ut t he su bje c t of Sa tanis m, w e c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its di scr eti on in permitting H aley

to testify over a ppellant’s qualific ation objections. We next turn to appellant’ s claim that Haley ’s testimony “could not be show n to be re liable.” The re liability

of “sof t” scien ce ev i d en ce may be esta blished by

showing that: (1) the f

ield of expertise involved is a leg itimate one; (2) the subje ct matter of the expert’s testimony is within t he scope of that field; and (3) the expert’s testimony proper ly reli es u p o n o r utiliz es the princ iples involved in that field. Nenno v. State, 970 S.W .2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), overruled on24

other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W .3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The evide nce show s that Haley ’s expert testim o n y wa s re liable under Nenno. Haley was c onsidered a

n expert on the sub je c t o f Sata

n is m b y T id e w a te r Co mm u n it y Co ll e g e an d th e V ir g in ia G an g A s s o c iati o n , had confe rre d with other experts on the subject in var ious cases, a nd had spent y ear s teac hing the subject to colleg e students and law -enf orce ment personne l. He had rea d numerous ar ticles and books on the subject, and his te stimony reg ardingSatanic philosophy relied dire ctly

upon these sourc es. The tr ial

c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

a dmi tti ngHa le y ’s e xpe rt te sti mony

ov e r a pp e lla nt’ s r e lia bil ity objections. Point of error three is overrule d. BATS ON CH AL LE NGE I n p oin t of

e rr or fou r, app ella

nt a rgue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in ov e rr uli nghis Batson objection to the State’s per emptory strike ag ainst prospec tive juror Jason Cofield. Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Appe llant asserts that “the State’s profe ssed reasons for striking juror Cofield wer e contrived in order to conce al racially discriminatory intent” and that the tr ial court’s

ru lin g wa s c le arl y

e rr on e ou s. A d e f e n d an t w h o o b

je c ts u n d er Batson must make a prima facie showing of ra cial discrimination in the state’s exercise of its pere mptory strikes. See H

erron v. State, 86 S.W .3d 621, 63 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); see also Mathis v. State, 67 S.W .3d 918, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The burden t hen shi fts to the state to articulate ra ce- neutra l expl anations for its strikes. Id. Once the prosec utor has ar

ticulated ra ce- neutra l expl anations, the burde n shifts back to the def endant to show that the explanations are a prete x t for discrimina t i o n. Id. The trial c ourt must then determine whether the def endant ha s ca rr i ed h is burden of pr oving disc rimination. Id. The trial c ourt’s de te rm inatio n is a c c or de d g re a t def e re nc e and wi ll not

be ov e rt ur ne d o n a pp e a l un le ss i t is c le a rl y25

err oneous. Id. I n the instant case , we ne ed not addr ess whethe r the a ppellant established a prima faci e c a s e . Wh e r e , a s in th is c a s e , th e p r o s e c u to r h a s arti c u late d

h is r e a s o n s f

o r th e c h a lleng ed pere mptory

strike and the tr ial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, that issue become s moot. Y oung v. State, 283 S.W .3d 854, 866 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. de nied, 130 S. Ct

. 1015 (2009). We re view the r ecor d of a Batson hear ing a nd the voir dire examination in t he light most favor able to the tria l court’s ruling

. Id. When appellant objec ted to the state’s pe remptory strike ag ainst Cofield under Batson , the prosec utor articulated the state’ s rea sons for the strike. Mr . Co fi e ld, my no te s ind ic a te [,] sa id thi s to us . On e , it ’s ne ve r t oo la te fo r p e op le to chang e. Any

one ca n chang e. That was the fir st thing he sa id. And then whe n he wa s spoken to about the burde n of proof , he said these things. He said he ne eded a

n enormous amount of e vidence , that–he wa s asked by Counsel for Def ense if the fac t of t he murder i tself weighe d with him and he said, I ’m not even close, b a s e d

o ns tati n g o f

th e c r im e , th a t I

n e e d ane n o r mo u s a mo u n t o f

e v id e nce. An d f or a ll tho se re a so ns we str

uc k him , be c a

us e it loo ke d lik e he wa s p utt ingso me kind of, one, we ight number on the eviden ce , an d h e was re quiring us to do something that, at least in my opinion, that we don’t have to do, a s I ’ve ma intained thr ou g ho ut t

he e nti re tr ia l. A juror c an, if he wishes, find a pe rson g uilty and answ er 1 and 2 based upon the evidenc e of the crime a lone. I thought I had ca se law to support that and he disag ree s wi th t hat so Idis a g re e wi th h im. F oll ow ingthe pr os e c utor’ s e xplanatio n, the tr ia l c ourt de nie d a pp e lla nt’ s Batson c ha lle ng e wi th reg ard to Cofield. Appellant eng ag es in a compar ative analy sis on a ppeal to show that the State’ s rea sons for striking Cofield we re a ctually a pre text for discr imination. He argues that prospe ctive jurors Shar on Ann Neuma

nn and Irma Medina

answe red in a simil ar f

ashion reg ardingthe amount of proof they26

n ee d edt o af

fi rm at i v el y

an s we r t h e f

u tu re -d an ger o u s n es s s p ec i al i s s ue. Howe ver, the v o ir d ire rec ord demonstrates that these two prospective j urors ult imately ag ree d to require the state to prove future dang erousne ss bey ond a re asonable doubt. Appell a nt contends that Ne uman “indicated that she would have to be ‘ 99.999’ [perce nt] sure befor e she could i mpose the death penalty .” The prosecutor initially pointed out during voir dire that Neumann stated in her jury questionnaire that she believe d in the death pe nalty for a n “[i] ntentional killing of a

