IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

IN RE THE PJARRIAGE OF 

CHARLES R. ANDERSON, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

AND 

LINDA L. ANDERSON, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Silver Bow, 

The Honorable Frank Davis, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Mulroney, Delaney & Scott; P. Mars Scott, Missoula, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Mark A. Vucurovich, Butte, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Sept. 25, 1-987 

Decided: January 8, 1988 

. . -I 75" 

Filed: ' 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

This case concerns a marriage dissolution. The issues 

on appeal concern the distribution of the marital estate, 

maintenance, and child support. We affirm issues 1, 3 and 4 

and reverse issue 2. 

The District Court of the Second Judicial District 

entered its final decree on February 13, 1987. The wife, 

Linda L. Anderson, received property valued at $120,222.00, 

the husband, Charles R. Anderson !Rick), received property 

worth $108,724.00. Rick was given responsibility for 

$83,146.00 of the marital debts, Linda was given 

responsibility for $30,000. Rick was ordered to pay $350 a 

month per child for child support. In addition, he is 

primarily responsible for medical and dental services for the 

children and must keep them as beneficiaries of existing life 

insurance policies. 

Linda presents these issues for review: 

(1) Did the District Court err by refusing to award 

rehabilitative maintenance to the wife? 

(2) Did the District Court err in setting child support 

payments at $700.00 a month rather than $900.00 as requested 

by the wife? 

(3) Did the District Court err in inventorying, valuing 

and distributing the marital estate in the following 

particulars: 

(a) the valuation of the clothing store "Linda's" and 

ordering Linda to be solely responsible for its debts? 

(b) failing to identify the cash value of life insurance policies in the division of marital property? 

(c) not ordering the Georgetown bake property sold and 

the proceeds split between the parties? 
(d) valuing the Bayard Street property? 

(4) Did the District Court err in refusing to award 

attorney fees and costs to Linda? 

ISSUE I 

The parties were married on September 13, 1969. Two 

children were born of the marriage, both are minors. The son 

is 16 years old and the daughter is 15 years of age. The 

parties have stipulated to joint custody of the children, 

with Linda as the primary custodian. Rick received a law 

degree from the University of Montana. He is currently a 

partner in a law firm. His earnings in 1986 were $117,000, 

including bonuses. Linda has a high school education and is 

currently living in Seattle where she is employed by 

Nordstroms part time as a salesclerk earning $7,824.00 

annually. 

During the marriage and while Rick was in school both 

parties were employed outside the home in various positions. 

At one point Linda was the owner and operator of two retail 

clothing stores, "Linda's" and "Matty's Kids". The parties 

still own "Linda's". 

Linda contends that the District Court erred when it 

refused to award her $2,000.00 a month for five years as 

rehabilitative maintenance in order to offset Rick's greater 

future earning capacity, compensate Linda for the high standard of living achieved by the couple and prevent unjust 

enrichment to Rick. 

The decision to award maintenance is governed by 5 

40-4-203, MCA, which provides: 

(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation or a proceeding for 

maintenance following dissolution of the marriage 

by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over 

the absent spouse, the court may grant a mainte- 
nance order for either spouse only if it finds that 

the spouse seeking maintenance: 

(a) lacks sufficient property to provide for 

his reasonable needs; and 

(b) is unable to support himself through 

appropriate employment or is the custodian of a 

child whose condition or circumstances make it 

appropriate that the custodian not be required to 

seek employment outside the home. 

(2) The maintenance order shall be in such 

amounts and for such periods of time as the court 

deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, 

and after considering all relevant facts including: 

(a) the financial resources of the party 

seeking maintenance, including marital property 

apportioned to him and his ability to meet his 

needs independently, including the extent to which 

a provision for support of a child living with the 

party includes a sum for that party as custodian; 

(b) the time necessary to acquire sufficient 

education or training to enable the party seeking 

maintenance to find appropriate employment; 

(c) the standard of living established during 

the marriage; 

(d) the duration of the marriage; 

(e) the age and the physical and emotional 

condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; and 

(f) the ability of the spouse from whom 

maintenance is sought to meet his needs while 

meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance. 

The standard of review for awarding maintenance was articulated in In re the Marriage of Aanenson (1979), 183 Mont. 

229, 235, 598 P.2d 1120, 1123. "The District Court has wide 

discretion in the determination of maintenance awards, and 

that discretion is not to be disturbed unless clearly 

erroneous." Linda's claim for maintenance fails to meet the 

statutory requirements. Linda has received a substantial 

portion of the marital estate, including income producing 

property and her business, "Linda's". The District Court 

also found that Linda was able to support herself through 

appropriate employment. Thus, the District Court did not 

abuse its discretion when it refused to award maintenance. 
ISSUE I1 

Linda has contended that the court erred in setting the 

amount of child support. The District Court awarded Linda 

$700 a month instead of $900 a month as she requested. The 

award made by the District Court will not be disturbed unless 

there is clear abuse of discretion resulting in substantial 

injustice. In re Marriage of Alt, (Mont. 1985), 708 P.2d 

258, 42 St.Rep. 1621. Section 40-4-204(1), MCA, provides the 

statutory guidelines for setting appropriate child support 

obligations: 

