### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 18

– 1545 Submitted September 17, 2020

— Filed October 23 , 2020

BRI AN TERRY and LISA TERRY , Appellants ,

vs.
MEGAN DOROTHY , Appell ee
.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Bethany
Currie , Judge.

Appellee seeks further review of the court of appeals decision vacating the district court’s grant of summary judgment. DECISION OF
COURT OF A PPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT GRANT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Appel, J. , delivered the opinion of the c ourt, in which all justices joined.

Sarah M. Baumgartner (argued) of Hedberg & Boulton, P.C.,
Des Moines , for appellant s
.

Charles A. Blades (a rgued) and Valerie A. Foote of Smith Mills
Schrock Blades Monthei, P.C., Cedar Rapids , for appellee.2

APPEL , Justice
. In this case, we consider whether settlement documents submitted to and approved by the workers’ compensation commissioner released
common law claims that th e employee brought against a co employee alleging gross negligence. On a motion for summary judgment, the district court found that the settlement precluded the employee from bringing the gross negligence clai m against the co employ ee. The employee appealed.
We transferred the c ase to the court of appeals. T he court of appeals
reversed. We granted further review. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the ruling of the district court dismissing the employee’s gross negligenc e claim against the co employee.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
. A. Introduction. On October 14, 2015, Brian Terry, an employee of Lutheran Services in Iowa (LSI) was attacked by a client of LSI , allegedly causing serious injuries. Brian filed a workers ’ compensation claim against LSI and its workers ’ compensation carrier. The parties ultimately resolved the workers’ compensation dispu te in a compromise settlement.
Two s ettlement documents were presented to the Iowa Worker s ’ Compensation Commis sioner pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.35 (3) (2015)

. One was titled “ Compromise Settlement ” and the other was titled
“Additional Terms of Settlement.” The c ommissioner ultimately approved
the settlement.
B. Settlement Documents Presented to Commissioner.
1. Compromise s ettlement

. Th e compromise s ettlement declared that “[t] he undersigned parties submit this Compromise Settlement

pursuan t to Iowa Code [ s ection ] 85.35(3) .” The compromise s ettlement further described the dispute as follows:3 A dispute exists under the Iowa Wo rker s ’ Compensation Law, which the parties seek to resolve by full an d final compromise disposition of Claimant’s claim for benefits. The subject and nature of the dispute is whe ther Claimant’s alleged October 14 , 2015 wo rk injury caused permanent impairment and per manent dis ability and, if so, the extent of permanent disability. The compromise s ettleme nt contained release language. It provided
that “[ i ]n consideration of this payme nt, claimant releases and discharges the above employer and insurance carrier from all liability under the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Law for the above compromised claim.”
2. Additional t erms o f s ettlement

. The parties also presented to the
commissioner a document entitled “Additional Terms of Settlement.” The compromise settlement expressly incorporated the additional terms of
settlement.
The additional terms of s ettlement stated that t he “[d]efendants [LS I
and West Bend Mutual Insurance] agree to pay C laimant [Brian Terry] a lu mp sum of $45,000 in new money.” In return, the c la imant , Brian , agreed that, the payment of $45,000 is accept able to Claimant as a full and final compromise d settlement, satisfacti on, and final discharge of all claims and demands that may exis t against Lutheran Services of Iowa, Inc , West Ben d Mutual Insur ance Company, and any of their . . . employees . . . by reason of his e mployment and by reason of all injuries or damages sustain ed by Claimant on o r about October 14, 2015, through his association with the Released Parties.

T he additional terms of s ettlement further provided, “ In consideration of this payment, Cl aimant releases and discharges the Released Parties from
all liabilit y, including l iability under Iowa Worker s ’ Compensation Law, for
the above injury or injuries . . . known or unknown . . .

