Event Report Guidelines

10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)

Draft Report for Comment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NUREG-1022, Rev. 3, 

Supplement 1
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Event Report Guidelines

10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)

Draft Report for Comment

Manuscript Completed: April 2014

Date Published: April 2014

Prepared by:

Aron Lewin

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NUREG-1022, Rev. 3

Supplement 1
COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT

Any interested party may submit comments on this report for consideration by the NRC staff. 

Comments may be accompanied by additional relevant information or supporting data. Please 

specify the report number NUREG-1022, Revision 3, Supplement 1 in your comments, and 

send them by the end of the comment period specified in the Federal Register notice 

announcing the availability of this report. 

Addresses: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. Please include 

Docket ID NRC-2011-0237 in the subject line of your comments. Comments submitted in 

writing or in electronic form will be posted on the NRC website and on the Federal rulemaking 

website http://www.regulations.gov. 

Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for documents 

filed under Docket ID NRC-2011-0237. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher at 301-287-3422 or by e-mail at Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.

Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch 

(RADB), Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, Mail Stop: 

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For any questions about the material in this report, please contact: Christopher Regan, Chief, 

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Please be aware that any comments that you submit to the NRC will be considered a public 

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iii

ABSTRACT

NUREG-1022, Revision 3, “Event Reporting Guidelines: 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73,” contains 

guidelines that the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) considers 

acceptable for use in meeting the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 

(10 CFR) Sections 50.72 and 50.73. Section 3.2.13, “Loss of Emergency Preparedness 

Capabilities,” of NUREG-1022, Revision 3, contains guidance for reporting under 

10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) requires reports for a major loss of 

emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or communications capability. 

Much of the guidance found in Section 3.2.13 of NUREG-1022, Revision 3, is subject to 

engineering judgment. This supplement to NUREG-1022, Revision 3, endorses Nuclear Energy 

Institute (NEI) 13-01, “Reportable Action Levels for Loss of Emergency Preparedness 

Capabilities,” dated October 2013. NEI 13-01 provides specific guidance for reporting under 

10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), and as a result, reduces the need for engineering judgment. Guidance 

found in NEI 13-01 dated October 2013 provides for an acceptable alternative to guidance 

found in Section 3.2.13 of NUREG-1022, Revision 3.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This NUREG contains and references information collection requirements that are subject to the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These information collections were 

approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0014, 3150-0035,

3150-0011, and 3150-0002.

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for 

information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting documents displays a 

currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number.

v

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

1. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

2. ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 3

3. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

1

1. BACKGROUND

On August 29, 1983, the NRC published a final rule amending 10 CFR 50.72, “Immediate 

notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors. Under this rule, 

10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(v) required reports be submitted to the NRC for any event that results in a 

major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or communications 

capability. These conditions are collectively referred to as a “Loss of Emergency Preparedness 

Capabilities.” While the Federal Register (FR) notice associated with the rule (48 FR 39043) 

lists some examples of systems within scope, it is unclear to what extent a given degradation 

would be reportable (i.e., how much degradation would have to occur to be considered “major”). 

In 2000, the NRC revised 10 CFR 50.72 (65 FR 63769) which resulted in the reporting 

requirements being renumbered. Loss of emergency preparedness capabilities were now 

reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No other significant changes to this reporting 

criterion occurred during the 2000 rule change.

NUREG-1022, “Event Reporting Guidelines: 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73,” contains guidelines that 

the staff of the NRC considers acceptable for use in meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 

and 50.73. NUREG-1022, Revision 0, Supplement 1, “Licensee Event Report System: 

Description of System and Guidelines for Reporting” (published February 1984 under

Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession 

No. ML101550097); NUREG-1022, Revision 1 (published January 1998 under ADAMS 

Accession No. ML070530420); and NUREG-1022, Revision 2 (published October 2000 under

ADAMS Accession No. ML003762595) all contain additional guidance for reporting under what 

is now 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). As was the case with the FR notice for the rule, much of the 

NUREG-1022 guidance associated with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) was unclear as to what extent 

a given degradation would be reportable. In addition, some of the guidance appeared to offer 

inconsistent approaches as to when to report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). As a result, much 

of the decision to report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) involved a licensee’s use of engineering 

judgment.

