In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 10-15L

(Filed: April 10, 2017)

ROSALIE GREENWOOD, et al.,

Individually and as Representatives of 

a Class of Similarly Situated 

Individuals, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

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Rails-to-Trails; Class Action; Final 

Approval of Settlement Agreement; 

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; Uniform 

Relocation Assistance and Real 

Property Acquisition Policies Act of 

1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4654(c) (“URA”); 

Partial Final Judgment; RCFC 54(b)

Steven M. Wald, St. Louis, MO, for plaintiffs. Michael J. Smith and J. Robert 

Sears, St. Louis, MO, and Thomas S. Stewart and Elizabeth G. McCulley, Kansas City, 

MO, of counsel.

Sean C. Duffy, Natural Resources Section, Environment & Natural Resources 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, with whom was Jeffrey 

H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.

ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF PARTIES’ PROPOSED 

SETTLEMENT AND GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

Pending before the court in this rails-to-trails class action are the parties’ request 

for final approval of the proposed settlement agreement pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the 

Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”), and plaintiffs’ motion for 

attorneys’ fees and costs under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property 

Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4654(c) (“URA”). The court held a 
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telephonic fairness hearing in this matter on March 24, 2017 at which 6 plaintiffs were on 

the call. During the hearing none of the plaintiffs spoke in opposition to the settlement

nor had any plaintiffs filed objections to the settlement.1

With regard to the parties’ request for final approval of the proposed settlement

agreement, the court finds for the reasons discussed below that the proposed settlement 

agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and warrants approval. 

With regard to plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, the court for the 

reasons discussed below grants-in-part and denies-in-part plaintiffs’ request. In this 

connection, the court also finds for the reasons discussed below that it may resolve 

plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs without providing plaintiffs with any 

additional notice. As discussed further below, the court finds that the notice sent to 

plaintiffs regarding the settlement and request for fees met the requirements of RCFC 

23(h). RCFC 23(h)(1) states that “[n]otice of the motion [for attorneys’ fees and costs in 

a certified class action] must be served on all parties and, for motions by class counsel, 

directed to class members in a reasonable manner.” 

Accordingly, the parties’ proposed settlement is APPROVED and plaintiffs’ 

motion for fees and costs is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.

 1 As discussed infra, the court received one comment to the effect that the plaintiff’s property 

had increased in value since the date of the taking, but the comment did not object to the 

settlement amount based on the valuation as of the date of the taking.
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I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This rails-to-trails case arises from the conversion of a railroad corridor in 

Lawrence County, Arkansas to a recreational trail. This action was brought on behalf of 

53 landowners who collectively own 78 parcels of land along the 6.70-mile corridor. On 

March 5, 2013, upon agreement of the parties, the court certified this matter as a class 

action and adopted the parties’ proposed schedule for providing notice to class members 

and preparation of a claims book (ECF No. 30). Thereafter, the parties engaged in 

extensive discovery and settlement discussions. 

The parties retained an expert real estate appraiser, Sara W. Stephens, CRE, MAI, 

who assisted in valuing the easements so that the parties could negotiate a compromise 

settlement of all of the claims. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval of Settlement, Approval 

of Notice to Class Members Regarding Proposed Class Action Settlement, and Req. to 

Set Date for Public Hr’g under RCFC 23(e) at 2-3 (“Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval”) 

(ECF No. 81); Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 2 (ECF No. 82); Joint 

Status Report filed Nov. 5, 2013 (ECF No. 35). The parties instructed Ms. Stephens to 

estimate the fair market value of representative parcels in their condition before and after 

the Notice of Interim Trail Use was issued. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 3; Def.’s 

Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 2. In the “before” condition, the parcels were 

valued as unburdened by an easement, and in the “after” condition the parcels were 

valued subject to an easement for recreational trail use, with the possibility of future 

reactivation of rail service. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 3; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. 

for Prelim. Approval 2. The parties asked Ms. Stephens to prepare the appraisals in 
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conformance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and the 

Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. 

Approval 3; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 2. The parties also asked 

Ms. Stephens to assist in identifying representative parcels. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. 

Approval 3; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 2. 

Counsel for the parties and Ms. Stephens conducted a site visit on February 20, 

2014. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 3; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval

2; Joint Status Report filed Mar. 24, 2014 (ECF No. 38). During the site visit, counsel for 

the parties and Ms. Stephens inspected the length of the corridor, and viewed all of the 

properties at issue in this case. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 3; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ 

Mot. for Prelim. Approval 2. In addition, class counsel called attention to unique parcels 

and legal and factual issues that class counsel believed should be addressed in the 

appraisal process. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 3; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for 

Prelim. Approval 2. Ms. Stephens subsequently returned to view the properties at issue 

without counsel present. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 3; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for 

Prelim. Approval 2.