n innocent per son if there is irrefuta ble evidenc e such a s [a] DNA matc h.” The prosec utor

e xpre sse d c on c e rn

that N e uma

nn ’s us e of the te rm “ ir

re futa ble ” me ant she wo uld

re qu ir e the state to prove its case “beyond all doubt” instead of “ bey ond a re asonable doubt.” Neuma nn replied, Ig uess for me it would take someth i n g such as a DNA test with something like a 99.999 perc ent cha

nce , an d ever

y thing e lse pointing to it. You know what I ’m saying? W ith nothing in mind, in addition, I g uess, t o the t esting

. There would have to be nothing in my

mind that makes me think, no, he didn’t do it, or, no, it wasn’t t h a tw ay. The prose cutor then r eminded Ne umann that another jury had already deter mined that appellant wa s g uilty of ca pital murder, a

nd that she woul d “n ot be able to disag ree with whether or not he committed capital murde r bec ause [she would] be instructed that that is the fa ct of the matter.” Ne uma nn e xpre sse d h e r u

nd e rs tand ing of thi s c on c e pt. Whe n late r q ue sti on e d b y

de fe ns e c ouns e l, sh e a c kn ow le dg e d th a t sh e un de rs too d the te rm “ be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t” and

that sh e wo uld

ho ld the state to t

hat bu rd e n w he n d e c idi ngthe iss ue of a pp e lla nt’ s f utu re da ng e ro us ne ss. Appellant conte nds that Medina “ma de a statement that she ne eded to be rea lly convince d befor e she c ould find in favor of the State.” The prosec utor initially explained to Medina that the state had to prove the futur e-dang erousne ss special issue be y ond a re asonable doubt, and Medina indicated he r under standing of this conce pt. When defe nse counsel later asked Medina how much27

proof she would require fro m t h e s t at e in order for he r to aff irmatively

answe r the futur eda ng e ro us ne ss s pe c ia l is su e , s he re pli e d, “ Ho w muc h? Ne e ds to r e a lly c on vin c e me .” De fe ns e counsel then reiterated t hat the standa rd of pr oof wa s “beyond a re asonable doubt.” L ike Neuma nn, Medina stated that she understood the standa rd of pr oof a n d t h at s h e would hold the state to that standard w hen answ eringthe future -dang erousne ss special issue. Cofield, howeve r, testified that he would require more proof in order to a ffirmatively answe r the futur e -d ang e ro us ne ss s pe c ia l is su e . T he pr osec uto r q ue sti on e d Co fi e ld a

bo ut h is a

bil ity to

ans we r t he sp e c ia l is su e s. Q. And I

think it t old y o u i n t he questionnaire that, y ou know, he wa s found g uilty of m urder ing someone whil e in the cour se of c ommitt ing or attempting to c omm it a g g ra

vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult

. A. Al l r ig ht. Q. So that’ s a lr e a dy

a do ne de a l. A. Cor

re c t. Q. That’s not something y ou’re g oing to de cide. A. Rig ht. Q. And y ou know, I ’m not saying that–well, my question to y ou is, based on that alone, is that alre ady

enoug h, y ou know, base d on th at , have you alre ady made up your mind one wa y or the other ? A. No , b e c a

us e Isti ll do n’ t kn ow

–I kn owwh a t he ’s be e n guil ty of , b ut I sti ll do n ’t h av e enoug h evidenc e to sit here a nd make a

decision as–ty

pe of de c isi on that you g uy s a re a sk ingus , o r a sk ingme as a po ssibl e jur or to m ak e. It ’ s g o t t o b e al o t

. I t ’s go tt o b e e n o rm o u s , en o rm o u s

– en o u gh evidenc e to sit here a

nd make that ty

pe of de cision. I ’m not g oing to sa y it’s g oing to ha

ppen over night. I t’s a toug h decision.

. . . Q. Iwas say

ing, but you need m ore tha n a simple fac t that the crime w as28

c omm itt e d, ri g ht? A. Cor

re c t. Q. You’r e b as i ca lly

g oing to look at a ll the evidence that’s pre sented to y ou. An d y ou ’r e wi lli ngto d o th a t, r ig ht? A. Cor

re c t. Q

. That ’ s w h a t w e w an t y o u to d o . We w an t y o u to s it an d wait and he ar e v e r yt h i n g b e f

o r e yo um a k e a

d e c i s i o n , o k ay? A

. O k ay. Q. The r ea s o n Iask is beca use some people , y ou know, will hear , well, he c o m m i t t e d

t h a t

. If h e d i d t h a t , t h e nt h a t ’ s i t

. It ’ s o v e r i nm y m i n d , o k ay. A

. O k ay. Q. Th a t’ s e no ug h f

or me to say , y ou

kn ow , th a t is the a

pp ro pr ia te punis hme nt. Yo u’ re say ingy ou ’r e no t th e re , r ig ht. A. No, I ’m not even c lose there

. Q. Yo u’ re no t th e re by a lon g sh ot? A. Yea

h, I ’m not even the re. I n response to continued questi o n i n g by the prosec utor, Cofield reiter ated that he neede d to hear