(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, 

legal separation, maintenance, or child support, 

the court may order either or both parents owing a 

duty of support to a child to pay an amount. 

reasonable or necessary for his support, without 

regard to marital misconduct, after considering all 

relevant factors including: 

(a) the financial resources of the child; 

(b) the financial resources of the custodial 

parent; 

(c) the standard of living the child would 

have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved; 

(d) the physical and emotional condition of 

the child and his educational needs; 

(e) the financial resources and needs of the 

noncustodial parent; and 

(f) for the purposes of determining a minimum 

amount for support, the amount received by children 

under the AFDC program, as defined in 53-2-702. 

Here the amount arrived at by the District Court disregards 

two important statutory factors, the standard of living the 

children would have enjoyed had the marriage not been 

dissolved and the financial resources and needs of the 

noncustodial parent. The sum awarded by the District Court 

is not commensurate with Rick's financial resources nor with 

the standard of living enjoyed by the children prior to 

dissolution. Upholding the District Court's award would 

result in substantial injustice to the children who are 
entitled to share in the high standard of living achieved by 

their father. Linda documented the children's monthly needs 

and requested $900.00 a month, which is less than would be 

required to pay under the Carlson formula calculations. In 

re Marriage of Carlson (Mont. 1984), 693 P.2d 496, 500, 41 

St.Rep. 2419, 2423. We reverse on this issue and remand to 

the District Court with instructions to grant $900.00 a month 

for child support. 

ISSUE 1x1 

Linda also maintains that the District Court erred in 

valuing several items of property. The standard for reviewing a District Court's division of marital property was 

articulated in In re the Marriage of Hall (Mont. 1987) , 740 

P.2d 684, 686, 44 St.Rep. 1321, 1323: 

We have concluded that in a property distribution 

review in marriage dissolution, this court will 

reverse a district court only upon a showing that 

the district court has acted arbitrarily or has 

committed a clear abuse of discretion, resulting in 

either instance in substantial injustice. 

(a) The first item of property, "Linda's", was valued at 

$28,642 with an accompanying debt of $30,000. Linda was 

awarded the store and was made responsible for it's debts. 

As the District Court stated "the value of 'Linda's' was 

troublesome." Though the valuation was difficult and conflicting evidence was presented, the figures arrived at by 

the District Court are supported by evidence. The accountant 

valued the business at $73,000 in 1985. In 1986 the store 

suffered financially. Jolene Morton's testimony about 

insufficient inventory provided some evidence that Linda was 

responsible for the store's present condition. There is no 

clear abuse of discretion resulting in substantial injustice, 

thus, we will uphold the District Court. 
/b) The second items are insurance policies. Linda 

claims that the District Court erred when it failed to account for the cash value of the life insurance policies in 

the property distribution. The District Court did make a 

finding concerning the policies: "He shall also keep the 

children as beneficiaries on the existing life insurance 

policies." (Finding of Fact No. 3). As we held in In re the 

Marriage of Larson, (1982), 200 Mont. 134, 139, 649 P.2d 

1351, 1.354, "Item-by-item findings are not required in 

property division cases, but findings nevertheless must be 

sufficiently adequate to ensure that this Court need not 

succumb to speculation while assessing the conscientiousness 

or reasonableness of the District Court's judgment." Here, 

we are able to assess the reasonableness of the District 

Court's judgment. The District Court provided for 

disposition of the life insurance policies and did so within 

it's discretion. 

(c) Linda also contests the valuation of the Georgetown 

Lake property. The District Court valued the property at 

$25,000 based upon recent sales of similar property as 

testified to by Rick. The figure arrived at by the District 

Court is supported by the evidence. There is no abuse of 

discretion. 

(dl Finally, Linda asserts that the District Court 

erred in valuing the Rayard Street property. Once again, the 

figure arrived at by the District Court was supported by 

evidence. Rick testified as to his equity in the Bayard 

property. Linda never presented any evidence to contradict 

this testimony. The District Court did not exceed its 

discretion in adopting this value. 

ISSUE IV 

The final issue on appeal concerns the District Court's 

refusal to grant Linda attorney fees. Section 40-4-110, MCA, 
MCA, governs awards of attorney fees in dissolution actions. 

This Court has held that the award of fees is permissive 

under this statute. In re Marriage of Obergfell, (Mont. 

1985), 708 P.2d 561, 42 St.Rep. 1414. The standard of review 

is whether the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to award such fees. In re Marriage of Gallinger (Mont. 

1986), 719 P.2d 777, 43 St.Rep. 976. The District Court did 

not exceed its discretion when it refused to grant Linda 

attorney fees on the grounds that she received more than half 

the marital estate including income producing property and 

that she is capable of supporting herself through appropriate 

employment. 

We affirm on all issues except issue 2 which we reverse 

and remand to the District Court for entry of a decree in 

conformance with this opinion. 

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/ Justices