[Cite as Coshocton Tribune Media v. Good Fortune Advertising, L.L.C., 2013-Ohio-2710.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COSHOCTON TRIBUNE MEDIA, A : JUDGES: 

DIVISION OF GANNETT SATELLITE : 

INFORMATION NETWORK, INC : 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff - Appellant : Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

 : 

-vs- : 

 : 

GOOD FORTUNE ADVERTISING, LLC : Case No. 2012CA0019 

DBA THE COSHOCTON COUNTY : 

BEACON : 

 : 

 Defendant - Appellee : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Coshocton County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

2012CI0117 

JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 26, 2013 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee 

RICHARD D. PANZA STEVEN J. SHROCK 

WILLIAM F. KOLIS, JR. Critchfield, Critchfield & Johnston, Ltd. 

RACHELLE KUZNICKI ZIDAR 138 East Jackson Street 

Wickens, Herzer, Panza, Cook & Batista Co. Millersburg, OH 44654 

35765 Chester Road 

Avon, OH 44011-1262 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2012CA0019 2 

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Coshocton Tribune Media, a Division of Gannett 

Satellite Information Network, Inc., appeals from the October 11, 2012 Judgment Entry 

of the Coshocton County Court of Common Pleas granting the Motion for Summary 

Judgment filed by defendant-appellee Good Fortune Advertising, LLC dba The 

Coshocton County Beacon. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} The Tribune is a newspaper of general circulation that has been published 

at least once a week every week continuously since 1909. The Tribune is owned and 

operated by appellant and, in order to produce revenue, publishes legal notices. 

{¶3} The Beacon, which is owned and operated by appellee, is a weekly 

newspaper. Prior to October 14, 2009, The Beacon was not published weekly. Since 

October 14, 2009, The Beacon has been published weekly except for the last weeks of 

December of 2009, 2010 and 2011. In early 2012, The Beacon began publishing legal 

notices. The Beacon published all 52 weeks in 2012 and stated in the record below that 

it intended to continue to do so. 

{¶4} On March 19, 2012, appellant filed a complaint against appellee seeking a 

declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Appellant, in its complaint, sought a 

declaration that The Beacon was not a” publication of general circulation” as authorized 

and defined by R.C. 7.11 and 7.12 and injunctive relief enjoining appellee from 

publishing legal notices in The Beacon until such time as The Beacon complied with the 

statutory definition of newspaper of general circulation. Appellant also sought costs, 

expenses and attorney’s fees. On the same date, appellant filed a Motion for Temporary 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2012CA0019 3 

Restraining Order, Preliminary and Permanent Injunction. A Stipulated Order relating to 

injunctive relief was filed on March 28, 2012. 

{¶5} Appellee filed an answer to the complaint on May 18, 2012. 

{¶6} Thereafter, on July 12, 2012, appellant filed a Motion for Summary 

Judgment. Appellee filed a memorandum in opposition to the same and a Motion for 

Summary Judgment on August 22, 2012. 

{¶7} Pursuant to a Judgment Entry filed on October 11, 2012, the trial court 

granted appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court, in its Judgment Entry, 

found that The Beacon has been “regularly issued at least once a week” since October 

14, 2009 and has been published continuously since May 1, 2008. The trial court 

denied appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

{¶8} Appellant now raises the following assignments of error on appeal: 

{¶9} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 

COSHOCTON COUNTY BEACON HAS BEEN “REGULARLY ISSUED AT LEAST 

ONCE A WEEK” SINCE OCTOBER 14, 2009, PURSUANT TO R.C. 7.12(A).

{¶10} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 

COSHOCTON COUNTY BEACON HAS “BEEN PUBLISHED CONTINUOUSLY” 

SINCE MAY 1, 2008, PURSUANT TO R.C. 7.12(A)(3).

{¶11} ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING R.C. 

7.12 AMBIGUOUS AND THEREAFTER CONSIDERING RULES OF STATUTORY 

CONSTRUCTION.
Coshocton County, Case No. 2012CA0019 4 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

{¶12} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the 

unique opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court. 

Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36, 506 N.E.2d 212 (1987). As 

such, we must refer to Civ.R. 56 which provides, in pertinent part: “ * * *Summary 

judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written 

stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law. * * * A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from such 

evidence or stipulation ..., that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and 

that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment 

is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most 

strongly in the party's favor.* * * ” 

{¶13} Pursuant to the above rule, a trial court may not enter a summary 

judgment if it appears a material fact is genuinely disputed. The party moving for 

summary judgment, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for its 

motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact. The moving party may not make a conclusory assertion 

that the non-moving party has no evidence to prove its case. The moving party must 

specifically point to some evidence which demonstrates the non-moving party cannot 

support its claim. If the moving party satisfies this requirement, the burden shifts to the 

non-moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue of 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2012CA0019 5 

material fact for trial. Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429, 1997–Ohio–259, 674 

N.E.2d 1164, citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 1996–Ohio–107, 662 N.E.2d 

264. 

{¶14} It is pursuant to this standard that we review appellant’s assignments of 

error. 

I, II, III 

{¶15} Appellant, in its three assignments of error, argues that the trial court erred 

in granting appellee’s Motion for Summary Judgment while denying appellant’s motion. 

Appellant specifically contends that the trial court erred in finding that The Beacon met 

the requirements set forth in R.C. 7.12 and was a “newspaper of general circulation.” 

Appellant also argues, alternatively, that the trial court erred in not finding R.C. 7.12 

ambiguous. 