“a lot of e vidence ” or a

n “enor mous” amount of evide nce in order to answer the future -dang erousne ss question in the affirmative, notwithstanding the fac t that appellant ha d a lr e a dy

be e n f ound g uil ty of mur de r in the c ours e of c omm itt ing or a tte mpt ingto c omm it

se xua l a ssa

ult . A t th e c on c lus ion

of his voir dire qu e sti on ing , Cof ie ld ag re e d tha t he c ou ld

no t affi rm ative ly

ans we r t he futur e -d ang e ro us ne ss q ue sti on ba se d o n th e fa c ts o f t

he c a se alone. Cofield also stated on voir dire that he wo rk e d a s a de te nti on of fi c e r f or the Juve nil e29

Pr ob ati on Dep art men t an d t hat he great ly enj oy ed i ns pi ri ng ju ven il e off end ers to chan ge the ir lives for the be tter. He further stated that “[ i ] t ’s n ever

too late” a

nd that “[a]ny

body can make a chang e.” Whe n th e tr ia l c ourt

de nie d a pp e lla nt’ s Batson challeng e, def ense c ounsel stated, Ag ain, I believe some of the juror s–and I can’ t point to them exactly rig ht now–but I t h i n k other juror s also indicated the sa me thing, you know, people do c hang e, people do ge t reha

bilitated. J ust by looking at their questionnaires Ibelieve the re’ s other juror s that are sitti ng on th i s panel that be lieve that, y ou know, re habilitation and cha ng ing is something that can be done. So that’s my response and that’s why Idon’t think those rea sons are sufficie nt, Your Honor. Ap pe lla nt n owargue s on app e a l th a t “ se ve ra l juro r s he e ts i nd ic a te d th e same be lie fs ” reg ardingthe issue of re habilitation; however, the jury questionnaires w ere not made a pa rt of the

re c or d o n a

pp e a l. I n h is a pp e llate br ie f, he sp e c if

ic a lly me nti on s pro sp e c tiv e jur or s Vic tor Re ve le s, Richard Salcido, Ve ronica Colli er, John Almanzar, and Jessica Portill o. Our re v i ew of their v oir dire testimony

does not support a finding of pre text

. The state’ s expl anations for striking Cofield we re f

acia lly rac e neutr al, and appellant ha s not demonstrated e vidence of pre text . Thus, the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion in deny ing

a pp e lla nt’ s Batson challeng e to Cofield. Point of error four is over

ruled. CO NF RO NT AT ION CL AU SE I n point of err or five, a

ppellant asser

ts that the trial court e rrone ously ad m i t t ed his highschool rec ords, labele d state’s Exhibit 237. Appellant claims that this exhibi t, which containe d an

e ntr y statin g tha

t he thr e a te ne d and pu sh e d ano the r stu de nt, wa s a dmi tte d in vio la tio n o f h is Si xth Amendment rig ht to confront the witnesse s ag ainst him. However , ther e i s n o i n d ication in the

rec ord that this exhi bit was eve r submitted to the jury

. The state of

fer ed the e x hibit prior to the t es t i m o n y o f Nelson Ne g ron and Clifton Gordon30

McQue en, two school-re source office rs who worke d at appellant’ s high school. When the parties discussed the a dmissibi lity of the e x hibit at the bench, de fense counsel objec ted. THE COURT: You need to dire ct my attention to the are as that y ou’re objecting to. You ca n’t make a

blanket objec tion.

. . . [DEFENSE C OUNSEL ]: Yes, Your Honor. The re’ s ref ere nce to–Ac tually , it’s the next one. I apolog ize. I t’s the next one afte r that. Talks about threatened a student and pushed, the n he g ot out, a school suspensi o n . Iwould argue to the Court that “that per son threate ned a stude nt and pushed” is based on hea rsay from anothe r pe rs on and it’ s n ot so me thi ngthat w a s– y ou kn ow , th a t qu a lif

ie s und e r t

he bu sin e ss rec ords exception. [P ROSECUTOR] : The relevant portion of t his, Your Honor, is that the Defe ndant in t his c a se wa s, ind e e d susp e nd e d. Th e a c tio n of the sc ho ol a nd the re le va nc e of thi s document ar e to show his char acte r and his bac kg round. W h en h e was attending school he wa s suspen d ed s ev er al times for diff ere nt rea sons and that’s why we of fe re d th e do c ume nts in t

he fi rs t pl a c e . T he re su lt i s w hat is the sig nif ic ant p art

. [DE F E N S E C O U

N S E L ]: I ’ m n o tar g u i n g r e l e v an c e , I ’ m ar g u i n g h e ar s ay w i t hin hear say . You know, I

understand the business rec ords come in unde r the -- y ou know, they

filed t heir affidavit and ever y thing and they

filed them at the c ourt. I ’m arguing that t hat spec ific portion re fer ence s hear say within hearsa

y that is not admissible under the business r ecor d exception. H ear say and confr ontation to that particula r portion that say s “threatened a student and pushed.”

