### FILED NOVEMBER 1, 2016 In the Office ofthe Clerk ofCourt WA State Court ofAppeals, Division III

INTHE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE Inthe Matter ofthe ParentalRights to K.S.F.t ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 33774-0-III
UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, A.CJ. -KevinF. appeals from the trial court's order terminatinghis parentalrights to his son, K.S.F. He argues the trial court erredin finding that all necessary services hadbeen offered orprovidedbecausethe DepartmentofSocial andHealth Services (DSHS) failed toprovidebonding and attachmenttherapy. 

### Mr. F. also argues thatbecauseDSHS didnotofferproper services, the trial courtprematurely found thathewas unfit, that little likelihoodexistedthatconditions wouldbe remedied so K.S.F. couldbereturnedtohim in the near future, and thatterminationwas inK.S.F.'s bestinterests. We affirm thetermination order.

t Toprotectthe minor's identity, weuse initials for the child's name, and aninitial for the father's last name.No. 33774-0-III ParentalRights to 

### K.S.F.
FACTS Mr. F. is the father ofK.S.F., who was born in August 2007. 1 Mr. F. has cerebral palsy. Throughout 2007 and 2008, DSHS received multiple referrals questioningMr. F.'s ability to care for K.S.F. The referrals alleged Mr. F. had asked the referent to feed, bathe, and change K.S.F. In May 2008, DSHS received a referral allegingthat K.S.F.
was crawling around onthe floor with dog and caturine and also had not eaten in 24 hours, except for some applesauce. In light ofthese referrals, DSHS provided family preservation services (FPS). The FPS provider determined Mr. F. and the mother were not capable ofparenting and that K.S.F. was unsafe in the home. DSHS then filed a dependency petition and placed K.S.F. in foster care. Following a contested fact finding hearing, the trial court found K.S.F. dependent. DSHS recommendedthe following services for Mr. F.: parenting education, a nursing child assessment satellite training (NCAST) assessment, applying for therapy and assistance equipmentwith a disability aid agency, participating in an occupational physical capacity evaluation, meeting with Developmental Disabilities Administration caseworkers and complying with theirrecommendations, and participating in individual counseling with a parenting component. DSHS also requested a psychological

1 K.S.F.'s mother is M.C. The trial court terminated M.C.'s parental rights before the trial in this case, and M.C. is not a party to this appeal.
2No. 33774-0-III ParentalRights to K.S.F.
evaluation. DSHS determinedthese were the appropriate services to address Mr. F.'s identifiedparental deficiencies. The trial court orderedMr. F. to completethese services. In October 2008, Dr. Roland Dougherty, a clinical psychologist, performed a psychological evaluation on Mr. F. DSHS also referred Mr. F. and K.S.F. for a bonding and attachment assessment with Jennifer Obeid-Campbell, a bonding and attachment therapist. DSHS also contactedNancy Riggle, a parenting instructor, to review Mr. F.'s and K.S.F.'s files and recommend other supports and services. At subsequentreview hearings, the trial court also orderedMr. F. to: (1) comply with all bonding and attachmentrecommendations, (2) participate in parenting coaching with Michelle Leifheit, (3) meetwith DSHS caseworkers and other care providers to discuss accommodations that would assist him in caring for K.S.F., (4)participate in videotaped intensive interactive parenting, and (5) complete an updatedparenting educationprogram addressing K.S.F.'s developmental needs. Mr. F. also participated in nine months ofparenting instruction withAracelia Sanchez. The dependency lasted sixyears. Atreview hearings, the trial court consistently found thatMr. F. was in partial compliance with the court's prior orders buthad not made progress toward correctingthe problems that necessitated K.S.F.'s placementin foster
care. Mr. F. participated in services and occasionally made someprogress, butwas generally unsuccessful in improving his parental deficiencies. AlthoughMr. F. saidhe understood the service providers' instructions, he was unable to demonstrate those parenting skills orput whathe had learned into practice. He didnotcomplete his
3No. 33774-0-III ParentalRights to K.S.F. parenting education assignments consistently, did not utilize the recommended adaptive equipment, and failed to eliminate safety hazards in his apartment. He refused individual counseling throughout the dependency because he did not believe he needed it. Forthe lastyear ofthe dependency, Mr. F. stopped engaging in services altogether. DSHS filed the terminationpetition in December 2013. The terminationtrial began July 30, 2014. Attrial, DSHS called the four social workers who had worked on the case-CloreeseWilkinson-Rivera, Timothy Barbour, BrennaBlanscett, and Kathy Lund. DSHS also called Ms. Leifheit, Deborah Cox (aphysical therapist), Rachel Ockleston-Catt (an occupational therapist), Dr. Dougherty, Ms. Obeid-Campbell, Ms. Riggle, Ms. Sanchez, and both guardian ad litems (GALs) who had w~rked onthe caseTara Symons and John Fredrick. Ms. Sancheztestified that she saw some bonding between Mr. F. and K.S.F., but that their bond wasjustbuilding. She testified this was one ofthe reasons she recommended increasing the length ofvisitations. She also testifiedthat, to her knowledge, there were no other services Mr. F. needed that DSHS had not offered or provided. Ms. Leifheittestified that Mr. F. was not emotionally responsive to K.S.F., and that the two lacked a connection. She stated Mr. F. had a flat affect with K.S.F., had difficulty communicating with him, and was awkward with him. She also testified DSHS "madereasonable efforts in theirreferrals and services that they provided to Mr. [F.]." Report ofProceedings (RP) at 123.
4No. 33774-0-111 ParentalRights to KS.F.
Dr. Dougherty testified thathe administeredthe Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI-3), which is a standardizedtest designed to detect personality disorders. Dr. Dougherty testified Mr. F.'s scores onthis test suggested the possible presence ofa narcissistic personality disorder with negativistic, paranoid, and depressive features, which are difficult to treat. He testified he was reluctantto simply diagnose a personality disorderbecause Mr. F. has cerebral palsy, which entails various emotional, psychological, and social challenges. However, he believed these traits affected Mr. F.'s functioning and should be considered in treatment. Pertaining to treatment, Dr. Dougherty recommendedthat Mr. F. engage in psychotherapy/counseling. He notedthat Mr. F. was raised in an orphanage and had early problems with bonding and attachment. Dr. Dougherty believedMr. F.'s relationship problems with K.S.F.'s mother and Mr. F.'s attachment problems with K.S.F. were related to his own bonding and attachmentproblems, and that counseling could address these. Dr. Dougherty believed counseling could address Mr. F.'s negative personality characteristics and provide extra support in reuniting him with K.S.F. Dr. Dougherty also recommended continued parentingtraining for Mr. F. When asked if there were other services that could be offeredto Mr. F., Dr. Dougherty testifiedthat support groups may be helpful, although he questioned whetherMr. F. would use them effectively. Finally, DSHS asked Dr. Dougherty what effect it has on a childto be in longterm foster care withoutbeing physically and legally identified in a permanenthome. Dr.


