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AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Investing in Science and Technology to 

Meet Africa’s Maritime Security Challenges

BY AUGUSTUS VOGEL

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

◆ The African maritime security challenge is defined by the need to monitor wide geographic expanses 

with limited resources.

◆ Science and technology are invaluable maritime security force multipliers. 

◆ Investment in “technology” without support for “science” is unsustainable.

◆ Complementary investments in African research institutions are needed to create collaborative 

“anchors” to sustain the effectiveness of maritime security efforts.

HIGHLIGHTS

NO. 10 / FEBRUARY 2011

continue to be a challenge and analysts expect increasing numbers of kidnappings at sea in 2011.3

 Illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing is 

estimated to cost sub-Saharan Africa about $1 billion 

annually,4 the catch from which floods international 

markets, depresses prices, and discourages legal and 

environmentally sustainable practices around the 

world. Attacks on the oil sector in Nigeria have cost 

T H E M A R I T I M E S E C U R I T Y C H A L L E N G E 

Africa’s maritime spaces host a growing number 

of threats that challenge both Africa and the global 

community. Narcotraffickers now move an estimated 

50–60 tons of cocaine every year through West Africa 

to Europe.1 More than 1,000 hostages were seized in 

218 piracy attacks off of East Africa in 2010—double 

the number of incidents in 2008.2 Armed robberies 

of local and international vessels in Nigerian waters 

Africa’s long and beautiful coasts and the abundance of marine resources can contribute to providing economic, 

food and environmental security for the continent. These coastal and marine resources, like the rest of Africa’s 

environmental resources, continue to be exploited in a manner that does not benefit Africa and her people. This is a 

paradox of a people dying from hunger, starvation and poverty when they are potentially so rich and well endowed.

 —Nelson Mandela
2

billions of dollars in lost revenue and repairs, helped 

destabilize prices globally, and contributed to an environmental disaster along Nigeria’s coast caused by 

546 million gallons of spilled oil.5 Storm fronts and 

hurricanes such as Isabel (2003), Ivan (2004), Katrina (2005), and Ike (2008) have caused extensive 

flooding and the sinking of hundreds of marine craft 

in Africa and billions of dollars in damage in the Caribbean and North America. Moreover, Africa’s $1 

trillion per annum maritime economy (representing 

90 percent of African commerce) is infested with illegal trafficking. This includes a multibillion dollar 

black market in military arms, illegally logged forest 

products that represent as much as 70 percent of African timber harvests,6

 and counterfeit medications 

that account for up to 50 percent of all sales on the 

African continent.7

There are a number of major reasons why Africa 

struggles to meet these maritime security challenges. 

First, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which reach 

out 200 nautical miles from a coastline, are by definition large and difficult to monitor. This situation 

is exacerbated in Africa because of resource limitations. Off of West and Central Africa, for example, 

there are fewer than 25 maritime craft longer than 

25 meters available for interdiction efforts. Many 

African countries, moreover, have prioritized investment in land-based forces over maritime units, 

thereby rendering any surveillance beyond coastal 

observation all but impossible. Lastly, maritime policing and management are never performed by a single 

agency but instead require a level of interministerial 

coordination and collaboration that is often difficult 

to achieve.8

S C I E N C E A N D T E C H N O L O G Y A S 

A SOLUTION

Strategic investment in science and technology 

(S&T) offers a solution to help overcome these resource constraints. Technology such as sensor networks can cover large areas with high repetition rates, 

collect information at a fraction of the cost of direct 

observation, and provide raw data in such a way that 

facilitates the partnerships and collaborations needed 

to achieve maritime security.

For instance, an array of Automatic Identification System (AIS) towers is a comparatively cost-effective means of expanding surveillance and domain 

control. This system allows countries to identify and 

monitor commercial vessels within about 20 nautical 

miles from the coast. Such a system would only cost 

the Republic of Ghana, for example, around $85,000 

in start-up costs. Maintenance and operation, excluding the cost of personnel, would run on the order 

of $15–20,000 per annum. Although AIS does not 

produce a complete surveillance picture because not 

all ships carry transponders and towers are limited by 

line of sight, it is much cheaper than relying solely 

on patrol boats, whose operating costs run into the 

thousands of dollars per day.

Ocean drogues are another example. These floating buoys collect oceanographic data such as salinity, temperature, and current direction. Over 3,000 

“Argo floats” (one type of drogue) are operating 

autonomously around the globe (including African 

waters) at any one time. When compared to shipbased efforts, Argo floats produce more than 10 times 

as much data, and do so in a way that is more evenly 

distributed and precise. An Argo float also costs about 

$15,000 and can normally operate for 2 to 5 years, 

whereas a single day of operating a research vessel 

costs between $15,000 and $40,000. 