{¶16} R.C. 7.12 states, in relevant part, as follows: “A) Whenever a state agency 

or a political subdivision of the state is required by law to make any legal publication in a 

newspaper, the newspaper shall be a newspaper of general circulation. As used in the 

Revised Code, ‘newspaper’ or ‘newspaper of general circulation,’... , is a publication 

bearing a title or name that is regularly issued at least once a week, and that meets all 

of the following requirements: 

{¶17} “(1) It is printed in the English language using standard printing methods, 

being not less than eight pages in the broadsheet format or sixteen pages in the tabloid 

format. 

{¶18} “(2) It contains at least twenty-five per cent editorial content, which 

includes, but is not limited to, local news, political information, and local sports. 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2012CA0019 6 

{¶19} “(3) It has been published continuously for at least three years 

immediately preceding legal publication by the state agency or political subdivision. 

{¶20} “(4) The publication has the ability to add subscribers to its distribution list. 

{¶21} “(5) The publication is circulated generally by United States mail or carrier 

delivery in the political subdivision responsible for legal publication or in the state, if 

legal publication is made by a state agency, by proof of the filing of a United States 

postal service “Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation” (PS form 3526) 

with the local postmaster, or by proof of an independent audit of the publication 

performed, within the twelve months immediately preceding legal publication.” 

(Emphasis added). 

{¶22} In Record Publishing Co. v. Kainrad, 49 Ohio St.3d 296, 551 N.E.2d 1286 

(1990), the Court held in paragraph 3 of the syllabus that: “To be a ‘newspaper of 

general circulation,’ a publication must meet all the requirements of R.C. 7.12, including 

the requirement that the publication be of a type to which the general public resorts for 

news of passing events.” Thus, The Beacon must have been regularly issued at least 

once a week and been published continuously for at least three years preceding legal 

publication to qualify as a “newspaper of general circulation” under R.C. 7.12. 

{¶23} At issue in the case sub judice is the meaning of the phrase “regularly 

issued at least once a week” as used in R.C. 7.12. Appellant maintains that such phrase 

requires that a publication be issued 52 consecutive weeks continuously for at least 

three years to qualify as a newspaper of general circulation and that, since The Beacon 

was only issued for 51 weeks in 2009, 2010 and 2011, it does not qualify as a 

newspaper of general circulation. 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2012CA0019 7 

{¶24} Generally when construing a statute, “a court's paramount concern is the 

legislative intent.” State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch, 72 Ohio St.3d 581, 584, 651 

N.E.2d 995 (1995). In doing so, the court must first look to the plain language of the 

statute itself to determine the legislative intent. Burrows v. Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 

78, 81, 1997-Ohio-310, 676 N.E.2d 519. If language used in a statute is clear and 

unambiguous, the statute must be applied as written and it is not appropriate to engage 

in further interpretation. Id. “A court should give effect to the words actually employed in 

a statute, and should not delete words used, or insert words not used, in the guise of 

interpreting the statute.” State v. Taniguchi, 74 Ohio St.3d 154, 156, 195-Ohio-163, 656 

N.E.2d 1286, citing State v. Waddell, 71 Ohio St .3d 630, 631, 1995-Ohio-31, 646 

N.E.2d 821. 

{¶25} We find that the trial court erred in its interpretation of R.C. 7.12. The 

statute clearly and unambiguously requires that a publication be regularly issued at 

least once a week. As noted by appellant, the trial court “essentially ignored the phrase 

‘at least once a week’ in favor of its own, more lenient language.” The statute does not 

require that a publication be “regularly issued” on a “weekly basis”. Rather, the statute 

requires a publication to be “regularly issued at least once a week.” While the trial court 

cited cases from other jurisdictions in support of its decision, we note that the statutes in 

such cases do not contain language similar to that contained in R.C. 7.12. Moreover, 

our reading is consistent with statutes, and rules, that require legal publication for a 

specified consecutive number of weeks. See, for example, 5721.18 (Foreclosure 

proceedings on lien of state), which requires that notice of foreclosure be published 

once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2012CA0019 8 

county. If R.C. 7.12 was interpreted in such a manner as appellee suggests, then, at 

times, it would be impossible to comply with the requirements in R.C. 5721.18 

{¶26} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court erred in finding that The 

Beacon has been “regularly issued at least once a week” since October 14, 2009. As is 

stated above, it is undisputed that The Beacon was not published the last weeks of 

December of 2009, 2010 and 2011. The trial court, therefore, erred in finding that The 

Beacon was a “newspaper of general circulation” under R.C. 7.12 since all of the 

requirements set forth in R.C. 7.12 have not been met. 

{¶27} Appellant’s first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained. Based on our 

disposition of appellant’s first assignment of error, the remaining assignments of error 

are moot. 

 
Coshocton County, Case No. 2012CA0019 9 

{¶28} Accordingly, the judgment of the Coshocton County Court of Common 

Pleas is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. 

By: Baldwin, J. 

Gwin, P.J. and 

Hoffman, J. concur. 

 

HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN 

HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

HON. JOHN W. WISE 

CRB/dr
[Cite as Coshocton Tribune Media v. Good Fortune Advertising, L.L.C., 2013-Ohio-2710.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COSHOCTON TRIBUNE MEDIA, A : 

DIVISON OF GANNETT SATELLITE : 

INFORMATION NETWORK, INC. : 

 : 

 Plaintiff -Appellant : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

GOOD FORTUNE ADVERTISING, LLC : 

DBA THE COSHOCTON COUNTY : 

BEACON : 

 : 

 Defendant - Appellee : CASE NO. 2012CA0019 

For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the 

judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Coshocton County, Ohio is reversed and 

this matter is remanded for further proceedings. Costs assessed to appellee. 

HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN 

HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

HON. JOHN W. WISE