A Report by a Panel of the 

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

An Independent Review of 

Foreign National Access Management

January 2013

Nationa Academy of

Public Administration ®
ABOUT THE ACADEMY

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chartered by Congress in 1984. It provides expert advice to 

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mayors, and state legislators, as well as prominent scholars, business 

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the Academy and its work at www.napawash.org. 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION® 

January 2014 

The National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

AnlndependentRe~ew 

of Foreign National Access Management 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

PANEL 

Dick Thornburgh, Chair* 

David Berteau* 

Frank Chellino* 

Bill Greenwalt* 

Chris Sale* 

Doug Webster* 

*Academy Fellow 
Officers of the Academy 

Robert J. Shea, Chair of the Board 

Nancy R. Kingsbury, Vice Chair 

Dan G. Blair, President and Chief Executive Officer 

B. J. Reed, Secretary 

Sallyanne Harper, Treasurer 

Project Staff 

joseph P. Mitchell, Ph.D., Director of Project Development 

joe Thompson, Project Director 

Susan Adams, Ph.D., Senior Advisor 

Tron Brekke, Senior Advisor 

Deborah Johnson, Senior Advisor 

john Martinez, Senior Advisor 

Dan Orr, Research Associate 

Laura Goldstein, Research Associate 

Andrew Price, Research Associate 

The views expressed in this report are those of the Panel. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Academy as an institution. 

National Academy of Public Administration 

1600 K St., NW, 

Suite 400 

Washington, DC 20006 

january 2014 

ii 
FOREWORD 

The National Aeronautica aDd Space AdmiDistration (NASA), 88 much 88 any orpniRiion 

public or pri.v~ has he!pecl to develop aDd spread the beaefiJa of acieDCe and teclmology 

1llrougbout the world. NASA laid 1he groundwork for mch IDOikrn-day teclmology u small 

tompufers, cellular ClOIIDilllllil:a1iom, and lightweight lllld boat R!llistant materials. To achieve ita 

minio11, NASA mll!l woik tollaboratively with many natiOJill, and individual citizens of those 

nations, on a broad JUI80 of soientific and ~ projec:!ll. Ovm the last year, security 

iru:id.cnts involving foreip nationals II NASA :meerch centers have led to justifiable scrutiny by 

tile NASA AdmiDiB1Dtor and o11ler agency leadm, ~sa, md tile media. 

NASA's charter directs 1he agency to woti: cooperatively 8lld llhare iDfolmation wi1h oCher 

natiOllll while simultmoouly safegumting its classified and proprietary infomm1ion lllld assets. 

This can prove to be a cballensing task. On 1he one hand, the threat of ~~ md 

C!!pionaac aimed at govemmcnt tp~Cics by hostile nation-Jtates aDd fonrip ailversarics is 

growiDg. On the other hlllll, collaboration and cooperation m ballmvb of modem ecienti& 

endeavors. 

R.ocognizing thOI&l socurity challl!llp, NASA con1J3cted. with the Na1i0llll! Acaclmny of Public 

Administtat:ion (tho Academy) 1D conduct a mview of its :linign national Ofl"lati.Oilll. How well 

NASA is able to balance these sometimes confliding demands, aDd what it might do to improve 

its processes for workiDg with foreign nationals, arc 11 the heart of this m'iew. The Academy 

Pmel :lilaDd 1hat NASA leaders have already tabn aomc important step8 to improve Coteigo 

national opcra1iona - iilcludmg requestiJlg 1hill review - 8lld offi:n rwnmendatio:ms for fill'the.r 

~g 1hill critical element of the NASA entaprile. Simply put. the goal is to help NASA 

strib the piopet balance between collabo1111ion and security. 

As a Ccmgteasionally dlartered non1"Utisan and non-profit O!pllization with nearly 800 

dildngnit!wt Fellows, the Academy brings seuon.ed ezpem toge1ber to help public 

organizations addreta their meet critical cballenges. The .AA:ademy is proud to have bea1 choflell 

by NASA to niView how it meolll those challenges. Not only haa the Acadl!llny conducted a 

numbm of important ll1udios for NASA in the Ieccmt past. but both o!plrizationa also sham a 

common lineaae in tho penon of James Webb, 1he second NASA Adminiatrator and founder of 

the .Academy in 1967. 

