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i 

85–326 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–62] 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF AIR–SEA 

BATTLE STRATEGY, GOVERNANCE AND 

POLICY INTO THE SERVICES’ ANNUAL 

PROGRAM, PLANNING, BUDGETING 

AND EXECUTION (PPBE) PROCESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 10, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page HEARING: 

Thursday, October 10, 2013, Department of Defense Development and Integration of Air-Sea Battle Strategy, Governance and Policy into the Services’ 

Annual Program, Planning, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Process .......... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, October 10, 2013 .................................................................................... 27 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, 2013 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF 

AIR–SEA BATTLE STRATEGY, GOVERNANCE AND POLICY INTO THE 

SERVICES’ ANNUAL PROGRAM, PLANNING, BUDGETING AND EXECUTION (PPBE) PROCESS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 1 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Cheek, MG Gary H., USA, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3/5/7, Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 12 

Foggo, RADM James G., III, USN, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations, Plans and Strategy) (N3/N5B), Department of Defense .. 4 

Jones, Maj Gen James J., USAF, Director of Operations, Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements, Department of Defense ......... 8 

Killea, BGen Kevin J., USMC, Director of the Marine Corps Warfighting 

Laboratory, Department of Defense ................................................................... 11 

Stough, Maj Gen Michael S., USAF, Vice Director, Joint Force Development, 

J7, Department of Defense .................................................................................. 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 31 

[Editor’s Note: The witnesses did not provide written statements of the 

proposed testimony in advance of the hearing. The Chairman, in concurrence with the Ranking Minority Member, agreed to waive Committee Rule 13 for this hearing.] 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 
Page

IV 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 35 

Mr. McIntyre ..................................................................................................... 35 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 41 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 54 
(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF AIR–SEA BATTLE STRATEGY, GOVERNANCE AND POLICY INTO THE SERVICES’ ANNUAL PROGRAM, PLANNING, BUDGETING AND EXECUTION 

(PPBE) PROCESS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, October 10, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:29 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. I would like to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. Today we 

have testifying before us Rear Admiral Jim Foggo, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy; 

Major General Mike Stough, Vice Director for Joint Force Development of the Joint Staff, J–7; Major General Jim Jones, Director 

of Operations for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air Force Operations, Plans and Requirements; Brigadier General Kevin Killea, Director of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory located within 

the Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and Major General Gary Cheek, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for the Army, 

G–3/5/7. 

Gentlemen, thank you again for appearing. And we thank you for 

your service to this great Nation. Under the first tranche of budget 

reductions that began in 2010 with $168 million of efficiencies 

taken out of the Defense Department’s budget, the Joint Staff was 

understandably stretched thin, supporting OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] and OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] operations, and 

was unable to absorb critical joint force integration functions and 

responsibilities of Joint Forces Command after it was dismantled 

in August 2011. One significant consequence of that budget cut was 

that a vacuum of preparedness and increased risk manifested 

itself, resulting in the Department of Defense’s inability to maintain sufficiently trained, equipped joint warfighting forces that 

could strategize, integrate, and guarantee a successful and timely 

outcome in an anti-access/area denial [A2/AD] high-end contingency operation. 

However, under the auspices of the new Defense Strategic Guidance, issued by the Secretary of Defense in January 2012, the serv-
2 

ices took it upon themselves to fill that institutional void and establish the Air-Sea Battle Office, acknowledging our military’s need 

to refocus capabilities on global full-spectrum contingencies in A2/ 

AD environments. 

I do not believe that Air-Sea Battle in itself is a strategy, a budget preservation gimmick, nor is it focused particularly on a specific 

country or entity. What I do believe is that it is the services’ best 

attempt to hold themselves accountable to their title 10 obligations 

of preparing for and defending the freedoms and liberties that we 

as Americans hold dear. It is extremely important that our military 

remains capable and equipped to fight full-spectrum warfare, 

whether it is in permissive environments such as what we have experienced for the past 10 years, or in high-end contingencies 

against adversaries with advanced air and missile defense systems 

and near-peer force structure. 

What we would like to discuss with our witnesses today is how 

the efforts and products developed by the Air-Sea Battle Office are 

integrating into each service’s planning and budgeting process, as 

well as how the Joint Staff plans to institutionalize the Air-Sea 

Battle initiative of the services within the Department of Defense. 

We would also like to understand how the Air-Sea Battle Concept 

informs the Department’s anti-access/area denial warfighting strategy, recognizes capability gaps and shortfalls, applies the necessary 

resources to mitigate those gaps, and tailors joint force training 

and exercises towards joint seamless integration continuity. The 

Air-Sea Battle Concept is an important initiative that will help determine how the joint force will gain and maintain access in future 

military operating environments. 

I look forward to hearing an update from our witnesses about the 

concept’s development and future outlook. I also view this hearing 

as a good public opportunity for our witnesses to clarify intent and 

respond to misconceptions and falsities that have surrounded the 

Air-Sea Battle Concept over the past few years. With that, I turn 

to my good friend and colleague, the ranking member of the subcommittee, Representative Mike McIntyre. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NORTH CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. Thanks to all the witnesses for your decades of service that you have given individually and collectively. 

And I know that there is concern about the importance of the AirSea Battle Concept. There has been support for this, but it seems 

like the question is how much has really happened within DOD 

[Department of Defense] to proceed on this? And I wanted just to 

lay out a few things in layman’s terms that maybe will help us 

focus today in the time we have together. First, we realize that AirSea Battle is not necessarily just a strategy, but rather an approach or a framework. And we want to make sure, is that a clear 

understanding? To solve a very difficult military challenge that 

U.S. forces may face in the future. 
3 

First, assuming that future enemies will use a wide array of 

methods to slow down or prevent U.S. military forces from moving 

to critical locations. Simply put, if the military forces can’t actually 

get there, then they can’t influence the battle. Second, we know 

that Air-Sea Battle assumes that even when the U.S. forces arrive, 

a smart enemy will try to use an array of asymmetric means to 

stop the U.S. military from operating the way it wants to, such as 

taking away the advantages in standoff-range weapons or logistics, 

or long-range sensors and other areas such as that. 

If they can do this in the future, if our enemies can do it, then 

our forces may end up not getting to the fight in time to make a 

difference, and may take many more casualties than we would expect once they do get there. Clearly, those would be bad outcomes 

for the United States. And clearly, I know that the chairman and 

I on this subcommittee and our full committee would want to make 

sure that those types of things were prevented as far as possible, 

and ultimately not happen at all. We want to make sure that the 

Air-Sea Battle Concept helps the DOD develop the weapons, the 

doctrine, the organizations, and the training needed to overcome 

these types of challenges in the future. 

Also, despite the clarity of this military challenge, we may also 

want to look at, is the DOD really progressing to make progress 

in these areas? For instance, the Asia-Pacific shift we hear so much 

about now with the focus on the Pacific Rim and with Air-Sea Battle Concept, we are told taking three aircraft carriers out of the 

fleet was one of the options looked at during the strategic management choices review. With the concern about anti-access and area 

denial capabilities, the question is, why would that type of step 

even be considered? 

Also from a larger perspective, DOD has not yet proposed a significant shift of funding within the DOD budget to two military departments, the Navy and the Air Force, who have the largest roles 

in the Air-Sea Battle Concept by definition. The Navy’s total budget share has yet to return to pre-9/11 levels despite the end of the 

war and the rapid drawdowns that are occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. The Air Force’s situation is even worse, 

with the Air Force dropping just under 30 percent of the total DOD 

budget before 9/11 to just under 25 percent today. 

So the concern I have and that many of us share is that until 

substantial resources shift within DOD to put back in place what 

the Navy and Air Force may need, that we would not see real implementation of the Air-Sea Battle Concept or the real progress 

necessary or understood to be necessary in the Asia-Pacific shift. 

So with that in mind, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for this 

opportunity, and would like to hear these areas addressed from our 

witnesses, and see what the prospects are for real progress as we 

look ahead to 2015 budget and beyond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mike. And Admiral, I think you are 

going to start us off. And just before you start, I just wanted to 

take just a moment and tell you this is probably one of the most 

bipartisan subcommittees we have in Congress. We all have a lot 

of respect for each other, and you have a lot of expertise on here. 

Later, Mr. Courtney, who has a lot of expertise in submarines and 

naval situations, will be asking questions. Mr. Wittman is the 
4 

chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee. And all of you know him 

and look forward to his comments and questions. And of course, the 

gentleman from California, Mr. Cook, served us well in uniform, as 

all of you know. 

So we are looking forward to our questions. But Admiral, as we 

start off, I would just like for you or someone else as you address 

in your opening remarks, since we are laying a transcript and a 

record to be used for other Members, Mike was correct in saying 

sometimes there is just a little confusion in what we are even talking about. And I want to go back to even what anti-access/area denial really means and how it has changed and transformed from 

maybe 20 years ago. But the second thing is, if you could address 

for us, I think part of this confusion we have is in the name. When 

you look at Air-Sea Battle, it is remarkably like AirLand Battle 

concept. And AirLand Battle was, I believe, a strategy. But Air-Sea 

Battle Concept is a concept. And if you could elaborate on maybe 

the difference between the two, because that nomenclature might 

have left some misconceptions in some people’s mind. With that, 

Admiral, we look forward to your remarks, and thank you again for 

being here. 

STATEMENT OF RADM JAMES G. FOGGO III, USN, ASSISTANT 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OPERATIONS, 

PLANS AND STRATEGY) (N3/N5B), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Admiral FOGGO. Chairman Forbes, thank you, sir. Ranking Member McIntyre and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to come here and testify today on the 

Air-Sea Battle Concept. I am joined by Major General Jones of the 

United States Air Force, Brigadier General Killea of the United 

States Marine Corps, Major General Cheek of the United States 

Army, and Major General Stough, Vice Director, Joint Force Development Joint Staff, each providing their individual service and 

Joint Staff perspectives for you today. 

So let me begin by answering the question, what is the Air-Sea 

Battle Concept? The Air-Sea Battle Concept was approved by the 

Secretary of Defense in 2011. It is designed to assure access to 

parts of the global commons, those areas of the air, sea, cyberspace, 

and space that no one necessarily owns, but which we all depend 

on, such as sea lines of communication. Our adversaries’ anti-access/area denial strategies employ a range of military capabilities 

that impede the free use of these ungoverned spaces. These military capabilities include new generations of cruise, ballistic, air-toair, surface-to-air missiles, with improved range, accuracy, and 

lethality that are being produced and proliferated. Quiet, modern 

submarines and stealthy fighter aircraft are being procured by 

many nations, while naval mines are being equipped with mobility, 

discrimination, and autonomy. 

Both space and cyberspace are becoming increasingly important 

and contested. Accordingly, Air-Sea Battle in its concept is intended to defeat such threats to access and provide options to national leaders and military commanders to enable follow-on operations, which could include military activities, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. 
5 

In short, it is a new approach to warfare. The Air-Sea Battle 

Concept is also about force development in the face of rising technological challenges. We seek to build at the service level a pre-integrated joint force which empowers U.S. combatant commanders, 

along with allies and partners, to engage in ways that are cooperative and networked across multiple domains: The land, maritime, 

air, space, and cyber domains. And our goal includes continually refining and institutionalizing these practices. When implemented, 

the Air-Sea Battle Concept will create and codify synergies within 

and among the services that will enhance our collective warfighting 

capability and effectiveness. 

So that is, in a nutshell, what the Air-Sea Battle Concept is. But 

now what is it not? Sir, you pointed out the Air-Sea Battle Concept 

is not a strategy, to answer your question on the difference between AirLand Battle and the Air-Sea Battle Concept. National or 

military strategies employs ways and means to a particular end or 

end state, such as deterring conflict, containing conflict, or winning 

conflict. A concept, in contrast, is a description of a method or a 

scheme for employing military capabilities to attain specific objectives at the operational level of war. The overarching objective of 

the Air-Sea Battle Concept is to gain and maintain freedom of action in the global commons. Air-Sea Battle does not focus on a particular adversary or a region. It is universally applicable across all 

geographic locations, and by addressing access challenges wherever, however, and whenever we confront them. 

I said earlier the Air-Sea Battle Concept represents a new approach to warfare. Here is what I meant by that. Historically, when 

deterrence fails, it is our custom to mass large numbers of resources, leverage our allies for coalition support and base access or 

overflight, and build up an iron mountain of logistics, weapons, and 

troops to apply overwhelming force at a particular space and time 

of our choosing. This approach of build up, rehearse, and roll back 

has proven successful, from Operation Overlord on the beaches of 

Normandy in 1944, to Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Middle East. 

But the 21st century operating environment is changing. Future 

generations of American service men and women will not fight 

their parents’ wars. And so I will borrow a quote from Abraham 

Lincoln written in a letter to this House on 1 December 1862, when 

he said, ‘‘We must think anew, act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves from the past, and then we shall save our country.’’ 

New military approaches are emerging, specifically intended to 

counter our historical methods of projecting power. Adversaries employing such an approach would seek to prevent or deny our ability 

to aggregate forces by denying us a safe haven from which to build 

up, rehearse, and roll back. Anti-access is defined as an action intended to slow deployment of friendly forces into a theater, or 

cause us to operate from longer distances than preferred. Area denial impedes friendly operations or maneuver in a theater where 

access cannot be prevented. The Air-Sea Battle Concept mitigates 

the threat of anti-access and area denial by creating pockets and 

corridors under our control. 

The recent conflict in Libya, Operation Odyssey Dawn in 2011, 

is a good example of this paradigm shift. Though Air-Sea Battle 

was still in development, the fundamental idea of leveraging access 
6 

in one domain to provide advantage to our forces in another was 

understood and employed against Libya’s modest anti-access/area 

denial capability. On day one of combat operations, cruise missiles 

launched from submarines and surface ships in the maritime domain targeted and destroyed Libya’s lethal air defense missile systems, thereby enabling coalition forces to conduct unfettered followon strikes and destroy the Libyan air force and control the air 

domain. 

Establishing a no-fly zone, key to interdicting hostile regime actions against innocent civilians, and that was our mission, protect 

civilians, was effectively accomplished within 48 hours of receiving 

the execution order from the President. I was the J–3, or the operations officer for Admiral Sam Locklear, commander of Joint Task 

Force Odyssey Dawn. And I transitioned from U.S.-led coalition operations to Operation Unified Protector as a task force commander 

for NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. During the entire 

campaign, which lasted 7 months, NATO reported in its U.N. 

[United Nations] after action report that there were just under 

18,000 sorties flown, employing 7,900 precision guided munitions. 

That is a lot. More than 200 Tomahawk land-attack missiles were 

used, over half of which came from submarines. The majority of the 

Libyan regime order of battle, which included 800 main battle 

tanks, 2,500 artillery pieces, 2,000 armored personnel carriers, 360 

fixed-wing fighters, and 85 transports, were either disabled or destroyed during the campaign. Not one American boot set foot on 

the ground. No Americans were killed in combat operations. We 

lost one F–15 due to a mechanical failure, but we recovered both 

pilots safely. 

Muammar Gaddafi, as you know, was killed by Libyan rebels in 

October 2011. The Air-Sea Battle Concept in its classified form was 

completed in November 2011, one month later. I provided Admiral 

Locklear with a copy of the Air-Sea Battle Concept, and we reviewed it on a trip to the United Kingdom. Upon reading it, I 

thought back to the Libya campaign, and I wondered how I might 

leverage the concepts of Air-Sea Battle to fight differently, to fight 

smarter. Operation Odyssey Dawn accelerated from a noncombatant evacuation operation and humanitarian assistance to kinetic 

operations in a very short period of time. There was little time to 

build up and rehearse our forces. 

To coin a phrase from my boss, this was like a pickup game of 

basketball, and we relied on the flexibility, innovation, and resiliency of the commanders and the forces assigned to the joint task 

force. The Libyan regime’s anti-access/area denial capability was 

limited, as I said, and we were able to overwhelm and defeat it 

with the tools that we had. But we must prepare for a more stressing environment in the future. 

Air-Sea Battle does so by providing commanders with a range of 

options, both kinetic and nonkinetic, to mitigate or neutralize challenges to access in one or many domains simultaneously. This is 

accomplished through the development of networked integrated 

forces capable of attack in depth to disrupt, destroy, and defeat the 

adversary. And it provides maximum operational advantage to 

friendly, joint, and coalition forces. I am a believer, and so are the 

rest of the flag and general officers here at the table with me. 
7 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I look forward to 

your questions. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. General Stough. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN MICHAEL S. STOUGH, USAF, VICE DIRECTOR, JOINT FORCE DEVELOPMENT, J7, DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

General STOUGH. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

Thanks for allowing me the opportunity to be here today to discuss 

how the joint force is addressing access challenges. My role here, 

I think, is to give you an idea of how this integrates into the Joint 

Staff. I am going to discuss the overarching concept very briefly, 

the Joint Operational Access Concept, its relationship to Air-Sea 

Battle and other supporting concepts, and our ongoing implementation efforts. The Secretary of Defense, as Admiral Foggo pointed 

out, clearly established as one of the 10 primary missions of the 

joint force the ability to project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges. To meet that objective, the Secretary directed the 

implementation of the Joint Operational Access Concept, or JOAC. 

JOAC describes the chairman’s vision for how joint forces will operate in response to emerging anti-access and area denial challenges 

as part of our broader national approach. It seeks flexible integration of service capabilities across multiple domains. And those include space and cyberspace and the traditional air, maritime, and 

land domains as well, and it identifies 30 required operational capabilities needed to gain operational access. 

Now, supporting concepts, Air-Sea Battle is one of those, provide 

the greater operational context to the JOAC itself. The Air-Sea 

Battle Concept is one of the most critical, as it focuses on the development of integrated forces to, again, as Admiral Foggo said, to 

gain and maintain freedom of action in the global commons. We are 

also developing the joint concept for entry operations. It is currently in work, and it describes how a future joint force will overcome area denial threats to enter into hostile territory. 

The development of the 30 JOAC capabilities and the associated 

capabilities from the supporting concepts is key to ensuring the 

joint force has the requisite capabilities to counter emerging A2/AD 

threats. To improve efforts to implement JOAC and its supporting 

concepts, the chairman has directed an approach to integrate, oversee, assess, and communicate joint force development efforts required to overcome emerging challenges. This approach focuses on 

the four operational objectives and associated capabilities that the 

combatant command require to operate in an A2/AD environment: 

Gain and maintain regional cooperative advantage to counter A2/ 

AD strategies, more the shaping the environment; rapidly aggregate the force; disrupt, destroy, and defeat A2/AD capabilities; and 

conduct sustained operations in an A2/AD environment. 

The Joint Staff J–7 will lead a multiyear iterative effort, with the 

oversight provided by the director of Joint Staff and the service operations deputies, in order to implement these concepts. In closing, 

I would offer two thoughts. First, the efforts to implement the 

JOAC, or Air-Sea Battle for that matter, don’t supplant established 

authorities or processes that are a means to increase focus and in-
8 

tegrate efforts across the services and the joint force to address a 

critical set of challenges. And second, in support of Joint Operational Access implementation, the Air-Sea Battle Office serves a 

critical function in integrating the development of service-specific 

capabilities that the joint force commander will require. The current Air-Sea Battle implementation plan will be leveraged to the 

maximum extent possible to inform relevant segments of our own 

Joint Operational Access implementation plan. 