. . . THE COURT: I ’m g oing to ove rrule the objection. Ne g ro n a nd Mc Qu e e n the n tes tif

ie d ab ou t the ir

e nc ounte rs wi th a

pp e lla nt a t hi s h ig h s c ho ol. State’s Exhi bit 237 wa s not mentioned during their testimony . Neg ron did not testify reg ardingthe particula r incident at issue. McQuee n testified that he was prese nt in 1999 when an “ assistant pr inc ipa l w a s g oin g to s us pe nd [ap pe lla nt] f or an a ssa ult ,” bu t he pro vi ded no fu rt he r d e ta ils reg ardingthat incid en t

. L ater , afte r both sides closed, the pa rties had a

discussion reg ardingthe

remova l of exhibi ts that had not been ide ntified or spec ifically discussed bef

ore the jury

. The trial31

W e n ot e t hat af

t er bot h s i des cl ose d, t he part i es ha d a di s cus s i on r ega r di ng t he r emo val of ex hi bi t s t hat 6 had not b een i d ent i f

i ed or specif

i cal l y dis cuss ed be f

o re t he jur y . T he st at e agreed t o remo ve E xhi b i t 25 8 f rom t he (continued...) c ourt c omp lie d w ith the state ’s re qu e st t o r e mov e Exhi bit 23 7 unti l it

c ou ld v e ri fy

wh e the r o r n ot i t had bee n discussed. The r ecor d does not ref lect that Ex hibit 237 was mentioned ag ain or that it was

ever submitt ed to the jury

for c onsideration. Def ense co u n s el objected only to the specific notation in the school rec ords that appe llant “thre atene d a student and pushe d.” McQ ueen did not testi fy to that eff ect. Si nce it appe ars that the exhibi t was never submi tted to the jury , and since McQue en testified only that he wa s prese nt when

a ssi sta nt p ri nc ipa l w a s g oin g to s us pe nd a pp e lla nt fo r an a ssa

ult , ap pe lla

nt ha s fa ile d to de mon str a te a Confrontation Cl ause violation. Se e Hi no jos a v . S tat e , 4 S.W .3d 240, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (f ind ingno e rr or

wh e n e vid e nc e a t is su e wa s n e ve r p re se nte d to the jur y ). Poi nt o f e rr or

fi ve is

overr uled. AD M ISSI ON OF P HOTO G RA P HS I n point of err or six , appellant ar gu es t h at t he trial c ourt violated Rules 401 and 403 by ad m i t t i n g t h e a u t o p s y

p h o t o grap h s l ab el eds t at e’ s E x h i b i t s 7 1 , 1 0 6 t h ro u gh 1 1 0 , an d 2 5 6 t h ro u gh 26 2. He c on te nd s th a t th e se ph oto g ra ph s w e re no t re le va

nt or ne c e ssa

ry be c a us e he “ ha d p re vio us ly been f ound g uilty as char g ed in the indictment . . . [t hat] li sted all the diffe rent manne rs of c ausing [t he] dece dent’s death[ .]” He also conte nds that any proba tive value of

the photog raphs wa s

su bs tanti a lly

ou tw e ig he d b y

the ir pr e jud ic ia l e ff

e c t. During the testimony of Dr. Corinne Eliz abeth Stern, the medica l examiner who perf ormed Medina’s a

utopsy , appellant made rele vance and Rul e 4 0 3 o b je c ti o ns to the autopsy

photogr aphs that ha d b e e n p re vio us ly adm it ted at the g uil t ph a se of

his 20 02 tr ia l. B e fo re a pp e lla nt m a de the se 632

(...continued) 6 j u r y ’ s c on s i der at i on . I n a ddi t i on , t h e r ec or d doe s n ot r ef l ec t t h at a n e x h i bi t l abe l ed s t at e’ s Exh i bi t 261 w as of f er ed or ad m i t t ed at t ri al

. W e f urt her not e t hat ap p el l ant did no t s p eci f i cal l y ob ject t o s t at e’ s E xhi b i t 71 unt i l af t er D r. Ster n te stif ie d a b o u t i t. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 33. 1. objections, the par

ties had discussed the pr eviously admi t t ed ev i dence , and the tria l court had de te rm ine d th a t “ any

e vid e nc e pr e vio us ly re c e ive d an d co ns ide re d by the jur y in r e tur nin g the g uil ty verdic t is now re ce i v ed i n evidenc e.” A ppellant complained that the state had “ not laid a prope r foundation” f

or the introduction of suc h evidenc e, and the state re sponded. Th is tri a l c an ta

ke a lon g tim e fo r i ss ues th at hav e a lr e a dy be e n d e c ide d. Th e c a se law is clea

r. The Court–this Court, with all due re spect, Your Honor, doe sn’t have any jurisd i ct i on on any

thing but the punishment phase at this point. Those issues h a v e al re ad y

b ee nd ec i d edan d

De fe n s e c o u n s el kn o ws t h i s . W e’ v e b ee nt h ro u gh this. I don’t have to lay

a pre dicate. E very

thing that wa s admitted in the g uilt portion is admitted now. There ’s no question. They ’re basic tene ts of law. Th e tr ia l c ou rt th en sta te d, “ Th a t’ s my ru lin g .” Ap pe lla

nt f ur the r a rgue d th a t th is w a s a “totally differ ent situation” in that this was a “br and-ne w” trial in front of a diffe rent jury . The trial court re sponded, “Y our ar g uments are on the re cord. I ’ve a lrea dy made my ruling .” I n its determination of the spec ial issues, the jury is entitled to consider all of the e vidence pr e se nte d at bo th t

