Filed 9/23/21 P. v. Patterson CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KIRK ANTHONY PATTERSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

D077938

(Super. Ct. No. SCD277112)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Charles G. Rogers and Michael S. Groch, Judges. Affirmed.

Bruce L. Kotler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. 

Sevidal, Collette C. Cavalier and Elizabeth M. Kuchar, Deputy Attorneys 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Based largely on evidence derived from a police search of a cell phone 

found in the possession of a 16-year-old prostitute (Precious), defendant Kirk 

Patterson was charged with commercial sex trafficking of a minor (Pen. Code, 

§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1)),1 pimping (§ 266h, subd. (a)), pandering (§ 266i, subd. 

(a)(2)), using a minor to pose for sex acts (§ 311.4, subd. (c)), oral copulation of 

a minor (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1)), and possessing child pornography (§ 311.11, 

subd. (a)). Patterson moved to suppress all evidence derived from the cell

phone, arguing Precious lacked authority to consent to the search, and, in 

any event, that her consent was not voluntary. The court denied the 

suppression motion at the preliminary hearing, and Patterson’s trial counsel 

did not renew the motion at trial. The jury convicted Patterson of all charges 

pertaining to Precious,2 and the trial court sentenced him to 10 years in 

prison. 

On appeal, Patterson indirectly attacks the suppression ruling by 

asserting his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to renew 

the suppression motion at trial, as required to preserve the issue for 

appellate review. Because the record shows that Precious had apparent 

authority to consent to the search and voluntarily consented to it, the search 

was legally valid and it would have been futile for Patterson’s trial counsel to 

renew the suppression motion. Counsel did not render ineffective assistance, 

and we affirm the judgment.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The jury acquitted Patterson of similar charges pertaining to another 

alleged victim. Those charges are not at issue here, and we do not discuss 

them.
3

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Because Patterson’s sole appellate challenge relates to the merits of his 

pretrial suppression motion, which we conclude was properly denied, we 

discuss only briefly the evidence presented at trial.

On May 9, 2018, San Diego Police Department vice detectives 

conducting an undercover sting operation negotiated a prostitution 

transaction with 16-year-old Precious. The detectives took her into custody 

and, because of her young age, contacted detectives with the department’s 

Human Trafficking Task Force (Task Force). Those detectives obtained 

Precious’s consent to search her nearby hotel room, which yielded indicia of 

prostitution and a Samsung cell phone. Detectives took Precious to a police 

station for questioning.

At the station, Precious gave detectives permission to search the 

Samsung cell phone and an additional cell phone—a black ZTE brand 

phone—she had in her possession when taken into custody. Detectives 

downloaded the contents of the ZTE phone and found numerous text 

messages with a contact named “EL” that suggested a pimp/prostitute 

relationship. The phone also contained a video of Precious orally copulating a 

male. 

Using information on the ZTE phone, detectives determined “EL” was 

Patterson. Police took Patterson into custody during a traffic stop. In his

vehicle, police recovered two cell phones, one of which contained a video of 

Precious exposing her vagina. After being advised of his Miranda3 rights, 

Patterson admitted to police that he was the male being orally copulated in 

the video downloaded from the ZTE phone. 

3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
4

Patterson was charged with commercial sex trafficking of a minor 

(§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1)), pimping (§ 266h, subd. (a)), pandering (§ 266i, subd. 

(a)(2)), using a minor to pose for sex acts (§ 311.4, subd. (c)), oral copulation of 

a minor (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1)), and possessing child pornography (§ 311.11, 

subd. (a)). 

Patterson moved to suppress all evidence obtained or derived from the 

ZTE phone, arguing Precious lacked authority to consent to a search. The 

court heard and denied Patterson’s motion at the preliminary hearing, and 

held him to answer on all charges. Patterson’s trial counsel did not renew 

the suppression motion at trial.

The jury found Patterson guilty on all counts pertaining to Precious, 

and the trial court sentenced him to 10 years in prison. 

II. DISCUSSION

Patterson contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to renew his suppression motion at trial, which was necessary to 

preserve his evidentiary challenge for appellate review. We disagree.