The parties agreed to group similarly situated properties into seven categories 

based upon location, highest and best use, and other characteristics. Pls.’ Mot. for 

Prelim. Approval 3; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 3. These included

three residential categories, three commercial/industrial categories, and one agricultural 

category. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 3; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. 

Approval 3. The parties and Ms. Stephens selected a representative parcel from each of 
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the seven categories and Ms. Stephens prepared and provided an appraisal report for each 

representative parcel in August to October 2014. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 3-4; 

Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 3. The parties reviewed and analyzed the 

appraisal reports and agreed to use those appraisals for settlement purposes. Pls.’ Mot.

for Prelim. Approval 4; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 3. 

The parties also retained a mapping expert to measure the frontage for each of the 

parcels along the corridor to calculate the area of land allegedly taken. Pls.’ Mot. for 

Prelim. Approval 4; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 3; Joint Status Report 

filed Mar. 24, 2014 (ECF No. 38). The frontage measurements were provided to the 

parties and Ms. Stephens. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 4; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. 

for Prelim. Approval 3. The appraised values of the representative parcels were applied 

to the remaining parcels using the frontage measurements to estimate the value of the 

easement allegedly taken from the remaining properties in each category. Pls.’ Mot. for 

Prelim. Approval 4; Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 3.

Class counsel on October 26, 2016 mailed a letter to each class member informing 

each class member of the proposed settlement agreement and class counsel’s motion for

URA fees. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 7.

Thereafter, on December 1, 2016, class counsel filed a motion for preliminary 

approval of the settlement, approval of notice to class members regarding the proposed 

class action settlement, and request for a public hearing under RCFC 23(e) (ECF No. 81). 

The parties’ proposed settlement agreement was filed with the court on December 1, 

2016. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval Ex. B (ECF No. 81-2). Under the settlement, class 
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members would receive a total of $1,025,595.00, of which $611,795.00 is principal for 

the value of the land allegedly taken and $413,800.00 is interest as of August 31, 2016. 

Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval Ex. B ¶ 4. The amount of principal to be paid for each 

claim was set forth in Attachment A to the proposed settlement agreement and attached to 

plaintiffs’ motion. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval Ex. B Attach. A. The government did

not oppose preliminary approval of the class action settlement but asked the court to 

adopt different notice and forms than proposed by plaintiffs’ counsel (ECF No. 82).

On January 25, 2017, the court granted preliminary approval of the parties’ 

proposed settlement and scheduled a public fairness hearing for March 24, 2017 (ECF 

No. 86). With regard to the dispute over the notice and forms to be sent to the plaintiffs, 

the court rejected the government’s request that class counsel create a website for 53 

plaintiffs to review the parties’ settlement methodology and motion for fees and costs. 

Instead, the court approved a notice that informed the plaintiffs of the terms of the 

settlement and provided them with the right and information needed to request copies of 

all relevant materials, including the motion for attorneys’ fees, from class counsel. In 

nearly all other respects, the court adopted the government’s proposed notice. The court 

determined that this approach satisfied the requirements of RCFC 23. The various notice 

provisions in the letter to be sent to plaintiffs stated as follows:

You may request additional information regarding the proposed 

settlement from Class Counsel, including: a copy of the representative 

appraisals applicable to the claims of class members, a spreadsheet 

identifying the properties in each appraisal group and the class member’s 

property and showing how the value of each property in that group was 

extrapolated or derived from the appraisal of the representative parcels, a 
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copy of the proposed Settlement Agreement, and the Parties’ filings on 

Class Counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees.

ECF No. 87-1 at 2 (emphasis added).

The notice also specifically informed class members of their right to attend the 

March 24, 2017 fairness hearing and comment on the pending settlement and motion for 

attorneys’ fees and costs. The notice stated: 

Members of the class, as well as members of the public, are invited to 

attend and participate in person or by telephone, in a public hearing on 

Friday, March 24, 2017 at 1:00 PM central time (2:00 PM eastern time)

before the Honorable Nancy B. Firestone, United States Court of Federal 

Claims Judge. 

. . . 

Any member of the class who would like an opportunity to comment on the 

proposed settlement or Class Counsel’s motion for an award of attorney’s 

fees at the hearing must advise the Court in writing at the address listed 

below by March 6, 2017.