### 5No. 33774-0-111 ParentalRights to K.S.F. Dougherty responded that it is best for childrento be in stable relationships withparents they feel bonded and attached to, and children are more likely to become securely bonded the soonerthey have a permanent home. Ms. Obeid-Campbell described the results ofthe bonding and attachment assessment. Ms. Obeid-Campbell testified that K.S.F.'s attachmentto Mr. F. was "nonindicative ofa secure attachment." RP at 203. She testified thatthe parenting dynamic
was very unstructured, butthat this was more illustrative ofMr. F.'s deficits than K.S.F.'s attachment to Mr. F. Ms. Obeid-Campbell believed it would be very difficult for Mr. F. to foster K.S.F.'s secure attachment development, as he did not provide K.S.F. with the necessary consistency, structure, and follow-through. Ms. Obeid-Campbell also noted Mr. F. had good empathy and nurturing ability. Mr. Barbourtestified that DSHS individualizedthis case and assessed Mr. F.'s specific needs. He testified he reviewed the reports and assessments from Mr. F.'s various providers and relied on this information in formulating his opinions and recommendations. Mr. Barbourreviewed Ms. Obeid-Campbell's bonding assessment and determined thatMr. F. had real strengths, such as his ability to empathize and nurture, but he also had limitations, which included providing structure, organizing, and preparingto carry outparenting tasks. Mr. Barbour's main impression from the bonding assessment was a concern about Mr. F.'s general lack ofparenting skills.

6No. 33774-0-111 ParentalRights to K.S.F.
Mr. Barbour described Mr. F. and K.S.F.'s relationship as generally positive, but indifferent. He did not believe there was a strong attachmentbetweenMr. F. and K.S.F. and believed that K.S.F. neededthis. Ms. Blanscetttestified that she reviewed all ofthe assessments, reports, and evaluations from all the various providers and took these into accountwhen making her recommendations. She stated the services DSHS offered would have assisted in correcting Mr. F.'sparental deficiencies ifhe wouldhave participated ordemonstrated progress. She further testifiedthatthere were no other services that would have helped during the period oftime she had the case. DSHS asked Ms. Riggle for her opinion onthe services DSHS had offered or provided andwhether she had any further recommendations. Ms. Riggle testifiedthat "[t]he services that had beenprovided were excellent." RP at 289. She later added that Mr. F. could have benefitted from supported living services or a residential program, but aside from these, she did not believe DSHS could have offered orprovided any other services that wouldhave helped Mr. F. parentK.S.F. Ms. Symons, who was the assigned GAL from 2008 to 2014, testified that [ t]herehas certainly been attachment issues the entire time andthatwas very evident since [K.S.F.] was a toddler. He was very resistantto his dad. Thatbond and attachment was clearly notthere
.

