If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

CENTRAL HOME HEALTH CARE SERVICES,

INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

June 27, 2024

v No. 363777

Oakland Circuit Court

HOME-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 2021-190275-NF

Defendant-Appellant.

CENTRAL HOME HEALTH CARE SERVICES,

INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 364422

Oakland Circuit Court

PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

LC No. 2021-191754-NF;

 

Defendant-Appellant.

CENTRAL HOME HEALTH CARE SERVICES 

INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 364870

Oakland Circuit Court

PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

LC No. 2022-192783-NF

Defendant-Appellant.
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CENTRAL HOME HEALTH CARE SERVICES,

INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 365437

Washtenaw Circuit Court

AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 22-000514-NF

Defendant,

and

HOME-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant.

CENTRAL HOME HEALTH CARE SERVICES,

INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 366216

Washtenaw Circuit Court

AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 22-000911-NF

Defendant-Appellant,

and

HOME-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

CENTRAL HOME HEALTH CARE SERVICES,

INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 366937

Washtenaw Circuit Court

ESURANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 22-001470-NF
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Defendant-Appellant,

and

USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

Before: YATES, P.J., and BORRELLO and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals,

1

defendants (collectively, the insurers) present an issue under 

the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., that this Court recently resolved in a published opinion in

Central Home Health Care Servs, Inc v Progressive Mich Ins Co, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d 

___ (2024) (Docket No. 364653). Specifically, the insurers challenge various trial courts’ rejection 

of the insurers’ position that MCL 500.3157(2)(a) governs the recovery of plaintiff, Central Home 

Health Care Services, Inc. (CHHCS), for in-home health care services provided to the insureds of 

the insurers. Consistent with this Court’s recent opinion in Central Home Health Care, ___ Mich 

App ___, we conclude that the trial courts erred, so we reverse and remand the various judgments 

against the insurers in all the cases before us.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

CHHCS provided treatment to people who purportedly sustained accidental bodily injuries 

under circumstances that made them eligible for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. The 

in-home physical therapy and skilled nursing services were rendered by CHHCS between July 1, 

2021 and July 2, 2022. If the services provided by CHHCS were submitted to the federal Medicare 

program for payment, those services would be reimbursed through a prospective payment system, 

rather than a standardized fee schedule.

 

1 Docket Nos. 363777, 364422, and 364870 were initially consolidated on April 19, 2023. Central 

Home Health Care Servs v Home Owners Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, 

entered April 19, 2023 (Docket No. 363777); Central Home Health Care Servs v Progressive 

Marathon Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 19, 2023 (Docket No. 

364422). Docket Nos. 365437, 366216, and 366937 were added to the consolidated appeals when 

the applications for those cases were granted on October 6, 2023. Central Home Health Care 

Servs v Auto Owners Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 6, 2023 

(Docket No. 365437); Central Home Health Care Servs v Auto-Owners Ins Co, unpublished order 

of the Court of Appeals, entered October 6, 2023 (Docket No. 366216); Central Home Health 

Care Servs v Esurance Ins Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 6, 2023 

(Docket No. 366937).
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In the trial courts, all of the insurers moved for partial summary disposition with respect to 

the portions of CHHCS’s charges that exceeded the payment cap in MCL 500.3157(2)(a). CHHCS

responded that its payments were governed by MCL 500.3157(7)(a)(i). The trial courts that issued 

rulings in these consolidated cases agreed with CHHCS and denied the insurers’ motionsfor partial

summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The insurers appealed, and while the consolidated 

cases were in the briefing process, this Court issued the published opinion in Central Home Health 

Care, ___ Mich App ___, that bears on the outcome in all the consolidated appeals. Thus, we now 

must consider the parties’ arguments in light of recent, binding precedent.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The various trial courts that resolved these consolidated cases denied the insurers’ motions 

for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We review a trial court’s decision on 

a summary disposition motion de novo. Andary v USAA Cas Ins Co, 512 Mich 207, 230; 1 NW3d 

186 (2023). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. El-Khalil 

v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). Such a motion should be 

granted when, considering all the evidence proffered by the parties in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, “there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “A genuine issue of material 

fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Id. 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo 

as legal issues. Sherman v St Joseph, 332 Mich App 626, 632; 957 NW2d 838 (2020).

In considering the motions for partial summary disposition in these consolidated cases, we 

must begin with the relevant language of the governing statute, MCL 500.3157, which states:

(2) Subject to subsections (3) to (14), a physician, hospital, clinic, or other 

person that renders treatment or rehabilitative occupational training to an injured 

person for an accidental bodily injury covered by personal protection insurance is 

not eligible for payment or reimbursement under this chapter for more than the 

following:

(a) For treatment or training rendered after July 1, 2021 and before July 2, 

2022, 200% of the amount payable to the person for the treatment or training under 

Medicare.

