IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA 18-1170

Filed: 20 August 2019

Iredell County, No. 14 CVS 1588

BETHESDA ROAD PARTNERS, LLC, Plaintiff,

v.

STEPHEN M. STRACHAN and wife, DEBORA L. STRACHAN, Defendants.

STEPHEN M. STRACHAN and DEBORA L. STRACHAN, Third-Party Plaintiffs

v.

GEORGE C. MCKEE, JR. and wife, ADRIANNE S. MCKEE, Third-Party 

Defendants.

Appeal by plaintiff and third-party defendant, Bethesda Road Partners, LLC, 

from Judgment entered 26 February 2018, and by defendant and third-party plaintiff 

Stephen M. Strachan from Order entered 6 June 2017 and Order and Judgment 

entered 26 February 2018, by Judge John O. Craig, III, in Iredell County Superior

Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 June 2019.

Carruthers & Roth, P.A., by J. Patrick Haywood and Rachel Scott Decker, for 

plaintiff and third-party defendants.

Moore & Van Allen PLLC, by Nathan A. White and Mark A. Nebrig, for 

defendants and third-party plaintiffs.

YOUNG, Judge.
BETHESDA ROAD PARTNERS, LLC. V. STRACHAN

Opinion of the Court

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This appeal arises from a dispute between a guarantor of a promissory note 

and a third party entity, formed by another guarantor, which purchased the note. 

The trial court did not err in granting the note holder’s Motions for Summary 

Judgment on its breach of guaranty claims against the guarantor where there were 

no issues of material fact. The guarantor did not preserve a piercing the corporate 

veil argument, and thus, we dismiss that argument. The trial court did not err in 

denying the guarantor’s Motion to Join a limited liability company whose debt was 

secured by his guaranty. The trial court did err in holding that the note holder was 

only entitled to recover half of the price of the guaranteed note. The trial court did 

err in applying the Doctrine of Equitable Contribution. Since Equitable Contribution 

is not an available remedy, we dismiss the argument that the defense was waived. 

We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, dismiss in part and remand.

I. Factual and Procedural History

On 31 July 2007, George C. McKee, Jr. (“McKee”), Stephen M. Strachan 

(“Strachan”), William Allen (“Allen”), and Timothy Bruin (“Bruin”) created ABMS 

Development, LLC (“ABMS”) as a real estate venture. McKee was the sole member 

manager of ABMS, controlled all the books and records, and made all strategic 

decisions for ABMS. On 28 February 2008, ABMS executed a promissory note 

(“Note”) to CommunityOne Bank (“C1 Bank”) as a part of a project. C1 Bank required 
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Opinion of the Court

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each ABMS member and his spouse to execute personal guaranties. The project 

failed, the Note matured, and ABMS defaulted on its obligations. 

An attorney for ABMS (“ABMS Attorney”) entered into negotiations with C1 

Bank on a resolution. The bank said it would not sell the Note to any ABMS 

members/co-guarantors. ABMS Attorney communicated to C1 Bank that “a different 

buyer” may be interested in the purchase. ABMS Attorney told bank that “[t]he buyer 

is not ABMS and the potential investor LLC owners are different than the owners of 

ABMS.” ABMS Attorney confirmed that ABMS and the guarantors would still be 

liable on the Note. 

McKee, the sole member manager of ABMS, formed Bethesda for the sole 

purpose of purchasing the Note. At the time of purchase, Adrianne S. McKee, 

McKee’s wife (“Mrs. McKee”), was the sole member manager of Bethesda, so it did 

not appear to have a direct connection to ABMS. However, shortly after closing, 

McKee was added as a member manager. While Bethesda held the Note, McKee, as 

managing member of ABMS, made no effort to pay down the debt. 