Dan Blair 

Pmlident ad Chief Executive Officer 

m 
iv 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

“Expand international cooperation on mutually beneficial space activities to: broaden and 

extend the benefits of space; further the peaceful use of space; and enhance collection and 

partnership in sharing of space-derived information” 

A Goal of the National Space Policy of the United States of America - June 28, 2010 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is one of the most accomplished 

agencies in the U.S. federal government and one of the most respected government entities in the 

world. To accomplish its mission, NASA works collaboratively with many nations on a broad 

range of scientific and engineering projects. Foreign national participation in NASA programs 

and projects is an inherent and essential element in NASA operations. No better illustration of 

this partnership is the fact that during 2013, NASA’s international operations were being 

supported by over 600 cooperative agreements with 120 nations. 

Having a well-run Foreign National Access Management program is in the best interests of 

NASA, both in terms of protecting vital U.S. security and proprietary information, as well as 

capitalizing on the talents of foreign nationals. This Academy review examined the Agency’s 

entire FNAM process from the initial request from a requestor or sponsor through foreign 

national vetting, credentialing, information technology security, counterintelligence, hosting and 

escort procedures, and export controls. 

There is a fundamental tension between NASA’s charter to work cooperatively and share 

information with other nations while simultaneously safeguarding its sensitive and proprietary 

information and assets from those same nations. How well NASA is able to balance these 

sometimes conflicting demands and what it might do to improve its processes for working with 

foreign nationals are the principal questions addressed in the Academy’s review.

Over the last year, security incidents involving foreign nationals at NASA research Centers have 

drawn the attention of the NASA Administrator and other agency leaders, Congress, and the 

media. Recognizing the growing threat of cyber-attacks and espionage aimed at government 

agencies by hostile nation-states and foreign adversaries, NASA asked the National Academy of 

Public Administration (the Academy) to conduct this review of its foreign national management 

processes. 

NASA staff members are dedicated, knowledgeable, committed to the mission, and genuinely 

happy to be working for NASA — they routinely rank the Agency as the best place to work in 

the federal government. NASA interviewees for this study were candid, cooperative, and eager 

to both offer suggestions and be involved in problem solving. Most NASA employees 

understood the challenge to share with, as well as to protect information from foreign nationals. 
v 

Having such a high-quality, dedicated workforce is a tremendous advantage for NASA in 

pursuing any improvement initiatives. 

The Academy Panel found that as with many federal agency programs, budget and personnel 

cuts have made the management of NASA’s security programs difficult. The Panel is sensitive to 

the budget situation NASA faces and has tried to keep most of its recommendations within 

achievable budget limits although some may prove to be resource-intensive. The Panel also 

thinks that strong leadership, which it believes NASA has, can accomplish much of what is 

recommended within existing resource limitations. In addition to the mission and security 

improvements that can be achieved, there are also long-term potential savings the Agency can 

realize by managing its foreign national efforts in a more efficient and effective manner. 

Despite the resource constraints, NASA leaders have already taken a number of positive steps to 

correct some of the weaknesses in the Foreign National Access Management (FNAM) process, 

including a moratorium on foreign national access which required each NASA field Center to 

evaluate its respective compliance with FNAM procedural requirements, a process completed 

earlier this year. Requesting this Academy review also demonstrates NASA’s commitment to 

making improvements to improving FNAM. To build on NASA’s goals, the Panel believes there 

are a number of important steps the Agency can take to improve FNAM and has proposed 

twenty-seven recommendations, the most significant of which are combined under the following 

six topics: 

1. Managing Foreign National Access Management as a Program – Currently, FNAM is 

not managed as a program. There is no systematic approach to FNAM at NASA; rather, 

there are individual Headquarters program requirements coupled with individual NASA 