These sensor networks can provide critical 

data for African maritime security. AIS data, for 

example, can help track vessels suspected of carrying illegal goods such as weapons or stolen oil, as 

well as monitor large “reefer” vessels that transship 

illegally-caught fish. Oceanographic and environmental data are also useful for monitoring and predicting movement of fish stocks (locating possible 

illegal fishing activity), oil spill behavior, dangerous 

Dr. Augustus Vogel is an Associate Director for the U.S. 

Office of Naval Research Global covering Sub-Saharan Africa. He has deployed three times with Africa Partnership Station, a U.S. Navy maritime security collaboration program.

“strategic investment in science 

and technology offers a solution 

to overcome resource constraints” 
weather patterns, ocean conditions for operational 

forces, and potential landing sites for narcotics 

dumped at sea.

S & T I N V E S T M E N T I N A F R I C A N 

M A R I T I M E S E C U R I T Y 

Experience has shown that technological investment in Africa can be successful. Cell phone 

technology, for example, has helped the region leapfrog landline infrastructure obstacles, dramatically 

improving information accessibility in a matter of 

years.9 Similarly, satellite imagery now tracks land 

use and environmental degradation in remote parts of 

the continent while computers with battery-charging 

hand cranks support children’s education in resourcepoor areas.

Technology can also be a powerful tool for 

maritime security in Africa. But it is not sufficient. 

Concurrent investment in the science half of “science and technology” is essential if the benefits of 

technology are to be fully realized and sustained. 

Without it, there is no one to manage the installed 

technology and analyze the data generated. As a 

result, the limit of the equipment’s functionality is 

typically met on the first day of operation. In the 

10–15 cases where AIS towers have been installed 

in Africa, for example, international partners must 

provide even basic repairs. Moreover, African governments have rarely linked the towers through the 

Internet to develop a comprehensive operating picture—the ultimate aim of this surveillance network. 

Likewise, most tide gauges in Africa, despite their 

relatively low cost and ease of maintenance, are broken and unused.

A lack of “repair culture” is usually blamed for 

this state of affairs, despite contradictory evidence 

that Africans are everyday repairing other sophisticated equipment such as cars, televisions, and 

personal computers. The problem is more correctly 

one of institutional incentives. Most African governments focus spending on front-line operations 

such as those directly responsible for ship-based 

patrolling, and have not established research and 

development units that prioritize issues related to 

repair strategies, technological development, and 

long-term maintenance. Likewise, international 

partners typically donate or sell security equipment to Africa in a piecemeal fashion with only 

perfunctory training in operation and repair. Critically absent is support for locally-driven technological adaptation.

I N T E G R AT I N G S C I E N C E W I T H 

TECHNOLOGY THROUGH ACADEMIA

To fuse science with technology and enhance 

maritime security, African governments must tap an 

underutilized resource: African universities and research 

centers. Though many of these are primarily teaching 

colleges, talented research faculty in selected departments or science institutions can be found performing 

research that is relevant to maritime security and could 

engender mutually beneficial partnerships. Ghana, for 

example, has the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, as well as departments of physics, mathematics, and oceanography and fisheries on 

the University of Ghana’s Legon campus. Specialists 

in fields like atmospheric science and alternative energy can be found in Senegal’s Université Cheikh Anta 

Diop. Mauritius has oceanographers at the Mauritius 

Oceanography Institute, as does Tanzania at the University of Dar es Salaam. Nigeria has oceanographers and 

remote sensing specialists at the University of Lagos and 

the Nigerian Institute for Oceanographic and Marine 

Research. And South Africa supports work on surveillance networks and remote ship identification through 

its Council for Scientific and Industrial Research.

Collaborating with African researchers provides a 

variety of critical advantages for ensuring sustainability 

of S&T investments in maritime security. First, unlike 

members of the military, researchers tend to be fairly 

settled in their specific areas of focus. They can therefore anchor projects by providing the continuity required 

to sustain strong partnerships, track technological advances, and keep programs up-to-date. This is especially 

important for S&T projects, given the increasing pace 

and sophistication of global advancements. Without scientists’ involvement, African militaries will depend on 

external partners to manage both the technology and the 

program, an unfortunately common pattern of ineffective 

implementation and unsustainable capacity-building.

Second, independent research institutions can be 

a magnet for financial resources. Scientists bring cred3
ibility and the prospect for long-term institutional 

relationship-building in the eyes of external investors 

and donors. Research institutions, moreover, are one 

of the few places where military and civilian funding 

mingle relatively easily, providing a location where the 

diverse partnerships needed for maritime security can 

grow. It is in a research institution, for example, where 

oceanographic and maritime surveillance data could be 

fused, supporting both civilian and military objectives. 

An organization that manages diverse funding sources 

also has a higher likelihood of sustaining support for a 

program after the initial investment has finished.