Id. at 2-3 (emphasis in original).

Under a section titled “ATTORNEY’S FEES,” the notice to class members 

further stated: 

The Court will make a separate determination regarding the reimbursement 

of your attorney’s fees and costs. Because you will not pay any costs, Class 

Counsel will retain the reimbursement for costs which they have incurred 

as out-of-pocket expenses in this litigation. Class Counsel has requested 

that the Court award it reasonable fees pursuant to the Uniform Relocation 

Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 

4654(a) (“URA”). The United States has agreed to reimburse the class for 

URA fees. 

Your legal rights are affected whether you act or do not act. Read this 

notice carefully. If you do not take the opportunity to object to the 

proposed settlement either in writing or during the forthcoming 

hearing, you may be deemed to have waived your right to later object 
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and to appeal from any court order approving the settlement and/or 

from any judgment that may be entered in this case.

You may obtain a copy of the proposed Settlement Agreement and the 

Parties’ filings on Class Counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees by 

requesting a copy from Class Counsel. These requests may be made by 

calling Class Counsel at 1-314-720-0220 or sending an email to Class 

Counsel at wald@swm.legal.

Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).

Under a section titled “YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND OPTIONS IN 

THIS CLASS ACTION,” the notice informed class members that they were not 

required to take any additional action as a class member at the time but “[a]s a 

member of the Class, you may approve of, object to, or comment on the proposed 

settlement and Class Counsel’s request for fees.” Id. at 4. 

With regard to requesting additional information, the notice reiterated that: 

This notice is intended to provide you with general information 

about the proposed settlement of this class action. You may request 

additional information about the terms of the proposed settlement, 

including information about how the settlement amount for your 

claim was determined, or information concerning Class Counsel’s 

request for fees, by contacting Class Counsel, Steven M. Wald of 

the law firm Stewart, Wald & McCulley by telephone at 1-314-720-

0220 or by sending an email to wald@swm.legal.

Id. (emphasis added).

For class members who might want to participate in the fairness hearing, 

the notice stated: 

As a class member, if you choose to provide written comments, you 

may (but are not required to) ask to speak in Court about the fairness 

of the proposed Settlement Agreement and Class Counsel’s request 

for fees. The space to request such permission is included in section 

“C” of the attached form. All forms must be sent to the address listed 
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above and postmarked or faxed to the fax number listed above by 

March 6, 2017.

Id. (emphasis removed).

Accompanying the notice for each class member were (1) a disclosure 

statement, and (2) a form titled “INDIVIDUAL CLASS MEMBER’S 

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED SETTLEMENT, CLASS COUNSEL’S 

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND/OR REQUEST TO ADDRESS 

THE COURT AT PUBLIC HEARING.” Id. at 5-6. The form offered class 

members (a) the option of approving or rejecting the proposed settlement and 

requesting to appear at the fairness hearing, (b) a space to provide “COMMENTS 

/ OBJECTIONS ON THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT OR CLASS 

COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR FEES,” and (c) the option of requesting to speak 

at the fairness hearing. Id. at 6-7. A note regarding this space for comments on 

the form explained: 

If you do not intend to appear at the hearing to state your objections 

on the record, you must submit specific objections in writing, or risk 

waiving those objections for the purposes of an appeal. Attach 

additional sheets setting forth your comments/objections if needed.

Id.

As noted, the court held a hearing on March 24, 2017. The court 

received 40 notices of approval and 1 comment. The comment, as noted in 

footnote 1, related to the timing of the valuation of the property and was 

discussed at the hearing. None of the 6 plaintiffs who participated at the 

hearing made any comments. Only the government raised an issue at the 
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hearing concerning the adequacy of the notice with regard to plaintiffs’ 

motion for attorneys’ fees and costs under RCFC 23(h) which the court has 

rejected.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Settlement Agreement is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate

Under RCFC 23(e), “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be 

settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.” The 

court may approve a proposed settlement “only after a hearing and on finding that it is 

fair, reasonable, and adequate.” RCFC 23(e)(2); see also Haggart v. Woodley, 809 F.3d 

1336, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2509 (2016). The court has 

discretion to accept or reject a proposed settlement, but it may not alter the proposed 

settlement, nor may it decide the merits of the case or resolve unsettled legal questions. 

Adams v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 74, 75-76 (2012) (citing Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 

717, 726-27 (1986); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 791, 797 

(2002)).

