1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r: ___ ____ ____ ____ 3 Fi lin g D at e: D ec em

be r 30, 201 4 4 N O. 33, 136 5 EI LEE N J. DALTO N, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v
. 8 SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC., 9 D ef

en da nt- Appe llant, 10 an d 11 PERFORMANCE AUTOMOT IVE GROUP, INC. 12 d/ b/ a PERFORMANCE B UICK PO NTI AC GMC; 13 LAWRE NCE BARELA; J ASON HI CKS; B DF 14 A C QU IS IT IO N S OF N EWM EX IC O, IN C . d /b /a 15 SI ERRA SANTA FE GMC BUI CK; TRAVEL ERS 16 CA SU ALT Y A ND SU RET Y C OMP AN Y; and 17 BRADFORD D. FU RRY, 18 D ef

en da nts . 19 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF SA NTAFE CO UN TY 20 Sa ra h M . S in gle to n, D ist ri ctJu dg e 21 Tr einen Law O ffice , P .C. 22 Rob Tre inen 23 Albuquerque, N M1 Public Justi ce, P. C.

2 Adrian A lvarez 3 W ashingt on, D .C. 4 for Appellee 5 Lewis Ro ca Ro th ge rb er LLP 6 Ro ss L. Crown 7 Jason C. Bouslim an 8 Albuquerque, N M 9 Ree d S m it h LLP 10 Marg ar et

A
. G ri gnon 11 Te rry B. Bates 12 K as ey J. Curt is 13 Los A ngeles, CA 14 fo r Appe llant1 OPIN ION

2 VA NZ I, Jud ge. 3 { 1} Inthi s c as e, w e de te rm ine w he the r an ar bitratio n sc he m e in a

ve hic le f inanc ing 4 co ntr ac t tha t ca rv es out e xc ep tio ns f

ro m m an da tor y a rb itr at ionf

or se lf -h el p and s m al l 5 cl ai m s r em ed ies i s su

bst an tiv el y

unc onsc ion ab le
. W e al so d et er m ine w he the r the 6 dis tr ic t c ourt i m

pr ope rl y shi ft ed th e bur de n of

pr oof a nd w he the r, a cc or din g to our 7 Suprem e Court’ s interpretation of federa l law, a finding of uncon scionabili ty under 8 th es e ci rcu m st an ces is pre em pt edby the Fed eral Arbi tra ti on Act (F AA). 9 { 2} T he dis put e he re aro se whe n E ile enD al ton( Pl ai nti ff ) fi le d su it ag ai nst 10 Santande r Co nsum er

U SA , I nc . ( D ef

en da nt) f or f ra ud, c o n v e r s ion , br ea chof

c ontra ct , 11 br ea chof

w ar ranty of ti tle , a nd v ar iou s vi ola tio ns o f the U nif orm Co m m er ci al Co de 12 (U CC ) an d th e U nf

ai r Prac tic es A ct . D ef

en da nt m ove d to c om

pe l arb itr at ionof 1 3 P l a i n t i f

f ’s c l a i ms . T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtd e t e rmi n e dt h a tt h e s e l f

- h e l p a n ds ma l l c l a i ms 14 carv e- out

pr ovi sio ns w er e unr ea sona bly one -s ided, re nde ri ng the a rb itr at ionc lause 15 une nf or ce ab le pur suant t o Riv e ra v . A m e ri c an G e ne ra l F i na nc i al S ervices, Inc. , 201 1- 16 NMS C-033, 150 N. M. 398, 259 P. 3d 80 3, and its progeny . W e af firm . W e hold that 17 the ar bitratio n clause is subs tanti ve ly unc onsc ion ab le be ca

use the pr ac tic al e ff

ec t of 18 the c ar

ve -o ut p ro vis ion s is to m an da te a rb itr at ionof P la int if f’ s m ost im portant and 19 m ost li ke ly c la im s w hil e exem

pti ng f ro m a rb itr at ionD ef

en da nt’ s m ost

im portant2

1 j udicial and no n-j udicial rem edies. W e further hold that the district court did n ot shift 2 the bu r d e n o f p r o o f a n d t h a t t h e F A A d o e s n o t p r e c l u d e t h e ap p l i c a t i on o f our 3 ge ne ra lly

appl ic ab le unc onsc ion ab ili ty doc tr ine und er

the se c ir cu m stanc es . 4 BACKGRO UND 5 { 3} De fe n d an ti s an Il l i n o i s -b as ed s ub p ri m e a u t o fi n an ce en t i t y. Pl ai n t i ff ’s 6 al le gatio ns i nvol ve ase ri es of a t l ea st tw o f

inanc e co ntr ac ts tha t w er e ap pa re ntl y sol d 7 to Defe ndant b y

ac ar de al er shi p op er at ed

by P er fo rm an ce A uto m oti ve G ro up 8 (Per fo rmance). The f

inance contracts contain identical arbitration clauses, w hich 9 sta te , in re le vant p ar

t: 10 Any clai m

or di sp ut e, whe th er i n c on tra ct , to rt, s ta tu te or o th erwi se . . . 11 be tw ee n y ou and u s or our e m plo y ee s, a ge nts , suc cess or s or a ssi gns, 12 w hic h ari se s ou t of or r el at es to y our

c re dit appl ic at ion , p ur ch ase or 13 co ndi tio n of

thi s ve hic le , thi s c ontra ct or a ny r es ult ing tr an sa ct ionor 14 re la tio nshi p ( inc lud ing a ny suc h re la tio nshi p w iththi rd part ie s w ho d o 15 not

sig n th is c ontra ct ) sha ll, a t y our or our e lec tio n, be r es olv ed

by 16 ne utr al , bin din g arb itr at iona nd n ot b y ac ourt a ct ion
. 17 D es pit e thi s swe ep ing langua ge , ase pa rate c lause the n e xpr es sly e xe m pts c er ta in 18 dis put es f

ro m m an da tor

y a rb itr at ion , pr ovi din g th at : 19 Y ou and w e re ta in an y ri ght s to s el f- he lp r em ed ie s, suc h a s r ep oss es sio n. 20 Y ou and w e re ta in the r igh t t o se ek r em ed ie s insm al l c la im s c ourt f or 21 dis put es or cl ai m s w ith in tha t co urt’ s j ur isd ic tio n, unl es s suc h ac tio n is 22 tra ns ferr ed , rem ov edor app eal edto a di ffer en t co ur t. Nei th er y ou no r we 23 w ai ve the r igh t t o arb itr at e by usi ng s el f- he lp r em ed ie s or f ili ng s uit
.3

1 T he c ontra ct s a lso pr ovi de th at the a rb itr at ionc lause s “ sha ll be gov er ne d by the 2 [FA A] .” 3 { 4} Plaintiff’ s com

plaint alleged that she purchased a Cadillac from Per form ance, 4 w ho the n sol d the fi na nc e co ntr ac t to D ef en da nt. D es pit e Pl ai nti ff