NUREG-1022, Revision 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13032A220) was published in 

January 2013. Section 3.2.13, “Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities,” which provides 

guidance for reporting under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), was rewritten in an attempt to provide 

clearer guidance that was in conformance to both the rule and its associated FR notices. The 

changes focused on the reporting of major losses in capability as opposed to individual

systems. In addition, guidance on planned activities was also provided. Although some of the 

guidance is specific, much of the guidance is still general in nature. In many areas, the decision 

to report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) still involves a licensee’s use of engineering judgment.

The use of engineering judgment can result in inconsistent application. During public meetings

conducted on April 3, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13100A390), and on May 7, 2013 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13109A228), the NRC discussed with external stakeholders, 

including the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), what specific considerations might be evaluated 

against when the NRC determines if acceptable engineering judgment was applied by a 

licensee. NEI 13-01, “Reportable Action Levels for Loss of Emergency Preparedness 

Capabilities” (ADAMS Accession No. ML13281A794) was then drafted with the purpose of 

providing a detailed uniform approach to reporting under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). 
2

NEI 13-01 provides more specific guidance for reporting under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) and, as 

a result, reduces the need for engineering judgment. By letter dated October 8, 2013 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13281A780), NEI requested NRC endorsement of NEI 13-01. It should also 

be noted that some of the specific guidance found in NEI 13-01 differs from certain specific 

positions found in Section 3.2.13 of NUREG-1022, Revision 3.
3

2. ANALYSIS

NEI 13-01 seeks to provide specific guidance regarding the conditions or events that warrant 

reporting under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), namely (1) major loss of emergency assessment 

capability, (2) major loss of offsite response capability, and (3) major loss of offsite 

communications capabilities. Reportability in NEI 13-01 is determined by using Reportable 

Action Levels (RALs). As defined and used in NEI 13-01, a RAL is a predetermined, 

site-specific, observable threshold that, when met or exceeded, requires notification of the 

associated event to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

In Section 3.2.13 of NUREG-1022, the discussion states that the loss of capabilities would be 

reportable if the event substantially impaired a licensee’s, or offsite officials’ ability, to respond to 

an emergency if one were to occur or has occurred. The NRC’s evaluation of NEI 13-01 

considered this threshold identified in NUREG-1022 in order to ensure that any significant 

events in which Commission action might be needed to maintain or improve reactor safety or to 

respond to heightened public concern will continue to be reported.

Much of the specific NEI 13-01 guidance for reporting under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) reduces 

the need for the engineering judgment which might be needed under Section 3.2.13 of 

NUREG-1022. In creating NEI 13-01, NEI solicited inputs and feedback from the NRC as to 

what specific considerations might be evaluated against when determining whether acceptable 

engineering judgment was applied. The following paragraphs illustrate how specific guidance in 

NEI 13-01 reduces the need for engineering judgment:

1. Regarding emergency classification capability, NUREG-1022 states that “a loss of a 

significant portion of control room indication, including annunciators or monitors, or the loss 

of all plant vent stack radiation monitors, should be evaluated for reportability. In evaluating 

the reportability of such events, only those display systems, indicators, and annunciators 

that are relied upon in the emergency plan and the emergency plan implementing 

procedures addressing classification, assessment, or protective actions; or relied upon in 

other station procedures that provide input to these activities need to be considered. The 

indication remaining available should be considered in determining if a major loss of 

emergency assessment capability has occurred.” The guidance is general in nature and 

subject to engineering judgment.

Table A in Section 3.1 of NEI 13-01 provides specific guidance for determining whether

issues associated with emergency classification capability result in a major loss of 

emergency assessment. The focus is on the ability to declare an emergency for a given 

condition as described in the emergency plan (or by extension, any implementing procedure 

described in the plan). NEI 13-01 defines an Initiating Condition (IC) as “An event or 

condition that aligns with the definition of one of the four emergency classification levels by 

virtue of the potential or actual effects or consequences, as described in the site emergency 

plan or an implementing procedure described in the emergency plan.” NEI 13-01 also 

defines Emergency Action Level (EAL) as “A pre-determined, site-specific, observable 

threshold for an Initiating Condition that, when met or exceeded, places the plant in a given 

emergency classification level, as described in the site emergency plan or an implementing 
4

procedure described in the emergency plan.” As a result, an IC provides one or more EALs 

which, when met, will require an emergency declaration.

For an IC with multiple EALs that assess the same condition (i.e., high Reactor Coolant 

System radioactivity), instrumentation failures that result in an inability to evaluate a given 

EAL would not be considered a major loss of emergency assessment if at least one EAL, 

and thus the IC, could be evaluated. For scenarios in which an IC has multiple EALs that 

assess different conditions (i.e., an IC for natural hazards with EALs for high wind speed, 

seismic event, flooding), instrumentation failures that result in an inability to evaluate all 

EALs for one of the conditions would be considered a major loss of emergency assessment.

Table A in Section 3.1 of NEI 13-01 also proposes to provide allowances for planned 

evolutions. Reports would not be required for planned maintenance evolutions that are 

equal to or less than 24 hours in duration (regardless of compensatory measure status). 

After 24 hours, if there is an inability to evaluate all EALs for a given emergency condition as 

described in the emergency plan, a compensatory measure would need to be in place and 

the ability to evaluate at least one EAL must be restored within 72 hours from the time the 

maintenance evolution began.

The classification of an emergency is a significant emergency assessment capability. The 

classification capability is not lost unless all EALs for a given condition are rendered 

unavailable. The NRC approves a licensee’s emergency classification schemes, which 

include ICs and EALs. The NRC recognizes that declaring an emergency based on certain

EALs (e.g., manual sampling and analysis) would take longer than reading an indication 

(e.g., radiation monitor) in the control room. If the IC can still be evaluated because of the 

availability of an EAL, there is no significant impairment of emergency assessment 

capability, even if an emergency declaration was delayed. As a result, NRC action or 

awareness is not likely warranted in such scenarios, and therefore a report would not be 

needed.

Regarding the provisions for planned maintenance, NRC action or awareness is not likely 

warranted for the proposed scenarios in which a licensee maintains plant awareness during 

a controlled evolution. As a result, a report would not be needed. If a pre-existing condition 

is identified during a planned evolution, a licensee would need to evaluate whether an 

unplanned major loss existed.

2. NUREG-1022 indicates that reports are required for “Failures in the primary public alerting 

systems (e.g., sirens, tone alert radios), for whatever reason, that result in the loss of the 

capability to alert a large segment of the population in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) 

for more than 1 hour.” Regarding what constitutes a “large segment of the population,” 

Example 1 in Section 3.2.13 of NUREG-1022 states “The NRC has not established a 

numerical threshold (e.g., number, percentage, or area of failed sirens) for this reporting 

requirement because the thresholds need to be specific to the particular EPZ. The NRC 

expects its licensees to establish thresholds that reflect the EPZ-specific population density 

and distribution, the locations of the sirens or other alerting devices, and the overlap in 

coverage of adjacent sirens.” As a result, the basis for what constitutes a “large segment of 

the population” is subject to engineering judgment.
5

Section 3.2 of NEI 13-01 proposes to establish a numeric threshold for what is considered a 

“large segment of the population.” The Developer Notes for Section 3.2 state that “For 

purposes of developing this list {primary alert notification system}, ‘a large segment of the 

population in the EPZ’ should be taken to mean approximately 25% of the total EPZ 

population. Variations in population density/distribution should be considered when 

identifying potential combinations of lost equipment (e.g., sirens) that could cause the ‘25% 

of the total EPZ population’ threshold to be exceeded. For example, depending upon the 

site-specific {alert notification system} design and EPZ characteristics (e.g., topography, 

population density/distribution, etc.), the criterion ‘approximately 25% of the total EPZ 

population’ may or may not correlate to 25% of the sirens.”

Absent any specific current guidance that establishes numeric thresholds for what 

constitutes a “large segment of the population,” the NRC believes that the proposed 

25% population threshold is reasonable for reporting considerations. Immediate NRC action 

or awareness is not likely warranted in scenarios for which primary alert notification failures 

impact less than 25% of a total EPZ population. As a result, a report would not be needed. 

It should be noted that although an event or condition might not rise to the level of requiring 

a report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), this does not imply that such an event or condition 

should not be corrected in order to re-establish or continue to ensure compliance with other 

regulatory requirements in place.

NRC evaluation also included areas in which proposed NEI 13-01 guidance differed from the 

specific guidance found in Section 3.2.13 of NUREG 1022. The NRC’s evaluation considered 

the following:

1. NUREG-1022 indicates that reports are not required for planned maintenance evolutions 

impacting the primary Emergency Response Facility (ERF) if (1) the ERF’s assessment 

capabilities could be restored to service within the facility activation time or the licensee had 

implemented viable compensatory actions and (2) the planned outage was not expected to, 

and did not, exceed 72 hours.

Section 3.1 of NEI 13-01 proposes that reports would not be required if planned 

maintenance evolutions impacting the primary ERF are equal to or less than 24 hours in 

duration (regardless of restoration capabilities or compensatory measure status). For 

planned maintenance evolutions impacting the primary ERF that are greater than 24 hours, 

NEI 13-01 guidance is similar to that found in NUREG-1022.

Regarding the provisions for planned maintenance, NRC action or awareness is not likely 

warranted for the proposed scenarios in which a licensee maintains plant awareness during 

a controlled evolution. As a result, a report would not be needed. If a pre-existing condition 

is identified during a planned evolution, a licensee would need to evaluate whether an 

unplanned major loss existed.

2. Under NUREG-1022, reporting considerations associated with unplanned or planned 

outages of the primary ERF do not take into account the availability of an alternate facility. 

Unplanned losses of the primary ERF would be reportable if not restored within the facility 

activation time specified in the emergency plan. However, for planned maintenance 

evolutions impacting the primary ERF, engineering judgment is afforded under 
6

NUREG-1022, in that a licensee could potentially consider whether or not an alternate 

facility could be used as a compensatory measure during the evolution.

Section 3.1 of NEI 13-01 proposes to allow the licensee to credit an “alternate facility” during 

a planned or unplanned outage of a primary ERF when determining whether a reportable 

condition exists. For reporting considerations, “alternate facility” is a defined term. An 

“alternate facility” is a location that may serve as a Technical Support Center (TSC) or 

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) as described in the emergency plan or in a procedure 

described in the emergency plan and meets the requirements of Sections IV.E.8.a and 8.c

of Appendix E, “Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization 

Facilities,” to 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.”

If a defined “alternate facility” exists, an outage of the primary ERF, whether planned or 

unplanned, might not require a report. In ways similar to those outlined in NUREG-1022, 

facilities that might not meet the definition would not necessarily be excluded for 

consideration as a compensatory measure associated with a planned maintenance 

evolution impacting the primary ERF. In addition, similar to NUREG-1022, loss of an 

alternate facility alone (whether it meets the definition or not) would not require a report.

If a licensee has an “alternate facility” that is capable of performing the functions of the 

primary facility, the licensee’s emergency assessment capability is not significantly impaired

if the primary facility is not available. As a result, NRC action or awareness is not likely 

warranted in such scenarios, and therefore a report would not be needed.

3. NUREG-1022 indicates that reports are required for failures in the primary public alerting 

system that result in the loss of the capability to alert a large segment of the population in 

the emergency planning zone (EPZ) for more than one hour. A planned outage of the 

primary public alerting system need not be reported if (1) the licensee had arranged for the 

implementation of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-approved backup 

alerting methods should public alerting become necessary and (2) the planned outage was 

not expected to, and subsequently did not, exceed 24 hours.

