alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 51.6 Notice of preliminary fee calculation. ( a ) *Content of notice.* For each sales year, the IRS will make a preliminary calculation of the fee for each covered entity as described in § 51.5. The IRS will notify each covered entity of its preliminary fee calculation for that sales year. The notification to a covered entity of its preliminary fee calculation will include— ( 1 ) The covered entity's allocated fee;
( 2 ) The covered entity's branded prescription drug sales, by NDC, by Program;
( 3 ) The covered entity's branded prescription drug sales taken into account after application of § 51.5(a)(4);
( 4 ) The aggregate branded prescription drug sales taken into account for all covered entities;
( 5 ) The covered entity's adjustment amount calculated as described in § 51.5(e); and
( 6 ) A reference to the fee dispute resolution procedures set forth in guidance published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.
( b ) *Time of notice.* The IRS will send each covered entity notice of its preliminary fee calculation by the date prescribed in guidance published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.
[T.D. 9684, 79 FR 43644, July 28, 2014]
I

104TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 1169

To amend the Truth in Lending Act to prohibit issuers of credit cards

from limiting the ability of Federal, State, and local government agencies

to impose fees for honoring credit cards, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 8, 1995

Mr. MORAN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee

on Banking and Financial Services

A BILL

To amend the Truth in Lending Act to prohibit issuers

of credit cards from limiting the ability of Federal, State,

and local government agencies to impose fees for honoring credit cards, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. ACCEPTANCE OF CREDIT CARDS BY GOVERN4 MENTAL AGENCIES.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 2 of the Truth in Lend6 ing Act (15 U.S.C. 1631 et seq.) is amended by adding

7 at the end the following:
2

•HR 1169 IH

1 ‘‘§ 138. Acceptance of credit cards by governmental

2 agencies

3 ‘‘(a) PROHIBITION ON LIMITING ABILITY TO IMPOSE

4 FEES.—A card issuer shall not prohibit or otherwise limit

5 the ability of Federal, State, or local governmental agen6 cies to impose on the user of a credit card issued by the

7 card issuer a fee for honoring the credit card.

8 ‘‘(b) LIMITATION ON AMOUNT OF FEES.—A Federal,

9 State, or local governmental agency shall not impose, for

10 the use of a credit card to make a payment to the agency,

11 any fee that is in excess of any amount that the agency

12 is required to pay for that use to the card issuer.

13 ‘‘(c) LIMITATION ON PAYMENTS FOR WHICH FEE

14 MAY BE IMPOSED.—A Federal, State, or local govern15 mental agency shall not impose a fee for the use of a credit

16 card to make a payment to the agency, other than a pay17 ment of—

18 ‘‘(1) a tax;

19 ‘‘(2) a fine or other criminal or civil penalty;

20 ‘‘(3) a motor vehicle or other registration fee;

21 or

22 ‘‘(4) a fee charged for the performance of any

23 other inherently governmental function.’’.
3

•HR 1169 IH

1 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections

2 at the beginning of that chapter is amended by adding

3 at the end the following:

‘‘138. Acceptance of credit cards by governmental agencies.’’.

Æ
#### In the Matter of Jaime Rivera, Appellant, v Brion Travis, as Chair of the New York State Board of Parole, Respondent.

[804 NYS2d 845]

Kane, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McNamara, J.), entered December 28, 2004 in Albany County, which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition/complaint.

Petitioner is presently serving a prison sentence of 15 years to life for murder in the second degree. In November 2003, two months after the Board of Parole denied his third request for release, petitioner sought a ruling from the Board that 9 NYCRR 8001.1, 8001.2 and 8001.3 were repealed by implication as a result of an amendment to Penal Law § 70.00 (3), which eliminated the Board’s authority to establish a prisoner’s minimum period of imprisonment (hereinafter MPI) and gave the sentencing court exclusive authority to do so *(see*L 1980, ch 873). When the Board failed to either make a declaratory ruling or issue a statement declining to do so within 30 days as required by statute *(see*State Administrative Procedure Act § 204 [2] [a]), petitioner properly commenced this combined proceeding/action *(see*State Administrative Procedure Act § 205) seeking a declaration that Executive Law § 259-i (1) (a) *943was repealed by implication as a result of the 1980 amendment and, therefore, the regulations upon which his parole release determinations have been based are null and void since they derive their authority from Executive Law § 259-i. Supreme Court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss based on petitioner’s failure to state a cause of action. Petitioner now appeals.