. ”
C. Proceedings Before the District Court.
1. Brian and Lisa Terry petition. On October 12, 2017, Brian and Lisa Terry filed a petition at law in district court. They sought to recover4 damages from Megan Dorothy, a supervisor of Brian ’s when he worked at LSI, on a gross negligence theory. Count I of the petition alleged gross negligence when Dorothy put Brian in a one

- on

- one situation with a client where the likelihood of assault was probable and the situation ultimately resulted in injuries to Terry. Count II of the petition alleged that the traumatic brain injury suff ered by Brian as a result of Dorothy’s gross neglige nce had an adverse impact on the Terrys ’ marriage.
2. District court ruling on motion for summary j udgment

. Dorothy moved for summary ju dgment , seeking to dismiss the action. In her moving papers, Dorothy asserted alternative grounds, including relyi ng upon “release language that releases plaintiffs’ co

- employee gross negligence claim against the defendant Dorothy.” The district court granted Dorothy’s motion for summary judgment

o n both con tract and statutory grounds. According to the district court, Mr. Terry lost any further right s to pursue damages under Iowa Code section 85.20 for gross neglige nce against a co

employee both because the Additional Terms of Sett lement specifically include a r e lease for all co

- employees and because Iowa Code se cti on 85.35 (9) provides that a comprom ise settlement approved by the Commissioner is a final bar to any further rights under chapter 85 . . .

. The district court next turned to Lisa Terry ’s consortium claim . The
district court reasoned that in order to bring a consortium claim, there must be liability on the underlying claim that caused injuries to the other

spouse. Because the district court dismissed Brian’s gross negligence claim, the district court reasoned that Lisa ’s consortium claim must also
fai l.
3. Decision of c ourt of a ppeals. The Terrys appealed. We transferred
the case to the court of appeals. The majority in t he court of appeals
reversed. The majority emphasized th at a claim of gross negligence i s a5 common law claim distinct and apar t from a workers’ compensation claim. The majority thus reasoned that the statutory settlement before the
workers ’ compensation commissioner ex tinguished all statutory claims but a settlement with the workers’ compensation commissioner did not
release a c ommon law claim of gross negl igence against a co employee. While the majority recognized there might be a claim for summ ary judgment based upon the contractual terms of the a dditional terms of

s ettlement , independent of any approval by the workers ’ compensation
commiss ioner, the majority found that contractual theory was not before the court. According to the majority, Dorothy exclusively relied upon the premise that a gross negli gence claim against a co employee was part and parcel of a workers ’ co mpensation claim and that the commissioner’s action in approving the settlement extinguishe d the gross negligence
claim. A dissent, however, agreed that a gross negligence claim against a

co employee was not a statutory clai m under Iowa Code section 85.20 but reasoned that the contract theory was, in fact, addressed by the district court and sufficiently presented on appeal to provide a basis to affirm the
district court.
II. Standard of Review
. This case involves review of a district court’s order on a motion for summary judgment. A district court’s summary judgment ruling is
reviewable for correction of errors at law. Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed
Church , 913 N.W.2 d 19, 36 (Iowa 2018).
III. D iscussion
. A. Summary Judgment Based On Statutory Theo ry. We first consider whether a gros s negligence claim against a co employee is a statutory claim that is extinguished under Iowa Code section 85.20 when the workers’ compensation commissioner approved settlement of the6 statutory claim

. Dorothy points out that an approved compromise and settlement is a final bar “without qualification or limitation” to all further rights under the workers’ compensation statutes. Bankers Standard Ins. v. Stanley , 661 N.W.2d 178, 181

– 82 (Iowa 2003)

. In co ntrast, the Terry s’ assert that a gros s negligence claim against a co employee is a common law claim that is outside the scope of the workers’ compensation statutes and, as a result, a settlement of Brian Terry’s statutory workers ’ compensation
claims does not extinguish the gross negligence and consortium claims. On this poi nt, we agree with the Terrys. Prior to 1973, the statutory immunity from claims under our workers’ compensation statute after settlement applied only to employers and not to co employee s. Craven v. Oggero , 213 N.W.2d 678, 680

– 81 (Iowa 1973) (en banc)

