No. 656 September 18, 2024 59

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 

STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

HUNTER LEE JAMES ANDREWS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Washington County Circuit Court

20CR64945; A177140

Andrew Erwin, Judge.

Submitted August 10, 2023.

Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate 

Section, and Emily P. Seltzer, Deputy Public Defender, Office 

of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.

Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin 

Gutman, Solicitor General, and Philip Thoennes, Assistant 

Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Mooney, Judge, and Pagán,

Judge.

SHORR, P. J.

Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 reversed and remanded; otherwise affirmed.
60 State v. Andrews

SHORR, P. J.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction 

for four counts of first-degree sexual abuse, ORS 163.427. 

He raises three assignments of error. As to defendant’s 

first assignment of error, we conclude that the trial court 

erred, in part, when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress un-Mirandized statements that defendant made to a 

detective during a 92-minute interview at the police station. 

More specifically, we reject defendant’s argument that the 

entirety of the interview was conducted under compelling 

circumstances and should have been suppressed. But we 

agree that the circumstances did become compelling before 

the end of the interview, when the repeated police interrogation tactics culminated in a direct accusation that defendant knowingly sexually abused a child. The court erred in 

not suppressing defendant’s statements obtained after that 

point. Because we conclude that the trial court at least partially erred in denying the suppression motion, we do not 

need to reach defendant’s remaining assignments of error, 

which challenge aspects of defendant’s sentencing. As a 

result, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

We state the facts consistently with the trial court’s 

findings when they are supported by sufficient evidence in 

the record. State v. Grimm, 290 Or App 173, 174, 414 P3d 

435, rev den, 363 Or 283 (2018). “[W]e presume that the trial 

court resolved disputed facts consistently with its express 

factual findings and its ruling denying defendant’s motion 

to suppress.” Id.

Tigard police detective Dresser began investigating 

a report by a 13-year-old girl, S, that she had been “inappropriately touched” by defendant. Defendant had dated 

S’s mother and resided in the same apartment with both 

mother and S. Dresser had a couple of phone conversations 

with defendant and invited him to come to the police station to talk. Defendant came in on his own without a police 

escort. They met in an interview room that was essentially 

an office with a small table and two chairs. Dresser and 

defendant sat on opposite sides of the table. Defendant was 

not in handcuffs or any kind of restraint. The room had two 

doors, one to a secure holding area and one to a hallway that 
Cite as 335 Or App 59 (2024) 61

led to other offices and an exit. Dresser was wearing “civilian clothes.” Dresser did not inform defendant at any point 

during the interview of his rights under Miranda v. State 

of Arizona, 384 US 436, 469, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 

(1966), which includes the right to remain silent, an explanation that his statements could and would be used against 

him in court, the right to consult with a lawyer and have a 

lawyer present, and the right to have a lawyer appointed 

before further questioning if defendant could not afford one.

At the beginning of the interview, Dresser indicated 

that the door behind him had been propped open, and he gave 

defendant specific directions to go down the hallway to exit 

the building if he had to leave. Dresser informed defendant 

that he was not under arrest and that “you are free to go 

any time, if you want. We’re just simply here to talk about 

this issue.” Defendant nodded, indicating that he understood, 

and stated that that was what he “thought was going to happen.” Defendant appeared nervous at the outset and informed 

Dresser that he had ADHD and his “jitters get real bad.”

Dresser asked for defendant’s understanding 

“about this situation.” Defendant then discussed three incidents when he was sleepwalking at night in his girlfriend’s 

apartment. During those times, defendant explained that 

he had mistakenly walked into S’s room and lay down with 

S instead of his girlfriend.1 When he realized this, he would 

leave. Defendant also relayed that he understood that S had 

claimed that defendant once masturbated in front of her, 

which defendant denied and attributed to a misunderstanding when he was scratching his genitals.

During the interview, Dresser pressed defendant 

for further details regarding the sleepwalking incidents, 

including the initial incident in which defendant claimed to 

have fallen asleep on the toilet before sleepwalking into S’s 

room by mistake. Defendant explained that he had cuddled 

up to S but woke up after about five minutes when he realized that she was not his girlfriend. Defendant volunteered 

that he engaged in no sexual contact with S. Defendant 

explained that he put a lock on his and his girlfriend’s door 

after the first incident and later added a lock on the door of 

1 S shared the room with her brother and her grandmother.
62 State v. Andrews

the children’s room after the third incident. Defendant had 

a hazier recollection of the second and third incidents but 

generally recalled waking up those times in the wrong room 

and leaving.