On behalf of our military members and civilian employees at 

work every day to ensure our country is successful in preparing for 

and countering these challenges, I would like to thank you for your 

support, and I look forward to the discussion. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. General Jones. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES J. JONES, USAF, DIRECTOR 

OF OPERATIONS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General JONES. Chairman Forbes and Ranking Member McIntyre, and again, the distinguished members of the subcommittee, I 

also want to thank you for the opportunity to come and speak with 

you today and present the Air Force perspective on how we are 

executing the Air-Sea Battle construct. As I know you are aware, 

Admiral Greenert and General Welsh recently collaborated on an 

article that was called ‘‘Breaking the Kill Chain.’’ It is a very descriptive term of one of the constructs that we are addressing in 

this Air-Sea Battle. And it was intended to describe the methodology that we would use to implement this overall concept. And 

there were three supporting efforts that were clearly identified in 

there: Compelling institutional change, fostering conceptual alignment amongst the services, and then promoting programmatic 

changes. And given this rapidly evolving, very sophisticated, and 

challenging operational environment that was described by Admiral Foggo in his opening remarks, I would like to further elaborate 

on how we are integrating the Air-Sea Battle Concept into our established service processes. 

I would like to start by saying that there is a big difference between deconflicting among services and integration amongst our 

services. And as we work to conduct these operations across the 

multi-domains that Admiral Foggo described, it requires a very 

rapid and a very tight coordination amongst the air, the ground, 

and the naval forces. It is a level of integration that goes far beyond what we may do to preplan or merely deconflict those actions. 

And it is not something that can be effectively and efficiently conducted on an ad hoc basis for any response that we may have to 

provide. Our forces need to be pre-integrated. We need to make 

sure that we have this ability inculcated into everything that we 

do. 

Sir, our adversaries have witnessed the power and the might 

that our services together can bring, the overwhelming force when 

we are given the opportunity to assemble forces in theater, do multiple mission rehearsals before the operations commence. And their 

concerns are clearly evident by the rapid proliferation of more lethal air defenses, the anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, and 
9 

more integrated surveillance systems. In addition, our military has 

evolved from a force that was largely dependent on large bases and 

forward garrisons that were close to the potential battlefields, to a 

more expeditionary force that could support a smaller overseas 

presence by surging into the area from hundreds, or even thousands of miles away. 

Sir, you asked in your comment how has the anti-access/area denial threat evolved over the last couple of decades? And, sir, as you 

well know, the idea of anti-access or area denial is not new. But 

what has changed is the range that these systems are able to employ at, a networked capability that ties into surveillance to be able 

to queue those systems in, and the incredible accuracy that those 

bring. So while the basic construct itself is part of warfare for decades past, this emerging technology and the proliferation of that 

technology that ties the integration of the sensors that sense where 

people are, and queues, and the range and precision that those 

bring have driven a much larger operational problem for us. We 

are leveraging Air-Sea Battle to build these pre-integrated joint 

forces that I talked about. And there is plenty of examples. 

Our brethren from the Navy and their Top Gun school routinely 

train with our Air Force’s weapons school. In recent Red Flag exercises that historically have been for our air services, we had planners, Navy TLAM [Tomahawk Land Attack Missile] planners from 

the Third Fleet, that were integrated into the air operations planning. And that enabled us to familiarize both the Air Force and the 

Army planners on how to integrate operations on a more frequent 

basis. 

Air Combat Command and Navy Fleet Forces Command are 

working on common problems together in this newly formed NavyAir Force integration forum. And just 2 weeks ago, the Navy sponsored an exercise, Navy Global 13, that examined three different 

concepts for doing command and control in a cross-domain environment. And we participated in those, and we will take those, those 

will be further developed, and those will lead into the Air Force’s 

Unified Engagement. And we will exercise in 2014, and we will further build on those and work towards a development of joint doctrine. 

We continue to expand doctrine integration and enhancing collaboration with the Army air defense forces, Marine reconnaissance 

forces. And each one of these small steps takes us closer to our objectives of conceptual alignment and the pre-integration of joint 

forces across the warfighting domain. Sir, Air-Sea Battle is not 

about adding processes to the existing DOD governance. We are 

working within the existing requirements and the resourcing processes that each service and the Joint Staff already use. Countering 

this anti-access/area denial environment has caught the attention 

of nearly every organization within DOD. And the Air-Sea Battle 

Office’s efforts to enhance that joint response across the full range 

of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, 

and facilities across that whole spectrum provides a prism through 

which each service can assess their resource priorities to enable 

their advancements to counter the anti-access/area denial environment. 
10 

And I want to stress again this provides a prism that each service can look through to identify what they might need to do. We 

advise and we assist those service resource planners and perform 

the specific roles as they ask us to look into their processes. And 

as we continue to mature the Air-Sea Battle Concept, the interservice collaboration is occurring more frequently on resource priorities that may cross service lines. These enhanced relationships 

across the services are essential to create a more highly networked, 

cross-domain operational mindset in all of our forces. 

Sir, you mentioned AirLand Battle. And Air-Sea Battle’s 10 mission focus areas can be roughly compared to the AirLand Battle’s 

31 initiatives. What might be different about Air-Sea Battle is that 

it is not tied to one particular focus area. And as you are well 

aware, the AirLand Battle was designed to help us perform more 

effectively in the Fulda Gap scenario. This has nothing to do with 

a region. It is a concept that can support that strategy and provide 

choices to our combatant commanders wherever they may need to 

counter that anti-access/area denial threat. 

These mission-focused areas are helping us more carefully align 

and incorporate what we learn from exercises, from war games, 

training and experiments, and advance the counters, the anti-access/area denial threats, much like AirLand Battle’s 31 initiatives 

helped us focus our response to that Fulda Gap problem in the cold 

war. 

Sir, we have had healthy discussions about our relationship with 

the Joint Staff and potential areas of duplication, and I am very 

confident that we have the right constructs in place. We are well 

integrated and mutually supporting each other’s work. And that relationship remains strong as we continue to refine our operational 

constructs. As mentioned earlier, the Air-Sea Battle is an accepted 

supporting component of the Joint Staff’s Joint Operational Access 

Concept, JOAC, and it sits alongside the forthcoming joint concept 

for entry operations. And as General Stough previously mentioned, 

while the Air-Sea Battle Concept is fully nested within those concepts, each of our services have unique roles and responsibilities 

under title 10 that need to continue outside that Joint Staff planning process. 

The identification of the capability gaps, the identification of solutions, and the resourcing of those solutions all begin with our 

services. And while the Joint Staff and the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] offices have oversight roles and numerous activities, the genesis and development of the requirements and the resource recommendations remain with those services. But what the 

Air-Sea Battle Office presents as an action arm of those services 

is assisting the evaluation of those DOTMILPF [Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, 

and Facilities] options to address the overall anti-access/area denial 

requirements. 

So sir, in conclusion, while the anti-access/area denial problems 

definitely present a significant challenge to the U.S. and our allied 

forces, sustaining the teamwork that we have established and the 

things that are resulting from the catalyst of this Air-Sea Battle 

Concept and the Air-Sea Battle Office’s efforts offer a path to success. Compelling the institutional change amongst our services, fos-
11 

tering the conceptual alignment, and promoting programmatic collaboration are broad actions taken to ensure the global commons 

remain free in the face of ever-increasing threats. 

Sir, again I thank you for this opportunity to address the subcommittee, and I look forward to addressing your questions. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General Jones. General Killea. 

STATEMENT OF BGEN KEVIN J. KILLEA, USMC, DIRECTOR OF 

THE MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING LABORATORY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General KILLEA. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McIntyre and 

members of the subcommittee, as the director of Marine Corps concept development and experimentation, I appreciate the ability to 

talk today about our perspective on anti-access/area denial challenges and our role in the Air-Sea Battle Office. While the development and proliferation of increasingly advanced A2/AD systems 

threaten our ability to gain access and achieve freedom of maneuver in the global commons, the A2/AD challenge isn’t new territory. 

Although, as you said, Mr. Chairman, it is evolving and developing. 

But addressing it continues to demand a balanced, joint approach, 

both non and material solutions. It is important that we not lose 

sight of this and allow A2/AD to become some entirely new problem 

that requires a solely technical solution. And I think everybody at 

this table agrees with that. 

As we recognize the formidable challenge the proliferation of advanced technologies presents to our long held military advantage, 

we must keep in mind that our operational approach to counter access and area denial threats will remain a key component to any 

successful strategy. In short, access challenges can’t be overcome by 

technology alone. The A2/AD discussion must continue to include 

the operational approach that leverages all the capabilities of the 

joint force. The overarching Joint Operational Access Concept, supported by the subordinate concepts of Air-Sea Battle, and the forthcoming joint concept for entry operations, gives due consideration 

to adversary systems, but also places emphasis on the joint force’s 

need for an effective operational approach. 

Along these lines, the Marine Corps continues to support the increasingly convergent efforts of the Air-Sea Battle Office and the 

Joint Staff to develop a more capable cross-domain force prepared 

for the range of missions laid out in the Defense Strategic Guidance. And it is a range of missions. As a pre-integrated naval force 

inherently equipped to fight across multi-domains, the Marine 

Corps supports Air-Sea Battle’s efforts to increase the interoperability of our joint forces in the A2/AD environment. To that end, 

the Marine Corps supports implementing both the Joint Operational Access and Air-Sea Battle Concepts through war gaming, 

experimentation, and exercising existing planned and developing 

capabilities. 

Specific efforts on our part include developing force postures and 

concepts for increased phase zero engagement and crisis response 

that will be critical to both deterring threats and maintaining access, developing concepts and longer range capabilities that will enhance our operational maneuver and our ability to seize and defend 
12 

forward bases, airfields, strategic chokepoints, and other key terrain in support of a joint campaign. 

These Marine Corps concepts and capabilities are intended to 

lend resiliency to the joint force by employing mobile platforms and 

dispersed aviation and ground assets that increase the number of 

sea- and land-based launch points. 

Lastly, projecting power despite A2/AD is just one of the many 

mission sets that the services must be able to accomplish per the 

Defense Strategic Guidance. As such, Air-Sea Battle is one of many 

lenses the Marine Corps uses to view its programming priorities. 

This is why collaboration between the services in Air-Sea Battle is 

so important. The Marine Corps will continue to maintain investment in a broad portfolio of capabilities to support the joint force 

across the entire range of military operations. 

In closing, the Air-Sea Battle’s Office efforts have been an important step in addressing the evolving access and area denial challenges our forces will face in the future. The Marine Corps looks 

forward to continued service-to-service collaboration in this area, as 

well as the integration of the appropriate ASB [Air-Sea Battle] efforts with those of the Joint Staff. Sir, I thank you for your support 

and the committee’s support, the subcommittee’s support for the 

men and women in uniform, and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. General Cheek. 

STATEMENT OF MG GARY H. CHEEK, USA, ASSISTANT DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF STAFF, G–3/5/7, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General CHEEK. Chairman Forbes and Ranking Member McIntyre, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 

the opportunity to speak with you today about Air-Sea Battle. Now 

some might be surprised that an Army general would be before 

Congress talking about Air-Sea Battle, and I confess, I am a little 

surprised myself to be here. But I would frankly tell you that for 

the Army, we look forward to any and every opportunity to partner 

with our joint brothers and sisters for operations. And we get a lot 

of benefits from those. And we give a lot of benefits to our other 

joint services. And frankly, this is really what makes our military 

unique, is the fact that we can bring these pieces together in a synergistic way and achieve great effect against our Nation’s enemies. 

But we also recognize that we have got to be able to look beyond 

what we are doing today currently in Afghanistan to future conflicts. And we recognize that there is a very real likelihood that 

those future conflicts could require us to go into areas that an adversary would deny us in either the global commons or an area 

that we are trying to operate in. 

So we are very happy to be part of this process. Now, maybe 

even more surprising is my own personal experience, having just 

come from the CENTCOM AOR [United States Central Command 

area of responsibility] and serving with my good friend General 

Jones, where I was the deputy for the Army component to 

CENTCOM and he was the deputy for the Air Force component. 

But we dealt on a daily basis there with this very issue in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz. So you would be interested 

to know that the things that we had to do to kind of counter that 
13 

environment I guess is the best way to describe it with a lot of joint 

interoperability. 

And so, for one example, for air and missile defense, we provided 

Army Patriots, the Navy provided Aegis cruisers, but we put them 

under the tactical control of the Air Force. And they did a great 

job of exercising those routinely so that we maintained the capability to take advantage of each other’s capabilities and provide 

overlapping and appropriate coverage of the critical assets in the 

theater. A second thing that we did, we provided Army tactical 

missiles as part of the air tasking order and the joint targeting 

plan. So again, an Army contribution to that effort. And maybe 

most uniquely, and something that I know our soldiers really enjoyed, was operating Apache helicopters off the decks of Navy 

ships, where we would receive moving target indicators from Air 

Force AWACs [Airborne Warning and Control System] aircraft and 

operate under the tactical control of the Navy against small attack 

craft in the Persian Gulf. 

So those are just examples of what is happening today. And I 

think what is really great about this concept is we can take those 

very real activities that we are doing, codify them, improve them, 

test them, and further develop them and then return those to the 

field. So despite the title Air-Sea Battle, I am very happy and the 

Army is very happy to be a charter member of the organization and 

active participant. And we think we have a lot to benefit from this 

because we recognize that any future land campaign will likely 

have to use the techniques, procedures, technologies that we have 

developed in support of this. So again, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. And we thank all of you for 

those opening remarks. And any written statements you would like 

to put in the record in addition to that, we certainly would welcome 

them. And I am going to defer my questions until the end so we 

can get all of our members’ questions in. But at this time, I would 

like to recognize our ranking member, Congressman McIntyre, for 

any questions he may have. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief so that 

we can afford our other members an opportunity. Rear Admiral 

Foggo, beyond the military weapons systems, are there specific examples you can cite in the areas of training or organizational 

change that are a product of the Air-Sea Battle Concept? 

Admiral FOGGO. Yes, sir. We talked about our recent war game 

in Newport, Rhode Island, just about 10 days ago, Global 13. Global 13 took a look at command and control in the Air-Sea Battle context with two additional domains that are rather new in terms of 

warfighting, space and cyber. And part of the challenge was to determine how to create a command and control construct that would 

operate in the space and cyber domain, and how you would control 

the space and cyber domain, and how you would integrate that 

with the rest of your forces. The outcome of that war game is being 

written up in conclusions and lessons learned by our War College, 

and it will come back to the Air-Sea Battle Office and be distributed to the services. That will be used next year in the Air Force’s 

Unified Engagement game as a baseline for future progression in 

the determination of how we best operate together. 
14 

Then those will be tested out in exercises in the fleet, in the Air 

Force, and amongst the joint force and the services. So, General 

Jones mentioned Red Flag. That is one aspect of an actual exercise 

that takes place out in the field, training. There is a joint effort 

right now, sir, Iron Crucible, which is a part of the JOAC [Joint 

Operational Access Concept] process, that will help train the joint 

force in the scheme of maneuver of the Air-Sea Battle Concept. So 

I hope that answers your question. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Major General Killea, with the Marine Corps, what efforts do you feel like the senior leaders feel are 

the top five things that could be done to help build the kind of military capabilities that we need to operate in an anti-access/area denial environment? And do you feel like we are making progress in 

any of those areas? 

General KILLEA. Well, sir, I think areas of development that 

would help us in the Air-Sea Battle environment, I think Admiral 

Foggo touched on a piece that is very critical right now, it is the 

initial war gaming, experimentation and then what leads to exercising and training as a joint force. We are still pretty much developing this. And we still don’t know what we don’t know in that 

realm. And I think that is going to uncover a lot of things that lead 

to the chairman’s question early on about what can we do to inject 

into the process that we can obtain to help in the Air-Sea Battle 

environment. 

So, sir, I don’t have anything more specific than that. I can take 

your question for the record and see if there is something more to 

it. But I think we have an opportunity here, as a joint force, to uncover some things as we go forward with war gaming, experimentation, and exercise. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 35.] 

Mr. MCINTYRE. That would help in listing what you feel like may 

be the top five things that would help you in that regard so that 

we will know how to prioritize. And then Major General Jones, the 

Air Force, we know that if there was a shift of funding that I alluded to in my opening remarks, that would clearly help. But in 

the little bit of time that I will take left, so that we can go to other 

questions, let me just ask you, absent a shift of funding share to 

the Air Force in this difficult budget time, what progress do you 

feel the Air Force can make in the next 5 years so that this moves 

forward? 

General JONES. Sir, as we have worked our way through the 

challenges that are associated with this fiscal environment, and we 

are focusing very much on what we need to continue to develop in 

this anti-access/area denial environment, things that we have protected to move forward in that is our effort to protect the F–35, the 

development of that airplane, which is not only important for the 

Air Force but for our joint sisters and for our coalition partners as 

well. And that will be a key piece of what we bring in terms of air 

power in this anti-access/area denial environment. So we are working hard to protect that within our existing budget. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Which did you say? 

General JONES. The F–35, sir. Protecting the F–35 platform. We 

are also protecting the development of our next long-range strike 
15 

bomber. And so, sir, as we work our way through this, the things 

that we are focused on within our existing budget are the things 

that are unique to the Air Force to bring in terms of how we will 

contribute to the joint fight. And we think that is that global power 

capability that we bring, and the capabilities and the technology 

that we need to be able to continue to counter this proliferation of 

technology. 

We are also focusing on, and continuing on track with our next 

tanker, the KC–46. And again, that is a global capability that enables us to have the reach, the speed of response, and the flexibility 

to help not only the Air Force, but to set the stage and to support 

the other components to arrive. So sir, where we are in our budget 

and our priorities, protecting those capabilities I think is key to advancing where we need to go. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Do you know if the intent to use those tankers 

would still be at Seymour Johnson Air Force [Base]? 

General JONES. Sir, I will have to take that and get back with 

you as we work our way through that final, the total basing. But 

I will take that for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 35.] 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Please let us know. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to 

thank our witnesses for their testimony. And I appreciate you appearing before this committee, and thank you for your service to 

our Nation. Brigadier General Killea, what role does the Marine 

Corps play in the highly contested threat environments A2 and 

AD? 

General KILLEA. Sir, thank you for that question. I think as a 

part of a larger naval team, the pre-integrated Marine Air-Ground 

Task Forces [MAGTF] operate from amphibious platforms and 

ships and also from austere sites ashore. And what this brings, 

that MAGTF, what that brings to this environment is the ability, 

when necessary, to obtain entry against a determined foe and also 

against a defended area. And what that does is it gives the—it facilitates freedom of action. So littoral maneuver, dispersed operations can help to uncover anti-access/area denial threats, and by 

neutralizing them support freedom of action. As well as, as I mentioned in my statement, securing advanced bases, strategic chokepoints, and even finding and securing areas where we can set up 

forward operating refueling points and arming points, not bases, 

but points where we can go in and quickly turn to challenge the 

enemy’s targeting processes and continue to spread out the fight so 

it challenges their ability to defend. So in a nutshell, I think that 

is what the Marine Corps and the MAGTF bring to this environment. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, General. I have no further questions. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman for his questions. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, is recognized for 5 minutes. 
16 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Foggo, you 

sort of used the Odyssey Dawn recent experience, which is kind of 

a, you know, textbook example of what we are talking about here 

today, although as you point out, that was kind of a limited foe in 

terms of, you know, the challenges in other places. 