The Legislature’s 1980 amendment to Penal Law § 70.00 (3) did not explicitly repeal any portion of the Executive Law *(see*L 1980, ch 873; *Matter of Schwimmer v*Hammock, 59 NY2d 636, 638 [1983]). While the amendment terminated the prospective applicability of Executive Law § 259-i (1) and 9 NYCRR 8001.1 and 8001.2, which all set forth the procedures for the Board to follow in setting MPIs, it had no effect on other subdivisions of the statute *(see*Executive Law § 259-i [2] [a], [c] [A]), nor on the guidelines found in 9 NYCRR 8001.3. These valid and effective statutory and regulatory provisions apply to parole release decisions, and the Board is specifically directed to establish and use such regulatory guidelines in making all parole decisions *(see*Executive Law § 259-c [4]). Petitioner’s remaining contentions lack merit.

Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Peters and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
#### § 28.100 Purpose and effective date.

The purpose of these Title IX regulations is to effectuate Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as amended (except sections 904 and 906 of those Amendments) (20 U.S.C. 1681, 1682, 1683, 1685, 1686, 1687, 1688), which is designed to eliminate (with certain exceptions) discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, whether or not such program or activity is offered or sponsored by an educational institution as defined in these Title IX regulations. The effective date of these Title IX regulations shall be September 29, 2000.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-6117 

ROBERT L. IRELAND,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

JAMES PEGUESE, Warden; SHAVELLA WATKINS,

Sergeant; FRANK SIZER, Commissioner; ARC

COORDINATOR; OFFICER WALKER,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.

(1:05-cv-01387-WDQ)

Submitted: October 18, 2007 Decided: October 23, 2007

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert L. Ireland, Appellant Pro Se. Stephanie Judith Lane Weber,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland,

for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Robert L. Ireland appeals the district court’s order

denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Ireland v.

Peguese, No. 1:05-cv-01387-WDQ (D. Md. Dec. 18, 2006). We deny

Ireland’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 20-0167

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL ROBERT STUTZMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including September 8, 2020, within which to prepare, 

file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

July 30 2020

07/30/2020

Case Number: DA 20-0167
Searched for **http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/series/**

 

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*Note:* This calendar view maps the number of captures of **http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/series/**, *not* how many times the site was actually updated.

Look Up URL in general Internet Archive web collection.
§ 14.1 Definitions. For purposes of this regulation, the term: ( a ) *Financial institution* means any office of a bank, savings bank, card issuer as defined in section 103 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1602(n)), industrial loan company, trust company, savings and loan, building and loan, or homestead association (including cooperative bank), credit union, or consumer financial institution, located in any State or territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the Virgin Islands.
( b ) *Financial record* means an original of, a copy of, or information known to have been derived from, any record held by a financial institution pertaining to a customer's relationship with the financial institution.
( c ) *Person* means an individual or a partnership of five or fewer individuals.
( d ) *Customer* means any person or authorized representative of that person who utilized or is utilizing any service of a financial institution, or for whom a financial institution is acting or has acted as a fiduciary, in relation to an account maintained in the person's name.
( e ) *Law enforcement inquiry* means a lawful investigation or official proceeding inquiring into a violation of or failure to comply with any criminal or civil statute or any regulation, rule, or order issued pursuant thereto.
( f ) *Departmental unit* means those offices, divisions, bureaus, or other components of the Department of the treasury authorized to conduct law enforcement inquiries.
( g ) *Act* means the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.
# L_2020153EN.01000401.xml

| 15.5.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 153/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.5.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 153/4

---

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2020/651

of 14 May 2020

amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 17 May 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 (1) concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 17 May 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 (1) concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States.

| (2) | Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 applies until 18 May 2020. On the basis of a review of that Decision, the restrictive measures set out therein should be extended until 18 May 2021. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 applies until 18 May 2020. On the basis of a review of that Decision, the restrictive measures set out therein should be extended until 18 May 2021.

| (3) | Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 should therefore be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 should therefore be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Article 10 of Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 10

This Decision shall apply until 18 May 2021 and shall be kept under constant review. It shall be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.’.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 14 May 2020.

For the Council

The President

G. GRLIĆ RADMAN

---

(1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (OJ L 129I, 17.5.2019, p. 13).