Dresser then asked defendant more specific questions about whether defendant touched S’s skin or breasts. 

Defendant denied that he did but also explained that he could 

not say for sure and “that’s the scariest part, because I don’t 

know.” Defendant denied that he ever told a Department 

of Human Services representative that he had touched S’s 

vagina, but also later admitted that he had said that he did 

not do so “to [his] knowledge” because he did not know what 

he did when he was asleep. Dresser then focused on S’s accusation that defendant had put his hand under her shirt and 

pants, touching her breasts and vagina, and S’s belief that 

defendant had not been asleep.

Dresser asked defendant if he thought S was making the allegations up. Defendant responded that it was 

speculation, but

“that’s why my dad is freaking out, going ‘You need to lawyer up. You need to get somebody in there by your side,’ and 

I’m like ‘Why? If he’s just asking questions. I’m allowed to 

flee, whatever. There should be no reason for that. I haven’t 

done anything wrong.’ The only times you should lawyer up 

is when you’ve done something wrong. At least, that’s my 

opinion of it. Like I haven’t done anything wrong. I don’t 

need one.”

Defendant then explained that he loved his girlfriend, 

would not touch a child, and, when asked about S’s motivations, explained that S may be lying because of defendant’s 

issues with S’s boyfriend and the fact that defendant took 

her phone away.

At that point, which was approximately halfway 

through the interview, Dresser asked defendant to confirm 

that he went into S’s room at night to lie down with her, 

probed for further details about the three incidents, and 

questioned defendant’s sleepwalking story because defendant did not have a diagnosis and could clearly recall some 

things that happened in each incident but not other details. 

Dresser asked what defendant would say to S if she were 
Cite as 335 Or App 59 (2024) 63

there and inquired whether defendant thought that S was 

lying. Dresser observed that defendant had admitted to certain conduct consistent with S’s allegations but not other 

conduct. Dresser also pressed defendant to admit that it 

was possible that what S alleged might be true. Defendant 

admitted that it was “potentially” true and a “possibility,” 

but he also asserted that, in his heart, he knew he would 

not do this. Dresser again asked defendant what he would 

say to S if she were there and inquired whether he felt bad. 

Defendant responded that, if he did something, that was 

not his intention. Defendant was crying by that time, which 

occurred at several points in the interview, and stated that, 

if he did something, he felt horrible.

Dresser also pointed out that S’s disclosures had 

been specific and remained consistent. Dresser continued 

to press defendant that S and defendant’s stories were consistent, except for defendant’s denial of any sexual contact. 

Defendant explained that he told S that “I don’t feel I would 

have done this, *** [a]nd, if I did, I’m sorry.” Dresser then 

asked defendant for further details on his recollection and 

his history of sleepwalking.

At that point in the interview, defendant received a 

call from his girlfriend and mentioned to her that he would 

call her back in a little bit. After the call, Dresser returned 

to questioning defendant about his history of sleepwalking. 

Defendant then referred to S’s allegations, and the detective 

stated,”[w]ell, I think we’ve—I think, at least from my standpoint, it really happened.” Defendant did not agree that it happened but then, as before, agreed to the “possibility, but I don’t 

agree I did anything. Because I don’t—I don’t see myself doing 

that.” Dresser then again asked for defendant’s understanding regarding why S would have made up the allegations and 

further inquired about what defendant and S had discussed. 

Defendant stated that S did not like him and explained that 

he had told S, “If this—if these have happened, I’m sorry. I am 

not wanting you. I want your mother. I love your mother. I’m 

in love with your mother. I want to marry your mom.”

After again pointing out inconsistencies in defendant’s 

sleepwalking story, Dresser stated, “I’m being straight with 

you that—that you had some lapses in judgment and that you 
64 State v. Andrews

did these things and that you knew you did them.” Defendant 

replied that he did not believe S but was not dismissing her 

allegation either. Dresser returned to the allegations and suggested that defendant had had things happening in his life 

that may have caused him to “deviate from the norm,” and 

he may now feel bad about what had happened. Defendant 

continued to acknowledge the “potential” that something had 

happened but was not “accepting or denying any of the allegations.” Dresser also suggested that people “who will decide * * * 

what happens next will look at this” and offered to defendant 

that he might “acknowledge what truthfully happened and 

admit here’s a mistake.” At that point, defendant stated that 

he knew “all the incidences were a mistake and they never 

should have happened,” but then he proceeded to continue to 

maintain that he had been sleepwalking.