Admiral FOGGO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. In that first 48 hours, the Tomahawk missiles 

that were utilized, as you point out, a number of them came from 

submarines, the Providence, Scranton, and Florida. The Florida, 

obviously, had the highest payload capacity of the SSGN [guided 

missile submarine]. I was just sort of wondering if you could talk 

a little bit about, you know, what will happen when those SSGNs 

go off line if we don’t replace that payload capacity in terms of just, 

you know, the whole approach that we are talking about here 

today. 

Admiral FOGGO. Sir, thanks for that question. And it is a great 

question, because Florida shot over 100 missiles in the campaign. 

I think you and I have spoken before in a previous hearing on the 

30-year shipbuilding plan, that that ship was 14 months with a rotational crew when she came back through the Mediterranean, so 

it was absolutely spectacular. 

We have four SSGNs. I think Florida demonstrated the capability and the massive strike capacity that one platform can generate. And they will go out of service around 2026. And so I think 

it is absolutely essential that we make up for the loss of the four 

SSGNs. And our plan, which is part of the Air-Sea Battle Concept 

when we talk programmatically, is to introduce the Virginia payload module on USS Virginia, with a number of missile launchers 

that will assist in boosting our capacity for TLAM strike in light 

of the loss of the SSGNs. Otherwise then, we will have, the rest 

of the force will be stressed to provide the same level of capacity 

and capability that we saw during Odyssey Dawn. That is not to 

say that we can’t do it. There was Stout and Barry who did a fantastic job as the DDGs [guided missile destroyers] that were TLAM 

missile launchers during the campaign. And they have quite an inventory and payload of weapons. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So again, if we are talking about adversaries that 

are not as limited as Libya was, I mean obviously losing payload 

is really actually going to handicap us more in terms of overcoming 

those—— 

Admiral FOGGO. Yes, sir, absolutely. I mean TLAM is a fantastic 

weapon. It is precision strike. We were very, very concerned about 

collateral damage during that campaign. So otherwise then, you 

are putting a man in the cockpit at risk going in on a weapons system. The TLAMs were very, very effective against the SA–5, 165- 

kilometer surface-to-air missile, which the Libyans maintained and 

were often tested. 

And so that was their job. And then almost near simultaneously 

our Air Force brethren came in with TAC [tactical] air in the first 

night of the campaign to destroy fixed-wing targets on the ground 

and other C2 nodes. So you are absolutely right. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman. And one question I have, as 

we go to Mr. Wittman, is if you are looking at current ways that 
17 

we can bring together the services so that we can fight the challenges we have to anti-access and area denial now, are you looking 

at what we currently have and how we best integrate that, or are 

you looking at what we need and how we get to that point? And 

if you are not looking at that, who is it that is looking at that? 

General JONES. Sir, we are looking at not only what we have, but 

what we are evolving to. And a good example of that is we continue 

to develop fifth generation fighters. The technology that they bring, 

the sensor integration, and the challenge of how do we integrate 

that information not only across the fourth generation fighters, but 

to other command and control assets that may need to be there is 

something that we need to work through in terms of the data links 

and how we will work that through. And so we are absolutely focused on future requirements as well as the current environments. 

And, sir, if I could return back on just briefly on your question 

about what we would protect in our budget, those are the things 

that we are focused on. But what I was perhaps not clear with is 

as a result of that what we are not able to focus on. And by focusing on these future capabilities that we will need to continue to integrate, then we are having to take decrements in our near-term 

readiness and modernization of our current fleet. And so we are 

faced in a somewhat untenable position of either maintaining our 

readiness for the future and continuing to advance in the antiaccess/area denial environment, or having a more ready force now 

at the expense of that technological advance in the future. 

Mr. FORBES. That is crucial, because as all of you mentioned, we 

are seeing this evolving much quicker than we have ever seen it 

before. We have got to stay on top of that curve. But even things 

like the amount of munitions and all we have to make sure that 

you have got those amounts if we are going to be using these concepts. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 

Wittman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today. I appreciate 

you taking the time to give us your perspectives on the Air-Sea 

Battle Concept. 

Brigadier General Killea, I would like to go to you and get your 

perspective on the Marine Corps’ role within that Air-Sea Battle 

Concept. Looking at where we have been and where we are going 

with the size of our amphibious lead, as you know, it continues to 

be on the decline. The proposal is to retire early two more LSDs 

[Dock Landing Ship]. How does the size of our amphibious fleet affect the Marine Corps’ ability to carry out its role in an Air-Sea 

Battle plan? 

General KILLEA. Thank you for that question, sir. That is a fantastic question, and I think that goes to the collaboration that has 

to go on amongst the services within the Air-Sea Battle Office. 

Once we identify the capabilities that we have, and then the gaps 

are identified from that, and then the services propose solutions to 

those gaps and the Air-Sea Battle Office will take those solutions 

and rack and stack them and then provide them and advocate the 

capabilities list that goes forward. So if that capabilities list includes additional amphibious shipping or something that could 

augment the capabilities of that amphibious shipping, that would 
18 

come out of the functions and the process of the office. But I think 

for the Marine Corps, where we stand today with our amphibious 

shipping is actually on pretty good stead for the missions that we 

have, for our focus, for forward presence and crisis response, and 

as we get into a major combat operation that would involve this 

kind of environment, then our participation with that is only going 

to be as good as we are preintegrated with that joint force through 

the efforts that we have been talking about this morning. I hope 

that answers your question, sir. 

Mr. WITTMAN. It does, it does. So I take what you are essentially 

saying is that you will do what you can within that context. If 

there is a need for more and you don’t have it, then it is going to 

be a problem? 

General KILLEA. Yes, sir, yes, sir, that will be a problem just 

based on resources, and then also the range of missions that the 

Marine Corps needs to address. My sense is that if something 

comes out of the air speed—I keep saying air speed—Air-Sea Battle 

Office that prioritizes a specific Marine capability, which hasn’t 

been the case yet, then it will become something that we push back 

to the service chief and the programmers to address. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask: I was at Quantico the other day and 

had the opportunity to visit with Dr. Burrow and his team with the 

development of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle [ACV]. By the way, 

they are doing a great job, on track for General Amos to make a 

decision. Tell me, in the Air-Sea Battle plan concept, what role 

does the ACV play in the need for the Marine Corps to have that 

online in being able to meet its role in that battle concept? 

General KILLEA. Sir, thank you for that question, and it goes 

back to the portion of my statement where I kind of stressed operational maneuver as well as technical advances and matching technologies that our adversaries may pose against us. I think that 

with the services being integrated in their capabilities, addressing 

what capabilities we would be facing in a specific AOR [area of responsibility], that having multiple maneuver units and deep strike 

capabilities is going to force the adversary to react to us. What we 

don’t want to do is go to where he thinks we are going to show up 

and have a bullet-on-bullet, missile-on-missile type of fight. 

So what does the ACV bring? It brings a great—it is an enabler 

to the MAGTF, because it gives us maneuver options. Whether that 

is 12 miles offshore or 50 miles offshore, I don’t know the answer 

to that right now, the replacement. We don’t know the exact answer to that, but what I do know is that we are going to have to 

have the ability, when required, to gain entry against a, you know, 

determined foe but also against a protected area so that we can 

open up access. It is kind of a little bit backwards in what most 

people think about Air-Sea Battle, which is access to get entry. I 

think in some cases, you are going to have to—you may have a situation where you are going to have to do some entry to support additional access or freedom of access. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you. 

Admiral Foggo, tell me this, I just had the opportunity to visit 

recently Australia and Singapore and talk to them about their relationship with the United States with the LCS [Littoral Combat 

Ship] now being not ported, but they are rotationally through 
19 

Singapore and also Marine Corps presence now building in Australia. How important are our allies in the Asia-Pacific with the implementation of the Air-Sea Battle plan concept? 

Admiral FOGGO. Sir, the allies are extremely important, not just 

Asia-Pacific but globally in any area where there might be an antiaccess/area denial threat. So I think it is commendable that we are 

able to put our rotational LCS force into Singapore. It is a fantastic 

ship; I rode one out of San Diego a couple weeks ago. We were up 

at or in excess of 40 knots on the ship. The mission modules, which 

are maturing, are going to give us a tremendous mine warfare capability, ASW [anti-submarine warfare] capability, ASUW [antisurface warfare] capability. I think the allies understand that. And 

one of the most important things, and we talk about a lot of asymmetric capabilities that we hold from the perspective of hardware 

and force structure, one of the most asymmetric capabilities that 

we have as the United States of America that does not get mentioned enough in, my humble opinion, are our allies, and they are 

enablers, they are force multipliers, and they are by our side not 

just in the Pacific, Europe, Africa, all over the globe. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, can you elaborate on what Mr. Wittman 

just asked you in this regard, how do our allies even know what 

to do? I know we have mil-to-mil contact and all, but I have a number of them that come to my office. They are confused right now 

as to what Air-Sea Battle really means. They are trying to make 

decisions about their own procurement situation so they can integrate, and one of the questions we would have is, how are we engaging them as part of this process so that when they have a choice 

between procurement A and procurement B, they are getting the 

one that integrates best? 

And, secondly, how are you communicating those needs to us? Do 

we need a classified setting for that or what do we need to make 

sure that we are meeting the needs that you have? 

Admiral FOGGO. Sir, as far as conveying the needs, that might 

be best to do in a classified setting. As far as our ability to communicate with the allies, we have several modem for communication. 

The first would be counterpart visits and country visits where AirSea Battle Concept comes up in many conversations. 

Secondly, I mentioned Global 13. That was our first war game 

where we have actually invited members of our five eyes partners 

and Japan to the war game, and so I think that was an eye opening experience for those partners who took a look at our Air-Sea 

Battle Concept in the five domains that I mentioned earlier. We 

will continue to do that, and we will continue to try to expand our 

ability to explain to our partners and to bring them into our implementation master plan. That is currently out in U.S.-only distribution. It looks at 10 mission focus areas. Many of the things that we 

do in the Air-Sea Battle Concept to assure access in the undersea 

domain, in the air domain, antijamming, and then the facilitation 

through force development activities, through exercising, training, 

and integration, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and a list of 

six things that we have asked our joint force and our service brethren to tell us how we can do better and adopt best practices. 
20 

So your point is very well taken. We are at the infancy in sharing with our allies and partners, but as I said, that is a very, very 

powerful asymmetric capability to the United States of America. 

We need to leverage off of it. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. The gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen 

for being here. The first question, I guess, how much harder is this 

than AirLand? I guess that is it. I mean, we know what AirLand 

Battle is, and how you have got to bring it all together as a joint 

force, whether it is an asymmetric warfare or symmetric, relatively 

symmetric warfare. How much harder is this than that, if you had 

to give it, like it is 20 percent harder? I am just curious. I mean, 

how much harder is this than that? 

General JONES. Sir, it is going to be difficult to give you a quantitative number and a percentage, but I will say—— 

Mr. HUNTER. I mean, is it a lot harder? Is it kind of the same? 

General JONES. Sir, what I will share with you is that the environment is so much more complex than it was when we started 

AirLand Battle. And so this with—really focusing on cross-domain, 

if you think of where we have advanced in terms of space, where 

we have advanced in terms of cyber, where we have advanced, and 

not only have we advanced but our adversaries have advanced. 

Mr. HUNTER. But you would use that in an AirLand Battle, too, 

those things, space, cyber, but you wouldn’t be floating while you 

do it. 

General JONES. Yes, sir, and my initial response was based off 

of where we started with AirLand Battle and where we are starting 

with Air-Sea Battle in terms of the levels of complexity. 

What we have found and what we actually hope to migrate to in 

Air-Sea Battle is the things that we worked with a focused effort 

in AirLand Battle, and got to the point where we don’t use the 

term AirLand Battle anymore, but those concepts are still resident 

amongst the services. And so it is that initial focusing effort to go 

against an operational problem set, work to drive the institutional 

change amongst the services that gets to the point where it now 

becomes part of our normal lexicon, and so what I would compare 

in difference of difficulty is the nascent stages of AirLand Battle, 

the nascent stages of Air-Sea Battle, but with the ultimate goal of 

those becoming about the same where it is part of our normal processes. 

Mr. HUNTER. So let me ask you this, then: When you get a new 

system like an LCS, or you get F–35 where we are discovering the 

operational plans for it and how we are going to use it and the Marine Corps is working on it, do we just fly five of them over here 

and land them here, we can refuel them, we don’t need, you know, 

runways anymore, we don’t need bases? When each service comes 

up with their own ways to deploy those new weapons systems, is 

your group the group that vets how that all works together at the 

joint level, or is that a joint thing or is that you when it comes to 

Air-Sea Battle or how does it work? 

Admiral FOGGO. Sir, I would like to take that one on and leave 

it open to anybody else. It is a great question, and you mentioned 

AirLand Battle, and we have drawn a distinction between AirLand 
21 

Battle as a strategy and Air-Sea Battle as a concept. There were, 

I think, if I am not mistaken, my staff has given me the right number, about 31 lines of effort in AirLand Battle. We took a hard look 

at those and scrubbed them, and we came up with the 10 mission 

focus areas I mentioned earlier for Air-Sea Battle, across the main 

operations, undersea warfare, war at sea, attack operations to defeat A2/AD, active and passive defense, the list goes on. That is our 

playbook for Air-Sea Battle, and then the force development activities, I mentioned training and integration tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. To your point, if you take the F–35, relatively new aircraft, in test and first airframe soon to be delivered, how are we 

going to deploy that, and who is going to decide what the best practices are? How are we going to get a synergy across the Air Force, 

the Marine Corps, and the Navy for the A, B, and C model? Great 

question. 

So we sent out this implementation master plan about a month 

ago, told all the services, all the combatant commanders, and all 

the fleet commanders, the Echelon II, to absorb it and come back 

to us in November with recommendations on what force development activities we need to do to enable Air-Sea Battle and how we 

are going to prevail in each one of these mission focus areas. Following that, we will assemble that and we will get those lessons 

redistributed to all of the people I mentioned, combatant commanders, Echelon II, and we are going to bring them to Washington in January for a conference, budget permitting, and sit 

down at the table and adapt a plan and a way ahead for the future 

that leverages off of some of the things the Marines do, the Air 

Force do, and individual geographic combatant commanders, who 

may have a different view of the world than somebody else. 

Great case in point. CENTCOM commander, NAVCENT [U.S. 

Naval Forces Central Command] and AFCENT [U.S. Air Forces 

Central Command] probably ought to be the best at mine warfare 

in the world, because that is what they do in the Straits of 

Hormuz, and they have tested it twice during international mine 

countermeasures exercises, and they probably have lessons learned 

for the PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] commander with his mine 

problem in Korea, and so we are going to bring all that together. 

Mr. HUNTER. So let me just, to try to get my hands around it just 

here as my time runs out. It looks like you are bringing together 

all the new technologies that we have, everything from UCAS [Unmanned Combat Air System], F–35, LCS, EFV [Expeditionary 

Fighting Vehicle] or whatever it is called now, ACV, you are bringing all those things together to counter the newer technologies that 

our symmetric foes or possible foes would bring against us, and 

that is what you are doing. I mean, is that basically it? 

General JONES. Sir, basically. What I would like to do, I would 

like to, if I can, circle back to your F–35 question as an example, 

and so what I will tell you is that this organization is not geared 

to drive the multi-service development of tactics for any particular 

program. That is still the responsibility of the MAJCOM [Major 

Commands], and the MAJCOM commanders for us, and we do that 

in concert with the different services as they approach their way 

through. So we have established methodologies that will figure out 

how to use any individual weapon system. That is not the purview 
22 

of this organization to drive a tactics development, but what we are 

able to do is use as a prism as we look at, as the services identify 

capabilities gaps, as the services look about the resources that they 

are trying to bring to address those gaps. A central organization, 

a multi-service organization that can be a prism through which we 

assess those and help the services assess those is very valuable as 

we start looking to maybe not so much about what we add to a program but the deficit, the challenges of things that may have to be 

cut. This organization can be a prism to look through those to identify the capabilities that might be remaining. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. No questions. 

Mr. FORBES. Then if the gentleman has no questions, I have just 

three left. As I said, I deferred mine until the end. 

The first one is, we understand that the Secretary of Defense released the Defense Strategic Guidance in January 2012, but as yet, 

an actual defense strategy has not been released. How is the Department designing and executing operational concepts such as AirSea Battle in the absence of an actual defense strategy? In other 

words, what defense strategy is the Joint Staff, combatant commanders, and services using as the baseline to design operational 

concepts such as Air-Sea Battle, and if a defense strategy does 

exist in your view, can you describe it for us and what formal document articulates it for the public? 

Admiral FOGGO. Sir—go ahead if you like, Mike. 

General STOUGH. Sir, I was just going to say from the joint perspective, from the view of the Joint Staff at this point, really the 

focal point as far—when we talk about force development activities, 

which is really I think what we are talking about here, it is the 

Defense Strategic Guidance, it is the 10 missions that are laid out 

there. For example, we are talking about here the mission to defeat 

the anti-access/area denial challenge, to be able to address that, 

and—but that is a precursor, if you will, or is foundational to all 

the other missions that we need to be able to accomplish. 

Mr. FORBES. General, is it your thought that that guidance—and 

how many pages was that guidance? Eleven? 

General STOUGH. I think that, yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. About 11 pages, that that guidance was in fact or 

now our national defense strategy? 

General STOUGH. No, sir, I am not that—I think our strategy 

was published probably 2011 is the last strategy that was published. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. So we had a strategy in 2011, but the guidance has basically changed that strategy, has it not, or—I am just 

asking. I am not—— 

General STOUGH. That is a good question. I can’t say it has fundamentally changed the strategy because the missions that it has 

outlined—— 

Mr. FORBES. And maybe you can take that for the record. We 

don’t want to put you on the spot, but one of the things we are 

wrestling with now is what is our strategy? You know. We don’t 

want to have a strategy that develops based on our procurement 

policy. We would prefer to have a strategy that we are doing our 
23 

procurement after that, but at least for most of us sitting up here 

we have had a rough time getting our arms around that or getting 

someone that can answer that for us, and I don’t think we want 

to, we feel comfortable relying on an 11-page guidance and saying 

that is our strategy. So if you guys would confer at some point in 

time and get back to us for the record on that, I think all of us 

would appreciate that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 35.] 

Mr. FORBES. My second question, there has been much written 

and discussed regarding perceptions about the escalatory nature of 

the Air-Sea Battle operational concept. Some have gone so far as 

to conclude, incorrectly in my opinion, that this operational concept 

presupposes conventional strikes into China and encourages the potential for nuclear escalation. Can you please clarify for us today 

how escalation management in phase zero and phase 1 of contingency operations is designed into this concept? 

Admiral FOGGO. Yes, sir. I think that is a misperception with respect to one particular adversary and one geographic domain. As 

I said, Air-Sea Battle looks at anti-access/area denial strategies 

globally, and part of what we do in phase zero is being there to try 

to shape the battle space and to know through our awareness, 

through our systems of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance what is going on in the region and how the region is changing, and then to be able to react to it. 