There is no definitive list of factors that the court must apply in considering a class 

action settlement. Raulerson v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 675, 677 (2013). However, 

in determining whether a settlement agreement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” courts 

have found the following factors instructive:

1. The relative strengths of plaintiff’s case compared to the proposed 

settlement;
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2. The recommendation of the counsel for the class regarding the proposed 

settlement, taking into account the adequacy of class counsel’s 

representation of the class;

3. The reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement, taking 

into account the adequacy of notice to the class members of the 

settlement terms;

4. The fairness of the settlement to the entire class;

5. The fairness of the provision for attorney fees; and

6. The ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment, taking 

into account whether the defendant is a governmental actor or private 

entity.

E.g., Sabo v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 619, 627 (2011) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

As discussed in the court’s January 25, 2017 order granting preliminary approval 

of the proposed settlement agreement (ECF No. 86), the court does not find any evidence 

of collusive activity, preferential treatment, or other deficiencies in the proposed

settlement. In this case, in reaching the proposed settlement agreement, the parties 

conducted discovery, a thorough joint appraisal of the fair market value of class 

members’ property interests for the alleged taking, and negotiations indicating no 

preferential treatment or other deficiencies. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 2-4; Def.’s 

Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval 2-3. 

In addition, consistent with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Haggart, 809 F.3d at 

1359, the proposed agreement does not provide for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees to be paid 

out of the settlement proceeds under the “common fund” doctrine. See also Sabo, 102 
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Fed. Cl. at 630; Barnes v. United States, No. 04-1335C, 2010 WL 1904503, at *2 (Fed. 

Cl. May 7, 2010). 

The court received forms approving the settlement from 40 of the 53 claimants. 

See Notice of Class Members Responses 1 (ECF No. 94, filed Mar. 17, 2017). As noted, 

only one class member, WRW Oil Co., Inc., through its president Douglas Wayland, 

commented on the settlement agreement. Mr. Wayland wrote: “The land was appraise[d] 

in 2004, land has taken a large jump in the last 13 years.” Id. Ex. A at 77-78. Mr. 

Wayland was a participant at the March 24, 2017 fairness hearing but did not speak. The 

court has considered WRW Oil’s comment and finds that it does not suggest that the 

settlement is unfair, unreasonable, or inadequate. Although WRW Oil might well be 

correct that the property taken has increased in value, as counsel discussed at the hearing, 

WRW Oil is entitled to compensation based on the property’s value at the date of the 

taking and will receive an amount that is commensurate with the value at that time. See, 

e.g., Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015) (“The Court has repeatedly 

held that just compensation normally is to be measured by the market value of the 

property at the time of the taking.” (citation omitted)).

In view of the foregoing, the court finds that the parties’ settlement agreement is 

fair, reasonable, and adequate and warrants approval.

B. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

RCFC 23(h) provides that “[i]n a certified class action, the court may award 

reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the 

parties’ agreement.” 
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The URA, 42 U.S.C. § 4654(c), provides that: 

The court rendering a judgment for the plaintiff in a proceeding brought 

under section 1346(a)(2) or 1491 of Title 28, awarding compensation for 

the taking of property by a Federal agency, or the Attorney General 

effecting a settlement of any such proceeding, shall determine and award or 

allow to such plaintiff, as a part of such judgment or settlement, such sum 

as will in the opinion of the court or the Attorney General reimburse such 

plaintiff for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including 

reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred 

because of such proceeding.

The Federal Circuit has found that under a fee-shifting statute such as the URA, 

“the court calculates awards for attorney fees using the ‘lodestar method’ which is ‘the 

product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate.’” Haggart, 809 F.3d at 1355

(quoting City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 559-60 (1992)). “A fee award that is 

determined through the use of a lodestar calculation carries a ‘strong presumption’ that it 

represents a ‘reasonable’ attorney fee.” Biery v. United States, 818 F.3d 704, 710 (Fed. 

Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 389 (2016) (quoting Bywaters v. United States, 670 

F.3d 1221, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). “Departures from the lodestar figure, once calculated, 

must be supported by ‘specific evidence’ justifying the award.” Id. (quoting Perdue v. 

Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553 (2010). “Ultimately, a fee award must ‘be 

adequate to attract competent counsel,’ but must not “produce windfalls to attorneys.’” 

Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 444 (1983)).