Third, scientists are tech-savvy. Researchers will, for 

example, have fluency in the computer coding languages needed to use and adapt sensor networks or remotecontrolled vehicles. They also already have training in 

the physics, math, and engineering needed to assimilate 

and adapt new systems to local conditions.

Fourth, given their advanced education, African 

researchers are in a position to provide leadership for 

an S&T project. They can draw on their exposure 

to the international community and help their governments decide how to manage S&T to enhance 

maritime security. Beyond having a good eye for the 

long-term financial consequences of investing in a 

technology, African researchers can also be expected 

to prioritize the benefits to Africa.

Fifth, African researchers tend to be deeply committed to their countries. Most have traveled abroad, 

yet have not used the opportunity to emigrate. At the 

University of Ghana’s Department of Oceanography 

and Fisheries, for example, 73 percent of the faculty 

have studied abroad yet have returned to work in Ghana. This is no small issue in Africa, where “brain drain” 

greatly hampers development. Large investments have 

been wasted educating doctors and other skilled professionals who promptly left to practice outside of Africa. Involving patriotic professionals and scientists 

can greatly benefit the tone and direction of African 

maritime security efforts, especially when considering 

the long-term objectives of security investments.

EMERGING CASES OF MARITIME SECURITY 

COLLABORATION WITH ACADEMIA

Despite the benefits listed above, incorporation 

of academia into maritime security is not a “turn-key” 

solution for sustainability. Researchers must have support to build some of the very specific skills needed to 

develop S&T investments in maritime security. This 

is a challenge, given that only South Africa has had 

success developing a dedicated government institution 

for funding research. There are, however, a number of 

pioneering examples of promising collaborations where 

academic institutions work as S&T anchors for maritime security in Africa. They underscore the fact that 

maritime security is a complex issue that will not be 

solved by singular actions such as putting more boats 

on the water. Rather, partnership and comprehensive 

intersectoral coordination are imperative.

Coastal processes and maritime domain awareness in Ghana. In 2008, a relationship was initiated between the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Research (ONR) 

and the University of Ghana’s Department of Oceanography and Fisheries (UGDOF) to develop a mutually 

beneficial coastal geosciences program. For ONR, the 

program produces research relevant to its coastal sciences program. For Ghana, the research support is being used to understand persistent coastal erosion of 1–2 

meters/year that it is washing away towns, highways (the 

West African Highway between Abidjan and Lagos is 

nearly cut), and coastal infrastructure. 

Findings from the research also contribute to 

Ghanaian maritime security. Analyses of erosion rates, 

information on sea state (like dangerous wave heights 

and directions), and ocean processes such as currents 

or temperature patterns that attract illegal fishing help 

the Ghanaian Navy better manage coastal bases and 

support coastal patrols searching for traffickers. 

This collaboration is further maturing to include 

U.S. Naval Forces Africa’s Africa Partnership Station 

(APS). This partnership is helping UGDOF leverage 

its remote sensing center, initially created for research 

on coastal environmental processes, to develop more 

advanced sensor tools for maritime security. Satellite 

imagery is being integrated with other sensor networks (such as AIS) to monitor ship traffic and analyze maritime activity off Ghana relevant to oil spill 

management, fishing, commercial activity, and patterns of and threats to port traffic. Through the partnership, Ghanaian researchers are developing skills 

and technologies that enhance UGDOF’s reputation 

as a leading center of maritime expertise. They are 

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also helping Ghana’s maritime security forces cover 

its 235,000-square-kilometer EEZ in a far more costefficient manner than it could by patrolling alone. 

Meteorology, oceanography, and hydrography in 

West Africa. Another partnership that is benefiting 

maritime security is a program to engage scientists across 

Africa in topics related to meteorology, oceanography, 

and hydrography. Although many navies around the 

globe have departments dedicated to collecting these 

types of environmental information, this is not the 

norm in Africa. African research institutions are therefore in a position to develop the products and maps that 

support this initial critical piece to maritime domain 

awareness—namely the baseline data that describe the 

environment in which maritime security forces operate. 

Training and collaboration are occurring among 

institutions from the United States, Europe, and 

Africa and are focused on analyzing data collected 

from sensor networks. Over 115 ocean drogues (supplied by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration) have been deployed around Africa 

since 2008. A related deployment of meteorological 

sensors across coastal West and Central Africa will 

be completed in 2011. To incorporate the science 

for managing these sensors, international workshops 

in Senegal, Nigeria, and Ghana (with plans for Gabon) have focused on ocean data analysis and creating maritime weather forecasts. Nigerian scientists, 

moreover, have benefited from formal education programs in hydrography in the United States. 

African nations will use these sensor data and 

training to better predict weather formations that 

kill innumerable African mariners every year, understand ocean currents for managing oil spills, and 

create bathymetric charts that are invaluable for the 

safety of maritime security operations. As in Ghana, 

researchers are collaborating with maritime security 

forces to deploy comprehensive sensor networks at 

modest costs. In the process, they are fostering partnerships that promote a deeper understanding of offshore activities in Africa.