he g uil t and

punis hme nt s ta g e s o f t

ri a l. A rt . 3 7. 07 1, § 2 (d )( 1) ; s e e a ls o Young, 283 S.W .3d at 863. Appellant a cknowledg ed that the evidenc e had be en pre viously admitted at the g uil t ph a se of his fi rs t tria l. H ow e ve r, he argue d th a t th e state ha d to re -o ff e r t he e vid e nc e be c a

us e the punis hme nt hearing wa s b e inghe ld b e fo re a dif fe re nt j ur y tha n th e on e that ha d p re vio us ly convicted him. The re is no re quirement that e vidence ad m i t ted at g uilt phase must be re- offe red befor e it can be considere d at punishment. Trevino v. State, 100 S.W .3d 232, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). T h e t ri al court did not abuse its discre tion by admitting the photog raphs that ha d been previously admitted at the 2002 trial. See R usseau v. State, 291 S.W .3d 426, 432 (Tex. Crim. App.33

2009) (whe n a ca s e i s on remand to the tr ial court for a new punishment hearing , the trial cour t’s jurisdiction is st atutorily

limit ed to punishment issues). Point of error six is overrule d. AD M ISSI ON OF JOK

ES I n p oin t of

e rr or se ve n, a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in adm it ti ng an a

ud io

rec ording of the following jokes that a ppellant told his brother on the tele phone while inca rce rate d. V O I C E N U M B E R

O N E : “ H e y , y o uw an tt o h e ar a j o k e ?” VOI CE NUMBE R TWO: “Yeah.” VO I C E NU M BE R

ON E : “W h at d o y o u t el l a wo m an wi t h t wo b l ac k ey es ? No t h i n g, beca use y ou alre ady

told her twice .” VOI CE NUMBE R TWO: “All right.” (L aug hter.) V O I C E N U M B E R

O N E : “ Y o uh e ar

a b o u tt h a tm anw h o w o nt h e l o t t e r y ?” VOI CE NUMBE R TWO: “No.” VOI CE NUMBE R ONE: “Oka y . He won the lottery , rig ht. And he comes home and he tells his wife, ‘Pac k y our stuff. I just won the lottery .’ “And she ’s like, ‘What do I need to pa ck? Do I need to pa ck for the ski trip or do I need to pa ck for

the”–( unintelligible.) “Just pack your shit and g et the hell out of he re.’ ” (L aug hter.) Appellant cha lleng es the a dmission of thi s evidenc e on both constitu t i o n al an d statutory g rounds, ar g uing that the tr i al co u rt violated his First Amendme nt rig ht to free dom of speec h and Rul e s 4 01 and

40 3 of the Te xas Rul e s of Ev ide nc e . Th is po int of e rr or is mul tif ari ou s be c a

us e it i s based on more than one leg al theory ; we will revie w appe llant’s arguments in the interest of justice. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1.34

Ap pe lla nt a lle g e s th a t th e a dmi ssi on of thi s evi de nc e a llo we d the state to “c ri min a lize [his ] tho ug hts ,” in v iol a tio n o f t he F ir st Ame ndme nt. Al tho ug h the F ir st A me ndme nt p re ve nts the state from employing e vidence of def endant’ s abstrac t beliefs at se ntencingwhen those be liefs have no be ari ngon

the iss ue s b e ingtr ie d, su c h e vid e nc e may be a dmi ssi ble if

it i s sh ow n to be re le va

nt t o the issues involved in the ca se. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 163-168. Future dang erousne ss is an issue that is releva nt to the s entenc ing stag e of a capital-murder trial. Mason, 905 S.W .2d at 577. Evidenc e of a de fenda

nt’s char acte r is one fa ctor that a jury may consider w hen dec iding the futuredang erousne ss special issue. Keeton v. State, 724 S.W .2d 58, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). When appellant made a fr eedom- of-spe ech obje ction to the admission of this evidence, the state re sponded that it was evide nce of appellant’ s char acte r, and the trial court ove rruled the objection. I t is withi n the zone of re asonable disag ree ment t h at t his evidence was indicative of appellant’ s char acte r and thus rele vant to the issue of future dang erousne ss. Defe nse counse l arg ues that appellant had been “trying to do the rig ht thing s” since he was inca rce rate d, that he wa s sorry fo r w hat he did , th at he too k r e sp on sib ili ty fo r h is ow n ac tio ns , an d tha t he un de rs too d w hat he did

was wr ong . The jokes at issue, which appe llant told while incarc erated af ter ra pi ng , beating , and murderinga 15-y ear -old fema le, demonstrate d the oppos ite. This evidenc e showed that appellant found the topics of violence a nd disrespec t towards women to be humorous. The trial c ourt did not abuse its discre tion in admitt ing this evide nce ove r appe llant’s First Amendme nt objection. This evidence was a l s o re levant under Rule 401 beca

use it had a te ndency

to make the exis tence of any

fac t of conseque nce ( i.e., a pp e lla nt’ s f utu re da ng e ro us ne ss) mor e pr ob a

ble tha n it would be without the evidenc e. T EX . R. E V ID . 4 01 . App e lla nt c lai ms th at the e vid e nc e sh ou ld