1. Rates

Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to reasonable compensation for class counsel 

at hourly rates of up to $475 for partners, $275 for associates, and $150-$175 for 

paralegals. Plaintiffs argue that this court has approved the requested rates as reasonable 
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in other recent rails-to-trails class actions. See Thomas v. United States, No. 10-459L, 

2014 WL 1347221, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 4, 2014) (awarding fees based on an hourly rate 

of $475 for Steven M. Wald and J. Robert Sears for work performed from 2009 through 

2013); Adkins v. United States, No. 09-503L (Opinion on Fees and Costs, ECF No. 140, 

filed Jan. 30, 2014) (awarding fees based on hourly rates of $475 for Thomas S. Stewart 

and $375 for Elizabeth G. McCulley for work performed from 2009 through 2013); 

Gregory v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 400, 406 (2013) (awarding fees based on hourly 

rates of $475 for Mr. Stewart and other partners, and $375 for Ms. McCulley “to reflect 

her transition from associate to partner,” for work performed from 2009 through 2013). 

Plaintiffs also provide several affidavits from attorneys who state that they have personal 

knowledge and experience concerning prevailing billable hour rates or complex 

commercial litigation in Kansas City and St. Louis and that class counsel’s requested 

rates are reasonable. See Pls.’ Fees Mot. Exs. C-G (ECF No. 76).

Plaintiffs acknowledge that in contingent fee agreements between class counsel 

and 4 of the 53 class members, signed in 2009 and 2010, the class members agreed to pay 

the greater of (a) 35% of the “gross settlement or verdict,” or (b) “statutory attorneys’ 

fees as determined by the appropriate court and to be paid by the United States, which 

[the class members] understand and agree to be $375 per hour for [Partners], $350 per 

hour for Of Counsel attorneys, $225 to $275 per hour for associate attorneys, and $150 

per hour for paralegals.” Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Fees Mot. Ex. 1 at 2-5 (ECF No. 83). The 

agreements further state that the class members “understand the statutory attorneys’ fees 

are based on the Law Firm’s hourly rate.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that these rates are not 
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binding on the court on the grounds that the agreements expressly state that statutory 

attorneys’ fees will be “determined by the appropriate court” and in any case are only one 

factor the court may consider in determining whether a fee is reasonable. See Bywaters, 

670 F.3d at 1231.

The government argues that plaintiffs should not be permitted to collect fees from 

the United States at higher rates than class counsel would have collected from its clients 

and thus the rates stated in the contingent fee agreements should serve as a ceiling for the 

hourly rates class counsel may be permitted to collect in this case. The government also 

argues that plaintiffs’ requested rates above $375 per hour are unreasonable as they are 

higher than rates awarded in other fee-shifting matters in the same location and 

timeframe for attorneys with comparable experience.

The court has examined plaintiffs’ affidavits and the attorneys’ fee award cases 

plaintiffs cite in support of the claimed rates and finds that the work of class counsel on 

this rails to trails case from 2009 to 2010 should be reimbursed at the rates stated in class 

counsel’s contingent fee agreements with class members and at the requested rates for 

later years. Plaintiffs are correct that the court is not bound by the fees quoted in the 

contingent fee agreements but may consider those rates. In Bywaters, 670 F.3d at 1231, 

the Federal Circuit found that a “fee agreement between [class members] and their 

counsel . . . is not a proper basis for reducing the lodestar figure, though it may be taken 

into account in the lodestar calculation.” Id. The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court 

have noted that contingent-fee agreements may “aid in determining reasonableness,” 

even if “such an agreement does not impose an ‘automatic ceiling’ on an award of 
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attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 1232 n.7 (quoting Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93 

(1989)). The court finds that the contingent fee rate represented a reasonable rate when 

this litigation was first initiated in 2009 on the grounds that the contingent fee agreements

state that the rates are based on the law firm’s then current billing rates. 

At the beginning of the litigation, when the agreements were signed, in 2009 and 

2010, the quoted rates were consistent with partner, associate, and paralegal rates for 

Kansas City and St. Louis firms and those rates will be used to guide the court. Thus, for 

2009 and 2010, the rates for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee award is $375 per hour for partners, 

$275 per hour for associates, and $150 per hour for paralegals. 

The court is persuaded by plaintiffs that the fees they seek for 2011 and later years 

are reasonable and consistent with fee awards in comparable cases for attorneys in and 

around Kansas City and St. Louis. See Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 340-41 (8th 

Cir. 2014) (affirming award of attorneys’ fees at “blended rate” of $514.60 per hour for 

partners and associates in ERISA action); Betton v. St. Louis Cty., Mo., 405 F. App’x 101 

(8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming award of attorneys’ fees at $450 per hour for 

partners in Missouri Human Rights Act case); Exec. Affiliates, Inc. v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 

No. 4:12-CV-175-CEJ, 2013 WL 6571595, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 13, 2013) (awarding 

attorneys’ fees at $450 per hour for partner in tort case); Albright v. Bi-State Dev. Agency 

of Missouri-Illinois Metro. Dist., No. 4:11-CV-01691-AGF, 2013 WL 4855304, at *8

(E.D. Mo. Sept. 11, 2013) (awarding attorneys’ fees at $500 per hour for lead counsel in 

class action under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act); United States ex rel. 