. Thus, as of 1973, an employee could b ring a common law claim against co employees based
on tort theories. In 1974, the statute was amended to extingui sh common law claims against co employ ees except for those founded in gross negligence. See 1974 Iowa Acts ch. 1111, § 1 (cod ified at Iowa Code § 85.20 (1975 )) ; Gourley v. Nielson , 318 N.W.2d 160 , 160

– 61 (Iowa 1982). Thus, t he common law claims against co employees for gross negligence survived the amendment and are not within the scope of our workers’ compensation statutes.
B. Summary Judgment Based on Contract Theory. We now turn to the separate and independent question of whether, as a matter of contract law, the settlement docu ments in this case extinguished Brian’s gross negligence claim and Lisa’s consortium claim

. As a preliminary matter, we must address whether the contract theory is properly before
the court.7

We first examine the ruling of the district court. The distric t court expressly ruled in favor of Dorothy on both statutory and contract grounds. The district court, among other things, declared that , the plain language of contract (here, the Compromise Settlement including the Additional terms of Settlement), Mr. Terry released all employees of LSI

— including Ms. Dorothy

— from any and all claims of injuries that he may have against them. Therefore, Ms. Dorothy is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Ter ry’s claim of gross negligence. Plainly, the contract was preserved in the district court. We now turn to the question of whether the contract theory was waived by Dorothy on appeal. The header of the argument section in
Dor o thy’s brief b roadly declares without limitation that the di strict court correctly granted summary judgme nt in favor of the defendant. The
discussion that follows admittedly concentrates most of its fire power on the statutory theory that we have rejected. Yet, the contract theory was also clearly presented in Dorothy’s appellate brief. Dorothy stated that “plaintiff Brian Terry’s compromise settlement agreement with LSI is a contract and the principles of contract law apply.” After citing various cases explaining basic principles of contract law, Dor othy argu ed “[w] ith the above principles in mind, it is clear that plaintiff Terry released any claim he might have against the defendant Dorothy invo lving his work place injury.” Dorothy further claims that because she “is one of the employees covered by the lang uage in the settlement documents, her motion for summary judg ment [was] properly granted. ” Certainly , this is enough to raise the contract theory on appeal. “ Our issue preservation rules are not designed to be hypertechnical. ” Griffin Pipe Prods

. Co. v. Bd. of R ev. , 789 N.W.2d 769,
772 (Iowa 2010).8

We now turn to the mer its of the contract theory. “A release is a contract, and its validity is governed by the usual rules relating to
contract

. ” Stetzel v. Dickenson , 174 N.W.2d 438, 439 (Iowa 197 0). The intent of the parties controls , and unless the contract is ambiguous, intent is determined by the plain language of the contract

. Verne R. Houghton Ins. Agency v. Orr Drywall Co. , 470 N.W.2d 39, 42 (Iowa 1991). I t is, of course, true that the co mpromise s ettlement is limited to release of workers ’ compensation claims. Considered in isolation, this document would not provide a basis for summary judgment. But, in addi tion, the parties executed the a d ditional terms of s ettlement. Here, much broad er rele ase language is employed. The additional terms of s ettlement releases all employees of LSI from any and all liability. The language is broad, unqualified, and not ambiguous. It certainly extinguishes common law claims. And, although L isa was not a signatory to the additional terms of

s ettlement, her claim depends on the validity of the underlying claim of her spouse. 1 As a result, although the district court’s ruling was flawed when it reasoned that a statutory work ers’ compensation claim exti nguishes common law gross negligenc e claims against a co employee, the district court properly ruled that, as a matter of contract, the language in the

a dditio nal terms of s ettlement extinguished Brian’s gross neglig ence claim and Lisa’s consortium claim

. IV. Conclusion. For all the above reasons, we affirm the order of the district court granting summary judgment against the plaintiffs in this matter. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

1 The appellants did not raise the issue of whether Lisa’s signature was required to release her loss of consortium claim. We therefore do not consider the issue.