In July 2014, Bethesda then commenced an action against Strachan, Allen, 

Bruin, and their spouses (“Defendants”), seeking damages under the Note for breach 

of guaranty agreements. In September 2014, Defendants denied the allegations and 

asserted claims against Bethesda and the McKees alleging violations of the Equal 

Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and 
BETHESDA ROAD PARTNERS, LLC. V. STRACHAN

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violation of Chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Bethesda and the 

McKees, as third-party defendants, denied those allegations and asserted claims 

against Strachan for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Allen, Bruin, and 

their spouses reached a settlement with Bethesda and were voluntarily dismissed 

with prejudice. Strachan and Appellees filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 

The trial court entered an order of summary judgment on 6 June 2017 in favor of 

Bethesda. In August 2017, Strachan filed a Motion to Join ABMS as a party, which 

the trial court denied. The trial court entered a final judgment on 26 February 2018. 

Strachan gave timely notice of appeal on 27 March 2018. Appellees timely crossappealed on 2 April 2018. Both appeals are now before this Court.

II. Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo; such 

judgment is appropriate only when the record shows that ‘there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law.’” In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008) (quoting 

Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 524, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)).

B. Analysis

a. Liability Discharged
BETHESDA ROAD PARTNERS, LLC. V. STRACHAN

Opinion of the Court

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In his first argument, Strachan contends that the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment in favor of Bethesda. We disagree.

The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that 

rights under a special guaranty–that is, a guaranty

addressed to a specific entity–are assignable unless: 

assignment is prohibited by statute, public policy, or the 

terms of the guaranty; assignment would materially alter 

the guarantor’s risks, burdens, or duties; or the guarantor 

executed the contract because of personal confidence in the 

obligee. This rule is consistent with the common law of 

contracts, accommodates modern business practices, and 

fulfills the intent of the parties to ordinary business 

agreements.

Self-Help Ventures Fund v. Custom Finish, LLC, 199 N.C. App. 743, 749, 682 S.E.2d

746, 750 (2009) (quoting Kraft Foodservice, Inc. v. Hardee, 340 N.C. 344, 348, 457 

S.E.2d 596, 598-99 (1995)).

In Self-Help Ventures Fund, a lender made a loan which was guaranteed by 

the guarantors. The note and guaranties were assigned to a government agency, 

which in turn assigned the note to the creditor, although the agency did not execute 

a separate reassignment of the guaranties. When the debtor defaulted on the note, 

the creditor sued the guarantors and obtained entry of default. The guarantors 

moved to set aside the default, but this Court held that the defendants did not provide 

legal support for the contention that the guaranties did not follow the note. The 

defendants asserted that the guaranties were not assigned, but did not provide 

evidence showing that the guaranties would “(1) violate a statute, public policy, or 
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the terms of the Guaranties; (2) materially alter defendants’ risks, burdens, or duties; 

or (3) violate personal confidence defendants placed in the obligee.” Id. In Self-Help, 

this Court also held that upon the note’s assignment to the plaintiff, the defendants 

“unconditionally guaranteed payment to plaintiff, whereupon plaintiff became a 

party in interest, as set forth in Rule 17(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil 

Procedure.” Id. at 750, 682 S.E.2d at 751; N.C.R. Civ. P. 17.

Similarly, in Gillespie, this Court held that guaranty contracts may be 

assigned to a guarantor. Gillespie v. De Witt, 53 N.C. App. 252, 262, 280 S.E.2d 736, 

743 (1981). A plaintiff guarantor took assignment of a note and guaranty from the 

bank assignor by providing plaintiff’s own note in the full amount of the debt. Id. at 

262, 280 S.E.2d at 743-44. This Court further held that in light of the written 

agreement, the plaintiff and the bank intended an assignment, not an 

extinguishment of debt. Id. If the parties had intended an extinguishment of debt, 

this Court reasoned, the parties would have cancelled or destroyed the documents. 

Id. at 262-63.

Here, McKee was a guarantor of the Note between ABMS and C1 Bank. 