1

---
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Commercial Mortgage  Servicing**D1050-084, 8th Fl  401 South Tryon Street  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334 |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

 

 

Reference is hereby made tothat certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of December 1, 2016, byand among CREDIT SUISSE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP., as Depositor,WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Master Servicer, TORCHLIGHT LOANSERVICES, LLC, as Special Servicer, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, asCertificate Administrator, WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trusteeand PARK BRIDGE LENDER SERVICES LLC, as Operating Advisor and AssetRepresentations Reviewer with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-ThroughCertificates, Series 2016-NXSR (the "Agreement"). Capitalized termsused herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in theAgreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 11.09 ofthis Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of CommercialMortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1.  A review of theactivities of the Master Servicer during the period from December 1, 2016through December 31, 2016 (the “Reporting Period”), and of itsperformance per the Agreement during such period has been made under mysupervision, and 

 

2.  To the best ofmy knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer, has fulfilled all ofits obligations under this Agreement in all material respects throughout the ReportingPeriod.

 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, theundersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28th day of February 2017.

                                                                                               

 

/s/ Daniel Bober

Daniel Bober

Executive Vice President                       

Wells Fargo Bank 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll  go far |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
#### § 1026.312 Identification required.

Refer to § 1010.312 of this chapter for identification requirements for reports of transactions in currency filed by futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities.

[76 FR 10521, Feb. 25, 2011]
#### In the Matter of Rebecca S. Anstey, Respondent, v Charles A. Palmatier, Appellant.

[803 NYS2d 767]

Crew III, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Broome County (Ray, J.), entered July 1, 2004, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 8, for an order of protection.

Petitioner, who is married to respondent’s stepson, commenced this family offense proceeding against respondent alleging that he engaged in harassing behavior toward her. Family Court initially issued a temporary order of protection. Following a fact-finding and dispositional hearing, Family Court found that a family offense had been committed and issued a two-year order of protection. Respondent now appeals.

Initially, respondent contends that Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, the petition must be dismissed. While this contention was not raised in Family Court, inasmuch as it implicates Family Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it is not waivable and we therefore will consider it *(see Matter of Hassig v Nicandri, 2*AD3d 1118, 1119 [2003], *lv denied 2*NY3d 701 [2004]).

Here, respondent is alleged to have harassed his stepson’s spouse, and the issue distills to whether petitioner and respondent, who do not share the same living quarters, may be considered “members of the same family or household” (Family Ct Act § 812 [1]), which includes, insofar as is relevant here, “persons related by consanguinity or affinity” (Family Ct Act § 812 [1] [a]). A relationship by affinity is based upon marriage and has to do with the relationship one spouse has to the blood or adopted relatives of the other spouse *(see Randolph v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,*242 AD2d 889, 890 [1997]; *see e.g. Wilmore v State,*268 Ga App 646, 602 SE2d 343 [2004]; *People v Armstrong,*212 Mich App 121, 536 NW2d 789 [1995]; *Duke v State,*257 Ala 339, 58 So 2d 764 *[1952]; Zimmerer v Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,*150 Neb 351, 34 NW2d 750 [1948]; *Clawson v Ellis,*286 Ill 81, 121 NE 242 [1918]; *Simcoke v Grand*
      *781
      *Lodge of A.O.U.W. of Iowa,*84 Iowa 383, 151 NW 8 [1892]; Black’s Law Dictionary 63, 1315 [8th ed 2004]). Here, petitioner is not a blood relative of respondent’s wife and, therefore, is not related to respondent by affinity. Consequently, Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the application for a protective order and the petition must be dismissed. In light of this conclusion, we need not address the remaining arguments raised by respondent.

Mercure, J.P., Peters, Carpinello and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Shell Appalachia April 6, 2011 1



# Well Construction Practices in the Marcellus EPA: Technical Workshops for the Hydraulic Fracturing Study Well Construction & Operations  March 10-11, 2011 Cody Teff C&WI Team Leader - AppalachiaShell- Appalachia 

# Agenda – Well Construction and Fresh Water

April 6, 2011 2 

##  

# Marcellus  

# Identifying Sources  

# Protecting Sources  

## Hazard Avoidance  

## Zonal IsolationShell- Appalachia 

# Marcellus Resource

3Shell- Appalachia 

# Water Salinity / Resistivity RelationshipShell- Appalachia 

# EvaluationShell- Appalachia 

# Depth Structure Map – “Fresh Water”Shell- Appalachia 

# Formation TargetingShell- Appalachia 

## • Casing Design • Cement Slurry Design 

# Horizontal Wellbore Construction

Surface Casing Conductor Intermediate
Production 4,000’
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter A of Chapter II

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to subchapter A appear at 78 FR 60697, Oct. 2, 2013.