’ s ti m el y paym en ts 5 ac co rd ing to the te rm s of he r co ntr ac t, the Ca dil la c w as re poss es se d ei gh t m on ths 6 la te r by a nothe r cr ed ito r be ca

use P er fo rm an ce ha d f

ai le d to pa y of

f a pr ior li enon the 7 ve hic le
. I n r es pons e to the r ep oss es sio n, P er fo rm an ce a gr ee d to c re dit P la int if f the 8 $4,500 sh e had paid on the Cadillac toward th e p u rc h as e o f a substitute vehicle. 9 Pl ai nti ff

r et ur ne d to P er fo rm an ce , se le ct ed aP ont ia c G 6, a nd s ig ne d a se co nd 10 pur ch as e ag re em en t and f inanc e co ntr ac t, nowpr ovi din g f or ahig he r m onthly 11 paym en t. A lth oughthe f ac ts are in dis put e, the P ont ia c fi na nc e co ntr ac t, li ke the 12 Ca dil la c co ntr ac t be fo re it , m ay ha ve be en sol d to D ef en da nt. S hortly

the re af te r, a nd 13 for re asons th at are not clear, the Pontiac w as also repossessed. P l ai n t i ff was lef t 14 wit ho ut a ve hi cl e, an d h er $ 4,5 00 was n ev er re tu rn ed
. 15 { 5} Plain ti ff

f ile d su it ag ai nst

anum be r of c or por at e en tit ie s and i ndi vid ua ls 16 inv olv ed

in the se tr an sa ct ion s, inc lud ing D ef en da nt, a lle gin g f

ra ud, c onve rsion, 17 br ea chof

c ontra ct , br ea chof

w ar ranty of ti tle, an d vio la tio ns o f the U CC a nd the 18 Unfa ir Pr actices A ct. De fendant m oved to com pel arbitration pursuant to the identical 19 arbitration clauses in the Cad i llac and Pontiac contracts. The district court denied4

1 D ef en da nt ’s m oti on, r ea soni ng tha t the c ar ve -o ut p ro vis ion s w er e subs tanti al ly 2 sim ilar to the e xc ep tio ns fr om ar bitratio n tha t our

S upr em e Co urt e xa m ine d in R iv era . 3 T he dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed that s el f-h el p re m ed ie s are of absol ute ly

no u se to 4 co nsum er s lik e Pl ai nti ff an d tha t sm al l cl ai m s re m ed ie s ar e sim ilarlyone- sid ed , 5 re nde ri ng the ar

bitratio n pr ovi sio n subs tanti ve ly unc onsc ion ab le
. D ef en da nt t im el y 6 ap pe al ed
. 7 DISC US SION 8 Stand ard of R eview 9 { 6} T his Co urt r ev ie w s de nov o both the de nia l of am oti on t o c om

pe l arb itr at ion 10 an d t he is su e of

un co ns ci on ab il it y

of a co nt ract . Co rdov a v . W or ld Fin . Cor p. o f N.M. , 1 1 2009
- N M S C
- 0 2 1 , ¶ 1 1 , 1 4 6 N
. M
. 2 5 6 , 2 0 8 P
. 3 d 9 0 1
. W e a l s o ap p l ya de nov o 12 st an da rd of rev ie w to th e in te rp ret at io n of s ta tu te s, i nc lu di ng th e FAA. Strau sberg v. 13 Laurel Healthcare Providers, L LC , 201 3- N MS C- 032, ¶

25, 304 P
. 3d 4 09. 14 U nf air ly O ne -S id ed C ar ve -O utP ro vis ion s A re S ub st an ti ve ly U nc on sc ion ab le 15 { 7} “ [A ] f

ind ing of un co nsc ion ab ili ty m ay be ba se d one ith er

pr oc ed ur al or 16 subs tantive uncon scionabili ty , or a com binatio n of both.” R iv era , 201 1- N MS C- 033, 17 ¶ 47. In th is cas e, the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r uli ng and the a rg um en ts o n a ppe al ha ve onl y 18 ad dr es se d th e iss ue of subs tanti ve unc onsc ion ab ili ty . “ Su bst an tiv e unc onsc ion ab ili ty 19 co nc er

ns the le ga lity

a nd f ai rn es s of the c ontra ct te rm s them se lve s, an d the an al y sis5

1 fo cu se s onsuc h is sue s a s whe the r the c ontra ct te rm s are c om

m er ci al ly r ea sona ble a nd 2 fair, the purpose and effect of the term s, the one-sidedness of the term s, and ot her 3 sim ilar public poli cy

concerns.” Id

. ¶ 45 ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c itatio n 4 om itted). Thus, con tract provi sions that unreasonably benefit one party over another 5 have been held to be sub stantivelyunconscio nable. I d. ¶¶ 4 6, 5 3- 54
. 6 { 8} In Cordova , our

S upr em e Co urt hel d that a one -s ide d ar bitratio n pr ovi sio n in 7 a co nsum er

loan a gr ee m en t w as voi d a s unco nsc ion ab le
. 2009 -N MS C- 021, ¶ 1. T he 8 ar bitratio n c lause a t i ssu e w as w hol ly one -sid ed on i ts f

ac e. I n th e ev en t of

de fa ult , 9 it reserved the lender’ s optio n to avail itself of any and all “ rem edies in an action at 1 0 l aw o r i n eq u i t y, i n cl u d i n g b u t n o t l i m i t ed t o , ju d i ci al fo re cl o s u re o r r ep o s s es s i o n [, ]” 1 1 w hi l e s i m

u l t a n e o u s l y d e n y i n g a c c e s s t o t h e c o u rt s t o b o rr o w e r s f o r a n y r ea son 12 w h a t s oe ve r. Id

. ¶

¶ 2 6
- 2 7 ( i n t e rn a l qu o t a t i o n m a rk s o m i t t e d )
. T h i s “ s e l f

- s e rv ing 13 arb it rat io n s ch em e” was so un reas on ab ly o ne -s id edth atit co ul d n ot be en fo rced
. Id

