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UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT TO THE 

HOMELAND FROM AQAP 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 

Serial No. 113–34 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

DONDALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

ERIC SWALWELL, California 

GREG HILL, Chief of Staff 

MICHAEL GEFFROY, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania, Vice Chair 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

CHRIS STEWART, Utah 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence ................................................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism 

and Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 2 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18 

WITNESSES

Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo, Associate Vice President, Director, Homeland Security 

Policy Institute, The George Washington University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 21 

Ms. Katherine L. Zimmerman, Senior Analyst Critical Threats Project, The 

American Enterprise Institute: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 27 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 28 

Mr. Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 35 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 37 

APPENDIX

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence: 

Statement of Robin Simcox, Research Fellow, The Henry Jackson Society .... 4 

Excerpt, ‘‘Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment’’ ....................................... 6 

Statement of The Jewish Federations of North America ................................. 9 

(1) 

UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT TO THE 

HOMELAND FROM AQAP 

Wednesday, September 18, 2013 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King [Chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives King, Higgins, and Keating. 

Mr. KING. Good afternoon. The Committee on Homeland Security 

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to 

order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony examining 

the threat to the homeland from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

At the onset of today’s hearing I want to express sincere sympathies to the families, friends, and coworkers of the 12 victims 

and 8 people who were wounded in the shooting at the Washington 

Navy Yard on Monday. Investigations are on-going into both the 

shooter and how he was able to gain access to a sensitive military 

facility, and I fully support those efforts. 

On Dec. 7, 2011, I held a joint hearing with Senator Lieberman 

on the threat to military personnel and facilities within the United 

States. While there is no evidence currently or any reason to believe that the tragic events of Sept. 16 were inspired by ideology, 

the reality is that our military personnel are a target and more 

needs to be done to address security in its ranks and at military 

facilities. 

Also this month we recognize the 12th anniversary of the Sept. 

11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In the past 12 years Islamist terrorists 

have carried out additional attacks, including the murder of two 

U.S. Army soldiers at a Little Rock recruiting center on June 1, 

2009, the murder of 13 people and 42 others being injured at a deployment center at Fort Hood on November 5, 2009, and the attack 

during the Boston Marathon killing 3 people and injuring approximately 260 people on April 15, 2013. 

We have been lucky that not all of these attempts resulted in the 

loss of innocent lives. There was the unsuccessful detonation of an 

explosive device on Flight 253 on Christmas day 2009, the attempt 

to detonate a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in Times 

Square on May 1, 2010, the discovery of two bombs hidden in printer cartridges on U.S.-bound cargo planes on October 29, 2010, a 
2 

disrupted plot to smuggle an explosive device onto an airline in 

May 2012, and numerous other plots that have been disruptive. 

AQAP, the Yemen-based al-Qaeda affiliate, has been linked to 

most of these either directly or indirectly through inspiring homegrown radicals. Most recently the U.S. Government closed 22 embassies, mainly in the Middle East and North Africa, for weeks due 

to security concerns relating to a threat from AQAP. 

As a result, the U.S. embassy in Yemen remained closed for 2 

weeks. The closure of any U.S. diplomatic facility for even 1 day, 

let alone 22, is a decision that is not made lightly. This incident 

should remind all of us what a danger AQAP poses. 

Many reports reveal that intercepted electronic conversations between AQAP and al-Qaeda leaders disclose that the plans for a 

major attack during a specific time frame, but not details on targets and locations for the attack. While additional counterterrorism 

pressure seems to have disrupted the attack in the short term, the 

situation is a reminder that we must remain vigilant, and that alQaeda and its affiliates remain intent on carrying out an attack 

against U.S. interests and especially against the homeland. 

In the past 12 years, under both the Bush and Obama administrations, we have made great efforts to track down and remove senior al-Qaeda leaders, including al-Awlaki, Samir Khan, and Said 

al-Shihiri within AQAP, and of course Osama bin Laden. Unfortunately, however, in many ways the al-Qaeda network is stronger 

today than it was before 9/11 because it has metastasized its footholds in so many locations. 

As the White House and Congress continue to grapple over the 

situation in Syria, it is vital that we do not lose sight of the threat 

posed by AQAP and other al-Qaeda affiliates. That is why I look 

forward to today’s hearing from the witnesses regarding the ongoing threat to the U.S. homeland from AQAP, including an evaluation of the current intent and capability. Also to review U.S. 

counterterrorism policy towards the group and the lessons learned 

from the August embassy closures. 

With that I now yield to the distinguished Ranking Member of 

the subcommittee, Mr. Higgins from New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for holding 

this hearing. I would also like to thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

According to the director of national intelligence al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula is the greatest immediate threat from a terrorist group in the United States. Even though the group has not 

been successful in recent years in its plots to attack the United 

States, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s reach and ability expose our country and our homeland to vulnerabilities that make it 

an extremely dangerous organization. 

The United States has attempted to make strides to diminish alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s terror capabilities, but the threat 

from this organization remains. 

In 2011 the United States through a drone strike killed Anwar 

al-Awlaki, who was once considered the most dangerous man in the 

world. Without al-Awlaki, the English-speaking American who recruited people to exploit Islam and perform terrorist acts, it was 
3 

thought al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s ability to strike the 

United States would be weakened. 

However, many in the intelligence community do not believe that 

al-Awlaki’s death had a significant impact and the National 

Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen has stated that 

al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has the ability to attack the 

United States with little or no warning. Aside from al-Awlaki, more 

than 35 senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have 

been killed by drone strikes. Yet the organization still continues to 

be a threat to the United States. 

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula moves fast and recognizes 

targets and opportunities for recruitment and exposure. For example, in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombing, the al-Qaeda recently dedicated an issue of its magazine Inspire to the Boston 

bombings. It praised the bombers and encouraged others to emulate the attack. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is also not 

afraid to attack the United States where it can, be it on the United 

States soil or our interests throughout the world. 

We saw this summer when the intelligence community intercepted a credible threat that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

was planning an attack on the United States facilities in the Middle East and North Africa. This threat was taken very seriously, 

was considered imminent. The threat prompted the United States 

and European countries to close their embassies in the Middle East 

and North Africa for days. 

It is astonishing that even though the United States has eliminated much of their senior leadership and one of its most effective 

recruiters, the group can still have capability to conduct attacks 

against the United States. It also recognizes the economic devastation terrorist acts can bring. 

A terrorist attack in the Buffalo/Niagara Region, which was the 

busiest passenger border crossing with Canada and the secondbusiest for cargo crossing, would be devastating. However, the Department of Homeland Security does not recognize the Buffalo/Niagara Region as a high-risk area. Hence, local law enforcement in 

the Buffalo/Niagara Region are left without the resources that 

could possibly be needed if an attack from this dangerous organization were to occur. 

As we saw with the Boston Marathon bombings, the role of first 

responders is invaluable to the response. With this terrorist group 

consistently adapting to and seemingly lying in wait for an exposure to our vulnerabilities, this Nation should be prepared to prevent attacks in all areas and on all fronts. 

I thank the Chairman for holding this important hearing. I look 

forward to the testimony of our expert witnesses. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BRIAN HIGGINS

SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 

I would like to thank the Chairman for holding this important hearing this after- noon. I would also like to thank the witnesses for their testimony. 

According to the director of national intelligence, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is the greatest immediate threat from a terrorist group to the United States. 

Even though the group has not been successful in recent years at its plots to attack 
4 

the United States, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s reach and ability to expose 

U.S. homeland security vulnerabilities makes it an extremely dangerous organization. The United States has attempted to make strides to diminish al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula’s terror capabilities, but the threat from this organization remains. 

In 2011, the United States, through a drone strike, killed Anwar al-Awlaki who 

was once considered the most dangerous man in the world. Without al-Awlaki, an 

English-speaking American who recruited people to exploit Islam and perform terrorist acts, it was thought al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s ability to strike the 

United States would be weakened. However, many in the intelligence community do 

not believe that al-Awlaki’s death had a significant impact and National Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen has stated that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula still has the ability to attack the United States with little or no warning. 

Aside from al-Awlaki, more than 35 senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have been killed by drone strikes, yet the organization still continues to be 

a threat to the United States. 

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula moves fast and recognizes targets and opportunities for recruitment and exposure. For example, in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombings, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula dedicated an issue of its magazine, Inspire, to the Boston bombings. It praised the bombers and encouraged others 

to emulate the attack. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is also not afraid to attack the United States where it can, be it on United States soil or our interests 

abroad. 

We saw this summer when the intelligence community intercepted a credible 

threat that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was planning on attacking United 

States facilities in Middle East and North Africa. This threat was taken very seriously and was considered imminent. The threat prompted the United States and 

European countries to close their embassies in the Middle East and North Africa 

for several days. 

It is astonishing that even though the United States has eliminated much of their 

senior leadership and one of its most effective recruiters, the group can still have 

the capability to conduct attacks against the United States. It also recognizes the 

economic devastation terrorist acts can bring. A terrorist attack in the Buffalo/Niagara region, which has the busiest passenger border crossing with Canada and second-busiest cargo crossing would be devastating. However, the Department of 

Homeland Security does not recognize the Buffalo/Niagara region as a high-risk 

area. Hence, local law enforcement in the Buffalo/Niagara region are left without 

the resources that could possibly be needed if an attack from this dangerous organization were to occur. 

As we saw with the Boston Marathon bombings, the role of first responders is invaluable to the response. With this terrorist group constantly adapting to and seemingly lying in wait for an exposure to our vulnerabilities, this Nation should be prepared to prevent attacks in all areas and on all fronts. 

Thank you and thank you Mr. King for holding this important hearing. 

Mr. KING. I thank the Ranking Member. 

Just to get one bit of business out of the way, it is apparent for 

today’s hearing we use information provided by additional security 

experts. 

I ask unanimous consent to include in the hearing record one testimony for the record on the threat posed by AQAP written by 

Robin Simcox with the Henry Jackson Society, and excerpts on the 

threat from AQAP from September 2013 report released by the Bipartisan Policy Center. Additionally I ask unanimous consent to include a letter and report from the Jewish Federation of North 

America regarding the continued terrorist threats to the Jewish 

community. 

Without objection these items will be included in the record. 

[The information follows:] 

STATEMENT OF ROBIN SIMCOX, RESEARCH FELLOW, THE HENRY JACKSON SOCIETY

The threat to the U.S. homeland from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 

is real, sustained, and likely to be enduring. AQAP is today the most aggressive 

branch of al-Qaeda, and a severe security threat within Yemen. 
5 

However, the threat from the group is not restricted to its own borders. It is also 

the al-Qaeda group most capable of carrying out an attack against not only the U.S. 

homeland, but the Western homeland more broadly. 

AQAP’s creation was announced in January 2009, following a merger between alQaeda’s Yemeni and Saudi branches. Its leadership is largely made up of experienced and dedicated jihadist fighters whose connections to al-Qaeda predate 9/11. 

The group’s emir, Nasir al-Wahayshi, is a former secretary to Osama bin Laden 

who connected with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Earlier this year, he was 

promoted to the role of al-Qaeda’s ‘‘general manager’’, a sign of his increased influence within the group. The group’s former deputy emir—the recently deceased Said 

al-Shehri—also fought in Afghanistan. 

Furthermore, AQAP’s military chief, Qasim al-Raymi, attended al-Qaeda training 

camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s, as did Ibrahim al-Rubaish, a senior AQAP theologian. 

The explosives expert within the group is a Saudi named Ibrahim al-Asiri, although he has now likely passed his expertise on to others. It was he who constructed the bomb that AQAP recruit Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab had concealed 

in his underwear and unsuccessfully attempted to detonate on a flight headed to 

Detroit, Michigan, on Christmas day of 2009. 

Al-Asiri was also likely involved in the construction of bombs discovered in U.S.- 

bound cargo planes on 29 October 2010, that were discovered during stopovers in 

the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom; as well as the second underwear bomb plot, that was thwarted in April 2012 when an AQAP plan to bomb a 

flight headed to the United States was thwarted by a Saudi agent that infiltrated 

the group. 

One man partially responsible for AQAP’s focus on the West was the Americanborn cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki. For example, it was he who, while in Yemen, assessed 

Abdulmutallab’s dedication to jihad; and his instructions or sermons have inspired 

a host of others to attempt terrorist attacks within the West itself. 

One of these attacks led to a tragic loss of life, when Major Nidal Hasan, a U.S.- 

born army Major shot and killed 13 people in November 2009 at Fort Hood army 

base in Killeen, Texas. Hasan and al-Awlaki were in e-mail contact prior to the attack. 

There are numerous other examples of al-Awlaki’s influence. Rajib Karim, a British Bangladeshi, was in e-mail contact with al-Awlaki in January and February 

2010. Karim worked for British Airways and discussed with al-Awlaki how his access to aviation information could facilitate a terrorist attack. Karim has since been 

jailed for 30 years. 

Others were inspired to act by al-Awlaki’s rhetoric, such as Faisal Shahzad, who 

planted a bomb in New York’s Times Square on 1 May 2010. He has now been sentenced to life in jail. 

Another who had been persuaded to act—in part because of al-Awlaki’s on-line 

sermons—was Roshonara Choudhry, who was convicted for attempting to murder 

Labour Member of Parliament Stephen Timms at his constituency surgery in London on 14 May 2010. 

Al-Awlaki was killed in a U.S. drone strike in al-Jawf, on 30 September 2011. 

However, the dissemination of his rhetoric—as well as the appeal to Western audiences that Inspire, AQAP’s English-language magazine, has—means that the threat 

to the Western homeland by no means ends with his death. 

However, the group’s ambitions do not begin and end with attacks against the 

United States. AQAP regards itself as an alternative government to that in Sana’a. 

Therefore, it has attempted to gain, and then control, territory within Yemen. 

Between March 2011 and June 2012, it controlled towns in the provinces of Abyan 

and Shabwa in southern Yemen, subsequently declaring them Islamic ‘‘emirates’’. 

Aware of al-Qaeda’s divisive reputation, AQAP introduced themselves to locals in 

Yemen as members of Ansar al-Sharia. They empowered local jihadists and rebranded their movement with a positive message that they could restore peace and 

justice to the area, while also providing key services. They achieved some success 

with this, providing food, water, and electricity. This only served to highlight the 

shortcomings of the government in Sana’a, who proved incapable of providing such 

basics for the population it purports to govern. 

A June 2012 government offensive removed AQAP control from its southern 

‘‘emirates’’. However, by mid-2013, AQAP had once again begun to control territory: 

This time, in Hadramout, eastern Yemen. 

While the government is capable of expelling the group from these areas militarily, this has led to AQAP dispersing its presence even more widely throughout 

Yemen. It now largely focuses on ‘‘hit-and-run’’ attacks against the government’s 
6 

74Schmitt, Eric. ‘‘Intelligence Report Lists Iran and Cyberattacks as Leading Concerns.’’ The 

New York Times. January 31, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/world/intelligencechief-sees-al-qaeda-likely-to-continue-fragmenting.html?pagewanted=all&lr=0. 75Garamone, Jim. ‘‘Terror Threat Potent, But Dispersed, Intelligence Chief Says.’’ American 

Forces Press Service. March 13, 2013. http://www.defense.gov/news/ 

newsarticle.aspx?id=119522. 

military and counterterrorism officials, often employing tactics as crude as ‘‘driveby’’ motorcycle shootings. 

It is vital to understand that the threat to the West from AQAP is on-going. In 

August 2013, it was (in part) a response to intercepted communications between 

Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s emir, and Nasir al-Wahayshi, that led to the U.S. 

Government shutting down its embassies across the Middle East and North Africa 

and issuing a global travel warning to its citizens. Al-Zawahiri and al-Wahayshi 

were believed to be discussing a large plot against Western targets and government 

infrastructure in Yemen. 

The U.S. Government response must be an all-encompassing policy that can address both terrorism issues as well as problems specific to Yemen that may be facilitating the group’s growth. 

Attempts must be stepped up to aid the development of Yemen’s economy and its 

basic infrastructure, as well as encourage the creation of a genuinely representative 

and democratic government. This should be backed up by a limited number of drone 

strikes against AQAP’s key leaders. These strikes may be controversial within 

Yemen, but remain vital in disrupting AQAP’s activities. The strikes should be carried out alongside the stepped-up counterterrorism training to Yemeni government 

forces. 

While America may take the lead on these issues, the entire effort will require 

support from key partner nations across the Middle East, Africa, and Europe if it 

is to be successful. 

Ultimately, the security of all those threatened by AQAP will be greatly enhanced 

if a cohesive, co-ordinated policy—that addresses both security and development 

issues—is formulated. 

EXCERPT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY HON. PETER T. KING

JIHADIST TERRORISM: A THREAT ASSESSMENT

A Report From the Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2013 

Chapter 3: The International Threat 

2. AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Threat Assessment 

Because AQAP remains interested in launching attacks against the West, and its 

chief bomb-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, remains at large, senior American counterterrorism and defense officials, including Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, have assessed that al-Qaeda’s 

affiliate in Yemen poses the greatest immediate threat from a jihadist group to the 

United States.74 In testimony before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in January, Clapper said that while AQAP is under attack in Saudi Arabia 

and Yemen, ‘‘the group continues to adjust its tactics, techniques and procedures for 

targeting the West.’’75 However, AQAP has not attacked a U.S. target since its October 2010 attempt to plant bombs hidden in printer cartridges on cargo planes destined for the United States. And while the organization gained significant territory 

in Yemen as it exploited the popular uprising in the country in 2011, it also lost 

these gains within about a year. 

Nonetheless, AQAP presents a lesson of how terrorist groups in the 21st century 

can become more lethal and shift their focus abroad more quickly than their 20thcentury counterparts. It took core al-Qaeda a full decade from its founding to launch 

its first significant international terrorist attack—the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. By comparison, it took AQAP less than nine months 

from its from its emergence out of the remnants of decimated al-Qaeda cells in 

Saudi Arabia in 2009 to launch its first transnational attack, the near-miss assassination of the senior Saudi prince responsible for counterterrorism, and less than 

a year to launch its first attack against the United States, another near-miss, but 

one that, on Christmas Day 2009, shook American confidence that the terrorist 
7 

76Schmitt, Eric. ‘‘As Al-Qaeda Loses a Leader, Its Power Shifts From Pakistan.’’ The New 

York Times. June 7, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/world/asia/al-qaeda-powershifting-away-from-pakistan.html?lr=1&. 77 Johnsen, Gregory D. The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia. New 

York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013. 78 Raghavan, Sudarsan. ‘‘In Yemen, U.S. Airstrikes Breed Anger, and Sympathy for al-Qaeda.’’ 

The Washington Post. May 29, 2012. http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-05-29/world/ 

35456187l1laqap-drone-strikes-qaeda. 79Shane, Scott. ‘‘Qaeda Branch Aimed for Broad Damage at Low Cost.’’ The New York Times. 

November 20, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/world/middleeast/21parcel.html. 80 ‘‘Counterterrorism 2013 Calendar: Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).’’ National 

Counterterrorism Center. http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html. 81Stier, Eric. ‘‘In Yemen, top military commanders defect from Saleh regime.’’ Christian 

Science Monitor. March 21, 2011. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0321/ 

In-Yemen-top-military-commanders-defect-from-Saleh-regime. 82 Johnsen, Gregory D. The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia. New 

York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013. 83Schmitt, Eric. ‘‘U.S. Teaming With New Yemen Government on Strategy to Combat AlQaeda.’’ The New York Times. February 26, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/world/ 

middleeast/us-teaming-with-yemens-new-government-to-combat-al-qaeda.html?lr=0. 84Swift, Christopher. ‘‘To Defeat Al-Qaeda, Win in Yemen.’’ Bloomberg View. June 21, 2012. 

http://christopher-swift.com/publications/to-defeat-al-qaeda-win-in-yemen. 85Swift, Christopher. ‘‘Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-Shari’a and the Struggle for 

Yemen.’’ CTC Sentinel. June 21, 2012. http://christopher-swift.com/publications/arc-of-convergence-aqap-ansar-al-sharia-and-the-struggle-for-yemen. 86Swift, Christopher. ‘‘To Defeat Al-Qaeda, Win in Yemen.’’ Bloomberg View. June 21, 2012. 

http://christopher-swift.com/publications/to-defeat-al-qaeda-win-in-yemen. 

threat to commercial aviation had receded. Had the AQAP suicide terrorist, a young 

Nigerian man recruited into the group by al-Awlaki been successful, nearly a decade’s worth of successes in the war on al-Qaeda and its allies could have been reversed in a matter of minutes. 

AQAP Activities Since 2009 

In the last few years, while core al-Qaeda declined in Pakistan, AQAP strengthened in Yemen.76 AQAP’s core membership grew from approximately 300 members 

in 2009 to around 1,000 in 2012, as hundreds of tribesmen joined AQAP in the fight 

against the U.S.-backed Yemeni government.77 Then-National Security Council 

spokesman Tommy Vietor stated in May 2012 that, ‘‘while AQAP has grown in 

strength... many of its supporters are tribal militants or part-time supporters 

who collaborate with AQAP for self-serving, personal interests rather than affinity 

with al-Qaeda’s global ideology. The portion of hard-core, committed AQAP members 

is relatively small.’’78

In the summer of 2010, AQAP increased its attacks in Yemen, assassinating dozens of Yemeni security officials while simultaneously plotting to place printer cartridges containing explosives on U.S.-bound flights. The packages were intercepted 

on October 29 while en route to the United States due to a tip from Saudi intelligence.79 AQAP also launched Inspire magazine in July 2010 and established the 

Arabic-language al-Madad News Agency in 2011.80

In March 2011, when Yemen’s then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh sanctioned the 

killing of Arab Spring—inspired protesters in the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, his allies 

turned against him and a substantial portion of his army deserted.81 Soldiers in the 

south, who hadn’t been paid in weeks, abandoned their posts, leaving the area open 

for AQAP to move in.82 Other troops returned to Sana’a to support the government 

there. The United States was forced to pull some Special Operations Forces out of 

Yemen, and counterterrorism training there slowed dramatically.83 Fighters from 

Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia are believed to have joined the insurgency, and 

in the spring of 2011, AQAP gained control of two Yemeni provinces and increased 

their presence in ten more.84

In a sign that AQAP may have learned from some of the mistakes other al-Qaeda 

affiliates have made in the past, it has provided some services to Yemeni citizens. 

It has also, on occasion, operated without using the al-Qaeda name, a brand that 

even bin Laden understood to be deeply tarnished. For instance, AQAP operates 

under the name ‘‘Ansar al-Sharia’’ when reaching out to Yemeni locals and aims to 

demonstrate its adherence to Islamic law.85 According to Christopher Swift, a 

Georgetown University researcher who has done field work in Yemen, economic factors, rather than religious extremism, provide AQAP with influence among locals. 

Insurgents offer local men ‘‘the promise of a rifle, a car and a salary of $400 a 

month—a veritable fortune in a country where nearly half the population lives on 

less than $2 a day.’’86
8 

87 Ibid. 88 Johnsen, Gregory D. The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America’s War in Arabia. New 

York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013. 89Schmitt, Eric. ‘‘U.S. Teaming With New Yemen Government on Strategy to Combat AlQaeda.’’ The New York Times. February 26, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/world/ 

middleeast/us-teaming-with-yemens-new-government-to-combat-al-qaeda.html?lr=0. 90 Ibid. 91 New America Foundation, National Security Studies Program. ‘‘U.S. Covert War in Yemen.’’ 

Last updated June 9, 2013. http://yemendrones.newamerica.net/. 92Schmitt, Eric. ‘‘Intelligence Report Lists Iran and Cyberattacks as Leading Concerns.’’ The 

New York Times. January 31, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/world/intelligencechief-sees-al-qaeda-likely-to-continue-fragmenting.html?pagewanted=all&lr=0. 93Schmitt, Eric, Mark Mazzetti, Michael S. Schmidt, and Scott Shane. ‘‘Boston Plotter Said 

to Initially Target July 4 for Attack.’’ The New York Times. May 2, 2013. http:// 

www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/us/Boston-bombing-suspects-planned-july-fourth-attack.html?- 

pagewanted=all&lr=0. 94 ‘‘Al-Qaeda Confirms Death of Yemen Leader in American Drone Strike.’’ Al-Akhbar English. 