Bethesda, a separate entity, purchased the Note from C1 Bank. At the time of 

purchase the guaranties were not cancelled or destroyed, nor was there any other 

evidence of intent to discharge the debt. There was also no evidence that the 

assignment would have been prevented by any of the exceptions provided in Self-
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Help. Therefore, this was a valid assignment based in contract law. The trial court 

did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Bethesda.

b. Mere Instrumentality

In his next argument, Strachan contends that the trial court erred in failing to 

conclude that the undisputed facts demonstrated Bethesda was a mere 

instrumentality of McKee, and therefore, the trial court failed to hold that McKee

was the actual “purchaser” of a liability that caused him to be both creditor and 

debtor. We disagree.

To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must present to the trial 

court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling 

the party desired the court to make, and the complaining party must obtain a ruling 

upon the party’s request, objection, or motion. N.C.R. App. P. 10(a)(1). A party cannot 

raise on appeal issues which were not pleaded or raised below. Whichard v. Oliver, 

56 N.C. App. 219, 224, 287 S.E.2d 461, 463 (1982).

Strachan failed to plead a piercing the corporate veil claim in his complaint. 

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Bethesda, regarding the issue 

of liability for breach of contract months before Strachan began arguing about 

piercing the corporate veil. There was no motion, objection, or ruling on a piercing 

the corporate veil defense. As such, this issue was not preserved for appeal. We 

decline to address this unpreserved issue and dismiss this argument.
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c. Liability Discharged and Mere Instrumentality

Furthermore, Strachan contends that the trial court erred in failing to 

conclude that upon McKee’s attempted “purchase” of a liability where he was both 

creditor and debtor was, by law, not a purchase, but a discharge of the liability, and 

thereby precluded McKee from bringing breach of contract claims against his coguarantors through his mere instrumentality. We disagree.

These arguments mirror those raised in Strachan’s first two arguments. The 

trial court did not err in failing to conclude the purchase was a discharge. In Gillespie, 

the purchase of the note was an assignment, not a discharge of the debt, since there 

was no evidence preventing an assignment nor were any documents cancelled or 

destroyed to show intent of a discharge. And again, we decline to entertain Strachan’s 

piercing the corporate veil or “mere instrumentality” argument, because Strachan 

failed to preserve that issue. 

d. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Next, Strachan contends that the trial court erred in granting McKee’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment on Strachan’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. We disagree.

A member-manager of a limited liability company owes no fiduciary duty to 

the other members; rather, the fiduciary duty is owed to the company. Kaplan v. O.K. 

Technologies, LLC, 196 N.C. App. 469, 474, 675 S.E. 2d 133, 137 (2009). Therefore, 
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Opinion of the Court

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individual members cannot maintain a claim of breach of fiduciary duty against the 

manager. Id.

Here, McKee and Strachan were both members of ABMS and McKee was the 

member manager. Any fiduciary duty that McKee owed would be to ABMS rather 

than Strachan. Accordingly, Strachan cannot assert the existence of a fiduciary duty 

against McKee. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting McKee’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment on Strachan’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. Id.

e. Constructive Fraud

Next, Strachan contends the trial court erred in granting McKee’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment on Strachan’s constructive fraud claim. We disagree.

The elements for constructive fraud are: (1) a relationship of trust and 

confidence exists between the parties; (2) the relationship led up to and surrounded 

the consummation of the transaction in which defendant took advantage of its 

position; and (3) defendant sought to benefit from the transaction. Trillium Ridge 

Condo. Ass’n v. Trillium Links & Vill., LLC, 236 N.C. App. 478, 502, 764 S.E.2d 603 

(2014). Further, to establish constructive fraud the plaintiff must show the existence 

of a fiduciary duty and a breach of that duty. Piles v. Allstate Ins. Co., 187 N.C. App. 

399, 406, 653 S.E.2d 181, 186 (2007), rev. denied, 362 N.C. 361, 663 S.E.2d 316 (2008).
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As we held above, there was no fiduciary duty, and therefore, such duty could 

not have been breached. As a result, the trial court did not err in granting McKee’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment on Strachan’s constructive fraud claim.

III. Motion to Join

A. Standard of Review

“A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that 

its actions are manifestly unsupported by reason . . . [or] upon a showing that [the 

trial court’s decision] was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a 

reasoned decision.” White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985).

B. Analysis

Lastly, Strachan contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to join 

ABMS in the action. We disagree.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 26-12 provides that “the law allows permissive or 

discretionary joinder.” High Point Bank & Trust Co., 368 N.C. 301, 308, 776 S.E.2d 

838, 844 (2015). “[W]hen any surety is sued by the holder of the obligation, the court, 

on motion of the surety may join the principal as an additional party defendant.” Id. 

Strachan waited to file this motion years after asserting his counterclaims and more 

than a month after the trial court had entered summary judgment against him on 

the breach of contract claim, disposing of the case. The trial court found that joining 

ABMS would cause a delay in the entry of judgment against Strachan which was not 
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necessary. The trial court has discretion to manage its dockets and deny a motion 

for joinder brought after undue delay. United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 60 N.C. App. 

40, 43, 298 S.E.2d 409, 411 (1982). As a result, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying the motion to join ABMS.

IV. Damages

A. Standard of Review

“The trial court’s award of damages . . . is a matter within its sound discretion, 

and will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse of discretion.” Helms v. Schultze, 

161 N.C. App. 404, 414, 588 S.E.2d 524, 530 (2003). “In order to reverse the trial 

court’s decision for abuse of discretion, we must find that the decision was 

unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of competent inquiry.” Id.

B. Analysis

a. Recovery Amount

On cross-appeal, McKee contends that the trial court erred in holding McKee

was limited to recovering half of the price he paid to purchase the Note, instead of 

the face value of the Note. We agree.

In Gillespie, this Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the defendant was 

liable to the plaintiff for the face value of the note in light of the assignment. 

Gillespie, 53 N.C. App. at 269, 280 S.E.2d at 747; see also Yates v. Brown, 275 N.C. 

634, 641, 170 S.E.2d 477, 482 (1969) (holding that to refuse to allow plaintiff to 
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recover the face value of the note is contrary to North Carolina law and that 

purchase of a note at a discount does not preclude recovery of the face value of the 

note); Pickett v. Fulford, 211 N.C. 160, 164, 189 S.E. 488, 490 (1937) (upholding as

valid assignment of note and deed of trust, even where note and deed of trust 

acquired after maturity and for face value of the note).

Here, C1 Bank assigned the Note to Bethesda via a Note Sale and Assignment 

Agreement, which made it clear that the transaction was an absolute assignment 

rather than a discharge. Since Bethesda received an assignment, it is entitled to 

recover the full value of the Note from Strachan.

b. Equitable Contribution

McKee further contends that the trial court erred in applying the Doctrine of 

Equitable Contribution to reduce Strachan’s liability by half. We agree.

“The rights of the obligee to a guaranty contract may be assigned under the 

principles of general contract law.” Gillespie, 53 N.C. App. at 262, 280 S.E.2d at 743. 

“Where no adequate remedy at law exists, a contract is enforceable through [equitable 

remedies].” Condellone v. Condellone, 129 N.C. App. 675, 681-82, 501 S.E.2d 690, 695

(1998).

Here, this Court has held that the C1 Note was assigned to Bethesda, and that 

the assignment was controlled by contract law. Consequently, an equitable remedy,

such as equitable contribution, would be inappropriate since there is an adequate 
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remedy at law. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in applying the Doctrine 

of Equitable Contribution to reduce Strachan’s liability.

V. Waiver Defenses

A. Analysis

Next on cross-appeal, McKee contends that the trial court erred in holding that 

Strachan had not waived defenses such as equitable contribution. Because we have 

held that equitable contribution is not an available remedy in this case, the waiver of 

equitable contribution as a defense is moot. Therefore, we dismiss this argument.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED.

Judges TYSON and INMAN concur.