. . . The bondjustwasn'treally there and thatwas always a concern to me for [K.S.F.].

7No. 33774-0-III ParentalRights to 

### K.S.F.
RP at 309. Ms. Symons testified that a child with a secure attachmentto a caregiver depends on that caregiver to meet his orherneeds, and she never saw K.S.F. go to Mr. F. whenhe needed something. She testifiedthat K.S.F. "was aggressive with his dad. He would run away. He would pushhim away. He wouldn't go to him for any kind ofcomfort." RP at 315. When asked ifthe services DSHS offered orprovided were the appropriate services to address Mr. F.'sparental deficiencies, Ms. Symons agreed that they were. Mr. Fredrick, who was the assigned GAL from January 2014 until the termination trial, testified there was no parental bondbetween Mr. F. and K.S.F. He statedthe two did not connect, talk to each other, or look at each other. Instead, K.S.F. would ignore Mr. F. He also testified, based on his review ofall the records and the documents in the case, the services DSHS provided were the appropriate services to correctMr. F.'s parental deficiencies. Ms. Lund, the last social worker onthe case, also testifiedthat the services the court ordered were those necessary to correct Mr. F.'s deficiencies. Following presentation ofthe evidence and closing arguments, the trial court granted DSHS'spetition to terminate Mr. F.'sparental rights to K.S.F. In ordering termination, the trial court found DSHS had established each ofthe six elements contained in RCW 13.34.180(1) by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The trial court found that DSHS had offered orprovidedMr. F. all necessary services, reasonably available, capable ofcorrecting his parental deficiencies withinthe foreseeable future.
8No. 33774-0-III ParentalRights to K.S.F.
The trial court also found that there was little likelihood that conditions could be remedied so K.S.F. could be returned to Mr. F. in the near future. In making this finding, the trial court found thatthere was not a secure bond or attachment between Mr. F. and K.S.F., and that a secure bond would be very difficult for them to develop. The trial court also found thatMr. F. was unfit to parent, and that termination ofMr. F.'sparental rights was in K.S.F.'s best interests. Mr. F. appeals. ANALYSIS Parents have fundamental liberty and privacy interests in the care and custody of their children. In re Welfare of S.J, 162 Wn. App. 873, 880, 256 P.3d 470 (2011). Thus,
a court may terminate parental rights "'only for the most powerful [of] reasons.'" Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotingIn re Welfare of A.J.R., 78 Wn. App. 222, 229, 896 P.2d 1298 (1995)). Washington courts use a two-step process when deciding whetherto terminate parental rights. Id. First, DSHS must show that the statutory requirements in RCW 13.34.180(1) are established by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. S.J., 162 Wn. App. at 880. Second, DSHS must show.thattermination is in the best interests ofthe child by apreponderance ofthe evidence. Id. Only ifthe first step is satisfied may the courtreach the second step. Id. Under the first element, the statutory requirements that DSHS must allege and prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence are outlined in RCW 13.34.180(1):
9No. 33774-0-III ParentalRights to K.S.F. (a) Thatthe child has been found to be a dependent child; (b) Thatthe court has entered a dispositional orderpursuantto RCW 13.34.130; (c) That the child has beenremoved
... from the custody ofthe parent for a period ofat least six months pursuant to a finding of dependency; (d) Thatthe services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and understandably offered orprovided and all necessary services, reasonably available, capable ofcorrecting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered orprovided; (e) That there is little likelihood that conditions will beremedied so that the child can be returnedto the parent in the near future
.... (f) That continuation ofthe parent and childrelationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanenthome
.... Mr. F. challenges the trial court's finding regarding subsection (d) and argues the trial court's finding regarding subsection (e) was premature. This court'sreview is limitedto determining ifsubstantial evidence supports the trial court's findings offact. S.J, 162 Wn. App.at 881. "Evidence is substantial ifit is sufficientto persuade a fairmindedperson ofthe truth ofthe declared premise." Id. Because the trial court has the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the witnesses, its factual findings are entitled to great deference. Id. This court does not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence on review. Id. A. NECESSARY SERVICES Mr. F. argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court's finding thatDSHS offered or provided all necessary services. Specifically, Mr. F. argues that