So it is a very deliberate process through Air-Sea Battle. We are 

there, we are present. You mentioned the DSG [Defense Strategic 

Guidance]. Part of the DSG was to rebalance to the Pacific because 

it is such an important region, but not just militarily, for all the 

reasons in the DIME [diplomacy, information, military, economics] 

concept. And so we are there, we are watching, and then we react 

accordingly to try to prevent any kind of escalation or regional conflict from burgeoning out of control, and that would apply in other 

places as well, in the Mediterranean, currently a very interesting 

and crisis-oriented area in the Eastern Med [Mediterranean] and 

also around Africa, as we saw in the past weekend. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. And the last question I have 

for you is this, first of all, preface on it. Congressman McIntyre and 

I and several of the members of the committee actually wrote a letter that I mentioned to each of you on Tuesday that we sent to 

leadership of both parties, and also requesting that they have a 

classified briefing regarding the impacts to national defense that is 

taking place based upon sequestration and where that is. Whatever 

decisions they make after they have that knowledge, it is up to 

them, but to not have the knowledge is concerning to many of us. 

We would like to hear, and I know Mr. Courtney asked you a little bit of this, and General Jones you responded somewhat, but as 

you see sequestration playing out, what impacts is that going to 

have to the Air-Sea Battle Office, to the Air-Sea Battle Concept? 

If you know any of that today, you can share with us, fine, we 

would appreciate it. If you want to get back to us for the record 

with that, we would welcome that. If you feel that needs to be done 

in a classified setting, we understand that. But I want to make 

sure you have the opportunity for the record at some point in time, 
24 

be it today or whenever you feel appropriate, to give us that because I think you feel appropriate to give us that because I think 

that is vitally important that we be able to communicate that. 

So I open that to you, and maybe, Admiral, since you have been 

quarterbacking some of this, any comment on that now or is that 

something you would like to get back to us on, and how do you feel 

about that? 

Admiral FOGGO. Sir, I would like to comment on that now, and 

I think our Chief of Naval Operations, and I will defer to the others 

here in a moment, made a pretty good and clear statement of 

where the Navy would be in particular with regard to Air-Sea Battle under the current PRES BUD 14 [President’s Budget for fiscal 

year 2014], and then again under the full impact of sequestration 

with the Budget Control Act from now through 2023 and a $500 

billion reduction in our ability to put resources into Air-Sea Battle. 

So some of the things that we remain concerned about would be 

our P–8 program would be delayed, multi-function towed arrays for 

DDGs, no change, and that is good as far as ASW and the undersea 

domain is concerned. LCS mission packages for ASW would be delayed. No change in the Virginia payload module. LCS mine mission modules still deliver the first increment 2015. On air and missile defense, integral and part of the Air-Sea Battle Concept, our 

surface electronic warfare implementation program would be 

slowed down, that is antijamming, it is critical to Air-Sea Battle. 

The evolved SeaSparrow missile still delivered on the same rate to 

80 platforms by 2020. Advanced missile defense radar, only four 

ships would receive it as opposed to a larger number under PB14 

[President’s Budget for fiscal year 2014]. Infrared search and track, 

which is another antijamming capability that uses infrared instead 

of other means, delayed by about 2 years. The radio frequency kill 

chain in AM 120 delta delayed to about 2020, and the naval integrated fires and counter air with our E–2D Deltas, we would have 

a reduction in the number of air wings that would be fully complemented by 2020. And so that is the impact on the capabilities 

which ultimately would have an impact on our ability to carry forward Air-Sea Battle, so whatever relief you can provide us we 

would appreciate. And I defer to my Air Force counterparts. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

General JONES. Sir, I would like to. I will address that, and if 

you don’t mind at the end, I would like to circle back to your question about escalatory perceptions. 

Sir, we absolutely will feel the impact of the ongoing sequester. 

As I said before, we are trying to protect and will try to do our best 

to protect the F–35, the KC–46 long-range strike development, and 

our space strategic warning and secure communications. However, 

we are faced with making some difficult choices that may require 

the need for us to divest up to 550 aircraft and over 25,000 airmen. 

So, sir, we are already facing a fleet that is aging an average of 

24, 25 years, and getting older, and as we have to make those hard 

choices, the key thing that we are faced with is a force that will 

be smaller, and with the trades that we have to make, that force 

is going to take offsets in readiness, and so you will have a force 

that will be smaller, it will also be less ready and therefore less responsive to our ability to meet the Nation’s needs if and when we 
25 

are required. We are protecting everything that we need to do to 

do the current operational fight that is out there, and we are meeting the combatant commander demands, but the risk comes at 

what is available to do anything else that our Nation may evolve. 

And, sir, I will be happy to come back to you for the record with 

a full list of what those impacts may be. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 35.] 

General JONES. I would like to address your question about 

escalatory concepts, though, sir. And what I would like to clear up 

is the perception perhaps may be that this Air-Sea Battle is a thing 

that if a conflict happens you reach over to the shelf and you pull 

out the Air-Sea Battle chip, and you execute. What Air-Sea Battle 

is designed to do, sir, is provide our combatant commanders a 

range of options to address a problem that is out there. It is not 

one thing, it is not a given playbook. It is the conceptual design 

that will enable our services to be networked and fully integrated, 

and then our combatant commanders have the responsibility to 

manage how they use the forces, and the full range across the diplomatic information, military, and economic environments to 

achieve the desires that they need. 

So, sir, I think what I would offer to you is those that think there 

is an escalatory construct to this, my counter would be that implies 

that it is a push a button and this happens, this is nothing but an 

enabling concept that provides a full range of options to our combatant commanders to apply as they see fit for the environment 

that we are in. 

Mr. FORBES. General. 

General KILLEA. Yes, sir, thank you for that question, and it circles back to Congressman McIntyre’s question that he asked me 

that I took for the record about top five things to put into ASB. I 

took that as additional capabilities and not capabilities that we 

currently are fielding or have fielded to protect. I think the entire 

MAGTF is an enabler to the ASB implementation and concept. We 

add capacity to the joint force, and capacity is critical when the potential adversaries are matching that capacity, or in some cases, 

succeeding it with lesser technology, but also very lethal capabilities. 

So that capacity is important to make sure that a potential foe 

has to defend across a vast area, and it goes back to the maneuver 

that the MAGTF provides to the solution, whether it is from the 

sea or ashore in austere sites. 

But for your specific question on sequestration and what that 

will do to current programs, our focus right now is on forward presence and crisis response and readiness, and the Commandant has 

been clear on that, and so something has to give, and I think—I 

don’t think, it has been stated that that would have to take, you 

know, something away from the modernization of forces down the 

road, something that would have to be delayed. It wouldn’t be 

something that we shelve, it would be something that we would 

keep focused on, but the priority for the Marine Corps right now 

is forward presence, crisis response, and the readiness of those 

forces and the forces that would follow in behind them. 
26 

Mr. FORBES. Very good. Well, gentlemen, thank you. General 

Cheek, I am sorry. 

General CHEEK. Yes, sir, if I may, I think it is a great question 

in the way it is captured, so all the questions about strategy really 

feed into this because we are talking ends, ways, and means, and 

so when our means are reduced under sequestration, there is a direct effect on both the ends that we can achieve and the ways that 

we would go about doing it, which I would categorize Air-Sea Battle as a way of getting an end of keeping open global commons, if 

you were, access to the global commons. 

So if in the times of the reduced resources we make a choice to 

resource something like Air-Sea Battle, there will be, as my colleague here pointed out, there will be a cost in some other area, 

we will have reduced capability. So I know for us, we share the 

same focus of our forward forces being ready for combat. The next 

tier of forces ready to deploy, and then there is other forces, frankly, we are going to struggle to find the funds to keep them ready 

for an unforeseen contingency. 

So the risk is building, you know, as we speak, and I think the 

sequestration will definitely affect Air-Sea Battle. It may delay it. 

It may weaken it, but it will have an effect, I think, in a number 

of areas that we are responsible for. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. Any other comments? Well, if not, let 

me first of all thank you all for your service to our country. Thank 

you for being here and for answering our questions today and enlightening us on this. I would like to leave you, again, with the opportunity, if you would, to give us, with any specificity that you 

would like to, what you believe the impact of sequestration could 

be on what you are trying to do and how you are doing it; and then 

if you would, as part of that, if you would tell us the additional risk 

that we are having to accept by having those shortfalls, because it 

all equates to risk to our men and women that are fighting, and 

sometime we miss that. It helps us give a picture that we can paint 

to individuals as we are fighting to get this turned around. 

Mike, did you have anything else? Mr. Conaway, anything else? 

With that, then, thank you all and we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 10, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 10, 2013 

(31) 

Opening Remarks of the Honorable Randy J. Forbes 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Sea power and Projection Forces 

Hearing on 

Department of Defense Integration of Air-Sea Battle Strategy, 

Governance and Policy into the Services' Annual Program, Planning, 

Budgeting and Execution Process 

October 10, 2013 

I'd like to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for appearing before the 

subcommittee today. 

Today we have testifYing before us: 

• Rear Admiral Jim Foggo, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, 

Plans and Strategy; 

• Major General Mike Stongh, Vice Director for Joint Force Development on the Joint Staff 

J7; 

• Major General Jim Jones, Director of Operations for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air 

Force Operations, Plans and Requirements; 

• Brigadier General Kevin Killea, Director of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 

located within the Marine Corps Combat Development Command; and, 

• Major General Gary Cheek, Assistant Deputy Chief ofStafffor the Army, G-3, 5, 7. 

Gentleman, thank you again for appearing and we thank you for your service to this great 

nation. 

Under the first tranche of budget reductions that began in 20 10 with $168 million of 

"efficiencies" taken out of the Defense Department's budget, the Joint Staff was understandably 

stretched thin supporting OEF and OIF operations and was unable to absorb critical joint force 

integration functions and responsibilities of Joint Forces Command after it was dismantled in 

August 20 II. 

One significant consequence of that budget cut was that a vacuum of preparedness and 

increased risk manifested itself resulting in the Department of Defense's inability to maintain 

sufficiently trained, equipped joint warfighting forces that could strategize, integrate and 

guarantee a successful and timely outcome in an anti-access, area-denial, high-end contingency 

operation. However, under the auspices of the new Defense Strategic Guidance issued by the 

Secretary of Defense in January 2012, the Services took it upon themselves to Jill that 

institutional void and established the "Air-Sea Battle Office," acknowledging our military's 

need to rdocus capabilities on global full-spectrum contingencies in A2/AD environments, 
32 

I do not believe that "Air Sea Battle" in itself is a strategy, a budget preservation 

gimmick, nor is it focused particularly on a specific country or entity. What I do believe is that 

it is the Services' best attempt to hold themselves accountable to their Title 10 obligations of 

preparing for and defending the freedoms and liberties that we as Americans hold dear. It is 

extremely important that our military remains capable and equipped to fight full-spectrum 

warfare, whether it is in pelmissive environments such as what we've experienced for the past 

10 years, or in high-end contingencies against adversaries with advanced air and missile defense 

systems and near-peer force structure. 

What we would like to discuss with our witnesses today is how the efforts and products 

developed by the Air-Sea Battle Office are integrated into each Services planning and budgeting 

process, as well as how the Joint StafT plans to institutionalize the Air-Sea Battle initiative of 

the Services within the Department of Defense. We would also like to understand how the AirSea Battle concept informs the Depmiment's anti-access, area-denial warfighting strategy, 

recognizes capability gaps and shortfalls, applies the necessary resources to mitigate those gaps, 

and tailors joint force training and exercises towards joint, seamless integration and continuity. 

The Air-Sea Battle concept is an important initiative that will help determine how the 

joint force will gain and maintain access in future military operating environments. 1 look 

forward to hearing an update from our witnesses about the concept's development and future 

outlook. I also view this hearing as a good public opportunity for our witnesses to clarifY intent, 

and respond to misconceptions and falsities that have surrounded the Air-Sea Battle concept 

over the past few years. 

With that, I turn to my good friend and colleague, the ranking member of the 

subcommittee, Representative Mike McIntyre. 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

OCTOBER 10, 2013 

(35) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

General STOUGH. Our current strategies are the 2010 National Security Strategy, 

the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the 2011 National Military Strategy. The writing of the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) was informed by 

these strategies. The JOAC was also informed by the congressional testimonies and 

expressed needs of the Combatant Commands, and a detailed examination of the 

emerging operating environment. 

In January 2012 the Secretary of Defense released, Sustaining Global Leadership: 

Priorities for 21st Century Defense, to articulate priorities for 21st century defense 

that sustains U.S. global leadership. This guidance does not replace current strategies but provides amplifying guidance to reflect the President’s strategic direction 

to the Department. [See page 23.] 

General JONES. Sequestration impacts to the ASB Office itself will be minimal, 

if any. The office is very small and requires minimal resources to continue concept 

development and implementation effort coordination. From an Air Force perspective, 

sequestration level budgets will severely impact concept implementation in the same 

way they will impact the Air Force at large. We’ll likely be forced into choosing between near-term readiness and sufficient forces/force structure that are properly 

modernized to address A2/AD threats. We’ll have to assess our ability to sustain 

major exercises and many of our flying units won’t be able to maintain the requisite 

readiness levels to meet operational requirements. Regardless of readiness impacts, 

we’ll almost certainly have to pare back forces/force structure (potentially up to 

25,000 Airmen and over 500 aircraft, including entire fleets of aircraft). Modernization and recapitalization of existing capabilities to address A2/AD threats will be 

significantly impacted, though we’ll do our best to sustain our top three acquisition 

programs: the F–35, KC–46, and the long-range strike bomber. [See page 25.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCINTYRE 

General JONES. Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base was included in the Strategic 

Basing Process to identify the bed-down location of the first KC–46 Main Operating 

Base and the Formal Training Unit. It will continue to be considered in future 

rounds of KC–46 basing. [See page 15.] 

General KILLEA. The ASB Office has previously identified Advanced Electronic 

Warfare/Operations in a Digital Radio Frequency Memory environment, Undersea 

Dominance, Long-Range Strike/Countering Long-Range Integrated Air Defense Systems, Multi-Domain Command and Control/Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and Integrated Air and Missile Defense as critical capability areas needed to operate in an A2/AD environment. It is vital to note, however, that this list 

focuses narrowly on gaining access in the global commons, and fails to address either the requirements for entry and landward operations or overall sustainment of 

the Joint Force in an A2/AD environment. As such, the identified ASB capability 

areas represent a subset of the greater requirements needed for the Joint Force to 

achieve operational access and project power despite advanced threats. In short— 

ASB’s capabilities set the conditions and enable follow-on decisive operations and 

should not be viewed as either comprehensive or an end unto themselves. A2/AD 

threats do not end at sea or in the other global commons, but persist well into an 

adversary’s littorals and ashore. Advances in and proliferation of area denial systems such as Guided-Rockets, Artillery, Mortars, and Munitions (G–RAMM) will 

present Marine and Army forces with equally daunting challenges in gaining access—especially when combined with advanced air, space, and cyber capabilities. 

Additionally, as can be seen from the recent disaster in the Philippines, access challenges can also be caused by natural disasters that make ports, airports, and roads 

unusable. Such challenges will require different capabilities to overcome them outside the list provided by the ASB Office. These access challenges as well as those 

cited in the ASB Concept are outlined in the JOAC and will be further defined and 

developed through implementation of it and its supporting concepts which include 

the Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO) as well as ASB. 
36 

Accordingly, the Marine Corps sees the solutions to countering A2/AD threats 

much more broadly, and we see several planned and existing capabilities as critical 

as we go forward: 

#1 F–35B 

Future A2/AD threat environments will place a premium on stealth, dispersion, 

and tactical flexibility. The F–35B Lightning II will reach its initial operational capability in 2015 and will provide the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and 

the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with a transformational leap in capability. Fundamentally, the F–35B supports our doctrine of maneuver warfare and our operational requirement to provide close air support while operating in austere conditions. Additionally, the F–35B’s short take-off and vertical landing capability will 

help increase sorties and greatly complicate an adversary’s planning by enabling operations from mobile, dispersed forward sea-based and remote landing sites. The F– 

35B is an essential part of our effort to modernize our aging aviation fleet and exploit fifth generation technologies. Advanced stealth and other technologies in the 

aircraft will greatly enhance our capabilities as America’s expeditionary crisis response force. 

#2 Amphibious Surface Assault 

Advanced guided munitions threats will require expeditionary forces to operate 

further out at sea and at greater risk in the littorals and ashore. Nothing is more 

important to the Marine Ground Combat Element in this environment than an improved surface assault capability such as the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV). 

The current amphibious assault vehicles are 1970’s vehicles with 1960’s technology. 

The ACV is envisioned to provide improved speed and range to enable over the horizon ingress, enhanced survivability, firepower, and inland mobility to potential 

hotspots. An improved vehicle such as the ACV will help the Joint Force to ensure 

freedom of maneuver and rapidly project power inland from the sea despite increasingly sophisticated threats. When coupled with the long-range vertical assault capabilities of the V–22, forward deployed amphibious forces will possess the capacity 

and tactical flexibility to rapidly get to problems and potentially diffuse them before 

they escalate into crisis. The Marine Corps is continuing to seek the balance of required performance and affordability with the amphibious assault vehicle replacement. 

#3 Amphibious ships 

America is a maritime nation and forward deployed Navy and Marine Corps 

forces area vital elements of national security that help ensure freedom of navigation and operational access for the Joint Force. The backbone of the Naval Expeditionary Force and our ability to project force and secure operational access despite 

A2/AD threats is a sufficient number of modern, capable, amphibious platforms that 

are interoperable with the Joint Force, and survivable against increasingly challenging A2/AD weapons that include anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise 

missiles, sophisticated mines, subsurface threats, etc. As critical as the number of 

amphibious platforms available during operations is, equally critical are their organic C2 suites and interoperability with the forces ashore, the supported Joint 

Force Commander, and adjacent joint and coalition forces. 

Due to current fiscal challenges, we must accept risk in the number of amphibious 

ships to a fiscally constrained fleet of 33 amphibious warships, translating into 30 

operationally available ships if readiness levels are significantly improved. Thirty 

operationally available amphibious warships represent the minimum capability and 

capacity necessary to fulfill our Combatant Commander commitments for sea-based 

forcible entry. 

#4 Readiness: 

The stealth, speed, and precision of advanced A2/AD threats will require U.S. 

forces to maintain a high state of personnel and equipment readiness in order to 

rapidly respond and seize the initiative. Our credibility as an effective deterrent to 

an A2/AD capable adversary, as well as our success in that environment will be 

largely determined by our readiness. Certain risks must be accepted in order to ensure that the operating forces—particularly those operating at the forward edge— 

maintain the highest state of readiness possible. Readiness is the aggregate of the 

investment in personnel, training, and equipment to ensure that units are prepared 

to perform missions at any given time. Readiness is directly linked to resources and 

we are consuming tomorrow’s ‘‘seed corn’’ to feed today’s requirements, leaving less 

to plant for the future A2/AD challenges. In order to have the capabilities needed 

to operate in an A2/AD environment we need flexibility in our funding for readiness. 
37 

#5 Force Posture: 

An important element to gaining and maintaining operational access is a continued focus on not losing it in the first place by establishing and nurturing partnerships with regional friends and allies. To this end a balanced force posture, forward 

deployed—both afloat and ashore—conducting cooperative engagement and training 

activities, and ready to respond to crisis is critical to deterring conflict and maintaining positional advantage should deterrence fail. Naval expeditionary forces are 

a key element in a balanced force posture, and nowhere is this requirement more 

acute than in the Pacific theater. The Navy-Marine Corps team has been continuously forward based in the Pacific for over 70 years and a ‘‘pivot to the Pacific’’ is 

like returning home. The ongoing initiative to adjust our force laydown represents 

much more than a simple redistribution of forces designed to relieve pressure on our 

Japanese hosts. A reorientation on the Pacific presents opportunities for cooperative 

engagement and training along with our allies and partners in a region that includes 7 of 15 major U.S. trading partners and 5 of our nation’s most important mutual defense treaties. A persistent Pacific presence and forward-leaning operational 

posture reinforces our national commitment to this region and highlights the importance to unencumbered access to U.S. national security. 