#### § 208.5 Accounts for disbursement of Federal payments.

Treasury may designate a Financial Agent to establish and administer Treasury-sponsored accounts for individuals for the disbursement of Federal payments, including benefit, retirement, salary, miscellaneous, vendor, expense reimbursement and tax payments. Such accounts may be established upon terms and conditions that the Secretary considers appropriate or necessary and shall be made available at a reasonable cost and with the same consumer protections provided to other account holders at the financial institution. Treasury may deliver payments to such accounts and the maintenance of accounts and the provision of account-related services under this section shall constitute reasonable duties of a Financial Agent of the United States.
C HIEF J USTICE

C AROLYN W RIGHT

J USTICES

D AVID L. B RIDGES

M OLLY F RANCIS

D OUGLAS S. L ANG

E LIZABETH L ANG

- M IERS

R OBERT M. F ILLMORE

L

ANA M YERS

D AVID E VANS

D AVID L EWIS

A DA B ROW N

C RAIG S TODDART

B ILL W HITEHILL

D AVID J. S CHENCK 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

600 C OMMERCE S TREET

, S UITE 200

D ALLAS

, T EXAS 75202

(214) 712

- 3400 L ISA M ATZ

CLERK OF THE COURT

(214) 712

- 3450

lisa.matz@ 5th.txcourts.gov

G AYLE H UMPA

BUSINESS ADMINISTRAT OR

(214) 712

- 3434

gayle.humpa@ 5th.txcourts.gov

F ACSIMILE

(214) 745

- 1083

I NTERNET

HTTP :// 5 TH

. TXCOURTS

. GOV



## August 27, 2015

Katherine Drew

Dallas County Public Defender’s Office

133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB

- 2

Dallas, TX 75207 Lori Ordiway

Dallas County District Attorney’s Office

133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB

- 19

Dallas, TX 75207

RE: 05

- 15

- 01022

- CR

Lauro Arizpe v. The State of Texas

Counsel:

After reviewing the documents before it, the Court questions its jurisdiction over the appeal.

Specifically, the notice of appeal reflects that sentence was imposed on July 8, 2015. No motion for new trial

was filed; therefore, appellant’s notice of appe al was due by August 7, 2015. See T EX



## . R. A PP



## . P . 26.2(a)(1).

Appellant’s notice of appeal is file

- stamped August 17, 2015, ten days late. The Court cannot determine from

the envelope in which it appears the pro se notice of appeal was delivered to the trial court whether it was

mailed and, if so, the date of mailing. Moreover, although the notice of appeal was filed within the fifteen

- day

period provided by rule 26.3, no extension motion was filed in this Court within that same fifteen

- day period.

See id . 26.3(a), (b). Therefore, it appears we have no jurisdiction over the appeal.

So that the Court may determine the threshold issue of jurisdiction, appellant is directed to file a letter

brief regarding the jurisdictional question by September 8, 201 5 . The State is directed to file any response by

September 18, 2015 . Any party relying on information not in the record before this Court must obtain a

supplemental record containing that information.

After it has reviewed the jurisdictional briefs, the Court will either dismiss the appeal for want of

jurisdiction or notify the parties by letter that the Court has jurisdiction over the appeal and of any pending

deadlines.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lisa Matz, Clerk of the Court

ltr:mrh
| (logo) WELLS FARGO | **Commercial Mortgage  Servicing**D1050-084, 8th Fl  401 South Tryon Street.  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334 |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

 

Reference is hereby made tothat certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of November 1, 2016, byand among Morgan Stanley Capital I Inc., as Depositor, Wells Fargo Bank,National Association, as Master Servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC, as SpecialServicer, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Certificate Administrator,Wilmington Trust, National Association, as Trustee and Park Bridge LenderServices LLC, as Operating Advisor and as Asset Representations Reviewer withrespect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series, 2016-BNK2 (the"Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise definedshall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 11.09 ofthe Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of Commercial MortgageServices do hereby certify that:

 

1.            A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period fromNovember 1, 2016 through December 31, 2016 (the “ReportingPeriod”), and of its performance per the Agreement during such period hasbeen made under my supervision, and 

 

2.            To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer, hasfulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respectsthroughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, theundersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 28th day of February 2017.

 

 

/s/ Daniel Bober

Daniel Bober

Executive Vice President

Wells Fargo Bank

 

 

| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll go far |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|