. 14 ¶¶ 32- 34. 15 { 9} T wo y ears la te r, the S upr em e Co urt r ea ff irm ed thi s pr inc ipl e in R iv era when 16 it co rr ec te d th is C ourt’ s “ ove rl y narr owc onstru ct ion ” of the unc ons ci ona

bil ity 17 doctrine. 2011-NMSC -033, ¶¶ 1, 39-54. T he arbit ra t i o n clause in the car title loan 18 co ntr ac t a ddr es se d in R iv era exem pted from m andatory

arbitration the lender’ s self19 he lp and j udi ci al re m ed ie s, suc h as r ep oss es sio n or f or ec los ur e, “ w ithr es pe ct

to an y6

1 property

that secures [the loan. ] ” Id

. ¶ 3. T his Co urt a tte m

pte d to dis tin gui sh Cordova 2 on the ba sis that the arb it ratio n c lause in R iv era wa s not com pletely one-sided 3 b e c au s e i t s t i l l a l l o w e d b o rr o w e r s t o c o mp e l a r b i t r a t i o n o f

a n y o f t h e l e n d e r ’s c l a i ms 4 th ataro se fro m

di sp ut es ab ou t t he lo an no te it se lf. Se e Riv er a v . Am. G en . Fin . Ser vs ., 5 Inc. , 2 01 0- NMCA-0 46 , ¶¶ 9- 10 , 1 48 N.M. 78 4, 2 42 P.3d 35 1, rev’d , 2011-NMS C6 0 3 3 . We t h u s re as o n ed t h at t h e e x emp t i o n o n l y ap p l i ed t o d i s p u t es o v ert h e l en d er ’s 7 int er es t i n th e co llate ra l tha t se cure d the loan and tha t those a ct ion s w er e so h eavil y 8 reg ul at ed by Arti cl e 9 of the UCC tha t t he ir e xe m pt io n was reas on ab le
. Id

. ¶¶ 12- 13. 9 Inuph old ing the a rb itr at ionc lause , w e ex pr es se d c onc er n th at , “ w ith out

a cc es s to 10 the se j udi ci al a nd e xtr a- j udi ci al pr oc ed

ur es , [ the le nde r] w ould los e m an y of the 11 statutory

protections it enjoy ed as a sec ured cre ditor.” Id

. ¶ 1 3. 12 { 10} OurSupr em e Co ur t ex pr es sl y reject edou r rea s o n i n g an d re ve rs ed
. R iv era , 13 2011 -N MSC- 033, ¶¶ 50-52. N otwithstandi ng t he l e nd e r ’ s status as a secured cr editor, 1 4 t h e C o u rth e l dt h a tt h e l e n d e r ’s ab i l i t y t o a c c e s s t h e c o u rt s f o r i t s l i k e l i e s tc l a i ms 15 w hil e fo rc ing the pla int if f to arb itr at e the cl ai m s tha t she m ay ha ve w as unr ea sona bly 16 on e-s id ed
. Id

. ¶ 53. T he Suprem e Court explained that “ [a] s a m atter of law arbitrators 17 ha ve br oa d auth or ity

a nd ar e de em ed

c ap ab le of

gr an tin g any

r em edy ne ce ssary

to 18 re sol ve ac as e” a nd tha t “ [p ] ar tie s m ay e ff ec tiv el y pur sue a ny

r em edy or rel ie f in 19 arbitration includ i n g statutory , c omm on law, injunctive, equitable, and all other7

1 lawf ul rem edies and relief. ” Id

. ¶¶ 51- 52 ( int er

na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c itatio n 2 o mi t t e d )
. T h u s , s i n c e “an a r b i t r a t o r c a n b e g i v e n t h e au t h o r i t y t o a d d r e s s a n y c l a i ms 3 a lender m ay

have against a borrowe r[, ] ” including a secure d creditor’ s Article 9 4 cl ai m s, the one -s ide d arb itr at ione xe m pti ons w er e unr ea sona

ble a nd v oid

und er state 5 la w. Se e id. ¶

¶ 52- 54. 6 Facially Bilateral Carve- Outs 7 { 11} Af

ter R iv era , w e su bs eq ue ntl y appl ie d th e unc onsc ion ab ili ty doc tr ine to 8 inv al ida te ase ri es of ost en sib ly bil at er al a rb itr at ionc lause s ina dm iss iona gr ee m en ts 9 be twee n n ur si ng h o mes an d t he ir r es id en ts . Se e F igu er oa v . T

H I of N

. M

. at Ca sa 10 Arena B lanca, LLC , 201 3- N MC A -0 77, ¶ ¶ 33- 35, 306 P
. 3d 480 (i nva lid at ing ac lause 11 tha t e xe m

pte d a ll g uard ianshi p pr oc ee din gs a s w el l a s c oll ec tio ns and e vic tio n 12 ac tio ns) ; Ruppelt v. Laurel H ealthcare Providers, LL C , 201 3- N MC A -0 14, ¶ ¶ 10- 18, 13 293 P. 3d 9 02 ( inv al ida tin g a cl au se that e xe m pte d di sput es pe rt ai nin g to c oll ec tio ns 14 or dis ch arge o f res ide nts ); cf

. Bargman v. Skilled Healthcare Group, I nc. , 201 3- 15 N MC A -0 06, ¶

24, 292 P
. 3d 1 ( ex am in ing ac lause ide nti ca l t o th at in R uppe lt

but 16 rem anding to give the defendant an oppo rtunity to pre sent e vidence that the one-sided 17 cl au se was n on et he le ss reas on ab le ). 18 { 12} While Co rdov a an d R iv era de al t wi th ar bitratio n c lause s w he re one -s ide dne ss 19 wa s evident on the face of the agree m ent, the cla uses in th e nursing ho m e case s wer e8

1 fa ci al ly bil at er al
. T he nur sin g ho m e carv e- out s e xc lud ed f ro m a rb itr at ionvari ous 2 claim s that either party could technically bring, but that were , a s a practica l m atter, 3 un li ke ly t o b e b ro ug ht by a resi de nt . Se e F igu er oa , 2013 -N MC A -0 77, ¶¶ 26, 28- 30; 4 R uppe lt , 201 3- N MC A -0 14, ¶ ¶ 3, 15- 18. I n bo th F igu er oa a nd R uppe lt , we 5 de te rm ine d th at

the “ pr ac tic al e ff

ec t” of the ost en sib ly

bil at er al c laus es was to 6 un reas on ab ly favo r the nur sin g ho m es . F igu er oa , 2013-NMC A- 077, ¶ 29 (stating that 7 t h e p r a c t i c a l e f

f e c to f t h e a g r e e me n t“i s n o d i f f e r e n tf r o m Co rdov a an d R iv era : the 8 re sid en t i s pr ec lud ed

f ro m br ing ing a ny

c la im s th at

he or she w oul d li ke ly

ha ve , w hil e 9 the m ost likely claim s the nursing hom e would have against the resident are excluded 10 fr om arb it rat ion ”) ; R uppe lt , 201 3- N MC A -0 14, ¶ 18 ( sta tin g th at