ne ve rt he le s s h a v e b e e ne xc l u d e d u n d e r R u l e 4 0 3 b e c a

u s e i t s p r o b a t i v e v a l u e w a s s u b s t an t i a lly35

outweig hed b y t h e d an ger of unfa ir prejudice . T EX . R. E V ID . 403. Although the evidenc e wa s arguably prejudicia l, it was not so pr ejudicial that there was a clea r disparity betwee n the deg ree of p r e ju d ic e an d it s p r o b a ti v e v a lu e . W i l liams, 958 S.W .2d at 196. And eve n if we a ssume that the eviden ce was admitted in violation of Rule 403, appellant wa s not harmed by its admissi on. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.2(b). The state did not heavily rely on appellant’ s jokes, and it prese nted other,

c omp e lli nge vid ence of

a pp e lla nt’ s f utu re da ng e ro us ne ss, inc lud ingthe br uta l f a c ts o f t he of fe ns e and appe llant’s prior history , violent artwork, a nd conver sion to Satanism while i ncar cer ated. Point of er ror se ven is overr

uled. JU RYAR G UM EN TS I n p oin t of e rr or e ig ht, a

pp e lla nt a sse rt s that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d w he n it

a llo we d th e state to argue to the jury that appellant was a con man because, even though he claimed to want to die, he spent four hour s testify ing be fore the jury

. Permissible jury argument g ener ally falls i nto one of four

are a s: ( 1) su mmatio n o f t

he e vid e nc e ; ( 2) re a so na

ble de du c tio n f

ro m th e e vid e nc e ; ( 3) an a ns we r t o the arg ument of opposi ng counsel; or (4) a plea for l aw e nforc ement. Cannady v. State, 11 S.W .3d 20 5, 21 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). We h a ve c on sis te ntl y hel d that argume nt t

hat stri ke s at a defe ndant over

the shoulders of d ef

en s e co unsel is improper. W ilson v. State, 7 S.W .3d 136, 147 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W .2d 330, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). When appellant testified at trial, defe nse counse l questioned him reg arding his journal that had bee n admitted into e vidence and labeled State’s Ex hibit 291. I n this journa l, a ppellant wrote :

“ What A m I : A c on fi de nc e man, a c ow ard , a the sp ian. Th e vir tue of my tr ibe is es se nti a lly de c e it. I n sh or t, I a m the c on su mmate vil lia n [sic ] i n a wo rl d wi tho ut he ro e s. ” Ap pe lla nt de sc ri bed this exhibi t as simply

a “co n ce p t j o urnal” containing a fic titious “my th.” I n response to further36

questioning by defe nse counse l, appellant said that he knew what he did to the victim was wrongand that he should g ive up his own life as a conseque nce of

his actions. Imean, I ’m a p i ec e o f cr ap. I understand that. I ’m not asking–Ididn’t come he re loo kin g fo r s a lvatio n. I c a me he re loo kin g fo r an e xec uti on . I ’m no t a sk ingy ou

a ll to s pa re my lif e . I ’m a sk ingy ou

a ll t o all ow me to g ive up my lif e in spi te of

he rs , based on the laws that I live by

. I t’s life for life. I took a life, mine should be taken in r e tur n. . . . I wo uld te ll [th e vic tim ’s fa

mil y ] that so rr

y do e sn ’t be g in t o e xpla in and it doesn’t beg in to just ify

. . . . Nothing that I can do w ill ever justify the life that Itoo k. I t’ s n ot r ig ht an d it wi ll ne ve r be ri g ht. Th e re ’s no thi ng that can ma ke it r ig ht. Only thing I can sa y is that I ’m asking them t o al l o w m e to give up my life. . . . Ag ain, I didn’t come he re looking for sa lvation. I didn’t come here to look t o extend my life. I came here looking f

or an e x ecutioner

. Def ense c ounsel later argued at c losing that a ppellant “de serve s to live beca use he g ets it,” i.e., he under stood what he did w as wrong a nd he took re sponsibili ty

for his own a ctions without

makin g e xcu se s f

or him se lf . D e fe ns e c ouns e l also argue d th a t a pp e lla nt s ho we d “ the ult imate

remorse ” by

asking the jury

“to put him to death beca

use of what he did.” The prosecutor r esponded wi tho ut o bje c tio n f

ro m a pp e lla nt. You know what? He doesn’t g et any thing. He doesn’t g et it at all. And I ’ll show y ou wh y in t his e vid e nc e . Th e re ’s pr oo f that he do e sn ’t g e t it, no t a t a ll, be c a us e the bo tto m li ne is that [ app e lla nt] i s a c on man. On e of

the be st– and

y ou saw i t y e s t e r d ay , a l m o s t f

o u r h o u r s , an d w e ’ l l t a l k a b o u t t h a t

. A n d y o u kn ow wh a t, L adies a nd Gentlemen, you d o n ’t ev en have to take my word for it. There’ s evidenc e rig ht the re in his own words that he’s a con man. . . . I n his own writing he say s, “ What am I ? A c on fi de nc e man, a c ow ard , a

the sp ian. Th e vir

tue of my tribe is essentially dece it. I n short, Iam the consummate villain in a world without heroe s.” When the prosec utor continued to re fer to appellant as a “c on man,” de fense counsel objected. [P ROSECUTOR] : And L adies a nd Gent l em en of the J ury , he’s a con man. And here ’s his bet. I f y ou buy

his con, at the ve ry

end of a ll his t estimony , if y ou buy that con whe n he say s execute me, his bet is that y ou’re g oing to f eel sorr y for him and y ou ’r e g oin g to g ive him