10No. 33774-0-III ParentalRights to K.S.F.
DSHS failed to offer bonding and attachment therapy. He argues thatDr. Dougherty recommended this service, and also cites testimony from the social workers, various providers, and GALs describing how he and K.S.F. lacked a secure attachment. To satisfy its statutory b~rden under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d), DSHS is required to offer orprovide "all necessary services, reasonably available, capable ofcorrectingthe parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future." When a condition prevents a parent and child from reunifying, DSHS mustprovide any necessary services to address that condition, regardless ofwhether it can be labeled a "parental deficiency." In re Parental Rights to K.MM,
_ Wn.2d_, 379 P.3d 75, 83 (2016). Thus, a service is "necessary" within the meaning ofthe statute ifit is needed to address a condition thatprecludes reunification ofthe parent and child. Id. DSHS must also tailorthe services it offers to meet each individual parent's needs. S.J, 162 Wn. App. at 881. Mr. F. relies on 

### S.J. In 

### S.J, the motherrectifiedthe unsanitary living conditions and substance abuse issues that led to the dependency, and she and the childthen began participating in therapeutic visitation. Id. at 876-77. Duringvisits, the child became increasingly resistant, controlling, and aggressive toward the mother. Id. at 877. The mother "faithfully kept the scheduled visitations and had applied parenting suggestions" but met increasing resistance from the child. Id. The mother suspected her child had detached from her, so she requested attachmenttherapy from her FPS therapist. Id. The social worker identified bonding and attachment as a major issue betweenthe mother and child. Id. at 878. However, he did notrefer them for bonding and attachmenttherapy
11No. 33774-0-III ParentalRights to K.SF.
because he incorrectly believedthey were already getting similar services from the parent educator, the mother did not complain about those services, and he did not want to burden the mother with additional services. Id. The trial court terminated the mother's parental rights, finding that despite her engagement in services she nevertheless failed to repair herrelationship with the child. Id. at 879. The SJ court reversed, holding that DSHS had notprovided all necessary services. Id. at 884. The court reasoned that DSHS had identified attachment and bonding as a "major issue," butthen failed to provide attachment and bonding services. Id. at 883. The SJ court further reasoned that the mother applied the suggested parenting skills and that it was DSHS'sresponsibility to try to reduce the child's controlling and aggressive behavior related to his detachment-notthe mother's responsibility. Id. Another instructive case is In re ParentalRights to K.JB., 188 Wn. App. 263,354 P.3d 879 (2015), review granted, 184 Wn.2d 1033, 366 P.3d 932 (2016). In that case, the trial court found the child dependent and then ordered the father to complete drug and alcohol evaluation and treatment, urinalysis testing, and parenting assessment and instruction. Id. at 267. The father neverremedied his substance abuse issues, and the trial court terminated his parental rights. Id. at 267, 272. On appeal, the father, relying on S.J, argued that counseling and a mental health assessment were necessary services for correcting his identifiedparenting deficiency of substance abuse, and DSHS should have therefore offered them. Id. at 279. This court
12No. 33774-0-III ParentalRights to K.S.F. distinguished 

### S.J, reasoning that the trial courtnever ordered a mental health assessment
or mental health counseling, and none ofthe social workers involved in the case testified that the father had a mental health issue that required evaluation or services. Id. at 280. In this case, the trial court found that Mr. F. and K.S.F. did not have a strong bond
or attachment. The parties do not dispute this finding. Thus, in determining whether bonding and attachment therapy was a necessary service underRCW 13.34.180(l)(d), the central question is whetherthis lack ofbonding and attachmentpreventedMr. F. and K.S.F. from reunifying. Ifit did, it was a necessary service. There was no evidence at trial that bonding and attachmenttherapy was needed to address any condition thatprecluded Mr. F. and K.S.F. from reunifying. This case is therefore unlike 

### S.J because in that case the motherhad remedied her otherparental deficiencies and the main conditionpreventing her and the child from reunifying was her inability to rectify herrelationship with the child. 

### S.J, 162 Wn. App. at 878. In contrast, the conditions here that precluded Mr. F. and K.S.F. from reunifying were Mr. F.'s "failure to participate in recommended services, failure to demonstrate progress in improving his parental deficiencies, and failure to make progress overthe substantial period oftime ofthe dependency." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 105. Mr. F.'s deficiencies included his "lack ofparenting skills, mental health issues, and lack ofmotivation to change." CP at 108. The implication is that ifthese deficiencies were corrected, Mr. F. and K.S.F. would be able to bond and attach.