“ al tho ugh the 11 exem ption provisio n m ay

fac ially appear to apply

evenhandedly , its prac tical eff ect 12 unr ea sona

bly f av or s [ the d] ef

en da nts , a nd the pr ovi sio n’ s bi la te ra l a ppe ar an ce is 13 ina cc ur at e” ). W e thus re fu se d to upho ld the e nti re a rb itr at ionsc he m e in b othc as es . 14 { 13} Appl y ing the se pr inc ipl es , w e ag re e w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt tha t the c ar ve -o ut 15 provisi ons in this case, while pur po r t e dl y b i l at e r al, are unfairly

and unreasonablyone16 sid ed in favor of D ef

en da nt and thu s re nde r the ag re em en t to arb itr at e subs tanti ve ly 17 uncons cionable. How ever, we first acknowledge the diffe rences betw een the carve18 out s a t i ssu e he re a nd those in R iv era .9

1 { 14} T he c ar

ve -o ut p ro vis ionin the c ar ti tle loan c ontra ct

in R iv era st at ed , in 2 re le vant p ar

t: 3 [T he plaintiff] cannot elect to arbitrate [ the l] ender’ s self-help or j udicial 4 re m ed ie s in cl udi ng, w ith ou t l im it at io n, re po ss es si on or f or ecl os ur e, w ith 5 re spe ct

to an y pr ope rt y that se cure s any

tr an sa ct ion
. . . . I n th e ev en t of 6 a de fa

ult
. . . , [ the l] en de r can e nf or ce it s r igh ts t o [ the pla int if f’ s] 7 property

in court or as o t herw ise provided b y law , and [the plaintiff] 8 cannot

r equir e tha t [ the l] en de r’ s a ct ion s be a rb itr at ed
. 9 2011 -N MSC- 033, ¶ 3 (internal quot ation m arks om itted). T here are tw o differe nces 10 be tw ee n R iv era an d the pr es en t ca se . Fi rs t, the cl au se in R iv era fac ially distin guish ed 11 be tw ee n th e ri ght s of t he lende r an d th e bor ro w er , e xpr es sly

e xe m pti ng f ro m 12 ar bitratio n on ly

the le nde r’ s “ se lf

-h el p o r jud icia l r em ed ie s” w ithr es pe ct to the 13 co llate ra l. I n c ontrast, the c lause in thi s c as e is f ac ia lly ne utr al
. H ow ev er , thi s 14 dif fe re nc e is supe rf

ic ia l. A s disc uss ed pr ev iou sly in this O pin ion , w e do n ot r el y on 15 os te ns ib le ne ut ral it y ; ra th er, we l oo k t o t h e p ract ic al effe ctof a carv e-o ut . See 16 F igu er oa , 201 3- N MC A -0 77, ¶ 29; R uppe lt , 20 13 -NMCA- 01 4, ¶ 1 8. 17 { 15} Second, un l i k e R iv era , the c lause a t i ssu e he re doe s no t e xe m pt judic ial 18 reme dies
. I nst ea d, it

e xe m pts a ll re m ed ie s insm al l c la im s c ou rt. Unde r the c ur re nt 19 circum stances, w e conclude that this is a distin ction without a m eaningful difference. 20 While we acknowledge that a fa ir rea ding of R iv era evinces concern about one-sided 21 acce ss to th e co ur ts , se e, e . g. , 201 1- N MS C- 033, ¶ ¶ 39, 46, 48- 49, 53, it

is ap pare nt 22 tha t the sm al l c la im s c ar ve -o ut h as the pr ac tic al ef fe ct of pr es er

vin g D ef en da nt’ s m ost10

1 im portant c la im s a s ase cure d c re dit or w hil e se ve re ly lim iti ng a bor ro w er ’ s a cc es s to 2 j udi ci al r edre ss. W e ex pla in. 3 Th e P ra ct ic al E ff

ec t of t he S m all C lai m s C ar ve -Ou t R en de rs t he A rb it ra ti on 4 Sc he m e Su bs ta nt ive ly U nc on sc ion ab le 5 { 16} W e co nc lud e tha t the sm al l c la im s c ar ve -o ut r en de rs Defe ndant’ s arb itr at ion 6 sc he m e unc onsc ion ab le f or tw o re as ons. Fi rs t, it pr es er ve s D ef en da nt’ s a cc es s to the 7 courts to assert its m ost im portant claim s as a secured cr editor. When a consum er8 bor ro wer d ef

au lts on h er

paym en ts, the se cure d party to a use d c ar

f inanc ing 9 co ntr ac t— in this c as e D ef en da nt— m ay r ep oss es s th e car pur suant t o A rt ic le 9 of the 10 UCC. See NMS A 1978, § 55-9-609 (200 1). I f the re po s s es s i o n can be ef fecte d 11 w ith out

abr ea chof

the pe ac e, f

or ins tanc e, if

the bor ro w er ke ep s the c ar

in a 12 dr ive w ay

a s op pose d to agara ge , the se cure d party c ansim ply take the ve hic le 13 wit ho ut jud ic ia l p ro ces s. See § 55-9-609 (b). So-ca lled “ self-help” re poss ession d oes 14 not usu al ly e nd the dis put e, a s th e cr ed ito r, se ek ing to re co ve r its los s, m ay the n se ll 15 th e v eh ic le in a co m

m erci al ly rea so na bl e m an ne r. See NMS A 1978, § 55-9-610(a) 16 (2001). A fter sa le, the creditor ty pically sues the borrower for any rem aining b alance 17 ow ed
. I f the part ie s have sig ne d a m utu al ly bin din g arb itr at iona gr ee m en t, the dis put e 18 over any

deficie n cy wo u l d then be brough t before an arbitrator. But in this case, 19 De fendant has carved out a sm all claim s exception i n a fi n an ci ng contract for cars11

1 va lue d a t $1 3, 297. 93 and $15, 965. 32, re spe ct ive ly
. T he a m ount s a ct ua lly f inanc ed on 2 t h e v e h i c l e s w e r e $ 1 1 , 0 7 4
. 9 3 a n d $ 1 4 , 3 0 5
. 7 4
. T h u s , D e f e n d a n t c o u l d s a f

e l y a s s u me 3 tha t any or din ar

y sui t f or apos t- re as ona

ble -s al e de fi ci en cy

j udgm en t w oul d c la im 4 da m ag es of

le ss t ha n $1 0, 000 an d w oul d th er ef or e be ex em

pt fr om a rb itr at ionby

the 5 te r ms o f th e small c la im s ca rv e-o ut . See N MS A 197 8, § 35 -3 -3 (A ) (2 001) 6 (es tabl is hi ng t

he j ur isd ic ti on al li m it s o f th e m ag is tra te co ur ts ); NM SA 19 78 , § 3 4- 8A7 3( A)(2 ) (2 00 1) (es tabl is hi ng juri sd ic ti on al li m it s o f th e m et ro po li ta n c ou rt) . As 8 dr af te d, thi s sc he m e af

fo rd s D ef en da nt the opt ionto fo re go arb itr at iondur ing the 9 en tir e ty