lif e . He ’s pu t it a ll in be c a

us e he do e sn ’t have a

ny thi nge lse to lose.37

I f that we re true , if his story that he told y ou was true, I ’m sorry , Ididn’t mean to do it, give me the death penalty , why did he take almost four hour s to ex plain and justify e ve ry sin g le thi nghe did ? Al l hi s w ri ti ngs, his jou rn a l, m a kin g up sto ri e s th a t th is is about some fictional cha rac ter– [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: I ’m g oing to object. That’s striking at the De fenda nt over the should er s o f C ounsel. I ’m the one that chose to do that direc t examination. Th e y ’r e a tta c kin g my

c lie nt f or that. [P ROSECUTOR] : His ex planations for all of these pictures, c ommissi oned ar t and all that. He’ s a con man. And he’s telling y ou all this. Why did he spend four

hours doing that? I ’m sorry

– [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: I ’m g oing to m ake the same objec tion. I ’m the one w ho chose to do that. The y ’re attackinghim over what Idid. THE COURT: Over

ruled. [PROS ECU TO R]: I ’m

ta lki ng a bo ut ev e ry

thi ng that th is guy

sa id o n th e sta

nd , r ig ht? Cou ld h e have sa id i t in

jus t a c ou ple of min

ute s? Sor ry . Pl e a se g ive me the de a th penalty . The e nd. But instead he spends almost four hours– [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Renew the same objec tion, Your Honor. THE COURT: Over

ruled. Ap pe lla nt c on te nd s th at w he n th e pr os e c uto r ac c us e d App e lla nt of be ing a c on man b e c a us e of the le ng th o f t ime he wa s o n th e sta nd , s he wa s st

ri kin g at a pp e lla nt o ve r t he sh ou lde rs of

de fe ns e counsel be cause the attac k was re ally a cr iticism of counsel’s dec ision to have Appe llant testify for that leng th of time. This is an inac curate cha rac terization of the prosec utor’s ar g ument, which wa s direc ted not at def

ense c ounsel, but at appe llant himself. Mosley v . State, 9 8 3 S. W. 2 d 2 4 9 , 2 5 9 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that “a prosec utor runs a risk of imprope rly striking at a def

endant ove r the shoulder of counsel when the arg ument is made in terms of defe nse counsel personally and whe n the argument expli citly

impugns de fense counsel’s c hara cter ”). D efe nse counse l failed to objec t the first time the prosec utor argued that appe llant was a con man who s pent four hours on t he stand. See38

T EX . R. A PP . P. 3 3. 1 ( re qu ir ing a tim e ly ob je c tio n in or de r t o p re se rv e e rr or ); see also Lane v. State, 151 S.W .3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (stating that err or in the admission of evidenc e is cure d wh e re the same e vid e nc e c ome s in e lse wh e re wi tho ut o bje c tio n) . Eve n if we re a c h the me ri ts o f t his alleg ation, appellant’ s claim fails bec ause the prosec utor’s ar g ument was a rea s o n able deduction from the evidenc e and an answer to the arg ument of opposi ng counsel. Cannady, 11 S.W .3d at 213. Point of error e ight is over ruled. I n poin ts of

e rr or 9Aa nd 9B , a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt imp ro pe rl y

pr e ve nte d him from makinghis desired c losing a rg uments to the j ury . I n point of err or 9A, a ppellant claims that he sh ou ld h a ve be e n a

ble to a rgue “ that th e jur

y c ou ld c on sid e r a s mi tig a tin g [his ] cl a im that hi s initial [ sexual] encounte r wit h the victim was conse nsual.” In point of err or 9B , he cla ims that he should have be en able to argue that the jur y wa s re q u i re d to find that he wa s bey ond rede mption befor e it could answe r the mitigation special issue in the neg ative. At iss ue is the fo llo wi nge xch ang e duri ngc los ingargume nt. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: When you have to answer the other que stion, the second qu e sti on, wha t do es it a sk y ou to d o? I t a sk s y ou

to t a ke a ll the e vid e nc e int o consideration, his charac ter, his backg round, his mora l c ulpability

. What does that boil down to, L adies and Gentlemen? You have to decide that this person is so far bey ond rede mption that there is no rea son– [P ROSECU T OR ]: Objection, Your Honor. That is an improper stateme nt of the law. [DE F EN SE C OU

NSE L ]: I t is no t, Yo ur Ho no r. Th a t is wh a t th e y have to d e c ide to do, in the opinion of the Def ense. THE COURT: The que stion t h at they need to a ddress, the issue, is in the Court’s char g e, and that’s what they will be addre ssing, not this other one. So I ’ll sustain the objection, ask y ou to move on.