A significant concern with maintaining this Pacific posture is the budget and the 

likelihood of continued sequestration beyond 2013. CMC initiated a study to identify 

the future Marine Corps force structure that would best meet the NSS requirements, while maintaining a high rate of readiness. A 174K force design was determined to best balance risk and resources with our most likely future operational environment. Based on the detailed planning of an internal working group and in conjunction with independent analysis, we have determined that within sequesteredlike budgets that our force design of 174K is the lowest temporary level that can 

retain America’s crisis response force. This provides a minimum acceptable level of 

readiness, while maintaining forward presence as a part of the Navy-Marine Corps 

team. This force structure we would likely be forced to accept would not be the force 

structure our strategy required, it would simply be the best we could put forth with 

the resources we were given. 

In summary, the Navy-Marine Corps team is essential to countering future A2/ 

AD threats and we are committed to fielding trained and ready forces with the best 

equipment the nation can provide. The Navy/Marine Corps team uses the advantage 

of all domains to project naval power at the time and place of our choosing. The 

F–35B is the future of tactical aviation and its development remains on track but 

the continued support of the Congress is vital. The ACV is our number one ground 

procurement priority but our solution must be affordable and we intend to get it 

right. A forward postured, agile Marine Corps presence is largely dependent on a 

fleet of modern, capable, and ready amphibious ships and support platforms. The 

current ship-building plan is adequate but it is not without risk. Forward deployed 

Marines must be ready to respond to a range of possible scenarios that range from 

providing security and humanitarian relief to conducting combat operations. Regardless of the size of the force, the Marine Corps is committed to ensuring that they 

will be poised and ready to respond when called. [See page 14.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

OCTOBER 10, 2013 

(41) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. Is the Air-Sea Battle strategy a new concept? If not, why has the 

concept been formalized with an official office? 

Admiral FOGGO. First, it’s important to note that Air-Sea Battle (ASB) is not a 

military strategy. It is an evolutionary set of ideas focused on defeating threats to 

access in order to enable follow-on operations—operations which could include military activities as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. ASB is a 

concept that enables the Joint Force to continue to operate in an anti-access area 

denial environment as directed in accordance with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance Joint Force mission to Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) 

Challenges. 

As a supporting operational concept to the Chairman’s Joint Operational Access 

Concept, ASB focuses on shaping any potential adversary’s anti-access and area denial environment to achieve access and freedom of action in order to enable concurrent or follow-on joint force power projection operations to achieve decisive results. 

By identifying the actions needed to counter threats to the global commons, the materiel and non-materiel investments required to execute those actions, and the institutional changes needed to sustain them, the ASB Concept serves to spur the development of better integrated air, land, and naval forces required to address evolving 

threats to access to ensure freedom of action in the air, space, cyberspace, and maritime domains. 

In the fall of 2011, following initial concept development by the Departments of 

the Navy and Air Force, and recognizing the value of further development and implementation of the concept, the Vice Chiefs of all four Services signed a memorandum of understanding to officially create the ASB Office and further build on 

the framework to implement the ASB Concept. While at first this effort was outside 

the Joint Staff and focused on primarily air and naval capabilities—it has since become integrated into a larger force development effort focused on capabilities in all 

domains including those needed to gain and maintain access ashore. 

Mr. FORBES. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office sufficiently resourced with funding, office 

space and personnel at a level to be effective and efficient? 

Admiral FOGGO. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office, as currently staffed and 

resourced, provides a fiscally efficient construct to enable further development and 

implementation of the ASB Concept through existing Service channels and processes. The office is manned, funded, and located within existing Service headquarters budgets, personnel, and spaces. 

Mr. FORBES. What is the annual budget of the Air-Sea Battle Office and how does 

it compare to other offices with the same responsibilities within the Joint Staff, OSD 

Office of Net Assessment, CAPE, and the JROC? 

Admiral FOGGO. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office does not have a specific/unique 

budget line. The ASB Office stood up from within the Services by redistributing existing headquarters billets and office space from each Service. Funding for office activities comes from the funding line that supports all headquarters personnel from 

each of the Services. For example, individual travel funds come from the Service 

headquarters staff directorate of the participating individual. 

Mr. FORBES. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office workload sufficient and proportional 

enough to the budget, personnel, administrative operating resources and support 

staff provided by each of the services? How was the Air-Sea Battle Office staffing 

and budget determined? 

Admiral FOGGO. Yes. Between concept implementation, programmatic efforts, 

wargaming, experimentation, and communications, the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office 

has more than a sufficient workload for the assigned personnel and support staff. 

Under the ASB Concept Implementation Memorandum of Understanding, the 

Services established a governance structure consisting of a flag-level ASB Executive 

Committee (EXCOM) that convenes on a quarterly basis; a Senior Steering Group 

(SSG) that convenes on a monthly basis; and supporting ASB Office staff charged 

with implementing the Concept. The supporting staff is composed of personnel from 

each of the four Services—sourced from existing military positions (i.e., ‘‘taken out 

of hide’’)—with the mission to foster the development and adoption of the related 
42 

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and 

facilities (DOTMLPF) solutions based upon Air-Sea Battle’s conceptual design. 

Current ASB Office manning: 

Navy Air Force Marines Army 

4 Military 2 Military 1 Military 1 Military 

4 Contractors 1 Contractor 1 Contractor 

1 Civilian 1 Civilian 

The ASB Office does not have a specific/unique budget line. 

Mr. FORBES. Before the Air-Sea Battle Office was established in 2012, how did 

the services determine capability gaps, shortfalls, requirements and programmatic 

budget priorities for training, equipping and operating in anti-access/area denial environments? 

Admiral FOGGO. Each Service has long-standing processes used to identify their 

specific capability requirements in order to inform resource prioritization decisions. 

None of the Air-Sea Battle Office analysis of force development activities conducted 

within each of the Services is intended to alter these existing processes. The operational environment, to include current and anticipated threats, remains an important consideration for Service resource decisions. The function of the Air-Sea Battle 

Office is to provide a more complete and thorough level of integration across what 

would otherwise be more service-centric solutions to the A2/AD challenges. 

Mr. FORBES. Do the services assess the roles and functions of the Air-Sea Battle 

Office as redundant or additive when compared to existing functions within current 

organizational constructs and authorities of each respective service’s A8, N8/N9, or 

DCMC(P&R) equivalent? 

Admiral FOGGO. While still in the early stages of development, the Air-Sea Battle 

(ASB) Office provides a complementary perspective to the analyses conducted by the 

Services. The ASB Office provides a focused view on a relatively narrow problem 

through a multi-domain and multi-Service lens. This additional perspective enhances planning, communicates individual service viewpoints, encourages increased 

service collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors and 

programmers to use in their established deliberations. 

Mr. FORBES. How are the roles, functions and policies of the Air-Sea Battle Office 

integrated into each service’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 

(PPBE) process and what authorities is the Air-Sea Battle Office permitted to exercise in the development of a service’s budget program? 

Admiral FOGGO. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Memorandum of Understanding explains the organizational structure, as well as the responsibilities and authorities 

of the ASB Office. To summarize: the ASB Office identifies key capabilities to enhance the ASB Concept and shares these with the Services. The ASB recommendations are considered in the same process as other Service doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) 

recommendations. Programmatic decisions on these capabilities are a Title 10 responsibility of the Service Chiefs. As such, the ASB Office has no unique authorities 

in the development of the Services’ budget. 

Mr. FORBES. How do the services assess the effectiveness of the Air-Sea Battle 

Office in supporting the annual Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 

(PPBE) process? 

Admiral FOGGO. The Air Sea Battle (ASB) Office identifies key capabilities to enhance the ASB Concept and shares these with the Services. The Services view the 

Air-Sea Battle Office as providing a valuable multi-Service ‘‘joint view’’ perspective 

on capabilities and recommended solution sets. In the Navy, the effectiveness is 

demonstrated by the increasing incorporation of identified ASB capabilities in the 

PPBE process. ASB is expected to be a multi-year process, whereby the Services will 

continue to strengthen and enhance their habitual relationships, and more closely 

integrate their ‘‘organize, train, and equip’’ actions. 

Mr. FORBES. How do service 3-star programmers integrate Air-Sea Battle products 

into the annual budget process and what percentage of Air-Sea Battle recommendations have been incorporated into the service’s budget to date? 

Admiral FOGGO. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office, along with OPNAV N81 (Assessments), evaluates the ASB Concept with respect to capability assessments to identify specific capability gaps and program requirements for incorporation into programming guidance and the Front End Assessment (FEA). The resource sponsors 
43 

and programmers consider these ASB inputs throughout the Sponsor Program Proposal (SPP) development and review process, giving special consideration to those 

that align with CNO priorities and compliment other FEA and SPP requirements 

and capabilities. 

ASB Office recommendations are one of many inputs given to programmers. A 

high percentage of ASB recommendations are acted upon favorably, but no defined 

percentage can be stated because recommendations are typically capabilities-based 

and not discrete resource allocation recommendations. Ultimately programmatic decisions on capabilities are a Title 10 responsibility of the Service Chiefs. 

Mr. FORBES. How are Air-Sea Battle Office recommended capabilities tracked by 

the services and the Joint Staff during year of budget execution to meet identified 

capability gaps and shortfalls of the combatant commanders? 

Admiral FOGGO. The Services track budget execution of all resource allocations; 

they do not uniquely track Air-Sea Battle (ASB) recommendations outside the ASB 

Office. 

Mr. FORBES. In the view of the service programmers, how did the Air-Sea Battle 

Office specifically influence the outcome of the Fiscal Year 2014 President’s Budget 

submission and the FY15–FY18 future years defense program? Provide under classified cover if necessary. 

Admiral FOGGO. Navy programmers carefully balance strategy, capabilities, capacity and resources in building a future years defense program. In our FY14 President’s Budget (PB–14) submission, our development of future capability, as 

benchmarked to support our rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific, is guided in large 

part by the Air Sea Battle (ASB) Concept, which implements the Joint Operational 

Access Concept. Both of these concepts are designed to assure U.S. forces freedom 

of action and access to support deterrence, assurance of our allies and partners, and 

the ability to respond to crises. PB–14 includes investments in both FY14 and over 

FY15–18 to focus on assuring access in each domain, often by exploiting the asymmetric capability advantages of U.S. forces across domains. 

Specifically, PB–14 incorporated the ASB Concept in determining the following investments to improve our ability to counter anti-access/area-denial threats: • Mine threat: Countering potential enemy ability to use mines to deny access to 

Naval forces continues to be a significant emphasis in the near term. The Navy 

budget request funds Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) MCM Mission Package development to include MH–60S helicopter Airborne Laser Mine Detection System 

(ALMDS) and Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) systems, MCM 

hull-mounted sonar, and accelerates fielding of the MK–18 UUV and Seafox 

mine neutralization system. • Small boat and anti-ship missile threat: Small boats with explosives and antiship missiles remain a potential threat to our forces in the constrained waters 

of the Arabian Gulf. The Navy budget request funds integration of Advanced 

Precision Kill Weapon system (APKWS) into our MH–60R helicopters to counter 

small boats with explosives or anti-ship missiles. The Laser Weapons system 

(LaWS) is also being tested in the Arabian Gulf onboard USS Ponce and we are 

investing in development and testing of near-term modifications to existing 

weapons on our larger surface combatants. 

• Undersea threat: Navy’s dominance of the undersea domain provides U.S. forces 

their most significant asymmetric advantage. Our investments continue to improve our capability to deny the undersea to adversaries, while exploiting it for 

our own operations. The Navy budget request sustains and plans production of 

proven Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) platforms including MH–60R Seahawk 

helicopters, P–8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, DDG–51 and Virginia 

Class nuclear submarines. The request also funds capabilities such as advanced 

airborne sensors for the P–8A Poseidon, accelerates torpedo defense systems for 

CVN, improves Navy’s Undersea Surveillance system, continues development of 

the Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicles and additional payloads for existing submarines. We also continue to practice and refine 

warfighting in war games and real-world exercises including VALIANT 

SHIELD and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) which practices high-end ballistic 

missile defense, surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare in simulations and 

live-fire missile and torpedo events. 

• Air threat: Air power is a key component of the Naval force, and improving the 

capability of our CSGs to project power despite threats to access closes a key 

gap. The Navy Budget request funds the continued development and low rate 

production of the new F–35C Lighting II and capability improvements such as 

infra-red sensors and weapons that provide air-to-air capability that are not 

susceptible to RF jamming. The request also funds improvements to further network sensors and weapons in the Navy Integrated Fire Control Counter Air 
44 

(NIFC–CA) capability that uses a network between AEGIS ships and the E–2D 

aircraft to seamlessly share threat information. Lastly, the budget funds the development and testing of the Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstrator 

(UCAS–D). 

• Electromagnetic Spectrum and Cyber: Future conflicts will be fought and won 

in the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace, which are converging to become one continuous environment. This environment is becoming increasingly 

important to defeating threats to access, since through it we can disrupt adversary sensors, command and control and weapons homing. The Navy budget request funds two additional squadrons of EA–18G Growler electronic warfare 

aircraft, the Next Generation Jammer, seven SLQ–32 Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) block I upgrades, accelerates Research and development on SEWIP Block 3, fields new deployable decoys to defeat anti-ship missiles and continues procurement of improvements to Navy’s Ships Signal Exploitation Equipment (SSEE) to provide protection from electronic attack. 

Mr. FORBES. How are service-specific capability gaps/shortfalls, requirements and 

programmatic assessments authored by the Air-Sea Battle Office vetted and coordinated within each service and subsequently with outside organizations such as 

OSD(CAPE), USD(AT&L), the Joint Staff, and the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council? 

Admiral FOGGO. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office does not solely identify capability gaps. Each Service assesses its specific capability gaps/shortfalls. These gaps 

are reviewed by the ASB Office for applicability in countering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenges. Additionally, Service-provided solutions are consolidated in 

order to provide a more holistic view of the collective Service efforts addressing the 

A2/AD threat. This broad view of ongoing efforts allows the ASB Office to identify 

opportunities for multi-Service collaboration and make recommendations to their respective Services. 

Since the ASB Office is a multi-Service organization, recommendations originate 

within Service processes. 

Mr. FORBES. What role(s) will the Air-Sea Battle Office perform for the services 

during development of the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)? 

Admiral FOGGO. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office is not assigned a specific QDR 

role. However, the QDR working groups are focused on topics of ASB relevance and 

ASB-informed Service representatives participate in QDR deliberations. 

Mr. FORBES. Is the Air-Sea Battle strategy a new concept? If not, why has the 

concept been formalized with an official office? 

General STOUGH. Neither the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) nor its 

supporting concepts are strategies, nor do they replace the need for coherent strategies. Concepts by their very nature are designed to bridge strategy to required capabilities. The Chairman’s Joint Operational Access Implementation Plan and the 

Services decision to stand up the ASB Office are efforts to better focus and integrate 

force development activities to provide the capabilities required by Combatant Commanders to operate in the emerging A2/AD environment. 

The writing of the JOAC was informed by current strategies—the 2010 National 

Security Strategy, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the 2011 National 

Military Strategy, and amplifying strategic documentation as provided by the 2012 

Defense Strategic Guidance. The JOAC was also informed by the congressional testimonies and expressed needs of the Combatant Commands, and a detailed examination of the emerging operating environment. 

The JOAC describes the Chairman’s vision for how joint forces will operate in response to emerging A2/AD challenges as part of our broader national approach. The 

growth of A2/AD capabilities around the globe, the changing U.S. overseas defense 

posture, and the emergence of space and cyberspace as contested domains—is likely 

to lead future enemies, both states and non-states, to adopt A2/AD strategies 

against the United States as a favorable course of action. 

JOAC describes how future joint forces will achieve operational access in the face 

of such strategies. Its central thesis is Cross-Domain Synergy—which requires a 

greater degree of integration across domains and at lower echelons and a greater 

degree and more flexible integration of space and cyberspace operations into the traditional air-sea-land battlespace than ever before. 

To achieve this integration in joint force development, the Chairman has directed 

the development and execution of the Joint Operational Access Implementation Plan 

to better focus and integrate development efforts to overcome A2/AD strategies and 

capabilities. Likewise, the Services agreed to establish the ASBO to focus and integrate Service Title 10 responsibilities for force development of capabilities to overcome A2/AD threats. 
45 

Mr. FORBES. Before the Air-Sea Battle Office was established in 2012, how did 

the services determine capability gaps, shortfalls, requirements and programmatic 

budget priorities for training, equipping and operating in anti-access/area denial environments? 

General STOUGH. Generally, capability gaps are identified through a capability 

based assessment (CBA). A CBA uses scenarios to set the operational conditions, 

such as A2/AD, in which military objectives must be achieved. The gap between current capability and what we need to do to meet our objectives is the ‘‘capability 

gap.’’ Using the current force structure and doctrinal approaches gaps can be characterized as to whether they are due to proficiency, sufficiency, lack of existing capability, needed recapitalization, or policy limitations. The risks associated with the 

identified gaps inform the programmatic and budget priorities of the Services. 

Mr. FORBES. How are Air-Sea Battle Office recommended capabilities tracked by 

the services and the Joint Staff during year of budget execution to meet identified 

capability gaps and shortfalls of the combatant commanders? 

General STOUGH. The Joint Staff tracks and validates required capabilities 

through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). In addition to the traditional sponsor centric requirements process, the Joint Staff tracks 

Combatant Commander’s needs through the Integrated Priority List (IPL) process 

and their time critical urgent and emergent needs through the Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) and Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) processes. 

Mr. FORBES. How are service-specific capability gaps/shortfalls, requirements and 

programmatic assessments authored by the Air-Sea Battle Office vetted and coordinated within each service and subsequently with outside organizations such as 

OSD(CAPE), USD(AT&L), the Joint Staff, and the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council? 

General STOUGH. The ASB Office analyzes needed future military capabilities 

based upon current and programmed force structure and capabilities and compares 

this as-is state to the desired end-state of executing the ASB Concept. The resultant 

gaps in capability are documented and pushed from the ASB Office to the services 

for their endorsement and development of formal capability requirements documentation. 

These capability requirements documents are submitted into Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System (JCIDS) through the Knowledge Management/ 

Decision Support (KM/DS) system from the service sponsors—this would include 

any ASB Office vetted recommendations. The KM/DS system provides a method for 

staffing requirements documents to ensure input from DOD components with equity, and provides an authoritative database for DOD requirements documents. 

Mr. FORBES. Are there any duplicative roles or functions within the Joint Staff 

directorates that are inherently resident within the Air-Sea Battle Office? 

General STOUGH. We believe that the roles and functions are complementary, vice 

duplicative, in that there are requirements for joint force development, as well as 

Service and multi-Service development consistent with Title 10 authorities. On behalf of the Chairman, the Joint Staff directorates focus on joint force development 

while the ASB Office provides a pre-coordinated and integrated view of the required 

capabilities of each Service to assure operational access through a multi-domain and 

multi-service lens. In practice, the Joint Staff leverages the work done by the ASB 

Office to inform overall joint force development. In an era of pressing A2/AD challenges and declining resources, additional focus on the thorough integration of capabilities at the onset of development efforts increases the effectiveness of our efforts 

to meet Combatant Command operational requirements for cross domain solutions 

during execution. 