pic al de fa

ult pr oc es s f

ro m r ep oss es sio n to sa le to de fi ci en cy sui t t o 10 ga rn is hm en t of wag es in th e m ag is tra te co ur ts . See Cordova , 200 9- N MS C- 021, ¶ 26 11 (s ta tin g th at

c as es of d efau lt a re the m ost li ke ly r ea son fo r le nde rs to ta ke a ct ion 12 against their borrowers)
. 13 { 17} Ina n a lte rn at ive sc en ar io, the bor ro w er ke ep s th e car in a

gara ge w he re it 14 cannot

be r ep oss es se d w ith out a br ea ch of the pe ac e or a co urt or de r. E ve n inthe se 15 cases, however, De fendant’ s arbitration schem e p r e se r ve s i m po r t ant a c c e ss to judicial 16 re dr es s f

or D ef en da nt. T he sm al l cla im s ca rv e- out , w hic h by it s te rm s a

ppl ie s to a ny 17 “ re m ed ie s insm al l c la im s c ourt, ” al so r es er ve s a cc es s to the c ourts f

or D ef en dant t o 18 judic ial lyforec lose on either v eh i cl e b y replevy ing th e collatera l if the fair m arket 19 v a lu e o f th e v eh ic le fal ls be lo w $1 0,0 00
. See N MS A 197 8, § 35 -1 1- 1 ( 1975 )12

1 (p ro vid ing f

or the c ivi l r em edy

of r ep le vinin the m ag istrate c ourts)
. Depe nding on 2 t h e v a l u e s o f t h e C a d i l l a c o r P o n t i a c a t t h e t i m e o f d e f au l t , t h e s e c l a i m s w oul d no t 3 al w ay s be a va ila

ble to D ef

en da nt, but

the y w oul d li ke ly

be avai la

ble dur ing the 4 gr eate r pa rt

of the li fe of

e ith er loan, and th ey

thu s c ontri but e to a

de te rm ina tio n of 5 su bs ta nt iv e u nc on sc io na bi li ty. Se e R iv era , 201 1- N MS C- 033, ¶ ¶ 53- 54 ( co nc lud ing 6 tha t a c re dit or ’s c ar

ve -o ut f or j udi ci al r ep oss es sio n is unf ai rl y one -s ide d) ; R uppe lt , 7 2013 -N MCA -014, ¶ 14 (focusing on fairness rather than “ com plete one-sidedness”). 8 { 18} Se co nd, our Su

pr em e Court

ha s id en tif

ie d abor ro w er ’ s ty

pic al c la im s a ga ins t 9 a le nde r to i nc lud e the e xa ct ty pe s of c la im s th at

w er e br ough t in this c as e: f ra ud and 10 m isr ep re se nta tio n, “ cl ai m s ba se d on fe de ra l or s ta te c onsu m er pr ote ct ion s, suc h a s th e 1 1 Ne w M ex i co Un fa i r P ra ct i ce s Ac t , a n dt o rt i o u s d eb t -c o l l ec t i o n ca u s es o f a ct i o n [. ]” 12 Cordova , 200 9- N MS C- 021, ¶ 27. I n c ontras t to D ef

en da nt’ s li ke ly

c la im s, the se 13 cl ai m s, w hic h are pr ote ct ive of c onsu m er s and o ft enpr ovi de f or pun iti ve dam ag es , 14 attorney

fee s, statutory

dam ages, or injunctions, are unlikelyto m eet the j urisdictio nal 15 lim its of

sm al l c la im s c ourt. See generally N MS A 197 8, § 57 -1 2- 10 ( 2005 ) (s ettin g 16 fo rth th e sta tut or

y r em ed ie s a va ila

ble f or unf ai r tr ad e pr ac tic es ); N MS A 1978 , § 55 -9
- 17 625 (2 001) ( de sc ri bin g th e re m ed ie s a va ila ble w he n a sec ur ed pa rty

f ai ls t o c om

ply 18 w ithA rt ic le 9 of

the U CC ); Rom ero v. Mervy n’s , 1989 -N MS C- 081, ¶¶ 31-3 4, 109 19 N. M. 249, 784 P. 2d 99 2 (holdin g that puni tive dam ages m ay be available in contract17 Whe n an in j unc tio n is gr an te d by

the a rb itr at or , D ef

en da nt’ s arb itr at ionc lause 1 18 the n si ngl es it

out a s an a ppe al ab le a w ar d.

13 1 cl ai m s whe n over

re ac hin g, m al ic iou s, or

w an tonc ondu ct

is inv olv ed ). T hus, the 2 c l a i ms t h a tD e f

e n d a n t h a s s ub

j e c t e dt o man d a t o ry a r

b i t r a t i o n a r e t h e s a me c l a i ms “a 3 borro w e r i s m o s t l i k e l y t o l i t i g a t e i n a d i s p u t e w i t h a l e n d e r , a n d t h e v eryone s th e 4 lender is least likely

to want to litigate.” Cordova , 200 9- N MS C- 021, ¶ 27. 5 { 19} G iven D ef

en da nt’ s a cc es s to j udi ci al r edre ss f or it s m ost li ke ly c la im s, the 6 ar bitratio n c lause ’ s on e- sid ed appl ic at ionto cl ai m s fo r inj unc tiv e re lie f is p ar tic ularl y 7 concerning. T his is evid ent in the context o f a ty p i ca l d i s p u te betwe en a secure d 8 cr ed ito r an d abor

ro w er . Whe n ase cure d c re dit or w an ts to stop a b or ro w er f ro m usi ng 9 the co llate ra l, it ne ed not se ek an inj unc tio n be ca use it can sim

ply rep os se ss the 10 co llate ra l. T hus, A rt ic le 9 sh if ts the bur de n of

ini tiatin g j udi ci al a ct ion —o r in this 11 cas e, arb it rat io n— to th e b orro wer. See E dw ar d L
. Ru bin , Th e Co de, the Co nsum er , 12 & the I

nst itu tio nal

Str uc tur e of t

he Co m m on L aw , 75 W ash. U. L. Q. 11, 37 (1997). 13 Fo r ins tanc e, it

is the a ggr ie ve d bo rr ower who m us t su e to e nj ointhe c re dit or f ro m 14 co nd uc ti ng an un la wfu l s al e. See § 5 5 -9 -6 2 5 . Ho we v er , t h i s i m p o rt an tb o r r o we r’s 1 5 r e me d y i s u n i qu e l y s ub j e c tt o D e f

e n d a n t ’s a r

b i t r a t i o n c l au s e s i n c e t h e s ma l l c l a i ms 16 courts cannot iss ue injunctions. Sec tion 3 5-3-3(C)( 6). 114