A. Background

1. Patterson’s Motion

Before the preliminary hearing, Patterson moved to suppress all 

evidence obtained or derived from the warrantless search of the ZTE phone. 

He maintained the phone was his, and that Precious lacked authority to 

consent to the search. 

The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing Patterson lacked standing 

because Precious possessed and was the primary user of the phone, and, in 

any event, Precious consented to the search. 
5

2. The Hearing

The trial court held a consolidated suppression and preliminary 

hearing at which the prosecution called three witnesses: the vice detective 

who detained Precious, and the two Task Force detectives who interviewed 

her and searched the ZTE phone.

(a) Detective Zoller

Vice Detective Joshua Zoller testified that on May 9, 2018, he and 

another male detective were conducting an undercover sting operation in an 

area well-known for prostitution activity. Detective Zoller caught Precious’s 

attention, and she agreed to perform specified sex acts with him in exchange 

for money. When Precious got into the detectives’ unmarked vehicle to drive 

to a nearby hotel room she had rented, the detectives identified themselves as 

police officers and detained her. 

The detectives called a female detective to search Precious. During this 

search, the detectives confirmed Precious’s identity and learned she was only 

16 years old. Because of the department’s policy to not arrest or charge 

minors engaged in prostitution activity, the vice detectives summoned 

detectives from the Task Force. 

Detective Zoller testified he did not recall whether Precious had a cell

phone when he detained her. 

(b) Detective Dierdorff

Task Force Detective Daniel Dierdorff testified that he and fellow Task

Force Detective Adam Wells traveled to the La Mesa Police Department to 

interview Precious, who had been taken into protective custody “[t]o make 

sure she wasn’t being pimped out.” Although she was not under arrest, the 

detectives advised Precious of her Miranda rights, which she stated she 

understood and waived. 
6

Precious told the detectives she used methamphetamine and had been 

up for 32 hours. But Detective Dierdorff, who has “been trained in how to 

detect when someone is under the influence of methamphetamine,” testified 

he did “not believe she was under the influence at the time [he] spoke with 

her.” 

Precious admitted she had been engaging in prostitution since she was 

13, and claimed to be a “renegade” who “was her own pimp” and “works for 

herself and nobody else.” However, Detective Dierdorff saw that she had two 

sets of initials (“E.L.” and “V.B.”) tattooed on her body, which is a common 

way that pimps “brand[ ]” or “mark” prostitutes as their property. When 

asked about these tattoos, Precious claimed they represented her mother and 

grandfather (although she could not recall her grandfather’s last name). 

Detective Dierdorff testified it is very common for prostitutes to lie to protect 

their pimps, who train their prostitutes to do this.

During the interview, Detective Dierdorff learned that Precious had 

two cell phones—a white Samsung and a black ZTE. He testified about how 

Detective Wells, who “was responsible for handling most of the . . . phone 

evidence in this case,” obtained Precious’s consent to search the phones: 

“[He] basically described to Precious the options she had, that she can give us 

consent to look through the phones, that if consent wasn’t given we can also 

get a search warrant for them and put it into evidence, but it was her choice 

what she wanted to do.” Precious gave the detectives oral and written 

consent to search both phones. 

Detective Dierdorff testified that although Precious never expressly 

stated the phones were hers, he believed they were and that “she was in 

possession of and had the privacy rights to” both of them. Under crossexamination, he acknowledged Precious “told [him] it wasn’t her phone,” but 
7

he clarified on redirect that her comment was directed toward Detective 

Wells, and Detective Dierdorff was not certain whether Precious made the 

statement during the May 9 interview or during a subsequent call, or which 

phone she was referring to. 

Under further cross-examination, Detective Dierdorff acknowledged 

that, in his experience, a 16-year-old cannot “contract for a cell phone.” 

During this line of questioning, the trial court interjected that whether the 

phone was “legally” Precious’s is “vague and a term of art. . . . If I give my 

16-year-old daughter a cell phone it’s her phone.” 