Mr. FORBES. Will services be able to more effectively meet requirements and operational planning considerations of the combatant commanders with implementation 

of the Air-Sea Battle concept? If so, in what specific ways? 

General STOUGH. The JOAC and its supporting concepts, Air Sea Battle and the 

Joint Concept for Entry Operations, were predicated on the current and emerging 

needs of the Combatant Commanders to overcome access challenges. The CJCS’s 

JOA Implementation Plan (JIP) is designed to ensure joint force development is appropriately focused on the Combatant Commanders requirements to overcome A2/ 

AD challenges. It does this by developing a comprehensive, department-wide understanding of ongoing JOA implementation activities, identifying opportunities for 

joint collaboration to solve potential shortfalls in development efforts and/or reducing redundant or duplicative activities, establishing a set of prioritized and approved 

recommendations for implementation by Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, 

Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF–P) processes 

owners, and by providing comprehensive assessments to military decision makers on 

progress toward the development of required capabilities. 
46 

JOA Implementation, which will leverage the complementary efforts of the ASB 

Office, will result in an improved ability to operate across multiple domains giving 

the Combatant Commanders the ability to defeat A2/AD strategies and capabilities 

with less risk. 

Mr. FORBES. How does the Air-Sea Battle Office products and analysis contribute 

to CJCS functions and responsibilities contained under 10 U.S.C. Section 153? 

General STOUGH. Under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 153, the Chairman is responsible 

for ‘‘Planning; Advice; Policy Formation.’’ To assist in fulfilling that responsibility 

the Chairman releases Joint Concepts that articulate his vision for how the force 

will operate to overcome specific challenges. In Jan 2012 the Chairman released the 

Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) to address emerging A2/AD challenges, 

the implementation of which will result in changes to Joint Doctrine, Organization, 

Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy 

(DOTMLPF–P). 

Efforts to implement the JOAC, or ASB Concept for that matter, don’t supplant 

established authorities or processes but are a means to increase focus and integrate 

efforts to address a critical set of challenges. In support of JOA implementation, the 

ASB Office serves an important function in integrating the development of Servicespecific capabilities that the Joint Force Commander will require. The current ASB 

implementation plan will be leveraged to the maximum extent possible to inform 

relevant segments of our JOA Implementation Plan. 

Mr. FORBES. Since the CJCS JOAC contains 30 precepts, and the Air-Sea Battle 

Office is responsible and contributes to enabling 26 of those precepts, why is the 

Air-Sea Battle Office a separate organization outside of the Joint Staff with no authority over JOAC implementation? 

General STOUGH. While JOA Implementation focuses efforts that are overseen by 

the Chairman commensurate with his Title 10 responsibilities and authorities—required changes to Joint Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 

education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF–P), the ASB Office focuses 

on integration of Service capabilities in accordance Service Title 10 responsibilities. 

These efforts are mutually supportive of and will be integrated with, JOA implementation in order to ensure the Combatant Commanders have the requisite capabilities to overcome A2/AD challenges. 

The JS J7, through a JOA Integration Working Group comprised of members from 

the Joint Staff, Services and Combatant Commands, will lead this multi-year, 

iterative effort with oversight provided by the Director of the Joint Staff and the 

Service Operations Deputies. On-going efforts by the ASB Office will be incorporated 

into this effort, and the implementation responsibilities for each element of the overall JOA Implementation Plan will be aligned consistent with appropriate Title 10 

authorities for the CJCS, Services, and CCMDs. 

Mr. FORBES. Is the Air-Sea Battle strategy a new concept? If not, why has the 

concept been formalized with an official office? 

General JONES. The Air-Sea Battle Concept was completed in 2011, making it a 

relatively new concept within DOD. In the fall of 2011, following initial concept development by the Departments of the Navy and Air Force, and recognizing the value 

of further development and implementation of the concept, the Vice Chiefs of all 

four Services signed a memorandum of understanding to officially create the ASB 

Office (ASBO) and further build on the framework to implement the ASB Concept. 

While at first this effort was outside the Joint Staff and focused on primarily air 

and naval capabilities—it has since become integrated into a larger force development effort focused on capabilities in all domains including those needed to gain and 

maintain access ashore. 

It’s important to note that Air-Sea Battle (ASB) is not a military strategy; it isn’t 

about countering an invasion; it isn’t a plan for U.S. forces to conduct an assault. 

It is an evolutionary set of ideas focused on defeating threats to access in order to 

enable follow-on operations—operations which could include military activities as 

well as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. ASB is a concept that enables the Joint Force to continue to operate in an anti-access, area denial environment as directed in accordance with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance Joint 

Force mission to Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenges. 

As a supporting operational concept to the Chairman’s Joint Operational Access 

Concept, ASB focuses on shaping any potential adversary’s anti-access and area denial environment to achieve access and freedom of action in order to enable concurrent or follow-on joint force power projection operations to achieve decisive results. 

By identifying the actions needed to counter threats to the global commons, the materiel and non-materiel investments required to execute those actions, and the institutional changes needed to sustain them, the ASB Concept serves to spur the development of better integrated air, land, and naval forces required to address evolving 
47 

threats to access to ensure freedom of action in the air, space, cyberspace, and maritime domains. 

Mr. FORBES. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office sufficiently resourced with funding, office 

space and personnel at a level to be effective and efficient? 

General JONES. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office, as currently staffed and 

resourced, provides a fiscally efficient construct to enable further development and 

implementation of the ASB Concept through existing Service channels and processes. The office is manned, funded, and located within existing Service budgets, 

personnel, and spaces. 

Mr. FORBES. What is the annual budget of the Air-Sea Battle Office and how does 

it compare to other offices with the same responsibilities within the Joint Staff, OSD 

Office of Net Assessment, CAPE, and the JROC? 

General JONES. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office does not have a specific/unique 

budget line. The ASB Office stood up from within the Services by redistributing existing billets and office space from each Service. Funding for office activities comes 

from the funding line of the offices contributing personnel from each of the Services. 

For example, individual travel funds come from the Service staff directorate of the 

participating individual. 

Mr. FORBES. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office workload sufficient and proportional 

enough to the budget, personnel, administrative operating resources and support 

staff provided by each of the services? How was the Air-Sea Battle Office staffing 

and budget determined? 

General JONES. Yes. Between concept implementation, programmatic efforts, 

wargaming, experimentation, and communications, the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office 

workload is sufficient and proportional for the assigned personnel and support staff. 

Under the ASB Concept Implementation Memorandum of Understanding, the 

Services established a governance structure consisting of a flag-level ASB Executive 

Committee (EXCOM) that convenes on a quarterly basis; a Senior Steering Group 

(SSG) that convenes on a monthly basis; and supporting ASB Office staff charged 

with implementing the Concept. The supporting staff is composed of personnel from 

each of the four Services—sourced from existing military positions (i.e., ‘‘taken out 

of hide’’)—with the mission to foster the development and adoption of the related 

DOTMLPF solutions based upon Air-Sea Battle’s conceptual design. 

Current ASB Office manning: 

Navy Air Force Marines Army 

4 Military 2 Military 1 Military 1 Military 

4 Contractors 1 Contractor 

1 GS 

1 Contractor 1 GS 

The ASB Office does not have a specific/unique budget line. 

Mr. FORBES. Before the Air-Sea Battle Office was established in 2012, how did 

the services determine capability gaps, shortfalls, requirements and programmatic 

budget priorities for training, equipping and operating in anti-access/area denial environments? 

General JONES. Each Service has long-standing processes used to identify their 

specific capability requirements in order to inform resource prioritization decisions. 

None of the Air-Sea Battle Office analysis of force development activities conducted 

within each of the Services is intended to alter these existing processes. The operational environment, to include current and anticipated threats, remains an important consideration for Service resource decisions. 

Mr. FORBES. Do the services assess the roles and functions of the Air-Sea Battle 

Office as redundant or additive when compared to existing functions within current 

organizational constructs and authorities of each respective service’s A8, N8/N9, or 

DCMC(P&R) equivalent? 

General JONES. While still in the fledgling stages of development, the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office provides a complementary perspective to the analyses conducted by 

the Services. The ASB Office provides a focused view on a relatively narrow problem 

through a multi-domain and multi-Service lens. This additional perspective enhances planning, communicates individual service viewpoints, encourages increased 

service collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors and 

programmers to use in their established deliberations. 

Mr. FORBES. How are the roles, functions and policies of the Air-Sea Battle Office 

integrated into each service’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 
48 

(PPBE) process and what authorities is the Air-Sea Battle Office permitted to exercise in the development of a service’s budget program? 

General JONES. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Memorandum of Understanding explains the organizational structure, as well as the responsibilities and authorities 

of the ASB Office. To summarize: the ASB Office forwards recommendations from 

its subject matter expert working groups to the Executive Committee, who then 

sends approved recommendations to the Vice Chiefs of Service for further consideration. The ASB recommendations are considered in the same process as other Service DOTMLPF recommendations. The ASB Office has no unique authorities in the 

development of the Services’ budget. 

Mr. FORBES. How do the services assess the effectiveness of the Air-Sea Battle 

Office in supporting the annual Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 

(PPBE) process? 

General JONES. The Services view the ASB Office as a valuable complementary 

perspective that can enhance individual service viewpoints and encourage increased 

programmatic collaboration. 

Mr. FORBES. How do service 3-star programmers integrate Air-Sea Battle products 

into the annual budget process and what percentage of Air-Sea Battle recommendations have been incorporated into the service’s budget to date? 

General JONES. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) working groups review service programs 

at all stages of development, from RDT&E to Full Operational Capability. ASB Office recommendations are one of many inputs given to programmers, and historically 

a high percentage of recommendations from the ASB Office are acted upon favorably. No specific percentage can be attributed because recommendations are typically capabilities-based and not discrete resource allocation recommendations. 

Mr. FORBES. How are Air-Sea Battle Office recommended capabilities tracked by 

the services and the Joint Staff during year of budget execution to meet identified 

capability gaps and shortfalls of the combatant commanders? 

General JONES. The Services track budget execution of all resource allocations; 

they do not uniquely track Air-Sea Battle (ASB) recommendations outside the ASB 

Office. 

Mr. FORBES. In the view of the service programmers, how did the Air-Sea Battle 

Office specifically influence the outcome of the Fiscal Year 2014 President’s Budget 

submission and the FY15–FY18 future years defense program? Provide under classified cover if necessary. 

General JONES. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office has no authorities in the development of the Services’ budget. The ASB Office provides a complementary perspective 

to the analyses conducted by the Services. This additional perspective informs and 

enhances planning, communicates individual service viewpoints, encourages increased Service collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors 

and programmers to use in their established deliberations. ASB recommendations 

have been well aligned with Service emphasis areas and have had particular impact 

shaping training, exercises, and wargames where the ASB Concept are tested and 

evaluated for incorporation into operational and strategic planning. 

Mr. FORBES. How are service-specific capability gaps/shortfalls, requirements and 

programmatic assessments authored by the Air-Sea Battle Office vetted and coordinated within each service and subsequently with outside organizations such as 

OSD(CAPE), USD(AT&L), the Joint Staff, and the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council? 

General JONES. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office does not author capability gaps. 

Each Service assesses its specific capability gaps/shortfalls. These gaps are reviewed 

by the ASB Office for applicability in countering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) 

challenges. Additionally, Service-provided solutions are consolidated in order to provide a more holistic view of the collective Service efforts addressing the A2/AD 

threat. This broad view of ongoing efforts allows the ASB Office to identify opportunities for multi-Service collaboration and make recommendations to their respective 

Services. 

Since the ASB Office is a multi-Service organization, recommendations originate 

within Service processes. 

As it relates to outside organizations, each year Services submit to OSD their Fiscal Year Defense Program (FYDP) programmatic requirements, including ASB recommendations. Subsequent to these submissions, during Program Budget Review 

(PBR), the Joint Staff and all OSD Principal Staff Assistants (PSA), including 

USD(AT&L), submit issue papers against the Services’ program recommendations 

to OSD(CAPE). Issues approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD) are assigned to Issue Teams for vetting. Joint Staff, USD(AT&L), and OSD(CAPE) have 

opportunity to participate on any Issue Team vetting ASB-related issues. Issue 

Teams either resolve issues internally or propose alternatives in turn to 
49 

OSD(CAPE) and DSD for resolution. Final FYDP programmatic decisions are documented in a Resource Management Decision signed by DSD. 

The Joint Staff also conducts an annual Capability Gap Analysis (CGA) that is 

directly linked to the CCDR Integrated Priority List (IPL) submission—as well as 

their Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA) data. The final outputs from the CJA 

are used to develop the Chairman’s Program Review (CPR) and Assessment (CPA), 

both reported to Congress. The output from the CGA has historically been used to 

identify those specific Service gaps that have been determined by the Joint Staff to 

be of significant risk, and to recommend specific Service action to close/reduce those 

risks. In the past, these recommendations have also included ones programmatic in 

nature. A2/AD capability gaps are adjudicated using the same Departmental processes that address other capability gaps. The CCDRs have incorporated those specific gaps/recommendations into their IPL submissions, to be adjudicated in a larger 

‘National’ context by the Joint Staff. The CGA is approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and documented in a JROC Memorandum 

(JROCM) that captures the relevant Joint decisions to inform many Service efforts 

(e.g., POM development, Science &Technology investment, Manpower, Policy, etc.). 

Mr. FORBES. What role(s) will the Air-Sea Battle Office perform for the services 

during development of the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)? 

General JONES. The Air Sea Battle Office will continue to encourage strategic 

thought and innovative doctrine on the integrated application of current and emerging counter A2/AD capabilities. They will continue to investigate capability gaps, 

shortfalls and requirements to face complex security threats in Anti-Access/Area Denial environments. The Air-Sea Battle Office will continue to engage with all the 

Services, Joint Staff and OSD Policy to ensure that new concepts of operations and 

emerging doctrine inform the QDR 2018 strategic conversation. 

Mr. FORBES. Is the Air-Sea Battle strategy a new concept? If not, why has the 

concept been formalized with an official office? 

General KILLEA. First, it’s important to note that Air-Sea Battle (ASB) is not a 

military strategy; it isn’t about countering an invasion; it isn’t a plan for U.S. forces 

to conduct an assault. It is an evolutionary set of ideas intended to inform the development of military capabilities for defeating threats to access in order to enable follow-on operations—operations which could include military activities as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. ASB is a concept intended to help enable the Joint Force to continue to operate in an anti-access area denial environment as directed in accordance with one of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance 

Joint Force missions to Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) 

Challenges. 

As a limited objective supporting operational concept to the Chairman’s Joint 

Operational Access Concept, ASB focuses on developing forces capable of shaping 

any potential adversary’s anti-access and area denial environment in order to 

achieve access and freedom of action; and to enable concurrent or follow-on joint 

force power projection operations to achieve decisive results. By identifying the actions needed to counter threats to the global commons, the materiel and non-materiel investments required to execute those actions, and the institutional changes 

needed to sustain them, the ASB Concept serves to spur the development of better 

integrated air, land, and naval forces required to address evolving threats to access 

to ensure freedom of action in the air, space, cyberspace, and maritime domains. 

In 2010 the Secretary of Defense directed the Departments of the Navy and Air 

Force to develop the ASB Concept and to work together to foster its implementation 

through focused wargaming, experimentation, and exercises. To that end the Navy, 

Air Force, and Marine Corps established a project office to provide a standing multiservice forum for both the exchange of ideas and the cross-coordination of service 

initiatives related to developing capabilities to overcome anti-access and area denial 

threats. Since then the effort has grown to include representation from the Army 

as well as the Joint Staff J–7 who are developing a framework for implementing 

the Joint Operational Access Concept. This broader joint effort will include ASB’s 

input and develop the full range of capabilities needed for U.S. forces to gain and 

maintain access in all domains in order to project power across the range of military 

operations. 

Mr. FORBES. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office sufficiently resourced with funding, office 

space and personnel at a level to be effective and efficient? 

General KILLEA. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office, as currently staffed and 

resourced, provides a fiscally efficient construct to enable further development and 

implementation of the ASB Concept through existing Service channels and processes. The office is manned, funded, and located within existing Service budgets, 

personnel, and spaces. Given increased resourcing in any of these areas, the office 
50 

could increase its multi-Service and multi-national implementation efforts through 

such activities as increased wargaming, experimentation, exercises, and training. 

Mr. FORBES. What is the annual budget of the Air-Sea Battle Office and how does 

it compare to other offices with the same responsibilities within the Joint Staff, OSD 

Office of Net Assessment, CAPE, and the JROC? 

General KILLEA. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office does not have a specific/unique 

budget line. The ASB Office was established from within the Services by redistributing existing billets and office space from each Service. Funding for office activities 

comes from the funding line of the offices contributing personnel from each of the 

Services. For example, individual travel funds come from the Service staff directorate of the participating individual. 

Mr. FORBES. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office workload sufficient and proportional 

enough to the budget, personnel, administrative operating resources and support 

staff provided by each of the services? How was the Air-Sea Battle Office staffing 

and budget determined? 

General KILLEA. Yes. Between concept implementation, programmatic efforts, 

wargaming, experimentation, and communications, the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office 

has more than a sufficient workload for the assigned personnel and support staff. 

Under the ASB Concept Implementation Memorandum of Understanding, the 

Services established a governance structure consisting of a flag-level ASB Executive 

Committee that convenes on a quarterly basis; a Senior Steering Group that convenes on a monthly basis; and supporting ASB Office staff charged with implementing the Concept. The supporting staff is composed of personnel from each of 

the four Services—sourced from existing military positions (i.e., ‘‘taken out of 

hide’’)—with the mission to foster the development and adoption of the related 

DOTMLPF solutions that support the Air-Sea Battle Concept’s objectives. Additionally, the governance structure includes a number of working groups, comprised of 

subject matter experts from the Services, which meet periodically. These working 

groups ensure that the ASB office maintains close linkages with the operating forces 

and other key supporting organizations within the Services. 

Current ASB Office manning: 

Navy Air Force Marines Army 

4 Military 2 Military 1 Military 1 Military 

4 Contractors 1 Contractor 

1 GS 

1 Contractor 1 GS 

The ASB Office does not have a specific/unique budget line. 

Mr. FORBES. Before the Air-Sea Battle Office was established in 2012, how did 

the services determine capability gaps, shortfalls, requirements and programmatic 

budget priorities for training, equipping and operating in anti-access/area denial environments? 

General KILLEA. Each Service has long-standing processes used to identify their 

specific capability requirements in order to inform resource prioritization decisions. 

None of the Air-Sea Battle Office analysis of force development activities conducted 

within each of the Services is intended to alter these existing processes. The operational environment, to include current and anticipated threats, remains an important consideration for Service resource decisions. 

Mr. FORBES. Do the services assess the roles and functions of the Air-Sea Battle 

Office as redundant or additive when compared to existing functions within current 

organizational constructs and authorities of each respective service’s A8, N8/N9, or 

DCMC(P&R) equivalent? 

General KILLEA. While still in the fledgling stages of development, the Air-Sea 

Battle (ASB) Office provides a complementary perspective to the analyses conducted 

by the Services and Joint Staff. The ASB Office provides a focused view on a relatively narrow problem (i.e. access to the global commons) through a multi-domain 

and multi-Service lens. This additional perspective enhances planning, communicates individual service viewpoints, encourages increased Service collaboration, 

and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors and programmers to use in 

their established deliberations. 