Joe Liotine v. CDW-Government, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-00033-DRH-PMF, 2013 WL 
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11267176, at *11 (S.D. Ill. May 17, 2013) (awarding attorneys’ fees at $525 per hour for 

senior partners in False Claims Act case); Holland v. City of Gerald, Mo., No. 4:08-CV707-HEA, 2013 WL 1688300, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 18, 2013) (awarding attorneys’ fees 

at $450 per hour for partners in civil rights litigation); Wilfong v. Rent-A-Center, 2002 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28016, *1 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2002) (awarding attorneys’ fees at $400 per 

hour for partners in employment discrimination class action). The court is also mindful 

that this court has awarded the higher requested rates in similar cases. See Thomas, 2014 

WL 1347221, at *4; Adkins, No. 09-503L (Opinion on Fees and Costs, ECF No. 140, 

filed Jan. 30, 2014); and Gregory, 110 Fed. Cl. at 406. Thus, the hourly rates awarded 

are $475 for partners, $275 for associates, and $150 to $175 for paralegals for time billed 

on January 1, 2011 forward.

2. Hours

Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that the number of hours submitted for 

payment is reasonable and should not include hours that are “excessive, redundant, or 

otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 437. Plaintiffs request an award of 

fees associated with more than 1,174.50 hours of attorney time, including: (1) 911.8

hours of work class counsel performed up to August 31, 2016, the date the parties filed a 

joint status report (ECF No. 70) requesting that the court set a briefing schedule for 

plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees; (2) 191.8 hours of work on plaintiffs’ initial fee 

motion and reply; (3) 70.9 hours of work class counsel performed after August 31, 2016 

on other “matters necessary to the litigation,” including “additional class management 

and preparation of the recent motion and reply in support of preliminary approval of the 
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class action settlement”; and (4) additional hours class counsel spent or will spend 

closing this case. The government asserts that plaintiffs’ requested number of hours is 

unreasonable. Below the court addresses in turn each category of disputed hours.

a. Prior to Filing the Complaint

The government argues that the court should exclude 62.7 hours class counsel 

spent on what the government characterizes as non-reimbursable client development and 

background research activities, consisting of 32.0 partner hours, 20.8 associate hours, and 

9.9 paralegal hours.

Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to reimbursement for all of the hours class 

counsel spent investigating and building the class members’ claims prior to the filing of 

the complaint in this case, which plaintiffs assert are not non-reimbursable “client 

development” activities. 

The court agrees with plaintiffs that class counsel’s work investigating plaintiffs’ 

claims, establishing the facts necessary to file a case on behalf of a class, prior to the 

filing of the complaint was not client development but necessary to ensure proper 

property claims and critical to every plaintiff achieving an award in this case. Plaintiffs 

have provided the court with detailed entries regarding the work performed in order to 

file the complaint. This court has found that while hours spent on client development are 

not the type of hours that are typically billed to a paying client, and therefore should be 

excluded from a reimbursement request, the URA allows for reimbursement of a 

reasonable number of hours spent preparing a complaint. See Thomas, 2014 WL 
19

1347221, at *2. The court finds the hours spent in preparing the complaint are 

reimbursable.

b. Vague Descriptions

The government objects to plaintiffs’ request for fees associated with 3.6 hours 

class counsel spent on vaguely described activities, consisting of 2 partner hours and 1.6 

associate hours. Plaintiffs assert that the contested time entries related to case strategy 

and investigation are sufficiently detailed, even though no specific client is identified, and 

should be fully reimbursable.

“Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the . . . court may reduce the 

award accordingly.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. After reviewing the time entries at issue, 

the court finds that plaintiffs may not be reimbursed for fees associated with the 2 hours 

class counsel spent on “[r]eview and planning” of the case and “[w]ork on strategy.” See

Thomas, 2014 WL 1347221, at *4 (finding that hours represented by similar entries were 

not reimbursable because the entries were too vague and appeared to be covered by other 

hours plaintiffs claimed). The remaining 1.6 hours for “[i]nvestigate and analyze class 

members’ claims” are reimbursable. Id.

c. Travel

The government contends that plaintiffs’ request for fees associated with travel 

time should be reduced. The government argues that 68.8 hours of travel time, consisting 

of 19 hours of partner time and 49.8 hours of associate time, should be reduced by 50% 

in light of case law reducing the amount a prevailing plaintiff can recover for an 
20

attorney’s travel time on the grounds that while traveling the attorney was not otherwise 

working on client-billable tasks.2

Plaintiffs argue that because nearly all of the travel in this case was by car, 

foreclosing the possibility of class counsel doing any other work, those hours should be 

reimbursable in full.