Dresser again returned to the details of each of the 

alleged incidents and cast doubt on defendant’s claim to be 

sleepwalking. Dresser stated, “I don’t think you’re being a 

hundred percent truthful,” suggested that defendant “may 

have made a mistake,” and stated that “it’s not fair to [S] for 

you not to step up and be completely honest, based on what 

she’s had to do” and “live with.” Right after that, the interview between Dresser and defendant concluded as follows:

“Defendant: Okay, I’m done with this conversation.

“* * * * *

“Detective: She had to (inaudible)—

“Defendant: I’m done. Done. I am done with my 

conversation.

“Detective: —(inaudible) with CARES.

“Defendant: I have said all I need to say. I’ve given my 

statement. And I agree that it’s potential, but I don’t know. 

So, I am not going to say anything further.

“Detective: Okay

“Defendant: Yeah. I’d like to leave, please.

“Detective: You can leave. That was always the rules. 

Remember?

“Defendant: I remember.
Cite as 335 Or App 59 (2024) 65

“Detective: Okay.”

The interview then concluded. Defendant was not arrested 

at that point and left the room. As noted, the total interview 

lasted for just over an hour and a half.

Defendant was ultimately charged with seven counts 

of sexual abuse in the first degree, ORS 163.427, and one count 

each of unlawful sexual penetration in the second degree, ORS 

163.408; encouraging child sexual abuse in the second degree, 

ORS 163.686; and criminal mistreatment in the first degree, 

ORS 163.205. All of the charges related to defendant’s conduct with S. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress, among 

other things, all statements that defendant made before being 

Mirandized, which necessarily covered Dresser’s entire interview of defendant. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that, under the totality of the circumstances, 

defendant was neither in custody nor in compelling circumstances and that his participation had been voluntary, such 

that Dresser did not have to Mirandize defendant.

In support of its legal conclusions and the denial of 

the motion to suppress, the trial court made the following 

findings of fact:

•	 Defendant came to the interview voluntarily without a 

police escort.

•	 Dresser met defendant in a room at the police station, 

left the door propped open for defendant, informed 

defendant that he was free to go at any time, and gave 

defendant instructions on how to leave.

•	 Dresser informed defendant that he was not under 

arrest.

•	 Dresser was calm, conversational, never raised his 

voice, never made threats, promises, or offers of leniency, and made “no show of authority of any kind that 

appears on the video.” Dresser was not coercive.

•	 Dresser was dressed in plain clothes with no visible 

weapon.2

2 The trial court made this finding based on its review of the video. From our 

review of the video in which Dresser quickly walks into the room and then immediately sits facing away from the camera, we also cannot see any visible weapon. 

On appeal, the state concedes that Dresser “almost certainly” would have been 
66 State v. Andrews

•	 Defendant was very nervous and had ADHD. He was 

also emotional and crying at times. But there was no 

indication of a mental illness or that defendant had 

any misunderstanding about their communications. 

Defendant did not appear intoxicated.

•	 Defendant expressed that he did not have a problem 

having a conversation with the detective despite his 

father’s advice not to participate and to get a lawyer.

•	 Defendant was not restrained and got up at times. He 

also took a phone call and told his girlfriend that he 

would call her back when he was done, indicating that 

defendant understood that he would not be in custody 

when the interview was done.

•	 At the conclusion of the interview, defendant acknowledged that he remembered that he was always free to 

terminate the interview and, at the moment he said he 

would like to leave, he was “allowed to terminate the 

interview and leave.”

Soon after the denial of the motion to suppress, the court 

commenced a bench trial. At the conclusion of that trial, the 

court found defendant guilty of five counts of first-degree 

sexual abuse, merged the two guilty verdicts on Counts 2 

and 3, which resulted in four convictions, and acquitted 

defendant on the remaining counts.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress the statements that he made 

during the interview with Dresser. We review a trial court’s 

denial of a motion to suppress for legal error. State v. HeiseFay, 274 Or App 196, 201, 360 P3d 615 (2015).