Mr. FORBES. How are the roles, functions and policies of the Air-Sea Battle Office 

integrated into each service’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 

(PPBE) process and what authorities is the Air-Sea Battle Office permitted to exercise in the development of a service’s budget program? 
51 

General KILLEA. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Memorandum of Understanding prescribes the organizational structure, as well as the responsibilities and authorities 

of the ASB Office. To summarize: the ASB Office forwards recommendations from 

its subject matter expert working groups to the Executive Committee, who then 

sends approved recommendations to the Vice Chiefs of Service for further consideration. The ASB Office recommendations are considered in the same process as other 

Service DOTMLPF recommendations. The ASB Office has no unique authorities in 

the development of the Service budget. 

Mr. FORBES. How do the services assess the effectiveness of the Air-Sea Battle 

Office in supporting the annual Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 

(PPBE) process? 

General KILLEA. The Services view the Air-Sea Battle Office as providing a valuable forum and complementary perspective that enhances individual Service viewpoints, informs related force development activities, and encourages increased programmatic collaboration. 

Mr. FORBES. How do service 3-star programmers integrate Air-Sea Battle products 

into the annual budget process and what percentage of Air-Sea Battle recommendations have been incorporated into the service’s budget to date? 

General KILLEA. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) working groups review service programs at all stages of development, from RDT&E to Full Operational Capability. 

The recommendations they make—especially for mature programs—generally coincide with those of the programmers. As a result, a high percentage of recommendations from the ASB Office are acted upon favorably. Please note however that no 

specific percentage can be attributed because recommendations are typically capabilities-based and not discrete resource allocation recommendations. 

Mr. FORBES. How are Air-Sea Battle Office recommended capabilities tracked by 

the services and the Joint Staff during year of budget execution to meet identified 

capability gaps and shortfalls of the combatant commanders? 

General KILLEA. The Services track budget execution of all resource allocations; 

they do not uniquely track Air-Sea Battle (ASB) recommendations outside the ASB 

Office. 

Mr. FORBES. In the view of the service programmers, how did the Air-Sea Battle 

Office specifically influence the outcome of the Fiscal Year 2014 President’s Budget 

submission and the FY15–FY18 future years defense program? Provide under classified cover if necessary. 

General KILLEA. The ASB Office does not, nor should it exert any authority over 

Service resource or budget decisions. The ASB implementation plan prescribes a 

programmatic collaboration process by which the ASB Office reviews Service capability gaps and their associated solutions for applicability in countering A2/AD 

threats. The POM 14 ASB deliberations presented the first opportunity for all four 

Services to participate in the nascent process. This review provided a focused look 

at how the Services are addressing a very narrow slice of the spectrum of military 

operations and threats that could be faced by the Joint Force. 

Though not a direct result of ASB recommendations, the Marine Corps continues 

to invest in capabilities that enhance the effectiveness and interoperability of the 

Joint Force in an A2/AD environment. Specific investments in systems such as the 

F–35B and ISR systems are integral to countering A2/AD threats. Additionally, the 

Marine Corps is making significant investment in improving and defending our expeditionary command and control networks. We remain committed to developing 

and strengthening relationships with our allies and partners world-wide, and we 

continue to refine our employment and sustainment concepts in the context of A2/ 

AD challenges. 

The Marine Corps provides general purpose forces organized, trained, and 

equipped to conduct military operations in myriad scenarios against a wide array 

of adversaries and capabilities. The analysis and recommendations provided by the 

ASB Office is one of many viewpoints considered by the Marine Corps as part of 

our POM development process. Even though the ASB office has not exerted direct 

influence over the Marine Corps POM submission, many of our investment decisions 

reflect a shared recognition of the challenges posed to the Joint Force by adversaries 

equipped with sophisticated A2/AD capabilities. 

Mr. FORBES. How are service-specific capability gaps/shortfalls, requirements and 

programmatic assessments authored by the Air-Sea Battle Office vetted and coordinated within each service and subsequently with outside organizations such as 

OSD(CAPE), USD(AT&L), the Joint Staff, and the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council? 

General KILLEA. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office does not author capability gaps. 

Each Service assesses its specific capability gaps/shortfalls. These gaps are reviewed 

by the ASB Office for applicability in countering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) 
52 

challenges primarily in the global commons of air, sea, space, and cyber. Additionally, Service-provided solutions are consolidated in order to provide a more holistic 

view of the collective Service efforts addressing the A2/AD threat. This broad view 

of ongoing efforts allows the ASB Office to identify opportunities for multi-Service 

collaboration and make recommendations to their respective Services. 

Mr. FORBES. What role(s) will the Air-Sea Battle Office perform for the services 

during development of the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)? 

General KILLEA. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office is not assigned a specific QDR 

role, however the QDR working groups are focused on topics of ASB relevance and 

ASB-informed Service representatives participate in QDR deliberations. 

Mr. FORBES. Is the Air-Sea Battle strategy a new concept? If not, why has the 

concept been formalized with an official office? 

General CHEEK. Air-Sea Battle (ASB) is a set of ideas focused on defeating threats 

to access in order to enable follow-on operations—operations which could include 

military activities as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster response. ASB 

is a concept that enables the Joint Force to continue to operate in an anti-access 

area denial environment as directed in accordance with the 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance Joint Force mission to Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/ 

AD) Challenges. 

As a supporting operational concept to the Chairman’s Joint Operational Access 

Concept, ASB focuses on shaping any potential adversary emplaced anti-access and 

area denial environment to achieve access and freedom of action in order to enable 

concurrent or follow-on joint force power projection operations to achieve decisive results in Joint Force campaigns. By identifying the actions needed to counter threats 

to the global commons, the materiel and non-materiel investments required to execute those actions, and the institutional changes needed to sustain them, the ASB 

Concept serves to spur the development of better integrated air, land, and naval 

forces required to address evolving threats to access to ensure freedom of action in 

the air, space, cyberspace, and maritime domains to enable follow on intra-theater 

or force projection operations. 

In the fall of 2011, following initial concept development by the Departments of 

the Navy and Air Force, and recognizing the value of further development and implementation of the concept, the Vice Chiefs of all four Services signed a memorandum of understanding to officially create the ASB office and further build on the 

framework to implement the ASB Concept. While at first this effort was outside the 

Joint Staff and focused on primarily air and naval capabilities—it has since become 

integrated into a larger force development effort focused on capabilities in all domains including those needed to gain and maintain access ashore. 

Mr. FORBES. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office sufficiently resourced with funding, office 

space and personnel at a level to be effective and efficient? 

General CHEEK. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office, as currently staffed and 

resourced, provides an efficient construct to appropriately enable further development and implementation of the ASB Concept through existing Service channels 

and processes. The office is manned, funded, and located within existing Service 

budgets, personnel, and spaces. Given increased resourcing in any of these areas, 

the office could increase its multi-Service and multi-national implementation efforts 

through such things as increased wargaming, experimentation, exercises, and training. 

Mr. FORBES. What is the annual budget of the Air-Sea Battle Office and how does 

it compare to other offices with the same responsibilities within the Joint Staff, OSD 

Office of Net Assessment, CAPE, and the JROC? 

General CHEEK. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office does not have a unique budget 

line. The ASB office stood up from within the Services by redistributing existing billets and office space from each Service. Funding for office activities comes from the 

funding line of the offices contributing personnel from each of the Services. For example, individual travel funds come from the Service staff directorate of the participating individual. 

Mr. FORBES. Is the Air-Sea Battle Office workload sufficient and proportional 

enough to the budget, personnel, administrative operating resources and support 

staff provided by each of the services? How was the Air-Sea Battle Office staffing 

and budget determined? 

General CHEEK. Yes. Between concept implementation, programmatic efforts, 

wargaming, experimentation, and communications, the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office 

has more than a sufficient workload for the assigned personnel and support staff. 

Under the ASB Concept Implementation Memorandum of Understanding, the 

Services established a governance structure consisting of a flag-level ASB Executive 

Committee (EXCOM) that convenes on a quarterly basis; a Senior Steering Group 

(SSG) that convenes on a monthly basis; and supporting ASB office staff charged 
53 

with implementing the Concept. The supporting staff is composed of personnel from 

each of the four Services—sourced from existing military positions—with the mission to foster the development and adoption of the related force development solutions based upon Air-Sea Battle’s conceptual design. Service representatives within 

the ASB office also leverage support through reach-back capabilities to Service staff 

directorates and Major Commands. As an example, the Army utilizes connectivity 

with Training and Doctrine Command’s Army Capabilities Integration Center 

(ARCIC) for subject matter expertise support for identified focus areas. 

Current ASB office manning is: Navy—4 military and 4 contractors; Air Force— 

2 military, 1 government civilian, 1 contractor; USMC—1 military and 1 contractor; 

Army—1 military and 1 government civilian. The ASB office does not have a budget 

line. 

Mr. FORBES. Before the Air-Sea Battle Office was established in 2012, how did 

the services determine capability gaps, shortfalls, requirements and programmatic 

budget priorities for training, equipping and operating in anti-access/area denial environments? 

General CHEEK. Each Service has long-standing processes used to identify their 

specific capability requirements, as part of the joint analytic community, in order 

to inform resource prioritization decisions. These processes continue in use. None of 

the Air-Sea Battle office analyses of force development activities conducted within 

each of the Services is intended to alter these existing processes. The operational 

environment, to include current and anticipated future threats, has been, and remains, an important consideration for Service resource decisions. 

Mr. FORBES. Do the services assess the roles and functions of the Air-Sea Battle 

Office as redundant or additive when compared to existing functions within current 

organizational constructs and authorities of each respective service’s A8, N8/N9, or 

DCMC(P&R) equivalent? 

General CHEEK. While still in the fledgling stages of development, the Air-Sea 

Battle (ASB) office provides a complementary perspective to the analyses conducted 

by the Services. The ASB office provides a focused view on a relatively narrow problem through a multi-domain and multi-Service lens. This additional perspective enhances planning, communicates individual service viewpoints, encourages increased 

service collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors and 

programmers to use in their established deliberations. 

Mr. FORBES. How are the roles, functions and policies of the Air-Sea Battle Office 

integrated into each service’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 

(PPBE) process and what authorities is the Air-Sea Battle Office permitted to exercise in the development of a service’s budget program? 

General CHEEK. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Memorandum of Understanding explains the organizational structure, as well as the responsibilities and authorities 

of the ASB office. To summarize: the ASB office forwards recommendations from its 

subject matter expert working groups to the Executive Committee, which, if warranted, sends approved recommendations to the Vice Chiefs of Service for further 

consideration. The ASB recommendations are considered in the same process as 

other Service force development recommendations. The ASB office has no unique authorities in the development of the Services’ budget. 

Mr. FORBES. How do the services assess the effectiveness of the Air-Sea Battle 

Office in supporting the annual Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 

(PPBE) process? 

General CHEEK. The Services view the Air-Sea Battle office as providing a complementary perspective that enhances individual Service viewpoints and can encourage increased programmatic collaboration. 

Mr. FORBES. How do service 3-star programmers integrate Air-Sea Battle products 

into the annual budget process and what percentage of Air-Sea Battle recommendations have been incorporated into the service’s budget to date? 

General CHEEK. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) working groups review relevant service 

programs at all stages of development, from Research Development Testing & Evaluation (RDT&E) to Full Operational Capability. ASB office recommendations are 

one of many inputs given to programmers. The recommendations they make—especially for mature programs—generally coincide with those of the programmers. As 

a result, a high percentage of recommendations from the ASB office are received favorably. No specific percentage can be attributed since ASB recommendations are 

typically capabilities-based and not discrete resource allocation recommendations. 

Mr. FORBES. How are Air-Sea Battle Office recommended capabilities tracked by 

the services and the Joint Staff during year of budget execution to meet identified 

capability gaps and shortfalls of the combatant commanders? 
54 

General CHEEK. The Services track budget execution of all resource allocations; 

they do not uniquely track Air-Sea Battle (ASB) recommendations outside the ASB 

office. 

Mr. FORBES. In the view of the service programmers, how did the Air-Sea Battle 

Office specifically influence the outcome of the Fiscal Year 2014 President’s Budget 

submission and the FY15–FY18 future years defense program? Provide under classified cover if necessary. 

General CHEEK. The recommendations provided by the Air-Sea Battle office to 

Army G3 and G8 provided a complementary supporting view for maintenance or increased funding for several areas within the Army Program. The most significant 

of these fell within the areas of Integrated Air and Missile Defense, Cyber, and 

Space. 

Mr. FORBES. How are service-specific capability gaps/shortfalls, requirements and 

programmatic assessments authored by the Air-Sea Battle Office vetted and coordinated within each service and subsequently with outside organizations such as 

OSD(CAPE), USD(AT&L), the Joint Staff, and the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council? 

General CHEEK. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office does not author capability gaps. 

Each Service assesses its specific capability gaps/shortfalls. These gaps are reviewed 

by the ASB office for applicability in countering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) 

challenges. Additionally, Service-provided solutions are consolidated in order to provide a more holistic view of the collective Service efforts addressing the A2/AD 

threat. This broad view of ongoing efforts allows the ASB office to identify opportunities for multi-Service collaboration and make recommendations to their respective 

Services for inclusion in existing processes to include the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The ASB office is a multi-Service organization, thus recommendations 

originate within Service processes. 

Mr. FORBES. What role(s) will the Air-Sea Battle Office perform for the services 

during development of the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)? 

General CHEEK. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office is not assigned a specific QDR 

role, however the QDR working groups that may include topics of ASB relevance 

have ASB-informed Service representatives participate in their QDR deliberations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As I look at the Air-Sea Battle strategy, I don’t see a lot that is 

fundamentally new—in most cases this is activity and thought that has been ongoing for some time. 

What changed to merit the creation of the ASB office, and what about the current 

joint structure was inadequate? In other words, what is the secret sauce that ASB 

is providing that no one else can, and why wasn’t it already being done? 

Admiral FOGGO. Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities and strategies are 

not new. The objective to deny an adversary both access and the ability to maneuver 

remain timeless precepts of warfare. The difference today is that technological advances and proliferation of A2/AD capabilities threaten stability by empowering potential adversaries with previously unattainable military capabilities. A new generation of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles with improved range, 

accuracy, and lethality is being produced and proliferated. Modern submarines and 

fighter aircraft are entering the militaries of many nations, while sea mines are 

being equipped with mobility, discrimination and autonomy. Space and cyberspace 

have never been more important and will be contested by our adversaries. The pervasiveness and advancement of computer technology and reliance on the internet 

and usable networks are creating means and opportunity for computer network attack by numerous state and non-state aggressors, and the domain of space is now 

integral to such military capabilities as communications, surveillance, and positioning. In certain scenarios, even low-tech capabilities, such as rudimentary sea 

mines, fast-attack small craft, or shorter range artillery and missile systems render 

transit into and through the commons vulnerable to interdiction by coercive, aggressive actors, slowing or stopping free movement. The range and scale of possible effects from these capabilities presents a military problem set that threatens the U.S. 

and allied warfare model of power projection and maneuver. 

In response to this changing environment, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 

directed the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force to address this challenge 

and develop an operational concept as a means of refocusing the joint force on these 

developing threats. The ‘secret sauce’ in ASB revolves around the central idea that 

better networked, integrated forces capable of attacking and defending in depth will 

be capable of disrupting, destroying, and defeating rapidly maturing and prolifer-
55 

ating A2/AD threats, while simultaneously maintaining joint assured access. While 

at first this effort was outside the Joint Staff and focused on primarily air and naval 

capabilities—it has since become integrated into a larger force development effort 

focused on capabilities in all domains including those needed to gain and maintain 

access ashore. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The ASB office exists within a very crowded organizational construct—CAPE, AT&L, the Joint Staff, and the JROC, among others. How do the 

services assess the roles and functions of the ASB office in relation to the servicespecific and joint organizational constructs? What happens if the ASB office and the 

joint staff, the combatant commanders, or the services disagree? 

Admiral FOGGO. The Services view the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office as one of several valuable complementary perspectives that inform and enhance individual service viewpoints and encourages multi-Service cooperation in force development activities such as wargaming, experimentation, and exercises. 

Any disagreement would be raised to the appropriate level in the respective chain 

of command, starting with the ASB Senior Steering Group (2-star) and the ASB Executive Committee (3-star) as outlined in our Memorandum of Understanding. 

It is important to note that the ASB Office meets routinely with the Joint Staff 

and Combatant Command staffs and their components to discuss initiatives, receive 

input, and coordinate future activity. This has greatly helped to avoid disagreements and disputes over roles and functions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What authorities does the office have in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, and does this include authority with regard 

to research and development investments? 

Can you provide some concrete examples of how the ASB office has affected service budget priorities that otherwise would have been substantially different? I bring 

this up as the ASB concept seems to place a heavy premium on certain asymmetric 

or next-generation capabilities—undersea warfare capabilities such as the Virginiaclass and Virginia Payload Module, advanced EW, full integration of cyber fires, 

next-generation weapons such as directed energy and rail guns, and durable space 

capabilities, among others. I would say that the services and the joint staff already 

recognize the value of these capabilities, and they are appropriately budgeting for 

them, broadly speaking, given the current fiscal constraints. 

Admiral FOGGO. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office has no authorities in the development of the Services’ budget. This is an individual Service Title 10 responsibility. 

The ASB Office provides a complementary perspective to the analyses conducted by 

the Services. This additional perspective informs and enhances planning, communicates individual service viewpoints, encourages increased Service collaboration, 

and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors and programmers to use in 

their established deliberations. ASB recommendations have been well aligned with 

Service emphasis areas and have had particular impact shaping training, exercises, 

and wargames where the ASB Concept is tested and evaluated for incorporation into 

operational and strategic planning. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office recommended that each of the 

services needs to continue to implement specific actions within their organization, 

train and equip roles. In particular, one such action item was that ‘‘Full command 

and control connectivity and nodal linkages between Air and Space Operations Centers (AOCs) and Maritime Operation Centers (MOCs) do not currently exist.’’ Does 

the ASB concept have concerns about this capability gap that are not already encompassed within the future Joint Information Environment construct, which includes ‘‘networked operations centers, core data centers, and a global identity management system with cloud-based applications and services’’? 

Admiral FOGGO. The only concern that is not already encompassed within the future Joint Information Environment construct is integrated AOC/MOC training. 

Joint training and exercises that integrate AOC and MOC operations on a habitual 

basis are needed to form permanent relationships between the two communities. 

This training should seek to proliferate best practices as Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures that can be used or adapted across Service and Unified Command lines. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. ASB heavily emphasizes cyber capabilities. However, the operational thought constructs seem to assume a much higher level of delegation of authority for cyber actions than currently exists. I am aware that OSD is working 

through some of the very thorny issues regarding the use of cyber capabilities, but 

to what extent does ASB inform that process, if it does at all? 

Admiral FOGGO. The ASB Concept identified the need for both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, but each of the Services must determine its own required 

capabilities. Delegation of authority policies are scenario specific and must still be 

developed through the collaborative efforts of OSD, Joint Staff, and the Combatant 
56 

Commander. The Air-Sea Battle Office informs that process through lessons learned 

from war games and exercises. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Training in the complex environments of the future is a huge challenge that I know has been an issue for some time—particularly the ability to integrate cyber and EW. While certainly there have been some strides in the generation 

of those training capabilities, I think we would all agree that the status quo is not 

adequate. What does ASB add to the services’ current efforts to create that ability? 