1 { 20} A r ec en t de ci sio n of af ed er al c ourt a

ppl y ing Calif

or nia ’ s un co nsc ion ab ili ty 2 doc tr ine to ana rb itr at ionsc he m e ide nti ca l t o th at in thi s c as e is i n a cc or d w ithour 3 an al y si s. See Trompeter v. Ally Fin. , I nc. , 914 F. Supp. 2 d 1067 (N .D . Cal. 2012). In 4 Trompeter , the c ourt no te d th at the de fe ndant’ s ca rv e- out s f or se lf -h el p r ep oss es sio n 5 an d sm al l c la im s r em ed ie s op er at ed in tande m

to al lowthe de fe ndant the op ti on t o 6 fo reg o a rb it rat io n d ur in g t y pi cal di sp ut es wit h i t s bo rro wer. Id

. a t 10 73- 74. “ If

the 7 co nsum er

sto ps p ay ing on the de bt, ” the c ourt st at ed , “ his or he r ve hic le w ill li ke ly 8 be repossessed and t h e co nsum er c ould be held liable for any deficiency

after 9 dispo sition of the repossessed v eh icle[. ] ” Id

. a t 10 73. M ea n wh i l e, t h e b o rr o we r’s 10 lik el y r em ed ie s, suc h a s in

j unc tio ns o r sta tut or

y le m on l awc la im s w er e al l su bj ec t t o 11 th e arb it rat io n c laus e. Id

. a t 10 73- 74. T his c ontri but ed to a fi ndi ng o f 12 un co ns ci on ab il it y . Id

. 13 { 21} T he bul k of D ef en da nt’ s ar gum en t ur ge s us to ign or e the se lf -h el p c ar ve -o ut. 14 D ef en dant c ont en ds tha t “ [t ] he a rb itr at ionpr ovi sio n do es not ex em pt f ro m a rb itr at ion 15 [the ] r igh t t o pr oc ee d w ith se lf- he lp r ep oss es sio n. I t si m ply not es the e xis te nc e of 16 such rem edies.” In other wor ds, acc ording to De f e nd ant , the language exem pting self17 help applies to a non-j udicial, non-arbitrable right is thus superfluous and therefore 18 can no t b e u nc on sc io na bl e.15

1 { 22} E ve n a ssu m ing th at se lf -h el p r ep oss es sio n is ne ce ssari ly non 2 arb it rab le —wh ic h in ou r vi ew is no t en ti rel y cle ar, se e R iv era , 2011 -N MS C- 033, ¶ 51 3 (“ A s am atte r of

lawa rb itr at or s have br oa d auth or ity a nd are de em ed

c ap ab le of 4 gr an tin g any

r em edy ne ce ssary

to re sol ve a ca se . ”) ; see also Buffalo Forge Co. v. 5 United Steelworkers of Am. , AF L-CIO , 428 U
. S. 397 , 405 -0 6 ( 1976 ) (s ta tin g th at a 6 c o u rtw o u l db e p e rmi t t e dt o e n j o i n a s e l f

- h e l p l ab o r s t r i k e i f

t h e s t r i k e a r o s e f

r o m a 7 dispu te that wa s subject to bindin g arbitration); Gree ne v. Allian ce Au t o., Inc. , 435 8 S. W
. 3d 6 46, 653 ( Mo. Ct
. App. 2014 ) (e xa m ini ng a cl au se r equir ing a rb itr at ionpr ior 9 to exercise of a

cre ditor’ s self- h el p repossessio n rem edy ), the fac t rem ains that 10 D ef en dant i s a se cure d cr ed ito r tha t can ge ne ra lly a ct out sid e the j udi ci al pr oc es s to 11 fo re cl ose on i ts c oll at er al
. I nc lud ing a n arb itr at ionc lause in a ve hic le f inanc ing 12 co ntr ac t w oul d n o r

m a l l y s u b j e c t t o m an da tor

y a rb itr at ionD ef

en da nt’ s m ost

im portant 13 re m ai nin g r em ed ie s: the abil ity to sue f or ade fi ci en cy

j udgm en t or

the abil ity

to 14 j udicially

forec lose on th e vehicles when self-help repos session cannot be com pleted 15 w ith out

a br ea ch of the pe ac e. In thi s ca se , how ev er , D ef en da nt ha s carv ed

out asm al l 16 cl ai m s e xc ep tio n th at

e nc om pa sse s bo th o f the se re m ed ie s. T hus, D ef en da nt’ s sm al l 17 claim s carve- out, viewe d in the context of D efendant’ s self-help right—whether pre

18 ex is ti ng or a ls o c arv edou t—ren de rs th e ag reem en t t o a rb it rat e u nf ai rly on e-s id ed
.16

1 { 23} Whi l e o s t en s i b l y b i l at er al o n i t s fa ce , t h e p ra ct i ca l ef fe ct o f D ef

en d an t ’s 2 decision to exem

pt sm all claim s rem edies, m uch like the “ collections” exception s at 3 iss ue in our

nur sin g ho m e ca se s, is to c re at e a ch oic e of f or um f or it s pr ef er re d c la im s, 4 whi le rel eg at in g a bo rro wer’s m os t l ik el y cla im s t o man d at ory

arb it rat io n. See 5 Fig ue roa , 201 3- N MC A -0 77, ¶ 29; R uppe lt , 2 0 1 3
- N M C A
- 0 1 4 , ¶ 1 8
. U n d e r

t h es e 6 circum stances, w e hold that th e ar bitration clauses in the Cadillac and Pontiac finance 7 ag reem en ts are s ub st an ti ve ly unc on sc io na bl e as a m at te r of law. 8 The D istrict C ourt D id N ot Shif t th e Bur den of P roof to D efen dant 9 { 24} D ef

en da nt n ex t arg ue s th at

the dis trict c ourt i m

pr ope rl y a llo cate d to it

the 10 bur de n to pr ove the ab se nc e of unc onsc ion ab ili ty . Sp ec if ic al ly , D ef

en da nt c ont en ds 11 tha t the dis tr ic t cour

t ra ise d and dec ide d the iss ue of the sm al l c la im s e xe m

pti on “ sua 12 spon te ” an d w ith out

a ny e vid en ce f

ro m P la int if f, the re by im pe rm iss ibl y

shi ft ing the 13 burden of proof. W e disagree. 14 { 25} T he part ie s do not dis put e that th e propon en t of the a ff irm at ive de fe nse of 15 uncons cionabil i t y bears the burden of proof. Strausb er g , 201 3- N MS C- 032, ¶