To protect the right against compelled selfincrimination under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon 

Constitution,3 an officer must give Miranda warnings before 

questioning “a person who is in full custody or in circumstances that create a setting which judges would and officers 

should recognize to be compelling.” State v. Roble-Baker, 340 

Or 631, 638, 136 P3d 22 (2006) (internal quotation marks 

wearing a service weapon that would have “likely” been visible to defendant. 

Either way, this fact ultimately had no meaningful effect on our analysis.

3 Article I, section 12, provides, in part, that “[n]o person shall be *** compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.”
Cite as 335 Or App 59 (2024) 67

omitted). Once a defendant raises the issue, it is then “the 

state’s burden to show that [the] defendant’s unwarned 

statements were made before the circumstances became 

compelling.” Id. at 639.

Defendant was not in custody when questioned by 

Dresser. The disputed issue is whether defendant was in 

compelling circumstances during the interview. “[W]hether 

the circumstances were compelling does not turn on either 

the officer’s or the suspect’s subjective belief or intent; rather, 

it turns on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position 

would have understood his or her situation.” State v. Shaff, 

343 Or 639, 645, 175 P3d 454 (2007). We consider the following non-exclusive factors in making that determination:

(1) the location of the encounter, (2) the length of the encounter, (3) the amount of pressure exerted on the defendant, and 

(4) the defendant’s ability to terminate the encounter. RobleBaker, 340 Or at 640-41. We do not apply any of the factors 

mechanically, but we look at all of the circumstances and 

our “overarching inquiry is whether the officers created the 

sort of police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.” Id. at 641.

We turn to our application of the law. First, the 

location of the encounter was in a small office at a police 

station. Defendant appeared voluntarily at an agreed time, 

arrived without an escort, and was given specific instructions on how to leave the office through the propped-open 

door behind the detective. The sole detective was in plain 

clothes. Still, we consider the location of the site, a small 

office within the police station, to slightly favor defendant’s 

position that this was a police-dominated atmosphere and 

to undermine the state’s showing of an absence of compelling circumstances. We have observed that “the location of 

the encounter, the unfamiliar, police-station setting of the 

interview tended—necessarily—toward a police-dominated 

atmosphere.” Grimm, 290 Or App at 180 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). However, we also then noted that a defendant who voluntarily comes to a station for an interview on 

his own power “lessened somewhat” the effect of the policedominated interview location. Id.; see also State v. Barber, 

179 Or App 674, 679, 41 P3d 455, rev den, 334 Or 632 (2002) 
68 State v. Andrews

(no compelling circumstances where the defendant agreed 

to voluntarily come to the police station, made an appointment and arrived late, and never indicated that he wanted 

to leave).

We turn to the length of the encounter. The interview was just over one hour and a half. Again, Grimm is 

instructive. In Grimm, we concluded that an interview of 

similar time “would not, considered in isolation, compel a 

conclusion that the circumstances ** * were compelling.” Id.

at 180. After examining our case law, we noted that one hour 

and a half “is not an insignificant amount of time to undergo 

questioning by police officers; however, neither is it determinative of compelling circumstances.” Id.; see also State v. 

Northcutt, 246 Or App 239, 250, 268 P3d 154 (2011) (holding 

that one hour and a half may be longer than many citizenpolice encounters but was not determinative under RobleBaker). “[A]s we explained in Northcutt, any consideration of 

the durational factor is necessarily dependent on the character or quality of the interaction.” Grimm, 290 Or App at 180 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The principal emphasis 

“is properly on the qualitative dynamics addressed in the 

third and fourth of the Roble-Baker factors.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

We, therefore, turn to an examination of the third 

and fourth Roble-Baker factors. Starting with the third 

factor, we readily conclude that the detective, through his 

questioning, exerted significant pressure on defendant. We 

fully credit, as we must, the trial court’s factual findings, 

which are supported by the evidence. Dresser was, indeed, 

calm and conversational, and he never raised his voice or 

made threats or promises. His tone and demeanor were not 

coercive.