What was the current joint planning environment unable to provide? 

Admiral FOGGO. All modern military operations are heavily reliant on the use of 

cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The Air Sea Battle (ASB) Concept and each of the Services assume that these will be increasingly challenged by 

sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)-capable adversaries. The ASB Office 

maintains awareness of ongoing Service actions to mitigate those challenges and improve the ability of the Joint Force to operate in the presence of these threats. The 

ASB Office established working groups comprised of subject matter experts from 

across the Services in both Electronic Warfare and Cyberspace Operations, among 

others. During January 2014, the ASB Office will convene its annual planning workshop as part of the FY14 ASB Implementation Master Plan activities. During this 

workshop, participants will review and organize the planned exercise, experimentation, training, etc., activities within each of the Services in order to determine the 

collective ‘‘roadmap’’ toward improvements in capabilities in the presence of A2/AD 

threats. The Working Group participants will draw from their expertise to make recommendations on improvements to existing activities, and identify any additional 

activities that will be provided back to the Services through existing lines of communication. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As I look at the Air-Sea Battle strategy, I don’t see a lot that is 

fundamentally new—in most cases this is activity and thought that has been ongoing for some time. 

What changed to merit the creation of the ASB office, and what about the current 

joint structure was inadequate? In other words, what is the secret sauce that ASB 

is providing that no one else can, and why wasn’t it already being done? 

General STOUGH. Events of recent decades demonstrated the decisive results U.S. 

joint forces can achieve when allowed to flow combat power into an operational area 

unimpeded. Yet few if any enemies perceived that they possessed the ability to deny 

U.S. access by armed opposition, and U.S. operational access during that period was 

essentially unopposed. What is new is that the ability to ensure operational access 

in the future is being challenged—and may well be the most difficult operational 

challenge U.S. forces will face over the coming decades. Increasingly capable future 

enemies will see the adoption of A2/AD strategy against the United States as a favorable course of action. The combination of three major trends has altered the calculus: (1) The dramatic improvement and proliferation of weapons and other technologies capable of denying access to or freedom of action within an operational 

area. (2) The changing U.S. overseas defense posture. (3) The emergence of space 

and cyberspace as increasingly important and contested domains. 

With the evolving A2/AD challenges comes the requirement to conduct cross domain operations—the central idea of the Joint Operational Access Concept—to overcome those challenges. Cross domain operations requires an increased level of integration during force development, and seeing a need to do so the Air Force, Navy, 

and Marine Corps (and later joined by the Army) leaned forward to develop the ASB 

Concept and to establish the ASB Office. Subsequent approval of the Joint Operational Access Concept provided the overarching framework for how to develop the 

Joint force to respond to access challenges, and ASB Office efforts now remain complementary and supportive of JOA implementation. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The ASB office exists within a very crowded organizational construct—CAPE, AT&L, the Joint Staff, and the JROC, among others. How do the 

services assess the roles and functions of the ASB office in relation to the servicespecific and joint organizational constructs? What happens if the ASB office and the 

joint staff, the combatant commanders, or the services disagree? 

General STOUGH. As capability requirements are identified and brought forward 

for validation, the Joint Staff conducts an independent assessment of the analysis 

and recommendations of the capability sponsor. As the documentation describing capability requirements are staffed through Joint Capabilities and Development System (JCIDS) to the Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC), views from the 

various equity holders are raised and adjudicated appropriately. The final arbiter 

of disagreements with respect to capability requirements is the JROC where CAPE 

and AT&L are statutory advisors, and the applicable Combatant Commanders are 

encouraged to attend and provide input. 
57 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What authorities does the office have in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, and does this include authority with regard 

to research and development investments? 

Can you provide some concrete examples of how the ASB office has affected service budget priorities that otherwise would have been substantially different? I bring 

this up as the ASB concept seems to place a heavy premium on certain asymmetric 

or next-generation capabilities—undersea warfare capabilities such as the Virginia- class and Virginia Payload Module, advanced EW, full integration of cyber fires, 

next-generation weapons such as directed energy and rail guns, and durable space 

capabilities, among others. I would say that the services and the joint staff already 

recognize the value of these capabilities, and they are appropriately budgeting for 

them, broadly speaking, given the current fiscal constraints. 

General STOUGH. The responsibility for planning, programming, budgeting, and 

execution process, and the authority for research and development investments resides with the Services per Title 10 U.S.C. On behalf of the Services, the ASB Office 

analyzes needed future military capabilities based upon current and programmed 

force structure and capabilities and compares this to the desired end-state of the 

ASB Concept. The resultant gaps in capability are documented and provided to the 

Services for their endorsement and development. 

The ASB Office is the appropriate organization to provide concrete examples of 

how the ASB Office efforts have affected service budget priorities that otherwise 

would have been substantially different. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office recommended that each of the 

services needs to continue to implement specific actions within their organization, 

train and equip roles. In particular, one such action item was that ‘‘Full command 

and control connectivity and nodal linkages between Air and Space Operations Centers (AOCs) and Maritime Operation Centers (MOCs) do not currently exist.’’ Does 

the ASB concept have concerns about this capability gap that are not already encompassed within the future Joint Information Environment construct, which includes ‘‘networked operations centers, core data centers, and a global identity management system with cloud-based applications and services’’? 

General STOUGH. The Joint Information Environment (JIE) will adequately address connectivity and nodal linkages between the Air and Space Operations Centers and Maritime Operation Centers. The JIE establishes a more secure and effective information technology infrastructure that will enable better connectivity and 

communications between Air and Space Operations Centers (AOCs) and Maritime 

Operation Centers (MOCs). With the development of networked JIE Enterprise Operations Centers and core data centers under the JIE construct, there will also be 

increased capability to share information between AOCs and MOCs. 

In addition, the JIE provides a more seamless means of collaborating between 

these two centers as standards, procedures, policies and techniques are no longer 

Service specific, but defined and conducted at a true joint level. While unique command, control, communications and computer (C4) systems to each center would still 

potentially pose a capability gap, the JIE enhances the overall fusion of joint C4 systems by ensuring the visibility and accessibility of data to improve operations. 

To specifically address the Services’ responsibilities in training for the Air Sea 

Battle, the JSJ7 Deputy Directorate for Joint Environment is moving to provide an 

accurate replication of the Joint Information Environment (JIE) construct to enable 

distributed training. The Joint Staff and the Services will be compliant with the JIE 

construct for Joint Force Development activities, enhancing overall ASB strategy efforts. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Training in the complex environments of the future is a huge challenge that I know has been an issue for some time—particularly the ability to integrate cyber and EW. While certainly there have been some strides in the generation 

of those training capabilities, I think we would all agree that the status quo is not 

adequate. What does ASB add to the services’ current efforts to create that ability? 

What was the current joint planning environment unable to provide? 

General STOUGH. The Joint Staff defers to the ASB Office to answer this question. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As I look at the Air-Sea Battle strategy, I don’t see a lot that is 

fundamentally new—in most cases this is activity and thought that has been ongoing for some time. 

What changed to merit the creation of the ASB office, and what about the current 

joint structure was inadequate? In other words, what is the secret sauce that ASB 

is providing that no one else can, and why wasn’t it already being done? 

General JONES. Anti-access and area denial capabilities and strategies are not 

new. The objective to deny an adversary both access and the ability to maneuver 

remain timeless precepts of warfare. What is different now is that technological advances and proliferation of A2/AD capabilities threaten stability by empowering po-
58 

tential adversaries with previously unattainable military capabilities. A new generation of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles with improved range, 

accuracy, and lethality is being produced and proliferated. Modern submarines and 

fighter aircraft are entering the militaries of many nations, while sea mines are 

being equipped with mobility, discrimination and autonomy. Both space and cyberspace are becoming increasingly important and contested. The pervasiveness and 

advancement of computer technology and reliance on the internet and usable networks are creating means and opportunity for computer network attack by numerous state and non-state aggressors, and the domain of space is now integral to such 

military capabilities as communications, surveillance, and positioning. In certain 

scenarios, even low-tech capabilities, such as rudimentary sea mines, fast-attack 

small craft, or shorter range artillery and missile systems render transit into and 

through the commons vulnerable to interdiction by coercive, aggressive actors, slowing or stopping free movement. The range and scale of possible effects from these 

capabilities presents a military problem set that threatens the U.S. and allied warfare model of power projection and maneuver. We have taken our collective eye off 

these developments, mainly because U.S. and allied forces have enjoyed uncontested 

freedom of combined action in the air, sea, space, and cyber domains for more than 

a generation. Going forward, we anticipate adversaries will actively oppose deployment and sustainment of our joint forces. 

In response to this changing environment, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 

directed the Departments of the Navy and the Air Force to address this challenge 

and develop a new operational concept. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The ASB office exists within a very crowded organizational construct—CAPE, AT&L, the Joint Staff, and the JROC, among others. How do the 

services assess the roles and functions of the ASB office in relation to the servicespecific and joint organizational constructs? What happens if the ASB office and the 

joint staff, the combatant commanders, or the services disagree? 

General JONES. The Services view the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office as one of several valuable complementary perspectives that inform and enhance individual service viewpoints and encourages multi-Service cooperation in force development activities such as wargaming, experimentation, and exercises. 

Any disagreement would be raised to the appropriate level in the respective chain 

of command, starting with the ASB Senior Steering Group (2-star) and the ASB Executive Committee (3-star) as outlined in our Memorandum of Understanding. 

It is important to note that the ASB Office meets routinely with the Joint Staff 

and Combatant Command staffs and their components to discuss initiatives, receive 

input, and coordinate future activity. In addition, the Joint Staff J7 attends the ASB 

Senior Steering Group meetings. This has greatly helped to avoid disagreements 

and disputes over roles and functions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What authorities does the office have in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, and does this include authority with regard 

to research and development investments? 

Can you provide some concrete examples of how the ASB office has affected service budget priorities that otherwise would have been substantially different? I bring 

this up as the ASB concept seems to place a heavy premium on certain asymmetric 

or next-generation capabilities—undersea warfare capabilities such as the Virginiaclass and Virginia Payload Module, advanced EW, full integration of cyber fires, 

next-generation weapons such as directed energy and rail guns, and durable space 

capabilities, among others. I would say that the services and the joint staff already 

recognize the value of these capabilities, and they are appropriately budgeting for 

them, broadly speaking, given the current fiscal constraints. 

General JONES. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office has no authorities in the development of the Services’ budget. The ASB Office provides a complementary perspective 

to the analyses conducted by the Services. This additional perspective informs and 

enhances planning, communicates individual service viewpoints, encourages increased Service collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors 

and programmers to use in their established deliberations. ASB recommendations 

have been well aligned with Service emphasis areas and have had particular impact 

shaping training, exercises, and wargames where the ASB Concept are tested and 

evaluated for incorporation into operational and strategic planning. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office recommended that each of the 

services needs to continue to implement specific actions within their organization, 

train and equip roles. In particular, one such action item was that ‘‘Full command 

and control connectivity and nodal linkages between Air and Space Operations Centers (AOCs) and Maritime Operation Centers (MOCs) do not currently exist.’’ Does 

the ASB concept have concerns about this capability gap that are not already encompassed within the future Joint Information Environment construct, which in-
59 

cludes ‘‘networked operations centers, core data centers, and a global identity management system with cloud-based applications and services’’? 

General JONES. The only concern that is not already encompassed within the future Joint Information Environment construct is integrated AOC/MOC training. Examining opportunities to develop joint training and exercises that integrate AOC 

and MOC operations on a habitual basis to form permanent relationships between 

the two communities is relevant to DOD and the Air-Sea Battle Office is engaging 

in those areas. The training should seek to proliferate the best practices as Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) that can be used or adapted across Service and 

Unified Command lines. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Training in the complex environments of the future is a huge challenge that I know has been an issue for some time—particularly the ability to integrate cyber and EW. While certainly there have been some strides in the generation 

of those training capabilities, I think we would all agree that the status quo is not 

adequate. What does ASB add to the services’ current efforts to create that ability? 

What was the current joint planning environment unable to provide? 

General JONES. All modern military operations are heavily reliant on the use of 

cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The Air Sea Battle (ASB) Concept and each of the Services assume that these will be increasingly challenged by 

sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)-capable adversaries. The ASB Office 

maintains awareness of ongoing Service actions to mitigate those challenges and improve the ability of the Joint Force to operate in the presence of these threats. The 

ASB Office established working groups comprised of subject matter experts from 

across the Services in both Electronic Warfare and Cyberspace Operations, among 

others. During January 2014, the ASB Office will convene its annual planning workshop as part of the FY14 ASB Implementation Master Plan activities. During this 

workshop, participants will review and organize the planned exercise, experimentation, training, etc., activities within each of the Services in order to determine the 

collective ‘‘roadmap’’ toward improvements in capabilities in the presence of A2/AD 

threats. The Working Group participants will draw from their expertise to make recommendations on improvements to existing activities, and identify any additional 

activities that will be provided back to the Services through existing lines of communication. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The ASB office exists within a very crowded organizational construct—CAPE, AT&L, the Joint Staff, and the JROC, among others. How do the 

services assess the roles and functions of the ASB office in relation to the servicespecific and joint organizational constructs? What happens if the ASB office and the 

joint staff, the combatant commanders, or the services disagree? 

General KILLEA. The Services view the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office as one of several valuable forums and complementary perspectives that help inform and enhance 

individual service viewpoints and encourage multi-Service cooperation in force development activities such as wargaming, experimentation, and exercises. 

Any disagreement would be raised to the appropriate level in the respective chain 

of command, starting with the ASB Senior Steering Group (2-star) and the ASB Executive Committee (3-star) as outlined in our Memorandum of Understanding. 

It is important to note that the ASB Office meets routinely with the Joint Staff 

and Combatant Command staffs and their components to discuss initiatives, receive 

input, and coordinate future activity. This has greatly helped to avoid disagreements and disputes over roles and functions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What authorities does the office have in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, and does this include authority with regard 

to research and development investments? 

Can you provide some concrete examples of how the ASB office has affected service budget priorities that otherwise would have been substantially different? I bring 

this up as the ASB concept seems to place a heavy premium on certain asymmetric 

or next-generation capabilities—undersea warfare capabilities such as the Virginiaclass and Virginia Payload Module, advanced EW, full integration of cyber fires, 

next-generation weapons such as directed energy and rail guns, and durable space 

capabilities, among others. I would say that the services and the joint staff already 

recognize the value of these capabilities, and they are appropriately budgeting for 

them, broadly speaking, given the current fiscal constraints. 

General KILLEA. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Office has no authorities in the development of the Services’ budget. The ASB Office provides a complementary perspective to the analyses conducted by the Services. This additional perspective informs 

and enhances planning, communicates individual service viewpoints, encourages increased Service collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors 

and programmers to use in their established deliberations. Some of ASB rec-
60 

ommendations have been aligned with various Service emphasis areas and have 

shaped some training, exercises, and wargames. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Training in the complex environments of the future is a huge challenge that I know has been an issue for some time—particularly the ability to integrate cyber and EW. While certainly there have been some strides in the generation 

of those training capabilities, I think we would all agree that the status quo is not 

adequate. What does ASB add to the services’ current efforts to create that ability? 

What was the current joint planning environment unable to provide? 

General KILLEA. All modern military operations are heavily reliant on the use of 

cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The Air Sea Battle (ASB) Concept and each of the Services assume that these will be increasingly challenged by 

sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)-capable adversaries. The ASB Office 

maintains awareness of ongoing Service actions to mitigate those challenges and improve the ability of the Joint Force to operate in the presence of these threats. The 

ASB Office established working groups comprised of subject matter experts from 

across the Services in both Electronic Warfare and Cyberspace Operations, among 

others. During January 2014, the ASB Office will convene its annual planning workshop as part of the FY14 ASB Implementation Master Plan activities. During this 

workshop, participants will review and organize the planned exercise, experimentation, training, etc., activities within each of the Services in order to determine the 

collective ‘‘roadmap’’ toward improvements in capabilities in the presence of A2/AD 

threats. The Working Group participants will draw from their expertise to make recommendations on improvements to existing activities, and identify any additional 

activities that will be provided back to the Services through existing lines of communication. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The ASB office exists within a very crowded organizational construct—CAPE, AT&L, the Joint Staff, and the JROC, among others. How do the 

services assess the roles and functions of the ASB office in relation to the servicespecific and joint organizational constructs? What happens if the ASB office and the 

joint staff, the combatant commanders, or the services disagree? 

General CHEEK. The Services view the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office as one of several complementary perspectives that inform and enhance individual service viewpoints and encourages multi-Service cooperation in force development activities such 

as wargaming, experimentation, and exercises. Any disagreement would be raised 

to the appropriate level in the respective chain of command, starting with the ASB 

Senior Steering Group (2-star) and the ASB Executive Committee (3-star) as outlined in our Memorandum of Understanding. The ASB office also meets with the 

Joint Staff and Combatant Command staffs and their components to discuss initiatives, receive input, and coordinate future activity within existing processes. This 

has greatly helped to avoid disagreements and disputes over roles and functions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What authorities does the office have in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process, and does this include authority with regard 

to research and development investments? 

Can you provide some concrete examples of how the ASB office has affected service budget priorities that otherwise would have been substantially different? I bring 

this up as the ASB concept seems to place a heavy premium on certain asymmetric 

or next-generation capabilities—undersea warfare capabilities such as the Virginiaclass and Virginia Payload Module, advanced EW, full integration of cyber fires, 

next-generation weapons such as directed energy and rail guns, and durable space 

capabilities, among others. I would say that the services and the joint staff already 

recognize the value of these capabilities, and they are appropriately budgeting for 

them, broadly speaking, given the current fiscal constraints. 

General CHEEK. The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) office has no authorities in the development of the Services’ budget. The ASB office provides a complementary perspective 

to the analyses conducted by the Services. This additional perspective informs and 

enhances planning, communicates individual service viewpoints, encourages increased Service collaboration, and acts as a touchstone for Service resource sponsors 

and programmers to use in their established deliberations. ASB recommendations 

have been well aligned with Service emphasis areas and have had particular impact 

shaping training, exercises, and wargames where the ASB Concept are tested and 

evaluated for incorporation into operational and strategic planning. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Training in the complex environments of the future is a huge challenge that I know has been an issue for some time—particularly the ability to integrate cyber and EW. While certainly there have been some strides in the generation 

of those training capabilities, I think we would all agree that the status quo is not 

adequate. What does ASB add to the services’ current efforts to create that ability? 

What was the current joint planning environment unable to provide? 
61 

General CHEEK. All modern military operations are heavily reliant on the use of 

cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The Air Sea Battle (ASB) Concept and each of the Services assume that these will be increasingly challenged by 

sophisticated anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)-capable adversaries. The ASB office 

maintains awareness of ongoing Service actions to mitigate those challenges and improve the ability of the Joint Force to operate in the presence of these threats. The 

ASB office is again establishing working groups comprised of subject matter experts 

from across the Services in both Electronic Warfare and Cyberspace Operations, 

among others, in support of its annual planning workshop to be held in January 

2014 as part of the FY14 ASB Implementation Master Plan activities. During this 

workshop, participants will review and organize the planned exercise, experimentation, training, etc., activities within each of the Services in order to determine the 

collective ‘‘roadmap’’ toward improvements in capabilities in the presence of A2/AD 

threats. The Working Group participants will draw from their expertise to make recommendations on improvements to existing activities, and identify any additional 

activities that will be provided back to the Services through existing lines of communication. 

Æ