Sensor development and remote monitoring in 

South Africa. South Africa has the most sophisticated 

program for leveraging civilian research to the benefit of national security. Much of it is centered in the 

Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). 

CSIR embodies an effort to build a scientific community that is tech-savvy, capable of supporting research 

beneficial to both civilian and military interests, durable and leadership-ready, and committed to building 

a strong South Africa.

Efforts at CSIR speak directly to maritime security 

and the challenges faced by Africa. Environmental 

data are being collected by CSIR’s Earth Observation 

department, research on optics for naval patrol vessels 

is being advanced, sensor networks and unmanned vehicles are being built, and analyses of maritime vessel 

identification from space are being carried out. Instead 

of leaving operational security forces to deal with technology on their own, CSIR is providing the scientific 

partnership needed to comprehensively and efficiently 

monitor South Africa’s waters.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The scope for expanding the use of S&T to enhance maritime security in Africa is substantial. Priority areas of focus include the following:

Assess viability of comprehensive maritime domain awareness strategies in Africa. The African 

Union and its respective subregional bodies have been 

increasingly focused on the importance of maritime security. A vital foundational effort should be an analysis 

of what it would take, both logistically and financially, 

to have a reasonable level of maritime domain awareness in African waters. The study would need to identify what types of data should be collected, how they 

would be collected, and the advantages of different 

technology strategies. This effort, in which African 

scientists would play a leading role, would provide 

the African Union a tangible starting point for assessing the most cost-effective strategies for monitoring 

Africa’s waters for illegal activity. The engagement 

of African researchers in this process could likewise 

jumpstart opportunities for collaboration across a wide 

variety of maritime security issues.

Include research cells in maritime security 

efforts. Wherever there is an investment in maritime 

“[support to African scientists is]

fostering a deeper understanding 

of offshore activities in Africa”
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security, sustainability must be a critical consideration. 

When that investment includes technology, maritime 

security forces should collaborate with research groups 

to meet that requirement. This will augment both the 

longevity and the adaptability of the technology. A research cell could also help ensure technology provided 

by external partners was compatible with pre-existing 

equipment in the operating environment.

Invest in S&T areas where African research expertise already exists. African research and maritime 

security efforts are currently poorly coordinated. However, a program that attempted to impose a general realignment would likely fail because of high costs and wariness 

of militarization. Instead, S&T investment for maritime 

security should be directed to where local expertise in 

the civilian research community currently exists. Three 

potential topics include cost-efficient communication 

technology, ocean sensor networks, and alternative energy. For communication technology, various programs 

are already developing tools to help artisanal fisherman 

communicate from their canoes, presenting an opportunity to put more eyes on the water. Likewise, many 

African universities have initiated efforts to enhance 

their ocean sensor networks, particularly those based on 

satellite technology. With alternative energy, engaging 

civilian researchers involved in the substantial biofuel 

investment in Africa could have far-reaching pay-offs 

for the many African maritime security forces that have 

highly constrained fuel budgets. In short, there is no 

need to reinvent the wheel. Targeted support can scaleup already proven successes.

These recommendations build on the goal of 

enhancing maritime security through deployment of 

cost-effective sensor networks and collaborative use 

of data. They reflect a belief that technology is an 

essential function of covering the expansiveness of 

Africa’s maritime domain. This potential, however, 

is ultimately dependent on the engagement and support of African researchers to provide the science for 

making these investments sustainable.

NOTES

1

 Andre Maria Costa, “Africa Under Attack: Drug Trafficking Has Acquired a Whole New Dimension,” Address Delivered 

Before the U.N. Security Council, December 8, 2009.

2

 “Pirate Attacks Increase in 2010,” The Maritime Executive, 

December 30, 2010.

3

 “Cash-driven piracy to rise in Nigeria’s oil delta: analysts,” 

Agence France-Presse, January 3, 2011.

4 Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries (London: Marine Resources Assessment 

Group Ltd., 2005), 16.

5

 Adam Nossiter, “Far From Gulf, A Spill Scourge 5 Decades 

Old,” The New York Times, June 16, 2010.

6 Strengthening Forest Law Enforcement and Governance: Addressing a Systemic Constraint to Sustainable Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), 78.

7

 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Transnational Trafficking 

and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment,” 2009, 94.

8

 Augustus Vogel, Navies versus Coast Guards: Defining the 

Roles of African Maritime Security Forces, ACSS Africa Security 

Brief No. 2 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 

December 2009), 2.

9

 Steven Livingston, Africa’s Evolving Infosystems: A Pathway to Security and Stability, Africa Center for Strategic Studies 

Research Paper No. 2 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, March 2011), 2.

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AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFS

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