13No. 33774-0-III ParentalRights to K.S.F
This case is more like K.JB., where the father argued on appeal that DSHS failed to provide counseling and a mental health assessment, but none ofthe social workers testified that the father actually needed those services. While it is true that Mr. F. and K.S.F. did not have a strong bond or attachment, the record does not supportMr. F.'s suggestion that this prevented the two from reunifying. 2 Accordingly, bonding and attachment therapy was not a necessary service. Contrary to Mr. F.'s argument, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that DSHS offered orprovided all necessary services. Mr. Barbour and Ms. Blanscettboth reviewed the assessments, reports, and evaluations from all the various providers and relied on this information in formulating their opinions and recommendations. Ms. Symons, Mr. Fredrick, and Ms. Lund all testified the services the court ordered and DSHS provided were the appropriate services to correctMr. F.'s parental deficiencies. Ms. Sanchez, Ms. Blanscett, and Ms. Riggle all testified there were
no other services Mr. F. needed that DSHS had not offered orprovided. 3

2 Our Supreme Court has recently issued decisions addressing the necessity of bonding and attachment services under RCW 13.34.180(l)(d). See, e.g., K.MM, 379 P.3d at 85-86 (affirming the termination orderbecause bonding and attachment services would have been futile); In re ParentalRights to B.P., 186 Wn.2d 292, 376 P.3d 350, 365 (2016) (reversingthe termination orderbecause DSHS failed to offer orprovide bonding or attachment services). These decisions are not applicable here, where there was no evidence that the lack ofbonding and attachment was a condition preventing reunification. 3Mr. F. asserts that "Dr. Dougherty recommended services to address attachment issues" between Mr. F. and K.S.F. Br. ofAppellant at 31. The service Dr. Dougherty recommended was psychotherapy/counseling. Dr. Dougherty believedMr. F. had bonding and attachment issues stemming from his childhood and believed counseling 14No. 33774-0-III ParentalRights to K.S.F.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that DSHS offered or provided all necessary, reasonably available services, and thereforeproved RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. B. UNFITNESS, LITTLE LIKELIHOOD FOR REMEDYING PARENTAL DEFICIENCIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND BEST INTERESTS Mr. F. finally argues that because DSHS did not offer orprovide bonding and attachment therapy, the trial courtprematurely found (1) he was unfitto parent, (2) there
was little likelihood his parental deficiencies would be remedied so K.S.F. could be returned to him in the near future, and (3) termination was in K.S.F.'s best interests. However, because we conclude that DSHS did in fact offer orprovide all necessary services, these three findings were notpremature. BecauseMr. F. does not argue that these findings are unsupported by substantial evidence, but rather hinges his argument on the assumption that he did not receive all necessary services, we need not analyze each finding individually. C. AXIS II "DIAGNOSIS" Mr. F. assigns errorto the following finding offact:

could address these. Dr. Dougherty also recommended continuedparenting training and suggested a support group, but never mentioned bonding and attachmenttherapy. 15No. 33774-0-III ParentalRights to K.S.F.
The father was diagnosed in apsychological evaluation with Axis II personality characteristics ofnarcissistic, negativistic, paranoid, and depressive traits, which were born out by the father's actions and behaviors throughout the dependency. These traits are difficult to treat and require the motivation to change, which the father failed to show. CP at 106 (Finding ofFact l.l 1(4)(q)). Mr. F. does not address this assignment of
error in the substantive portion ofhis brief. An appellant ordinarily waives an assignment oferror when he or she presents no argument in support ofthe assigned error. See In re Welfare of L.NB.-L., 157 Wn. App. 215, 243-44, 237 PJd944 (2010). But we exercise our discretion to address this finding so it does not have consequences beyondthis appeal. Mr. F. is correctthat substantial evidence does not supportthe finding that he was diagnosedwith these personality traits. Rather, Dr. Dougherty stated that Mr. F.'s scores on the MCMI-3 "suggestedthe possible presence" ofa personality disorder, butthat he was "reluctantto simply diagnose apersonality disorder" due to Mr. F.'s cerebral palsy. RP at 154, 159. But this factual finding is irrelevant for purposes ofthe termination order. The fact that Mr. F. was not diagnosed withthese personality traits does not impactthe trial court's ultimate finding that DSHS proved RCW 13.34.lSO(l)(d) by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

16No. 33774-0-III ParentalRights to K.S.F.
Affirmed. A majority ofthe panel has determinedthis opinionwill notbe printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, butitwill be filed for publicrecordpursuantto RCW 2.06.040.

WE CONCUR: 

## j 

# ~aW, ·~- Siddoway, J. ~.

17