48. 16 Strausb er

g wa s decided after the parties com pleted their briefing on Defe ndant ’s 17 m oti on t o co m

pe l arb itr at ionbut

f ive day s be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld i ts h eari ng o n 18 the m oti on. A t the he ar ing , P la int if f, thr oughhe r attor

ne y , pr ovi de d the co urt w itha 19 copy of the Str ausb er

g deci sio n and i nf

orm ed the c ourt tha t sh e bor e the bur de n of17

1 pr ovi ng unc onsc ion ab ili ty . P la int if f the n ana log iz ed

thi s ca se to R iv era in lig ht o f the 2 nur sin g ho m e ca se s and the ir r ec ogni tio n of

the “ pr ac tic al e ffec t” of a rb itr at ion 3 pr ovi sio ns. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t ho ld an e vid en tiary he ar ing to de te rm ine 4 w he the r the bor

ro w er in a veh ic le fi na nc ing co ntr ac t i s le ss l ike ly than th e le nde r to 5 fi le suit i n sm al l c la im s c ourt. I nst ea d, f or som e of the r ea sons dis cu sse d inthi s 6 O pin ion , the dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed that the a rb itr at ionc lause at iss ue he re is 7 subs tanti al ly

sim ilar to tha t i n R iv era an d i s t he refo re u nc on sc io na bl e. 8 { 26} W e not e fi rs t tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt w as e nti tle d to ra ise the sm al l c la im s is sue 9 and request argum ent from counsel at the hearing on Defendant’ s m otion to com pel 10 ar bitratio n. W e can f

ind no a uth or ity to the e ff

ec t tha t a c ourt sh if

ts the bur de n of 11 pr oof by a ski ng c ouns el aque sti on a t a he ar ing sua spon te . “ T he the or y of ple ad ing s 12 is t o gi ve the part ie s f ai r not ic e of

the c la im s and d ef

en se s a ga ins t the m , a nd the 13 ground s upon which they are based.” Schmitz v. Smentowski , 199 0- N MS C- 002, ¶ 9, 14 109 N.M. 386, 785 P.2d 726. In Plaint iff’ s response to the m otion , she pleaded as an 15 af fi rm at ive de fe nse that the a rb itr at ioncla use w as unc onsc ion ab le
. H er ple ad ing 16 spe ci fi ca lly

state d th at

the sm al l c la im s e xe m

pti on d oe s no t di m ini sh the im pa ct of 17 the se lf

-h el p r ep oss es sio n c ar

ve -o ut b ec au se D ef

en da nt “ sti ll ha s an unlim ite d r igh t 18 to a cc es s the co urts fo r the c la im s it is m ost li ke ly to br ing , w hil e a co nsum er sti ll is 19 fo rc ed int o arb itra tio n f

or the c la im s th at

ac onsu m er

w oul d m ost

li ke ly w an t t o18

1 br ing
. ” D ef

en da nt w as on s uf

fi ci en t no tic e tha t the co urt w oul d have to co nsi de r the 2 va lue to co nsum er s of th e sm al l cl ai m s c ar

ve -o ut i n or de r to m ak e its r uli ng o n 3 Pl ai nti ff

’ s a ff irm at ive de fe nse . Bo th p ar tie s arg ue d th e poi nt at the he ar ing , a nd the 4 court wa s persuaded by Plaintiff. W e find no error her e. 5 { 27} Se co nd, the dis tr ic t c ourt w as not r equir ed to hold

a n e vid en tiary

he ar ing on 6 th e small c la im s i ss ue . See S tate ex rel. King v. B &B Inv. Grp. , I nc. , 2014-NMS C7 024, ¶ 32, 329 P
. 3d 6 58 ( sta tin g th at “ subs tanti ve unc onsc ion ab ili ty can be f ound by 8 ex am ini ng the c ontra ct te rm s onthe ir

f ac e” ). T he c ourt’ s c onc lus ionw as ba se d on 9 subs tanti al sim ila

r i t i e s t o e x e m

p t i o n s d e e m e d un co nsc ion ab le by our appe llate c ourts. 10 While it is true that Plaintiff bore t h e b u rd en of persuasion on th e issue, P laintiff 11 ar gue d purs uant t o our pr ec ed en ts tha t i t i s se lf -e vid en t tha t a

sm al l c la im s e xc ep tio n 12 un fai rly favo rs len de rs un de r th es e ci rcu m st an ces . Se e F igu er oa , 201 3- N MC A -0 77, 13 ¶ 31. D ef

en da nt f ai le d to ad equa te ly re but

that arg um en t. A sim ilar sit ua tio n aro se in 14 F igu er oa , w he re w e sta te d: 15 In further support of its claim , [ the d] efendant asserts that [the p] laintiff 16 fa ile d to pr es en t e vid en ce that the a rb itr at io n agre em en t e xe m pts the 1 7 m o s tl i k el y cl ai m s [t h e d ]ef en d an two u l db r i n g ag ai n s ta r es i d en t . We 18 co nc lude tha t the inf er en ce that gu ar dianshi p, c oll ec tio n, a nd e vic tio n 19 proceedings would be the m ost lik ely claim s of the nursing hom e is self20 ev ide nt. 21 Id

. G ive n th e va lue of the co llate ra l in this c as e an d th e ab ili ty of ase cure d c re dit or 22 to s ue f

or ade fi ci en cy

j udgm en t i n sm al l c la im s c ourt, w e co nc lud e tha t the19

1 use fu lne ss o f the sm al l c la im s c ar ve -o ut t o D efen dant i s si m ilarl y se lf -e vid en t. 2 Mor eo ve r, giv enour

S upre m e Co urt’ s de te rm ina tio n th at abor ro w er ’ s m ost

li ke ly 3 claim s against a

lender include fraud and m isrepresentation, “ claim s based on federal 4 or state c onsu m er pr ot ect io ns, s uc h a s th e N ewMe xic o U nf ai r Pr ac tic es A ct , a nd 5 tortious debt-collection causes of action[] ,” Cordova , 200 9- N MS C- 021, ¶ 27, a nd i n 6 lig ht o f our

statut es a nd p re ce de nts that m ak e av ai la ble inj unc ti o n s , p un i t i v e d am a g es , 7 or trebled dam ages in those ty pes of cases, we conclude that the sm all claim s carve8 ou t is no t sim ilarl y

sui ta ble f or bor ro w er s. T he re fo re , a s in F igu er oa , w e re

j ect 9 Defen da nt ’s con te nt io n t ha t a l ackof e vi de nc e req ui res rev ers al
. See 20 13 -NMCA10 077, ¶ 31. I f D efendant desired to factually dis p u t e t h e g eneral pre cedent that wa s 11 es ta bli she d by

our ap pe llate co urts, it

ha d th e ri ght

to pr es en t e vid en ce to dis tin gui sh 12 th e e x c ep ti on in th is pa rti cu la r cas e. Se e B argm an , 201 3- N MC A -0 06, ¶ ¶ 22- 24 13 (r ec ogni zi ng the right to ad dr es s th e iss ue of unc onsc ion ab ili ty

by pr es en tin g 14 ev ide nc e re ga rd ing the ne utr al a nd o the r le git im at e re as ons fo r ane xc ep tio n to 15 m an da tor

y a rb itr at ion ). D ef

en da nt’ s f ai lur e to u til iz e its opp ortun ity to fa ct ua lly r eb ut 16 th e ap pa ren t o ne -s id ed ne ss of t h e c a r v e - ou t ex cep ti on to arb it rat io n was of i ts own 17 ch oo si ng an d wi ll no t b e se co nd gu es se d o n app eal
. Se e id. ¶ 17 (clar ify ing th at there 18 is n o in fl ex ibl e ru le that on e- sid ed c lause s are a lw ay s un re as ona ble a nd cannot

be 19 review ed on a case- by -case basis).20

1 Our Conc lu si on Is Not Pre empted by the FAA 2 { 28} “ T he F A A w as en ac te d in 1925 in re spon se to w ide spr ea d j udi ci al hos til ity to 3 arbitration agreem ents.” A T& T M obi lit y LL C v