Dresser, however, returned repeatedly to S’s allegations, frequently pressed defendant on details, cast substantial doubt on defendant’s story while crediting S’s accusations, called into question various inconsistencies with 

defendant’s sleepwalking defense, used tactics to seek to get 

defendant to admit to a lapse in judgment and a “mistake,” 

and pushed defendant to take personal responsibility for 

his conduct with a child in a manner that would effectively 
Cite as 335 Or App 59 (2024) 69

serve as a confession. Taken together, those were coercive 

practices under our case law. See Northcutt, 246 Or App at 

250 (stating that the “gravamen of the third Roble-Baker

factor is the use of aggressive and coercive police interrogation practices, especially including, but not limited to, those 

explicitly predicated on assumptions of a suspect’s guilt or 

calculated to contradict a suspect’s assertions of innocence”); 

State v. Mattheisen, 273 Or App 641, 651-52, 359 P3d 1218 

(2015) (police officers’ professional demeanor and pleasant 

and conversational tone were overshadowed by repetitive 

and coercive interrogation practices that were predicated 

on assumptions of guilt, accusations of lying, confrontation

with polygraph results, and use of pressure to attempt to 

get the defendant to admit to “less-serious” crimes); State v. 

Ford, 244 Or App 289, 296, 260 P3d 637, adh’d to as modified 

on reasons, 245 Or App 500, 263 P3d 1110 (2011) (An “officer’s repeated commands to divulge more information”—

occurring five or six times—coupled with the officer’s implications of guilt gave the interview “coercive overtones.”). 

The third factor heavily favors defendant.

We turn to the fourth factor, defendant’s ability to 

terminate the encounter. From Dresser’s perspective, he told 

defendant at the beginning that he was not under arrest and 

was “free to go anytime if you want.” Dresser propped open 

the door behind him and gave defendant explicit instructions on how to leave the building. Further, at the conclusion of the interview when defendant asked to terminate the 

interview, Dresser honored that request immediately.

We also consider the circumstances that defendant 

was in and defendant’s statements. Defendant confirmed at 

the beginning of the interview that he understood he was 

free to leave. He also confirmed at the end—right after he 

stated, “I’d like to leave, please”—that he remembered from 

the beginning that he was always free to leave. In the middle of the interview, he also indicated that his father had 

advised him against participating and, instead, advised him 

to obtain a lawyer. But defendant said that he did not want 

to do that and understood he could “flee.” He also took a call 

from his girlfriend during the interview and indicated to her 

that he expected he would call her later after the conclusion 
70 State v. Andrews

of the interview. In sum, at discrete points during the beginning, middle, and end of the interview, defendant made 

statements that demonstrated that he understood that he 

did not have to attend the interview and could terminate it 

at any time, which he did. The fourth factor heavily favors 

the state.

This is a difficult case where the key factors point in 

different directions. We also are mindful that we are not to 

apply those factors mechanically. Our “overarching inquiry 

is whether the officers created the sort of police-dominated 

atmosphere that Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.” Roble-Baker, 340 Or at 641. We consider whether 

defendant was “in circumstances that create a setting 

which judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling.” Id. at 638 (internal quotation marks omitted). We 

consider how “a reasonable person in the suspect’s position 

would have understood his or her situation.” Shaff, 343 Or at 

645.

We are somewhat hampered by the fact that the parties initially take sweeping positions regarding the entirety 

of the interview. That is, defendant’s primary argument on 

appeal is that the entire interview was conducted under compelling circumstances. The state argues in response that 

it was not compelling at any point. We reject both of those 

arguments. However, defendant contends in the alternative 

that the interview had at least become compelling towards 

the end of the interview by the point that Dresser asked 

defendant to “acknowledge what truthfully happened and 

admit here’s a mistake.” At that point, defendant expressly 

acknowledged that he knew that all the incidences were a 

mistake and they never should have happened.

We agree with defendant that, considering the 

totality of the circumstances leading up to that point, the 

interview had become coercive towards the end of the interview. We conclude that that point occurred when Dresser 

again returned to the allegations and made the unequivocal accusation, “I’m being straight with you, that—that you 

had some lapses in judgment and that you did these things 

and that you knew you did them.” By that point, Dresser 

had repeatedly pressed defendant regarding S’s allegations, 
Cite as 335 Or App 59 (2024) 71

regularly pushed defendant regarding details and inconsistencies in his story, and made multiple attempts to get 

defendant to admit to criminal conduct through various 

interrogation tactics. Those tactics, when considered cumulatively, created compelling circumstances at the point that 

Dresser directly accused defendant of sexually abusing S 

and knowing that he had done so. That overbearing conduct 

ultimately created “the sort of police-dominated atmosphere 

that Miranda warnings were intended to counteract.” RobleBaker, 340 Or at 641.