* * *

(7) If Medicare does not provide an amount payable for a treatment or 

rehabilitative occupational training under subsection (2), (3), (5), or (6), the 

physician, hospital, clinic, or other person that renders the treatment or training is 

not eligible for payment or reimbursement under this chapter of more than the 

following, as applicable:

(a) For a person to which subsection (2) applies, the applicable following 

percentage of the amount payable for the treatment or training under the person’s 

charge description master in effect on January 1, 2019 or, if the person did not have 
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a charge description master on that date, the applicable following percentage of the 

average amount the person charged for the treatment on January 1, 2019:

(i) For treatment or training rendered after July 1, 2021 and before July 2, 

2022, 55%.

* * *

(15) As used in this section:

(f) “Medicare” means fee for service payments under part A, B, or D of the 

federal Medicare program established under subchapter XVIII of the social security 

act, 42 USC 1395 to 1395lll, without regard to the limitations unrelated to the rates 

in the fee schedule such as limitation or supplemental payments related to 

utilization, readmissions, recaptures, bad debt adjustments, or sequestration.

The insurers insist that the outcome in the consolidated cases is dictated by MCL 500.3157(2)(a), 

whereas CHHCS asserts that MCL 500.3157(7)(a)(i) controls the outcome.

This Court recently resolved that precise dispute in Central Home Health Care, ___ Mich 

App ___. Construing the relevant language of MCL 500.3157, this Court determined that whether 

reimbursement is governed by MCL 500.3157(2) or (7) turns entirely on whether Medicare covers

the service at issue. Id. at ___; slip op at 4. Focusing on the definition of “Medicare” set forth in 

MCL 500.3157(15)(f), this Court explained:

The first clause of this definition specifically directs our attention to the 

federal statutes defining the Medicare program. Pursuant to 42 USC 1395c, 

Medicare Part A is an “insurance program” that “provides basic protection against 

the costs of hospital, related post-hospital, home health services, and hospice care 

in accordance with this part” for eligible individuals as defined under the Social 

Security Act, 42 USC 301 et seq. Medicare Part B is “a voluntary insurance 

program to provide medical insurance benefits in accordance with the provisions 

of this part for aged and disabled individuals who elect to enroll under such 

program, to be financed from premium payments by enrollees together with 

contributions from funds appropriated by the Federal Government.” 42 USC 1395j. 

Medicare Part D provides qualified prescription drug coverage for eligible 

individuals. 42 USC 1395w-101(a)(1). Both Part A and Part B indicate that the 

insurance program benefits entitle the covered individual to “payment” to the 

individual or on the individual’s behalf for certain medical services, including 

certain home health services. 42 USC 1395d(a); 42 USC 1395k(a).

Considering the description of Medicare provided by the relevant federal 

statutes, it is apparent that Medicare provides “fee for service payments” as 

contemplated by MCL 500.3157(15)(f). Accordingly, the first clause of the 

definition of Medicare in MCL 500.3157(15)(f) simply states the obvious: the 
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Legislature’s use of the term “Medicare” in MCL 500.3157 means Parts A, B, and 

D of the federal Medicare program, which provides fee-for-service-payment 

coverage, akin to insurance coverage, for certain medical expenses for eligible 

individuals. The second clause of MCL 500.3157(15)(f) instructs that certain other 

adjustments may be made under Medicare for purposes of administering the 

Medicare program but those adjustments are not related to the actual reimbursement 

rates and therefore, are not to be considered for purposes of Michigan’s no-fault 

act. [Central Home Health Care, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5.]

This Court was unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s theory that only payments made according 

to a fee schedule fall within the scope of “Medicare” as defined by subsection (15)(f) because “the 

simple question to answer in determining whether MCL 500.3157(2) or MCL 500.3157(7) applies 

is whether Medicare covers the service at issue.” Id. at ___; slip op at 6. According to this Court,

the method for calculating the amount Medicare would pay, whether by reference to a fee schedule 

or through the use of a prospective payment system, is irrelevant. Id.

In each of the consolidated cases, the services provided by CHHCS to the insurers’ insureds 

were covered by Medicare’s prospective payment system. All the services at issue were provided 

between July 1, 2021, and July 2, 2022, so CHHCS’s reimbursement is restricted to 200% of the 

amount payable under Medicare pursuant to MCL 500.3157(2)(a). Accordingly, we must reverse 

every order denying the insurers’ motions for partial summary disposition and remand for further 

proceedings. In doing so, however, we must note, as we stated in Central Home Health Care, that

the insurers’ entitlement to partial summary disposition is confined to the determination that MCL 

500.3157(2)(a) governs all the consolidated cases. To the extent that the insurers ask for judgments 

or declarations limiting CHHCS’s recovery to a specified amount, the parties presented conflicting 

evidence about the amounts payable by Medicare with regard to CHHCS’s claims, thereby creating 

genuine issues of material fact that preclude a dispositive ruling concerning the amounts CHHCS

may recover under MCL 500.3157(2)(a). Consequently, “[o]n remand, the parties are free to argue 

their positions regarding the amount that represents 200% of the amount Medicare would pay for 

purposes of MCL 500.3157(2)(a).” Central Home Health Care, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op 6.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Christopher P. Yates

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello

/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett