alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
AD Economic Evaluation

Docket No. FAA-2015-3821 Directorate ID: 2014-SW-025-AD

Helicopter Model: 

Number of Helicopters (U.S. Operators): 52 Helicopters in the US Registry.

Reason: These actions are intended to detect a crack and prevent failure of an M/R blade and 

subsequent loss of helicopter control.

Costs:

 Cleaning and performing all inspections of a set of M/R blades (2 per helicopter) requires

a half work-hour. No parts are needed. At an estimated 24 inspections a year, the cost is $1,032 

per helicopter and $53,664 for the U.S. fleet. 

 Replacing an M/R blade requires 12 work hours, and parts cost $90,656 for a total cost of 

$91,676 per blade. 

Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action?” Yes ( ) No ()

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant? Yes ( ) Explain Below No ()

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities?

Yes ( ) No ()

Project Engineer: Charles Harrison
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-24,164-02

EX PARTE DENNIS LEVECE MAYES, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. W12-53766-K(A) IN CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4

FROM DALLAS COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Applicant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and sentenced to life

imprisonment. The Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Mayes v. State, No. 05-16-

00490-CR (Tex. App.—Dallas May 23, 2017) (not designated for publication). Applicant filed this

application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded

it to this Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07.

Applicant contends that trial counsel failed, among other things, to request that the State elect

which incident it would rely on and to object to the admission of extraneous misconduct evidence

because no notice was provided. Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Accordingly, the record should be developed. The
2

trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d). 

The trial court shall order trial counsel to respond to the above claims. In developing the record, the

trial court may use any means set out in Article 11.07, § 3(d). If the trial court elects to hold a

hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. If Applicant is indigent and wants to be

represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent him at the hearing. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04. If counsel is appointed or retained, the trial court shall immediately

notify this Court of counsel’s name.

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whethertrial counsel’s

performance was deficient and Applicant was prejudiced. The trial court may make any other

findings and conclusions that it deems appropriate in response to Applicant’s claims.

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from

the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court’s

findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things,

affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from

hearings and depositions. See TEX.R.APP.P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested

by the trial court and obtained from this Court.

Filed: April 15, 2020

Do not publish
§ 53.4944-2 Additional taxes. ( a ) *On the private foundation.* Section 4944(b)(1) of the Code imposes an excise tax in any case in which an initial tax is imposed by section 4944(a)(1) and § 53.4944-1(a) on the making of a jeopardizing investment by a private foundation and such investment is not removed from jeopardy within the taxable period (as defined in section 4944(e)(1)). The tax imposed under section 4944(b)(1) is to be paid by the private foundation and is at the rate of 25 percent of the amount of the investment. This tax shall be imposed upon the portion of the investment which has not been removed from jeopardy within the taxable period.
( b ) *On the management.* Section 4944(b)(2) of the Code imposes an excise tax in any case in which an additional tax is imposed by section 4944 (b)(1) and paragraph (a) of this section and a foundation manager has refused to agree to part or all of the removal of the investment from jeopardy. The tax imposed under section 4944(b)(2) is at the rate of 5 percent of the amount of the investment, subject to the provisions of section 4944(d) and § 53.4944-4. This tax is to be paid by any foundation manager who has refused to agree to the removal of part or all of the investment from jeopardy, and shall be imposed upon the portion of the investment which has not been removed from jeopardy within the taxable period.
( c ) *Examples.* The provisions of this section may be illustrated by the following examples:
Example 1. X is a foundation manager of Y, a private foundation. On the advice of X, Y invests $5,000 in the common stock of corporation M. Assume that both X and Y are liable for the taxes imposed by section 4944(a) on the making of the investment. Assume further that no part of the investment is removed from jeopardy within the taxable period and that X refused to agree to such removal. Y will be liable for an additional tax of $1,250 (*i.e.*, $5,000 × 25%). X will be liable for an additional tax of $250 (*i.e.*, $5,000 × 5%).
Example 2. Assume the facts as stated in Example (1), except that X is not liable for the tax imposed by section 4944(a)(2) for his participation in the making of the investment, because such participation was not willful and was due to reasonable cause. X will nonetheless be liable for the tax of $250 imposed by section 4944(b)(2) since an additional tax has been imposed upon Y and since X refused to agree to the removal of the investment from jeopardy.
Example 3. Assume the facts as stated in Example (1), except that Y removes $2,000 of the investment from jeopardy within the taxable period, with X refusing to agree to the removal from jeopardy of the remaining $3,000 of such investment. Y will be liable for an additional tax of $750, imposed upon the portion of the investment which has not been removed from jeopardy within the taxable period (*i.e.*, $3,000 × 25%). Further X will be liable for an additional tax of $150, also imposed upon the same portion of the investment (*i.e.*, $3,000 × 5%).
[T.D. 7240, 37 FR 28747, Dec. 27, 1972, as amended by T.D. 8084, 51 FR 16302, May 2, 1986]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 10-QSB
FOR THE QUARTER ENDED JUNE 30, 1997, FOR DIGITAL POWER CORPORATION AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                         778,852
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,329,913
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (170,000)
<INVENTORY>                                  3,810,929
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,125,208
<PP&E>                                       1,735,002
<DEPRECIATION>                               (882,957)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,996,751
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,810,952
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     8,276,587
<OTHER-SE>                                 (2,433,202)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,996,751
<SALES>                                      8,822,702
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             8,822,702
<CGS>                                      (6,642,805)
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              (6,642,805)
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           (1,132,843)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            (43,350)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,020,360)
<INCOME-TAX>                                 (418,895)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (601,465)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (601,465)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.18
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.17
        

</TABLE>
Janice K. Brewer
 

Governor
 

March 26, 2010 

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT 

OF 

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 

1110 West Washington Street • Phoenix, Arizona 85007 

(602) 771-2300 • www.azdeq.gov Benjamin H. Grumbles 

Director 

Mr. Jared Blumenfeld 

Regional Administrator 

US EPA Region IX 

75 Hawthorne Street 

San Francisco, CA 94105-3901 

Re: Technical support documentation for Pinal County Particulate Matter Designations 

Dear Administrator Blumenfeld: 

As a follow up to Governor Brewer's letter of March 23, 2010 communicating her 

recommendation for the Pinal County PMIO Nonattainment Area boundary recommendations, 

please find attached technical support documentation for her recommendation and an analysis of 

the nature and causes PM2.5 NAAQS violations in Pinal County: 

"Arizona Air Quality Designations Technical Support Document, Boundary 

Recommendation for the Pinal County 24-hour PM10 Nonattainment Area;" and 

"Analysis ofPM2.5 Exceedances in Pinal County Arizona: Demonstration that PM25 

Concentrations are Driven by Local Sources ofPMIO Near the Cowtown Monitor" 

I look forward to working with you to finalize the designations. If you have any questions, 

please contact me (602) 771-2203 or Ira Domsky, Director, Air Quality Division, at (602) 771­

2308. 

c:	 Deborah Jordan 

Colleen McKaughan 

Northern Regional Office Southern Regional Office 

400 West Congress Street· Suite 433' Tucson, AZ 85701 1801 W. Route 66 • Suite 117' Flagstaff, AZ 86001 

(520) 628-6733 (928) 779-0313 

Printed on recycled paper
#### § 1060.800 Penalties.

A person violating any requirement under this part is subject to the penalties provided for in sections 5321(a) and 5322 of title 31, United States Code, in the same manner and to the same extent as such penalties would apply to any person that is otherwise subject to such section 5321(a) or 5322.
#### In the Matter of the Assignment of De Wilton Robinson to George A. Wicks for the Benefit of Creditors.

[Special Term.]

(Decided January 3d, 1884.)

The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to proceedings under the General Assignment Act.

The bond of an assignee for the benefit of creditors must, in the County of Mew York, he approved by a judge of the Court of Common Pleas. An approval by a justice of the Supreme Court is a nullity, and confers no authority upon the assignee to dispose of the assigned property.

An assignee for the benefit of creditors who pays as fees to his counsel money of the assigned estate with the understanding that his counsel shall furnish sureties on his bond and pay what is necessary to procure them, is to all intents and purposes using the-assigned estate for the purchase of bondsmen, and should be removed.

Application for the removal of an assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors.

O

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Van Hoesen, J.

The bond of the assignee has never been ' approved. A justice of the Supreme Court has no power to *149approve the bond of an assignee appointed under the General Assignment Act of 1877, and his action in approving such a bond is a nullity. The Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to proceedings under the Assignment Act. The bond of an assignee under the Act of 1877 can not be approved by any other judge than a county judge (L. 1877, c. 466, § 5). The assignee has therefore been acting without lawful authority in disposing of the assigned estate. Before he could lawfully “sell, dispose of or convert to the purposes of the trust any of the assigned property,” it was his duty to obtain the approval of his bond by a judge of the Court of Common Pleas. This is sufficient cause for removal.

But there is another cause.

In order to obtain sureties, he paid out money of the assigned estate. Directly he did not pay his sureties for becoming his bondsmen, but he gave to his counsel money belonging to the estate, with the understanding that his counsel would furnish the sureties, and pay what was necessary to procure them. This is, to all intents and purposes, using the assigned estate for the purchase of bondsmen.

The assignee must be removed.

Application granted.
# L_2019279EN.01002201.xml

| 31.10.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 279/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

31.10.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 279/22

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2019/1826

of 25 October 2019

entering a name in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications (‘Kaimiškas Jovarų alus’ (PGI))

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), and in particular Article 52(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, Lithuania’s application to register the name ‘Kaimiškas Jovarų alus’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, Lithuania’s application to register the name ‘Kaimiškas Jovarų alus’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2).

| (2) | As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Kaimiškas Jovarų alus’ should therefore be entered in the register, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Kaimiškas Jovarų alus’ should therefore be entered in the register,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The name ‘Kaimiškas Jovarų alus’ (PGI) is hereby entered in the register.

The name specified in the first paragraph denotes a product in Class 2.1. – Beer, as listed in Annex XI to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 (3).

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 25 October 2019.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Phil HOGAN

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ C 217, 28.6.2019, p. 5.

2

(3)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 of 13 June 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ L 179, 19.6.2014, p. 36).

3

---
```

[Congressional Bills 104th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 120 Introduced in House (IH)]

104th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 120

   To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league 
                               baseball.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 1995

Mr. Bunning of Kentucky (for himself and Mr. Bilirakis) introduced the 
  following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To apply the antitrust laws of the United States to major league 
                               baseball.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Baseball Fans and Communities 
Protection Act of 1995''.

SEC. 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL IN 
              EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES.

    The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding at the 
end the following:
    ``Sec. 27. (a) If unilateral terms and conditions of employment in 
restraint of trade or commerce are imposed by any party that has been 
subject to an agreement between 2 or more major league baseball clubs 
and the labor organization representing the players of major league 
baseball, such unilateral imposition shall be subject to the antitrust 
laws.
    ``(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to a term or condition imposed 
solely with respect to a professional baseball player who is a party to 
a uniform player contract that is assigned, at the time the imposition 
described in such subsection occurs, to a baseball club that is not a 
major league professional baseball club.
    ``(c) This section shall not be construed to modify, impair, or 
supersede the operation of--
            ``(1) the Act of September 30, 1961 (Public Law 87-331; 15 
        U.S.C. 1291 et seq.), or
            ``(2) any Federal statute relating to labor relations.
    ``(d) For purposes of this section, the term `terms and conditions' 
does not include a strike or a lockout.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Larry Taylor, Appellant.

[806 NYS2d 472]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (James A. Yates, J.), rendered July 9, 2003, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 2 to 4 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion. The record establishes that the police entered defendant’s apartment with the voluntary consent of defendant’s companion, with whom he lived *(see People v Gonzalez,*39 NY2d 122 [1976]). The hearing court’s finding of implied or tacit consent is supported by evidence that defendant’s companion was insistent on showing the police an order of protection she claimed to have against the complainant, which she said was in the apartment, and that she did not protest when the officer accompanied her into the apartment. The companion’s conduct, viewed as a whole, demonstrated that she voluntarily brought the officer into the apartment in order to show her the order *(see e.g. People v Smith,*239 AD2d 219 [1997], *lv denied*90 NY2d 911 [1997]; *People v Brown,*234 AD2d 211 [1996], *affd*91 NY2d 854 [1997]; *People v Washington,*209 AD2d 817, 819 [1994], *lv denied*85 NY2d 944 [1995]).

The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. There is no basis for disturbing the jury’s determinations concerning credibility *(see People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94 [1903]). The fact that the jury acquitted defendant of other charges does not warrant a different conclusion *(see People v Rayam,*94 NY2d 557 [2000]). To *308the extent that defendant is also making a repugnant verdict argument, that claim is unpreserved and without merit. Concur—Buckley, P.J., Mazzarelli, Ellerin, Catterson and McGuire, JJ.
39738.

#### TATUM et al. v. PRUITT.

Decided September 20, 1962

Rehearing denied December 18, 1962,

*174
      *William A. Ingram,*for plaintiff in error.

*Cullins & Lancaster, J. B. Cullins, Ben Lancaster,*contra.

Eberhardt, Judge.

We can find nothing in the evidence to support a finding of gross negligence against the Tatums. The only act of negligence supported, as we see it, is a possible exceeding of the city speed limit. That alone is not enough. *Southern R. Co. v. Davis,*132 Ga. 812, 817 (65 SE 131); *Peavy v. Peavy,*36 Ga. App. 202, 205 (136 SE 96); *Hopkins v. Sipe,*58 Ga. App. 511, 513 (199 SE 246); *Fletcher v. Abbott,*92 Ga. App. 364, 370 (88 SE2d 445) (dissenting opinion).

Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto and the judgment is reversed with direction that a judgment non obstante veredicto be granted as to plaintiffs in error.

*Judgment reversed with direction.*

*Carlisle, P. J., and Bus-sell, J., concur.*
EXHIBIT 3.3
                                                                     -----------

                            CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
                                       OF
                          CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
                                       OF
                                  DYNAGEN, INC.

           It is hereby certified that:

           1. The name of the corporation (hereinafter called the "Corporation")
is DynaGen, Inc.

           2. The Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Corporation is
hereby amended by deleting the first paragraph of Paragraph 4 thereunder and
inserting in its place the following paragraph:

                     4. The total number of shares of stock which the
              corporation shall have authority to issue is 235,000,000 shares,
              consisting of 225,000,000 shares of common stock, having a par
              value of $0.01 per share (the "Common Stock"), and 10,000,000
              shares of preferred stock, having a par value of $0.01 per share
              (the "Preferred Stock").

           3. The amendment to the Restated Certificate of Incorporation herein
certified has been duly adopted in accordance with Section 242 of the General
Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.

           IN WITNESS WHEREOF, DynaGen, Inc. has caused this certificate to be
signed by Dhananjay G. Wadekar, its President, thereto duly authorized, this 9th
day of May, 2001.


                                                 DYNAGEN, INC.


                                                 By:  /s/Dhananjay G. Wadekar
                                                      -----------------------
                                                       Dhananjay G. Wadekar
                                                       President
#### In the Matter of Edward S. Reich, an Attorney, Respondent.

[804 NYS2d 284]

Order of suspension entered pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (f) and (g). Present—Green, J.P., Scudder, Gorski, Pine and Hayes, JJ.