July 17, 2013. http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/al-qaeda-confirms-death-yemen-leaderamerican-drone-strike. 95 New America Foundation, National Security Studies Program. ‘‘U.S. Covert War in Yemen.’’ 

Last updated June 9, 2013. http://yemendrones.newamerica.net/. 

AQAP has also given towns new wells, water, and food in exchange for the tribal 

elders’ help in recruiting. In areas of the country with the most chaotic security environments, AQAP has used a combination of armed militias to gain control of territory, gifts of money, and weapons to prop up local sheikhs, and sharia courts to 

prosecute criminals and provide some semblance of law and order. ‘‘In doing so, the 

movement exhibits a pragmatic approach that has more in common with the 

Taliban’s operations in Afghanistan than it does with Osama bin Laden’s globalized, 

decentralized jihad,’’ Swift says.87

In mid-2011, as the fight between the Yemeni government and armed opposition 

groups escalated, AQAP moved to seize more territory in southern Yemen, and the 

Yemeni government launched aggressive counter-assaults.88 The United States also 

resumed its campaign of air and drone strikes, which had been halted the previous 

year. In February 2012, under pressure from the Obama administration, President 

Saleh signed an agreement to step down. Abd Rabu Mansur Hadi took over as president and subsequently gave the U.S. drone program unfettered access to targets in 

Yemen.89

With the broad permission granted by Yemen’s new president, the United States 

greatly expanded its drone campaign in 2012 and began to train and equip the Yemeni military to better combat AQAP.90 Since 2010, U.S. drone strikes in Yemen have 

killed at least 31 high-level al-Qaeda operatives, including al-Awlaki and Samir 

Khan, the AQAP operative believed to have been the driving force behind Inspire 

magazine.91

Al-Awlaki’s death likely reduced the organization’s ability to plan transnational 

attacks because he was a key operational planner.92 The group has not attempted 

an actual attack on the West since the failed 2010 cartridge-bomb plot. (A 2012 

AQAP bombing plot was, in actuality, controlled by Saudi intelligence, which had 

inserted an informer into the group.) 

With his native English-speaking ability, al-Awlaki was also AQAP’s chief recruiter of foreigners, particularly those with Western connections; the group’s foreign recruitment has dried up since his death. However, even in death, his voice 

continues to resonate with militants in the West. The surviving Boston bombing 

suspect, for example, admitted to watching al-Awlaki’s sermons on-line, though 

there is no evidence that the Boston bombers ever communicated with him.93

On July 17, 2013, AQAP confirmed the death of Said al-Shihri, the group’s deputy 

commander, in a video posted to jihadist websites. Shihri, a Saudi and 6-year resident of the U.S. detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, had long been reported dead from wounds he received from a drone strike in late 2012. The statement said Shihri had indeed died in a U.S. drone strike and that ‘‘lax security measures during his telephone contacts enabled the enemy to identify and kill him,’’ 

though it did not confirm the date of his death.94

Shihri’s death is another blow to the organization, which as of mid-2013 is battered, though not defeated. In the past three years, as outlined above, more than 

30 al-Qaeda leaders and other senior operatives in Yemen have been killed by U.S. 

drone strikes, according to a count by the New America Foundation.95 AQAP’s only 

remaining leaders appear to be its chief bomb-maker, Asiri; AQAP’s leader and 

founder, Nasser al-Wuhayshi; and the man who delivered Shihri’s eulogy, Ibrahim 

al-Rubaish, another former Guantanamo detainee. 
9 

96 ‘‘Counterterrorism 2013 Calendar: Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).’’ National 

Counterterrorism Center. http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html. 97 ‘‘Al-Qaeda Attack on Yemen Army Parade Causes Carnage.’’ BBC News. May 21, 2012. 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18142695. 98 Almoravid, Abu Abdillah. ‘‘Who and Why?’’ Inspire. Spring 2013, Issue 11. http:// 

info.publicintelligence.net/InspireSpring2013.pdf. 

In June 2012, AQAP elements withdrew from their southern Yemen strongholds 

when Yemeni military forces—with the support of local tribesmen and U.S. airstrikes—regained control of cities and towns in Abyan and Shabwah provinces.96

They have since been reduced to carrying out smaller-scale, hit-and-run attacks; 

nothing close to the massive attack in May 2012, when an AQAP suicide bomber 

blew himself up at a military parade rehearsal in Sana’a, killing upward of 100 people, mostly soldiers, and injuring more than 200.97

Western Recruitment 

AQAP has led global online radicalization efforts and has made Western recruitment to its cause a priority in its propaganda. This ‘‘lone wolf’’ strategy is spearheaded by AQAP’s al-Malahem Media Foundation. Written in eloquent English and 

formatted like a U.S. tabloid, al-Malahem’s Inspire magazine incites Western youth 

to join the jihad and carry out attacks within their own communities. According to 

the spring 2013 issue of Inspire, ‘‘Lone-Jihad is impossible to counter and stop, except when basic cooking ingredients and building material become illegal!’’98

STATEMENT OF THE JEWISH FEDERATIONS OF NORTH AMERICA

SEPTEMBER 17, 2013. 

The Honorable PETER T. KING, 

Chairman, Counterterrorism and Intelligence Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515. 

The Honorable BRIAN M. HIGGINS, 

Ranking Member, Counterterrorism and Intelligence Subcommittee, U.S. House of 

Representatives, Washington, DC 20515. 

DEAR CHAIRMAN KING AND RANKING MEMBER HIGGINS: I write today on behalf of 

The Jewish Federations of North America to applaud you for scheduling tomorrow’s 

hearing on the ‘‘Al-Qaeda Threat.’’ 

As you know last week, in marking the twelfth anniversary of 9/11, the leader 

of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, issued a message to followers and adherents to undertake ‘‘lone-wolf’’ attacks in the United States. Provocative statements such as 

this are not new from al-Zawahiri. On multiple occasions, he has called upon alQaeda followers and sympathizers to attack Jewish interests in the United States 

and worldwide. 

This focus on ‘‘soft’’ Jewish civilian targets is deeply engrained in al-Qaeda’s 

method of operation. In February 2002, the Associated Press published an English 

translation of an al-Qaeda training manual smuggled out of Afghanistan that directed followers to attack Jewish organizations and institutions in every country 

Jews exist and to carry out the attacks in a manner designed to cause mass causalities. 

There have been several deadly attacks and potentially deadly attempts targeting 

the Jewish community in the United States and abroad in the intervening years, 

as set forth in the attached risk compilation—from al-Qaeda to extremists across the 

ideological spectrum. At a February 15, 2012 hearing of the Homeland Security 

Committee, Chairman King recognized the ‘‘almost imminent threat posed by 

Hezbollah quite possibly to Jewish houses of worship and religious institutions.’’ For 

these reasons, we seek your consideration of the risks to Jewish communal security 

as you hear from and question tomorrow’s panel of distinguished witnesses. 

Sincerely, 

ROBERT B. GOLDBERG, 

Senior Director, Legislative Affairs. 

APPENDIX.—SEPTEMBER 13, 2013 

RISK OVERVIEW: THREATS, VULNERABILITIES, AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES

Existential Threats to Jewish Communal Institutions 

Since 9/11, the FBI, Department of Homeland Security and other law enforcement 

entities have warned the U.S. Jewish community of a number of plots by inter-
10 

national terrorist organizations, white supremacists, prison Islamic radicals, and 

other home-grown violent individuals across the political spectrum. While a number 

of prominent plots have been averted, others became operationalized. 

One regular thread among many terrorist occurrences is the symmetrical selection 

of targets that include both Government/military facilities/personnel, and Jewish 

communal institutions and civilians. One large distinction, however, is that the latter category comprises soft nonprofits with limited resources and capabilities with 

which to harden their facilities and to train their personnel. 

Additionally, over the past decade, the FBI has reported that approximately 70% 

of religious-based hate crimes have been perpetrated against the Jewish community—well above the combined occurrences of all other faiths. (Source: Annual FBI 

Hate Crimes Statistics Reports; Link: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2012/ 

december/annual-hate-crimes-report-released/annual-hate-crimes-report-released). December 10, 2012.—Of the 1,480 victims of an anti-religious hate crime, 63.2 percent were victims of an offender’s anti-Jewish bias—more than all other categories 

combined. (Source: FBI Hate Crime Statistics, 12/10/12; Link: http://www.fbi.gov/ 

news/stories/2012/december/annual-hate-crimes-report-released/annual-hatecrimes-report-released). July 20, 2012.—New York police believe Iranian Revolutionary Guards or their 

proxies have been involved so far this year in nine plots against Israeli or Jewish 

targets around the world. According to NYPD analysts, ‘‘through its own Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah,’’ Iran had ‘‘sharply increased its operational tempo 

and its willingness to conduct terrorist attacks targeting Israeli interests and the 

International Jewish community worldwide.’’ (Source: Reuters, 07/20/12; Link: 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/20/us-iran-hezbollah-plots-idUSBRE86- 

J0SW20120720). June 5, 2012.—According to Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, 

‘‘Jews face special risks that require vigilance.’’ She also stated that, during her tenure at DHS, threats to the Jewish community came from foreign entities, homegrown extremists, and domestic hate groups. (Source: The Forward, 06/05/12: Link: 

http://forward.com/articles/157280/jews-face-special-risks-napolitano-says/?p=all). February 16, 2012.—With tensions between Iran and the West running high, law 

enforcement officials are concerned Iran or its surrogates could mount attacks 

against Jewish targets inside the United States. (Source: CNN, 02/16/12; Link: 

http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/15/us/iran-fbi-warning/index.html?iref=allsearch). January 9, 2009.—Terrorist analysts report that throughout the world, Jewish 

communities will be specifically at risk from several ‘‘fatwas’’ disseminated through 

Arab media and jihadist websites, including one instructing that ‘‘any Jew is a legitimate target that can be struck by Muslims.’’ (Source: European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, 01/09/09). 

March 24, 2008.—Al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released an 

audio tape on which called upon al-Qaeda followers and sympathizers to attack Jewish interests worldwide. The tape, part of a string of provocative statements by bin 

Laden and his senior cohorts, was regarded by counter terrorism experts as a new 

and bold escalation by al-Qaeda to link the Middle East conflict with immediate and 

urgent violence in the West, including against Jewish targets in the United States. 

(Source: Associated Press, 03/24/08). 

November 24, 2002.—In a ‘‘Letter to America’’ Osama bin Laden released soon 

after the 9/11 attacks, to explain his reasoning and intent to justify the attacks, he 

wrote, ‘‘The creation and continuation of Israel is one of the greatest crimes, and 

you are the leaders of its criminals.’’ ‘‘This is why the American people cannot be 

innocent of all the crimes committed by the Americans and Jews against us.’’ The 

letter also made clear that, to bin Laden, civilian populations, as with governments, 

were acceptable (equivalent) targets for retaliation. (Source: Guardian (UK), 11/24/ 

02; Full text of the letter: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/ 

theobserver). 

June 3, 2002.—Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of the terrorists in the first attack on 

the World Trade Center in 1993, revealed in a CBS 60 Minutes interview that the 

World Trade Center was not the terrorists’ original target. Rather, they initially 

planned to blow up Jewish neighborhoods in Brooklyn. But after scouting Crown 

Heights and Williamsburg, they decided to target the World Trade Center, instead. 

The reasoning: Rather than undertaking multiple small explosions in Jewish neighborhoods, they figured that one big explosion in the World Trade Center would kill 

mostly Jews who they believed made up a majority of the workforce there, according 

to Yasin’s statements. (Source: CBS News 06/02/02; Reuters, 06/03/02). 

February 2, 2002.—Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda’s training manual was 

translated by the Associated Press, which included a directive to followers to attack 

Jewish communal organizations and institutions in every country Jews exist and to 
11 

carry out the attacks in a manner designed to cause the most causalities. It specified community centers, hospitals, places of worship, and wherever there are large 

gathering places of Jews. (Source: Associated Press, 02/02/02). 

Recent Jewish Security Threats 

May 16, 2013.—A 22-year-old Moroccan man has been convicted and sentenced to 

5 years and 4 months in jail for plotting a terror attack against a Milan synagogue. 

The man was arrested in March 2012 after police noted that the suspect had used 

a Google maps application to case security at the synagogue. (Source: The Associated Press, 05/16/13). 

May 7, 2013.—Israeli airstrikes on Syrian missile stockpiles suspected to be destined for Hezbollah raise concern for retaliation against Jewish civilians. According 

to the Washington Post, ‘‘U.S. and Middle Eastern officials say any retaliation 

would probably come in a familiar form: Attempted attacks by Hezbollah operatives 

on Israeli or Jewish civilian targets, perhaps far outside the Middle East.’’ (Source: 

Washington Post, May 8, 2013; Link: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 

national-security/western-officials-fear-retaliation-for-israeli-airstrikes-in-syria/ 

2013/05/07/2989f1a4-b72f-11e2-92f3-f291801936b8lprint.html). May 1, 2013.—Bomb threats were phoned in to two different Houston synagogues 

(Congregation Beth Israel and Congregation Or Ami) causing their schools to cancel 

classes, so that the FBI and Houston Police Department could search the institutions for explosives. When the buildings reopen, it was reported that they will require extra security personnel and police presence. 

April 8, 2013.—Ruben Ubiles, 35, who the police say has more than 50 prior arrests, on charges including robbery, assault, and weapons and drug possession, was 

arrested for the hate-crime burning of a dozen Jewish doorway adornments in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, on Holocaust Remembrance Day. The ornaments, known as 

mezuzot, contain scrolls with Old Testament verses that are intended to bless and 

protect the home. (Source: New York Times, 04/10/13). 

March 18, 2013.—French President Francois Hollande on Sunday paid tribute to 

the 7 people who last year fell victim to terrorist Mohamed Merah, saying he remains committed to the fight against terrorism. A self-described al-Qaeda sympathizer, 23-year-old Merah murdered Rabbi Jonathan Sandler, his sons Aryeh and 

Gavriel and Miriam Monsonego at a Jewish school, Otzar HaTorah, in Toulouse. Before that, he murdered three paratroopers. (Source: Arutz Sheva, 03/18/13: Link: 

http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/166321). 

March 17, 2013.—Marked the 21st anniversary of the March 17, 1992 terrorist 

attack that left 28 people dead and 240 wounded at the Israel Embassy in Buenos 

Aires. Two years later (July 1994) 85 members of the Argentine Jewish community 

were killed in an attack on a community center. This was the deadliest terror attack 

in Argentina’s history. In both cases, the attackers were never caught. (Source: 

Arutz Sheva, 03/17/13; Link: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/ 

166301). 

March 15, 2013.—An Algerian man convicted of plotting to bomb synagogues was 

sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. According to New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, ‘‘Ferhani posed a real threat to New York’s Jewish community, eagerly purchasing a hand grenade, two guns and 150 rounds of ammunition 

from an undercover officer as part of Ferhani’s stated intention to attack and then 

blow up a synagogue in Manhattan, and take out the whole entire building.’’ 

(Source: CNN, 03/15/13). 

January 30, 2013.—A new policy paper from the Washington Institute for Near 

East Studies finds that Iran’s elite Qods Force and Hezbollah militants pose a growing threat to the United States, fueling worries that they increasingly have the ability and willingness to attack the United States, and, in particular, Jewish targets. 

Among the most likely scenarios, stated the report, ‘‘an attack targeting a location 

affiliated with a Jewish community abroad’’, such as the report noted, the 1994 

bombing of AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. (Source WINES, January 30, 2013; Link: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ 

PolicyFocus123.pdf). 

January 23, 2013.—The Congressional Research Service published a comprehensive analysis on the complex threat of American Jihadist Terrorism, including particular threats to Jewish communal security: (1) The 2005 plot by the group 

Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh, to attack Jewish institutions, including synagogues, 

and military recruiting offices and military bases, which the report described as the 

‘‘most prominent post-9/11 example of domestic violent jihadist activity inspired in 

prison;’’ (2) The 2009 Newburgh Four case, which involved a plot to trigger explosive 

in front of a synagogue and Jewish community center and to shoot down military 

aircraft; (3) The 2011 grenade plot by Ahmed Ferhani, an Algerian, and Mohamed 
12 

Mamdouth, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Morocco, who plotted to blow up prominent synagogues in New York City; and (4) The 2012 bombing plot by Amine El 

Khalifi, a Moroccan citizen living in the United States on an expired B2 tourist visa, 

who targeted the U.S. Capitol, a synagogue, and a restaurant that was frequented 

by U.S. military personnel. (Source: CRS, 01/23/13; Link: http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 

crs/terror/R41416.pdf). January 16, 2013.—The FBI warned the Detroit Jewish community of potential 

risks after discovering in the home of a known white supremacist and convicted 

murderer, Richard Schmidt, 18 firearms including assaults weapons, high-capacity 

magazines, and more than 40 thousand rounds of ammunition; Nazi paraphernalia; 

a ‘‘Jewish hit-list’’ of 500 Jewish-owned businesses; and detailed information on the 

leadership of the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Detroit and diagrams of the facility. (Source: U.S. Attorney, Ohio, 01/16/13; Link: http://www.justice.gov/usao/ 

ohn/news/2013/16janschmidt.html). 

Historic Record of Threats 

December 4, 2012.—A man from Queens accused of plotting to blow up a synagogue in Manhattan ended on Tuesday when the man, Ahmed Ferhani, pleaded 

guilty to 10 charges, including conspiracy as a crime of terrorism and criminal possession of a weapon as a crime of terrorism. He was arrested immediately after 

making a downpayment in exchange for a hand grenade, three semiautomatic pistols and 150 rounds of ammunition. (Source: New York Times, 12/04/12; Link: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/nyregion/ahmed-ferhani-pleads-guilty-inplot-to-blow-up-synagogue.html). 

July 20, 2012.—New York police believe Iranian Revolutionary Guards or their 

proxies have been involved so far this year in nine plots against Israeli or Jewish 

targets around the world. According to NYPD analysts, ‘‘through its own Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah,’’ Iran had ‘‘sharply increased its operational tempo 

and its willingness to conduct terrorist attacks targeting Israeli interests and the 

International Jewish community worldwide’’. (Source: Reuters, 07/20/12; Link: 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/20/us-iran-hezbollah-plots-idUSBRE86- 

J0SW20120720). 

June 22, 2012.—The FBI announced the 11.5-year sentence for American Jess 

Curtis Morton, aka Younus Abdullah Muhammed, for running several internet sites 

in the United States to solicit attacks and future threat against Jewish organizations in the United States. His co-conspirator lived in Fairfax, VA (less than 20 

miles from Capitol Hill). The websites Morton ran perpetuated al-Qaeda-produced 

propaganda and included hit lists. (Source: U.S. Attorney’s Office/Eastern District 

of Virginia, 06/22/12; Link: http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2012/ 

leader-of-revolution-muslim-sentenced-to-138-months-for-using-internet-to-solicitmurder-encourage-violent-extremism?utmlcampaign=email-Immediate&utmlmedium=email&utmlsource=washington-press-releases&utmlcontent=108401). 

June 20, 2012.—This week, the New York Post described a new ‘‘Crime Wave’’ 

against Brooklyn’s Jewish community when it reported several synagogue thefts and 

anti-Semitic vandalism targeting synagogues and Jewish neighborhoods. (Source: 

New York Post, 06/20/12; Link: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/brooklyn/ 

antiljewishlcrimelwavelGNiQRau6jWlgBeqM7ugEBO; Forward, 06/05/12; Link: 

http://m.forward.com/articles/157280). 

June 5, 2012.—According to Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, 

‘‘Jews face special risks that require vigilance.’’ She also stated that, during her tenure at DHS, threats to the Jewish community came from foreign entities, homegrown extremists, and domestic hate groups. (Source: The Forward, 06/05/12: Link: 

http://forward.com/articles/157280/jews-face-special-risks-napolitano-says/?p=all). 

May 3, 2012.—On the anniversary of the bin Laden raid, the U.S. Government 

released a sampling of documents. Only one pertained to approving funding for terrorism—the approval of a request by a militant group to purchase and manufacture 

weapons, and to support operations against the Jewish community. (Source: CNN, 

May 3, 2012; Link: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/03/world/osama-bin-ladendocuments/index.html). 

April 23, 2012.—Meanwhile, the United States just placed a $10 million bounty 

on Hafeez Saeed, the leader of Lashkar-i-Taiba, an al-Qaeda-affiliated militant 

group, and the mastermind behind the 2008 Mumbai, India massacre. A paramount 

objective of the massacre was an attack on that city’s Jewish community center and 

the torture and murder of its Jewish civilians. Saeed remains at-large. (Source: Pro 

Publica, 04.03.12; Link: http://www.propublica.org/article/10-million-bounty-for-alleged-mumbai-plotter-ups-pressure-on-pakistan). 

March 26, 2012.—The livery driver whose two-gun attack on a group of Hasidic 

students on the Brooklyn Bridge shocked the city 18 years ago has finally admitted 
13 

that he targeted them because they were Jewish, The Post has learned. Rashid Baz 

was convicted in 1995 of murdering Yeshiva student Ari Halberstam, 16, and trying 

to kill more than a dozen others in a van with a hail of bullets he fired on a Manhattan approach to the bridge on March 1, 1994. (Source: New York Post, 03/26/ 

2012; Link: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/killerlJewslmyltargetlgOgyDs9rPP92Z5irlUqK1H). March 26, 2012.—According to the Associated Press this morning, French authorities are defending criticism that their counterterrorism authorities and laws failed 

in preventing an Islamic terrorist attack that killed paratroopers, Jewish children, 

and a rabbi (teacher) in front of a Jewish school in Toulouse, France. The general 

reaction from Europol, and a growing chorus of other European terrorist authorities, 

is that home-grown extremists are hard to track and stop; combating individuals 

acting in isolation will be tough and problematic; and it will be hard for police to 

apprehend them before they attack. (Source: Associated Press, 03/26/12). 

February 17, 2012.—The FBI announced the indictment of Amine El Khalifi, an 

illegal immigrant from Morocco, for attempting a suicide attack on the Capitol. According to the indictment, El Khalifi had first indicated his intention to blow up a 

Jewish civilian target—a synagogue. (Sources: FBI WFO; Link: http://www.fbi.gov/ 

washingtondc/press-releases/2012/virginia-man-accused-of-attempting-to-bomb-u.s.- 

capitol-in-suicide-attack?utmlcampaign=email?Immediate&utmlmedium=- 

email&utmlsource=washington-press-releases&utmlcontent=72268; Criminal Complaint Link: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/amine-elkhalifi-criminal-complaint.html). February 16, 2012.—With tensions between Iran and the West running high, law 

enforcement officials are concerned Iran or its surrogates could mount attacks 

against Jewish targets inside the United States. (Source: CNN, 02/16/12; Link: 

http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/15/us/iran-fbi-warning/index.html?iref=allsearch). February 15, 2012.—A statement by House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Peter King called attention to the ‘‘almost imminent threat posed by Hezbollah 

quite possibly to Jewish houses of worship and religious institutions.’’ (Source: Hearing: An Examination of the President’s Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request for the Department of Homeland Security; Link: http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/hearingexamination-presidents-fy-2013-budget-request-department-homeland-security). February 14, 2012.—With Iran allegedly striking out at Israeli citizens and Jewish targets around the world, Israeli and American security officials in the United 

States are on high alert. According to Frank Cilluffo, director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University in the District of Columbia, 

the recent incidents in India, Georgia, Thailand, and Azerbaijan have ‘‘all the hallmarks of a concerted campaign’’ that could extend to U.S. soil. As such, the NYPD 

has adjusted its counterterrorism posture to include increased presence in recent 

weeks at Israeli government facilities and synagogues. Furthermore, around the 

country, private security industry officials report numerous requests for Jewish institutional security. (Source: ABC News; Link: http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ 

heightened-security-us-iran-threat/story?id=15592451). 

February 14, 2012.—In a lead story, the New York Times reported on the escalation of threats posed by Iran (and its proxies)—meaning violent actions taken 

against Jewish targets outside of the region. The article followed recent plots and 

attacks that have increased the concern of American Jewish leaders for the safety 

and security of Jewish community centers and synagogues within the United States, 

and the article reminds that an attack on the Mumbai Jewish community center led 

to the torture and death of a number of Jewish American civilians in 2008. (Source: 

New York Times, 02/14/12; Link: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/world/ 

middleeast/israeli-embassy-officials-attacked-in-india-and-georgia.html?lr=2&ref=- 

world&pagewanted=print). 

February 14, 2012.—Convicted arsonist/bomber Omar Bulphred, 26, will serve his 

full 7-year prison term for hate crimes—including the firebombing of a Jewish 

school for children and attempted bombing of a Jewish community center—will remain behind bars for his entire sentence as he continues to pose a serious problem 

for Correctional Service Canada (CSC). While investigating the fires, police found 

letters in which Bulphred and an accomplice declared jihad and demanded the liberation of their ‘‘brothers’’—a group of men arrested on terrorism charges in Toronto. (Source: The Gazette (Montreal); Link: http://www.montrealgazette.com/ 

news/todays-paper/Hate+crime+convict+refused+early+release/6148040/story.html). 

February 10, 2012.—Nine extremists who ‘‘were well advanced in their terrorist 

planning’’ were convicted. ‘‘The men possessed almost every famous jihadi publication, including copies of Inspire, an English language internet magazine produced 

by Yemen-based extremist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki’s group al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula.’’ According to the prosecution, ‘‘These men were motivated to act as they 
14 

did in large part by extreme jihadist propaganda circulated on the internet.’’ Convicted for planning a ‘‘Mumbai’’-style attack that included targeting the Jewish community, one of the group’s leaders and his brother, ‘‘were bugged claiming that 

fewer than 100,000 Jews’’ died in the Holocaust and talking about how Hitler ‘‘had 

been on the same side as the Muslims’’ because he understood that ‘‘the Jews were 

dangerous’’. (Source: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/british-terror-gangthat-plotted-to-blow-680112). 

February 9, 2012.—The leader of ‘‘Revolution Muslim’’ pleaded guilty to using the 

internet to solicit murder and encourage violent extremism against Jews. (Source: 

The FBI; Link: http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2012/leader-ofrevolution-muslim-pleads-guilty-to-using-internet-to-solicit-murder-and-encourageviolent-extremism-utmlcampaign=email-Immediate&utmlmedium=email&utmlsource=washington-press-releases&utmlcontent=69655). 

February 1, 2012.—Four defendants inspired by al-Qaeda have admitted planning 

to detonate bombs—Mumbai-style—at five symbolic sites including the U.S. Embassy, the Palace of Westminster (both well-fortified institutions), and two prominent rabbis from separate synagogues. The men reportedly admitted to being inspired by the preachings of the radical al-Qaeda extremist Yemeni American imam 

Anwar al-Awlaki and to being in possession of two editions of al-Qaeda magazine 

Inspire for terrorist purposes. (Source: BBC News, link: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 

news/uk-16833032). 

January 25, 2012.—A joint attack by Iran and Hezbollah against Jewish targets 

in Bangkok, Thailand, had been stopped, where the operative in custody reportedly 

confessed to having intended to blow up a synagogue and the Israeli Embassy. 

Moreover, the New York Times story reported that Iran and Hezbollah have also 

planted some 40 terrorist sleeper cells around the world, ready to attack Jewish targets if Iran deems it necessary to retaliate against efforts to thwart its nuclear ambitions. (Source: The New York Times Magazine, 01/25/12; link: http:// 

www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/magazine/will-israel-attack-iran.html?scp=1&sq=- 

six%20key%20strikes%20thought%20to%20be%20made%20by%20the%20mossad- 

&st=cse). 

January 13, 2012.—Federal-elected officials from North Jersey and across the 

State pledged resources in the investigation into the firebombing of a Rutherford 

synagogue at a meeting convened to discuss safety at Jewish temples Thursday 

night. (Source: New Jersey On-line; Link: http://www.nj.com/bergen/index.ssf/ 

2012/01/officialslpledgelfederallresourceslforlinvestigationlintoltemplelfirebombinglbiaslcrimes.html). 

December 2, 2011.—Homeland Security Director Janet Napolitano and Attorney 

General Eric Holder met with their counterparts from Britain and other European 

partners to discuss issues of points of cooperation in fighting terrorism. In seeking 

this meeting to improve the U.S.-E.U. partnership to combat global terrorism, the 

Secretary pointed to the success of shared efforts in aiding the investigation and 

prosecution of American David Headley, the mastermind behind the deadly attack 

on the Mumbai Jewish Community Center just over 3 years ago—November 27, 

2008. (Sources: Associated Press; Link: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201l162- 

57336080/napolitano-lone-wolf-terror-threat-growing/). 

December 2, 2011.—Jubair Ahmad, 24, a native of Pakistan and resident of 

Woodbridge, VA, pleaded guilty of providing material support to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 

(LeT), a designated foreign terrorist organization. ‘‘By preparing and posting a 

graphic video that glorified violent extremism, Mr. Ahmad directly supported the 

mission of a designated terrorist organization,’’ said FBI Assistant Director in 

Charge McJunkin. ‘‘The FBI will track down and disrupt those who communicate 

with terrorist groups for the purpose of recruiting others to inflict harm on the U.S. 

and its interests overseas.’’ Ahmad considered including images of the Mumbai attack to show the power of LeT. This is a reference to LeT’s operation against the 

city of Mumbai, India, on Nov. 26, 2008, which resulted in the death of over 160 

people, including a number of Jewish Americans killed at the targeted Jewish Community Center. (Source: U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Virginia; Link: http:// 

www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2011/virginia-man-pleads-guilty-to-providing-material-support-to-terrorist-organization?utmlcampaign=email-Immediate&utmlmedium=email&utmlsource=washington-press-releases&utmlcontent=53207). 

November 14, 2011.—The FBI released hate crimes data for 2010. As has been 

the case since the FBI first began reporting incidents of hate crimes, approximately 

70% of all religious bias crimes are committed against Jewish institutions and civilians in the United States. (Source: FBI Hate Crime Statistics: http://www.fbi.gov/ 

about-us/ciis/ucr/hate-crime/2010). 
15 

November 9, 2011.—The Cold War’s most notorious international terrorists, Ilich 

Ramirez Sanchez (aka ‘‘Carlos the Jackal’’), went on trial in France, on charges of 

instigating four attacks in 1982 and 1983. Sanchez’s first terrorist strike was an assassination attempt against major British philanthropist of Jewish charities, Joseph 

Sieff. Sanchez gained entrance into Sieff’s home by gunpoint, and shot the past vicepresident of the British Zionist Federation at point-blank range in the face. 

(Sources: Associated Press; Link: http://m.ctv.ca/topstories/20111107/carlos-ilichramirez-sanchez-jackal-terror-trial-france-111107.html and TruTV; Link: http:// 

www.trutv.com/library/crime/terroristsspies/terrorists/jackal/1.html). 

January 17, 2011.—Five synagogues and a Jewish school in a Jewish enclave in 

Montreal were attacked in a single night. Condemning the attack, the Liberal Leader, Michael Ignatieff, remarked, ‘‘Our thoughts and prayers are with Jewish communities across Canada that once again have been made to feel that their congregations and the children in their schools have cause to fear for their safety.’’ (Sources: 

The Globe and Mail (Canada), 01/17/11). 

October 29, 2010.—Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula attempted to ship air cargo 

bombs addressed to Chicago-based synagogues. (Source: MSNBC, 10/29/10). 

January 20, 2010.—FBI Director Robert Mueller testified before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that al-Qaeda; self-directed groups linked to terror organizations; and self-radicalizing, self-executing homegrown terrorists remained determined to strike the country and the threat has not diminished. (Source: http:// 

judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/10-01-20Mueller’sTestimony.pdf, 01/20/10). 

December 28, 2009.—The FBI Year in Review chronicled the U.S. top terror cases, 

including: The arrest of David Coleman Headley, a U.S. citizen, for his role in planning the 2008 Mumbai attacks, where six Americans (4 Jewish) were killed; the arrest of four radicalized individuals for attempting to blow up a Riverdale, New York 

synagogue and Jewish community center; the deadly shooting at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC; and the attack on an Army recruiting center in Little 

Rock, Arkansas, by an assailant who was also found to be targeting Jewish sites 

in Little Rock, Philadelphia, Atlanta, New York, Louisville, and Memphis. (Source: 

FBI Release, 12/28/09; Link: http://www.fbi.gov/page2/dec09/review122809.html). 

December 15, 2009.—The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, 

Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk held a hearing on the emergence of violent 

extremism and domestic terrorism in the United States. In her opening remarks, 

Chairwomen Jane Harman (D–CA) focused on two infamous plots and attacks 

against Jewish communal interests at home and abroad: (1) The plot by Jami’yyat 

Ul-Islam Is-Shaheeh, a prison-founded radical Muslim group, to attack prominent 

synagogues and other Jewish iconic sites in the Los Angeles area; and (2) The massacre in Mumbai, India, where American David Headley is now accused by Federal 

law enforcement officials of having helped to identify and surveil for attack, among 

others, the Chabad House Jewish community center, whose director, Rabbi Gavriel 

Noach Holtzberg, his wife, unborn child, and four others were tortured and killed. 

(Source: House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk, 12/15/09; Link: http://homeland.house.gov/Hearings/ 

index.asp?ID=229). 

September 13, 2009.—Osama bin Laden warned the American people over their 

Government’s close ties with Israel. In the tape, bin Laden warned, ‘‘If you stop the 

war, then fine. Otherwise we will have no choice but to continue our war of attrition 

on every front.’’ (Source: Washington Post, 09/13/09). 

August 17, 2009.—A man was sentenced to 70 months in prison today for his role 

in a domestic terrorism plot to wage war on the United States by attacking Jewish 

synagogues and military bases. Hammad Riaz Samana is the fourth member of 

Jami’yyat Ul-Islam Is-Shaheeh, or JIS, a prison-founded radical Muslim group that 

wanted to make a political statement that also had plans to attack the Israeli consulate in Los Angeles and El Al Israel Airlines at the Los Angeles International Airport. (Source: The Orange County Register, 08/17/09). 

June 16, 2009.—Critical aspects of the nonprofit sector are particularly vulnerable 

and regular targets of terrorist groups and radicalized home-grown individuals. A 

number of incidents make this point clear. In remarking on the June 10, 2009, attack at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum by a radical right-wing fanatic, Secretary Napolitano stated that the attack underscored the need for the Nonprofit Security Grant Program, so that high-risk nonprofits can take their own security 

measures. (Sources: Remarks by Secretary Napolitano Announcing Fiscal Year 2009 

FEMA Preparedness Grants, Release, 06/16/09). 

June 3, 2009.—The Arkansas man convicted of killing an Army recruiter and 

wounding another had used the popular Google Maps application to investigate recruiting centers in at least five States, as well as Jewish institutions in Little Rock, 
16 

Philadelphia, Atlanta, New York, Louisville, and Memphis. (Source: ABC News, 06/ 

03/09). 

April 7, 2009.—Two accusatory tactics associated with the current rise in rightwing radicalization and the potential for violence are aimed at the Jewish community. The first is a belief in anti-Government conspiracy theories related to a Jewish-controlled ‘‘one world government.’’—The second is a prevalence of right-wing extremist chatter on the internet that focuses on the perceived loss of U.S. jobs in the 

manufacturing and construction sectors, and home foreclosures they attribute to a 

deliberate conspiracy conducted by a cabal of Jewish ‘‘financial elites.’’ (Source: 

Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence 

in Radicalization and Recruitment, Office of Intelligence Assessment and Analysis, 

Department of Homeland Security, April 7, 2009.) 

April 4, 2009.—The New York Police Department beefed up security at the city’s 

synagogues and other Jewish sites amid escalating tensions between Israel and 

Iran. Concerns that Muslim extremist groups might retaliate against civilians in the 

city’s Jewish community if Israel were to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities prompted 

the NYPD to put together a response plan that includes deploying extra officers, including heavily armed ‘‘Hercules Teams,’’ to synagogues, Jewish community centers, 

and Israeli diplomatic offices. (Source: Jerusalem Post, 04/04/09). 

March 24, 2009.—A British terrorist cell with alleged links to al-Qaeda discussed 

bombing revelers at a large central London nightclub as well as targeting several 

synagogues in London and one in Manchester, according to prosecutors. One of the 

defendants, Salahuddin Amin, even discussed trying to buy a radio-isotope ‘‘dirty 

bomb’’ from the Russian mafia. (Fox News, 03/31/09; European Jewish Press, 03/24/ 

09). 

February 23, 2009.—FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III warned that extremists 

‘‘with large agendas and little money can use rudimentary weapons’’ to sow terror, 

raising the specter that recent attacks in Mumbai that killed 170 people (including 

victims at the Chabad House Jewish community center) could embolden terrorists 

seeking to attack U.S. cities. Mueller said that the bureau is expanding its focus 

beyond al-Qaeda and into splinter groups, radicals (who come in through the visa 

waiver program) and ‘‘home-grown terrorists.’’ He warned that ‘‘melting-pot’’ communities in Seattle, San Diego, Miami, or New York were of particular concern. 

(Source: Washington Post, 02/23/09). 

February 2, 2009.—According to Michael J. Heimbach, assistant director of the 

FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, al-Qaeda and like-minded individuals are still the 

country’s No. 1 concern in 2009, and that there is significant intelligence out there 

that indicates their focus remains on the United States. Threats from Hamas and 

Hezbollah are quite concerning to the United States as well, he stated. In addition, 

he acknowledged that home-grown extremism is still a significant focus of the FBI, 

and that we can’t lose sight of the domestic terrorism issues, such as White supremacists and neo-Nazi group, who need to remain on the FBI’s radar. (Source: 

WTOP (New York), 02/02/09). 

January 9, 2009.—Terrorist analysts report that throughout the world, Jewish 

communities will be specifically at risk—from several ‘‘fatwas’’ disseminated 

through Arab media and jihadist websites, including one instructing that ‘‘any Jew 

is a legitimate target that can be struck by Muslims.’’ (Source: European Strategic 

Intelligence and Security Center, 01/09/09). 

January 6, 2009.—Al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, called on 

Muslims to strike at Jewish targets in the West and around the world. (Source: Reuters, 01/06/09). 

January 5, 2009.—Hamas leader, Mahmoud Zahar, called on Palestinian sympathizers to target Jews abroad (including their children) in response to Israel’s incursion into Gaza. (Source: Associated Press, 01/05/09). 

May 21, 2009.—The Federal Bureau of Investigation and other cooperating law 

enforcement agencies arrested four Muslim men as they attempted to carry out a 

plot to bomb a synagogue and Jewish community center in Riverdale, New York. 

Law enforcement sources are calling it a home-grown terrorist plot. (Source: NBC 

News; Los Angeles Times, 05/21/09). 

January 1, 2009.—For the third time in a year, a Jewish pre-school was defaced 

by swastikas and hate speech. Investigators are exploring whether they might be 

related to Israeli’s conflict with Hamas militants in Gaza. (Source: Ventura County 

Star, 01/01/09). 

January 1, 2009.—Jewish day schools in Chicago received a bomb threat in the 

mail. The letter was sent to the Chicago offices of the Associated Talmud Torahs 

and the Ida Crown Jewish Academy. (Source: WBBM newsradio 780; JTA World Report, 01/01/09). 
17 

September 15, 2008.—Top counterterrorism officials at the U.S. Department of 

State reiterated a growing refrain among American intelligence agencies that 

Hezbollah is emerging as an increased threat to the United States (Associated 

Press, September 15, 2008). The story followed reports in August 2008 that deepening ties between Iran and Venezuela may lead to the establishment of a new 

Hezbollah front in the Western Hemisphere to carry out abductions and attacks 

against Jewish targets (Source: Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2008). Similar reports in June 2008 pointed to warnings raised by intelligence agencies in the United 

States and Canada that Hezbollah sleeper cells are operating along the U.S. border 

with Canada, and are poised to mount terror attacks against Jewish targets in the 

West (Source: ABC News, June 19, 2008). 

April 9, 2008.—The U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence held a hearing on ‘‘Assessing the Fight Against al Qaeda.’’ On the subject 

of tactics and targeting al-Qaeda will use in the future, counterterrorism experts 

testified that since 9/11 al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups have directed an ‘‘intensified campaign’’ against Jewish targets. Moreover, since 2004, Osama bin Laden has 

moved the Israeli-American alliance to the center of his justification for al-Qaeda’s 

attacks against the West. (Source: U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee 

on Intelligence, 04/09/08; Link: http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/Word/ 

Bergen040908.doc). March 4, 2008.—Al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released an 

audio tape on March 24, 2008, which called upon al-Qaeda followers and sympathizers to attack Jewish interests world-wide. The tape, part of a string of provocative statements by bin Laden and his senior cohorts, was regarded by counter-terrorism experts as a new and bold escalation by al-Qaeda to link the Middle East 

conflict with immediate and urgent violence in the West, including against Jewish 

targets in the United States. (Source: Associated Press, 03/04/08). 

February 16, 2008.—With known Hezbollah fundraisers and supporters in the 

United States, U.S. counterterrorism authorities have been particularly concerned 

about the threat of Hezbollah sleeper cells against synagogues and other potential 

Jewish targets in the United States. On February 14, 2008 the FBI put 101 Nationwide Joint Terrorism Task Forces on alert for potential threats against the Jewish 

community by Hezbollah operatives. (AP, February 14, 2008). A day later, the FBI 

and the Department of Homeland Security sent out a rare joint bulletin to State 

and local law enforcement authorities advising them to watch for strikes by 

Hezbollah against Jewish targets, as well. (Source: Los Angeles Times, 02/16/08). 

January 15, 2008.—The Wall Street Journal reported a policy shift within the 

White House (and among its allies) to place greater pressure on the Iranian regime 

through an investigation that centers on the 1994 bombing of the AIMA Jewish 

Community Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In an effort to redefine its Iran policy, the administration’s focus on the JCC bombing, ‘‘Serves as a model for how 

Tehran has used its overseas embassies and relationships with foreign militant 

groups, in particular Hezbollah, to strike at its enemies.’’ (Source: Wall Street Journal, 01/15/08). 

May 1, 2007.—Convicted British home-grown Islamic terrorists with links to the 

2005 London subway bombings were in advanced stages of planning, and were targeting synagogues for attack when they were arrested. (Source: CNN.com, 05/01/07). 

February 13, 2007.—Osama bin Laden’s last known personally-authorized terror 

attacks were made against two Jewish synagogues in Istanbul. The simultaneous 

attacks, in 2003, killed 27 people and injured more than 300. (Source: Washington 

Post, 02/13/07). 

The FBI warned Jewish community leaders that Hezbollah operatives were conducting surveillance on numerous synagogues and Jewish community centers for 

possible terrorist attacks in the United States. (Source: New York Post, 07/19/06). 

October 10, 2006.—Home-grown Islamic militants were convicted of plotting terrorist attacks against prominent synagogues and other Jewish iconic sites in Los 

Angeles. FBI Director Mueller reported that the group was ready to strike when 

they were brought down. The plot is considered by counterterrorism officials to be 

the closest to operationalization since 9/11. Of particular concern, the groups’ clandestine terrorist activities were discovered serendipitously during a police investigation into a string of gas station robberies that only later were connected to the funding of the terrorist operation. (Source: Department of Justice Releases, 7/24/08; 12/ 

14/07; International Herald Tribune 10/10/06). 

July 28, 2006.—Naveed Haq was found guilty of murder and hate crimes in his 

second trial for a 2006 shooting spree at the Jewish Federation of Greater Seattle. 

On July 28, 2006, Haq, a Muslim American, attacked the Federation, a center of 

Jewish communal life and supporter of social welfare, youth, and adult education 

programs. Of the 6 women he gunned down, one was 17 weeks pregnant and an-
18 

other, Pamela Waechter, died of her wounds. At trial evidence was presented that 

‘‘he railed against Jews and U.S.-Israeli policies as he opened fire in the Jewish 

Federation,’’ and that in telephone calls recorded by the King County Jail, Haq told 

his mother he was ‘‘a soldier of Islam.’’ (Source: Associated Press, 12/15/09; The Seattle Times, 12/15/09; Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 08/06/08; 2008; The Seattle Times, 

02/21/08; 07/29/06). 

May 31, 2005.—Department of Justice convicted an Iraqi-American who had obtained illegal machine guns and targeted Jewish communal sites in Nashville, Tennessee. (Source: Department of Justice Release, 10/08/04; Associated Press, 05/31/ 

05). 

April 13, 2004.—Terrorists responsible for the Madrid train bombings in March 

2004 also were planning additional attacks on a Jewish community center outside 

of Madrid, home to the largest Jewish population in Spain, according to evidence 

gathered in the investigation. (Source: New York Times; CNN.com, 04/13/04). 

November 24, 2002.—In a ‘‘Letter to America’’ Osama bin Laden released soon 

after the 9/11 attacks, to explain his reasoning and intent to justify the attacks, he 

wrote, ‘‘The creation and continuation of Israel is one of the greatest crimes, and 

you are the leaders of its criminals.’’ ‘‘This is why the American people cannot be 

innocent of all the crimes committed by the Americans and Jews against us.’’ The 

letter also made clear that, to bin Laden, civilian populations, as with governments, 

were acceptable (equivalent) targets for retaliation. (Source: Guardian (UK), 11/24/ 

02; Full text of the letter: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/ 

theobserver.) 

June 3, 2002.—Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of the terrorists in the first attack on 

the World Trade Center in 1993, revealed in a CBS 60 Minutes interview that the 

World Trade Center was not the terrorists’ original target. Rather, they initially 

planned to blow up Jewish neighborhoods in Brooklyn. But after scouting Crown 

Heights and Williamsburg, they decided to target the World Trade Center, instead. 

The reasoning: Rather than undertaking multiple small explosions in Jewish neighborhoods, they figured that one big explosion in the World Trade Center would kill 

mostly Jews who they believed made up a majority of the workforce there, according 

to Yasin’s statements. (Source: CBS News 06/02/02; Reuters, 06/03/02). 

January 2, 2002.—Al-Qaeda’s training manual, translated by the Associated 

Press, directed followers to attack Jewish organizations and institutions in every 

country Jews exist and to carry out the attacks in a manner designed to cause mass 

causalities. (Source: Associated Press, 02/02/02). 

Mr. KING. Other Members of the subcommittee may introduce 

opening statements for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing on AQAP, and 

I thank the witnesses for appearing today. 

For the past 21⁄2 years, democracy has been on the march in North Africa and 

the Middle East. Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world, has seen a change 

in leadership as its former President Ali Abdallah Saleh was forced to transfer 

power to Abd Hadi. Yemen is one of the places that has seen its share of unrest— 

which continues to make it ripe for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to 

thrive. 

However, strides made by the Obama administration have made life more difficult 

for AQAP. Through drone strikes, several high-profile AQAP senior leaders including Anwar al-Awlaki, have been killed. Even though these drone strikes have eliminated senior AQAP leadership, these targeted strikes have killed Americans. The 

administration knows this is a reality and the Department of Justice has issued a 

guidance for the use of targeted strikes against Americans abroad. 

Once again, 12 years after 9/11, we fall on the side of security which is a vivid 

reality in the world in which we live. Even though AQAP’s operations appear to 

have diminished, it has not prevented the organization from restrategizing and remaining a threat to the United States. The deaths of al-Awlaki and Khan have been 

detrimental to its publication Inspire magazine. The syntax and grammar is not as 

amenable to an American audience. But that does not prevent the magazine from 

celebrating the Boston bombing or sympathizing with lone wolves. 
19 

Targeted killings also did not prevent AQAP from issuing a threat considered 

credible by U.S. intelligence officials. This threat prompted the closure of several 

embassies in the Middle East and North Africa for several days in early August. 

See with AQAP, the game is the same, yet the methods are different. AQAP’s ability to incite panic and economic devastation still plagues the United States. Even 

though AQAP’s large-scale plots—such as the Christmas day bombing of 2009—have 

been unsuccessful, they still impact the way we travel and at a significant economic 

cost. The economic cost of terrorism is something that cannot be overlooked. We cannot call attacks that do not yield a loss of life unsuccessful when we continue to 

go into debt as a country and when we change our lives due to close calls. AQAP 

knows this and since its capabilities have diminished, it can certainly use this as 

leverage. 

I am not advocating ignoring credible threats and standing in the face of danger. 

These threats can not be ignored. But what also can not be ignored is the cost of 

terrorism and terrorist threats. The methods currently used to decrease AQAP’s 

presence and reach to the United States still haven’t prevented the organization 

from causing devastation to not only our lives but also our economy. 

I look forward to hearing the witnesses’ testimony about the strength and reach 

of this organization. 

I yield back. 

Mr. KING. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this vital topic: Mr. Frank Cilluffo and 

Ms. Katherine Zimmerman and Mr. Brian Katulis. 

Beginning with Frank Cilluffo who is an old friend and testified 

before this committee a number of times. I say an old friend, old 

friend of the committee because he has always been available to 

any of us whenever we need assistance or information. 

He is an associate vice president at the George Washington University where he is the director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute. The institute is a nonpartisan think tank that builds 

bridges between theory and practice to advance homeland security 

policy and focuses on counterterrorism and counter-radicalization 

efforts, cyber threats and deterrence, and the nexus between crime 

and terrorism. 

Mr. Cilluffo joined the faculty at George Washington in 2003 

from the White House where he served as special assistant to the 

President for homeland security, and prior to his White House appointment, Mr. Cilluffo spent 8 years in senior policy positions with 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

Mr. Cilluffo, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO, ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

for the kind introduction. 

Ranking Member Higgins, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. 

I will be brief. There are a lot of issues to cover. But when you 

are looking at the terrorism threat today I think, Mr. Chairman, 

you hit it spot on that the threat has metastasized. It comes in various shapes, sizes, flavors, and form ranging from al-Qaeda senior 

leadership, which is still entrenched in federally-administered tribal areas led by Ayman al-Zawahiri to its many affiliates, including 

al-Qaeda in Iraq, which has been resurgent, to Boko Haram in Nigeria, Ansar al-Dine in Mali, al-Shabaab in Somalia, and of course 

the focus of today’s hearing, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in 

Yemen. 
20 

If you have noticed, these are all in under-governed spaces, and 

you are talking about huge swaths of territory and land. So I think 

that anyone who thinks that since the death of Osama bin Laden, 

yes, he may be dead, but the witch lives on. Unfortunately it comes 

in various forms. 

I also think it is important that now, when all eyes are fixed on 

Syria, that we not forget that we have other threats out there, including one that just a month ago had a very active threat stream. 

So I think it is important to keep our eye on the ball. 

Firstly, why al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula? As was noted by 

Ranking Member Higgins, this is the group that has been perhaps 

the most active threat against the U.S. homeland. 

This isn’t could-have, should-have, would-have. This is a group 

that has actually been engaged in multiple attempts on not only 

U.S. targets overseas, but also the U.S. homeland. Many of those 

were discussed, with Abdulmutallab in 2009 along with a number 

of other active threat streams. 

It is also home to the world’s most dangerous and innovative 

bomb makers in Ibrahim al-Asiri. These guys don’t grow on trees. 

They are very unique in terms of the value that they play, not only 

in terms of building out their own capabilities, but also to be able 

to train the next generation. 

If you were to put, rack and stack, the most dangerous terrorists 

on a list I think he would be on the top of anybody’s list. He has 

done so in such a way that he has devised and improvised explosive devices that can circumvent our security. This is absolutely 

critical, important, and something that we need to be very cognizant of. 

I think also in addition to AQAP, I think their greatest hallmark 

has been Inspire magazine and the role that it plays in radicalizing 

and lone-wolf jihadists, especially in the West. There have now 

been 11 copies, 11 editions of Inspire magazine, and you can go 

back through dozens and dozens of cases where in Anwar al-Awlaki 

and Samir Khan and the original authors played a very significant 

role in inspiring people to act, not only in the United States but 

also in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. 

You actually saw a dip after al-Awlaki and Khan’s death in 

terms of the quality of the production. Unfortunately, post the terrorist attack in Boston you saw an increase again in the quality. 

I would argue it is definitely being driven by an English speaker 

who of course makes this significant. So they have reached out to 

the West and they have done so successfully. 

It is also currently led by Nasir al-Wahishi, who is a long-time 

confidant of Osama bin Laden. That obviously gives him some potential additional resolve in terms of taking on the mantle of alQaeda in the broader scheme of things, but also very directly. 

There was a lot of discussion after al-Awlaki’s death. Is the 

group going to look local? Is it going to continue to focus global? 

I think it is not an either-or proposition. It is both. Unfortunately, it is playing a more significant role in the broader tapestry 

that makes up the al-Qaeda environment. 

In addition to Wahishi being named the No. 2 in al-Qaeda, you 

have also seen al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula coordinate their 

activities with numerous affiliates in the past, most notably al- 
21 

1 Reuters, ‘‘Foiled Plot Shows Militants Seek Detection-Proof Bombs,’’ May 7, 2012. http:// 

www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/07/us-usa-security-plot-idUSBRE84612820120507. 

Shabaab in Somalia, but others as well. I think this is important 

because in addition to their own role they serve as—they can foster 

the intent in others to attack the U.S. homeland. I think you are 

starting to see that, the sharing of trade craft. 

You are starting to see a conflation of these al-Qaeda organizations. So that is one thing to keep our eye on. 

I am actually beyond my time. But I hope to get to some of the 

responses afterwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO

Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished Members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. The decision 

to step back and take a hard look at al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 

at a time when all eyes are fixed on Syria is a prudent one. It is far too easy to 

lose sight of key pieces of the big picture when the heat of a particular crisis draws 

our focus. 

Yet to do so would be a real mistake. Notwithstanding the importance of Syria 

as a threat to (U.S.) National, regional, and international security—and as a situation that terrorists may seek to exploit, there is a broader range of forces and factors that pose serious and on-going threats to the United States. One critical example is the terrorist group AQAP which is currently the al-Qaeda affiliate that poses 

the greatest threat to the U.S. homeland. 

WHY AQAP MATTERS

• AQAP is the most active of al-Qaeda’s affiliate groups. AQAP has directly targeted the U.S. homeland as well as U.S. interests abroad on multiple occasions. 

• AQAP (and Yemen) is home to one of the world’s most dangerous and innovative bombmakers who has actively tried and shown himself to be able to circumvent U.S. countermeasures intended to thwart his improvised explosive devices. 

• AQAP has invested significantly in encouraging radicalization and ‘‘lone wolf’’ 

home-grown attacks, including Inspire magazine. AQAP’s efforts in this regard 

propagate the ideology that underpins al-Qaeda as a movement, and provide the 

‘‘how-to’’ do-it-yourself in terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

• AQAP is currently led by Nasser al-Wuhayshi, formerly a direct confidant of 

Osama bin Laden, who was recently named the No. 2 figure within al-Qaeda 

writ large. The No. 2 leadership slot is symbolically important but also operationally so, particularly as the boundaries between al-Qaeda components (core 

and affiliates) fade away and their activities converge. 

• AQAP has for some time assumed a leadership role within al-Qaeda as a whole, 

and has cooperated with multiple al-Qaeda affiliates. AQAP’s leadership position offers a conduit to foster intent in others to attack the U.S. homeland and 

U.S. interests. 

AQAP was established in 2009 by the merger of Yemeni al-Qaeda with Saudi alQaeda elements that were driven out of the Kingdom. The influence of Yemeni alQaeda was felt long before, however, and pre-dated 9/11. Bear in mind that Yemen, 

the birthplace of Osama bin Laden, was the host country of the terrorist attack on 

the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, in which 17 U.S. sailors perished. Since its creation, AQAP 

has demonstrated ample evidence of intent to attack the U.S. homeland and U.S. 

interests, including the 2009 Christmas day airliner bomb attempt by ‘‘underwear 

bomber’’ Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab the 2010 cargo/plane bomb attempt in which 

explosives were concealed in printer cartridges; and the spring 2012 concealed explosives plot.1 The first two of these attempted attacks were overseen by AQAP’s 

former external operations leader Anwar al-Awlaki. AQAP has managed to attract 

Western recruits or others with the ability to travel, to facilitate such attacks. In 

addition to Abdulmutallab, examples include American Sharif Mobley, who is in the 

custody of the Yemeni government following his shooting of two Yemeni security 

guards, and British national Minh Qhang Pham, who was indicted on terrorism 

charges in New York in 2012. 
22 

2 Eli Lake, Josh Rogin, ‘‘Exclusive: Al Qaeda Conference Call Intercepted by U.S. Officials 

Sparked Alerts,’’ The Daily Beast (August 7, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/ 

2013/08/07/al-qaeda-conference-call-intercepted-by-u-s-officials-sparked-alerts.html. 3 Rhonda Schwartz and James Gordon Meek, ‘‘Al Qaeda Threat: Officials Fear ‘Ingenious’ Liquid Explosive,’’ ABC News (August 5, 2013) http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-threat-officials-fear-ingenious-liquid-explosive/story?id=19871892. 4 Andrew Scarpitta, ‘‘Terrorist Deck of Cards: Leaders of Al Qaeda affiliates are clubs, ’’ The 

Washington Times—Communities (September 9, 2013) http://communities.- 

washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/simply-world/2013/sep/9/terrorist-deck-cards-clubs/ 5 Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, ‘‘Qaeda Trying to Harness Toxin for Bombs, U.S. Officials 

Fear,’’ New York Times (August 12, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/world/ 

middleeast/13terror.html?pagewanted=all&lr=0. 6 Barbara Starr, ‘‘US official: Al Qaeda core chief picks number two from Yemeni affiliate,’’ 

CNN (August 5, 2013) http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/08/05/us-official-al-qaeda-core-chiefpicks-number-two-from-yemeni-affiliate/. 7See FBI press release on Warsame plea deal at http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/ 

2013/guilty-plea-unsealed-in-new-york-involving-ahmed-warsame-a-senior-terrorist-leader-and-liaison-between-al-shabaab-and-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-for-providing-material-supportto-both-terrorist-organizations. 8 UPI, ‘‘AQAP Eyed for Benghazi Role,’’ May 3, 2013. http://www.upi.com/ToplNews/ 

Special/2013/05/03/AQAP-eyed-for-Benghazi-role/UPI-39181367594594/. 

Most recently, this August (before all eyes turned to Syria and the regime’s use 

of chemical weapons on its own people there), there was much discussion of a threat 

stream emanating from Yemen, where AQAP is based. A spate of articles appeared 

in the press reporting on a so-called ‘‘conference call’’ between al-Qaeda Senior 

Leadership (AQSL) figure Ayman al-Zawahiri and a dozen chiefs of al-Qaeda affiliates including AQAP’s Nasser al-Wuhayshi.2 The intelligence suggested that a 

major terrorist plot directed against Western targets was afoot and prompted a 

range of countermeasures including a U.S. decision to shut temporarily 19 embassies and consulates. The plot is said to have involved ‘‘a new generation of liquid 

explosive, currently undetectable,’’ which U.S. officials described as ‘‘ingenious.’’3

In addition to these various demonstrations of intent to attack, AQAP has also 

evidenced a record of innovation in terror tradecraft. AQAP’s lead bomb-maker 

Ibrahim al-Asiri personifies this, as the mastermind behind the devices used in the 

2009 attempted assassination of the Saudi Interior Minister, the 2009 Christmas 

day attack, the 2010 cargo printer bomb, and plots that involve surgically implanted 

explosives. 

Over and above his own considerable expertise, al-Asiri has been training the next 

generation of bomb-makers.4 AQAP has also expressed an interest in attacks using 

biological warfare agents, including ricin.5

Encouraging radicalization and ‘‘lone wolf’’ home-grown attacks has been a further 

hallmark and focus of AQAP. Cases of this type inspired by AQAP—and Anwar alAwlaki in particular—include the attack on Fort Hood in 2009 by Major Nidal 

Hasan, the attack on a military recruiting center in Arkansas in the same year by 

Carlos Bledsoe, the 2010 attack on a British parliamentarian by student Roshonara 

Choudhry, and the Boston marathon bombing earlier this year. 

AQAP ‘‘bridge figure’’ Anwar al-Awlaki possessed an almost unmatched ability to 

recruit and inspire new and existing members to al-Qaeda’s cause and ideology. 

Though killed in a drone strike in 2011, al-Awlaki’s voice lives on including in the 

many radical and violent ‘‘sermons’’ that he recorded in multiple media formats— 

and continues to resonate. 

Ideology is the lifeblood that sustains al-Qaeda, and instruments such as Inspire 

magazine are intended to fuel the fire, including the ‘‘home-grown’’ component. Although the original authors and publishers of Inspire (al-Awlaki and colleague 

Samir Khan) are now deceased, the magazine continues and its production values 

have improved recently. Immediately following the death of al-Awlaki and Khan, 

there was a highly noticeable degradation of Inspire; the more recent issues of Inspire, including the 11th issue released after the Boston marathon attack, once 

again demonstrate high production quality and appear to be written by a native 

English speaker. 

The linkages between AQAP and other al-Qaeda affiliates and terrorist groups are 

another source of significant concern. As mentioned, current AQAP leader alWuhayshi is the overall No. 2 in al-Qaeda.6 He is also directly connected to Osama 

bin Laden, having served as his secretary until 2001. For him, the battle may be 

personal; being a direct prote ́ge ́ of bin Laden may add an extra layer of resolve and 

determination to his actions. Other important links exist, however, beyond alWuhayshi’s connection with AQSL. These include AQAP ties to al-Shabaab in Somalia, as discussed by convicted terrorist leader Ahmed Warsame in his guilty plea;7

and a reported AQAP role in the attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi.8
23 

9 Reuters, ‘‘Al Qaeda calls for attacks inside United States’’ (September 13, 2013) http:// 

www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/13/us-qaeda-zawahri-idUSBRE98C05820130913. 10Omar S. Mahmood, ‘‘Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria: No Easy Fix,’’ HSPI Issue Brief 

(April 3, 2013) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/HSPI%20Issue%20Brief%2018%20- 

Boko%20Haram.pdf. 11 Rida Lyammouri, ‘‘Northern Mali: Armed Groups, State Failure, and Terrorism,’’ HSPI 

Issue Brief (May 30, 2013) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/HSPI%20Issue%20Brief%20- 

20%20Northern%20Mali.pdf. 12 Navanti Group, ‘‘Somalia’s Al-Shabaab: Down But Not Out,’’ HSPI Issue Brief (August 27, 

2013) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/HSPI%20Issue%20Brief%2022%20Somalia%20- 

Al%20Shabaab.pdf. 13Frank J. Cilluffo, ‘‘The Future of Homeland Security: Evolving and Emerging Threats,’’ Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (July 

11, 2012) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/Testimony%20-%20SHSGAC%20Hearing%20- 

%2011%20July%202012.pdf. Frank Cilluffo, Joseph Clark, and Clinton Watts, ‘‘Pardon the 

Pivot: What about Africa?’’ HSPI Issue Brief (March 6, 2013) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/ 

policy/HSPI%20Issue%20Brief%2017%20-%20What%20About%20Africa.pdf. Navanti Group, 

‘‘Origins and Dimensions of Instability in Post-Qaddafi Libya,’’ HSPI Issue Brief (July 30, 2013) 

http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/HSPI%20Issue%20Brief%2021%20Instability%20PostQaddafi%20Libya.pdf. 14 ‘‘CIA Official Calls Syria Top Threat to U.S. Security,’’ The Wall Street Journal (August 6, 

2013) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323420604578652330222498920.html. 15 Carlo Munoz, ‘‘FBI’s Mueller warns of new generation of homegrown terrorists,’’ The Hill 

(August 23, 2013) http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/operations/318539-fbis-mueller-warns-ofnew-generation-of-homegrown-terrorists-. 16Sharon L. Cardash, Frank J. Cilluffo, Jean-Luc Marret, ‘‘Foreign Fighters in Syria: Still 

Doing Battle, Still a Multidimensional Danger,’’ Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique—Note 

no. 24/13 (August 2013) http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/notes/2013/ 

201324.pdf. See also Frank J. Cilluffo, Jeffrey R. Cozzens, and Magnus Ranstorp, ‘‘Foreign 

Fighters: Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones,’’ Joint Report of the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute and the Swedish National Defence College (October 1, 

2010) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/reportlforeignfighters501.pdf. 

AQAP IN BROADER CONTEXT

Though AQAP occupies a vaunted place within the larger al-Qaeda hierarchy 

(which, as mentioned above, is itself something of a misnomer as the boundaries between core and affiliates of al-Qaeda are fading away and operational and ideological activities converge), the organization is by no means the only important threat 

that the United States faces at this time. As evidenced by the above reference to 

Ayman al-Zawahiri, even AQSL is now reinvigorated and reappearing. Indeed just 

last week, on the day after the twelfth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, Zawahiri 

released an audio message calling for further attacks on the United States, intended 

to ‘‘bleed America economically by provoking it to continue in its massive expenditure on its security.’’9

Although the primary threat vector no longer emanates from AQSL alone, the 

threat streams coming from al-Qaeda affiliates and those inspired by al-Qaeda are 

many and varied. At the group level, these include: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram in Nigeria,10 and Ansar Dine in Mali.11 In Africa 

and the Middle East alone, there are still multiple al-Qaeda affiliates that continue 

to thrive, most notably in the Sahel and in Somalia.12 Indeed, there is an arc of 

Islamist extremism that stretches across Africa from east to west, through the Sahel 

and the Maghreb.13

The latest and most concerning hot spot to emerge is undoubtedly Syria. Outgoing 

CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell has identified Syria as ‘‘the greatest threat to 

U.S. national security.’’14 Former FBI Director Robert Mueller echoed the point immediately prior to completing his term of service and leaving office; he ‘‘warned that 

an increasing flow of U.S. citizens heading to Syria and elsewhere to wage jihad 

against regional powers could end up in a new generation of home-grown terrorists.’’15 Just one returning fighter with lethal intent and competence could cause serious harm. In Syria alone, there are thousands of foreign fighters—including from 

14 European countries, Chechnya, China, North Africa, the Balkans, Australia, and 

North America.16

At the same time, a veritable witch’s brew of jihadists exists in Pakistan including, for example: The Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Tehrik-i-Taliban 

Pakistan (often dubbed the ‘‘Pakistani Taliban’’), Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), 

Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. We have seen in the 

past and continue to see substantial evidence of cooperation and collaboration between these latter groups and al-Qaeda. Though some of these groups may be more 

regionally or locally focused, they increasingly ascribe and subscribe to al-Qaeda’s 
24 

17 Cilluffo, ‘‘The Future of Homeland Security: Evolving and Emerging Threats’’ (July 11, 

2012) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/Testimony%20-%20SHSGAC%20Hearing%20- 

%2011%20July%202012.pdf. 18David Lerman, ‘‘African Terrorist Groups Starting to Cooperate, U.S. Says’’ Bloomberg 

(June 25, 2012) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-25/african-terrorist-groups-startingto-cooperate-u-s-says.html. 19 Anna Mulrine, ‘‘9/11 Commission leaders push for changes in US terrorism fight,’’ The 

Christian Science Monitor (September 11, 2013) http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/ 

2013/0911/9-11-Commission-leaders-push-for-changes-in-US-terrorism-fight-video. Peter Bergen, Bruce Hoffman, Michael Hurley, and Erroll Southers, ‘‘Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment,’’ Bipartisan Policy Center Report (September 2013) http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/ 

default/files/Jihadist%20Terrorism-A%20Threat%20Assesmentl0.pdf. 20Frank J. Cilluffo, ‘‘The Iranian Cyber Threat to the United States,’’ Testimony Before the 

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence; and Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies (April 26, 2012) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/ 

Iran%20Cyber%20Testimony%204.26.12%20Frank%20Cilluffo.pdf. See also: Cilluffo, ‘‘A Line in 

the Sand: Assessing Dangerous Threat to Our Nation’s Borders’’ (November 2012) http:// 

www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/testimony11.16.12.pdf; and Frank J. Cilluffo, ‘‘Cyber Threats from 

China, Russia, and Iran: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure,’’ Testimony Before the 

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies (March 20, 2013) http:// 

www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/MeehanlCilluffo%20Testimony%20March%202013.pdf. 

goals and the broader global jihad, with U.S. and Western targets increasingly in 

their crosshairs.17

Ungoverned and under-governed spaces such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Yemen, the Sahel, and Somalia pose 

a potent challenge. Here, failed, failing, or weak states offer a propitious climate for 

jihadists to regroup, train, plan, plot, and execute attacks. Former head of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) General Carter Ham warned, while still in office last 

year, that AQIM (operating in southern Algeria, northern Mali, and eastern Mauritania; and spreading elsewhere in the Sahel), plus al-Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko 

Haram in Nigeria, ‘‘are seeking to coordinate and synchronize their efforts.’’ General 

Ham characterized each of these groups as ‘‘by itself, a dangerous and worrisome 

threat’’; but he was particularly concerned by the emerging trend of them sharing 

‘‘funds, training, and explosive material.’’18

Compounding the challenges posed the ecosystem described above is the so-called 

‘‘lone wolf’’ who self-radicalizes and prepares to commit violence without directly 

reaching out to al-Qaeda or others for support and guidance. The term lone wolf is 

a bit of a misnomer, however, since individuals in this category have at least been 

inspired, goaded, and in some cases facilitated by external forces—which in turn 

blurs the line between the foreign and domestic. In such cases, the mission of prevention is all the harder because there may be little for law enforcement or counterterrorism professionals to pick up on ahead of time, when we are still left of boom. 

The mission remains critical, though, as evidenced by the discovery of more than 

60 ‘‘home-grown’’ jihadi terrorism plots since September 11, 2001. 

In short, the system is still blinking red, and the United States would be extremely ill-advised to think or act otherwise. In a report released just last week, the 

Bipartisan Policy Center assessed that al-Qaeda and affiliates are in ‘‘some 16 different theaters of operation—compared with half as many as recently as five years 

ago.’’ Among the ‘‘sites of revival and resuscitation’’ is Iraq.19 Nor can we take our 

eye off the ball of state-sponsored terrorism, such as that perpetrated by the government of Iran and proxies such as Hezbollah. Although state-sponsored terrorism is 

beyond the scope of this hearing, it will undoubtedly demand significant attention.20

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY VERSUS AQAP

The United States has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in support of 

counterterrorism measures directed against al-Qaeda in Yemen, but the need for direct U.S. counterterrorism engagement in the country persists. Below I address four 

elements that should be central to and included in U.S. counterterrorism efforts 

against AQAP; but the list is not meant to be comprehensive. 

1. Drones and Special Operations 

The bulwark of our strategy has been a sustained drone campaign informed by 

solid intelligence. As I have written with my colleague Clint Watts: ‘‘Light-footprint 

drone and special operations force (SOF) missions specifically focused on short-term 

tactical counterterrorism objectives can help avoid the long-term quagmire of Yem-
25 

21Frank J. Cilluffo and Clinton Watts, ‘‘Yemen & Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Exploiting a Window of Counterterrorism Opportunity,’’ HSPI Issue Brief (June 24, 2011) http:// 

www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/issuebrieflyemenaqap.pdf. 22 Ibid. See also Frank Cilluffo and Clinton Watts, ‘‘Countering the Threat Posed by AQAP: 

Embrace, Don’t Chase, Yemen’s Chaos,’’ Security Debrief (July 14, 2011) http:// 

securitydebrief.com/2011/07/14/countering-the-threat-posed-by-aqap-embrace-don%E2%80%99tchase-yemen%E2%80%99s-chaos/. 23Washington Post (September 3, 2013) http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-03/ 

world/41723879l1lu-s-drone-campaign-al-qaeda-commanders-unmanned-aircraft. 

eni insurgencies while immediately degrading AQAP’s ability to strike the U.S.’’21

While in itself insufficient and of itself not a perfect option (since the possibility of 

‘‘blowback’’ or backlash effects cannot be entirely eliminated), the described tools 

have proven to be both powerful and effective. 

As I have also stated elsewhere, ‘‘targeted attacks on AQ’s leadership in Pakistan 

severely disrupted the terror group’s ability to plan and execute terror attacks 

abroad.’’ Applied to Yemen, this same tactic and strategy has yielded substantial 

counterterrorism advances from a U.S. perspective. The threat from AQAP has not 

disappeared, of course; but the terrorist group has been forced to look over its shoulder constantly—which diverts the adversary’s limited amounts of energy and resources into self-preservation, and away from plots and planning against the United 

States and its allies. If there is an alternative policy course that could produce an 

equally favorable outcome, the critics have yet to specify it. Meantime, the specified 

course of action allows us ‘‘to lay the groundwork and move toward a long-term 

Yemen strategy . . . ’’.22

Although the balance of power between government and al-Qaeda forces in Yemen 

has vacillated over time, the ‘‘Arab Spring’’ of 2011 toppled Yemeni President Saleh 

and created a window of opportunity that al-Wuhayshi and associates exploited successfully. Yemeni government forces pushed back in 2012, reversing the territorial 

gains made by the Islamists the previous year. But the militants remain in-country, 

though now they are scattered and interspersed throughout Yemen rather than 

heavily concentrated in a few locations. In addition, the adversary has prioritized 

the building of anti-drone capabilities.23 In some ways, therefore, the current situation is more dangerous and more difficult to address than in past. 

2. Robust Intelligence Collection 

Robust intelligence collection vis-a`-vis terrorist threats must always be a priority, 

in part because the yield of such collection efforts informs both strategy and a widerange tactics (including operations, counter-measures, etc.). In the wake of leaks, 

AQAP—which was already a difficult intelligence target—has become an even greater collection challenge for the United States. Post-leaks, AQAP has improved its 

operational security and changed its practices; think tradecraft, communications, 

and planning. 

Whether AQAP remains poised to deliver on the plot that came to light this August is yet to be seen. However, the terrorist group has demonstrated and continues 

to demonstrate significant ability and intent to do harm to the United States and 

its interests. Some have even speculated that the August plot was simply a test of 

U.S. systems, meant to inform future attack. Whatever the case, AQAP has proven 

that it has the capacity to attain global reach, as the source of active threat to the 

United States on more than one occasion. Against this background and despite the 

level of challenge it entails, it is imperative to redouble U.S. efforts to obtain robust 

intelligence on this threat—with special emphasis accorded to AQAP’s bomb-makers 

and others involved in external operations. 

3. Aviation Security and Thwarting Terrorist Travel 

AQAP has demonstrated a persistent interest in carrying out attacks against and 

using the global aviation system. With each successive plot, they have attempted 

to improve their tradecraft and develop new devices and techniques to bypass our 

security measures. Given this, it is imperative that TSA and its foreign partners remain nimble at anticipating new types of threats and rapidly developing the means 

to detect them. 

Given AQAP’s focus on finding Western operatives to carry out attacks, it is also 

important that intelligence information is used to inform the risk-based screening 

of travelers, both by expediting low-risk travelers through programs such as 

PreCheck and by providing extra scrutiny for higher-risk travelers. The Passenger 

Name Record (PNR) information that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) receives 

from travelers coming from Europe is vital in carrying out such risk-based screening. CBP and TSA have also been successful since the cargo planes plot of October 
26 

24Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, ‘‘It’s the Ideology, Stupid,’’ The National Interest 

(June 3, 2013) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/It%27s%20the%20ideology,%20stupid.pdf. 

Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘‘Working to Counter Online Radicalization to Violence in the United 

States,’’ The White House Blog (February 5, 2013) http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/ 

05/working-counter-online-radicalization-violence-united-states. 25Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, ‘‘Baghdad Surprise?’’ HSPI Commentary (August 

20, 2010) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/commentary17lBaghdadSurprise.pdf. 26Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, ‘‘Tumult in the Middle East: When and Where 

Will the Next Shoe Drop?’’ HSPI Commentary (February 17, 2011) http://www.gwumc.edu/ 

hspi/policy/commentary021lmideast.pdf. 27Katherine Zimmerman, ‘‘The Al Qaeda Network: A New Framework for Defining the 

Enemy,’’ A Report by AEI’s Critical Threats Project (September 2013) http:// 

www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdflupload/analysis/Zimmermanlthelall- QaedalNetworklSeptemberl2013.pdf. 

2010 at improving risk-based screening of international air cargo, through their 

joint Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) pilot project. 

4. U.S.-Based Efforts to Combat Violent Islamist Extremism 

As noted earlier, AQAP has been focused not only on carrying out its own attacks 

but also on radicalizing individuals and encouraging them to act on their own and 

carry out attacks in their home countries. The biggest element missing from U.S. 

statecraft on counterterrorism relates to our efforts—which have been lacking—to 

counter and defeat the jihadist ideology. The result is that the terrorist narrative 

lives on and continues to attract and inspire those who wish us harm. 

The State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications is 

doing some good work overseas in this area in foreign languages. But it is not 

enough. A systemic strategic communications effort is needed, aimed at exposing the 

hypocrisy of our adversaries’ words versus their deeds. Nor domestically have we 

figured out how to address the issue of on-line violent Islamist extremism. Although 

this challenge appeared on White House radar years ago and a strategy to address 

‘‘on-line violent extremist radicalization’’ was promised by the White House in 2011, 

this significant and complex undertaking was instead treated in a cursory blog post 

earlier this year.24

CONCLUSION

The bottom line is that we must not take our foot off the gas pedal when it comes 

to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Now is not the time to offer our adversaries time 

and space in which to expand and entrench, or further regroup and reconstitute. 

This admonition is all the more important as the United States prepares to conclude the combat role of its military forces in Afghanistan in 2014. The decision on 

whether to retain or remove U.S. and allied forces from Afghanistan raises a host 

of strategic issues. Strictly from a tactical counterterrorism perspective however, 

U.S. withdrawal is a concern, just as it was in Iraq.25

Indeed, nature abhors a vacuum; and there is no shortage of actors hostile to the 

United States who presently seek to exploit a range of ungoverned and under-governed spaces worldwide (failed and failing states), as well as transitional circumstances such as those that prevail in Egypt.26 Accordingly, along with our allies, 

we must continue to target the leaders of foreign terrorist organizations, and their 

military and operational planners. 

AQAP is just one of many organizations that demand the attention of U.S. law 

enforcement and intelligence officials as well as our military forces. Al-Qaeda, its 

affiliates, and those inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology have by no means been defeated.27 The United States must therefore meet the challenge posed by its adversaries with equal determination, patience, and resolve. 

Thank you once more for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward to trying to answer any questions that you may have. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Cilluffo. 

Our next witness, Katherine Zimmerman, is a senior analyst and 

the al-Qaeda movement’s team lead for the American Enterprise 

Institute’s Critical Threats Project. Her work is focused on alQaeda’s affiliates in the Gulf of Asia region, and associated movements in West and in Northern Africa. She specializes in the alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al-Shabaab. 
27 

Recently, Ms. Zimmerman released a new report entitled ‘‘The alQaeda Network: A New Framework for Defining the Enemy,’’ 

which informs American policy and decision makers on the composition of the al-Qaeda network, and raises concerns with the lack 

of evolution in U.S. counterterrorism policy to target the whole network. 

Ms. Zimmerman, thank you for being here today, and you are 

recognized. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF KATHERINE L. ZIMMERMAN, SENIOR ANALYST 

CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 

INSTITUTE 

Ms. ZIMMERMAN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Higgins, 

thank you for including me in this important hearing on the threat 

to the—about the United States homeland from AQAP. I would like 

to highlight my understanding of AQAP’s role in the al-Qaeda network presented in my prepared testimony. 

America’s failure to understand the complexities of the al-Qaeda 

network as it has evolved over the years has led only to tactical 

successes on the battlefield. The strategy to disrupt the network by 

killing senior leaders in a core group is based on a faulty understanding that overemphasizes al-Qaeda core centrality to the network. 

There is no single group at the heart of the al-Qaeda network 

today. Instead, the network strength now lies in interwoven connections between regional al-Qaeda groups, as well in the ties between those groups and the core. The al-Qaeda network has 

evolved and our strategy must change with it. 

AQAP does pose the most direct threat to the U.S. homeland 

from al-Qaeda. But it must be examined in the context of the entire 

network. The most significant change occurred in 2009 when AQAP 

created a new model for the role of groups in the al-Qaeda network. 

It focused its efforts on the far war against the United States, and 

it began to foster relationships with other groups. 

AQAP is the first known example of an affiliate or an associate 

directing an attack against the U.S. homeland, an effort the group 

has continued to prioritize. It also provides training to, and shares 

resources with al-Qaeda groups in a manner that is characteristic 

of Osama bin Laden’s group in the 1990s and 2000s. 

The previous model for the al-Qaeda network held that franchises were subordinated to a core, conventionally understood to be 

the al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda core maintains command and control over its regional affiliates and directed external 

operations. This model no longer holds true. 

Al-Qaeda’s expansion in 2011 and 2012 is explained as fallout 

from the weakening of the core group. But there is an alternative 

explanation. 

The Arab Spring and bin Laden’s death in 2011 served as a catalyst for change in the network. Other affiliates adapted to AQAP’s 

model and cultivated intergroup connection spanning the region. 

These connections facilitate broader coordination and cooperation 

within the al-Qaeda network and it increases overall resiliency. 

Today AQAP’s prominence in the al-Qaeda network, or the appointment of its leader to the No. 2 position in al-Qaeda, should not 
28 

be interpreted to mean that AQAP has risen to replace the core 

group in Pakistan, or that it is directing the network. There are 

three main points to emphasize. 

First, there is no group at the heart of the network. It is not centrally organized or directed. The senior leadership in Pakistan 

maintains an advisory role and provides strategic guidance, but it 

no longer issues directives. 

Therefore, operations specifically targeting a single group, including AQAP, would have a limited overall effect. Such a strategy has 

allowed al-Qaeda’s affiliates in Iraq, Syria, and West Africa to expand virtually unchecked, and has ignored the growth of associates 

across North Africa, especially in Libya. 

Second, the lateral connections, relationships among al-Qaeda 

core, its affiliates and associates, create an interwoven structure. 

The structure is what gives the network its strength. Al-Qaeda 

groups are able to interact without running relations through a 

central node, creating a much more dispersed network. 

Finally, the entire al-Qaeda network, including groups operating 

solely at the local level, must be considered when devising a strategy to counter it because of the existence of the interwoven structure. Any additional connections through added individuals or 

added groups strengthens the overall network. 

Al-Qaeda today bears little resemblance to the network in 2001. 

Yet America’s strategy to counter it remains largely unchanged. 

The network is global, and therefore the United States needs a 

comprehensive global strategy. 

Al-Qaeda extends beyond the commonly-known affiliates, AQAP, 

al-Qaeda in Iraq, among others, to local groups that operate at the 

grassroots level. These local groups understand local grievances 

and respond to shifts in popular sentiment on the ground. Any 

strategy to counter the al-Qaeda network must recognize the role 

of these groups. 

Including them as part of the network does not necessarily lead 

to the conclusion that the United States must deploy forces or invest heavily in military assets where the al-Qaeda network is active. But it does require that policymakers invest in a substantial 

effort to develop a global strategy with local solutions. 

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Higgins, if I could leave you 

with one take-away from my testimony and research, the view that 

this is no longer George Bush’s al-Qaeda, but we are still fighting 

with George Bush’s tactics. The enemy has transformed, and if we 

want to win our strategy must transform with it. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Zimmerman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KATHERINE L. ZIMMERMAN

SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 

The United States continues to face a threat from the al-Qaeda network 12 years 

after declaring war against it. America’s failure to understand the complexities of 

the terrorist network as it has evolved over the years has led only to tactical successes on the battlefield. The strategy to disrupt the al-Qaeda network by killing 

senior leadership in a ‘‘core group’’ is based on a faulty understanding that overemphasizes that group’s importance and the current intentions of affiliates to attack 

the United States. This strategy has been ineffective in dismantling the network 

overall. Al-Qaeda today bears little resemblance to the network in 2001, yet America’s strategy to counter it remains largely unchanged. 
29 

1For more on the al Houthi wars, see Christopher Boucek, ‘‘War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge,’’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2010, 

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/warlinlsaada.pdf. 

The al-Qaeda network has moved away from a centrally organized network over 

the years. Al-Qaeda’s strength and resilience now lies in the latticed interconnections between regional al-Qaeda groups, as well as in the ties between those groups 

and the center. The most significant inflection point occurred in 2009 when alQaeda’s Yemen-based affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), established a new model for the role of groups in the al-Qaeda network. AQAP focused 

its efforts on the far war against the United States and began to foster relationships 

with other groups. The Arab Spring and Osama bin Laden’s death in 2011 served 

as a catalyst for change in the network: Other affiliates, too, adapted to AQAP’s 

model and cultivated inter-group connections spanning the region. These connections facilitate broader coordination and cooperation within the al-Qaeda network, 

and have increased its overall resiliency. 

Targeting individuals or a specific group within the al-Qaeda network will not be 

effective alone. Such a strategy has allowed al-Qaeda’s affiliates in Iraq, Syria, and 

West Africa to expand virtually unchecked and has ignored the growth of associated 

groups across North Africa, especially in Libya. The al-Qaeda network is global and 

operates on a global level. Many al-Qaeda groups operate solely on the local level, 

but they strengthen the broader network. The United States, therefore, needs a 

comprehensive global strategy to counter al-Qaeda that is tailored down to the local 

level. 

Case Study: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

The most direct threat to the U.S. homeland today emanates from AQAP, which 

has attempted to attack the United States homeland at least three times since its 

establishment in January 2009. The affiliate is also behind the threat stream that 

prompted the unprecedented closure of over 20 American diplomatic posts across the 

Middle East and North Africa. 

AQAP’s prominence in the al-Qaeda network should not be interpreted to mean 

that AQAP has risen to replace the core group in Pakistan or that it is directing 

the network in some way. It must be interpreted within the broader context of the 

al-Qaeda network. AQAP is an extremely capable terrorist group that is a member 

of a network of other groups all operating in similar manners. Its prominence is a 

reflection of its capabilities and its prioritization of conducting attacks against the 

United States, not the subordination of other groups to AQAP. 

BACKGROUND

A January 2009 video announced the establishment of AQAP as a merger between 

al-Qaeda’s Yemeni and Saudi branches. The video identified four AQAP leaders: 

Two former Guantanamo detainees (Said al Shihri and Mohamed al Awfi) and two 

escaped Yemeni prisoners (Nasser al Wahayshi and Qasim al Raymi). Saudi alQaeda operatives, including at least five former Guantanamo detainees who had 

gone through Saudi Arabia’s rehabilitation program, had fled to Yemen in the late 

2000s to escape the crackdown on al-Qaeda in the Kingdom. They began operating 

with al-Qaeda in Yemen, which was on the path to being reconstituted after having 

been essentially neutralized in 2002–2004. The February 2006 escape of 23 al-Qaeda 

operatives from a Sana’a prison, including Wahayshi and Raymi, revitalized alQaeda in Yemen. 

AQAP’s rapid ascendancy in Yemen profited from the expertise of individuals who 

had been active in the al-Qaeda network for years and from the relatively free environment in which these individuals could operate. The senior echelon of AQAP’s 

leadership structure had decades of combined experience. Many of the senior leaders 

had trained at al-Qaeda’s al Farouq training camp or elsewhere in Afghanistan, 

some were members of Osama bin Laden’s direct human network, and nearly all 

had been active in the al-Qaeda network before the 9/11 attacks. Yemen’s weak central government, then headed by President Ali Abdullah Saleh, did not exert direct 

control over its territory and in August 2009 dedicated scarce security resources to 

fighting the sixth iteration of a rebellion in the north.1 The Yemeni government also 

prioritized putting down a rising secessionist movement in the south over counterterrorism operations against AQAP. The permissive security environment along 

with the leadership’s experience facilitated al-Qaeda’s full reconstitution in Yemen 

in 2009. 

The group continued the small-scale attacks that al-Qaeda in Yemen had been 

carrying out. But it also began to focus on external operations against Saudi and 

American targets. AQAP’s first major external operation targeted the Saudi deputy 
30 

2 ‘‘Killed Militants Planned ‘Imminent’ Attack: Saudi,’’ Agence-France Press, October 19, 2009, 

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jPLO7NB9gaJCikLRqTXEklkdMAHQ. 3For further analysis, see Chris Harnisch, ‘‘Christmas Day Attack: Manifestation of AQAP 

Shift Targeting America,’’ AEI’s Critical Threats Project, December 29, 2009, http:// 

www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/christmas-day-attack-manifestation-aqap-shift-targeting-america. 4Philip Crowley, ‘‘Designations of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Senior 

Leaders,’’ U.S. Department of State Press Statement, January 19, 2010, http://www.state.gov/ 

r/pa/prs/ps/2010/01/135364.htm. 5 James Gallagher, ‘‘Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in 2010: The Intensification of the 

Near War,’’ AEI’s Critical Threats Project, March 8, 2011, http://www.criticalthreats.org/ 

yemen/aqap-2010-intensification-near-war-march-8-2011. 

* Al-Qaeda affiliates are groups that have publicly pledged allegiance to the al-Qaeda emir 

and have in turn received public recognition as part of al-Qaeda by the al-Qaeda emir. Al-Qaeda 

associates are groups that exhibit a sufficient number of characteristics common within the alQaeda network such as shared resources, overlapping fighter or leadership networks, a common 

signature, and ideological alignment with al-Qaeda. 

interior ministry in August 2009. Ibrahim al Asiri, the group’s top bombmaker, designed an explosive device that was concealed as a suppository in his brother’s body. 

The remotely-detonated bomb failed to kill the Saudi official. A second plot to hit 

Saudi targets failed in October when a firefight with Saudi border patrolmen killed 

Yousef al Shihri and Raed al Harbi, who were smuggling explosives in to Saudi Arabia.2 AQAP became the first affiliate to target the U.S. homeland in December that 

year. Asiri modified the design for Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who conducted the 

December 2009 attack. Asiri concealed Abdulmutallab’s bomb in his underwear. The 

device passed successfully through airport security, but failed to detonate.3 The attack shone a spotlight on the al-Qaeda affiliate and within a month, the U.S. designated AQAP, Wahayshi, and Shihri under Executive Order 13224.4

The al-Qaeda affiliate was capable of maintaining two lines of operations by 2010. 

It continued to pursue attacks on American targets, evidenced by the October 2010 

parcel plot. It also increased its focus on fighting the Saleh government, which, 

under U.S. and international pressure, had begun to intensify its operations against 

AQAP.5 The retraction of the Yemeni central state into the capital, Sana’a, due to 

the political unrest in winter 2011 opened up space for AQAP. The group fielded 

an insurgent arm operating under the name ‘‘Ansar al Sharia’’ in spring 2011 that 

seized and held territory in south Yemen. AQAP briefly governed in certain areas, 

but more significantly, expanded its area of operations outside of its historical terrain. AQAP continues to have a presence in many of these regions, though it has 

not held territory since spring 2012. Its operatives have also regularly targeted 

Yemeni political and military officials for assassination, a strategy employed in 2010 

and resumed as of 2012. 

AQAP poses the most direct threat to the U.S. homeland out of the al-Qaeda network. It incorporated lessons learned from the experience of al-Qaeda in Iraq in 

building popular support when its insurgent arm, Ansar al Sharia, tried its hand 

at governance in 2011 and 2012 (though it ultimately failed). It has responded to 

shifting conditions on the ground and has attempted to appeal to Yemen’s various 

anti-government groupings. It has innovated in the design of its explosive devices 

and repeatedly attempted, with success, to penetrate American National security defenses. Though the affiliate is extremely capable in its own right, it must be examined in the context of the entire al-Qaeda network. 

New Model for al-Qaeda Affiliates and Associates * 

A major inflection point for the al-Qaeda network occurred with the establishment 

of AQAP. The Yemen-based affiliate created a new model for the role of groups in 

the al-Qaeda network by the end of 2009. The previous model held that groups in 

the network were subordinated to a ‘‘core’’ group. That core group, which was the 

al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan, maintained command and control over its regional 

affiliates and directed external operations. AQAP is the first known example of an 

affiliate or an associate directing an attack against the U.S. homeland, an effort the 

group has continued to prioritize. It also provided training and shared resources 

with al-Qaeda associates in a manner characteristic of bin Laden’s group in the 

1990s and early 2000s. The new model indicates that the network is no longer centrally organized or directed, but continued relations between the ‘‘core’’ and AQAP 

indicate a continued advisory role for the central group. 

The December 2009 attack on Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines Flight 253 was 

the first attack from the al-Qaeda network on the U.S. homeland directed by an affiliate, as previously mentioned. U.S. court documents related to the case against 

the underwear bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, provide the details of the 
31 

6 ‘‘Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Government’s Sentencing Memorandum,’’ United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, February 10, 2012, http:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/umar-farouk-abdul-mutallab-sentencebrief.pdf. 7The bin Laden statement, an audio statement that runs just over a minute, was released 

through al Jazeera on January 24, 2010 and then through the al Fajr forum on February 16, 

2010. ‘‘Bin Laden Warns US of More Attacks,’’ al Jazeera, January 24, 2010, http:// 

www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/01/201012415287209336.html; ‘‘Al-Fajr Releases 

Bin Laden Message to Obama,’’ SITE Intelligence Group, February 16, 2010. Available by subscription through www.siteintelgroup.com. 8 ‘‘United States of America vs. Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame,’’ United States District Court, 

Southern District of New York, July 5, 2011, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/ 

world/WarsamelIndictment.pdf. 9 Brian Bennett, ‘‘Al-Qaeda’s Yemen Branch Has Aided Somalia Militants, U.S. Says,’’ Los Angeles Times, July 18, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/18/world/la-fg-bin-laden-somalia-20110718. 10Martin Plaut, ‘‘Somalia and Yemen Swapping Militants,’’ BBC, January 17, 2010, http:// 

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8463946.stm, Casey Coombs, ‘‘African Militants Learn from al-Qaeda in 

Yemen,’’ Global Post, September 10, 2012, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/war/conflict-zones/120907/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-yemen-somalia-al-shabaab-gulf-aden. 11 ‘‘State Security Prosecution Present Nasr City Cell File to Public Prosecutor for Transfer 

to the Criminal Court,’’ Youm7, February 6, 2013 [Arabic], http://www1.youm7.com/ 

News.asp?NewsID=935561&. 

** Mohamed Jamal had been imprisoned under Hosni Mubarak’s regime, but was released in 

2011. He was arrested in 2012 and is incarcerated in Egypt. 12Siobhan Gorman and Matt Bradley, ‘‘Militant Link to Libya Attack,’’ Wall Street Journal, 

October 1, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444549204578020373- 

444418316.html. 

plot.6 Abdulmutallab sought out Yemeni-American cleric and AQAP senior operative 

Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen, and, after getting in touch through an intermediary and 

submitting a letter to al-Awlaki, spent 3 days with the cleric. Al-Awlaki connected 

him to the bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, who explained the plan. Abdulmutallab 

received specialized training on the explosive device and basic military training at 

one of AQAP’s training camps. He then received orders from al-Awlaki to detonate 

the bomb over U.S. airspace and Asiri provided him with the bomb itself. Osama 

bin Laden mentioned the AQAP-directed attack in a message directed at President 

Barack Obama, but did not claim credit for it.7 AQAP’s deputy leader, Said al 

Shihri, claimed credit for the attack in February 2010. 

The Yemen-based affiliate has attempted to attack the U.S. homeland at least two 

more times since December 2009. It shipped two explosive devices disguised as 

printer cartridges in October 2010. The bombs were only discovered with the assistance of Saudi intelligence. AQAP tried again in May 2012 when it innovated on the 

underwear-bomb design. That plot was uncovered and thwarted by American and 

foreign intelligence agencies. It is likely that AQAP leadership still seeks to attack 

the U.S. homeland. 

AQAP has fostered relations with other groups in the al-Qaeda network. (See figure 1.) It has an established relationship with al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia. It provided explosives and basic military training to at least one al-Shabaab 

operative in 2010 and 2011.8 AQAP also facilitated al-Shabaab’s communications 

with al-Qaeda ‘‘core,’’ though al-Shabaab also appeared to have a line of communications that ran outside of Yemen as well.9 Multiple sources document the movement 

of fighters across the Gulf of Aden.10 The Arab Spring presented AQAP with the 

opportunity to develop additional relationships. It purportedly supported the establishment of an al-Qaeda-linked cell in Egypt under the leadership of Mohamed 

Jamal Abu Ahmed by sending him fighters and funding.11 Mohamed Jamal, a 

former member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, knew AQAP leaders Nasser al 

Wahayshi, Adil al Abab, and Qasim al Raymi.** The Wall Street Journal reported 

that Jamal’s group was connected to the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya.12
32 

13 Rukmini Callimachi, ‘‘Yemen Terror Boss Left Blueprint for Waging Jihad,’’ Associated 

Press, August 9, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/yemen-terror-boss-left-blueprintwagingjihad. The letters are available here: http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/linternational/ 

lpdfs/al-qaida-papers-how-to-run-a-state.pdf. 

*** Osama bin Laden offered Wahayshi similar advice, but it appears to have been ignored 

in Yemen. 

Nasser al Wahayshi, AQAP’s emir, was also in direct contact with Abdelmalek 

Droukdel, AQIM’s emir, and the al-Qaeda core leadership in Pakistan, in addition 

to al-Shabaab’s leadership. Two separate letters recovered in a document cache in 

Timbuktu, Mali, reveal Wahayshi’s counsel to Droukdel.13 In his first letter, dated 

May 21, 2012, Wahayshi congratulated Droukdel on his progress in Mali and compared AQIM’s relationship with Ansar al Din (an ethnically Tuareg militant 

Islamist group) with AQAP’s Ansar al Sharia. He advised Droukdel that AQIM 

could generate support by providing basic services and fulfilling daily needs, like 

food and water. In his second letter, dated August 6, 2012, Wahayshi explained 

AQAP’s loss in south Yemen against the Yemeni security forces and cautioned 

Droukdel against declaring an emirate when he would not be able to fulfill the role 

of a state.*** Wahayshi also mentioned he held communications from the core group 

for Droukdel. 

Today, AQAP continues to seek to attack the United States and to nurture lateral 

connections with other groups in the al-Qaeda network. It is believed that a credible 

threat stream from the Arabian Peninsula, where AQAP operates, instigated the 

closure of diplomatic posts across North Africa and the Middle East. Like other 

groups in the al-Qaeda network, AQAP preferenced its local fight against the Yemeni government during the Arab Spring, but it was also able to sustain a second 

operational line devoted to attacking the United States. Other al-Qaeda groups follow the model established by AQAP today, though many have yet to develop the capabilities to conduct an attack against the United States and to support such efforts. 

The implications for this new model for al-Qaeda groups are far-reaching when 

studying the al-Qaeda network. First, there is no group at the heart of the network. 

The core group in Pakistan maintains a mediatory or advisory role, but it no longer 

issues directives. Therefore, operations specifically targeting a single group, including AQAP, would have a limited overall effect on the network. Second, the lateral 
33 

14Leon E. Panetta, ‘‘The Fight against al-Qaeda: Today and Tomorrow,’’ (speech at the Center 

for New American Security, Washington, DC) November 20, 2012, www.defense.gov/Speeches/ 

Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1737. 15 Jessica D. Lewis, ‘‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking the Walls Campaign Part 1,’’ 

The Institute for the Study of War, September 11, 2013, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/al-qaeda-iraq-resurgent. 

connections—relationships between al-Qaeda groups—create a latticed structure 

that adds to the resiliency of the network. This latticed structure is what gives the 

network its strength. And finally, the entire al-Qaeda network, including groups operating solely at the local level, must be considered when devising any strategy to 

counter the network because of the existence of the latticed structure. 

COUNTERING THE AL-QAEDA NETWORK

The strategy in place to counter al-Qaeda today remains largely consistent with 

that adopted by the Bush administration in 2001. That strategy emphasizes the killing of senior leadership in the core group as the means by which to disrupt the network. Under this strategy, the United States also pursues localized train-and-assist 

programs to enable local militaries to counter the growth of al-Qaeda-linked groups. 

The network model around which this strategy was designed is one that holds there 

is a central group at the heart of the network. In 2001, this group was the one 

Osama bin Laden led directly, and it is often referred to as al-Qaeda core. The 

Obama administration grouped AQAP in with this central group after the December 

2009 attack and began targeting both AQAP and al-Qaeda core senior leadership. 

The same occurred after the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) May 2010 Times 

Square bombing. The recent appointment of AQAP’s emir Wahayshi to ma’sul al 

’amm (general manager or al-Qaeda’s No. 2 position), has even led to assertions that 

AQAP has replaced the core group. 

The United States has been extremely successful at killing al-Qaeda, AQAP, and 

TTP senior leadership. The United States has killed four of the top five al-Qaeda 

leaders in Pakistan in the past 3 years, including Osama bin Laden, Sheikh Said 

al Masri, Atiyah Abd al Rahman, and Abu Yahya al Libi.14 In Yemen, it has killed 

senior leader Anwar al-Awlaki, USS Cole bombers Abdul Munim al Fathani and 

Fahd al Quso, AQAP senior operative Mohamed Said al Umdah, spiritual leader 

Adil al Abab, and deputy leader Said al Shihri. The same is true for the TTP. AQAP 

and the TTP have both been able to regenerate leadership, limiting the long-term 

impact of U.S. operations. Al-Qaeda core is decimated, but such an effect required 

the dedication of significant U.S. military and intelligence assets and resources, and 

still, there are al-Qaeda senior operatives active today that are capable of leading 

the group. Partners’ successes against al-Qaeda groups have been mixed, but overall, the network has expanded since the outbreak of the Arab Spring. 

The strategy to counter AQAP relies on American direct action operations targeting AQAP leadership and on Yemeni counterterrorism operations to combat the 

group on the ground. As noted, U.S. targeted strikes have killed a number of 

AQAP’s leaders. America’s partner in Yemen has had limited success. Yemeni 

troops, partnered with local militias, re-captured territory under AQAP’s control in 

the beginning of 2012. Yemen’s security forces have not, however, been able fully 

clear the territory of AQAP’s local network. They are also riven with low-level instances of insubordination, which may limit their overall effectiveness. Many of the 

conditions that created a permissive environment in Yemen remain in place, including grievances against the central government and local conflict over access to resources such as water. It is not clear that this strategy will be effective against 

AQAP. 

America’s tactical successes against al-Qaeda have not succeeded in weakening 

the overall network and probably will not have the desired effect. Instead, al-Qaeda 

is more expansive than it was at the beginning of 2011 and of 2001. Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq has resurged and is conducting operations in both Iraq and Syria, for 

example.15 It also supported the establishment of Jabhat al Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. The strengthening of these affiliates has strengthened the overall network. The targeting of a single group or select senior leadership has not disrupted 

the network, and only in Pakistan has it effectively weakened the al-Qaeda group. 

The failure to understand properly how the al-Qaeda network is operating today has 

confused U.S. strategy to counter it. 

Al-Qaeda has evolved since 2001 and the network today is much more complex 

and resilient. The heart of the network is now its latticed structure, which is composed of the interconnections among al-Qaeda core, the affiliates, and the associ-
34 

16See Katherine Zimmerman, ‘‘The al-Qaeda Network: A New Framework for Defining the 

Enemy,’’ AEI’s Critical Threats Project, September 10, 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/alqaeda/zimmerman-al-qaeda-network-new-framework-defining-enemy-september-10-2013. 17 ‘‘Why We Must Win in Afghanistan,’’ American Enterprise Institute, October 17, 2012, 

http://www.aei.org/issue/foreign-and-defense-policy/why-we-must-win-in-afghanistan/. 18Mara Tchalakov, ‘‘The Northern Alliance Prepares for Afghan Elections in 2013,’’ The Institute for the Study of War, August 23, 2013, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/northernalliance-prepares-afghan-elections-2014. 19 Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012 

(London: C. Hurst and Co. Ltd., 2013) 243. 

ates.16 The relationships among al-Qaeda groups facilitate inter-group cooperation 

and the sharing of resources. The network is global, and therefore the United States 

needs a comprehensive global strategy to counter it. Al-Qaeda groups operate on the 

local level, though, and have proven to be responsive to minute shifts in local conditions. America’s strategy to counter al-Qaeda must not only be global, but it also 

must be tailored locally to respond directly to the local conditions. Only then will 

the United States be able to neutralize effectively the threat from the al-Qaeda network. 

LOOKING FORWARD: THE AL-QAEDA NETWORK IN 2014

Afghanistan is extremely important to al-Qaeda and the global jihad movement 

because of its history. The mujahideen’s fight against the Soviets was the birth of 

the global jihad movement and brought together the future senior leaders of what 

would come to be known as al-Qaeda. Osama bin Laden’s first major alliance was 

with the Pashtun warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani, who offered sanctuary to bin Laden’s 

forces and shared in bin Laden’s vision. There, bin Laden founded al-Qaeda and he 

would return in 1996 to Haqqani’s sanctuary with the Taliban’s approval when he 

lost favor in Sudan. 

President Barack Obama announced plans to draw down forces in Afghanistan 

and said that U.S. troop levels would be at 34,000 by February 2014. The American 

force posture in Afghanistan in the second half of 2014 and beyond remains unclear, 

and the bilateral security agreement discussions for a long-term American military 

presence in Afghanistan are formally suspended. Regardless of its shape, the reduced American military footprint will limit U.S. counterterrorism operations capabilities in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater. Considerations extend beyond America’s own military capabilities to those of the Afghan government: It must be able 

to sufficiently govern its territory to prevent civil war, the return of the Taliban, 

or significant power vacuums.17 If not, there is the risk that progress made in Afghanistan will be reversed. 

Retreat from Afghanistan in any form will be a victory for al-Qaeda and will feed 

into its propaganda. Al-Qaeda’s objective in Afghanistan has been to defeat the 

American military the way that the mujahideen defeated the Soviet military in 

1989. The Soviet-supported Afghan government, under Mohammed Najibullah, faced 

a continued insurgency and collapsed in 1992, opening the space for the eventual 

rise of the Taliban. It is probable that today’s insurgency in Afghanistan would continue after the withdrawal of American and international troops and would challenge the survival of the Afghan government. Afghanistan’s political elite is also increasingly consumed by the upcoming presidential elections in April 2014, the outcome of which will determine the longevity of the country’s constitutional system.18

These conditions set the stage for the possible return of al-Qaeda to Afghanistan. 

Al-Qaeda’s return to Afghanistan would have a resounding effect on the network. 

Al-Qaeda associates in Afghanistan such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 

weakened by the American and international military presence, would probably 

resurge and destabilize the region. Jalaluddin Haqqani’s son, Sirajuddin, who heads 

the Waziristan-based Haqqani network, would likely seek to regain territory in 

Khost, Paktika, and Paktia provinces in Afghanistan and would almost certainly 

maintain his group’s partnership with the Afghan Taliban, possibly positioning the 

Haqqani network to extend beyond its previous territories. The Haqqani network 

would also probably maintain its ties with al-Qaeda given the Haqqanis’ ideological 

sympathies and trajectory of supporting the group over the past 25 years.19 Such 

a relationship may translate to support for al-Qaeda in Haqqani-controlled territory. 

The al-Qaeda-run training camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s churned out leaders 

of militant Islamist groups in Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, among others. Today, 

these groups are members of the al-Qaeda network. Though freedom of movement 

for al-Qaeda operatives is more limited now than in the past, the resumption of mil-
35 

itant training and religious indoctrination in Afghanistan would be a significant 

boost to the overall al-Qaeda network. 

CONCLUSION

The United States still faces a significant threat from the al-Qaeda network. One 

of the reasons for this is that American strategy to counter al-Qaeda did not change 

as the network evolved. Tactical successes in Yemen or Pakistan will not lead to 

victory, and may be reversed should pressure on groups be removed. Understanding 

the latticed structure that forms the heart of the al-Qaeda network will more fully 

develop a picture of how the entire network is operating. Locally focused al-Qaeda 

groups, currently dismissed and at times ignored, are extremely important to the 

al-Qaeda network because of how they support the efforts of such groups as AQAP. 

Any strategy to counter the al-Qaeda network must recognize the role of these local 

groups in strengthening the network. Including them as part of the network does 

not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the United States must deploy forces or 

invest heavily in military assets where the al-Qaeda network is active. It does require that policymakers invest in a substantial effort to develop a global strategy 

with local solutions to counter the entire al-Qaeda network. 

We must fully understand the al-Qaeda network, and then, and only then, will 

we be in the position to craft a strategy to defeat it. 

Mr. KING. Thank you very much. 

Our next witness, Mr. Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at the 

Center for American Progress where his work focuses on U.S. and 

National security policy in the Middle East and South Asia. Excuse 

me. 

Mr. Katulis has served as a consultant with—no reflection on 

Mr. Katulis—served as a consultant to numerous Government 

agencies, private corporations, and non-Government organizations 

in more than 2,000 countries including Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Egypt, and Colombia. From 1995 to 1998 he worked 

in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Egypt for the National Democratic Institute of International Affairs. 

We welcome your testimony. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF BRIAN KATULIS, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER 

FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS 

Mr. KATULIS. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you will 

hear that the panel today is in violent agreement on most issues. 

So what I wanted to do was highlight four points from my written 

testimony. 

First, at the outset I want to highlight that more than a decade 

after the 9/11 attacks it is my assessment that the United States 

still lacks the overall ability to assess strategically whether the 

Government is properly matching resources to meet the threats 

posed by these various terrorist networks. 

This picks up from a point that Katherine just made in her testimony that despite the great work by our military personnel and 

people serving in our intelligence agencies, and despite the tremendous leaps and advances in technology and our ability to target financial networks and other things. It has been a stunning revolution. 

The United States still lacks this overall strategy that anticipates the emergence of new threats and nimbly changes our approach to adapt to these new networks. These networks are very 

adaptive. I think Congress has a very important role in pressing 

the Executive branch in this area to help the Nation become even 

more secure. 
36 

In sum, I think the United States still lacks clear metrics that 

can help senior policymakers assess whether the current strategic 

focus of U.S. efforts to protect the homeland has the right priorities, objectives, and tactics. 

The USCT efforts against al-Qaeda in Yemen is a prime example 

of a series of tactical efforts producing some successes, some failures. But all of these efforts are nested in an overall weak strategy 

lacking sufficient focus on the long-term investments needed to 

produce sustainable security. So that is the first point. 

Second point is mostly to echo much of what Frank and Katherine said about AQAP, and then what you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. 

Higgins said in your opening testimonies about AQAP. It is the 

most dangerous organization. It is a hybrid form in that it has both 

local goals and the goal of attacking the United States and international targets. It is very dangerous for the reasons that we have 

all mentioned here. 

It maintains a very strong regional focus, particularly against 

the governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In addition to the actions it has undertaken against Saudi Arabia and Yemen, AQAP, 

as Frank mentioned, has served as a key interlocutor with a number of all al-Qaeda terrorist branches like al-Shabaab and AQIM, 

al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. 

So this is the second point, to agree that this assessment is correct. There is not much disagreement about where AQAP is. 

I think the third point I want to stress is more of an assessment 

on U.S. efforts against AQAP. I think since 2009 the United States 

has been increasingly involved in an air campaign against AQAP 

using a range of measures, air strikes in Yemen that escalated in 

2012 up to about 54 according to some Open Source information. 

Again, this policy has had several tactical successes in eliminating key al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leaders. In fact the 

recent shift towards regional plots by AQAP, as evidenced by the 

recent regional embassy closures this summer, suggest a possible 

degradation of AQAP’s capabilities to mount plots outside of the 

Middle East. A possible degradation of that ability, but I think 

AQAP still remains dangerous. 

The main point I want to stress here is that I think we have a 

series of tactics focused on kinetic measures. That our policy in 

Yemen needs to focus more on what we can do to help the Yemenis 

help themselves, in building institutions, in building a stronger 

government so that they themselves are carrying this fight much 

more effectively, and eliminating threats in the long run. 

That is where I think over the last 12 years in Yemen, in Iraq, 

in Afghanistan the United States has fallen short. That is where 

I think we need a more holistic assessment. 

In closure, and the final point, fourth point I want to make is 

more towards the future and what we are likely to see in the region. AQAP, as I mentioned, is a hybrid organization that has this 

dual focus on international targets and regional targets. 

However, what we have seen in the last 2 years in the upheaval 

in the Middle East, the proliferation of jihadist militant groups, 

presents I think a potential recruitment problem for AQAP and 

core al-Qaeda. In particular, Syria’s civil war has provided a mag-
37 

net for both jihadist funding and recruitment. The lawlessness in 

the Sinai in Egypt should concern all of us. 

There is a bigger picture going on here. AQAP, I think, is facing 

some stresses because of that. It is facing greater competition from 

other jihadist groups for potential recruits. This competition may 

both serve to harm and help American interests by drawing jihadi 

funding and recruitment away from AQAP and towards more regionally-focused targets. But it could also spin out in ways that 

continue to present a threat for the United States in the long run. 

In sum, and I will close here, is that our discussion on counterterrorism needs to be nested also in this complicated discussion 

about the broader upheaval in the Middle East because it needs to 

be much more interlinked to how these societies build their governments and build a much more capable, functioning security system 

for themselves. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Katulis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIAN KATULIS

SEPTEMBER 18, 2013 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee: More than 12 years after the 

September 11 attacks, and 21⁄2 years into the Middle East uprisings, the United 

States continues to face dangerous threats on a daily basis from that region of the 

world. Complicated security and political dynamics present new challenges for U.S. 

National security in the Middle East, and new threats posed by a number of 

Islamist terrorist networks affiliated with al-Qaeda in transition have emerged 

across the region. 

That is why it is important to take opportunities such as today’s hearing to step 

back from the daily events, assess the security implications of the recent changes 

in the Middle East, and focus in on the overall status of the al-Qaeda network and 

the particular threats posed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP. 

At the outset, it is worth noting that more than a decade after the September 11 

attacks transformed the way we as a Nation view these threats, the United States 

still lacks the overall ability to assess strategically whether the Government is properly matching resources to meet the threats posed by these various terrorist networks. 

The United States has invested in many new sophisticated means to collect intelligence against a range of terrorist networks, and it has substantially enhanced its 

capabilities to take action against these networks through various kinetic actions, 

targeting financial networks, and countering propaganda produced by terrorist 

groups. The use of new technologies and weapons systems by the United States has 

been a stunning revolution. The U.S. Government has become more capable in reacting and responding to new threats. 

But the United States still lacks an overarching strategy that anticipates the 

emergence of new threats and adapts nimbly to fast changes within terrorist networks. America’s ability to assess the overall strategy to counter terrorist networks 

around the world remains limited and hampered by bureaucratic challenges. In 

sum, the United States still lacks clear and discernible metrics that can help senior 

policymakers assess whether the current strategic focus of all U.S. Government efforts to protect the homeland from terrorist attacks has the right priorities, objectives, and tactics to reinforce the strategy. The U.S. counterterrorism efforts to respond to the threats posed by AQAP in Yemen is a prime example of a series of 

tactical efforts producing some successes and some failures, but all of these efforts 

are nested in a weak overarching strategy lacking sufficient focus on the long-term 

investments necessary to help produce sustainable security. 

CURRENT STATE OF AL-QAEDA AND AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Since 2008, al-Qaeda’s core organization in Pakistan has suffered a series of severe losses, including the death of founder Osama bin Laden at the hands of U.S. 

forces in 2011. These continuing losses have sufficiently harmed the group such 

that, according to the U.S. director of national intelligence’s March 2013 worldwide 
38 

1 James R. Clapper, ‘‘Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,’’ 

March 13, 2013, available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/ 

2013%20ATA%20SFR%20for%20SSCI%2012%20Mar%202013.pdf. 2 Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, ‘‘Qaeda Leader’s Edict to Yemen Affiliate Is Said to Prompt 

Alert,’’ The New York Times, August 5, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/ 

06/world/middleeast/qaeda-chiefs-order-to-yemen-affiliate-said-to-prompt-alert.html. 3 National Counterterrorism Center, ‘‘Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),’’ available 

at http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html. 

4 Caitlin Dewey, ‘‘Al-Qaeda’s Inspire Magazine Celebrates Boston Bombings,’’ The Washington 

Post, May 31, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/ 

05/31/al-qaedas-inspire-magazine-celebrates-boston-bombings/. 5 James Gordon Meek, ‘‘al-Qaeda Leader Calls for Followers to Aim Lower in Attacks,’’ ABC 

News, September 13, 2013, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-leader-calls-followers-aim-lower-attacks/story?id=20250860. 

threat assessment, core al-Qaeda ‘‘is probably unable to carry out complex, largescale attacks in the West.’’1 As a result, the major threats posed by al-Qaeda are 

increasingly less about the core organization that attacked the United States on 

September 11, 2001, and more related to a series of local and regional organizations 

sharing a common ideology. 

The most dangerous of these more local organizations is AQAP, which represents 

a hybrid of the transnational core al-Qaeda organization on the one hand and largely regional groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, or the Islamic 

State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS. Whereas core al-Qaeda remains focused on global strategic goals, groups such as AQIM and ISIS focus primarily on national or regional objectives. By contrast, AQAP pursues both local goals and attacks against 

the United States and other international targets. 

One possible reason for this hybrid focus is a stronger organizational tie between 

AQAP and core al-Qaeda. Yemen served as a core al-Qaeda communications hub 

prior to the 9/11 attacks. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda elements attacked the U.S.S. Cole 

in Aden in October 2000. AQAP’s leader, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, had served as bin 

Laden’s personal secretary and was in Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban 

in 2001. He was also part of the February 2006 jailbreak in Yemen that preceded 

the formation of AQAP, and was tapped this summer to serve as core al-Qaeda’s 

‘‘general manager’’ by Ayman al-Zawahiri.2

The 2006 jailbreak is a seminal moment that contributed to the eventual creation 

of AQAP. Along with Wuhayshi, 22 other jailed al-Qaeda members escaped. By September 2006, al-Qaeda in Yemen, or AQY, was conducting large-scale suicide terrorist attacks against Yemeni oil facilities. In 2008, AQY conducted a series of attacks against Western diplomatic and Yemeni government facilities, including an attack with multiple car bombs outside the U.S. embassy that killed 13 in September 

2008.3

In January 2009, AQY merged with the remnants of the al-Qaeda organization 

in Saudi Arabia that had been conducting attacks in the Kingdom since 2003 to 

form AQAP. During the last 4 years, AQAP has come to form the most direct terrorist threat to the United States, as direct threats to U.S. homeland security from 

Pakistan reduced in part due to the aggressive counterterrorism efforts pursued 

since 2008 there. 

In the past 4 years, AQAP has attempted multiple attacks against the United 

States, including the Christmas 2009 underwear bomb plot against a U.S.-bound 

airliner, the October 2010 parcel bomb plot, and most recently last summer’s shutdown of U.S. diplomatic facilities across the Middle East. This threat has prompted 

the United States to become directly involved in Yemen, conducting an active campaign against AQAP in coordination with the Yemeni government and other governments in the region. 

Moreover, AQAP has sought to foment ‘‘lone wolf’’ attacks in the West via propaganda such as the English-language Inspire on-line magazine. AQAP ideologues like 

Anwar al-Awlaki and Inspire have been implicated in several attacks, including the 

2009 Fort Hood shooting and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.4 Despite the 

elimination of al-Awlaki and Inspire editor-in-chief Samir Khan in a U.S. airstrike 

in September 2011, AQAP’s desire to spread violence to the West by encouraging 

attacks by individuals heretofore unaffiliated with terrorist organizations remains. 

This approach has also been encouraged by core al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri in his latest tape recording.5

AQAP maintains a strong regional focus—particularly against the governments of 

Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Yemeni and Saudi officials have been the targets of AQAP 

attacks since the group’s formation in 2009, most notably an attempt against Saudi 

Arabia’s then-counterterrorism chief Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. Saudi intelligence also played a crucial role in disrupting a May 2012 AQAP plot to bomb a 
39 

6Sudarsan Raghavan, Peter Finn, and Greg Miller, ‘‘In Foiled Bomb Plot, AQAP Took Bait 

Dangled by Saudi Informant,’’ The Washington Post, May 9, 2012, available at http:// 

articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-05-09/world/35456649l1lunderwear-bomb-bomb-plot-alqaeda. 7Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung, ‘‘Brennan Nomination Exposes Criticism on Targeted 

Killings and Secret Saudi Base,’’ The Washington Post, February 5, 2013, available at http:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/brennan-nomination-opens-obama-to-criticism-on-secret-targeted-killings/2013/02/05/8f3c94f0-6fb0-11e2-8b8d-e0b59a1b8e2alstory.html. 8FBI, ‘‘Guilty Plea Unsealed in New York Involving Ahmed Warsame, a Senior Terrorist 

Leader and Liaison Between al-Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, for Providing 

Material Support to Both Terrorist Organizations,’’ Press release, March 25, 2013, available at 

http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2013/guilty-plea-unsealed-in-new-york-involvingahmed-warsame-a-senior-terrorist-leader-and-liaison-between-al-shabaab-and-al-qaeda-in-thearabian-peninsula-for-providing-material-support-to-both-terrorist-organizations. 9 Bill Roggio, ‘‘Wuhayshi Imparted Lessons of AQAP Operations in Yemen to AQIM,’’ Long 

War Journal, August 12, 2013, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/ 

wuhayshilimpartslles.php. 10 Brian Ross and others, ‘‘Obama Ordered U.S. Military Strike on Yemen Terrorists,’’ ABC 

News, December 18, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/cruise-missiles-strikeyemen/story?id=9375236. 11 New America Foundation, ‘‘U.S. Covert War in Yemen,’’ New America Foundation, available 

at http://yemendrones.newamerica.net/ (last accessed September 2013). 12 Bill Roggio, ‘‘AQAP Operative Killed in Recent Drone Strike in Yemen,’’ The Long War 

Journal, February 3, 2012, available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/02/ 

aqaploperativelkille.php; Hakim Almasmari, ‘‘Senior al Qaeda Operative Killed By Airstrike 

in Yemen,’’ CNN.com, May 7, 2012, available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/06/world/ 

africa/yemen-airstrikes; Reuters, ‘‘FBI Chief in Yemen as Drone Kills AQAP Leader,’’ April 24, 

2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/24/us-yemen-idUSBRE83N0XB20120424. 13 Alexander Marquardt, ‘‘al-Qaeda Leader Gets Lazy, Killed in Drone Strike, Terror Group 

Says,’’ ABC News, July 17, 2013, available at http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/07/ 

al-qaeda-leader-gets-lazy-killed-in-drone-strike-terror-group-says/; Al-Arabiya, ‘‘Al-Qaeda Confirms Death of Yemen Leader Qaeed al-Dhahab,’’ September 15, 2013, available at http:// 

Continued 

U.S.-bound airliner with an improved underwear explosive.6 The threats posed by 

AQAP produced incentives for several countries in the region to work more closely 

with the United States on counterterrorism efforts, most notably Saudi Arabia, 

which hosts a drone base from which the United States conducts operations against 

AQAP in Yemen.7

Beyond direct action against the Saudi and Yemeni governments, AQAP has also 

served as a key interlocutor with other al-Qaeda-linked terrorist branches. For instance, AQAP has provided weapons and training to Somalia’s al-Shabaab group according to the guilty plea of Ahmed Warsame.8 AQAP leader Wuhayshi has also 

been in contact with the leaders of AQIM according to documents found in Mali following the French intervention against jihadist forces there in January 2013.9

Outside of its obvious role in Yemen, AQAP has played little role in the on-going 

political transitions in the region. A number of other jihadist groups have played 

more direct roles in North African states such as Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. AQAP’s 

influence there is likely limited to advice and possible support. In Yemen, AQAP has 

sought to take advantage of the chaos and uncertainty surrounding the transition 

from the Saleh regime to take and hold territory. However, this effort has been met 

with a U.S.-supported Yemeni government counteroffensive that has in part reversed AQAP’s gains. AQAP’s wider regional role has therefore been limited, which 

is somewhat expected given its previous focus on Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the 

West. 

ASSESSMENT OF U.S. EFFORTS AGAINST AQAP

The United States became directly involved in efforts against AQAP in December 

2009, when the Obama administration launched a cruise missile strike against 

AQAP targets in order to prevent ‘‘an imminent attack against a U.S. asset.’’10 (This 

strike is also believed to have unfortunately killed dozens of civilians.) The U.S. air 

campaign against AQAP began in earnest in May 2011, when the United States 

launched the first of 14 airstrikes in Yemen that year. Subsequently, the United 

States conducted 54 airstrikes in Yemen in 2012 and 23 thus far in 2013.11

This policy has scored several tactical successes in eliminating key AQAP leaders 

and helping the Yemeni government reverse AQAP’s battlefield advances. In addition to al-Awlaki and Khan, U.S. airstrikes in Yemen have killed a number of AQAP 

leaders from Abdul Munim Salim al-Fatahani, Fahd al-Quso, and Muhammad 

Saeed al-Umda in 2012,12 to Saeed al-Shehri, then AQAP’s second-in-command, and 

Qaeed al-Dhahab in 2013.13 In addition to their roles in AQAP, Fatahani and Quso 
40 

english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/09/15/Al-Qaeda-confirms-death-of-Yemenleader.html. 14 Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, ‘‘Distancing the Past for a Brighter and Democratic Future,’’ 

Yemen Times, September 15, 2013, available at http://yementimes.com/en/1711/opinion/ 

2887/Distancing-the-past-for-a-brighter-and-democratic-future.htm. 15 Holger Albrecht, ‘‘The Security Sector in Yemen’’ (Washington: United States Institute of 

Peace, 2013), available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB142-Security-Sector-inYemen.pdf. 

were both believed to have been involved in the Cole bombing, and Quso likely was 

involved in supporting the 9/11 hijackers as well. Umda was believed to have been 

involved in the 2002 attack on the oil tanker Limburg. 

The recent shift toward regional plots, as evidenced by the regional embassy closures this summer, suggests a possible degradation of AQAP’s capability to mount 

plots outside the Middle East. 

These tactical successes, however, are not reinforced by a broader, more coherent 

U.S. policy to promote Yemen’s transition to democracy under President Abdo Rabu 

Mansour Hadi. There is an inherent tension between the long-term objective of supporting a transition to a stable democracy in Yemen and the short-term imperative 

of preventing terrorist attacks against the United States and our allies and partners 

in the region. This short-term imperative is being at a quicker speed than the more 

difficult problem of transitioning a developing country from authoritarianism to democracy. This transition cannot be accomplished at a pace that will solve the immediate and pressing security challenge presented by AQAP. 

However, it is possible for the United States to try and better link these shortand long-term policies. Doing so will be difficult, but offers a chance to translate recent tactical success into long-term stability. President Hadi has recently outlined 

the progress made in Yemen’s political transition,14 and should be commended and 

supported as the transition continues. Encouraging Yemen’s National Dialogue to be 

as inclusive as possible to include Southern Yemenis and those outside the capital, 

Sanaa, will be important, as will ensuring the Yemeni government meets its commitments on human rights and democratic reforms. 

Of particular importance going forward will be support for security sector reform. 

Despite some progress in purging the security services of Saleh loyalists,15 developing an effective and professional security sector capable of tackling AQAP with 

minimal U.S. support will likely take time. 

In short, the United States should make every effort to sync up the imperatives 

of its short-term fight against AQAP with the long-term goal of a stable and developing Yemeni democracy that is able to provide for its own security. This effort will 

be difficult, but not impossible. 

NEXT PHASE OF U.S. POLICY

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan next year is unlikely to have a 

major impact on either core al-Qaeda or AQAP. Assuming a bilateral security agreement between the United States and Afghanistan is concluded, U.S. forces will remain in Afghanistan to conduct operations against core al-Qaeda if and when necessary. However, core al-Qaeda is less important today than before its evisceration 

began in 2008. Branch al-Qaeda organizations such as AQIM and ISIS are likely 

to prove greater challenges to U.S. interests even if they do not directly target the 

U.S. homeland. 

AQAP is a hybrid organization that maintains a dual focus on international targets such as the U.S. homeland and more local and regional goals such as fighting 

the Yemeni and Saudi governments. It will therefore rightly receive more attention 

from U.S. policymakers than AQIM, ISIS, or the myriad jihadist groups operating 

in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. While these groups operate in regions with equally good 

prospects for serving as a terrorist ‘‘safe haven,’’ they do not as yet present the same 

direct threat to the U.S. homeland or regional interests as AQAP. 

However, the proliferation of jihadist militant groups does present a potential recruitment problem for AQAP and core al-Qaeda. In particular, Syria’s civil war has 

provided a magnet for both jihadi funding and recruitment. Increased lawlessness 

in the Sinai may prove a more attractive prospect for militants than fighting in 

Yemen, particularly in the wake of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ouster from power in 

Egypt, and AQIM’s activities in North Africa present another possible syphon of recruits and funding. In short, AQAP is facing greater competition from other jihadist 

groups for potential recruits. Paradoxically, this competition may both serve and 

harm American interests by drawing jihadi funding and recruitment away from 

AQAP, the only non-core al-Qaeda organization that directly targets the U.S. home-
41 

land, and toward various other groups that pose threats both to U.S. regional interests and the citizens of the region itself. 

While it remains appropriate for U.S. policy to concentrate on the threat posed 

by AQAP, policymakers should begin re-evaluating the threat posed by al-Qaeda to 

take into account its evolution from the core organization that attacked the United 

States on 9/11. AQAP serves as an example of al-Qaeda’s transition from a core organization based in Afghanistan and Pakistan with grandiose global objectives to a 

series of largely independent but mutually supportive branch offices with a more 

local and regional focus. These movements still pose a threat to the United States 

and its allies, but the nature of these threats are constantly changing. 

These changes and transitions within terrorist networks such as AQAP require 

a more strategic and nimble policy approach by the United States. The Middle East 

has entered a difficult and complicated period of transitions, one that will likely be 

prolonged and will present new challenges for U.S. security. Syria’s civil war, ongoing unrest in Egypt, Iran’s role in supporting terrorist groups around the region, 

and the unsettled security situations in Yemen and Libya all present substantial 

challenges to U.S. security. 

During the last 12 years, the United States has increased its capabilities to identify, target, and act against a range of terrorist networks operating in the Middle 

East. What it has not succeeded in doing is helping the countries and governments 

of the region develop their own institutions that possess sufficient capability and political legitimacy to produce the long-term gains necessary ultimately to defeat the 

threats posed by groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Katulis. I thank all the witnesses for 

the testimony. 

I think one thing that struck me is that the three of you come 

from such different perspectives yet all share the belief that AQAP 

and al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the whole al-Qaeda organization 

is so extremely dangerous to the United States. I agree with you. 

Probably many Members on this committee would agree with you. 

But I don’t know if the American people share that knowledge at 

all. 

Without getting into the whole Syria debate because I realize 

that is separate, but one of the reasons why I think people objected 

so much to Syria is that they are war-weary. They just somehow 

feel this is going on for so many years. 

Quite frankly, without making this partisan, I wish the White 

House would talk more about what a real threat al-Qaeda is rather 

than saying bin Laden is dead and we are back to a pre-9/11 stage 

because in many ways I think it is more dangerous than it was before 9/11. 

I guess I am asking for advice from you on how do we get that 

out to the public? Is the burden on us as elected officials, as people 

in the public eye? Without sounding like we are war-mongers and 

we just want a war never to end? I mean that is another expression that is used a lot, we can’t have endless wars. This is almost 

as close to one as we are going to have, I think, certainly in our 

lifetimes and certainly over the next 5, 10 years. 

Do you have any thoughts to that, as to how we can generate 

public intentions so we don’t walk around and worry about being 

attacked every moment, but also realizing that we have an enemy 

that is 24/7 trying to find ways to kill us in many forms. I guess 

we will just go down the line. 

Frank, Mr. Cilluffo. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you raise a 

very significant set of issues that is playing out not only in respect 

to Syria, but on a whole host of different matters. 
42 

I think first and foremost it is being as transparent as we can 

be in terms of conveying the facts. Keep in mind, they are the ones 

who declared war, it is not the other way around. So as much as 

we can convey the information as clearly in a way that is not emotional but factually-based I think we have a responsibility, not just 

the Executive branch but the Legislative branch and those of us 

who study these issues. I think that is critically important as well. 

Let me also suggest that I am very concerned that in a recent 

environment that the terrorists are learning from some of the leaks 

that continue to leak, like a sieve, from Washington. Most notably, 

they are going to alter their trade craft, whether it is their communications, whether it is their planning, and even their operations, 

I would argue, and I am probably in the minority on this panel 

here. 

Think of suppressive fire. We can wait until the threat emanates 

and is in front of us or we can keep the adversary looking a little 

bit over their shoulder so they have less time to plot, train, and 

execute attacks. We need to continue to keep our foot, to one extent 

or another, on the gas pedal. 

Let me also just underscore one thing that I think is the greatest 

missing dimension of our counterterrorism state craft since 9/11. 

This is to paraphrase a campaign manager for Bill Clinton. I am 

not suggesting I am talking to you guys, but in this case it is the 

ideology, that is stupid. 

We have not gotten our arms around the ability to push back, 

expose, unpack the hypocrisy that al-Qaeda espouses. That is what 

makes AQAP unique. It is 11 editions of Inspire, and case after 

case after case after case will show that Anwar al-Awlaki played 

a role in some of the home-grown cases, as well as the foreign 

fighters. 

I think Brian was spot-on. When you look at Syria you have got 

thousands of Western foreign fighters fighting along in Syria right 

now. What happens when they go home? 

In the past you had seen AQAP was the first organization that 

truly went out of their way to try to recruit ‘‘cleanskins,’’ as they 

would be referred to, those with the ability to travel freely. That 

is a big issue. 

It is a very significant issue. Quite honestly we still have an 

awful lot to do. Part of that is just as much as we can without getting into emotion just laying out the facts and let the American 

people decide based on that. 

Mr. KING. Ms. Zimmerman, don’t worry about the time because 

there are only two of us so take whatever time you need to answer. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. I have never had an unspoken thought. 

Mr. KING. No, no. 

Ms. ZIMMERMAN. Thank you. 

I think that what I want to draw out is that, though we may be 

war-weary, al-Qaeda is still attempting to attack the United States, 

and that the strategy to counter it doesn’t need to be solely based 

on a military strategy. 

This draws on some of what Brian brought up in his testimony 

that al-Qaeda groups thrive in areas of lower, poor governance, and 

are able to take advantage of grievances against the Government 
43 

or local administrations, and are able to find traction where basic 

services are not being provided. 

You can look at south Yemen in 2011, in the spring of 2011, as 

a very good example of how AQAP was able to be down on the 

ground at the local level and address basic grievances of the population and actually start taking control of territory. In the end it 

wasn’t successful, but that example shows how al-Qaeda is attempting to take advantage of gaps in governance and gaps in 

basic services to build popular support. 

I want to point you also to a letter from AQAP’s leader to the 

leader of al-Qaeda’s leader in Maghreb, which advised him and 

counseled him not to declare a state because then you have to provide all the goods and services of a state, but to be almost a state. 

That way the people would turn to you, but you are not to blame 

if you fail. I think that what we are seeing is al-Qaeda groups applying lessons learned, as Frank mentioned, and growing from 

there. 

So we can start to counter al-Qaeda by countering issues in governance, in human rights and on the softer side where there is 

much broader appeal for the American people. 

Mr. KING. How possible is that in Yemen, for instance, under the 

current government or the immediately previous government? 

Ms. ZIMMERMAN. The current government is still very weak from 

its transition. But there is a lot of popular support still and hope 

for change. The National Dialogue, which is a process that has 

brought together opposition groups is actually wrapping up today, 

and final reports are due tomorrow from different various working 

groups that will move forward the transition process. 

What Yemen needs, though, is a much longer-term investment 

from partners. It has long-term socioeconomic issues that are coming to the floor now and that are only going to grow worse. Unemployment rate, natural resources drawing down, these are issues 

that are going to come up in the next 5 to 10 years, and there 

doesn’t seem to be a plan to address them. 

So, some of the underlying challenges besides the terrorism problem in Yemen will come to the floor. As it has in the past, will likely distract the government from pursuing our interests in AQAP. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Katulis. 

Mr. KATULIS. On your initial question about this challenge, I 

share your concern. I think there is no substitute for Presidential 

leadership on this. I share your view on that as well. 

But what I worry about in the last 6, 7 years, what I see up here 

is less of a bipartisan focus on how we can educate the American 

public about these threats. When you think about that decade post9/11, and here it is both parties, different figures have been—you 

could blame them for this. 

But I think often times Americans, ordinary Americans just see 

rancor, whether it is related to the budget negotiations or other 

things. Quite frankly, even the security issues. We have had a lot 

on that front. 

I think Members of Congress, Senators and others, who are 

internationally-minded have a special responsibility to go out and 

educate the American public that these are long-term trends. Because if you look at both Republicans and Democrats, there are 
44 

strands within both parties that say who cares? Let’s wash our 

hands of this and let’s go home. There really needs to be a much 

more focused effort. Educating much in the same way I think we 

have all said here. 

These are long-term challenges. If no one else will do this if the 

United States is not engaged in this. 

One last point on that is in my travels in the Middle East, and 

I go once a month or so, and in my discussions with senior U.S. 

officials, including military officials, they make the point that what 

we do here at home as we address issues like our budget and problems here at home, or if we don’t. 

The perception of deadlock, the perception that we can’t get anything done on those things that matter most to our own citizens 

here at home, it has an impact on our power, on our ability to actually shape those countries in the Middle East that we want to say 

we are a leader. It sends a very negative message. 

Here again I am not assigning blame to anyone here. Here it is 

just the sense that there has been this rancor and it spills over 

overseas. It has this impact on if—our soft power, if you will. 

If 10 or 15 years ago there was great admiration for our democracy and our ability to get things done in our economic system, 

when I go to Egypt, when I go to Yemen, when I go to these places, 

people have tuned out because they see a lot of division and they 

see the United States not leading anymore. 

Yes, it comes back to our commander-in-chief and our President 

and how he talks about it in part. But it is also a broader point 

about our system and the special role that we all play in trying to 

foster a dialogue that I think keeps America engaged in these problems in the world. 

Mr. KING. I wish there were some people here that were listening 

to you right now. I have a few of them in mind. But in any event— 

not Mr. Higgins. 

With that I yield, sir. Blaming both parties. Yield to the Ranking 

Member. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Katulis, you had indicated that there is a competition, in essence, between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and fighters 

that are gravitating toward both Iraq and Syria because of the instability there. So these are—but the other issue I—you know there 

has been a lot of talk the last couple of weeks about whether or 

not to strike militarily on Syria and what the consequence of that 

is. 

You know if you look at the situation in Syria where you have— 

it is the last minority-led regime in the Middle East. First was Lebanon, then Iraq and now Syria. You tip that balance, Syria is probably 65 percent to 75 percent Sunni. 

The opposition is really not that of a freedom and democracy 

movement. Its best fighters are al-Qaeda affiliates and Islamic extremists bent on creating an Islamist state in Syria. 

I understand fundamentally that al-Qaeda thrives in failed 

states. Well, the whole region is failed, I mean it is a mess. So in— 

you know whatever we do anybody that tells you they know what 

the result of that is we should be skeptical of. Because you know 

whether it is in Afghanistan we helped the Mujahideen defeat the 
45 

Soviets in 1989. Then the Mujahideen basically facilitated the 

transfer of bin Laden from the Sudan in 1996 to Afghanistan, 

which created really the global jihadist movement. That is something that it could be said that we helped facilitate. Unknowingly, 

perhaps, but we did. 

I was taken by your suggestions that America and our standing 

in the world is compromised when the rest of the world sees that 

America is not functioning well, or is in a state of dysfunction. I 

think that is particularly true today with social media. 

You know none of these movements would be occurring in any 

of these places without the tools of collaboration and social media, 

Facebook, Twitter, and everything else. But those tools are used 

not only for organizational purposes, but they are also used for aspirational purposes as well. 

The rest of the world can see how they are not living. If the 

United States is strong and prosperous and providing opportunities 

for all of its people, that, to me, is the most powerful influence in 

terms of people rising up and challenging the regimes that have 

kept them oppressed. 

So I know I kind of said a lot there without a question, but I 

would like each of you to kind of comment on that. 

Mr. KATULIS. Well, if I could just start out by saying almost 2 

years ago, that 21⁄2 years ago I testified before the subcommittee 

early in what some people called the Arab Spring. I never called 

it the Arab Spring, I called it the uprisings because we were uncertain about which way it would go. 

Now it is more than 2 years into this. The uprisings have hit its 

terrible 2’s or 3’s. I have a 3-year-old, I can attest to that. It is very 

complicated. I wouldn’t be completely negative. 

One thing you said that struck me, and I will just respectfully 

disagree, is that the whole region is a mess. Yes, a good bit of it 

is. But in places like Tunisia and even in places like Yemen which 

are deeply complicated and there are lots of threats there, what 

Katherine said about the National Dialogue is spot-on. Those sorts 

of footholds are essential. 

I think what I was trying to say in my first point we as a country 

have lacked an overarching strategy that actually defines what we 

would like to see in the long term in this region of the world. We 

have been hesitant to do that. George W. Bush didn’t do it. Barack 

Obama has not done it. 

We often define in the negative. We are going to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist networks. We need to continue to do 

that. But it doesn’t actually tell the American public or tell ourselves what it is we actually need to help these societies create. 

Now, we can’t do it for them. That is the trickier part. But I 

think, I fear that we see complexity and see problems in places like 

Syria, and I completely agree with I think everything you said on 

Syria. 

But I think we also still need to stay engaged and we need to 

actually figure out what is the long-term solution because what we 

are seeing in many of these places, especially in Syria, is the collapse of a state system potentially. Or at least it is creating these 

demographic, social, economic, and political pressures. All of these 

are linked together. That is one thing I wanted to stress is that the 
46 

terror threat is not dis-linked at all to the political situation in 

these countries. 

In fact, places like Tunisia where you have an Islamist government, and many of these Islamists that are in power have common 

ideologies with some of these radical terrorist groups. But I do 

think that those non-radical groups that are in government now 

have some potential for marginalizing those radical groups, some 

potential. 

But this is going to take decades. We ourselves can’t shape and 

determine what will happen. But I think we can have a big influence if we actually work with others and work with countries in 

the region to figure out how to—what is our end-goal, which is 

what we are lacking right now. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Higgins, just to build on a couple of the 

points, because I think you raised a number of fundamental issues 

that go far beyond counterterrorism, but also touch on what is the 

U.S. role in the world. One thing I think we also need to acknowledge and recognize is U.S. credibility in the world once we start 

coming up with red lines and the like, not only with respect to 

Syria, but to others as well. So there are no very simple or easy 

questions here. 

On the counterterrorism side, I think we really have to have the 

hard question of asking what is truly in the U.S. National interest. 

Here is where I am going to be a little hawkish. 

I agree with everything that Brian and Katie raised and I am 

fans of their work. But at the end of the day we have got limited 

resources. We have got all sorts of problems brewing, including in 

our own country. We have got economic crises and challenges that 

we are going to have to get very focused in terms of what is in our 

greatest National interest. 