(c) Detective Wells

Task Force Detective Wells testified it was his understanding that the 

ZTE phone was in Precious’s possession when she was taken into custody, 

and that he took custody of it at the La Mesa Police Department. When he 

asked Precious if he “could look in it,” she “gave consent but said ‘It’s dead.’ ” 

Another detective found a charging cable, and they charged the phone while 

the interview continued. 

Detective Wells testified he obtained Precious’s consent to search the 

cell phone by explaining they could go down one of “two paths”—“the consent

path” or “the search warrant process where we collect things as evidence.” 

Precious consented orally and in writing.4 

Detective Wells testified he did not recall questioning Precious about 

who the ZTE phone belonged to, but there was “[n]o question in [his] mind 

that that was her phone and she was in dominion and control” of it. He 

explained, “My understanding was it was on her person at the time of the 

4 The signed “Consent to Search Computer Equipment and Electronic 

Data” form was admitted as an exhibit at the suppression hearing, but it is 

not in the appellate record.
8

arrest. As we interacted between the two of us whether I could look into that 

phone, charge it, and the general conversation, I had no question that that 

was her phone and she was the one that could give me permission to look into 

it.” 

Detective Wells looked in the phone “and saw some text messages 

making [him] believe she may be involved in prostitution.” During his initial 

viewing, he “saw a lot of interaction with a contact labeled ‘El,’ back and forth 

that made [him] think that there may be a trafficker involved.” Precious did 

not mention Patterson’s name during the interview or indicate he was “El.”

The next day, Detective Wells downloaded the contents of the ZTE 

phone. Based on his review of the phone’s contents, he concluded someone 

other than Precious (later determined to be Patterson) had possessed the 

phone until April 29 (11 days before the sting), and Precious possessed it 

from that day forward. 

Detective Wells testified in detail about many text messages he saw 

between Precious and “El” and that “some of the content made [him] believe

there was a pimp/prostitute relationship.” He cross-referenced “El’s” phone 

number against police contact records and determined the contact 

corresponded to Patterson. 

Detective Wells acknowledged on cross-examination that Precious 

called him on May 23 (about two weeks after her interview) and said “she 

took the [ZTE] phone from Patterson,” and that “he didn’t give it to her.” She 

also “denied knowing El’s name.” On redirect, however, Detective Wells 

explained that when he confronted Precious during this call with the fact “she 

referred to [Patterson] as ‘El’ and ‘Kirk’ in text messages,” she “kind of 

giggled” and said, “ ‘Ah, shit,’ as if [Detective Wells] caught her in a lie.” 
9

(d) Arguments of Counsel

The prosecutor argued Patterson lacked standing to challenge the 

phone search because he “no longer ha[d] a privacy interest” in the phone 

since he “essentially gifted” it to Precious to keep track of her. The 

prosecutor also argued the detectives reasonably relied on Precious’s 

apparent authority to consent to the search because she “was in possession of 

the” phone, “she was the primary user of [it] at that time,” and she provided 

oral and written consent. 

Defense counsel maintained Patterson had standing because the 

Supreme Court held in Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373 (Riley) that 

cell phone searches now require a warrant, which the detectives failed to 

obtain despite “easily” having “enough facts at that point to” get one.

Counsel argued the detectives unreasonably relied on Precious’s consent 

because she “never said that she owned the phone,” and the detectives “didn’t 

ask detailed questions” regarding ownership. Counsel also argued Precious’s 

consent was “not voluntary” because she was “a minor [B]lack female” being 

interviewed by “two older white detectives” in a police station “interrogation 

room.” 

(e) Ruling

The court denied Patterson’s suppression motion with a detailed 

explanation. First, the court found there was probable cause to arrest 

Precious and, thus, the police “lawfully came into possession of [the ZTE] 

phone.” 

Second, although the court’s “sense” was that Patterson “d[id]n’t have 

standing” to challenge the search, the court stated it would “assume that he 

does for purposes of this analysis.” 
10

Third, the court addressed two aspects of consent—whether it was (1) 

“free and voluntary,” and (2) given “by one who was authorized or who 

reasonably appeared to be authorized to give [it].” 

Regarding voluntariness, the court “d[id]n’t see any indication of the 

[detectives] overreaching and overbearing [Precious’s] free will.” To the 

contrary, she “was totally responsive to their questions . . . in a pimpprotecting way,” and had “no hesitation” objecting to the detectives’ theory 

that she was working for a pimp. 

Regarding apparent authority, the court found that Precious’s denial of 

working with a pimp “was a pretty compelling argument that this was her 

cell phone.” The court acknowledged the detectives “might speculate that it’s 

a pimp who gave this phone to her, but it sure comes across as her phone, 

and she’s denying to them that there was such a third person.” (Italics 

added.) The court asked rhetorically, “What would any of us think? We’d 

think that this was her cell phone.” The court thus concluded Precious “ha[d] 

a sufficient possessory interest [in the phone], and . . . it [was] reasonable for 

the officers to believe that she had authority to give consent.” 

Accordingly, the court denied Patterson’s suppression motion and held 

him to answer on all charges. 

3. Post-Ruling Proceedings

A few months after the suppression/preliminary hearing, Patterson 

substituted new counsel. It is undisputed that although his new counsel filed 

additional suppression motions, none of them relitigated the search of the 

ZTE phone that Patterson challenges here.

B. Legal Principles

A defendant whose suppression motion is denied at a preliminary 

hearing ordinarily must renew the motion before the trial court to preserve 
11

the challenge for appellate review. (People v. Lilienthal (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, 

896); People v. Hart (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 479, 485 (Hart); People v. Hoffman

(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1, 3; People v. Witcraft (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 659, 666

(Witcraft).) 

However, if the defendant claims the failure to renew the suppression 

motion was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellate court 

must review the merits of the suppression motion to determine whether 

counsel performed deficiently and, if so, whether that deficient performance 

prejudiced the defendant. (Hart, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 486; see People 

v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463, 488 (Caro); People v. Sepulveda (2020) 47 

Cal.App.5th 291, 301 [“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel [under 

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668], a defendant must show that 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 

under prevailing professional norms, and counsel’s deficient performance was 

prejudicial, that is, there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

failings, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant.”].) 

If the suppression issue has merit, “failing to preserve the issue 

constitute[s] deficient performance when measured against the standard of a 

reasonably competent attorney.” (Hart, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 486-487; 

see Witcraft, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 666.)

If, on the other hand, the suppression issue lacks merit, counsel did not 

render ineffective assistance by failing to preserve it because “[a] decision not 

to pursue futile or frivolous motions does not make an attorney ineffective.” 

(People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 126; see Caro, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 488 

[same].)
12

C. Analysis

Assuming without deciding that Patterson has standing to challenge 

the warrantless search of the ZTE phone, we conclude his challenge lacks 

merit, and thus his trial counsel was not ineffective.

Warrantless searches “ ‘ “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.” ’ ” (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041.) 

“[An] established exception . . . is when consent is given by one authorized to 

give it.” (People v. Superior Court (Chapman) (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 

1011, italics added; see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 219.) 

Additionally, consent must be voluntary to be valid. (People v. Boyer (2006) 

38 Cal.4th 412, 445 (Boyer).) We will address authority and voluntariness in 

turn.

But first, we address Patterson’s intimation that, because the Supreme 

Court recognized in Riley, supra, 573 U.S. 373 that “cell phones . . . implicate 

privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of” other types of 

property (id. at p. 393), the consent exception to the warrant requirement no 

longer applies to cell phones. We disagree. Riley held only that the search 

incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones; it did not hold that 

other well-established exceptions no longer apply. (Id. at pp. 401-402 [“even 

though the search incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones, 

other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a 

particular phone”]; see United States v. Gardner (6th Cir. 2018) 887 F.3d 780, 

783-784 [holding that even though “cell phones have become singular 

instruments with singular importance to many people,” the “third-party 

consent exception to the warrant requirement applies to cell phones all the 

same”; thus, minor prostitute’s consent to search cell phone shared with pimp 
13

was valid]; United States v. Truong Son Do (N.D.Okla. 2014) 62 F.Supp.3d 

1236, 1248 [“[c]onsent is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement” 

even after Riley]; Zuegel v. Mountain View Police Department (N.D.Cal. Apr. 

19, 2018, No. 17-cv-03249-BLF) 2018 WL 1876948, at *7, fn. 9 [finding “Riley

inapposite” to search of cell phone based on owner’s consent].)

1. Precious Had Apparent Authority to Consent to the Search

Valid consent to search may be given by (1) the person whose property 

or place is searched, (2) a third party who possesses common authority over 

that property or place, or (3) “a person with apparent authority where the 

officers conducting the search reasonably believe that the person is 

empowered to give that consent.” (People v. Superior Court (Walker) (2006) 

143 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1198-1199 (Walker); see Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 

497 U.S. 177, 188 [the “determination of consent . . . must ‘be judged against 

an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the 

moment . . . “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” ’ that the 

consenting party had authority over the premises?”].) We will address only 

apparent authority because that is the basis on which the trial court denied 

Patterson’s motion.

Courts have applied different review standards to the determination of 

whether an officer’s belief was reasonable. (Compare People v. Douglas

(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 869 [substantial evidence]; with People v. 

Carreon (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 866, 876 [de novo review as “a question of 

law”].) Under any standard, we conclude it was reasonable for Detectives 

Dierdorff and Wells to believe Precious had the authority to consent to a 

search of the ZTE phone.

When the detectives began interviewing Precious, they were aware she 

had the ZTE phone in her possession when she was taken into custody. 
14

When Detective Wells asked if he “could look in” the phone, Precious’s 

response was not “it’s not mine,” it was words to the effect of “yes, but it’s not 

charged.” It appears from the record that she was aware the detectives found 

a charging cable and were charging the phone while they continued to 

interview her. The detectives then obtained Precious’s oral and written 

consent before actually searching the phone. Both detectives testified they 

believed the phone belonged to Precious. 

Patterson suggests that based on the detectives’ experience 

investigating human trafficking, observation of Precious’s tattoos, and 

understanding that minors cannot enter into contracts for cell phones, they 

should have inferred she was working for a pimp, and further inferred the cell

phone belonged to that pimp. We find this ultimate inference too speculative. 

Precious repeatedly denied she worked for a pimp, she maintained her 

tattoos were tributes to her mother and grandfather, and the detectives had 

not yet seen the text messages that suggested a pimp/prostitute relationship. 

Additionally, the trial court correctly observed that the legal question of 

whether a minor can contract for a cell phone does not alter the practical 

reality that many teenagers possess and control cell phones. (See, e.g., 

United States v. Matlock (1974) 415 U.S. 164, 171, fn. 7 [explaining, in the 

related context of obtaining consent from a third party with “common 

authority” over the property to be searched, that authority to consent is not 

derived from “the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal 

refinements”].)

Patterson also argues the detectives “conveniently glossed over”

Precious’s statement during the interview “that the phone wasn’t hers.” The 

record is not so clear on this point. Although Detective Dierdorff initially 

testified on cross-examination that Precious made such a statement, he 
15

clarified on redirect that he was not certain she made the statement during 

the interview or which phone she was referring to. He also clarified that 

Precious’s statement was directed to Detective Wells, who was in charge of 

the cell phone aspect of the investigation. 

For his part, Detective Wells testified he did not recall Precious making 

such a statement during the interview, but he recalled her making such a 

claim a few weeks later. He also explained that he caught Precious in a lie 

during this phone conversation.

This cold record does not support Patterson’s assertion that Precious 

unequivocally stated during the interview that the cell phone was not hers. 

Rather, the record as a whole suggests she was silent on the issue during the 

interview, such that it was reasonable for the detectives to conclude from her 

other statements and conduct that she had apparent authority to consent to 

the search. 

2. Precious’s Consent Was Voluntary

“The voluntariness of consent is a question of fact to be determined 

from the totality of circumstances. [Citations.] If the validity of a consent is 

challenged, the prosecution must prove it was freely and voluntarily given—

i.e., ‘that it was [not] coerced by threats or force, or granted only in 

submission to a claim of lawful authority.’ ” (Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at 

pp. 445-446; see People v. Harris (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671, 689-690.) 

Voluntariness “ ‘is to be determined in the first instance by the trier of fact; 

and in that stage of the process, “[t]he power to judge credibility of witnesses, 

resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences, is 

vested in the trial court. On appeal all presumptions favor proper exercise of 

that power, and the trial court’s findings—whether express or implied—must 

be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Monterroso
16

(2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 758 (Monterroso); see People v. Balov (2018) 23 

Cal.App.5th 696, 701.) We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial 

court’s factual finding that Precious’s consent was voluntary.

The detectives advised Precious of her Miranda rights before 

questioning her, which “tend[s] to show that” her subsequent “consent was 

voluntary.” (People v. Sloss (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 74, 84 (Sloss); see People v. 

Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 686 (Ratliff) [“the failure to give Miranda

warnings does not render a consent to search involuntary”].) 

Detective Wells also expressly requested Precious’s consent. “[S]uch a 

request, by its nature, carries the implication that permission may be 

withheld.” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 704; see People v. 

James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 116.) The fact Detective Wells told Precious he 

would seek a search warrant if she refused to consent does not render her 

consent involuntary. (Ratliff, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 687 [“The trial court 

was . . . entitled to conclude that” officers’ “threat[ ] to secure a search

warrant . . . unless defendant consented to a search” was “merely . . . a 

declaration of the officers’ legal remedies should defendant refuse to 

cooperate”].)

Additionally, as the trial court observed, the detectives’ preliminary 

hearing testimony showed Precious “was totally responsive to their 

questions . . . in a pimp-protecting way,” and had “no hesitation” objecting to 

the detectives’ theory that she was working with a pimp. This supports the 

trial court’s findings that the detectives were not “overreaching” or 

“overbearing [Precious’s] free will,” and that her consent was free and 

voluntary. 

None of Patterson’s contentions to the contrary are persuasive. For 

example, although Precious told the detectives she was on methamphetamine 
17

and had been up for 32 hours, Detective Dierdorff testified that, based on his 

training and experience, he did “not believe she was under the influence at 

the time [he] spoke with her.” The trial court was entitled to credit this 

testimony. (Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 758.) And, in any event, “the 

mere fact that one has taken drugs, or is intoxicated, . . . does not render 

consent involuntary.” (United States v. Rambo (8th Cir. 1986) 789 F.2d 1289, 

1297; see United States v. George (9th Cir. 1993) 987 F.2d 1428, 1430-1431 

[consent was voluntary even when the defendant was recovering in the 

hospital from a drug overdose].)

Patterson also cites the fact that Precious was a young, Black female

being questioned alone at a police station by two adult, White, male 

detectives. While potentially relevant, none of these factors compelled the 

trial court to find her consent involuntary. (See, e.g., People v. Hoxter (1999) 

75 Cal.App.4th 406, 413-414 [finding that police officers’ “belief that [a 16-

year-old] had apparent authority to provide them consent to enter her home 

was made in good faith and was eminently reasonable under the 

circumstances”]; Sloss, supra, 34 Cal.App.3d at p. 84 [“The fact that a 

number of officers were present does not render the consent involuntary if 

they engaged in no threatening or coercive conduct.”]; United States v.

Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 558 [“It is additionally suggested that the 

[defendant, a 22-year-old Black female who never completed high school], 

may have felt unusually threatened by the officers, who were [W]hite males. 

While these factors were not irrelevant [to determining the voluntariness of 

her consent], [citation], neither were they decisive”].)
18

D. Conclusion

In sum, because we conclude that the trial court properly denied 

Patterson’s suppression motion, such that it would have been futile for his 

trial counsel to have renewed it, the failure to renew the motion did not 

constitute ineffective assistance.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

O'ROURKE, J.