Section 3.2 of NEI 13-01 proposes two options for determining whether or not planned and 

unplanned losses of the primary public alert and notification system are reportable. The first 

option is for sites with a FEMA-approved backup alerting method that does not meet the 

primary design objectives stated in Section IV.D.3 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Similar 

to NUREG-1022, extended planned outages of the primary public alerting system would not 

be reportable if the FEMA-approved backup alerting method was available and the planned 

outage was not expected to, and subsequently did not, exceed 24 hours. However, 

NEI 13-01 proposes that for extended unplanned losses of the primary public alerting 

system, a report would not be required if the FEMA approved backup alerting method was 

available and the primary public alerting system was returned to service within 24 hours.

This 24-hour cap is put into place to limit reliance on a less capable backup alerting method. 

However, because some backup capability exists, NRC action or awareness is not likely 

warranted in such scenarios for which the loss of the primary capability is limited in duration. 

As a result, a report would not be required. After 24 hours, a report would ensure NRC 

awareness of the issue and allow follow-up action as appropriate. In addition, the 24-hour 
7

time limit serves as an incentive to restore the primary public alerting system in a timely 

manner.

The second option for determining whether or not planned and unplanned losses of the 

primary public alert and notification system are reportable is for sites with a FEMA-approved 

backup alerting method that meets the primary design objectives stated in Section IV.D.3 of 

Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. Under the second option, extended planned and unplanned 

losses of the primary public alert and notification system are reportable only if the 

FEMA-approved backup alerting method is not available.

A FEMA-approved backup alerting method that meets the performance criterion of the 

primary system achieves the same level of performance as the primary system. If a backup 

alerting method is available, the licensee’s offsite response capability is not significantly 

impaired, even if the primary method is not available. As a result, NRC action or awareness 

is not likely warranted in such scenarios, and therefore a report would not be needed.

Although there may be editorial or formatting differences, other specific guidance that is found in 

NEI 13-01 is similar in nature to specific guidance found in Section 3.2.13 of NUREG-1022. It 

should also be noted that Sections 1, 2, and 4 of NUREG-1022, Revision 3, contain general 

guidance for event reporting that would still be applicable to reports submitted under 

10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). While NEI 13-01 does appear to contain limited general reporting 

guidance that does not appear to conflict with NUREG-1022 guidance, much of the guidance 

found in Sections 1, 2, and 4 of Revision 3 of NUREG-1022 is not found in NEI 13-01. As a 

result, Sections 1, 2, and 4 of Revision 3 of NUREG-1022 are not considered superseded by 

licensee adoption of NEI 13-01. In addition, a decision that a particular condition is not 

reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) does not alleviate the requirement to maintain the 

effectiveness of an emergency plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) or the need for prior 

NRC approval of emergency-plan changes as required in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4).

9

3. CONCLUSION

The NRC endorses NEI 13-01, “Reportable Action Levels for Loss of Emergency Preparedness 

Capabilities,” dated October 2013. For reporting considerations associated with 

10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), the guidance found in NEI 13-01 provides an acceptable alternative to 

that found in Section 3.2.13 of NUREG-1022, Revision 3. Licensees that choose to adopt the 

guidance in NEI 13-01 should maintain as much fidelity as possible to the NEI document. This 

will help to minimize any potential regulatory compliance issues associated with reporting under 

10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

Sections 1, 2, and 4 of Revision 3 of NUREG-1022 contain general guidance for event reporting 

that would still be applicable to reports submitted under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). These 

sections are not considered superseded by licensee adoption of NEI 13-01.

Although an event or condition might not rise to the level of requiring a report under 

10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), this does not imply that such an event or condition should not be 

corrected in order to re-establish or continue to ensure compliance with other regulatory 

requirements in place. For example, a decision that a particular condition is not reportable 

under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) does not alleviate the requirement to maintain the effectiveness 

of an emergency plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) or the need for prior NRC 

approval of emergency plan changes as required in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4).






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Event Report Guidelines: 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)