The court agrees with plaintiffs that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees associated 

with hours class counsel spent traveling. Plaintiffs rely on Crumbaker v. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, 781 F.2d 191, 193 (Fed. Cir. 1986), modified on other grounds, 827 

F.2d 761 (Fed. Cir. 1987), to support their position that class counsel’s travel time should 

be fully reimbursed. In Crumbaker, the Federal Circuit found that the appropriate billing 

rate for time spent traveling “is the same billing rate as would be appropriate for the other 

time the lawyers put in on the case.” Id. (quoting Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 

194 (7th Cir. 1984)). The Federal Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning that 

“[w]hen a lawyer travels for one client he incurs an opportunity cost that is equal to the 

fee he would have charged that or another client if he had not been traveling.” Id.

(quoting Henry, 788 F.2d at 194). However, the Federal Circuit noted that unnecessary 

or unreasonable travel time “should be subtracted out.” Id. (quoting Henry, 788 F.2d at 

 2 The government also argues that 6.8 partner hours for “[p]reparation for research at [the 

National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”)] and travel to College Park, MD” on 

June 23, 2009 should be eliminated on the grounds that it was non-compensable client 

development and background research activity. Plaintiffs note that as part of the verification of 

individual claims and work with title documents and issues, class counsel identified and obtained 

“[v]aluation maps showing the original source conveyances . . . from the National Archives in 

College Park, Maryland,” which “were then electronically digitized and overlain on parcel maps 

created by Plaintiffs’ Counsel.” Pls.’ Fees Mot. 10. For the reasons above, the court agrees with 

plaintiffs that this work prior to the filing of the complaint is reimbursable.
21

194). Therefore, attorney travel time may be fully compensable but plaintiffs must still 

show that the requested hours are reasonable. The court agrees with plaintiffs that the 

hours class counsel spent travelling were reasonable and therefore reimbursable. See id. 

In this case, because the transit time was spent driving, it would not have been possible 

for class counsel to work while in transit and thus they are entitled to their fees while in 

transit.

d. Hours Spent on Unsuccessful Arguments Regarding Plaintiffs’ Proposed 

Notice to Class Members and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Fees and Costs

The government asserts that plaintiffs’ request should be reduced by 11.9 hours on 

the grounds that the court did not adopt plaintiffs’ version of the notice to class members 

regarding the proposed class action settlement. The government also argues that 

plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover attorneys’ fees associated with any of the 

191.8 hours class counsel spent on plaintiffs’ fees motion, or at least the time spent on 

unsuccessful arguments. The government identifies 11 additional hours it claims should 

be characterized as pertaining to plaintiffs’ fees motion and should be excluded on that 

basis. 

The court agrees with the government that plaintiffs may not recover fees 

associated with time spent on unsuccessful arguments. This court may eliminate hours or 

reduce an award “based on the degree of success obtained.” Biery, 818 F.3d at 712. 

First, plaintiffs’ requested hours for time class counsel spent on plaintiffs’ fees motion

and reply in support of the motion are not all reimbursable. Plaintiffs initially proposed 

that class counsel could collect contingent fees pursuant to agreements with four class 
22

members or treat the settlement as a common fund and recover an unspecified contingent 

fee. However, plaintiffs withdrew the request for contingent fees pursuant to the 

agreements with four class members. See Pls.’ Reply in Support of Fees Mot. 1 (ECF 

No. 85). Plaintiffs also initially requested that the court apply the “common fund 

doctrine,” which the court found was foreclosed by the Federal Circuit’s decision in 

Haggart, 809 F.3d at 1354-59. See Order on Plaintiffs’ “Notice Regarding Class 

Counsel’s Position” (ECF No. 89, filed Jan. 30, 2017). Therefore, plaintiffs’ requested 

hours for time class counsel spent on these arguments must be eliminated. 