So I still think that while I realize we will never kill and capture 

our way to victory, the kinetic instrument is still important. What 

we can’t afford to do is get pulled into quagmires that are going 

to be long-term insurgencies that will actually foster what it is we 

are trying to prevent. 

So short of that what are our limited options? I would argue we 

do have a responsibility, especially if you have got a threat directly 

facing the United States. Take some of the operational and military 

leadership of terrorist organizations. 

I think that some of our soft, light-footprint-type special operations and light-footprint capabilities are critical to include drones 

which kind of get lost. Drones is a means to an end. It is a vehicle. 

It is not the end-state in itself. I will be the first to say that that 

is in itself insufficient. But at the end of the day, you also need to 

focus on the greatest National interest that is facing you at that 

time. 

I would also argue sometimes short-term interests, if we move 

away after we address those could foster and pay us back in a very 

different kind-of way long-term if we don’t continue to keep our eye 

on the ball. 

So one thing on social media, keep in mind that many of these 

countries don’t even have access given their regimes given that a, 

because they may not have access to smartphones and in other 
47 

cases where regimes are not permitting some of their citizens access to information. So that does cut both ways. 

Clearly you have others co-opting and exploiting situations. Take 

Egypt, the intent may have been very different than what we see 

today. So who is in a position to seize and move in and take advantage of these vacuums? That is something we need to be thinking 

about and thinking about strategically. 

On Syria there are no easy—there are no good solutions if you 

ask me. But this is not a hearing on Syria, so I will shut up. 

Ms. ZIMMERMAN. I will be brief. I think that the point that I 

want to draw out here is the narrative that it doesn’t matter what 

is happening in the rest of the world because we here at home are 

safe, and we need to deal with our own budget and economic 

issues. 

No one can dismiss that the United States has its own domestic 

policy decisions to make. But I do want to push back on the idea 

that what is happening in Syria, what is happening in Egypt, some 

of the unrest that has started happening in Tunisia following the 

coup or the ousting of Morsi in July in Egypt, those do start to 

have an effect on the U.S. security because they set the long-term 

risk for Americans. Where they create conditions on the ground 

that let extremism thrive in a way that we haven’t seen before. 

That will, in the next few decades, come back to the United 

States in the same way that the ungoverned space that we saw in 

Afghanistan and Jahim permitted al-Qaeda to train. It was 10 

years later that we saw al-Qaeda thrive at the beginning of 2001 

and conduct the 9/11 attacks. 

That is the message that I think has been missed in recent years 

is that for Americans we do very much depend on global security 

for our own National security and that the two are not entirely disconnected. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. You mentioned earlier that Inspire magazine had been 

particularly effective in recruiting Americans. Samir Khan, who actually went to East Meadow High School right near my home, was 

American. He not just spoke English, he spoke American English, 

assumed to have a unique ability to impact young Americans, obviously young Muslim Americans. 

I know that Inspire magazine has come back. But is it at the 

same level as it was in the Samir Khan, as far as being able to 

make that unique appeal to Americans as he seemed to have, and 

al-Awlaki, who was an American citizen, seemed to have? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. I think that is a great question, Mr. Chairman. 

I would have said immediately following his death some of the editions that came out were grammatically wrong. They were very 

poor quality production. But what we saw post the Boston terrorist 

attack was at the same level, at least from a production standpoint. 

I think what you are starting to see is in addition to the attempt 

to radicalize and recruit Westerners and Americans and others, 

they are getting much more focused on also terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures. So the TTPs that basically are providing 

the how-to, do-it-yourself terrorism. That is a concern as well. 

So it is teaching operational security. It is teaching how to not 

get pulled up by the law enforcement authorities, whether local or 

Federal. So I think you are starting to see a bit more focused on 
48 

TTPs. That does require—that is a concern, maybe of a different 

kind of level. 

So I was thinking post al-Awlaki and Samir Khan that that 

would have been the end of Inspire as we saw it. Unfortunately, 

there is a very fluent English speaker, whether American, British, 

Australian, Canadian, I am not sure, but clearly someone who is 

fluent not only in the language but also culturally in our country. 

So it is a concern. 

Again, I underscore almost every case of homegrown Islamist or 

jihadi-based terrorism had an al-Awlaki connection, at least from 

an inspirational perspective. You also see that in the United Kingdom. So it is a concern. 

Mr. KING. Anybody else want to comment on this? 

Mr. Cilluffo, in your testimony, and again, each of you can comment on this. You mentioned about the impact of leaks and the 

operational impact, the changes we have seen in al-Qaeda affiliates. Would you care to expand on that? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mainly to underscore its significance. Think of it 

as having the playbooks of an offensive and defensive coordinator, 

if you are thinking football. That is pretty dangerous. 

I was very concerned, not only in terms of how they can alter 

their operational security and trade craft from a communicating 

and planning perspective. But perhaps one of the most eye-opening 

documents was what al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and others 

in the broader al-Qaeda community are doing to try to protect 

themselves from drones. 

The level of specificity that was in that document is quite damning. Obviously now the adversary knows what we know that they 

know, and that has big potential operational implications. I might 

underscore in that same document and in other reporting, all the 

principal foreign terrorist organizations also highlighted just how 

significant drones were. They were scared, very much so, about the 

efficacy of them. 

Ms. ZIMMERMAN. I just want to echo that, but I wanted to add 

a little bit more. We have seen reporting from I believe it was 

Washington Post that specifically said that AQAP changed the way 

that it was communicating following the leaks this summer. That 

shows a reaction from the groups to our method, an adoptiveness 

that we have yet to actually overcome. 

There is an idea that we will always have superior technology. 

But it will have to meet—be superior all the time if we are going 

to be able to glean the intelligence that we need. It needs to be unknown to the enemy, which means unknown to the public. 

The other point is actually in Inspire magazine where initially 

the editors had sought questions and solicited articles using 

encryption software. At some point in the middle of the 11 issues 

there was a message in Inspire magazine saying that they were no 

longer asking because the encryption software was not working. 

I have not been able to tie that to any specific information, but 

clearly the organization was very careful about seeing reflections of 

its own internal communications in the public sphere. So we need 

to be very aware of how the enemy is watching what we are doing 

as well. 
49 

Mr. KATULIS. Just real quick, these tools are essential for keeping America safe. When I mentioned the leaps in technology that 

we have seen in the last few years, that is what I was talking 

about. You talk to people who work in the intelligence community 

who work this day-in and day-out. These leaks are damaging beyond belief. 

The one point I wanted to stress was in addition to those tools 

for collecting information, one place where I feel there is still a 

weakness after more than 12 years of being deeply engaged in the 

Middle East is our ability to actually collect human intelligence on 

these organizations. 

We have become much more sophisticated in our technology, and 

that is a good thing. We should protect that as much as possible. 

But it is still stunning to me the lack of depth of knowledge, the 

lack of Arabic speakers—and it takes a while, I speak Arabic myself—inside of the community. People that can embed themselves 

and understand not only the terrorist organizations, but also I 

think some of these Islamist groups that some of them are actually 

in power in some of these countries, and understanding the linkages, at least ideologically and in terms of heritage. 

I am not saying that they are all linked together, but I think 

there was a bit of naivete about the Muslim Brotherhood and other 

things. Yes, they are separate and distinct from al-Qaeda. Yes, 

Ayman Zawahiri was arguing against the Muslim Brotherhood. 

But they do share a lineage, and there was a lack of depth, I think, 

inside of the U.S. Government of understanding just what the nature of these organizations were. I think it is something we should 

continue to press them on. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. I hate to jump in because I already spoke too 

much. But to pick up on two very important points I think Brian 

raised, I mean human is critical in any counter. Only a human 

source is going to know when and where and why. So I think a 

human source, human enabled by technology, sure, but I think as 

much as we can invest there, critical. 

But the bigger point being, think back to the Cold War. You had 

every war college. Everyone I knew was taking Russian in college. 

You had war colleges. You had whole institutions devoted to understanding the KGB, understanding the Soviets and understanding 

their mindset and what made them tick. 

You don’t see that today in the counterterrorism environment— 

either universities like ours and think tanks and institutions I 

think are feeling some of that. But not at the level of training that 

next generation, educating that next generation with the linguistic 

skills all the way through to understanding cultures, regions, and 

the like. 

I just wanted to bring up one other point because I am very concerned about the leaks. But the flip side is, as both you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Higgins brought up, we also have a responsibility to have a dialogue with the American people. 

So we need transparency, but we need to do it in a calibrated, 

smart kind of way. We have a responsibility to communicate with 

the American people on many of these issues. 

But we also have to realize that it is not just the American people who are reading and learning. In fact, I would argue many 
50 

more non-Americans are learning from some of this information, 

and that includes obviously our enemies. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. Just a couple things that have been said as 

well, U.S. credibility is on the line. You get yourself involved in a 

quagmire that really creates a long-term insurgency. I think Iraq 

is very instructive. We had a situation within 3 weeks we took out 

a bad guy, you know, without question a bad guy, Saddam Hussein. 

We issued the death-if-ication order, and dissolved the Iraqi 

army and basically said to 100,000 Iraqis there is no place for you 

in Iraqi society anymore. They said, oh really? They created the 

Sunni insurgency. We are right in the middle of a situation that 

you know Iraq today is as violent as it was in the worst time of 

our American occupation there in 2006 and 2007. 

I see Syria going in the exact same direction. 

Now, Assad, obviously a brutal, murderous dictator, much like 

his father. You know you take him out and you again have an opposition whose dominant influences are al-Qaeda and Islamic extremists. What do they start to do? Ethnic cleansing. Then we are 

responsible for that stuff that is going on and we are supposed to 

stop that as well. 

So let me just say this, you know generally speaking. You know 

I don’t view America’s credibility—I don’t have an answer, and 

there are no black-and-whites. There is a lot—there are no straight 

lines. There is a lot of grey and a lot of confusion and a lot of other 

things there. 

But you know, at what point does the Arab Muslim civilization 

take responsibility for their own future? Because you know this has 

been going on for 14 centuries between Shiite and Sunnis as to who 

the rightful successor to the Prophet Mohammad is. Okay. 

What they are saying, there are 250 million people in the Arab 

Muslim world, half of which are under the age of 25. So the response to all those kids is there is no future for you. I think there 

are certain things that Americans clearly don’t understand about 

that part of the world. 

You know unlike our society we have a victim’s mentality. We 

feel empathy and sympathy for victims. There it is survivor’s mentality. They shouldn’t have been there. They must have been doing 

something wrong. 

You know I think these are obviously complicated situations. But 

our ability to help in places that want to be and can be helped is 

greatly undermined by having spent $2 trillion in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those places are no better than they were the day we entered those places. But they have seriously undermined the United 

States’ ability to do other things domestically and internationally 

as well. 

So I just—you know there are no—again, there are no black-andwhites here. I think, you know, comparisons to what was going on 

to Europe. I heard the Secretary of State’s point that this is our 

Munich moment. That is insulting. That is insulting. 

You know Hitler was an awful guy who was leading a very prosperous country with the largest army in the world, was about to 

conquer—wanted to conquer Europe and potentially the world. 
51 

Assad is clearly a bad guy presiding over one of the poorest countries in the world and having a hard time hanging on. 

You know we can’t—history is not always applicable to what is 

going on contemporarily in the Middle East and in the Arabian Peninsula, so. 

Mr. KATULIS. If I could react here again, I actually agree with 

a lot of what you said there. I think the region more than 2 years 

ago it just started a phase that is going to go on for a long period 

of time, a struggle for political legitimacy, a fragmentation and 

fracturing of power, of a way of doing business, essentially, for the 

last century when the Ottoman Empire collapsed. 

Yes, our ability to shape all of these things is quite limited. I 

think there should be a great deal of humility based on our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and lessons learned from all of that. 

But it is my view that if the lesson is simply, don’t get involved 

in any sort of way, or get involved in the way—take your example 

of Syria. Where I think we are at on Syria is that we simply lack 

a coherent strategy. That is why we have seen this sort of whipsaw 

the last couple of weeks. 

We have had a series of tactics and tactical reactive measures 

bit-by-bit, dribs and drabs. Arm a little bit of the opposition here, 

engage a little bit diplomatic with the political opposition there. 

I think if this, whatever has happened in the last couple of 

weeks, is offered a moment, it is an opportunity to further press 

the administration so that they are not jamming you up on the Hill 

for a quick vote on an authorization of use of force. But it is separate, as Frank said, from the topic of our hearing. 

But it is essential to press them for what their strategy is. Going 

back to the point I was saying, what is your end-goal and what are 

those means that you are going to us to accomplish that? 

You may end up hearing, Mr. Higgins, a lot of sympathetic voices 

to your view inside of the administration because I think there is 

that reticence there. But then, we should all ask ourselves is, what 

will this serve U.S. interests in the long run? 

I think what we are trying to say is no more nation-building and 

going in with boots on the ground. You listen to Frank especially. 

All of us are saying that. But how can we get others to help them 

help themselves? 

The picture you painted of the Syrian opposition is, I think, essentially correct. But there are others that Ambassador Ford and 

others have been trying to work with. So how do we get them to 

fight this fight for themselves that leads it to some sort of conclusion? 

Last point I would want to make, and you had mentioned this 

on Iraq and Syria, very brief point, is that increasingly I think we 

need to look at those challenges at interlinked. 

As the problem is either violence in Iraq and the uptick that you 

mentioned in your statement there I think is directly related to 

what is going on. You see the terrorist groups, al-Qaeda in Iraq 

and Asham in Syria. They are becoming much more cohesive and 

coordinated. 

It is not a problem, in my view, for U.S. National security interests yet. They don’t represent the threat that AQAP represents yet. 
52 

But we all, I think, have talked about the adaptive nature of these 

networks. 

We should keep a close eye on it. We should make sure that 

whatever we are doing, how modest and marginal it is with the 

Syrian opposition, we are also collecting information on the 

morphing of these networks. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Underscoring your begging to touch a third rail, 

but in addition to what is going on in the Middle East, Sunni-Shia, 

you also have minority Christians that we need—we have a responsibility to protect their right to faith, as well as obviously Israel 

and Judaism and every other religion. So I just put that on the 

table. 

One other thing that I think some of us sometimes forget, and 

that is with respect to Afghanistan. Keep in mind the likelihood 

that we would have seen other big acts after 9/11, I would argue, 

would have been quite high had we not taken certain actions. 

So it is difficult to disprove double negatives. But at the end of 

the day, if we didn’t degrade that capability, don’t think that we 

would not have witnessed—there was a lot of blood, sweat, and 

tears and of course treasure as well. But at the end of the day, I 

think lives were saved. That doesn’t mean I am not putting one 

cost of life over another, but it is just something to keep in mind. 

One other factor with respect to Pakistan and Afghanistan today 

is there is another terrorist group that has just touched the homeland. We all said that they didn’t, but Tehrik-i-Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, that our Times Square bomber in the fine city of 

New York was a TTP actor. 

So, it is not just AQAP. You do have a witch’s brew of folks operating out of Pakistan, Lashkar-e-taiba, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. I mean it is a mess. So, at the end of the day let’s not 

forget that that could change should we not have a presence. 

Ms. ZIMMERMAN. I just want to add here and say that today the 

United States actually lacks options that it had 2 years ago in 

Syria because of its inaction. That the original opposition was secular, and that it was predicted by many individuals studying the 

region that should the United States fail to take action, Arab regimes would and that they would end up supporting religions networks, which is what happened. 

So the secular opposition didn’t receive the original support. That 

allowed Islamist movement to gain strength in a way that could 

have—may have been prevented. I am not saying that it would 

have been. 

The other point is that though the fight against Assad, whichever 

side you fall on in the military strength, his continued presence in 

Syria means that the Free Syrian Army, which is the secular group 

fighting Assad, is continued—will be continued to be distracted in 

fighting him rather than in fighting Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. 

So by removing Assad you advance at least the local grouping 

that you would expect to see fight the al-Qaeda affiliate on the 

ground there. I think that that idea is being missed in all of this 

dialogue about what to do. 

So when you look at our option I do think that we need to think 

longer-term than we have been. The United States people tend to 
53 

think short-term. But we are now on our back foot in Syria in a 

way that we might not have been. 

The same way that we are in Yemen when AQAP was announced 

in 2009, the group al-Qaeda in Yemen had already started to 

resurge in a way, but no serious counterterrorism operations were 

conducted against it until right after the Christmas day attack. So 

we have seen this happen again and again, and I do think that we 

need to be more prescient when we decide on policy. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you very much. 

George Mitchell was appointed special envoy to Northern Ireland 

under previous administration. The chairman was a leading Congressional figure in the eventual Good Friday Accord. But he wrote 

a book called ‘‘Making Peace’’ about his experiences there. He practically lived there at the later stages of that negotiation. 

But he made a very profound point saying that in all world conflict—and a lot of people thought that the situation between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland was intractable, that nobody was going to be able to resolve it. 

They said exhaustion, exhaustion, is a huge variable in conflictresolution. You know you think about what those parties had to do. 

You know the Protestants and the Catholics had you denounce violence, and they had you give up their arms. There was an international tribunal that witnessed the destruction of those arms. 

That makes sense to me that other countries, the United States, 

Great Britain get involved in conflict resolution in that part of the 

world because you know what? Those people, both sides are invested in it. You know what they did? They were able to 

marginalize the extremists because there was a consensus that this 

is what we want to be prospectively. 

I just think that in the Arab Muslim world, whether it is the Palestinians, they are so committed to the conflict. They are so committed to the struggle. There is no sense of what they want to be. 

I think unless and until you have—I am not even looking for a 

constitution. I am looking for a preamble that basically is a unifying vision as to what these places want to become. Then and only 

then, whether it is Syria, Iraq, or anywhere else, can they expect 

international help to help them achieve something that is consistent with our American values. 

So you know I just think that you know George Mitchell’s admonishment that exhaustion is a huge variable in all this stuff, exhausting can’t be imposed from the outside. It has to be experienced from within. That is it. 

Mr. KING. AQAP was probably the most aggressive as far as 

going forward scientifically, whether it is doctors trying to enflame 

farms, whether it was the cylinder-type explosives that they placed 

on the airplane. 

First of all, are they as aggressive today as they were then? Are 

they sharing any of that with anyone else in the al-Qaeda nexus? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be very naive to 

think that he has not, Ibrahim al-Asiri shared that with others 

within al-Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula and beyond al-Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula, notably al-Shabaab. There have been 

some indictments that have identified some of that. 
54 

Again, when we talk about people with unique skills, he is at the 

very, very top of the list, and ruthless. I mean the first time he attempted to use this improvised explosive device he sent his own 

brother to try to kill Muhammad bin Nayef, the Saudi prince. 

So I think that is a significant concern and it is a lot more sophisticated than what you see in Inspire, for example, of how to 

build an IED in your mother’s kitchen. This is not that level. This 

is at a much higher level. 

Again, has successfully circumvented some of the security countermeasures that are put in place, which again underscores just 

how important intelligence is, whether technical means, but especially I would argue human intelligence. 

Mr. KING. How about AQAP’s relationship with Boko Haram or 

AQIM or we are seeing in Libya the variation of groups in eastern 

Libya? How far are their tentacles spreading, AQAP’s? 

Ms. ZIMMERMAN. I think the first point is our information on that 

is limited because there hasn’t been that much correspondence recovered. We had great insight into al-Qaeda in Iraq because of the 

U.S. military presence there. The insight that we have into AQAP’s 

relationships abroad comes either from uncovered documents in 

Mali or from U.S. indictments. 

I want to focus on the letters published by the Associated Press 

from AQAP’s leader, Naser al-Wuhayshi, to the leader of al-Qaeda 

in the Islamic Maghreb, Abumallah Tricktel. Those two letters 

went to insight both into how the AQAP has envisioned its role in 

sharing counsel with other affiliates that actually mirrors the counsel that bin Laden shared with AQAP. 

But also that that relationship is geographically very far—when 

you look at the distance between Algeria and Yemen, that is a long 

way for correspondents to travel. It is unclear whether it is electronic or—and whether these are printed or how they were moved 

across the region, but that it is certainly a connection there that 

shows the breadth of the al-Qaeda network. 

There are allegations that AQAP has helped to fund some camps 

in Libya, and again these are allegations and cannot be proved in 

any way in the Open Source—or have been proved, to my knowledge. But what we do see is that AQAP has set itself up to start 

funding and financing and training and building up local groups 

who share maybe not al-Qaeda’s global ideology, but the local idea 

of radical Islam, you know in order to further the message. 

This is actually the same thing that bin Laden was doing in the 

1990s. When you look at that it is very concerning to see a group 

pushing its message and pushing its capabilities abroad. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Chairman, just to underscore, I think Katie 

laid that out perfectly. But I also think fundamentally the way we 

need to think about al-Qaeda today is different than it was just a 

few years ago. There is a lot of swapping—a lot of utility infielders 

that are being swapped between, among, and across these various 

organizations. 

They are fellow travelers. Whether it is both operationally and 

ideologically, clearly they are attempting to co-opt local grievances 

to achieve their broader global jihadi objectives. But I think just 

the way we think about al-Qaeda you have seen a conflation. You 

have actually seen many of these organizations that you couldn’t 
55 

come up with an org chart in the same old hierarchical kind of way 

you could because many of them criss-cross. 

Many of them are fighting in conflict zones in various places. 

They are meeting one another, whether it is Syria today or whether it was Iraq or whether it was Yemen or whether it was Somalia 

or whether it was Mali or whether it is you name the jihadi hotspot 

of the moment. 

They are fellow travelers to one extent or another. The one thing 

I would underscore with AQAP and this is probably a very bad 

analogy, but they are kind of the Kevin Bacon of al-Qaeda. I mean 

they really are. They have connected with a lot of different organizations in the past. 

So I think we have got to stop thinking about it in the traditional 

hierarchical approach. It is relatively flat. In the military they are 

achieving what we would in the United States refer to as commander’s intent. So we got intentions coming from on high, but it 

is ultimately up to those closer to the pointy end of the spear to 

execute. That is what you are seeing now. 

You have got the intent, the aspirational objectives. But when 

you are talking about operations it is local. They are fighting in 

similar conflict zones. They are getting to know one another. That 

is unfortunately where we are. 

Mr. KATULIS. If I could just add one perspective connected to a 

point I was trying to make at the start of my testimony of this 

adaptive nature of AQAP and how it impacts our approach. When 

I said that we are not still properly matching resources to meet 

threats, I think we are constantly behind the curve. It is almost the 

nature of the threat that that would be the case. 

But if you look at—and you mentioned Afghanistan, I think in 

2010 we were spending $120 billion or $130 billion as a country in 

Afghanistan. By that time I think the assessment of most counterterrorism analysts is that the threats had migrated. The central 

threat to the homeland security had migrated to AQAP. 

What I think we are all trying to say, and I think we largely 

agree here, is these threats migrate and adapt quite a lot. We are 

still in a transformative moment. I fear that U.S. Government policy is not nimble enough at adapting to these new threats in Syria, 

Sinai Peninsula again. 

We are very good. I think we have done a very good job in the 

last 2 years in kinetic strikes against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. It has had an impact. 

We didn’t talk much about the embassy closures a bit, but I do 

think it limited their ability. It didn’t de-fang it completely. But the 

overarching point is it is almost perplexing to me as an American 

citizen, 12 years after 9/11 we still don’t have a good read on the 

metrics of whether we are winning or losing this thing. 

We don’t have—and that, I think, contributes, Mr. Chairman, to 

your question about educating the American public. That contributes to the general confusion and disinterest because of the complexity of this. But the lack of overarching strategy and metrics is 

I think a big challenge here. 

Mr. KING. Before we leave, any points that any of you want to 

make before we end the hearing? Anything that hasn’t been 
56 

brought out that you want to bring out that you think is important? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. If you can keep, Mr. Chairman, your leadership 

role in bringing these issues to the American people and to Government and assuming that role, I would appreciate that. So thank 

you. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. Okay. I will end on that note. That is a 

great one. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. Brian, thank you. 

With that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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