. . .39

[DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: All rig ht. I s there a mitigating circ umstance in this case , L adies a nd Gentlemen? I ’m g oing to outline what I think are two diff ere nt miti g ating c ir c ums tanc e s in

thi s o ff e ns e . I ’m g oin g to a sk

y ou to t a ke int o c on sid e ra

tio n th a t if y ou thi nk that th is s tart e d o ut a s a c on se ns ua l r e la tio ns hip , y ou sh ou ld u se tha

t a s a mitigating circ umstance. [P ROSECUTOR] : Objection, Your H onor. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: I n this– THE COURT: I ’m g oing to sustain the o b j ec t ion. The De fenda

nt has bee n found g u i l t y. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Your Honor – THE COURT: This J ury will not revisit whether it was consensua l as y ou’re asking them to. He has be en convic ted. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: No, I – TH E CO UR T: [De fe ns e c ouns e l], I wi ll a sk y ou no t to argue wi th t

he Court

. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Your Hono r, wi t h all due re spect, I am not arguing that this was

– t h at they

didn’t find him guilty

of it. I ’m saying that if this st arte d out as a c on se ns ua l r e la tio ns hip , a nd the re ’s a lot of e vid e nc e to p ro ve tha

t and sh owtha t, I’ m n o ts ayi n g t h a ti te n d e d t h a tw ay. I’ ms ayi n g i tb e g an

– an d i f i t b e g ant h a tw ay, Ithi nk that’ s a mit ig a tin g c ir c ums tanc e the y c an take int o e ff e c t. I a sk y ou to l e t me argue that. [P ROSECUTOR] : Your Honor, this Jury – T H E CO U RT : T h e D e f

e n d an t h a s b e e nf

o u n d g u il ty , [d e f

e n s e c o u n s e l]

. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: I ’m not arguing that. I ’m doing a ver y – TH E CO UR T: Th e y c an loo k a t a ll of the c ir c ums tanc e s su

rr ound ingthe inc ide nt i n decidingwhether

or not there ’s suffic ient mitigation. Go ahe ad. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Thank y ou. L adies a nd Gentlemen, the re is a lot of evidenc e out there to show y ou that this started out as a c onsensual re lationship. [P ROSECUTOR] : Objection, Your H onor. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: I t didn’t end–40

[P ROSECUTOR] : Your Honor, I ’m g oing to objec t. He ca nnot tell this J ury

what miti gat i o n is. Only

the J ury can de cide, ba sed on the e vidence , whether or not so me thi ngis m iti g a tin g , a nd the n th e y have to b a lanc e it. [DE F EN SE C OU

NSE L ]: As a De fe ns e a tto rn e y I c an’ t sa y a s fa r a s th e De fe ns e is conce rned this is miti g ating and y ou should take it into consideration? THE COURT: You may

argue the e vidence

. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Okay . I ’m arguing the evidenc e, Your Honor. Ap pe lla nt a sse rt s th a t th e imp ro pe r de nia l of his jur y argume nts a mou

nte d to a de nia l of his rig ht to counsel and preve nted him f rom prese nting a defe nse. When appe llant testified befor e the jury , he explained that he a nd Medina be g an havingconsensua l sex , but he “sna pped” w hen she chang ed her

mind and threatened to ac cuse him of r ape if he told any o n e ab o u t their sexual encounte r. De tective Albe rt L icon conf irmed that appe llant had t old the s ame story when que stioned by the police. De fense counsel e licited testimony from Dr . Stern o n cr o s s -examination that she

c ou ld “ [n]ot

wi th a hu nd re d p e rc e nt c e rt a int y ” de te rm ine wh e the r o r n ot t he se x wa s c on se ns ua l. And althoug h the trial cour t initi ally sustained the state’s objections to a ppellant’s conse nsual sex as a mitig ating circ umstance a rg ument, the re cord r efle cts that the trial cour t later ove rruled the state ’s ob je c tio n to a

sim ila r a rgume nt. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: Detec tive L icon. W h at did he say to y ou? This is not something that we suddenly made up to t el l y ou. He told y ou that befor e he took I rving ’s conf

ession, that I rving told y ou this started out as a c onsensual re lationship. This confe ssion came into evidenc e and it wa s uncontrover ted. The prosec ution had the opportunity

when he was on the stand to confront him about the truthfulne ss of this confession and they

didn’t, L adi es and Ge ntlemen. I t came in unc ontroverte d an d t h er e i s n o re as o nfo r y o un o tt o b el i ev e i t

. “W e w er e n ea r t h e p o rt ab l e b u i l d i n gs and it was da

rk. We beg an to have sex. S he wa s a willing participa nt.” I f y ou think that this star

ted out a s a consensua l r elationship beca use of the evidenc e t h at was prese nted to y ou, then y ou could use that a s a mitigating f actor

. [P ROSECUTOR] : Objection, Your H onor.41

THE COURT: Over

ruled. Thus, appellant wa s ultim ately allowed to make his desired argument to the j ury . Point of error 9A is overrule d. We further

hold that the trial cou rt did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the state’s objection to appellant’ s argument that the j ury was required to find that he was be y ond rede mption befor e it could answe r the mi tigation specia l issue in the neg ative. This is not what Article 37.071 require s. The statute instead r equire s that the jury answe r a spe cific que stion. Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidenc e, including the circ umstances of the offe nse, the defe ndant’s char acte r and backg round, and the perso n al m o ral culpability

of the de fenda

nt, there is a suffi ci ent m itigatingcirc umstance or circ umstances to w arr ant that a sentenc e of life imprisonment without parole rather than a de ath sentenc e be imposed. Ar t

. 3 7 .071, § 2(e) (1). Althoug h we have held that imprope r denia l of a jury argument may constitute a denia l of the rig ht to co u n s el , this holdi ng assumes that the jury argument is one the defe ndant is entitled to make. McG ee v . State, 774 S.W .2d 229, 2 3 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Appellant wa s not entitled to arg ue contr ary to Article 37.071. Point of err or 9B is overrule d. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. Deliver ed: September

29, 2010 Pub lis h