In addition, the court agrees with the government that plaintiffs’ requested hours 

should be reduced to reflect their partial success with regard to the parties’ disagreement 

about which notice and forms to use to inform class members of the proposed settlement 

in this case. The court approved the government’s version of the notice and forms with 

the exception of references to a proposed website and the references to class counsel’s 

request for contingent fees. See Order Granting Preliminary Approval to Parties’ 

Proposed Settlement and Notice Forms to Class Members and Scheduling a Public 

Fairness Hearing 3-5 (ECF No. 86, filed Jan. 25, 2017). Plaintiffs’ requested hours 

should be reduced by 50% for this work because class counsel could have objected only 

to the government’s proposal to create a website and thus saved time spent briefing other 

issues regarding the adequacy of their proposed notice. Plaintiffs are entitled to their fees 

and costs for this round of briefing on fees and costs for continuing litigation and the

court understands that those amounts may need to be recalculated.
23

3. Notice was Directed to Class Members as Required by 

RCFC 23(h)

Finally, as discussed above, the court finds that the government’s contention 

raised for the first time at the fairness hearing regarding plaintiffs’ compliance with 

RCFC 23(h) must be rejected. RCFC 23(h) sets out the following procedures for 

approving a motion for attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs: 

(1) A claim for an award must be made by motion under RCFC 54(d)(2), 

subject to the provisions of this subdivision (h), at a time the court sets. 

Notice of the motion must be served on all parties and, for motions by class 

counsel, directed to class members in a reasonable manner.

(2) A class member, or party from whom payment is sought, may object to 

the motion.

(3) The court may hold a hearing and must find the facts and state its legal 

conclusions under RCFC 52(a).

RCFC 23(h).

At the hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel argued that RCFC 23(h) only requires that 

“[n]otice of the motion,” not actual copies of the motion and related filings, “must be 

served on all parties and, for motions by class counsel, directed to class members in a 

reasonable manner,” and that the notice sent to class members more than satisfied that 

requirement. The court agrees. As detailed above, the notice and forms provided to class 

members expressly identified plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs and 

provided an opportunity to “request additional information regarding the proposed 

settlement from Class Counsel, including . . . the Parties’ filings on Class Counsel’s 

motion for attorney’s fees.” E.g., ECF No. 87-1 at 2. In Haggart, the Federal Circuit 

noted that “[c]ourts have approved notices that did not contain some of the precise details 
24

of the settlement, such as the distribution or allocation plan, or the amount of attorney 

fees to be taken out, as long as sufficient contact information is provided to allow the 

class members to obtain more detailed information about those matters.” 809 F.3d at 

1348 (quoting Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or 

Compromise of Class Actions—Settlement Notice, 7B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1797.6 

(3d ed. 2004)). Similarly, the Advisory Committee notes regarding the analogous notice 

requirement under Rule 23(h)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state:

Besides service of the motion on all parties, notice of class counsel’s 

motion for attorney fees must be ‘directed to the class in a reasonable 

manner.’ Because members of the class have an interest in the 

arrangements for payment of class counsel whether that payment comes 

from the class fund or is made directly by another party, notice is required 

in all instances. In cases in which settlement approval is contemplated 

under Rule 23(e), notice of class counsel's fee motion should be combined 

with notice of the proposed settlement, and the provision regarding notice 

to the class is parallel to the requirements for notice under Rule 23(e). In 

adjudicated class actions, the court may calibrate the notice to avoid undue 

expense.

In this case, the notice and forms sent to class members regarding the proposed 

settlement, which were based on the government’s proposed notice and forms, expressly 

discussed plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. The notice and forms included 

information about plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs and provided class 

members an opportunity to obtain copies of the parties’ filings from class counsel. The 

notice and forms also provided class members the opportunity to object or comment on 

plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs in writing and at the fairness hearing. 

Therefore, the court finds that the requirements of RCFC 23(h) have been met and thus a 

ruling on attorneys’ fees and costs is appropriate.
25

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the parties’ proposed settlement is APPROVED. Because 

there is no just reason for delay, the clerk is directed to enter judgment pursuant to RCFC 

54(b) in the amount of $611,795.00 in principal apportioned among the plaintiffs as 

shown in the table attached to this opinion. Interest shall be payable on these amounts at 

a rate of 4.3 percent, compounded annually, beginning on May 24, 2004, until the date 

the judgment is paid.

Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is GRANTED-IN-PART and 

DENIED-IN-PART. The parties shall have until April 24, 2017 to file a joint status 

report with a final proposed judgment for attorneys’ fees and costs.

IS SO ORDERED.

s/Nancy B. Firestone 

NANCY B. FIRESTONE

Senior Judge