We recognize that defendant’s acknowledgement 

that he was free to leave at various points in the interview favors the state’s position that the circumstances were 

not compelling. But an officer’s coercive tactics that build 

throughout an interview to implore a defendant’s admission 

to criminal conduct can undercut an officer’s statement and a 

defendant’s corresponding acknowledgement that the defendant was free to leave. Our decision in Mattheisen is particularly instructive. There, as here, the defendant had travelled 

to the police interview voluntarily, been advised at the outset 

that he was free to leave, was interviewed in a room with 

a partially propped-open door, and had expressly acknowledged to the interviewing officer (right before his arrest) that 

he had felt free to leave during the entire interview and was 

not in custody. Mattheisen, 273 Or App at 652. We concluded 

that “[e]ven so, this one of four factors does not overcome the 

otherwise compelling circumstances.” Id. We reach the same 

conclusion here. We note that, although this is a close case, 

the state bears the burden of proving that the interview was 

not conducted under compelling circumstances.

In denying defendant’s suppression motion, the 

trial court heavily relied on the following passage from 

Roble-Baker:

“Conversely, when a police officer tells a defendant that he 

or she may terminate the encounter—and then allows that 

defendant to do so—the officer has not placed the defendant 

in compelling circumstances. See State v. Johnson, 340 Or 

319, 332, 131 P3d 173 (2006) (holding that defendant was 

not in compelling circumstances, in part, because ‘when 

he asked the investigators to terminate the interview and 

return him to his home, they did so’).”
72 State v. Andrews

340 Or at 641-42. Indeed, here, Dresser told defendant that 

he was free to leave and permitted defendant to terminate 

the interview. We acknowledge that that passage, standing 

alone, might suggest a rule. However, our reading of that 

passage in the overall context of Roble-Baker’s admonition 

to consider all of the relevant factors in a non-mechanical 

fashion under the totality of the circumstances suggests 

to us that Roble-Baker was not stating a bright-line rule 

as to that factor—the defendant’s ability to terminate an 

encounter. Rather, the Supreme Court was pointing to one 

factor among several. Depending on the circumstances, an 

interview might become compelling following an officer’s 

coercive questioning despite the officer initially offering and 

later allowing the defendant to terminate the interview. 

The protections of Miranda were intended to counteract 

the “current practice of incommunicado interrogation” and 

“dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.” 

Miranda, 384 US at 457-58.

We conclude that the trial court erred when it denied 

defendant’s motion to suppress in its entirety. The court 

should have suppressed defendant’s statements towards the 

end of the interview, starting right after Dresser unequivocally stated that defendant “did these things and that 

you know you did them” and continuing to the end of the 

interview.

We further conclude that the failure to suppress 

that evidence was not harmless. That is, we cannot say that 

the error had little likelihood of affecting the verdict. See 

Grimm, 290 Or App at 186 (explaining that we may affirm 

despite error only when the error had little likelihood of 

affecting the verdict). The disputed evidence was admitted 

at trial. The state used defendant’s interview to corroborate 

S’s accusations. Defendant made statements early in the 

interview, before the interview became compelling, that certainly were incriminating. For instance, he admitted to at 

least the potential and “possibility” that S’s allegations were 

true and that he felt horrible and sorry if it had happened. 

Further, his sleepwalking defense was not compelling. 

However, when conducting the harmless-error analysis, we 

are not to usurp the role of the factfinder or reweigh the 
Cite as 335 Or App 59 (2024) 73

evidence. State v. Zaldana-Mendoza, 299 Or App 590, 613, 

450 P3d 983 (2019). Defendant’s later statement, after the 

interview became compelling, that he knew that “all of the 

incidences were a mistake and they never should have happened” was significant evidence against him.

In sum, we conclude that the trial court erred, in 

part, when it failed to suppress the end of Dresser’s interview of defendant. That error was not harmless. As a result, 

we do not reach defendant’s assignments of error that challenge aspects of his sentencing. We reverse and remand the 

first-degree sexual abuse counts on which defendant was 

found guilty. We otherwise affirm those counts on which 

defendant was acquitted.

Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 reversed and remanded; 

otherwise affirmed.