. Co nc ep ci on , ___ U
. S. ___ , ___ , 131 4 S
. C t . 1 7 4 0 , 1 7 4 5 ( 2 0 1 1 )
. T h e F A A r e qu i r e s c o u rt s t o e n f o r c e av a l i da rb itr at ion 5 agreem ent unless th e agre em ent is r evocable under establish ed principles of contract 6 la w. See 9 U
. S. C. § 2 (2 013) ( “ A w ri tte n pr ovi sio n in
. . . ac ontra ct . . . to se ttl e by 7 ar bit r a t i o n a c o n t r o v e r s y t h e r e a f t e r a r i s i n g o u t o f s u c h c o n t r a c t . . . s h a l l b e va lid , 8 ir re voc ab le , a nd e nf

or ce ab le , sa ve upo n such gr ound s as exi st at law or in equ ity f or 9 th e rev ocat ionof

a ny c ontra ct . ”)
. T his “ sa vin gs c lause ” pe rm its state c ourts t o 10 in v al i date agree m ents to arbitrate via “ generally applicable contract defe nses, such 11 as f ra ud, dur es s, or un co ns ciona bil ity , but

not by de fe nse s th at

appl y onl y to 12 ar bitratio n or

that der ive the ir

m eanin g f

ro m the f ac t tha t an a gr ee m en t t o arb itr at e is 13 at i s s u e.” A T& T M

obi lit y , _ _ _ U
. S
. a t_ _ _ , 1 3 1 S
. C t . a t1 7 4 6 ( i n t e rn a l qu o t at ion 14 m ark s an d c it at io n o m it te d)
. 15 { 29} In a ccordanc e w iththe F A A , our S upr em e Co urt ha s c onsi ste ntl y uph el d th e 16 application of our generally applicable uncons cionabilit y doctrine to o n e-sided 17 arb it rat io n a gr eem en ts . Se e S tr ausber g , 201 3- N MS C- 032, ¶

¶ 49- 50 ( hol din g th at

a 18 spe ci al r

ule that a ppl ie s on ly

to nur sin g ho m e ar

bitratio n agr ee m en ts i s pr ee m pte d by 19 the FA A, but statin g that “ a co u rt m ay, consist ent with the FA A .
. . invalidate an21

1 arbitration agreem ent through the application o f an ex isting com m on law contrac t 2 de fe nse suc h a s un co nsc ion ab ili ty ”) ; se e al so Flemma v. Hal li bu rt on Ene rg y S er vs ., 3 Inc. , 2013 -N MS C- 022 (s am e) , ¶ 19, 303 P
. 3d 8 14; R iv era , 201 1- N MS C- 033, ¶ ¶ 15- 4 18 ( sa m e) ; Cordova , 20 09 -NMSC -0 21 , ¶¶ 35 -3 8 (s am e). 5 { 30} T he part ie s ar gue the m er its of a re ce nt de ci sio n of the T en th C ir cu it Co urt of 6 Appe al s, w hic h de te rm ine d th at our sta te c ourts are appl y ing the unc onsc ion ab ili ty 7 doc tr ine ba se d ona n im pe rm iss ibl e “ pe rc ei ve d in fe ri or ity of ar bitratio n to li tig at ion 8 a s am e a ns o f

v i nd i c a t i ng o ne ’ s r i gh t s. ” THI of N.M

. at H obbs Ct r. , LLC v . P att on , 9 741 F. 3d 1162, 1169 (1 0th Ci r. 2014 ). W e do n ot a ddr es s th is i ssu e. Appe al s inthi s 10 Co urt are gov er

ne d by the de ci sio ns of

the N ewMe xic o S upr em e Co urt— inc lud ing 11 decisions invol ving feder al law , and “ even when a United States S uprem e Cou rt 12 decision seem s contra.” State v. M anza nares , 198 3- N MS C- 102, ¶ 3, 100 N
. M. 621 , 13 674 P. 2d 5 11; se e Stat e ex re l. M art ine z v. Ci tyof

La s V egas , 200 4- N MS C- 009, ¶ 20, 14 135 N.M
. 37 5, 89 P
. 3d 47 ( st a t i ng t hat t hi s C ourt i s bo un d by our S up r e m e Court 1 5 p r e c e de nt) ; St ate v . W ils on , 199 4- N MS C- 009, ¶ 5, 116 N
. M. 793 , 867 P
. 2d 1 175 16 (s am e)
. A s di sc uss ed pr ev iou sly

in thi s O pin ion , our

S upr em e Co ur t ha s a lr ea dy 17 ex pr es sly

r ej ec te d D ef

en da nt’ s pr ec ise a rg um en t tha t a ppl y ing the unc onsc ion ab ili ty 18 doc tr ine to a carv e- out e xe m pti ng A rt ic le 9 r igh ts is som eh ow inc onsi ste nt w iththe 19 FAA. R iv era , 201 1- N MS C- 033, ¶ ¶ 50- 52. W e ar e boun d by that de ci sio n.22

1 { 31} Ac cordingly , w e conclude that the arbitration provis ions are unfa i r l y one-sided 2 an d un en fo rc ea

ble
. S inc e “ the e xe m

pti on s of certa in c la im s f ro m a rb itr at iona re so 3 ce ntr al to the a gr ee m en t tha t the y ar e inc ap ab le of se pa ratio n f

ro m the a gr ee m en t t o 4 a r b i t r a t e , ” t h e a r

b i t r a t i o n c l au s e mu s tb e s t r i c k e n f r o m th e c o n t r a c ti n i t s e n t i r e t y. 5 F igu er oa , 201 3- N MC A -0 77, ¶ 39. 6 CON CLU SION 7 { 32} T he or de r of

the dis tr ic t c ourt i s a ff

irm ed
. 8 { 33} IT IS S O ORDERE D. 9 10

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 11 LI N D A M . V A N Z I, Ju dg e 12 WE CO NCUR:
13

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 14 C Y N TH IAA . F R

Y , Ju dg e
15

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ 16 TI M OT HYL. GA R C IA , Ju dg e