Center approaches. Given inadequate means for determining the overall effect of these 

processes, the result is a broad range of outcomes, many of which are insufficient. The 

following steps towards a coordinated FNAM program would begin to coordinate efforts 

and secure better results: 

a. Change FNAM organizational alignments and reporting requirements in NASA 

Headquarters and field Centers. This restructuring includes moving 

counterintelligence staff from under the direct supervision of the HQ Office of 

Protective Services to the supervision of field Centers; moving the Office of 

Protective Services in HQ up one level to provide a more direct relationship 

between the Office and NASA senior leaders; and strengthening the formal 

organizational relationships between individual field Center FNAM staff and 

NASA HQ program staff. 

b. Improve training by developing comprehensive, integrated curriculums and lesson 

plans. This training would include all of the components of the FNAM process 

such as export control, host, sponsor, escort and counterintelligence. 
vi 

2. Reducing the flexibility given to Centers to interpret FNAM requirements – Too

much flexibility in largely procedural processes coupled with a “stovepiped” 

organizational structure and overly broad and organizationally-specific directives has 

resulted in inconsistent and ineffective outcomes. The following steps should be taken by 

NASA Headquarters: 

a. Write a comprehensive and detailed FNAM operating manual covering all 

functional aspects of the program. Headquarters staff should work in consultation 

with knowledgeable field staff in creating this manual. 

b. Conduct periodic, external, programmatic reviews of field Center FNAM to 

include a focus on overall performance and asset protection. 

3. Determining critical assets and building mechanisms to protect them – NASA needs 

to improve how it protects all of its valuable technical data and proprietary information, 

not simply the proprietary, sensitive, and/or classified information potentially exposed to 

foreign nationals. Building on existing Agency risk review processes, NASA should 

require each Center to prepare and submit a comprehensive assessment of threats to its 

facilities, personnel, technologies, and information in order to compile an agency-wide 

threat/risk assessment. The following steps should be taken by NASA HQ: 

a. Establish an Asset Protection Oversight Board to manage the overall effort. 

b. Create an Independent Review Team to review the individual program 

compliance metrics, the overall performance and outcomes of FNAM, and the 

adequacy of the comprehensive threat/risk assessment at each Center. 

4. Correcting longstanding information technology security issues – Given the extent of 

the concerns expressed during this review by NASA IT professionals regarding the 

security of the Agency’s non-classified systems, the Agency should: 

a. Establish a working group to identify and protect sensitive, proprietary 

information in a manner that does not prevent system owners from meeting their 

mission needs. 

b. Establish clear, specific, and mandatory requirements for all Centers to follow 

regarding remote access of their information technology systems. 

c. Give the NASA Chief Information Officer more control over IT operations in 

field Centers. 

5. Changing several aspects of NASA culture – In most ways, NASA has an excellent 

organizational culture, but several factors need to be addressed when considering how 

best to improve FNAM: 
vii 

a. Decrease the competitiveness, and correspondingly, increase cooperation between 

Centers. This dynamic can create an inflection point for needed change at NASA 

well beyond the issue of foreign national access management. 

b. Improve accountability, particularly when serious mistakes are made or mandates 

are ignored; this is essential to improving the systems of management controls. 

c. Guard against the tendency to revert back to prior lax habits once a problem has 

been solved and the tension of the moment has passed. 

6. Communicating the importance of these changes clearly, firmly and consistently –

The importance of security, the existence of “real world” threats to NASA assets, and the 

need for improvements in handling foreign national issues have not been clearly and 

consistently communicated throughout NASA. Senior leaders must firmly establish and 

communicate their total commitment to an effective FNAM program that enhances 

cooperation while safeguarding information. 
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COVER IMAGES CREDITS

Top row, left to right:

Artist Concept: Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion Spacecraft, NASA 

Webb Telescope, NASA Goddard/ Chris Gunn 

Bottom row, left to right:

TDRS-L, NASA 

International Space Station , NASA 

Artist Concept: Space Launch System (SLS) Initial Crew Vehicle Launch, NASA 
9

 

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